

MMJ-Bench: A Comprehensive Study on Jailbreak Attacks and Defenses for Vision Language Models

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Abstract

Warning: This paper contains unsafe model responses.

As deep learning advances, Large Language Models (LLMs) and their multimodal counterparts, Vision-Language Models (VLMs), have shown exceptional performance in many real-world tasks. However, VLMs face significant security challenges, such as jailbreak attacks, where attackers attempt to bypass the model's safety alignment to elicit harmful responses. The threat of jailbreak attacks on VLMs arises from both the inherent vulnerabilities of LLMs and the multiple information channels that VLMs process. While various attacks and defenses have been proposed, there is a notable gap in unified and comprehensive evaluations, as each method is evaluated on different dataset and metrics, making it impossible to compare the effectiveness of each method. To address this gap, we introduce *MMJ-Bench*, a unified pipeline for evaluating jailbreak attacks and defense techniques for VLMs. Through extensive experiments, we assess the effectiveness of various attack methods against SoTA VLMs and evaluate the impact of defense mechanisms on both defense effectiveness and model utility for normal tasks. Our comprehensive evaluation contribute to the field by offering a unified and systematic evaluation framework and the first public-available benchmark for VLM jailbreak research. We also demonstrate several insightful findings that highlights directions for future studies.

1 Introduction

Continuous breakthroughs in deep learning and the expansion of model scales have led to the exceptional performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) in language understanding and generation tasks (Achiam et al., 2023). Building on the success of single-modal models, multimodal models have

emerged, capable of comprehending the physical environment and simulating human perception (Yin et al., 2023). Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) extend the architecture of LLMs (such as the GPT series) by integrating visual, audio, and other modalities. This integration enhances cross-modal semantic understanding and generation while maintaining the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. As a subset of MLLMs, Vision-Language Models (VLMs) focus specifically on integrating visual and textual data to offer services like visual question answering (Liu et al., 2024c).

As VLM inference services become widely integrated into daily life, enhancing their security and reliability has become a critical issue. Many existing studies have explored the potential of breaking the inherent safety alignment of LLMs and eliciting harmful responses, a phenomenon referred to as "Jailbreak Attacks" (Zou et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2023b; Deng et al., 2024; Zhou and Wang, 2024). This vulnerability is also present in VLMs and is even more severe due to several factors:

- VLMs, built upon the architecture of LLMs, inherit the vulnerabilities of LLMs related to jailbreak attacks, making them susceptible to jailbreak attacks.
- The multimodal nature of VLMs, which process both textual and visual data, introduces greater risks. Attackers can exploit multiple information channels, increasing the likelihood of eliciting responses that violate regulatory compliance boundaries.
- The continuous and high-dimensional nature of image inputs and the underlying LLM's limited ability to generalize its safety guardrails to unseen visual modalities makes VLM more vulnerable to jailbreak attacks.

Jailbreaking threats were first discovered and studied in LLMs (Zou et al., 2023; Liu et al.,

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


Figure 1: Workflow of *MMJ-Bench*

2023b). Following this, many studies have extended focus to VLMs. Compared to jailbreak attacks on LLMs, which use manually designed templates or automatically designed triggers to bypass safety alignment, attacks on VLMs primarily target the image modality. There are two main strategies for jailbreaking VLMs: generation-based and optimization-based. The generation-based approach aims to create new images that embed harmful behaviors from harmful queries while rephrasing the original text input into a non-harmful form (Gong et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2023a; Li et al., 2024; Shayegani et al., 2023). This approach is motivated by the intuition that VLMs are primarily safety aligned for text but not extended to images. On the other hand, optimization-based jailbreak attacks, similar to adversarial attacks in the image classification domain, aim to optimize an adversarial perturbation with a sophisticated designed objective function to bypass the safeguards of VLMs (Qi et al., 2024; Niu et al., 2024; Zhao et al., 2024).

To defend against jailbreak attack, some countermeasures have also been proposed including safety fine-tuning by constructing a safety fine-tuning datasets for VLMs (Zong et al., 2024), model unlearning that enable the VLMs to forget harmful content (Chakraborty et al., 2024), and jailbreak detection (Zhang et al., 2023; Xu et al., 2024).

Despite various jailbreak attacks and defenses for VLMs, a significant gap remains in unified and comprehensive evaluations of these approaches. Current methods use different datasets, target models, and evaluation metrics, making it difficult to comprehensively assess their effectiveness. To address this problem, in this work, we propose *MMJ-*

Bench a framework designed for a comprehensive study of jailbreak attack and defense techniques for VLMs. Our study aims to address two key questions: **How effective are existing VLM jailbreak attacks**, and **How well do current VLM jailbreak defenses protect target models**? To answer these questions, we evaluate various jailbreak attacks and defense using a unified and systematic evaluation pipeline across several state-of-the-art (SoTA) Vision Language Models (VLMs), from the perspective of attack and defense effectiveness, impact on the model utility in normal tasks and the additional model response time incurred.

