Nietzsche's Readings on Spinoza

A Contextualist Study, Particularly on the Reception of Kuno Fischer

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Abstract: Nietzsche's relation to Spinoza is highly puzzling. It was based mainly on secondary sources. This article explores for the first time what impact Nietzsche's reading about Spinoza—particularly of Kuno Fischer's *History of Modern Philosophy*—had on his conceptions. First, I consider how Nietzsche found a brother-in-arms in Spinoza upon leaving teleology behind. Second, I examine Nietzsche's concept of eternal recurrence in the context of Spinoza's teaching as it was presented by Fischer. Third, I investigate the relation between Nietzsche's *amor fati* and Spinoza's *amor intellectualis dei*. Finally, I discuss how the Spinozist concept of self-preservation (as it was modeled and discussed in nineteenth-century Spinoza research) became in the horizon of evolutionary theory a critical point for Nietzsche. It turns out that the knowledge of Nietzsche's sources is fundamental for an adequate understanding of the use Nietzsche made of Spinoza's philosophy. The article thus tries to find a new approach to Nietzsche's Spinoza with the help of the contemporary sources he used.

Nietzsche in Spinoza, Spinoza in Nietzsche

> You were one of the noblest, the most genuine people, who have ever walked this earth. And though both friend and foe know this, I don't think it unwarranted to verbally bear witness to it before your grave. For we know the world, we know Spinoza's fate. For the world could lay shadows around *Nietzsche's* memory as well. And therefore I conclude with the words: *Peace* to your ashes! *Holy* be thy name to all those to come![1]

The only historical person Peter Gast puts in relation to his much-revered master in these closing words of the funeral oration he delivered in front of Friedrich Nietzsche's open grave in Röcken on August 28, 1900, is Baruch de Spinoza.[2] His intentions are clear: Nietzsche is to avoid the fate of Spinoza, who was ostracized both during his lifetime and posthumously. Simultaneously, the reference to Spinoza denotes the high intellectual esteem Gast had for the deceased.

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Researchers have since highlighted the association between Nietzsche and Spinoza, especially in their attempts to portray Nietzsche as a positive, politically innocuous, anti-anti-Semitic and pan-European figure of integration.[3] Nietzsche himself provided evidence for such an association, most famously in a letter to his friend Franz Overbeck, written on July 30, 1881:

> I am completely surprised, elated! I have a *predecessor*, and what a predecessor at that! I hardly knew Spinoza at all: that I was driven to him *now* was an "instinctual act." It's not only that his general tendencies are the same as mine—to make insight the *most powerful emotion*—in five main points of his teachings I recognize myself, this most abnormal and loneliest thinker is closest to me in *these* things especially: he denies free will—; purpose—; a moral world order—; the nonegotistical—; evil—; even though the differences are clearly enormous, these can mainly be found in the difference of time, culture and science. To sum up: my loneliness, which, as if I were atop a high mountain, often gave me trouble breathing and made my blood flow, has now, at least, found some company.—Curious! (*KSB* 6, no. 135, p. 111)[4]

We will return to this passage. For now, it is sufficient to note that in 1881 Nietzsche identified with Spinoza not only because they had a common interest in a similar subject matter but also because Spinoza, owing to his radicalism, was seen as a completely isolated thinker in the seventeenth century, just as Nietzsche feels he is.[5] In notes contemporaneous to his letter, Nietzsche ponders family relations:

> When I speak of Plato, Pascal, Spinoza and Goethe, I know that their blood flows in mine—I am *proud*, when I tell the truth about them—the family is good enough not to have to poeticize or to conceal; and thus I stand to everything that has been, I am *proud of the humanity*, and especially proud of unconditional truthfulness. (*KSA* 9:12[52], p. 585)[6]

If one were to trust these testimonies alone, one would conclude that, as of 1881, Nietzsche was a self-avowed Spinozist, a person who recognized himself and his philosophy in the relevant Spinozist teachings. Accordingly, researchers have been convinced that "of the modern philosophers, none were as significant as Spinoza for the late Nietzsche."[7] One could thus settle for simply labeling Nietzsche a Spinozist and turn to other matters. And yet certain details interfere with the idea that Nietzsche was indeed a Spinozist. The first of these details is the fact that any evidence for Nietzsche ever having read Spinoza's writings themselves is missing.[8] Nietzsche came across Spinoza in his years as a student in Bonn, while he was attending Karl Schaarschmidt's lectures in 1865, and then also in the course of reading Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Albert Lange's *Geschichte des Materialismus* (*History of Materialism*), Eduard von Hartmann's *Philosophie des Unbewussten* (*Philosophy of the Unconscious*), Friedrich Ueberweg's *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie* (*Basic History of Philosophy*), and Eugen Dühring's *Der Werth des Lebens* (*The Value of Life*).[9]

Nietzsche's deeper interest in Spinoza only began when he read Kuno Fischer's *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie* (*History of Modern Philosophy*), which he had requested Overbeck in a postcard dated July 8, 1881, to send to Sils-Maria (*KSB* 6, no. 123, p. 101) and to which, upon reading it, he reacted in his enthusiastic letter of July 30, 1881.[10] Another close reading of Fischer's book follows in 1887, as can be seen in a long note found in Nietzsche's posthumously published writings (see *KSA* 12:7[4], pp. 259–70). Incidentally, Nietzsche had returned a new edition of Spinoza's *Ethics* to his bookseller already in 1875—and later he seemingly had no desire to read the original book.[11]

Certainly, Nietzsche's secondhand knowledge of Spinoza is not at all an argument that he could not have seen very crucial and problematic issues in Spinoza's thinking. He is not to be blamed that he did not read the original; however, the fact the he didn't read Spinoza himself becomes noteworthy when we ask how he used elements of Spinoza for his own philosophy. Thomas H. Brobjer came to a harsh judgment, which has nevertheless a certain force, at least from the point of view of the history of philosophy: "To discuss Nietzsche's interpretations and misinterpretations of Spinoza in relation to Spinoza's own writings is simply irrelevant."[12]

In order to understand where Nietzsche is new and original in his assessment of Spinoza, it is obviously necessary to focus on Nietzsche's actual readings. Despite several rather systematic studies about Nietzsche and Spinoza, no one has ever attempted to reconstruct carefully Nietzsche's view on Spinoza out of the studies he actually read. This article tries to go some first steps in this direction in order to recontextualize Nietzsche's own thinking. Recontextualizing seems to be a basic necessity of contemporary Nietzsche research.

The second detail to disturb the idea of Nietzsche the Spinozist is the fact that Nietzsche occasionally makes positive pronouncements about Spinoza in the works he wrote before his actual discovery of Spinoza in 1881, and that afterward, any positive mention of Spinoza is limited to letters and his posthumously published notes, while references to Spinoza in published works are to a large extent dismissive in nature.[13] Why, then, is there no public acknowledgment of Spinoza as a predecessor?

The third bothersome detail in this is the fact that Nietzsche's pertinent pronouncements between 1881 and 1888 in no way form a coherent picture. Systematizing his assertions as to what he believes to know about Spinoza and his philosophy is difficult.

In what follows, I make no attempt at a comprehensive analysis of the Nietzsche-Spinoza complex. I ignore the relatedness between the two in terms of their analysis and critique of morals, especially in terms of the problem of conscience, as well as emotions, and the problem of compassion.[14] The following highlights to what extent Nietzsche may make use of his secondhand knowledge of Spinoza in his own concept of historicity of (human or all) reality.[15]

This points to a fourth detail that disturbs the notion of Nietzsche the Spinozist: Nietzsche did all of his reading—at least in the middle and later periods of his work—based on how useful it would be for his own work. Nietzsche submitted every author he read to a rigorous calculation of personal utility.[16] So he may have appropriated essential elements from Spinoza's philosophy, but he would have been disinclined to admit himself to be a confessor or disciple of Spinoza's system. Nietzsche never adopted Spinoza's system—or what he took as Spinoza's system—in its entirety. Thus the question whether Nietzsche was a Spinozist or not loses its relevance.

I am interested in the question of how Nietzsche understood the temporality of the world and of human existence, which served as the background of his readings concerning Spinoza. First, I suggest that his readings *about* Spinoza show that Nietzsche found a brother-in-arms with respect to their mutual rejection of teleology. The dismissal of teleology in nature and also in the understanding of historically conditioned human existence seems to be a characteristic trait in the critical approach of both Spinoza and Nietzsche. Second, I propose that Nietzsche's concept of eternal recurrence gives an answer to the question how we can understand the temporal structure of the world. There seems to be a connection to Nietzsche's knowledge of Spinoza here as well. Third, it is worth thinking about the relation between Nietzsche's *amor fati* and Spinoza's *amor dei intellectualis*, because both conceptions try to formulate an answer to the question how to deal with the historicity of the human existence. Finally, I would like to return to the issue of teleology in terms of the concept of self-preservation, which in its frequent mention in discussions of evolutionary theory at the time became a critical point for Nietzsche. In this, Nietzsche even toyed with the idea of not only sacrificing teleology but causality itself. It is necessary for these various examinations to take into consideration both the public declarations found in Nietzsche's published works and also various posthumously published notes, which often react directly to secondary literature, specifically, Kuno Fischer.[17] Fischer was one of the most influential historians of philosophy in the nineteenth century. The importance of Nietzsche's reading of Fischer's book has often been acknowledged but never investigated carefully.

Therefore, this article does not confront Nietzsche with the "original" Spinoza but rather with the Spinoza known to Nietzsche from what he read about Spinoza. Here, I am not concerned with the problem of whether Nietzsche had an adequate idea of Spinoza's thinking and of how the philosophies of the two thinkers interact directly, although this is certainly also an important issue. I am concerned with the problem how Nietzsche dealt with secondhand Spinoza material and tried to gain a philosophical benefit out of it. Therefore, we have to explore how Nietzsche transformed the specific material he used. The aim of this study is thus to trace the genesis and transformation of some concepts in Nietzsche and to contextualize them, not to ask whether Nietzsche was wrong or right in his view and criticism of Spinoza.

