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Majority Support for 2 Global Redistributive and Climate Policies

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4 March 25, 2025

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Abstract

6 We document majority support for policies entailing global redistribution and climate mitigation. Surveys on 40,680 respondents in 20 countries show strong stated support for a global carbon price funding equal cash transfers, called the “Global Climate Scheme” (GCS). Through our surveys on 8,000 respondents in the U.S., France, Germany, Spain, and the UK, we test several hypotheses that could reconcile strong stated support with scarce occurrences in public debates. Three quarters of Europeans and half of Americans support the GCS, even as they understand its cost to them. Using several experiments, we show that the support for the GCS is sincere and that political programs that include it are preferred to programs that do not. We document widespread support for other globally redistributive policies, such as increased foreign aid or a wealth tax funding low-income countries. In sum, global policies are genuinely supported by majorities, even in wealthy, contributing countries.

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68 1 Introduction

69 Major sustainability objectives could be achieved by global approaches to mitigating
 70 climate change and poverty that would involve transfers from high- to lower-income
 71 countries.¹⁻⁶ Especially, global carbon pricing is widely regarded by economists as the
 72 reference climate policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon emissions externality.
 73 Specifically, a version of global carbon pricing as a system based upon tradable permits
 74 for carbon emissions is prominently discussed in environmental economics.⁷⁻¹³ It would
 75 work as follows: A cap on carbon emissions to limit global warming below 2°C is im-
 76 plemented. Emissions rights compatible with the carbon budget are auctioned each year
 77 to polluting firms and fund a global basic income, alleviating extreme poverty. These
 78 emission rights would be allocated equally among human adults, yielding redistribution
 79 from richer to poorer countries. It would combine long-term effectiveness, feasibility,
 80 equity, and simplicity.⁷ We call this approach to global carbon pricing the “Global Climate
 81 Scheme” (GCS).

82 While international negotiations have not yet led to ambitious globally redistributive
 83 policies, some recent prominent attempts are that the International Maritime Organiza-
 84 tion is poised to adopt a global carbon levy on maritime fuel; the African Union **calls**
 85 **for** a global carbon taxation regime, the UN **is setting up** a Framework Convention on
 86 International Tax Cooperation and the G20 **seeks** global cooperation on the taxation of

87 billionaires.

88 A key factor for implementing global policies has remained largely unaddressed: the
89 support of citizens. As a first piece of evidence, a global survey on 40,680 respondents
90 from 20 high- and middle-income countries reveals substantial support for global climate
91 policies and, in addition, for a global tax on the wealthiest aimed at financing low-income
92 countries' development. Surprisingly, even in wealthy nations that would bear a signifi-
93 cant burden of such globally redistributive policies, majorities of citizens express support
94 for them. To better understand public support for global policies in high-income coun-
95 tries, the main analysis of this article is conducted with surveys among 8,000 respondents
96 from France, Germany, Spain, the UK, and the U.S.

97 The focus of the Western surveys is to study how respondents react to the key trade-off
98 between the benefits and costs of globally redistributive climate policies. In our survey
99 respondents are made aware of the cost that the GCS entails for their country's people,
100 that is average Westerners would incur a net loss from the policy. Our main result is that
101 the Global Climate Scheme is supported by three quarters of Europeans and more than
102 half of Americans.

103 Furthermore, we test the robustness of this conclusion by a wide variety of methods.
104 First, we control for social desirability bias using a list experiment. We find no evidence
105 that people exaggerate their support in the direct question. Second, to assess whether
106 the support would diminish in a context that approaches real stakes, we ask respondents
107 whether they are willing to sign a petition in favor of the GCS, after informing them
108 that the results of the survey question will be communicated to their head of state's of-
109 fice. The support is sustained in an environment that approaches real stakes. Third, we
110 carry out conjoint analyses to neutralize experimenter demand and investigate the prior-
111 ity given to global policies compared to other types of policies. Conjoint analyses reveal
112 that a political platform is more likely to be preferred if it contains the GCS or a global tax
113 on millionaires, and that global policies rank high in the prioritization of policies. Our
114 randomized experiments also show that a candidate would not lose vote intentions by
115 endorsing the GCS, and might even gain up to 11 points in France. Fourth, an analysis
116 of open-ended fields indicates that the appeal of the GCS comes from its international
117 nature and its impacts on climate, more than on global poverty. To put our main finding
118 in context, we also test support for other global policies and examine whether people's
119 values are univeralistic. Support is very strong for a global tax on millionaires (69% in the
120 U.S., 84% in Europe), and the median respondent prefers to allocate 30% of the revenues

121 of such a tax to low-income countries. Majorities are willing to increase foreign aid, but
122 only if some conditions are respected, such as making sure the aid is well spent and other
123 high-income countries also increase their contribution. Questions on universalistic val-
124 ues, including a donation experiment, confirm the congruence of underlying values with
125 the support for specific policies. The diverse approaches summarized also help under-
126 stand what drives support for different policies. For instance, the evidence indicates that
127 one key reason why increasing foreign aid is not as popular as global policies lies in its
128 unilateral nature.

129 Overall, our results point out to strong and genuine support for global climate and re-
130 distributive policies, as our experiments confirm the stated support found in direct ques-
131 tions. They contribute to a body of literature on attitudes toward climate policy, which
132 confirms that climate policy is preferred at a global level,^{14–17} where it is more effective
133 and fair. While 3,354 economists supported a national carbon tax financing equal cash
134 transfers in the *Wall Street Journal*, numerous surveys have shown that public support
135 for such policy is mixed.^{18–23} Meanwhile, the GCS — the global version of this policy
136 — is largely supported, despite higher costs in high-income countries. In the Discussion
137 we offer potential explanations that could reconcile the strong support for global policies
138 with their lack of prominence in the public debate.

139 **Literature** International surveys have shown widespread support for costly climate ac-
140 tion.^{19,24} For instance, representative surveys in 125 countries covering 96% of the world's
141 greenhouse gas emissions show that 69% of the global population express willingness
142 to contribute 1% of their income to fight global warming.²⁵ International surveys have
143 also uncovered near consensus that “present economic differences between rich and poor
144 countries are too large” (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree) in each of 29 countries.²⁶

145 Yet, few prior attitudinal surveys have examined global redistributive policies. A no-
146 table exception tests the support for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples in five
147 countries, representative along gender and age.²⁷ For a given variant, the sample size is
148 about 167 respondents per country. They find over 80% support for any variant in India,
149 between 50% and 65% in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43% to 59% in the U.S.,
150 depending on the variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding an equal
151 cash transfer for each human is close to 50% in high-income countries.

152 Further evidence of the popularity of global redistribution is provided by the finding
153 that 66% of Americans support providing “financial aid and technical support to devel-

¹⁵⁴ oping countries that agree to limit their greenhouse gas emissions".²⁸ In addition, 90%
¹⁵⁵ of Germans want some degree of global redistribution.²⁹ Besides, in surveys conducted
¹⁵⁶ in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S., support ranges from 55% to 74% for "a
¹⁵⁷ global democracy including both a global government and a global parliament, directly
¹⁵⁸ elected by the world population, to recommend and implement policies on global issues",
¹⁵⁹ and similar support is found in surveys over 17 countries.^{30;31}

¹⁶⁰ Appendix A contains a broader literature review including further attitudinal sur-
¹⁶¹ veys on global policies (A.1.1); prior work on attitudes toward climate burden sharing
¹⁶² (Appendix A.1.2), attitudes toward foreign aid (Appendix A.1.3), global carbon pricing
¹⁶³ (Appendix A.2.1), global redistribution (Appendix A.2.3), basic income (Appendix A.2.4),
¹⁶⁴ and global democracy (Appendix A.2.5).

¹⁶⁵ 2 Results


¹⁶⁶ 2.1 Data

¹⁶⁷ We use unanalysed questions from a global survey conducted in 2021 that involved
¹⁶⁸ 40,680 respondents from 20 countries, representing approximately 72% of global CO₂
¹⁶⁹ emissions. This survey (henceforth: global survey) serves as the basis for measuring
¹⁷⁰ stated support for various global policies worldwide, including the GCS. Detailed in-
¹⁷¹ formation about the data collection process, sample representativeness, and analysis of
¹⁷² questions on national policies can be found in that article.¹⁹

¹⁷³ To delve deeper into the sincerity and rationales behind support for the GCS and at-
¹⁷⁴ titudes towards global policies, global redistribution, and universalistic values, we con-
¹⁷⁵ ducted further surveys in 2023 (henceforth: Western surveys). These surveys are based
¹⁷⁶ on a sample of 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, the UK, and the U.S. The
¹⁷⁷ European survey (*Eu*) comprises 3,000 respondents, while the U.S. sample was collected
¹⁷⁸ in two separate waves: *US1* with 3,000 respondents and *US2* with 2,000 respondents. The
¹⁷⁹ survey questions in both the European and U.S. surveys are almost identical (see Fig-
¹⁸⁰ ure 1), except for an additional question in *US2* that uses results from *US1* to assess the
¹⁸¹ bandwagon effect and variations in policy designs in some questions.

¹⁸² The Western surveys ensured broad representativeness along key dimensions: gender,
¹⁸³ income, age, highest diploma, and degree of urbanization. The *Eu* survey is also repre-
¹⁸⁴ sentative of its four countries in terms of population size, while the *US1* and *US2* surveys

Figure 1: Structure of Western survey, cf. also Figure S41 for the treatment branches.




¹⁸⁵ are representative in terms of region and ethnicity. Tables S6-S7 detail how our samples
¹⁸⁶ match population frequencies. More detail on data collection is given in Section Methods.
¹⁸⁷ The questionnaires used in the surveys are provided in Appendices C and D.

¹⁸⁸ 2.2 Global support

¹⁸⁹ We find strong support for climate policies enacted at the global level when analysing
¹⁹⁰ the global survey (Figure 2). When asked “At which level(s) do you think public policies
¹⁹¹ to tackle climate change need to be put in place?”, 70% (in the U.S.) to 94% (in Japan)
¹⁹² choose the global level. The next most popular choice is the federal or continental level,
¹⁹³ favored by 52% of Americans and less than half of European respondents. Local policies
¹⁹⁴ receive the least support. This preference for climate policies implemented at the global
¹⁹⁵ scale is in line with earlier contributions ^{15;32;16} and consistent with individuals’ concerns
¹⁹⁶ for the fairness and effectiveness of such policies, which have been identified as two of the
¹⁹⁷ three key determinants of support, besides self-interest. ^{33;18;19} It could also stem from a
¹⁹⁸ preference for conditional cooperation, ³⁴ even if previous studies suggest that the support

¹⁹⁹ for climate policies does not depend on climate action abroad^{35;36}.

Figure 2: Relative Support for global climate policies.



Note 1: The numbers represent *relative support*, i.e. the share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* among non-*indifferent* answers (in percent, $n = 40,680$). Shares of indifferent answers range from 11% to 48%, with quartiles 20%, 27%, and 33%. The color blue denotes a relative majority. See Figure S4 for the absolute support. (Questions A-I).

Note 2: *In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

200 Among the four global climate policies examined, three policies garner high support
201 across all countries (Figure 2). These policies include a global democratic assembly on
202 climate change, a global tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries contingent
203 on their climate action, and a global carbon budget of +2°C divided among countries
204 based on tradable shares (or “global quota”), with the allocation of country shares un-
205 specified (see wording in Appendix C). The three policies garner a majority of absolute
206 support (i.e., “somewhat” or “strong” support) in all countries (except in the U.S. for the
207 global assembly, 48% absolute support). In high-income countries, the global quota pol-

²⁰⁸ icy obtains 64% absolute support and 84% relative support (i.e., excluding “indifferent”
²⁰⁹ answers).

²¹⁰ Following the support for the global quota, respondents are asked about their preferences
²¹¹ for dividing the carbon budget among countries, as depicted in the third block
²¹² of Figure 2. Consistent with the existing literature (see Appendix A.1.2), an equal per
²¹³ capita allocation of emission rights emerges as the preferred burden-sharing principle,
²¹⁴ garnering absolute majority support in all countries and never below 84% relative sup-
²¹⁵ port. Taking into account historical responsibilities or vulnerability to climate damages is
²¹⁶ also popular, albeit with less consensus, while grandfathering (i.e., allocation of emission
²¹⁷ shares in proportion to current emissions) receives the least support in all countries.

²¹⁸ A global carbon tax that funds a global basic income should produce the same dis-
²¹⁹ tributional outcomes as a global tradable quota with equal per capita emission rights (to
²²⁰ the extent that the carbon price is the same and provided that each country returns the
²²¹ revenues from emissions trading equally to its citizens). The support for the global car-
²²² bon tax is also tested and its redistributive effects – the average increase in expenditures
²²³ along with the amount of the basic income – are specified to the respondents explicitly
²²⁴ (see box below and Appendix D, p.90). The support for the carbon tax is lower than for
²²⁵ the quota, particularly in high-income countries, and there is no relative majority for the
²²⁶ tax in Anglo-Saxon countries (consistently with the levels of support found in the only
²²⁷ previous study that tested a global carbon tax²⁷). Two possible reasons for this lower
²²⁸ support are that distributive effects are specified explicitly in the case of the tax, and that
²²⁹ people may prefer a quota, perhaps because they find it more effective than a tax to re-
²³⁰ duce emissions. The two reasons are consistent with the intermediate level of support for
²³¹ the GCS in the Western survey, which is based on a global quota but where the question
²³² specifies explicitly the distributive effects.

²³³ 2.3 Stated support for the Global Climate Scheme

²³⁴ The Western surveys (*US1, US2, Eu*) include a comprehensive exploration of citizens’
²³⁵ attitudes towards the GCS. We present to respondents a detailed description of the GCS
²³⁶ and explain its distributive effects, including specific amounts at stake (as specified in
²³⁷ the box below). Furthermore, we assess respondents’ understanding of the GCS with
²³⁸ incentivized questions to test their comprehension of the expected financial outcome for
²³⁹ typical individuals in high-income countries (loss) and the poorest individuals globally
²⁴⁰ (gain), followed by the provision of correct answers (Figures S5-S6).

241 For comparison, the same approach is applied to a National Redistribution (NR) scheme
242 targeting top incomes with the aim of financing cash transfers to all adults, calibrated to
243 offset the monetary loss of the GCS for the median emitter in their country. We evaluate
244 respondents' understanding that the richest would lose and the typical fellow citizens
245 would gain from that policy. Subsequently, we summarize both schemes to enhance re-
246 spondents' recall. Additionally, we present a final incentivized comprehension question
247 and provide the expected answer that the combined GCS and NR would result in no net
248 gain or loss for a typical fellow citizen. Finally, respondents are directly asked to express
249 their support for the GCS and NR using a simple Yes/No question.

The Global Climate Scheme The GCS consists of global emissions trading with emission rights being auctioned each year to polluting firms, and of a global basic income, funded by the auction revenues. Using the price and emissions trajectories from the report by Stern & Stiglitz,³⁷ and in particular a carbon price of \$90/tCO₂ in 2030, we estimate that the basic income would amount to \$30 per month for every human adult (see details in Appendix E). We describe the GCS to the respondents as a "climate club" and we specify its redistributive effects: The 700 million people with less than \$2/day [in Purchasing Power Parity] would be lifted out of extreme poverty, and fossil fuel price increases would cost the typical person in their country a specified amount (see Appendix D for details). The monthly median net cost is \$85 in the U.S., €10 in France, €25 in Germany, €5 in Spain, £20 in the UK.

250
251 Our main result is that stated support for the GCS is 54% in the U.S. and 76% in Eu-
252 rope, while the support for NR is very similar: 56% and 73% respectively (Figures 3, S3).
253 Appendix F examines the sociodemographic determinants of support for the GCS as well
254 as the beliefs correlated with the support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic
255 income. The strongest correlates are political leaning, trust in the government and per-
256 ceptions that climate policies are effective at reducing emissions or in one's self-interest.

257 Finding majority support for the GCS motivates the subsequent analysis of robustness
258 and sincerity, novel to attitudinal surveys on instrument choice for environmental policy.

259 **2.4 Robustness and sincerity of support for the GCS**

260 We use several methods to assess the sincerity of the support for the GCS: a list exper-
261 iment, a real-stake petition, conjoint analyses, and an exercise involving the prioritization

²⁶² of policies. All methods suggest that the support is either completely sincere, or the share
²⁶³ of insincere answers is limited.

²⁶⁴ **2.4.1 List experiment**

²⁶⁵ By asking *how many* policies within a list respondents support and varying the list
²⁶⁶ among respondents, a list experiment allows identifying the tacit support for a policy
²⁶⁷ of interest. For example, a first subsample faces the list of policies A, B, and C, while a
²⁶⁸ second subsamples faces the list A, B, C, and GCS. We do not need to know which policies
²⁶⁹ each respondent supports to estimate the average (tacit) support for the GCS, we simply
²⁷⁰ need to compute the difference in the average number of supported policies between
²⁷¹ the two random subsamples.³⁸ In our case, as shown in Table 1, the tacit support for the
²⁷² GCS measured through the list experiment is not significantly lower than the direct stated
²⁷³ support. Hence, we do not find a social desirability bias in our study.

²⁷⁴ **2.4.2 Petition**

²⁷⁵ We ask respondents whether they are willing to sign a petition in support of either
²⁷⁶ the GCS or the NR policy. We inform them that the petition results will be sent to the
²⁷⁷ head of state's office, highlighting the proportion of fellow citizens endorsing the respec-
²⁷⁸ tive scheme. Even when framed as a petition that might have real stakes, both policies
²⁷⁹ continue to receive majority support. In the U.S., we find no significant difference be-
²⁸⁰ tween the support expressed in the petitions question and the simple questions (GCS:
²⁸¹ $-.02$, $t(3,044)=1.0$, $p=.30$, 95% CI=[$-.05$, $.02$]; NR: $-.01$, $t(2,952)=.3$, $p=.76$, 95% CI=[$-.04$,
²⁸² $.03$]). In Europe, the petition leads to a comparable lower support for both the GCS (-7
²⁸³ p.p., $t(3,018)=4.4$, $p=10^{-5}$, 95% CI=[$-.10$, $-.04$]) and NR (-4 p.p., $t(2,953)=2.6$, $p=.008$,
²⁸⁴ 95% CI=[$-.08$, $-.01$]). While some European respondents are unwilling to sign a petition
²⁸⁵ for policies they are expected to support, this phenomenon is not specific to the GCS, and
²⁸⁶ the overall willingness to sign a petition remains strong, with 69% expressing support for
²⁸⁷ the GCS and 67% for NR.

²⁸⁸ **2.4.3 Conjoint analyses**

²⁸⁹ In order to assess the public support for the GCS in conjunction with other policies, we
²⁹⁰ conduct a series of conjoint analyses. We ask respondents to make five choices between

²⁹¹ pairs of political platforms. Each choice is intended to test a different hypothesis about
²⁹² support for the GCS in relation to other policies or voting intentions.

²⁹³ The first conjoint analysis suggests that the GCS is supported independently of being
²⁹⁴ complemented by the National Redistribution Scheme and a national climate policy (C).
²⁹⁵ The second analysis indicates majority support for the GCS and for C, which are seen
²⁹⁶ as neither complement nor substitute (see [Methods](#)). A minor share of respondents like
²⁹⁷ a national climate policy and dislike a global one, but as many people prefer a global
²⁹⁸ rather than a national policy. Besides, there is no evidence that implementing NR would
²⁹⁹ increase the support for the GCS.

³⁰⁰ In the third analysis, we present two random branches of the sample with hypothetical
³⁰¹ progressive and conservative platforms that differ only by the presence (or not) of the
³⁰² GCS in the progressive platform. Table 2 shows that a progressive candidate would not
³⁰³ significantly lose voting share by endorsing the GCS in any country, and may even gain
³⁰⁴ 11 p.p. ($p = .007$) in voting intention in France.

³⁰⁵ Our last two analyses make respondents choose between two random platforms. In
³⁰⁶ Europe, respondents are prompted to imagine that a left or center-left coalition will win
³⁰⁷ the next election and asked what platform they would prefer that coalition to have cam-
³⁰⁸ paigned on. In the U.S., the question is framed as a hypothetical duel in a Democratic
³⁰⁹ primary, and asked only to non-Republicans ($n = 2,218$), i.e. the respondents who declare
³¹⁰ as political affiliation *Democrat*, *Independent*, *Non-Affiliated* or *Other*.

³¹¹ In the fourth analysis, a policy (or an absence of policy) is randomly drawn for each
³¹² platform in each of five categories: *economic issues*, *societal issues*, *climate policy*, *tax system*,
³¹³ *foreign policy* (Figure [ED1](#), Table [ED3](#)). In the UK, Germany, and France, a platform is
³¹⁴ about 9 to 13 p.p. more likely to be preferred if it includes the GCS rather than no foreign
³¹⁵ policy. This effect is between 1 and 4 p.p. and no longer significant in the U.S. (among
³¹⁶ non-Republicans) and in Spain. Moreover, a platform that includes a global tax on mil-
³¹⁷ lionaires rather than no foreign policy is 5 to 13 p.p. more likely to be preferred in all
³¹⁸ countries (the effect is significant and at least 9 p.p. in all countries but Spain). Similarly,
³¹⁹ a global democratic assembly on climate change has a significant effect of 8 to 12 p.p. in
³²⁰ the U.S. (among non-Republicans), Germany, and France. These effects are large, and not
³²¹ far from the effects of the policies most influential on the platforms, which range between
³²² 15 and 18 p.p. in most countries (27 p.p. in Spain), and all relate to improved public
³²³ services (in particular healthcare, housing, and education).

³²⁴ The fifth analysis draws random platforms similarly, except that candidate A's plat-

³²⁵ form always contains the GCS while B's includes no foreign policy. In this case, A is
³²⁶ chosen by 60% of Europeans and 58% of non-Republican Americans (Figure ED2).

³²⁷ Overall, taking the U.S. as an example, our conjoint analyses indicate that a candidate
³²⁸ at the Democratic primary would have more chances to obtain the nomination by en-
³²⁹ dorsing the GCS, and this endorsement would not penalize her or him at the presidential
³³⁰ election. This result relates to the finding that 12% of Germans shift their voting intention
³³¹ from SPD and CDU/CSU to the Greens and the Left when they are told that the latter
³³² parties support global democracy.³⁰

³³³ 2.4.4 Prioritization

³³⁴ Towards the end of the survey, we ask respondents to allocate 100 points among six
³³⁵ randomly selected policies from the previous conjoint analyses, using sliders. The instruc-
³³⁶ tion was to distribute the points based on their level of support, with a higher allocation
³³⁷ indicating greater support for a policy. As a result, the average support across policies is
³³⁸ 16.67 points. In each country, the GCS ranks in the middle of all policies or above, with
³³⁹ an average number of points from 15.4 in the U.S. to 22.9 in Germany.

³⁴⁰ Interestingly, in Germany, the most prioritized policy is the global tax on millionaires,
³⁴¹ while the GCS is the second most prioritized policy. The global tax on millionaires con-
³⁴² sistently ranks no lower than fifth position (out of 15 or 17 policies) in every country,
³⁴³ garnering an average of 18.9 points in Spain to 22.9 points in Germany.

³⁴⁴ 2.4.5 Pros and Cons

³⁴⁵ We survey respondents to gather their perspectives on the pros and cons of the GCS,
³⁴⁶ randomly utilizing an open-ended or a closed question. In the closed question format,
³⁴⁷ respondents tend to consider every argument as important in determining their support
³⁴⁸ or opposition to the GCS (see Figure S10).

