

International Majorities Genuinely Support Global Redistributive and Climate Policies

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Abstract

We document majority support for policies entailing global redistribution and climate mitigation. Surveys on 40,680 respondents in 20 countries show strong stated support for a global carbon price funding equal cash transfers, called the “Global Climate Scheme” (GCS). Through our surveys on 8,000 respondents in the U.S., France, Germany, Spain, and the UK, we test several hypotheses that could reconcile strong stated support with scarce occurrences in public debates. Three quarters of Europeans and half of Americans support the GCS, even as they understand its cost to them. Using several experiments, we show that the support for the GCS is sincere and that political programs that include it are preferred to programs that do not. We document widespread support for other globally redistributive policies, such as increased foreign aid or a wealth tax funding low-income countries. In sum, global policies are genuinely supported by majorities, even in wealthy, contributing countries.

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68 1 Introduction

69 Major sustainability objectives could be achieved by global approaches to mitigating
 70 climate change and poverty that would involve transfers from high- to lower-income
 71 countries.¹⁻⁶ Especially, global carbon pricing is widely regarded by economists as the
 72 reference climate policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon emissions externality.
 73 Specifically, a version of global carbon pricing as a system based upon tradable permits
 74 for carbon emissions is prominently discussed in environmental economics.⁷⁻¹³ It would
 75 work as follows: A cap on carbon emissions to limit global warming below 2°C is im-
 76 plemented. Emissions rights compatible with the carbon budget are auctioned each year
 77 to polluting firms and fund a global basic income, alleviating extreme poverty. These
 78 emission rights would be allocated equally among human adults, yielding redistribution
 79 from richer to poorer countries. It would combine long-term effectiveness, feasibility,
 80 equity, and simplicity.⁷ We call this approach to global carbon pricing the “Global Climate
 81 Scheme” (GCS).

82 While international negotiations have not yet led to ambitious globally redistributive
 83 policies, some recent prominent attempts are that the International Maritime Organiza-
 84 tion is poised to adopt a global carbon levy on maritime fuel; the African Union **calls**
 85 **for** a global carbon taxation regime, the UN **is setting up** a Framework Convention on
 86 International Tax Cooperation and the G20 **seeks** global cooperation on the taxation of

87 billionaires.

88 A key factor for implementing global policies has remained largely unaddressed: the
89 support of citizens. As a first piece of evidence, a global survey on 40,680 respondents
90 from 20 high- and middle-income countries reveals substantial support for global climate
91 policies and, in addition, for a global tax on the wealthiest aimed at financing low-income
92 countries' development. Surprisingly, even in wealthy nations that would bear a signifi-
93 cant burden of such globally redistributive policies, majorities of citizens express support
94 for them. To better understand public support for global policies in high-income coun-
95 tries, the main analysis of this article is conducted with surveys among 8,000 respondents
96 from France, Germany, Spain, the UK, and the U.S.

97 The focus of the Western surveys is to study how respondents react to the key trade-off
98 between the benefits and costs of globally redistributive climate policies. In our survey
99 respondents are made aware of the cost that the GCS entails for their country's people,
100 that is average Westerners would incur a net loss from the policy. Our main result is that
101 the Global Climate Scheme is supported by three quarters of Europeans and more than
102 half of Americans.

103 Furthermore, we test the robustness of this conclusion by a wide variety of methods.
104 First, we control for social desirability bias using a list experiment. We find no evidence
105 that people exaggerate their support in the direct question. Second, to assess whether
106 the support would diminish in a context that approaches real stakes, we ask respondents
107 whether they are willing to sign a petition in favor of the GCS, after informing them
108 that the results of the survey question will be communicated to their head of state's of-
109 fice. The support is sustained in an environment that approaches real stakes. Third, we
110 carry out conjoint analyses to neutralize experimenter demand and investigate the prior-
111 ity given to global policies compared to other types of policies. Conjoint analyses reveal
112 that a political platform is more likely to be preferred if it contains the GCS or a global tax
113 on millionaires, and that global policies rank high in the prioritization of policies. Our
114 randomized experiments also show that a candidate would not lose vote intentions by
115 endorsing the GCS, and might even gain up to 11 points in France. Fourth, an analysis
116 of open-ended fields indicates that the appeal of the GCS comes from its international
117 nature and its impacts on climate, more than on global poverty. To put our main finding
118 in context, we also test support for other global policies and examine whether people's
119 values are univeralistic. Support is very strong for a global tax on millionaires (69% in the
120 U.S., 84% in Europe), and the median respondent prefers to allocate 30% of the revenues

121 of such a tax to low-income countries. Majorities are willing to increase foreign aid, but
122 only if some conditions are respected, such as making sure the aid is well spent and other
123 high-income countries also increase their contribution. Questions on universalistic val-
124 ues, including a donation experiment, confirm the congruence of underlying values with
125 the support for specific policies. The diverse approaches summarized also help under-
126 stand what drives support for different policies. For instance, the evidence indicates that
127 one key reason why increasing foreign aid is not as popular as global policies lies in its
128 unilateral nature.

129 Overall, our results point out to strong and genuine support for global climate and re-
130 distributive policies, as our experiments confirm the stated support found in direct ques-
131 tions. They contribute to a body of literature on attitudes toward climate policy, which
132 confirms that climate policy is preferred at a global level,^{14–17} where it is more effective
133 and fair. While 3,354 economists supported a national carbon tax financing equal cash
134 transfers in the *Wall Street Journal*, numerous surveys have shown that public support
135 for such policy is mixed.^{18–23} Meanwhile, the GCS — the global version of this policy
136 — is largely supported, despite higher costs in high-income countries. In the Discussion
137 we offer potential explanations that could reconcile the strong support for global policies
138 with their lack of prominence in the public debate.

139 **Literature** International surveys have shown widespread support for costly climate ac-
140 tion.^{19,24} For instance, representative surveys in 125 countries covering 96% of the world's
141 greenhouse gas emissions show that 69% of the global population express willingness
142 to contribute 1% of their income to fight global warming.²⁵ International surveys have
143 also uncovered near consensus that “present economic differences between rich and poor
144 countries are too large” (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree) in each of 29 countries.²⁶

145 Yet, few prior attitudinal surveys have examined global redistributive policies. A no-
146 table exception tests the support for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples in five
147 countries, representative along gender and age.²⁷ For a given variant, the sample size is
148 about 167 respondents per country. They find over 80% support for any variant in India,
149 between 50% and 65% in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43% to 59% in the U.S.,
150 depending on the variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding an equal
151 cash transfer for each human is close to 50% in high-income countries.

152 Further evidence of the popularity of global redistribution is provided by the finding
153 that 66% of Americans support providing “financial aid and technical support to devel-

¹⁵⁴ oping countries that agree to limit their greenhouse gas emissions".²⁸ In addition, 90%
¹⁵⁵ of Germans want some degree of global redistribution.²⁹ Besides, in surveys conducted
¹⁵⁶ in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S., support ranges from 55% to 74% for "a
¹⁵⁷ global democracy including both a global government and a global parliament, directly
¹⁵⁸ elected by the world population, to recommend and implement policies on global issues",
¹⁵⁹ and similar support is found in surveys over 17 countries.^{30;31}

¹⁶⁰ Appendix A contains a broader literature review including further attitudinal sur-
¹⁶¹ veys on global policies (A.1.1); prior work on attitudes toward climate burden sharing
¹⁶² (Appendix A.1.2), attitudes toward foreign aid (Appendix A.1.3), global carbon pricing
¹⁶³ (Appendix A.2.1), global redistribution (Appendix A.2.3), basic income (Appendix A.2.4),
¹⁶⁴ and global democracy (Appendix A.2.5).

¹⁶⁵ 2 Results


¹⁶⁶ 2.1 Data

¹⁶⁷ We use unanalysed questions from a global survey conducted in 2021 that involved
¹⁶⁸ 40,680 respondents from 20 countries, representing approximately 72% of global CO₂
¹⁶⁹ emissions. This survey (henceforth: global survey) serves as the basis for measuring
¹⁷⁰ stated support for various global policies worldwide, including the GCS. Detailed in-
¹⁷¹ formation about the data collection process, sample representativeness, and analysis of
¹⁷² questions on national policies can be found in that article.¹⁹

¹⁷³ To delve deeper into the sincerity and rationales behind support for the GCS and at-
¹⁷⁴ titudes towards global policies, global redistribution, and universalistic values, we con-
¹⁷⁵ ducted further surveys in 2023 (henceforth: Western surveys). These surveys are based
¹⁷⁶ on a sample of 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, the UK, and the U.S. The
¹⁷⁷ European survey (*Eu*) comprises 3,000 respondents, while the U.S. sample was collected
¹⁷⁸ in two separate waves: *US1* with 3,000 respondents and *US2* with 2,000 respondents. The
¹⁷⁹ survey questions in both the European and U.S. surveys are almost identical (see Fig-
¹⁸⁰ ure 1), except for an additional question in *US2* that uses results from *US1* to assess the
¹⁸¹ bandwagon effect and variations in policy designs in some questions.

¹⁸² The Western surveys ensured broad representativeness along key dimensions: gender,
¹⁸³ income, age, highest diploma, and degree of urbanization. The *Eu* survey is also repre-
¹⁸⁴ sentative of its four countries in terms of population size, while the *US1* and *US2* surveys

Figure 1: Structure of Western survey, cf. also Figure S48 for the treatment branches.




¹⁸⁵ are representative in terms of region and ethnicity. Tables S9-S10 detail how our samples
¹⁸⁶ match population frequencies. More detail on data collection is given in Section Methods.
¹⁸⁷ The questionnaires used in the surveys are provided in Appendices C and D.

¹⁸⁸ 2.2 Global support

¹⁸⁹ We find strong support for climate policies enacted at the global level when analysing
¹⁹⁰ the global survey (Figure 2). When asked “At which level(s) do you think public policies
¹⁹¹ to tackle climate change need to be put in place?”, 70% (in the U.S.) to 94% (in Japan)
¹⁹² choose the global level. The next most popular choice is the federal or continental level,
¹⁹³ favored by 52% of Americans and less than half of European respondents. Local policies
¹⁹⁴ receive the least support. This preference for climate policies implemented at the global
¹⁹⁵ scale is in line with earlier contributions ^{15;32;16} and consistent with individuals’ concerns
¹⁹⁶ for the fairness and effectiveness of such policies, which have been identified as two of the
¹⁹⁷ three key determinants of support, besides self-interest. ^{33;18;19} It could also stem from a
¹⁹⁸ preference for conditional cooperation, ³⁴ even if previous studies suggest that the support

¹⁹⁹ for climate policies does not depend on climate action abroad^{35;36}.

Figure 2: Relative Support for global climate policies.



Note 1: The numbers represent *relative support*, i.e. the share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* among non-*indifferent* answers (in percent, $n = 40,680$). Shares of indifferent answers range from 11% to 48%, with quartiles 20%, 27%, and 33%. The color blue denotes a relative majority. See Figure S11 for the absolute support. (Questions A-I).

Note 2: *In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

200 Among the four global climate policies examined, three policies garner high support
 201 across all countries (Figure 2). These policies include a global democratic assembly on
 202 climate change, a global tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries contingent
 203 on their climate action, and a global carbon budget of +2°C divided among countries
 204 based on tradable shares (or “global quota”), with the allocation of country shares un-
 205 specified (see wording in Appendix C). The three policies garner a majority of absolute
 206 support (i.e., “somewhat” or “strong” support) in all countries (except in the U.S. for the
 207 global assembly, 48% absolute support). In high-income countries, the global quota pol-

²⁰⁸ icy obtains 64% absolute support and 84% relative support (i.e., excluding “indifferent”
²⁰⁹ answers).

²¹⁰ Following the support for the global quota, respondents are asked about their preferences
²¹¹ for dividing the carbon budget among countries, as depicted in the third block
²¹² of Figure 2. Consistent with the existing literature (see Appendix A.1.2), an equal per
²¹³ capita allocation of emission rights emerges as the preferred burden-sharing principle,
²¹⁴ garnering absolute majority support in all countries and never below 84% relative sup-
²¹⁵ port. Taking into account historical responsibilities or vulnerability to climate damages is
²¹⁶ also popular, albeit with less consensus, while grandfathering (i.e., allocation of emission
²¹⁷ shares in proportion to current emissions) receives the least support in all countries.

²¹⁸ A global carbon tax that funds a global basic income should produce the same dis-
²¹⁹ tributional outcomes as a global tradable quota with equal per capita emission rights (to
²²⁰ the extent that the carbon price is the same and provided that each country returns the
²²¹ revenues from emissions trading equally to its citizens). The support for the global car-
²²² bon tax is also tested and its redistributive effects – the average increase in expenditures
²²³ along with the amount of the basic income – are specified to the respondents explicitly
²²⁴ (see box below and Appendix D, p.90). The support for the carbon tax is lower than for
²²⁵ the quota, particularly in high-income countries, and there is no relative majority for the
²²⁶ tax in Anglo-Saxon countries (consistently with the levels of support found in the only
²²⁷ previous study that tested a global carbon tax²⁷). Two possible reasons for this lower
²²⁸ support are that distributive effects are specified explicitly in the case of the tax, and that
²²⁹ people may prefer a quota, perhaps because they find it more effective than a tax to re-
²³⁰ duce emissions. The two reasons are consistent with the intermediate level of support for
²³¹ the GCS in the Western survey, which is based on a global quota but where the question
²³² specifies explicitly the distributive effects.

²³³ 2.3 Stated support for the Global Climate Scheme

²³⁴ The Western surveys (*US1, US2, Eu*) include a comprehensive exploration of citizens’
²³⁵ attitudes towards the GCS. We present to respondents a detailed description of the GCS
²³⁶ and explain its distributive effects, including specific amounts at stake (as specified in
²³⁷ the box below). Furthermore, we assess respondents’ understanding of the GCS with
²³⁸ incentivized questions to test their comprehension of the expected financial outcome for
²³⁹ typical individuals in high-income countries (loss) and the poorest individuals globally
²⁴⁰ (gain), followed by the provision of correct answers (Figures S12-S13).

241 For comparison, the same approach is applied to a National Redistribution (NR) scheme
242 targeting top incomes with the aim of financing cash transfers to all adults, calibrated to
243 offset the monetary loss of the GCS for the median emitter in their country. We evaluate
244 respondents' understanding that the richest would lose and the typical fellow citizens
245 would gain from that policy. Subsequently, we summarize both schemes to enhance re-
246 spondents' recall. Additionally, we present a final incentivized comprehension question
247 and provide the expected answer that the combined GCS and NR would result in no net
248 gain or loss for a typical fellow citizen. Finally, respondents are directly asked to express
249 their support for the GCS and NR using a simple Yes/No question.

The Global Climate Scheme The GCS consists of global emissions trading with emission rights being auctioned each year to polluting firms, and of a global basic income, funded by the auction revenues. Using the price and emissions trajectories from the report by Stern & Stiglitz,³⁷ and in particular a carbon price of \$90/tCO₂ in 2030, we estimate that the basic income would amount to \$30 per month for every human adult (see details in Appendix E). We describe the GCS to the respondents as a "climate club" and we specify its redistributive effects: The 700 million people with less than \$2/day [in Purchasing Power Parity] would be lifted out of extreme poverty, and fossil fuel price increases would cost the typical person in their country a specified amount (see Appendix D for details). The monthly median net cost is \$85 in the U.S., €10 in France, €25 in Germany, €5 in Spain, £20 in the UK.

250
251 Our main result is that stated support for the GCS is 54% in the U.S. and 76% in Eu-
252 rope, while the support for NR is very similar: 56% and 73% respectively (Figures 3, S1).
253 Appendix F examines the sociodemographic determinants of support for the GCS as well
254 as the beliefs correlated with the support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic
255 income. The strongest correlates are political leaning, trust in the government and per-
256 ceptions that climate policies are effective at reducing emissions or in one's self-interest.

257 Finding majority support for the GCS motivates the subsequent analysis of robustness
258 and sincerity, novel to attitudinal surveys on instrument choice for environmental policy.

259 **2.4 Robustness and sincerity of support for the GCS**

260 We use several methods to assess the sincerity of the support for the GCS: a list exper-
261 iment, a real-stake petition, conjoint analyses, and an exercise involving the prioritization

²⁶² of policies. All methods suggest that the support is either completely sincere, or the share
²⁶³ of insincere answers is limited.

²⁶⁴ **2.4.1 List experiment**

²⁶⁵ By asking *how many* policies within a list respondents support and varying the list
²⁶⁶ among respondents, a list experiment allows identifying the tacit support for a policy
²⁶⁷ of interest. For example, a first subsample faces the list of policies A, B, and C, while a
²⁶⁸ second subsamples faces the list A, B, C, and GCS. We do not need to know which policies
²⁶⁹ each respondent supports to estimate the average (tacit) support for the GCS, we simply
²⁷⁰ need to compute the difference in the average number of supported policies between
²⁷¹ the two random subsamples.³⁸ In our case, as shown in Table 1, the tacit support for the
²⁷² GCS measured through the list experiment is not significantly lower than the direct stated
²⁷³ support. Hence, we do not find a social desirability bias in our study.

²⁷⁴ **2.4.2 Petition**

²⁷⁵ We ask respondents whether they are willing to sign a petition in support of either the
²⁷⁶ GCS or the NR policy. We inform them that the petition results will be sent to the head
²⁷⁷ of state's office, highlighting the proportion of fellow citizens endorsing the respective
²⁷⁸ scheme. Even when framed as a petition that might have real stakes, both policies con-
²⁷⁹ tinue to receive majority support. In the U.S., we find no significant difference between
²⁸⁰ the support in the petitions and the simple questions (GCS: $-.02$, $t(3,044)=1.0$, $p=.30$, 95%
²⁸¹ CI=[-.05, .02]; NR: $-.01$, $t(2,952)=.3$, $p=.76$, 95% CI=[-.04, .03]). In Europe, the petition
²⁸² leads to a comparable lower support for both the GCS (-7 p.p., $t(3,018)=4.4$, $p=10^{-5}$,
²⁸³ 95% CI=[-.10, -.04]) and NR (-4 p.p., $t(2,953)=2.6$, $p=.008$, 95% CI=[-.08, -.01]). While
²⁸⁴ some European respondents are unwilling to sign a petition for policies they are expected
²⁸⁵ to support, this phenomenon is not specific to the GCS, and the overall willingness to sign
²⁸⁶ a petition remains strong, with 69% expressing support for the GCS and 67% for NR.

²⁸⁷ **2.4.3 Conjoint analyses**

²⁸⁸ In order to assess the public support for the GCS in conjunction with other policies, we
²⁸⁹ conduct a series of conjoint analyses. We ask respondents to make five choices between
²⁹⁰ pairs of political platforms. Each choice is intended to test a different hypothesis about
²⁹¹ support for the GCS in relation to other policies or voting intentions.

292 The first conjoint analysis suggests that the GCS is supported independently of being
293 complemented by the National Redistribution Scheme and a national climate policy (C).
294 The second analysis indicates majority support for the GCS and for C, which are seen
295 as neither complement nor substitute (see [Methods](#)). A minor share of respondents like
296 a national climate policy and dislike a global one, but as many people prefer a global
297 rather than a national policy. Besides, there is no evidence that implementing NR would
298 increase the support for the GCS.

299 In the third analysis, we present two random branches of the sample with hypothetical
300 progressive and conservative platforms that differ only by the presence (or not) of the
301 GCS in the progressive platform. Table 2 shows that a progressive candidate would not
302 significantly lose voting share by endorsing the GCS in any country, and may even gain
303 11 p.p. ($p = .005$) in voting intention in France.

304 Our last two analyses make respondents choose between two random platforms. In
305 Europe, respondents are prompted to imagine that a left or center-left coalition will win
306 the next election and asked what platform they would prefer that coalition to have cam-
307 paigned on. In the U.S., the question is framed as a hypothetical duel in a Democratic
308 primary, and asked only to non-Republicans ($n = 2,218$), i.e. the respondents who declare
309 as political affiliation *Democrat*, *Independent*, *Non-Affiliated* or *Other*.

310 In the fourth analysis, a policy (or an absence of policy) is randomly drawn for each
311 platform in each of five categories: *economic issues*, *societal issues*, *climate policy*, *tax system*,
312 *foreign policy* (Figure S2, Table S3). In the UK, Germany, and France, a platform is about 9
313 to 13 p.p. more likely to be preferred if it includes the GCS rather than no foreign policy.
314 This effect is between 1 and 4 p.p. and no longer significant in the U.S. (among non-
315 Republicans) and in Spain. Moreover, a platform that includes a global tax on millionaires
316 rather than no foreign policy is 5 to 13 p.p. more likely to be preferred in all countries
317 (the effect is significant and at least 9 p.p. in all countries but Spain). Similarly, a global
318 democratic assembly on climate change has a significant effect of 8 to 12 p.p. in the U.S.
319 (among non-Republicans), Germany, and France. These effects are large, and not far from
320 the effects of the policies most influential on the platforms, which range between 15 and
321 18 p.p. in most countries (27 p.p. in Spain), and all relate to improved public services (in
322 particular healthcare, housing, and education).

323 The fifth analysis draws random platforms similarly, except that candidate A's plat-
324 form always contains the GCS while B's includes no foreign policy. In this case, A is
325 chosen by 60% of Europeans and 58% of non-Republican Americans (Figure S3).

³²⁶ Overall, taking the U.S. as an example, our conjoint analyses indicate that a candidate
³²⁷ at the Democratic primary would have more chances to obtain the nomination by en-
³²⁸ dorsing the GCS, and this endorsement would not penalize her or him at the presidential
³²⁹ election. This result relates to the finding that 12% of Germans shift their voting intention
³³⁰ from SPD and CDU/CSU to the Greens and the Left when they are told that the latter
³³¹ parties support global democracy.³⁰

³³² 2.4.4 Prioritization

³³³ Towards the end of the survey, we ask respondents to allocate 100 points among six
³³⁴ randomly selected policies from the previous conjoint analyses, using sliders. The instruc-
³³⁵ tion was to distribute the points based on their level of support, with a higher allocation
³³⁶ indicating greater support for a policy. As a result, the average support across policies is
³³⁷ 16.67 points. In each country, the GCS ranks in the middle of all policies or above, with
³³⁸ an average number of points from 15.4 in the U.S. to 22.9 in Germany.

³³⁹ Interestingly, in Germany, the most prioritized policy is the global tax on millionaires,
³⁴⁰ while the GCS is the second most prioritized policy. The global tax on millionaires con-
³⁴¹ sistently ranks no lower than fifth position (out of 15 or 17 policies) in every country,
³⁴² garnering an average of 18.3 points in Spain to 22.9 points in Germany.

³⁴³ 2.4.5 Pros and Cons

³⁴⁴ We survey respondents to gather their perspectives on the pros and cons of the GCS,
³⁴⁵ randomly utilizing an open-ended or a closed question. In the closed question format,
³⁴⁶ respondents tend to consider every argument as important in determining their support
³⁴⁷ or opposition to the GCS (see Figure S17).

³⁴⁸ The open-ended question provides more insights into what people associate with the
³⁴⁹ GCS when prompted to think about it. Analyzing keywords in the responses (automati-
³⁵⁰ cally translated into English), the most frequently mentioned topics are the international
³⁵¹ dimension and the environment, each appearing in approximately one-quarter of the
³⁵² answers (see Figure S19). This is followed by discussions on the effects of the GCS on
³⁵³ poverty and prices, each mentioned by about one-tenth of the respondents. We also man-
³⁵⁴ ually classified each answer into different categories (see Figure S18). This exercise con-
³⁵⁵ firms the findings from the automatic search: the environmental benefit of the GCS is the
³⁵⁶ most commonly discussed topic, while obstacles to implementation or agreement on the

³⁵⁷ proposal are relatively infrequently mentioned.

³⁵⁸ In the *US2* survey, we divided the sample into four random branches. Two branches
³⁵⁹ were presented the pros and cons questions (either in open or closed format) *before* being
³⁶⁰ asked about their support for the GCS or NR. Another branch received information on
³⁶¹ the actual level of support for the GCS and NR (estimated in *US1*, see box p. 15), and
³⁶² one control group received none of these treatments. The objective of the “pros and cons
³⁶³ treatment” was to mimic a “campaign effect”, which refers to the shift in opinion result-
³⁶⁴ ing from media coverage of the proposal.^{39,40} To conservatively estimate the effect of a
³⁶⁵ (potentially negative) campaign, we intentionally included more cons (6) than pros (3).
³⁶⁶ Interestingly, the support for the GCS decreased by 11 p.p. ($t(1,996)=-3.5$, $p=5 \cdot 10^{-4}$,
³⁶⁷ 95% CI=[-.17, -.05]) after respondents viewed a list of its pros and cons. Notably, the
³⁶⁸ support also decreased by 7 p.p. ($t(1,996)=-2.3$, $p=.02$, 95% CI=[-.13, -.01]) after respon-
³⁶⁹ dents were asked to consider the pros and cons in an open-ended question. Despite some
³⁷⁰ significant effects of pondering the pros and cons, approximately half of the Americans
³⁷¹ express support for the GCS across all treatment branches (see Table S1). Although sup-
³⁷² port remains significant, these results suggest that the public success of the GCS would
³⁷³ be sensitive to the content of the debate about it, and oriented by the discourse adopted
³⁷⁴ by interest groups.

Second-order Beliefs To explain the strong support for the GCS despite its absence from political platforms and public debate, we hypothesized pluralistic ignorance, i.e. that the public and policymakers mistakenly perceive the GCS as unpopular. As a result, individuals might conceal their support for such globally redistributive policy, believing that advocating for it would be futile.

