ZEEP: Zone Encryption with Enhanced Privacy for Vehicular Communication

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C Security Analysis Of ZEEP

We extend the formal definitions and experiments of ZE [1] to establish PH-CCA security, anonymity, ciphertext integrity, and ticket traceability for ZEEP. We define the lists, notations, and oracles used in the security experiments below:

Lists. The challenger maintains several lists to store information gathered by adversary from its interactions with the oracles. Table 1 summarizes these lists. Here $\mathcal{V}$ represents a vehicle with id *vid*.

Table 1: Lists used in the security experiments

List	Description
$\mathcal{L}_{honest}$	Enrolled honest vehicles $\{(\mathcal{V})\}$
$\mathcal{L}_{corrupt}$	Enrolled vehicles $\{(\mathcal{V})\}$ that are corrupt
$\mathcal{L}_{auth}$	Authorized tickets of vehicles per epoch e, i.e. $\{(q_{\mathcal{V}}, \mathcal{V}, e)\}$
$\mathcal{L}_{enter}$	Messages $\{((q_{\mathcal{V}}, \mathcal{V})/(q_{\mathcal{A}}, \mathcal{A}), M = (z, t, m))\}$ exchanged during Enter by honest vehicles $\mathcal{V}$ or adversary $\mathcal{A}$ using their tickets $q_{\mathcal{V}}$ or $q_{\mathcal{A}}$
$\mathcal{L}_{sent}$	Ciphertexts $\{\gamma\}$ generated by honest vehicles
$\mathcal{L}_{received}$	Decrypted ciphertexts $\{\gamma = (t, Y, \gamma')\}$
$\mathcal{L}_{opened}$	Opened transcripts M
$\mathcal{L}_{revoked}$	Revoked authentication tickets $\{q_{\mathcal{V}}\}$
$\mathcal{L}_{keys}$	Zone-keys $\{(z, t, K_{t,z})\}$ obtained by adversary $\mathcal{A}$ after corrupting vehicles

Notations. We use $O(sk_{\mathcal{I}}, pk_{\mathcal{I}}, reg_{\mathcal{I}})$ to represent the set of oracles initialized with secret key $sk_{\mathcal{I}}$, public key $pk_{\mathcal{I}}$, and registry state $reg_{\mathcal{I}}$. We adopt the following notations from ZE:

- $O.protocol.\mathcal{P}$: It allows the adversary to interact with the honest party $\mathcal{P}$ running *protocol*. It verifies whether $\mathcal{V} \in \mathcal{L}_{honest}$ and aborts otherwise.
- $O.protocol.\mathcal{P}\&\mathcal{R}$: It enables the adversary to initiate interactive *protocol* between honest parties $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{R}$. The oracle updates its internal states but does not learn any output. It ensures $\mathcal{V} \in \mathcal{L}_{honest}$ for honest vehicles.
- Honest parties maintain their state as $\mathcal{P}[reg\mathcal{P}]$. For example, $\mathcal{V}[L_K]$ denotes the zone keys L_K held by $\mathcal{V}$ in epoch e. The adversary's state is denoted by $state_{\mathcal{A}}$, which stores information obtained during its interactions.

Oracles. Fig. 1 details the oracles that the adversary can query.

C.1 PH-CCA Security

PH-CCA Security ensures that an adversary cannot learn any information about the ciphertext in any zone and time period without executing the zone entry protocol. The experiment $\text{Exp}^{\text{ph-cca-b}}_{Z,E,T}(\mathcal{A})$ for proving PH-CCA Security is detailed in Fig. 2. The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ outputs two challenge payloads P_0 and P_1 for target zones Y^* and time period t^*. $\mathcal{A}$ then receives a challenge ciphertext encrypting P_b for a random $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and must determine b with probability better than random guessing, excluding trivial win cases.

Definition C.1. *ZEEP is PH-CCA secure if for any efficient adversary $\mathcal{A}$, zone-set Z, epoch set E and time-period set T,*

$$|Pr[Exp^{ph-cca-0}_{Z,E,T}(\mathcal{A}) = 1] - Pr[Exp^{ph-cca-1}_{Z,E,T}(\mathcal{A}) = 1]| \leq negl(\lambda)$$

Theorem C.1. *ZEEP is PH-CCA secure if TFRAC satisfies misauthentication resistance, DGSA satisfies traceability, SE and PKE are IND-CPA secure, and DAE satisfies privacy and authenticity.*

Proof. We prove the PH-CCA security by showing that no efficient adversary $\mathcal{A}$ can distinguish between the PH-CCA challenger C_0^{ph-cca} (encrypting P_0) and C_1^{ph-cca} (encrypting P_1). Following the ZE security, we construct a series of hybrids between C_0^{ph-cca} and C_1^{ph-cca}. Let the challenge zone set be $Y^* = \{y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_n\}$. For $i = 0, \ldots, n$, we define the hybrid algorithms below.

(1) Hybrid Δ_i: behaves exactly like C_0^{ph-cca}, except that to compute the challenge ciphertext, it encrypts the first i zones with a payload key K' and the remaining zones with another key K, and encrypts P_0 with K.
(2) Hybrid Δ'_i: behaves exactly like C_1^{ph-cca}, except that to compute the challenge ciphertext, it encrypts the first i zones with a payload key K and the remaining zones with another key K' and encrypts P_1 with K.

By definition $\Delta_0 = C_0^{ph-cca}$ and $\Delta'_n = C_1^{ph-cca}$. To prove the theorem, we show that $\mathcal{A}$ has negligible advantage in distinguishing between any two consecutive hybrids Δ_i and Δ_{i+1}. If $\mathcal{A}$ can distinguish them, then we can use it to build a reduction algorithm $\mathcal{S}$ to break **DAE privacy**.

$\mathcal{S}$ answers $\mathcal{A}$'s queries and interacts with the DAE privacy challenger Cb^{priv} ($b \in 0, 1$) with the challenge key $Kpriv$, while maintaining the same lists as the PH-CCA challenger. $\mathcal{S}$ receives pp_{DAE} from C_b^{priv} and generates rest ZEEP parameters $sk\mathcal{I}, pk_{\mathcal{I}}, pp_{TFRAC}$, and pp_{DGSA} and sends pp_{TFRAC}, pp_{DGSA} and pk_I to $\mathcal{A}$. $\mathcal{S}$ randomly selects a time period $\tilde{t}$ and sets zone key as $K_{y_{i+1},\tilde{t}} = K_{priv}$ and answers the queries as follows.