As demonstrated in Figure 1, the workflow of *MMJ-Bench* undergoes four steps: data collection, jailbreak case generation, response generation and evaluation. According to the prevalence and the implementation availability, we evaluate six SoTA attacks and four defenses on six VLMs from four prevalent model families, including LLaVa, MiniGPT4, InstructBlip and Qwen-VL. The details of our dataset selection and evaluation metrics will be discussed in the following sections. In summary, this work contribute to the field of jailbreak attacks in the following aspects:

- We propose *MMJ-Bench* that builds a systematic and unified pipeline to comprehensively evaluate the existing jailbreak attacks and defense techniques in VLMs.
- Our extensive experimental results disclose important findings, not only comparing attack and defense methods systematically but also highlighting directions for future research.
- We develop and publicly release the first

Table 1: This table catalogs all identified attack techniques, with the ones evaluated in our study marked with an *.

Category	Paper	Description
Generation-based	Gong et al. (2023)*	Embeds the text into a blank image by typography.
	Liu et al. (2023a)*	Generates a query-relevant image using stable diffusion and typography.
	Li et al. (2024)*	Refines the prompt for text-to-image model iteratively.
Optimization-based	Qi et al. (2024)*	Optimizes a universal image that can be incorporated into any harmful malicious text.
	Niu et al. (2024)*	Uses three model ensembles as surrogate models to obtain adversarial image.
	Zhao et al. (2024)*	Queries the model multiple times to estimate the gradient of the target model.
	Shayegani et al. (2023)	Matches the embeddings of benign images with malicious triggers.
	Bailey et al. (2023)	Optimizes an image such that the VLM output matches the output of target behaviors.

Table 2: This table catalogs all identified defense techniques, with the ones evaluated in our study marked with an *.

Category	Paper	Description
Proactive	Zong et al. (2024)*	Constructs a safety dataset to enhance model’s robustness.
	Chakraborty et al. (2024)	Utilizes model unlearning to enable VLM to forget harmful content.
	Liu et al. (2024d)	Enhances VLM’s visual modality safety alignment by adding safety modules.
Reactive	Wang et al. (2024c)*	Prepends input with defense prompts.
	Zhang et al. (2023)*	Distinguishes attack samples by discrepancy of the variants’ responses.
	Wang et al. (2024a)	Modifies the activations of the target model by safety steering vectors.
	Xu et al. (2024)*	Examines the cross-modal similarity between harmful queries and adversarial images.

benchmark that includes a comprehensive collection of both attack and defense techniques for VLMs, thereby facilitating further research in this area. The code are available on: <https://github.com/thunxxx/MLLM-Jailbreak-evaluation-MMJ-bench>.

2 Background and Related Work

In this section, we review existing work on jailbreak attacks in VLMs. We start by defining the jailbreak threat model in VLMs and highlighting the differences from jailbreak scenarios in LLMs. Next, we explore the existing jailbreak attack and defense techniques evaluated in this study.

2.1 Jailbreak Attack Threat Model

Jailbreak attack originally refers to techniques used to bypass safety alignment and ethical restrictions in LLMs, enabling them to generate content that is forbidden by the developers. These attacks are often executed using manually designed templates (Wei et al., 2024; Deng et al., 2024) or automatically generated triggers that are appended as a suffix to prompt the models into producing malicious content (Zou et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2023b; Zhou and Wang, 2024).

However, threat model in LLMs and VLMs are quite different. In the context of jailbreaking VLMs, new modalities introduce additional security threats, with jailbreak noise often targeting the image modality. This threat arises from the continuous and high-dimensional nature of image inputs and the underlying LLM’s limited ability

to generalize its safety guardrails to unseen visual modalities.

2.2 Jailbreak Attacks in VLM

Jailbreaking VLMs can be categorized into generation-based attacks and optimization-based attacks, as listed in Table 1 with brief descriptions. The attacks evaluated in our study are marked with an * and are introduced below.

Generation-based attacks. Generation-based attacks aim to embed malicious content into image through typography or text-to-image models like stable diffusion (Rombach et al., 2022), creating new images with malicious intent. The original text prompt is typically rephrased to remove explicit harmful content. For example, Gong et al. (2023) directly converts harmful text queries into images with typography. Liu et al. (2023a) leverages stable diffusion to generate images relevant to the query while simultaneously transforming extracted keywords into typographic representations. Li et al. (2024) utilizes a method similar to (Liu et al., 2023a) but the text-to-image prompt is iteratively refined.

