

A Global Climate Plan

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Introduction

Meeting the 2°C target

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A yearly **cap on global emissions**

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This Global Climate Scheme garners majority support in the 20 countries surveyed.

Questionnaires

Support for the Global Climate Scheme

International surveys with a focus on the West

Global survey (02/2021–02/2022):


20 countries; 2,000 respondents per country; median duration: 28 min.

Complementary surveys (01–04/2023):

Eu: 3,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, UK; 20 min.

US1: 3,000 respondents from the U.S.; 14 min.


US2: 2,000 respondents from the U.S.; 11 min.



Stated support


Global survey: Global policies are strongly supported.

Share of support (somewhat or strongly) for the main global policies among non-indifferent.




Level at which climate policies are needed (Multiple choice question)

Global




Global climate policies (5-Likert scale)

Global carbon budget (+2°C) divided in tradable country shares



Burden sharing preferences for the global carbon budget (5-Likert)

Emission share should be in proportion to population*



The Global Climate Scheme (GCS)

Our main policy of interest is the GCS, a **global emissions trading system funding a global basic income**:

At the Paris agreement in 2015, all countries have agreed to contain global warming “well below +2 °C”. To limit global warming to this level, **there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally**.


To meet the climate target, a limited number of permits to emit greenhouse gases can be created globally. Polluting firms would be required to buy permits to cover their emissions. Such a policy would **make fossil fuel companies pay** for their emissions and progressively raise the price of fossil fuels. **Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions.**

In accordance with the principle that each human has an equal right to pollute, the revenues generated by the sale of permits could finance a global basic income. **Each adult in the world would receive \$30/month**, thereby lifting out of extreme poverty the 700 million people who earn less than \$2/day.

The typical [American] would lose out financially [\$85] per month (as he or she would face [\$115] per month in price increases, which is higher than the \$30 they would receive).

The policy could be put in place as soon as countries totaling more than 60% of global emissions agree on it. Countries that would refuse to take part in the policy could face sanctions (like tariffs) from the rest of the World and would be excluded from the basic income.

Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme



Support for the Global Climate Scheme

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Do you support...? Yes/No (Percentage of Yes) ▶ Perceptions ▶ Complementary policies ▶ By vote

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)	54	76	80	71	81	74
National redistribution scheme (NR)	56	73	77	66	79	75
National climate policy + GCS + NR	52	74	79	69	81	70

Stated support for other global redistribution policies

Support for other global policies

Do you support or oppose...? 5-Likert scale (Percentage of Support among non-Indifferent)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	55	71	72	70	79	70
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	68	82	82	82	85	81
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	60	76	77	79	79	71
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	46	53	53	43	62	61
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	58	71	69	69	78	72
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	62	73	58	73	80	83
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	63	80	80	78	81	83
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	62	87	90	86	91	87
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	46	62	58	62	65	67
National tax on millionaires	73	85	81	87	89	88
Global tax on millionaires	69	84	84	84	87	83


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
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Whether half of the tax revenues should go to low-income countries (vs. none).



⇒ Median Eu preference is 30% of global wealth tax for low-income countries.

Sincerity of the support for the GCS

Petition

Would you be willing to sign a petition for the [GCS / NR]?

As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to the [head of state] (...) Yes/No

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Petition for the GCS	51	69	69	66	78	69
(Comparable) support for the GCS	53	76	81	74	81	74
Petition for NR	57	67	65	66	74	68
(Comparable) support for NR	58	72	76	65	78	75

Willingness to sign a real-stake petition is generally (1 to 7 p.p.) lower than stated support.

But this is not specific to GCS, and majorities are still willing to sign the petition.

List experiment

We ask *Among the policies below, how many do you support?*, randomly varying the list of policies.

The difference in mean number of supported policies for lists with and without the GCS should equal the support for GCS. If the tacit support is lower, it may indicate a social desirability bias.

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	Number of supported policies		
	All	US	Europe
List contains: GCS	0.624*** (0.028)	0.524*** (0.041)	0.724*** (0.036)
<i>Support for GCS</i>	0.65	0.542	0.757
<i>Social desirability bias</i>	-0.026	-0.018	-0.033
<i>80% C.I. for the bias</i>	[-0.06; 0.01]	[-0.07; 0.01]	[-0.08; 0.01]
Constant	1.317	1.147	1.486
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000
R ²	0.089	0.065	0.125

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

⇒ No (significant) social desirability bias.

