

Digital Certificates

Introduction

Authentication Methods

Public Key Infrastructures

Digital Certificate Passing

Digital Signatures

Prof Bill Buchanan OBE

<https://asecuritysite.com/digitalcert/>





Identity on the Internet

Identifies it is trusted
(Digital Certificate)


Keeps communications
secure (encryption)

A screenshot of a Firefox browser window displaying a secure connection to [paypal.com](https://www.paypal.com/uk/webapps/mpp/home-merchant). The address bar shows a lock icon and the URL `https://www.paypal.com/uk/webapps/mpp/home-merchant`. A callout box from a character named Bob points to the digital certificate information in the status bar, which reads: "You are connected to **paypal.com** which is run by **PayPal, Inc.** San Jose California, US Verified by: VeriSign, Inc." Another callout box from a character named Trent points to the padlock icon in the status bar, indicating a secure connection. The main content area of the browser shows a promotional message: "However you do business, PayPal gets you paid. Choose your payment solution, you can switch any time." Below this, there is a button for "Accept card payments anywhere with PayPal Here™" and a link to "Learn More".


Bob

Eve

Learn More




Authentication is a fundamental issue in security.




How do we know that it was really Bob who sent the data , as anyone can get Alice's public key , and thus pretend to be Bob?

Authentication is a fundamental issue in security.




How can we tell that the message has not been tampered with ?

Authentication is a fundamental issue in security




How does Bob distribute his public key to Alice, without having to post it onto a Web site or for Bob to be on-line when Alice reads the message?



Authentication is a fundamental issue in security.

Who can we *really* trust to properly authenticate Bob? Obviously we can't trust Bob to authenticate that he really is Bob.



Unit 6: Digital Certificates




Introduction

Authentication Methods

Prof Bill Buchanan OBE

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
What to authenticate?

Systems.
Users.
Data.
Servers.


Where authenticated?

End-to-end. User to service.
Intermediate. Part of the authentication process.


Authentication Methods



End-to-end authentication



Intermediate authentication



Authentication


User




Device




Intermediate device



Intermediate device




Server





Service


One-way server.
One-way client
Two-way.

Username/password
Digital Certificate
Token Card
Soft Tokens
Session key
Pass phrase
Biometrics



Device name
Digital Certificate —————→
Pass phrase
MAC address
Encryption key





Username/
password




Mother's maiden name

Something you
know



Smart card



Network/physical
address

Something you
have

Something you have
Something you know
Something you are

Digital Certificates

Introduction

Authentication Methods

PKI

Digital Certificate Passing

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Now that we need the public key to either encrypt data for a recipient, or to authenticate a sender...

How does Bob distribute his public key to Alice , without having to post it onto a Web site or for Bob to be on -line when Alice reads the message?




Public-key



Digital Certificates

Digital certificates are a soft token of authentication, and require a trust mechanism

One method is the digital certificate which can carry the public key (and also the private key, if nesc.)



Authentication

Digital Cert.

Bob



Certificate

General Details Certification Path

Certificate Information

Windows does not have enough information to verify this certificate.

Details

Issued to: William Buchanan

Issued by: Ascertia CA 1

Valid from: 17/12/2006 to 17/12/2007

Issuer Statement

Certificate

General Details Certification Path

Show: <All>

Field	Value
Public key	RSA (2048 Bits)
Subject Key Identifier	cf 26 7f 61 c0 89 c1 3e 68 a4 f...
Authority Key Identifier	KeyID=94 fe 59 87 45 7b d3 4...
CRL Distribution Points	[1]CRL Distribution Point: Distr...
Authority Information Access	[1]Authority Info Access: Acc...
Thumbprint algorithm	sha1
Thumbprint	13 b8 68 cb 2c 93 b7 7f 2a 7c 6f 81 11 fa ab 97 99 72 80 5a

Thumbprint

Edit Properties... Copy to File... OK

Certificate

General Details Certification Path

Show: <All>

Field	Value
Issuer	Ascertia CA 1, Class 1 Certific...
Valid from	17 December 2006 21:04:49
Valid to	17 December 2007 21:14:49
Subject	William Buchanan, IT, Napier U...
Public key	RSA (2048 Bits)
Subject Key Identifier	cf 26 7f 61 c0 89 c1 3e 68 a4 f...
Authority Key Identifier	KeyID=94 fe 59 87 45 7b d3 4...
CRL Distribution Points	[1]CRL Distribution Point: Distr...