In the case of Americans, their beliefs about the level of support for the GCS are relatively accurate (Figure S4). The mean perceived support is 52% (with quartiles of 36%, 52%, and 68%), which closely aligns with the actual support of 54%. Europeans, on the other hand, underestimate the support by 17 p.p. Nonetheless, 65% of them correctly estimate that the GCS garners majority support, and the mean perceived support is 59% (and quartiles of 43%, 61%, and 74%), compared to the actual support of 76%. Second-order beliefs are equally accurate for NR in the U.S. and similarly underestimated in Europe. Finally, consistent with Americans accurately perceiving the levels of support for the GCS or NR, providing information on the actual level had no significant effect on their support in the US2 survey (effect=.025, $t(1,998)=1.1$, $p=.26$, 95% CI=[-.02, .07]).

375

376 2.5 Stated support for global redistribution

377 We also assess support for a range of other international policies (Figure 3) as well as
378 unilateral foreign aid.

379 2.5.1 International policies

380 Most policies garner relative majority support in each country, with two exceptions:
381 the “cancellation of low-income countries’ public debt” and “a maximum wealth limit”
382 for each individual (Figure 3). There is relative majority support for it in Europe but
383 not in the U.S., despite the cap being set at \$10 billion in the U.S. compared to €/£100
384 million in Europe. Notably, climate-related policies enjoy significant popularity, with
385 “high-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries” receiving
386 absolute majority support in all countries surveyed. Additionally, relative support for
387 loss and damages compensation, as approved in principle at the international climate
388 negotiations in 2022 (“COP27”), ranges from 55% (U.S.) to 81% (Spain).

389 Consistent with the results of the global survey, a “tax on millionaires of all countries

390 to finance low-income countries" garners relative support of over 69% in each country,
391 only 5 p.p. lower than a national millionaires tax overall. In random subsamples, we
392 inquire about respondents' preferences regarding the redistribution of revenues from a
393 global tax on individual wealth exceeding \$5 million, after providing information on the
394 revenue raised by such a tax in their country compared to low-income countries. We
395 ask certain respondents ($n = 1,283$) what percentage of the global tax revenues should be
396 pooled to finance low-income countries. In each country, at least 88% of respondents in-
397 dicate a positive amount, with an average of one-third (Figure S5). To other respondents
398 ($n = 1,233$), we inquire whether they would prefer each country to retain all the revenues
399 it collects or that half of the revenues be pooled to finance low-income countries. Ap-
400 proximately half of the respondents opt to allocate half of the tax revenues to low-income
401 countries, consistently with the other variant of the question.

402 2.5.2 Foreign aid

403 In addition, we provide respondents with information about the actual amount "spent
404 on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries" relative to their country's gov-
405 ernment spending and GDP. Less than 16% of respondents state that their country's for-
406 eign aid should be reduced, while 62% express support for increasing it, including 17%
407 who support an unconditional increase (Figure S6). Among the 45% who think aid should
408 be increased under certain conditions, we subsequently ask them to specify the conditions
409 they deem necessary (Figure S7). The three most commonly selected conditions are that:
410 "we can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted" (73% chose this
411 condition), "recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights" (67%),
412 and "other high-income countries also increase their foreign aid" (48%). On the other
413 hand, respondents who do not wish to increase their country's foreign aid primarily jus-
414 tify their view by prioritizing the well-being of their fellow citizens or by perceiving each
415 country as responsible for its own fate (Figure S8). In response to an open-ended ques-
416 tion regarding measures high-income countries should take to fight extreme poverty, a
417 large majority of Americans expressed that more help is needed (Figure S46). The most
418 commonly suggested form of aid is financial support, closely followed by investments in
419 education.

420 We also inquire about the perceived amount of foreign aid. Consistent with prior re-
421 search (see Appendix A.1.3), most people overestimate the actual amount of foreign aid
422 (Figure S25). We then elicit respondents' preferred amount of foreign aid, after randomly

Figure 3: Relative support for various global policies. (percentage of *somewhat* or *strong support*, after excluding *indifferent* answers; *except for GCS: percentage of Yes in a Yes/No question, preferred share: percentage of answers $\geq 30\%$, and foreign aid: percentage of unconditional or conditional increase rather than decrease or stable aid). Shares of *indifferent* answers range from 10% to 40%, with quartiles 19%, 25%, and 32%. (p. 90, Questions 20, 36, 43, 44, and 45; See Figure S33 for the absolute support.)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Global climate scheme (GCS)* | 54 | 76 | 80 | 71 | 81 | 74 |
| National tax on millionaires funding public services | 73 | 85 | 81 | 87 | 89 | 88 |
| Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries | 69 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 87 | 83 |
| Preferred share of global wealth tax for low-income countries: 30% or more* | 50 | 54 | 53 | 50 | 57 | 54 |
| [Country]'s foreign aid should be increased* | 60 | 64 | 63 | 68 | 69 | 56 |
| High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change | 60 | 76 | 77 | 79 | 79 | 71 |
| High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries | 68 | 82 | 82 | 82 | 85 | 81 |
| Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages | 55 | 71 | 72 | 70 | 79 | 70 |
| Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt | 46 | 53 | 53 | 43 | 62 | 61 |
| Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population | 58 | 71 | 69 | 69 | 78 | 72 |
| Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries | 62 | 73 | 58 | 73 | 80 | 83 |
| A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage | 63 | 80 | 80 | 78 | 81 | 83 |
| Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets | 62 | 87 | 90 | 86 | 91 | 87 |
| A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human | 46 | 62 | 58 | 62 | 65 | 67 |

⁴²³ presenting them with either the actual amount or no information. Most of the respondents who learn the actual amount choose a bracket at least as high as the actual one, and ⁴²⁴ most of those without the information choose a bracket at least as high as the perceived ⁴²⁵

⁴²⁶ one (Figures S28–S27). Finally, we ask a last question to the respondents who received
⁴²⁷ the information. To those who prefer an increase of foreign aid, we ask how they would
⁴²⁸ finance it: by far, the preferred source of funding is higher taxes on the wealthiest (Figure
⁴²⁹ S30). To those who prefer a reduction, we ask how they would use the funds becoming
⁴³⁰ available: In every country, more people choose higher spending on education or health-
⁴³¹ care rather than lower taxes (Figure S31).

⁴³² 2.6 Universalistic values

⁴³³ We ask broad questions on people's values to assess whether their core values are
⁴³⁴ consistent with support for specific policies. When we ask respondents which group they
⁴³⁵ defend when they vote, 20% choose "sentient beings (humans and animals)," 22% choose
⁴³⁶ "humans," 33% select their "fellow citizens" (or "Europeans"), 15% choose "My family
⁴³⁷ and myself," and the remaining 10% choose another group (mainly "My State or region"
⁴³⁸ or "People sharing my culture or religion"). Notably, a majority of left-wing voters choose
⁴³⁹ *humans or sentient beings*.

⁴⁴⁰ Answers to this and other broad value questions are consistent with half of Americans
⁴⁴¹ and three quarters of Europeans supporting global policies like the GCS: people are al-
⁴⁴² most as much willing to make a donation to poor Africans than to poor fellow citizens in
⁴⁴³ a lottery experiment, most respondents find that global poverty and climate change are
⁴⁴⁴ bigger problems than national inequality, and most respondents wish that their diplomats
⁴⁴⁵ take into account global justice (see [Methods](#) for details).

⁴⁴⁶ 3 Discussion

⁴⁴⁷ In our analysis, we have uncovered strong and genuine support for global redistribu-
⁴⁴⁸ tive policies.

⁴⁴⁹ We conclude by providing hypotheses to reconcile the scarcity of global policies in the
⁴⁵⁰ public debate with our findings that they would be widely accepted. The first two are
⁴⁵¹ variations of pluralistic ignorance, and the last three represent complementary explana-
⁴⁵² tions.

⁴⁵³ First, there may be pluralistic ignorance *among policymakers* regarding universalistic
⁴⁵⁴ values, support for the GCS, or the electoral advantage of endorsing it. Second, citizens
⁴⁵⁵ or policymakers may believe that globally redistributive policies are politically infeasi-

ble in some key (potentially foreign) countries such as the U.S. Third, political discourse centrally happens at the national level, shaped by national media and institutions such as the voting system. National framing by political voices may create biases and suppress universalistic values. Fourth, many individuals, including policymakers, may be unaware of specific proposals or may perceive global redistributive policies as ill-defined or technically infeasible, ultimately dismissing them as unrealistic. Fifth, just as policy is disproportionately influenced by the economic elites,^{41–43} public debate may be shaped by the wealthiest, who have vested interests in preventing global redistribution.

Uncovering evidence to support the above hypotheses could draw attention to global policies in the public debate and contribute to their increased prominence. Their confirmation would further support the conclusion that there exists substantial public support for global policies addressing climate change and global inequality, even in high-income countries.

Methods

Pre-registration. The project is approved by Economics & Business Ethics Committee (EBEC) at the University of Amsterdam (EB-1113) and was preregistered in the Open Science Foundation registry (osf.io/fy6gd). The study did not deviate from the registration: the questionnaires and the hypotheses tests used are the same as the ones *given ex ante*. Informed consent was obtained from all respondents, randomized treatment branches were unknown to the respondents, and our research complies with all relevant ethical regulations. Respondents were compensated with gift certificates for a value of €1 after participation. No statistical methods were used to pre-determine sample sizes but our sample sizes match those reported in similar publications.^{19;14–16;18}

Data collection. The paper utilizes two sets of surveys: the *global* survey and the *Western* surveys. The *global* surveys consist of two U.S. surveys, *US1* and *US2*, and one European survey, *Eu*. The *global* survey was conducted from March 2021 to March 2022 on 40,680 respondents from 20 countries (with 1,465 to 2,488 respondents per country). *US1* collected responses from 3,000 respondents between January and March 2023, while *US2* gathered data from 2,000 respondents between March and April 2023. *Eu* included 3,000 respondents and was conducted from February to March 2023. We used the survey companies *Dynata* and *Bilendi*. To ensure representative samples, we employed stratified quotas based on gender, age (5 brackets), income (4), region (4), education level (3), and ethnicity (3) for the U.S. We also incorporated survey weights throughout the analysis to account for any remaining imbalances. These weights were constructed using the quota variables as well as the size of agglomeration, and trimmed between 0.25 and 4. Stratified

489 quotas followed by reweighting is the usual method to reduce selection bias from opt-in online
490 panels, when better sampling methods (such as compulsory participation of random dwellings)
491 are unavailable.⁴⁴ By applying weights, the results are fully representative of the respective coun-
492 tries along the above mentioned dimensions. Results at the European level apply different weights
493 which ensure representativeness of the combined four European countries. Appendix G shows
494 how our samples compare to actual population frequencies. They match the actual frequencies,
495 except for some imbalances in specific quota demographics —such as gender in the UK (43%
496 of women instead of 50%) or urbanity in Spain (15% rural instead of 26%)— that are corrected
497 through our survey weights, and in the U.S. vote (which does not affect our results, as shown by
498 the results reweighted by vote in the *Support for the GCS* section below). Appendix I shows that the
499 treatment branches are balanced. Appendix J runs placebo tests of the effects of each treatment on
500 unrelated outcomes. We do not find effects of earlier treatments on unrelated outcomes arriving
501 later in the survey. Appendix K shows that our results are unchanged when including inattentive
502 respondents.

503 **Data quality.** The median duration is 28 minutes for the *global* survey, 14 min for *US1*, 11 min
504 for *US2*, and 20 min for *Eu*. To ensure the best possible data quality, we exclude respondents who
505 fail an attention test or rush through the survey (i.e., answer in less than 11.5 minutes in the *global*
506 survey, 4 minutes in *US1* or *US2*, 6 minutes in *Eu*). At the end of the survey, we ask whether
507 respondents thought that our survey was politically biased and offer to provide some feedback.
508 67% of the respondents found the survey unbiased. 25% found it left-wing biased, and 8% found
509 it right-wing biased.

510 **Questionnaires and raw results.** The raw results are reported in Appendix B while the surveys'
511 structures and questionnaires are given in Appendices C and D. Details on the *global* survey can
512 be found in the Appendix of Dechezleprêtre et al. (forthcoming).¹⁹ Country-specific raw results
513 are also available as supplementary material files: [US](#), [EU](#), [FR](#), [DE](#), [ES](#), [UK](#).

514 **Incentives.** To encourage accurate and truthful responses, several questions of the Western sur-
515 veys use incentives. For each of the three comprehension questions that follow the policy descrip-
516 tions, we randomly select and reward three respondents who provide correct answers with a \$50
517 gift certificate. Similarly, for questions involving estimating support shares for the GCS and NR,
518 three respondents with the closest guesses to the actual values receive a \$50 gift certificate. In the
519 donation lottery question, we randomly select one respondent and split the \$100 prize between
520 the NGO GiveDirectly and the winner according to the winner's choice. In total, our incentives
521 scheme distributes gift certificates (and donations) for a value of \$850. Finally, respondents have
522 an incentive to answer truthfully to the petition question, as they are aware that the results for that

523 question (the share of respondents supporting the policy) will be transmitted to the office of their
524 head of state.

525 **Absolute vs. relative support.** In most questions, support or opposition for a policy is asked
526 using a 5-Likert scale, with compulsory response and *Indifferent* as the middle option. We call
527 *absolute support* the share of *Somewhat* or *Strong support*. We generally favor the notion of *relative*
528 *support*, which reports the share of support after excluding *Indifferent* answers. Indeed, the *relative*
529 *support* is better suited to assess whether there are more people in favor vs. against a policy.

530 **Support for the GCS.** The 95% confidence intervals are [52.4%, 55.9%] in the U.S. and [74.2%, 77.2%]
531 in Europe. The average support is computed with survey weights, employing weights based on
532 quota variables, which exclude vote. Another method to reweigh the raw results involves running
533 a regression of the support for the GCS on sociodemographic characteristics (including vote) and
534 multiplying each coefficient by the population frequencies. This alternative approach yields sim-
535 ilar figures: 76% in Europe and 52% or 53% in the U.S. (depending on whether individuals who
536 did not disclose their vote are classified as non-voters or excluded). The average support among
537 voters is 54% in the U.S., with 74% support among Biden voters vs. 26% among Trump voters (see
538 Figure S47).

539 Though the level of support for the GCS is significantly lower in swing States (at 51%) that
540 are key to win U.S. elections, the electoral effect of endorsing the GCS remains non-significantly
541 different from zero (at +1.2 p.p.) in these States. Note that we define swing states as the 8 states
542 with less than 5 p.p. margin of victory in the 2020 election (MI, NV, PA, WI, AZ, GA, NC, FL). The
543 results are unchanged if we use the 3 p.p. threshold (that excludes FL) instead.

544 **List experiment.** List experiments have been used to reveal social desirability bias, silencing ei-
545 ther racism in the Southern U.S.⁴⁵ or opposition to the invasion of Ukraine in Russia.⁴⁶ In our case,
546 the question reads: “Beware, this question is quite unusual. Among the policies below, **how many**
547 do you support?” The list of policies randomly varies across respondents, and includes a subset of
548 GCS, NR (National Redistribution scheme), C (“Coal exit” in the U.S., “Thermal insulation plan”
549 in Europe) and O (“Marriage only for opposite-sex couples in the U.S.”, “Death penalty for major
550 crimes” in Europe). There are four branches: GCS/NR/C/O; GCS/C/O; NR/C/O; C/O. To esti-
551 mate the tacit average support for the GCS and NR, we regress the number of supported policies
552 on indicators that the list includes GCS and NR. We utilize the difference-in-means estimator, and
553 confidence intervals are computed using Monte Carlo simulation with the R package *list*.³⁸

554 **Petition.** The respondent is randomly assigned a branch where the petition relates to the GCS or
555 the National Redistribution scheme. The question reads: “Would you be willing to sign a petition

556 for the [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme?

557 As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President's office], inform-
558 ing him what share of [American] people are willing to endorse the [Global climate / National
559 redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign, only your answer here is required and
560 remains anonymous.)".

561 Paired weighted *t*-tests are conducted to test the equality in support for a policy among re-
562 spondents who were questioned about the policy in the petition.

563 **Conjoint analyses.** The first conjoint analysis suggests that the GCS is supported independently
564 of being complemented by the National Redistribution Scheme and a national climate policy
565 ("Coal exit" in the U.S., "Thermal insulation plan" in Europe, denoted C). Indeed, 54% of U.S.
566 respondents and 74% of European ones prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to the com-
567 bination of C and NR alone, indicating similar support for the GCS conditional on NR and C than
568 for the GCS alone (Figure S15).

569 In the second conjoint analysis, results from the first branch show that the support for the GCS
570 conditional on NR, at 55% in the U.S. ($n = 757$) and 77% in Europe ($n = 746$), is not significantly
571 different from the support for the GCS alone. This suggests that rejection of the GCS is not driven
572 by the cost of the policy on oneself. The second branch indicates that the GCS, C, or their combi-
573 nation, are all similarly supported. This branch shows that the support for C conditional on NR
574 is somewhat higher than the support for the GCS, at 62% in the U.S. ($n = 751$) and 84% in Europe
575 ($n = 747$). However, the third one shows no significant preference for C compared to GCS (both
576 conditional on NR), neither in Europe, where GCS is preferred by 52% ($n = 741$) nor in the U.S.,
577 where C is preferred by 53% ($n = 721$). The fourth branch shows that 55% in the U.S. ($n = 771$) and
578 77% in Europe ($n = 766$) prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to NR alone.

579 The effects reported in the fourth analysis are the Average Marginal Component Effects.⁴⁷ The
580 policies studied are progressive policies prominent in the country. Except for the category *foreign*
581 *policy*, which features the GCS 42% of the time, they are drawn uniformly.

582 **Prioritization.** The prioritization allows inferring individual-level preferences for one policy
583 over another, including their intensity. This somewhat differs from a conjoint analysis, which
584 only allows inferring individual-level preferences for one platform over another or collective-level
585 preferences for one policy over another. Also, by comparing platforms, conjoint analyses may be
586 subject to interaction effects between policies of a platform (which can be seen as complementary,
587 substitute, or antagonistic) while the prioritization frames the policies as independent.

588 This question sheds light on a potential discrepancy between the policy priorities of the public
589 and those enacted by legislators. For instance, while the European Union and California have
590 enacted plans to phase out new combustion-engine cars by 2035, the proposal to "ban the sale of

591 new combustion-engine cars by 2030" emerged as one of the three least prioritized policies in each
592 country, with an average allocation of 7.8 points in France to 11.4 points in the UK.

593 **Open-ended question on the GCS.** Around one in four respondents explicitly cites pros or cons.
594 Few individuals explicitly express support or opposition, and misunderstandings are rare. Only
595 11% of the responses are empty or express a lack of opinion, though one-quarter are unclassifiable
596 due to the rarity, nonsensical nature, or irrelevance of the conveyed idea.

597 **Pros and cons.** In the closed question, the least important aspect was the negative impact on
598 their household, with 60% in Europe ($n=1,505$) and 75% in the U.S. ($n=493$) finding it important.
599 The most important elements differ between Europe and the U.S. In Europe, the key factors are
600 the GCS's potential to limit climate change and reduce poverty in low-income countries, both
601 deemed important by 85% of respondents. In the U.S., having sufficient information about the
602 scheme ranks highest at 89%, followed by its potential to foster global cooperation at 82%.

603 Surprisingly, the support for National Redistribution also decreased by 7 p.p. following the
604 closed question about the GCS. This suggests that some individuals may lack attention and con-
605 fuse the two policies, or that contemplating the pros and cons alters the mood of some people,
606 moving them away from their initial positive impression.

607 **Universalistic values** When asked what their country's diplomats should defend in interna-
608 tional climate negotiations, only 11% prefer their country's "interests, even if it goes against global
609 justice." In contrast, 30% prefer global justice (with or without consideration of national interests),
610 and the bulk of respondents (38%) prefer their country's "interests, to the extent it respects global
611 justice."

612 Furthermore, when we ask respondents to assess the extent to which climate change, global
613 poverty, and inequality in their country are problems, climate change is generally seen as the most
614 important problem (with a mean score of 0.59 after recoding answers between -2 and 2). This is
615 followed by global poverty (0.42) and national inequality (0.37).

616 Finally, we conduct a lottery experiment. Respondents were automatically enrolled in a lottery
617 with a \$100 prize and had to choose the proportion of the prize they would keep for themselves
618 versus give to a person living in poverty. The charity donation is directed either to an African
619 individual or a fellow citizen, depending on the respondent's random assignment. In Europe, we
620 observe no significant variation in the willingness to donate based on the recipient's origin (in line
621 with an earlier study⁴⁸). In the U.S., the donations to Africans are 3 p.p. lower, but the slightly
622 lower donations to Africans are entirely driven by Trump voters and non-voters (Table S2).

623 **Global wealth tax estimates.** A 2% tax on net wealth exceeding \$5 million would annually raise
624 \$816 billion, leaving 99.9% of the world population untaxed. More specifically, it would collect €5
625 billion in Spain, €16 billion in France, £20 billion in the UK, €44 billion in Germany, \$430 billion in
626 the U.S., and \$1 billion collectively in all low-income countries (28 countries, home to 700 million
627 people). These Figures come from the [WID wealth tax simulator](#).⁴⁹

628 **Design choices.** As global survey results indicated strong support for global redistributive poli-
629 cies worldwide, we conducted our Western surveys to further investigate the surprisingly high
630 support. Among the eight largest high-income countries, we selected the five ones with a rela-
631 tively low level of support for global redistributive policies as observed in the global survey. We
632 also focus on the GCS as its costs are less concentrated on the very rich, compared to other global
633 redistributive policies, so we expected lower (or less genuine) support. By selecting countries that
634 would lose from global redistribution, are less supportive than others, and focusing on less con-
635 sensual policies, we aimed at conservatively assessing the level of support of world citizens for
636 global redistribution.

637 We split the U.S. survey into two waves to test the effect on the support of providing the
638 information on the actual support, and merged the *Eu* survey in one wave to get larger sample
639 sizes and more power in the analyses.

640 To select the policies tested, we spanned three key areas for global redistribution: climate
641 change, inequality, and global governance. We selected policies that are either on the agenda
642 of international negotiations (international transfers for mitigation; adaptation; or loss and dam-
643 ages; cancellation of public debt; reform of voting rights at the UN or IMF; global wealth tax) or
644 advocated by prominent NGOs or scholars ([global asset registry](#); limits on wealth;^{50;51} democratic
645 climate governance;⁵² global minimum wage;⁵³ fair trade;⁵⁴ carbon pricing;⁶ [increased foreign](#)
646 [aid](#)).

647 Data and code availability

648 All data and code of the *global* surveys as well as figures of the paper are available on [10.5281/zen-](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.11202245)
649 [odo.11202245](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.11202245). Data and code for the *g* survey will be made public upon publication.

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655 **Author Contributions**

656 A.F. collected and analysed the data, and drafted the questionnaire and the paper. T.D. and
657 L.M. substantially revised the questionnaire and paper, and contributed to the conception and
658 redaction.

659 **Competing interests**

660 Fabre declares that he also serves as president of Global Redistribution Advocates.

Table 1: Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list. The tacit support for the GCS is estimated by regressing the number of supported policies on the presence of the GCS in the list of policies. The social desirability is estimated as the difference between the tacit and stated support, and it is not significantly different from zero even at a 20% threshold (see [Methods](#)).

| | Number of supported policies | | |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | All | U.S. | Europe |
| List contains: GCS | 0.624*** (0.028) | 0.524*** (0.041) | 0.724*** (0.036) |
| <i>Support for GCS</i> | 0.65 | 0.542 | 0.757 |
| <i>Social desirability bias</i> | -0.025 | -0.019 | -0.034 |
| <i>80% C.I. for the bias</i> | [-0.06; 0.01] | [-0.07; 0.03] | [-0.08; 0.01] |
| Constant | 1.317 | 1.147 | 1.486 |
| Observations | 6,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 |
| R ² | 0.089 | 0.065 | 0.125 |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 2: Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. (Question 28)

| | Prefers the Progressive platform | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------|-------------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|
| | All | United States | France | Germany | UK | Spain |
| GCS in Progressive platform | 0.028** 0.039 | 0.029 0.132 | 0.112*** 0.005 | 0.015 0.639 | 0.008 0.839 | -0.015 0.696 |
| P-value | | | | | | |
| t | 2.07 | 1.51 | 2.83 | 0.47 | 0.20 | -0.39 |
| 95% C.I. | [.00; .05] | [-.01; .07] | [.03; .19] | [-.05; .08] | [-.07; .08] | [-.09; .06] |
| Constant | 0.623 | 0.604 | 0.55 | 0.7 | 0.551 | 0.775 |
| Observations | 5,202 | 2,619 | 605 | 813 | 661 | 504 |
| R ² | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.013 | 0.0003 | 0.0001 | 0.0003 |

Note: Simple OLS model. The 14% of *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples.

