

# International Majorities Genuinely Support Global Redistributive and Climate Policies

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## Abstract

We document majority support for policies entailing global redistribution and climate mitigation. Surveys on 40,680 respondents in 20 countries show strong stated support for a global carbon price funding equal cash transfers, called the “Global Climate Scheme” (GCS). Through our surveys on 8,000 respondents in the U.S., France, Germany, Spain, and the UK, we test several hypotheses that could reconcile strong stated support with scarce occurrences in public debates. Three quarters of Europeans and half of Americans support the GCS, even as they understand its cost to them. Using several experiments, we show that the support for the GCS is sincere and that political programs that include it are preferred to programs that do not. We document widespread support for other globally redistributive policies, such as increased foreign aid or a wealth tax funding low-income countries. In sum, global policies are genuinely supported by majorities, even in wealthy, contributing countries.

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## 68 1 Introduction

69 Major sustainability objectives could be achieved by global approaches to mitigating climate change and poverty that would involve transfers from high- to lower-income countries.<sup>1-6</sup> Especially, global carbon pricing is widely regarded by economists as the benchmark climate policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon emissions externality. Specifically, a version of global carbon pricing as a system based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions is prominently discussed in environmental economics.<sup>7-13</sup> It would work as follows: A cap on carbon emissions to limit global warming below 2°C is implemented. The resulting emission rights are auctioned each year to polluting firms and fund a global basic income, alleviating extreme poverty. These emission rights would be allocated equally among human adults, yielding redistribution from richer to poorer countries. It would combine long-term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity.<sup>7</sup>

80 We call this approach to global carbon pricing the “Global Climate Scheme” (GCS).

81 While international negotiations have not yet led to ambitious globally redistributive policies, some recent prominent attempts are that the International Maritime Organization is poised to adopt a global carbon levy on maritime fuel; the African Union calls for a global carbon taxation regime, the UN is setting up a Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation and Brazil is proposing a global wealth tax at the G20.

86 A key factor for implementing global policies has remained largely unaddressed: the

87 support of citizens. As a first piece of evidence, a global survey on 40,680 respondents  
88 from 20 high- and middle-income countries reveals substantial support for global climate  
89 policies and, in addition, for a global tax on the wealthiest aimed at financing low-income  
90 countries' development. Surprisingly, even in wealthy nations that would bear a signifi-  
91 cant burden of such globally redistributive policies, majorities of citizens express support  
92 for them. To better understand public support for global policies in high-income coun-  
93 tries, the main analysis of this article is conducted with surveys among 8,000 respondents  
94 from France, Germany, Spain, the UK, and the U.S.

95 The focus of the Western surveys is to study how respondents react to the key trade-off  
96 between the benefits and costs of globally redistributive climate policies. In our survey  
97 respondents are made aware of the cost that the GCS entails for their country's people,  
98 that is average Westerners would incur a net loss from the policy. Our main result is that  
99 the Global Climate Scheme is supported by three quarters of Europeans and more than  
100 half of Americans.

101 Furthermore, we test the robustness of this conclusion by a wide variety of methods.  
102 First, we control for social desirability bias using a list experiment. We find no evidence  
103 that people exaggerate their support in the direct question. Second, to assess whether  
104 the support would diminish in a context that approaches real stakes, we ask respondents  
105 whether they are willing to sign a petition in favor of the GCS, after informing them  
106 that the results of the survey question will be communicated to their head of state's of-  
107 fice. The support is sustained in an environment that approaches real stakes. Third, we  
108 carry out conjoint analyses to neutralize experimenter demand and investigate the prior-  
109 ity given to global policies compared to other types of policies. Conjoint analyses reveal  
110 that a political platform is more likely to be preferred if it contains the GCS or a global tax  
111 on millionaires, and that global policies rank high in the prioritization of policies. Our  
112 randomized experiments also show that a candidate would not lose vote intentions by  
113 endorsing the GCS, and might even gain up to 11 points in France. Fourth, an analysis  
114 of open-ended fields indicates that the appeal of the GCS comes from its international  
115 nature and its impacts on climate, more than on global poverty. To put our main finding  
116 in context, we also test support for other global policies and examine whether people's  
117 values are univeralistic. Support is very strong for a global tax on millionaires (69% in the  
118 U.S., 84% in Europe), and the median respondent prefers to allocate 30% of the revenues  
119 of such a tax to low-income countries. Majorities are willing to increase foreign aid, but  
120 only if some conditions are respected, such as making sure the aid is well spent and other

