

TRATR

1-taxonomy

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standard taxonomy

Chalmers, 2006

irrealism

No properties
at all

Properties exist,
but not “colour”
properties

Properties exist,
colour
properties exist:
But **nothing in
the world
exemplifies any
colour property**

realism

mentalism

colours are mental items
(sense-data)

externalism

colours are exemplified by physical items
colours are exemplified by mental items
(insofar as they are physical)

physicalism

type-identity:


being in pain == C-fiber firing;
all token instances of being in
pain are an instance of the
same physical type.

**(a colour is a particular
wavelength reflectance)**

**(does anyone actually
subscribe to type-
physicalism in colour
phenomenology...?)**

token-identity:

every single token of being in pain is an
instance of **some** physical type,
but there is not one singular physical
type which can encompass all tokens of
being in pain (ex C-fiber, delta fiber)
**(all token instances of a colour cannot
be accounted for by any one physical
type, but every token instance of ‘red’
is a member of some physical type)**
most suggest red = a class of spectral
reflectance functions; such that
metamers (distinct spectral reflectance
distributions) can still count as the same
colour



under standard taxonomy:

- * dispositions are considered genuine
properties that actual objects genuinely
exemplify
- * real, physical, external things exemplify
those dispositions to affect perceivers

dispositionalism

colours are dispositions to affect perceivers:
specify: [perceivers, circumstances, effects]
unlike physicalism, includes perceivers

canonical dispositionalism

red = disposition to “cause red
sensations” (to ‘look red’) to *normal*
observers in *normal* circumstance

* *compatible with token-physicalism*
(every token of a colour is a member
of some physical type— a physical
type gives rise to a disposition to
produce token effects on perceivers)

primitivism

colours are genuine
properties exemplified by
external objects, but are
primitive (sui generis); a
unique primary class of their
own
ie cannot be reduced.

argue “mere correlation”
between colours and
physical/ functional types or
dispositions

problems w standard taxonomy

1. Orthogonalize the **realism-irrealism** axis: Irrealism should be considered compatible with physicalism, dispositionalism, primitivism —> i.e., just claim that colours are “unexemplified” by actual objects (ex E-primitivism vs. R-primitivism)... *what colours ARE is independent of whether or not they exist*
2. Orthogonalized the **mentalism-externalism** axis: mentalism should be considered compatible with physicalism, dispositionalism, primitivism —> i.e., just claim they are physical/ dispositional/ primitive properties of mental entities... what colour properties ARE (dispositional, primitive, etc.) is independent of whether the properties are exemplified by mental or physical objects

problems w standard taxonomy

- 3. Physicalism and the physical** — If colours are physical properties, you need to substantively characterize those physical things... and if you do that characterization *well enough*, you'd find that dispositionalists and primitivists could also claim colours are physical properties.
- Example 1: type-identity dispositions: to exemplify a disposition in an external object, you'd ordinarily use a 'type' defined by some physical basis
 - disposition "fragility" points to irregular atomic structure
 - same might apply to functional relations
 - Example 2: physicalism and primitivism are compatible; ex, mass, quark flavour, charge are all primitive physical properties; colour could be both physical and primitive

4. The need for relationalism (includes but is not limited to dispositionalism)

enlarged view of space of options

relationalism

Colours defined by relation between objects and subjects


- Pre-theoretical understanding using traditional examples; though subject to change as we learn more about the world (ie note 11)
- “being a sister,” “being 50 m left of a philosopher”
- “being cubical.” “having 50 kg in mass”

A non-relational property of x is a property x has or lacks regardless of relations x bears to non-x things

- Not quite the same as intrinsic/ non-intrinsic; though all intrinsic things are non-relational

Limit relations to **subjects**

- Ex, relation of objects + light would not really be useful in a “relationist” stance
- Distinct from relativism (colours exist only for certain subjects in certain circumstances)



?

Intrinsic vs. non-relational — all intrinsic things are non-relational, but non-relational things are not all intrinsic?

Why does the distinction between relational and non-relational have to be pre-theoretical? Isn't there a satisfactory definition that could be made?

Is a **mentalist, physicalist (identity)** account possible?
What would a mentalist x type or token-identity account look like... and why would it not just collapse back into externalism?