³⁴⁹ The open-ended question provides more insights into what people associate with the
³⁵⁰ GCS when prompted to think about it. Analyzing keywords in the responses (automati-
³⁵¹ cally translated into English), the most frequently mentioned topics are the international
³⁵² dimension and the environment, each appearing in approximately one-quarter of the
³⁵³ answers (see Figure S12). This is followed by discussions on the effects of the GCS on
³⁵⁴ poverty and prices, each mentioned by about one-tenth of the respondents. We also man-
³⁵⁵ ually classified each answer into different categories (see Figure S11). This exercise con-

³⁵⁶ firms the findings from the automatic search: the environmental benefit of the GCS is the
³⁵⁷ most commonly discussed topic, while obstacles to implementation or agreement on the
³⁵⁸ proposal are relatively infrequently mentioned.

³⁵⁹ In the *US2* survey, we divided the sample into four random branches. Two branches
³⁶⁰ were presented the pros and cons questions (either in open or closed format) *before* being
³⁶¹ asked about their support for the GCS or NR. Another branch received information on
³⁶² the actual level of support for the GCS and NR (estimated in *US1*, see box p. 15), and
³⁶³ one control group received none of these treatments. The objective of the “pros and cons
³⁶⁴ treatment” was to mimic a “campaign effect”, which refers to the shift in opinion result-
³⁶⁵ ing from media coverage of the proposal.^{39;40} To conservatively estimate the effect of a
³⁶⁶ (potentially negative) campaign, we intentionally included more cons (6) than pros (3).
³⁶⁷ Interestingly, the support for the GCS decreased by 11 p.p. ($t(1,996)=-3.5$, $p=5 \cdot 10^{-4}$,
³⁶⁸ 95% CI=[-.17, -.05]) after respondents viewed a list of its pros and cons. Notably, the
³⁶⁹ support also decreased by 7 p.p. ($t(1,996)=-2.3$, $p=.02$, 95% CI=[-.13, -.01]) after respon-
³⁷⁰ dents were asked to consider the pros and cons in an open-ended question. Despite some
³⁷¹ significant effects of pondering the pros and cons, approximately half of the Americans
³⁷² express support for the GCS across all treatment branches (see Table ED1). Although sup-
³⁷³ port remains significant, these results suggest that the public success of the GCS would
³⁷⁴ be sensitive to the content of the debate about it, and oriented by the discourse adopted
³⁷⁵ by interest groups.

Second-order Beliefs To explain the strong support for the GCS despite its absence from political platforms and public debate, we hypothesized pluralistic ignorance, i.e. that the public and policymakers mistakenly perceive the GCS as unpopular. As a result, individuals might conceal their support for such globally redistributive policy, believing that advocating for it would be futile.

In the case of Americans, their beliefs about the level of support for the GCS are relatively accurate (Figure ED3). The mean perceived support is 52% (with quartiles of 36%, 52%, and 68%), which closely aligns with the actual support of 54%. Europeans, on the other hand, underestimate the support by 17 p.p. Nonetheless, 65% of them correctly estimate that the GCS garners majority support, and the mean perceived support is 59% (and quartiles of 43%, 61%, and 74%), compared to the actual support of 76%. Second-order beliefs are equally accurate for NR in the U.S. and similarly underestimated in Europe. Finally, consistent with Americans accurately perceiving the levels of support for the GCS or NR, providing information on the actual level had no significant effect on their support in the US2 survey (effect=.025, $t(1,998)=1.1$, $p=.26$, 95% CI=[-.02, .07]).

376

377 2.5 Stated support for global redistribution

378 We also assess support for a range of other international policies (Figure 3) as well as
379 unilateral foreign aid.

380 2.5.1 International policies

381 Most policies garner relative majority support in each country, with two exceptions:
382 the “cancellation of low-income countries’ public debt” and “a maximum wealth limit”
383 for each individual (Figure 3). There is relative majority support for it in Europe but
384 not in the U.S., despite the cap being set at \$10 billion in the U.S. compared to €/£100
385 million in Europe. Notably, climate-related policies enjoy significant popularity, with
386 “high-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries” receiving
387 absolute majority support in all countries surveyed. Additionally, relative support for
388 loss and damages compensation, as approved in principle at the international climate
389 negotiations in 2022 (“COP27”), ranges from 55% (U.S.) to 81% (Spain).

390 Consistent with the results of the global survey, a “tax on millionaires of all countries

391 to finance low-income countries" garners relative support of over 69% in each country,
392 only 5 p.p. lower than a national millionaires tax overall. In random subsamples, we also
393 inquire about respondents' preferences regarding the redistribution of revenues from a
394 global tax on individual wealth exceeding \$5 million, after providing information on the
395 revenue raised by such a tax in their country compared to low-income countries. We
396 ask certain respondents ($n = 1,283$) what percentage of the global tax revenues should be
397 pooled to finance low-income countries. In each country, at least 88% of respondents indi-
398 cate a positive amount, with an average of one-third (Figure ED4). To other respondents
399 ($n = 1,233$), we inquire whether they would prefer each country to retain all the revenues
400 it collects or that half of the revenues be pooled to finance low-income countries. Ap-
401 proximately half of the respondents opt to allocate half of the tax revenues to low-income
402 countries, consistently with the other variant of the question.

403 **2.5.2 Foreign aid**

404 In addition, we provide respondents with information about the actual amount "spent
405 on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries" relative to their country's gov-
406 ernment spending and GDP. Less than 16% of respondents state that their country's for-
407 eign aid should be reduced, while 62% express support for increasing it, including 17%
408 who support an unconditional increase (Figure ED5). Among the 45% who think aid
409 should be increased under certain conditions, we subsequently ask them to specify the
410 conditions they deem necessary (Figure ED6). The three most commonly selected condi-
411 tions are that: "we can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted"
412 (73% chose this condition), "recipient countries comply with climate targets and human
413 rights" (67%), and "other high-income countries also increase their foreign aid" (48%).
414 On the other hand, respondents who do not wish to increase their country's foreign aid
415 primarily justify their view by prioritizing the well-being of their fellow citizens or by
416 perceiving each country as responsible for its own fate (Figure ED7). In response to an
417 open-ended question regarding measures high-income countries should take to fight ex-
418 treme poverty, a large majority of Americans expressed that more help is needed (Figure
419 S39). The most commonly suggested form of aid is financial support, closely followed by
420 investments in education.

421 We also inquire about the perceived amount of foreign aid. Consistent with prior re-
422 search (see Appendix A.1.3), most people overestimate the actual amount of foreign aid
423 (Figure S18). We then elicit respondents' preferred amount of foreign aid, after randomly

Figure 3: Relative support for various global policies. (percentage of *somewhat* or *strong support*, after excluding *indifferent* answers; *except for GCS: percentage of Yes in a Yes/No question, preferred share: percentage of answers $\geq 30\%$, and foreign aid: percentage of unconditional or conditional increase rather than decrease or stable aid). Shares of *indifferent* answers range from 10% to 40%, with quartiles 19%, 25%, and 32%. (p. 90, Questions 20, 36, 43, 44, and 45; See Figure S26 for the absolute support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)*	54	76	80	71	81	74
National tax on millionaires funding public services	73	85	81	87	89	88
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	69	84	84	84	87	83
Preferred share of global wealth tax for low-income countries: 30% or more*	50	54	53	50	57	54
[Country]'s foreign aid should be increased*	60	64	63	68	69	56
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	60	76	77	79	79	71
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	68	82	82	82	85	81
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	55	71	72	70	79	70
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	46	53	53	43	62	61
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	58	71	69	69	78	72
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	62	73	58	73	80	83
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	63	80	80	78	81	83
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	62	87	90	86	91	87
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	46	62	58	62	65	67

⁴²⁴ presenting them with either the actual amount or no information. Most of the respondents who learn the actual amount choose a bracket at least as high as the actual one, and ⁴²⁵ most of those without the information choose a bracket at least as high as the perceived ⁴²⁶

⁴²⁷ one (Figures S21–S20). Finally, we ask a last question to the respondents who received
⁴²⁸ the information. To those who prefer an increase of foreign aid, we ask how they would
⁴²⁹ finance it: by far, the preferred source of funding is higher taxes on the wealthiest (Figure
⁴³⁰ S23). To those who prefer a reduction, we ask how they would use the funds becoming
⁴³¹ available: In every country, more people choose higher spending on education or health-
⁴³² care rather than lower taxes (Figure S24).

⁴³³ 2.6 Universalistic values

⁴³⁴ We ask broad questions on people's values to assess whether their core values are
⁴³⁵ consistent with support for specific policies. When we ask respondents which group they
⁴³⁶ defend when they vote, 20% choose "sentient beings (humans and animals)," 22% choose
⁴³⁷ "humans," 33% select their "fellow citizens" (or "Europeans"), 15% choose "My family
⁴³⁸ and myself," and the remaining 9% choose another group (mainly "My State or region"
⁴³⁹ or "People sharing my culture or religion"). Notably, a majority of left-wing voters choose
⁴⁴⁰ *humans or sentient beings*.

⁴⁴¹ Answers to this and other broad value questions are consistent with half of Americans
⁴⁴² and three quarters of Europeans supporting global policies like the GCS: people are al-
⁴⁴³ most as much willing to make a donation to poor Africans than to poor fellow citizens in
⁴⁴⁴ a lottery experiment, most respondents find that global poverty and climate change are
⁴⁴⁵ bigger problems than national inequality, and most respondents wish that their diplomats
⁴⁴⁶ take into account global justice (see [Methods](#) for details).

⁴⁴⁷ 3 Discussion

⁴⁴⁸ In our analysis, we have uncovered strong and genuine support for global redistribu-
⁴⁴⁹ tive policies.

⁴⁵⁰ We conclude by providing hypotheses to reconcile the scarcity of global policies in the
⁴⁵¹ public debate with our findings that they would be widely accepted. The first two are
⁴⁵² variations of pluralistic ignorance, and the last three represent complementary explana-
⁴⁵³ tions.

⁴⁵⁴ First, there may be pluralistic ignorance *among policymakers* regarding universalistic
⁴⁵⁵ values, support for the GCS, or the electoral advantage of endorsing it. Second, citizens
⁴⁵⁶ or policymakers may believe that globally redistributive policies are politically infeasi-

ble in some key (potentially foreign) countries such as the U.S. Third, political discourse centrally happens at the national level, shaped by national media and institutions such as the voting system. National framing by political voices may create biases and suppress universalistic values. Fourth, many individuals, including policymakers, may be unaware of specific proposals or may perceive global redistributive policies as ill-defined or technically infeasible, ultimately dismissing them as unrealistic. Fifth, just as policy is disproportionately influenced by the economic elites,^{41–43} public debate may be shaped by the wealthiest, who have vested interests in preventing global redistribution.

Uncovering evidence to support the above hypotheses could draw attention to global policies in the public debate and contribute to their increased prominence. Their confirmation would further support the conclusion that there exists substantial public support for global policies addressing climate change and global inequality, even in high-income countries.

Methods

Pre-registration. The project is approved by Economics & Business Ethics Committee (EBEC) at the University of Amsterdam (EB-1113) and was preregistered in the Open Science Foundation registry (osf.io/fy6gd). The study did not deviate from the registration: the questionnaires and the hypotheses tests used are the same as the ones *given ex ante*. Informed consent was obtained from all respondents, randomized treatment branches were unknown to the respondents, and our research complies with all relevant ethical regulations. Respondents were compensated with gift certificates for a value of €1 after participation. No statistical methods were used to pre-determine sample sizes but our sample sizes match those reported in similar publications.^{19;14–16;18}

Data collection. The paper utilizes two sets of surveys: the *global* survey and the *Western* surveys. The *global* surveys consist of two U.S. surveys, *US1* and *US2*, and one European survey, *Eu*. The *global* survey was conducted from March 2021 to March 2022 on 40,680 respondents from 20 countries (with 1,465 to 2,488 respondents per country). *US1* collected responses from 3,000 respondents between January and March 2023, while *US2* gathered data from 2,000 respondents between March and April 2023. *Eu* included 3,000 respondents and was conducted from February to March 2023. We used the survey companies *Dynata* and *Bilendi*. To ensure representative samples, we employed stratified quotas based on gender, age (5 brackets), income (4), region (4), education level (3), and ethnicity (3) for the U.S. We also incorporated survey weights throughout the analysis to account for any remaining imbalances. These weights were constructed using the quota variables as well as the degree of urbanization, and trimmed between 0.25 and 4. Stratified

490 quotas followed by reweighting is the usual method to reduce selection bias from opt-in online
491 panels, when better sampling methods (such as compulsory participation of random dwellings)
492 are unavailable.⁴⁴ By applying weights, the results are fully representative of the respective coun-
493 tries along the above mentioned dimensions. Results at the European level apply different weights
494 which ensure representativeness of the combined four European countries. Appendix G shows
495 how our samples compare to actual population frequencies. They match the actual frequencies,
496 except for some imbalances in specific quota demographics —such as gender in the UK (43%
497 of women instead of 50%) or urbanity in Spain (15% rural instead of 26%)— that are corrected
498 through our survey weights, and in the U.S. vote (which does not affect our results, as shown by
499 the results reweighted by vote in the *Support for the GCS* section below). Appendix I shows that the
500 treatment branches are balanced. Appendix J runs placebo tests of the effects of each treatment on
501 unrelated outcomes. We do not find effects of earlier treatments on unrelated outcomes arriving
502 later in the survey. Appendix K shows that our results are unchanged when including inattentive
503 respondents.

504 **Data quality.** The median duration is 28 minutes for the *global* survey, 14 min for *US1*, 11 min
505 for *US2*, and 20 min for *Eu*. To ensure the best possible data quality, we exclude 14% respondents
506 who fail an attention test or rush through the survey (i.e., answer in less than 11.5 minutes in the
507 *global* survey, 4 minutes in *US1* or *US2*, 6 minutes in *Eu*). At the end of the survey, we ask whether
508 respondents thought that our survey was politically biased and offer to provide some feedback.
509 69% of the respondents found the survey unbiased. 24% found it left-wing biased, and 8% found
510 it right-wing biased.

511 **Questionnaires and raw results.** The raw results are reported in Appendix B while the surveys'
512 structures and questionnaires are given in Appendices C and D. Details on the *global* survey can
513 be found in the Appendix of Dechezleprêtre et al. (forthcoming).¹⁹ Country-specific raw results
514 are also available as supplementary material files: [US](#), [EU](#), [FR](#), [DE](#), [ES](#), [UK](#).

515 **Incentives.** To encourage accurate and truthful responses, several questions of the Western sur-
516 veys use incentives. For each of the three comprehension questions that follow the policy descrip-
517 tions, we randomly select and reward three respondents who provide correct answers with a \$50
518 gift certificate. Similarly, for questions involving estimating support shares for the GCS and NR,
519 three respondents with the closest guesses to the actual values receive a \$50 gift certificate. In the
520 donation lottery question, we randomly select one respondent and split the \$100 prize between
521 the NGO GiveDirectly and the winner according to the winner's choice. In total, our incentives
522 scheme distributes gift certificates (and donations) for a value of \$850. Finally, respondents have
523 an incentive to answer truthfully to the petition question, as they are aware that the results for that

524 question (the share of respondents supporting the policy) will be transmitted to the office of their
525 head of state.

526 **Absolute vs. relative support.** In most questions, support or opposition for a policy is asked
527 using a 5-Likert scale, with compulsory response and *Indifferent* as the middle option. We call
528 *absolute support* the share of *Somewhat* or *Strong support*. We generally favor the notion of *relative*
529 *support*, which reports the share of support after excluding *Indifferent* answers. Indeed, the *relative*
530 *support* is better suited to assess whether there are more people in favor vs. against a policy.

531 **Support for the GCS.** The 95% confidence intervals are [52.4%, 56.0%] in the U.S. and [74.2%, 77.2%]
532 in Europe. The average support is computed with survey weights, employing weights based on
533 quota variables, which exclude vote. Another method to reweigh the raw results involves running
534 a regression of the support for the GCS on sociodemographic characteristics (including vote) and
535 multiplying each coefficient by the population frequencies. This alternative approach yields sim-
536 ilar figures: 76% in Europe and 52% or 53% in the U.S. (depending on whether individuals who
537 did not disclose their vote are classified as non-voters or excluded). The average support among
538 voters is 54% in the U.S., with 74% support among Biden voters vs. 26% among Trump voters (see
539 Figure S40).

540 Though the level of support for the GCS is significantly lower in swing States (at 51%) that
541 are key to win U.S. elections, the electoral effect of endorsing the GCS remains non-significantly
542 different from zero (at +1.2 p.p.) in these States. Note that we define swing states as the 8 states
543 with less than 5 p.p. margin of victory in the 2020 election (MI, NV, PA, WI, AZ, GA, NC, FL). The
544 results are unchanged if we use the 3 p.p. threshold (that excludes FL) instead.

545 **List experiment.** List experiments have been used to reveal social desirability bias, silencing ei-
546 ther racism in the Southern U.S.⁴⁵ or opposition to the invasion of Ukraine in Russia.⁴⁶ In our case,
547 the question reads: “Beware, this question is quite unusual. Among the policies below, **how many**
548 do you support?” The list of policies randomly varies across respondents, and includes a subset of
549 GCS, NR (National Redistribution scheme), C (“Coal exit” in the U.S., “Thermal insulation plan”
550 in Europe) and O (“Marriage only for opposite-sex couples in the U.S.”, “Death penalty for major
551 crimes” in Europe). There are four branches: GCS/NR/C/O; GCS/C/O; NR/C/O; C/O. To esti-
552 mate the tacit average support for the GCS and NR, we regress the number of supported policies
553 on indicators that the list includes GCS and NR. We utilize the difference-in-means estimator, and
554 confidence intervals are computed using Monte Carlo simulation with the R package *list*.³⁸

555 **Petition.** The respondent is randomly assigned a branch where the petition relates to the GCS or
556 the National Redistribution scheme. The question reads: “Would you be willing to sign a petition

557 for the [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme?

558 As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President's office], inform-
559 ing him what share of [American] people are willing to endorse the [Global climate / National
560 redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign, only your answer here is required and
561 remains anonymous.)".

562 Paired weighted *t*-tests are conducted to test the equality in support for a policy among re-
563 spondents who were questioned about the policy in the petition.

564 **Conjoint analyses.** The first conjoint analysis suggests that the GCS is supported independently
565 of being complemented by the National Redistribution Scheme and a national climate policy
566 ("Coal exit" in the U.S., "Thermal insulation plan" in Europe, denoted C). Indeed, 55% of U.S.
567 respondents and 74% of European ones prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to the com-
568 bination of C and NR alone, indicating similar support for the GCS conditional on NR and C than
569 for the GCS alone (Figure S8).

570 In the second conjoint analysis, results from the first branch show that the support for the GCS
571 conditional on NR, at 55% in the U.S. ($n = 757$) and 77% in Europe ($n = 746$), is not significantly
572 different from the support for the GCS alone. This suggests that rejection of the GCS is not driven
573 by the cost of the policy on oneself. The second branch indicates that the GCS, C, or their combi-
574 nation, are all similarly supported. This branch shows that the support for C conditional on NR
575 is somewhat higher than the support for the GCS, at 62% in the U.S. ($n = 751$) and 84% in Europe
576 ($n = 747$). However, the third one shows no significant preference for C compared to GCS (both
577 conditional on NR), neither in Europe, where GCS is preferred by 52% ($n = 741$) nor in the U.S.,
578 where C is preferred by 53% ($n = 721$). The fourth branch shows that 55% in the U.S. ($n = 771$) and
579 77% in Europe ($n = 766$) prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to NR alone.

580 The effects reported in the fourth analysis are the Average Marginal Component Effects.⁴⁷ The
581 policies studied are progressive policies prominent in the country. Except for the category *foreign*
582 *policy*, which features the GCS 42% of the time, they are drawn uniformly.

583 **Prioritization.** The prioritization allows inferring individual-level preferences for one policy
584 over another, including their intensity. This somewhat differs from a conjoint analysis, which
585 only allows inferring individual-level preferences for one platform over another or collective-level
586 preferences for one policy over another. Also, by comparing platforms, conjoint analyses may be
587 subject to interaction effects between policies of a platform (which can be seen as complementary,
588 substitute, or antagonistic) while the prioritization frames the policies as independent.

589 This question sheds light on a potential discrepancy between the policy priorities of the public
590 and those enacted by legislators. For instance, while the European Union and California have
591 enacted plans to phase out new combustion-engine cars by 2035, the proposal to "ban the sale of

592 new combustion-engine cars by 2030” emerged as one of the three least prioritized policies in each
593 country, with an average allocation of 7.8 points in France to 11.4 points in the UK.

594 **Open-ended question on the GCS.** Around one in four respondents explicitly cites pros or cons.
595 Few individuals explicitly express support or opposition, and misunderstandings are rare. Only
596 11% of the responses are empty or express a lack of opinion, though one-quarter are unclassifiable
597 due to the rarity, nonsensical nature, or irrelevance of the conveyed idea.

598 **Pros and cons.** In the closed question, the least important aspect was the negative impact on
599 their household, with 60% in Europe ($n=1,505$) and 75% in the U.S. ($n=493$) finding it important.
600 The most important elements differ between Europe and the U.S. In Europe, the key factors are
601 the GCS’s potential to limit climate change and reduce poverty in low-income countries, both
602 deemed important by 85% of respondents. In the U.S., having sufficient information about the
603 scheme ranks highest at 89%, followed by its potential to foster global cooperation at 82%.

604 Surprisingly, the support for National Redistribution also decreased by 7 p.p. following the
605 closed question about the GCS. This suggests that some individuals may lack attention and con-
606 fuse the two policies, or that contemplating the pros and cons alters the mood of some people,
607 moving them away from their initial positive impression.

608 **Universalistic values.** When asked what their country’s diplomats should defend in interna-
609 tional climate negotiations, only 11% prefer their country’s “interests, even if it goes against global
610 justice.” In contrast, 30% prefer global justice (with or without consideration of national interests),
611 and the bulk of respondents (38%) prefer their country’s “interests, to the extent it respects global
612 justice.”

613 Furthermore, when we ask respondents to assess the extent to which climate change, global
614 poverty, and inequality in their country are problems, climate change is generally seen as the most
615 important problem (with a mean score of 0.58 after recoding answers between -2 and 2). This is
616 followed by global poverty (0.40) and national inequality (0.35).

617 Finally, we conduct a lottery experiment. Respondents were automatically enrolled in a lottery
618 with a \$100 prize and had to choose the proportion of the prize they would keep for themselves
619 versus give to a person living in poverty. The charity donation is directed either to an African
620 individual or a fellow citizen, depending on the respondent’s random assignment. In Europe, we
621 observe no significant variation in the willingness to donate based on the recipient’s origin (in line
622 with an earlier study⁴⁸). In the U.S., the donations to Africans are 3 p.p. lower, but the slightly
623 lower donations to Africans are entirely driven by Trump voters and non-voters (Table ED2).

624 **Global wealth tax estimates.** A 2% tax on net wealth exceeding \$5 million would annually raise
625 \$816 billion, leaving 99.9% of the world population untaxed. More specifically, it would collect €5
626 billion in Spain, €16 billion in France, £20 billion in the UK, €44 billion in Germany, \$430 billion in
627 the U.S., and \$1 billion collectively in all low-income countries (28 countries, home to 700 million
628 people). These Figures come from Kappeler et al. (2021)⁴⁹ (for European countries) and the WID
629 **wealth tax simulator** (for the U.S. and low-income countries).⁵⁰

630 **Design choices.** As global survey results indicated strong support for global redistributive poli-
631 cies worldwide, we conducted our Western surveys to further investigate the surprisingly high
632 support. Among the eight largest high-income countries, we selected the five ones with a rela-
633 tively low level of support for global redistributive policies as observed in the global survey. We
634 also focus on the GCS as its costs are less concentrated on the very rich, compared to other global
635 redistributive policies, so we expected lower (or less genuine) support. By selecting countries that
636 would lose from global redistribution, are less supportive than others, and focusing on less con-
637 sensual policies, we aimed at conservatively assessing the level of support of world citizens for
638 global redistribution.