- $Enroll.\mathcal{V}\&\mathcal{I}$: $\mathcal{S}$ runs the protocol and stores the generated TFRAC credential.
- $Enroll.\mathcal{I}$:, $\mathcal{S}$ runs the protocol with $sk_{\mathcal{I}}$.
- $Authorize.\mathcal{V}\&\mathcal{I}$: $\mathcal{S}$ runs the protocol and stores the generated *TFRAC* and *DGSA* credentials.
- $Authorize.\mathcal{I}$: $\mathcal{S}$ runs the protocol with $pk_{\mathcal{I}}$.
- *Enter*: On input $(q_{\mathcal{V}}, \mathcal{V}, z, t, msg)$ on behalf of the honest vehicle $\mathcal{V}$, if $(z, t) = (y_{i+1,\tilde{t}})$, $\mathcal{S}$ executes *Enter* with $\mathcal{A}$.
  - If $msg = request$, $\mathcal{S}$ generates $(ek, dk) \leftarrow PKE.KeyGen(1^\lambda)$, computes $tok_{\mathcal{V}} \leftarrow DGSA.GenTok(pk_{\mathcal{I}}, cred_{\mathcal{V}}, e, (z, t, ek))$ and sends $(M = (z, t, ek), tok_{\mathcal{V}})$ to $\mathcal{A}$.

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Enrollment and Authorization

- $O.Enroll.\mathcal{V}\&\mathcal{I}(sk_I, \cdot)$: On input $\mathcal{V}$, the adversary triggers the enrollment protocol between an honest vehicle $\mathcal{V}$ and the honest issuer $\mathcal{I}$. If $Enroll.\mathcal{V}$ returns a private output $\mathcal{V}[(cred_{TFRAC}, e)]$, then $\mathcal{V}$ is added to $\mathcal{L}_{honest}$.
- $O.Enroll.\mathcal{I}(sk_I, \cdot)$: On input $\mathcal{V}$, the adversary, acting as a corrupt vehicle, triggers enrollment with the honest issuer $\mathcal{I}$ and adds $\mathcal{V}$ to $\mathcal{L}_{corrupt}$.
- $O.Authorize.\mathcal{V}\&\mathcal{I}(sk_I, \cdot)$: On input $(q_{\mathcal{V}}, \mathcal{V}, e)$, the adversary initiates authorization of an honest vehicle $\mathcal{V}$ with the honest issuer $\mathcal{I}$. If the protocol outputs private credentials $\mathcal{V}[(cred_{TFRAC}, e')]$ and $\mathcal{V}[(cred_{\mathcal{V}}, e)]$, then $(q_{\mathcal{V}}, \mathcal{V}, e)$ is added to $\mathcal{L}_{auth}$.
- $O.Authorize.\mathcal{I}(sk_I, \cdot)$: On input $(q_{\mathcal{V}}, \mathcal{V}, e)$, the adversary triggers authorization on behalf of a corrupt vehicle $\mathcal{V}$ and adds $(q_{\mathcal{V}}, \mathcal{V}, e)$ to $\mathcal{L}_{auth}$.

Entering and Exiting Zones

- $O.Enter(\cdot)$: On input $(q_{\mathcal{V}}, \mathcal{V}, z, t, msg)$, the adversary triggers a zone-key request/response for an honest vehicle $\mathcal{V}$ in zone z at time t.
  - If $msg = request$, the oracle executes the Enter protocol with $\mathcal{V}$ as requester and honest vehicles $\mathcal{W}_i$ as responders.
  - If $msg = response$, the oracle allows $\mathcal{V}$ to respond to a request from a corrupt vehicle; the derived key $K_{z,t}$ is added to $\mathcal{V}[L_K]$.

  All messages $(q_{\mathcal{V}}, \mathcal{V}, (z, t, m))$ sent by honest vehicles are stored in $\mathcal{L}_{enter}$.
- $O.Exit(\cdot)$: On input $(\mathcal{V}, z, t)$, deletes the zone key $K_{z,t}$ from $\mathcal{V}[L_K]$.

Sending and Receiving Payloads

- $O.Send(\cdot)$: On input $(\mathcal{V}, P, Y, t)$, runs $\gamma/\perp \leftarrow Send(\mathcal{V}[L_K], P, Y, t)$ and adds γ to $\mathcal{L}_{sent}$.
- $O.Receive(\cdot)$: On input $(\mathcal{V}, \gamma)$, runs $m/\perp \leftarrow Receive(\mathcal{V}[L_K], \gamma)$ and adds γ to $\mathcal{L}_{received}$.

Opening, Corruption and Revocation

- $O.Open(sk_I, reg_I, \cdot)$: On input M, returns $q_{\mathcal{V}} \leftarrow Open(sk_I, reg_I, M)$ and adds M to $\mathcal{L}_{opened}$.
- $O.Corrupt(\cdot)$: On input $\mathcal{V}$, returns the full internal state of $\mathcal{V}$, adds $\mathcal{V}$ to $\mathcal{L}_{corrupt}$, and all keys to $\mathcal{L}_{keys}$.
- $O.Revoke(sk_I, \cdot)$: On input authentication ticket $q_{\mathcal{V}}$, blocklists or penalizes $q_{\mathcal{V}}$ and updates $\mathcal{L}_{revoked}$.

Note. The notation "$protocol^*$" denotes a modified oracle with a specific response strategy. This applies to $Enter^*$, $Exit^*$, $Authorize^*$, $Send^*$, and $Receive^*$.

