

Unit 5: Key Exchange

Diffie-Hellman

Diffie-Hellman Weaknesses

Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)

Passing Key Using Public Key

Key Distribution Centre (KDC)

Prof Bill Buchanan OBE

<http://asecuritysite.com/crypto05>

<http://asecuritysite.com/encryption>



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Data Centre > Networks

Internet's safe-keepers forced to postpone crucial DNSSEC root key signing ceremony – no, not a hacker attack, but because they can't open a safe

Online security process stalled by offline security screw-up

By Kieren McCarthy in San Francisco 13 Feb 2020 at 06:09

59



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
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
Diffie-Hellman
Elliptic Curve
Passing Keys
Key Distribution

Professor
<http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mmp/crypt/>
<http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mmp/crypt/>

No	Date	Subject	Lab
1	17 Jan 2020	Ciphers and Fundamentals Unit	Lab [Link] Demo [Link]
2	24 Jan 2020	Symmetric Key Unit	Lab [Link] Demo [Link]
3	31 Jan 2020	Hashing and MAC Unit	Lab [Link]
4	7 Feb 2020	Asymmetric (Public) Key Unit	Lab [Link]
5	14 Feb 2020	Key Exchange Unit	Lab [Link]
6	21 Feb 2020	Guest lecture	Mini-project/Coursework [Link]
7	28 Feb 2020	Trust and Digital Certificates Unit	Lab [Link]
8	6 Mar 2020	Tunnelling Unit	Lab [Link]
9	13 Mar 2020	Test 1 (Units 1-5) [Study guide]	
10	20 Mar 2020	Blockchain Unit	Lab [Link]
11	27 Mar 2020	Future Cryptography Unit	Lab [Link]
12	3 April 2020	Tokens, Authorization and Docker Unit	Lab [Link]
13	10 April 2020	Trusted Hosts Unit	
Easter Break			
14	Week beginning 27 April 2020 (TBC)	Test 2 (Units 6-10)	
15	Week beginning 4 May 2020 (TBC)	Coursework Hand-in [Draft]	

Overview





Test Scenario and Properties	Application					
	Signal	WhatsApp	Wire	Viber	Riot	Telegram
Setup and Registration						
Phone Registration	●	●	●	●	○	●
E-mail Registration	○	○	●	○	●	○
Access SMS Inbox	●	●	○	●	○	●
Contact list Upload	●	●	●	●	●	●
Verification by SMS	●	●	●	●	○	●
Verification by Phone Call	●	●	●	●	○	●
Initial Contact						
Trust-On-First-Use	●	●	○	○	○	○
Notification About E2E Encryption	○	●	○	○	●	●
Message After a Key Change						
Notification about key changes	●	●	○	○	●	○
Blocking message	●	○	○	○	○	○
Key Change While a Message Is In Transit						
Re-encrypt and Send Message	○	●	○	○	○	○
Details About Transmission of Message	●	●	●	○	●	●
Verification Process						
QR-Code	●	●	○	○	○	●
Verify By Phone Call	●	●	●	●	●	○
Share Keys Through 3rd Party	●	●	○	○	○	○
Verified Check	○	○	●	●	●	○
Other Security Implementations						
Two-Step Verification	○	●	○	○	○	●
Passphrase/Code	●	○	○	○	○	●
Screen Security	●	○	○	○	○	●
Clear Trusted Contacts	○	○	○	●	○	○
Delete Devices From Account	○	○	●	●	●	●

●: Has the property; ○: Does not have the property.

Paper



“ Use anything by Open Whisper Systems.
Edward Snowden, Whistleblower and privacy advocate



“ Signal is the most scalable encryption tool we have. It is free and peer reviewed. I encourage people to use it everyday.
Laura Poitras, Oscar-winning filmmaker and journalist



“ I am regularly impressed with the thought and care put into both the security and the usability of this app. It's my first choice for an encrypted conversation.
Bruce Schneier, internationally renowned security technologist

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
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Key Distribution Centre (KDC)

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
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
Private key

Private key uses the same key for encryption and decryption ... how does Bob send the key to Alice?