Public-key

Certificate

General Details Certification Path

Show: <All>



Field	Value
Version	V3
Serial number	58 74 4e 71 00 00 00 00 44 ba
Signature algorithm	sha1RSA
Issuer	Ascertia CA 1, Class 1 Certific...
Valid from	17 December 2006 21:04:49
Valid to	17 December 2007 21:14:49
Subject	William Buchanan, IT, Napier U...
Public key	RSA (2048 Bits)

CN = Ascertia CA 1
OU = Class 1 Certificate Authority
O = Ascertia
C = GB

Issuer

Edit Properties... Copy to File... OK




Digital certificate contains a thumbprint to verify it

Bob

Bob

P7b format

```
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIDZCCA4wgAwIBAgIKWHR0cQAAAABeujANBgkqhkiG 9w0BAQUFADBgMQSwCQYD
VQQGEWJHqjERMA 8GA1UEChMIQXnjZXJ 0awExJjAkBgNvBAS THUnsYXKnZIDEgQ_2Vv
dglmawNhgdUgox 0 ag9yaXR 5MRWfAYDVQDew 1bc2n1cnRpYSBDQSAxMB 4XDTA2
MTIxNzIxMDQ 0 0voxDTA3MTIxNzIxMTQ 0 0VowgZ 8xJjAkBgkqhkiG 9w0BCQEWf3cu
YnvjagFuYw 5AbmFwawVylMfjLnVmRQSwCQYDVQGEWJSZEOMA 4GA1UECBMHTG 90
ag1hbjEsmBAGA 1UEBxMjRWrbmJ 1cmdoMrRowGAYDVQKExFOYKbpZXigVw 5pdmy
c210etELMAKGA 1UECxMCsvQxtAxBgNVBAMTefdpbgxpVw 0 qgnVjaGFuYw 4wgEi
MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCVCFETyJL 8VxAhEMRzQI0gM81
ci75nmMsomajzcB 6fhGmGowmYcoscmQkrVjAknoS +4mxzhny3mdob+szbwVaX
M5FoXhsrV+Q86hsk8Cdc+lsqy38TQtufuDns 0tR6q7CgGqQ8/VjsXnqzK 39
iLUF1ahycet/ab60/gwzL4ivSz2nml4dyauyt1hLP1VbpbHGde 6sDQXWyd0cpfv
ZN7paud5fqBESf06bukcieI47AzRMQj 3kHuDt7MexVw7aoX+nXLP4wn7iamaxasF
QvhdoKyczHs 82JQDGatXRCqkk1ztmz 5i6GKpse7XvuX265Wjq5fhp2hY1AgMB
AAGjggEXMIEBEZAdgNVHQ 4EFgQoUzY/YccJwT5opPHLPIcqkkolkjwwyyvDVR 0j
BFwwloAU1P 5Zh0V700k6 CorvRMwB9ifvkBmhP6Q9MDsxC2AjB9NVBAYTAKdCMREW
DwYDVQKewHBC 2N1cnRpYTEZMBcGA 1UEAxMQXNzjZXJ 0awEgum9vdCBQYIBDTBN
BgNvHR8ERjBEMEkQKA+hjxodhrwo1 8vd3d3LmfjzY2vydG1hlmNbVs 5pbpxbmVD
QS9jcmxzL0FzY2Vdg1hQ0ExL3nSYXNzMS 5jcmrwPgYIKWvBQHUQAQEMJAWMC 4G
CCsGAQFBzAChiJodhrwo1 8vb2Nzcc5nbG9iYwX0cnVzdGzpbmr1ci 5j2b20vMA0G
CSqGSiB 3DQEBBQAA0EATOCwGJ 1t50kt1upmpjkM1 8idxMmD5wuhszjB1GsMhPxI
H+vXhL9yaOw+Prpz7aJS4/3xxu8vRAnhyu 9yu4qDA==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
```



- The main certificate formats include:**
- P7b. Text format
 - PFX/P12. Binary.
 - SST. Binary.




- A. Bob creates the message.
- B. Bob encrypts with Alice's public key and sends Alice the encrypted message
- C. Alice decrypts with her private key
- D. Alice receives the message



Hello

H&\$d .