Conjoint analyses: influence on electoral prospects

Choice between a conservative platform and a progressive platform with/without the GCS.

Imagine if the two favorite candidates in your constituency in the next general election campaigned with the following policies in their party's platforms.

Which of these candidates would you vote for?

Candidate A	Candidate B
Windfall tax on oil companies	Cut the burden of tax on business
Ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030	£100 billion for infrastructures like road and rail
£150 billion to upgrade schools, hospitals, care homes and council houses	Tougher sentencing for the worst offenders and 10,000 more prison places
National redistribution scheme	Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation
Global climate scheme	

Candidate A

Candidate B

None of them

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None of them

Conjoint analyses: influence on electoral prospects

Table 1: Imagine if the [Democratic and Republican presidential candidates in 2024] campaigned with the following policies in their platforms. [Credible Progressive and Conservative platforms]
Which of these candidates would you vote for? *A; B; None of them*
[FR: second round of presidential; DE, ES, UK: two favorite candidates in one's constituency]

	Prefers the Progressive platform					
	All	United States	France	Germany	UK	Spain
GCS in Progressive platform	0.028* (0.014)	0.029 (0.022)	0.112*** (0.041)	0.015 (0.033)	0.008 (0.040)	-0.015 (0.038)
Constant	0.623	0.604	0.55	0.7	0.551	0.775
Observations	5,202	2,619	605	813	661	504
R ²	0.001	0.001	0.013	0.0003	0.0001	0.0003

Note: The 14% of *None* answers have been excluded from the regression samples. GCS has no significant influence on them.

A progressive candidate would not lose votes by endorsing the GCS, and could even gain 11 p.p.*** in France.


Conjoint analyses: influence on preferred platform

We ask the preference between two progressive platforms, where each measure is taken at random. The GCS is included in one of the platforms.

Imagine that a [Left or Center-left coalition wins the next elections]. Here are two possible platforms on which [the coalition] may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a pool of credible [Left/Center-left] policies).

Even if you do not support the Left, which of these platforms do you prefer?

[FR: Left or center-left; DE: rot-rot-grüne; ES: PSOE; UK: Labour; US: Democratic primary (*not asked to Republican*)]



Random programs: A+GCS preferred to B

58 60 61 59 65 58

⇒ Majorities prefer platforms that include the GCS.

Conjoint analyses: influence on preferred platform (UK)

► EU ► FR ► U.S.

Imagine that the Labour wins the next elections. Here are two possible platforms on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a pool of credible Labour policies).

(...) which of these platforms do you prefer?

Climate policy:

- Ban of most polluting vehicles in city centers (low-emission zones)
- Thermal insulation plan
- Ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030

Economic issues:

- £150 billion to upgrade schools, hospitals, care homes and council houses
- Real Living Wage of £11 per hour for all workers aged 16 and over
- Reduce the average full-time weekly working hours to 32
- Re-establish neighbourhood policing and recruit 2,000 more frontline officers

Foreign policy:


- Global climate scheme
- Global tax on millionaires
- Global democratic assembly on climate change
- Doubling foreign aid

Societal issues:

- Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation
- Legalization of cannabis

Tax system:

- National redistribution scheme
- Wealth tax



Second-order beliefs

Belief about the support

Beliefs on the support for the GCS are relatively accurate:

no evidence of pluralistic ignorance in the U.S.

an underestimation by 15-20 p.p. in Eu.

According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer *Yes* to the previous question?

The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$50]. *Mean answer*

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Belief about GCS	52	59	61	56	63	57
Support for the GCS	54	76	80	71	81	74
Belief about NR	55	58	60	53	62	59
Support for NR	56	73	77	66	79	75

Universalist values

Donation to Africans vs. fellow citizens

Respondents might win a \$/€/£ lottery prize, they have to decide which share to donate if they win.
Donation is to people in need, either in Africa or in their own country (random treatment).