<sup>121</sup> high-income countries also increase their contribution. Questions on universalistic values, including a donation experiment, confirm the congruence of underlying values with <sup>122</sup> the support for specific policies. The diverse approaches summarized also help understand what drives support for different policies. For instance, the evidence indicates that <sup>124</sup> one key reason why increasing foreign aid is not as popular as global policies lies in its <sup>125</sup> unilateral nature.

<sup>127</sup> Overall, our results point out to strong and genuine support for global climate and re-<sup>128</sup> distributive policies, as our experiments confirm the stated support found in direct ques-<sup>129</sup> tions. They contribute to a body of literature on attitudes toward climate policy, which <sup>130</sup> confirms that climate policy is preferred at a global level,<sup>14–17</sup> where it is more effective <sup>131</sup> and fair. While 3,354 economists supported a national carbon tax financing equal cash <sup>132</sup> transfers in the *Wall Street Journal*, numerous surveys have shown that public support <sup>133</sup> for such policy is mixed.<sup>18–23</sup> Meanwhile, the GCS — the global version of this policy <sup>134</sup> — is largely supported, despite higher costs in high-income countries. In the Discussion <sup>135</sup> we offer potential explanations that could reconcile the strong support for global policies <sup>136</sup> with their lack of prominence in the public debate.

<sup>137</sup> **Literature** International surveys have shown widespread support for costly climate ac-<sup>138</sup> tion.<sup>19;24</sup> For instance, representative surveys in 125 countries covering 96% of the world's <sup>139</sup> greenhouse gas emissions show that 69% of the global population express willingness <sup>140</sup> to contribute 1% of their income to fight global warming.<sup>25</sup> International surveys have <sup>141</sup> also uncovered near consensus that “present economic differences between rich and poor <sup>142</sup> countries are too large” (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree) in each of 29 countries.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>143</sup> Yet, few prior attitudinal surveys have examined global redistributive policies. A no-<sup>144</sup> table exception tests the support for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples in five <sup>145</sup> countries, representative along gender and age.<sup>27</sup> For a given variant, the sample size is <sup>146</sup> about 167 respondents per country. They find over 80% support for any variant in India, <sup>147</sup> between 50% and 65% in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43% to 59% in the U.S., <sup>148</sup> depending on the variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding an equal <sup>149</sup> cash transfer for each human is close to 50% in high-income countries.

<sup>150</sup> Further evidence of the popularity of global redistribution is provided by the finding <sup>151</sup> that 66% of Americans support providing “financial aid and technical support to devel-<sup>152</sup> oping countries that agree to limit their greenhouse gas emissions”.<sup>28</sup> In addition, 90% <sup>153</sup> of Germans want some degree of global redistribution.<sup>29</sup> Besides, in surveys conducted

<sup>154</sup> in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S., support ranges from 55% to 74% for “a  
<sup>155</sup> global democracy including both a global government and a global parliament, directly  
<sup>156</sup> elected by the world population, to recommend and implement policies on global issues”,  
<sup>157</sup> and similar support is found in surveys over 17 countries.<sup>30,31</sup>

<sup>158</sup> Appendix A contains a broader literature review including further attitudinal sur-  
<sup>159</sup> veys on global policies (A.1.1); prior work on attitudes toward climate burden sharing  
<sup>160</sup> (Appendix A.1.2), attitudes toward foreign aid (Appendix A.1.3), global carbon pricing  
<sup>161</sup> (Appendix A.2.1), global redistribution (Appendix A.2.3), basic income (Appendix A.2.4),  
<sup>162</sup> and global democracy (Appendix A.2.5).