Teleology as *Asylum Ignorantiae*

Spinoza's denial of purpose is, after his denial of free will, the second point on which Nietzsche bases his spiritual relatedness to his "predecessor" in his letter to Overbeck. The issue of purpose gives important hints how the temporal structure of reality might be conceptualized. At the same time, Nietzsche writes in his notebooks: "Spinoza or teleology as *Asylum Ignorantiae*" (*KSA* 9:11[194], p. 519). Of course, according to the common view, Spinoza did not actually seek refuge in teleology from an otherwise deserted metaphysics but rather abruptly distanced himself from the teleological viewpoints of the tradition. Nietzsche's note is based on a chapter in Fischer's book entitled "Teleology as *asylum ignorantiae*."[18] In the final paragraph of the immediately preceding chapter, Fischer writes:

> If the mathematical method and its strict reasoning count as the measuring stick of all true cognition, then the world order must be thought in such a way that it corresponds with this method: therefore the universe must be thought of as *eternal* and thus neither as genesis nor as creation; therefore the order of things must be thought of as a *steady nexus of causality* that excludes from itself any form of freedom and any purposeful action.[19]

In his reconstruction, Fischer thus places causality in opposition to teleology, although the world is already so eternal and complete that it no longer needs to become or develop. Hence it cannot work toward an end.[20]

> Real cognition discovers and explains things and drives this explanation forward, unlike the imagined and false cognition, that is, ignorance, which is satisfied by the concept of purpose and turns this concept into its comfortable asylum. Thus Spinoza himself declares in the appendix to the first book of the *Ethics*, which clarifies his entire teachings. After showing how people arrive at this illusion of purpose, he continues as follows: "Do but see, I pray, to what all this has led. Amidst so much in nature that is beneficial, not a few things must have been observed which are injurious, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases, and it was affirmed that these things happened either because the gods were angry because of wrongs which had been inflicted on them by man, or because of sins committed in the method of worshipping them; and although experience daily contradicted this and showed by an infinity of examples that both the beneficial and the injurious were indiscriminately bestowed on the pious and the impious, the inveterate prejudices on this point have not therefore been abandoned. For it was much easier for a man to place these things aside with others of the use of which he was ignorant and thus retain his present and inborn state of ignorance, than to destroy the whole superstructure and think out a new one. Hence it was looked upon as indisputable that the judgments of the gods far surpass our comprehension; and this opinion alone would have been sufficient to keep the human race in darkness to all eternity, if *mathematics*, which does not deal with ends but with the essences and properties of forms, had not placed before us another rule of truth." The explanation of purpose must ultimately resort to calling upon the will of god, who made everything so that this or that occurrence may take place. His will, however, is impenetrable for man, and thus the only escape for teleological thought is the "asylum ignorantiae."[21]

Nietzsche learned from Fischer's version of Spinoza the extant of the disillusionment that follows from a departure from teleological thought. Teleology had provided religion in particular with a generous asylum, from whence Spinoza then evicted it. The idea that nature, history, and man lack purpose henceforth became one of the few constants in Nietzsche's thought. Purpose is incapable of explaining the world and is a relic of a thought system that no longer corresponds to reality. The German Enlightenment had failed to emancipate itself from a purpose-based form of thought, leaving only Nietzsche in agreement with Spinoza: "Moses Mendelssohn, that archangel of precocity, said in reference to purpose that Spinoza could not have been so foolish as to deny its existence!" (*KSA* 9:11[137], p. 493). This statement, too, Nietzsche found in Fischer's Spinoza book.[22]

Nietzsche's critique of the concept of purpose had a very contemporary scientific and theoretical target, which is still apparent in one of his last works, the *Twilight of the Idols*. When—with the grand gesture of the discoverer—Nietzsche claims that purpose is an invention of man—"in reality purpose is *lacking* . . ." (*TI* "Errors" 8; *KSA* 6, p. 96)—he is not fighting against some windmills that have long been brought to fall but against the influential neo-Kantian thinker Otto Liebmann, in whose works Nietzsche read the following:[23]

> Whether there is objectively, be it in the appearances, be it in the *metaphysical background* of the appearances, anything similar to human intentions, plans, purpose and purposeful actions, we cannot know; that remains a matter of opinion. However, in accordance with our specific rational constitution, we humans undoubtedly see it as necessary to interpret much in the world of appearances as having a purpose. As to whether apart from, next to, or over our continuous working with blindly aimless necessity, causis efficientibus, there are also special *causes of purpose*, causae finales, a difference of opinion is possible; but that in natura naturata there is an *infinitely superior purpose*, independent of man and all his arts, over that there cannot be any difference of opinion. Those are conceptually helpful constructions of some metaphysical systems; this is a concrete fact of experience. It may be also asked whether these constructions are compatible with the scientific principle of causality; in this it is only a question of whether what is actually purposeful can be explained by the general causal laws of nature or not.[24]

Nietzsche disputes Kantian ideas of teleology, whereby our consciousness is forced to see the world as purposeful, with the contention that we humans are beings that are thirsty for knowledge and thus seek to apply purpose to reality. This is something that even Kant and neo-Kantian philosophers such as Liebmann would essentially agree with. The second element of Nietzsche's claim, the idea that reality is free of purpose, remains, scientifically speaking, unclear. For how can Nietzsche know what shape reality takes beyond human perception? Without sharing Spinoza's metaphysical conclusions on the true composition of the world, Nietzsche nevertheless insists that the nonexistence of purpose entails what Spinoza argues it entails, as outlined in Fischer's book:

> What happens in nature follows from a given cause, by which it is instigated without being determined. Everything here happens for a reason, not for a purpose;

> everything happens based on a functioning trigger, nothing happens for an end. For purpose, however it might be defined, demands a certain amount of self-determination, which does not take place in this order of things. The idea of purpose does not fit in with a mathematical way of thinking. . . . Mathematical truths only have reasons, but no purposes. And if in the nature of things, everything follows out of a reason, like the axioms of mathematics, then there is no purpose, then purpose is a monstrosity in the world, a monstrous thought in my head, an unclear and confused idea, nothing but a groundless imagination. Thus the concept of the functioning cause is juxtaposed with that of the final cause and the possibility of a purpose is in its very essence picked up and thrown out. There is no purpose, whether in things or actions. . . . In Spinoza's way of seeing there is nothing that could or should be any different than it is in reality.[25]

A world without any purposes is a world without a historical teleology—there is no aim in history. Is there anything that could replace purposes in the process of the world? What would a conception of history without teleology look like? It would be a cold, a very sober conception in which human acting is no longer defined by reasons but only by causes.

Eternal Recurrence as Model for Understanding the Historicity of Reality

At the same time Nietzsche had his first intensive confrontation with Spinoza through Kuno Fischer's lens, he discovered what he would later call "the idea of eternal return" (*KSA* 11:27[23], p. 281) or the "idea of eternal recurrence" (*KSA* 11:27[80], p. 295). The first mention of the idea of eternal recurrence does in fact appear side by side with the excerpts from Fischer's book. The first text containing Nietzsche's musings on recurrence is entitled "Die Wiederkunft des Gleichen" ("The Recurrence of the Same") and is marked as having been written in the "[b]eginning of August 1881 in Sils-Maria / 6000 feet above the sea and far higher above all human things!" (*KSA* 9:11[141], p. 494). Here, too, the pathos is accompanied by metaphors of loneliness, the same sentiment Nietzsche expressed in his letter to Overbeck regarding Spinoza and himself.

> The new *heavyweight: the eternal recurrence of the same*. Endless importance of our knowledge, our erring, our habits, ways of living for everything to come. What do we do with the rest of our life—we, who have spent most of it in basic ignorance? *We teach the teachings*—it is the best instrument of *self-inculcation*. Our kind of beatitude, as teachers of the greatest teachings. (*KSA* 9:11[141], p. 494)

Libraries are filled with clever contributions on the subject of where Nietzsche may have drawn inspiration from for his idea of recurrence, how much importance it carries for Nietzsche's general thought altogether, and to what extent we are here faced with an idea for which Nietzsche demanded not only ethical but also scientific evidence. Only two aspects, which have gone somewhat unnoticed

in these branching discussions, are of particular interest to me here. The first is the question of whether the idea of recurrence was directed against the dominant historical model of the speculative-universalistic philosophy of history, that is, against the traditional concept of teleology in history, against the idea of progress.[26] Here it becomes clearer why the rejection of an *asylum ignorantiae* for teleology is relevant to the notion of the human existence's historicity. The second is what role Spinoza (as presented in Fischer's adaptation) may have played in Nietzsche's development of the idea of recurrence.

In his late work, Nietzsche, who occasionally categorizes the idea of progress as one of the "modern ideas," which has an "ignoble origin" (*BGE* 260; *KSA* 5, p. 210), tends to interpret that which is commonly referred to as "progress" as the general advancing of *decadence* (*TI* "Skirmishes" 43; *KSA* 6, p. 144).[27] In the *Antichrist*, written in 1888, he argues against the contemporary ideology of progress, which assigns "mankind" "a development of the better or the stronger or the higher" (*A* 4), by providing examples of higher individuals, who do not allow for the conclusion that the species has progressed. Here, Nietzsche does not advance a regressive theory against the idea of progress, which seeped into the pan-European mentality through the speculative-universalistic philosophy of history and as a consequence of the metaphysical notion of teleology, but rather opposes it by privileging the individual and the particular over the entire species and the general. "[S]omething which in relation to collective mankind is a sort of overman" (*A* 4) serves as a measure, which devalues the leftover individuals. This passage from *The Antichrist* reads like an appeal for insight into the contingency of history, which objects to any and every type of historical "necessity" (including teleology). World-historical hope is no longer projected onto "the humanity" of the speculative-universalistic philosophy of history but onto a single (the one and only) and special individual. Unlike in Christian teachings of redemption, which also assign the key role to a single individual, in the anti-Christian model, it is not for the many that the individual acts. Rather, the higher man is his own purpose; general well-being and charity are of no interest to him.

It has been remarked that Nietzsche designed the idea of eternal recurrence of the same as a counterpart to the model of progress. Such a model of progress was often treated in research as a result of Judeo-Christian heritage—a treatment that was in no small way influenced by Nietzsche's reductive portrayal of Greco-Roman antiquity.[28] It is thus noteworthy that in *The Antichrist* the idea of recurrence is in no way presented as an opposing concept to the idea of progress.[29] Elsewhere in Nietzsche's works and posthumously published writings there also seem to be hardly any passages that place eternal recurrence in relation or in opposition to the advancement of species or any other teleological structure meant to account for the historical process. The idea of the advancement of species and the idea of recurrence are both attempts at subsuming the totality

of history under a single term. Their opposition is of a gradual, not a principled, nature. Within a conception of recurrence, it is possible to integrate particular progress—such as that of "a sort of overman." However, if we take the overman as an aim of human agency, do we not reestablish teleology?

