diff --git a/Makefile.am b/Makefile.am
index 3d130bdcbd..7461ff328b 100644
--- a/Makefile.am
+++ b/Makefile.am
@@ -154,10 +154,6 @@ if ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH
include src/modules/ecdh/Makefile.am.include
endif
-if ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORR
-include src/modules/schnorr/Makefile.am.include
-endif
-
if ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY
include src/modules/recovery/Makefile.am.include
endif
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 67a9d46015..1933f7169f 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -119,11 +119,6 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_ecdh,
[enable_module_ecdh=$enableval],
[enable_module_ecdh=no])
-AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_schnorr,
- AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-schnorr],[enable Schnorr signature module (experimental)]),
- [enable_module_schnorr=$enableval],
- [enable_module_schnorr=no])
-
AC_ARG_ENABLE(module_recovery,
AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-module-recovery],[enable ECDSA pubkey recovery module (default is no)]),
[enable_module_recovery=$enableval],
@@ -381,9 +376,6 @@ fi
if test x"$use_jni" != x"no"; then
AX_JNI_INCLUDE_DIR
have_jni_dependencies=yes
- if test x"$enable_module_schnorr" = x"no"; then
- have_jni_dependencies=no
- fi
if test x"$enable_module_ecdh" = x"no"; then
have_jni_dependencies=no
fi
@@ -392,7 +384,7 @@ if test x"$use_jni" != x"no"; then
fi
if test "x$have_jni_dependencies" = "xno"; then
if test x"$use_jni" = x"yes"; then
- AC_MSG_ERROR([jni support explicitly requested but headers/dependencies were not found. Enable ECDH and Schnorr and try again.])
+ AC_MSG_ERROR([jni support explicitly requested but headers/dependencies were not found. Enable ECDH and try again.])
fi
AC_MSG_WARN([jni headers/dependencies not found. jni support disabled])
use_jni=no
@@ -421,10 +413,6 @@ if test x"$enable_module_ecdh" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the ECDH module])
fi
-if test x"$enable_module_schnorr" = x"yes"; then
- AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORR, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the Schnorr signature module])
-fi
-
if test x"$enable_module_recovery" = x"yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY, 1, [Define this symbol to enable the ECDSA pubkey recovery module])
fi
@@ -442,7 +430,6 @@ AC_MSG_NOTICE([Using bignum implementation: $set_bignum])
AC_MSG_NOTICE([Using scalar implementation: $set_scalar])
AC_MSG_NOTICE([Using endomorphism optimizations: $use_endomorphism])
AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building ECDH module: $enable_module_ecdh])
-AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building Schnorr signatures module: $enable_module_schnorr])
AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building ECDSA pubkey recovery module: $enable_module_recovery])
AC_MSG_NOTICE([Using jni: $use_jni])
@@ -451,12 +438,8 @@ if test x"$enable_experimental" = x"yes"; then
AC_MSG_NOTICE([WARNING: experimental build])
AC_MSG_NOTICE([Experimental features do not have stable APIs or properties, and may not be safe for production use.])
AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building ECDH module: $enable_module_ecdh])
- AC_MSG_NOTICE([Building Schnorr signatures module: $enable_module_schnorr])
AC_MSG_NOTICE([******])
else
- if test x"$enable_module_schnorr" = x"yes"; then
- AC_MSG_ERROR([Schnorr signature module is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.])
- fi
if test x"$enable_module_ecdh" = x"yes"; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([ECDH module is experimental. Use --enable-experimental to allow.])
fi
@@ -476,7 +459,6 @@ AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_TESTS], [test x"$use_tests" != x"no"])
AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_BENCHMARK], [test x"$use_benchmark" = x"yes"])
AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_ECMULT_STATIC_PRECOMPUTATION], [test x"$set_precomp" = x"yes"])
AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_ECDH], [test x"$enable_module_ecdh" = x"yes"])
-AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_SCHNORR], [test x"$enable_module_schnorr" = x"yes"])
AM_CONDITIONAL([ENABLE_MODULE_RECOVERY], [test x"$enable_module_recovery" = x"yes"])
AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_JNI], [test x"$use_jni" == x"yes"])
AM_CONDITIONAL([USE_EXTERNAL_ASM], [test x"$use_external_asm" = x"yes"])
diff --git a/include/secp256k1_schnorr.h b/include/secp256k1_schnorr.h
deleted file mode 100644
index dc32fec1ea..0000000000
--- a/include/secp256k1_schnorr.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,173 +0,0 @@
-#ifndef _SECP256K1_SCHNORR_
-# define _SECP256K1_SCHNORR_
-
-# include "secp256k1.h"
-
-# ifdef __cplusplus
-extern "C" {
-# endif
-
-/** Create a signature using a custom EC-Schnorr-SHA256 construction. It
- * produces non-malleable 64-byte signatures which support public key recovery
- * batch validation, and multiparty signing.
- * Returns: 1: signature created
- * 0: the nonce generation function failed, or the private key was
- * invalid.
- * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for signing
- * (cannot be NULL)
- * Out: sig64: pointer to a 64-byte array where the signature will be
- * placed (cannot be NULL)
- * In: msg32: the 32-byte message hash being signed (cannot be NULL)
- * seckey: pointer to a 32-byte secret key (cannot be NULL)
- * noncefp:pointer to a nonce generation function. If NULL,
- * secp256k1_nonce_function_default is used
- * ndata: pointer to arbitrary data used by the nonce generation
- * function (can be NULL)
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_schnorr_sign(
- const secp256k1_context* ctx,
- unsigned char *sig64,
- const unsigned char *msg32,
- const unsigned char *seckey,
- secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp,
- const void *ndata
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
-
-/** Verify a signature created by secp256k1_schnorr_sign.
- * Returns: 1: correct signature
- * 0: incorrect signature
- * Args: ctx: a secp256k1 context object, initialized for verification.
- * In: sig64: the 64-byte signature being verified (cannot be NULL)
- * msg32: the 32-byte message hash being verified (cannot be NULL)
- * pubkey: the public key to verify with (cannot be NULL)
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_schnorr_verify(
- const secp256k1_context* ctx,
- const unsigned char *sig64,
- const unsigned char *msg32,
- const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
-
-/** Recover an EC public key from a Schnorr signature created using
- * secp256k1_schnorr_sign.
- * Returns: 1: public key successfully recovered (which guarantees a correct
- * signature).
- * 0: otherwise.
- * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for
- * verification (cannot be NULL)
- * Out: pubkey: pointer to a pubkey to set to the recovered public key
- * (cannot be NULL).
- * In: sig64: signature as 64 byte array (cannot be NULL)
- * msg32: the 32-byte message hash assumed to be signed (cannot
- * be NULL)
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_schnorr_recover(
- const secp256k1_context* ctx,
- secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,
- const unsigned char *sig64,
- const unsigned char *msg32
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4);
-
-/** Generate a nonce pair deterministically for use with
- * secp256k1_schnorr_partial_sign.
- * Returns: 1: valid nonce pair was generated.
- * 0: otherwise (nonce generation function failed)
- * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object, initialized for signing
- * (cannot be NULL)
- * Out: pubnonce: public side of the nonce (cannot be NULL)
- * privnonce32: private side of the nonce (32 byte) (cannot be NULL)
- * In: msg32: the 32-byte message hash assumed to be signed (cannot
- * be NULL)
- * sec32: the 32-byte private key (cannot be NULL)
- * noncefp: pointer to a nonce generation function. If NULL,
- * secp256k1_nonce_function_default is used
- * noncedata: pointer to arbitrary data used by the nonce generation
- * function (can be NULL)
- *
- * Do not use the output as a private/public key pair for signing/validation.
- */
-SECP256K1_API int secp256k1_schnorr_generate_nonce_pair(
- const secp256k1_context* ctx,
- secp256k1_pubkey *pubnonce,
- unsigned char *privnonce32,
- const unsigned char *msg32,
- const unsigned char *sec32,
- secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp,
- const void* noncedata
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-/** Produce a partial Schnorr signature, which can be combined using
- * secp256k1_schnorr_partial_combine, to end up with a full signature that is
- * verifiable using secp256k1_schnorr_verify.
- * Returns: 1: signature created successfully.
- * 0: no valid signature exists with this combination of keys, nonces
- * and message (chance around 1 in 2^128)
- * -1: invalid private key, nonce, or public nonces.
- * Args: ctx: pointer to context object, initialized for signing (cannot
- * be NULL)
- * Out: sig64: pointer to 64-byte array to put partial signature in
- * In: msg32: pointer to 32-byte message to sign
- * sec32: pointer to 32-byte private key
- * pubnonce_others: pointer to pubkey containing the sum of the other's
- * nonces (see secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine)
- * secnonce32: pointer to 32-byte array containing our nonce
- *
- * The intended procedure for creating a multiparty signature is:
- * - Each signer S[i] with private key x[i] and public key Q[i] runs
- * secp256k1_schnorr_generate_nonce_pair to produce a pair (k[i],R[i]) of
- * private/public nonces.
- * - All signers communicate their public nonces to each other (revealing your
- * private nonce can lead to discovery of your private key, so it should be
- * considered secret).
- * - All signers combine all the public nonces they received (excluding their
- * own) using secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine to obtain an
- * Rall[i] = sum(R[0..i-1,i+1..n]).
- * - All signers produce a partial signature using
- * secp256k1_schnorr_partial_sign, passing in their own private key x[i],
- * their own private nonce k[i], and the sum of the others' public nonces
- * Rall[i].
- * - All signers communicate their partial signatures to each other.
- * - Someone combines all partial signatures using
- * secp256k1_schnorr_partial_combine, to obtain a full signature.
- * - The resulting signature is validatable using secp256k1_schnorr_verify, with
- * public key equal to the result of secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine of the
- * signers' public keys (sum(Q[0..n])).
- *
- * Note that secp256k1_schnorr_partial_combine and secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine
- * function take their arguments in any order, and it is possible to
- * pre-combine several inputs already with one call, and add more inputs later
- * by calling the function again (they are commutative and associative).
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_schnorr_partial_sign(
- const secp256k1_context* ctx,
- unsigned char *sig64,
- const unsigned char *msg32,
- const unsigned char *sec32,
- const secp256k1_pubkey *pubnonce_others,
- const unsigned char *secnonce32
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(1) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(4) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(5) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(6);
-
-/** Combine multiple Schnorr partial signatures.
- * Returns: 1: the passed signatures were successfully combined.