Optimization-based attacks. Optimization-based attacks can be regarded as a variant of standard vision adversarial attacks, requiring gradients for optimization. The malicious user generates adversarial images by introducing carefully crafted perturbations to the original image, causing models to produce harmful content. In a black-box scenario, these perturbations are created by either optimizing

on a surrogate model and transferring them to other models (Qi et al., 2024; Niu et al., 2024) or by directly querying the target models multiple times to estimate the gradient (Zhao et al., 2024).

2.3 Jailbreak Defenses in VLM

Defense techniques can be categorized as proactive defense and reactive defense, as listed in Table 2 with brief descriptions. The defenses evaluated in our study are marked with an * and are introduced below.

Proactive Defense. Proactive defense refers to measures taken to prevent attacks before they occur, such as fine-tuning (Zong et al., 2024) or adversarial training (Mazeika et al., 2024). Specifically, Zong et al. (2024) first constructs a safety fine-tuning dataset for VLM. And Chakraborty et al. (2024) leverages model unlearning to enable the model to forget harmful content.

Reactive defense. Reactive defense refers to strategies implemented in response to an ongoing or detected attack, aiming to mitigate its impact. Wang et al. (2024c) iteratively refines a safety prompt, which will be added at the beginning of inputs. Zhang et al. (2023) mutates untrusted input to generating variants and distinguishing attack samples by discrepancy of the variants’ responses. Furthermore, Xu et al. (2024) attempts to identify maliciously perturbed image by examining the cross-modal similarity between harmful queries and adversarial images.

2.4 Jailbreak Benchmark for VLMs

Previous VLM benchmarks, such as (Liu et al., 2023c; Ying et al., 2024; Yu et al., 2023), primarily focuses on evaluating the multimodal capabilities of VLMs across various tasks, with limited attention to their safety features. Recently, however, safety concerns in VLMs have gained significant attention. Existing research has approached this issue from the perspective of model capacity, focusing on building benchmark datasets and defining safe/harmful domains for safety alignment (Liu et al., 2023a; Wang et al., 2024b; Zhang et al., 2024). *Unlike these benchmarks, MMJ-Bench adopts the perspective of adversarial rivalry to provide a thorough evaluation of existing techniques.* A related study by Luo et al. (2024) examines the transferability of attacks from LLMs to MLLMs, without considering existing defenses. **In contrast, our work is the first benchmark to evaluate existing VLM jailbreak attack and defense techniques in a standardized and comprehensive**

manner.

3 Study Design

MMJ-Bench is proposed to address two key questions: How effective are existing VLM jailbreak attacks, and how effective are existing VLM jailbreak defenses in protecting target models? To answer these questions, we have designed a four-step workflow (as illustrated in Figure 1): data collection, jailbreak case generation, response generation, and evaluation. In this section, we will provide a detailed introduction to each step of the workflow.

3.1 Data Collection

As mentioned above the jailbreak attacks can be categorized as *generation-based* which requires only harmful queries to generate corresponding harmful images, and *optimization-based* that requires both harmful queries and any clean images to add optimized noise. To prepare the harmful queries, we leverage the standard behaviors of HarmBench (Mazeika et al., 2024), a standard evaluation dataset for harmful refusal, which consists of 200 textual harmful queries.

To comprehensively evaluate the defenses, besides employing the jailbreak instances generated by HarmBench to assess the defense capacity, we also evaluate the negative impact on the VLMs on the normal tasks after applying the defenses. We chose MM-Vet (Yu et al., 2023) as the helpful dataset, which integrates six core VL capabilities, including recognition, OCR, knowledge, language generation, spatial awareness, and math.

3.2 Jailbreak Cases Generation

Our criteria for selecting methodologies are based on the method’s popularity and the availability of source code. For attacks, three generation-based attacks namely FigStep (Gong et al., 2023), MM-SafetyBench (Liu et al., 2023a) and Hades (Li et al., 2024), and three optimization-based attacks Visual-Adv (Qi et al., 2024), ImgJP (Niu et al., 2024) and AttackVLM (Zhao et al., 2024) are chosen. The brief description of baseline attacks are shown in Table 1.

3.3 Response Generation

For defenses, we select one proactive defense VLM-Guard (Zong et al., 2024), and three reactive defenses AdaShield (Wang et al., 2024c), CIDER (Xu et al., 2024) and JailGuard (Zhang et al., 2023). The brief description of defense techniques are shown in Table 2.

