Appendix A

Proof of Lemma 1.

To show that $\overline{g}(v)$ is increasing in v, note by eq. (4) that

$$\overline{g}'(v) = -\overline{g}(v) \frac{R'(v)}{1 + R(v)} \tag{A-1}$$

Moreover, since $\beta_i \sim Exp(1/\lambda)$, $R(v) = \frac{1 - e^{-\beta_1(v)/\lambda}}{e^{-\beta_2(v)/\lambda}}$. Therefore, differentiating R(v) with respect to v yields

$$R'(v) = \frac{1}{\lambda} \beta_2'(v) e^{\beta_2(v)/\lambda} - \frac{1}{\lambda} \left[\beta_2'(v) - \beta_1'(v) \right] e^{(\beta_2(v) - \beta_1(v))/\lambda} =$$

$$= -\frac{N(N-1)}{(Nv-1)^2} \frac{1}{\lambda} \left[e^{\beta_2(v)/\lambda} + \gamma R(v) \right] < 0$$
(A-2)

where the last equality takes into account that $\beta_1'(v) = -\frac{N(N-1)}{(Nv-1)^2} < 0$ and $\beta_2'(v) = -\frac{N(N-1)}{(Nv-1)^2}(1+\gamma) < 0$. Given R'(v) < 0, eq. (A-1) implies that $\overline{g}'(v) > 0$.

To show that $\lim_{v \to \frac{1}{N}} \overline{g}(v) = 0$, we need to show that $\lim_{v \to \frac{1}{N}} R(v) = \infty$. Note that $\lim_{v \to \frac{1}{N}} \beta_1(v) = \lim_{v \to \frac{1}{N}} \beta_2(v) = \infty$. Therefore, $\lim_{v \to \frac{1}{N}} e^{-\beta_2(v)/\lambda} = \lim_{v \to \frac{1}{N}} e^{-\beta_1(v)/\lambda} = 0$, resulting in $\lim_{v \to \frac{1}{N}} R(v) = \infty$. To see that $\lim_{v \to 1} \overline{g}(v) = W$ note that $\lim_{v \to 1} \beta_1(v) = 0$ and $\lim_{v \to 1} \beta_2(v) = \gamma$. This implies that $\lim_{v \to 1} R(v) = 0$ and $\lim_{v \to 1} \overline{g}(v) = W$.

To establish the existence and uniqueness of $\tilde{v}(\lambda)$ and its corresponding properties, we first derive $\overline{g}''(v)$ by differentiating $\overline{g}'(v)$ with respect to v, yielding

$$\overline{g}''(v) = \frac{\overline{g}(v)}{(1+R(v))} \left[2\frac{[R'(v)]^2}{1+R(v)} - R''(v) \right]$$
(A-3)

Differentiating eq. (A-2) with respect to v and simplifying yields

$$R''(v) = \frac{N^2(N-1)^2}{\lambda^2(Nv-1)^4} \left[\left(e^{\beta_2(v)/\lambda} + \gamma R(v) \right) \left(\frac{2\lambda(Nv-1)}{(N-1)} + \gamma \right) + (1+\gamma)e^{\beta_2(v)/\lambda} \right]$$
(A-4)

Substituting for R'(v) and R''(v) in eq. (A-3) and simplifying results in

$$\overline{g}''(v) = \frac{\overline{g}(v)}{(1+R(v))} \frac{N^2(N-1)^2}{\lambda^2(Nv-1)^4} [e^{\beta_2(v)/\lambda} + \gamma R(v)] \times \left[2\frac{e^{\beta_2(v)/\lambda} + \gamma R(v)}{1+R(v)} - \frac{(1+\gamma)e^{\beta_2(v)/\lambda}}{e^{\beta_2(v)/\lambda} + \gamma R(v)} - \frac{2\lambda(Nv-1)}{(N-1)} - \gamma \right]$$

Note that

$$g''(v) \stackrel{sign}{=} \left[2 \frac{e^{\beta_2(v)/\lambda} + \gamma R(v)}{1 + R(v)} - \frac{(1+\gamma)e^{\beta_2(v)/\lambda}}{e^{\beta_2(v)/\lambda} + \gamma R(v)} - \frac{2\lambda(Nv-1)}{(N-1)} - \gamma \right] = \Omega(v,\lambda).$$

To show the uniqueness of $\tilde{v}(\lambda)$, we first show that $\Omega(v,\lambda)$ is strictly decreasing in v, implying that there is at most one solution to $\overline{g}''(v) = 0$. Substituting for R(v) in the above expression and further simplifying yields

$$\Omega(v,\lambda) = 2\frac{1 + \gamma(1 - e^{-\beta_1(v)/\lambda})}{1 + e^{-[\beta_1(v) + \beta_2(v)]/\lambda}} - \frac{1 + \gamma}{1 + \gamma(1 - e^{-\beta_1(v)/\lambda})} - \frac{2\lambda(Nv - 1)}{(N - 1)} - \gamma \tag{A-5}$$

It is immediately evident that $\Omega(v,\lambda)$ is strictly decreasing in v since $\beta'_1(v) < 0$ and $\beta'_2(v) < 0$. Thus, there is at most one solution to $\Omega(v,\lambda) = 0$.

