

Unit 5: Key Exchange

Diffie-Hellman

Diffie-Hellman Weaknesses


Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)

Passing Key Using Public Key

Key Distribution Centre (KDC)

Prof Bill Buchanan OBE

<https://asecuritysite.com/keyexchange>



No	Date	Subject	Lab
2	27 Jan 2025	Ciphers and Fundamentals [Unit]	[Lab] [Demo]
3	3 Feb 2025	Symmetric Key [Unit]	[Lab] Vincent Rijmen
4	10 Feb 2025	Hashing and MAC [Unit]	[Lab] Ivan Damgård
5	17 Feb 2025	Asymmetric (Public) Key [Unit]	[Lab] Len Adleman
6	24 Feb 2025	Key Exchange [Unit]	[Lab] Whitfield Diffie
7	3 Mar 2025	Reading Week (Revision lecture)	Mini-project [Here] / Coursework
8	10 Mar 2025	Digital Signatures and Certificates [Unit]	[Lab]
9	17 Mar 2025	Test (Units 1-5) 40% of overall mark [Here]	
10	24 Mar 2025	Tunnelling [Unit]	[Lab] Marty Hellman
11	31 Mar 2025	Blockchain [Unit]	[Lab] Troy Hunt
12	7 Apr 2025	Future Cryptography [Unit]	[Lab]
13	28 Apr 2025	Host/Cloud Security [Unit]	[Lab]
14	5 May 2025	Coursework Hand-in - 60% of overall mark (Sunday, 11 May 2025) [Coursework]	Daniel J Bernstein

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Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)


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
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Unit 5: Key Exchange

644

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY, VOL. IT-22, NO. 6, NOVEMBER 1976

New Directions in Cryptography

Invited Paper

WHITFIELD DIFFIE AND MARTIN E. HELLMAN, MEMBER, IEEE

Abstract—Two kinds of contemporary developments in cryptography are examined. Widening applications of teleprocessing have given rise to a need for new types of cryptographic systems, which minimize the need for secure key distribution channels and supply the equivalent of a written signature. This paper suggests ways to solve these currently open problems. It also discusses how the theories of communication and computation are beginning to provide the tools to solve cryptographic problems of long standing.


I. INTRODUCTION

WE STAND TODAY on the brink of a revolution in cryptography. The development of cheap digital hardware has freed it from the design limitations of mechanical computing and brought the cost of high grade


The best known cryptographic problem is that of privacy: preventing the unauthorized extraction of information from communications over an insecure channel. In order to use cryptography to insure privacy, however, it is currently necessary for the communicating parties to share a key which is known to no one else. This is done by sending the key in advance over some secure channel such as private courier or registered mail. A private conversation between two people with no prior acquaintance is a common occurrence in business, however, and it is unrealistic to expect initial business contacts to be postponed long enough for keys to be transmitted by some physical means. The cost and delay imposed by this key distribution problem is a major barrier to the transfer of business communications to large teleprocessing networks.

Section III proposes two approaches to transmitting

Overview



Crypto Wars



Crypto Wars

Technology

Malcolm Turnbull says laws of Australia trump laws of mathematics as tech giants told to hand over encrypted messages

15

share



Australian PM Malcolm Turnbull CREDIT: AAP


key



Key pair

Private key

Shared key



Key pair

Private key

Shared key

Trent

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COMODO

Let's Encrypt

Crypto Wars

Technology

Malcolm Turnbull says laws of Australia trump laws of mathematics as tech giants told to hand over encrypted messages

share    




Australian PM Malcolm Turnbull CREDIT: AAP

Key pair 

“The laws of mathematics are very commendable, but the only law that applies in Australia is the law of Australia”

Malcolm Turnbull

Private key 

Shared key 

Trent 

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Crypto Wars

Amber Rudd claims “real people” don’t care about end-to-end encryption

But Silicon Valley hobbles Amber Rudd’s crypto “trade-off” call to fight terrorists.


KELLY FIVEASH - 1/8/2017, 11:36



Stefan Rousseau - WPA Pool/Getty Images

Key Shared key

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Crypto Wars

D'oh! Amber Rudd meant 'understand hashing', not 'hashtags'

Home Sec sends out junior minister to clarify gaffe

By Kat Hall 3 Apr 2017 at 13:34

101 SHARE ▾



Stefan Rousseau - WPA Pool / Getty Images

It was the cringiest moment in an already gaffe-prone interview on *The Andrew Marr Show* last week.