- * 0: the resulting signature is not valid (chance of 1 in 2^256)
- * -1: some inputs were invalid, or the signatures were not created
- * using the same set of nonces
- * Args: ctx: pointer to a context object
- * Out: sig64: pointer to a 64-byte array to place the combined signature
- * (cannot be NULL)
- * In: sig64sin: pointer to an array of n pointers to 64-byte input
- * signatures
- * n: the number of signatures to combine (at least 1)
- */
-SECP256K1_API SECP256K1_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT int secp256k1_schnorr_partial_combine(
- const secp256k1_context* ctx,
- unsigned char *sig64,
- const unsigned char * const * sig64sin,
- size_t n
-) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(2) SECP256K1_ARG_NONNULL(3);
-
-# ifdef __cplusplus
-}
-# endif
-
-#endif
diff --git a/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1.java b/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1.java
index be67048fbe..1c67802fba 100644
--- a/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1.java
+++ b/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1.java
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
* You can find an example library that can be used for this at https://github.com/bitcoin/secp256k1
*
* To build secp256k1 for use with bitcoinj, run
- * `./configure --enable-jni --enable-experimental --enable-module-schnorr --enable-module-ecdh`
+ * `./configure --enable-jni --enable-experimental --enable-module-ecdh`
* and `make` then copy `.libs/libsecp256k1.so` to your system library path
* or point the JVM to the folder containing it with -Djava.library.path
*
@@ -417,36 +417,6 @@ public static synchronized boolean randomize(byte[] seed) throws AssertFailExcep
}
}
- public static byte[] schnorrSign(byte[] data, byte[] sec) throws AssertFailException {
- Preconditions.checkArgument(data.length == 32 && sec.length <= 32);
-
- ByteBuffer byteBuff = nativeECDSABuffer.get();
- if (byteBuff == null) {
- byteBuff = ByteBuffer.allocateDirect(32 + 32);
- byteBuff.order(ByteOrder.nativeOrder());
- nativeECDSABuffer.set(byteBuff);
- }
- byteBuff.rewind();
- byteBuff.put(data);
- byteBuff.put(sec);
-
- byte[][] retByteArray;
-
- r.lock();
- try {
- retByteArray = secp256k1_schnorr_sign(byteBuff, Secp256k1Context.getContext());
- } finally {
- r.unlock();
- }
-
- byte[] sigArr = retByteArray[0];
- int retVal = new BigInteger(new byte[] { retByteArray[1][0] }).intValue();
-
- assertEquals(sigArr.length, 64, "Got bad signature length.");
-
- return retVal == 0 ? new byte[0] : sigArr;
- }
-
private static native long secp256k1_ctx_clone(long context);
private static native int secp256k1_context_randomize(ByteBuffer byteBuff, long context);
@@ -471,8 +441,6 @@ public static byte[] schnorrSign(byte[] data, byte[] sec) throws AssertFailExcep
private static native byte[][] secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(ByteBuffer byteBuff, long context, int inputLen);
- private static native byte[][] secp256k1_schnorr_sign(ByteBuffer byteBuff, long context);
-
private static native byte[][] secp256k1_ecdh(ByteBuffer byteBuff, long context, int inputLen);
}
diff --git a/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1Test.java b/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1Test.java
index f18ce95810..1555a4dc0a 100644
--- a/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1Test.java
+++ b/src/java/org/bitcoin/NativeSecp256k1Test.java
@@ -167,32 +167,6 @@ public static void testRandomize() throws AssertFailException {
assertEquals( result, true, "testRandomize");
}
- /**
- * This tests signSchnorr() for a valid secretkey
- */
- public static void testSchnorrSign() throws AssertFailException{
-
- byte[] data = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("CF80CD8AED482D5D1527D7DC72FCEFF84E6326592848447D2DC0B0E87DFC9A90".toLowerCase()); //sha256hash of "testing"
- byte[] sec = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("67E56582298859DDAE725F972992A07C6C4FB9F62A8FFF58CE3CA926A1063530".toLowerCase());
-
- byte[] resultArr = NativeSecp256k1.schnorrSign(data, sec);
- String sigString = javax.xml.bind.DatatypeConverter.printHexBinary(resultArr);
- assertEquals( sigString, "C5E929AA058B982048760422D3B563749B7D0E50C5EBD8CD2FFC23214BD6A2F1B072C13880997EBA847CF20F2F90FCE07C1CA33A890A4127095A351127F8D95F" , "testSchnorrSign");
- }
-
- /**
- * This tests signSchnorr() for a valid secretkey
- */
- public static void testCreateECDHSecret() throws AssertFailException{
-
- byte[] sec = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("67E56582298859DDAE725F972992A07C6C4FB9F62A8FFF58CE3CA926A1063530".toLowerCase());
- byte[] pub = BaseEncoding.base16().lowerCase().decode("040A629506E1B65CD9D2E0BA9C75DF9C4FED0DB16DC9625ED14397F0AFC836FAE595DC53F8B0EFE61E703075BD9B143BAC75EC0E19F82A2208CAEB32BE53414C40".toLowerCase());
-
- byte[] resultArr = NativeSecp256k1.createECDHSecret(sec, pub);
- String ecdhString = javax.xml.bind.DatatypeConverter.printHexBinary(resultArr);
- assertEquals( ecdhString, "2A2A67007A926E6594AF3EB564FC74005B37A9C8AEF2033C4552051B5C87F043" , "testCreateECDHSecret");
- }
-
public static void main(String[] args) throws AssertFailException{
@@ -216,11 +190,6 @@ public static void main(String[] args) throws AssertFailException{
testSignPos();
testSignNeg();
- //Test Schnorr (partial support) //TODO
- testSchnorrSign();
- //testSchnorrVerify
- //testSchnorrRecovery
-
//Test privKeyTweakAdd() 1
testPrivKeyTweakAdd_1();
diff --git a/src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.c b/src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.c
index dba9524dd4..bcef7b32ce 100644
--- a/src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.c
+++ b/src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.c
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
#include "include/secp256k1.h"
#include "include/secp256k1_ecdh.h"
#include "include/secp256k1_recovery.h"
-#include "include/secp256k1_schnorr.h"
SECP256K1_API jlong JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ctx_1clone
@@ -333,39 +332,6 @@ SECP256K1_API jlong JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ecdsa_1p