Figure 1: Adversarial Oracles and Capabilities

Experiment $\mathbf{Exp}^{\text{ph-cca-b}}_{Z,E,T}(\mathcal{A})$:
$pp \leftarrow Setup(1^\lambda, Z, E, T)$
$(sk_I, pk_I, reg_I)) \leftarrow KeyGen.\mathcal{I}(pp)$

Initialize the oracles as $O(sk_I, pk_I, reg_I)$
$(\mathcal{V}^*, P_0, P_1, Y^*, t^*, state_{\mathcal{A}}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^O(\text{choose}, pp, pk_I)$
abort if $\mathcal{V}^* \in \mathcal{L}_{corrupt}$

$\gamma^* \leftarrow Send(\mathcal{V}^*[L_K], P_b, Y^*, t^*)$ with $\gamma^* = (t^*, Y^*, \gamma^{*\prime})$
$b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^O(\text{guess}, \gamma^*, state_{\mathcal{A}})$
return b' if $\mathcal{A}$ did not trivially win, i.e.:

1. $\forall (t^*, Y, \gamma) \in \mathcal{L}_{received}$: $\gamma \cap \gamma^{*\prime} = \emptyset$, i.e. $\mathcal{A}$ did not query decryption oracle on challenge ciphertext, and
2. $\forall y^* \in Y^*$: $(y^*, t^*, \cdot) \notin \mathcal{L}_{keys}$ i.e., $\mathcal{A}$ did not corrupt a vehicle with zone key for a challenge zone, and

3a. $\forall y^* \in Y^*$: $((q_{\mathcal{A}}, \mathcal{A}, y^*, t^*, \cdot) \notin \mathcal{L}_{enter})$, i.e. $\mathcal{A}$ did not enter a challenge zone in time t^* with corrupt vehicle or

3b. $\exists (\mathcal{A}, y^*, t^*, \cdot) \in \mathcal{L}_{enter}$ and $\forall \mathcal{V}_j \in \mathcal{L}_{corrupt}, \nexists (q_{\mathcal{V}_j}, \mathcal{V}_j, e(t^*)) \in \mathcal{L}_{auth}$ i.e. $\mathcal{A}$ entered a challenge zone without authorization.

Figure 2: Experiment for PH-CCA Security

- If $msg = response$, then upon receiving $(y_{i+1}, \tilde{t}, ek, tok)$ from $\mathcal{A}$, $\mathcal{S}$ checks whether the request was originally sent by a non-corrupt vehicle in the same protocol execution—i.e., whether $\mathcal{A}$ is passively replaying some request. If so, $\mathcal{S}$ encrypts a random message instead of K with PKE. **IND-CPA security of PKE** ensures the indistinguishability of the hybrids here. If $\mathcal{V} \in \mathcal{L}_{corrupt}$ or if request is not from a non-corrupt vehicle in the same protocol execution (active attack), then $\mathcal{S}$ sends $\perp$ and aborts.

If $\mathcal{A}$ wins the PH-CCA game, with $t^* = \tilde{t}$ as the challenge time period, the winning condition 3b ensures that no corrupt vehicle $\mathcal{V}_j$ is authorized in $e(\tilde{t})$. Therefore,

- either there exists a vehicle with a valid credential for $e(\tilde{t})$ without enrollment, which occurs with negligible probability if **TFRAC is misauthentication-resistant**.
- or no such vehicle exists, and the token sent by $\mathcal{A}$ is valid, which happens with negligible probability if **DGSA satisfies traceability**.

Therefore after aborting, once $\mathcal{S}$ receives token from $\mathcal{A}$, $\mathcal{S}$ is computationally indistinguishable from Δ_i and Δ_{i+1}.

- *Exit* : On input $(\mathcal{V}, z, t)$, $\mathcal{S}$ deletes $(z, t, K_{z,t})$ from $\mathcal{V}[L_K]$.
- *Send*: On input $(\mathcal{V}, P, Y \ni y_{i+1}, \tilde{t})$, $\mathcal{S}$ checks if all zones in Y are active for $\mathcal{V}$ and if $(y_{i+1}, \tilde{t}, .) \in \mathcal{V}[L_K]$ and then generates payload key $DAE.KeyGen(pp_{DAE})$, computes $ct \leftarrow DAE.Enc(K, P)$, $\gamma_{y_{i+1},\tilde{t}}$ by sending K to C_b^{priv}. $\mathcal{S}$ then encrypts K with keys for other zone-time pairs in query and sets ciphertext as *Enter* protocol.
- *Receive* : On input $\mathcal{V}$ and ciphertext $\gamma = (\tilde{t}, Y, ((y, \gamma_{y,\tilde{t}})_{y \in Y}, ct))$ such that $y_{i+1} \in Y$, $\mathcal{S}$ checks for any other active zone z for $\mathcal{V}$ by computing $K_P \leftarrow DAE.Dec(K_{z,\tilde{t}}, ct, \gamma_{z,\tilde{t}})$ and returns $P \leftarrow SE.Dec(K_P, ct)$. If $\gamma_{y_{i+1},\tilde{t}}$ and ct were included in a previous *Send* query response, $\mathcal{S}$ returns the corresponding queried payload. Otherwise, it returns $\perp$ and aborts. **DAE authenticity** ensures that $\mathcal{A}$ can't generate a ciphertext that decrypts to a valid plaintext.
- *Open* : On query $M = (z, t, m)$, tok $\mathcal{S}$ runs $DGSA.OpenTok$ and sends output q to $\mathcal{A}$.
- *Revoke* : On input $q_{\mathcal{V}}$, blacklists $q_{\mathcal{V}}$ and informs $\mathcal{A}$.
- *Corrupt* : On input $\mathcal{V}$, sends the state of the vehicle, i.e. credentials and key list, to $\mathcal{A}$.

Note: For all queries where $z \neq y_{i+1}$ or $t \neq \tilde{t}$, $\mathcal{S}$ simply runs the corresponding protocol on the given inputs. In challenge phase, $\mathcal{A}$ outputs challenge tuples $(\mathcal{V}^*, P_0, P_1, Y^*, t^*)$.