GCS has no significant influence on them. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

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663 ranna, Marc Fleurbaey, David Klenert, Ulrike Kornek, Kevin Kuruc, Aurélie Méjean,
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Extended data

Table S1: Effects on the support for the GCS of a question on its pros and cons (either in open-ended or closed format) and on information about the actual support, in the U.S. (See Section D in the US2 Questionnaire) [\(Back to Section 2.4.5\)](#)

| | Support | | | |
|--|-----------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|
| | Global Climate Scheme | | National Redistribution | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Control group mean | 0.557 | 0.557 | 0.569 | 0.569 |
| Treatment: Open-ended field on GCS pros & cons | -0.073** (0.035) | -0.071** (0.031) | -0.035 (0.035) | -0.030 (0.032) |
| Treatment: Closed questions on GCS pros & cons | -0.109*** (0.034) | -0.096*** (0.031) | -0.065* (0.034) | -0.062** (0.031) |
| Treatment: Info on actual support for GCS and NR | -0.021 (0.034) | -0.015 (0.031) | 0.048 (0.033) | 0.056* (0.031) |
| Includes controls | | ✓ | | ✓ |
| Observations | 2,000 | 1,995 | 2,000 | 1,995 |
| R ² | 0.007 | 0.170 | 0.007 | 0.154 |

Figure S1: [For Supplementary Material] Support for the GCS, NR and the combination of GCS, NR and C (Yes/No questions).
(p. 90, Questions 20, 22, 34, 35, and 26).




Table S2: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality. (Question 33) [\(Back to Section 2.6\)](#)


| | Donation to poor people (in %) | | | |
|--|--------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | All | US | US | Eu |
| Poor is in own country | 0.590 (0.799) | 2.509** (1.152) | 0.046 (1.691) | -1.349 (1.108) |
| Poor is in own country \times Vote: <i>not</i> Biden | | | 3.954* (2.279) | |
| Mean | 34.034 | 33.658 | 33.658 | 34.41 |
| Observations | 6,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 |
| R ² | 0.0001 | 0.002 | 0.034 | 0.0005 |

Table S3: Average Marginal Component Effects of global policies.


| | Effect | Obs. | t | P-value | 95% C.I. |
|--|---------|------|-------|-------------------|---------------|
| FR; Global Climate Plan | 0.13*** | 1456 | 3.5 | $5 \cdot 10^{-4}$ | [0.06; 0.21] |
| DE; Global Climate Plan | 0.09** | 1958 | 2.8 | 0.005 | [0.03; 0.16] |
| ES; Global Climate Plan | 0.04 | 1086 | 0.82 | 0.411 | [-0.05; 0.12] |
| UK; Global Climate Plan | 0.09* | 1498 | 2.31 | 0.021 | [0.01; 0.16] |
| US; Global Climate Plan | 0.01 | 4436 | 0.61 | 0.539 | [-0.03; 0.06] |
| FR; Global Millionaire Tax | 0.11* | 1456 | 2.49 | 0.013 | [0.02; 0.2] |
| DE; Global Millionaire Tax | 0.09* | 1958 | 2.3 | 0.022 | [0.01; 0.18] |
| ES; Global Millionaire Tax | 0.05 | 1086 | 0.91 | 0.365 | [-0.06; 0.16] |
| UK; Global Millionaire Tax | 0.13** | 1498 | 2.86 | 0.004 | [0.04; 0.22] |
| US; Global Millionaire Tax | 0.09** | 4436 | 3.16 | 0.002 | [0.03; 0.14] |
| FR; Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change | 0.12* | 1456 | 2.52 | 0.012 | [0.03; 0.21] |
| DE; Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change | 0.1* | 1958 | 2.52 | 0.012 | [0.02; 0.18] |
| ES; Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change | -0.01 | 1086 | -0.22 | 0.829 | [-0.12; 0.1] |
| UK; Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change | 0.07 | 1498 | 1.56 | 0.12 | [-0.02; 0.17] |
| US; Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change | 0.08** | 4436 | 2.93 | 0.003 | [0.03; 0.13] |

Figure S2: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See non-translated versions in Figure S16; Question 29)

(a) U.S. (Asked only to non-Republicans)




(b) France




(c) Germany

- Climate policy:
- Obligatory solar systems on all suitable roofs
 - Thermal insulation plan
 - Ban on the sale of new cars with internal combustion engines by 2030
- Economic issues:
- Increase in the standard rate of citizen income to up to €600 per month
 - Citizens' insurance (Bürgerversicherung) as fairer social insurance
 - Reduce the national debt ratio to below 60%
 - Deploy investments for gigabit networks
- Foreign policy:
- Global Climate Plan
 - Global Millionaire Tax
 - Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change
 - Double foreign aid to low-income countries
- Societal issues:
- Referendum at the federal level
 - Cannabis Legalization
- Tax system:
- National redistribution plan
 - Reinstate the wealth tax



(d) Spain

- Climate policy:
- 100% electricity produced with renewable energy by 2040
 - Thermal insulation plan
 - Ban the sale of new cars with combustion engines by 2030
- Economic issues:
- Broader health coverage within the public system (dental care, glasses, mental health)
 - Guaranteed Basic Income of €600 per month
 - 34 hour work week
 - Investment in the educational system and universalization of preschool education
- Foreign policy:
- Global Climate Plan
 - Global Millionaire Tax
 - Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change
 - Double foreign aid to low-income countries
- Societal issues:
- Reform the electoral law to make the Senate more proportional
 - Abolition of prostitution
- Tax system:
- National redistribution plan
 - Increase taxes on income above 100,000 euros per year



(e) UK

- Climate policy:
- Ban of most polluting vehicles in city centers (low-emission zones)
 - Thermal insulation plan
 - Ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030
- Economic issues:
- £150 billion to upgrade schools, hospitals, care homes and council houses
 - Real Living Wage of £11 per hour for all workers aged 16 and over
 - Reduce the average full-time weekly working hours to 32
 - Re-establish neighbourhood policing and recruit 2,000 more frontline officers
- Foreign policy:
- Global climate scheme
 - Global tax on millionaires
 - Global democratic assembly on climate change
 - Doubling foreign aid
- Societal issues:
- Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation
 - Legalization of cannabis
- Tax system:
- National redistribution scheme
 - Wealth tax




Figure S3: Influence of the GCS on preferred platform:

Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question 30; in the U.S., asked only to non-Republicans.)




Figure S4: Beliefs regarding the support for the GCS and NR. (Questions 21 and 23)




Figure S5: Percent of global wealth tax that should finance low-income countries (*mean*).

“Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all countries around the world. (...)

What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of retained in the country’s national budget)?” (Question 36)




Figure S6: Attitudes regarding the evolution of [own country] foreign aid. (Question 45)




Figure S7: Conditions at which foreign aid should be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish an increase of foreign aid at some conditions.] (Question 46)





Figure S8: Reasons why foreign aid should not be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish a decrease or stability of foreign aid.] (Question 47)



837 **A Literature review**

838 **A.1 Attitudes and perceptions**

839 **A.1.1 Population attitudes on global policies**

840 Using representative samples in 125 countries covering 96% of the world's greenhouse
841 gas emissions, Andre et al. (2024) show that 69% of the global population express willingness
842 to contribute 1% of their income to fight global warming.¹ Carattini et al. (2019) test
843 the support for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples in five countries, representative
844 along gender and age. For a given variant, the sample size is about 167 respondents per country.
845 They find over 80% support for any variant in India, between 50% and 65% in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43% to 59% in the U.S., depending on the
846 variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding an equal dividend for each
847 human is close to 50% in high-income countries (e.g., at 44% in the U.S.), consistently
848 with our results from the *Global* survey (see Figure 2). This is another piece of evidence
849 that the support is lower for a tax that would "only" reduce CO₂ emissions than for a
850 quota that would unambiguously achieve the climate target. In a survey over 15 countries,
851 Bloodworth & Callegari (2023) find 73% agreement to tax fossil fuel companies and
852 finance climate action in poorer countries. Using a conjoint analysis in the U.S. and Germany,
853 Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019) find that the support for a carbon tax increases
854 by up to 50% if it applies to all industrialized countries rather than exclusively to one's
855 own country.

857 In surveys conducted in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S., Ghassim (2020)
858 finds support ranging from 55% to 74% for "a global democracy including both a global
859 government and a global parliament, directly elected by the world population, to recom-
860 mend and implement policies on global issues". Ghassim & Pauli (2024) also finds strong
861 support for a democratic world government in surveys over 17 countries. Furthermore,
862 through an experiment, Ghassim (2020) finds that, in countries where the government
863 stems from a coalition, voting shares would shift by 8 (Brazil) to 12 p.p. (Germany) from
864 parties who are said to oppose global democracy to parties that supposedly support it.
865 For instance, when Germans respondents were told that (only) the Greens and the Left
866 support global democracy, these parties gained respectively 9 and 3 p.p. in vote inten-
867 tions, while the SPD and the CDU-CSU each lost 6 p.p. Ghassim (2020) also presents

¹However, Ipsos (2023) find no majority support when the amount is not specified, despite strong agreement for own individual action.

868 survey results showing strong majorities in favor of the direct election of one's country's
869 UN representative in all 18 surveyed countries. Similarly, in each of 10 countries, there
870 are clear majorities in favor of "a new supranational entity [taking] enforceable global de-
871 cisions in order to solve global risks" (Global Challenges Foundation 2018). Remarkably,
872 already in 1946, 54% of Americans agreed (while 24% disagreed) that "the UN should be
873 strengthened to make it a world government with the power to control the armed forces
874 of all nations" (Gallup 1946). Furthermore, in surveys conducted in Argentina, China,
875 India, Russia, Spain, and the U.S., Ghassim et al. (2022) find majority support for UN
876 reforms that would make United Nations' decisions binding, give veto powers to a few
877 other major countries at the Security Council, or complement the highest body of the UN
878 with a chamber of directly elected representatives.

879 Relatedly, Meilland et al. (2024) find that both Americans and French people prefer
880 an international settlement of climate justice, even if it encroaches on sovereignty. In a
881 2013 survey conducted in China, Germany, and the U.S., Schleich et al. (2016) show that
882 over three-quarter of people think that international climate agreements reached so far
883 are not successful and that future agreements are important. In Finland, Sivonen (2022)
884 finds that that support for a carbon tax is higher if implemented at the global level (54%)
885 rather than at the national level (40%).

886 The results from these specific questions are in line with the answers to more gen-
887 eral questions. In each of 36 countries, ISSP (2010) find near consensus that "for envi-
888 ronmental problems, there should be international agreements that [their country] and
889 other countries should be made to follow" (overall, 82% agree and 4% disagree). In each
890 of 29 countries, ISSP (2019) uncover near consensus that "Present economic differences
891 between rich and poor countries are too large" (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree).
892 Leiserowitz et al. (2021) reveal that 66% of Americans support providing "financial aid
893 and technical support to developing countries that agree to limit their greenhouse gas
894 emissions." Fehr et al. (2022) find that 90% of Germans want some degree of global redis-
895 tribution.

896 A.1.2 Population attitudes on climate burden sharing

897 Despite differences in the description of fairness principles, surveys on burden-sharing
898 rules show consistent attitudes. Or at least, their seemingly contradictory results can be
899 made compatible with the following interpretation: Concerning emissions reductions,
900 most people want that every country engage in strong and collective decarbonization ef-

901 forts, with a global quota converging to climate neutrality in the medium run. Concerning
902 the financial effort, most people support high-emitting countries paying and low-income
903 countries receiving funding. The most supported rules are those perceived as equitable,
904 in particular an equal right to emit per person.

905 This interpretation helps to understand the apparent differences between articles that
906 approach burden sharing from different angles: cost sharing (in money terms), effort shar-
907 ing (in terms of emissions reductions), or resource sharing (in terms of rights to emit).
908 Existing papers adopt either the cost sharing or effort sharing approach, which preclude
909 any country from being a net receiver of funds. Also, by focusing on *either* the financial
910 or the decarbonization effort, these surveys miss the other half of the picture, which can
911 explain why some papers find strong support for the ability-to-pay principle while others
912 find strong support for grandfathering (defined as emissions reductions being the same
913 in every country). The literature follows these approaches to align with the notions used
914 by the UNFCCC. Yet, we argue that the resource sharing approach is preferable for un-
915 covering attitudes, as it unambiguously describes the distributive implications of each
916 rule while achieving an efficient geographical distribution of emissions reductions and
917 explicitly allowing for monetary gains for some countries.

918 Now, let us summarize the results of the different papers in the light of this clarifica-
919 tion. [Schleich et al. \(2016\)](#) find an identical ranking of support for burden-sharing prin-
920 ciples in China, Germany, and the U.S.: polluter-pays followed by ability-to-pay, equal
921 emissions per capita, and grandfathering. Note that the authors do not allow for emis-
922 sions trading in their description of equal *emissions per capita*, which may explain its rel-
923 atively low support. Yet, the relative support for egalitarianism also depends on how
924 *the other* rules are described. Indeed, [Carlsson et al. \(2011\)](#) find that Swedes prefer that
925 “all countries are allowed to emit an equal amount per capita” rather than options where
926 emissions are reduced based on current or historical emissions, for which it is explicitly
927 stated that high-emitting countries “will continue to emit more than others”. [Bechtel &](#)
928 [Scheve \(2013\)](#) find agreement that rich countries should pay more and historical emis-
929 sions should matter, but that efforts should not be solely borne by wealthy nations. More
930 precisely, their conjoint analysis conducted in France, Germany, the UK, and the U.S.
931 shows that a climate agreement is 15 p.p. more likely to be preferred (to a random alter-
932 native) if it includes 160 countries rather than 20, and 5 p.p. less likely to be preferred
933 if “only rich countries pay” compared to other burden-sharing rules: “rich countries pay
934 more than poor”, “countries pay proportional to current emissions” or “countries pay

proportional to historical emissions". In Germany and the U.S., Gampfer et al. (2014) also find stronger support for funding climate action in low-income countries when cost is shared with other countries. Using a choice experiment, Carlsson et al. (2013) find that the least preferred option in China and the U.S. is when low-emitting countries are exempted from any effort. Ability-to-pay is appreciated in both countries and is the preferred option in the U.S., though the preferred option in China is another one that accounts for historical responsibility. In the U.S. and France, Meilland et al. (2024) find that the most favored fairness principle is that "all countries commit to converge to the same average of total emissions per inhabitant, compatible with a controlled climate change". Furthermore, in each country, 73% disagree with grandfathering defined as "countries which emitted a lot of carbon in the past have a right to continue emitting more than others in the future". The study by Meilland et al. (2024) contains many other results: for instance, majorities prefer to hold countries accountable for their consumption-based rather than territorial emissions, and the median choice regarding historical responsibility is to hold a country accountable for its post-1990 emissions (rather than post-1850 or just their current emissions). Finally, in each of 28 (among the largest) countries, Dabla-Norris et al. (2023) find strong majority for "all countries" to the question "Which countries do you think should be paying to reduce carbon emissions?". When asked to choose between a cost sharing based on *current* vs. *accumulated historic emissions*, a majority prefers *current emissions* in all countries but China and Saudi Arabia (where the two options are close to equally preferred).

[\(Back to Section 2.2\)](#)

A.1.3 Population attitudes on foreign aid

There is an extensive literature on attitudes towards foreign aid in donor countries. The key findings indicate that most people overestimate the amount of foreign aid and that only a minority wants a cut in foreign aid compared to actual amounts, especially once they become aware of them.

For instance, PIPA (2001) shows that 83% of Americans support a multilateral effort to cut world hunger in half. PIPA (2008) shows that in each of 20 countries, a majority thinks that developed countries "have a moral responsibility to work to reduce hunger and severe poverty in poor countries", with an average agreement of 81%. In 7 OECD countries, the study finds that at least 75% of respondents are willing to pay for a program to cut hunger in half (at an estimated cost of, e.g., \$50 a year for each American). Eurobarometer data shows majority support to comply with the promise to increase aid

968 (Cho 2024).

969 Kaufmann et al. (2019) find that perceived aid is overestimated in each of the 24 coun-
970 tries they study, on average by a factor of 7. In most countries, desired aid is larger than
971 perceived aid.² They show that individuals in the top income quintile desire aid 0.13
972 p.p. lower than those in the bottom 40% – which is very close to what we find. By em-
973 ploying a theoretical model and examining correlations between lobbying and actual aid
974 (controling for desired aid), they argue that the gap between actual and desired aid stems
975 from the political influence of the rich who defend their vested interests. In Kaufmann
976 et al. (2012), the U.S. is an outlier: desired aid is at the other countries' average (3% of
977 GNI), but as misperceptions are enormous, perceived aid is twice as large as desired aid.
978 Indeed, Gilens (2001) shows that even Americans with high political knowledge misper-
979 ceive actual aid, and finds that 17% fewer of them want to cut aid when we provide them
980 specific information about the amount of aid. Similarly, Nair (2018) finds that the rela-
981 tively low support for aid in the U.S. is driven by information on global distribution, as
982 people underestimate their rank by 27 centiles on average and overestimate the global
983 median income by a factor 10. This could explain why in the 2000–2004 waves of the GSS,
984 over 60 percent of Americans state that the government is spending too much on foreign
985 aid (Okten & Osili 2007).

986 Hudson & van Heerde (2012) provide a critical review of the literature and show that
987 the strong support for poverty alleviation largely stems from intrinsic altruism. They note
988 that, according to DFID (2009) and PIPA (2001), 47% of British people find that the aid
989 is wasted (mainly due to corruption), while Americans estimate that less than a quarter
990 of the aid reaches those in need, with over half ending up in the hands of corrupt gov-
991 ernment officials. Despite these perceptions, most people still support aid, suggesting
992 the presence of nonutilitarian motives. Consistent with Henson et al. (2010), Bauhr et al.
993 (2013) find that support for aid is reduced by the perception of corruption in recipient
994 countries. However, this effect is mitigated by the aid-corruption paradox: countries with
995 higher levels of corruption often need more help. Bodenstein & Faust (2017) further show
996 that right-wing Europeans, as well as those who perceive strong corruption in their coun-
997 try, are more likely to agree that recipient countries should “follow certain rules regarding
998 democracy, human rights and governance as a condition for receiving EU development
999 aid.” Using a 2002 Gallup survey and the 2006 World Values Survey, and in line with

²Kaufmann et al. (2012) offer the best results on desired aid because (as Hudson & van Heerde (2012) criticize), other studies did not take into account misperceptions of actual aid.

1000 Heinrich et al. (2018) in the U.S., Bayram (2017) and Paxton & Knack (2012) show that the
1001 main determinants for wanting more aid are trust, left-wing ideology, interest in politics,
1002 and being a woman (all positively associated).

1003 While foreign aid is generally unilateral, discretionary, and often used as a bargaining
1004 chip, global redistribution is conceived as multilateral, rule-based, and with dedicated
1005 funding. Our paper finds much stronger support for global redistributive policies than
1006 for increased foreign aid. The difference in attitudes between unilateral foreign aid and
1007 global policies is consistent with the literature on foreign aid. Indeed, it can be explained
1008 by the observation that people prefer multilateral policies and often view foreign aid as
1009 inefficient in reducing poverty. Therefore, we contribute to the theory of attitudes towards
1010 global transfers by showing that when such transfers are multilateral and trusted to be
1011 effective, they would be largely supported.

(Back to Section 2.5.2)

1012 A.1.4 Population attitudes on taxes on the rich

1013 We are not aware of any previous survey on a global wealth tax,³ though surveys
1014 consistently show strong support for national wealth taxes. In a comprehensive survey
1015 conducted in the UK, Rowlingson et al. (2021) show that a wealth tax is the preferred
1016 option for raising revenues. Only 8% of respondents state that total net wealth should not
1017 be taxed (with little differences between Labour and Conservative voters). The study also
1018 finds that the preferred design would be a 1% or 3% tax on net wealth above £1 million. By
1019 asking how much taxes per year should a person with a certain income and wealth level
1020 pay, Fisman et al. (2017) finds that the average American favors a 0.8% linear tax rate
1021 on unspecified wealth up to \$2 million (the highest wealth level tested), and a 3% linear
1022 rate on inherited wealth. Through a conjoint analysis conducted in three high-income
1023 countries, Schechtl & Tisch (2023) find widespread support for a wealth tax (from 78% in
1024 the U.S. to 86% in Germany and the UK), with a preference for an exemption threshold
1025 set at \$/€1 million (rather than 500,000 or 2 million) with the tax rate and tax unit having
1026 little influence on the preferred design. In 21 OECD countries, the OECD (2019) uncovers
1027 strong majority support for higher taxes on the rich to support the poor, with nearly
1028 70% overall agreement and less than 20% disagreement. Isbell (2022) finds similarly high
1029 level of support in 34 African countries. In the UK, Patriotic Millionaires (2022) find 69%
1030 support (and 7% opposition) for a 1.1% tax on wealth in excess of £10 million. In the

³We did not find any using the combination of “survey” or “attitudes” with “wealth tax” or “global wealth tax” in Google Scholar.

1031 U.S., [Americans for Tax Fairness \(2021\)](#) find that 67% to 71% of the respondents support
1032 to “raise taxes for those earning more than \$400,000 a year”, “raise the income tax rate
1033 for those earning over \$1 million a year by 10 percentage points”, or “apply a 2% tax on
1034 an individual’s wealth above \$50 million each year, and 3% on wealth above \$1 billion”.
1035 [Patriotic Millionaires \(2024\)](#) indicate that millionaires themselves agree to be taxed: out
1036 of 2,385 millionaires contacted through wealth councillors, 74% support “increased tax on
1037 very wealthy individuals” and 58% support a 2% wealth tax above \$10 million. Finally,
1038 in surveys in Germany and the U.S., [Ferreira et al. \(2024\)](#) finds strong majority support
1039 for a limit on income or wealth.

1040 A.1.5 Population attitudes on ethical norms

1041 As argued by [Nyborg et al. \(2016\)](#), social norms can be the solution to the collective
1042 action problem. As such, universalistic values and free-riding attitudes are key.

1043 **Universalism** Various studies have examined the concept of global identity (see [Rey-](#)
1044 [sen & Katzarska-Miller \(2018\)](#) for a review). In the 2005-2008 wave of the World Values
1045 Survey, [Bayram \(2015\)](#) notes that “78% of the participants in 57 countries see themselves
1046 as citizens of the world”, though the [2017-2022 wave](#) reveals that more people feel close
1047 to their town, region or country than to the world. [Nation \(2024\)](#) finds large variation
1048 across 21 countries, as 31% to 88% of respondents (excluding *indifferent* answers) consider
1049 themselves “more a world citizen than a citizen of [their] country” (with similar shares
1050 agreeing that “[their] taxes should go towards solving global problems”).

1051 [Enke et al. \(2023\)](#) measure universalism at the U.S. district level using donation data,
1052 and find that a district’s universalism predicts electoral outcomes better than its income
1053 or education level. To measure universalism at the individual level, [Enke et al. \(2023\)](#)
1054 ask American respondents to split \$100 between a random stranger and a random person
1055 with the same income but closer to them. They distinguish different facets of universal-
1056 ism, and define *foreign universalism* as the inclination to give to a foreigner rather than a
1057 fellow citizen. They find a home bias for most people, which could partly be attributed to
1058 concerns about inequality, as the split involves two persons with the same income, with
1059 the foreigner most certainly living in a poorer country than the American and thus en-
1060 joying a higher social status. That being said, a home bias probably remains even after
1061 accounting for concerns about inequality: [Prather \(2013\)](#) also finds a home bias in the
1062 U.S., and 84% of Americans agree that “taking care of problems at home is more impor-

tant than giving aid to foreign countries" (PIPA 2001). Enke et al. (2023) also measure universalism and analyze its correlates in 7 countries, and Cappelen et al. (2022) deploy this method in 60 countries. In a lab experiment with students in the U.S., Cherry et al. (2017) show that a substantial share of people prefer policies detrimental to them due to their egalitarian worldview. Leiserowitz (2006) shows that 68% of Americans are most concerned about the impacts of climate change on "people all over the world" (50%) or "non-human nature" (18%) rather than themselves and their family (12%) or the U.S. (9%).⁴ A 2017 survey by Focus 2030 shows that 40% of French people agree "fighting poverty in developing countries should be one of the priorities of the European Union" while only 19% disagree. Waytz et al. (2019) show that left-leaning people exhibit a wider "moral circle". Jaeger & Wilks (2023) find that judgments of moral concern are equally well explained by characteristics of the judge and the evaluated target.

Free-riding Despite the long-standing explanation of the lack of climate action as a result of free-riding, surveys consistently show that people support climate mitigation action in their own country, even in the absence of such action in other countries. Bernauer & Gampfer (2015) show this for Americans and Indians, who both overestimate their country's emissions at one third of the global total. Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019) show this in the U.S. and China using an experimental design. McEvoy & Cherry (2016) show that Americans mostly invoke leadership and morality to justify unilateral climate action. Using a range of methods, Aklin & Mildenberger (2020) show that the empirical evidence for free-riding is not compelling, and that climate inaction can be equally well explained by distributive conflicts. Finally, review of the literature by McGrath & Bernauer (2017) shows that climate attitudes are largely nonreciprocal, and primarily driven by values and perceptions of the policies, rather than by considerations of what other countries do.

A.1.6 Second-order beliefs

Allport (1924) introduced the concept of pluralistic ignorance: a shared misperception concerning others' beliefs. The concept became notorious when O'Gorman (1975) showed that, towards the end of the civil rights movement, 47% of Americans believed that a majority of white people supported segregation, while only 18% did so. PIPA (2001) has shown that while 75% of Americans are willing to contribute \$50 annually to halve

⁴Unpublished survey results of Dechezleprêtre et al. (forthcoming) find similar figures in 2024.

1094 world hunger (the cost of the program), only 32% believed that the majority would share
1095 this willingness. Pluralistic ignorance regarding climate-friendly norms in the United
1096 States has been documented by Andre et al. (2022), who further show that correcting the
1097 misperceptions would be effective to enhance pro-climate behaviors. Relatedly, Spark-
1098 man et al. (2022) show that Americans underestimate the support for climate policies
1099 by nearly half, while Drews et al. (2022) document pluralistic ignorance of carbon tax
1100 support in Spain. Additionally, Geiger & Swim (2016) show that pluralistic ignorance
1101 regarding concern for climate change leads people to self-silence, resulting in reduced
1102 discussions on the topic.