639 We split the U.S. survey into two waves to test the effect on the support of providing the
640 information on the actual support, and merged the *Eu* survey in one wave to get larger sample
641 sizes and more power in the analyses.

642 To select the policies tested, we spanned three key areas for global redistribution: climate
643 change, inequality, and global governance. We selected policies that are either on the agenda
644 of international negotiations (international transfers for mitigation; adaptation; or loss and dam-
645 ages; cancellation of public debt; reform of voting rights at the UN or IMF; global wealth tax) or
646 advocated by prominent NGOs or scholars (**global asset registry**; limits on wealth;^{51,52} democratic
647 climate governance;⁵³ global minimum wage;⁵⁴ fair trade;⁵⁵ carbon pricing;⁶ **increased foreign
648 aid**).

649 **Data and code availability**

650 All data and code of the *global* surveys as well as figures of the paper are available on [10.5281/zen-](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1120224)
651 [odo.1120224](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1120224). Data and code for the *g* survey will be made public upon publication.

652 **Acknowledgements**

653 We are grateful for financial support from A Sustainable Future (ASF) at the University of Am-
654 sterdam, and TU Berlin. Mattauch also thanks the Robert Bosch Foundation. We thank Antoine
655 Dechezleprêtre, Tobias Kruse, Blueberry Planterose, Ana Sanchez Chico, and Stefanie Stantcheva

for their invaluable inputs for the project. We thank Auriane Meilland for feedback. We are grateful to Rafael Wildauer for graciously providing estimates on wealth tax revenues.

Author Contributions

A.F. collected and analysed the data, and drafted the questionnaire and the paper. T.D. and L.M. substantially revised the questionnaire and paper, and contributed to the conception and redaction.

Competing interests

Fabre declares that he also serves as treasurer of Global Redistribution Advocates.

Table 1: Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list. The tacit support for the GCS is estimated by regressing the number of supported policies on the presence of the GCS in the list of policies. The social desirability is estimated as the difference between the tacit and stated support (see [Methods](#)), and it is not significantly different from zero even at a 20% threshold (as shown by the 80% Confidence Interval).

	Number of supported policies		
	All	U.S.	Europe
List contains: GCS	0.624*** (0.028)	0.524*** (0.041)	0.724*** (0.036)
<i>Support for GCS</i>	0.65	0.542	0.757
<i>Social desirability bias</i>	-0.026	-0.019	-0.033
<i>80% C.I. for the bias</i>	[-0.06; 0.01]	[-0.07; 0.04]	[-0.08; 0.01]
Constant	1.317	1.147	1.486
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000
R ²	0.089	0.065	0.125

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 2: Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. (Question 28)

	Prefers the Progressive platform					
	All	United States	France	Germany	UK	Spain
GCS in Progressive platform	0.028*	0.029	0.112***	0.015	0.008	-0.015
P-value	0.057	0.185	0.007	0.647	0.844	0.698
t	1.90	1.33	2.73	0.46	0.20	-0.39
95% C.I.	[-.00; .06]	[-.01; .07]	[.03; .19]	[-.05; .08]	[-.07; .09]	[-.09; .06]
Constant	0.623	0.604	0.55	0.7	0.551	0.775
Observations	5,202	2,619	605	813	661	504
R ²	0.001	0.001	0.013	0.0003	0.0001	0.0003

Note: Simple OLS model with robust standard errors (HC1). The 14% of *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples. GCS has no significant influence on them. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

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Extended data

Table ED1: Effects on the support for the GCS of a question on its pros and cons (either in open-ended or closed format) and on information about the actual support, in the U.S.
 (See Section D in the US2 Questionnaire) [\(Back to Section 2.4.5\)](#)

	Support			
	Global Climate Scheme		National Redistribution	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Control group mean	0.557	0.557	0.569	0.569
Treatment: Open-ended field on GCS pros & cons	-0.073** (0.035)	-0.073** (0.031)	-0.035 (0.035)	-0.031 (0.032)
Treatment: Closed questions on GCS pros & cons	-0.109*** (0.034)	-0.096*** (0.031)	-0.065* (0.034)	-0.062** (0.031)
Treatment: Info on actual support for GCS and NR	-0.021 (0.034)	-0.017 (0.031)	0.048 (0.033)	0.054* (0.031)
Includes controls		✓		✓
Observations	2,000	1,995	2,000	1,995
R ²	0.007	0.169	0.007	0.153

Table ED2: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality. (Question 33) [\(Back to Section 2.6\)](#)


	Donation to poor people (in %)			
	All	US	US	Eu
Poor is in own country	0.590 (0.799)	2.509** (1.152)	0.046 (1.691)	-1.349 (1.108)
Poor is in own country \times Vote: <i>not</i> Biden			3.954* (2.279)	
Mean	34.034	33.658	33.658	34.41
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000	3,000
R ²	0.0001	0.002	0.034	0.0005

Table ED3: Average Marginal Component Effects of global policies.


	Effect	Obs.	t	P-value	95% C.I.
FR; Global Climate Plan	0.13	1456	3.5	$5 \cdot 10^{-4}$	[0.06; 0.21]
DE; Global Climate Plan	0.09	1958	2.8	0.005	[0.03; 0.16]
ES; Global Climate Plan	0.04	1086	0.82	0.411	[-0.05; 0.12]
UK; Global Climate Plan	0.09	1498	2.31	0.021	[0.01; 0.16]
US; Global Climate Plan	0.01	4436	0.61	0.539	[-0.03; 0.06]
FR; Global Millionaire Tax	0.11	1456	2.49	0.013	[0.02; 0.2]
DE; Global Millionaire Tax	0.09	1958	2.3	0.022	[0.01; 0.18]
ES; Global Millionaire Tax	0.05	1086	0.91	0.365	[-0.06; 0.16]
UK; Global Millionaire Tax	0.13	1498	2.86	0.004	[0.04; 0.22]
US; Global Millionaire Tax	0.09	4436	3.16	0.002	[0.03; 0.14]
FR; Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change	0.12	1456	2.52	0.012	[0.03; 0.21]
DE; Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change	0.1	1958	2.52	0.012	[0.02; 0.18]
ES; Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change	-0.01	1086	-0.22	0.829	[-0.12; 0.1]
UK; Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change	0.07	1498	1.56	0.12	[-0.02; 0.17]
US; Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change	0.08	4436	2.93	0.003	[0.03; 0.13]

Figure ED1: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See non-translated versions in Figure S9; Question 29)

(a) U.S. (Asked only to non-Republicans)




(b) France




(c) Germany

- Climate policy:
- Obligatory solar systems on all suitable roofs
 - Thermal insulation plan
 - Ban on the sale of new cars with internal combustion engines by 2030
- Economic issues:
- Increase in the standard rate of citizen income to up to €600 per month
 - Citizens' insurance (Bürgerversicherung) as fairer social insurance
 - Reduce the national debt ratio to below 60%
 - Deploy investments for gigabit networks
- Foreign policy:
- Global Climate Plan
 - Global Millionaire Tax
 - Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change
 - Double foreign aid to low-income countries
- Societal issues:
- Referendum at the federal level
 - Cannabis Legalization
- Tax system:
- National redistribution plan
 - Reinstate the wealth tax



(d) Spain

- Climate policy:
- 100% electricity produced with renewable energy by 2040
 - Thermal insulation plan
 - Ban the sale of new cars with combustion engines by 2030
- Economic issues:
- Broader health coverage within the public system (dental care, glasses, mental health)
 - Guaranteed Basic Income of €600 per month
 - 34 hour work week
 - Investment in the educational system and universalization of preschool education
- Foreign policy:
- Global Climate Plan
 - Global Millionaire Tax
 - Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change
 - Double foreign aid to low-income countries
- Societal issues:
- Reform the electoral law to make the Senate more proportional
 - Abolition of prostitution
- Tax system:
- National redistribution plan
 - Increase taxes on income above 100,000 euros per year



(e) UK

- Climate policy:
- Ban of most polluting vehicles in city centers (low-emission zones)
 - Thermal insulation plan
 - Ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030
- Economic issues:
- £150 billion to upgrade schools, hospitals, care homes and council houses
 - Real Living Wage of £11 per hour for all workers aged 16 and over
 - Reduce the average full-time weekly working hours to 32
 - Re-establish neighbourhood policing and recruit 2,000 more frontline officers
- Foreign policy:
- Global climate scheme
 - Global tax on millionaires
 - Global democratic assembly on climate change
 - Doubling foreign aid
- Societal issues:
- Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation
 - Legalization of cannabis
- Tax system:
- National redistribution scheme
 - Wealth tax




Figure ED2: Influence of the GCS on preferred platform:
 Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question 30; in the U.S., asked only to non-Republicans.)




Figure ED3: Beliefs regarding the support for the GCS and NR. (Questions 21 and 23)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Belief about GCS	52	59	61	56	63	57
Support for the GCS	54	76	80	71	81	74
Belief about NR	55	58	60	53	62	59
Support for NR	56	73	77	66	79	75

Figure ED4: Percent of global wealth tax that should finance low-income countries (*mean*).
 “Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all countries around the world. (...)
 What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of retained in the country’s national budget)?” (Question 36)




Figure ED5: Attitudes regarding the evolution of [own country] foreign aid. (Question 45)




Figure ED6: Conditions at which foreign aid should be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish an increase of foreign aid at some conditions.] (Question 46)




Figure ED7: Reasons why foreign aid should not be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish a decrease or stability of foreign aid.] (Question 47)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Aid perpetuates poverty as it makes people feel less responsible for themselves	29	30	31	35	31	24
Aid is not effective as most of it is diverted	40	53	48	57	60	49
Aid is a pressure tactic for high-income countries that prevents low-income countries from developing freely	16	16	15	14	23	13
[Country] is not responsible for what happens in other countries	45	30	28	30	20	37
Charity begins at home: there is already a lot to do to support the [country] people in need	63	63	51	62	71	69

841 **A Literature review**

842 **A.1 Attitudes and perceptions**

843 **A.1.1 Population attitudes on global policies**

844 Using representative samples in 125 countries covering 96% of the world's greenhouse
845 gas emissions, Andre et al. (2024) show that 69% of the global population express willingness
846 to contribute 1% of their income to fight global warming.¹ Carattini et al. (2019) test
847 the support for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples in five countries, representative
848 along gender and age. For a given variant, the sample size is about 167 respondents per country.
849 They find over 80% support for any variant in India, between 50% and 65% in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43% to 59% in the U.S., depending on the
850 variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding an equal dividend for each
851 human is close to 50% in high-income countries (e.g., at 44% in the U.S.), consistently
852 with our results from the *Global* survey (see Figure 2). This is another piece of evidence
853 that the support is lower for a tax that would "only" reduce CO₂ emissions than for a
854 quota that would unambiguously achieve the climate target. In a survey over 15 countries,
855 Bloodworth & Callegari (2023) find 73% agreement to tax fossil fuel companies and
856 finance climate action in poorer countries. Using a conjoint analysis in the U.S. and Germany,
857 Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019) find that the support for a carbon tax increases
858 by up to 50% if it applies to all industrialized countries rather than exclusively to one's
859 own country.

861 In surveys conducted in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S., Ghassim (2020)
862 finds support ranging from 55% to 74% for "a global democracy including both a global
863 government and a global parliament, directly elected by the world population, to recom-
864 mend and implement policies on global issues". Ghassim & Pauli (2024) also finds strong
865 support for a democratic world government in surveys over 17 countries. Furthermore,
866 through an experiment, Ghassim (2020) finds that, in countries where the government
867 stems from a coalition, voting shares would shift by 8 (Brazil) to 12 p.p. (Germany) from
868 parties who are said to oppose global democracy to parties that supposedly support it.
869 For instance, when Germans respondents were told that (only) the Greens and the Left
870 support global democracy, these parties gained respectively 9 and 3 p.p. in vote inten-
871 tions, while the SPD and the CDU-CSU each lost 6 p.p. Ghassim (2020) also presents

¹However, Ipsos (2023) find no majority support when the amount is not specified, despite strong agreement for own individual action.

872 survey results showing strong majorities in favor of the direct election of one's country's
873 UN representative in all 18 surveyed countries. Similarly, in each of 10 countries, there
874 are clear majorities in favor of "a new supranational entity [taking] enforceable global de-
875 cisions in order to solve global risks" (Global Challenges Foundation 2018). Remarkably,
876 already in 1946, 54% of Americans agreed (while 24% disagreed) that "the UN should be
877 strengthened to make it a world government with the power to control the armed forces
878 of all nations" (Gallup 1946). Furthermore, in surveys conducted in Argentina, China,
879 India, Russia, Spain, and the U.S., Ghassim et al. (2022) find majority support for UN
880 reforms that would make United Nations' decisions binding, give veto powers to a few
881 other major countries at the Security Council, or complement the highest body of the UN
882 with a chamber of directly elected representatives.

883 Relatedly, Meilland et al. (2024) find that both Americans and French people prefer
884 an international settlement of climate justice, even if it encroaches on sovereignty. In a
885 2013 survey conducted in China, Germany, and the U.S., Schleich et al. (2016) show that
886 over three-quarter of people think that international climate agreements reached so far
887 are not successful and that future agreements are important. In Finland, Sivonen (2022)
888 finds that that support for a carbon tax is higher if implemented at the global level (54%)
889 rather than at the national level (40%).

890 The results from these specific questions are in line with the answers to more gen-
891 eral questions. In each of 36 countries, ISSP (2010) find near consensus that "for envi-
892 ronmental problems, there should be international agreements that [their country] and
893 other countries should be made to follow" (overall, 82% agree and 4% disagree). In each
894 of 29 countries, ISSP (2019) uncover near consensus that "Present economic differences
895 between rich and poor countries are too large" (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree).
896 Leiserowitz et al. (2021) reveal that 66% of Americans support providing "financial aid
897 and technical support to developing countries that agree to limit their greenhouse gas
898 emissions." Fehr et al. (2022) find that 90% of Germans want some degree of global redis-
899 tribution.

900 A.1.2 Population attitudes on climate burden sharing

901 Despite differences in the description of fairness principles, surveys on burden-sharing
902 rules show consistent attitudes. Or at least, their seemingly contradictory results can be
903 made compatible with the following interpretation: Concerning emissions reductions,
904 most people want that every country engage in strong and collective decarbonization ef-

905 forts, with a global quota converging to climate neutrality in the medium run. Concerning
906 the financial effort, most people support high-emitting countries paying and low-income
907 countries receiving funding. The most supported rules are those perceived as equitable,
908 in particular an equal right to emit per person.

909 This interpretation helps to understand the apparent differences between articles that
910 approach burden sharing from different angles: cost sharing (in money terms), effort shar-
911 ing (in terms of emissions reductions), or resource sharing (in terms of rights to emit).
912 Existing papers adopt either the cost sharing or effort sharing approach, which preclude
913 any country from being a net receiver of funds. Also, by focusing on *either* the financial
914 or the decarbonization effort, these surveys miss the other half of the picture, which can
915 explain why some papers find strong support for the ability-to-pay principle while others
916 find strong support for grandfathering (defined as emissions reductions being the same
917 in every country). The literature follows these approaches to align with the notions used
918 by the UNFCCC. Yet, we argue that the resource sharing approach is preferable for un-
919 covering attitudes, as it unambiguously describes the distributive implications of each
920 rule while achieving an efficient geographical distribution of emissions reductions and
921 explicitly allowing for monetary gains for some countries.

922 Now, let us summarize the results of the different papers in the light of this clarifica-
923 tion. [Schleich et al. \(2016\)](#) find an identical ranking of support for burden-sharing prin-
924 ciples in China, Germany, and the U.S.: polluter-pays followed by ability-to-pay, equal
925 emissions per capita, and grandfathering. Note that the authors do not allow for emis-
926 sions trading in their description of equal *emissions per capita*, which may explain its rel-
927 atively low support. Yet, the relative support for egalitarianism also depends on how
928 *the other* rules are described. Indeed, [Carlsson et al. \(2011\)](#) find that Swedes prefer that
929 “all countries are allowed to emit an equal amount per capita” rather than options where
930 emissions are reduced based on current or historical emissions, for which it is explicitly
931 stated that high-emitting countries “will continue to emit more than others”. [Bechtel &](#)
932 [Scheve \(2013\)](#) find agreement that rich countries should pay more and historical emis-
933 sions should matter, but that efforts should not be solely borne by wealthy nations. More
934 precisely, their conjoint analysis conducted in France, Germany, the UK, and the U.S.
935 shows that a climate agreement is 15 p.p. more likely to be preferred (to a random alter-
936 native) if it includes 160 countries rather than 20, and 5 p.p. less likely to be preferred
937 if “only rich countries pay” compared to other burden-sharing rules: “rich countries pay
938 more than poor”, “countries pay proportional to current emissions” or “countries pay

proportional to historical emissions". In Germany and the U.S., Gampfer et al. (2014) also find stronger support for funding climate action in low-income countries when cost is shared with other countries. Using a choice experiment, Carlsson et al. (2013) find that the least preferred option in China and the U.S. is when low-emitting countries are exempted from any effort. Ability-to-pay is appreciated in both countries and is the preferred option in the U.S., though the preferred option in China is another one that accounts for historical responsibility. In the U.S. and France, Meilland et al. (2024) find that the most favored fairness principle is that "all countries commit to converge to the same average of total emissions per inhabitant, compatible with a controlled climate change". Furthermore, in each country, 73% disagree with grandfathering defined as "countries which emitted a lot of carbon in the past have a right to continue emitting more than others in the future". The study by Meilland et al. (2024) contains many other results: for instance, majorities prefer to hold countries accountable for their consumption-based rather than territorial emissions, and the median choice regarding historical responsibility is to hold a country accountable for its post-1990 emissions (rather than post-1850 or just their current emissions). Finally, in each of 28 (among the largest) countries, Dabla-Norris et al. (2023) find strong majority for "all countries" to the question "Which countries do you think should be paying to reduce carbon emissions?". When asked to choose between a cost sharing based on *current* vs. *accumulated historic emissions*, a majority prefers *current emissions* in all countries but China and Saudi Arabia (where the two options are close to equally preferred).

[\(Back to Section 2.2\)](#)

960 A.1.3 Population attitudes on foreign aid

961 There is an extensive literature on attitudes towards foreign aid in donor countries.
962 The key findings indicate that most people overestimate the amount of foreign aid and
963 that only a minority wants a cut in foreign aid compared to actual amounts, especially
964 once they become aware of them.

965 For instance, PIPA (2001) shows that 83% of Americans support a multilateral effort
966 to cut world hunger in half. PIPA (2008) shows that in each of 20 countries, a majority
967 thinks that developed countries "have a moral responsibility to work to reduce hunger
968 and severe poverty in poor countries", with an average agreement of 81%. In 7 OECD
969 countries, the study finds that at least 75% of respondents are willing to pay for a pro-
970 gram to cut hunger in half (at an estimated cost of, e.g., \$50 a year for each American).
971 Eurobarometer data shows majority support to comply with the promise to increase aid

972 (Cho 2024).

973 Kaufmann et al. (2019) find that perceived aid is overestimated in each of the 24 coun-
974 tries they study, on average by a factor of 7. In most countries, desired aid is larger than
975 perceived aid.² They show that individuals in the top income quintile desire aid 0.13
976 p.p. lower than those in the bottom 40% – which is very close to what we find. By em-
977 ploying a theoretical model and examining correlations between lobbying and actual aid
978 (controlling for desired aid), they argue that the gap between actual and desired aid stems
979 from the political influence of the rich who defend their vested interests. In Kaufmann
980 et al. (2012), the U.S. is an outlier: desired aid is at the other countries' average (3% of
981 GNI), but as misperceptions are enormous, perceived aid is twice as large as desired aid.
982 Indeed, Gilens (2001) shows that even Americans with high political knowledge misper-
983 ceive actual aid, and finds that 17% fewer of them want to cut aid when we provide them
984 specific information about the amount of aid. Similarly, Nair (2018) finds that the rela-
985 tively low support for aid in the U.S. is driven by information on global distribution, as
986 people underestimate their rank by 27 centiles on average and overestimate the global
987 median income by a factor 10. This could explain why in the 2000–2004 waves of the GSS,
988 over 60 percent of Americans state that the government is spending too much on foreign
989 aid (Okten & Osili 2007).

990 Hudson & van Heerde (2012) provide a critical review of the literature and show that
991 the strong support for poverty alleviation largely stems from intrinsic altruism. They note
992 that, according to DFID (2009) and PIPA (2001), 47% of British people find that the aid
993 is wasted (mainly due to corruption), while Americans estimate that less than a quarter
994 of the aid reaches those in need, with over half ending up in the hands of corrupt gov-
995 ernment officials. Despite these perceptions, most people still support aid, suggesting
996 the presence of nonutilitarian motives. Consistent with Henson et al. (2010), Bauhr et al.
997 (2013) find that support for aid is reduced by the perception of corruption in recipient
998 countries. However, this effect is mitigated by the aid-corruption paradox: countries with
999 higher levels of corruption often need more help. Bodenstein & Faust (2017) further show
1000 that right-wing Europeans, as well as those who perceive strong corruption in their coun-
1001 try, are more likely to agree that recipient countries should “follow certain rules regarding
1002 democracy, human rights and governance as a condition for receiving EU development
1003 aid.” Using a 2002 Gallup survey and the 2006 World Values Survey, and in line with

²Kaufmann et al. (2012) offer the best results on desired aid because (as Hudson & van Heerde (2012) criticize), other studies did not take into account misperceptions of actual aid.

1004 Heinrich et al. (2018) in the U.S., Bayram (2017) and Paxton & Knack (2012) show that the
1005 main determinants for wanting more aid are trust, left-wing ideology, interest in politics,
1006 and being a woman (all positively associated).

1007 While foreign aid is generally unilateral, discretionary, and often used as a bargaining
1008 chip, global redistribution is conceived as multilateral, rule-based, and with dedicated
1009 funding. Our paper finds much stronger support for global redistributive policies than
1010 for increased foreign aid. The difference in attitudes between unilateral foreign aid and
1011 global policies is consistent with the literature on foreign aid. Indeed, it can be explained
1012 by the observation that people prefer multilateral policies and often view foreign aid as
1013 inefficient in reducing poverty. Therefore, we contribute to the theory of attitudes towards
1014 global transfers by showing that when such transfers are multilateral and trusted to be
1015 effective, they would be largely supported.