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Table 2: (...) In case you are winner of the lottery, what share of the [\$]100 would you donate to [African / [own country]] people living in poverty through GiveDirectly?

	Donation to poor people (in %)		
	All	US	Eu
Poor is in own country	0.590 (0.867)	2.509* (1.300)	-1.349 (1.146)
Constant	33.739	32.422	35.093
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000
R ²	0.0001	0.002	0.0005

⇒ U.S. non-voters and Trump voters donate 5 to 6 p.p. more to fellow citizens, others give the same amount.
Other results on universalism: ▶ Prioritization ▶ Negotiations ▶ Group defended ▶ Global issues

Wrapping up

1. Across the world, people are ready for international solidarity

- ▶ Consensus on the allocation key of emissions permits: equal per capita
- ▶ Majorities support global climate policies, including with transfers detrimental to their countries

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- ▶ Majorities are willing to sign a real-stake petition for the GCS
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Alternative explanations for the mismatch are needed

- ▶ National bias in power structures (elections, media) and mental structures (hymns, sport teams)?
- ▶ Pluralistic ignorance of the elites? ⇒ Ongoing survey on European Members of Parliament
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- ▶ Ideas whose time has come, and just lack some advocacy? ⇒ I launched a new association:



Global Redistribution Advocates

The Global Climate Plan (GCP)

An old idea

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
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Carattini et al. (2019) find support of $\approx 80\%$ in India and $\approx 50\%$ in the U.S., UK, Australia for a global tax and dividend.


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
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② A global basic income that eradicates extreme poverty.

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
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The unadjusted distributive effects

Distributive effects of the Global Climate Scheme in 2030.



Participation mechanisms

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
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A provision to avoid anti-redistributive effects.

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
The distributive effects

Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan in 2030.




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The distributive effects

Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan throughout the century.



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A global democratic climate assembly would be the ideal forum for climate governance.

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Satellite internet access might soon become cheap and ubiquitous (Hanson 2016).

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Ideal timeline: negotiation, consultations up to 2030, phase-in between 2030 and 2035.

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Market design: Carbon offsets should not be allowed. Borrowing and banking emissions permits should be limited.

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
Appendix

Additional results

Conditions for increased foreign aid ▶ Perceptions


[Info on actual amount]. Do you support [the U.S.] transferring more money to low-income countries?

■ No, should be reduced ■ No, should remain stable ■ Yes, but at some conditions ■ Yes, should be increased




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


[If *at some conditions*] What conditions should be required for [the U.S.] to increase its foreign aid?




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People want to help people (not oligarchs) and to foster climate action and human rights.


National preference is the main reason behind not wanting increased foreign aid.

Preferences over public spending

► Perceptions

Your previous answer shows that you would like to increase [UK] foreign aid.


How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers possible)



People want better public services and higher taxes on the wealthiest.

Your previous answer shows that you would like to reduce [UK] foreign aid.

How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible)



Support for increased foreign aid

[» Go back](#)

Actual, perceived and preferred amount of foreign aid, with random info (or not) on actual amount. (*Mean*)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Actual foreign aid (in % of public spending)	0.4	1.1	0.8	1.3	0.5	1.7
Belief about foreign aid	4.7	2.9	2.7	2.9	2.8	3.5
Preferred foreign aid (with info)	1.8	2.7	3.4	2.9	2.1	2.5
Preferred foreign aid (no info)	4	3.9	4.7	4.4	3.1	3.4

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Support for increased foreign aid: from previous question, and directly asked (with info).

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as current	70	75	91	76	77	57
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as perceived	57	74	83	79	77	58
Supports increasing foreign aid (incl. with conditions)	60	64	63	68	69	56


Actual foreign aid is overestimated.

Majorities support more foreign aid.

Perceptions of the Global Climate Scheme

[Go back](#)

When determining your support or opposition to the Global climate scheme, which points are important to you?



Conjoint analyses: interaction with other policies [» Go back](#)

National climate policy (C) is as supported as the GCS, but no substitute for it.

Support for the GCS does not increase when complemented by National Redistribution.


⇒ Confirms that the **monetary loss is not a primary concern** for one's attitude toward the GCS.

Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you prefer?

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)	54	76	80	71	81	74
NR+GCS preferred to NR	55	77	79	74	79	77
C+NR+GCS preferred to C+NR	55	74	79	71	78	68
NR+C preferred to NR	62	84	88	83	84	82
GCS+NR preferred to C+NR	47	52	53	53	49	52

Conjoint analyses: influence on preferred platform (Eu) [» Go back](#)

(...) Even if you do not support the Left, which of these platforms do you prefer?



Europeans prefer platforms that include the GCS and without the ban on thermal cars (a planned policy).

The effect of GCS is among the highest (wealth tax, better public services, higher minimum wage).

Conjoint analyses: influence on preferred platform (France) [▶ Go back](#)

France shows that there can be a **mismatch between preferred policies** (insulation plan, public services, global tax, GCS) **and enacted policies** (higher retirement age and ban on thermal cars: the least preferred).

Imaginez que la gauche ou le centre gauche gagne les prochaines élections en 2027. Voici deux programmes possibles sur lesquels elle pourrait faire campagne (...), lequel de ces programmes préférez-vous ?

Climat:

Interdiction des véhicules les plus polluants dans les centres-villes (ZFE)

Plan pour l'isolation thermique

Interdiction de la vente de voitures thermiques neuves d'ici 2030

Économie:

Versement du RSA aux 18-25 ans sans emploi

SMIC à 1600€ net par mois

Recul de l'âge légal de départ à la retraite à 65 ans

Hausse de 20% du financement de l'hôpital public et de l'Éducation nationale

Politique étrangère:

Plan mondial pour le climat

Taxe mondiale sur les millionnaires

Assemblée démocratique mondiale sur le changement climatique

Doubler l'aide au développement des pays à faibles revenus

Démocratie:


Élection des députés à la proportionnelle

Référendum d'Initiative Citoyenne (RIC)

Fiscalité:

Plan de redistribution nationale

Rétablissement de l'impôt sur la fortune (ISF)



Conjoint analyses: influence on preferred platform (US)

[Go back](#)

Endorsing the GCS is not determinant to gain the Democratic primary.

[Only on non-Republican] Imagine that at the 2024 Democratic party presidential primaries, the two main candidates campaign with the following key policies in their platforms.

Which of these candidates do you prefer?

Climate policy:

Ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030

Coal exit

Trillion dollar investment in clean transportation infrastructure and building insulation

Economic issues:

\$15 minimum wage

Funding affordable housing

Student loan forgiveness

Universal childcare/pre-K

Foreign policy:

Doubling foreign aid

Global climate scheme

Global democratic assembly on climate change

Global tax on millionaires

Societal issues:

Expanding the Supreme Court

Handgun ban


Making abortion a right at the federal level

Tax system:

Increase corporate income tax rate from 21% to 28%

National redistribution scheme

Wealth tax



“you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

How do you allocate the points among the following policies?”
[6 policies taken at random]

GCS is as prioritized as the average policy, or even more in France and Germany.

It is more prioritized than some planned climate policies, like the ban on thermal cars.

The global tax on millionaires is among the most prioritized measures. It is prioritized as a national wealth tax, if not more.

Most prioritized are better public services and a higher minimum wage.

Prioritization

[Go back](#)


Mean number of points

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	13	21	10	14	35	31
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	23	22	25	21	22	23
econ3	21	15	13	18	17	13
econ4	28	22	27	17	24	20
soc1	10	17	13	17	12	21
soc2	13	9	14	8	10	8
climate1	14	15	11	18	20	12
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	20	18	22	19	15	17
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030	11	9	8	8	9	11
tax1: National redistribution scheme	14	15	16	15	15	15
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	19	19	21	18	17	19
foreign1: Global climate scheme	15	20	20	23	16	17
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	21	20	20	23	19	20
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	15	15	15	17	14	13
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	9	11	13	14	9	8

International climate negotiations

[» Go back](#)

In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend [U.S.] interests or global justice?




The typical answer is to defend one's country's "interests, to the extent it respects global justice."
Only one eighth wants to defend one's country's "interests, even if it goes against global justice."

Group defended

[» Go back](#)

What group do you defend when you vote?