1103 A.1.7 Elite attitudes

1104 In a survey of climate negotiators on their preferences in terms of burden-sharing,
1105 Lange et al. (2007) uncovers a mix of self-serving bias and support for the egalitarian
1106 principle. Dannenberg et al. (2010) elicit climate negotiators' equity preferences and find
1107 that regional differences in addressing climate change are driven more by national inter-
1108 ests than by different equity concerns. Hjerpe et al. (2011) indicate that voluntary con-
1109 tribution, indicated as willingness to contribute, was the least preferred principle among
1110 both negotiators and observers. Three of the four principles for allocating mitigation
1111 commitments were recognized widely across the major geographical regions: historical
1112 responsibilities, ability-to-pay, and equal per capita emissions. This result is confirmed
1113 by Kesternich et al. (2021), who observe tendencies for a more harmonized view among
1114 key groups towards the ability-to-pay rule in a setting of weighted burden sharing rules.
1115 Mildenberger & Tingley (2019) survey elites (Congress staffers and international relations
1116 scholars) as well as the population in U.S. and China. They document pluralistic igno-
1117 rance of pro-climate attitudes, egocentric bias, and increasing support after beliefs are
1118 updated.

1119 A.2 Proposals and analyses of global policy-making

1120 A.2.1 Global carbon pricing

1121 Global carbon pricing is widely regarded by economists as the benchmark climate
1122 policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon emissions externality. For instance, Hoel
1123 (1991) shows that an international carbon tax can be designed to simultaneously achieve
1124 efficiency and accommodate any distributional objective. Concerning the distributional

1125 objective, Grubb (1990), Agarwal & Narain (1991) and Bertram (1992) were the first to
1126 advocate for an equal right to emit for each human. As Grubb (1990) states it: "by far the
1127 best combination of long term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity, is obtained
1128 from a system based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions which are allocated on
1129 an adult per capita basis".⁵ Support for such solution has been renewed ever since (Baer
1130 et al. 2000; Jamieson 2001; Blanchard & Tirole 2021; Rajan 2021).

1131 While many endorse the egalitarian allocation of emissions permits, economists also
1132 considered this outcome as politically unfeasible. Thus, to preserve the current level of
1133 inequalities and to preclude transfers between countries, they adjusted their (integrated
1134 assessment) models by assigning more weight to the interest of rich countries (Stanton
1135 2011).

1136 Gollier & Tirole (2015) synthesize the distributional decision with a *generosity* parame-
1137 ter which would allocate emissions permit to countries in proportion to their population
1138 if set to one, in proportion to their emissions (on the start date of the policy) if set to zero,
1139 and as a mixture of the egalitarian and grandfathering rules if set in between. Using a
1140 similar formula in the context of a tax, Cramton et al. (2015) (summarized in MacKay
1141 et al. 2015) propose that countries with emissions per capita around the average fix the
1142 generosity parameter, so that it is strategically chosen to maximize the tax rate, and to
1143 fix the tax rate at the minimum price proposed by participating countries. Negotiations
1144 would exclude countries with low ambition beforehand; and the treaty would impose
1145 trade sanctions on non-participating countries. van den Bergh et al. (2020) propose a
1146 "dual-track transition to global carbon pricing": an expanding climate club that would
1147 integrate existing and new emissions trading systems, and a reorientation of UNFCCC
1148 negotiations towards a global carbon price and burden-sharing rules. The IMF (2019)
1149 also supports global carbon pricing or, as a first step, a carbon price floor. They propose
1150 either differentiated prices among countries or international transfers, and estimate that
1151 a price of \$75/tCO₂ in 2030 would be compatible with a 2°C trajectory.

1152 Other authors have put forth more radical proposals. For instance, Weitzman (2017)
1153 envisions a World Climate Assembly with proportional representation at the global scale,
1154 so that the median (human) voter would choose the carbon price level. To finance an
1155 adaptation fund, Chancel & Piketty (2015) propose a global *progressive* carbon tax (or a
1156 progressive tax on air tickets as a first step), so that rich people (who are high emitters)
1157 contribute more to the public good. Fleurbaey & Zuber (2013) highlight that, given that

⁵By "adult per capita", Grubb (1990) means that permits would be allocated equally among adults.

1158 current emitters are probably richer than future victims of climate change damages, cli-
1159 mate policies deserve a *negative* discount rate. In other words, we cannot dissociate the
1160 climate issue from global inequalities, and an ethical response to this issue requires global
1161 redistribution.

1162 **A.2.2 Climate burden sharing**

1163 The literature has discussed different burden-sharing principles (Ringius et al. 2002).
1164 While there is no agreement on their definitions as different approaches are used (cost
1165 sharing, effort sharing, or resource sharing, see Section A.1.2), we describe here the burden-
1166 sharing principles consistently using the resource sharing approach (i.e., allocating emis-
1167 sions rights). For other papers that define or compare different burden-sharing principles,
1168 see Vaillancourt & Waaub (2004), Zhou & Wang (2016), Leimbach & Giannousakis (2019).

1169 **Equal per capita.** The simplest principle is perhaps to allocate each year's global carbon
1170 quota based on an equal right to emit per capita, or an equal right to emit for each adult.
1171 Implementing this principle would result in large transfers from high-emitting to low-
1172 emitting countries (Young-Brun et al. 2023).

1173 **Grandfathering.** In contrast, *grandfathering* entails allocating emissions rights in pro-
1174 portion to current emissions. From the perspective of allocating carbon pricing revenues
1175 between countries, grandfathering amounts to each country retaining the revenues it col-
1176 lects. Given that nations are sovereign and have not agreed to share emissions rights,
1177 this principle can be considered as the default option against which the other ones can be
1178 compared in terms of distributive effects.

1179 **Historical responsibilities.** At the opposite end of the spectrum is the principle of *his-
1180 torical responsibilities*, which assigns to each country a carbon budget proportional to its
1181 population. Countries that have emitted more than the average have accumulated a car-
1182 bon debt towards countries that have emitted less, which have a carbon credit.⁶

1183 To fully specify this rule, one needs to define a start date for the responsibilities on
1184 past emissions and specify how to account for population size. 1990 is often chosen as

⁶It is not clear how these debts would be settled. Approaches could involve carbon removal from the atmosphere, or using a conventional social cost of carbon to monetize them, by crediting (positively or negatively) emissions rights to countries in an international carbon market.

1185 a start year as it is the date of the first IPCC assessment report, marking the widespread
1186 acknowledgment of climate change, though variants include 1972, 1960, 1950 or 1850.⁷
1187 Several solutions have been proposed to account for evolving populations, none of which
1188 is flawless. Matthews (2015) allocates emissions rights on a given year proportionally to
1189 the countries' populations in that year. An alternative is to use fixed populations, such
1190 as the populations at the chosen start year (Neumayer 2000), or at a future date such
1191 as projected when the global total population will reach 9 billion (Raupach et al. 2014).
1192 Fanning & Hickel (2023) convert the projected climate debt up to 2050 into monetary
1193 terms in a 1.5°C scenario.

1194 The rationale for using fixed populations is to prevent countries from intentionally
1195 increasing their population size to gain more emissions rights. However, this approach
1196 treats countries with different demographic trajectories similarly, effectively penalizing
1197 countries which grow more than others (if past populations are used) or grow more than
1198 expected (if future populations are used). Using current populations like Matthews (2015)
1199 also comes with its own problems. Consider two countries having contributed very little
1200 to cumulative emissions, with the same emissions per capita but different demographic
1201 patterns: country A's population has doubled in the last 30 years, while country B's pop-
1202 ulation has remained stable. Despite the similar present situation, country B would ac-
1203 cumulate more carbon credit than country A. Essentially, compensating country B more
1204 due to its past population size amounts to compensating the dead although it is future
1205 generations who will suffer. That being said, using current populations is likely a more
1206 viable solution than relying on fixed populations since, in practice, countries with similar
1207 emissions per capita tend to have relatively similar demographic trajectories.

1208 **Ability to pay.** Another prominent burden-sharing principle is the ability to pay whereby
1209 richer countries should contribute more to mitigation efforts. To operationalize this prin-
1210 ciple, Baer et al. (2008) define *capacity* as the share of global income above an exemption
1211 threshold. They use the threshold of \$7,500 per year (in 2005 PPP), which corresponds to
1212 the top 28% of the global income distribution. According to this principle, the effort of a
1213 country should be proportional to the revenues it would raise with a linear income tax on
1214 individual income above \$7,500.

⁷Climate equity monitor uses 1850 for example.

1215 **Climate Equity Reference Framework** Baer et al. (2008) propose another effort-sharing
1216 method, the *Climate Equity Reference Framework* (CERF), which blends the ability to pay
1217 principle with their version of historical responsibilities. They define *responsibility* as fol-
1218 lows: they determine the mitigation requirement as the emissions gap between the Busi-
1219 ness as Usual scenario from IEA (2007) and a 2°C (with 68-86% probability) scenario.
1220 The mitigation requirement is then allocated to countries proportionally to their cumu-
1221 lative emissions (starting in 1990). The emissions right of a country according to their
1222 *responsibility* are then determined by its Business as Usual emissions minus its mitigation
1223 requirement. A country's emissions right, dubbed its *greenhouse development right* (GDR),
1224 is defined using a combination of *capacity* (C) and *responsibility* (R) to allocate the miti-
1225 gation requirement between countries. This allocation key is called the *Responsibility and*
1226 *Capacity Indicator* (RCI) and defined as $RCI = R^a \cdot C^{1-a}$, with $a = .4$.

1227 This choice of parameter may seem somewhat arbitrary, but the [EcoEquity calculator](#)
1228 allows for a customization all CERF parameters (Holz et al. 2018; Holz et al. 2019). The
1229 Climate Action Network has adopted the CERF as its *fair share* framework, though the
1230 different national chapters of the organization could not agree on a choice of parameters
1231 (Athanasou et al. 2022).⁸

1232 The CERF approach was adopted by a prominent network of climate NGOs because
1233 it operationalizes the principle of *common but differentiated responsibilities and respective ca-*
1234 *pabilities* recognized by the UNFCCC. However, this approach suffers from three draw-
1235 backs. First, its definition of historical responsibility as an effort sharing principle is in-
1236 consistent with the principle of an equal right of cumulative emissions per capita, which
1237 is a resource sharing principle. For instance, consider a fully decarbonized country that
1238 has exhausted *exactly* its cumulative carbon budget. According to the CERF notion of *re-*
1239 *sponsibility*, this country would still be expected to contribute significantly to mitigation
1240 efforts due to its relatively high cumulative emissions. Yet, according to the usual defini-
1241 tion of the historical responsibility based on an equal right of cumulative emissions p.c.,
1242 this country would have no liability as it has not exceeded its carbon budget. Second, a

⁸The U.S. Climate Action Network and the think tank EcoEquity (funded by Tom Athanasou and late Paul Baer) choose the following parameters: an equal weight for R and C ($a = .5$), their own business as usual projections of CO₂ emissions based on trends of GDP growth and emissions intensity reduction, a 1.5°C (Low Energy Demand) pathway, 1950 as the start year for responsibility, a gradual inclusion of income to compute capacity (which adds complexity to the calculation) from a full exemption of the bottom 70% (\$7,500 per year) linearly to a full inclusion of the top 2% (\$72,211), the inclusion of non-CO₂ gases but not of emissions embodied in trade (i.e. imported emissions) nor LULUCF (land-use).


country with moderate incomes⁹ and low historical responsibility would be assigned a relatively low effort, even if its emissions per capita are high. In other words, the CERF approach favors countries that have experienced recent growth. Third, the poorest countries would be granted emissions rights close to the Business as Usual trajectory, as they would bear virtually none of the effort. But this trajectory carries the current (unfair) income distribution and amounts to grandfathering. For example, the baseline trajectory for emissions¹⁰ in the DRC entail 0.8 tCO₂ p.c. in 2030, which is five times less than the world average emissions right per capita. In this framework, if the DRC were to grow faster than projected in the baseline, it would actually have to pay to the rest of the world for mitigation efforts. This is what is likely to happen to countries like Mexico or Senegal, from our simulation of the net gains of CERF compared to a situation without international transfers (see Figure S9). In contrast, a resource sharing approach based on equal per capita emissions would result in low-income countries receiving emissions rights exceeding their projected trajectories, leading to transfers from high-income countries. By construction, such transfers do not occur in an effort sharing approach like the CERF, implying lower transfers to low-income countries. Compared to an equal right to emit per capita, this method favors countries like China (whose emissions are allowed to remain stable over 2020-2030 instead of a reduction of 35-40%) and penalizes regions like Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (see Figure S10).

Contraction and Convergence. Meyer (2004) defines a rule called *contraction and convergence* (C&C), which combines elements of grandfathering and equal per capita approaches. According to C&C, each country is granted (tradable) emissions rights, starting at their current emission level and converging linearly to an equal per capita level at some pre-specified date. The *contraction* part refers to the reduction of total emissions rights in line with the climate objective. When discussed around year 2000, the convergence date was specified between 2020 and 2050. This rule, advocated by the Global Commons Institute (a UK think tank), was on the agenda from COP2 to COP15 (i.e., until Copenhagen, and including in Kyoto), including at Kyoto, and was endorsed by the European Parliament in 1998. More recently, Gignac & Matthews (2015) have shown how C&C can be made consistent with historical responsibilities by computing carbon debts and credits until the convergence date.

⁹Using the above parameters, moderate incomes means few incomes above the global 70th. percentile.

¹⁰The baseline trajectory is computed as the “product of the projected GDP and CO₂ emission intensity”.

Figure S9: Net gains from the CERF burden-sharing rule in 2030.




Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO₂.

¹²⁷⁴ **Assessments of the NDCs against burden-sharing principles.** The regime established
¹²⁷⁵ by the 2015 Paris agreement to regulate climate change respects none of the burden-
¹²⁷⁶ sharing principles and relies instead on voluntary contributions from each country, known
¹²⁷⁷ as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). A body of literature (reviewed by [Höhne](#)
¹²⁷⁸ [et al. 2014](#)) assesses the NDCs against the emissions reduction objective and different
¹²⁷⁹ burden-sharing principles. To evaluate the NDCs, [Gao et al. \(2019\)](#) examine their emis-
¹²⁸⁰ sions projections for 2030 and estimate the resulting increase in temperature. The most
¹²⁸¹ recent and comprehensive assessment of NDCs against burden-sharing principles is con-
¹²⁸² ducted by [van den Berg et al. \(2020\)](#) (see also [Raupach et al. 2014](#); [Robiou du Pont et al.](#)
¹²⁸³ [2016](#); [Robiou du Pont et al. 2017](#)).

¹²⁸⁴ A.2.3 Global redistribution

¹²⁸⁵ **Lack of cooperation vs. lack of redistribution.** Major social science scholarship from
¹²⁸⁶ Realism in International Relations to game theory of international environmental agree-
¹²⁸⁷ ments in economics has pointed to lack of cooperation as the major obstacle to global
¹²⁸⁸ sustainability ([Waltz 1979](#); [Snidal 1991](#); [Barrett 1994](#); [Nordhaus 2015](#)). Another body of

Figure S10: Difference between net gains from Greenhouse Development Rights and equal rights per capita.



Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO₂.

literature on international climate cooperation emphasises redistribution from North to South as a key condition for making global climate policy work, noting the historical responsibility of major emitters in the Global North ([Parks & Roberts 2008](#); [Friman & Strandberg 2014](#); [Bou-Habib 2019](#); [Aklin & Mildenberger 2020](#)). Taking the second perspective, making progress on international climate policy also requires a decision on how the burden of climate change mitigation can be shared fairly. This raises the question of whether citizens around the world support such global redistribution policies or, more specifically, whether citizens in high-income countries are willing to make sacrifices to combat climate change and extreme poverty.

While we cannot test conditional cooperation as part of the present analysis, our empirical results document that if the North-South redistribution would be implemented as part of global climate policies, they would receive strong public support.

Studies on global redistribution Addressing global poverty, inequalities, and climate change are central to the universally agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). As

1303 highlighted by Bolch et al. (2022) and Fabre (2024), low-income countries often lack suf-
1304 ficient domestic resources to eradicate poverty in the short term, indicating the need for
1305 international transfers to rapidly end global poverty. In *Beyond the Welfare State*, Gunnar
1306 Myrdal (1960) called for a *welfare world*. In his Nobel lecture, he emphasized the neces-
1307 sity of increasing foreign aid to low-income countries, stating that “The type of marginal
1308 foreign aid we have provided, is clearly not enough to meet their barest needs” (Myrdal
1309 1975).

1310 Drawing on the labor theory of value, some economists have argued that global in-
1311 equalities arise from unequal exchange in international trade (Arghiri 1972). Indeed, the
1312 stark disparity in wages between countries implies that one unit of labor exported by an
1313 American commands five units of labor embodied in imported goods, whereas Ethiopi-
1314 ans need to export 50 units of labor to obtain one unit through imports (Alsamawi et al.
1315 2014; Reyes et al. 2017). Taking stock, Hickel (2017) proposes to globally establish mini-
1316 mum wages at 50% of the local median wage. Hickel (2017) also suggests other solutions
1317 against global inequality, which served as inspiration for our questionnaire. These mea-
1318 sures include the cancellation of low-income countries’ public debt, fair trade practices
1319 (such as eliminating tariffs from high-income countries, reducing patent protections, and
1320 reducing farming subsidies in rich countries), initiatives to combat tax evasion (e.g., im-
1321 plementing a global financial register), land reform, and a fair international climate policy.

1322 Piketty (2014) prominently advocates for a progressive wealth tax on a global scale,
1323 and Piketty (2022) suggests to allocate its revenues to countries in proportion to their
1324 population.

1325 Kopczuk et al. (2005) compute the optimal linear income tax rates for all countries in
1326 two ways: globally centralized and decentralized (i.e., within each country and without
1327 international transfers). They show that the average decentralized rate is 41%. In con-
1328 trast, the global rate is 62%, which would generate funds to finance a basic income of
1329 250\$/month (higher than the GPD per capita of 73 countries). From a current global Gini
1330 index of 0.695, they show that decentralized optimal taxation would only marginally re-
1331 duce global inequality to 0.69, whereas global taxation would significantly decrease the
1332 Gini to 0.25. The study also shows that the existing level of foreign aid can only be ratio-
1333 nalized if the U.S. attaches 2,000 less value to a citizen in the poorest countries than to an
1334 American citizen (or 1,000 less if half of the transfers are diverted due to corruption).

1335 **A.2.4 Basic income**

1336 Unconditional cash transfers (UCT) are increasingly seen as an effective way to end ex-
1337 treme poverty. A growing body of evidence from randomized control trials supports this
1338 notion: [Gangopadhyay et al. \(2015\)](#) find that UCT outperform a food subsidy; [Haushofer](#)
1339 & [Shapiro \(2016\)](#) find significant impacts on health, economic outcomes, and psycholog-
1340 ical well-being; [Egger et al. \(2022\)](#) find large positive spillovers on non-recipient people,
1341 and minimal inflation. Reviews of existing research further confirm the positive outcomes
1342 of UCT ([Standing 2014](#); [Bastagli et al. 2016](#)).

1343 While the delivery of cash to remote areas and the prevention of fraud is challenging
1344 in regions without a proper civil register, the use of mobile phones as banking and bio-
1345 metric identification tools could provide viable solutions ([Harnett 2017](#)). Although many
1346 places still lack internet access, satellite internet technology shows promising progress,
1347 with some experts suggesting that it could soon become affordable and universally ac-
1348 cessible ([Hanson 2016](#)).

1349 **A.2.5 Global democracy**

1350 The idea of world federalism has a long-standing history, dating back at least to [Kant](#)
1351 ([1795](#)), who argued that a world federation was essential for achieving perpetual peace.
1352 International organizations were eventually created to foster peace, though the League
1353 of Nations and its successor, the United Nations, never succeeded in avoiding military
1354 conflicts. Many have argued that we need stronger and more democratic global institu-
1355 tions, competent to address global challenges such as extreme poverty, climate change,
1356 wars, pandemics, or financial stability. Before World War II, feminist and pacifist [Maver-](#)
1357 [ick Lloyd & Schwimmer \(1937\)](#) founded the *Campaign for World Government*, advocating
1358 for direct representation at the global scale. [Einstein \(1947\)](#) called for the subordination of
1359 the UN Security Council to the General Assembly and the direct election of UN delegates.
1360 Since 2007, there has been widespread support for a United Nations Parliamentary As-
1361 sembly (UNPA) from individuals and institutions in over 150 countries, including 1,800
1362 member of parliament, heads of state, as well the European Parliament, the Pan-African
1363 Parliament, and the Latin-American Parliament. The UNPA campaign calls for a gradual
1364 implementation of a democratic assembly, starting with a consultative assembly com-
1365 posed of members of national parliaments, allowing for the direct election of its members
1366 in voluntary countries, and progressing towards a world parliament with binding legisla-


¹³⁶⁷ tive powers once all members are directly elected ([Leinen & Bummel 2018](#)). Besides the
¹³⁶⁸ UNPA, various scholars have put forward different models of global democracy, ranging
¹³⁶⁹ from deliberative spaces to a world federation ([Archibugi et al. 2011](#)). While the most
¹³⁷⁰ radical proposals may still be on the horizon, an assembly of random citizens represen-
¹³⁷¹ tative of the world population has already been convened. It has produced a joint state-
¹³⁷² ment at the COP26 ([Global Assembly 2022](#)), and a similar *World Citizens' Assembly* should
¹³⁷³ soon follow. Using surveys covering 86% of global population, [Hale & Koenig-Archibugi](#)
¹³⁷⁴ ([2019](#)) find that the world as a whole is less polarized than some countries and argue
¹³⁷⁵ against the fear people's views would be too diverse for a functioning global democracy.

1376 B Raw results

1377 Country-specific raw results are also available as supplementary material files: **US**,
 1378 **EU, FR, DE, ES, UK**.

Figure S11: Absolute support for global climate policies.

Share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* (in percent, $n = 40,680$). The color blue denotes an absolute majority. See Figure 2 for the relative support. (Questions A-I of the global survey.)



*In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

Figure S12: Correct answers to comprehension questions (in percent). (Questions 16-18)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| With NR, typical [country] people win and richest lose | 68 | 73 | 76 | 73 | 73 | 70 |
| With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win | 60 | 68 | 62 | 72 | 67 | 67 |
| With GCS+NR, typical [country] people neither win nor lose | 54 | 60 | 63 | 59 | 57 | 61 |

Figure S13: Number of correct answers to comprehension questions (mean). (Section 2.3, Questions 16-18)




Figure S14: List experiment: mean number of supported policies. (Section 2.4.1, Question 24)




Figure S15: Conjoint analyses 1 and 2. (Questions 25-27, Back to Section 2.4.3)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|-----------------------------|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Global climate scheme (GCS) | 54 | 76 | 80 | 71 | 81 | 74 |
| C+NR+GCS preferred to C+NR | 55 | 74 | 79 | 71 | 78 | 68 |
| NR+GCS preferred to NR | 55 | 77 | 79 | 74 | 79 | 77 |
| NR+C preferred to NR | 62 | 84 | 88 | 83 | 84 | 82 |
| GCS+NR preferred to C+NR | 47 | 52 | 53 | 53 | 49 | 52 |
| NR+C+GCS preferred to NR | 55 | 77 | 86 | 73 | 83 | 72 |

Figure S16: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See English translations in Figure S2; Question 29)




Figure S17: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements seen as important for supporting the GCS in a 4-Likert scale (in percent). (Question 32) [\(Back to Section 2.4.5\)](#)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|---|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| It would succeed in limiting climate change | 78 | 85 | 85 | 86 | 86 | 83 |
| It would hurt the [Country] economy | 81 | 67 | 61 | 67 | 66 | 69 |
| It would penalize my household | 75 | 60 | 55 | 63 | 59 | 63 |
| It would make people change their lifestyle | 78 | 79 | 83 | 79 | 78 | 77 |
| It would reduce poverty in low-income countries | 77 | 85 | 88 | 85 | 86 | 81 |
| It might be detrimental to some poor countries | 79 | 72 | 79 | 67 | 78 | 70 |
| It could foster global cooperation | 82 | 81 | 81 | 82 | 85 | 80 |
| It could fuel corruption in low-income countries | 79 | 75 | 82 | 69 | 79 | 72 |
| It could be subject to fraud | 80 | 79 | 80 | 74 | 83 | 81 |
| It would be technically difficult to put in place | 77 | 71 | 74 | 62 | 79 | 71 |
| Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences | 89 | 82 | 89 | 68 | 91 | 88 |

Figure S18: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements found in the open-ended field on the GCS (manually recoded, in percent).

"When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to your mind?

Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme." (Question 31) (Back to Section 2.4.5)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|-------------------------|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| environment | 26 | 31 | 37 | 26 | 43 | 24 |
| unclassifiable | 25 | 24 | 23 | 28 | 25 | 22 |
| pro | 22 | 23 | 21 | 22 | 33 | 20 |
| con | 22 | 17 | 12 | 18 | 20 | 16 |
| cost | 17 | 12 | 11 | 14 | 17 | 7 |
| poorest humans | 11 | 7 | 6 | 9 | 5 | 6 |
| tax redistribution | 10 | 7 | 11 | 8 | 4 | 9 |
| support | 8 | 6 | 3 | 5 | 6 | 8 |
| oppose | 7 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 4 |
| don't know | 6 | 8 | 10 | 8 | 7 | 10 |
| empty | 6 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13 |
| difficult agreement | 5 | 10 | 7 | 12 | 8 | 8 |
| difficult implement | 3 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 4 | 6 |
| misunderstands gcs | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 |
| misunderstands question | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 |

Figure S19: Perceptions of the GCS. Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).