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is the



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Key  Shared key 

Crypto Wars

Amber Rudd knows nothing about encryption, says Amber Rudd



Nobody expects Rudd to have a PhD in cryptography but she does need to understand how backdooring encryption would disadvantage perfectly legitimate businesses and potentially cost them dearly.

Speaking at the Conservative Party conference earlier this week the UK home secretary, Amber Rudd, stated that she didn't need to "understand how encryption works to understand how it's helping the criminals." She does, however, need to understand how backdooring encryption would disadvantage perfectly legitimate businesses and potentially cost them dearly.



With such things as the EU General Data Protection Regulation coming into play in May next year, and the UK Data Protection Bill already progressing through Parliament, encryption is a topic that will not be going away. It's vital that businesses not only know under what circumstances encryption should be implemented, but also understand the how such encryption gels with the regulatory compliance process. That Rudd is, in effect, muddying the waters with demands for technical solutions to enable encryption to be broken on demand is unhelpful to say the least.



Amber Rudd - doesn't need to "understand how encryption works to understand how it's helping the criminals."

Trent



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Amber Rudd - doesn't need to "understand how encryption works to understand how it's helping the criminals."

Virgin 3G 18:07 60% Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data www-wsj.com.cdn.ampproject.org THE WALL STREET JOURNAL. TECH Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data Interim chief should have asked his staff 'the day he took over,' analyst says Paulino do Rego Barros Jr., took over as interim CEO of Equifax in late September. PHOTO: TOM TAYLOR/ASSOCIATED PRESS Share < >

Crypto Wars

 BBC Radio 4 Today 
@BBCr4today

'I can't confirm that the data has been encrypted' - Dido Harding, chief executive of #TalkTalk on cyber attack.

9:00 AM - 23 Oct 2015

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Encryption, says Amb

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18:07 60% 

Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data www-wsj.com.cdn.ampproject.org

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.

TECH

Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data

Interim chief should have asked his staff 'the day he took over,' analyst says



Paulino do Rego Barros Jr., took over as interim CEO of Equifax in late September. PHOTO: TOM

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Key Shared key

Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are En...
www-wsj.com.cdn.ampproject.org

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.

The Investigatory Powers Bill.

Yes, it's actually worse than it sounds.

- Web browsing history available without warrant
- Mandatory removal of encryption
- Bulk collection of communications data



ProtonMail

Paulino do Rego Barros Jr., took over as interim CEO of Equifax in late September. PHOTO: TOM

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Share



Advanced Data Protection

iCloud encrypts your data to keep it secure. Advanced Data Protection uses end-to-end encryption to ensure that the iCloud data types listed here can only be decrypted on your trusted devices, protecting your information even in the case of a data breach in the cloud.

[See how your data is managed...](#)

Because Apple will not have the keys required to recover your data, using Advanced Data Protection requires setting up an alternative recovery method in case you ever lose access to your account.

Device Backup

Messages Backup

iCloud Drive

Notes

Photos

Reminders


Safari Bookmarks


Siri Shortcuts


Voice Memos

Wallet Passes

[Turn On Advanced Data Protection](#)








Test Scenario and Properties	Application					
	Signal	WhatsApp	Wire	Viber	Riot	Telegram
Setup and Registration						
Phone Registration	●	●	●	●	○	●
E-mail Registration	○	○	●	○	●	○
Access SMS Inbox	●	●	○	●	○	●
Contact list Upload	●	●	●	●	●	●
Verification by SMS	●	●	●	●	○	●
Verification by Phone Call	●	●	●	●	○	●
Initial Contact						
Trust-On-First-Use	●	●	○	○	○	○
Notification About E2E Encryption	○	●	○	○	●	●
Message After a Key Change						
Notification about key changes	●	●	○	○	●	○
Blocking message	●	○	○	○	○	○
Key Change While a Message Is In Transit						
Re-encrypt and Send Message	○	●	○	○	○	○
Details About Transmission of Message	●	●	●	○	●	●
Verification Process						
QR-Code	●	●	○	○	○	●
Verify By Phone Call	●	●	●	●	●	○
Share Keys Through 3rd Party	●	●	○	○	○	○
Verified Check	○	○	●	●	●	○
Other Security Implementations						
Two-Step Verification	○	●	○	○	○	●
Passphrase/Code	●	○	○	○	○	●
Screen Security	●	○	○	○	○	●
Clear Trusted Contacts	○	○	○	●	○	○
Delete Devices From Account	○	○	●	●	●	●

●: Has the property; ○: Does not have the property.