Diffie-Hellman

One of the most widely used methods for creating a secret key which is the same for Bob and Alice



Key Exchange

- **Forward secrecy (FS)**, which means that a compromise of the long-term keys will not compromise any previous session keys. A leakage of the public key of the server would cause all the sessions which used this specific public key to be compromised. FS thus aims to overcome this by making sure that all the sessions keys could not be compromised, even though the long-term key was compromised.
- **Ephemeral**. With some key exchange methods the same key will be generated if the same parameters are used on either side. This can cause problems as an intruder could guess the key, or even where the key was static and never changed. With ephemeral methods, a different key is used for each connection, and, again, the leakage of any long-term would not cause all the associated session keys to be breached.





$$A^x A^y \rightarrow A^{(x+y)}$$




$$(A^x)^y \rightarrow A^{xy}$$









Diffie-Hellman

Eve can listen to the values of A and B, but should not be able to determine the secret key

1. Both nodes agree on two values (G and n)

2. Generate a random value (x)

2. Generate a random value (y)

3. $A = G^x \text{ mod } n$


3. $B = G^y \text{ mod } n$

5. $K1 = B^x \text{ mod } n$

5. $K2 = A^y \text{ mod } n$

**4. A and B
values
exchanged**

*K₁ and K₂ should be the **same** and are the secret key*



Diffie-Hellman

Eve can listen to the values of A and B, but should not be able to determine the secret key

1. Both nodes agree on two values (5 and 7)

2. Generate a random value (2)

2. Generate a random value (3)

$$3. A = 5^2 \bmod 8 = 25 \bmod 7 = 4$$

$$3. B = 5^3 \bmod 7 = 125 \bmod 7 = 6$$

4. A and B values exchanged

$$5. K1 = 6^2 \bmod 7 = 36 \bmod 7 = 1$$

$$5. K2 = 4^3 \bmod 7 = 64 \bmod 7 = 1$$

$K1$ and $K2$ should be the **same** and are the secret key

Example



Diffie-Hellman Generator

$$Y = G^x \bmod p$$

p	11									
Generator	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		
x	$g^x \bmod p$									
2	4	9	5	3	3	5	9	4		
3	8	5	9	4	7	2	6	3		
4	5	4	3	9	9	3	4	5		
5	10	1	1	1	10	10	10	1		
6	9	3	4	5	5	4	3	9		
7	7	9	5	3	8	6	2	4		
8	3	5	9	4	4	9	5	3		
9	6	4	3	9	2	8	7	5		
10	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		

Picking G

Diffie-Hellman Generation

```
C:\> openssl dhparam -out dhparams.pem 768 –text
```

```
C:\> type dhparams.pem
```

Diffie-Hellman-Parameters: (768 bit)

prime:

```
00:d0:37:c2:95:64:02:ea:12:2b:51:50:a2:84:6c:  
71:6a:3e:2c:a9:80:e2:65:b2:a5:ee:77:26:22:31:  
66:9e:fc:c8:09:94:e8:9d:f4:cd:bf:d2:37:b2:fb:  
b8:38:2c:87:28:38:dc:95:24:73:06:d3:d9:1f:af:  
78:01:10:6a:7e:56:4e:7b:ee:b4:8d:6b:4d:b5:9b:  
93:c6:f1:74:60:01:0d:96:7e:85:ca:b8:1f:f7:bc:  
43:b7:40:4d:4e:87:e3
```

generator: 2 (0x2)

-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----

```
MGYCYQDQN8KVZALqEitRUKKEbHFqPiypgOJlsqXudyYiMWae/  
MgJIoid9M2/0jey  
+7g4LicoONyVJHMG09kfr3gBEGp+Vk577rSNa021m5PG8XRgAQ2WfoXKu  
B/3vEO3  
QE1Oh+MCAQI=  
-----END DH PARAMETERS-----
```

- **DH Group 5:**
1,536 bit prime.
- **DH Group 2:**
1,024 bit prime.
- **DH Group 1:**
768-bit prime.

