## A Proof of Section 4.1

## A.1 Only one node in the environment

Recall that there is one node with a fixed opinion  $p \in [-1, 1]$  in the environment. The opinion of the agent is updated as in Equation (4),

**Lemma 3.** If  $w + \beta py(t) + 1 < 0$ , the opinion of the agent stays at sgn(y(t)) for all t' > t.

*Proof.* As shown in Equation (4) that when  $w+\beta py(t)+1<0$ ,  $y(t+1)=\mathrm{sgn}(y(t))$ .  $w+\beta py(t)+1<0$  is equivalent to  $\beta py(t)<-w-1<0$ . Knowing that  $|y(t+1)|=1\geq |y(t)|$ ,

$$\beta py(t+1) < -w-1$$

Therefore,  $y(t') = \operatorname{sgn}(y(t+1)) = \operatorname{sgn}(y(t))$  for all t' > t.

**Lemma 4.** If  $w+\beta py(t)+1>0$ , there exist two fixed points where y(t+1)=y(t): p and  $-\frac{1}{\beta p}$ . p is attracting while  $-\frac{1}{\beta p}$  is repelling.

*Proof.* The converged opinion y of the agent should satisfy

$$f(y) = \frac{wy + \beta p^2 y + p}{w + \beta py + 1}$$

$$f(y) - y = \frac{-\beta p y^2 + (\beta p^2 - 1)y + p}{w + \beta p y + 1} = \frac{u(y)}{v(y)} = 0 \quad (5)$$

where

$$u(y) = -\beta p y^2 + (\beta p^2 - 1)y + p$$
  
$$v(y) = \beta p y + w + 1$$

By solving u(y)=0, which is equivalent to f(y)-y=0 since u(y)>0, the two fixed points of f(y) are: p and  $-\frac{1}{\beta p}$ .

Next, we prove that p is attracting and  $-\frac{1}{\beta p}$  is repelling.

$$f'(y) = \frac{w(w + \beta p^2)}{(w + \beta py + 1)^2} \ge 0$$

$$\begin{split} |f'(y)| &= f'(y) \text{, then } f'(p) = \frac{w(w+\beta p^2)}{(w+\beta p^2+1)^2} < 1 \text{, thus attracting; while } f'(y-\frac{1}{\beta p}) = \frac{w(w+\beta p^2)}{w^2} > 1 \text{, thus repelling.} \quad \ \, \Box \end{split}$$

**Lemma 5.** If  $w + \beta py(t) + 1 > 0$  and  $py(t) \ge 0$ , y = p.

*Proof.* If p=0,  $y(t+1)=\frac{w}{w+1}y(t)$ , as the iteration goes,  $\lim_{t\to\infty}y(t)=0$ ;

If py(t) > 0, e.g., they are both positive

- when 0 < y(t) < p,  $y(t+1) y(t) = \frac{u(y(t))}{v(y(t))} > 0$ , thus y(t+1) > y(t), the agent's opinion increases until it reaches p;
- when p < y(t) < 1, y(t+1) y(t) < 0, the agent's opinion decreases to p.

**Lemma 6.** If  $w + \beta py(t) + 1 > 0$  and py(t) < 0,

1. If 
$$\left| \frac{1}{\beta p} \right| > 1$$
,  $\lim_{t \to \infty} y(t) = y^e$ .

2. If 
$$\left|\frac{1}{\beta p}\right| \leq 1$$
,

(a) If 
$$|y(t)| < \left| \frac{1}{\beta p} \right|$$
,  $y = p$ .

(b) If 
$$y(t) = -\frac{1}{\beta p}$$
,  $y(t') = -\frac{1}{\beta p}$  for all  $t' \ge t$ .

(c) If 
$$\left| \frac{1}{\beta p} \right| < |y(t)| \le 1$$
,  $y = \text{sgn}(y(t))$ .