## <sup>163</sup> 2 Results


### <sup>164</sup> 2.1 Data

<sup>165</sup> We use unanalysed questions from a global survey conducted in 2021 that involved  
<sup>166</sup> 40,680 respondents from 20 countries, representing approximately 72% of global CO<sub>2</sub>  
<sup>167</sup> emissions. This survey (henceforth: global survey) serves as the basis for measuring  
<sup>168</sup> stated support for various global policies worldwide, including the GCS. Detailed in-  
<sup>169</sup> formation about the data collection process, sample representativeness, and analysis of  
<sup>170</sup> questions on national policies can be found in that article.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>171</sup> To delve deeper into the sincerity and rationales behind support for the GCS and at-  
<sup>172</sup> titudes towards global policies, global redistribution, and universalistic values, we con-  
<sup>173</sup> ducted further surveys in 2023 (henceforth: Western surveys). These surveys are based  
<sup>174</sup> on a sample of 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, the UK, and the U.S. The  
<sup>175</sup> European survey (*Eu*) comprises 3,000 respondents, while the U.S. sample was collected  
<sup>176</sup> in two separate waves: *US1* with 3,000 respondents and *US2* with 2,000 respondents. The  
<sup>177</sup> survey questions in both the European and U.S. surveys are almost identical (see Fig-  
<sup>178</sup> ure 1), except for an additional question in *US2* that uses results from *US1* to assess the  
<sup>179</sup> bandwagon effect and variations in policy designs in some questions.

<sup>180</sup> The Western surveys ensured broad representativeness along key dimensions: gender,  
<sup>181</sup> income, age, highest diploma, and degree of urbanization. The *Eu* survey is also repre-  
<sup>182</sup> sentative of its four countries in terms of population size, while the *US1* and *US2* surveys  
<sup>183</sup> are representative in terms of region and ethnicity. Tables S9-S10 detail how our samples  
<sup>184</sup> match population frequencies. More detail on data collection is given in Section Methods.

Figure 1: Structure of Western survey, cf. also Figure S48 for the treatment branches.




<sup>185</sup> The questionnaires used in the surveys are provided in Appendices C and D.

## <sup>186</sup> 2.2 Global support

<sup>187</sup> We find strong support for climate policies enacted at the global level when analysing  
<sup>188</sup> the global survey (Figure 2). When asked “At which level(s) do you think public policies  
<sup>189</sup> to tackle climate change need to be put in place?”, 70% (in the U.S.) to 94% (in Japan)  
<sup>190</sup> choose the global level. The next most popular choice is the federal or continental level,  
<sup>191</sup> favored by 52% of Americans and less than half of European respondents. Local policies  
<sup>192</sup> receive the least support. This preference for climate policies implemented at the global  
<sup>193</sup> scale is in line with earlier contributions<sup>15;32;16</sup> and consistent with individuals’ concerns  
<sup>194</sup> for the fairness and effectiveness of such policies, which have been identified as two of the  
<sup>195</sup> three key determinants of support, besides self-interest.<sup>33;18;19</sup> It could also stem from a  
<sup>196</sup> preference for conditional cooperation,<sup>34</sup> even if previous studies suggest that the support  
<sup>197</sup> for climate policies does not depend on climate action abroad<sup>35;36</sup>.

<sup>198</sup> Among the four global climate policies examined, three policies garner high support

Figure 2: Relative Support for global climate policies.



Note 1: The numbers represent *relative support*, i.e. the share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* among non-*indifferent* answers (in percent,  $n = 40,680$ ). Shares of indifferent answers range from 11% to 48%, with quartiles 20%, 27%, and 33%. The color blue denotes a relative majority. See Figure S11 for the absolute support. (Questions A-I).

Note 2: \*In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

199 across all countries (Figure 2). These policies include a global democratic assembly on  
200 climate change, a global tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries contingent  
201 on their climate action, and a global carbon budget of +2°C divided among countries  
202 based on tradable shares (or “global quota”), with the allocation of country shares un-  
203 specified (see wording in Appendix C). The three policies garner a majority of absolute  
204 support (i.e., “somewhat” or “strong” support) in all countries (except in the U.S. for the  
205 global assembly, 48% absolute support). In high-income countries, the global quota pol-  
206 icy obtains 64% absolute support and 84% relative support (i.e., excluding “indifferent”  
207 answers).