(Back to Section 2.5.2)

1016 A.1.4 Population attitudes on taxes on the rich

1017 We are not aware of any previous survey on a global wealth tax,³ though surveys
1018 consistently show strong support for national wealth taxes. In a comprehensive survey
1019 conducted in the UK, Rowlingson et al. (2021) show that a wealth tax is the preferred
1020 option for raising revenues. Only 8% of respondents state that total net wealth should not
1021 be taxed (with little differences between Labour and Conservative voters). The study also
1022 finds that the preferred design would be a 1% or 3% tax on net wealth above £1 million. By
1023 asking how much taxes per year should a person with a certain income and wealth level
1024 pay, Fisman et al. (2017) finds that the average American favors a 0.8% linear tax rate
1025 on unspecified wealth up to \$2 million (the highest wealth level tested), and a 3% linear
1026 rate on inherited wealth. Through a conjoint analysis conducted in three high-income
1027 countries, Schechtl & Tisch (2023) find widespread support for a wealth tax (from 78% in
1028 the U.S. to 86% in Germany and the UK), with a preference for an exemption threshold
1029 set at \$/€1 million (rather than 500,000 or 2 million) with the tax rate and tax unit having
1030 little influence on the preferred design. In 21 OECD countries, the OECD (2019) uncovers
1031 strong majority support for higher taxes on the rich to support the poor, with nearly
1032 70% overall agreement and less than 20% disagreement. Isbell (2022) finds similarly high
1033 level of support in 34 African countries. In the UK, Patriotic Millionaires (2022) find 69%
1034 support (and 7% opposition) for a 1.1% tax on wealth in excess of £10 million. In the

3We did not find any using the combination of “survey” or “attitudes” with “wealth tax” or “global wealth tax” in Google Scholar.

1035 U.S., [Americans for Tax Fairness \(2021\)](#) find that 67% to 71% of the respondents support
1036 to “raise taxes for those earning more than \$400,000 a year”, “raise the income tax rate
1037 for those earning over \$1 million a year by 10 percentage points”, or “apply a 2% tax on
1038 an individual’s wealth above \$50 million each year, and 3% on wealth above \$1 billion”.
1039 [Patriotic Millionaires \(2024\)](#) indicate that millionaires themselves agree to be taxed: out
1040 of 2,385 millionaires contacted through wealth councillors, 74% support “increased tax on
1041 very wealthy individuals” and 58% support a 2% wealth tax above \$10 million. Finally,
1042 in surveys in Germany and the U.S., [Ferreira et al. \(2024\)](#) finds strong majority support
1043 for a limit on income or wealth.

1044 A.1.5 Population attitudes on ethical norms

1045 As argued by [Nyborg et al. \(2016\)](#), social norms can be the solution to the collective
1046 action problem. As such, universalistic values and free-riding attitudes are key.

1047 **Universalism** Various studies have examined the concept of global identity (see [Rey-
1048 sen & Katzarska-Miller \(2018\)](#) for a review). In the 2005-2008 wave of the World Values
1049 Survey, [Bayram \(2015\)](#) notes that “78% of the participants in 57 countries see themselves
1050 as citizens of the world”, though the [2017-2022 wave](#) reveals that more people feel close
1051 to their town, region or country than to the world. [Nation \(2024\)](#) finds large variation
1052 across 21 countries, as 31% to 88% of respondents (excluding *indifferent* answers) consider
1053 themselves “more a world citizen than a citizen of [their] country” (with similar shares
1054 agreeing that “[their] taxes should go towards solving global problems”).

1055 [Enke et al. \(2023\)](#) measure universalism at the U.S. district level using donation data,
1056 and find that a district’s universalism predicts electoral outcomes better than its income
1057 or education level. To measure universalism at the individual level, [Enke et al. \(2023\)](#)
1058 ask American respondents to split \$100 between a random stranger and a random person
1059 with the same income but closer to them. They distinguish different facets of universal-
1060 ism, and define *foreign universalism* as the inclination to give to a foreigner rather than a
1061 fellow citizen. They find a home bias for most people, which could partly be attributed to
1062 concerns about inequality, as the split involves two persons with the same income, with
1063 the foreigner most certainly living in a poorer country than the American and thus en-
1064 joying a higher social status. That being said, a home bias probably remains even after
1065 accounting for concerns about inequality: [Prather \(2013\)](#) also finds a home bias in the
1066 U.S., and 84% of Americans agree that “taking care of problems at home is more impor-

tant than giving aid to foreign countries" (PIPA 2001). Enke et al. (2023) also measure universalism and analyze its correlates in 7 countries, and Cappelen et al. (2022) deploy this method in 60 countries. In a lab experiment with students in the U.S., Cherry et al. (2017) show that a substantial share of people prefer policies detrimental to them due to their egalitarian worldview. Leiserowitz (2006) shows that 68% of Americans are most concerned about the impacts of climate change on "people all over the world" (50%) or "non-human nature" (18%) rather than themselves and their family (12%) or the U.S. (9%).⁴ A 2017 survey by Focus 2030 shows that 40% of French people agree "fighting poverty in developing countries should be one of the priorities of the European Union" while only 19% disagree. Waytz et al. (2019) show that left-leaning people exhibit a wider "moral circle". Jaeger & Wilks (2023) find that judgments of moral concern are equally well explained by characteristics of the judge and the evaluated target.

Free-riding Despite the long-standing explanation of the lack of climate action as a result of free-riding, surveys consistently show that people support climate mitigation action in their own country, even in the absence of such action in other countries. Bernauer & Gampfer (2015) show this for Americans and Indians, who both overestimate their country's emissions at one third of the global total. Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019) show this in the U.S. and China using an experimental design. McEvoy & Cherry (2016) show that Americans mostly invoke leadership and morality to justify unilateral climate action. Using a range of methods, Aklin & Mildenberger (2020) show that the empirical evidence for free-riding is not compelling, and that climate inaction can be equally well explained by distributive conflicts. Finally, review of the literature by McGrath & Bernauer (2017) shows that climate attitudes are largely nonreciprocal, and primarily driven by values and perceptions of the policies, rather than by considerations of what other countries do.

A.1.6 Second-order beliefs

Allport (1924) introduced the concept of pluralistic ignorance: a shared misperception concerning others' beliefs. The concept became notorious when O'Gorman (1975) showed that, towards the end of the civil rights movement, 47% of Americans believed that a majority of white people supported segregation, while only 18% did so. PIPA (2001) has shown that while 75% of Americans are willing to contribute \$50 annually to halve

⁴Unpublished survey results of Dechezleprêtre et al. (forthcoming) find similar figures in 2024.

1098 world hunger (the cost of the program), only 32% believed that the majority would share
1099 this willingness. Pluralistic ignorance regarding climate-friendly norms in the United
1100 States has been documented by ? (?), who further show that correcting the mispercep-
1101 tions would be effective to enhance pro-climate behaviors. Relatedly, **Sparkman et al.**
1102 (2022) show that Americans underestimate the support for climate policies by nearly half,
1103 while **Drews et al. (2022)** document pluralistic ignorance of carbon tax support in Spain.
1104 Additionally, **Geiger & Swim (2016)** show that pluralistic ignorance regarding concern for
1105 climate change leads people to self-silence, resulting in reduced discussions on the topic.

1106 A.1.7 Elite attitudes

1107 In a survey of climate negotiators on their preferences in terms of burden-sharing,
1108 **Lange et al. (2007)** uncovers a mix of self-serving bias and support for the egalitarian
1109 principle. **Dannenberg et al. (2010)** elicit climate negotiators' equity preferences and find
1110 that regional differences in addressing climate change are driven more by national inter-
1111 ests than by different equity concerns. **Hjerpe et al. (2011)** indicate that voluntary con-
1112 tribution, indicated as willingness to contribute, was the least preferred principle among
1113 both negotiators and observers. Three of the four principles for allocating mitigation
1114 commitments were recognized widely across the major geographical regions: historical
1115 responsibilities, ability-to-pay, and equal per capita emissions. This result is confirmed
1116 by **Kesternich et al. (2021)**, who observe tendencies for a more harmonized view among
1117 key groups towards the ability-to-pay rule in a setting of weighted burden sharing rules.
1118 **Mildenberger & Tingley (2019)** survey elites (Congress staffers and international relations
1119 scholars) as well as the population in U.S. and China. They document pluralistic igno-
1120 rance of pro-climate attitudes, egocentric bias, and increasing support after beliefs are
1121 updated.

1122 A.2 Proposals and analyses of global policy-making

1123 A.2.1 Global carbon pricing

1124 Global carbon pricing is widely regarded by economists as the benchmark climate
1125 policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon emissions externality. For instance, **Hoel**
1126 (1991) shows that an international carbon tax can be designed to simultaneously achieve
1127 efficiency and accommodate any distributional objective. Concerning the distributional
1128 objective, **Grubb (1990)**, **Agarwal & Narain (1991)** and **Bertram (1992)** were the first to

advocate for an equal right to emit for each human. As [Grubb \(1990\)](#) states it: "by far the best combination of long term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity, is obtained from a system based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions which are allocated on an adult per capita basis".⁵ Support for such solution has been renewed ever since ([Baer et al. 2000](#); [Jamieson 2001](#); [Blanchard & Tirole 2021](#); [Rajan 2021](#)).

While many endorse the egalitarian allocation of emissions permits, economists also considered this outcome as politically unfeasible. Thus, to preserve the current level of inequalities and to preclude transfers between countries, they adjusted their (integrated assessment) models by assigning more weight to the interest of rich countries ([Stanton 2011](#)).

[Gollier & Tirole \(2015\)](#) synthesize the distributional decision with a *generosity* parameter which would allocate emissions permit to countries in proportion to their population if set to one, in proportion to their emissions (on the start date of the policy) if set to zero, and as a mixture of the egalitarian and grandfathering rules if set in between. Using a similar formula in the context of a tax, [Cramton et al. \(2015\)](#) (summarized in [MacKay et al. 2015](#)) propose that countries with emissions per capita around the average fix the generosity parameter, so that it is strategically chosen to maximize the tax rate, and to fix the tax rate at the minimum price proposed by participating countries. Negotiations would exclude countries with low ambition beforehand; and the treaty would impose trade sanctions on non-participating countries. [van den Bergh et al. \(2020\)](#) propose a "dual-track transition to global carbon pricing": an expanding climate club that would integrate existing and new emissions trading systems, and a reorientation of UNFCCC negotiations towards a global carbon price and burden-sharing rules. The [IMF \(2019\)](#) also supports global carbon pricing or, as a first step, a carbon price floor. They propose either differentiated prices among countries or international transfers, and estimate that a price of \$75/tCO₂ in 2030 would be compatible with a 2°C trajectory.

Other authors have put forth more radical proposals. For instance, [Weitzman \(2017\)](#) envisions a World Climate Assembly with proportional representation at the global scale, so that the median (human) voter would choose the carbon price level. To finance an adaptation fund, [Chancel & Piketty \(2015\)](#) propose a global *progressive* carbon tax (or a progressive tax on air tickets as a first step), so that rich people (who are high emitters) contribute more to the public good. [Fleurbaey & Zuber \(2013\)](#) highlight that, given that current emitters are probably richer than future victims of climate change damages, cli-

⁵By "adult per capita", [Grubb \(1990\)](#) means that permits would be allocated equally among adults.

1162 mate policies deserve a *negative* discount rate. In other words, we cannot dissociate the
1163 climate issue from global inequalities, and an ethical response to this issue requires global
1164 redistribution.

1165 **A.2.2 Climate burden sharing**

1166 The literature has discussed different burden-sharing principles (Ringius et al. 2002).
1167 While there is no agreement on their definitions as different approaches are used (cost
1168 sharing, effort sharing, or resource sharing, see Section A.1.2), we describe here the burden-
1169 sharing principles consistently using the resource sharing approach (i.e., allocating emis-
1170 sions rights). For other papers that define or compare different burden-sharing principles,
1171 see Vaillancourt & Waaub (2004), Zhou & Wang (2016), Leimbach & Giannousakis (2019).

1172 **Equal per capita.** The simplest principle is perhaps to allocate each year's global carbon
1173 quota based on an equal right to emit per capita, or an equal right to emit for each adult.
1174 Implementing this principle would result in large transfers from high-emitting to low-
1175 emitting countries (Young-Brun et al. 2023).

1176 **Grandfathering.** In contrast, *grandfathering* entails allocating emissions rights in pro-
1177 portion to current emissions. From the perspective of allocating carbon pricing revenues
1178 between countries, grandfathering amounts to each country retaining the revenues it col-
1179 lects. Given that nations are sovereign and have not agreed to share emissions rights,
1180 this principle can be considered as the default option against which the other ones can be
1181 compared in terms of distributive effects.

1182 **Historical responsibilities.** At the opposite end of the spectrum is the principle of *his-
1183 torical responsibilities*, which assigns to each country a carbon budget proportional to its
1184 population. Countries that have emitted more than the average have accumulated a car-
1185 bon debt towards countries that have emitted less, which have a carbon credit.⁶

1186 To fully specify this rule, one needs to define a start date for the responsibilities on
1187 past emissions and specify how to account for population size. 1990 is often chosen as
1188 a start year as it is the date of the first IPCC assessment report, marking the widespread

6It is not clear how these debts would be settled. Approaches could involve carbon removal from the atmosphere, or using a conventional social cost of carbon to monetize them, by crediting (positively or negatively) emissions rights to countries in an international carbon market.

1189 acknowledgment of climate change, though variants include 1972, 1960, 1950 or 1850.⁷
1190 Several solutions have been proposed to account for evolving populations, none of which
1191 is flawless. Matthews (2015) allocates emissions rights on a given year proportionally to
1192 the countries' populations in that year. An alternative is to use fixed populations, such
1193 as the populations at the chosen start year (Neumayer 2000), or at a future date such
1194 as projected when the global total population will reach 9 billion (Raupach et al. 2014).
1195 Fanning & Hickel (2023) convert the projected climate debt up to 2050 into monetary
1196 terms in a 1.5°C scenario.

1197 The rationale for using fixed populations is to prevent countries from intentionally
1198 increasing their population size to gain more emissions rights. However, this approach
1199 treats countries with different demographic trajectories similarly, effectively penalizing
1200 countries which grow more than others (if past populations are used) or grow more than
1201 expected (if future populations are used). Using current populations like Matthews (2015)
1202 also comes with its own problems. Consider two countries having contributed very little
1203 to cumulative emissions, with the same emissions per capita but different demographic
1204 patterns: country A's population has doubled in the last 30 years, while country B's pop-
1205 ulation has remained stable. Despite the similar present situation, country B would ac-
1206 cumulate more carbon credit than country A. Essentially, compensating country B more
1207 due to its past population size amounts to compensating the dead although it is future
1208 generations who will suffer. That being said, using current populations is likely a more
1209 viable solution than relying on fixed populations since, in practice, countries with similar
1210 emissions per capita tend to have relatively similar demographic trajectories.

1211 **Ability to pay.** Another prominent burden-sharing principle is the ability to pay whereby
1212 richer countries should contribute more to mitigation efforts. To operationalize this prin-
1213 ciple, Baer et al. (2008) define *capacity* as the share of global income above an exemption
1214 threshold. They use the threshold of \$7,500 per year (in 2005 PPP), which corresponds to
1215 the top 28% of the global income distribution. According to this principle, the effort of a
1216 country should be proportional to the revenues it would raise with a linear income tax on
1217 individual income above \$7,500.

1218 **Climate Equity Reference Framework** Baer et al. (2008) propose another effort-sharing
1219 method, the *Climate Equity Reference Framework* (CERF), which blends the ability to pay

⁷Climate equity monitor uses 1850 for example.

principle with their version of historical responsibilities. They define *responsibility* as follows: they determine the mitigation requirement as the emissions gap between the Business as Usual scenario from IEA (2007) and a 2°C (with 68-86% probability) scenario. The mitigation requirement is then allocated to countries proportionally to their cumulative emissions (starting in 1990). The emissions right of a country according to their *responsibility* are then determined by its Business as Usual emissions minus its mitigation requirement. A country's emissions right, dubbed its *greenhouse development right* (GDR), is defined using a combination of *capacity* (C) and *responsibility* (R) to allocate the mitigation requirement between countries. This allocation key is called the *Responsibility and Capacity Indicator* (RCI) and defined as $RCI = R^a \cdot C^{1-a}$, with $a = .4$.

This choice of parameter may seem somewhat arbitrary, but the [EcoEquity calculator](#) allows for a customization all CERF parameters (Holz et al. 2018; Holz et al. 2019). The Climate Action Network has adopted the CERF as its *fair share* framework, though the different national chapters of the organization could not agree on a choice of parameters (Athanasou et al. 2022).⁸

The CERF approach was adopted by a prominent network of climate NGOs because it operationalizes the principle of *common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities* recognized by the UNFCCC. However, this approach suffers from three drawbacks. First, its definition of historical responsibility as an effort sharing principle is inconsistent with the principle of an equal right of cumulative emissions per capita, which is a resource sharing principle. For instance, consider a fully decarbonized country that has exhausted *exactly* its cumulative carbon budget. According to the CERF notion of *responsibility*, this country would still be expected to contribute significantly to mitigation efforts due to its relatively high cumulative emissions. Yet, according to the usual definition of the historical responsibility based on an equal right of cumulative emissions p.c., this country would have no liability as it has not exceeded its carbon budget. Second, a country with moderate incomes⁹ and low historical responsibility would be assigned a relatively low effort, even if its emissions per capita are high. In other words, the CERF

⁸The U.S. Climate Action Network and the think tank EcoEquity (funded by Tom Athanasiou and late Paul Baer) choose the following parameters: an equal weight for R and C ($a = .5$), their own **business as usual projections** of CO₂ emissions based on trends of GDP growth and emissions intensity reduction, a 1.5°C (Low Energy Demand) pathway, 1950 as the start year for responsibility, a gradual inclusion of income to compute *capacity* (which adds complexity to the calculation) from a full exemption of the bottom 70% (\$7,500 per year) linearly to a full inclusion of the top 2% (\$72,211), the inclusion of non-CO₂ gases but not of emissions embodied in trade (i.e. imported emissions) nor LULUCF (land-use).

⁹Using the above parameters, moderate incomes means few incomes above the global 70th. percentile.


1248 approach favors countries that have experienced recent growth. Third, the poorest coun-
1249 tries would be granted emissions rights close to the Business as Usual trajectory, as they
1250 would bear virtually none of the effort. But this trajectory carries the current (unfair) in-
1251 come distribution and amounts to grandfathering. For example, the baseline trajectory
1252 for emissions¹⁰ in the DRC entail 0.8 tCO₂ p.c. in 2030, which is five times less than the
1253 world average emissions right per capita. In this framework, if the DRC were to grow
1254 faster than projected in the baseline, it would actually have to pay to the rest of the world
1255 for mitigation efforts. This is what is likely to happen to countries like Mexico or Senegal,
1256 from our simulation of the net gains of CERF compared to a situation without interna-
1257 tional transfers (see Figure S1). In contrast, a resource sharing approach based on equal
1258 per capita emissions would result in low-income countries receiving emissions rights ex-
1259 ceeding their projected trajectories, leading to transfers from high-income countries. By
1260 construction, such transfers do not occur in an effort sharing approach like the CERF,
1261 implying lower transfers to low-income countries. Compared to an equal right to emit
1262 per capita, this method favors countries like China (whose emissions are allowed to re-
1263 main stable over 2020-2030 instead of a reduction of 35-40%) and penalizes regions like
1264 Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (see Figure S2).

1265 **Contraction and Convergence.** Meyer (2004) defines a rule called *contraction and con-*
1266 *vergence* (C&C), which combines elements of grandfathering and equal per capita ap-
1267 proaches. According to C&C, each country is granted (tradable) emissions rights, starting
1268 at their current emission level and converging linearly to an equal per capita level at some
1269 pre-specified date. The *contraction* part refers to the reduction of total emissions rights in
1270 line with the climate objective. When discussed around year 2000, the convergence date
1271 was specified between 2020 and 2050. This rule, advocated by the Global Commons Insti-
1272 tute (a UK think tank), was on the agenda from COP2 to COP15 (i.e., until Copenhagen,
1273 and including in Kyoto), including at Kyoto, and was endorsed by the European Parlia-
1274 ment in 1998. More recently, Gignac & Matthews (2015) have shown how C&C can be
1275 made consistent with historical responsibilities by computing carbon debts and credits
1276 until the convergence date.

1277 **Assessments of the NDCs against burden-sharing principles.** The regime established
1278 by the 2015 Paris agreement to regulate climate change respects none of the burden-

¹⁰The baseline trajectory is computed as the “product of the projected GDP and CO₂ emission intensity”.

Figure S1: Net gains from the CERF burden-sharing rule in 2030.




Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO₂.

sharing principles and relies instead on voluntary contributions from each country, known as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). A body of literature (reviewed by [Höhne et al. 2014](#)) assesses the NDCs against the emissions reduction objective and different burden-sharing principles. To evaluate the NDCs, [Gao et al. \(2019\)](#) examine their emissions projections for 2030 and estimate the resulting increase in temperature. The most recent and comprehensive assessment of NDCs against burden-sharing principles is conducted by [van den Berg et al. \(2020\)](#) (see also [Raupach et al. 2014](#); [Robiou du Pont et al. 2016](#); [Robiou du Pont et al. 2017](#)).

1287 A.2.3 Global redistribution

1288 **Lack of cooperation vs. lack of redistribution.** Major social science scholarship from
 1289 Realism in International Relations to game theory of international environmental agree-
 1290 ments in economics has pointed to lack of cooperation as the major obstacle to global
 1291 sustainability ([Waltz 1979](#); [Snidal 1991](#); [Barrett 1994](#); [Nordhaus 2015](#)). Another body of
 1292 literature on international climate cooperation emphasises redistribution from North to
 1293 South as a key condition for making global climate policy work, noting the historical

Figure S2: Difference between net gains from Greenhouse Development Rights and equal rights per capita.



Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO₂.

1294 responsibility of major emitters in the Global North ([Parks & Roberts 2008](#); [Friman &](#)

1295 [Strandberg 2014](#); [Bou-Habib 2019](#); [Aklin & Mildenberger 2020](#)). Taking the second per-

1296 spective, making progress on international climate policy also requires a decision on how

1297 the burden of climate change mitigation can be shared fairly. This raises the question of

1298 whether citizens around the world support such global redistribution policies or, more

1299 specifically, whether citizens in high-income countries are willing to make sacrifices to

1300 combat climate change and extreme poverty.

1301 While we cannot test conditional cooperation as part of the present analysis, our em-

1302 pirical results document that if the North-South redistribution would be implemented as

1303 part of global climate policies, they would receive strong public support.

1304 **Studies on global redistribution** Addressing global poverty, inequalities, and climate

1305 change are central to the universally agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). As

1306 highlighted by [Bolch et al. \(2022\)](#) and [Fabre \(2024\)](#), low-income countries often lack suf-

1307 ficient domestic resources to eradicate poverty in the short term, indicating the need for

international transfers to rapidly end global poverty. In *Beyond the Welfare State*, Gunnar Myrdal (1960) called for a *welfare world*. In his Nobel lecture, he emphasized the necessity of increasing foreign aid to low-income countries, stating that “The type of marginal foreign aid we have provided, is clearly not enough to meet their barest needs” (Myrdal 1975).

Drawing on the labor theory of value, some economists have argued that global inequalities arise from unequal exchange in international trade (Arghiri 1972). Indeed, the stark disparity in wages between countries implies that one unit of labor exported by an American commands five units of labor embodied in imported goods, whereas Ethiopians need to export 50 units of labor to obtain one unit through imports (Alsamawi et al. 2014; Reyes et al. 2017). Taking stock, Hickel (2017) proposes to globally establish minimum wages at 50% of the local median wage. Hickel (2017) also suggests other solutions against global inequality, which served as inspiration for our questionnaire. These measures include the cancellation of low-income countries’ public debt, fair trade practices (such as eliminating tariffs from high-income countries, reducing patent protections, and reducing farming subsidies in rich countries), initiatives to combat tax evasion (e.g., implementing a global financial register), land reform, and a fair international climate policy.

