

# Chapter 6: Digital Certificates

Introduction

Authentication Methods

PKI

Digital Certificate Passing

Prof Bill Buchanan OBE

[http://asecuritysite.com/  
esecurity/unit06](http://asecuritysite.com/esecurity/unit06)

<http://asecuritysite.com/encryption>





# Identity on the Internet

Identifies it is trusted  
(Digital Certificate)

Keeps communications  
secure (encryption)

Firefox

P Accept Online Payments And Mobile Pa... +

PayPal, Inc. (US) | https://www.paypal.com/uk/webapps/mpp/home-merchant

You are connected to  
**paypal.com**  
which is run by  
**PayPal, Inc.**  
San Jose  
California, US  
Verified by: VeriSign, Inc.

The connection to this website is secure.

More Information...


However you do business, PayPal gets you paid.  
Choose your payment solution, you can switch any time.


Accept card payments anywhere with PayPal Here™ [Learn More](#)

Eve




Bob






Authentication is a fundamental issue in security.




**How do we know that it was really Bob who sent the data , as anyone can get Alice's public key , and thus pretend to be Bob?**

Authentication is a fundamental issue in security.




**How can we tell that the message has not been tampered with ?**

Authentication is a fundamental issue in security




**How does Bob distribute his public key to Alice, without having to post it onto a Web site or for Bob to be on-line when Alice reads the message?**

Authentication is a fundamental issue in security.



**Who can we *really* trust to properly authenticate Bob? Obviously we can't trust Bob to authenticate that he really is Bob.**



## Chapter 6: Digital Certificates




Introduction

Authentication Methods

**Prof Bill Buchanan OBE**

<http://asecuritysite.com/crypto06>






## What to authenticate?

Systems.  
Users.  
Data.  
Servers.


## Where authenticated?

End-to-end. User to service.  
Intermediate. Part of the authentication process.

Authentication Methods




End-to-end authentication



Intermediate authentication



User



**One-way server authentication.** Server provides authentication to the client, such as SSL (HTTPS, FTPS, etc).

## Authentication type


One-way server.  
One-way client.  
Two-way.



ID




User



**One-way client authentication.** Client provides authentication to the server such as EAP-TLS in Wireless.



User



**Mutual authentication.** Client and server provide ID to authenticate each other. Examples include PEAP in wireless.



ID

## Authentication


### User




### Device




### Intermediate device



### Intermediate device




### Server





### Service

One-way server.  
One-way client  
Two-way.

**Username/password**  
**Digital Certificate**  
**Token Card**  
**Soft Tokens**  
**Session key**  
**Pass phrase**  
**Biometrics**



**Device name**  
**Digital Certificate** —————→  
**Pass phrase**  
**MAC address**  
**Encryption key**



## Authentication methods

Something you have  
Something you know  
Something you are




Retina scan



Finger prints

Iris scans



Palm prints

**Something you are**




Username/  
password



Mother's maiden name

**Something you  
know**



Digital certificate



Smart card

Network/physical  
address

**Something you  
have**

# Chapter 6: Digital Certificates

Introduction

Authentication Methods

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Digital Certificate Passing

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<http://asecuritysite.com/encryption>



Now that we need the public key to either encrypt data for a recipient, or to authenticate a sender...

How does Bob distribute his public key to Alice , without having to post it onto a Web site or for Bob to be on -line when Alice reads the message?




Public-key



## Digital Certificates

Digital certificates are a soft token of authentication, and require a trust mechanism



## Authentication

## Digital Cert.

Bob



**Certificate**

General Details Certification Path

**Certificate Information**

Windows does not have enough information to verify this certificate.