- If $\mathcal{V}^* \in \mathcal{L}_{corrupt}$, $\mathcal{S}$ returns 0 same as PH-CCA challenger.
- If $\tilde{t} \neq t^*$, $\mathcal{S}$ sends $\perp$ and aborts.
- Otherwise, $\mathcal{S}$ generates payload keys K and K' and sends them to C and receives a ciphertext $\gamma^*_{y_{i+1},\tilde{t}}$ from C_b^{priv}. For $k = 1, \ldots, i$, $\mathcal{S}$ computes $\gamma_{y_k,\tilde{t}} \leftarrow DAE.Enc(K_{y_k,\tilde{t}}, K')$, for $k = i, \ldots, n$, computes $\gamma^*_{y_k,\tilde{t}} \leftarrow DAE.Enc(K_{y_k,\tilde{t}}, K)$, $ct \leftarrow$

$DAE.Enc(K, P_0)$ and sends $\gamma^* = (\tilde{t}, Y^*, ((y_k, \gamma_{y_k,\tilde{t}})_{k\le i}, (y_{i+1}, \gamma^*_{y_{i+1},\tilde{t}}), (y_k, \gamma_{y_k,\tilde{t}})_{k>i+1}, ct))$ to $\mathcal{A}$.

After challenge phase, to answer a *Receive* query on $(\mathcal{V}, \gamma)$, $\mathcal{S}$ checks that no part of γ is replayed from the challenge ciphertext γ' and then proceeds as before. Other queries are answered as before.

At the end of the game, $\mathcal{S}$ forwards the bit b of $\mathcal{A}$ to $\mathcal{C}$. $\mathcal{S}$ perfectly simulates $\mathcal{C}_b^{ph-cca}$ to $\mathcal{A}$ under the stated assumptions. As $\tilde{t} = t^*$ with probability $1/|T|$, thus for $|Y^*| = n$ zones, the adversarial advantage is given by

$$Adv_{\Delta_i,\Delta_{i+1}(\mathcal{A})} - Q_1 Adv^{misauth}_{TFRAC}(\mathcal{S}(\mathcal{A})) - Q_2 Adv^{trace}_{DGSA}(\mathcal{S}(\mathcal{A})) - Q_3 Adv^{auth}_{DAE}(\mathcal{S}(\mathcal{A})) - Q_4 Adv^{ind-cpa}_{PKE}(\mathcal{S}(\mathcal{A})) \le n|T| Adv^{priv}_{DAE}(\mathcal{S}(\mathcal{A}))$$

where Q_1, Q_2 are no. of active *Enter* queries, Q_3 is no. of *Recieve* queries with target zone as the only active zone, and Q_4 is the no. of passive *Enter* queries. Therefore, Δ_i and Δ_{i+1} are computationally indistinguishable.

We can use a similar reduction to **DAE privacy** for proving the indistinguishability of Δ'_i and Δ'_{i+1}. Furthermore, we can reduce the **IND-CPA security of SE** to the computational indistinguishability of Δ_n and Δ'_0. $\mathcal{S}$ can set K as the challenge key and forward (P_0, P_1) as the challenge tuples in the SE IND-CPA game. It can respond to all the *Send* queries (excluding the challenge) by generating fresh payload keys. Additionally, since $\mathcal{S}$ knows all the keys for active zones, it can address all the other queries as well. Therefore the advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ in the PH-CCA game is given by,

$$Adv^{ph-cca}_{ZEEP}(\mathcal{A}) \le 2n|T| Adv^{priv}_{DAE}(S(\mathcal{A})) + Adv^{ind-cpa}_{SE}(S(\mathcal{A})).$$

Thus, if TFRAC is misauthentication resistant, SE and PKE are IND-CPA secure and DAE satisfies privacy and authenticity, then ZEEP is PH-CCA secure. □

C.2 Anonymity

ZEEP anonymity ensures that ciphertexts sent during the *Enter* protocol reveals no information about vehicle identity (anonymity) and remains unlinkable. The experiment $Exp^{ano-b}_{Z,E,T}(\mathcal{A})$ for anonymity is detailed in Fig. 3.

Definition C.2. *ZEEP satisfies anonymity if for any efficient adversary $\mathcal{A}$, zone-set Z, epoch set E and time-period set T,*

$$|Pr[Exp^{ano-0}_{Z,E,T}(\mathcal{A}) = 1] - Pr[Exp^{ano-1}_{Z,E,T}(\mathcal{A}) = 1]| \le negl(\lambda)$$

Theorem C.2. *ZEEP satisfies anonymity if TFRAC is misauthentication resistant and DGSA satisfies anonymity.*

Proof. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an adversary in the ZEEP anonymity game, making Q queries to the $Enter^*$ oracle. We define Δ_i as an algorithm that simulates the ZEEP anonymity game challenger, only differing in its handling of $Enter^*$ queries. For the first i $Enter^*$ queries made with bit d, Δ_i responds using $(q_{\mathcal{V}_{1-d}}, \mathcal{V}_{1-d})$, while for the remaining queries, it responds using $(q_{\mathcal{V}_d}, \mathcal{V}_d)$. Let C_b^{ano} represents the ZEEP anonymity challenger using $(q_{\mathcal{V}_b}, \mathcal{V}_b)$, then by definition $\Delta_0 = C_0^{ano}$ and $\Delta_Q = C_1^{ano}$.

We prove that if $\mathcal{A}$ can distinguish between any two consecutive hybrids Δ_i and Δ_{i+1}, then we can build a reduction $\mathcal{S}$ which can use $\mathcal{A}$ as a subroutine to win the **DGSA anonymity** game.

Experiment $\mathbf{Exp}^{ano-b}_{Z,E,T}(\mathcal{A})$
$pp \leftarrow Setup(1^\lambda, Z, E, T)$
$(sk_I, pk_I, reg_I) \leftarrow KeyGen.\mathcal{I}(pp)$

Initialize all oracles $O(sk_I, pk_I, reg_I)$
$((q_{\mathcal{V}_0}, \mathcal{V}_0), (q_{\mathcal{V}_1}, \mathcal{V}_1), state_{\mathcal{A}}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^O(\text{choose}, pp, pk_I)$
Abort if $\mathcal{V}_0$ and $\mathcal{V}_1$ have different states, i.e. for $d \in \{0,1\}$:
$\nexists e_l$ s.t. $(q_{\mathcal{V}_d}, \mathcal{V}_d, e_l) \in \mathcal{L}_{auth}$ and $(q_{\mathcal{V}_{1-d}}, \mathcal{V}_{1-d}, e_l) \notin \mathcal{L}_{auth}$ and $\mathcal{V}_0[L_K] = \mathcal{V}_1[L_K]$. It ensures that *Enter*, *Exit* is not queried for the challenge vehicles unless both vehicles have been authorized in the same epoch.