"When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to your mind?

Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme." (Question 31) [\(Back to Section 2.4.5\)](#)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|---|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| world: international world country global | 28 | 22 | 23 | 19 | 22 | 23 |
| environment: climat environment animal emission natur | 26 | 21 | 17 | 28 | 21 | 17 |
| poorest: poor low-income 700 poverty | 16 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 4 | 10 |
| pro: pro pros pros pros: | 16 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 5 |
| con: con con: cons cons: | 15 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 6 |
| cost: cost expensive higher price 85 inflation | 13 | 7 | 5 | 9 | 7 | 6 |
| tax: tax | 8 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| redistribution: rich redistribu | 8 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 5 |
| implementation: implement enforce polic monitor | 6 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 5 |
| agreement: agree accept participat | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 2 | 3 |

Figure S20: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality (mean). (Question 33) [\(Back to Section 2.6\)](#)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|-------------------------|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Donation to own country | 35 | 34 | 31 | 38 | 34 | 32 |
| Donation to Africa | 32 | 35 | 33 | 41 | 32 | 33 |

Figure S21: Support for a global wealth tax.

"Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-income countries?

Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education." (Question 34)




Figure S22: Support for a national wealth tax.

"Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: affordable housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and schools]?" (Question 35)




Figure S23: Preferred share of global wealth tax revenues that should be pooled to finance low-income countries. (Question 36)




Figure S24: Support for sharing half of global tax revenues with low-income countries, rather than each country retaining all the revenues it collects (in percent). (Question 37)




Figure S25: Perceived foreign aid. “From your best guess, what percentage of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?” (Question 38) (Back to Section 2.5.2)

Actual values: France: 0.8%; Germany: 1.3%; Spain: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%; U.S.: 0.4%.




Figure S26: Preferred foreign aid (without info on actual amount).

"If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?" (Question 39) [\(Back to Section 2.5.2\)](#)




Figure S27: Preferred foreign aid (after info on actual amount).

"Actually, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid.

If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?" (Question 39) [\(Back to Section 2.5.2\)](#)




Figure S28: Actual, perceived and preferred amount of foreign aid, with random info (or not) on actual amount. (*Mean* in percent of public spending, Questions 38, 39) (Back to Section 2.5.2)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Actual foreign aid (in % of public spending) | 0.4 | 1.1 | 0.8 | 1.3 | 0.5 | 1.7 |
| Belief about foreign aid | 4.7 | 2.9 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 3.5 |
| Preferred foreign aid (with info) | 1.8 | 2.7 | 3.4 | 2.9 | 2.1 | 2.5 |
| Preferred foreign aid (no info) | 4 | 3.9 | 4.7 | 4.4 | 3.1 | 3.4 |

Figure S29: Preferred foreign aid (after info or after perception). (Questions 38 and 39)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as current | 70 | 75 | 91 | 76 | 77 | 57 |
| Preferred foreign aid is higher than current | 47 | 59 | 75 | 58 | 63 | 43 |
| Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as perceived | 57 | 74 | 83 | 79 | 77 | 58 |
| Preferred foreign aid is higher than perceived | 37 | 53 | 64 | 59 | 54 | 39 |

Figure S30: Preferences for funding increased foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]
 "How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent) (Question 40) (Back to Section 2.5.2)




Figure S31: Preferences of spending following reduced foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]
 "How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent)
 (Question 41) [\(Back to Section 2.5.2\)](#)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Higher spending on defense | 19 | 23 | 11 | 21 | 17 | 31 |
| Higher spending on retirement pensions | 23 | 41 | 22 | 51 | 57 | 35 |
| Higher spending on healthcare | 40 | 57 | 31 | 42 | 80 | 70 |
| Higher spending on welfare benefits | 13 | 20 | 7 | 19 | 39 | 20 |
| Higher spending on education | 30 | 45 | 31 | 47 | 58 | 43 |
| Higher spending on other programs | 6 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 9 | 8 |
| Lower taxes on the wealthiest | 5 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| Lower corporate income tax rate | 12 | 6 | 10 | 4 | 8 | 6 |
| Lower personal income tax rates | 48 | 29 | 26 | 27 | 37 | 30 |
| Lower public deficit | 32 | 24 | 21 | 13 | 41 | 21 |

Figure S32: Willingness to sign real-stake petition for the Global Climate Scheme or National Redistribution, compared to stated support in corresponding subsamples (e.g. support for the GCS in the branch where the petition was about the GCS). (Question 42)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|----------------------------------|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Petition for the GCS | 51 | 69 | 69 | 66 | 78 | 69 |
| (Comparable) support for the GCS | 53 | 76 | 81 | 74 | 81 | 74 |
| Petition for NR | 57 | 67 | 65 | 66 | 74 | 68 |
| (Comparable) support for NR | 58 | 72 | 76 | 65 | 78 | 75 |

Figure S33: Absolute support for various global policies (Percent of (*somewhat or strong*) support). (Questions 43 and 44. See Figure 3 for the relative support.)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages | 41 | 54 | 52 | 53 | 62 | 51 |
| High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries | 53 | 65 | 62 | 66 | 68 | 62 |
| High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change | 45 | 58 | 55 | 60 | 62 | 54 |
| Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt | 31 | 37 | 36 | 30 | 45 | 40 |
| Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population | 34 | 44 | 44 | 43 | 52 | 43 |
| Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries | 39 | 49 | 39 | 51 | 50 | 54 |
| A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage | 42 | 55 | 54 | 54 | 61 | 53 |
| Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets | 44 | 70 | 73 | 70 | 72 | 65 |
| A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human | 34 | 45 | 40 | 48 | 44 | 50 |
| National tax on millionaires funding public services | 62 | 76 | 70 | 79 | 79 | 77 |
| Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries | 58 | 71 | 69 | 72 | 78 | 71 |

Figure S34: Preferred approach of diplomats at international climate negotiations. In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend [own country] interests or global justice? (Question 48)




Figure S35: Percent of selected issues viewed as important.
 "To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem?" (Question 55)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--------------------------------|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Income inequality in [Country] | 55 | 59 | 54 | 58 | 71 | 57 |
| Climate change | 59 | 66 | 66 | 63 | 73 | 63 |
| Global poverty | 50 | 57 | 50 | 58 | 75 | 49 |

Figure S36: Group defended when voting.
 "What group do you defend when you vote?" (Question 56)




Figure S37: Mean prioritization of policies.

Mean number of points allocated policies to express intensity of support (among six policies chosen at random). Blue color means that the policy has been awarded more points than the average policy.

"In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

How do you allocate the points among the following policies?" (Question 57)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| econ1 | 13 | 21 | 10 | 14 | 35 | 31 |
| econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung) | 23 | 22 | 25 | 21 | 22 | 23 |
| econ3 | 21 | 15 | 13 | 18 | 17 | 13 |
| econ4 | 28 | 22 | 27 | 17 | 24 | 20 |
| soc1 | 10 | 17 | 13 | 17 | 12 | 21 |
| soc2 | 13 | 9 | 14 | 8 | 10 | 8 |
| climate1 | 14 | 15 | 11 | 18 | 20 | 12 |
| climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport) | 20 | 18 | 22 | 19 | 15 | 17 |
| climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030 | 11 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 11 |
| tax1: National redistribution scheme | 14 | 15 | 16 | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes) | 19 | 19 | 21 | 18 | 17 | 19 |
| foreign1: Global climate scheme | 15 | 20 | 20 | 23 | 16 | 17 |
| foreign2: Global tax on millionaires | 21 | 20 | 20 | 23 | 19 | 20 |
| foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change | 15 | 15 | 15 | 17 | 14 | 13 |
| foreign4: Doubling foreign aid | 9 | 11 | 13 | 14 | 9 | 8 |

Figure S38: Positive prioritization of policies.

Percent of people allocating a positive number of points to policies, expressing their support (among six policies chosen at random).

"In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

How do you allocate the points among the following policies?" (Question 57)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| econ1 | 64 | 78 | 61 | 67 | 96 | 95 |
| econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung) | 83 | 86 | 85 | 84 | 87 | 89 |
| econ3 | 81 | 69 | 50 | 78 | 80 | 68 |
| econ4 | 88 | 86 | 91 | 79 | 89 | 85 |
| soc1 | 57 | 75 | 69 | 74 | 74 | 78 |
| soc2 | 58 | 58 | 72 | 53 | 64 | 48 |
| climate1 | 70 | 76 | 65 | 79 | 89 | 75 |
| climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport) | 79 | 83 | 86 | 84 | 78 | 80 |
| climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030 | 62 | 58 | 56 | 48 | 60 | 70 |
| tax1: National redistribution scheme | 67 | 79 | 79 | 76 | 82 | 79 |
| tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes) | 80 | 79 | 76 | 78 | 83 | 85 |
| foreign1: Global climate scheme | 71 | 83 | 84 | 85 | 84 | 78 |
| foreign2: Global tax on millionaires | 80 | 81 | 79 | 83 | 82 | 82 |
| foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change | 71 | 77 | 79 | 74 | 83 | 76 |
| foreign4: Doubling foreign aid | 58 | 70 | 79 | 74 | 74 | 57 |

Figure S39: Charity donation.

"How much did you give to charities in 2022?" (Question 49)




Figure S40: Interest in politics.

"To what extent are you interested in politics?" (Question 50)




Figure S41: Desired involvement of government (from 1 to 5). (Question 51)




Figure S42: Political leaning on economics (from 1: Left to 5: Right). (Question 52)




Figure S43: Voted in last election. (Question 53)




Figure S44: Vote in last election (aggregated). PNR includes people who did not vote or prefer not to answer. (Question 54)




Figure S45: Perception that survey was biased.
“Do you feel that this survey was politically biased?” (Question 60)





Figure S46: Opinion on the fight against extreme poverty.

“According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme poverty in low-income countries?” (Question 61) [\(Back to Section 2.5.2\)](#)

(a) Elements found in the open-ended field on the question
(manually recoded, in percent)



(b) Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).




Figure S47: Main attitudes by vote (“Right” spans from Center-right to Far right).
 (Relative support in percent in Questions 20, 34, 44, 45, 48) (Back to Section 2.6)

| | Europe Left | Europe PNR/Non-voter | Europe Right | U.S. Left | U.S. PNR/Non-voter | U.S. Right |
|--|-------------|----------------------|--------------|-----------|--------------------|------------|
| Support for the GCS | 85 | 72 | 71 | 74 | 53 | 26 |
| Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries | 94 | 83 | 76 | 85 | 71 | 40 |
| Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries* | 61 | 52 | 45 | 55 | 67 | 41 |
| A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human | 73 | 65 | 52 | 62 | 49 | 23 |
| High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries | 93 | 79 | 74 | 87 | 70 | 38 |
| [Country]'s foreign aid should be increased | 78 | 62 | 54 | 75 | 64 | 34 |
| Universalist* | 56 | 48 | 26 | 53 | 49 | 23 |

1379 C Questionnaire of the global survey (section on global
1380 policies)

1381 A. At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be
1382 put in place? (Multiple answers are possible) [Figures 2 and S11]
1383 Global; [Federal / European / ...]; [State / National]; Local

1384 B. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “[country] should take mea-
1385 sures to fight climate change.”

1386 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly
1387 agree*

1388 C. How should [country] climate policies depend on what other countries do?

- 1389 • If other countries do more, [country] should do...
1390 • If other countries do less, [country] should do...

1391 *Much less; Less; About the same; More; Much more*

1392 D. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] All countries have signed the
1393 Paris agreement that aims to contain global warming “well below +2 °C’. To limit
1394 global warming to this level, there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we
1395 can emit globally, called the carbon budget. Each country could aim to emit less
1396 than a share of the carbon budget. To respect the global carbon budget, countries
1397 that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less
1398 than their share.

1399 Do you support such a policy? [Figures 2 and S11]

1400 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1401 support*

1402 E. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] Suppose the above policy is in
1403 place. How should the carbon budget be divided among countries? [Figures 2 and
1404 S11]

1405 *The emission share of a country should be proportional to its population, so that each human
1406 has an equal right to emit.; The emission share of a country should be proportional to its
1407 current emissions, so that those who already emit more have more rights to emit.; Countries
1408 that have emitted more over the past decades (from 1990 onwards) should receive a lower*

1409 *emission share, because they have already used some of their fair share.; Countries that will*
1410 *be hurt more by climate change should receive a higher emission share, to compensate them*
1411 *for the damages.*

1412 F. [In the U.S., Denmark, and France only] To achieve a given reduction of greenhouse
1413 gas emissions globally, costly investments are needed. Ideally, how should countries
1414 bear the costs of fighting climate change?

- 1415 • Countries should pay in proportion to their income
- 1416 • Countries should pay in proportion to their current emissions [Used as a sub-
1417 stitute to the equal right per capita in Figure 2]
- 1418 • Countries should pay in proportion to their past emissions (from 1990 on-
1419 wards) [Used as a substitute to historical responsibilities in Figure 2]
- 1420 • The richest countries should pay it all, so that the poorest countries do not have
1421 to pay anything
- 1422 • The richest countries should pay even more, to help vulnerable countries face
1423 adverse consequences: vulnerable countries would then receive money instead
1424 of paying [Used as a substitute to compensating vulnerable countries in Figures
1425 2 and S11]

1426 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly*
1427 *agree*

1428 G. Do you support or oppose establishing a global democratic assembly whose role
1429 would be to draft international treaties against climate change? Each adult across
1430 the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly. [Figures 2 and S11]
1431 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1432 *support*

1433 H. Imagine the following policy: a global tax on greenhouse gas emissions funding a
1434 global basic income. Such a policy would progressively raise the price of fossil fuels
1435 (for example, the price of gasoline would increase by [40 cents per gallon] in the
1436 first years). Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil
1437 fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Revenues from the tax would be used to
1438 finance a basic income of [\$30] per month to each human adult, thereby lifting the
1439 700 million people who earn less than \$2/day out of extreme poverty. The average

1440 [American] person would lose a bit from this policy as they would face [\$130] per
1441 month in price increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive.

1442 Do you support or oppose such a policy? [Figures 2 and S11]

1443 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1444 *support*


- 1445 I. Do you support or oppose a tax on all millionaires around the world to finance low-
1446 income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate ac-
1447 tion? This would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drink-
1448 ing water, healthcare, and education. [Figures 2 and S11]
1449 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1450 *support*

1451 **D Questionnaire of the Western surveys**

1452 Below, we provide the generic questionnaire (based on the U.S. version), which roughly
1453 corresponds to the *Eu* questionnaire as well as the combination of the *US1* and *US2* ques-
1454 tionnaire. The main difference between Europe and the U.S. is that we split the *US2*
1455 sample into four random branches to include some treatments before the Section D on
1456 the GCS. Besides the control group, the treatments are: information regarding the sup-
1457 port of Americans for the GCS and NR, an open-ended field, and a closed question on the
1458 pros and cons of the GCS. The pros and cons of the GCS are also asked in *Eu* (likewise,
1459 either as an open-ended field or a question), but only in Section D, after the support.

1460 At each section or question, square brackets specify in which questionnaires it is present
1461 (*US1*, *US2* and/or *Eu*) as well as country specificities. Figure S48 displays the structure of
1462 each questionnaire. Each treatment randomization is independent. Qualtrics and Word
1463 versions of the questionnaires in each language are available on our [public repository](#),
1464 together with a spreadsheet that summarizes country specificities and our sources.

Figure S48: Western surveys' structure. Cf. Figure 1 for a simplified version.



1465 [Eu, US1, US2] Socio-demographic characteristics

1466 1. Welcome to this survey!

1467
1468 This survey is **anonymous** and is conducted for research purposes on a representa-
1469 tive sample of [1,000 British people].

1470
1471 It takes [US1, US2: 10 to 15 min; Eu: around 20 min] to complete.

1472
1473 The survey contains lotteries and awards for those who get the correct answer to
1474 some understanding questions.

1475 If you are attentive and lucky, you can win up to [US1, Eu: \$350; US2: \$150] in
1476 points. (See terms and conditions).

1477 Please answer every question carefully.

1478
1479 Do you agree to participate in the survey?

1480 Yes; No

1481 2. What is your gender? [gender]

1482 Woman; Man; Other

1483 3. How old are you? [age]

1484 Below 18; 18 to 20; 21 to 24; 25 to 29; 30 to 34; 35 to 39; 40 to 44; 45 to 49; 50 to 54; 55 to
1485 59; 60 to 64; 65 to 69; 70 to 74; 75 to 79; 80 to 84; 85 to 89; 90 to 99; 100 or above

1486 4. [Eu] In which country do you live? [country]

1487 France; Germany; Spain; United Kingdom; Other

1488 5. What is your ZIP code? [zipcode UK: What is your Outcode (the left part of your
1489 postcode, e.g. if your postcode is N7 8H7, just enter N7)?]

1490 6. Do you live with your partner (if you have one)? [couple]

1491 Yes; No

1492 7. How many people are in your household? The household includes: you, the mem-
1493 bers of your family who live with you, and your dependants. [hh_size]

1494 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more

1495 8. [Eu] How many children below 14 live with you? [Nb_children_14]

1496 1; 2; 3; 4 or more

1497 9. [US1, US2] What race or ethnicity do you identify with? (Multiple answers are
1498 possible) [race]

1499 White; Black or African American; Hispanic; Asian; American Indian or Alaskan Native;
1500 Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; Other: {open field}; Prefer not to say

1501 10. What is the [US1, US2: annual; Eu: monthly] gross income of your household (before
1502 withholding tax)? This includes all income: wages, self-employment earnings, So-
1503 cial Security benefits, pensions, investment income, welfare payments, and income
1504 from other sources. [income]

1505 [US1, US2: Items based on household total income deciles and quartiles, namely:
1506 Less than \$20,000; between \$20,001 and \$35,000; between \$35,001 and \$42,000; between
1507 \$42,001 and \$50,000; between \$50,001 and \$65,000; between \$65,001 and \$82,000; between
1508 \$82,001 and \$103,000; between \$103,001 and \$130,000; between \$130,001 and \$145,000;
1509 between \$145,001 and \$165,000; between \$165,001 and \$250,000; More than \$250,000; I
1510 prefer not to answer;

1511 Eu: custom thresholds, taking into account household composition Questions 6-8,
1512 and corresponding to the country's deciles and quartiles of standard of living, cf.
1513 the sheet "Income" in [this spreadsheet](#)]

1514 11. What is the highest level of education you have completed? [education, post_secondary]
1515 [Below upper secondary, Upper secondary, and Post secondary are coded as the first two,
1516 middle three, and last three items, respectively.

1517 US1, US2: Primary school or less; Eighth grade; Some high school; Regular high school
1518 diploma/GED or alternative credential; Some college, no degree; 2-year college degree or as-
1519 sociates degree (for example: AA, AS); Bachelor's degree (for example: BA, BS); Master's
1520 degree or above (MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA, MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD, PhD);
1521 FR: École primaire / Aucun; Brevet; CAP ou BEP; Baccalauréat professionnel ou tech-
1522 nologique; Baccalauréat général; Bac +2 (BTS, DUT, DEUG...); Bac +3 (licence...); Bac
1523 +5 ou plus (master, école d'ingénieur ou de commerce, doctorat, médecine, maîtrise, DEA,
1524 DESS...)

1525 DE: Keine abgeschlossene Schulbildung / Grundschule; Untere Sekundarstufe (z.B. Haupt-
1526 oder Realschulabschluss); Erstausbildung; Beruflicher Abschluss / Ausbildung; Abitur;
1527 Zweitausbildung; Bachelor oder Fachhochschulabschluss; Master-Abschluss oder höher

1528 ES: *Educación primaria / No he completado la enseñanza básica; Educación secundaria obligatoria (ESO); Formación profesional básica (FP); Formación profesional de grado medio; Bachillerato; Formación profesional de grado superior; Grado universitario; Máster/doctorado*
1529 UK: *Primary education or less; Some secondary school; GSCE; Vocational Upper secondary (Level 3 award, level 3 certificate, level 3 diploma, advanced apprenticeship, etc.); High school degree (A level); Higher vocational education (Level 4+ award, level 4+ certificate, level 4+ diploma, higher apprenticeship, etc.); Bachelor's Degree (BA, BSc, BEng, etc.); Postgraduate diploma or certificate, Master's Degree (MSc, MA, MBA, etc.) or Ph.D.]*

1536 12. What is your employment status? [employment_agg]

1537 *Full-time employed; Part-time employed; Self-employed; Student; Retired; Unemployed*
1538 *(searching for a job); Inactive (not searching for a job)*

1539 13. Are you a homeowner or a tenant? (Multiple answers are possible) [home_...]

1540 *Tenant; Owner; Landlord renting out property; Hosted free of charge*

1541 14. [If lives with partner: What is the estimated value of your household's assets (in
1542 U.S. dollars)? [wealth]]

1543 If does not live with partner: What is the estimated value of your assets (in U.S.
1544 dollars)?]

1545 Include here all your possessions (home, car, savings, etc.) net of debt. For example,
1546 if you own a house worth [\$]300,000 and you have [\$]100,000 left to repay on your
1547 mortgage, your assets are [\$]200,000.

1548 I estimate my [If lives with partner: household's] assets net of debt to be:

1549 [Items based on the following individual wealth quintiles, doubled if lives with
1550 partner. US1, US2: *Less than \$0 (I have a net debt); Close to \$0; Between \$4,000 and*
1551 *\$60,000; Between \$60,000 and \$190,000; More than \$190,000;* For Eu, the thresholds are:
1552 FR: €5/50/150/300k; DE: €0/35/130/280k; ES: €0/50/100/200k; UK: £3/45/115/270k]

1553 15. [US1, US2 (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the vote question)] What
1554 do you consider to be your political affiliation, as of today? [political_affiliation]
1555 *Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other; Non-Affiliated*

1558 [Eu, US1, US2] Global climate scheme

1559 In the following, we describe two policies, on which we will survey your opinion.
1560 To check that you have attentively read the descriptions, **we will ask some under-**
1561 **standing questions afterwards: those who get correct answers can win up to \$150.**

1562 **Global climate scheme:** At the Paris agreement in 2015, all countries have agreed
1563 to contain global warming “well below +2 °C”. To limit global warming to this
1564 level, **there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally.**

1565 To meet the climate target, a limited number of permits to emit greenhouse gases
1566 can be created globally. Polluting firms would be required to buy permits to cover
1567 their emissions. Such a policy would **make fossil fuel companies pay** for their
1568 emissions and progressively raise the price of fossil fuels. **Higher prices would en-**
1569 **courage people and companies to use less fossil fuels, reducing greenhouse gas**
1570 **emissions.**

1571 In accordance with the principle that each human has an equal right to pollute, the
1572 revenues generated by the sale of permits could finance a global basic income. **Each**
1573 **adult in the world would receive [US1, US2: \$30/month; UK: \$30 (that is £25) per**
1574 **month; FR, DE, ES: €30/month], thereby lifting out of extreme poverty the 700 mil-**
1575 **lion people who earn less than \$2/day.**

1576 **The typical [American] would lose out financially [US1, US2: \$85, FR: €10, DE:**
1577 **€25, ES: €5, UK: £20] per month** (as he or she would face [\$115] per month in price
1578 increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive).

1579 The policy could be put in place as soon as countries totaling more than 60% of
1580 global emissions agree on it. Countries that would refuse to take part in the policy
1581 could face sanctions (like tariffs) from the rest of the World and would be excluded
1582 from the basic income.

(Back to Section 2.2)

- 1583 16. Who would win or lose financially in the Global climate scheme? [Figure S12; gcs_win_lose]

1584
1585 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1586 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

1587 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.;*

1588 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

1589 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would lose and*

1591 *the 700 million poorest humans would win* from the Global climate scheme. Now, here
1592 is the second policy:

1593
1594 **National redistribution scheme:**

1595 This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [US1, US2: 5%; Eu: 1%]¹¹ and provide
1596 cash transfers to all adults. More precisely, **each [American] adult would receive**
1597 **[\$85] per month** (that is [\$1,000] per year). This would be financed by an increase
1598 of the federal income tax on household income in excess of [US1, US2: \$315,000 per
1599 year; FR: €15,000 per month; DE: €20,000 per month; ES: €10,000 per month; UK:
1600 £15,000 per month], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000]. [US1,
1601 US2: See more details.] ¹²

- 1602 17. Who would win or lose financially in the National redistribution? [Figure S12;
1603 nr_win_lose]

1604
1605 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1606 Typical [Americans] would win and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Ameri-
1607 cans] would win and the richest [Americans] would lose.; Typical [Americans] would lose
1608 and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Americans] would lose and the richest
1609 [Americans] would lose.

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would win and
1611 the richest [Americans] would lose* from the National redistribution scheme.

1612
1613 To help you with the next question, here is a reminder of the policies:

1614
1615 **Global Climate scheme:**

1616 To limit global warming and reach the international climate objective, the Global

¹¹The wider base in the U.S. was chosen because emissions are larger in the U.S. than in Europe, and it would hardly be feasible to offset the median American's loss from the GCS by taxing only the top 1%.