**Details**

**Issued to:** William Buchanan

**Issued by:** Ascertia CA 1

**Valid from:** 17/12/2006 to 17/12/2007

**Issuer Statement**

**Certificate**

General Details Certification Path

Show: <All>

Field	Value
Public key	RSA (2048 Bits)
Subject Key Identifier	cf 26 7f 61 c0 89 c1 3e 68 a4 f...
Authority Key Identifier	KeyID=94 fe 59 87 45 7b d3 4...
CRL Distribution Points	[1]CRL Distribution Point: Distr...
Authority Information Access	[1]Authority Info Access: Acc...
Thumbprint algorithm	sha1
Thumbprint	13 b8 68 cb 2c 93 b7 7f 2a 7c 6f 81 11 fa ab 97 99 72 80 5a

**Thumbprint**

Edit Properties... Copy to File... OK

**Certificate**

General Details Certification Path

Show: <All>

Field	Value
Issuer	Ascertia CA 1, Class 1 Certific...
Valid from	17 December 2006 21:04:49
Valid to	17 December 2007 21:14:49
Subject	William Buchanan, IT, Napier U...
Public key	RSA (2048 Bits)
Subject Key Identifier	cf 26 7f 61 c0 89 c1 3e 68 a4 f...
Authority Key Identifier	KeyID=94 fe 59 87 45 7b d3 4...
CRL Distribution Points	[1]CRL Distribution Point: Distr...

**Public-key**

**Certificate**

General Details Certification Path

Show: <All>

Field	Value
Version	V3
Serial number	58 74 4e 71 00 00 00 00 44 ba
Signature algorithm	sha1RSA
Issuer	Ascertia CA 1, Class 1 Certific...
Valid from	17 December 2006 21:04:49
Valid to	17 December 2007 21:14:49
Subject	William Buchanan, IT, Napier U...
Public key	RSA (2048 Bits)

CN = Ascertia CA 1  
OU = Class 1 Certificate Authority  
O = Ascertia  
C = GB


**Issuer**

Edit Properties... Copy to File... OK

Digital certificate contains a thumbprint to verify it

**Bob****Certificate****General Details Certification Path****Certificate Information**




Windows does not have enough information to verify this certificate.

**This certificate has only the public key****Issued to:** William Buchanan**Issued by:** Ascertia CA 1**Valid from** 17/12/2006 **to** 17/12/2007**Issuer Statement****OK**

**Bob**

## P7b format

```
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIDZCCA4wgAwIBAgIKWHR0cQAAAABeujANBgkqhkiG 9w0BAQUFADBgMQSwCQYD
VQQGEWJHqjERMA 8GA1UEChMIQXnjZXJ 0awExJjAkBgNvBAS THUnsYXKnZIDEg 2Vv
dglmawNhgdUgox 0 ag9yaXR 5MRWfAYDVQDew 1bc2n1cnRpYSBDQSAxMB 4XDTA2
MTIxNzIxMDQ 0 0voxDTA3MTIxNzIxMTQ 0 0VowgZ 8xJjAkBgkqhkiG 9w0BCQEWf3cu
YnvjagFuYw 5AbmFwawVylMfjLnVmRQSwCQYDVQGEWJSZEOMA 4GA1UECBMHTG 90
ag1hbjEsmBAGA 1UEBxMjRWRpdmJ 1cmdoMrRowGAYDVQKExFOYKbpZXigVw 5pdmy
c210etELMAKGA 1UECxMCsvQxtAxBgNVBAMTEfdpbGxpVw 0 qgnVjaGFuYw 4wgEi
MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCVCFETyJL 8VxAhEMRzQI0gM81
ci75nmMsomajzcB 6fhGmGowMycoscmQkrVjAknoS +4mxzhny3mdob+szbwVaX
M5FoXhsrV+Q86hsk8Cdc+lsqy3TQtqnfubDns 0tR6q7CgGqQ8/VjsXnqzK 39
iLuf1ahycet /ab60/gwzL4ivsz2nml4dyauyt1hLP1VbppHGde 6sDQXWyd0cpfv
ZN7paud5fqBESf06bukcieI47AzRMQj 3kHuDt7MexVw7aoX+nXLP4wn7iamaxasF
QvhodkyCzh8s BZJQDGatXRCqkk1ztmz 5i6GKpse7XvuX265Wjq5afhp2hY1AgMB
AAGjggEXMIEBEZAdbgNVHQ 4EFgqUzy/Z/YccJwT5opPHLPIcqkkolkjwwyyvDR 0j
BFwwloAUtP 5Zh0V700k6 CorvRMwB9ifvkBmhP6Q9MDsxzC2AjB9NVBAYTAKdCMREW
DwYDVQKewHbC 2N1cnRpYTeZMBcGA 1UEAxMQXNzjZXJ 0awEgum9vdCBQYIBDTBN
BgNvHR8ERjBEMEkQKA+hjxodhrwo1 8vd3d3lmfzY2vydG1hlmNbVs 5pbpxbmVD
QS9jcmxzL0FzY2Vdg1hQ 0ExLNsYXNzMS 5jcmrwPgYIKWvBQHUQAQEMJAWMC 4G
CCsGAQFBzAChiJodhrwo1 8vb2Nzcc5nbG9iYwX0cnvZdgZpbmr1ci 5j2b2v0mAOG
CSqGSib 3DQEBBQAA0EATOCwGJ 1t50kt1upmpjkM1 8idxMmD5wuhszjB1GsMhPxI
H+vXhL9yaOw+Prpz7aJS4/3xxu8vRAnhyu 9yu4qDA==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
```