To establish the existence of $\tilde{v}(\lambda)$, note that

$$\lim_{v \to \frac{1}{N}} \Omega(v, \lambda) = 1 + \gamma > 0, \tag{A-6}$$

since $\lim_{v\to\frac{1}{N}}\beta_1(v)=\lim_{v\to\frac{1}{N}}\beta_2(v)=\infty$, and

$$\lim_{v \to 1} \Omega(v, \lambda) = \frac{2}{1 + e^{-\lambda/\gamma}} - 2/\lambda - 1, \tag{A-7}$$

since $\lim_{v\to 1} \beta_1(v) = 0$ and $\lim_{v\to 1} \beta_2(v) = \gamma$. It is straightforward to verify that $\lim_{v\to 1} \Omega(v,\lambda)$ is strictly decreasing in λ and takes negative values for all $\lambda > \tilde{\lambda}$ where $\tilde{\lambda} \in (0,\infty)$ solves

$$\lim_{v \to 1} \Omega(v, \tilde{\lambda}) = 0.$$

Thus, for $\lambda > \tilde{\lambda}$, $\tilde{v}(\lambda)$ uniquely solves $\Omega(\tilde{v}(\lambda), \lambda) = 0$ and $\tilde{v}(\lambda) \in (\frac{1}{N}, 1)$, while for $\lambda < \tilde{\lambda}$, $\Omega(v, \lambda) > 0$ for all $v \in (\frac{1}{N}, 1)$ and thus $\tilde{v}(\lambda) = 1$. This establishes the existence of a unique $\tilde{v}(\lambda) \in (\frac{1}{N}, 1]$ with g''(v) > 0 for $v < \tilde{v}(\lambda)$ and g''(v) < 0 for $v > \tilde{v}$, proving property 1).

To establish property 2, note first that for $\lambda < \tilde{\lambda}$ $\tilde{v}(\lambda) = 1$. For $\lambda > \tilde{\lambda}$ implicit differentiation of $\Omega(\tilde{v}(\lambda), \lambda) = 0$ results in

$$\tilde{v}'(\lambda) = -\frac{\partial \Omega(v,\lambda)/\partial \lambda}{\partial \Omega(v,\lambda)/\partial v}$$

Recall that $\partial \Omega(v,\lambda)/\partial v < 0$. Moreover, straighforward differentiation reveals that $\partial \Omega(v,\lambda)/\partial \lambda < 0$. 0. Therefore, it follows immediately that $\tilde{v}'(\lambda) < 0$.

The property $\lim_{\lambda\to 0} \tilde{v}(\lambda) = 1$ follow immediately from the fact that $\tilde{v}(\lambda) = 1$ for $\lambda < \tilde{\lambda} \in (0, \infty)$. Finally, to establish that $\lim_{\lambda\to\infty} \tilde{v}(\lambda) = \frac{1}{N}$, note that

$$\lim_{\lambda \to \infty} \Omega(v,\lambda) = \lim_{\lambda \to \infty} -2 \frac{Nv-1}{N-1} \lambda$$

By definition, $\Omega(\tilde{v}(\lambda), \lambda) = 0$ for $\lambda > \tilde{\lambda}$. Therefore,

$$\lim_{\lambda \to \infty} \Omega(\tilde{v}(\lambda), \lambda) = \lim_{\lambda \to \infty} -2 \frac{N\tilde{v}(\lambda) - 1}{N - 1} \lambda = 0 \Longrightarrow \lim_{\lambda \to \infty} \tilde{v}(\lambda) = \frac{1}{N}$$

Proof of Proposition 1.

Given $\frac{1}{N} < v_L < v_H < 1$, by Lemma 1, there exist $\lambda_1 > 0$ be such that $\tilde{v}(\lambda_1) = v_H$ and $\lambda_2 > \lambda_1$ such that $\tilde{v}(\lambda_2) = v_L$. Furthermore, by Lemma 1, $\overline{g}(v)$ is convex for all $v < v_H$ if $\lambda \le \lambda_1$. Thus, by definition of convexity,

$$p_L \overline{g}(v_L) + p_H \overline{g}(v_H) > \overline{g}(p_L v_L + p_H v_H)$$

Analogously, for $\lambda \geq \lambda_2$, $\overline{g}(v)$ is concave for all $v \geq v_L$, implying the reverse inequality.