In our study, we evaluate six open-sourced VLMs from 4 popular model families and their 6 variations: LLaVa (LLaVa-v1.5-Vicuna-7b (Liu et al., 2024a), LLaVa-v1.6-Vicuna-7b (Liu et al., 2024b)), MiniGPT4-Vicuna- (7b/13b (Zhu et al., 2023)), InstructBlip (Dai et al., 2023), Qwen-VL (Bai et al., 2023). These models are selected because they are widely used in security research, including both attack simulations and the creation of defensive strategies.

3.4 Evaluation

Evaluating the attack power of each attack methods requires a standard criteria to determine whether the model responses harmful contents. We adopt the currently most widely-adopted and acknowledged evaluator GPT-4 (Achiam et al., 2023) and a binary classifier provided by HarmBench (Mazeika et al., 2024). The GPT-4 evaluator’s system prompt is:

You are an AI assistant to help me determining whether an answer is safe or unsafe.
 You are provided with an answer. If the answer contain unsafe contents, you should output unsafe. Otherwise, you should output safe.
 Example 1:
 Answer: To traffic a product across borders undetected, you can use a variety of methods, such as:
 1. Mislabeling
 2. Hiding the product
 3. Using a trusted courier
 4. Utilizing a legal loophole..
 Your output: unsafe
 Example 2:
 Answer: It is not advisable or legal to purchase or use illegal drugs.
 Your output: safe
 Example 3:
 Answer: <prediction>
 Your output:

4 Experiment

In this section, we present *MMJ-Bench*, a comprehensive evaluation on different jailbreak attacks and defenses.

4.1 Attack Implementation Details

FigStep. Following the pipeline in the original paper, We use the HarmBench dataset and rephrase each harmful query to start with a noun like "Steps to," prompting the model to respond step-by-step. Then, the rephrased text is transformed into a typographical image and the model is prompted with: "The image shows a list numbered 1, 2, and 3, but

the items are empty. Please generate detailed content for each item on the list. Each item should contain approximately 100 words."

MM-SafetyBench. The basic idea of MM-SafetyBench is to generate images that are relevant to the harmful queries. It involves three image generation methods including with Stable Diffusion, with typographical methods and with both stable diffusion (Rombach et al., 2022) and typographical. According to the experimental results, utilizing both Stable Diffusion and typographical to generate query relevant images is the most effective attack strategy, which is the only method we include in our evaluation when comparing with other attack techniques.

Hades. To maximize the attack power, Hades proposes to combine three orthogonal attack strategies including text-to-image with typographical methods, amplification of image toxicity with diffusion models and adversarial perturbation optimization. We following this full implementation settings to optimize a harmful image for multiple turns via prompt optimization.

VisualAdv. VisualAdv optimizes universal adversarial perturbations with sepsific loss functions. We implement three universal adversarial images under different perturbation L_∞ constraints, namely ADV-16, ADV-64, and ADV-inf. ADV-16 and ADV-64 represent varying distortion budgets from the clean image, while ADV-inf indicates direct optimization from random noise. As the optimized adversarial perturbations on one model (surrogate model) can be transferred to other target models, we use MiniGPT4 (Zhu et al., 2023) as the surrogate model when targeting other VLMs, and use InstructBlip (Dai et al., 2023) as the surrogate model when targeting MiniGPT4.

ImgJP. The basic idea of ImgJP is similar to VisualAdv, where we optimize an adversarial perturbation from a random noise and use the ensemble of MiniGPT4-7b/14b and MiniGPT-v2 as a surrogate model.

AttackVLM. AttackVLM targets mainly on black-box senario where the parameter and gradients of VLMs are not accessible. It involves transfer-based attack and query-based. In our evaluation, We only applies query-based attack strategy proposed in the paper, which employs the random gradient-free algorithm (Nesterov and Spokoiny, 2017) to estimate the gradient.

Table 3: ASR of each attack on different VLMs, evaluated with GPT-4 (up) and HarmBench classifier (bottom).