Use the challenge oracles $O^*(b)$ for the queries on $Enter^*$, $Exit^*$, $Send^*$, and $Receive^*$
$b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{O^*}(\text{guess}, state_{\mathcal{A}})$
Return b' if $\mathcal{A}$ did not trivially win, i.e., for $d \in \{0,1\}$:
$\mathcal{V}_d \in \mathcal{L}_{honest}$ and $\forall M \in \mathcal{L}^*_{enter} : M \notin \mathcal{L}_{opened}$, i.e. adversary did not open a message sent during *Enter* by a challenge vehicle.

Figure 3: Experiment for Anonymity

$\mathcal{A}$'s advantage in the ZEEP anonymity game is thus bounded by $Q \times Adv_{\Delta_i,\Delta_{i+1}}$, where $Adv_{\Delta_i,\Delta_{i+1}}$ is the advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ in distinguishing Δ_i from Δ_{i+1} for any $0 \le i \le Q-1$.

$\mathcal{S}$ receives pp_{DGSA} and pk_{DGSA} from the DGSA challenger, generates $sk_{TFRAC}, pk_{TFRAC} \leftarrow TFRAC.KeyGen(pp_{TFRAC})$ and parameters for other ZEEP protocols. $\mathcal{S}$ sends the public parameters and pk_{DGSA}, pk_{TFRAC} to $\mathcal{A}$. $\mathcal{S}$ answers the queries as follows.

- $Enroll.\mathcal{V}\&\mathcal{I}$: $\mathcal{S}$ runs the protocol and stores the generated TFRAC credentials.
- $Enroll.\mathcal{I}$: $\mathcal{S}$ runs the protocol using sk_{TFRAC}.
- $Authorize.\mathcal{V}\&\mathcal{I}$: On $(q_{\mathcal{V}}, \mathcal{V}, e)$ for vehicle $\mathcal{V}$ in epoch e, simulator $\mathcal{S}$ runs $TFRAC.Auth$ and queries $DGSA.Issue$ oracle of $C_{DGSA,b}$ and stores the output (updated TFRAC and DGSA) credentials.
- $Authorize.\mathcal{I}$: On $(\mathcal{V}, e)$, $\mathcal{S}$ executes $Authorize$ with $\mathcal{A}$. Let $\mathcal{V}_0, \mathcal{V}_1$ be the challenge vehicles used by $\mathcal{A}$ in the challenge phase to win the game.
  - If $\mathcal{A}$ queries on $\mathcal{V} = \mathcal{V}_0$ or $\mathcal{V} = \mathcal{V}_1$, with $(cred_{TFRAC}, cred_{\mathcal{V}})$, $\mathcal{S}$ check $\mathcal{V} \in \mathcal{L}_{honest}$; If not it aborts. $\mathcal{S}$ is indistinguishable from ZEEP anonymity challenger because of **TFRAC misuthentication-resistance**.
  - If $\mathcal{V} \neq \mathcal{V}_0$ or $\mathcal{V}_1$, then $\mathcal{S}$ runs $TFRAC.Auth$ using sk_{TFRAC}, pk_{TFRAC}. If the authentication succeeds, it outputs an updated TFRAC credential $cred'_{TFRAC}$ and queries $DGSA.Issue$ oracle of $C_{DGSA,b}$ for DGSA credential and forwards the responses to $\mathcal{A}$. Otherwise, it .
  - $Enter$: $\mathcal{S}$ uses $DGSA.AuthTok$ and $DGSA.VerifyTok$ on the input to generate and verify authentication tokens.
  - $Exit$: On $(\mathcal{V}, z, t)$, $\mathcal{S}$ deletes $(z, t, K(z,t))$ from $\mathcal{V}[L_K]$ that it locally maintains for $\mathcal{V}$.
  - For *Send* and *Recieve*, $\mathcal{S}$ runs the corresponding protocols
  - $Open$: On input M, $\mathcal{S}$ queries the $DGSA.OpenTok$ oracle of $C_{DGSA,b}$ and returns q to $\mathcal{A}$.
  - $Revoke$: On input $q_{\mathcal{V}}$, blacklists $q_{\mathcal{V}}$ and informs $\mathcal{A}$.
  - $Corrupt$: On input $\mathcal{V}$, sends the state of the vehicle, i.e. credentials and key list, to $\mathcal{A}$.

In the challenge phase, $\mathcal{A}$ outputs challenges $(q_{\mathcal{V}_0}, V_0)$ and $(q_{\mathcal{V}_1}, \mathcal{V}_1)$. $\mathcal{S}$ checks if both tickets are authorized in same epochs and $\mathcal{V}_0[L_K] = \mathcal{V}_1[L_K]$. If not it aborts. $\mathcal{S}$ randomly selects a zone-time pair $(\tilde{z}, \tilde{t})$

where both the challenge vehicle tickets $q_{\mathcal{V}_0}$ and $q_{\mathcal{V}_1}$ are authorized. After the challenge phase, the oracles *Enter*, *Exit*, *Send*, and *Receive* are replaced by *Enter**, *Exit**, *Send**, and *Receive**, respectively. For all other oracle queries involving a bit d, $\mathcal{S}$ responds as it did before the challenge phase.

- For the $(*)$ queries up to the i^{th} *Enter** query with a bit d, $\mathcal{S}$ uses $(q_{\mathcal{V}_{1-d}}, \mathcal{V}_{1-d})$ to respond. It verfies $(q_{\mathcal{V}_{1-d}}, \mathcal{V}_{1-d}, e) \in \mathcal{L}_{auth}$ and executes the ZEEP sub-protocols during *Enter*, by querying $C_{DGSA,b}$ for *DGSA.AuthTok*, and executing the remaining protocols itself.
- To answer *Exit**, *Send** and *Receive** queries for a bit d the simulator uses the state of $\mathcal{V}_{1-d}$ that it locally maintains.
- For the $(i+1)^{th}$ *Enter** query on input (d, z, t, msg) $\mathcal{S}$ aborts if $(z,t) \neq (\tilde{z}, \tilde{t})$. Otherwise, if $msg = request$, $\mathcal{S}$ generates ek for PKE and sends $(q_{\mathcal{V}_0}, q_{\mathcal{V}_1}, e(\tilde{t}), M = (z, t, ek))$ as a challenge tuple to $C_{DGSA,b}$. If $msg = response$, $\mathcal{S}$ sends $(q_{\mathcal{V}_0}, q_{\mathcal{V}_1}, e(\tilde{t}), M = (z, t, ct))$ as challenge to $C_{DGSA,b}$.
- To answer the remaining $(*)$ queries, $\mathcal{S}$ uses $(q_{\mathcal{V}_d}, \mathcal{V}_d)$.