Appendix B Instructions for Stage 2

Thank you for participating in our study.

This is an experiment in decision-making. You will earn money based on the decisions that you and others make during this study. Since you could earn a significant amount of money from this study, please pay attention to the instructions.

It is very important that you remain silent and do not talk to others. If you have any questions or need assistance, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you.

Today, I will be reading the instructions for you. Please follow the instructions as I read them and please do not click "NEXT" until I instruct you to do so. We appreciate your cooperation.

Please turn off your electronic devices and put them away. You are not allowed to use your electronic devices until the end of the experiment. Please feel free to use the calculator that is provided for you.

You will be paid a show-up fee of \$8 for participating in our study today; this will be yours to keep. You will have the opportunity to make more money during the experiment. All of your earnings will be paid to you in cash and in private at the end of the experiment.

The currency used in this experiment is tokens. At the end of the experiment, all of the tokens you have earned will be converted to money at the following rate:

1 Token=\$0.50 (1 Token = 50 cents)

Please click NEXT when you are ready.

Instructions You will be randomly assigned to a group consisting of three people. The identity of your group members in this experiment will be kept anonymous and confidential to all participants. Neither before nor after the experimental session will you learn who are/were in your group. This experiment consists of two sets of 10 rounds, and you will be paid for one round picked at random at the end of the experiment. Right now, nobody knows which round is the paying round. Thus, it is in your best interest to pay equal attention to all rounds. In each round, each group member has to decide on the allocation of 20 tokens. Each group member starts out with 20 tokens in his/her private account in each and every round. You can leave these 20 tokens in your private account or you can contribute them fully or partially to a group project. Each token you do not contribute to the group project will automatically remain in your private account. In each round, you will face the same decision. In each round, you will be randomly re-matched with two other participants. Are there any questions so far? Please click NEXT when you are ready. Next YOUR EARNINGS FROM THE PRIVATE ACCOUNT You will earn one token for each token you leave in your private account. Earnings from your private account = 20 - your contribution to the group project For example, if you leave 20 tokens in your private account (and therefore do not contribute to the group project), your earnings from your private account will be 20 tokens. If you leave 6 tokens in your private account (and therefore you contribute 14 tokens to the group project), your earnings from your private account will be 6 tokens. Only you will earn tokens from your private account.

Please click NEXT when you are ready.

Next

Are there any questions so far?

YOUR EARNINGS FROM THE GROUP PROJECT

You as well as your group members can contribute to the group project. The earnings for the group members from the group project will be determined by either of these two formulas:

Formula 1: Earnings from the group project = (Sum of Contributions X 1.2)/3

Formula 2: Earnings from the group project = (Sum of Contributions X 1.8)/3

There is a 50% chance that the earnings from the group project will be calculated by Formula 1. In this case, you and your group members will each earn (Sum of Contributions X 1.2) / 3 from the project.

There is a 50% chance that the earnings from the group project will be calculated by Formula 2. In this case, you and your group members will each earn (Sum of Contributions X 1.8) / 3 from the project.

In each round, the computer will randomly determine whether the earnings from the group project will be calculated according to Formula 1 or Formula 2. Right now, nobody knows which formula is going to be used.

We will give you two examples in the following screen. These examples are designed to help you better understand the instructions. They should not be used as a guide for your decisions in the experiment.

Are there any questions so far?

Please click NEXT when you are ready.

Next

EXAMPLES

Example 1

Suppose that the sum of contributions to the group project made by you and your group members is 27 tokens.

Also, suppose that Formula 1 is randomly selected.

Then, you and your group members will each earn $(27 \times 1.2)/3 = 32.4/3 = 10.8$ tokens from the group project. Are there any questions so far?

Example 2:

Suppose that the sum of contributions to the group project made by you and your group members is 11 tokens.

Also, suppose that Formula 2 is randomly selected.

Then, you and your group members will each earn (11 \times 1.8) / 3 = 19.8 / 3 = 6.6 tokens from the group project. Are there any questions so far?

Please click NEXT when you are ready.

	TOTAL	EARNINGS		
Again, there are three participants and from the group project:	s in each group. This means that you will be matched with two other	er participants in thi	is sessions. Your total earnings are the sum of your earnings from your private a	account
and normale group project.				
Total Earnings	= Earnings From Your Private Account	+	Earnings From the Group Project	
	(20 - your contribution to the group project)		With 50% chance: (Sum of Contributions x 1.2) / 3	
			With 50% chance: (Sum of Contributions x 1.8) / 3	
Are there any questions so far?				
Are there any questions so fair?				
	Please click NEX	(T when you are	ready.	
				Ne


UNDERSTANDINGS TASK Before you start making your decisions, we would like you to answer a few questions. These questions are <u>not</u> designed to test you; but to help you better understand the experiment. They should <u>not</u> be used as a guide for your decisions in the experiment. If you need any help with the questions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come and help you. You have to answer the questions correctly in order to proceed. Please click NEXT when you are ready.