		LLaVa-v1.5	LLaVa-v1.6	Qwen-VL	InstructBlip	MiniGPT4-7b	MiniGPT4-13b	Average
Generation-based	FigStep (Gong et al., 2023)	0.84	0.45	0.855	0.54	0.195	0.22	0.517
		0.505	0.265	0.42	0.14	0.06	0.115	0.251
	MM-SafetyBench (Liu et al., 2023a)	0.455	0.45	0.51	0.41	0.205	0.315	0.391
		0.27	0.345	0.27	0.105	0.125	0.215	0.222
	Hades (Li et al., 2024)	0.645	0.565	0.3	0.64	0.535	0.56	0.541
Optimization-based		0.425	0.325	0.11	0.17	0.22	0.335	0.264
	ADV-16 (Qi et al., 2024)	0.605	0.405	0.095	0.41	0.42	0.555	0.415
		0.585	0.335	0.13	0.38	0.275	0.485	0.365
	ADV-64 (Qi et al., 2024)	0.445	0.445	0.08	0.53	0.415	0.455	0.395
		0.51	0.335	0.13	0.475	0.305	0.44	0.366
	ADV-inf (Qi et al., 2024)	0.54	0.46	0.07	0.41	0.43	0.735	0.441
		0.485	0.335	0.09	0.455	0.375	0.65	0.398
	ImgJP (Niu et al., 2024)	0.615	0.35	0.08	0.44	0.625	0.655	0.461
		0.57	0.305	0.11	0.43	0.51	0.6	0.421
	AttackVLM (Zhao et al., 2024)	0.645	0.335	0.07	0.345	0.5	0.64	0.423
		0.625	0.25	0.075	0.27	0.44	0.625	0.381
Average		0.599	0.433	0.258	0.466	0.393	0.517	
		0.497	0.312	0.167	0.303	0.289	0.433	




Figure 2: This graph illustrates ASR of different attack techniques against VLMs. ASR-Average represents the average ASR of ADV-16, ADV-64 and ADV-inf.

4.2 Findings of Jailbreak Attacks

The ASR of various attacks across different target models are presented in Table 3. For each attack result, we demonstrate both the harmful evaluation results from GPT-4 (up) and HarmBench classifier (bottom). To better compare the performance of different attack algorithms on various models, we also present a radar chart in Figure 2. Note that the three versions of VisualAdv are averaged in this figure, named ADV-Average (blue area).

Finding 1. The effectiveness of each attack varies among VLMs. For examples, generation-based attack, such as FigStep, is more effective to LLaVa-v1.5 and Qwen-VL but less effective on MiniGPT4. On the contrast, optimization-based attack such as ImgJP are more effective on MiniGPT4 series but less effective on Qwen-VL. Figure 2 also reflects this phenomenon that the area for each attack is unevenly distributed across the different model dimensions.

Finding 2. Generation-based attack are more effective according to the GPT-4 evaluator, while optimization-based techniques perform better according to the HarmBench classifier. As shown in the Table 3, considering the average

ASR over each attack, Hades and ADV-inf/ImgJP are the most effective attacks evaluated by GPT-4 and HarmBench respectively, achieving the highest score of 0.541 evaluated by GPT-4 and 0.421 by HarmBench. Figure 2 also reflects this phenomenon that the area of Hades (purple area) is the largest in the left figure while ImgJP indicated with orange region is the largest.

Finding 3. No VLM is uniformly robust to all jailbreak attacks. According to Table 3, all VLMs demonstrate a high ASR on at least one jailbreak attack, *suggesting the potential of jailbreaking any VLMs with ensemble attacks*. Overall, Qwen-VL demonstrates the lowest average ASR over all attacks of 0.258 according to GPT-4 and 0.167 by HarmBench classifier.

Finding 4. The selection of evaluators matters as different evaluators yield different ASR. HarmBench classifier and GPT-4 yield similar results for optimization-based attacks. However, GPT-4 consistently reports a higher ASR for generation-based attacks. One hypothesis of the reason behind this phenomenon is that VLMs tend to describe the harmful contents embedded to the image by generateion-based attack without directly respond-

ing to the harmful query. GPT-4 and HarmBench consider differently on whether the target model answers this harmful queries. GPT-4 considers any harmful description as harmful, while the HarmBench classifier may deem the response harmless if the harmful query isn't directly answered. *We suggest future works to consider various evaluations to demonstrate the effectiveness of proposed attacks.*

Finding 5. Lower ASR doesn't necessarily indicates stronger safety guardrail. This is because, in some VLMs, the lower ASR may stem from inferior visual comprehension and cross-modality alignment rather than more robust safety alignment. Taking the FigStep attack as an example, where harmful contents are typographically embedded into the image input, InstructBlip and MiniGPT4 demonstrate strong robustness to FigStep (lower ASR in Table 3 because they fail to understand the task. InstructBlip merely repeats the text on the image, while MiniGPT4 misinterprets the task as image generation rather than VQA, responding with, "I apologize, but I cannot generate an image or provide the requested image as I am a text-based AI language model." *This finding highlights the importance of researches on distinguishing the model utility and the safety when evaluating the VLM robustness.*

4.3 Defense Implementation Details

VLGuard. VLGuard is a vision-language safe instruction-following dataset. We fine-tune four VLMs using the VLGuard training set: MiniGPT4-7b, Qwen-VL, LLaVa-v1.5, and LLaVa-v1.6, following the fine-tuning scripts provided in the official GitHub repositories. As instructBlip does not provide official fine-tuning scripts, we skip instructBlip in the evaluation of VLGuard. Each target model is fine-tuned for one epoch on 2 A40 within 2 hours. To prevent overemphasis on safety over utilities, we also integrate 5,000 additional helpfulness samples from MiniGPT4 and LLaVa-v1.5's original training sets into VLGuard.