Following the support for the global quota, respondents are asked about their preferences for dividing the carbon budget among countries, as depicted in the third block of Figure 2. Consistent with the existing literature (see Appendix A.1.2), an equal per capita allocation of emission rights emerges as the preferred burden-sharing principle, garnering absolute majority support in all countries and never below 84% relative support. Taking into account historical responsibilities or vulnerability to climate damages is also popular, albeit with less consensus, while grandfathering (i.e., allocation of emission shares in proportion to current emissions) receives the least support in all countries.

A global carbon tax that funds a global basic income should produce the same distributional outcomes as a global tradable quota with equal per capita emission rights (to the extent that the carbon price is the same and provided that each country returns the revenues from emissions trading equally to its citizens). The support for the global carbon tax is also tested and its redistributive effects – the average increase in expenditures along with the amount of the basic income – are specified to the respondents explicitly (see box below and Appendix D, p.89). The support for the carbon tax is lower than for the quota, particularly in high-income countries, and there is no relative majority for the tax in Anglo-Saxon countries (consistently with the levels of support found in the only previous study that tested a global carbon tax<sup>27</sup>). Two possible reasons for this lower support are that distributive effects are specified explicitly in the case of the tax, and that people may prefer a quota, perhaps because they find it more effective than a tax to reduce emissions. The two reasons are consistent with the intermediate level of support for the GCS in the Western survey, which is based on a global quota but where the question specifies explicitly the distributive effects.

### 2.3 Stated support for the Global Climate Scheme

The Western surveys (*US1, US2, Eu*) include a comprehensive exploration of citizens' attitudes towards the GCS. We present to respondents a detailed description of the GCS and explain its distributive effects, including specific amounts at stake (as specified in the box below). Furthermore, we assess respondents' understanding of the GCS with incentivized questions to test their comprehension of the expected financial outcome for typical individuals in high-income countries (loss) and the poorest individuals globally (gain), followed by the provision of correct answers (Figures S12-S13).

For comparison, the same approach is applied to a National Redistribution (NR) scheme targeting top incomes with the aim of financing cash transfers to all adults, calibrated to

241 offset the monetary loss of the GCS for the median emitter in their country. We evaluate  
242 respondents' understanding that the richest would lose and the typical fellow citizens  
243 would gain from that policy. Subsequently, we summarize both schemes to enhance re-  
244 spondents' recall. Additionally, we present a final incentivized comprehension question  
245 and provide the expected answer that the combined GCS and NR would result in no net  
246 gain or loss for a typical fellow citizen. Finally, respondents are directly asked to express  
247 their support for the GCS and NR using a simple Yes/No question.

**The Global Climate Scheme** The GCS consists of global emissions trading with emission rights being auctioned each year to polluting firms, and of a global basic income, funded by the auction revenues. Using the price and emissions trajectories from the report by Stern & Stiglitz,<sup>37</sup> and in particular a carbon price of \$90/tCO<sub>2</sub> in 2030, we estimate that the basic income would amount to \$30 per month for every human adult (see details in Appendix E). We describe the GCS to the respondents as a "climate club" and we specify its redistributive effects: The 700 million people with less than \$2/day [in Purchasing Power Parity] would be lifted out of extreme poverty, and fossil fuel price increases would cost the typical person in their country a specified amount (see Appendix D for details). The monthly median net cost is \$85 in the U.S., €10 in France, €25 in Germany, €5 in Spain, £20 in the UK.

248

249 Our main result is that stated support for the GCS is 54% in the U.S. and 76% in Eu-  
250 rope, while the support for NR is very similar: 56% and 73% respectively (Figures 3, S1).  
251 Appendix F examines the sociodemographic determinants of support for the GCS as well  
252 as the beliefs correlated with the support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic  
253 income. The strongest correlates are political leaning, trust in the government and per-  
254 ceptions that climate policies are effective at reducing emissions or in one's self-interest.

255 Finding majority support for the GCS motivates the subsequent analysis of robustness  
256 and sincerity, novel to attitudinal surveys on instrument choice for environmental policy.

## 257 2.4 Robustness and sincerity of support for the GCS

258 We use several methods to assess the sincerity of the support for the GCS: a list exper-  
259 iment, a real-stake petition, conjoint analyses, and an exercise involving the prioritization  
260 of policies. All methods suggest that the support is either completely sincere, or the share  
261 of insincere answers is limited.