return 0;
}
-SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1schnorr_1sign
- (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jobject byteBufferObject, jlong ctx_l)
-{
- secp256k1_context *ctx = (secp256k1_context*)(uintptr_t)ctx_l;
- unsigned char* data = (unsigned char*) (*env)->GetDirectBufferAddress(env, byteBufferObject);
- unsigned char* secKey = (unsigned char*) (data + 32);
-
- jobjectArray retArray;
- jbyteArray sigArray, intsByteArray;
- unsigned char intsarray[1];
- unsigned char sig[64];
-
- int ret = secp256k1_schnorr_sign(ctx, sig, data, secKey, NULL, NULL);
-
- intsarray[0] = ret;
-
- retArray = (*env)->NewObjectArray(env, 2,
- (*env)->FindClass(env, "[B"),
- (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 1));
-
- sigArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 64);
- (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, sigArray, 0, 64, (jbyte*)sig);
- (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 0, sigArray);
-
- intsByteArray = (*env)->NewByteArray(env, 1);
- (*env)->SetByteArrayRegion(env, intsByteArray, 0, 1, (jbyte*)intsarray);
- (*env)->SetObjectArrayElement(env, retArray, 1, intsByteArray);
-
- (void)classObject;
-
- return retArray;
-}
-
SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ecdh
(JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jobject byteBufferObject, jlong ctx_l, jint publen)
{
diff --git a/src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.h b/src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.h
index 4125a1f523..fe613c9e9e 100644
--- a/src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.h
+++ b/src/java/org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1.h
@@ -104,14 +104,6 @@ SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1e
SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1ec_1pubkey_1parse
(JNIEnv *, jclass, jobject, jlong, jint);
-/*
- * Class: org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1
- * Method: secp256k1_schnorr_sign
- * Signature: (Ljava/nio/ByteBuffer;JI)[[B
- */
-SECP256K1_API jobjectArray JNICALL Java_org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1_secp256k1_1schnorr_1sign
- (JNIEnv* env, jclass classObject, jobject byteBufferObject, jlong ctx_l);
-
/*
* Class: org_bitcoin_NativeSecp256k1
* Method: secp256k1_ecdh
diff --git a/src/modules/schnorr/Makefile.am.include b/src/modules/schnorr/Makefile.am.include
deleted file mode 100644
index f1af8e8325..0000000000
--- a/src/modules/schnorr/Makefile.am.include
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-include_HEADERS += include/secp256k1_schnorr.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/schnorr/main_impl.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/schnorr/schnorr.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/schnorr/schnorr_impl.h
-noinst_HEADERS += src/modules/schnorr/tests_impl.h
-if USE_BENCHMARK
-noinst_PROGRAMS += bench_schnorr_verify
-bench_schnorr_verify_SOURCES = src/bench_schnorr_verify.c
-bench_schnorr_verify_LDADD = libsecp256k1.la $(SECP_LIBS) $(COMMON_LIB)
-endif
diff --git a/src/modules/schnorr/main_impl.h b/src/modules/schnorr/main_impl.h
deleted file mode 100755
index c88a7ea246..0000000000
--- a/src/modules/schnorr/main_impl.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,164 +0,0 @@
-/**********************************************************************
- * Copyright (c) 2014-2015 Pieter Wuille *
- * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying *
- * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
- **********************************************************************/
-
-#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_SCHNORR_MAIN
-#define SECP256K1_MODULE_SCHNORR_MAIN
-
-#include "include/secp256k1_schnorr.h"
-#include "modules/schnorr/schnorr_impl.h"
-
-static void secp256k1_schnorr_msghash_sha256(unsigned char *h32, const unsigned char *r32, const unsigned char *msg32) {
- secp256k1_sha256_t sha;
- secp256k1_sha256_initialize(&sha);
- secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, r32, 32);
- secp256k1_sha256_write(&sha, msg32, 32);
- secp256k1_sha256_finalize(&sha, h32);
-}
-
-static const unsigned char secp256k1_schnorr_algo16[17] = "Schnorr+SHA256 ";
-
-int secp256k1_schnorr_sign(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *sig64, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *seckey, secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp, const void* noncedata) {
- secp256k1_scalar sec, non;
- int ret = 0;
- int overflow = 0;
- unsigned char nonce32[32];
- unsigned int count = 0;
- VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx));
- ARG_CHECK(msg32 != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(sig64 != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(seckey != NULL);
- if (noncefp == NULL) {
- noncefp = secp256k1_nonce_function_default;
- }
-
- secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, seckey, NULL);
- while (1) {
- ret = noncefp(nonce32, msg32, seckey, secp256k1_schnorr_algo16, (void*)noncedata, count);
- if (!ret) {
- break;
- }
- secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&non, nonce32, &overflow);
- if (!secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&non) && !overflow) {
- if (secp256k1_schnorr_sig_sign(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, sig64, &sec, &non, NULL, secp256k1_schnorr_msghash_sha256, msg32)) {
- break;
- }
- }
- count++;
- }
- if (!ret) {
- memset(sig64, 0, 64);
- }
- memset(nonce32, 0, 32);
- secp256k1_scalar_clear(&non);
- secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec);
- return ret;
-}
-
-int secp256k1_schnorr_verify(const secp256k1_context* ctx, const unsigned char *sig64, const unsigned char *msg32, const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey) {
- secp256k1_ge q;
- VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx));
- ARG_CHECK(msg32 != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(sig64 != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL);
-
- secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &q, pubkey);
