

RSA® Conference 2018

San Francisco | April 16–20 | Moscone Center

SESSION ID: CXO-T07

MODEL-DRIVEN SECURITY: IT'S CLOSER THAN YOU THINK

Jim Routh

CSO
Aetna
@jmrouth1



Session objectives



1

Share some examples of model-driven security


2

Introduce you to the world of unconventional controls

3

Identify talent development challenges

Evolution from conventional to unconventional controls



aetna™

Conventional

Un-Conventional

The #1 Threat Vector today



#1 CYBER THREAT VECTOR



CONVENTIONAL CONTROL

UN-
CONVENTIONAL
CONTROL
EVOLVING TO
CONVENTIONAL

This is the reason that **phishing**, **spear-phishing**, and whaling attacks are directed against individuals. ... Almost all national and industry **phishing laws** and **regulations** include a stipulation that businesses and organizations must create, implement, and maintain a **security awareness training program**.

<http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/category/enterprise/phishing/phishing-countermeasures/anti-phishing-laws-regulations>


NIST SP 800-177 SEPTEMBER, 2016

Domain based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance (**DMARC**) was conceived to allow email senders to specify policy on how their mail should be handled, the types of security reports that receivers can send back, and the frequency those reports should be sent. Standardized handling of SPF and DKIM removes guesswork about whether a given message is authentic, benefitting receivers by allowing more certainty in quarantining and rejecting unauthorized mail.

Different tactics require different controls




Sender



Inbound email protection- Domain Attributes




Using email traffic data, the system learns the **unique fingerprint** of all email senders into your enterprise



29,231 servers sent email for an enterprise on a single day



This durable **identity trust model** is used to stop all messages that do not prove they should be trusted



312 servers for the enterprise
4,641 servers owned by service providers
9,732 benign email forwarders
14,526 malicious senders

Enabled by models




Comparing Aetna in-bound email and correlating it with billions of emails every day from the largest email providers using machine learning models applied in real time enables filtering of email based on sending domain attributes to divide the mail stream into trusted and untrusted streams.



Privilege user & activity management activity




1 Reduce the number of privilege users




2 Provide context to monitoring and change admin tool choice

3 Implement data analytic techniques to determine behavioral patterns



Behavioral analysis is the cornerstone



Example of an event email



Privileged Access Management (PAM)

Implement and consolidate access monitoring, alerting, and response utilizing all available access and identity data (policy and event) to identify anomalies:

- Provide clear understanding of privileged access
- Ensure appropriate access is not being misused
- Target investigations & follow up

Event email is sent:

- When unusual activity is detected within a 24-hour period
- To the employee's manager
- And contains attachment of Anomalous Activity Report



This results in a substantial 'false-positive' reduction, as well as an increased business awareness of privileged access.

**Over 3 billion user IDs and
passwords were stolen in
2016**

Criminals use credentials for account takeover



40%

In 2016,
data breaches
increased by

3 Billion

In one breach-
Yahoo 2013



51%

of consumers suffered some kind of security incident in 2016, including a stolen password or breached account

81%

of hacking related breaches leveraged stolen or weak passwords

Sources: 2017 Verizon DBIR Report; Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC) and CyberScout

The trouble with passwords...



Most people use less than 5 passwords for all accounts

50%

of those **haven't changed** their password in the last **5 years**

Reuse makes them easy to compromise

39%

of adults use the **same password** for many of their online accounts

They are difficult to remember

25%

of adults admit to using less secure passwords, because they are **easier to remember**

Sources: Pew research; Telesign research


If I were a criminal...

I would use **Sentry MBA** for credential stuffing. I'd take log in credentials and try them on different domains. I'd get a 2% hit, meaning 2% of the credentials I use will give me control of the account.

I can get a 4% return by using the domain name in front of the password.

10,000 credentials = 200 or 400 accounts that I own.

Sources: <https://krebsonsecurity.com/tag/sentry-mba/>
<https://blog.shapesecurity.com/2016/03/09/a-look-at-sentry-mba/>



<https://sentry.mba/>



It's time for something better



A simpler and more secure experience

Aetna is leading the way in introducing advanced authentication methods into the health care sector.