It is true that Spinoza stands at a considerable distance from the speculative-universalistic philosophy of history that is posited as a strategy to by which to overcome contingency. Even though, as is well known, he became an inventor of historical biblical criticism in his *Tractatus theologico-politicus* and was one of the first scholars to consistently historicize the development of the Judeo-Christian religion of revelation, his ontology remains radically free of history.[30] Fischer, as we have seen, summarizes this as follows: the "universe" must be "thought of as eternal and thus neither as genesis nor as creation."[31] Pursuing this train of thought, Fischer states:

> The universe *is the result*, that is, it is necessary like a mathematical truth. It follows from the original being, like the mathematical truth from the axiom. This necessary consequence is simultaneously eternal. The world does not come into being, it *is*; just as the mathematical truth does not (in time) come into being out of the axiom but rather resides in the axiom eternally. Thus the universe must be thought of as a necessary and eternal order of things.[32]

Spinoza here appears as a radical thinker of eternity and being, who, as such, must deny becoming in the world itself, for the world is already complete in its own being-as-it-is. With his idea of recurrence, Nietzsche offers a counterpoint to this, which should not only be understood as an alternative to the Enlightenment and later idealistic (or materialistic) ideas of progress but also as opposed to the absolutism of being that characterizes Spinoza's thought, according to Fischer. For Spinoza's trust in the completeness of the world would effectively only allow contemplation as an adequate form of being; there would be nothing left to do, nothing to change, nothing to create, nothing to desire, nothing to become. Such a position stands in complete opposition to Nietzsche's intellectual disposition. With the idea of recurrence Nietzsche thus seems to believe himself to have found a solution for an understanding of world events in time and temporality, which manages to evade both the speculative-universalistic philosophy of history, that is, a thought based on teleological becoming, and also Spinoza's timeless and temporality-free idea of being—thereby avoiding the aporias of both. This is made clear in a posthumously published note from 1885:

> If the world had a goal, it could not fail to have been reached by now. If it had an unintended final state, this too could not fail to have been reached. If it were capable at all of standing still and remaining frozen, of "being," if for just one second in all its becoming it had this capacity for "being," then in turn all becoming would long since be over and done with, and so would all thinking, all "mind." The fact of "mind" *as a becoming* proves that the world has no goal and no final state and is incapable of being.—But the old habit of

> thinking about all events in terms of goals, and about the world in terms of a guiding, creating God, is so powerful that the thinker is hard-pressed not to think of the goallessness of the world as, again, an intention. This idea—the idea that the world is intentionally *evading* a goal and even has the means expressly to prevent itself from being drawn into a cyclical course—is what occurs to all those who would like to impose upon the world the faculty for *eternal novelty*, that is, impose upon a finite, determinate force of unchanging magnitude like "the world" the miraculous capacity to refashion its shapes and states *infinitely*. They would like the world, if no longer God, to be capable of divine creative force, an infinite force of transformation; they would like the world to *prevent itself* at will from falling back into one of its earlier shapes, to possess not only the intention but also the *means* of *guarding* itself from all repetition. The world is, thus, to *control* every one of its movements at every moment so as to avoid goals, final states, repetitions—and whatever else the consequences of such an unforgivably crazy way of thinking and wishing may be. This is still the old religious way of thinking and wishing, a kind of longing to believe that in *some way or other* the world does, after all, resemble the beloved old, infinite, boundlessly creative God—that in some way or other "the old God still lives"—that longing of Spinoza's expressed in the words "deus sive natura" (he even felt "natura sive deus"). But what, then, is the proposition and belief that most distinctly formulates that critical turn, the present *ascendancy* of the scientific spirit over the religious, god-inventing spirit? Is it not: the world, as force, must not be conceived of as unlimited, for it *can*not be conceived of that way—we forbid ourselves the concept of an *infinite* force, *as being incompatible with the concept of "force."* Thus—the world also lacks the capacity for eternal novelty. (*KSA* 11:36[15], pp. 556–57)

According to Nietzsche, then, Spinoza is a nostalgic metaphysician, who, in the end, cannot bare the godlessness and purposelessness of the world and stipulates a unity and a being for which there is no evidence in reality. Nietzsche, on the other hand, insinuates that that which is becoming is the only reality that can be experienced, that all kinds of knowing are always temporal in nature. According to Nietzsche, Spinoza (or, to be precise: Fischer's Spinoza) denies this simple experience, to the extent that he must be strongly suspected of being a metaphysician. In *The Antichrist*, for instance, Spinoza appears as the prototype of the metaphysical "conceptual albinos" who ultimately pervert the Christian God into a "thing in itself" (*A* 17; *KSA* 6, p. 184).[33]

All this provokes the impression that Nietzsche sought to systematically discredit Spinoza in his public pronouncements in an effort to prevent the reader from noticing the closeness of their views and in order to ensure that Nietzsche was under no circumstances taken for someone else. To this effect, Spinoza is presented as the exact opposite of how Nietzsche wants to be. Nietzsche reacts to Spinoza "with a forced distancing" out of fear of being mistaken for him.[34] In reality, Spinoza seems to achieve (in Fischer's reconstruction) precisely that which Nietzsche is striving for, that is, the affirmation of the world as it is, the elimination of all naïve desires for it to be different. Behind Spinoza's

affirmation Nietzsche also identifies a hidden theology and morality, which can indeed be said to correspond to Spinoza's style, but this affirmation is ultimately only marginally different from Nietzsche's affirmation, namely, the affirmation of the world, even when it recurs eternally. Nietzsche must depict this marginality as being crucial, as an incredibly wide gulf, to avoid the danger of being confused for Spinoza:

> "Return to nature" 1. Its stages: its background Christian credulity (in some ways already Spinoza's "deus sive natura"!)
>
> [. . .]
>
> Spinozism extremely influential:
>
> 1. the attempt to acquiesce in the world *as it is*
> 2. happiness and knowledge naively posited in a relation of *dependence* (express a will *to* optimism which betrays the deeply suffering man—)
> 3. the attempt to *rid oneself* of the moral order of the world, *so as* to have "God" remain, *a world that holds its ground in the face of* ***reason*** . . .
>
> "When man no longer considers himself evil, he ceases to be so—" Good and evil are only interpretations, by no means facts or in-themselves. One can track down origin of this kind of interpretation; one can try in this way to slowly liberate oneself from the deep-rooted compulsion to interpret morally. (*KSA* 12:2[131], pp. 131–32)[35]

What also becomes clear here is that Spinoza's rationalism must have struck Nietzsche as a constant provocation. Not only does Spinoza show little appreciation for pity—and neither does Nietzsche—but he also shows little appreciation for suffering, which is according to him nothing other than the expression of an erroneous self-understanding. Underlying the criticism of naivety—which is what Nietzsche is accusing Spinoza of implicitly with the mention of optimism—is also the accusation of seeing the best of all possible worlds in this world, a view that the young Nietzsche's idol Schopenhauer declared to be shameless.[36] It is true that Spinoza's philosophy, as presented by Fischer, is a completely and utterly nontragic matter: tragedy and suffering are merely signs of a lack of insight. Nietzsche, on the other hand, sees tragic ambiguity everywhere, the abyss and suffering—and he sees endless suffering, which no future development in history can overcome or turn for the better, disputing the thought of progress in speculative-universalistic philosophy of history. Therefore, Nietzsche looks as a psychologist beyond Spinoza's philosophical façade and seeks out the suffering experienced by the philosopher, pointing to his "will to optimism" as an expression and compensation for this suffering. Conversely, Nietzsche understands his own thoughts of recurrence to constitute a heroic yes-saying to suffering in particular, to a senseless, painful world itself in eternal recurrence. The historicity of humans is—against Fischer's Spinoza—always characterized by suffering, by passion.

In the much-discussed Lenzerheide fragment of June 10, 1887, Spinoza is assigned a key role in the history of "European Nihilism":

> 6
>
> Let us think this thought in its most terrible form: existence as it is, without meaning or goal, but inevitably recurring, without any finale into nothingness: "eternal recurrence."
>
> That is the most extreme form of nihilism: nothingness ("meaningless-ness") eternally!
>
> European form of Buddhism: the energy of knowledge and of strength *compels* such a belief. It is the *most scientific* of all possible hypotheses. We deny final goals: if existence had one, it could not fail to have been reached.
>
> 7
>
> It now becomes clear that here an opposite of pantheism is being sought: because "Everything perfect, divine, eternal" *likewise* compels *a belief in* "*eternal recurrence*." Question: once morality becomes impossible, does the pantheistic affirmative stance towards all things become impossible as well? After all, fundamentally it's only the moral God that has been overcome. Does it make sense to conceive of a God "beyond good and evil"? Would a pantheism in *this* sense be possible? If we remove the idea of purpose from the process do we *nevertheless* affirm the process?—This would be the case if something within that process were *achieved* at every moment of it—and always the same thing.
>
> Spinoza attained an affirmative stance, insofar as every moment has a *logical* necessity: and with his fundamental instinct for logic he felt a sense of triumph about the world's being constituted *thus*.
>
> 8
>
> But his is only a single case. *Every fundamental trait*, which underlies *everything* that happens, which expresses itself in everything that happens, ought to lead an individual who felt it as *his* fundamental trait to welcome triumphantly every moment of general existence. The point would be precisely to experience this fundamental trait in oneself as good, as valuable, with pleasure. (*KSA* 12:5[71], pp. 213–14)

Now, the apparently antihistorical thinker Spinoza suddenly appears as a main witness to the thought of eternal recurrence itself; every "moment" possesses a "logical necessity" and in every moment the process of the world has already achieved what it can achieve—without it being in any way a purpose or goal. Spinoza thus shows himself to be an exemplary exponent of the senselessness of the world, against whom Nietzsche can only offer the rather feeble reproach that "his is only a single case"—as if this changes anything about his validity or exemplarity. At the very least, it is remarkable that Spinoza is put forth as a process thinker—a reading that Kuno Fischer decidedly precluded. The choice of words suggests a completely different source of inspiration, that is, the much-maligned *Philosophy of the Unconscious* by Eduard von Hartmann, which

explicitly sought to reconnect causality with necessity and rejected Spinoza's dismissal of teleology:

