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IOS TRUSTJACKING NEW IOS VULNERABILITY

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Agenda

- Background
- Recap of related past attacks
- Remote Videojacking Attack + Demo
- Advanced Trustjacking attack flows + Demo
- Summary & Recommendations

A day in the office




- Working with several iOS devices
- Weird behavior



Background



- Trust This Computer?
 - Background
 - Why use it?






Background

- Behind the scenes
- Key relevant daemons:
 - usbd
 - usbmux
 - lockdown
 - authd

Juice jacking

<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/08/beware-of-juice-jacking/>



Videojacking (leveraging HDMI interface)

<https://krebsonsecurity.com/tag/video-jacking/>



#RSAC





But we promised you a remote (wifi?) hijacking disclosure...

iTunes Wi-Fi Sync



Options

- Automatically sync when this iPhone is connected
- Sync with this iPhone over Wi-Fi
 - Sync only checked songs and videos
 - Prefer standard definition videos
 - Convert higher bit rate songs to 128 kbps AAC
 - Manually manage music and videos
- [Reset Warnings](#)
- [Configure Accessibility...](#)

- Uses the trust established during initial USB connection
- Relies on implementation of usbmux over network

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IOS TRUSTJACKING

iOS Trustjacking – Attack Flow



- Trust == One time mistake
- Victim side
- Attacker side
 - Accessing device information
 - Accessing device logs
 - Rebooting the device (can be used for DoS attack)
 - Leveraging the developer image


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REMOTE VIDEOJACKING DEMO

Using developer image for advanced attacks

Remote Videojacking –
A New iOS Vulnerability



<http://embed.ustudio.com/embed/DTkChBhtXc2/UfREnMM6AY40>

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IOS TRUSTJACKING ADVANCED DEMO

Backup and restore



<https://embed.ustudio.com/embed/DTkChBhtXcx2/UMQhu5XRecFM>

Backup format



- The decision whether the backup is encrypted or not is initiated by the computer side but then enforced on the client side
- If legitimate user opted in to encrypt backup password will be required disabled that
- If user didn't choose to encrypt backup attacked to enforce encrypted backup on the user's device 😞
- Getting photos out of the device
 - Info.plist - contains information about the device and installed apps
 - Manifest.plist – contains information about the backup and installed apps
 - Status.plist - information regarding the backup
 - Manifest.db - SQLite3
 - Files paths converted to SHA1 file names

Remote Backup



- Obviously the remote backup allows us access to:
 - Messages
 - Contacts
 - App data



IOS TRUSTJACKING ADVANCED DEMO

Installing / Deleting Apps

Replacing Apps

Private API Access



<https://embed.ustudio.com/embed/DTkChBHTxcz2/UX50hxVoh6kp>

Pre-Trust vs. Post-Trust Attacks



- Trusting a malicious computer
- Attacking a trusted computer (Post-Trust Attack)
- Temporal access to a computer (Pre-Trust attacks)
 - Won't work as Apple mitigated it by generating a unique key-pair for each connection




Is the attack confined to Wi-Fi only?

Wi-Fi Sync & Bonjour




- mDNS (Bonjour) used for device discovery
- Replicating / tunneling mDNS + Malicious Profiles attack
 - Malicious Profiles can also allow attacker to redirect and decrypt traffic
 - Allows access to the mobile phone without the need to be on the same network nor location
- More on Malicious Profiles:
 - <https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malicious-profiles-sleeping-giant-ios-security>



Recommendations



- End Users:
 - Clear trusted computer settings
 - Settings > General > Reset > Reset Location & Privacy
 - Enable encryption on all backups
 - Trust who you really trust
- Organizations:
 - IT: Deploy Mobile Threat Defense (MTD) solutions
 - Dev: Exclude sensitive info from app backup data



Recommendations



- Work with Apple
 - As always Apple has been actively engaged to preserve and maintain the security of its users
 - Issue reported to Apple in mid July 2017
 - iOS 11 Changes
 - Trusting computers now requires passcode
 - Wi-Fi sync should be reconsidered
 - Mobile OS should be owning most of the security decisions
 - Encrypted backups

Summary



- Single point of failure / one time mistake
- Long lasting implications
- Can be used by conventional malwares
- How to avoid
- New breed of attacks jumping from traditional to modern OS

- Check out our blog for more information:
 - <https://www.symantec.com/blogs/feature-stories/ios-trustjacking-dangerous-new-ios-vulnerability>
- Twitter: @Royiarchy @AdiSharabani
- Birds of Feather Session: Marriot, Golden Gate A
 - Should I put security on mobile or make my whole security mobile?