Piketty (2014) prominently advocates for a progressive wealth tax on a global scale, and Piketty (2022) suggests to allocate its revenues to countries in proportion to their population.

Kopczuk et al. (2005) compute the optimal linear income tax rates for all countries in two ways: globally centralized and decentralized (i.e., within each country and without international transfers). They show that the average decentralized rate is 41%. In contrast, the global rate is 62%, which would generate funds to finance a basic income of 250\$/month (higher than the GPD per capita of 73 countries). From a current global Gini index of 0.695, they show that decentralized optimal taxation would only marginally reduce global inequality to 0.69, whereas global taxation would significantly decrease the Gini to 0.25. The study also shows that the existing level of foreign aid can only be rationalized if the U.S. attaches 2,000 less value to a citizen in the poorest countries than to an American citizen (or 1,000 less if half of the transfers are diverted due to corruption).

A.2.4 Basic income

Unconditional cash transfers (UCT) are increasingly seen as an effective way to end extreme poverty. A growing body of evidence from randomized control trials supports this

¹³⁴¹ notion: [Gangopadhyay et al. \(2015\)](#) find that UCT outperform a food subsidy; [Haushofer & Shapiro \(2016\)](#) find significant impacts on health, economic outcomes, and psychological well-being; [Egger et al. \(2022\)](#) find large positive spillovers on non-recipient people, and minimal inflation. Reviews of existing research further confirm the positive outcomes of UCT ([Standing 2014](#); [Bastagli et al. 2016](#)).

¹³⁴⁶ While the delivery of cash to remote areas and the prevention of fraud is challenging
¹³⁴⁷ in regions without a proper civil register, the use of mobile phones as banking and bio-
¹³⁴⁸ metric identification tools could provide viable solutions ([Harnett 2017](#)). Although many
¹³⁴⁹ places still lack internet access, satellite internet technology shows promising progress,
¹³⁵⁰ with some experts suggesting that it could soon become affordable and universally ac-
¹³⁵¹ cessible ([Hanson 2016](#)).

¹³⁵² A.2.5 Global democracy

¹³⁵³ The idea of world federalism has a long-standing history, dating back at least to [Kant \(1795\)](#), who argued that a world federation was essential for achieving perpetual peace.
¹³⁵⁴ International organizations were eventually created to foster peace, though the League
¹³⁵⁵ of Nations and its successor, the United Nations, never succeeded in avoiding military
¹³⁵⁶ conflicts. Many have argued that we need stronger and more democratic global institu-
¹³⁵⁷ tions, competent to address global challenges such as extreme poverty, climate change,
¹³⁵⁸ wars, pandemics, or financial stability. Before World War II, feminist and pacifist [Maver-
ick Lloyd & Schwimmer \(1937\)](#) founded the *Campaign for World Government*, advocating
¹³⁵⁹ for direct representation at the global scale. [Einstein \(1947\)](#) called for the subordination of
¹³⁶⁰ the UN Security Council to the General Assembly and the direct election of UN delegates.
¹³⁶¹ Since 2007, there has been widespread support for a United Nations Parliamentary As-
¹³⁶² sembly (UNPA) from individuals and institutions in over 150 countries, including 1,800
¹³⁶³ member of parliament, heads of state, as well the European Parliament, the Pan-African
¹³⁶⁴ Parliament, and the Latin-American Parliament. The UNPA campaign calls for a gradual
¹³⁶⁵ implementation of a democratic assembly, starting with a consultative assembly com-
¹³⁶⁶ posed of members of national parliaments, allowing for the direct election of its members
¹³⁶⁷ in voluntary countries, and progressing towards a world parliament with binding legisla-
¹³⁶⁸ tive powers once all members are directly elected ([Leinen & Bummel 2018](#)). Besides the
¹³⁶⁹ UNPA, various scholars have put forward different models of global democracy, ranging
¹³⁷⁰ from deliberative spaces to a world federation ([Archibugi et al. 2011](#)). While the most
¹³⁷¹ radical proposals may still be on the horizon, an assembly of random citizens represen-
¹³⁷²

¹³⁷⁴ tative of the world population has already been convened. It has produced a joint state-
¹³⁷⁵ ment at the COP26 ([Global Assembly 2022](#)), and a similar *World Citizens' Assembly* should
¹³⁷⁶ soon follow. Using surveys covering 86% of global population, [Hale & Koenig-Archipugi](#)
¹³⁷⁷ ([2019](#)) find that the world as a whole is less polarized than some countries and argue
¹³⁷⁸ against the fear people's views would be too diverse for a functioning global democracy.

¹³⁷⁹ **B Raw results**


¹³⁸⁰ Country-specific raw results are also available as supplementary material files: **US**,
¹³⁸¹ **EU, FR, DE, ES, UK**.

Figure S3: Support for the GCS, NR and the combination of GCS, NR and C (*Yes/No* questions).
(p. 90, Questions 20, 22, 35, 34, and 26).

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)	54	76	80	71	81	74
National redistribution scheme (NR)	56	73	77	66	79	75
National climate policy + GCS + NR	52	74	79	69	81	70

Figure S4: Absolute support for global climate policies.

Share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* (in percent, $n = 40,680$). The color blue denotes an absolute majority. See Figure 2 for the relative support. (Questions A-I of the global survey.)



*In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

Figure S5: Correct answers to comprehension questions (in percent). (Questions 16-18)




Figure S6: Number of correct answers to comprehension questions (mean). (Section 2.3, Questions 16-18)




Figure S7: List experiment: mean number of supported policies. (Section 2.4.1, Question 24)




Figure S8: Conjoint analyses 1 and 2. (Questions 25-27, Back to Section 2.4.3)




Figure S9: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See English translations in Figure ED1; Question 29)

(a) Germany


Klimaschutz:
 Verpflichtende Solaranlagen auf allen geeigneten Dächern
 Plan zur Wärmedämmung
 Verbot des Verkaufs von Neuwagen mit Verbrennungsmotor bis 2030

Wirtschaftspolitik:
 Erhöhung des Regelsatzes des Bürgergelds auf bis zu 600€ pro Monat
 Bürgerversicherung als gerechtere Sozialversicherung
 Staatsschuldenquote auf unter 60% reduzieren
 Investitionen für Gigabit–Netzwerke bereitstellen

Außenpolitik:
 Globales Klimaprogramm
 Globale Steuer auf Millionäre
 Globale demokratische Versammlung zum Klimawandel
 Verdopplung der Mittel für die Entwicklungshilfe in einkommensschwachen Ländern

Gesellschaft:
 Volksentscheid auf Bundesebene
 Cannabis-Legalisierung

Steuerpolitik:
 Nationales Umverteilungsprogramm
 Die Vermögenssteuer wieder in Kraft setzen



(b) France


Climat:
 Interdiction des véhicules les plus polluants dans les centres-villes (ZFE)
 Plan pour l'isolation thermique
 Interdiction de la vente de voitures thermiques neuves d'ici 2030

Économie:
 Versement du RSA aux 18–25 ans sans emploi
 SMIC à 1600€ net par mois
 Recul de l'âge légal de départ à la retraite à 65 ans
 Hausse de 20% du financement de l'hôpital public et de l'Éducation nationale

Politique étrangère:
 Plan mondial pour le climat
 Taxe mondiale sur les millionnaires
 Assemblée démocratique mondiale sur le changement climatique
 Doubler l'aide au développement des pays à faibles revenus

Démocratie:
 Élection des députés à la proportionnelle
 Référendum d'Initiative Citoyenne (RIC)

Fiscalité:
 Plan de redistribution nationale
 Rétablissement de l'impôt sur la fortune (ISF)



(c) Spain

Política climática:
 100% de electricidad producida con energías renovables en 2040
 Plan de aislamiento térmico
 Prohibir la venta de coches nuevos con motor de combustión para 2030

Asuntos económicos:
 Más necesidades sanitarias dentro del sistema público (cuidado dental, gafas, salud mental)
 Ingreso Básico Garantizado de 600€ al mes
 Jornada laboral de 34 horas semanales
 Inversión en el sistema educativo y universalización de la educación preescolar

Política exterior:
 Plan climático global
 Impuesto mundial a los millonarios
 Asamblea democrática mundial sobre el cambio climático
 Duplicar la ayuda exterior a los países de renta baja

Asuntos sociales:
 Reformar la ley electoral para hacer el Senado más proporcional
 Abolición de la prostitución

Sistema fiscal:
 Plan de redistribución nacional
 Aumentar los impuestos sobre las rentas superiores a 100.000 euros anuales




Figure S10: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements seen as important for supporting the GCS in a 4-Likert scale (in percent). (Question 32) [\(Back to Section 2.4.5\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
It would succeed in limiting climate change	78	85	85	86	86	83
It would hurt the [Country] economy	81	67	61	67	66	69
It would penalize my household	75	60	55	63	59	63
It would make people change their lifestyle	78	79	83	79	78	77
It would reduce poverty in low-income countries	77	85	88	85	86	81
It might be detrimental to some poor countries	79	72	79	67	78	70
It could foster global cooperation	82	81	81	82	85	80
It could fuel corruption in low-income countries	79	75	82	69	79	72
It could be subject to fraud	80	79	80	74	83	81
It would be technically difficult to put in place	77	71	74	62	79	71
Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences	89	82	89	68	91	88

Figure S11: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements found in the open-ended field on the GCS (manually recoded, in percent).

"When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to your mind?

Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme." (Question 31) (Back to Section 2.4.5)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
environment	26	31	37	26	43	24
unclassifiable	25	24	23	28	25	22
pro	22	23	21	22	33	20
con	22	17	12	18	20	16
cost	17	12	11	14	17	7
poorest humans	11	7	6	9	5	6
tax redistribution	10	7	11	8	4	9
support	8	6	3	5	6	8
oppose	7	3	2	3	1	4
don't know	6	8	10	8	7	10
empty	6	3	0	0	0	13
difficult agreement	5	10	7	12	8	8
difficult implement	3	5	5	6	4	6
misunderstands gcs	3	2	2	1	3	1
misunderstands question	2	2	1	3	3	3

Figure S12: Perceptions of the GCS. Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).

"When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to your mind?

Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme." (Question 31) [\(Back to Section 2.4.5\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
world: international world country global	28	22	23	19	22	23
environment: climat environment animal emission natur	26	21	17	28	21	17
poorest: poor low-income 700 poverty	16	8	8	9	4	10
pro: pro pros pros pros:	16	3	0	1	9	5
con: con con: cons cons:	15	4	0	1	8	6
cost: cost expensive higher price 85 inflation	13	7	5	9	7	6
tax: tax	8	3	4	3	2	2
redistribution: rich redistribu	8	4	5	4	3	5
implementation: implement enforce polic monitor	6	4	5	6	0	5
agreement: agree accept participat	3	4	5	6	2	3

Figure S13: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality (mean). (Question 33) [\(Back to Section 2.6\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Donation to own country	35	34	31	38	34	32
Donation to Africa	32	35	33	41	32	33

Figure S14: Support for a national wealth tax.

"Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: affordable housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and schools]?" (Question 34)




Figure S15: Support for a global wealth tax.

"Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-income countries?

Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education." (Question 35)




Figure S16: Preferred share of global wealth tax revenues that should be pooled to finance low-income countries. (Question 36)




Figure S17: Support for sharing half of global tax revenues with low-income countries, rather than each country retaining all the revenues it collects (in percent). (Question 37)



Figure S18: Perceived foreign aid. “From your best guess, what percentage of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?” (Question 38) (Back to Section 2.5.2)

Actual values: France: 0.8%; Germany: 1.3%; Spain: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%; U.S.: 0.4%.




Figure S19: Preferred foreign aid (without info on actual amount).

"If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?" (Question 39) [\(Back to Section 2.5.2\)](#)




Figure S20: Preferred foreign aid (after info on actual amount).

"Actually, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid.

If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?" (Question 39) [\(Back to Section 2.5.2\)](#)




Figure S21: Actual, perceived and preferred amount of foreign aid, with random info (or not) on actual amount. (*Mean* in percent of public spending, Questions 38, 39) (Back to Section 2.5.2)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Actual foreign aid (in % of public spending)	0.4	1.1	0.8	1.3	0.5	1.7
Belief about foreign aid	4.7	2.9	2.7	2.9	2.8	3.5
Preferred foreign aid (with info)	1.8	2.7	3.4	2.9	2.1	2.5
Preferred foreign aid (no info)	4	3.9	4.7	4.4	3.1	3.4

Figure S22: Preferred foreign aid (after info or after perception). (Questions 38 and 39)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as current	70	75	91	76	77	57
Preferred foreign aid is higher than current	47	59	75	58	63	43
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as perceived	57	74	83	79	77	58
Preferred foreign aid is higher than perceived	37	53	64	59	54	39

Figure S23: Preferences for funding increased foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]
 "How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent) (Question 40) (Back to Section 2.5.2)




Figure S24: Preferences of spending following reduced foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]
 "How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent)
 (Question 41) [\(Back to Section 2.5.2\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Higher spending on defense	19	23	11	21	17	31
Higher spending on retirement pensions	23	41	22	51	57	35
Higher spending on healthcare	40	57	31	42	80	70
Higher spending on welfare benefits	13	20	7	19	39	20
Higher spending on education	30	45	31	47	58	43
Higher spending on other programs	6	6	6	4	9	8
Lower taxes on the wealthiest	5	2	5	2	0	2
Lower corporate income tax rate	12	6	10	4	8	6
Lower personal income tax rates	48	29	26	27	37	30
Lower public deficit	32	24	21	13	41	21

Figure S25: Willingness to sign real-stake petition for the Global Climate Scheme or National Redistribution, compared to stated support in corresponding subsamples (e.g. support for the GCS in the branch where the petition was about the GCS). (Question 42)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Petition for the GCS	51	69	69	66	78	69
(Comparable) support for the GCS	53	76	81	74	81	74
Petition for NR	57	67	65	66	74	68
(Comparable) support for NR	58	72	76	65	78	75

Figure S26: Absolute support for various global policies (Percent of (*somewhat or strong*) support). (Questions 43 and 44. See Figure 3 for the relative support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	41	54	52	53	62	51
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	53	65	62	66	68	62
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	45	58	55	60	62	54
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	31	37	36	30	45	40
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	34	44	44	43	52	43
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	39	49	39	51	50	54
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	42	55	54	54	61	53
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	44	70	73	70	72	65
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	34	45	40	48	44	50
National tax on millionaires funding public services	62	76	70	79	79	77
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	58	71	69	72	78	71

Figure S27: Preferred approach of diplomats at international climate negotiations. In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend [own country] interests or global justice? (Question 48)




Figure S28: Percent of selected issues viewed as important.
 "To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem?" (Question 55)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Income inequality in [Country]	55	59	54	58	71	57
Climate change	59	66	66	63	73	63
Global poverty	50	57	50	58	75	49

Figure S29: Group defended when voting.
 "What group do you defend when you vote?" (Question 56)




Figure S30: Mean prioritization of policies.

Mean number of points allocated policies to express intensity of support (among six policies chosen at random). Blue color means that the policy has been awarded more points than the average policy.

"In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

How do you allocate the points among the following policies?" (Question 57)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	13	21	10	14	35	31
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	23	22	25	21	22	23
econ3	21	15	13	18	17	13
econ4	28	22	27	17	24	20
soc1	10	17	13	17	12	21
soc2	13	9	14	8	10	8
climate1	14	15	11	18	20	12
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	20	18	22	19	15	17
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030	11	9	8	8	9	11
tax1: National redistribution scheme	14	15	16	15	15	15
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	19	19	21	18	17	19
foreign1: Global climate scheme	15	20	20	23	16	17
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	21	20	20	23	19	20
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	15	15	15	17	14	13
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	9	11	13	14	9	8

Figure S31: Positive prioritization of policies.

Percent of people allocating a positive number of points to policies, expressing their support (among six policies chosen at random).

"In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

How do you allocate the points among the following policies?" (Question 57)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	64	78	61	67	96	95
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	83	86	85	84	87	89
econ3	81	69	50	78	80	68
econ4	88	86	91	79	89	85
soc1	57	75	69	74	74	78
soc2	58	58	72	53	64	48
climate1	70	76	65	79	89	75
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	79	83	86	84	78	80
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030	62	58	56	48	60	70
tax1: National redistribution scheme	67	79	79	76	82	79
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	80	79	76	78	83	85
foreign1: Global climate scheme	71	83	84	85	84	78
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	80	81	79	83	82	82
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	71	77	79	74	83	76
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	58	70	79	74	74	57

Figure S32: Charity donation.

"How much did you give to charities in 2022?" (Question 49)




Figure S33: Interest in politics.

"To what extent are you interested in politics?" (Question 50)




Figure S34: Desired involvement of government (from 1 to 5). (Question 51)




Figure S35: Political leaning on economics (from 1: Left to 5: Right). (Question 52)




Figure S36: Voted in last election. (Question 53)




Figure S37: Vote in last election (aggregated). PNR includes people who did not vote or prefer not to answer. (Question 54)




Figure S38: Perception that survey was biased.
“Do you feel that this survey was politically biased?” (Question 60)





Figure S39: Opinion on the fight against extreme poverty.

“According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme poverty in low-income countries?” (Question 61) [\(Back to Section 2.5.2\)](#)

(a) Elements found in the open-ended field on the question
(manually recoded, in percent)



(b) Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).




Figure S40: Main attitudes by vote (“Right” spans from Center-right to Far right).
 (Relative support in percent in Questions 20, 35, 44, 45, 48) (Back to Section 2.6)

	Europe Left	Europe PNR/Non-voter	Europe Right	U.S. Left	U.S. PNR/Non-voter	U.S. Right
Support for the GCS	85	72	71	74	53	26
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	94	83	76	85	71	40
Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries*	61	52	45	55	67	41
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	73	65	52	62	49	23
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	93	79	74	87	70	38
[Country]'s foreign aid should be increased	78	62	54	75	64	34
Universalist*	56	48	26	53	49	23

1382 C Questionnaire of the global survey (section on global
1383 policies)

1384 A. At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be
1385 put in place? (Multiple answers are possible) [Figures 2 and S4]
1386 Global; [Federal / European / ...]; [State / National]; Local

1387 B. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “[country] should take mea-
1388 sures to fight climate change.”

1389 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly
1390 agree*

1391 C. How should [country] climate policies depend on what other countries do?

- 1392 • If other countries do more, [country] should do...
1393 • If other countries do less, [country] should do...

1394 *Much less; Less; About the same; More; Much more*

1395 D. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] All countries have signed the
1396 Paris agreement that aims to contain global warming “well below +2 °C’. To limit
1397 global warming to this level, there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we
1398 can emit globally, called the carbon budget. Each country could aim to emit less
1399 than a share of the carbon budget. To respect the global carbon budget, countries
1400 that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less
1401 than their share.

1402 Do you support such a policy? [Figures 2 and S4]

1403 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1404 support*

1405 E. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] Suppose the above policy is in
1406 place. How should the carbon budget be divided among countries? [Figures 2 and
1407 S4]

1408 *The emission share of a country should be proportional to its population, so that each human
1409 has an equal right to emit.; The emission share of a country should be proportional to its
1410 current emissions, so that those who already emit more have more rights to emit.; Countries
1411 that have emitted more over the past decades (from 1990 onwards) should receive a lower*

1412 *emission share, because they have already used some of their fair share.; Countries that will*
1413 *be hurt more by climate change should receive a higher emission share, to compensate them*
1414 *for the damages.*

1415 F. [In the U.S., Denmark, and France only] To achieve a given reduction of greenhouse
1416 gas emissions globally, costly investments are needed. Ideally, how should countries
1417 bear the costs of fighting climate change?

- 1418 • Countries should pay in proportion to their income
- 1419 • Countries should pay in proportion to their current emissions [Used as a sub-
1420 stitute to the equal right per capita in Figure 2]
- 1421 • Countries should pay in proportion to their past emissions (from 1990 on-
1422 wards) [Used as a substitute to historical responsibilities in Figure 2]
- 1423 • The richest countries should pay it all, so that the poorest countries do not have
1424 to pay anything
- 1425 • The richest countries should pay even more, to help vulnerable countries face
1426 adverse consequences: vulnerable countries would then receive money instead
1427 of paying [Used as a substitute to compensating vulnerable countries in Figures
1428 2 and S4]

1429 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly*
1430 *agree*

1431 G. Do you support or oppose establishing a global democratic assembly whose role
1432 would be to draft international treaties against climate change? Each adult across
1433 the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly. [Figures 2 and S4]
1434 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1435 *support*

1436 H. Imagine the following policy: a global tax on greenhouse gas emissions funding a
1437 global basic income. Such a policy would progressively raise the price of fossil fuels
1438 (for example, the price of gasoline would increase by [40 cents per gallon] in the
1439 first years). Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil
1440 fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Revenues from the tax would be used to
1441 finance a basic income of [\$30] per month to each human adult, thereby lifting the
1442 700 million people who earn less than \$2/day out of extreme poverty. The average

1443 [American] person would lose a bit from this policy as they would face [\$130] per
1444 month in price increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive.

1445 Do you support or oppose such a policy? [Figures 2 and S4]

1446 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1447 *support*


- 1448 I. Do you support or oppose a tax on all millionaires around the world to finance low-
1449 income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate ac-
1450 tion? This would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drink-
1451 ing water, healthcare, and education. [Figures 2 and S4]
1452 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1453 *support*

1454 **D Questionnaire of the Western surveys**

1455 Below, we provide the generic questionnaire (based on the U.S. version), which roughly
1456 corresponds to the *Eu* questionnaire as well as the combination of the *US1* and *US2* ques-
1457 tionnaire. The main difference between Europe and the U.S. is that we split the *US2*
1458 sample into four random branches to include some treatments before the Section D on
1459 the GCS. Besides the control group, the treatments are: information regarding the sup-
1460 port of Americans for the GCS and NR, an open-ended field, and a closed question on the
1461 pros and cons of the GCS. The pros and cons of the GCS are also asked in *Eu* (likewise,
1462 either as an open-ended field or a question), but only in Section D, after the support.

1463 At each section or question, square brackets specify in which questionnaires it is present
1464 (*US1*, *US2* and/or *Eu*) as well as country specificities. Figure S41 displays the structure of
1465 each questionnaire. Each treatment randomization is independent. Qualtrics and Word
1466 versions of the questionnaires in each language are available on our [public repository](#),
1467 together with a spreadsheet that summarizes country specificities and our sources.

Figure S41: Western surveys' structure. Cf. Figure 1 for a simplified version.



1468 [Eu, US1, US2] Socio-demographic characteristics

1469 1. Welcome to this survey!

1470
1471 This survey is **anonymous** and is conducted for research purposes on a representa-
1472 tive sample of [1,000 British people].

1473
1474 It takes [US1, US2: 10 to 15 min; Eu: around 20 min] to complete.

1475
1476 The survey contains lotteries and awards for those who get the correct answer to
1477 some understanding questions.

1478 If you are attentive and lucky, you can win up to [US1, Eu: \$350; US2: \$150] in
1479 points. (See terms and conditions).

1480 Please answer every question carefully.

1481
1482 Do you agree to participate in the survey?

1483 Yes; No

1484 2. What is your gender? [gender]

1485 Woman; Man; Other

1486 3. How old are you? [age]

1487 Below 18; 18 to 20; 21 to 24; 25 to 29; 30 to 34; 35 to 39; 40 to 44; 45 to 49; 50 to 54; 55 to
1488 59; 60 to 64; 65 to 69; 70 to 74; 75 to 79; 80 to 84; 85 to 89; 90 to 99; 100 or above

1489 4. [Eu] In which country do you live? [country]

1490 France; Germany; Spain; United Kingdom; Other

1491 5. What is your ZIP code? [zipcode UK: What is your Outcode (the left part of your
1492 postcode, e.g. if your postcode is N7 8H7, just enter N7)?]