> *Herewith causality is understood as a logical necessity, which becomes reality through the will*.
>
> If we have thus recognized purpose as the positive side of the logical, then we can henceforth unconditionally underline Leibniz's axiom: "causas efficientes pendent a causis finalibus"; but we also know that he is only expressing a part of the truth, that the *entire* process of the world is only a logical process in its content but in its existence a continuous act of the will. Only through the fact that causality and finality are understood as logical necessities, . . . has a general teleological understanding of the processes of the world essentially become possible. For when every moment of the process, completely and without excess, is to become a link in the chain of causality and equally a link in the chain of finality, this is only possible under one of three conditions: either causality and finality have their identity in a *higher unit* of which they merely form different aspects through the discursive thought of man, or both chains emerge in a *preexisting harmony*, or the current link in the chain of causality only *coincidentally* corresponds to the current link in the chain of finality (as one and the same process). Coincidence would be possible once but not repetitiously; preexisting harmony is the miracle or the act of giving up understanding. This means that only the first case is left, if one does not wish to give up finality altogether, as Spinoza does.
>
> The term "logical necessity" is this higher element of causality, finality, and motivation; all causal, final, and motivational-deterministic necessity is only necessary, because it is *logical necessity*.[37]

Though Nietzsche completely refutes Hartmann's restitution of teleology, he obviously extracts the vocabulary for a characterization of an anti-teleological concept of the historical process in Spinoza from Hartmann, with which he conversely aligns himself in the Lenzerheide fragment.[38] He does this, of course, without dwelling on how it contradicts what he read about Spinoza in Fischer's work and without dwelling on the fact that Hartmann actually did not depict Spinoza as such a process philosopher. This way of proceeding not only shows that Nietzsche is a situational thinker, who reorganizes historical and philosophical material according to his needs on any given day, but also shows that he only had a genuine interest in Spinoza's philosophy to the extent to which it could be incorporated in his own thoughts. If one could interpret the idea of eternal recurrence as one of "historicity" against the unhistorical presentism of Spinoza's systematic thought, wherein—according to Fischer's reading, at least—there cannot be any kind of development of the world, Nietzsche gets from other readings the impression of Spinoza as a process philosopher (something von Hartmann certainly does not state in this manner) whose anti-teleology can be construed as a veiled avowal of eternal recurrence. However, Nietzsche never pretended publicly that Spinoza had been suggesting such a radical historical conception of the world—this proposition is hidden in the *Nachlass*. Nietzsche might have been aware of the incompatibilities in his different pictures of Spinoza. He never showed any interest in harmonizing these pictures; his main concern remained his being different from everybody else.

Amor Fati and *Amor Intellectualis Dei* as Practical Responses to Historicity

"My formula for the greatness in man is *amor fati*" (*EH* "Clever" 10; *KSA* 6, p. 297). Nietzsche writes in his autogenealogy *Ecce homo*. The famous phrase—Latin for "love of fate" or "love for fate"—appears rarely in Nietzsche's works; it does first in the notebooks of 1881, just after the Fischer-Spinoza study: "First, the necessary—and this as beautiful and complete as you can! 'Love that which is necessary'—amor fati, this would be my moral, do it all the good and lift it above its terrible origin, up to you" (*KSA* 9:15[20], p. 643). Nietzsche makes fate, the bare "being-as-is" of all things, the object of love. The "formula" expresses this affirmation with which he characterizes his Zarathustra without the "formula" needing to appear itself in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*: "I still cook every chance [Zufall] in *my* pot. And only when it has been cooked through there do I welcome it as *my* food" (*Z*:III "On the Virtue That Makes Small" 3; *KSA* 4, p. 215). The fatalism that lies within *amor fati* has emancipated itself from naturally existing values and wants to create (values).[39] The explication of *amor fati* in *Ecce homo* thus sounds confident: "[I]t means that one does want nothing different, nor in the future neither in the past, not in all eternity. The necessary has not only to be borne, and not at all to be concealed,—all idealism is mendacity in front of necessity,—but it has to be *loved* . . ." (*EH* "Clever" 10; *KSA* 6, p. 297). It seems to be the appropriate philosophical attitude vis-à-vis the temporal structure and the meaninglessness of the world—without projection of an artificial meaning onto this world and onto the blind *fatum* reigning it.

Amor fati, of course, terminologically recalls Spinoza's term "amor intellectualis dei" (Spinoza's deduction can be found in *Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata* V, prop. 32, corollarium), which Nietzsche derides as "the conceptual cobweb-spinning of a hermit" (*TI* "Skirmishes" 23) in *Twilight of the Idols* and also ridicules in *The Gay Science*: "[W]hat is *left* from Spinoza, amor intellectualis dei, is a rattle, nothing more! What is amor, what is deus, when they lack every drop of blood? . . ." (*GS* 372; *KSA* 3, p. 624).[40] Once again, Kuno Fischer is Nietzsche's brother-in-arms in the case of *amor intellectualis dei*:

> As long as happiness is related to the singular, it is limited and ephemeral; it will be fulfilled, when it no longer interchanges with things, but resides in a fixed continuity; it is eternal, when I turn the universe into my property, omnia in mea, and I can say in every moment of this, omnia mea "mecum porto" In tract. de intell. emendatione Op. p. 413. "I have taken the decision to determine if it were possible to find something of which the pleasure would provide a constant and highest joy." "Love for an eternal and infinite being fills the spirit with a joy that excludes every form of sorrow." "The greatest possession is the awareness of our spirit's unity with the universe." (*KSA* 12:7[4], p. 260)[41]

Clearly, Nietzsche rejects the notion of having to love a god and thus refuses any form of *amor dei*. And yet the question of whether the *fatum* that Nietzsche makes into an object of affection differs from the *deus sive natura*

that is Spinoza's object of affection in more than just its choice of words is unavoidable. Potentially, it is not so much the object of affection that enrages Nietzsche about the *amor intellectualis dei* but the characterizing adjective "intellectualis": Spinoza's love is to be purely rational, free of affection, while Nietzsche wishes to return to the passions, to a new loving immediacy. Whether the object of love, the *fatum* is particularly well suited for this, whether it has more "blood," remains questionable. *Amor fati* is supposed to indicate a return to facticity, to becoming—to experience, which, according to Nietzsche (and in Fischer's reading), Spinoza petrified into a rigid being, into a motionless eternity, into metaphysics. However, Nietzsche makes something imminent here that is already imminent in Spinoza. Both Nietzsche's *amor fati* and equally the recurrence and its metaphysically suspicious attribute of eternity serve as a means of affirmation for that which is. But has Spinoza not already affirmed it as well? The only solution possible is to turn totally to the transient: "against the *value* of what remains eternally the same (see the naivety of *Spinoza*, also of *Descartes*), the value of the shortest and most fleeting, the seductive flash of gold on the belly of the snake vita—" (*KSA* 12:9[26], p. 348). But is *amor fati* really still plausible in the case of such an absolute value of the moment? Can eternal recurrence save the moment from the impositions of eternal being? Is *amor fati* a practical and practicable response to the historicity and the fleetingness of (human) being(s)?

Certainly, *amor fati* is a reaction to the *amor intellectualis dei*, its secularization. Nietzsche appropriated Spinoza's formula for his own uses. However, it is not evident that *amor fati* does in fact have fewer metaphysical implications than *amor intellectualis dei*.

Self-Preservation as Veiled Teleology and the Necessity of Being Someone Else

Already while reading Fischer in 1881, self-preservation struck Nietzsche as a central tenet of Spinoza's *Ethics*. The excerpts from Fischer show how Nietzsche tried to mark the distance between himself and Spinoza:

> Spinoza: we are only guided by our desires and our emotions in our actions. Understanding must be emotion to be a motive.—I say: it must be *passion*, to be a motive.
>
> ex virtute absolute agere = ex ductu rationis agere, vivere, suum Esse conservare. "From the very root look for nothing else than one's *own advantage*" "No one strives to uphold their own being for another's sake." "Striving for self-preservation is the condition for all virtues."
>
> "People are most useful to each other, when everyone seeks their own advantage." "No single being in the world is useful to man, as the man that lives with his reason as his guideline ex ductu rationis."

> "*Good* is everything that truly serves understanding; *bad*, on the other hand, is everything that prevents it." Our reason is our greatest power. Amongst all commodities it is the only one that pleases everyone equally, that no one envies anyone else for, that everyone wishes for everyone else to have and wishes for them to have more than they have themselves.—People only agree in reason. They cannot be more in agreement than when they live according to reason. They cannot be more powerful than when they are in complete agreement.—At least we are stronger living in agreement with others and with ourselves than living in antagonism. To separate the passions; they lead us into dispute with other people and with ourselves, they make us outwardly hostile and inwardly wavering.—**ego**: all that is **preconception**. There *is* no reason of the sort, and *without* conflict and passion everything becomes *weak*, man and society.
>
> ("Desire is the essence of man itself, that is, striving, from which man wishes to persevere in his being.")
>
> "Everyone is impotent to the degree to which they ignore their own gain, that is, their own self-preservation."
>
> "Striving for self-preservation is the first and only basis for virtue."
>
> There is no free will in the spirit, but rather the spirit is dictated to want this or that by a cause that in itself is dictated by another cause, and this one once again by another one, and so forth into eternity.
>
> The will is the ability to agree and to disagree: nothing else.
>
> On the other hand, *I*: *Pre*-egotism, drive of the herd are older than the "wanting-to-preserve-oneself." First man is *developed* as a *function*: out of that an individual is later formed by having **made the acquaintance** of innumerable conditions of the whole, of the organism *as the function*, and eventually having *incorporated* himself. (*KSA* 9:11[193], pp. 517–18)[42]

The argument Nietzsche makes against Spinoza's idea of individual self-preservation toward the end of his notes stems from his dispute with the "English," particularly Herbert Spencer, John Stuart Mill, and the "German" Englishman, Nietzsche's sporadic friend Paul Rée.[43] "Pre-egotism" and "drive of the herd" are the keywords of the argument he raises against Spinoza, stating that originally there is no individual as original parameter that wishes to preserve itself but rather only a collective identity out of which individuals emerge over the course of time. One could therefore take Nietzsche's contention to be an evolutionary argument: individuals in whose nature there is a certain striving (for self-preservation) are not naturally given but rather develop over time. But Nietzsche's historical argument against Spinoza somehow fails to resonate, for Spinoza by no means regards the world as a collection of atomized or monadic individuals. Spinoza could as easily be talking about the will to self-preservation in plants as in human individuals or human collectives. Translated into Spinoza's ontology, Nietzsche's herd would also be striving for self-preservation.