The most defended group is one's fellow citizens.

40% are universalist, i.e. defend all humans or sentient beings.

Biggest issues

[Go back](#)

To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem? *5-Likert scale*
(Mean of answers recoded in [-2, +2])




People rank these the importance of these 3 issues as follows:

1. Climate change
2. Global poverty
3. Income inequality in their country

Eu questionnaire

[Go back](#)



Descriptive statistics

Main attitudes by vote


[Go back](#)

Main attitudes by vote (“Right” spans from Center-right to Far right). (Relative support in percent)


	Europe Left	Europe PNR/Non-voter	Europe Right	U.S. Left	U.S. PNR/Non-voter	U.S. Right
Support for the GCS	85	72	71	74	53	26
Global tax on millionaires	94	83	76	85	71	40
Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries	61	52	45	55	67	41
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	73	65	52	62	49	23
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	93	79	74	87	70	38
[Country]'s foreign aid should be increased	93	83	72	92	81	48
Universalist	56	48	26	53	49	23

OECD

Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “[country] should take measures to fight climate change.” [► Go back](#)




At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be put in place? (Multiple answers are possible) [► Go back](#)




How should [country] climate policies depend on what other countries do?

If other countries do more, [country] should do... [▶ Go back](#)




How should [country] climate policies depend on what other countries do?

If other countries do less, [country] should do... [▶ Go back](#)



[Question non posée aux U.S., au Danemark et en France] All countries have signed the Paris agreement that aims to contain global warming “well below +2 °C”. To limit global warming to this level, there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally, called the carbon budget. Each country could aim to emit less than a share of the carbon budget. To respect the global carbon budget, countries that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less than their share.

Do you support such a policy? [► Go back](#)



[*Question not asked in the U.S., Denmark and France, answers to a similar question are displayed]


Suppose the above policy is in place. How should the carbon budget be divided among countries?

The emission share of a country should be proportional to its population, so that each human has an equal right to emit.; The emission share of a country should be proportional to its current emissions, so that those who already emit more have more rights to emit.; Countries that have emitted more over the past decades (from 1990 onwards) should receive a lower emission share, because they have already used some of their fair share.; Countries that will be hurt more by climate change should receive a higher emission share, to compensate them for the damages.

Percentage of support (somewhat or strong) among: *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support* ▶ [Go back](#)


	High-income Australia	Canada	Denmark*	France*	Germany	Italy	Japan	Poland	South Korea	Spain	United Kingdom	United States*	Middle-income	Brazil	China	India	Indonesia	Mexico	South Africa	Turkey	Ukraine	
Emission share should be in proportion to population*	63	62	59	55	71	55	68	53	65	66	62	67	72	65	76	75	73	71	75	71	63	
Emission share should be in proportion to current emissions	35	35	35	NA	NA	29	33	39	37	42	35	30	NA	50	41	65	60	62	40	38	55	31
Countries that have emitted more since 1990 should receive a lower share*	44	42	45	28	54	45	51	42	44	48	48	42	41	58	56	65	67	63	47	53	58	52
Countries that will be hurt more by CC should receive a higher share*	44	42	39	41	51	37	42	51	53	43	48	38	41	63	58	74	72	70	54	61	60	47

Do you support or oppose establishing a global democratic assembly whose role would be to draft international treaties against climate change? Each adult across the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly. [► Go back](#)




Imagine the following policy: a global tax on greenhouse gas emissions funding a global basic income. Such a policy would progressively raise the price of fossil fuels (for example, the price of gasoline would increase by [40 cents per gallon] in the first years). Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Revenues from the tax would be used to finance a basic income of [\$30] per month to each human adult, thereby lifting the 700 million people who earn less than \$2/day out of extreme poverty. The average British person would lose a bit from this policy as they would face [\$130] per month in price increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive.