1493 6. Do you live with your partner (if you have one)? [couple]

1494 Yes; No

1495 7. How many people are in your household? The household includes: you, the mem-
1496 bers of your family who live with you, and your dependants. [hh_size]

1497 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more

- 1498 8. [Eu] How many children below 14 live with you? [Nb_children_14]
1499 1; 2; 3; 4 or more
- 1500 9. [US1, US2] What race or ethnicity do you identify with? (Multiple answers are
1501 possible) [race]
1502 White; Black or African American; Hispanic; Asian; American Indian or Alaskan Native;
1503 Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; Other: {open field}; Prefer not to say
- 1504 10. What is the [US1, US2: annual; Eu: monthly] gross income of your household (before
1505 withholding tax)? This includes all income: wages, self-employment earnings, So-
1506 cial Security benefits, pensions, investment income, welfare payments, and income
1507 from other sources. [income]
1508 [US1, US2: Items based on household total income deciles and quartiles, namely:
1509 Less than \$20,000; between \$20,001 and \$35,000; between \$35,001 and \$42,000; between
1510 \$42,001 and \$50,000; between \$50,001 and \$65,000; between \$65,001 and \$82,000; between
1511 \$82,001 and \$103,000; between \$103,001 and \$130,000; between \$130,001 and \$145,000;
1512 between \$145,001 and \$165,000; between \$165,001 and \$250,000; More than \$250,000; I
1513 prefer not to answer;
1514 Eu: custom thresholds, taking into account household composition Questions 6-8,
1515 and corresponding to the country's deciles and quartiles of standard of living, cf.
1516 the sheet "Income" in [this spreadsheet](#)]
- 1517 11. What is the highest level of education you have completed? [education, post_secondary]
1518 [Below upper secondary, Upper secondary, and Post secondary are coded as the first two,
1519 middle three, and last three items, respectively.
1520 US1, US2: Primary school or less; Eighth grade; Some high school; Regular high school
1521 diploma/GED or alternative credential; Some college, no degree; 2-year college degree or as-
1522 sociates degree (for example: AA, AS); Bachelor's degree (for example: BA, BS); Master's
1523 degree or above (MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA, MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD, PhD);
1524 FR: École primaire / Aucun; Brevet; CAP ou BEP; Baccalauréat professionnel ou tech-
1525 nologique; Baccalauréat général; Bac +2 (BTS, DUT, DEUG...); Bac +3 (licence...); Bac
1526 +5 ou plus (master, école d'ingénieur ou de commerce, doctorat, médecine, maîtrise, DEA,
1527 DESS...)
1528 DE: Keine abgeschlossene Schulbildung / Grundschule; Untere Sekundarstufe (z.B. Haupt-
1529 oder Realschulabschluss); Erstausbildung; Beruflicher Abschluss / Ausbildung; Abitur;
1530 Zweitausbildung; Bachelor oder Fachhochschulabschluss; Master-Abschluss oder höher

1531 ES: *Educación primaria / No he completado la enseñanza básica; Educación secundaria obligatoria (ESO); Formación profesional básica (FP); Formación profesional de grado medio; Bachillerato; Formación profesional de grado superior; Grado universitario; Máster/doctorado*
1532 UK: *Primary education or less; Some secondary school; GSCE; Vocational Upper secondary (Level 3 award, level 3 certificate, level 3 diploma, advanced apprenticeship, etc.); High school degree (A level); Higher vocational education (Level 4+ award, level 4+ certificate, level 4+ diploma, higher apprenticeship, etc.); Bachelor's Degree (BA, BSc, BEng, etc.); Postgraduate diploma or certificate, Master's Degree (MSc, MA, MBA, etc.) or Ph.D.]*

1539 12. What is your employment status? [employment_agg]

1540 *Full-time employed; Part-time employed; Self-employed; Student; Retired; Unemployed*
1541 *(searching for a job); Inactive (not searching for a job)*

1542 13. Are you a homeowner or a tenant? (Multiple answers are possible) [home_...]

1543 *Tenant; Owner; Landlord renting out property; Hosted free of charge*

1544 14. [If lives with partner: What is the estimated value of your household's assets (in
1545 U.S. dollars)? [wealth]]

1546 If does not live with partner: What is the estimated value of your assets (in U.S.
1547 dollars)?]

1548 Include here all your possessions (home, car, savings, etc.) net of debt. For example,
1549 if you own a house worth [\$]300,000 and you have [\$]100,000 left to repay on your
1550 mortgage, your assets are [\$]200,000.

1551 I estimate my [If lives with partner: household's] assets net of debt to be:

1552 [Items based on the following individual wealth quintiles, doubled if lives with
1553 partner. US1, US2: *Less than \$0 (I have a net debt); Close to \$0; Between \$4,000 and*
1554 *\$60,000; Between \$60,000 and \$190,000; More than \$190,000;* For Eu, the thresholds are:
1555 FR: €5/50/150/300k; DE: €0/35/130/280k; ES: €0/50/100/200k; UK: £3/45/115/270k]

1556 15. [US1, US2 (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the vote question)] What

1557 do you consider to be your political affiliation, as of today? [political_affiliation]
1558 *Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other; Non-Affiliated*

1561 [Eu, US1, US2] Global climate scheme

1562 In the following, we describe two policies, on which we will survey your opinion.
1563 To check that you have attentively read the descriptions, **we will ask some under-**
1564 **standing questions afterwards: those who get correct answers can win up to \$150.**

1565 **Global climate scheme:** At the Paris agreement in 2015, all countries have agreed
1566 to contain global warming “well below +2 °C”. To limit global warming to this
1567 level, **there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally.**

1568 To meet the climate target, a limited number of permits to emit greenhouse gases
1569 can be created globally. Polluting firms would be required to buy permits to cover
1570 their emissions. Such a policy would **make fossil fuel companies pay** for their
1571 emissions and progressively raise the price of fossil fuels. **Higher prices would en-**
1572 **courage people and companies to use less fossil fuels, reducing greenhouse gas**
1573 **emissions.**

1574 In accordance with the principle that each human has an equal right to pollute, the
1575 revenues generated by the sale of permits could finance a global basic income. **Each**
1576 **adult in the world would receive [US1, US2: \$30/month; UK: \$30 (that is £25) per**
1577 **month; FR, DE, ES: €30/month], thereby lifting out of extreme poverty the 700 mil-**
1578 **lion people who earn less than \$2/day.**

1579 **The typical [American] would lose out financially [US1, US2: \$85, FR: €10, DE:**
1580 **€25, ES: €5, UK: £20] per month** (as he or she would face [\$115] per month in price
1581 increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive).

1582 The policy could be put in place as soon as countries totaling more than 60% of
1583 global emissions agree on it. Countries that would refuse to take part in the policy
1584 could face sanctions (like tariffs) from the rest of the World and would be excluded
1585 from the basic income.

(Back to Section 2.2)

- 1586 16. Who would win or lose financially in the Global climate scheme? [Figure S5; gcs_win_lose]

1587 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1588 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

1589 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.;*

1590 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

1591 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would lose and*

1594 *the 700 million poorest humans would win* from the Global climate scheme. Now, here
1595 is the second policy:

1596

1597 **National redistribution scheme:**

1598 This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [US1, US2: 5%; Eu: 1%]¹¹ and provide
1599 cash transfers to all adults. More precisely, **each [American] adult would receive**
1600 **[\$85] per month** (that is [\$1,000] per year). This would be financed by an increase
1601 of the federal income tax on household income in excess of [US1, US2: \$315,000 per
1602 year; FR: €15,000 per month; DE: €20,000 per month; ES: €10,000 per month; UK:
1603 £15,000 per month], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000]. [US1,
1604 US2: See more details.]¹²

1605 17. Who would win or lose financially in the National redistribution? [Figure S5; nr_win_lose]

1606

1607

1608 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1609 Typical [Americans] would win and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Ameri-
1610 cans] would win and the richest [Americans] would lose.; Typical [Americans] would lose
1611 and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Americans] would lose and the richest
1612 [Americans] would lose.

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would win and
1614 the richest [Americans] would lose* from the National redistribution scheme.

1615

1616 To help you with the next question, here is a reminder of the policies:

1617

1618 **Global Climate scheme:**

1619 To limit global warming and reach the international climate objective, the Global

¹¹The wider base in the U.S. was chosen because emissions are larger in the U.S. than in Europe, and it would hardly be feasible to offset the median American's loss from the GCS by taxing only the top 1%.

¹²8% of U.S. respondents click. They then see the following text, based on taxjusticenow.org by Saez & Zucman (2019): *The marginal income tax rates would evolve as follows:*

Below \$315,000: unchanged

\$315,000 - \$400,000: current rate 32% => new rate 41%

\$400,000 - \$600,000: 35% => 50%

\$600,000 - \$2.5 million: 37% => 60%

\$2.5 - \$5 million: 37% => 65%

Above \$5 million: 37% => 70%

1620 climate scheme would **impose a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can**
1621 **emit globally.**

1622 It would **make polluters pay** for their emissions, which in turn would increase fos-
1623 sil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities.

1624 The revenues would finance a **global basic income** of [\$30] per month for all hu-
1625 mans, lifting out of extreme poverty the poorest billion people.

1626 Considering the basic income and the fuel price increases, **the typical [American]**
1627 **would lose out financially [\$85] per month.**

1628

1629 **National redistribution scheme:**

1630 This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [5%] and provide cash transfers to
1631 all adults. More precisely, **each [American] would receive [\$85] per month.** This
1632 would be financed by an increase of the federal income tax on household income in
1633 excess of [\$315,000 per year], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000
1634 per year].

- 1635 18. If both the Global climate scheme and the National redistribution scheme are im-
1636 plemented, how would a typical [American] be financially affected? [Figure S5;
1637 both_win_lose]

1638 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1639 *A typical [American] would lose out financially.; A typical [American] would neither gain
1640 nor lose.; A typical [American] would gain financially.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was that *A typical [American] would nei-*
1642 *ther gain nor lose from both schemes combined. [US1, Eu: Now, here are the last two*
1643 *policies:]*

1644

1645 **[US1: Coal exit:**

1646 To reduce CO₂ emissions, this policy would require all U.S. coal power plants to be
1647 phased out by 2030. Coal would be replaced by renewable sources like wind and
1648 solar panels as well as stronger reliance on gas power plants.

1649 *Eu: **Thermal insulation plan:***

1650 To reduce CO₂ emissions and energy insecurity, this policy would require that all
1651 buildings meet energy efficiency targets: at least rating E in 2030 and rating C in
1652 2040. The [UK] government would subsidise half the cost of insulation for all house-

1653 holds, and up to 90% for the poorest households. Insulation work would cost [FR,
1654 DE: €25; ES: €20; UK: £25] billion a year, but would deliver energy savings greater
1655 than this cost.]

1656
1657 [US1: **Marriage only for opposite-sex couples:**

1658 This policy is a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would legally
1659 define marriage as a union of one man and one woman.

1660 **Eu: Death penalty for major crimes:**

1661 This measure would reintroduce capital punishment for major crimes such as ter-
1662 rrorism and mass shootings.]

1663
1664 Now, we will ask your opinion on the [US1, Eu: four] policies.

1665 [Click here for the reminder of the \[US1, Eu: first\] two policies.](#) [Clicking displays the
1666 previous summarized descriptions.]

- 1667 19. [US2] [4 Random branches: control (*nothing*); Question 31 (*field*); Question 32 (*impor-
1668 tant*); or the following question (*info*).] For information, a recent survey has shown
1669 that: [branch_gcs_..., info_support]

- 1670 • 64% of Americans support the Global climate scheme.
1671 • 72% of Americans support the National redistribution scheme.

- 1672 20. Do you support the Global climate scheme? [Figure S3; gcs_support]

1673 Yes; No

- 1674 21. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the
1675 previous question? [Figure ED3; gcs_belief]

1676 The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

1677 Percentage of [Americans] in favor of Global climate scheme [slider from 0 to 100]

- 1678 22. Do you support the National redistribution scheme? [Figure S3; nr_support]

1679 Yes; No

- 1680 23. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the
1681 previous question? [Figure ED3; nr_belief]

1682 The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

1683 Percentage of [Americans] in favor of National redistribution [slider from 0 to 100]

- 1684 24. [Eu, US1] Beware, this question is quite unusual. Among the policies below, **how**
1685 **many** do you support? [Figure S7, Table 1; list_exp]
1686 [Four random branches. Branch GCS/NR/C/O; branch_list_exp]
1687
1688 • Global climate scheme
1689 • National redistribution scheme
1690 • [Coal exit]
1691 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]
1692 0; 1; 2; 3; 4
1693
1694 [Branch GCS/C/O]
1695
1696 • Global climate scheme
1697 • [Coal exit]
1698 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]
1699 0; 1; 2; 3
1700
1701 [Branch NR/C/O]
1702
1703 • National redistribution scheme
1704 • [Coal exit]
1705 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]
1706 0; 1; 2; 3
1707 [Branch C/O]
1708
1709 • [Coal exit]
1710 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]
1711 0; 1; 2
1712

1713 [Eu, US1] Conjoint analyses

- 1714 25. Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you prefer? [Figure
1715 S8; conjoint_crg_cr]

1716 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the
1717 same time.

Bundle A	Bundle B
[Coal exit]	[Coal exit]
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme
Global climate scheme	

1719 1720 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 1721 26. Do you support Bundle A (combining [Coal exit], the National redistribution scheme,
1722 and the Global climate scheme)?[Figure S3; cgr_support]

1723 Yes; No

- 1724 27. [new page] Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you
1725 prefer? [Figure S8; conjoint_b, branch_conjoint_b]

1726 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the
1727 same time.

1728 [Four random branches. Branch C + NR vs. GCS + NR; conjoint_cr_gr]

Bundle A	Bundle B
[Coal exit]	Global climate scheme
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme

1731 [Branch NR vs. NR + C + GCS; conjoint_r_rcg]

Bundle A	Bundle B
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme [Coal exit] Global climate scheme

1734 [Branch NR + GCS vs. NR; conjoint_rg_r]

	Bundle A	Bundle B
1735	National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme
1736	Global climate scheme	

1737 [Branch NR + C vs. NR; conjoint_rc_r]

	Bundle A	Bundle B
1738	National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme
1739	[Coal exit]	

1740 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 1741 28. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and
 1742 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies
 1743 in their platforms.

1744 *Eu: Imagine if [DE, ES, UK: the two favorite candidates in your constituency in the
 1745 next general election; FR: the two candidates in the second round of the next pres-
 1746 idential election] campaigned with the following policies in their party's platforms.]*

1747
 1748 Which of these candidates would you vote for? [Table 2, Figure S8; conjoint_c, branch_conjoint_]
 1749 [Table 2. Two random branches: with and without the final row. The US1 version of the poli-
 1750 cies is given below, see the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the European versions.]

	Democrat	Republican
	Increase corporate income tax rate from 21% to 28%	Decrease the payroll tax
	Coal exit	Permit completion of the Keystone pipeline
1751	Trillion dollar investment in childcare, healthcare, education and housing	Withdrawal of the Paris agreement
	\$15 minimum wage	Marriage only for opposite-sex couples
	National redistribution scheme	Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation
1752	[Global climate scheme / <i>no row</i>]	[/ <i>no row</i>]

1753 [US1: Democrat; Republican; None of them; Eu: Candidate A; Candidate B; None of them]

- 1754 29. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and
 1755 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies
 1756 in their platforms.

1757 *Eu (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the Section “Values and politics”): Imagine that [FR: the left or center-left; DE: a red-red-green coalition; ES: the PSOE; UK: the Labour Party] wins the next [general] elections. Here are two possible platforms on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a pool of credible [FR: left or center-left, DE: left-wing parties'; ES: PSOE; UK: Labour] policies).]*

1763 1764 [US1: Which of these candidates do you prefer?

1765 *Eu: Even if you [FR: are not from the left or center-left; DE: do not support the left-wing parties; ES: do not support the PSOE; UK: do not support the Labour Party], which of these platforms do you prefer?]*

1766 1767 [Figures ED1, S9; see also the sheet “Policies” in [this spreadsheet](#) for the possible policies.;
 1768 conjoint_left_a_b]

	[Candidate A]	[Candidate B]
1770	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]

1771 [US1: Candidate A; Candidate B; Eu: Platform A; Platform B]

- 1772 30. [new page] [Same wording and conditions as above. For brevity, only the UK version
 1773 is given here.; conjoint_left_ag_b] Imagine that the Labour Party wins the next
 1774 general elections. Here are two possible platforms on which it may campaign (the
 1775 policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a pool of credible Labour poli-
 1776 cies).

1777 Even if you do not support the Labour Party, which of these platforms do you pre-
 1778 fer? [Figure ED1]

	Platform A	Platform B
1780	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	Foreign policy	Global climate scheme

1781 Platform A; Platform B

1782 [Eu, US2] Perceptions of the GCS

1783 [Eu: two random branches. US2: four random branches and the question is asked (if asked)

1784 before Question 20; branch_gcs]

- 1785 31. [Branch: field] When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to
 1786 your mind?

1787 Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme. [Figures S11, S12; gcs_field]
 1788 {Open field}

- 1789 32. [Branch: important] When determining your support or opposition to the Global
1790 climate scheme, which points are important to you? [Figure S10; important_...]
- 1791 • It would succeed in limiting climate change.
1792 • It would hurt the [U.S.] economy.
1793 • It would penalize my household.
1794 • It would make people change their lifestyle.
1795 • It would reduce poverty in low-income countries.
1796 • It might be detrimental to some poor countries.
1797 • It could foster global cooperation.
1798 • It could fuel corruption in low-income countries.
1799 • It could be subject to fraud.
1800 • It would be technically difficult to put in place.
1801 • Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences.

1802 *Not at all important; Not so important; Quite important; Very important*

1803 **[Eu, US1] Donation lottery**

1804 US1 Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention). [attention_test]
1805 *Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*

- 1806 33. [*Two random branches*] By taking this survey, you are automatically entered into a
1807 lottery to win [\$]100 in panel points. This lottery is unrelated to the previous ones
1808 that rewarded answers’ accuracy. In a few days you will know whether you have
1809 been selected in the lottery. The payment will be made to you in the same way as
1810 your compensation for this survey, so no further action is required on your part.

1811
1812 Should you be selected in the lottery, you can also donate a part of this additional
1813 compensation to [[American] / African] people living in poverty through [US1: the
1814 charity GiveDirectly. The charity GiveDirectly; Eu: a charity. We would channel this
1815 donation to a charity that] provides small amounts of cash to people in need in [[the
1816 U.S] / Africa].

1817

1818 **In case you are winner of the lottery, what share of the [\$]100 would you donate**
1819 **to [[American] / African] people living in poverty [US1: through GiveDirectly]?**
1820 **[Figure S13, Table ED2; donation, branch_donation]**
1821 *Amount donated to [[American] / African] people in need (in [\$]) [slider from 0 to 100]*

1822 **[Eu, US2] Wealth tax**

1823 *[Four random branches: Question 35 then Question 34 (global_first); Question 34 then Ques-*
1824 *tion 35 (national_first); Question 36 (global_share); Question 37 (sharing); branch_global_tax]*

1825 34. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: afford-
1826 able housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and
1827 schools]? [Figures S3, S14; national_tax_support]

1828 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1829 support*

1830 35. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-
1831 income countries?

1832 Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking
1833 water, healthcare, and education. [Figures S3, S15; global_tax_support]

1834 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1835 support*

1836 36. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all
1837 countries around the world. In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount
1838 to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE: €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2:
1839 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount
1840 to [\$]1 billion in all low-income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700
1841 million people, most of them in Africa).

1842 Each country would retain part of the revenues it collects, and the remaining part
1843 would be pooled at the global level to finance infrastructure and public services in
1844 low-income countries.

1845
1846 What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of re-
1847 tained in the country's national budget)? [Figures ED4, S16; global_tax_global_share]
1848 *Percent of global wealth tax that should go to low-income countries [slider from 0 to 100]*

1849 37. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in
1850 all countries around the world.

1851 In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE:
1852 €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2: 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES:
1853 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount to [\$]1 billion in all low-
1854 income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700 million people, most of
1855 them in Africa).

1856 Which of the following options would you prefer? [Figure S17; global_tax_sharing]

- 1857 • The whole wealth tax financing national budgets in each country. For ex-
1858 ample, in [US2: the U.S., it could finance affordable housing and universal
1859 childcare/pre-K.; Eu-UK: the UK, it could finance the National Health Service
1860 and state-funded schools].
- 1861 • Half of the wealth tax financing national budgets in each country, half of it
1862 financing low-income countries. For example, it could finance [US2: universal
1863 childcare/pre-K in the U.S.; Eu-UK: state-funded schools in the UK] and access
1864 to drinking water, healthcare, and education in Africa.

1865 **[Eu, US2] Foreign aid**

1866 US2 Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention). [attention_test]
1867 *Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*

1868 38. From your best guess, what percentage of [U.S.] government spending is allocated
1869 to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?

1870
1871 For your information, government spending totals [US2: 38%; FR: 55%; DE: 45%; ES:
1872 42%; UK: 41%] of [U.S.] GDP, it includes [US2: federal, State; Eu: national] and local
1873 government spending, and apart from foreign aid, it covers the following items: de-
1874 fense, social security (retirement pensions), health [US2: (including Medicare and
1875 Medicaid)], welfare benefits [US2: (including food stamps and EITC)], education,
1876 roads, justice, other programs [US2: and federal agencies (including in energy, sci-
1877 ence...)]. [Figure S18; foreign_aid_belief]

1878 *Less than 0.1%; 0.1% to 0.2%; 0.3% to 0.5%; 0.6% to 1.0%; 1.1% to 1.7%; 1.8% to 2.6%;
1879 2.7% to 4%; 4.1% to 6%; 6.1% to 9%; 9.1% to 13%; 13.1% to 25%; More than 25%*

- 1880 39. [Two random branches: with or without information on actual amount] [Info: Actually,
1881 [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [the U.S.] government spend-
1882 ing is allocated to foreign aid.]

1883

1884

If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate
1885 to foreign aid? [Figures S21, S22, S19 and S20; foreign_aid_preferred, branch_foreign_aid_pre

- 1886 40. [Asked iff branch: Info and preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than actual for-
1887 eign aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to increase [U.S.] foreign
1888 aid.

1889

1890

How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers
1891 possible) [Figure S23; foreign_aid_raise_how_...]

1892

Lower spending on defense; Lower spending on retirement pensions; Lower spending on
1893 healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Lower spending on welfare benefits [US2: (like
1894 EITC or food stamps)]; Lower spending on education; Lower spending on other programs
1895 [US2: and federal agencies]; Higher taxes on the wealthiest; Higher corporate income tax
1896 rate; Higher personal income tax rates; Higher public deficit

1897

1898

41. [Asked iff branch: Info and preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than actual foreign
aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to reduce [U.S.] foreign aid.

1899

1900

How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible) [Fig-
1901 ure S24; foreign_aid_reduce_how_...]