Nietzsche's evolutionary argument against Fischer's reformulation of Spinoza's concept of self-preservation in terms of the conflict-laden emergence of the individual out of the herd remains an unpublished note of which he makes no further use in his published works. This argument against Spinoza lacks cogency. What is most remarkable about Nietzsche's note is less the fact

that he ridicules Spinoza's rationalism—his belief in reason and defense of the passions—but rather the fact that an aspect that plays a major role in Fischer's account only finds marginal mention, an aspect that is ever so important for Nietzsche's own ontology: power. In Fischer's recapitulation it is not only a question of the preservation of power but also—what is so crucial for Nietzsche's approximately simultaneously developed concept of the "will to power" —the expansion of power: "The basic form of all desires is the striving for one's self-preservation: the will to uphold and expand our power. . . . In the sense of Spinoza there are no other virtues other than diligence, than power. Their opposites are not vices, but impotence, to which, of course, the vices belong, for they are conditions of greatest impotence."[44] In a passage directly copied by Nietzsche, Fischer writes:

> "The more someone strives toward and exerts power in an effort to find his use, that is to preserve his being, the bigger his virtue is; conversely, everyone is impotent to the extent to which they neglect their use, that is, their self-preservation." "Virtue is man's power itself, which can merely be explained by the essence of man." Virtue comes from the striving for self-preservation. "Therefore, no virtue can be understood before this striving." "Striving for self-preservation is therefore the first and the only basis for virtue." What we do, we do to preserve and increase our power. This power is our virtue; this virtue is our purpose; this purpose is our striving. Thus Spinoza says: "The purpose for which we do something is what I understand to be striving." "Virtue and power are the same to me."[45]

The idea of power and its expansion strangely receives little emphasis in Nietzsche's discussion of Spinoza. For example, it is not even mentioned in his July 30, 1881, letter to Overbeck, which speaks of the similarities between the two thinkers, even though it is in the matter of *potentia* that the systematic similarities between the two appears most obvious. Instead of openly acknowledging intellectual indebtedness toward Spinoza (or Fischer), Nietzsche, in the fifth book of *Gay Science*, published in 1887, still charges that Spinoza's theory of self-preservation has an impotent origin:

> *The Origin of the Learned once more*.—To seek self-preservation merely, is the expression of a state of distress, or of limitation of the true, fundamental instinct of life, which aims at the *expansion of power*, and with this in view often enough calls in question self-preservation and sacrifices it. It should be taken as symptomatic when individual philosophers, as for example, the consumptive Spinoza, have seen and have been obliged to see the principal feature of life precisely in the so-called self-preservative instinct:—they have just been men in states of distress. That our modern natural sciences have entangled themselves so much with Spinoza's dogma (finally and most grossly in Darwinism, with its inconceivably one-sided doctrine of the "struggle for existence"—), is probably owing to the origin of most of the inquirers into nature: they belong in this respect to the people, their forefathers have been poor and humble persons, who knew too well by immediate experience the difficulty of making a living. Over the whole of English Darwinism there hovers something of the suffocating air of over-crowded England, something of the odour of humble people in need and straits. But as an

> investigator of nature, a person ought to emerge from his paltry human nook: and in nature the state of distress does not *prevail*, but superfluity, even prodigality to the extent of folly. The struggle for existence is only an *exception*, a temporary restriction of the will to live; the struggle, be it great or small, turns everywhere on predominance, on increase and expansion, on power, in conformity to the will to power, which is just the will to live. (*GS* 349; *KSA* 3, pp. 585–86)[46]

The notion of *conatus* as not just simple preservation of power but also "expansion of power" in Spinoza—as Nietzsche had read it in Fischer—goes unnoticed here. By degrading Spinoza to a fainting theoretician of power preservation, Nietzsche wishes to gloss over Spinoza's dangerous proximity to his own "will to power," a concept he claims as his own original philosophical creation. With his "will to power," Nietzsche pretends to have found the key to an adequate understanding of the dynamic reality, marked by change. Under no circumstances does he want to be mistaken for Spinoza.

The passage from the *Gay Science* also shows that the question of self-preservation in Nietzsche is by no means a historical recapitulation of a long-forgotten theory but rather a discussion of what was at his time a highly contemporary debate: Darwinism and its related understanding of nature and world-historical development. According to Nietzsche, Spinoza's claims that every being strives for self-preservation provides contemporary Darwinian theories with an important building block. Only in his posthumously published notes does Nietzsche acknowledge Spinoza more freely, especially when he is thinking of his own "philosophical genealogy." He "feels" himself "in connection" with "the anti-teleological, that is, the Spinozist movement of our time, but with the difference, that I also hold 'purpose' and 'the will' to be a delusion" (*KSA* 11:26[432], p. 266).[47] In his published works, however, Nietzsche makes the claim that Spinoza did not remain loyal to anti-teleology:

> Psychologists should bethink themselves before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to *discharge* its strength—life itself is *Will to Power*; self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent *results* thereof. In short, here, as everywhere else, let us beware of *superfluous* teleological principles!—one of which is the instinct of self-preservation (we owe it to Spinoza's inconsistency). It is thus, in effect, that method ordains, which must be essentially economy of principles. (*BGE* 13; *KSA* 5, pp. 27–28)

For Nietzsche, "Spinoza's inconsistency" consisted in the obvious fact that while he maintained a rigorous program of departure from teleology, when it came to self-preservation Spinoza retained a telos, a purpose, namely, a self to preserve.

Recently, the question has been raised whether this accusation of inconsistency, which is so matter-of-factly added in parentheses and presented as apparently well known, was not simply borrowed by Nietzsche from the literature on Spinoza he consulted. Andreas Rupschus and Werner Stegmaier presume

Adolf Trendelenburg's *Über Spinoza's Grundgedanken und dessen Erfolg* (*On Spinoza's Basic Thought and Its Success*), published in 1849–50, to be the source.[48] As a matter of fact, Fischer not only discusses Trendelenburg's book generally but actually criticizes Trendelenburg's understanding of teleology. Trendelenburg writes:[49]

> The singular thing . . . can have nothing in it through which it destroys its essence and can only be destroyed by an external cause (see Eth. III, 4 to 6). Only the power of inertia, the *vis inertiae*, is proven here and nothing else; and the self-preservation of an operative cause can have no other meaning; for no true self is existent. But, regardless of this, in this striving for self-preservation and for increase in power, as well as in the ideas emerging in this direction, Spinoza has thought more than there is in these premises. The purposes of an individual life are established therein and only through this does the expression really hold true that everything, as far as it is in itself, strives to maintain its essence.[50]

Nietzsche's only partly formulated critique of Spinoza seems to go in this direction as well. For Rupschus and Stegmaier, the implicit connection between Trendelenburg and Nietzsche is proven insofar as Trendelenburg makes use of the term "inconsistency" when speaking of Spinoza, while Fischer does not.[51] Nevertheless, Trendelenburg only invokes the term at the end of his book, and it does not bear directly on the question of whether the self is posed as an end in self-preservation; rather it just appears at the end of a long list that includes other, quite different, accusations: "These arguments result when one follows Spinoza on his own path and one measures all his main points against his basic thought for consistencies or inconsistencies."[52] The proximity between Trendelenburg's argument and Nietzsche's thoughts is obvious. However, both the argument itself and the accusation of inconsistency, which is raised in various different contexts in the research on Spinoza, are themselves commonplace in Spinoza criticism, making it questionable whether Trendelenburg really is Nietzsche's source.[53] At the very least, the reading of rather old, highly specialized secondary literature on a subject in the history of philosophy would have been atypical scholarly behavior for Nietzsche in the late 1880s. I think it far more likely that Nietzsche may have turned to a popular, contemporary source such as Richard Falckenberg's *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie* (*History of Contemporary Philosophy*), published in 1886, in which is written:

> The basis of virtue is the striving for *self-preservation*: how can someone want to act good, if he does not want to exist (IV *prop*. 21–22)? Since reason does not allow for anything that is contrary to nature, it necessarily demands of every individual that he love himself, that he seek his true purpose and that he desire everything that fulfills him. According to natural law, everything useful is permitted. That which increases our power, activity, or fulfillment or promotes our understanding is useful, for the life of the soul persists in thought (IV *prop*. 26; *app*. *cap*. 5). Evil is that which prevents man from fulfilling reason and leading a sensible life. To act virtuously in an effective way means to follow reason's lead in self-preservation

> (IV *prop*. 24).—Nowhere in Spinoza are there more mistakes, nowhere is the insufficiency of what is artificially arranged, in its direct abstraction of reality in terms no way congruous, clearer than in the philosophy of morals. He remained as unfaithful to his intention of only wanting to truly understand people's actions, while excluding the imperatorial, as any other philosopher who claimed to do the same. He mitigates inconsistency by cloaking his commandments in the antique robe of the ideals of a wise and free man.[54]

Whatever the answer to the question of Nietzsche's sources, it is clear that Nietzsche wishes to outdo Spinoza as anti-teleologist by accusing him of secretly reinstating teleology in the world process. Here too, Nietzsche seems to be guided by the fear that Spinoza may have already discovered that which he himself wanted to present as his very own. Accordingly, Nietzsche positions himself against the—in his view—static metaphysician Spinoza as a thinker of dynamics, of becoming:[55]

> We stand differently to "certainty." Because man has been raised by fear for the longest time, and all bearable existence began with the "feeling of safety," this persists in the thinkers. But as soon as the outer "dangerousness" of existence recedes, a desire for insecurity, limitlessness of the horizon emerges. The luck of the great discoverers in striving for certainty could now turn into the luck of substantiating uncertainty and hazard everywhere. Equally the fearfulness of the earlier existence is the reason why the philosophers emphasize the preservation (of the ego or the species) and make it to a principle: while we are in reality continuously playing a lottery against the principle. Here is where all of Spinoza's maxims belong: that is, *the basis for English Utilitarianism*. (*KSA* 11:26[280], pp. 223–24)

While excerpts from Fischer concerning self-preservation (*KSA* 9:11[193], pp. 517–18) and in Nietzsche's counterarguments from the notes of 1881, Nietzsche related Spinoza's thought on self-preservation exclusively to human individuals and countered this with the preindividual "drive of the herd," which he had acquired from his "English" studies. Here, however, there is no role for which self is the object of "self-preservation" ("ego" or "species"). Rather, here the idea of self-preservation is generally seen as an expression of a static thought that is geared toward safety, stability, and an unwillingness to be irritated. Nietzsche's own courage in the face of change, in the face of a permanent intellectual and practical experiment is juxtaposed, with "fearfulness," which appears as the symbol of previous philosophies, namely Spinoza and English utilitarianism. Just as in his note (*KSA* 9:11[193], pp. 517–18), Nietzsche again completely ignores that Spinoza's *conatus* is (according to Fischer) by no means only a matter of preserving an existing state of being but precisely a matter of that dynamics of expansion of power that Nietzsche claims as his own original concept. Furthermore, the combination of utilitarianism and Spinoza is remarkable: self-preservation is understood to be the basis of English utilitarianism—an interpretation for which no parallel can be found in the German Spinoza literature

that Nietzsche read. In *GS* 349, it isn't utilitarianism but Darwinism that appears as the heir of Spinoza's idea of self-preservation.