- return secp256k1_schnorr_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, sig64, &q, secp256k1_schnorr_msghash_sha256, msg32);
-}
-
-int secp256k1_schnorr_recover(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey, const unsigned char *sig64, const unsigned char *msg32) {
- secp256k1_ge q;
-
- VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_ctx));
- ARG_CHECK(msg32 != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(sig64 != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(pubkey != NULL);
-
- if (secp256k1_schnorr_sig_recover(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, sig64, &q, secp256k1_schnorr_msghash_sha256, msg32)) {
- secp256k1_pubkey_save(pubkey, &q);
- return 1;
- } else {
- memset(pubkey, 0, sizeof(*pubkey));
- return 0;
- }
-}
-
-int secp256k1_schnorr_generate_nonce_pair(const secp256k1_context* ctx, secp256k1_pubkey *pubnonce, unsigned char *privnonce32, const unsigned char *sec32, const unsigned char *msg32, secp256k1_nonce_function noncefp, const void* noncedata) {
- int count = 0;
- int ret = 1;
- secp256k1_gej Qj;
- secp256k1_ge Q;
- secp256k1_scalar sec;
-
- VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx));
- ARG_CHECK(msg32 != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(sec32 != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(pubnonce != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(privnonce32 != NULL);
-
- if (noncefp == NULL) {
- noncefp = secp256k1_nonce_function_default;
- }
-
- do {
- int overflow;
- ret = noncefp(privnonce32, sec32, msg32, secp256k1_schnorr_algo16, (void*)noncedata, count++);
- if (!ret) {
- break;
- }
- secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, privnonce32, &overflow);
- if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&sec)) {
- continue;
- }
- secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &Qj, &sec);
- secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&Q, &Qj);
-
- secp256k1_pubkey_save(pubnonce, &Q);
- break;
- } while(1);
-
- secp256k1_scalar_clear(&sec);
- if (!ret) {
- memset(pubnonce, 0, sizeof(*pubnonce));
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-int secp256k1_schnorr_partial_sign(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *sig64, const unsigned char *msg32, const unsigned char *sec32, const secp256k1_pubkey *pubnonce_others, const unsigned char *secnonce32) {
- int overflow = 0;
- secp256k1_scalar sec, non;
- secp256k1_ge pubnon;
- VERIFY_CHECK(ctx != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context_is_built(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx));
- ARG_CHECK(msg32 != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(sig64 != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(sec32 != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(secnonce32 != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(pubnonce_others != NULL);
-
- secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&sec, sec32, &overflow);
- if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&sec)) {
- return -1;
- }
- secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&non, secnonce32, &overflow);
- if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&non)) {
- return -1;
- }
- secp256k1_pubkey_load(ctx, &pubnon, pubnonce_others);
- return secp256k1_schnorr_sig_sign(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, sig64, &sec, &non, &pubnon, secp256k1_schnorr_msghash_sha256, msg32);
-}
-
-int secp256k1_schnorr_partial_combine(const secp256k1_context* ctx, unsigned char *sig64, const unsigned char * const *sig64sin, size_t n) {
- ARG_CHECK(sig64 != NULL);
- ARG_CHECK(n >= 1);
- ARG_CHECK(sig64sin != NULL);
- return secp256k1_schnorr_sig_combine(sig64, n, sig64sin);
-}
-
-#endif
diff --git a/src/modules/schnorr/schnorr.h b/src/modules/schnorr/schnorr.h
deleted file mode 100644
index de18147bd5..0000000000
--- a/src/modules/schnorr/schnorr.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-/***********************************************************************
- * Copyright (c) 2014-2015 Pieter Wuille *
- * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying *
- * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php. *
- ***********************************************************************/
-
-#ifndef _SECP256K1_MODULE_SCHNORR_H_
-#define _SECP256K1_MODULE_SCHNORR_H_
-
-#include "scalar.h"
-#include "group.h"
-
-typedef void (*secp256k1_schnorr_msghash)(unsigned char *h32, const unsigned char *r32, const unsigned char *msg32);
-
-static int secp256k1_schnorr_sig_sign(const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ctx, unsigned char *sig64, const secp256k1_scalar *key, const secp256k1_scalar *nonce, const secp256k1_ge *pubnonce, secp256k1_schnorr_msghash hash, const unsigned char *msg32);
-static int secp256k1_schnorr_sig_verify(const secp256k1_ecmult_context* ctx, const unsigned char *sig64, const secp256k1_ge *pubkey, secp256k1_schnorr_msghash hash, const unsigned char *msg32);
-static int secp256k1_schnorr_sig_recover(const secp256k1_ecmult_context* ctx, const unsigned char *sig64, secp256k1_ge *pubkey, secp256k1_schnorr_msghash hash, const unsigned char *msg32);
-static int secp256k1_schnorr_sig_combine(unsigned char *sig64, size_t n, const unsigned char * const *sig64ins);
-
-#endif
diff --git a/src/modules/schnorr/schnorr_impl.h b/src/modules/schnorr/schnorr_impl.h
deleted file mode 100644
index e13ab6db7c..0000000000
--- a/src/modules/schnorr/schnorr_impl.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,207 +0,0 @@
-/***********************************************************************
- * Copyright (c) 2014-2015 Pieter Wuille *
- * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying *
- * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php. *
- ***********************************************************************/
-
-#ifndef _SECP256K1_SCHNORR_IMPL_H_
-#define _SECP256K1_SCHNORR_IMPL_H_
-
-#include
-
-#include "schnorr.h"
-#include "num.h"
-#include "field.h"
-#include "group.h"
-#include "ecmult.h"
-#include "ecmult_gen.h"
-
-/**
- * Custom Schnorr-based signature scheme. They support multiparty signing, public key
- * recovery and batch validation.