- The main certificate formats include:**
- P7b. Text format
  - PFX/P12. Binary.
  - SST. Binary.




- A. Bob creates the message.
- B. Bob encrypts with Alice's public key and sends Alice the encrypted message
- C. Alice decrypts with her private key
- D. Alice receives the message



Hello

H&\$d .




Alice sends her digital certificate with her public key on it



Alice's private key

Hello



Bob sends his Digital certificate to authenticate himself



Alice checks the hash using Bob's public key from his certificate

# Chapter 6: Digital Certificates

Introduction

Authentication Methods

PKI

Digital Certificate Passing




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<http://asecuritysite.com/crypto06>

<http://asecuritysite.com/encryption>



**Who do we trust to get Bob's certificate ... we can't trust Bob, as he may be Eve... meet Trent.**




## Digital Certificates

Digital certificates are a soft token of authentication, and require a trust mechanism

## Trusted Root CA



The Trusted Root CE (Trent) checks Bob's identity and creates a certificate which he signs



Certificate Authority (CA)  
- Able to grant certificates  
Examples; Verisign, Entrust, Microsoft Trust.

Trent



Trusted root certificates are installed as a default on the machine (or installed with the user's permission)

Trusted root certificate

Alice checks the signature of the certificate to validate Bob. Both Alice and Bob trust the CA (Trent) as a third party.




Author: Prof Bill Buchanan



## Trusted Root CA



Eve tricks the CA to get a certificate with Bob's name



Alice checks the signature of the certificate to validate Bob. Both Alice and Bob trust the CA (Trent) as a third party.


Certificate Authority (CA)  
- Able to grant certificates  
Examples; Verisign, Entrust, Microsoft Trust.

Trent



Trusted root certificates are installed as a default on the machine (or installed with the user's permission)

Trusted root certificate



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**Certificates**

Intended purpose: <All>

Intermediate Certification Authorities Trusted Root Certification Authorities Trusted Publ

Issued To	Issued By	Expiration...	Friendly...
Microsoft Authenticode(tm)...	Microsoft Authenticode(tm)...	31/12/1999	Microsoft
Microsoft Root Authority	Microsoft Root Authority	31/12/2020	Microsoft
Microsoft Root Certificate ...	Microsoft Root Certificate ...	09/05/2021	Microsoft
NetLock Expressz (Class C...)	NetLock Expressz (Class C...)	20/02/2019	NetLock I
NetLock Kozjegyzoj (Class ...	NetLock Kozjegyzoj (Class ...	19/02/2019	NetLock I
NetLock Uzleti (Class B) Ta...	NetLock Uzleti (Class B) Ta...	20/02/2019	NetLock I
NO LIABILITY ACCEPTED, ...	NO LIABILITY ACCEPTED, (...	07/01/2004	VeriSign
PTT Post Root CA	PTT Post Root CA	26/06/2019	KeyMail F

Import... Export... Remove Advanced...