1902

1903

Higher spending on defense; Higher spending on retirement pensions; Higher spending on
1904 healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Higher spending on welfare benefits [US2:
1905 (like EITC or food stamps)]; Higher spending on education; over spending on other pro-
1906 grams [US2: and federal agencies]; Lower taxes on the wealthiest; Lower corporate income
tax rate; Lower personal income tax rates; Lower public deficit

1907

[Eu, US1] Petition

1908

1909

42. [Two random branches] Would you be willing to sign a petition for the [Global climate
/ National redistribution] scheme? [Figure S25; branch_petition, petition, petition_gcs]

1910

1911

As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President's

1912 office], informing him what share of American people are willing to endorse the
1913 [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign,
1914 only your answer here is required and remains anonymous.) Yes; No

1915 **[Eu, US1] Other policies**

1916 43. The following policies are discussed at international negotiations on how to deal
1917 with climate change. [Figures 3 and S26; variables_climate_policies]

1918
1919 Do you support or oppose the following policies?

- 1920 • Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for
1921 climate damages [climate_compensation_support]
1922 • High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries [climate_mitigat
1923 • High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income
1924 countries adapt to climate change [climate_adaptation_support]

1925 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1926 support*

1927 44. Do you support or oppose the following global policies? [Figures 3 and S26; variables_global_pol

- 1928 • Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt [debt_cancellation_support]
1929 • Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting
1930 right proportional to its population [democratise_un_imf_support]
1931 • Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries [remove_tariffs_support]
1932 • A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage [global_min_wage_support]
1933 • Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of
1934 all assets [global_register_support]
1935 • A maximum wealth limit of [US1: \$10 billion; Eu: [€]100 million] for each
1936 human [cap_wealth_support]

1937 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1938 support*

1939 45. Currently, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [U.S.] govern-
1940 ment spending (that is, [US1: 0.2%; FR: 0.4%; DE: 0.6%; ES: 0.2%; UK: 0.7%] of [U.S.]
1941 GDP) is spent on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries. [Figure
1942 [ED5](#); [foreign_aid_raise_support](#)]

1943

1944 Do you support [the U.S.] transferring more money to low-income countries?
1945 *Yes, [U.S.] foreign aid should be increased.; Yes, but only if some conditions are met.; No,*
1946 *[U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.; No, [U.S.] foreign aid should be reduced.*

1947 46. [Asked only if *Yes, but only if some conditions are met.* is chosen] What conditions
1948 should be required for [the U.S.] to increase its foreign aid? (Multiple answers pos-
1949 sible) [Figures [ED6](#), [S21](#); [foreign_aid_condition_...](#)]
That recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights.; That recipient

1950 *countries cooperate to fight illegal migrations.; That other high-income countries also in-*
1951 *crease their foreign aid.; That this is financed by increased taxes on millionaires.; That we*
1952 *can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted.; Other: [open field]*

1954 47. [Asked only if *No, [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.* or *No, [U.S.] foreign aid*
1955 *should be reduced.* is chosen] Why do you oppose [the U.S.] increasing its foreign
1956 aid? (Multiple answers possible) [Figure [ED7](#); [foreign_aid_no_](#)]
Aid perpetuates poverty as it makes people feel less responsible for themselves.; Aid is not

1957 *effective as most of it is diverted.; Aid is a pressure tactic for high-income countries that*
1958 *prevents low-income countries from developing freely.; [The U.S.] is not responsible for what*
1959 *happens in other countries.; Charity begins at home: there is already a lot to do to support*
1960 *the American people in need.; Other: [open field]*

1962 **[Eu, US1, US2] Values and politics**

1963 48. [Eu (where it is instead asked at the beginning of Section “Other Policies”), US1]
1964 In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend
1965 [U.S.] interests or global justice? [Figure [S27](#); [negotiation](#)]
[U.S.] interests, even if it goes against global justice; [U.S.] interests, to the extent it re-
1966 *spects global justice; Indifferent or don’t know; Global justice, to the extent it respects [U.S.]*
1967 *interests; Global justice, even if it goes against [U.S.] interests*

1968 49. How much did you give to charities in 2022? [Figure [S32](#); [donation_charities](#)]

1970 *I did not make donations to charities last year.; Less than [\$]100.; Between [\$]101 and*
1971 *[\$]500.; Between [\$]501 and [\$]1,000.; Between [\$]1,001 and [\$]5,000.; More than [\$]5,000.*

1972 50. To what extent are you interested in politics? [Figure S33; interested_politics]
1973 *Not at all; A little; Moderately; A lot; A great deal*

1974 51. Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means you think
1975 the government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic
1976 government functions, and 5 means you think the government should take active
1977 steps in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens? [Figure S34;
1978 involvement_govt]

1979 *Desired involvement of government [slider from 1 to 5]*

1980 52. **On economic policy matters**, where do you see yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where
1981 1 is Left (favoring equality and government interventions) and 5 is Right (favoring
1982 free competition and little government intervention)? [Figure S35; left_right]
1983 *Left (1) to Right (5) on economic issues [slider from 1 to 5]*

1984 53. Did you vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election? [Figure S36; vote_participation]
1985 *Yes; No: I didn't have the right to vote in the U.S.; Prefer not to say*

1986 54. [If voted: Which candidate did you vote for in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election?
1987 If did not vote: Even if you did not vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election,
1988 please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who
1989 represents your views more closely.] [Figure S37; vote_factor, voted]
1990 *[US1, US2: Biden; Trump; Jorgensen; Hawkins; Prefer not to say*

1991 FR: candidates at the 2022 presidential election

1992 DE: parties with more than 1% of votes at the 2021 federal election and *Other*

1993 ES: lists with more than 0.9% at the November 2019 general election and *Other*

1994 UK: parties with more than 0.5% of votes at the 2019 general election and *Other*]

1995 55. To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem? [Figure S28; variables_problem]

- 1996 • Income inequality in [the U.S.] [problem_inequality]
- 1997 • Climate change [problem_climate]
- 1998 • Global poverty [problem_poverty]

1999 *Not an important issue for me; An issue but there are other priorities; An issue but we already do what we can; An important issue, we should do more; One of the most pressing issue of our time*

2002 56. What group do you defend when you vote? [Figure S29; group_defended]
2003 *Sentient beings (humans and animals); Humans; [Eu: Europeans]; [Americans]; People sharing my culture or religion; [US1, US2: My State]; [US1, US2: My town; Eu: My country, region or town]; My relatives and/or colleagues; My family and myself*

2006 **[Eu, US1] Prioritization**

2007 57. In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

2009
2010 How do you allocate the points among the following policies? [Figures S30 and S31;
2011 points_foreign1_gcs, points_...]

2012
2013 You can adjust the number of points either using the slider or entering the number of your choice on the right-hand-side. **The sum of points must equal exactly 100**. By pushing the last slider to the right, the total will automatically adjust to 100.
2014 Please read the 6 options before making your choice.

2015
2016 See the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the pool of policies in each country.
2017 [sliders from 0 to 100]

2019 **[FR, DE, ES] ETS2**

2020 58. Similar to the Global Climate Scheme, the European Climate Scheme would impose a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit across the EU in the buildings and transport sectors. It would make polluters pay for their emissions, which in turn would increase fossil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities. Several options are possible regarding the use of the scheme's revenues:

- 2021
2022
2023
2024
- 2025 • Provide an equal cash transfer of €105 per year to each European.
 - 2026 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European, proportional to their country's emissions: people in countries with higher emissions per person (like Germany) would receive more than people in countries with lower emissions

2029 (like Romania). For information, people in [Germany] would receive €[FR:
2030 110; DE: 130; ES: 90]/year.

- 2031 • Finance low-carbon investments: thermal insulation of buildings, switch to
2032 clean sources of heating, public transportation, and charging stations for elec-
2033 tric vehicles.
- 2034 • Provide cash transfers to the most vulnerable half of Europeans and finance
2035 low-carbon investments.

2036 Do you support or oppose the European Climate Scheme in case the revenue is used
2037 to...? [Fig. 1 in [Funke et al. \(2024\)](#); variables_ets2_support]

- 2038 • Provide an equal cash transfer to each European [ets2_equal_cash_support]
2039 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European [ets2_country_cash_support]
2040 • Finance low-carbon investments [ets2_investments_support]
2041 • Provide cash transfers for the most vulnerable Europeans and low-carbon in-
2042 vestments [ets2_vulnerable_investments_support]

2043 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
2044 *support*

2045 59. [Asked iff none of the four variants of the European Climate Scheme is (somewhat or
2046 strongly) supported] Why do you not support a European Climate Scheme? (Mul-
2047 tiple answers possible) [ets2_no_...]

2048 *I am opposed to climate policy being decided at the EU level, it should be decided at the na-*
2049 *tional level;*

2050 *I would prefer if the revenues were used in a different way (beyond the four suggestions*
2051 *above) than previously suggested;*

2052 *I would prefer if decreasing carbon emissions were regulated by other climate policies;*

2053 *I am generally opposed to additional, or more ambitious, climate policies;*

2054 *I do not fully understand how the European Climate Scheme is supposed to work;*

2055 *I don't know*

2056 **[Eu, US1, US2] Feedback**

2057 60. Do you feel that this survey was politically biased? [Figure S38; survey_biased]

2058 *Yes, left-wing biased; Yes, right-wing biased; No, I do not feel it was biased*

- 2059 61. [US2 Asked only to one random third of the respondents, instead of the feedback Question 62] According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme
2060 poverty in low-income countries? [Figure S39; poverty_field, branch_poverty_field]
2061 {Open field}
2062
- 2063 62. The survey is nearing completion. You can now enter any comments, thoughts or
2064 suggestions in the field below. [comment_field]
2065 {Open field}
- 2066 63. Lastly, are you interested to be interviewed by a researcher (through videoconfer-
2067 encing) for 30 min?
- 2068
- 2069 This is totally optional and will not be rewarded. [interview]
2070 Yes; No

2071 E Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme

2072 To specify the GCS, we use the IEA's 2DS scenario (IEA 2017), which is consistent
2073 with limiting the global average temperature increase to 2°C with a probability of at least
2074 50%. The paper by Hood (2017) contributing to the Report of the High-Level Commission
2075 on Carbon Prices (Stern & Stiglitz 2017) presents a price corridor compatible with this
2076 emissions scenario, from which we take the midpoint. The product of these two series
2077 provides an estimate of the revenues expected from a global carbon price. We then use
2078 the UN median scenario of future population aged over 15 years (*adults*, for short). We
2079 derive the basic income that could be paid to all adults by recycling the revenues from
2080 the global carbon price: evolving between \$20 and \$30 per month, with a peak in 2030.
2081 Accounting for the lower price levels in low-income countries, an additional income of
2082 \$30 per month would allow **670 million people** to escape extreme poverty, defined with
2083 the threshold of \$2.15 per day in purchasing power parity.¹³

2084 To estimate the increase in fossil fuel expenditures (or “cost”) in each country by 2030,
2085 we make a key assumption concerning the evolution of the carbon footprints per adult:
2086 that they will decrease by the same proportion in each country. We use data from the
2087 Global Carbon Project (Peters et al. 2012). In 2030, the average carbon footprint of a
2088 country c , e_c , evolves from baseline year b proportionally to the evolution of its adult
2089 population $\Delta p_c = p_c^{2030} / p_c^b$. Thus, the global share of country c 's carbon footprint, s_c ,
2090 is proportional to $\sigma_c = e_c \Delta p_c$, and as countries' shares sum to 1, $s_c = \frac{\sigma_c}{\sum_k \sigma_k}$. Multiplying
2091 country c 's emission share with global revenues in 2030, R , and dividing by c 's adult pop-
2092 ulation in year y , yields its average cost per adult: $R \cdot s_c / p_c^y$. Using findings from Ivanova
2093 & Wood (2020) for Europe and Fremstad & Paul (2019) for the U.S., we approximate the
2094 median cost as 90% of the average cost. Finally, the net gain is given by the basic income
2095 (\$30 per month) minus the cost. We provided consistent estimates of net gains in all sur-
2096 veys (using $y = b = 2015$), though in the global survey we gave the average net gains
2097 vs. the median ones in the Western surveys. The latter are shown in Figure S42. For the
2098 record, Table S1 also provides an estimate of *average* net gains (computed with $b = 2019$)

¹³The average carbon footprint of Sub-Saharan Africa is 0.75tCO₂ per capita (World Bank), and it is even lower for people living in extreme poverty, under one tenth of the world average of about 5tCO₂ per capita (Chancel & Piketty 2015). Under a GCS with a cash transfer of \$30 per person, if one's emission is one tenth of the world average, their net gain would be \$27 per month in nominal terms. In regions with extreme poverty like Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding high-income countries), the conversion factor from Market Exchange Rate to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is 2.4 (computed as the ratio of the World Bank series relating the GDP per capita of Sub-Saharan Africa in PPP and nominal). Therefore, the net gain for the extreme poor is \$65 per month (or \$2.13 a day) in PPP, enough to lift them out of extreme poverty.

²⁰⁹⁹ and $y = 2030$).¹⁴

²¹⁰⁰ Estimates of the net gains from the Global Climate Scheme are necessarily imprecise,
²¹⁰¹ given the uncertainties surrounding the carbon price required to achieve emissions
²¹⁰² reductions as well as each country's trajectory in terms of emissions and population. These
²¹⁰³ values are highly dependent on future (non-price) climate policies, technical progress,
²¹⁰⁴ and economic growth of each country, which are only partially known. Integrated As-
²¹⁰⁵ sessment Models have been used to derive a Global Energy Assessment (Johansson et al.
²¹⁰⁶ 2012), a 100% renewable scenario (Greenpeace 2015) as well as Shared Socioeconomic
²¹⁰⁷ Pathways (SSPs), which include consistent trajectories of population, emissions, and car-
²¹⁰⁸ bon price Bauer et al. (2017), Fricko et al. (2017), Riahi et al. (2017), van Vuuren et al.
²¹⁰⁹ (2017). Instead of using some of these modelling trajectories, we relied on a simple and
²¹¹⁰ transparent formula, for a number of reasons. First and foremost, those trajectories de-
²¹¹¹ scribe territorial emissions while we need consumption-based emissions to compute the
²¹¹² incidence of the GCS. Second, the carbon price is relatively low in trajectories of SSPs that
²¹¹³ contain global warming below 2°C (less than \$35/tCO₂ in 2030), so we conservatively
²¹¹⁴ chose a method yielding a higher carbon price (\$90 in 2030). Third, modelling results are
²¹¹⁵ available only for a few macro regions, while we wanted country by country estimates.
²¹¹⁶ Finally, we have checked that the emissions per capita given by our method are broadly
²¹¹⁷ in line with alternative methods, even if it tends to overestimate net gains in countries
²¹¹⁸ which will decarbonize less rapidly than average.¹⁵ For example, although countries' de-
²¹¹⁹ carbonization plans should realign with the GCS in place, India might still decarbonize
²¹²⁰ less quickly than the European Union, so India's gain and the EU's loss might be over-
²¹²¹ estimated in our computations. For a more sophisticated version of the Global Climate
²¹²² Scheme which includes participation mechanisms preventing middle-income countries
²¹²³ (like China) to lose from it and estimations of the Net Present Value by country, see Fabre
²¹²⁴ (2023).

(Back to Section 2.3)

¹⁴2015 was the last year of data available when the global questionnaire was conceived (OECD data was then used – it does not cover all countries but give identical rounded estimates than those recomputed from the Global Carbon Project data for our Western surveys). 2030 was chosen as the reference year as it is the date at which global carbon price revenues are expected to peak (and the GCS redistributive effects would be largest), and the GCS could not realistically enter into force before that date. In the surveys, we chose $y = b = 2015$ rather than $b = 2019$ and $y = 2030$ to get more conservative estimates of the monthly cost in the U.S. (\$20 higher than the other option) and in Europe (€5 or £10 higher).

¹⁵Computations with alternative methods can be found on [our public repository](#).

Figure S42: Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme.




Table S1: Estimated net gain from the GCS in 2030 and carbon footprint by country.

	Mean net gain from the GCS (\$/month)	CO ₂ footprint per adult in 2019 (tCO ₂ /y)			
Mexico			2	5.6	
Ukraine			2	5.6	
Uzbekistan*			4	5.1	
Argentina			5	4.9	
Thailand			6	4.6	
Egypt			12	3.6	
Indonesia			13	3.3	
Colombia			15	3.0	
Saudi Arabia	-93	24.0	Brazil	15	2.9
United States	-77	21.0	Vietnam	15	2.9
Australia	-60	17.6	Peru	16	2.8
Canada	-56	16.7	Morocco	16	2.7
South Korea	-50	15.6	North Korea*	17	2.5
Germany	-30	11.7	India	18	2.4
Russia	-29	11.5	Philippines	18	2.3
Japan	-28	11.3	Pakistan	22	1.6
Malaysia	-21	10.0	Bangladesh	24	1.1
Iran	-19	9.5	Nigeria	25	1.0
Poland	-19	9.5	Kenya	25	0.9
United Kingdom	-18	9.4	Myanmar*	26	0.9
China	-14	8.6	Sudan*	26	0.9
Italy	-13	8.4	Tanzania	27	0.5
South Africa	-11	8.0	Afghanistan*	27	0.5
France	-10	7.8	Uganda	28	0.4
Iraq*	-8	7.4	Ethiopia	28	0.3
Spain	-6	7.0	Venezuela	29	0.3
Turkey	-2	6.2	DRC*	30	0.1
Algeria*	-1	6.0			

²¹²⁵ Note: Asterisks denote countries where footprint is missing and territorial emissions is used instead.

²¹²⁶ Values differ from Figure S42 as this table present estimates of *mean* net gain per adult in 2030, not at the

²¹²⁷ present. Only the countries with more than 20 million adults (covering 87% of the global total) are shown.

F Determinants of support

Table S2: Determinants of support for the Global Climate Scheme. (Back to [2.3](#))

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme						
	All	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Country: Germany	-0.157*** (0.022)		-0.144*** (0.022)				
Country: Spain	-0.044* (0.024)		-0.026 (0.024)				
Country: United Kingdom	-0.079*** (0.024)		-0.104*** (0.023)				
Country: United States	-0.375*** (0.019)						
Income quartile: 2	0.037** (0.017)	0.031 (0.022)	0.038 (0.023)	0.047 (0.043)	0.058 (0.049)	0.013 (0.053)	0.023 (0.043)
Income quartile: 3	0.042** (0.017)	0.033 (0.024)	0.049** (0.024)	0.080** (0.040)	0.059 (0.052)	0.074 (0.056)	-0.052 (0.052)
Income quartile: 4	0.056*** (0.018)	0.063** (0.026)	0.010 (0.026)	0.018 (0.047)	-0.015 (0.055)	-0.001 (0.056)	-0.005 (0.057)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.023* (0.012)	0.033* (0.017)	0.010 (0.018)	0.007 (0.029)	0.045 (0.039)	0.007 (0.039)	-0.010 (0.039)
Age: 25-34	-0.076*** (0.025)	-0.083*** (0.031)	-0.044 (0.035)	-0.031 (0.057)	-0.077 (0.083)	-0.050 (0.066)	-0.103 (0.091)
Age: 35-49	-0.101*** (0.024)	-0.108*** (0.030)	-0.069* (0.034)	-0.094* (0.055)	-0.009 (0.077)	-0.168** (0.070)	-0.050 (0.090)
Age: 50-64	-0.137*** (0.024)	-0.164*** (0.030)	-0.038 (0.035)	-0.039 (0.056)	-0.020 (0.082)	-0.146** (0.067)	-0.017 (0.087)
Age: 65+	-0.116*** (0.028)	-0.140*** (0.034)	-0.056 (0.044)	0.003 (0.076)	-0.045 (0.094)	-0.258*** (0.091)	0.011 (0.105)
Gender: Man	0.019* (0.011)	0.023 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.029)	-0.018 (0.033)	0.042 (0.038)	-0.005 (0.034)
Lives with partner	0.029** (0.013)	0.022 (0.017)	0.058*** (0.018)	0.070** (0.033)	0.082** (0.038)	0.017 (0.038)	0.040 (0.039)
Employment status: Retired	-0.020 (0.024)	-0.047 (0.030)	0.056 (0.038)	0.087 (0.081)	0.096 (0.075)	0.040 (0.082)	0.001 (0.073)
Employment status: Student	0.045 (0.033)	0.063 (0.048)	0.101** (0.044)	0.165* (0.085)	0.192** (0.087)	0.116 (0.074)	-0.021 (0.107)
Employment status: Working	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.021 (0.024)	0.011 (0.028)	0.082 (0.064)	0.006 (0.056)	-0.050 (0.056)	0.036 (0.051)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.331*** (0.013)	-0.435*** (0.017)	-0.106*** (0.019)	-0.131*** (0.035)	-0.004 (0.044)	-0.114*** (0.038)	-0.081* (0.041)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	-0.184*** (0.016)	-0.198*** (0.022)	-0.136*** (0.021)	-0.196*** (0.039)	-0.034 (0.043)	-0.116** (0.046)	-0.108*** (0.040)
Vote: Far right	-0.396*** (0.032)		-0.309*** (0.033)	-0.493*** (0.064)	-0.168*** (0.051)	-0.130 (0.102)	-0.314*** (0.080)
Urban	0.049*** (0.012)	0.074*** (0.018)	0.006 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.029)	0.019 (0.032)	-0.014 (0.036)	0.017 (0.033)
Race: White		-0.030 (0.019)					
Region: Northeast		0.009 (0.023)					
Region: South		0.011 (0.020)					
Region: West		0.011 (0.022)					
Swing State		-0.019 (0.017)					
Constant	1.048	0.729	0.89	0.7	0.732	0.935	0.886
Observations	7,986	4,992	2,994	977	727	748	542
R ²	0.160	0.180	0.064	0.116	0.067	0.043	0.063

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table S3: Support for the GCS regressed on comprehension of its financial effects.

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme					
	All	United States	France	Germany	United Kingdom	Spain
With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win	0.029** (0.012)	-0.004 (0.016)	0.043 (0.033)	0.051 (0.033)	0.040 (0.036)	0.038 (0.037)
Constant	0.596	0.53	0.764	0.677	0.707	0.796
Observations	8,000	5,000	729	979	749	543
R ²	0.001	0.00001	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.002

Table S4: Correlation between (*Somewhat or Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in high-income countries.