- *
- * Rationale for verifying R's y coordinate:
- * In order to support batch validation and public key recovery, the full R point must
- * be known to verifiers, rather than just its x coordinate. In order to not risk
- * being more strict in batch validation than normal validation, validators must be
- * required to reject signatures with incorrect y coordinate. This is only possible
- * by including a (relatively slow) field inverse, or a field square root. However,
- * batch validation offers potentially much higher benefits than this cost.
- *
- * Rationale for having an implicit y coordinate oddness:
- * If we commit to having the full R point known to verifiers, there are two mechanism.
- * Either include its oddness in the signature, or give it an implicit fixed value.
- * As the R y coordinate can be flipped by a simple negation of the nonce, we choose the
- * latter, as it comes with nearly zero impact on signing or validation performance, and
- * saves a byte in the signature.
- *
- * Signing:
- * Inputs: 32-byte message m, 32-byte scalar key x (!=0), 32-byte scalar nonce k (!=0)
- *
- * Compute point R = k * G. Reject nonce if R's y coordinate is odd (or negate nonce).
- * Compute 32-byte r, the serialization of R's x coordinate.
- * Compute scalar h = Hash(r || m). Reject nonce if h == 0 or h >= order.
- * Compute scalar s = k - h * x.
- * The signature is (r, s).
- *
- *
- * Verification:
- * Inputs: 32-byte message m, public key point Q, signature: (32-byte r, scalar s)
- *
- * Signature is invalid if s >= order.
- * Signature is invalid if r >= p.
- * Compute scalar h = Hash(r || m). Signature is invalid if h == 0 or h >= order.
- * Option 1 (faster for single verification):
- * Compute point R = h * Q + s * G. Signature is invalid if R is infinity or R's y coordinate is odd.
- * Signature is valid if the serialization of R's x coordinate equals r.
- * Option 2 (allows batch validation and pubkey recovery):
- * Decompress x coordinate r into point R, with odd y coordinate. Fail if R is not on the curve.
- * Signature is valid if R + h * Q + s * G == 0.
- */
-
-static int secp256k1_schnorr_sig_sign(const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context* ctx, unsigned char *sig64, const secp256k1_scalar *key, const secp256k1_scalar *nonce, const secp256k1_ge *pubnonce, secp256k1_schnorr_msghash hash, const unsigned char *msg32) {
- secp256k1_gej Rj;
- secp256k1_ge Ra;
- unsigned char h32[32];
- secp256k1_scalar h, s;
- int overflow;
- secp256k1_scalar n;
-
- if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(key) || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(nonce)) {
- return 0;
- }
- n = *nonce;
-
- secp256k1_ecmult_gen(ctx, &Rj, &n);
- if (pubnonce != NULL) {
- secp256k1_gej_add_ge(&Rj, &Rj, pubnonce);
- }
- secp256k1_ge_set_gej(&Ra, &Rj);
- secp256k1_fe_normalize(&Ra.y);
- if (secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&Ra.y)) {
- /* R's y coordinate is odd, which is not allowed (see rationale above).