*Proof.* Assume  $y(t) \in (0,1]$  and  $p \in (-1,0)$ ,

- if  $\left|\frac{1}{\beta p}\right| > 1$ , all  $y(t) \in (0,1] < -\frac{1}{\beta p}$ , y(t) is attracted to p as the updating goes;
- if  $\left|\frac{1}{\beta p}\right| = 1$ , y(t) is repelled by the extreme point and goes to the attracting one unless it starts with  $-\frac{1}{\beta p}$  at time t;
- if  $\left|\frac{1}{\beta p}\right| < 1$ , when  $0 < y(t) < -\frac{1}{\beta p}$ ,  $y(t+1) y(t) = \frac{u(y(t))}{v(y(t))} < 0$ , y(t+1) < y(t), the agent's opinion decreases to p; when  $y(t) = -\frac{1}{\beta p}$ , y(t) stays there; when  $y(t) > -\frac{1}{\beta p}$ , y(t+1) > y(t), the agent's opinion increases to the extreme value on its side.

## A.2 A group of nodes in the environment

Assume there is a set of m neighbour with different fixed opinions,  $\mathbf{p}=(p_1,p_2,...,p_m), m>1.$  We denote

•  $q = \sum_{i} p_{i}^{2}$  the sum of the squares of the fixed opinions.

•  $s = \sum_{i} p_{j}$  the sum of the fixed opinions.

•  $m = \sum_{i} 1$  the number of nodes in the environment.

**Lemma 7.**  $mq - s^2 \ge 0$ , which is  $m \sum_i p_i^2 \ge (\sum_i p_i)^2$ .

Proof

$$m \sum_{j} p_j^2 - (\sum_{j} x_j)^2 = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i} \sum_{j} (p_i - p_j)^2 \ge 0$$

The agent's opinion is updated by

$$y(t+1) = \begin{cases} \operatorname{sgn}(y(t)) & \text{if } w + \beta s y(t) + m \le 0, \\ \frac{wy(t) + \beta q y(t) + s}{w + \beta s y(t) + m} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

**Lemma 8.** If  $w + \beta sy(t) + m > 0$ , there exist two fixed points where y(t+1) = y(t):

$$y^a = \frac{\beta q - m + \sqrt{\Delta}}{2\beta s}$$
  $y^r = \frac{\beta q - m - \sqrt{\Delta}}{2\beta s}$ 

where  $\Delta = (\beta q - m)^2 + 4\beta s^2$ .  $y^a$  is attracting while  $y^r$  is repelling.

*Proof.* The function is  $f(y) = \frac{wy + \beta qy + s}{w + \beta sy + m}$ . The two fixed points satisfy f(y) = y. |f'(y)| = f'(y) since

$$f'(y) = \frac{(w + \beta q)(w + m) - \beta s^2}{(\beta sy + w + m)^2} = \frac{w(w + m) + \beta qw + \beta (qm - s)}{(\beta sy + w + m)^2}$$

For 
$$y^a = \frac{\beta q - m + \sqrt{\Delta}}{2\beta s}$$
,  $f'(y^a) < 1$  because

$$f'(y^a) - 1 = -\frac{1}{2} \frac{(m - \beta q)^2 + 4\beta s^2 + (2w + m + \beta q)\sqrt{\Delta}}{(\beta s y^a + w + m)^2} < 0$$
the absolute value of 1, thus for any  $i \in V$ ,  $\lim_{t \to \infty} |y_i(t)| = 0$ 1.

For 
$$y^r = \frac{\beta q - m - \sqrt{\Delta}}{2\beta s}$$
,  $f'(y^r) > 1$  because

$$f'(y^r) - 1 = -\frac{1}{2} \frac{(m - \beta q)^2 + 4\beta s^2 - (2w + m + \beta q)\sqrt{\Delta}}{(\beta s y^r + w + m)^2}$$

 $\frac{A}{B} < 0$  since B > 0 and it can be proved as below that A < 0.

$$\left[ (m - \beta q)^2 + 4\beta s^2 \right]^2 - \left[ (2w + m + \beta q)\sqrt{\Delta} \right]^2$$

$$= 4 \left[ (m - \beta q)^2 + 4\beta s^2 \right] \left[ \beta (s^2 - qm) - w(m + w + \beta q) \right] < 0$$
Therefore,  $u^a$  is attracting and  $u^r$  is repelling.