Alice sends her digital certificate with her public key on it



Alice's private key

Hello



Bob sends his Digital certificate to authenticate himself



Alice checks the hash using Bob's public key from his certificate

Digital Certificates

Introduction

Authentication Methods


PKI

Certificate Creation

Digital Certificate Passing

Prof Bill Buchanan OBE

<https://asecuritysite.com/digitalcert/>



asecuritysite.com

Your connection to this site is private.

Permissions

Connection



The identity of this website has been verified by Go Daddy Secure Certificate Authority - G2. No Certificate Transparency information was supplied by the server.

[Certificate information](#)



Your connection to asecuritysite.com is encrypted using an obsolete cipher suite.

The connection uses TLS 1.0.

The connection is encrypted using AES_128_CBC, with HMAC-SHA1 for message authentication and RSA as the key exchange mechanism.

[What do these mean?](#)

- Coding. [Coding](#). The
- Challenges. [Challen](#)
- IP. [IP](#). These pages
- Information. [Info](#).
- Fun. [Fun](#). These pac
- Introduction to Se
- SQL Statements. [S](#)
- File and Network
- Cisco Simulators.
- Install on Android
- Wireless. [Wireless](#)

Certificate

General

Details

Certification Path

Certificate Information

This certificate is intended for the following purpose(s):

- Ensures the identity of a remote computer
- Proves your identity to a remote computer
- 2.16.840.1.114413.1.7.23.1

* Refer to the certification authority's statement for details.

Issued to: asecuritysite.com

Issued by: Go Daddy Secure Certificate Authority - G2

Valid from 20- Sep- 15 **to** 20- Sep- 16

[Issuer Statement](#)

Learn more about [certificates](#)

OK

Organisation

ase

You

Per



Generate Keypair
openssl genrsa -out ia.key 2048

ia.key

Create CSR
openssl req -new -key ia.key -out ia.csr

ia.csr

Root CA



Generate Keypair
openssl genrsa -out ca.key 2048


ca.key

Generate CA certificate
openssl req -new -x509 -days 1826 -key ca.key -out ca.crt

ca.crt

Create certificate
openssl x509 -req -days 730 -in ia.csr -CA ca.crt -CAkey ca.key -set_serial 01 -out ia.crt

ia.crt



Digital
certificate
signed by CA

.com
arksims



e following purpose(s):

e computer
e computer

statement for details.

Certificate Authority - G2

20- Sep


6



Issuer Statement



- Install on Android
- Wireless. Wireless



PEM

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----

```
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BBwwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUmnH4bhDrz5vsYJ8YkBug630J/SswZAYIKwYBBQUHAQEE  
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KwYBBQUHMAKGH2h0dHA6Ly9wa2kuZ29vZy9nc3IyL0dUUzFPMS5jcNQwGQYDVR0R  
BBIwEI0d3d3Lmdvb2dsZS5jb20wIqYDVR0gBBowGDAIBgZngQwBAgIwDAYKKwYB  
BAHWeQIFAzAvBgNVHR8EKDAmMCsgIqAghh5odHRw0i8vY3jsLnBraS5nb29nL0dU  
UzFPMS5jcmwgEFBgorBgeEAdZ5AgQCBIH2BIHZAPEAdgCyHgXMi6LNiiB0h2b5  
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PbXJZb1drKEAdwBep3P531bA57U2SH30SeAyepGaDIShEhKEGHWwgXFFWAAAAXA5  
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A4IBAQCDU8CVusGstVk1lAmrtg3DyYhNV1UnKyLk3RrHKumwYz5mC25bWGoLVKvv  
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IzbJSEipZJm8DsP10ffFxPtoIn+zKoQAxAA==  
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
```

PKCS#7

-----BEGIN PKCS7-----

```
MIIEdwTCCA6mgAwIBAgIRA093GGFLfHWUCAAAAAAUCZgwDQYJKoZIhvCNQELBQA  
wQjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxHjAcBgNVBAoTFUdvb2dsZSBucnVzdCBTZJ2aWNlcET  
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BQUHMAKGH2h0dHA6Ly9wa2kuZ29vZy9nc3IyL0dUUzFPMS5jcNQwGQYDVR0R  
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MS5jcmwgEFBgorBgeEAdZ5AgQCBIH2BIHZAPEAdgCyHgXMi6LNiiB0h2b5  
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N3za329/9JZq0mnn0vmPMxjTDvh9sVQ7g4znwha/KJfzL8AZKUDldD90+hD0  
qVqITZPCAI/ANvbHdZiMEEPB8eA+oTiw2ucChqlLsop5Mio8ckg7aXG4/qFC  
vkoffK44rs4UEpsaqGe9QmjjTu07ZCZrFd1m3geq2ARKPHgPoPM6UbDdqg0  
9C0F5Z10k0gV/qshvpT04YzE7TB2U571eYEqNXH48syVx8XSk3P7FjM7FI22  
SEipZJm8DsP10ffFxPtoIn+zKoQAxAA==  
-----END PKCS7-----
```