¹²8% of U.S. respondents click. They then see the following text, based on taxjusticenow.org by Saez & Zucman (2019): *The marginal income tax rates would evolve as follows:*

Below \$315,000: unchanged

\$315,000 - \$400,000: current rate 32% => new rate 41%

\$400,000 - \$600,000: 35% => 50%

\$600,000 - \$2.5 million: 37% => 60%

\$2.5 - \$5 million: 37% => 65%

Above \$5 million: 37% => 70%

1617 climate scheme would **impose a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can**
1618 **emit globally.**

1619 It would **make polluters pay** for their emissions, which in turn would increase fos-
1620 sil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities.

1621 The revenues would finance a **global basic income** of [\$30] per month for all hu-
1622 mans, lifting out of extreme poverty the poorest billion people.

1623 Considering the basic income and the fuel price increases, **the typical [American]**
1624 **would lose out financially [\$85] per month.**

1625

1626 **National redistribution scheme:**

1627 This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [5%] and provide cash transfers to
1628 all adults. More precisely, **each [American] would receive [\$85] per month.** This
1629 would be financed by an increase of the federal income tax on household income in
1630 excess of [\$315,000 per year], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000
1631 per year].

- 1632 18. If both the Global climate scheme and the National redistribution scheme are im-
1633 plemented, how would a typical [American] be financially affected? [*Figure S12;*
1634 *both_win_lose*]

1635 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1636 *A typical [American] would lose out financially.; A typical [American] would neither gain*
1637 *nor lose.; A typical [American] would gain financially.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was that *A typical [American] would nei-*
1639 *ther gain nor lose from both schemes combined. [US1, Eu: Now, here are the last two*
1640 *policies:]*

1641

1642 **[US1: Coal exit:**

1643 To reduce CO₂ emissions, this policy would require all U.S. coal power plants to be
1644 phased out by 2030. Coal would be replaced by renewable sources like wind and
1645 solar panels as well as stronger reliance on gas power plants.

1646 **Eu: Thermal insulation plan:**

1647 To reduce CO₂ emissions and energy insecurity, this policy would require that all
1648 buildings meet energy efficiency targets: at least rating E in 2030 and rating C in
1649 2040. The [UK] government would subsidise half the cost of insulation for all house-

1650 holds, and up to 90% for the poorest households. Insulation work would cost [FR,
1651 DE: €25; ES: €20; UK: £25] billion a year, but would deliver energy savings greater
1652 than this cost.]

1653
1654 [US1: **Marriage only for opposite-sex couples:**

1655 This policy is a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would legally
1656 define marriage as a union of one man and one woman.

1657 **Eu: Death penalty for major crimes:**

1658 This measure would reintroduce capital punishment for major crimes such as ter-
1659 rrorism and mass shootings.]

1660
1661 Now, we will ask your opinion on the [US1, Eu: four] policies.

1662 [Click here for the reminder of the \[US1, Eu: first\] two policies.](#) [Clicking displays the
1663 previous summarized descriptions.]

1664 19. [US2] [4 Random branches: control (*nothing*); Question 31 (*field*); Question 32 (*impor-
1665 tant*); or the following question (*info*).] For information, a recent survey has shown
1666 that: [branch_gcs_..., info_support]

- 1667 • 64% of Americans support the Global climate scheme.
1668 • 72% of Americans support the National redistribution scheme.

1669 20. Do you support the Global climate scheme? [Figure S1; gcs_support]

1670 Yes; No

1671 21. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the
1672 previous question? [Figure S4; gcs_belief]

1673 The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

1674 Percentage of [Americans] in favor of Global climate scheme [slider from 0 to 100]

1675 22. Do you support the National redistribution scheme? [Figure S1; nr_support]

1676 Yes; No

1677 23. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the
1678 previous question? [Figure S4; nr_belief]

1679 The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

1680 Percentage of [Americans] in favor of National redistribution [slider from 0 to 100]

- 1681 24. [Eu, US1] Beware, this question is quite unusual. Among the policies below, **how**
1682 **many** do you support? [Figure S14, Table 1; list_exp]
1683 [Four random branches. Branch GCS/NR/C/O; branch_list_exp]
- 1684
- 1685 • Global climate scheme
- 1686 • National redistribution scheme
- 1687 • [Coal exit]
- 1688 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]
- 1689 0; 1; 2; 3; 4
- 1690
- 1691 [Branch GCS/C/O]
- 1692
- 1693 • Global climate scheme
- 1694 • [Coal exit]
- 1695 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]
- 1696 0; 1; 2; 3
- 1697
- 1698 [Branch NR/C/O]
- 1699
- 1700 • National redistribution scheme
- 1701 • [Coal exit]
- 1702 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]
- 1703 0; 1; 2; 3
- 1704 [Branch C/O]
- 1705
- 1706 • [Coal exit]
- 1707 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]
- 1708 0; 1; 2
- 1709

1710 [Eu, US1] Conjoint analyses

- 1711 25. Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you prefer? [Figure
1712 S15; conjoint_crg_cr]

1713 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the
1714 same time.

| Bundle A | Bundle B |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| [Coal exit] | [Coal exit] |
| National redistribution scheme | National redistribution scheme |
| Global climate scheme | |

1716 1717 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 1718 26. Do you support Bundle A (combining [Coal exit], the National redistribution scheme,
1719 and the Global climate scheme)?[Figure S1; cgr_support]

1720 Yes; No

- 1721 27. [new page] Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you
1722 prefer? [Figure S15; conjoint_b, branch_conjoint_b]

1723 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the
1724 same time.

1725 [Four random branches. Branch C + NR vs. GCS + NR; conjoint_cr_gr]

| Bundle A | Bundle B |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| [Coal exit] | Global climate scheme |
| National redistribution scheme | National redistribution scheme |

1728 [Branch NR vs. NR + C + GCS; conjoint_r_rcg]

| Bundle A | Bundle B |
|--------------------------------|--|
| National redistribution scheme | National redistribution scheme [Coal exit] Global climate scheme |

1731 [Branch NR + GCS vs. NR; conjoint_rg_r]

| | Bundle A | Bundle B |
|------|---|--------------------------------|
| 1732 | National redistribution scheme Global climate scheme | National redistribution scheme |
| 1733 | | |

1734 [Branch NR + C vs. NR; conjoint_rc_r]

| | Bundle A | Bundle B |
|------|---|--------------------------------|
| 1735 | National redistribution scheme [Coal exit] | National redistribution scheme |
| 1736 | | |

1737 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 1738 28. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and
 1739 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies
 1740 in their platforms.

1741 *Eu: Imagine if [DE, ES, UK: the two favorite candidates in your constituency in the
 1742 next general election; FR: the two candidates in the second round of the next pres-
 1743 idential election] campaigned with the following policies in their party's platforms.]*

1744
 1745 Which of these candidates would you vote for? [Table 2, Figure S15; conjoint_c, branch_conjoint
 1746 [Table 2. Two random branches: with and without the final row. The US1 version of the poli-
 1747 cies is given below, see the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the European versions.]

| | Democrat | Republican |
|------|--|--|
| | Increase corporate income tax rate from 21% to 28% | Decrease the payroll tax |
| | Coal exit | Permit completion of the Keystone pipeline |
| 1748 | Trillion dollar investment in childcare, healthcare, education and housing | Withdrawal of the Paris agreement |
| | \$15 minimum wage | Marriage only for opposite-sex couples |
| | National redistribution scheme | Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation |
| 1749 | [Global climate scheme / <i>no row</i>] | [/ <i>no row</i>] |

1750 [US1: Democrat; Republican; None of them; Eu: Candidate A; Candidate B; None of them]

- 1751 29. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and
 1752 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies
 1753 in their platforms.

1754 *Eu (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the Section “Values and politics”): Imagine that [FR: the left or center-left; DE: a red-red-green coalition; ES: the PSOE; UK: the Labour Party] wins the next [general] elections. Here are two possible platforms on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a pool of credible [FR: left or center-left, DE: left-wing parties'; ES: PSOE; UK: Labour] policies).]*

1760 1761 [US1: Which of these candidates do you prefer?

1762 *Eu: Even if you [FR: are not from the left or center-left; DE: do not support the left-wing parties; ES: do not support the PSOE; UK: do not support the Labour Party], which of these platforms do you prefer?]*

1763 [Figures S2, S16; see also the sheet “Policies” in *this spreadsheet* for the possible policies.;
 1764 conjoint_left_a_b]

| | [Candidate A] | [Candidate B] | |
|------|--------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 1767 | [Policy field in random order] | [Random policy] | [Random policy] |
| | [Policy field in random order] | [Random policy] | [Random policy] |
| | [Policy field in random order] | [Random policy] | [Random policy] |
| | [Policy field in random order] | [Random policy] | [Random policy] |
| | [Policy field in random order] | [Random policy] | [Random policy] |

1768 [US1: Candidate A; Candidate B; Eu: Platform A; Platform B]

- 1769 30. [new page] [Same wording and conditions as above. For brevity, only the UK version
 1770 is given here.; conjoint_left_ag_b] Imagine that the Labour Party wins the next
 1771 general elections. Here are two possible platforms on which it may campaign (the
 1772 policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a pool of credible Labour poli-
 1773 cies).

1774 Even if you do not support the Labour Party, which of these platforms do you pre-
 1775 fer? [Figure S2]

| | Platform A | Platform B | |
|------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|
| 1777 | [Policy field in random order] | [Random policy] | [Random policy] |
| | [Policy field in random order] | [Random policy] | [Random policy] |
| | [Policy field in random order] | [Random policy] | [Random policy] |
| | [Policy field in random order] | [Random policy] | [Random policy] |
| | Foreign policy | Global climate scheme | - |

1778 Platform A; Platform B

1779 [Eu, US2] Perceptions of the GCS

1780 [Eu: two random branches. US2: four random branches and the question is asked (if asked)

1781 before Question 20; branch_gcs]

- 1782 31. [Branch: field] When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to
 1783 your mind?

1784 Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme. [Figures S18, S19; gcs_field]
 1785 {Open field}

- 1786 32. [Branch: important] When determining your support or opposition to the Global
1787 climate scheme, which points are important to you? [Figure S17; important_...]
- 1788 • It would succeed in limiting climate change.
1789 • It would hurt the [U.S.] economy.
1790 • It would penalize my household.
1791 • It would make people change their lifestyle.
1792 • It would reduce poverty in low-income countries.
1793 • It might be detrimental to some poor countries.
1794 • It could foster global cooperation.
1795 • It could fuel corruption in low-income countries.
1796 • It could be subject to fraud.
1797 • It would be technically difficult to put in place.
1798 • Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences.

1799 *Not at all important; Not so important; Quite important; Very important*

1800 **[Eu, US1] Donation lottery**

- 1801 US1 Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention). [attention_test]
1802 *Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*
- 1803 33. [*Two random branches*] By taking this survey, you are automatically entered into a
1804 lottery to win [\$]100 in panel points. This lottery is unrelated to the previous ones
1805 that rewarded answers’ accuracy. In a few days you will know whether you have
1806 been selected in the lottery. The payment will be made to you in the same way as
1807 your compensation for this survey, so no further action is required on your part.
- 1808
1809 Should you be selected in the lottery, you can also donate a part of this additional
1810 compensation to [[American] / African] people living in poverty through [US1: the
1811 charity GiveDirectly. The charity GiveDirectly; Eu: a charity. We would channel this
1812 donation to a charity that] provides small amounts of cash to people in need in [[the
1813 U.S] / Africa].

1814

1815 **In case you are winner of the lottery, what share of the [\$]100 would you donate**
1816 **to [[American] / African] people living in poverty [US1: through GiveDirectly]?**
1817 **[Figure S20, Table S2; donation, branch_donation]**
1818 *Amount donated to [[American] / African] people in need (in [\$]) [slider from 0 to 100]*

1819 **[Eu, US2] Wealth tax**

1820 *[Four random branches: Question 34 then Question 35 (global_first); Question 35 then Ques-*
1821 *tion 34 (national_first); Question 36 (global_share); Question 37 (sharing); branch_global_tax]*

1822 34. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-
1823 income countries?

1824 Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking
1825 water, healthcare, and education. *[Figures S1, S21; global_tax_support]*

1826 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1827 *support*

1828 35. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: afford-
1829 able housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and
1830 schools]? *[Figures S1, S22; national_tax_support]*

1831 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1832 *support*

1833 36. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all
1834 countries around the world. In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount
1835 to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE: €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2:
1836 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount
1837 to [\$]1 billion in all low-income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700
1838 million people, most of them in Africa).

1839 Each country would retain part of the revenues it collects, and the remaining part
1840 would be pooled at the global level to finance infrastructure and public services in
1841 low-income countries.

1842
1843 What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of re-
1844 tained in the country's national budget)? *[Figures S5, S23; global_tax_global_share]*
1845 *Percent of global wealth tax that should go to low-income countries [slider from 0 to 100]*

1846 37. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in
1847 all countries around the world.

1848 In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE:
1849 €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2: 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES:
1850 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount to [\$]1 billion in all low-
1851 income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700 million people, most of
1852 them in Africa).

1853 Which of the following options would you prefer? [Figure S24; global_tax_sharing]

- 1854 • The whole wealth tax financing national budgets in each country. For ex-
1855 ample, in [US2: the U.S., it could finance affordable housing and universal
1856 childcare/pre-K.; Eu-UK: the UK, it could finance the National Health Service
1857 and state-funded schools].
- 1858 • Half of the wealth tax financing national budgets in each country, half of it
1859 financing low-income countries. For example, it could finance [US2: universal
1860 childcare/pre-K in the U.S.; Eu-UK: state-funded schools in the UK] and access
1861 to drinking water, healthcare, and education in Africa.

1862 **[Eu, US2] Foreign aid**

1863 US2 Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention). [attention_test]
1864 *Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*

1865 38. From your best guess, what percentage of [U.S.] government spending is allocated
1866 to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?

1867
1868 For your information, government spending totals [US2: 38%; FR: 55%; DE: 45%; ES:
1869 42%; UK: 41%] of [U.S.] GDP, it includes [US2: federal, State; Eu: national] and local
1870 government spending, and apart from foreign aid, it covers the following items: de-
1871 fense, social security (retirement pensions), health [US2: (including Medicare and
1872 Medicaid)], welfare benefits [US2: (including food stamps and EITC)], education,
1873 roads, justice, other programs [US2: and federal agencies (including in energy, sci-
1874 ence...)]. [Figure S25; foreign_aid_belief]

1875 *Less than 0.1%; 0.1% to 0.2%; 0.3% to 0.5%; 0.6% to 1.0%; 1.1% to 1.7%; 1.8% to 2.6%;
1876 2.7% to 4%; 4.1% to 6%; 6.1% to 9%; 9.1% to 13%; 13.1% to 25%; More than 25%*

- 1877 39. [Two random branches: with or without information on actual amount] [Info: Actually,
1878 [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [the U.S.] government spend-
1879 ing is allocated to foreign aid.]

1880

1881

If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate
1882 to foreign aid? [Figures S28, S29, S26 and S27; foreign_aid_preferred, branch_foreign_aid_pre

- 1883 40. [Asked iff branch: Info and preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than actual for-
1884 eign aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to increase [U.S.] foreign
1885 aid.

1886

1887

How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers
1888 possible) [Figure S30; foreign_aid_raise_how_...]

1889

Lower spending on defense; Lower spending on retirement pensions; Lower spending on
1890 healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Lower spending on welfare benefits [US2: (like
1891 EITC or food stamps)]; Lower spending on education; Lower spending on other programs
1892 [US2: and federal agencies]; Higher taxes on the wealthiest; Higher corporate income tax
1893 rate; Higher personal income tax rates; Higher public deficit

1894

1895

41. [Asked iff branch: Info and preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than actual foreign
aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to reduce [U.S.] foreign aid.

1896

1897

How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible) [Fig-
1898 ure S31; foreign_aid_reduce_how_...]

1899

1900

Higher spending on defense; Higher spending on retirement pensions; Higher spending on
1901 healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Higher spending on welfare benefits [US2:
1902 (like EITC or food stamps)]; Higher spending on education; over spending on other pro-
1903 grams [US2: and federal agencies]; Lower taxes on the wealthiest; Lower corporate income
tax rate; Lower personal income tax rates; Lower public deficit

1904

[Eu, US1] Petition

1905

1906

42. [Two random branches] Would you be willing to sign a petition for the [Global climate
/ National redistribution] scheme? [Figure S32; branch_petition, petition, petition_gcs]

1907

1908

As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President's

1909 office], informing him what share of American people are willing to endorse the
1910 [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign,
1911 only your answer here is required and remains anonymous.) Yes; No

1912 **[Eu, US1] Other policies**

1913 43. The following policies are discussed at international negotiations on how to deal
1914 with climate change. [Figures 3 and S33; variables_climate_policies]

1915
1916 Do you support or oppose the following policies?

- 1917
- 1918 • Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for
climate damages [climate_compensation_support]
 - 1919 • High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries [climate_mitigat
 - 1920 • High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income
1921 countries adapt to climate change [climate_adaptation_support]

1922 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1923 support*

1924 44. Do you support or oppose the following global policies? [Figures 3 and S33; variables_global_pol

- 1925
- 1926 • Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt [debt_cancellation_support]
 - 1927 • Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting
right proportional to its population [democratise_un_imf_support]
 - 1928 • Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries [remove_tariffs_support]
 - 1929 • A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage [global_min_wage_support]
 - 1930 • Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of
1931 all assets [global_register_support]
 - 1932 • A maximum wealth limit of [US1: \$10 billion; Eu: [€]100 million] for each
1933 human [cap_wealth_support]

1934 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1935 support*

1936 45. Currently, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [U.S.] govern-
1937 ment spending (that is, [US1: 0.2%; FR: 0.4%; DE: 0.6%; ES: 0.2%; UK: 0.7%] of [U.S.]
1938 GDP) is spent on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries. [Figure S6;
1939 foreign_aid_raise_support]

1940

1941 Do you support [the U.S.] transferring more money to low-income countries?
1942 Yes, [U.S.] foreign aid should be increased.; Yes, but only if some conditions are met.; No,
1943 [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.; No, [U.S.] foreign aid should be reduced.

1944 46. [Asked only if Yes, but only if some conditions are met. is chosen] What conditions
1945 should be required for [the U.S.] to increase its foreign aid? (Multiple answers pos-
1946 sible) [Figures S7, S28; foreign_aid_condition_...]
1947 That recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights.; That recipient
1948 countries cooperate to fight illegal migrations.; That other high-income countries also in-
1949 crease their foreign aid.; That this is financed by increased taxes on millionaires.; That we
1950 can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted.; Other: [open field]

1951 47. [Asked only if No, [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable. or No, [U.S.] foreign aid
1952 should be reduced. is chosen] Why do you oppose [the U.S.] increasing its foreign
1953 aid? (Multiple answers possible) [Figure S8; foreign_aid_no_]
1954 Aid perpetuates poverty as it makes people feel less responsible for themselves.; Aid is not
1955 effective as most of it is diverted.; Aid is a pressure tactic for high-income countries that
1956 prevents low-income countries from developing freely.; [The U.S.] is not responsible for what
1957 happens in other countries.; Charity begins at home: there is already a lot to do to support
1958 the American people in need.; Other: [open field]

1959 **[Eu, US1, US2] Values and politics**

1960 48. [Eu (where it is instead asked at the beginning of Section "Other Policies"), US1]
1961 In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend
1962 [U.S.] interests or global justice? [Figure S34; negotiation]
1963 [U.S.] interests, even if it goes against global justice; [U.S.] interests, to the extent it re-
1964 spects global justice; Indifferent or don't know; Global justice, to the extent it respects [U.S.]
1965 interests; Global justice, even if it goes against [U.S.] interests

1966 49. How much did you give to charities in 2022? [Figure S39; donation_charities]

1967 *I did not make donations to charities last year.; Less than [\$]100.; Between [\$]101 and*
1968 *[\$]500.; Between [\$]501 and [\$]1,000.; Between [\$]1,001 and [\$]5,000.; More than [\$]5,000.*

1969 50. To what extent are you interested in politics? [Figure S40; interested_politics]
1970 *Not at all; A little; Moderately; A lot; A great deal*

1971 51. Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means you think
1972 the government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic
1973 government functions, and 5 means you think the government should take active
1974 steps in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens? [Figure S41;
1975 involvement_govt]
1976 *Desired involvement of government [slider from 1 to 5]*

1977 52. **On economic policy matters**, where do you see yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where
1978 1 is Left (favoring equality and government interventions) and 5 is Right (favoring
1979 free competition and little government intervention)? [Figure S42; left_right]
1980 *Left (1) to Right (5) on economic issues [slider from 1 to 5]*

1981 53. Did you vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election? [Figure S43; vote_participation]
1982 *Yes; No: I didn't have the right to vote in the U.S.; Prefer not to say*

1983 54. [If voted: Which candidate did you vote for in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election?
1984 If did not vote: Even if you did not vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election,
1985 please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who
1986 represents your views more closely.] [Figure S44; vote_factor, voted]
1987 *[US1, US2: Biden; Trump; Jorgensen; Hawkins; Prefer not to say*
1988 FR: candidates at the 2022 presidential election
1989 DE: parties with more than 1% of votes at the 2021 federal election and *Other*
1990 ES: lists with more than 0.9% at the November 2019 general election and *Other*
1991 UK: parties with more than 0.5% of votes at the 2019 general election and *Other*]

1992 55. To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem? [Figure S35; variables_problem]
1993 • Income inequality in [the U.S.] [problem_inequality]
1994 • Climate change [problem_climate]
1995 • Global poverty [problem_poverty]

1996 *Not an important issue for me; An issue but there are other priorities; An issue but we already do what we can; An important issue, we should do more; One of the most pressing issue of our time*

1999 56. What group do you defend when you vote? [Figure S36; group_defended]
2000 *Sentient beings (humans and animals); Humans; [Eu: Europeans]; [Americans]; People sharing my culture or religion; [US1, US2: My State]; [US1, US2: My town; Eu: My country, region or town]; My relatives and/or colleagues; My family and myself*

2003 **[Eu, US1] Prioritization**

2004 57. In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

2006
2007 How do you allocate the points among the following policies? [Figures S37 and S38;
2008 points_foreign1_gcs, points_...]

2009
2010 You can adjust the number of points either using the slider or entering the number of your choice on the right-hand-side. **The sum of points must equal exactly 100**. By pushing the last slider to the right, the total will automatically adjust to 100.
2011 Please read the 6 options before making your choice.

2012 See the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the pool of policies in each country.
2013 [sliders from 0 to 100]

2016 **[FR, DE, ES] ETS2**

2017 58. Similar to the Global Climate Scheme, the European Climate Scheme would impose a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit across the EU in the buildings and transport sectors. It would make polluters pay for their emissions, which in turn would increase fossil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities. Several options are possible regarding the use of the scheme's revenues:

- 2018 • Provide an equal cash transfer of €105 per year to each European.
2019 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European, proportional to their country's emissions: people in countries with higher emissions per person (like Germany) would receive more than people in countries with lower emissions

2026 (like Romania). For information, people in [Germany] would receive €[FR:
2027 110; DE: 130; ES: 90]/year.

- 2028
- Finance low-carbon investments: thermal insulation of buildings, switch to
2029 clean sources of heating, public transportation, and charging stations for elec-
2030 tric vehicles.
 - Provide cash transfers to the most vulnerable half of Europeans and finance
2031 low-carbon investments.
2032

2033 Do you support or oppose the European Climate Scheme in case the revenue is used
2034 to...? [Fig. 1 in [Funke et al. \(2024\)](#); variables_ets2_support]

- 2035
- Provide an equal cash transfer to each European [ets2_equal_cash_support]
 - Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European [ets2_country_cash_support]
 - Finance low-carbon investments [ets2_investments_support]
 - Provide cash transfers for the most vulnerable Europeans and low-carbon in-
2038 vestments [ets2_vulnerable_investments_support]
2039

2040 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
2041 support*

2042 59. [Asked iff none of the four variants of the European Climate Scheme is (somewhat or
2043 strongly) supported] Why do you not support a European Climate Scheme? (Mul-
2044 tiple answers possible) [ets2_no_...]