## **Proof of Theorem 2**

Recall that  $y_i(t) \in (-1,0) \cup (0,1)$ . Given any opinion vector  $\mathbf{y}(0)$  of a given connected network G = (V, E), the opinions can be divided into two groups  $V_1$  and  $V_2$  at any time t: a)  $\forall i \in V_1, y_i(t) > 0$ ; b)  $\forall i \in V_2, y_i(t) < 0$ , and  $V = V_1 \cup V_2$ . Denote  $n_i^s(t)$  the number of node i's neighbors node that are in the same group with i at time t, and  $n_i^d(t)$  the number of neighbors in the different group. Specifically, they are denoted as

$$\begin{aligned} &n_i^s(t) = &|N(i)^s|, N(i)^s = \{j|j \in N(i), \text{ and } y_i(t)y_j(t) > 0\} \\ &n_i^d(t) = &|N(i)^d|, N(i)^d = \{k|k \in N(i), \text{ and } y_i(t)y_k(t) < 0\} \\ &\textbf{Lemma 9. For node } i \in V \text{ fix } \beta_i = \beta > 0, \text{ if } \beta > \\ &\frac{1}{[\min(|\mathbf{y}(0)|)]^2}, \lim_{t \to \infty} |y_i(t)| = 1. \end{aligned}$$

*Proof.* For node  $i \in V$ , the opinion is updated as in Equation (3). If  $\gamma = 1 + \sum_{j \in N(i)} w_{ij} \leq 0$ ,  $y_i(t+1)$  reaches the extreme value in one iteration due to strong backfire effect.

While when  $\gamma > 0$ , for any t > 0,  $y_i(t+1)$  is updated as

$$y_{i}(t) \frac{1 + \sum_{j \in N(i)^{s}} w_{ij} \frac{y_{j}(t)}{y_{i}(t)} + \sum_{k \in N(i)^{d}} w_{ik} \frac{y_{k}(t)}{y_{i}(t)}}{1 + \sum_{j \in N(i)^{s}} w_{ij} + \sum_{k \in N(i)^{d}} w_{ik}} = y_{i}(t) \frac{C}{D}$$
(7)

When  $\beta>\frac{1}{[\min(|\mathbf{y}(t)|)]^2}$ , for all  $k\in N(i)^d$ ,  $w_{ik}=\beta y_i(t)y_k(t)+1<0$ . The sums in Equation (7) satisfy:  $\sum_{j \in N(i)^s} w_{ij} \frac{y_j(t)}{y_i(t)}, \sum_{j \in N(i)^s} w_{ij}, \sum_{k \in N(i)^d} w_{ik} \frac{y_k(t)}{y_i(t)} > 0,$  and  $\sum_{k \in N(i)^d} w_{ik} < 0.$ 

Now we focus on the node that has the most moderate opinion, namely the node with absolute value of opinion  $\min |\mathbf{y}(t)|$  at each time step, starting from time 0. Knowing C, D > 0,

$$C - D = \sum_{j \in N(i)^s} w_{ij} \left( \frac{y_j(t)}{y_i(t)} - 1 \right) + \sum_{k \in N(i)^d} w_{ik} \left( \frac{y_k(t)}{y_i(t)} - 1 \right)$$
(8)

Since  $y_i(t)$  has the smallest absolute opinion value, for any  $j\in N(i)^s, \frac{y_j(t)}{y_i(t)}\geq 1$ , thus  $C>D, \frac{C}{D}>1$ , and  $|y_i(t+1)|>1$ 

After every iteration from time t to t+1, the opinion of the most moderate node becomes more extreme, until it reaches