Base64

Binary

DER
CER

```
openssl x509 -outform der -in www-google-com.pem -out google.crt  
openssl pkcs12 -export -in server.pem -out keystore.pkcs12
```

PEM

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----

MIIEdwTCCA6mgAwIBAgIRA093GGFLfHw0CAAAAAAucZgwDQYJKoZIhvCNQELBQA...
QjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxHjAcBgNVBAoTFUdvb2dsZSBucnVzdCBTZJ2aWNlcET
MBEGA1UEAxMKR1RTIENBIDFPMTAEw0yMDAyMTIxMTQ3NDFaFw0yMDA1MDYxMTQ3
NDFaMGgxCzAJBgNVBAYTA1VTMRMwEQYDVQQIEwpDYWxpZm9ybmlhMRYwFAYDVQQH
Ew1nb3VudGFpbIBWaWV3MRMwEQYDVQQKEwpHb29nbGUgTEXDMRcwFQYDVQDEw53
d3cuZ29vZ2x1LmNvbTBZMBMGBYqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABCzzLJYFjb8W
Tn02WI07vSCt5fCm7170CF...
-----END CERTIFICATE-----

- X.509 Certificate (DER)
- X.509 Certificate (PKCS#7)

PKCS#1 v2 - Padding for Public Key

PKCS #7 v1.5 - Cryptography Message Syntax

PKCS 10 v1.7 - Certificate Request Standard.

AIDbvkoffK44rs4UEpsaqGe9QqMJjTu07ZCZrFd1m3geq2ARKPHgPoPM6UbDdqg0
TNQoC0F5Zl0k0gV/qshvpT04YzE7TB2U571eYEqNXH48syVx8XSk3P7FjM7FI22
IzbJSEipZJm8DsP10ffFXpToIn+zKoQAxAA==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----

PKCS#7

-----BEGIN PKCS7-----

MIIEdwTCCA6mgAwIBAgIRA093GGFLfHw0CAAAAAAucZgwDQYJKoZIhvCNQELBQA...
wTCCA6mgAwIBAgIRA093GGFLfHw0CAAAAAAucZgwDQYJKoZIhvCNQELBQA...
MAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxHjAcBgNVBAoTFUdvb2dsZSBucnVzdCBTZJ2aWNlcET
A1UEAxMKR1RTIENBIDFPMTAEw0yMDAyMTIxMTQ3NDFaFw0yMDA1MDYxMTQ3
MGgxCzAJBgNVBAYTA1VTMRMwEQYDVQQIEwpDYWxpZm9ybmlhMRYwFAYDVQDEw53
b3VudGFpbIBWaWV3MRMwEQYDVQQKEwpHb29nbGUgTEXDMRcwFQYDVQDEw53
Z29vZ2x1LmNvbTBZMBMGBYqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABCzzLJYFjb8W
WL0TySDvfEWcKMe7l81CFspT60kn13YILndTM22sUwPycogkjBsAQz9Ax...
EAiJkbejggJVMICUTAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCB4AwEwYDVR01BAwwCgYIKwYB
AwEwDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQU9Ty3t90o7Uw9+Hc6kv/j9511
HwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUmNH4bhDrz5vsYJ8YkgB630J/SswZAYIKwYBBQUHQAQEE
MCcGCCsGAQUFBzABhhodHRw0i8v2Nzc5Wa2kuZ29vZy9nc3IyL0dUUzPM5jcnQwGQYDVR0R
BQUHMAKGh2h0dHA6Ly9wa2kuZ29vZy9nc3IyL0dUUzPM5jcnQwGQYDVR0R
EII0d3d3Lmdvb2dsZs5jb20wI0YDVR0gBBowGDAIBgZngQwBAgIwDAYKKwYB
eQIFAzAvBgNVHR8EKDAmMCsgIqAghh5odHRw0i8vYJ3sLnBraS5nb29nL0dU
MS5jcmwggEFBgorBgEEAdZ5AgQCBIH2BIhZAPEAdgCyHgXMi6LNiiB0h2b5
JSBna9r6c0eySmt74uQXgAAAXA5CnqwAAAEAwBHMEUCIQCojKtz0e8l1JYK
bt1puqt4AE3peMVAVk/WelWgp10IgBvRMbNkwF6i8+jVv3CfTHKvFd8e00+GY
Zb1drKEAdwBep3P531ba57U2SH3SeAyeGadIShEhKEGHWgXFFWAAAAXA5
AAAEBIMEYCIQCQ50NppELP0Dh65oFT5ZAGsSzQ4FsjnNZedgS7WqzLnQIh
u0QuoE3RWngfhI6W7n1kxkEmd0vSZTe6+Ql+JVuMa0GCSqGS1b3DQEBCwUA
AQCDU8CVusGstVklAmrtg3DyYhN1UnKyLk3RrHKumwYz5mC25bWgoLvKvv
N3zA329/9JZq0mn0vmPMxjTDvh9sVQ7g4znwha/KjfzL8AZKUDldD90+hd0
qVqITZPCAI/ANvbhDziMEEPB8eA+oTiw2ucChqlLsop5Mio8ckg7aXG4/Qfc
vkoffK44rs4UEpsaqGe9QqMJjTu07ZCZrFd1m3geq2ARKPHgPoPM6UbDdqg0
9C0F5Zl0k0gV/qshvpT04YzE7TB2U571eYEqNXH48syVx8XSk3P7FjM7FI22
SEipZJm8DsP10ffFXpToIn+zKoQAxAA==
-----END PKCS7-----