“ Use anything by Open Whisper Systems.
Edward Snowden, Whistleblower and privacy advocate




“ Signal is the most scalable encryption tool we have. It is free and peer reviewed. I encourage people to use it everyday.
Laura Poitras, Oscar-winning filmmaker and journalist



“ I am regularly impressed with the thought and care put into both the security and the usability of this app. It's my first choice for an encrypted conversation.
Bruce Schneier, internationally renowned security technologist


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Setup
Phone
E-mail
Access
Conta
Verific
Verific
Initial
Trust-
Notifi

Messag
Notifi
Block

Key C
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Detail



Verification Process

QR-Code	●	●	○	○	○	●
Verify By Phone Call	●	●	●	●	●	○
Share Keys Through 3rd Party	●	●	○	○	○	○
Verified Check	○	○	●	●	●	○

Other Security Implementations

Two-Step Verification	○	●	○	○	○	●
Passphrase/Code	●	○	○	○	○	●
Screen Security	●	○	○	○	○	●
Clear Trusted Contacts	○	○	○	●	○	○
Delete Devices From Account	○	○	●	●	●	●

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Unit 5: Key Exchange

Diffie-Hellman

Diffie-Hellman Weaknesses


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Key Distribution Centre (KDC)


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
Private key

Private key uses the same key for encryption and decryption ... how does Bob send the key to Alice?



Diffie-Hellman


One of the most widely used methods for creating a secret key which is the same for Bob and Alice




Key Exchange

- **Forward secrecy (FS)**, which means that a comprise of the long-term keys will not compromise any previous session keys. A leakage of the public key of the server would cause all the sessions which used this specific public key to be compromised. FS thus aims to overcome this by making sure that all the sessions keys could not be compromised, even though the long-term key was compromised.
- **Ephemeral**. With some key exchange methods the same key will be generated if the same parameters are used on either side. This can cause problems as an intruder could guess the key, or even where the key was static and never changed. With ephemeral methods, a different key is used for each connection, and, again, the leakage of any long-term would not cause all the associated session keys to be breached.

Key Exchange




Key Exchange



Example

Key Exchange (using HKDF)



Example

Diffie-Hellman Generator

$$Y = G^x \bmod p$$

p	11								
Generator	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
x	$g^x \bmod p$								
2	4	9	5	3	3	5	9	4	
3	8	5	9	4	7	2	6	3	
4	5	4	3	9	9	3	4	5	
5	10	1	1	1	10	10	10	1	
6	9	3	4	5	5	4	3	9	
7	7	9	5	3	8	6	2	4	
8	3	5	9	4	4	9	5	3	
9	6	4	3	9	2	8	7	5	
10	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	

Picking G

Diffie-Hellman Generation

```
C:\> openssl dhparam -text -out dhparams.pem 768
```

```
C:\> type dhparams.pem
```

Diffie-Hellman-Parameters: (768 bit)

prime:

```
00:d0:37:c2:95:64:02:ea:12:2b:51:50:a2:84:6c:  
71:6a:3e:2c:a9:80:e2:65:b2:a5:ee:77:26:22:31:  
66:9e:fc:c8:09:94:e8:9d:f4:cd:bf:d2:37:b2:fb:  
b8:38:2c:87:28:38:dc:95:24:73:06:d3:d9:1f:af:  
78:01:10:6a:7e:56:4e:7b:ee:b4:8d:6b:4d:b5:9b:  
93:c6:f1:74:60:01:0d:96:7e:85:ca:b8:1f:f7:bc:  
43:b7:40:4d:4e:87:e3
```

generator: 2 (0x2)

-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----

```
MGYCYQDQN8KVZALqEitRUKKEbHFqPiypgOJlsqXudyYiMWae/  
MgJlOid9M2/0jey  
+7g4LicoONyVJHMG09kfr3gBEGp+Vk577rSNa021m5PG8XRgAQ2WfoXKu  
B/3vEO3  
QE1Oh+MCAQI=  
-----END DH PARAMETERS-----
```

- **DH Group 5:**
1,536 bit prime.
- **DH Group 2:**
1,024 bit prime.
- **DH Group 1:**
768-bit prime.