2045 *I am opposed to climate policy being decided at the EU level, it should be decided at the na-
2046 tional level;*

2047 *I would prefer if the revenues were used in a different way (beyond the four suggestions
2048 above) than previously suggested;*

2049 *I would prefer if decreasing carbon emissions were regulated by other climate policies;*

2050 *I am generally opposed to additional, or more ambitious, climate policies;*

2051 *I do not fully understand how the European Climate Scheme is supposed to work;*

2052 *I don't know*

2053 **[Eu, US1, US2] Feedback**

2054 60. Do you feel that this survey was politically biased? [Figure S45; survey_biased]

2055 *Yes, left-wing biased; Yes, right-wing biased; No, I do not feel it was biased*

- 2056 61. [US2 Asked only to one random third of the respondents, instead of the feedback Question 62] According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme
2057 poverty in low-income countries? [Figure S46; poverty_field, branch_poverty_field]
2058 {Open field}
2059
- 2060 62. The survey is nearing completion. You can now enter any comments, thoughts or
2061 suggestions in the field below. [comment_field]
2062 {Open field}
- 2063 63. Lastly, are you interested to be interviewed by a researcher (through videoconfer-
2064 encing) for 30 min?
- 2065
- 2066 This is totally optional and will not be rewarded. [interview]
2067 Yes; No

2068 E Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme

2069 To specify the GCS, we use the IEA's 2DS scenario (IEA 2017), which is consistent
2070 with limiting the global average temperature increase to 2°C with a probability of at least
2071 50%. The paper by Hood (2017) contributing to the Report of the High-Level Commission
2072 on Carbon Prices (Stern & Stiglitz 2017) presents a price corridor compatible with this
2073 emissions scenario, from which we take the midpoint. The product of these two series
2074 provides an estimate of the revenues expected from a global carbon price. We then use
2075 the UN median scenario of future population aged over 15 years (*adults*, for short). We
2076 derive the basic income that could be paid to all adults by recycling the revenues from
2077 the global carbon price: evolving between \$20 and \$30 per month, with a peak in 2030.
2078 Accounting for the lower price levels in low-income countries, an additional income of
2079 \$30 per month would allow **670 million people** to escape extreme poverty, defined with
2080 the threshold of \$2.15 per day in purchasing power parity.¹³

2081 To estimate the increase in fossil fuel expenditures (or "cost") in each country by 2030,
2082 we make a key assumption concerning the evolution of the carbon footprints per adult:
2083 that they will decrease by the same proportion in each country. We use data from the
2084 Global Carbon Project (Peters et al. 2012). In 2030, the average carbon footprint of a
2085 country c , e_c , evolves from baseline year b proportionally to the evolution of its adult
2086 population $\Delta p_c = p_c^{2030} / p_c^b$. Thus, the global share of country c 's carbon footprint, s_c ,
2087 is proportional to $\sigma_c = e_c \Delta p_c$, and as countries' shares sum to 1, $s_c = \frac{\sigma_c}{\sum_k \sigma_k}$. Multiplying
2088 country c 's emission share with global revenues in 2030, R , and dividing by c 's adult pop-
2089 ulation in year y , yields its average cost per adult: $R \cdot s_c / p_c^y$. Using findings from Ivanova
2090 & Wood (2020) for Europe and Fremstad & Paul (2019) for the U.S., we approximate the
2091 median cost as 90% of the average cost. Finally, the net gain is given by the basic income
2092 (\$30 per month) minus the cost. We provided consistent estimates of net gains in all sur-
2093 veys (using $y = b = 2015$), though in the global survey we gave the average net gains
2094 vs. the median ones in the Western surveys. The latter are shown in Figure S49. For the
2095 record, Table S4 also provides an estimate of *average* net gains (computed with $b = 2019$)

¹³The average carbon footprint of Sub-Saharan Africa is 0.75tCO₂ per capita (World Bank), and it is even lower for people living in extreme poverty, under one tenth of the world average of about 5tCO₂ per capita (Chancel & Piketty 2015). Under a GCS with a cash transfer of \$30 per person, if one's emission is one tenth of the world average, their net gain would be \$27 per month in nominal terms. In regions with extreme poverty like Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding high-income countries), the conversion factor from Market Exchange Rate to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is 2.4 (computed as the ratio of the World Bank series relating the GDP per capita of Sub-Saharan Africa in PPP and nominal). Therefore, the net gain for the extreme poor is \$65 per month (or \$2.13 a day) in PPP, enough to lift them out of extreme poverty.

2096 and $y = 2030$).¹⁴

2097 Estimates of the net gains from the Global Climate Scheme are necessarily imprecise,
2098 given the uncertainties surrounding the carbon price required to achieve emissions re-
2099 ductions as well as each country's trajectory in terms of emissions and population. These
2100 values are highly dependent on future (non-price) climate policies, technical progress,
2101 and economic growth of each country, which are only partially known. Integrated As-
2102 sessment Models have been used to derive a Global Energy Assessment (Johansson et al.
2103 2012), a 100% renewable scenario (Greenpeace 2015) as well as Shared Socioeconomic
2104 Pathways (SSPs), which include consistent trajectories of population, emissions, and car-
2105 bon price Bauer et al. (2017), Fricko et al. (2017), (Riahi et al. 2017), van Vuuren et al.
2106 (2017). Instead of using some of these modelling trajectories, we relied on a simple and
2107 transparent formula, for a number of reasons. First and foremost, those trajectories de-
2108 scribe territorial emissions while we need consumption-based emissions to compute the
2109 incidence of the GCS. Second, the carbon price is relatively low in trajectories of SSPs that
2110 contain global warming below 2°C (less than \$35/tCO₂ in 2030), so we conservatively
2111 chose a method yielding a higher carbon price (\$90 in 2030). Third, modelling results are
2112 available only for a few macro regions, while we wanted country by country estimates.
2113 Finally, we have checked that the emissions per capita given by our method are broadly
2114 in line with alternative methods, even if it tends to overestimate net gains in countries
2115 which will decarbonize less rapidly than average.¹⁵ For example, although countries' de-
2116 carbonization plans should realign with the GCS in place, India might still decarbonize
2117 less quickly than the European Union, so India's gain and the EU's loss might be over-
2118 estimated in our computations. For a more sophisticated version of the Global Climate
2119 Scheme which includes participation mechanisms preventing middle-income countries
2120 (like China) to lose from it and estimations of the Net Present Value by country, see Fabre
2121 (2023).

(Back to Section 2.3)

¹⁴2015 was the last year of data available when the global questionnaire was conceived (OECD data was then used – it does not cover all countries but give identical rounded estimates than those recomputed from the Global Carbon Project data for our Western surveys). 2030 was chosen as the reference year as it is the date at which global carbon price revenues are expected to peak (and the GCS redistributive effects would be largest), and the GCS could not realistically enter into force before that date. In the surveys, we chose $y = b = 2015$ rather than $b = 2019$ and $y = 2030$ to get more conservative estimates of the monthly cost in the U.S. (\$20 higher than the other option) and in Europe (€5 or £10 higher).

¹⁵Computations with alternative methods can be found on [our public repository](#).

Figure S49: Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme.




Table S4: Estimated net gain from the GCS in 2030 and carbon footprint by country.

| | Mean net gain from the GCS (\$/month) | CO ₂ footprint per adult in 2019 (tCO ₂ /y) | | | |
|----------------|---|---|--------------|-----|-----|
| Mexico | | | 2 | 5.6 | |
| Ukraine | | | 2 | 5.6 | |
| Uzbekistan* | | | 4 | 5.1 | |
| Argentina | | | 5 | 4.9 | |
| Thailand | | | 6 | 4.6 | |
| Egypt | | | 12 | 3.6 | |
| Indonesia | | | 13 | 3.3 | |
| Colombia | | | 15 | 3.0 | |
| Saudi Arabia | -93 | 24.0 | Brazil | 15 | 2.9 |
| United States | -77 | 21.0 | Vietnam | 15 | 2.9 |
| Australia | -60 | 17.6 | Peru | 16 | 2.8 |
| Canada | -56 | 16.7 | Morocco | 16 | 2.7 |
| South Korea | -50 | 15.6 | North Korea* | 17 | 2.5 |
| Germany | -30 | 11.7 | India | 18 | 2.4 |
| Russia | -29 | 11.5 | Philippines | 18 | 2.3 |
| Japan | -28 | 11.3 | Pakistan | 22 | 1.6 |
| Malaysia | -21 | 10.0 | Bangladesh | 24 | 1.1 |
| Iran | -19 | 9.5 | Nigeria | 25 | 1.0 |
| Poland | -19 | 9.5 | Kenya | 25 | 0.9 |
| United Kingdom | -18 | 9.4 | Myanmar* | 26 | 0.9 |
| China | -14 | 8.6 | Sudan* | 26 | 0.9 |
| Italy | -13 | 8.4 | Tanzania | 27 | 0.5 |
| South Africa | -11 | 8.0 | Afghanistan* | 27 | 0.5 |
| France | -10 | 7.8 | Uganda | 28 | 0.4 |
| Iraq* | -8 | 7.4 | Ethiopia | 28 | 0.3 |
| Spain | -6 | 7.0 | Venezuela | 29 | 0.3 |
| Turkey | -2 | 6.2 | DRC* | 30 | 0.1 |
| Algeria* | -1 | 6.0 | | | |

²¹²² Note: Asterisks denote countries where footprint is missing and territorial emissions is used instead.

²¹²³ Values differ from Figure S49 as this table present estimates of *mean* net gain per adult in 2030, not at the

²¹²⁴ present. Only the countries with more than 20 million adults (covering 87% of the global total) are shown.

F Determinants of support

Table S5: Determinants of support for the Global Climate Scheme. (Back to [2.3](#))

| | Supports the Global Climate Scheme | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | All | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
| Country: Germany | -0.157*** (0.022) | | -0.144*** (0.022) | | | | |
| Country: Spain | -0.044* (0.024) | | -0.026 (0.024) | | | | |
| Country: United Kingdom | -0.079*** (0.024) | | -0.104*** (0.023) | | | | |
| Country: United States | -0.375*** (0.019) | | | | | | |
| Income quartile: 2 | 0.037** (0.017) | 0.031 (0.022) | 0.038 (0.023) | 0.047 (0.043) | 0.058 (0.049) | 0.013 (0.053) | 0.023 (0.043) |
| Income quartile: 3 | 0.042** (0.017) | 0.033 (0.024) | 0.049** (0.024) | 0.080** (0.040) | 0.059 (0.052) | 0.074 (0.056) | -0.052 (0.052) |
| Income quartile: 4 | 0.056*** (0.018) | 0.063** (0.026) | 0.010 (0.026) | 0.018 (0.047) | -0.015 (0.055) | -0.001 (0.056) | -0.005 (0.057) |
| Diploma: Post secondary | 0.023* (0.012) | 0.033* (0.017) | 0.010 (0.018) | 0.007 (0.029) | 0.045 (0.039) | 0.007 (0.039) | -0.010 (0.039) |
| Age: 25-34 | -0.076*** (0.025) | -0.083*** (0.031) | -0.044 (0.035) | -0.031 (0.057) | -0.077 (0.083) | -0.050 (0.066) | -0.103 (0.091) |
| Age: 35-49 | -0.101*** (0.024) | -0.108*** (0.030) | -0.069* (0.034) | -0.094* (0.055) | -0.009 (0.077) | -0.168** (0.070) | -0.050 (0.090) |
| Age: 50-64 | -0.137*** (0.024) | -0.164*** (0.030) | -0.038 (0.035) | -0.039 (0.056) | -0.020 (0.082) | -0.146** (0.067) | -0.017 (0.087) |
| Age: 65+ | -0.116*** (0.028) | -0.140*** (0.034) | -0.056 (0.044) | 0.003 (0.076) | -0.045 (0.094) | -0.258*** (0.091) | 0.011 (0.105) |
| Gender: Man | 0.019* (0.011) | 0.023 (0.015) | -0.010 (0.016) | -0.014 (0.029) | -0.018 (0.033) | 0.042 (0.038) | -0.005 (0.034) |
| Lives with partner | 0.029** (0.013) | 0.022 (0.017) | 0.058*** (0.018) | 0.070** (0.033) | 0.082** (0.038) | 0.017 (0.038) | 0.040 (0.039) |
| Employment status: Retired | -0.020 (0.024) | -0.047 (0.030) | 0.056 (0.038) | 0.087 (0.081) | 0.096 (0.075) | 0.040 (0.082) | 0.001 (0.073) |
| Employment status: Student | 0.045 (0.033) | 0.063 (0.048) | 0.101** (0.044) | 0.165* (0.085) | 0.192** (0.087) | 0.116 (0.074) | -0.021 (0.107) |
| Employment status: Working | -0.016 (0.019) | -0.021 (0.024) | 0.011 (0.028) | 0.082 (0.064) | 0.006 (0.056) | -0.050 (0.056) | 0.036 (0.051) |
| Vote: Center-right or Right | -0.331*** (0.013) | -0.435*** (0.017) | -0.106*** (0.019) | -0.131*** (0.035) | -0.004 (0.044) | -0.114*** (0.038) | -0.081* (0.041) |
| Vote: PNR/Non-voter | -0.184*** (0.016) | -0.198*** (0.022) | -0.136*** (0.021) | -0.196*** (0.039) | -0.034 (0.043) | -0.116** (0.046) | -0.108*** (0.040) |
| Vote: Far right | -0.396*** (0.032) | | -0.309*** (0.033) | -0.493*** (0.064) | -0.168*** (0.051) | -0.130 (0.102) | -0.314*** (0.080) |
| Urban | 0.049*** (0.012) | 0.074*** (0.018) | 0.006 (0.016) | -0.002 (0.029) | 0.019 (0.032) | -0.014 (0.036) | 0.017 (0.033) |
| Race: White | | -0.030 (0.019) | | | | | |
| Region: Northeast | | 0.009 (0.023) | | | | | |
| Region: South | | 0.011 (0.020) | | | | | |
| Region: West | | 0.011 (0.022) | | | | | |
| Swing State | | -0.019 (0.017) | | | | | |
| Constant | 1.048 | 0.729 | 0.89 | 0.7 | 0.732 | 0.935 | 0.886 |
| Observations | 7,986 | 4,992 | 2,994 | 977 | 727 | 748 | 542 |
| R ² | 0.160 | 0.180 | 0.064 | 0.116 | 0.067 | 0.043 | 0.063 |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table S6: Support for the GCS regressed on comprehension of its financial effects.

| | Supports the Global Climate Scheme | | | | | |
|--|------------------------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | All | United States | France | Germany | United Kingdom | Spain |
| With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win | 0.029** (0.012) | -0.004 (0.016) | 0.043 (0.033) | 0.051 (0.033) | 0.040 (0.036) | 0.038 (0.037) |
| Constant | 0.596 | 0.53 | 0.764 | 0.677 | 0.707 | 0.796 |
| Observations | 8,000 | 5,000 | 729 | 979 | 749 | 543 |
| R ² | 0.001 | 0.00001 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.002 | 0.002 |

Table S7: Correlation between (*Somewhat or Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in high-income countries.

| | Support for a global GHG tax and dividend | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | USA (1) | DNK (2) | FRA (3) | DEU (4) | ITA (5) | ESP (6) | GBR (7) | JPN (8) | POL (9) | AUS (10) | CAN (11) | KOR (12) |
| Control group mean | 0.34 | 0.409 | 0.34 | 0.361 | 0.341 | 0.421 | 0.288 | 0.317 | 0.309 | 0.294 | 0.316 | 0.334 |
| Trusts the government | 0.040*** (0.013) | 0.0005 (0.013) | 0.036*** (0.013) | 0.051*** (0.011) | 0.061*** (0.012) | 0.046*** (0.011) | 0.050*** (0.012) | 0.039*** (0.013) | 0.023** (0.011) | 0.041*** (0.013) | 0.019 (0.012) | 0.079*** (0.013) |
| Believes inequality is an important problem | 0.038*** (0.014) | 0.051*** (0.012) | 0.045*** (0.013) | 0.040*** (0.011) | 0.023** (0.011) | 0.012 (0.011) | 0.052*** (0.012) | 0.015 (0.012) | 0.009 (0.010) | 0.005 (0.013) | 0.031*** (0.012) | 0.024** (0.012) |
| Worries about CC | 0.006 (0.018) | 0.058*** (0.015) | 0.005 (0.016) | 0.048*** (0.014) | 0.023* (0.013) | 0.036*** (0.013) | 0.044*** (0.015) | 0.014 (0.014) | 0.018 (0.013) | 0.036** (0.017) | 0.004 (0.014) | 0.015 (0.013) |
| Believes net-zero is technically feasible | 0.009 (0.015) | 0.007 (0.012) | 0.018 (0.014) | 0.015 (0.012) | -0.004 (0.012) | 0.032** (0.011) | 0.027** (0.013) | -0.004 (0.013) | 0.024** (0.014) | 0.018 (0.015) | 0.014 (0.014) | 0.001 (0.013) |
| Believes will suffer from climate change | 0.059*** (0.015) | 0.019 (0.013) | 0.008 (0.014) | 0.032** (0.013) | 0.012 (0.013) | 0.006 (0.012) | 0.006 (0.014) | 0.037** (0.014) | 0.036*** (0.013) | 0.033** (0.016) | 0.026* (0.014) | 0.033** (0.013) |
| Understands emission across activities/regions | -0.018 (0.011) | 0.009 (0.013) | 0.003 (0.012) | 0.023* (0.012) | 0.007 (0.011) | 0.012 (0.011) | 0.007 (0.012) | -0.007 (0.011) | -0.026** (0.012) | -0.002 (0.013) | 0.003 (0.012) | 0.015 (0.012) |
| Knows CC is real & caused by human | 0.007 (0.012) | 0.008 (0.014) | 0.023 (0.014) | 0.011 (0.012) | -0.0005 (0.012) | 0.031*** (0.012) | -0.007 (0.012) | -0.010 (0.013) | 0.014 (0.011) | 0.025* (0.013) | 0.006 (0.012) | 0.024* (0.012) |
| Knows which gases cause CC | 0.005 (0.011) | 0.021* (0.012) | 0.010 (0.013) | 0.001 (0.011) | -0.008 (0.010) | 0.020* (0.010) | 0.015 (0.010) | 0.017 (0.011) | 0.011 (0.011) | -0.0003 (0.010) | -0.003 (0.011) | -0.008 (0.013) |
| Understands impacts of CC | -0.014 (0.012) | -0.010 (0.013) | 0.007 (0.014) | -0.009 (0.012) | -0.010 (0.011) | -0.029*** (0.011) | -0.008 (0.011) | -0.011 (0.011) | -0.009 (0.012) | -0.022* (0.011) | -0.008 (0.012) | -0.024* (0.012) |
| Believes policies entail positive econ. effects | -0.005 (0.013) | 0.007 (0.012) | 0.021 (0.014) | -0.005 (0.014) | 0.011 (0.014) | 0.010 (0.013) | 0.014 (0.013) | 0.008 (0.013) | 0.015 (0.013) | 0.036** (0.016) | 0.004 (0.014) | -0.007 (0.013) |
| Believes policies would reduce pollution | -0.013 (0.021) | 0.037 (0.023) | 0.043* (0.022) | -0.014 (0.020) | -0.038** (0.019) | 0.029 (0.020) | -0.019 (0.018) | -0.017 (0.018) | -0.021 (0.019) | -0.006 (0.022) | 0.021 (0.020) | -0.020 (0.019) |
| Believes policies would reduce emissions | 0.086*** (0.024) | 0.066*** (0.023) | 0.075*** (0.023) | 0.094*** (0.022) | 0.105*** (0.020) | 0.074*** (0.023) | 0.091*** (0.021) | 0.154*** (0.019) | 0.089*** (0.020) | 0.070*** (0.024) | 0.053** (0.023) | 0.112*** (0.020) |
| Believes own household would lose | -0.071*** (0.021) | -0.057*** (0.015) | -0.026 (0.020) | -0.087*** (0.017) | -0.066*** (0.017) | -0.053*** (0.017) | -0.073*** (0.017) | -0.008 (0.017) | -0.079*** (0.017) | -0.052*** (0.016) | -0.060*** (0.019) | -0.083*** (0.017) |
| Believes low-income earners will lose | -0.034* (0.019) | -0.020 (0.016) | -0.056*** (0.018) | -0.022 (0.017) | -0.021 (0.018) | -0.015 (0.016) | -0.015 (0.017) | -0.009 (0.017) | -0.056*** (0.017) | -0.025 (0.016) | -0.030 (0.020) | -0.056*** (0.018) |
| Believes high-income earners will lose | -0.001 (0.012) | -0.001 (0.012) | 0.013 (0.013) | 0.003 (0.011) | -0.004 (0.011) | 0.007 (0.010) | -0.003 (0.012) | -0.016 (0.013) | -0.011 (0.010) | -0.025** (0.012) | -0.008 (0.012) | -0.0004 (0.013) |
| Observations | 2,218 | 2,013 | 2,006 | 2,006 | 2,088 | 2,268 | 2,025 | 1,990 | 2,053 | 1,978 | 2,022 | 1,932 |
| R ² | 0.329 | 0.241 | 0.237 | 0.295 | 0.211 | 0.216 | 0.272 | 0.222 | 0.214 | 0.272 | 0.254 | 0.228 |

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 of Dechezleprêtre et al. (forthcoming) for variable definitions.

Table S8: Correlation between (*Somewhat* or *Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in middle-income countries.

| | Support for a global GHG tax and dividend | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | IDN (1) | ZAF (2) | MEX (3) | TUR (4) | IND (5) | BRA (6) | CHN (7) | UKR (8) |
| Control group mean | 0.697 | 0.396 | 0.681 | 0.44 | 0.719 | 0.539 | 0.737 | 0.622 |
| Trusts the government | 0.051*** (0.012) | 0.058*** (0.015) | 0.040*** (0.014) | 0.066*** (0.017) | 0.065*** (0.015) | 0.038** (0.015) | -0.011 (0.015) | 0.061*** (0.014) |
| Believes inequality is an important problem | 0.048** (0.011) | 0.002 (0.014) | 0.057*** (0.015) | 0.028 (0.017) | 0.092*** (0.016) | 0.055*** (0.015) | -0.001 (0.015) | 0.027 (0.018) |
| Worries about CC | 0.003 (0.014) | -0.005 (0.016) | 0.013 (0.016) | -0.006 (0.017) | -0.0002 (0.016) | 0.032* (0.017) | -0.0002 (0.016) | 0.046*** (0.016) |
| Believes net-zero is technically feasible | 0.020 (0.014) | 0.026 (0.017) | 0.004 (0.014) | 0.039** (0.017) | 0.022 (0.016) | 0.019 (0.015) | 0.034** (0.016) | 0.018 (0.016) |
| Believes will suffer from climate change | 0.020* (0.011) | 0.038** (0.016) | 0.032* (0.017) | -0.002 (0.020) | -0.014 (0.015) | -0.017 (0.016) | -0.004 (0.015) | 0.018 (0.016) |
| Understands emission across activities/regions | -0.007 (0.009) | -0.012 (0.014) | -0.006 (0.013) | 0.003 (0.015) | -0.006 (0.010) | 0.039*** (0.013) | -0.004 (0.013) | 0.00004 (0.013) |
| Knows CC is real & caused by human | -0.006 (0.009) | 0.011 (0.016) | -0.004 (0.015) | -0.006 (0.016) | 0.0002 (0.012) | 0.003 (0.014) | -0.052*** (0.016) | 0.022 (0.014) |
| Knows which gases cause CC | -0.026*** (0.009) | 0.019 (0.015) | 0.035** (0.014) | 0.015 (0.015) | 0.020 (0.013) | 0.007 (0.014) | -0.023* (0.012) | 0.023 (0.015) |
| Understands impacts of CC | -0.002 (0.010) | -0.015 (0.014) | -0.0005 (0.015) | 0.009 (0.017) | 0.043*** (0.014) | -0.023 (0.015) | -0.008 (0.014) | -0.014 (0.014) |
| Believes policies entail positive econ. effects | -0.010 (0.007) | 0.009 (0.016) | 0.015 (0.013) | -0.007 (0.013) | 0.002 (0.011) | -0.016 (0.014) | -0.013 (0.010) | 0.035** (0.015) |
| Believes policies would reduce pollution | 0.023 (0.015) | 0.002 (0.021) | 0.019 (0.022) | 0.044 (0.029) | 0.021 (0.020) | 0.032 (0.021) | -0.001 (0.018) | -0.023 (0.025) |
| Believes policies would reduce emissions | 0.111*** (0.019) | 0.073*** (0.022) | 0.088*** (0.024) | 0.078** (0.031) | 0.034 (0.025) | 0.129*** (0.022) | 0.060*** (0.022) | 0.138*** (0.025) |
| Believes own household would lose | -0.027 (0.021) | -0.044** (0.020) | -0.071*** (0.019) | -0.054** (0.024) | -0.012 (0.019) | -0.067*** (0.023) | -0.119*** (0.022) | -0.045** (0.021) |
| Believes low-income earners will lose | -0.059*** (0.020) | -0.016 (0.019) | 0.003 (0.017) | -0.053** (0.023) | -0.055*** (0.019) | -0.013 (0.020) | 0.001 (0.018) | 0.004 (0.020) |
| Believes high-income earners will lose | 0.026** (0.011) | -0.020 (0.015) | 0.010 (0.013) | 0.010 (0.016) | -0.004 (0.014) | 0.003 (0.016) | -0.047*** (0.014) | -0.007 (0.013) |
| Observations | 2,488 | 2,003 | 2,045 | 1,932 | 2,472 | 1,860 | 1,717 | 1,564 |
| R ² | 0.366 | 0.175 | 0.242 | 0.248 | 0.370 | 0.272 | 0.280 | 0.255 |

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 of Dechezleprêtre et al. (forthcoming) for variable definitions.