Base64

Binary

DER
CER

openssl x509 -outform der -in www-google-com.pem -out google.crt
openssl pkcs12 -export -in server.pem -out keystore.pkcs12

Digital Certificates

Introduction

Authentication Methods

PKI




Digital Certificate Passing

Prof Bill Buchanan OBE

<https://asecuritysite.com/digitalcert/>



Who do we trust to get Bob's certificate ... we can't trust Bob, as he may be Eve... meet Trent.




Digital Certificates

Digital certificates are a soft token of authentication, and require a trust mechanism

Trusted Root CA



The Trusted Root CE (Trent) checks Bob's identity and creates a certificate which he signs



Certificate Authority (CA)
- Able to grant certificates
Examples; Verisign, Entrust, Microsoft Trust.

Trent




Trusted root certificates are installed as a default on the machine (or installed with the user's permission)

Trusted root certificate

Alice checks the signature of the certificate to validate Bob. Both Alice and Bob trust the CA (Trent) as a third party.




Author: Prof Bill Buchanan



Trusted Root CA



Eve tricks the CA to get a certificate with Bob's name



Certificate Authority (CA)
- Able to grant certificates
Examples; Verisign, Entrust, Microsoft Trust.

Trent



Trusted root certificates are installed as a default on the machine (or installed with the user's permission)

Trusted root certificate

Alice checks the signature of the certificate to validate Bob. Both Alice and Bob trust the CA (Trent) as a third party.



Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Certificates

Intended purpose: <All>

Intermediate Certification Authorities Trusted Root Certification Authorities Trusted Publ

Issued To	Issued By	Expiration...	Friendly...
Microsoft Authenticode(tm)...	Microsoft Authenticode(tm)...	31/12/1999	Microsoft
Microsoft Root Authority	Microsoft Root Authority	31/12/2020	Microsoft
Microsoft Root Certificate ...	Microsoft Root Certificate ...	09/05/2021	Microsoft
NetLock Expressz (Class C...)	NetLock Expressz (Class C...)	20/02/2019	NetLock I
NetLock Kozjegyzoj (Class ...)	NetLock Kozjegyzoj (Class ...)	19/02/2019	NetLock I
NetLock Uzleti (Class B) Ta...	NetLock Uzleti (Class B) Ta...	20/02/2019	NetLock I
NO LIABILITY ACCEPTED, ...	NO LIABILITY ACCEPTED, (...)	07/01/2004	VeriSign
PTT Post Root CA	PTT Post Root CA	26/06/2019	KeyMail F

Import... Export... Remove Advanced...

Certificate intended purposes <All>

Trusted Root CA
- always trusted

Trusted Root CA



Certificate purposes:

- Secure email.
- Server authentication.
- Code signing.
- Driver authentication.
- Time stamping.
- Client authentication.
- IP tunnelling.
- EFS (Encrypted File System).