The winning condition implies that $\mathcal{A}$ never queried the *Open* oracle on any message exchanged during *Enter**. Therefore the distribution of $\mathcal{S}'s$ responses except for the $(i+1)^{th}$ *Enter** query is identical to those in Δ_i and Δ_{i+1}.

At the end of the game, $\mathcal{A}$ outputs a decision bit b', which $\mathcal{S}$ forwards to $C_{DGSA,b}$. The advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ in distinguishing Δ_i from Δ_{i+1} is therefore given as

$$Adv_{\Delta_i,\Delta_{i+1}}(\mathcal{A}) - negl(\lambda) \leq |Z||T| Adv^{ano}_{DGSA}(S(\mathcal{A})),$$

where $negl(\lambda)$ is the negligible advantage due to the misauthentication resistance of TFRAC and $Adv^{ano}_{DGSA}(S(\mathcal{A}))$ is the advantage of $\mathcal{S}$ running $\mathcal{A}$ as a subroutine in the DGSA anonymity game. Thus,

$$Adv^{ano}_{ZEEP}(\mathcal{A}) - negl(\lambda) \leq Q|Z||T| Adv^{ano}_{DGSA}(S(\mathcal{A})).$$

Thus, a non-negligible advantage for $\mathcal{A}$ in ZEEP anonymity game implies a non-negligible advantage for $\mathcal{S}$ in DGSA anonymity game. □

C.3 Ciphertext Integrity

Ciphertext integrity ensures that an adversary cannot generate a valid ciphertext for any zone z and time period t without possessing the corresponding zone key $K_{z,t}$. The experiment $\text{Exp}^{integrity}_{Z,Epoch,T}(\mathcal{A})$ to prove ciphertext integrity is detailed in Fig. 4.

Definition C.3. *ZEEP satisfies ciphertext integrity if for any efficient adversary $\mathcal{A}$, zone-set Z, epoch set E and time-period set T,*

$$Pr[\boldsymbol{Exp}^{integrity}_{Z,E,T}(\mathcal{A}) = 1] \leq negl(\lambda).$$

To win, the adversary must output a fresh and valid ciphertext γ^* for zones whose keys it does not know, and also output an honest vehicle $\mathcal{V}$ that decrypts γ^* to $P \neq \perp$.

Theorem C.3. *ZEEP satisfies ciphertext integrity if DAE satisfies authenticity, TFRAC is misauthentication resistant if DGSA satisfies traceability, and PKE is IND-CPA secure.*

Proof. Assuming that TFRAC is misauthentication-resistant, DGSA satisfies traceability, and PKE is IND-CPA secure, we prove that ZEEP achieves ciphertext integrity by reducing it to the **authenticity of the DAE scheme.**

Experiment $\text{Exp}^{integrity}_{Z,E,T}(\mathcal{A})$
$pp \leftarrow Setup(1^\lambda, Z, E, T)$
$(sk_{\mathcal{I}}, pk_{\mathcal{I}}, reg_{\mathcal{I}}) \leftarrow KeyGen.\mathcal{I}(pp)$

Initialize all the oracles as $O(sk_{\mathcal{I}}, pk_{\mathcal{I}}, reg_{\mathcal{I}})$
$(\mathcal{V}, \gamma^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^O(\text{forge}, pp, pk_{\mathcal{I}})$
Parse $\gamma^* = (t^*, Y^*, \gamma^{*'})$, abort if $\mathcal{V} \in \mathcal{L}_{corrupt}$

Return 1 if $Receive(\mathcal{V}[L_K], \gamma^*) \neq \perp$ and $\mathcal{A}$ didn't trivially win, i.e.

(1) $\forall (t^*, Y, \gamma) \in \mathcal{L}_{sent} : \gamma \cap \gamma^{*'} = \emptyset$, i.e. γ^* does not include any ciphertext previously queried by $\mathcal{A}$ to the *Send* oracle, and
(2) $\forall y^* \in Y^* : (y^*, t^*, \cdot) \notin \mathcal{L}_{keys}$ i.e., $\mathcal{A}$ has not corrupted any vehicle that knows the key of challenge zone, and
3a. $\forall y^* \in Y^* : ((\cdot, \mathcal{A}, y^*, t^*, \cdot) \notin \mathcal{L}_{enter})$, i.e. either $\mathcal{A}$ has not entered challenge zone in time t^*, or
3b. $\exists (\cdot, \mathcal{A}, y^*, t^*) \in \mathcal{L}_{enter}$ and $\forall \mathcal{V}_j \in \mathcal{L}_{corrupt} : \nexists (\cdot, \mathcal{V}_j, e(t^*)) \in \mathcal{L}_{auth}$, i.e. $\mathcal{A}$ has entered challenge zone in time t^* without authorization.

Figure 4: Experiment for Ciphertext Integrity

Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an adversary that wins the ZEEP ciphertext integrity game with probability at least ϵ. Let $\mathcal{S}$ be the simulator that runs $\mathcal{A}$ as a subroutine and interacts with the DAE authenticity challenger C^{priv}_b. The challenger generates secret key $K \leftarrow DAE.KeyGen(pp)$ and provides pp to $\mathcal{S}$. $\mathcal{S}$ generates the remaining protocol parameters. It runs $(sk_{TFRAC}, pk_{TFRAC}) \leftarrow TFRAC.KeyGen(pp_{TFRAC})$, $(sk_{DGSA}, pk_{DGSA}) \leftarrow DGSA.KeyGen\ (pp_{DGSA})$ and sends all the public parameters and $pk_{\mathcal{I}} = (pk_{TFRAC}, pk_{DGSA})$ to $\mathcal{A}$.