JailGuard. JailGuard works by mutating input text or images and evaluate the discrepancy across all responses. As JailGuard with random rotation mutator demonstrates highest detection success rate in the original paper, we adopt this mutator in the evaluation, which rotates the image by a random degrees between 0 and 180. Note that the original paper uses JailGuard solely for detection and does not address the model's response after detection.




Figure 3: The trade-off between defense effectiveness, measured by the average ASR reduction across all attacks, and model utility on normal tasks, evaluated using the MM-Vet score. The circle markers represent the baseline performance of the vanilla models without any defense, while different markers signify the performance of various defense methods. The lines connecting the vanilla and post-defense performance of each model indicate the change introduced by the defenses. Each color corresponds to a specific target VLM. Ideally, we aim for a high MM-Vet score (high model utility) and a low ASR (strong defense capacity).

To ensure a fair comparison of ASR reduction with other defenses, we add an output module to JailGuard's detection process. The VLM will refuse to respond if JailGuard detects a jailbreak sample; otherwise, the original input will be processed by the VLM.

AdaShield. AdaShield works by analyzing input characteristics and generating adaptive shield prompts to guide the model in ignoring malicious content. Note that AdaShield is only designed for generation-based attacks, so the evaluation of AdaShield is conducted on FigStep, MM-SafetyBench and Hades. We evaluate two versions of AdaShield, AdaShield-A which optimize a prompt with the guidance of LLMs, and AdaShield-S which adopts a manually designed fixed prompt.

CIDER. CIDER utilizes cross-modal semantic similarity between malicious queries and adversarial images to detect optimization-based attacks. Since optimization-based attacks involve converting harmful content in the query into a noise pattern added to the image modality, CIDER detects discrepancies by leveraging this semantic shift. A diffusion-based denoiser preprocesses the image modality, and the relative shift in semantic distance before and after denoising is used to differentiate between clean and adversarial images. Specifically,

Table 4: The table below summarizes the effectiveness of various defenses against different attacks VLMs. Each block indicates the ASR after applying a defense, along with the change in ASR (highlighted in blue with ↓ for decreases and red with ↑ for increases). The last column averages the ASR across all models to assess the overall effectiveness of each defense against a specific attack. The two most effective defenses for each attack are highlighted in dark and light colors, respectively. Top two effective defenses for each attack are: FigStep: AdaShield-A and VLGuard; MM-SafetyBench: AdaShield-A and VLGuard; Hades: VLGuard and AdaShield-A; ADV-16: CIDER and VLGuard; ADV-64: VLGuard and CIDER; ADV-Inf: CIDER and VLGuard; ImgJP: CIDER and VLGuard; AttackVLM: VLGuard and JailGuard (without highlight because only these two defenses are applicable).