Even the combination of utilitarianism and Spinoza under the horizon of the idea of self-preservation is no original intellectual achievement of Nietzsche's. It can already be found in Jean-Marie Guyau's *La morale anglaise*, published in 1879, under the keyword "conservation of the Being": "Mr Herbert Spencer is a sort of positivist Spinoza."[56] Guyau treats the subject with much more depth in his *Morale d'Épicure*, which preceded *La morale anglaise* by a year and in which an entire chapter is dedicated to Spinoza.[57] In this work Spinoza is explicitly defined as "metaphysician of utilitarianism." "The large system of Spinoza, in which those of Epicurus and of Hobbes are absorbed, contains in advance the fundamental theories of the French and English utilitarian school."[58] Here too, next to moral relativity, the idea of self-preservation is elevated to a central theoretical tenet of both Spinoza and the modern utilitarians. According to Guyau, the only modern element missing from Spinoza's system is the idea of historical progress, that is, natural development or evolution.[59] Nietzsche, on the other hand, would see the thinkers of evolution as equally "fearful" as Spinoza. For Nietzsche, even evolutionary thinkers, with their claims of a necessarily (better) future historical and worldly condition, seem to lack courage with respect to the radical openness of the future and consequently lack courage in the face of the freest possible construction of the future. Spinoza's fear of change and his corresponding belief in reason and its exclusion of coincidence appear as a leitmotif throughout Nietzsche's notes until 1888:

> **Unreason**, randomness, coincidence are equally hated by them [the "Metaphysicians"] (as causes for innumerable physical pains).
>
> *Consequently*, they denied this element in the being-unto-itself, conceived it as absolute "reason" and "usefulness."
>
> Equally **change**, **transience** are feared: therein a suppressed soul is expressed, full of mistrust and terrible experiences (Spinoza's case: an opposing type of person would find this change appealing)
>
> A *playful* type of being that is overloaded with strength would **endorse** precisely these *emotions*, *unreason* and *change* in a eudemonic sense, including their consequences, danger, contrast, decline, etc. (*KSA* 13:18[16], pp. 536–37)

Spinoza increasingly becomes an archetypal metaphysician for Nietzsche. The idea of self-preservation serves as evidence of the fact that Spinoza wished to deny the reality of becoming.[60] Spinoza becomes a puppet on whom Nietzsche can vent his frustration with metaphysics. The idea of self-preservation is no longer only suspicious as a leftover teleology—as it was in section *BGE* 13—but appears, at least in the late notebooks as the very symbol of dismissible metaphysical thought. As Guyau pointed out, Spinoza is particularly suited for this role, since he represents a constant in the philosophical thought of modernity as well as in the scientific thought in

Nietzsche's time. A criticism of the idea of self-preservation is a criticism of (almost) all rationalism, both past and present. Those who dismiss this idea, like Nietzsche, can promote themselves as unequivocal individuals or complete loners because they appear to stand in opposition to everything that has been hitherto thought. Accordingly, it does not bother Nietzsche that in the book he read by Fischer, Spinoza's *conatus* is by no means merely a question of preserving the status quo.

At least Nietzsche rereads Fischer's *History of Modern Philosophy* in 1887 and writes a note that, among others, recaps Kant's philosophy of history alongside Spinoza (*KSA* 12:7[4], pp. 259–70). This note, entitled "The Metaphysicians," begins with an interesting idea about the emergence of the speculative-universalistic philosophy of history in the time of Kant:

> From the acclimatization to absolute authority a deep need for absolute authority emerged:—so strong that even in a critical time such as Kant's, it proved itself to be superior to the need for criticism, and, in a certain sense, the entire work of the critical mind knew to submit and make itself useful to it.—In the following generation, which, through its historical instincts, came to recognize the relativity of every authority, it proved its superiority once more, when it made use of the Hegelian philosophy of development, the history cum philosophy itself, and presented history as progressive self-revelation, self-surpassing of moral ideas. (*KSA* 12:7[4], p. 259)

There is hardly a better way of fundamentally critiquing the speculative-universalistic philosophy of history as a transformed form of the old metaphysics. If we suppose that this is not (like a large part of the rest of the notes) an unidentified excerpt from other sources but Nietzsche's position on the enlightenment and the post-Enlightenment project of understanding history as a large developmentally driven connection of meanings, then it becomes clear why the philosophical assumption of historical progress was never a serious option for him: because it sought to preserve traditional morality and immunize against it against all criticism. "Since Plato, philosophy has been under the reign of morality" (*KSA* 12:7[4], p. 259), he continues—and it is precisely in order to terminate this reign that Nietzsche intervenes. Rather abruptly the note passes on to Spinoza, mainly to his psychology and his ethics (*KSA* 12:7[4], pp. 260–64). These are critically annotated paraphrases of Fischer, wherein it is noticeable that Nietzsche does not simply summarize single chapters but rather takes his objects of analysis from various parts of Fischer's book.[61]

> "If there is a real and nonvolatile Good, then the pleasure derived from it is equally durable and indestructible, then my joy is eternal."
>
> *Psychological false conclusion*: as if the eternity of a thing guarantees the eternity of the emotion I feel for it!
>
> (complete absence of the "artist") Highest and most comical pedantry of a logician, *who venerates his drive*. (*KSA* 12:7[4], p. 263)[62]

Here too Nietzsche uses his beloved weapon of psychology against Spinoza, the thinker of eternity, who is trying to use this kind of thought to overcome becoming. Nietzsche now finds ways to highlight the difference between him and Spinoza everywhere. These ways force him into an ever-increasing radicalism. Thus, in his notes from 1885–86, the renunciation of teleology does not suffice. The thought of causality itself becomes questionable: "In short: the psychological necessity for a belief in causality lies in the impossibility of imagining an event without intent: wherewith, of course, nothing is said about truth or untruth (entitlement to such a belief). The belief in causae falls with the belief in τέλη (against Spinoza and his causalism)" (*KSA* 12:2[83], p. 103).

For a while, it seems to have been Nietzsche's intention to make the "unfathomable" fathomable; to liberate humanity not only from morality and teleology but also from the necessity of thinking in causal relations. This happens when Nietzsche presents himself as an advocate of chance (Zufall) or when he declares any form of authorship to be an illusion. With an understanding of reality that renounces all causality entirely, Nietzsche would have in fact achieved the much-desired yet so difficultly attained emancipation from Spinoza. However, if one were to seriously pursue an abolition of causality (of course, there would be no one left who could "pursue" anything in any way), any form of history and historiography as they are known to us would become impossible, since past, present, and future things would no longer stand in any describable relation to each other. Nietzsche too constantly enacts his power over history, and its authorship, and in no way thinks of erasing himself from the role of enactor, of origin. With all these polemics against Spinoza and his teleology, ultimately even against the very idea of causality, the question remains what alternative could possibly be conceived. In this Nietzsche remains shaky and in accordance with his experimental-philosophical credo fails to provide any conclusive answers.

Nietzsche's repeated attempts to distance himself from Spinoza can be understood as a historicist rebellion against an understanding of reality in which (at least according to Fischer's reading) there is no longer any real development. Hereby Nietzsche would be defending becoming from being. However, he also avoids the answers of contemporarily fashionable developmental thought—be it the natural evolution of the Darwinians, the progress of history as propounded by the speculative-universalistic philosophers of history, or the regression of history as advocated by the pessimists and the *décadents*. A developmental historical type of answer to Spinoza could lead to Nietzsche being mistaken for one of his contemporaries. Is the result hereof the emergency solution of the eternal recurrence of the same? In the end, Nietzsche's different strategies in dealing with (Fischer's) Spinoza leave the impression of his being noncommittal (or even not being able to commit). What appears to be most important for Nietzsche is highlighting their difference. This difference varies according

to circumstance. And yet Nietzsche finds himself in the company of Spinoza in his student's eulogy.

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NOTES

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1. Quoted in Curt Paul Janz, *Friedrich Nietzsche*, 3 vols. (Munich: Hanser, 1978–79), 3:357.

2. Gast does also mention the French moralist Vauvenargues: "All great thoughts, as Vauvenargues says, come from the heart" (quoted in Janz, *Friedrich Nietzsche*, 3:357) and thus highlights Nietzsche's strong ties to French culture without directly connecting Vauvenargues to Nietzsche.