 $f'(y^r) - 1 = -\frac{1}{2} \frac{(m - \beta q)^2 + 4\beta s^2 - (2w + m + \beta q)\sqrt{\Delta}}{(\beta s y^r + w + m)^2} = \frac{\text{ists a unique } y^* \in [-\max{(|\mathbf{y}(0)|)}, \max{(|\mathbf{y}(0)|)}]^2, \text{ there exists a unique } y^* \in [-\max{(|\mathbf{y}(0)|)}, \max{(|\mathbf{y}(0)|)}] \text{ such that } y^* \in [-\max{(|\mathbf{y}(0)|)}, \max{(|\mathbf{y}(0)|)}] \text{ such$ **Lemma 10.** For node  $i \in V$ , if  $\beta < \frac{1}{\lceil \max(|\mathbf{y}(0)|) \rceil^2}$ , there ex-

Proof. When  $\beta < \frac{1}{[\max(|\mathbf{y}(0)|)]^2}, \ \gamma = 1 + \sum_{j \in N(i)} w_{ij} > 0$  because for any  $j \in N(i), w_{ij} = \beta y_i(t) y_j(t) + 1 > 0$ . For any t > 1,  $y_i(t+1)$  is updated as in Equation (7), however, the sums have different values:  $=4\left[(m-\beta q)^2+4\beta s^2\right]\left[\beta(s^2-qm)-w(m+w+\beta q)\right]<0 \quad \sum_{j\in N(i)^s}w_{ij}\frac{y_j(t)}{y_i(t)}, \sum_{j\in N(i)^s}w_{ij}, \sum_{k\in N(i)^d}w_{ik}>0, \text{ and} \\ \sum_{k\in N(i)^d}w_{ik}\frac{y_k(t)}{y_i(t)}<0.$  Therefore,  $y^a$  is attracting and  $y^r$  is repelling.  $\square$ 

Then we focus on the most opinionated node, which means the node has the largest absolution value of its opinion  $\max |\mathbf{y}(t)|$ , starting from time 0. Knowing D > 0,

- when C > 0, C D is shown in Equation (8). With ibeing the most opinionated node,  $\frac{y_j(\bar{t})}{y_i(t)} \leq 1$  for all  $j \in$  $N(i)^s$ ;  $\frac{y_k(t)}{y_i(t)} < 0$  for all  $k \in N(i)^d$ . Therefore, C < D,  $0 < \frac{C}{D} < 1$  and  $|y_i(t+1)| < |y_i(t)|$ .
- when C = 0,  $y_i(t+1) = 0$ .
- when C < 0, -C D is shown in Equation (9). As  $-1 \le$  $\frac{y_k(t)}{y_i(t)} \leq 0$  for  $k \in N(i)^d, -C-D < 0, 0 < \left|\frac{C}{D}\right| < 1$ , thus  $|y_i(t+1)| < |y_i(t)|.$

$$-C - D = -2 - \sum_{j \in N(i)^s} w_{ij} \left( \frac{y_j(t)}{y_i(t)} + 1 \right) - \sum_{k \in N(i)^d} w_{ik} \left( \frac{y_k(t)}{y_i(t)} + 1 \right)$$
(9)

At every time step, the most opinionated node get moderated until they reach consensus - there is no such node and the updating process stops because consensus is reached.

**Lemma 11.** For node  $i \in V_1$ ,  $y_i(0) = y_0$ , where  $0 < y_0 < 1$ ;  $\forall i \in V_2$ ,  $y_i(0) = -y_0$ . If  $\beta = \frac{1}{y_0^2}$ ,  $y_i(t) = y_i(0)$  for all  $t \ge 0$ .

*Proof.* When  $\beta = \frac{1}{u_o^2}$ ,  $w_{ij} = \frac{1}{u_o^2} y_i(t) y_j(t)$ . At time 1,

$$y_i(1) = \frac{y_i(0) + 2n_i^s(0)y_i(0)}{1 + 2n_i^s(0)} = y_i(0)$$

For any  $t \geq 1$ ,

$$y_i(t+1) = \frac{y_i(t) + 2n_i^s(t)y_i(t)}{1 + 2n_i^s(t)} = y_i(t) = y_i(0)$$