Certificate

General Details Certification Path



Certificate Information

This CA Root certificate is not trusted. To enable trust, install this certificate in the Trusted Root Certification Authorities store.

Self signed
- Can never be trusted

Issued to: William Buchanan
Issued by: William Buchanan
Valid from 22/02/2007 to 29/01/2107
You have a private key that corresponds to this certificate.

Issuer Statement OK



Certificates

Intended purpose: <All>

Intermediate Certification Authorities Trusted Root Certification Authorities Trusted Publ

Issued To	Issued By	Expiration...	Friendly...
GTE CyberTrust Root	Root SGC Authority	23/02/2006	<N>
Microsoft Internet Authority	GTE CyberTrust Global Root	23/02/2007	<N>
Microsoft Internet Authority	GTE CyberTrust Global Root	19/04/2009	<N>
Microsoft Secure Server Authority	Microsoft Internet Authority	23/02/2007	<N>
Microsoft Secure Server Authority	Microsoft Internet Authority	19/04/2009	<N>
Microsoft Windows Hardware C...	Microsoft Root Authority	31/12/2002	<N>
Microsoft Windows Hardware C...	Microsoft Root Authority	31/12/2002	<N>
MS SGC Authority	Root SGC Authority	01/01/2010	<N>

Import... Export... Remove Advanced...

Certificate intended purposes

Signing, Windows Hardware Driver Verification

Intermediate CA
- Can be trusted for some things

Levels of trust



The two main problems with digital certificates are:

- Lack of understanding of how they work.
- They can be spoofed.

So let's look at a few ... are they real or fake?



Humor12.com




Bob



Eve

Real or fake?



Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Real or fake?



Certificate

General Details Certification Path

Certification path

VeriSign
VeriSign Class 3 Extended Validation SSL CA
signin.ebay.com

https://www.verisign.com/repository/rpa.html - Windows Internet Explorer

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Products & Services Solutions Support About VeriSign

UNITED STATES

RESOURCES

PKI Disclosure
Licenses & Approvals
E-Sign
Publications

Home > Repository

VeriSign Relying Party Agreement

YOU MUST READ THIS RELYING PARTY AGREEMENT ("AGREEMENT") BEFORE VALIDATING A CERTIFICATE, USING VERISIGN'S ONLINE CERTIFICATE STATUS PROTOCOL ("OCSP") OR USING A VERISIGN OR VERISIGN AFFILIATE DATABASE OF CERTIFICATE REVOCATION LIST ("CRL"). IF YOU DO NOT AGREE TO THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT, DO NOT SUBMIT A QUERY AND DO NOT ACCESS, OR RELY ON ANY VERISIGN INFORMATION. IN CONSIDERATION OF YOUR AGREEMENT, YOU ARE ENTITLED TO USE VERISIGN INFORMATION AS SET FORTH HEREIN.

1. Term of Agreement. This Agreement becomes effective when you submit a query to validate a Certificate, or rely on any VeriSign Information in the manner set forth in the preamble and shall be applicable for as long as you use and/or rely on such VeriSign Information.


2. Definitions.
"Certificate" or "Digital Certificate" means a message that, at least, states a name or identifier for the Subscriber, contains the Subscriber's public key, identifies the Certificate's serial number, and contains a digital signature of the issuing CA.



Real!

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan


Real or fake?




Real or fake?

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Real or fake?



Fake!



Certificates

Intended purpose: <All>


Intermediate Certification Authorities Trusted Root Certification Authorities Trusted Publ

Issued To	Issued By	Expiration Date	Friendly Name
ABA ECOM Root CA	ABA.ECOM Root CA	09/07/2009	DST (ABA.ECOM...)
Amazon eCommerce	Amazon eCommerce	01/01/2013	<None>
Autoridad Certifica...	Autoridad Certificador...	28/06/2009	Autoridad Certifi...
Autoridad Certifica...	Autoridad Certificador...	29/06/2009	Autoridad Certifi...
Baltimore EZ by DST	Baltimore EZ by DST	03/07/2009	DST (Baltimore E...
Belgacom E-Trust P...	Belgacom E-Trust Prim...	21/01/2010	Belgacom E-Trus...
C&W HKT SecureN...	C&W HKT SecureNet ...	16/10/2009	CW HKT Secure...
C&W HKT SecureN...	C&W HKT SecureNet ...	16/10/2009	CW HKT Secure...
C&W HKT SecureN...	C&W HKT SecureNet ...	16/10/2010	CW HKT Secure...