Certificate intended purposes <All>

**Trusted Root CA**  
- always trusted

## Trusted Root CA



### Certificate purposes:

- Secure email.
- Server authentication.
- Code signing.
- Driver authentication.
- Time stamping.
- Client authentication.
- IP tunnelling.
- EFS (Encrypted File System).

**Certificate**

General Details Certification Path

**Certificate Information**

This CA Root certificate is not trusted. To enable trust, install this certificate in the Trusted Root Certification Authorities store.

**Self signed**  
- Can never be trusted

Issued to: William Buchanan  
Issued by: William Buchanan  
Valid from 22/02/2007 to 29/01/2107  
You have a private key that corresponds to this certificate.

Issuer Statement OK



**Certificates**

Intended purpose: <All>

Intermediate Certification Authorities Trusted Root Certification Authorities Trusted Publ

Issued To	Issued By	Expiration...	Friendly...
GTE CyberTrust Root	Root SGC Authority	23/02/2006	<N>
Microsoft Internet Authority	GTE CyberTrust Global Root	23/02/2007	<N>
Microsoft Internet Authority	GTE CyberTrust Global Root	19/04/2009	<N>
Microsoft Secure Server Authority	Microsoft Internet Authority	23/02/2007	<N>
Microsoft Secure Server Authority	Microsoft Internet Authority	19/04/2009	<N>
Microsoft Windows Hardware C...	Microsoft Root Authority	31/12/2002	<N>
Microsoft Windows Hardware C...	Microsoft Root Authority	31/12/2002	<N>
MS SGC Authority	Root SGC Authority	01/01/2010	<N>

Import... Export... Remove Advanced...

Certificate intended purposes

Signing, Windows Hardware Driver Verification

**Intermediate CA**  
- Can be trusted for some things

Levels of trust



The two main problems with digital certificates are:

- Lack of understanding of how they work.
- They can be spoofed.


So let's look at a few ... are they real or fake?



Humor12.com



# Real or fake?



Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Real or fake?



Certificate path

VeriSign  
VeriSign Class 3 Extended Validation SSL CA  
signin.ebay.com

https://www.verisign.com/repository/rpa.html - Windows Internet Explorer

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RESOURCES

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Licenses & Approvals  
E-Sign  
Publications

Home > Repository

## VeriSign Relying Party Agreement

YOU MUST READ THIS RELYING PARTY AGREEMENT ("AGREEMENT") BEFORE VALIDATING A CERTIFICATE, USING VERISIGN'S ONLINE CERTIFICATE STATUS PROTOCOL ("OCSP") OR USING A VERISIGN OR VERISIGN AFFILIATE DATABASE OF CERTIFICATE REVOCATION LIST ("CRL"). IF YOU DO NOT AGREE TO THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT, DO NOT SUBMIT A QUERY AND DO NOT ACCESS, OR RELY ON ANY VERISIGN INFORMATION. IN CONSIDERATION OF YOUR AGREEMENT TO THESE TERMS, YOU ARE ENTITLED TO USE VERISIGN INFORMATION AS SET FORTH HEREIN.

**1. Term of Agreement.** This Agreement becomes effective when you submit a query to validate a Certificate, or rely on any VeriSign Information in the manner set forth in the preamble and shall be applicable for as long as you use and/or rely on such VeriSign Information.


**2. Definitions.**  
"Certificate" or "Digital Certificate" means a message that, at least, states a name or identifier for the Subscriber, contains the Subscriber's public key, identifies the Certificate's serial number, and contains a digital signature of the issuing CA.



# Real!

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan


Real or fake?




# Real or fake?

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Real or fake?