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Diffie-Hellman

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
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


Diffie-Hellman Weaknesses

- In 2015, a paper entitled *Imperfect Forward Secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman Fails in Practice* – showed that it was fairly easy to precompute on values for two popular Diffie-Hellman parameters (and which use the DHE_EXPORT cipher set).
- The research team found that one was used as a default in the around 7% of the Top 1 million web sites and was hard coded into the Apache httpd service. Overall, at the time, it was found that over 3% of Web sites were still using the default.
- Diffie-Hellman-Parameters: (512 bit)
- prime:
 - 00:9f:db:8b:8a:00:45:44:f0:04:5f:17:37:d0:ba:
 - 2e:0b:27:4c:df:1a:9f:58:82:18:fb:43:53:16:a1:
 - 6e:37:41:71:fd:19:d8:d8:f3:7c:39:bf:86:3f:d6:
 - 0e:3e:30:06:80:a3:03:0c:6e:4c:37:57:d0:8f:70:
 - e6:aa:87:10:33
- generator: 2 (0x2)

Man-in-the-middle

Diffie-Hellman suffers from a man-in-the-middle attack, where Eve intercepts the key interchange, so that Bob thinks he's talking to Alice for the key exchange.



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
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
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Public and private keys with ECC



Private key:

0xc9f4f55bdeb5ba0bd337f2dbc952a5439e20ef
9af6203d25d014e7102d86aaeeL

Public key:

0xc44370819cb3b7b57b2aa7edf550a9a5410c23
4d27aff497458bbbfc8b6a327,
0x52a1a3e222cd89cbd2764b69bd9b0ea5c4fd6c
a28861e1f2140eff9c2e76487

G:

(50662630222773436695787188951685343262
50603453777594175500187360389116729240L
,
32670510020758816978083085130507043184
47127338065924327593890433575733748242
4L)

----BEGIN EC PARAMETERS----

BgUrgQQACg==

----END EC PARAMETERS----

----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----

MHQCAQEEIEa56GG2PTUJyIt4FydaMNItYsjNj6ZIbd7jXvDY4ElfoAcGBSuBBAAK
oUQDQgAEJQDn8/vd8oQpA/VE3ch0IM6VAprOTiV9VLp38rwfOog3qUYcTxxX/sxJ
I1M4HncqEopYIKkkovoFFi62Yph6nw==

----END EC PRIVATE KEY----

Private-Key: (256 bit)

priv:

34:7c:b7:89:8c:d9:5f:eb:00:73:94:3e:bc:b9:97:
89:67:ef:e7:f5:04:ba:04:a3:1b:4f:ec:b0:63:1c:
66:10

pub:

04:29:b0:50:38:a6:32:fc:89:a1:2b:65:80:7b:14:
8e:20:f3:03:2a:34:85:1f:3a:63:1a:fc:30:96:83:
c0:e0:b7:72:77:17:cf:0c:53:2f:b9:e9:48:de:c2:
70:1c:74:12:8d:04:8d:18:55:af:34:ff:9b:0b:a4:
8a:bb:1d:3b:b9

ASN1 OID: secp256k1

Field Type: prime-field

$Y^2 = X^3 + ax + b \pmod{p}$

Public and private keys with EC

Prime:

00:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:
ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:
ff:fc:2f

A: 0

B: 7 (0x7)

Generator (uncompressed):

04:79:be:66:7e:f9:dc:bb:ac:55:a0:62:95:ce:87:
0b:07:02:9b:fc:db:2d:ce:28:d9:59:f2:81:5b:16:
f8:17:98:48:3a:da:77:26:a3:c4:65:5d:a4:fb:fc:
0e:11:08:a8:fd:17:b4:48:a6:85:54:19:9c:47:d0:
8f:fb:10:d4:b8