Do you support or oppose such a policy? ▶ [Go back](#)



Do you support or oppose a tax on all millionaires around the world to finance low-income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate action? This would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education. ▶ Go back



Synthèse : Pourcentage de réponses positive (e.g. Plutôt/Très favorable). ▶ Go back

	High-income	Australia	Canada	Denmark*	France*	Germany	Italy	Japan	Poland	South Korea	Spain	United Kingdom	United States*	Middle-income	Brazil	China	India	Indonesia	Mexico	South Africa	Turkey	Ukraine
Level of climate policies needed: global	85	78	87	81	85	88	92	94	88	86	88	88	70	85	88	87	78	86	88	90	82	76
Level of climate policies needed: federal/continental	46	67	58	48	37	48	30	NA	40	NA	40	47	52	48	48	61	67	50	41	42	41	24
Level of climate policies needed: state/national	44	54	50	45	27	45	28	50	38	65	34	53	41	42	36	32	59	35	26	53	58	35
Level of climate policies needed: local	36	48	45	33	26	37	24	35	37	41	30	43	35	35	35	29	50	24	28	42	41	27
If other do more, [country] should do more	46	50	53	40	37	42	52	59	36	35	44	49	55	63	65	67	73	71	57	60	71	32
If other do less, [country] should do more	56	55	57	54	47	51	74	62	57	44	64	53	58	76	74	69	75	82	80	78	79	60
Global carbon budget (+2°C) divided in tradable country shares	62	57	64	NA	NA	52	69	50	59	71	71	66	NA	74	69	78	78	77	76	71	68	76
Emission share should be in proportion to population*	63	62	59	55	71	55	68	53	65	66	66	62	67	72	65	76	75	73	71	75	71	63
Emission share should be in proportion to current emissions	35	35	35	NA	NA	29	33	39	37	42	35	30	NA	50	41	65	60	62	40	38	55	31
Countries that have emitted more since 1990 should receive a lower share*	44	42	45	28	54	45	51	42	44	48	48	42	41	58	56	65	67	63	47	53	58	52
Countries that will be hurt more by CC should receive a higher share*	44	42	39	41	51	37	42	51	53	43	48	38	41	63	58	74	72	70	54	61	60	47
Global democratic assembly on climate change	57	52	54	51	55	56	68	61	63	57	68	53	48	75	64	86	77	78	76	70	72	73
Global tax on GHG financing a global basic income	34	29	32	41	34	36	34	32	31	33	42	29	34	61	54	74	72	70	68	40	44	62
Global tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries	64	58	67	55	65	65	72	64	62	65	75	65	53	78	73	86	80	83	78	71	73	83

Synthèse : Pourcentage de réponses positive (e.g. *Plutôt/Très favorable*) parmi les non *indifférents*. [▶ Go back](#)

	High-income	Australia	Canada	Denmark*	France*	Germany	Italy	Japan	Poland	South Korea	Spain	United Kingdom	United States*	Middle-income	Brazil	China	India	Indonesia	Mexico	South Africa	Turkey	Ukraine
Level of climate policies needed: global	85	78	87	81	85	88	92	94	88	86	88	70	85	88	87	78	86	88	90	82	76	
Level of climate policies needed: federal/continental	46	67	58	48	37	48	30	NA	40	NA	40	47	52	48	48	61	67	50	41	42	41	24
Level of climate policies needed: state/national	44	54	50	45	27	45	28	50	38	65	34	53	41	42	36	32	59	35	26	53	58	35
Level of climate policies needed: local	36	48	45	33	26	37	24	35	37	41	30	43	35	35	35	29	50	24	28	42	41	27
If other do more, [country] should do more	88	84	91	87	88	82	91	92	82	90	89	90	87	91	89	95	86	94	92	89	93	80
If other do less, [country] should do more	88	82	86	91	87	82	95	91	89	90	91	85	86	93	93	93	89	96	97	93	92	87
Global carbon budget (+2°C) divided in tradable country shares	84	79	85	NA	NA	74	89	82	81	92	85	90	NA	90	82	95	89	95	92	90	88	88
Emission share should be in proportion to population*	88	87	87	90	90	85	91	84	89	91	89	88	87	91	84	96	91	94	92	93	90	85
Emission share should be in proportion to current emissions	54	55	53	NA	NA	47	46	63	57	68	49	48	NA	69	53	86	77	88	56	55	77	46
Countries that have emitted more since 1990 should receive a lower share*	72	69	73	57	80	76	80	69	71	75	74	72	68	82	79	92	86	91	75	73	81	74
Countries that will be hurt more by CC should receive a higher share*	71	71	68	62	74	67	71	84	80	72	75	68	59	84	78	95	90	91	77	81	83	69
Global democratic assembly on climate change	81	74	80	77	82	76	90	88	85	85	88	77	71	91	84	97	88	96	94	89	87	93
Global tax on GHG financing a global basic income	49	41	44	57	51	52	55	53	47	53	50	40	49	79	76	92	88	91	83	54	60	77
Global tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries	82	74	84	72	86	83	90	88	80	89	86	85	73	92	86	98	92	97	93	89	87	94