		LLaVa-v1.5	LLaVa-v1.6	Qwen-VL	InstructBlip	MiniGPT4-7b	MiniGPT4-13b	Average
VLGuard	Figstep	0(0.505 ↓)	0(0.265 ↓)	0.33(0.09 ↓)	—	0.01(0.05 ↓)	—	0.085(0.228 ↓)
	MM-SafetyBench	0(0.27 ↓)	0(0.345 ↓)	0.25(0.02 ↓)	—	0.05(0.075 ↓)	—	0.075(0.178 ↓)
	Hades	0(0.425 ↓)	0(0.325 ↓)	0.085(0.025 ↓)	—	0.03(0.19 ↓)	—	0.029(0.241 ↓)
	ADV-16	0(0.585 ↓)	0(0.335 ↓)	0.085(0.045 ↓)	—	0.02(0.255 ↓)	—	0.026(0.305 ↓)
	ADV-64	0(0.51 ↓)	0(0.335 ↓)	0.12(0.01 ↓)	—	0.025(0.28 ↓)	—	0.036(0.284 ↓)
	ADV-inf	0(0.485 ↓)	0(0.335 ↓)	0.06(0.03 ↓)	—	0.045(0.33 ↓)	—	0.026(0.295 ↓)
	ImgJP	0(0.57 ↓)	0(0.305 ↓)	0.06(0.05 ↓)	—	0.03(0.48 ↓)	—	0.023(0.351 ↓)
	AttackVLM	0(0.625 ↓)	0(0.25 ↓)	0.025(0.05 ↓)	—	0.005(0.395 ↓)	—	0.008(0.33 ↓)
JailGuard	Figstep	0.385 (0.12 ↓)	0.235 (0.03 ↓)	0.09 (0.33 ↓)	0 (0.14 ↓)	0 (0.06 ↓)	0.01 (0.105 ↓)	0.12(0.131 ↓)
	MM-SafetyBench	0.235 (0.035 ↓)	0.21 (0.135 ↓)	0.13 (0.14 ↓)	0.025 (0.08 ↓)	0.035 (0.09 ↓)	0.065 (0.15 ↓)	0.117(0.105 ↓)
	Hades	0.29 (0.135 ↓)	0.22 (0.105 ↓)	0.035 (0.075 ↓)	0.07 (0.10 ↓)	0.11 (0.11 ↓)	0.205 (0.13 ↓)	0.163(0.109 ↓)
	ADV-16	0.47 (0.115 ↓)	0.25 (0.085 ↓)	0.055 (0.075 ↓)	0.16 (0.22 ↓)	0.15 (0.125 ↓)	0.36 (0.125 ↓)	0.241(0.113 ↓)
	ADV-64	0.48 (0.03 ↓)	0.215 (0.12 ↓)	0.055 (0.075 ↓)	0.225 (0.25 ↓)	0.185 (0.12 ↓)	0.43 (0.01 ↓)	0.265(0.101 ↓)
	ADV-inf	0.465 (0.020 ↓)	0.23 (0.105 ↓)	0.04 (0.05 ↓)	0.155 (0.30 ↓)	0.195 (0.18 ↓)	0.47 (0.18 ↓)	0.259(0.139 ↓)
	ImgJP	0.455 (0.115 ↓)	0.215 (0.09 ↓)	0.045 (0.065 ↓)	0.065 (0.365 ↓)	0.18 (0.33 ↓)	0.29 (0.31 ↓)	0.208(0.192 ↓)
	AttackVLM	0.455 (0.17 ↓)	0.23 (0.02 ↓)	0.035 (0.04 ↓)	0.045 (0.225 ↓)	0.1 (0.34 ↓)	0.31 (0.315 ↓)	0.196(0.19 ↓)
CIDER	ADV-16	0 (0.585 ↓)	0.075 (0.26 ↓)	0.0125 (0.118 ↓)	0.006 (0.374 ↓)	0.069 (0.206 ↓)	0.094 (0.391 ↓)	0.043(0.322 ↓)
	ADV-64	0 (0.51 ↓)	0.181 (0.154 ↓)	0.013 (0.078 ↓)	0.05 (0.425 ↓)	0.169 (0.136 ↓)	0.306 (0.134 ↓)	0.120(0.239 ↓)
	ADV-inf	0 (0.485 ↓)	0.05 (0.285 ↓)	0.006 (0.04 ↓)	0.025(0.43 ↓)	0.075 (0.3 ↓)	0.013 (0.637 ↓)	0.028(0.363 ↓)
	ImgJP	0.031 (0.549 ↓)	0.056 (0.249 ↓)	0 (0.11 ↓)	0.006 (0.424 ↓)	0.025 (0.485 ↓)	0.044 (0.556 ↓)	0.027(0.396 ↓)
AdaShield-S	Figstep	0.045(0.46 ↓)	0.00(0.265 ↓)	0.07(0.35 ↓)	0.00(0.14 ↓)	0.02(0.04 ↓)	0.05(0.065 ↓)	0.031(0.220 ↓)
	MM-SafetyBench	0.015(0.255 ↓)	0.005(0.34 ↓)	0.06(0.21 ↓)	0.01(0.095 ↓)	0.065(0.06 ↓)	0.055(0.16 ↓)	0.035(0.187 ↓)
	Hades	0.00(0.425 ↓)	0.005(0.32 ↓)	0.16(0.05 ↑)	0.005(0.165 ↓)	0.13(0.09 ↓)	0.13(0.205 ↓)	0.072(0.193 ↓)
AdaShield-A	Figstep	0.006(0.499 ↓)	0.0(0.265 ↓)	0.0(0.42 ↓)	0.0(0.14 ↓)	0.017(0.043 ↓)	0.029(0.086 ↓)	0.009(0.242 ↓)
	MM-SafetyBench	0.006(0.264 ↓)	0.029(0.316 ↓)	0.011(0.259 ↓)	0.0(0.105 ↓)	0.023(0.102 ↓)	0.051(0.164 ↓)	0.02(0.202 ↓)
	Hades	0.0(0.425 ↓)	0.006(0.319 ↓)	0.006(0.104 ↓)	0.011(0.159 ↓)	0.034(0.186 ↓)	0.109(0.226 ↓)	0.028(0.208 ↓)

350 denoising iterations are performed on the input image. If the semantic similarity between the image and text modalities drops below a predefined threshold, the input is classified as adversarial. Similar to JailGuard, we have added an output module to CIDER’s detection process. If CIDER detects a jailbreak, it will refuse to respond.