- Force it to be even by negating the nonce. Note that this even works
- for multiparty signing, as the R point is known to all participants,
- which can all decide to flip the sign in unison, resulting in the
- overall R point to be negated too. */
- secp256k1_scalar_negate(&n, &n);
- }
- secp256k1_fe_normalize(&Ra.x);
- secp256k1_fe_get_b32(sig64, &Ra.x);
- hash(h32, sig64, msg32);
- overflow = 0;
- secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&h, h32, &overflow);
- if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&h)) {
- secp256k1_scalar_clear(&n);
- return 0;
- }
- secp256k1_scalar_mul(&s, &h, key);
- secp256k1_scalar_negate(&s, &s);
- secp256k1_scalar_add(&s, &s, &n);
- secp256k1_scalar_clear(&n);
- secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(sig64 + 32, &s);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int secp256k1_schnorr_sig_verify(const secp256k1_ecmult_context* ctx, const unsigned char *sig64, const secp256k1_ge *pubkey, secp256k1_schnorr_msghash hash, const unsigned char *msg32) {
- secp256k1_gej Qj, Rj;
- secp256k1_ge Ra;
- secp256k1_fe Rx;
- secp256k1_scalar h, s;
- unsigned char hh[32];
- int overflow;
-
- if (secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(pubkey)) {
- return 0;
- }
- hash(hh, sig64, msg32);
- overflow = 0;
- secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&h, hh, &overflow);
- if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&h)) {
- return 0;
- }
- overflow = 0;
- secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&s, sig64 + 32, &overflow);
- if (overflow) {
- return 0;
- }
- if (!secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&Rx, sig64)) {
- return 0;
- }
- secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&Qj, pubkey);
- secp256k1_ecmult(ctx, &Rj, &Qj, &h, &s);
- if (secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&Rj)) {
- return 0;
- }
- secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var(&Ra, &Rj);
- secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&Ra.y);
- if (secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&Ra.y)) {
- return 0;
- }
- return secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&Rx, &Ra.x);
-}
-
-static int secp256k1_schnorr_sig_recover(const secp256k1_ecmult_context* ctx, const unsigned char *sig64, secp256k1_ge *pubkey, secp256k1_schnorr_msghash hash, const unsigned char *msg32) {
- secp256k1_gej Qj, Rj;
- secp256k1_ge Ra;
- secp256k1_fe Rx;
- secp256k1_scalar h, s;
- unsigned char hh[32];
- int overflow;
-
- hash(hh, sig64, msg32);
- overflow = 0;
- secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&h, hh, &overflow);
- if (overflow || secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&h)) {
- return 0;
- }
- overflow = 0;
- secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&s, sig64 + 32, &overflow);
- if (overflow) {
- return 0;
- }
- if (!secp256k1_fe_set_b32(&Rx, sig64)) {
- return 0;
- }
- if (!secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(&Ra, &Rx, 0)) {
- return 0;
- }
- secp256k1_gej_set_ge(&Rj, &Ra);
- secp256k1_scalar_inverse_var(&h, &h);
- secp256k1_scalar_negate(&s, &s);
- secp256k1_scalar_mul(&s, &s, &h);
- secp256k1_ecmult(ctx, &Qj, &Rj, &h, &s);
- if (secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&Qj)) {
- return 0;
- }
- secp256k1_ge_set_gej(pubkey, &Qj);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int secp256k1_schnorr_sig_combine(unsigned char *sig64, size_t n, const unsigned char * const *sig64ins) {
- secp256k1_scalar s = SECP256K1_SCALAR_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
- size_t i;
- for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
- secp256k1_scalar si;
- int overflow;
- secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(&si, sig64ins[i] + 32, &overflow);
- if (overflow) {
- return -1;
- }
- if (i) {
- if (memcmp(sig64ins[i - 1], sig64ins[i], 32) != 0) {
- return -1;
- }
- }
- secp256k1_scalar_add(&s, &s, &si);
- }
- if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(&s)) {
- return 0;
- }
- memcpy(sig64, sig64ins[0], 32);
- secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(sig64 + 32, &s);
- secp256k1_scalar_clear(&s);
- return 1;
-}
-
-#endif
diff --git a/src/modules/schnorr/tests_impl.h b/src/modules/schnorr/tests_impl.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 5bd14a03e3..0000000000
--- a/src/modules/schnorr/tests_impl.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,175 +0,0 @@
-/**********************************************************************
- * Copyright (c) 2014-2015 Pieter Wuille *
- * Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying *
- * file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
- **********************************************************************/
-
-#ifndef SECP256K1_MODULE_SCHNORR_TESTS
-#define SECP256K1_MODULE_SCHNORR_TESTS
-
-#include "include/secp256k1_schnorr.h"
-
-void test_schnorr_end_to_end(void) {
- unsigned char privkey[32];
- unsigned char message[32];
- unsigned char schnorr_signature[64];
- secp256k1_pubkey pubkey, recpubkey;
-
- /* Generate a random key and message. */
- {
- secp256k1_scalar key;
- random_scalar_order_test(&key);
- secp256k1_scalar_get_b32(privkey, &key);
- secp256k1_rand256_test(message);
- }
-
- /* Construct and verify corresponding public key. */
