Privacy Engineering (70018)

Computing on Untrusted Servers - Solutions

3.1 Here's one solution. Others are possible also. Using some cryptographic notation in the steps is ok also.

Alice is submitting document P. Bob is searching for documents on keyword Q. Assuming: EncH(Word, Key) = Encrypt(Hash(Keyword))

```
__ Document insertion _____
Alice:
  AEP
                                            // Encrypt P with random symmetric key K
       = Encrypt(P, K)
  AK
       = Encrypt(K, Ae1)
                                            // Encrypt symmetric key with Alice's key
  AW[i] = EncH(W[i], Ae1) for each keyword // Encrypt hashes of keywords with Alice's key
  Send AEP, AK, AW[] to DB
                                            // Send to DB
DB:
                                   // Document encryption key now encrypted by DB(e)
       = Encrypt(AK, Ae2)
 DW[i] = Encrypt(AW[i], Ae2) for each keyword // Keyword hashes now encrypted by DB(e)
 Store AEP and DK indexed by each DW[i]
                                          // e.g. Store[DW[i]] = (AEP, AK) for each i
                      ___ Document query _____
Bob:
 Send BQ=EncH(Q, Be1) to DB // Encrypt hash of search keyword and send to DB
DB:
 DQ = Encrypt(BQ, Be2)
                                            // Search keyword now encrypted by DB (e)
 AEP[j], DK[j] = Lookup(DQ)
                                            // Lookup entries for matching encrypted keywords
  BK[j] = Decrypt(DK[j], Bd2) for each document j // Documents encryption keys half
                                            // decrypted for Bob
 Send AEP[], BK[] to Bob
Bob:
       K[j] = Decrypt (BK[j], Bd1)
                                           // Retrieve symmetric keys for encrypted documents
       Docs[j] = Decrypt(AEP[j], K[j])
                                            // Decrypt encrypted documents
```

3.2 Alice publishes her public key online and generates a secret function key for her spam filtering rule predicate and sends it to Bob the spam filtering service. Users sending email to Alice will encrypt the email with her public key. Bob can now determine, for each email, whether to store it in Alice's mailbox or to discard it as spam, without learning anything about Alice's email (except for whether it was considered spam or not).

3.3 (a) Show that c_2 simplifies to $m \cdot e(g, g)^{r_a n}$ in step 5.

$$c_{2} = m \cdot Z_{a}^{r_{a}} \cdot e(g^{r_{a}}, g^{n}h_{a2}^{-x_{a}})$$

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$$c_{2} = m \cdot Z_{a}^{r_{a}} \cdot e(g^{r_{a}}, g^{n-x_{a}z_{a}})$$

$$c_{2} = m \cdot Z_{a}^{r_{a}} \cdot e(g, g)^{r_{a}(n-x_{a}z_{a})}$$

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$$c_{2} = m \cdot Z_{a}^{r_{a}} \cdot e(g, g)^{r_{a}n-r_{a}x_{a}z_{a}}$$

$$c_{2} = m \cdot Z_{a}^{r_{a}} \cdot e(g, g)^{r_{a}n} \cdot e(g, g)^{-r_{a}x_{a}z_{a}}$$

$$c_{2} = m \cdot Z_{a}^{r_{a}} \cdot e(g^{r_{a}}, g^{n}) \cdot e(g^{r_{a}}, g^{-x_{a}z_{a}})$$

$$c_{2} = m \cdot e(g^{x_{a}}, g^{z_{a}})^{r_{a}} \cdot e(g^{r_{a}}, g^{n}) \cdot e(g^{r_{a}}, g^{-x_{a}z_{a}})$$

$$c_{2} = m \cdot e(g, g)^{x_{a}z_{a}r_{a}} \cdot e(g^{r_{a}}, g^{n}) \cdot e(g, g)^{-x_{a}z_{a}r_{a}}$$

$$c_{2} = m \cdot e(g, g)^{x_{a}z_{a}r_{a}} \cdot e(g^{r_{a}}, g^{n}) \cdot e(g, g)^{-x_{a}z_{a}r_{a}}$$

$$c_{3} = m \cdot e(g, g)^{r_{a}n}$$

(b) Show that step 6 produces *m*

$$c_{2} \cdot c_{1}^{-\frac{1}{y_{b}}}$$

$$m \cdot e(g, g)^{r_{a}n} \cdot e(g^{r_{a}}, h_{b1}^{n})^{-\frac{1}{y_{b}}}$$

$$m \cdot e(g, g)^{r_{a}n} \cdot e(g^{r_{a}}, g^{y_{b}n})^{-\frac{1}{y_{b}}}$$

$$m \cdot e(g, g)^{r_{a}n} \cdot e(g, g)^{-r_{a}y_{b}n\frac{1}{y_{b}}}$$

$$m \cdot e(g, g)^{r_{a}n} \cdot e(g, g)^{-r_{a}n}$$

$$m$$

(c) (i)
$$sk_{a} = (x'_{a}, y_{a})$$
(ii)
$$pk_{a} = (h_{a1}, h_{a2}, z'_{a})$$

$$z'_{a} = z_{a}^{x'_{a}/x_{a}}$$

$$z'_{a} = e(g^{x_{a}}, g^{z_{a}})^{x'_{a}/x_{a}}$$

$$z'_{a} = e(g, g)^{x_{a}z_{a}x'_{a}/x_{a}}$$

$$z'_{a} = e(g, g)^{x'_{a}z_{a}}$$

$$z'_{a} = e(g, g)^{x'_{a}z_{a}}$$

$$z'_{a} = e(g, g)^{x'_{a}z_{a}}$$

$$z_a^{\prime r_a} = e(g^{x_a^{\prime}}, g^{z_a})^{r_a}$$

(iii)

$$rk_{a o b}=(h^n_{b1},g^nh^{-x_a}_{a2})$$
 for Alice to Bob
$$rk_{a o f}=(h^{n'}_{f1},(g^nh^{-x_a}_{a2})^{x'_a/x_a}) \text{ where } n'=nx'_a/x_a \text{ for Alice's friend } f$$

$$rk_{a o f}=(h^{n'}_{f1},g^{n'}h^{-x'_a}_{a2})$$

(iv)

For Alice's friend f we have

$$c_1 = e(g^{r_a}, h_{f_1}^{n'})$$

$$c_2 = m \cdot Z_a^{\prime r_a} \cdot e(g^{r_a}, g^{n'}h_{a2}^{-x'a})$$

$$c_2 = m \cdot e(g^{r_a}, g^{n'})$$

$$c_2 = m \cdot e(g, g)^{r_a n'}$$

Decryption

$$m \cdot e(g,g)^{r_a n'} \cdot e(g^{r_a}, g^{y_f n'})^{-\frac{1}{y_f}}$$

$$m \cdot e(g,g)^{r_a n'} \cdot (g,g)^{-r_a n'}$$

$$m$$

For revoked Bob (b) we have

$$\begin{split} c_1 &= e(g^{r_a}, h^n_{b1}) \\ c_2 &= m \cdot Z_a^{\prime \, r_a} \cdot e\big(g^{r_a}, g^n h^{-x_a}_{a2}\big) \\ c_2 &= m \cdot e(g^{x'_a}, g^{z_a})^{r_a} \cdot e(g^{r_a}, g^n) \cdot e(g^{r_a}, g^{-x_a z_a}) \\ c_2 &= m \cdot e(g, g)^{x'_a z_a r_a} \cdot e(g^{r_a}, g^n) \cdot e(g, g)^{-x_a z_a r_a} \\ 2^{\text{nd}} \text{ and last multiplicands don't cancel!} \end{split}$$