Unit 5: Key Exchange

Diffie-Hellman

Diffie-Hellman Weaknesses


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
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
Diffie-Hellman Weaknesses

- In 2015, a paper entitled *Imperfect Forward Secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman Fails in Practice* – showed that it was fairly easy to precompute on values for two popular Diffie-Hellman parameters (and which use the DHE_EXPORT cipher set).
- The research team found that one was used as a default in the around 7% of the Top 1 million web sites and was hard coded into the Apache httpd service. Overall, at the time, it was found that over 3% of Web sites were still using the default.
- Diffie-Hellman-Parameters: (512 bit)
- prime:
- 00:9f:db:8b:8a:00:45:44:f0:04:5f:17:37:d0:ba:
- 2e:0b:27:4c:df:1a:9f:58:82:18:fb:43:53:16:a1:
- 6e:37:41:71:fd:19:d8:d8:f3:7c:39:bf:86:3f:d6:
- 0e:3e:30:06:80:a3:03:0c:6e:4c:37:57:d0:8f:70:
- e6:aa:87:10:33
- generator: 2 (0x2)


Eve-in-the-middle



Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman with RSA (DHE-RSA)



Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman with RSA (DHE-RSA)



Unit 5: Key Exchange

Diffie-Hellman

Diffie-Hellman Weaknesses


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
Key Distribution Centre (KDC)

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Public and private keys with ECC



Private key:

0xc9f4f55bdeb5ba0bd337f2dbc952a5439e20ef
9af6203d25d014e7102d86aaeeL

Public key:

0xc44370819cb3b7b57b2aa7edf550a9a5410c23
4d27aff497458bbbfc8b6a327,
0x52a1a3e222cd89cbd2764b69bd9b0ea5c4fd6c
a28861e1f2140eff9c2e76487

G:

(50662630222773436695787188951685343262
50603453777594175500187360389116729240L

,

32670510020758816978083085130507043184
47127338065924327593890433575733748242

4L)

Public and private keys with ECC

----BEGIN EC PARAMETERS----

BgUrgQQACg==

----END EC PARAMETERS----

----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----

MHQCAQEEIEa56GG2PTUJyIt4FydaMNItYsjNj6ZIbd7jXvDY4ElfoAcGBSuBBAAK
oUQDQgAEJQDn8/vd8oQpA/VE3ch0IM6VAprOTiV9VLp38rwfOog3qUYcTxxX/sxJ
I1M4HncqEopYIKkkovoFFi62Yph6nw==

----END EC PRIVATE KEY----

Private-Key: (256 bit)

priv:

34:7c:b7:89:8c:d9:5f:eb:00:73:94:3e:bc:b9:97:
89:67:ef:e7:f5:04:ba:04:a3:1b:4f:ec:b0:63:1c:
66:10

pub:

04:29:b0:50:38:a6:32:fc:89:a1:2b:65:80:7b:14:
8e:20:f3:03:2a:34:85:1f:3a:63:1a:fc:30:96:83:
c0:e0:b7:72:77:17:cf:0c:53:2f:b9:e9:48:de:c2:
70:1c:74:12:8d:04:8d:18:55:af:34:ff:9b:0b:a4:
8a:bb:1d:3b:b9

ASN1 OID: secp256k1

Field Type: prime-field

$Y^2 = X^3 + ax + b \pmod{p}$

Prime:

00:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:
ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:
ff:fc:2f

A: 0

B: 7 (0x7)

Generator (uncompressed):

04:79:be:66:7e:f9:dc:bb:ac:55:a0:62:95:ce:87:
0b:07:02:9b:fc:db:2d:ce:28:d9:59:f2:81:5b:16:
f8:17:98:48:3a:da:77:26:a3:c4:65:5d:a4:fb:fc:
0e:11:08:a8:fd:17:b4:48:a6:85:54:19:9c:47:d0:
8f:fb:10:d4:b8

Order:

00:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:
ff:fe:ba:ae:dc:e6:af:48:a0:3b:bf:d2:5e:8c:d0:
36:41:41