- Our consumers no longer need to rely on traditional usernames and passwords when logging into Aetna applications
- Authentication, once a single event, is now integrated into the application transparently and continuously
- We're adjusting controls and analytic capabilities to create friction for the threat adversaries while reducing friction for our users



Continuous risk-based authentication



Continual
authentication
without
impacting the
user experience



Risk score calculated


Risk score determines how much and
what access to provide






Authentication framework for mobile & web




- One framework
- Multiple authentication tools
- Change controls without changing applications
- Across mobile and web
- Policy-driven authentication model




Model-driven security controls have arrived



The Models are driving security



The Models are driving security



Data Aggregation

Data Analysis

Security Controls



Model Inventory


| Model/Policy Name | Description | Effects |
|--|--|-----------|
| High Risk user - Departing User Sending self email | Users with future term date in UltiPro sending email to personal email accounts | Workforce |
| Restrict SSN email for High Risk users | Provide a daily list of all users with a risk score over 80 so they are restricted from sending email with SSN data. | Workforce |
| Events By Restricted Users | High volumes of privileged activity | Workforce |
| Off hours activities | Unusual evening privileged activity | Workforce |
| Week end login events | Unusual weekend privileged activity | Workforce |
| Unauthorized password changes | Vaulted accounts that have passwords changed by an unauthorized ID | Workforce |
| Self-Privilege Escalation | Admin granting privileges to themselves | Workforce |
| Account Compromise: Multiple Failed Logins/ Possible Configuration Issue | Multiple Failed Logins/ Possible Configuration Issue | Workforce |
| Unusual amount of password reset events | Unusual amount of password reset events | Workforce |
| Unusual amount of Failed Password changes | Unusual amount of Failed Password changes | Workforce |
| Purging of Audit Logs | A user purges an audit log from a server | Workforce |



Models to be scheduled

| Model/Policy Name | Description | Effects | Order |
|--|---|-----------|-------|
| Register new bank followed by transaction over threshold | If a person changes banking information and performs a financial transaction same day | Consumer | 1 |
| Account email address changed followed by password reset request | Account email address changed followed by password reset request | Consumer | 2 |
| Financial Activity greater than threshold | Financial Activity greater than threshold | Consumer | 3 |
| Brute Force Attack | high number of failed login attempts | Consumer | 4 |
| Prevent Vault Checkout for High Risk Users | Require additional verification before allowing a vaulted ID to be checked out by a high risk user | Workforce | 5 |
| Geographic Activity without Physical Access | Logical Account activity at Geo location where there is no Physical Account activity | Workforce | 6 |
| Physical/Geographic Location Mismatch | Logical Account Geo location not matching Physical Account Geo location. | Workforce | 7 |
| Accounts Creation and deletion in a day | Accounts created by the admin , used and then deleted in the same day | Workforce | 8 |
| Accounts Enable and Disable in a day | Accounts enabled by the admin , used and then disabled in the same day | Workforce | 9 |
| Potential Access Misuse Attempt (Wanderer) - Badge | User is getting failed access at multiple access point | Workforce | 10 |
| Abnormal Access using Multiple Cards - Badge | Person is using temporary badge and permanent badge in short timeframe | Workforce | 11 |
| Rare Badge Access Anomaly | User accesses badge outside his normal historical behavior | Workforce | 12 |
| Potential Access Breach Attempt - Badge Stats model | User is getting high number of failed access | Workforce | 13 |


Model Inventory Management




What are Models?



$$e^x = 1 + x/1! + x^2/2! + x^3/3! + \dots$$



$$\zeta(s) = \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{n^s} = \prod_p \frac{1}{1 - p^{-s}}$$



Vendor Analytics Ecosystem



BRO



Various
models in
production
from a
variety of
vendors

Custom Fraud Analytic Models



HSA Burst Model



FSA Burst Model



Merchant Spike



HSA Employer Breach



FSA Employer Breach



Cardholder Fraud




HSA Individual Fraud



FSA Individual Fraud




Targeted Merchant




Daily Report

Model Data and Workflow



Data Scientist meet Security Professional



RSA® Conference 2018



QUESTIONS?

routhj@aetna.com

<https://www.linkedin.com/in/jmrouth/>