3. For further reading on this see William S. Wurzer, *Nietzsche und Spinoza* (Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1975), André Comte-Sponville, "Nietzsche et Spinoza," in *De Sils-Maria à Jérusalem: Nietzsche et le judaisme, les intellectuels juifs et Nietzsche*, ed. Dominique Bourel and Jacques Le Rider (Paris: Cerf, 1991), 47–66, Yirmijahu Yovel, "Spinoza und Nietzsche: *Amor dei* und *Amor fati*," in Yirmijahu Yovel, *Spinoza: Das Abenteuer der Immanenz*, trans. Brigitte Flickinger (1989; Göttingen: Steidl, 1994), 384–420, Richard Schacht, "The Nietzsche-Spinoza Problem: Spinoza as Precursor," in Richard Schacht, *Making Sense of Nietzsche* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1995), 167–86, Greg Whitlock, "Roger Boscovich, Benedict de Spinoza, and Friedrich Nietzsche: The Untold Story," in *Nietzsche-Studien* 25 (1996): 200–20, Hans-Jürgen Gawoll, "Nietzsche und der Geist Spinozas: Die existentielle Umwandlung einer affirmativen Ontologie," *Nietzsche-Studien* 30 (2001): 44–61, Giuseppe Turco Liveri, *Nietzsche e Spinoza: Riconstruzione filosofico, storia di un "incontro impossibile"* (Rome: Armando, 2003), Werner Stegmaier, "'Philosophischer Idealismus' und die 'Musik des Lebens': Zu Nietzsches Umgang mit Paradoxien," *Nietzsche-Studien* 33 (2004): 90–128, esp. 109–19, Hans-Gerd Seggern, "Die Spur von Spinozas Affektenlehre," in *Nietzsche und die Weimarer Klassik*, ed. Hans-Gerd von Seggern (Tübingen: Franke, 2005), 127–47, and Philippe Choulet, "Le Spinoza de Nietzsche: Les attendus d'une amitié d'étoile," in *Spinoza au XIXe siècle*, ed. André Tosel, Pierre-François Moreau, Jean Salem (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2007), 193–205.

4. I use the following translations: *Basic Writings of Friedrich Nietzsche*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1992), *Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and for None*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1978); *Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 2003), and *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, trans. Kate Sturge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). All other translations from German and French are my own, unless indicated otherwise.

5. Even if ultimately Spinoza's loneliness itself is not enough for him: "One loses one's appetite with all this 'freedom of the press' and 'freedom of impertinence' of the century, and I look to the image of Dante and Spinoza, who understood far better their lot of loneliness. Of course, their thought was, in comparison to mine, one which allowed for the endurance of loneliness; and, until very recently, there was not, for all those who had some kind of 'God' as

their society, that which I call 'loneliness'" (Nietzsche to Overbeck, July 2, 1885, *KSB* 7, no. 609, p. 63).

6. See also *KSA* 11:25[454], p. 134: "'Man is something that must be overcome'—it depends on the speed: the Greeks wondrous: without haste,

—my ancestors Heraclitus, Empedocles, Spinoza, Goethe."

7. Wurzer, *Nietzsche und Spinoza*, 148.

8. Thomas H. Brobjer judges with even more conviction: "And yet . . . Nietzsche never read Spinoza!" (*Nietzsche's Philosophical Context: An Intellectual Biography* [Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008], 77). See 77–82 for a list of the secondary literature to which Nietzsche's image of Spinoza is mainly indebted.

9. Friedrich Albert Lange, *Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart* (Iserlohn: Baedeker, 1866); Eduard von Hartmann, *Philosophie des Unbewussten: Versuch einer Weltanschauung* (Berlin: Duncker, 1869); Friedrich Ueberweg, *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie von Thales bis auf die Gegenwart* (Berlin: Mittler, 1866); Eugen Dühring, *Der Werth des Lebens: Eine philosophische Betrachtung* (Breslau: Trewendt, 1865).

The first edition of Lange's book, which was extremely important for Nietzsche in writing his early works, did not survive in his personal library; however, an 1887 edition did, which indicates that Nietzsche was reading Lange at a later date as well. See Giuliano Campioni, Paolo D'Iorio, Maria Cristina Fornari, Francesco Fronterotta, and Andrea Orsucci, eds., *Nietzsches persönliche Bibliothek* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2003), 338 (hereafter *NPB*). Nietzsche sold his copy of von Hartmann's *Philosophie des Unbewussten* in 1875 (*NPB*, 276). Regarding Uerberweg's *Grundriß*, see *NPB*, 628. On page 68 Nietzsche marked the following passage in the margin: "The seventh and last axiom is: Quidquid ut non existens potest concipi, ejus essentia non involvit existentiam. This axiom involves the ontological paralogism, as if it exists, out of which the definition of existence may be deducted. Every essence that is in reality available involves the Being of objects of which the essence it is; but this sentence is a mere tautology. No essence can be the cause before it has Being; it only has Being, however, in those objects of which it is the essence. The thought that goes to the essentia, that is, the (subjective) term (conceptus) can, under the circumstance of the reality of that which is thought, justify the setting aside of certain properties, but not without this circumstance, and can therefore never present this circumstance in itself." On Dühring's *Der Werth des Lebens*, see *NPB*, 202. An early passage on Spinoza in Nietzsche's notebooks (*KSA* 8:9[1], p. 133) is an excerpt from this book: "The total judgment of the worth of life is the result of the elementary determinants; there can be no theoretical term which determines in advance how life is to be conditioned to receive our approval. Absurd positions are thus the following: evil is to be disclaimed, for it is only evil in man's view. Or, according to Spinoza: nothing is in itself deplorable; it is humans' desires that determine the good and the evil. If one gives up on the human altogether in this manner, one loses every standard for a practical valuation of worth. Alongside one loses moral judgment (one is no longer aloud to speak of good and evil, every decision that is not purely theoretical should be called a deception).—It is thus in striving that the value of things is measured, for he who does not strive there are no values, for he who purely cognizes there is no good and no bad, no assent and no dissent. He who does not strive at all only makes purely theoretical judgments. It thus seems to me that the judgment of the greatness of value of life depends on the greatness and strength of striving, that is, firstly based on the goal and secondly based on the degree of the drive, the urging toward that goal."

10. Kuno Fischer, *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, vol. 1, *Descartes und seine Schule*, pt. 2, *Descartes' Schule, Geulinx, Malebranche, Baruch Spinoza, Zweite völlig umgearbeitete Auflage* (Mannheim: Basserman, 1865). The text is not listed in *NPB*; for more about it, see Marco Brusotti, *Die Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis: Philosophie und ästhetische Lebensgestaltung bei Nietzsche von "Morgenröthe" bis "Also sprach Zarathustra"* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1997), 351–53.

11. Baruch de Spinoza, *Die Ethik des Spinoza im Urtexte* (Leipzig: Koschny, 1875). Nietzsche's return of the book was documented on July 13, 1875. See *NPB*, 719.

12. Brobjer, *Nietzsche's Philosophical Context*, 77.

13. *HH* 157; *KSA* 2, pp. 147–48. Spinoza, along with Kepler, belongs to the type of "knowing Genius." At *HH* 475; *KSA* 2, pp. 309–10, Nietzsche also speaks of "European man and the abolition of nations" and calls for the "production of the strongest possible European mixed race," in which the Jews play no little part, since they are to thank for "the noblest human being (Christ), the purest sage (Spinoza), the mightiest book and the most efficacious moral code in the world."

14. Of course, Nietzsche also finds an explanation for Spinoza's critique of morals, which accuses it of having secret moral motives: "I saw no one who had dared to attempt a critique of moral perceptions of value: and I soon turned my back on the measly attempts at creating a history of origin of these perceptions (as those of the English and the German Darwinists).—How can Spinoza's position be explained, his negation and dismissal of moral value judgments? (It was a consequence of theodicy?)" (*KSA* 12:2[162], p. 144).

On the problem of conscience, see *GM* II:14; *KSA* 5, pp. 320–21. The disagreement with Fischer's reading of Spinoza that is hinted at here is more concrete in *KSA* 12:7[4], pp. 261–262; it refers to Fischer, *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, 358–59. See also *KSA* 12:7[57], p. 314. And for an especially harsh critique of Spinoza's position vis-à-vis the emotions, see *BGE* 19; *KSA* 5, p. 117.

On the problem of compassion, see *GM* P:5; *KSA* 5, p. 252: "For this overestimation of and predilection for pity on the part of modern philosophers is something new: hitherto philosophers have been at one as to the *worthlessness* of pity. I name only Plato, Spinoza, La Rochefoucauld and Kant—four spirits as different from one another as possible, but united in one thing: in their low estimation of pity."

15. On Nietzsche's concept of historicity, see Manuel Dries, ed., *Nietzsche on Time and History* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008); see also Andreas Urs Sommer, "Sieben Thesen zur Geschichtsphilosophie bei Kant und Nietzsche," in *Kant und Nietzsche im Widerstreit: Internationale Konferenz der Nietzsche-Gesellschaft in Zusammenarbeit mit der Kant-Gesellschaft, Naumburg an der Saale, 26–29 August 2004*, ed. Beatrix Himmelmann (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2005), 217–25.

16. See Andreas Urs Sommer, "Vom Nutzen und Nachteil kritischer Quellenforschung. Einige Überlegungen zum Fall Nietzsches," *Nietzsche-Studien* 29 (2000): 302–16.

17. Otherwise it is only worth drawing on the *Nachlass* for clarification of Nietzsche's works explicatively. See Andreas Urs Sommer, "Ein philosophisch-historischer Kommentar zu Nietzsche's *Götzen-Dämmerung*: Probleme und Perspektiven," *Perspektiven der Philosophie: Neues Jahrbuch* 35 (2009): 45–66.

18. Fischer, *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, 235.

19. Fischer, *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, 235.

20. "Spinoza places the mathematical method in opposition to the teleological one" (Fischer, *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, 235).

21. Fischer, *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, 235, 235–37. The Spinoza quotation here comes from Baruch de Spinoza, *Ethics*, trans. W. H. White and A. H. Stirling (Hertfordshire, UK: Wordsworth, 2001), 37.

22. "Nature should not have to take care of man, should not have to act for man's sake? Man should not be inclined toward good for natural reasons? Where then would that leave the usefulness of nature, the naturalness of moral sentiments, the wisdom of god, deism, etc.? Where would that leave the ideas of which the German enlightenment of the eighteenth century was so proud? No wonder then that Spinoza could not figure in this enlightenment, that it was scared of him, as if he were a monster, when Jacobi showed Spinoza's teachings in its true light—to the point that namely Moses Mendelssohn could not believe that Spinoza denied purpose. He would

rather take Jacobi's claim to be hearsay than believe that Spinoza could have denied purpose with such 'foolishness'" (Fischer, *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, 562).