Order:

00:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:
ff:fe:ba:ae:dc:e6:af:48:a0:3b:bf:d2:5e:8c:d0:
36:41:41

Cofactor: 1 (0x1)

ECDH

Private key (d_A)



Public key:

$$Q_A = d_A \times G$$



Private key (d_B)




Public key:

$$Q_B = d_B \times G$$



Q_A

Q_B



Shared key:

$$\text{Share} = d_A \times Q_B$$



Shared key:

$$\text{Share} = d_A \times d_B \times G$$

Shared key:


$$\text{Share} = d_B \times Q_A$$




Shared key:

$$\text{Share} = d_B \times d_A \times G$$


Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH)



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
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Key Exchange with Public Key



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
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
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
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
Trust Infrastructures



Trust Infrastructures



Simple KDC



Link

Simple KDC



KEK: k_A

Request(ID_A, ID_B)

```
rnd = random.randint(1,2**128)
keyA= hashlib.md5(str(rnd)).digest()
```

```
rnd = random.randint(1,2**128)
keyB= hashlib.md5(str(rnd)).digest()
```

```
print 'Long-term Key Alice=',binascii.hexlify(keyA)
print 'Long-term Key Bob=',binascii.hexlify(keyB)
```

```
rnd = random.randint(1,2**128)
```

```
keySession= hashlib.md5(str(rnd)).hexdigest()
ya = encrypt(keySession,keyA,AES.MODE_ECB)
yb = encrypt(keySession,keyB,AES.MODE_ECB)
```

```
print "Encrypted key sent to Alice:",binascii.hexlify(ya)
print "Encrypted key sent to Bob:",binascii.hexlify(yb)
```

```
decipherA = decrypt(ya,keyA,AES.MODE_ECB)
decipherB = decrypt(yb,keyB,AES.MODE_ECB)
print "Session key:",decipherA print "Session key:",decipherB
```

$$k_{ses} = e_{kA}^{-1}(y_A)$$

y_A

cipher = $e_{kes}(\text{message})$



$\text{message} = e_{kes}^{-1}(y)$

Link

Simple KDC



KEK: k_A

Request(ID_A, ID_B)

```
rnd = random.randint(1,2**128)
keyA= hashlib.md5(str(rnd)).digest()

rnd = random.randint(1,2**128)
keyB= hashlib.md5(str(rnd)).digest()

print 'Long-term Key Alice=',binascii.hexlify(keyA)
print 'Long-term Key Bob=',binascii.hexlify(keyB)

rnd = random.randint(1,2**128)
keySession= hashlib.md5(str(rnd)).hexdigest()
ya = encrypt(keySession,keyA,AES.MODE_ECB)
yb = encrypt(keySession,keyB,AES.MODE_ECB)
```

Long-term Key Alice= 9997205ef32f910d094b11b5f02ffe23

Long-term Key Bob= c2d0b8ac3567ac1f7305d223cecf3cbe

Encrypted key sent to Alice:

2c4ebf8e8748cb11065bb3cba7869c1af9d877c08805b2232ad4c7d8b2f987d5

Encrypted key sent to Bob:

8d9d34a0cf2385a328643e83c11f5523b9d241db50d2e534c563dbbac9bb08ba

Session key: 0ff7556d5a49f4f84f1b7e7c61c7c869


Session key: 0ff7556d5a49f4f84f1b7e7c61c7c869

o Alice:",binascii.hexlify(ya)
o Bob:",binascii.hexlify(yb)
/A,AES.MODE_ECB)
/B,AES.MODE_ECB)
erA print "Session key:",decipherB

message = $e_{kes}^{-1}(y)$

[Link](#)

Simple KDC (enhanced)



Link

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