Network and Web Security


PHP

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Course web page: https://331.cybersec.fun

Why PHP?

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- PHP is the predominant server-side language
 - Many large websites
 - Facebook
 - Baidu, Yahoo
 - Wikipedia, Wordpress
 - Pornhub ⊕
 - ...
 - Very large percentage of small websites
- Simple and practical
 - Fast development cycle
 - Easy to get started and to deploy
- Powerful and dangerous
 - Easy to make mistakes
 - Many practical examples of server-side vulnerabilities are on PHP
 - Preferred by attackers
 - Most exploit/phishing kits are written in PHP
- Goal: understand enough PHP to read examples, find vulnerabilities, propose fixes
 - Non-goal: become a proficient PHP programmer
 - Recommended exercise
 - Write a simple web app in PHP that can store HTTP POST data in a Postgres SQL or SQLite database




Search for CVEs, 5/2/21, for last 3 years

PHP	5,145
Java	2,452
Ruby	173
ASP.net	37

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PHP by examples

- Hello WWW
 - Client sends GET request http://www.example.com/hello.php?name=www
 - Server runs the PHP script
 - <? echo "<HTML><Body>Hello_".\$_GET["name"]."!</Body></HTML>"; ?>
 - Client receives personalised web page



Imperative language with aliasing

Dynamic variable names

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PHP by examples

• Implicit type conversions ("type juggling")

```
php> if (0) {echo "yes";} else {echo "no";} // "no"
php> if ("0") {echo "yes";} else {echo "no";} // "no"
php> if (0.0) {echo "yes";} else {echo "no";} // "no"
php> if ("0.0") {echo "yes";} else {echo "no";} // "yes"
    — "0"=> false, "sssss"=> true (as boolean)
php> var_dump(3.2*"hi" + 45 - "3bye"*true); // float(42)
    - "sssss" => 0, "nnnssss" => nnn (as number)
php > var_dump("10" < "9");
                            // bool(false)
php> var_dump("10LOW"<"9HIGH"); // bool(true)</pre>
    — Crazy rules for comparison operator (<_n vs <_s)
```

See: Abstract domains for type juggling (Arceri, Maffeis), 2016

```
• Arrays $x = array("foo" => "bar",4.5 => "baz");
$x[] = "default"; // use default key 5
echo $x[5]; // prints "default"
echo current($x); // prints "bar"
next($x); // advances the pointer
echo current($x); // prints "baz"
```

Objects

```
$obj -> x = 0;
var_dump($obj);
> object(stdClass)#1 (1) { ["x"]=> int(0) }

class par {
    private $id = "foo";
    function displayMe() {
        echo $this -> id; }}

$obj = new chld();
$obj -> displayHim(); // prints "foo"
```

Arrays view of environments

```
$GLOBALS["x"] = 42;
echo $x;  // prints 42
```

Subtle array-copy semantics

```
x = array(1, 2, 3);
y = x;
$x[0] = "updated";
echo $y[0];
           // prints 1
x = array(1, 2, 3);
$temp = &$x[1]; // we introduce sharing
                    // and assign normally
$y = $x;

$x[0] = "regular";

// and assign normally
// update a regular element
y = x
$x[1] = "shared"; // update the shared element
var_dump($x);
                               var_dump($y);
> array(3) {
                               > array(3) {
    [0]=> string(7) "regular"
                                [0] = \inf(1)
                                [1]=> &string(6) "shared"
    [1]=> &string(6) "shared"
    [2]=> int(3) }
                                   [2]=> int(3) }
```

Functions, and delayed reference resolution

```
function mod_x() {
        global $x;
        $x = array('a','b');
        return 0;
}

$x = array(1, 2);
$x[0] = mod_x();
var_dump($x);

>array(2) { [0]=> int(0)
        [1]=> string(1) "b" }
```

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Analysis of PHP

- PHP is hard to analyse statically
 - Interplay of aliasing, objects, type conversions, dynamic string-to-code conversion, copy-on-write optimisation
 - Hack (https://hacklang.org) restricts PHP to provide static type system
- Practical PHP analysis tools (Fortify, Pixy, Checkmarx...)
 - Mostly based on taint analysis and string analysis
 - Coarse over/under-approximation to limit false positives/negatives
- Research on static analysis
 - Dahse, Holz: Static Detection of Second-Order Vulnerabilities in Web Applications. USENIX Security 2014
 - Hauzar, Kofron: Framework for Static Analysis of PHP Applications. ECOOP 2015
 - Filaretti: An executable formal semantics of PHP with applications to program analysis. DOC PhD Thesis, 2016
 - Backes, et al: Efficient and Flexible Discovery of PHP Application Vulnerabilities.
 EURO S&P 2017
- DeepTective: prize winning DOC MEng project
 - Rabheru, Hanif, Maffeis: A Hybrid Graph Neural Network Approach for Detecting PHP Vulnerabilities. ArXiv 2020 and SAC 2021
 - Found 4 new vulns in Wordpress plugins, 2 CVEs