23. Nietzsche further speaks to the invention of purpose at *KSA* 12:9[91], p. 386, contemplating the "apparent 'convenience' as a 'result' of the 'will to power.'" The inspiration for this comes from Otto Liebmann, *Gedanken und Thatsachen: Philosophische Abhandlungen, Aphorismen und Studien* (Straßburg: Trübner, 1882).

24. Liebmann, *Gedanken und Thatsachen*, 90–91. See *NPB*, p. 356. Nietzsche underlined "this is a concrete fact of experience" in his copy of the book.

25. Fischer, *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, 233–34; see also 91.

26. For more on this, see Andreas Urs Sommer, *Sinnstiftung durch Geschichte? Zur Entstehung spekulativ-universalistischer Geschichtsphilosophie zwischen Bayle und Kant* (Basel: Schwabe, 2006), 421–35.

27. See also *TI* "Skirmishes" 37; *KSA* 6, pp. 136–39.

28. Hubert Cancik, "Die Rechtfertigung Gottes durch den 'Fortschritt der Zeiten': Zur Differenz jüdisch-christlicher und hellenisch-römischer Zeit- und Geschichtsvorstellung," in Hubert Cancik, *Antik-Modern: Beiträge zur römischen und deutschen Kulturgeschichte*, ed. Richard Faber, Barbara von Reibnitz, und Jörg Rüpke (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1998), 25–54, esp. 25–30.

29. See Andreas Urs Sommer, *Friedrich Nietzsche: "Der Antichrist," ein philosophisch-historischer Kommentar* (Basel: Schwabe, 2000), 62–64.

30. Again, Nietzsche could have instructed himself on the matter via Fischer, *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, 151–54.

31. Fischer, *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, 235.

32. Fischer, *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, 232–33.

33. See also the denunciations in *BGE* 25; *KSA* 5, p. 43, and *KSA* 10:8[17], p. 340.

34. Stegmaier, "'Philosophischer Idealismus' und die 'Musik des Lebens,'" p. 112.

35. The phrase "When man no longer considers himself evil, he ceases to be so—" is a self-citation from *D* 148; *KSA* 3, p. 140.

36. "For the rest, I cannot refrain from stating here that to me *optimism*—when it is not merely the thoughtless talk of those who give room only to words under their low brows—appears not merely as an absurd, but also as a really *wicked* way of thinking, and as a bitter mockery of the unspeakable suffering of humanity" (Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea*, trans. Jill Berman [London: J. M. Dent, 1995], 206).

37. Eduard von Hartmann, *Metaphysik des Unbewussten*, vol. 2 of *Philosophie des Unbewussten* (Berlin: Duncker, 1878), 450. Nietzsche owned the first edition of Hartmann's book, published in 1869, and had already resold it by 1875 (*NPB*, p. 276). The quoted passage seems to be missing in it.

38. Nietzsche refers to von Hartmann as "a superficial crank, who mucks up pessimism through teleology and wants to transform it into a philosophy of comfort (approximating the English in that[)]" (*KSA* 11:26[326], p. 236).

39. See *KSA* 11:27[71], p. 292: "Zarathustra 2. Highest fatalism identical with coincidence and the creative. (No order of value in things! but first to create.)"

40. As early as 1884, Nietzsche lampooned Spinoza in a poem titled "An Spinoza" ("To Spinoza"), which probably cannot be considered one of the pinnacles of occidental poetry: "Dem 'Eins in Allem' liebend zugewandt, / Ein amor dei, selig, auf Verstand — / Die Schuhe aus! Welch dreimal heilig Land! — — / Doch unter dieser Liebe fraß / unheimlich glimmender Rachebrand: /— am Judengott fraß Judenhaß! — / — Einsiedler, hab ich dich erkannt?" (*KSA* 11:28[49], p. 319) ("Lovingly turned toward the 'One in All,' / An amor dei, blessed, to reason—/ Off with the shoes! What three times holy land! — — / But under this love was scuffing / an

eerily shimmering fire of vengeance: /—Jew-Hatred was scuffing on the Jew-God—/ Hermit, have I recognized you?").

41. The source is Fischer, *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, 540.

42. See Fischer, *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, 480–88.

43. Maria Cristina Fornari gives a more detailed account of this in *Die Entwicklung der Herdenmoral: Nietzsche liest Spencer und Mill*, trans. Leonie Schröder (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2009).

44. Fischer, *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, 483.

45. Fischer, *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, 484.

46. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Joyful Wisdom ("La Gaya Scienza")*, trans. Thomas Common (Edinburgh: Foulis, 1910), 289–90. For a background of sources for this attack on Darwinism, see Andreas Urs Sommer, "Nietzsche mit und gegen Darwin in den Schriften von 1888," *Nietzscheforschung: Jahrbuch der Nietzsche-Gesellschaft* 17 (2010): 31–44. Nietzsche was decisively inspired by W. H. Rolph, *Biologische Probleme zugleich als Versuch zur Entwicklung einer rationellen Ethik* (Leipzig: Engelmann, 1884). Cf. *NPB*, 504–5. See also John Richardson, *Nietzsche's New Darwinism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

47. The note ends with a remarkable determination of philosophy's function in general: "Not a philosophy as dogma, but as a preliminary regulation of research."

48. Andreas Rupschus and Werner Stegmaier, "'Inconsequenz Spinoza's'? Adolf Trendelenburg als Quelle von Nietzsches Spinoza-Kritik in *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* 13," *Nietzsche-Studien* 38 (2009): 299–308.

49. Fischer, *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, 564–69. Fischer parts with his former mentor Trendelenburg on the subject of Spinoza; see Rupschus and Stegmaier, "'Inconsequenz Spinoza's,'" 304–5.

50. Adolf Trendelenburg, *Über Spinoza's Grundgedanken und dessen Erfolg: Vorgetragen in der Königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Berlin: Bethge, 1850), 38–39). The book is not noted in *NPB*.

51. See Rupschus and Stegmaier, "'Inconsequenz Spinoza's,'" 301.

52. Trendelenburg, *Über Spinoza's Grundgedanken und dessen Erfolg*, 58. At least one of the "arguments" is the following: "Spinoza deducts all emotions from the axiom that every being strives to establish itself in its Being, and every virtue from the power to affect something that can be understood from the laws of one's own nature. . . . Embedded in these axioms is individual life, which in its determination is not mere negation but affirmation, which can, however, not be thought without their basic purposes. In this observation of the natural laws of the soul, Spinoza presupposes the teleological position" (57).

53. Pars pro toto, cf. Johan Jacob Borelius, *Ueber den Satz des Widerspruchs und die Bedeutung der Negation* (Leipzig: Koschny, 1881), 17: "Regardless of this, Spinoza has no problems assigning God infinite virtue or to let 'infinita infinitis modis' follow from him for the explicit reason that he embodies all of reality (Eth. 1, prop. 9, 16 and elsewhere). Here the key to Spinoza's otherwise inexplicable inconsistency is given. For him, every certainty is only a negation and thus does not belong to the Being of the determined thing, but its Not-Being; not-Being, however, does not exist and therefore requires no deduction or explanation. If God is the embodiment of reality, then everything that is real in the attributes and *modis* is already within him and is therefore the sufficient reason for that which exists."

54. Richard Falckenberg, *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie von Nikolaus von Kues bis zur Gegenwart: Im Grundriss dargestellt* (Leipzig: Veit, 1886), 100. This book is missing in *NPB*. Falckenberg in fact reviewed Nietzsche's *Geburt der Tragödie* and the fourth volume of *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung: Richard Wagner in Bayreuth* for the *Musikalisches Wochenblatt* in 1873 and 1876 respectively. See Richard Frank Krummel, *Nietzsche und der deutsche Geist:*

Ausbreitung und Wirkung des Nietzscheschen Werkes im deutschen Sprachraum bis zum Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges, 4 vols. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1998–2006), 1: 32, 62. Falckenberg's *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie* is one of the first histories of philosophy that mentions Nietzsche. In the 1886 edition, he still appears as one of the "most understanding admirers" (422) of Schopenhauer and Wagner.

55. See Manuel Dries, "Nietzsche's Critique of Staticism," in *Nietzsche on Time and History*, 1–19.

56. Jean-Marie Guyau, *La morale anglaise contemporaine: Morale de l'utilité et de l'évolution* (Paris: Ballière, 1879), 195, 258; see also 167–68. *La morale anglaise* is not listed in *NPB*; however, Nietzsche later worked his way intensively through Guyau's *Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation ni sanction* (Paris: Alcan, 1885) (*NPB*, 270–71; Nietzsche's copy is lost today) as well as through his *L'irréligion de l'avenir: Étude sociologique*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Alcan, 1887) (*NPB*, 271–73). So it is quite possible that Nietzsche was also familiar with *La morale anglaise*. See, for example, Fornari, *Die Entwicklung der Herdenmoral*, 94. On Guyau and Spinoza, see André Comte-Sponville, "Jean-Marie Guyau et Spinoza," in *Spinoza au XIXe siècle*, 281–84.

57. Jean-Marie Guyau, *La morale d'Épicure et ses rapports avec les doctrines contemporaines* (Paris: Ballière, 1878), 227–37. This work is not listed in *NPB*; nevertheless, it seems possible that Nietzsche read it or read about it.

58. Guyau, *La morale d'Épicure et ses rapports avec les doctrines contemporaines*, 227.

59. "The only element which seems lacking in Spinozism is the idea of a real progress of nature or of an *evolution*, an idea on which the German metaphysicians will insist, particularly Hegel and the English moralists, especially Spencer" (Guyau, *La morale d'Épicure et ses rapports avec les doctrines contemporaines*, 237).

60. "It's simply a matter of experience that change *does not cease*: we don't really have the slightest reason to find it comprehensible that one change must be followed by another. On the contrary: a *state achieved* would seem bound to preserve itself if there weren't a capacity in it precisely *not* to want to preserve itself . . ." (*KSA* 13:14[121], p. 301).

61. Fischer, *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, 540, 484, 383, 358, 258, 237, 175, 169, 181. Nietzsche apparently works his way through the volume, more or less consecutively, from back to front. See also the evidence in Thomas H. Brobjer, "Beiträge zur Quellenforschung: Nachweise aus Höffding, Harald: Psychologie in Umrissen u. a.," *Nietzsche-Studien* 30 (2001): 418–21.

62. The quotation at the beginning comes from Fischer, *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, 169.