Network Security - Eclipse Attacks

Eclipse Attacks



1 connection sufficient
No victim restart necessary

Eclipse attacks
Heilman et al., Usenix ’15

Monopolize connections
Spamming addresses
Forcing node restart
Requires many bots

Denial of Service

Double Spending

Request timeouts



Block timeout: 20 minutes
Transaction timeout: 2 minutes

Implications

Adversary

- Blinds victim from blocks and transaction > 20 min
- Experimental validation

Impact

- **Double spend transactions**
- Aggravated selfish mining
- **Network wide Denial of Service**



Mitigations

- **Hardening measures**
- Estimate waiting time for secure transactions

Necessary requirements

1. Must be **first** peer to advertise Transaction/Block



2. Victim should wait
   - Block timeout: 20 minutes
   - Transaction timeout: 2 minutes

Being First



Connections of Adversary	40	80	200	800
Connections of Victim	40	40	40	40
Average success in being first	0.44± 0.14	0.57± 0.20	0.80± 0.14	**0.89± 0.07**

Waiting

Transactions

- After 2 minutes request from other peer (FIFO)





Blocks

- After 20 minutes disconnect and do nothing
- If received header, disconnect and request block from another peer