²¹²⁶ **G Representativeness of the surveys**

Table S9: Sample representativeness of the Western surveys. (Back to [2.1](#))

| | US1 | | | US2 | | | Eu | | |
|--------------------------------------|------|--------|-----------------|------|--------|-----------------|------|--------|-----------------|
| | Pop. | Sample | Weighted sample | Pop. | Sample | Weighted sample | Pop. | Sample | Weighted sample |
| Sample size | | 3,000 | 3,000 | | 2,000 | 2,000 | | 3,000 | 3,000 |
| Gender: Woman | 0.51 | 0.52 | 0.51 | 0.51 | 0.45 | 0.50 | 0.51 | 0.49 | 0.51 |
| Gender: Man | 0.49 | 0.47 | 0.49 | 0.49 | 0.55 | 0.50 | 0.49 | 0.51 | 0.49 |
| Income_quartile: 1 | 0.25 | 0.27 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.28 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.28 | 0.25 |
| Income_quartile: 2 | 0.25 | 0.24 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.23 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.23 | 0.25 |
| Income_quartile: 3 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.26 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 |
| Income_quartile: 4 | 0.25 | 0.23 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.22 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.24 | 0.25 |
| Age: 18-24 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.10 |
| Age: 25-34 | 0.18 | 0.15 | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.16 | 0.18 | 0.15 | 0.17 | 0.15 |
| Age: 35-49 | 0.24 | 0.25 | 0.24 | 0.24 | 0.25 | 0.24 | 0.24 | 0.25 | 0.24 |
| Age: 50-64 | 0.25 | 0.27 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.26 | 0.24 | 0.26 |
| Age: 65+ | 0.21 | 0.21 | 0.21 | 0.21 | 0.22 | 0.21 | 0.25 | 0.23 | 0.25 |
| Diploma_25_64: Below upper secondary | 0.06 | 0.02 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.13 | 0.14 | 0.13 |
| Diploma_25_64: Upper secondary | 0.28 | 0.25 | 0.28 | 0.28 | 0.29 | 0.28 | 0.23 | 0.19 | 0.23 |
| Diploma_25_64: Post secondary | 0.34 | 0.40 | 0.34 | 0.34 | 0.33 | 0.34 | 0.29 | 0.33 | 0.29 |
| Race: White only | 0.60 | 0.67 | 0.61 | 0.60 | 0.62 | 0.61 | | | |
| Race: Hispanic | 0.18 | 0.15 | 0.19 | 0.18 | 0.19 | 0.19 | | | |
| Race: Black | 0.13 | 0.16 | 0.14 | 0.13 | 0.17 | 0.14 | | | |
| Region: Northeast | 0.17 | 0.20 | 0.17 | 0.17 | 0.19 | 0.17 | | | |
| Region: Midwest | 0.21 | 0.22 | 0.21 | 0.21 | 0.23 | 0.21 | | | |
| Region: South | 0.38 | 0.39 | 0.38 | 0.38 | 0.38 | 0.38 | | | |
| Region: West | 0.24 | 0.20 | 0.24 | 0.24 | 0.20 | 0.24 | | | |
| Urban: TRUE | 0.73 | 0.78 | 0.74 | 0.73 | 0.75 | 0.73 | | | |
| Employment_18_64: Inactive | 0.20 | 0.16 | 0.16 | 0.20 | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.17 | 0.15 | 0.15 |
| Employment_18_64: Unemployed | 0.02 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.03 | 0.06 | 0.05 |
| Vote: Left | 0.32 | 0.47 | 0.45 | 0.32 | 0.46 | 0.45 | 0.30 | 0.32 | 0.32 |
| Vote: Center-right or Right | 0.30 | 0.31 | 0.31 | 0.30 | 0.29 | 0.29 | 0.28 | 0.32 | 0.32 |
| Vote: Far right | | | | | | | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.10 |
| Country: FR | | | | | | | 0.24 | 0.24 | 0.24 |
| Country: DE | | | | | | | 0.33 | 0.33 | 0.33 |
| Country: ES | | | | | | | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.18 |
| Country: UK | | | | | | | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 |
| Urbanity: Cities | | | | | | | 0.43 | 0.49 | 0.43 |
| Urbanity: Towns and suburbs | | | | | | | 0.33 | 0.32 | 0.33 |
| Urbanity: Rural | | | | | | | 0.25 | 0.20 | 0.25 |

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

Table S10: Sample representativeness for each European country. (Back to [2.1](#))

| | FR | | | DE | | | ES | | | UK | | |
|--------------------------------------|------|------|---------------|------|------|---------------|------|------|---------------|------|------|---------------|
| | Pop. | Sam. | Wght. sam. |
| Sample size | | 729 | 729 | | 979 | 979 | | 543 | 543 | | 749 | 749 |
| Gender: Woman | 0.52 | 0.50 | 0.52 | 0.51 | 0.52 | 0.51 | 0.51 | 0.53 | 0.51 | 0.50 | 0.43 | 0.50 |
| Gender: Man | 0.48 | 0.50 | 0.48 | 0.49 | 0.48 | 0.49 | 0.49 | 0.47 | 0.49 | 0.50 | 0.57 | 0.50 |
| Income_quartile: 1 | 0.25 | 0.31 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.29 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.27 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.26 | 0.25 |
| Income_quartile: 2 | 0.25 | 0.17 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.31 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.19 | 0.25 |
| Income_quartile: 3 | 0.25 | 0.19 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.28 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.26 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.26 | 0.25 |
| Income_quartile: 4 | 0.25 | 0.33 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.18 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.17 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.28 | 0.25 |
| Age: 18-24 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.09 | 0.14 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.10 | 0.07 | 0.10 |
| Age: 25-34 | 0.15 | 0.14 | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.17 | 0.15 | 0.12 | 0.16 | 0.12 | 0.17 | 0.20 | 0.17 |
| Age: 35-49 | 0.24 | 0.31 | 0.24 | 0.22 | 0.26 | 0.22 | 0.28 | 0.25 | 0.28 | 0.24 | 0.18 | 0.24 |
| Age: 50-64 | 0.24 | 0.19 | 0.24 | 0.28 | 0.23 | 0.28 | 0.27 | 0.28 | 0.27 | 0.25 | 0.30 | 0.25 |
| Age: 65+ | 0.25 | 0.24 | 0.25 | 0.26 | 0.21 | 0.26 | 0.25 | 0.22 | 0.25 | 0.24 | 0.25 | 0.24 |
| Diploma_25_64: Below upper secondary | 0.11 | 0.19 | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.14 | 0.10 | 0.24 | 0.16 | 0.25 | 0.12 | 0.09 | 0.12 |
| Diploma_25_64: Upper secondary | 0.26 | 0.16 | 0.26 | 0.27 | 0.20 | 0.27 | 0.16 | 0.15 | 0.16 | 0.21 | 0.23 | 0.21 |
| Diploma_25_64: Post secondary | 0.26 | 0.30 | 0.26 | 0.29 | 0.31 | 0.29 | 0.28 | 0.38 | 0.27 | 0.33 | 0.36 | 0.33 |
| Urbanity: Cities | 0.47 | 0.52 | 0.47 | 0.37 | 0.47 | 0.37 | 0.52 | 0.58 | 0.52 | 0.40 | 0.41 | 0.40 |
| Urbanity: Towns and suburbs | 0.19 | 0.19 | 0.19 | 0.40 | 0.35 | 0.40 | 0.22 | 0.27 | 0.22 | 0.42 | 0.43 | 0.42 |
| Urbanity: Rural | 0.34 | 0.29 | 0.34 | 0.23 | 0.18 | 0.23 | 0.26 | 0.15 | 0.26 | 0.18 | 0.16 | 0.18 |
| Employment_18_64: Inactive | 0.20 | 0.19 | 0.18 | 0.15 | 0.14 | 0.11 | 0.20 | 0.13 | 0.12 | 0.16 | 0.16 | 0.17 |
| Employment_18_64: Unemployed | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.07 | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.04 |
| Vote: Left | 0.23 | 0.19 | 0.21 | 0.37 | 0.44 | 0.44 | 0.33 | 0.37 | 0.38 | 0.25 | 0.28 | 0.29 |
| Vote: Center-right or Right | 0.26 | 0.30 | 0.29 | 0.28 | 0.27 | 0.29 | 0.18 | 0.24 | 0.24 | 0.36 | 0.44 | 0.41 |
| Vote: Far right | 0.23 | 0.22 | 0.22 | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.03 |

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. In this Table, weights are defined at the country level. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

²¹²⁷ Similar tables for the global surveys can be found in [Dechezleprêtre et al. \(forthcoming\)](#).
²¹²⁸ [ing](#).

²¹²⁹ H Attrition analysis

Table S11: Attrition analysis for the US1 survey.

| | Dropped out | Dropped out after socio-eco | Failed attention test | Duration (in min) | Duration below 4 min |
|-------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Mean | 0.08 | 0.059 | 0.082 | 21.198 | 0.016 |
| Income quartile: 2 | 0.025*** (0.010) | 0.025*** (0.010) | 0.000 (0.000) | -0.740 (3.064) | -0.009 (0.006) |
| Income quartile: 3 | 0.062*** (0.012) | 0.062*** (0.012) | 0.000*** (0.000) | 0.754 (2.813) | -0.004 (0.007) |
| Income quartile: 4 | 0.035*** (0.011) | 0.035*** (0.011) | -0.000*** (0.000) | -3.917 (2.798) | -0.003 (0.007) |
| Diploma: Post secondary | 0.039*** (0.009) | 0.039*** (0.009) | -0.000*** (0.000) | 1.544 (2.665) | 0.006 (0.006) |
| Age: 25-34 | -0.094*** (0.015) | -0.094*** (0.015) | -0.000*** (0.000) | -0.597 (2.604) | -0.031** (0.013) |
| Age: 35-49 | -0.100*** (0.015) | -0.100*** (0.015) | -0.000*** (0.000) | 4.824 (3.176) | -0.032** (0.013) |
| Age: 50-64 | -0.060*** (0.015) | -0.060*** (0.015) | 0.000*** (0.000) | 5.723** (2.763) | -0.039*** (0.012) |
| Age: 65+ | 0.048*** (0.017) | 0.048*** (0.017) | 0.000** (0.000) | 8.952** (4.267) | -0.047*** (0.012) |
| Gender: Man | -0.039*** (0.007) | -0.039*** (0.007) | -0.000* (0.000) | -0.451 (2.210) | -0.0001 (0.005) |
| Urban | 0.006 (0.008) | 0.006 (0.008) | -0.000*** (0.000) | 4.888** (2.443) | -0.004 (0.006) |
| Race: Black | 0.020** (0.010) | 0.020** (0.010) | -0.000*** (0.000) | 8.554*** (2.600) | 0.004 (0.007) |
| Race: Hispanic | 0.021** (0.010) | 0.021** (0.010) | -0.000*** (0.000) | 4.119* (2.293) | -0.002 (0.007) |
| Region: Northeast | -0.005 (0.011) | -0.005 (0.011) | -0.000*** (0.000) | -4.862 (4.782) | -0.004 (0.007) |
| Region: South | -0.009 (0.009) | -0.009 (0.009) | -0.000 (0.000) | -1.151 (4.710) | -0.004 (0.006) |
| Region: West | 0.006 (0.011) | 0.006 (0.011) | 0.000*** (0.000) | -4.000 (4.305) | -0.003 (0.007) |
| Vote: Biden | -0.048*** (0.008) | -0.048*** (0.008) | 0.000*** (0.000) | -2.901 (2.379) | -0.009 (0.007) |
| Vote: Trump | -0.043*** (0.009) | -0.043*** (0.009) | -0.000 (0.000) | 0.145 (2.878) | -0.005 (0.008) |
| Observations | 5,719 | 5,719 | 3,252 | 3,044 | 3,044 |
| R ² | 0.127 | 0.127 | 1.000 | 0.006 | 0.017 |

Table S12: Attrition analysis for the US2 survey.

| | Dropped out (1) | Dropped out after socio-eco (2) | Failed attention test (3) | Duration (in min) (4) | Duration below 4 min (5) |
|-------------------------|----------------------|--|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Mean | 0.095 | 0.074 | 0.092 | 16.338 | 0.052 |
| Income quartile: 2 | 0.023* (0.013) | 0.023* (0.013) | -0.000** (0.000) | 1.352 (1.601) | -0.029** (0.014) |
| Income quartile: 3 | 0.054*** (0.014) | 0.054*** (0.014) | -0.000 (0.000) | 8.502 (9.649) | -0.009 (0.016) |
| Income quartile: 4 | 0.060*** (0.016) | 0.060*** (0.016) | -0.000 (0.000) | 5.254 (3.376) | 0.0003 (0.017) |
| Diploma: Post secondary | -0.033*** (0.011) | -0.033*** (0.011) | 0.000 (0.000) | 1.601 (2.630) | 0.012 (0.011) |
| Age: 25-34 | -0.004 (0.015) | -0.004 (0.015) | 0.000 (0.000) | -0.929 (1.535) | -0.032 (0.024) |
| Age: 35-49 | 0.012 (0.014) | 0.012 (0.014) | 0.000*** (0.000) | 9.076 (6.651) | -0.047** (0.022) |
| Age: 50-64 | 0.040*** (0.014) | 0.040*** (0.014) | -0.000*** (0.000) | 0.364 (1.565) | -0.079*** (0.022) |
| Age: 65+ | 0.115*** (0.017) | 0.115*** (0.017) | -0.000*** (0.000) | 2.619 (3.150) | -0.095*** (0.022) |
| Gender: Man | -0.073*** (0.009) | -0.073*** (0.009) | 0.000 (0.000) | 4.707 (6.037) | 0.010 (0.010) |
| Urban | 0.019* (0.011) | 0.019* (0.011) | 0.000*** (0.000) | 1.766 (1.135) | 0.005 (0.012) |
| Race: Black | 0.060*** (0.015) | 0.060*** (0.015) | 0.000*** (0.000) | 18.673 (13.328) | -0.010 (0.015) |
| Race: Hispanic | 0.079*** (0.014) | 0.079*** (0.014) | -0.000 (0.000) | 2.930 (1.813) | -0.027** (0.012) |
| Region: Northeast | -0.026* (0.014) | -0.026* (0.014) | 0.000 (0.000) | -0.837 (2.855) | -0.011 (0.015) |
| Region: South | -0.006 (0.012) | -0.006 (0.012) | -0.000 (0.000) | 3.220 (5.002) | 0.009 (0.014) |
| Region: West | -0.010 (0.013) | -0.010 (0.013) | 0.000 (0.000) | -1.759 (1.942) | -0.009 (0.015) |
| Vote: Biden | -0.049*** (0.008) | -0.049*** (0.008) | -0.000*** (0.000) | 3.230 (2.731) | -0.006 (0.014) |
| Vote: Trump | -0.026*** (0.009) | -0.026*** (0.009) | -0.000 (0.000) | -0.554 (1.272) | 0.007 (0.016) |
| Observations | 2,973 | 2,973 | 2,280 | 2,103 | 2,103 |
| R ² | 0.241 | 0.241 | 1.000 | 0.010 | 0.031 |

Table S13: Attrition analysis for the *Eu* survey.

| | Dropped out (1) | Dropped out after socio-eco (2) | Failed attention test (3) | Duration (in min) (4) | Duration below 6 min (5) |
|---|----------------------|--|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Mean | 0.067 | 0.044 | 0.151 | 54.602 | 0.039 |
| Country: Germany | 0.023** (0.010) | 0.019** (0.010) | 0.000*** (0.000) | 9.533 (18.906) | 0.019* (0.010) |
| Country: Spain | -0.102*** (0.011) | -0.098*** (0.011) | 0.000* (0.000) | -29.136* (15.948) | 0.010 (0.010) |
| Country: United Kingdom | 0.042*** (0.011) | 0.043*** (0.011) | 0.000*** (0.000) | -7.458 (18.046) | 0.010 (0.010) |
| Income quartile: 2 | 0.032*** (0.010) | 0.029*** (0.010) | 0.000 (0.000) | 32.749* (19.771) | -0.015 (0.010) |
| Income quartile: 3 | 0.049*** (0.010) | 0.047*** (0.010) | 0.000*** (0.000) | 6.130 (11.734) | -0.021** (0.010) |
| Income quartile: 4 | 0.024** (0.011) | 0.021* (0.011) | 0.000*** (0.000) | 18.659 (19.955) | -0.018* (0.011) |
| Diploma: Post secondary | 0.035*** (0.008) | 0.034*** (0.008) | 0.000*** (0.000) | 10.647 (12.959) | -0.007 (0.007) |
| Age: 25-34 | 0.028** (0.013) | 0.025* (0.013) | -0.000*** (0.000) | 36.132 (22.285) | -0.005 (0.018) |
| Age: 35-49 | 0.064*** (0.012) | 0.062*** (0.012) | -0.000*** (0.000) | 37.159** (17.190) | -0.013 (0.016) |
| Age: 50-64 | 0.085*** (0.013) | 0.083*** (0.013) | -0.000 (0.000) | 48.363** (22.526) | -0.063*** (0.015) |
| Age: 65+ | 0.117*** (0.014) | 0.115*** (0.013) | -0.000** (0.000) | 36.351** (14.226) | -0.061*** (0.015) |
| Gender: Man | -0.027*** (0.007) | -0.027*** (0.007) | -0.000* (0.000) | -22.980 (14.093) | 0.009 (0.007) |
| Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs | 0.006 (0.008) | 0.004 (0.008) | 0.000*** (0.000) | -16.736 (17.256) | 0.004 (0.008) |
| Degree of urbanization: Rural | 0.023** (0.009) | 0.023** (0.009) | 0.000 (0.000) | -14.593 (19.733) | -0.001 (0.009) |
| Vote: Center-right or Right | -0.025*** (0.005) | -0.025*** (0.005) | 0.000*** (0.000) | -17.558 (13.143) | 0.019** (0.008) |
| Vote: Far right | 0.005 (0.007) | 0.005 (0.007) | 0.000*** (0.000) | 15.838 (32.281) | 0.029** (0.014) |
| Vote: PNR/Non-voter | 0.023*** (0.006) | 0.022*** (0.005) | 0.000 (0.000) | 24.631 (19.824) | 0.030*** (0.010) |
| Observations | 3,963 | 3,963 | 3,326 | 3,115 | 3,115 |
| R ² | 0.406 | 0.395 | 1.000 | 0.006 | 0.028 |

2130 I Balance analysis

Table S14: Balance analysis.

| | List contains: G (1) | Branch petition: NR (2) | Branch donation: Own nation (3) | Branch conjoint 3: with GCS (4) |
|---|-------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Mean | 0.496 | 0.493 | 0.5 | 0.499 |
| Country: Germany | -0.026 (0.026) | 0.017 (0.026) | 0.020 (0.026) | 0.005 (0.026) |
| Country: Spain | 0.025 (0.030) | 0.026 (0.030) | 0.026 (0.030) | 0.043 (0.030) |
| Country: United Kingdom | 0.002 (0.028) | 0.018 (0.028) | 0.037 (0.028) | 0.063** (0.028) |
| Country: United States | -0.001 (0.024) | 0.019 (0.024) | 0.007 (0.024) | 0.023 (0.024) |
| Income quartile: 2 | -0.013 (0.021) | -0.024 (0.021) | 0.012 (0.021) | -0.010 (0.021) |
| Income quartile: 3 | 0.021 (0.022) | -0.005 (0.022) | 0.011 (0.022) | -0.004 (0.022) |
| Income quartile: 4 | -0.001 (0.023) | -0.017 (0.023) | -0.013 (0.023) | 0.0001 (0.023) |
| Diploma: Post secondary | 0.008 (0.016) | 0.014 (0.016) | -0.010 (0.016) | -0.001 (0.016) |
| Age: 25-34 | 0.023 (0.031) | -0.049 (0.031) | -0.003 (0.031) | -0.009 (0.031) |
| Age: 35-49 | 0.032 (0.030) | -0.002 (0.030) | -0.014 (0.030) | -0.016 (0.030) |
| Age: 50-64 | 0.030 (0.030) | -0.005 (0.030) | -0.016 (0.030) | -0.020 (0.030) |
| Age: 65+ | 0.029 (0.037) | -0.037 (0.037) | -0.015 (0.037) | -0.012 (0.037) |
| Gender: Man | 0.024 (0.015) | 0.012 (0.015) | 0.002 (0.015) | -0.016 (0.015) |
| Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs | -0.010 (0.017) | -0.0005 (0.017) | -0.010 (0.017) | -0.011 (0.017) |
| Degree of urbanization: Rural | 0.013 (0.024) | 0.017 (0.024) | -0.004 (0.024) | 0.027 (0.024) |
| Employment status: Retired | -0.005 (0.032) | -0.031 (0.032) | -0.034 (0.032) | -0.016 (0.032) |
| Employment status: Student | 0.005 (0.044) | -0.023 (0.044) | -0.033 (0.044) | -0.025 (0.044) |
| Employment status: Working | 0.010 (0.024) | -0.027 (0.024) | -0.033 (0.024) | -0.012 (0.024) |
| Vote: Center-right or Right | -0.004 (0.017) | 0.003 (0.017) | 0.010 (0.017) | 0.002 (0.017) |
| Vote: PNR/Non-voter | 0.001 (0.019) | 0.014 (0.019) | -0.005 (0.019) | -0.012 (0.019) |
| Vote: Far right | 0.009 (0.034) | 0.030 (0.034) | 0.023 (0.035) | 0.038 (0.034) |
| Observations | 5,991 | 5,991 | 5,991 | 5,991 |
| R ² | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.002 | 0.003 |

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

²¹³¹ **J Placebo tests**

Table S15: Placebo tests.

| | G+R+C preferred to R+C (1) | Supports G+R+C (2) | Signs petition (3) | Share of policies supported (4) | Conjoint 5 A+CGS preferred to B (5) |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--|--|
| Mean | 0.645 | 0.633 | 0.611 | 0.535 | 0.596 |
| Branch of list experiment: 1 | -0.013 (0.019) | -0.024 (0.019) | -0.019 (0.019) | -0.013 (0.012) | -0.018 (0.021) |
| Branch of list experiment: rgl | 0.005 (0.019) | 0.006 (0.019) | -0.002 (0.019) | 0.001 (0.012) | 0.010 (0.021) |
| Branch of list experiment: rl | -0.009 (0.019) | -0.005 (0.019) | 0.022 (0.019) | 0.007 (0.012) | 0.007 (0.021) |
| Branch of petition: nr | 0.011 (0.014) | 0.006 (0.014) | 0.022 (0.014) | 0.003 (0.009) | -0.006 (0.015) |
| Poor is in own country | -0.002 (0.014) | -0.003 (0.014) | 0.015 (0.014) | 0.003 (0.009) | -0.020 (0.015) |
| Observations | 6,000 | 6,000 | 6,000 | 6,000 | 5,218 |
| R ² | 0.0004 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.001 |

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

²¹³² **K Main results on the extended sample**

²¹³³ As a robustness check, we reproduce our main results on the extended sample that
²¹³⁴ includes the 14% respondents who failed the attention check ($n = 9,318$). These results
²¹³⁵ are non-weighted. They closely match the results in our main specification. For example,
²¹³⁶ the support for the GCS is 54% in the U.S. and 75% in Europe, while the same coefficients
²¹³⁷ are significant for the list experiment.

Figure S50: [Extended sample] Main attitudes by vote (“Right” spans from Center-right to Far right).

(Relative support in percent in Questions 20, 34, 44, 45, 48)

(Back to Section 2.6)

| | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom | United States |
|--|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|---------------|
| Support for the GCS | 75 | 78 | 70 | 81 | 75 | 54 |
| Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries | 83 | 81 | 84 | 87 | 81 | 68 |
| Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries* | 52 | 45 | 60 | 59 | 44 | 52 |
| A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human | 62 | 57 | 62 | 65 | 65 | 47 |
| High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries | 82 | 80 | 82 | 86 | 80 | 69 |
| [Country]'s foreign aid should be increased | 83 | 87 | 87 | 89 | 69 | 77 |
| Universalist* | 41 | 35 | 49 | 44 | 36 | 43 |

Figure S51: [Extended sample] Influence of the GCS on preferred platform: Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question 30; in the U.S., asked only to non-Republicans.)

| | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom | United States |
|---------------------------------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|---------------|
| Random programs: A+GCS preferred to B | 60 | 61 | 59 | 64 | 58 | 59 |

Table S16: [Extended sample] Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list. The tacit support for the GCS is estimated by regressing the number of supported policies on the presence of the GCS in the list of policies. The social desirability is estimated as the difference between the tacit and stated support, and it is not significantly different from zero even at a 20% threshold (see [Methods](#)).

| | Number of supported policies | | |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | All | U.S. | Europe |
| List contains: GCS | 0.624*** (0.028) | 0.524*** (0.041) | 0.724*** (0.036) |
| <i>Support for GCS</i> | NA | 0.554 | 0.754 |
| <i>Social desirability bias</i> | -0.025 | -0.017 | -0.033 |
| <i>80% C.I. for the bias</i> | [-0.06; 0.01] | [-0.07; 0.04] | [-0.08; 0.01] |
| Constant | 1.317 | 1.147 | 1.486 |
| Observations | 6,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 |
| R ² | 0.089 | 0.065 | 0.125 |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table S17: [Extended sample] Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. ([Question 28](#))

| | Prefers the Progressive platform | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------|---------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | All | United States | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
| GCS in Progressive platform | 0.022* (0.013) | 0.015 (0.018) | 0.116*** (0.037) | -0.007 (0.032) | 0.028 (0.038) | 0.012 (0.037) |
| Constant | 0.628 | 0.629 | 0.55 | 0.682 | 0.721 | 0.553 |
| Observations | 5,638 | 2,797 | 671 | 883 | 550 | 737 |
| R ² | 0.001 | 0.0002 | 0.014 | 0.0001 | 0.001 | 0.0001 |

Note: Simple OLS model. *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples. *p < 0.1;
p < 0.05; *p < 0.01.

₂₁₃₈ **L Effect of questionnaire framing**

₂₁₃₉ When comparing the samples *US1* and *US2*, we observe no effect of questionnaire
₂₁₄₀ framing (or block sequence) on the question “What group do you defend when you
₂₁₄₁ vote?”, common to all waves and placed close to the end of the questionnaire (Table S18).

Table S18: Effect of the wave (*US1* vs. *US2*) on the group defend when voting.
“What group do you defend when you vote?” (Question 56)

| | Group defended when voting | | |
|------------------|----------------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | Humans or Sentient beings | Fellow citizens | Family and self |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Wave: <i>US2</i> | −0.009 (0.014) | 0.009 (0.014) | 0.010 (0.011) |
| Mean | 0.432 | 0.335 | 0.156 |
| Observations | 5,000 | 5,000 | 5,000 |
| R ² | 0.0001 | 0.0001 | 0.0002 |

Note: Simple OLS model. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

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