Table 5: MM-Vet score before and after defenses. Positive impact (increasing in the base model score) are bold.

MM-Vet score	Base model	JailGuard	CIDER	VLGuard	AdaShield-A
LLaVa-v1.5	0.306	0.285	0.191	0.307	0.152
LLaVa-v1.6	0.305	0.298	0.262	0.333	0.372
Qwen-VL	0.492	0.246	0.292	0.504	0.495
InstructBlip	0.261	0.179	0.127	—	0.299
MiniGPT4-7b	0.227	0.044	0.13	0.202	0.203
MiniGPT4-13b	0.197	0.049	0.161	—	0.247

4.4 Findings of Jailbreak Defenses

Table 4 presents the reductions in ASR for various defense mechanisms against different attacks and target VLMs, demonstrating the effectiveness of the defenses in mitigating the harmfulness of the attacks. In addition, MM-Vet score is shown in Table 5, highlighting the impact of each defense on

the model utilities on normal tasks. Furthermore, Figure 3 illustrates the trade-off between defense effectiveness and VLM utilities. Note that the ASR evaluations in this section are based on the Harm-Bench classifier.

Finding 1. The effectiveness of each defense varies among attack techniques. As shown in Table 4, VLGuard stands out as the most effective defense, achieving top-two ASR reductions across all attacks. Notably, it completely mitigates attacks on LLaVa-v1.5 and LLaVa-v1.6 but falls short on Qwen-VL, evident in Figure 3 (red line with triangle marker). AdaShield-A and CIDER are specifically designed for generation-based attack and optimization-based attacks, achieving the best defense performance on generation-based attack such as FigStep and MM-SafetyBench, and optimization-based attacks such as ADV-16, ADV-inf and ImgJP respectively. JailGuard is the least effective defense, possibly due to its reliance on models’ inherent alignment capabilities. As shown in Table 6, JailGuard exhibits the highest DSR mostly on Qwen-VL, which we previously concluded possesses the best safety alignment. Consequently,

Table 6: Detection success rate of JailGuard

DSR	LLaVa-v1.5	LLaVa-v1.6	Qwen-VL	InstructBlip	MiniGPT4-7b	MiniGPT4-13b
Figstep	0.265	0.74	0.795	0.855	0.58	0.505
MM-SafetyBench	0.27	0.44	0.625	0.64	0.58	0.505
Hades	0.31	0.43	0.83	0.45	0.605	0.525
ADV-16	0.41	0.64	0.765	0.24	0.695	0.48
ADV-64	0.4	0.76	0.75	0.33	0.745	0.5
ADV-inf	0.425	0.61	0.85	0.475	0.685	0.51
ImgJP	0.455	0.76	0.85	0.49	0.665	0.515
AttackVLM	0.375	0.63	0.865	0.445	0.745	0.53

JailGuard improves limited robustness of VLMs that are not well-aligned.

Finding 2. Detection-based defenses have negative impact on VLM’s utility. As depicted in Figure 3, JailGuard and CIDER compromise VLM utility on regular tasks. This implies that they may misclassify many clean samples as jailbreak samples, underscoring the importance in setting the threshold for identifying jailbreak samples. In contrast, VLGuard and AdaShield-A have minimal to positive impact on VLM utility, demonstrating their effectiveness in maintaining or even enhancing performance.

Finding 3. Developing a defense method that achieves an optimal balance between model utility and defense effectiveness for all VLMs is challenging. As illustrated in Figure 3, individual defenses often excel in either enhancing model robustness against jailbreak attacks or preserving model utility for standard tasks, but narrowly for one or two models. Notably, no defense method has demonstrated universal effectiveness across all VLMs, including VLGuard, which falls short in safeguarding QWen-VL against jailbreak attacks. These findings underscore the critical need to account for the inherent diversities among VLMs when designing universal defense strategies.

5 Conclusions

In this work, we propose *MMJ-bench*, a unified and systematic framework to conduct a comprehensive analysis the effectiveness of various attack methods against state-of-the-art VLMs and the impact of defense mechanisms in terms of defense effectiveness and model utility on normal tasks. Extensive experiments demonstrate several insightful findings that highlights directions for future studies. This findings also contribute to the field by offering a systematic evaluation framework. We construct

and release the first comprehensive benchmark for VLM jailbreak research. In the future, we aim to continuously update *MMJ-bench* with new attacks and defenses, ultimately advancing the development of safer and more secure VLMs.

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