$\mathcal{S}$ randomly selects a zone, time period $(\tilde{z}, \tilde{t})$ and sets the zone key $K_{\tilde{z},\tilde{t}} = K$. It then responds to the adversary's queries as follows.

- $Enroll.\mathcal{V}\&\mathcal{I} : \mathcal{S}$ runs the protocol and stores the generated TFRAC credential.
- $Enroll.\mathcal{I} : \mathcal{S}$ runs the protocol with $sk_{\mathcal{I}}$.
- $Authorize.\mathcal{V}\&\mathcal{I} : \mathcal{S}$ runs the protocol and stores generated *TFRAC* and *DGSA* credentials.
- $Authorize.\mathcal{I} : \mathcal{S}$ runs the protocol with $pk_{\mathcal{I}}$.
- *Enter*: On input $(q_{\mathcal{V}}, \mathcal{V}, z, t, msg)$ on behalf of honest vehicle $\mathcal{V}$, if $(z,t) = (\tilde{z}, \tilde{t})$ and $\mathcal{V} \notin \mathcal{L}_{corrupt}$, $\mathcal{S}$ executes *Enter* protocol with $\mathcal{A}$.
  - If $msg = request$, then simulator $\mathcal{S}$ generates $(ek, dk) \leftarrow PKE.KeyGen(1^\lambda)$, computes authentication token $tok \leftarrow DGSA.GenTok(pk_{\mathcal{I}}, cred_{\mathcal{V}}, e, (z, t, ek))$, and sends $(z, t, ek, tok_{\mathcal{V}})$ to $\mathcal{A}$.
  - If $msg = response$, then on input $(\tilde{z}, \tilde{t}, ek, tok)$ from $\mathcal{A}$, $\mathcal{S}$ checks whether the request is from a non-corrupt vehicle identity in the same protocol execution (i.e. $\mathcal{A}$ is replaying a request of a non-corrupt vehicle (passive attack). If so, $\mathcal{S}$ encrypts a random message instead of K with PKE. **IND-CPA security of PKE** ensures the indistinguishability from the actual protocol. If $\mathcal{V} \in \mathcal{L}_{corrupt}$, or if the request is not from a non-corrupt vehicle in the same protocol execution (active attack) then $\mathcal{S}$ sends $\perp$ and aborts.

If $\mathcal{A}$ wins the ciphertext integrity game, with $t^* = \tilde{t}$ as the challenge time period, the winning condition 3*b* ensures that no corrupt vehicle $\mathcal{V}_j$ is authorized in $e(\tilde{t})$. Therefore, either

- there exists a vehicle with a valid credential for $e(\tilde{t})$ without enrollment, which occurs with negligible probability if **TFRAC is misauthentication-resistant**, or

– no such vehicle exists, and the token sent by the adversary is valid, which happens with negligible probability if **DGSA satisfies traceability**.

Therefore, by aborting the protocol upon receiving a token from $\mathcal{A}$, simulator's response is computationally indistinguishable from the real protocol execution.

- *Exit* : On input $(\mathcal{V}, z, t)$, $\mathcal{S}$ simply deletes $(z, t, K_{z,t})$ from $\mathcal{V}[L_K]$ that it locally maintains for $\mathcal{V}$.
- *Send* : On input $(\mathcal{V}, P, Y \ni \tilde{z}, \tilde{t})$, $\mathcal{S}$ checks whether all zones in Y are active for $\mathcal{V}$ and $(\tilde{z}, \tilde{t}, .) \in \mathcal{V}[L_K]$. If not it aborts, otherwise, $\mathcal{S}$ generates payload key $K \leftarrow SE.KeyGen(pp_{SE})$, computes $ct \leftarrow SE.Enc(K, P)$ and $\gamma_{\tilde{z},\tilde{t}}$ by sending K to C_b^{priv}. $\mathcal{S}$ encrypts K with keys of remaining zone-time pairs in the query and sets ciphertext similar to *Enter*.
- *Receive* : On ciphertext $\gamma = (t, Y \ni \tilde{z}, ((y, \gamma_y, t))_{y \in Y}, ct)$ such that $t = \tilde{t}$, $\mathcal{S}$ checks if there exists a zone $y \neq \tilde{z}$ in Y such that $(y, t, \cdot) \in \mathcal{V}[L_K]$. If so, it decrypts the ciphertext using $K_{y,t}$ and replies as the real *Receive* protocol. Otherwise, it checks whether $(\tilde{z}, t, \cdot) \in \mathcal{V}[L_K]$. If not, it returns $\perp$; if yes, it sends $(\gamma_{\tilde{z}}, \tilde{t}, ct)$ as a header to the challenger C and forwards its response to $\mathcal{A}$.
- *Open*, *Revoke*, *Corrupt* queries are handled exactly as in the previous games.

Note: For all queries where $z \neq \tilde{z}$ or $t \neq \tilde{t}$, $\mathcal{S}$ simply runs the corresponding protocol on the given inputs.

Finally $\mathcal{A}$ outputs a challenge $(\mathcal{V}, \gamma^*)$, where γ^* is parsed as $(t^*, Y^*, \gamma^{*\prime})$. If $t^* \neq \tilde{t}$ or $\tilde{z} \notin Y^*$, $\mathcal{S}$ aborts. Otherwise in the case if $\mathcal{A}$ wins, $Receive(\mathcal{V}[L_K], \gamma^*) \neq \perp$, then some $y^* \in Y^*$ exists which satisfies $DAE.Dec(K_{y^*,\tilde{t}}, \gamma_{y^*,\tilde{t}}) \neq \perp$. The probability of such $y^* = \tilde{z}$ is $1/|Z|$, and such $t^* = \tilde{t}$ is $1/|T|$. Additionally, since γ^* was not in the set of sent ciphertexts, $\gamma_{\tilde{z},\tilde{t}}$ must be a fresh one. $\mathcal{S}$ then forwards it to $C^{auth}_{DAE,b}$, breaking DAE authenticity. Hence, if $\mathcal{A}$ succeeds with probability ϵ, $\mathcal{S}$ breaks DAE authenticity with probability at least $\epsilon/(|Z||T|) - negl(\lambda)$. As **DAE satisfies authenticity** and $|Z|, |T|$ are polynomial, ϵ must be negligible.