Cofactor: 1 (0x1)

ECDH

Private key (d_A)



Public key:

$$Q_A = d_A \times G$$



Private key (d_B)




Public key:

$$Q_B = d_B \times G$$



Q_A

Q_B



Shared key:

$$\text{Share} = d_A \times Q_B$$



Shared key:

$$\text{Share} = d_A \times d_B \times G$$

Shared key:

$$\text{Share} = d_B \times Q_A$$




Shared key:


$$\text{Share} = d_B \times d_A \times G$$

[Example](#)


Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH)





Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH)



Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH)



Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH)



[ECDH](#)

[X25519](#)

[Hybrid
Encryption](#)

Unit 5: Key Exchange

Diffie-Hellman

Diffie-Hellman Weaknesses


Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)

Passing Key Using Public Key


Key Distribution Centre (KDC)

Prof Bill Buchanan OBE

<https://asecuritysite.com/keyexchange>



Key Exchange with Public Key



Unit 5: Key Exchange

Diffie-Hellman

Diffie-Hellman Weaknesses


Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)

Passing Key Using Public Key


Key Distribution Centre (KDC)

Prof Bill Buchanan OBE


<https://asecuritysite.com/keyexchange>




Trust Infrastructures



Trust Infrastructures



Simple KDC



[Link](#)

Simple KDC



KEK: k_A

Request(ID_A, ID_B)

```
rnd = random.randint(1,2**128)
keyA= hashlib.md5(str(rnd)).digest()
```

```
rnd = random.randint(1,2**128)
keyB= hashlib.md5(str(rnd)).digest()
```

```
print 'Long-term Key Alice=',binascii.hexlify(keyA)
print 'Long-term Key Bob=',binascii.hexlify(keyB)
```

```
rnd = random.randint(1,2**128)
```

```
keySession= hashlib.md5(str(rnd)).hexdigest()
ya = encrypt(keySession,keyA,AES.MODE_ECB)
yb = encrypt(keySession,keyB,AES.MODE_ECB)
```

```
print "Encrypted key sent to Alice:",binascii.hexlify(ya)
print "Encrypted key sent to Bob:",binascii.hexlify(yb)
```

```
decipherA = decrypt(ya,keyA,AES.MODE_ECB)
decipherB = decrypt(yb,keyB,AES.MODE_ECB)
print "Session key:",decipherA print "Session key:",decipherB
```

$$k_{ses} = e_{kA}^{-1}(y_A)$$

y_A

cipher = $e_{kes}(\text{message})$



$\text{message} = e_{kes}^{-1}(y)$

[Link](#)

Simple KDC



KEK: k_A

Request(ID_A, ID_B)

```
rnd = random.randint(1,2**128)
keyA= hashlib.md5(str(rnd)).digest()

rnd = random.randint(1,2**128)
keyB= hashlib.md5(str(rnd)).digest()

print 'Long-term Key Alice=',binascii.hexlify(keyA)
print 'Long-term Key Bob=',binascii.hexlify(keyB)

rnd = random.randint(1,2**128)
keySession= hashlib.md5(str(rnd)).hexdigest()
ya = encrypt(keySession,keyA,AES.MODE_ECB)
yb = encrypt(keySession,keyB,AES.MODE_ECB)
```

Long-term Key Alice= 9997205ef32f910d094b11b5f02ffe23

Long-term Key Bob= c2d0b8ac3567ac1f7305d223cecf3cbe

Encrypted key sent to Alice:

2c4ebf8e8748cb11065bb3cba7869c1af9d877c08805b2232ad4c7d8b2f987d5

Encrypted key sent to Bob:

8d9d34a0cf2385a328643e83c11f5523b9d241db50d2e534c563dbbac9bb08ba

Session key: 0ff7556d5a49f4f84f1b7e7c61c7c869

Session key: 0ff7556d5a49f4f84f1b7e7c61c7c869


o Alice:",binascii.hexlify(ya)
o Bob:",binascii.hexlify(yb)

/A,AES.MODE_ECB)
/B,AES.MODE_ECB)
erA print "Session key:",decipherB

message = $e_{kes}^{-1}(y)$



[Link](#)

Simple KDC (enhanced)



Link

Kerberos



[Link](#)

Unit 5: Key Exchange

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