Obfuscating Web User Search Queries via Generative Adversarial Privacy

EE 599 Final Project
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AOL Dataset

UserID	Query	QueryTime	Rank	Link
81943	are people who have asthma prone to get lung cancer	3/7/06 23:26	2	http://kidshealth.org
81943	is pronounced lung cancer leaded into lung cancer	3/7/06 23:33		
81943	if you have asthma can it lead to lung cancer	3/7/06 23:35	6	http://www.lungusa.org

• Preprocessing:

- Filter the dataset by keywords from two topic: cancer, pregnancy.
- Classify the dataset into three categories: cancer related, pregnancy related, and other.
- Each category contains 1000 users, with queries related to each topic.

• Goal:

- Mutate word tokens in web search queries
- Decrease its privacy risk: category inference accuracy
- Maintain its stealthiness (utility metric1): the obfuscated query should be meaningful instead of random words
- Reduce obfuscation cost (utility metric2): the maximum likelihood estimation loss

Motivation

- Baseline solution:
 - Delete words with high privacy risk (e.g. cancer, pregnancy)
 - Mutate words randomly
 - Mutate words with differential privacy
- Limitations:
 - May not capture the correlation among words in the query
 - Context-free, no adversary

Our approach: SeqGAN with multiple objectives




Figure 1: The illustration of SeqGAN. Left: D is trained over the real data and the generated data by G. Right: G is trained by policy gradient where the final reward signal is provided by D and is passed back to the intermediate action value via Monte Carlo search.

Fig. 1. Original SeqGAN (single objective).

- * Discriminator: predict where a query is real, to make the obfuscated query meaningful.
- * Adversary: predict the category of a query, to enhance the privacy of user query.




Fig. 2. Our SeqGAN with multiple objectives.

Policy gradient (theory part)

$$J(\theta) = \mathbb{E}[R_T|s_0, \theta] = \sum_{y_1 \in \mathcal{Y}} G_{\theta}(y_1|s_0) \cdot Q_{D_{\phi}}^{G_{\theta}}(s_0, y_1), \quad (1)$$

$$Q_{D_{\phi}}^{G_{\theta}}(a=y_T, s=Y_{1:T-1}) = D_{\phi}(Y_{1:T}). \tag{2}$$

$$\left\{Y_{1:T}^{1}, \dots, Y_{1:T}^{N}\right\} = MC^{G_{\beta}}(Y_{1:t}; N),$$
 (3)

$$Q_{D_{\phi}}^{G_{\theta}}(s = Y_{1:t-1}, a = y_t) = \tag{4}$$

$$\begin{cases} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^{N} D_{\phi}(Y_{1:T}^{n}), \ Y_{1:T}^{n} \in MC^{G_{\beta}}(Y_{1:t}; N) & \text{for} \quad t < T \\ D_{\phi}(Y_{1:t}) & \text{for} \quad t = T, \end{cases}$$

$$\min_{\phi} - \mathbb{E}_{Y \sim p_{\text{data}}}[\log D_{\phi}(Y)] - \mathbb{E}_{Y \sim G_{\theta}}[\log(1 - D_{\phi}(Y))]. \quad (5)$$

$$\nabla_{\theta} J(\theta) = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \mathbb{E}_{Y_{1:t-1} \sim G_{\theta}} \left[\sum_{y_t \in \mathcal{Y}} \nabla_{\theta} G_{\theta}(y_t | Y_{1:t-1}) \cdot Q_{D_{\phi}}^{G_{\theta}}(Y_{1:t-1}, y_t) \right].$$


$$\tag{6}$$

$$\nabla_{\theta} J(\theta) \simeq \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{y_{t} \in \mathcal{Y}} \nabla_{\theta} G_{\theta}(y_{t}|Y_{1:t-1}) \cdot Q_{D_{\phi}}^{G_{\theta}}(Y_{1:t-1}, y_{t})$$
(7)
$$= \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{y_{t} \in \mathcal{Y}} G_{\theta}(y_{t}|Y_{1:t-1}) \nabla_{\theta} \log G_{\theta}(y_{t}|Y_{1:t-1}) \cdot Q_{D_{\phi}}^{G_{\theta}}(Y_{1:t-1}, y_{t})$$


$$= \sum_{t=1}^{T} \mathbb{E}_{y_{t} \sim G_{\theta}(y_{t}|Y_{1:t-1})} [\nabla_{\theta} \log G_{\theta}(y_{t}|Y_{1:t-1}) \cdot Q_{D_{\phi}}^{G_{\theta}}(Y_{1:t-1}, y_{t})],$$

$$\theta \leftarrow \theta + \alpha_h \nabla_{\theta} J(\theta),$$
 (8)

Pretrained Result (Adversary)





Evaluation





Explanation: MLE loss -> 0 (Identity transformation)





To do:

• Change the weights of each part in loss function

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Introduction

Conclusion