Principales des attitudes sur les politiques mondiales

Pourcentage de réponses positive (e.g. Plutôt/Très favorable). [► Go back](#)

	High-income	Australia	Canada	Denmark*	France*	Germany	Italy	Japan	Poland	South Korea	Spain	United Kingdom	United States*	Middle-income	Brazil	China	India	Indonesia	Mexico	South Africa	Turkey	Ukraine
Level of climate policies needed: global	85	78	87	81	85	88	92	94	88	86	88	88	70	85	88	87	78	86	88	90	82	76
Global carbon budget (+2°C) divided in tradable country shares	62	57	64	NA	NA	52	69	50	59	71	71	66	NA	74	69	78	78	77	76	71	68	76
Emission share should be in proportion to population*	63	62	59	55	71	55	68	53	65	66	66	62	67	72	65	76	75	73	71	75	71	63
Global democratic assembly on climate change	57	52	54	51	55	56	68	61	63	57	68	53	48	75	64	86	77	78	76	70	72	73
Global tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries	64	58	67	55	65	65	72	64	62	65	75	65	53	78	73	86	80	83	78	71	73	83

Principales attitudes sur les politiques mondiales

Pourcentage de réponses positive (e.g. *Plutôt/Très favorable*) parmi les non *indifférents*. [► Go back](#)

	High-income Australia	Canada	Denmark*	France*	Germany	Italy	Japan	Poland	South Korea	Spain	United Kingdom	United States*	Middle-income	Brazil	China	India	Indonesia	Mexico	South Africa	Turkey	Ukraine	
Level of climate policies needed: global	85	78	87	81	85	88	92	94	88	86	88	88	70	85	88	87	78	86	88	82	76	
Global carbon budget (+2°C) divided in tradable country shares	84	79	85	NA	NA	74	89	82	81	92	85	90	NA	90	82	95	89	95	92	90	88	88
Emission share should be in proportion to population*	88	87	87	90	90	85	91	84	89	91	89	88	87	91	84	96	91	94	92	93	90	85
Global democratic assembly on climate change	81	74	80	77	82	76	90	88	85	85	88	77	71	91	84	97	88	96	94	89	87	93
Global tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries	82	74	84	72	86	83	90	88	80	89	86	85	73	92	86	98	92	97	93	89	87	94

Principales attitudes sur les politiques mondiales

Moyennes des réponses, recodées en [-2; +2]. [▶ Go back](#)

	High-income	Australia	Canada	Denmark*	France*	Germany	Italy	Japan	Poland	South Korea	Spain	United Kingdom	United States*	Middle-income	Brazil	China	India	Indonesia	Mexico	South Africa	Turkey	Ukraine
Level of climate policies needed: global	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	
Global carbon budget (+2°C) divided in tradable country shares	0.7	0.6	0.7	NA	NA	0.4	0.8	0.5	0.6	0.8	0.8	NA	1	0.9	1	1.1	1.2	1	1	0.9	0.9	
Emission share should be in proportion to population*	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.7	1	0.6	0.8	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	1	0.7	0.9	1.1	1.1	0.9	1	1	0.7	
Global democratic assembly on climate change	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.9	0.5	0.3	1	0.8	1.1	1	1.2	1	0.9	1	0.9
Global tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries	0.8	0.5	0.9	0.5	0.9	0.8	1	0.8	0.6	0.8	1	0.8	0.5	1.1	1	1.2	1.2	1.4	1.1	1	1.1	1.2