QUESTION 1
If you need assistance at any point, please raise your hand. 1. Each group member has 20 tokens in their private accounts. Suppose that nobody contributes anything to the group project.
a. How many tokens will you earn from your <u>private account</u> ?
b. How many tokens will your and your group members each earn from the group project.? c. How many tokens will your total earnings be?
When you are finished answering the questions, please click NEXT.

QUESTION 2
If you need assistance at any point, please raise your hand. 2. Each group member has 20 tokens. Suppose that you contribute 5 tokens to the group project. Your other group members contribute 2 and 9 tokens each to the group project. Also, suppose that the earnings from the group project will be calculated according to Formula 2 (sum of all contributions x 1.8) / 3. Please notice that the answers for some questions may not be whole numbers.
a. How many tokens will you earn from your <u>private account</u> ? b. How many tokens will you and your group members each earn from the <u>group project</u> ? 9.6 C. How many tokens will your total earnings be?
c. How many tokens will your <u>total earnings</u> be?
When you are finished answering the questions, please click NEXT.

QUESTION 3 If you need assistance at any point, please raise your hand. 3. Each group member has 20 tokens, Suppose that you contribute 5 tokens to the group project. Your other group members contribute 2 and 9 tokens each to the group project. Also, suppose that the earnings from the group project will be calculated according to Formula 1 (sum of all contributions x 1.2) / 3. Please notice that the answers for some questions may not be whole numbers. a. How many tokens will you earn from private account? b. How many tokens will you and your group members each earn from the group project? c. How many tokens will total earnings be? When you are finished answering the questions, please click NEXT.

Treatment 1 (Selfish Groups – Informed):



Periode	
1 von 1	Worthelbende Zeit [sec] 29
FIRST SET OF 10 ROUNDS	
The first set of the experiment will last for 10 rounds.	
In each round, you will have 20 tokens in your private account and will be asked to make a contribution decision to the group pro	ject.
Your total earnings are the sum of your earnings from your private account and from the group project:	
You will earn 1 token for each token you keep in your private account.	
Your earnings from the group project will be:	
- Either (Sum of Contributions x 1.2) / 3 with 50% chance (Formula 1)	
- Or (Sum of Contributions x 1.8) / 3 with 50% chance (Formula 2)	
In each round, only one of these Formulas will be randomly selected. The randomly selected Formula will be used to calculate	the earnings from the group project for that round.
In the first 10 rounds of the experiment, when you make your contribution decision, you will know which formula is going to be us you will know whether Formula 1 or Formula 2 is randomly selected to be used in that round.	ed for that round. In other words, when you make your contribution decision,
In each round, you will be randomly re-matched with two other participants in this session and you will face the same decision. A this page, you will receive feedback on your earnings, the formula that was chosen, and your group member's contributions in the	
Are there any questions so far?	
Please click NEXT when you are ready.	
	Next

INFORMED decision Screen

ROUND 11 You have 20 tokens in your private account. Below, we ask you to make your contribution decision to the group project. Your contribution can be any whole number from 0 to 20. Please remember that you will be randomly re-matched with two other participants in each round. The randomly selected formula to be used in this round is: (Sum of Contributions X 1.8) / 3 How many tokens would you like to contribute to the project?

ROUND SUMMARY

Earnings from Private Account: 17 tokens.

Earnings from Group project: 2.80 tokens.
Other's Average Contribution (rounded up): 2 tokens.
Sum of Contribution: 7 tokens.
Formula used: (Sum of Contributions X 1.2) / 3

Your Total Earnings This Round: 19.80 tokens.

Please click NEXT when you are ready.

Next

SECOND SET OF 10 ROUNDS

Again, in each round, you will have 20 tokens in your private account, and you will be asked to make a contribution decision to the group project.

Your total earnings are the sum of your earnings from your private account and from the group project.

You will earn 1 token for each token you keep in your private account.

Your earnings from the group project will be:

- Either (Sum of Contributions x 1,2) / 3 with 50% chance (Formula 1)

- Or (Sum of Contributions x 1,3) / 3 with 50% chance (Formula 2)


In each round, only one of these Formulas will be randomly selected. The randomly selected Formula will be used to calculate the earnings from the group project for that round.


Different from the previous set of 10 rounds, in this second set of 10 rounds, you will make your contribution decision without knowing which formula is selected for that round. This is the only difference.

Again, in each round, you will face the same decision. Also, in each round, you will be randomly re-matched with two other participants in this session.

Are there any questions so far?

Please click NEXT when you are ready.





Appendix C Instructions for Stage 1