	Support for a global GHG tax and dividend											
	USA (1)	DNK (2)	FRA (3)	DEU (4)	ITA (5)	ESP (6)	GBR (7)	JPN (8)	POL (9)	AUS (10)	CAN (11)	KOR (12)
Control group mean	0.34	0.409	0.34	0.361	0.341	0.421	0.288	0.317	0.309	0.294	0.316	0.334
Trusts the government	0.040*** (0.013)	0.0005 (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.051*** (0.011)	0.061*** (0.012)	0.046*** (0.011)	0.050*** (0.012)	0.039*** (0.013)	0.023** (0.011)	0.041*** (0.013)	0.019 (0.012)	0.079*** (0.013)
Believes inequality is an important problem	0.038*** (0.014)	0.051*** (0.012)	0.045*** (0.013)	0.040*** (0.011)	0.023** (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.052*** (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)	0.009 (0.010)	0.005 (0.013)	0.031*** (0.012)	0.024** (0.012)
Worries about CC	0.006 (0.018)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.005 (0.016)	0.048*** (0.014)	0.023* (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.044*** (0.015)	0.014 (0.014)	0.018 (0.013)	0.036** (0.017)	0.004 (0.014)	0.015 (0.013)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	0.009 (0.015)	0.007 (0.012)	0.018 (0.014)	0.015 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.012)	0.032** (0.011)	0.027** (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.024** (0.014)	0.018 (0.015)	0.014 (0.014)	0.001 (0.013)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.059*** (0.015)	0.019 (0.013)	0.008 (0.014)	0.032** (0.013)	0.012 (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.006 (0.014)	0.037** (0.014)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.033** (0.016)	0.026* (0.014)	0.033** (0.013)
Understands emission across activities/regions	-0.018 (0.011)	0.009 (0.013)	0.003 (0.012)	0.023* (0.012)	0.007 (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.007 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.026** (0.011)	-0.002 (0.013)	0.003 (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	0.007 (0.012)	0.008 (0.014)	0.023 (0.014)	0.011 (0.012)	-0.0005 (0.012)	0.031*** (0.012)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.014 (0.011)	0.025* (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.024* (0.012)
Knows which gases cause CC	0.005 (0.011)	0.021* (0.012)	0.010 (0.013)	0.001 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.010)	0.020* (0.010)	0.015 (0.010)	0.017 (0.011)	0.011 (0.011)	-0.0003 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.013)
Understands impacts of CC	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.029*** (0.011)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.022* (0.012)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.024* (0.012)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	-0.005 (0.013)	0.007 (0.012)	0.021 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.014)	0.011 (0.014)	0.010 (0.013)	0.014 (0.013)	0.008 (0.013)	0.015 (0.013)	0.036** (0.016)	0.004 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.013)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	-0.013 (0.021)	0.037 (0.023)	0.043* (0.022)	-0.014 (0.020)	-0.038** (0.019)	0.029 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.017 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.006 (0.022)	0.021 (0.020)	-0.020 (0.019)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.086*** (0.024)	0.066*** (0.023)	0.075*** (0.023)	0.094*** (0.022)	0.105*** (0.020)	0.074*** (0.023)	0.091*** (0.021)	0.154*** (0.019)	0.089*** (0.020)	0.070*** (0.024)	0.053** (0.023)	0.112*** (0.020)
Believes own household would lose	-0.071*** (0.021)	-0.057*** (0.015)	-0.026 (0.020)	-0.087*** (0.017)	-0.066*** (0.017)	-0.053*** (0.017)	-0.073*** (0.017)	-0.008 (0.017)	-0.079*** (0.017)	-0.052*** (0.016)	-0.060*** (0.019)	-0.083*** (0.017)
Believes low-income earners will lose	-0.034* (0.019)	-0.020 (0.016)	-0.056*** (0.018)	-0.022 (0.017)	-0.021 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.016)	-0.015 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.056*** (0.017)	-0.025 (0.016)	-0.030 (0.020)	-0.056*** (0.018)
Believes high-income earners will lose	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.012)	0.013 (0.013)	0.003 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.007 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.025** (0.012)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.0004 (0.013)
Observations	2,218	2,013	2,006	2,006	2,088	2,268	2,025	1,990	2,053	1,978	2,022	1,932
R ²	0.329	0.241	0.237	0.295	0.211	0.216	0.272	0.222	0.214	0.272	0.254	0.228

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 of Dechezleprêtre et al. (forthcoming) for variable definitions.

Table S5: Correlation between (*Somewhat* or *Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in middle-income countries.

	Support for a global GHG tax and dividend							
	IDN (1)	ZAF (2)	MEX (3)	TUR (4)	IND (5)	BRA (6)	CHN (7)	UKR (8)
Control group mean	0.697	0.396	0.681	0.44	0.719	0.539	0.737	0.622
Trusts the government	0.051*** (0.012)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.040*** (0.014)	0.066*** (0.017)	0.065*** (0.015)	0.038** (0.015)	-0.011 (0.015)	0.061*** (0.014)
Believes inequality is an important problem	0.048** (0.011)	0.002 (0.014)	0.057*** (0.014)	0.028 (0.017)	0.092*** (0.016)	0.055*** (0.015)	-0.001 (0.015)	0.027 (0.018)
Worries about CC	0.003 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.016)	0.013 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.017)	-0.0002 (0.016)	0.032* (0.017)	-0.0002 (0.016)	0.046*** (0.016)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	0.020 (0.014)	0.026 (0.017)	0.004 (0.014)	0.039** (0.017)	0.022 (0.016)	0.019 (0.015)	0.034** (0.016)	0.018 (0.016)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.020* (0.011)	0.038** (0.016)	0.032* (0.017)	-0.002 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.015)	-0.017 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.018 (0.016)
Understands emission across activities/regions	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.013)	0.003 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.010)	0.039*** (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.00004 (0.013)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	-0.006 (0.009)	0.011 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.016)	0.0002 (0.012)	0.003 (0.014)	-0.052*** (0.016)	0.022 (0.014)
Knows which gases cause CC	-0.026*** (0.009)	0.019 (0.015)	0.035** (0.014)	0.015 (0.015)	0.020 (0.013)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.023* (0.012)	0.023 (0.015)
Understands impacts of CC	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.0005 (0.015)	0.009 (0.017)	0.043*** (0.014)	-0.023 (0.015)	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.014 (0.014)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	-0.010 (0.007)	0.009 (0.016)	0.015 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.013)	0.002 (0.011)	-0.016 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.010)	0.035** (0.015)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	0.023 (0.015)	0.002 (0.021)	0.019 (0.022)	0.044 (0.029)	0.021 (0.020)	0.032 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.018)	-0.023 (0.025)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.111*** (0.019)	0.073*** (0.022)	0.088*** (0.024)	0.078** (0.031)	0.034 (0.025)	0.129*** (0.022)	0.060*** (0.022)	0.138*** (0.025)
Believes own household would lose	-0.027 (0.021)	-0.044** (0.020)	-0.071*** (0.019)	-0.054** (0.024)	-0.012 (0.019)	-0.067*** (0.023)	-0.119*** (0.022)	-0.045** (0.021)
Believes low-income earners will lose	-0.059*** (0.020)	-0.016 (0.019)	0.003 (0.017)	-0.053** (0.023)	-0.055*** (0.019)	-0.013 (0.020)	0.001 (0.018)	0.004 (0.020)
Believes high-income earners will lose	0.026** (0.011)	-0.020 (0.015)	0.010 (0.013)	0.010 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.014)	0.003 (0.016)	-0.047*** (0.014)	-0.007 (0.013)
Observations	2,488	2,003	2,045	1,932	2,472	1,860	1,717	1,564
R ²	0.366	0.175	0.242	0.248	0.370	0.272	0.280	0.255

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 of Dechezleprêtre et al. (forthcoming) for variable definitions.

²¹²⁹ **G Representativeness of the surveys**

Table S6: Sample representativeness of the Western surveys. (Back to [2.1](#))

	US1			US2			Eu		
	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample
Sample size		3,000	3,000		2,000	2,000		3,000	3,000
Gender: Woman	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.45	0.50	0.51	0.49	0.51
Gender: Man	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.49	0.55	0.50	0.49	0.51	0.49
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.11	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.18	0.15	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.18	0.15	0.17	0.15
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.24	0.26
Age: 65+	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.25	0.23	0.25
Diploma_25_64: Below upper secondary	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.13	0.14	0.13
Diploma_25_64: Upper secondary	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.28	0.23	0.19	0.23
Diploma_25_64: Post secondary	0.34	0.40	0.34	0.34	0.33	0.34	0.29	0.33	0.29
Race: White only	0.60	0.67	0.61	0.60	0.62	0.61			
Race: Hispanic	0.18	0.15	0.19	0.18	0.19	0.19			
Race: Black	0.13	0.16	0.14	0.13	0.17	0.14			
Region: Northeast	0.17	0.20	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.17			
Region: Midwest	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.21			
Region: South	0.38	0.39	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38			
Region: West	0.24	0.20	0.24	0.24	0.20	0.24			
Urban: TRUE	0.73	0.78	0.74	0.73	0.75	0.73			
Employment_18_64: Inactive	0.20	0.16	0.16	0.20	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.15
Employment_18_64: Unemployed	0.02	0.07	0.08	0.02	0.09	0.08	0.03	0.06	0.05
Vote: Left	0.32	0.47	0.45	0.32	0.46	0.45	0.30	0.32	0.32
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.32	0.32
Vote: Far right							0.10	0.10	0.10
Country: FR							0.24	0.24	0.24
Country: DE							0.33	0.33	0.33
Country: ES							0.18	0.18	0.18
Country: UK							0.25	0.25	0.25
Urbanity: Cities							0.43	0.49	0.43
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs							0.33	0.32	0.33
Urbanity: Rural							0.25	0.20	0.25

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

Table S7: Sample representativeness for each European country. (Back to [2.1](#))

	FR			DE			ES			UK		
	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.									
Sample size		729	729		979	979		543	543		749	749
Gender: Woman	0.52	0.50	0.52	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.53	0.51	0.50	0.43	0.50
Gender: Man	0.48	0.50	0.48	0.49	0.48	0.49	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.50	0.57	0.50
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.29	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.19	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.19	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.33	0.25	0.25	0.18	0.25	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.14	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.07	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.12	0.16	0.12	0.17	0.20	0.17
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.31	0.24	0.22	0.26	0.22	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.24	0.18	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.24	0.19	0.24	0.28	0.23	0.28	0.27	0.28	0.27	0.25	0.30	0.25
Age: 65+	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.26	0.21	0.26	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.24
Diploma_25-64: Below upper secondary	0.11	0.19	0.11	0.10	0.14	0.10	0.24	0.16	0.25	0.12	0.09	0.12
Diploma_25-64: Upper secondary	0.26	0.16	0.26	0.27	0.20	0.27	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.21	0.23	0.21
Diploma_25-64: Post secondary	0.26	0.30	0.26	0.29	0.31	0.29	0.28	0.38	0.27	0.33	0.36	0.33
Urbanity: Cities	0.47	0.52	0.47	0.37	0.47	0.37	0.52	0.58	0.52	0.40	0.41	0.40
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.40	0.35	0.40	0.22	0.27	0.22	0.42	0.43	0.42
Urbanity: Rural	0.34	0.29	0.34	0.23	0.18	0.23	0.26	0.15	0.26	0.18	0.16	0.18
Employment_18-64: Inactive	0.20	0.19	0.18	0.15	0.14	0.11	0.20	0.13	0.12	0.16	0.16	0.17
Employment_18-64: Unemployed	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.11	0.12	0.02	0.03	0.04
Vote: Left	0.23	0.19	0.21	0.37	0.44	0.44	0.33	0.37	0.38	0.25	0.28	0.29
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.26	0.30	0.29	0.28	0.27	0.29	0.18	0.24	0.24	0.36	0.44	0.41
Vote: Far right	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.01	0.03	0.03

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. In this Table, weights are defined at the country level. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

²¹³⁰ Similar tables for the global surveys can be found in [Dechezleprêtre et al. \(forthcoming\)](#).
²¹³¹ [ing](#).

²¹³² H Attrition analysis

Table S8: Attrition analysis for the US1 survey.

	Dropped out	Dropped out after socio-eco	Failed attention test	Duration (in min)	Duration below 4 min
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mean	0.08	0.059	0.082	21.198	0.016
Income quartile: 2	0.025*** (0.010)	0.025*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.740 (3.064)	-0.009 (0.006)
Income quartile: 3	0.062*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.754 (2.813)	-0.004 (0.007)
Income quartile: 4	0.035*** (0.011)	0.035*** (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-3.917 (2.798)	-0.003 (0.007)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.039*** (0.009)	0.039*** (0.009)	-0.000*** (0.000)	1.544 (2.665)	0.006 (0.006)
Age: 25-34	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.597 (2.604)	-0.031** (0.013)
Age: 35-49	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.824 (3.176)	-0.032** (0.013)
Age: 50-64	-0.060*** (0.015)	-0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	5.723** (2.763)	-0.039*** (0.012)
Age: 65+	0.048*** (0.017)	0.048*** (0.017)	0.000** (0.000)	8.952** (4.267)	-0.047*** (0.012)
Gender: Man	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.451 (2.210)	-0.0001 (0.005)
Urban	0.006 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.888** (2.443)	-0.004 (0.006)
Race: Black	0.020** (0.010)	0.020** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	8.554*** (2.600)	0.004 (0.007)
Race: Hispanic	0.021** (0.010)	0.021** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.119* (2.293)	-0.002 (0.007)
Region: Northeast	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-4.862 (4.782)	-0.004 (0.007)
Region: South	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-1.151 (4.710)	-0.004 (0.006)
Region: West	0.006 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-4.000 (4.305)	-0.003 (0.007)
Vote: Biden	-0.048*** (0.008)	-0.048*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-2.901 (2.379)	-0.009 (0.007)
Vote: Trump	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.145 (2.878)	-0.005 (0.008)
Observations	5,719	5,719	3,252	3,044	3,044
R ²	0.127	0.127	1.000	0.006	0.017

Table S9: Attrition analysis for the US2 survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 4 min (5)
Mean	0.095	0.074	0.092	16.338	0.052
Income quartile: 2	0.023* (0.013)	0.023* (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	1.352 (1.601)	-0.029** (0.014)
Income quartile: 3	0.054*** (0.014)	0.054*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	8.502 (9.649)	-0.009 (0.016)
Income quartile: 4	0.060*** (0.016)	0.060*** (0.016)	-0.000 (0.000)	5.254 (3.376)	0.0003 (0.017)
Diploma: Post secondary	-0.033*** (0.011)	-0.033*** (0.011)	0.000 (0.000)	1.601 (2.630)	0.012 (0.011)
Age: 25-34	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.929 (1.535)	-0.032 (0.024)
Age: 35-49	0.012 (0.014)	0.012 (0.014)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.076 (6.651)	-0.047** (0.022)
Age: 50-64	0.040*** (0.014)	0.040*** (0.014)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.364 (1.565)	-0.079*** (0.022)
Age: 65+	0.115*** (0.017)	0.115*** (0.017)	-0.000*** (0.000)	2.619 (3.150)	-0.095*** (0.022)
Gender: Man	-0.073*** (0.009)	-0.073*** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	4.707 (6.037)	0.010 (0.010)
Urban	0.019* (0.011)	0.019* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	1.766 (1.135)	0.005 (0.012)
Race: Black	0.060*** (0.015)	0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.673 (13.328)	-0.010 (0.015)
Race: Hispanic	0.079*** (0.014)	0.079*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	2.930 (1.813)	-0.027** (0.012)
Region: Northeast	-0.026* (0.014)	-0.026* (0.014)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.837 (2.855)	-0.011 (0.015)
Region: South	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.000 (0.000)	3.220 (5.002)	0.009 (0.014)
Region: West	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.000 (0.000)	-1.759 (1.942)	-0.009 (0.015)
Vote: Biden	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	3.230 (2.731)	-0.006 (0.014)
Vote: Trump	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.554 (1.272)	0.007 (0.016)
Observations	2,973	2,973	2,280	2,103	2,103
R ²	0.241	0.241	1.000	0.010	0.031

Table S10: Attrition analysis for the *Eu* survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 6 min (5)
Mean	0.067	0.044	0.151	54.602	0.039
Country: Germany	0.023** (0.010)	0.019** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.533 (18.906)	0.019* (0.010)
Country: Spain	-0.102*** (0.011)	-0.098*** (0.011)	0.000* (0.000)	-29.136* (15.948)	0.010 (0.010)
Country: United Kingdom	0.042*** (0.011)	0.043*** (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-7.458 (18.046)	0.010 (0.010)
Income quartile: 2	0.032*** (0.010)	0.029*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	32.749* (19.771)	-0.015 (0.010)
Income quartile: 3	0.049*** (0.010)	0.047*** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	6.130 (11.734)	-0.021** (0.010)
Income quartile: 4	0.024** (0.011)	0.021* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.659 (19.955)	-0.018* (0.011)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.035*** (0.008)	0.034*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	10.647 (12.959)	-0.007 (0.007)
Age: 25-34	0.028** (0.013)	0.025* (0.013)	-0.000*** (0.000)	36.132 (22.285)	-0.005 (0.018)
Age: 35-49	0.064*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	-0.000*** (0.000)	37.159** (17.190)	-0.013 (0.016)
Age: 50-64	0.085*** (0.013)	0.083*** (0.013)	-0.000 (0.000)	48.363** (22.526)	-0.063*** (0.015)
Age: 65+	0.117*** (0.014)	0.115*** (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	36.351** (14.226)	-0.061*** (0.015)
Gender: Man	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-22.980 (14.093)	0.009 (0.007)
Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs	0.006 (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-16.736 (17.256)	0.004 (0.008)
Degree of urbanization: Rural	0.023** (0.009)	0.023** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	-14.593 (19.733)	-0.001 (0.009)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.025*** (0.005)	-0.025*** (0.005)	0.000*** (0.000)	-17.558 (13.143)	0.019** (0.008)
Vote: Far right	0.005 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.000*** (0.000)	15.838 (32.281)	0.029** (0.014)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	0.023*** (0.006)	0.022*** (0.005)	0.000 (0.000)	24.631 (19.824)	0.030*** (0.010)
Observations	3,963	3,963	3,326	3,115	3,115
R ²	0.406	0.395	1.000	0.006	0.028

²¹³³ I Balance analysis

Table S11: Balance analysis.

	List contains: G (1)	Branch petition: NR (2)	Branch donation: Own nation (3)	Branch conjoint 3: with GCS (4)
Mean	0.493	0.492	0.5	0.497
Country: Germany	-0.026 (0.026)	0.017 (0.026)	0.020 (0.026)	0.005 (0.026)
Country: Spain	0.025 (0.030)	0.026 (0.030)	0.026 (0.030)	0.043 (0.030)
Country: United Kingdom	0.002 (0.028)	0.018 (0.028)	0.037 (0.028)	0.063** (0.028)
Country: United States	-0.001 (0.024)	0.019 (0.024)	0.007 (0.024)	0.023 (0.024)
Income quartile: 2	-0.013 (0.021)	-0.024 (0.021)	0.012 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.021)
Income quartile: 3	0.021 (0.022)	-0.005 (0.022)	0.011 (0.022)	-0.004 (0.022)
Income quartile: 4	-0.001 (0.023)	-0.017 (0.023)	-0.013 (0.023)	0.0001 (0.023)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.008 (0.016)	0.014 (0.016)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.016)
Age: 25-34	0.023 (0.031)	-0.049 (0.031)	-0.003 (0.031)	-0.009 (0.031)
Age: 35-49	0.032 (0.030)	-0.002 (0.030)	-0.014 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.030)
Age: 50-64	0.030 (0.030)	-0.005 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.030)	-0.020 (0.030)
Age: 65+	0.029 (0.037)	-0.037 (0.037)	-0.015 (0.037)	-0.012 (0.037)
Gender: Man	0.024 (0.015)	0.012 (0.015)	0.002 (0.015)	-0.016 (0.015)
Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.0005 (0.017)	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.011 (0.017)
Degree of urbanization: Rural	0.013 (0.024)	0.017 (0.024)	-0.004 (0.024)	0.027 (0.024)
Employment status: Retired	-0.005 (0.032)	-0.031 (0.032)	-0.034 (0.032)	-0.016 (0.032)
Employment status: Student	0.005 (0.044)	-0.023 (0.044)	-0.033 (0.044)	-0.025 (0.044)
Employment status: Working	0.010 (0.024)	-0.027 (0.024)	-0.033 (0.024)	-0.012 (0.024)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.004 (0.017)	0.003 (0.017)	0.010 (0.017)	0.002 (0.017)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	0.001 (0.019)	0.014 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.019)	-0.012 (0.019)
Vote: Far right	0.009 (0.034)	0.030 (0.034)	0.023 (0.035)	0.038 (0.034)
Observations	5,991	5,991	5,991	5,991
R ²	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.003

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

²¹³⁴ **J Placebo tests**

Table S12: Placebo tests.

	G+R+C preferred to R+C (1)	Supports G+R+C (2)	Signs petition (3)	Share of policies supported (4)	Conjoint 5 A+CGS preferred to B (5)
Mean	0.642	0.63	0.612	0.532	0.591
Branch of list experiment: 1	-0.013 (0.019)	-0.024 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.018 (0.021)
Branch of list experiment: rgl	0.005 (0.019)	0.006 (0.019)	-0.002 (0.019)	0.001 (0.012)	0.010 (0.021)
Branch of list experiment: rl	-0.009 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.019)	0.022 (0.019)	0.007 (0.012)	0.007 (0.021)
Branch of petition: nr	0.011 (0.014)	0.006 (0.014)	0.022 (0.014)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.015)
Poor is in own country	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.014)	0.015 (0.014)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.020 (0.015)
Observations	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	5,218
R ²	0.0004	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

²¹³⁵ **K Main results on the extended sample**

²¹³⁶ As a robustness check, we reproduce our main results on the extended sample that in-
²¹³⁷ cludes the 14% respondents who failed the attention check or rushed through the survey
²¹³⁸ ($n = 9,318$). These results are non-weighted. They closely match the results in our main
²¹³⁹ specification. For example, the support for the GCS is 54% in the U.S. and 75% in Europe,
²¹⁴⁰ while the same coefficients are significant for the list experiment.

Figure S43: [Extended sample] Main attitudes.

(Relative support —unless *— in percent in Questions 20, 35, 44, 45, 48)

(Back to Section 2.6)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Support for the GCS	54	75	78	70	81	75
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	68	83	81	84	87	81
Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries*	52	52	45	60	59	44
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	47	62	57	62	65	65
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	69	82	80	82	86	80
[Country]'s foreign aid should be increased	32	55	53	61	59	45
Universalist*	43	41	35	49	44	36

Figure S44: [Extended sample] Influence of the GCS on preferred platform:

Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question 30; in the U.S., asked only to non-Republicans.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Random programs: A+GCS preferred to B	59	60	61	59	64	58

Table S13: [Extended sample] Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list. The tacit support for the GCS is estimated by regressing the number of supported policies on the presence of the GCS in the list of policies. The social desirability is estimated as the difference between the tacit and stated support, and it is not significantly different from zero even at a 20% threshold (see [Methods](#)).

	Number of supported policies		
	All	U.S.	Europe
List contains: GCS	0.624*** (0.028)	0.524*** (0.041)	0.724*** (0.036)
<i>Support for GCS</i>	0.655	0.554	0.754
<i>Social desirability bias</i>	-0.026	-0.018	-0.034
<i>80% C.I. for the bias</i>	[-0.06; 0.01]	[-0.07; 0.04]	[-0.08; 0.01]
Constant	1.317	1.147	1.486
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000
R ²	0.089	0.065	0.125

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table S14: [Extended sample] Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. ([Question 28](#))

	Prefers the Progressive platform					
	All	United States	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
GCS in Progressive platform	0.022* (0.013)	0.015 (0.018)	0.116*** (0.037)	-0.007 (0.032)	0.028 (0.038)	0.012 (0.037)
Constant	0.628	0.629	0.55	0.682	0.721	0.553
Observations	5,638	2,797	671	883	550	737
R ²	0.001	0.0002	0.014	0.0001	0.001	0.0001

Note: Simple OLS model. *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples. *p < 0.1;
p < 0.05; *p < 0.01.

₂₁₄₁ **L Effect of questionnaire framing**

₂₁₄₂ When comparing the samples *US1* and *US2*, we observe no effect of questionnaire
₂₁₄₃ framing (or block sequence) on the question “What group do you defend when you
₂₁₄₄ vote?”, common to all waves and placed close to the end of the questionnaire (Table S15).

Table S15: Effect of the wave (*US1* vs. *US2*) on the group defend when voting.
“What group do you defend when you vote?” (Question 56)

	Group defended when voting		
	Humans or Sentient beings	Fellow citizens	Family and self
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Wave: <i>US2</i>	−0.009 (0.014)	0.009 (0.014)	0.010 (0.011)
Mean	0.432	0.335	0.156
Observations	5,000	5,000	5,000
R ²	0.0001	0.0001	0.0002

Note: Simple OLS model. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

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