□

C.4 Ticket traceability

ZEEP ensures that any vehicle holding a zone key $K_{z,t}$ must have entered zone z at time t by sending a message that allows the corresponding authentication ticket to be traced and blocklisted. The experiment $\text{Exp}^{trace}_{Z,E,T}(\mathcal{A})$ is detailed in Fig. 5.

Definition C.4. *ZEEP satisfies ticket traceability if for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$, zone-set Z, epoch set E, and time-period set T,*

$$Pr[Exp^{trace}_{Z,E,T}(\mathcal{A}) = 1] \leq negl(\lambda).$$

Theorem C.4. *ZEEP satisfies ticket traceability if DGSA satisfies unforgeability and traceability, PKE is IND-CPA secure, and TFRAC is misauthentication resistant.*

Proof. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an adversary that wins the ticket traceability game with ϵ probability. To win the game $\mathcal{A}$ outputs a tuple (z^*, t^*, K_{z^*,t^*}) such that there exists at least one honest vehicle $\mathcal{V} \in \mathcal{L}_{honest}$ which accepted the key. The winning conditions implies that $K_{z^*,t^*} \notin \mathcal{L}_{keys}$, which requires one of the following condition to hold.

Experiment $\text{Exp}^{trace}_{Z,E,T}(\mathcal{A})$:
$pp \leftarrow Setup(1^\lambda, Z, E, T)$
$(sk_I, pk_I, reg_I) \leftarrow KeyGen.\mathcal{I}(pp)$

Initialize all the oracles as $O(sk_I, reg_I)$
$(z^*, t^*, K_{z^*,t^*}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^O(\text{forge}, pp, pk_I)$
Check if $\exists \mathcal{V} \in \mathcal{L}_{honest}$ with $K_{z^*,t^*} \in \mathcal{V}[L_K]$, otherwise abort.

Return 1 if knowledge of K_{z^*,t^*} cannot be traced with *Open* to the authentication ticket of a corrupt vehicle, i.e.

(1) $K_{z^*,t^*} \notin \mathcal{L}_{keys}$, i.e., $\mathcal{A}$ has not corrupted an honest vehicle which already had key K_{z^*,t^*} and
(2a) $\forall(\cdot, z^*, t^*, m_j) \in \mathcal{L}_{enter}$ s.t. $q_{\mathcal{V}_j} \leftarrow Open(sk_I, reg_I, m_j)$, then $(\nexists(q_{\mathcal{V}_j}, \mathcal{V}_j, e(t^*)) \in \mathcal{L}_{auth})) : (\mathcal{V}_j \in \mathcal{L}_{corrupt})$, i.e. if an enter message opens to ticket $q_{\mathcal{V}_j}$, then no corrupt vehicle authorized using it in epoch $e(t^*)$.

Figure 5: Experiment for Traceability to Tickets

(1) Case 1: No enter message involving $m_j = (z^*, t^*, \cdot)$ is sent, i.e. $m_j = (z^*, t^*, \cdot)$ does not exist in $\mathcal{L}_{enter}$
(2) Case 2: There exists atleast one enter message involving $m_j = (z^*, t^*, \cdot)$ in $\mathcal{L}_{enter}$

Case 1: Since no message of the form $m_j = (z^*, t^*, \cdot)$ exists in $\mathcal{L}_{\text{enter}}$, $\mathcal{A}$ does not interact actively with the system and cannot influence the key list. $\mathcal{A}$ only sees ciphertexts generated via PKE during Enter. Hence, traceability reduces to the **IND-CPA security of PKE**.
Case 2: In this case atleast one such message m_j exists, then the winning condition ensures that if $q_{\mathcal{V}_j} \leftarrow Open(sk_I, st_I, m_j)$ is the ticket recovered from m_j then the following scenarios can occur:

(1) There is no tuple $(q_{\mathcal{V}_j}, \mathcal{V}_j, e(t)^*) \in \mathcal{L}_{\text{auth}}$ such that $\mathcal{V}_j \in \mathcal{L}_{\text{corrupt}}$. It shows some corrupt vehicle $\mathcal{V}_j$ did not get authorized in epoch $e(t)^*$ using $q_{\mathcal{V}}$. In this case, the traceability of ZEEP can be reduced to the **traceability of DGSA**. We construct a simulator $\mathcal{S}$ that runs the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ as a subroutine. The simulator $\mathcal{S}$ uses the message m_j and token tok output by $\mathcal{A}$ as a forgery for the vehicle $\mathcal{V}_j$ in epoch $e(t)^*$.
(2) There exist $(q_{\mathcal{V}_j}, \mathcal{V}_j, e(t)^*) \in \mathcal{L}_{\text{auth}}$ such that $\mathcal{V}_j \in \mathcal{L}_{honest}$. It shows either *i*) $\mathcal{A}$ replayed a valid message from the honest vehicle or *ii*) $\mathcal{A}$ forged a token that opens to an authentication ticket $q_{\mathcal{V}}$ of an honest vehicle that never computed it. In the first case, ZEEP traceability can be reduced to the **IND-CPA security of PKE** similar to Case 1. In the second case, traceability can be reduced to **DGSA traceability** similar to Case 2.1.
(3) There exists $(q_{\mathcal{V}_j}, \mathcal{V}_j, e(t)^*) \in \mathcal{L}_{\text{auth}}$ such that $\mathcal{V}_j \notin \mathcal{L}_{honest}$ and $\mathcal{V}_j \notin \mathcal{L}_{corrupt}$. This implies $\mathcal{V}_j$ was never enrolled i.e. $\mathcal{A}$ forged a TFRAC credential. In this case, ZEEP traceability can be reduced to **TFRAC misauthentication resistance**.

Since all primitives are assumed to be secure, the adversary's advantage in breaking the traceability of ZEEP is negligible. □

References

[1] Jan Camenisch, Manu Drijvers, Anja Lehmann, Gregory Neven, and Patrick Towa. 2020. Zone encryption with anonymous authentication for V2V communication. In *2020 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)*. IEEE.