- CHECK(secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, privkey) == 1);
- CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pubkey, privkey) == 1);
-
- /* Schnorr sign. */
- CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_sign(ctx, schnorr_signature, message, privkey, NULL, NULL) == 1);
- CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_verify(ctx, schnorr_signature, message, &pubkey) == 1);
- CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_recover(ctx, &recpubkey, schnorr_signature, message) == 1);
- CHECK(memcmp(&pubkey, &recpubkey, sizeof(pubkey)) == 0);
- /* Destroy signature and verify again. */
- schnorr_signature[secp256k1_rand_bits(6)] += 1 + secp256k1_rand_int(255);
- CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_verify(ctx, schnorr_signature, message, &pubkey) == 0);
- CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_recover(ctx, &recpubkey, schnorr_signature, message) != 1 ||
- memcmp(&pubkey, &recpubkey, sizeof(pubkey)) != 0);
-}
-
-/** Horribly broken hash function. Do not use for anything but tests. */
-void test_schnorr_hash(unsigned char *h32, const unsigned char *r32, const unsigned char *msg32) {
- int i;
- for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
- h32[i] = r32[i] ^ msg32[i];
- }
-}
-
-void test_schnorr_sign_verify(void) {
- unsigned char msg32[32];
- unsigned char sig64[3][64];
- secp256k1_gej pubkeyj[3];
- secp256k1_ge pubkey[3];
- secp256k1_scalar nonce[3], key[3];
- int i = 0;
- int k;
-
- secp256k1_rand256_test(msg32);
-
- for (k = 0; k < 3; k++) {
- random_scalar_order_test(&key[k]);
-
- do {
- random_scalar_order_test(&nonce[k]);
- if (secp256k1_schnorr_sig_sign(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, sig64[k], &key[k], &nonce[k], NULL, &test_schnorr_hash, msg32)) {
- break;
- }
- } while(1);
-
- secp256k1_ecmult_gen(&ctx->ecmult_gen_ctx, &pubkeyj[k], &key[k]);
- secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var(&pubkey[k], &pubkeyj[k]);
- CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, sig64[k], &pubkey[k], &test_schnorr_hash, msg32));
-
- for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
- int pos = secp256k1_rand_bits(6);
- int mod = 1 + secp256k1_rand_int(255);
- sig64[k][pos] ^= mod;
- CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, sig64[k], &pubkey[k], &test_schnorr_hash, msg32) == 0);
- sig64[k][pos] ^= mod;
- }
- }
-}
-
-void test_schnorr_threshold(void) {
- unsigned char msg[32];
- unsigned char sec[5][32];
- secp256k1_pubkey pub[5];
- unsigned char nonce[5][32];
- secp256k1_pubkey pubnonce[5];
- unsigned char sig[5][64];
- const unsigned char* sigs[5];
- unsigned char allsig[64];
- const secp256k1_pubkey* pubs[5];
- secp256k1_pubkey allpub;
- int n, i;
- int damage;
- int ret = 0;
-
- damage = secp256k1_rand_bits(1) ? (1 + secp256k1_rand_int(4)) : 0;
- secp256k1_rand256_test(msg);
- n = 2 + secp256k1_rand_int(4);
- for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
- do {
- secp256k1_rand256_test(sec[i]);
- } while (!secp256k1_ec_seckey_verify(ctx, sec[i]));
- CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(ctx, &pub[i], sec[i]));
- CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_generate_nonce_pair(ctx, &pubnonce[i], nonce[i], msg, sec[i], NULL, NULL));
- pubs[i] = &pub[i];
- }
- if (damage == 1) {
- nonce[secp256k1_rand_int(n)][secp256k1_rand_int(32)] ^= 1 + secp256k1_rand_int(255);
- } else if (damage == 2) {
- sec[secp256k1_rand_int(n)][secp256k1_rand_int(32)] ^= 1 + secp256k1_rand_int(255);
- }
- for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
- secp256k1_pubkey allpubnonce;
- const secp256k1_pubkey *pubnonces[4];
- int j;
- for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
- pubnonces[j] = &pubnonce[j];
- }
- for (j = i + 1; j < n; j++) {
- pubnonces[j - 1] = &pubnonce[j];
- }
- CHECK(secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(ctx, &allpubnonce, pubnonces, n - 1));
- ret |= (secp256k1_schnorr_partial_sign(ctx, sig[i], msg, sec[i], &allpubnonce, nonce[i]) != 1) * 1;
- sigs[i] = sig[i];
- }
- if (damage == 3) {
- sig[secp256k1_rand_int(n)][secp256k1_rand_bits(6)] ^= 1 + secp256k1_rand_int(255);
- }
- ret |= (secp256k1_ec_pubkey_combine(ctx, &allpub, pubs, n) != 1) * 2;
- if ((ret & 1) == 0) {
- ret |= (secp256k1_schnorr_partial_combine(ctx, allsig, sigs, n) != 1) * 4;
- }
- if (damage == 4) {
- allsig[secp256k1_rand_int(32)] ^= 1 + secp256k1_rand_int(255);
- }
- if ((ret & 7) == 0) {
- ret |= (secp256k1_schnorr_verify(ctx, allsig, msg, &allpub) != 1) * 8;
- }
- CHECK((ret == 0) == (damage == 0));
-}
-
-void test_schnorr_recovery(void) {
- unsigned char msg32[32];
- unsigned char sig64[64];
- secp256k1_ge Q;
-
- secp256k1_rand256_test(msg32);
- secp256k1_rand256_test(sig64);
- secp256k1_rand256_test(sig64 + 32);
- if (secp256k1_schnorr_sig_recover(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, sig64, &Q, &test_schnorr_hash, msg32) == 1) {
- CHECK(secp256k1_schnorr_sig_verify(&ctx->ecmult_ctx, sig64, &Q, &test_schnorr_hash, msg32) == 1);
- }
-}
-
-void run_schnorr_tests(void) {
- int i;
- for (i = 0; i < 32*count; i++) {
- test_schnorr_end_to_end();
- }
- for (i = 0; i < 32 * count; i++) {
- test_schnorr_sign_verify();
- }
- for (i = 0; i < 16 * count; i++) {
- test_schnorr_recovery();
- }
- for (i = 0; i < 10 * count; i++) {
- test_schnorr_threshold();
- }
-}
-
-#endif