# Fake!



**Certificates**


Intended purpose: <All>

Issued To	Issued By	Expiration Date	Friendly Name
ABA ECOM Root CA	ABA.ECOM Root CA	09/07/2009	DST (ABA.ECOM...)
Amazon eCommerce	Amazon eCommerce	01/01/2013	<None>
Autoridad Certifica...	Autoridad Certificador...	28/06/2009	Autoridad Certifi...
Autoridad Certifica...	Autoridad Certificador...	29/06/2009	Autoridad Certifi...
Baltimore EZ by DST	Baltimore EZ by DST	03/07/2009	DST (Baltimore E...
Belgacom E-Trust P...	Belgacom E-Trust Prim...	21/01/2010	Belgacom E-Trus...
C&W HKT SecureN...	C&W HKT SecureNet ...	16/10/2009	CW HKT Secure...
C&W HKT SecureN...	C&W HKT SecureNet ...	16/10/2009	CW HKT Secure...
C&W HKT SecureN...	C&W HKT SecureNet ...	16/10/2010	CW HKT Secure...

Import... Export... Remove Advanced...

Certificate intended purposes

Code Signing View Close



# Real or fake?

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Real or fake?



# Real



Certificate

General Details Certification Path

Certification path

- GlobalSign
- GlobalSign Domain Validation CA
- \*.napier.ac.uk

GlobalSign (SSL Certificate) Legal Repository - Windows Internet Explorer

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

GlobalSign (SSL Certificate) Legal Repository

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You are here: United States Home > Repository > Legal Documents

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- Company Profile
- Company History
- Management Team
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- Repository**
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- International
- Contact Us

**Repository of Legal Documents & Root Certificates**

GlobalSign Root Certificates  
All Root & Intermediate CA Certificates

GlobalSign Certification Practice Statement (CPS)  
Current version - v6.1 - June 08  
Previous version - v6.0 - December 07

GlobalSign Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for  
Adobe Certified Document Services (CDS)

Waiting 100% Internet | Protected Mode: Off Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

# Chapter 6: Digital Certificates

Introduction

Authentication Methods

PKI

Digital Certificate Passing

**Prof Bill Buchanan OBE**

<http://asecuritysite.com/crypto06>

<http://asecuritysite.com/encryption>





## Public key encryption ... secret ... identity ... trust



Eve



Trent



MegaCorp




Bob's Private Key



Bob's Public Key



Alice's Public Key



Alice's Private Key



## Public key encryption ... secret ... identity ... trust



Eve



Trent



MegaCorp



Bob's Private Key




Bob's Public Key



Alice's Public Key



Alice's Public Key




Alice's Private Key



# Public key encryption ... secret ... identity ... trust



MegaCorp





## Public key encryption ... secret ... identity ... trust



Eve



Trent



MegaCorp



Alice's Public Key



Bob's Private Key





Bob's Public Key

Hello Alice,  
Wish you were  
here!  
- Bob

Bob.



Alice's Public Key



Alice's Private Key



# Public key encryption ... secret ... identity ... trust



Eve



Trent



MegaCorp




Hello Alice,  
Wish you were  
here!  
- Bob

Bob:



Bob's Private Key





# Public key encryption ... secret ... identity ... trust





Eve



Trent



MegaCorp





## Public key encryption ... secret ... identity ... trust



Eve



Trent



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Bob's Private Key




Bob's Public Key



Which key to open  
the message?



Alice's Public Key



Alice's Private Key




# Public key encryption ... secret ... identity ... trust



Hello Alice,  
Wish you were  
here!  
- Bob

Bob.

Which key to open  
the message?






## Public key encryption ... secret ... identity ... trust



Eve



Trent



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Bob's Private Key



Bob's Public Key


Hello Alice,  
Wish you were  
here!  
- Bob

Bob:

Which key to we  
open the signature  
with?



Alice's Public Key



Alice's Private Key



# Public key encryption ... secret ... identity ... trust




MegaCorp




Hello Alice,  
Wish you were  
here!  
- Bob


Bob:






# Public key encryption ... secret ... identity ... trust










## Authentication

The magic private key




**Bob encrypts the message/hash with Alice's public key**

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

## Authentication



The magic private key



Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Alice decrypts the message

## Authentication



Alice compares the MD5 values. If they are the same ... Bob sent the message

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Alice decrypts the message

# Chapter 6: Digital Certificates

Introduction

Authentication Methods

PKI

Digital Certificate Passing

**Prof Bill Buchanan OBE**

<http://asecuritysite.com/crypto06>

<http://asecuritysite.com/encryption>