Import... Export... Remove Advanced...

Certificate intended purposes

Code Signing View Close



Real or fake?

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Real or fake?



Real



Certificate

General Details Certification Path

Certification path

- GlobalSign
- GlobalSign Domain Validation CA
- *.napier.ac.uk

GlobalSign (SSL Certificate) Legal Repository - Windows Internet Explorer

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

GlobalSign (SSL Certificate) Legal Repository

Contact Us

GlobalSign™
GMO Internet Group

HOME Products Solutions Partners About GlobalSign

You are here: United States Home > Repository > Legal Documents

About GlobalSign

- Company Profile
- Company History
- Management Team
- Press Center
- Repository**
- Content Library
- International
- Contact Us

Repository of Legal Documents & Root Certificates

GlobalSign Root Certificates
All Root & Intermediate CA Certificates

GlobalSign Certification Practice Statement (CPS)
Current version - v6.1 - June 08
Previous version - v6.0 - December 07

GlobalSign Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for
Adobe Certified Document Services (CDS)

Waiting 100% Internet | Protected Mode: Off Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Chapter 6: Digital Certificates

Introduction

Authentication Methods

PKI

Digital Certificate Passing

Prof Bill Buchanan OBE

<https://asecuritysite.com/digitalcert/>





Public key encryption ... secret ... identity ... trust



Eve



Trent



MegaCorp




Bob's Private Key



Bob's Public Key



Alice's Public Key



Alice's Private Key



Public key encryption ... secret ... identity ... trust



Eve



Trent



MegaCorp



Bob's Private Key




Bob's Public Key



Alice's Public Key



Alice's Public Key




Alice's Private Key



Public key encryption ... secret ... identity ... trust



MegaCorp





Public key encryption ... secret ... identity ... trust



Eve



Trent



MegaCorp



Alice's Public Key



Bob's Private Key



Bob's Public Key

Hello Alice,
Wish you were
here!
- Bob

Bob.



Alice's Public Key



Alice's Private Key



Public key encryption ... secret ... identity ... trust



Eve



Trent



MegaCorp




Hello Alice,
Wish you were
here!
- Bob

Bob:



Bob's Private Key





Public key encryption ... secret ... identity ... trust




Eve



Trent



MegaCorp





Public key encryption ... secret ... identity ... trust



Eve



Trent



MegaCorp



Bob's Private Key




Bob's Public Key



Which key to open
the message?



Alice's Public Key



Alice's Private Key






Public key encryption ... secret ... identity ... trust



Hello Alice,
Wish you were
here!
- Bob

Bob.

Which key to open
the message?





Public key encryption ... secret ... identity ... trust



Eve



Trent



MegaCorp



Bob's Private Key



Bob's Public Key


Hello Alice,
Wish you were
here!
- Bob

Bob:

Which key to we
open the signature
with?



Alice's Public Key



Alice's Private Key



Public key encryption ... secret ... identity ... trust




MegaCorp




Hello Alice,
Wish you were
here!
- Bob


Bob:






Public key encryption ... secret ... identity ... trust










Authentication

The magic private key





Bob encrypts the message/hash with Alice's public key

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Authentication

The magic private key





Authentication

The magic private key

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Alice decrypts the message

Chapter 6: Digital Certificates

Introduction

Authentication Methods

PKI


Digital Certificate Passing

Prof Bill Buchanan OBE


https://asecuritysite.com/digitalcert/




Overview



Trent



ECDSA




Msg: Hello

Alice's private key=91410319197544581782194931321068666964077231613962372395224337286787851207623
Alice's public key=(107007219618086620558122760490508950019883614381385070624798268553636785085033,
50295619771883464285297058390425887963371353465625215351103778057382666752225)
k= 26701147302148539062679299392480227032483869521805022198405523431584788447963


$r=9860780814777449203575356285408019661538158474047478294689777633119075968396$
 $s=99068437226471908177637999380627689653261729073056918331666171421799362411402$

Result $r=9860780814777449203575356285408019661538158474047478294689777633119075968396$
Signature matches!

RSA Signatures



Schnorr Signatures – used with EdDSA



Digital Certificates

Introduction

Authentication Methods

PKI

Digital Certificate Passing

Prof Bill Buchanan OBE

<https://asecuritysite.com/digitalcert/>

