


[Brim Security](#) maintains a free, Electron-based desktop GUI for exploration of PCAPs and select cybersecurity logs:



along with a broad [ecosystem of tools](#) which can be used independently of the GUI.

The standalone or embedded `zqd` server, as well as the `zq` command line utility let analysts run ZQL (a domain-specific query language) queries on cybersecurity data sources.

The Brim team maintains a Python module that is capable of working with the `zqd` HTTP API and my nascent `{brimr}` [github|gh|gl|bb](#) R package provides a similar API structure to perform similar operations in R, along with a wrapper for the `zq` command line tool.

## PCAPs! In! Spaaaaacces[s]!

Brim Desktop organizes input sources into something called “spaces”. We can check for available spaces with `brim_spaces()`:

```
library(brimr)
library(tibble)

brim_spaces()
##           id
name
## 1 sp_1p6pwLgtsESYBTHU9PL9fcl2iBn 2021-02-17-Trickbot-gtag-rob13-
infection-in-AD-environment.pcap
##
data_path storage_kind
## 1 file:///Users/demo/Library/Application%20Support/Brim/
data/spaces/sp_1p6pwLgtsESYBTHU9PL9fcl2iBn    filestore
```

This single space available is a sample capture of [Trickbot](#)

Let's profile the network connections in this capture:

```
# ZQL query to fetch Zeek connection data
zql1 <- '_path=conn | count() by id.orig_h, id.resp_h, id.resp_p | sort
```

```

id.orig_h, id.resp_h, id.resp_p'

space <- "2021-02-17-Trickbot-gtag-rob13-infection-in-AD-
environment.pcap"

r1 <- brim_search(space, zql1)

r1
## ZQL query took 0.0000 seconds; 384 records matched; 1,082 records
read; 238,052 bytes read

(r1 <- as_tibble(tidy_brim(r1)))
## # A tibble: 74 x 4
##   orig_h      resp_h      resp_p count
##
## 1 10.2.17.2    10.2.17.101  49787      1
## 2 10.2.17.101 3.222.126.94   80        1
## 3 10.2.17.101 10.2.17.1     445        1
## 4 10.2.17.101 10.2.17.2     53        97
## 5 10.2.17.101 10.2.17.2     88        27
## 6 10.2.17.101 10.2.17.2    123         5
## 7 10.2.17.101 10.2.17.2    135         8
## 8 10.2.17.101 10.2.17.2    137         2
## 9 10.2.17.101 10.2.17.2    138         2
## 10 10.2.17.101 10.2.17.2    389        37
## # ... with 64 more rows

```

Brim auto-processed the PCAP into [Zeek](#) log format and `_path=conn` in query string indicates that's where we're going to perform further data operations (the queries are structured a bit like [jq](#) filters). We then ask Brim/zqd to summarize and sort source IP, destination IP, and port counts. {brimr} sends this query over to the server. The raw response is a custom data structure that we can turn into a tidy data frame via `tidy_brim()`.

We can do something similar with the Suricata data that Brim also auto-processes for us:

```

# Z query to fetch Suricata alerts including the count of alerts per
source:destination
zql2 <- "event_type=alert | count() by src_ip, dest_ip, dest_port,
alert.severity, alert.signature | sort src_ip, dest_ip, dest_port,
alert.severity, alert.signature"

r2 <- brim_search(space, zql2)

r2
## ZQL query took 0.0000 seconds; 47 records matched; 870 records read;
238,660 bytes read

(r2 <- (as_tibble(tidy_brim(r2))))
## # A tibble: 35 x 6
##   src_ip      dest_ip      dest_port severity signature
count
##

```

## 1	10.2.17.2	10.2.17.1...	49674	3	SURICATA Applayer Detect	1
	protocol only one direction					
## 2	10.2.17.2	10.2.17.1...	49680	3	SURICATA Applayer Detect	1
	protocol only one direction					
## 3	10.2.17.2	10.2.17.1...	49687	3	SURICATA Applayer Detect	1
	protocol only one direction					
## 4	10.2.17.2	10.2.17.1...	49704	3	SURICATA Applayer Detect	1
	protocol only one direction					
## 5	10.2.17.2	10.2.17.1...	49709	3	SURICATA Applayer Detect	1
	protocol only one direction					
## 6	10.2.17.2	10.2.17.1...	49721	3	SURICATA Applayer Detect	1
	protocol only one direction					
## 7	10.2.17.2	10.2.17.1...	50126	3	SURICATA Applayer Detect	1
	protocol only one direction					
## 8	10.2.17.1...	3.222.126...	80	2	ET POLICY curl User-	1
	Agent Outbound					
## 9	10.2.17.1...	36.95.27...	443	1	ET HUNTING Suspicious	1
	POST with Common Windows Process Names - Possib...					
## 10	10.2.17.1...	36.95.27...	443	1	ET MALWARE	1
	Win32/Trickbot Data Exfiltration					
## # ...	with 25 more rows					

Finally, for this toy example, we'll also generate a visual overview of these connections:

```
library(igraph)
library(ggraph)
library(tidyverse)


gdf <- count(r1, orig_h, resp_h, wt=count)

count(gdf, node = resp_h, wt=n, name = "in_degree") %>%
  full_join(
    count(gdf, node = orig_h, name = "out_degree")
  ) %>%
  mutate_at(
    vars(in_degree, out_degree),
    replace_na, 1
  ) %>%
  arrange(in_degree) -> vdf

g <- graph_from_data_frame(gdf, vertices = vdf)

ggraph(g, layout = "linear") +
  geom_node_point(
    aes(size = in_degree), shape = 21
  ) +
  geom_edge_arc(
    width = 0.125,
    arrow = arrow(
      length = unit(5, "pt"),
      type = "closed"
    )
  )
```

)



We can also process log files directly (i.e. without any server) with `zq_cmd()`:

```
zq_cmd(  
  c(  
    '"*' | cut ts,id.orig_h,id.orig_p"', # note the quotes  
    system.file("logs", "conn.log.gz", package = "brimr")  
  )  
)  
##           id.orig_h id.orig_p           ts  
##  1:  10.164.94.120    39681 2018-03-24T17:15:21.255387Z  
##  2:   10.47.25.80    50817 2018-03-24T17:15:21.411148Z  
##  3:   10.47.25.80    50817 2018-03-24T17:15:21.926018Z  
##  4:   10.47.25.80    50813 2018-03-24T17:15:22.690601Z  
##  5:   10.47.25.80    50813 2018-03-24T17:15:23.205187Z  
##  ---  
## 988: 10.174.251.215    33003 2018-03-24T17:15:21.429238Z  
## 989: 10.174.251.215    33003 2018-03-24T17:15:21.429315Z  
## 990: 10.174.251.215    33003 2018-03-24T17:15:21.429479Z  
## 991:  10.164.94.120    38265 2018-03-24T17:15:21.427375Z  
## 992: 10.174.251.215    33003 2018-03-24T17:15:21.433306Z
```

## FIN

This package is less than 24 hrs old (as of the original blog post date) and there are still a few bits missing, which means y'all have the ability to guide the direction it heads in. So kick the tyres and interact where you're most comfortable.