262 **2.4.1 List experiment**

263 By asking *how many* policies within a list respondents support and varying the list  
264 among respondents, a list experiment allows identifying the tacit support for a policy  
265 of interest. For example, a first subsample faces the list of policies A, B, and C, while a  
266 second subsamples faces the list A, B, C, and GCS. We do not need to know which policies  
267 each respondent supports to estimate the average (tacit) support for the GCS, we simply  
268 need to compute the difference in the average number of supported policies between  
269 the two random subsamples.<sup>38</sup> In our case, as shown in Table 1, the tacit support for the  
270 GCS measured through the list experiment is not significantly lower than the direct stated  
271 support. Hence, we do not find a social desirability bias in our study.

272 **2.4.2 Petition**

273 We ask respondents whether they are willing to sign a petition in support of either the  
274 GCS or the NR policy. We inform them that the petition results will be sent to the head  
275 of state's office, highlighting the proportion of fellow citizens endorsing the respective  
276 scheme. Even when framed as a petition that might have real stakes, both policies con-  
277 tinue to receive majority support. In the U.S., we find no significant difference between  
278 the support in the petitions and the simple questions (GCS:  $-.02$ ,  $t(3,044)=1.0$ ,  $p=.30$ , 95%  
279 CI=[-.05, .02]; NR:  $-.01$ ,  $t(2,952)=.3$ ,  $p=.76$ , 95% CI=[-.04, .03]). In Europe, the petition  
280 leads to a comparable lower support for both the GCS ( $-7$  p.p.,  $t(3,018)=4.4$ ,  $p=10^{-5}$ ,  
281 95% CI=[-.10, -.04]) and NR ( $-4$  p.p.,  $t(2,953)=2.6$ ,  $p=.008$ , 95% CI=[-.08, -.01]). While  
282 some European respondents are unwilling to sign a petition for policies they are expected  
283 to support, this phenomenon is not specific to the GCS, and the overall willingness to sign  
284 a petition remains strong, with 69% expressing support for the GCS and 67% for NR.

285 **2.4.3 Conjoint analyses**

286 In order to assess the public support for the GCS in conjunction with other policies, we  
287 conduct a series of conjoint analyses. We ask respondents to make five choices between  
288 pairs of political platforms. Each choice is intended to test a different hypothesis about  
289 support for the GCS in relation to other policies or voting intentions.

290 The first conjoint analysis suggests that the GCS is supported independently of being  
291 complemented by the National Redistribution Scheme and a national climate policy (C).  
292 The second analysis indicates majority support for the GCS and for C, which are seen

293 as neither complement nor substitute (see [Methods](#)). A minor share of respondents like  
294 a national climate policy and dislike a global one, but as many people prefer a global  
295 rather than a national policy. Besides, there is no evidence that implementing NR would  
296 increase the support for the GCS.

297 In the third analysis, we present two random branches of the sample with hypothetical  
298 progressive and conservative platforms that differ only by the presence (or not) of the  
299 GCS in the progressive platform. Table 2 shows that a progressive candidate would not  
300 significantly lose voting share by endorsing the GCS in any country, and may even gain  
301 11 p.p. ( $p = .005$ ) in voting intention in France.

302 Our last two analyses make respondents choose between two random platforms. In  
303 Europe, respondents are prompted to imagine that a left or center-left coalition will win  
304 the next election and asked what platform they would prefer that coalition to have cam-  
305 paigned on. In the U.S., the question is framed as a hypothetical duel in a Democratic  
306 primary, and asked only to non-Republicans ( $n = 2,218$ ), i.e. the respondents who declare  
307 as political affiliation *Democrat*, *Independent*, *Non-Affiliated* or *Other*.

308 In the fourth analysis, a policy (or an absence of policy) is randomly drawn for each  
309 platform in each of five categories: *economic issues*, *societal issues*, *climate policy*, *tax system*,  
310 *foreign policy* (Figure S2, Table S3). In the UK, Germany, and France, a platform is about 9  
311 to 13 p.p. more likely to be preferred if it includes the GCS rather than no foreign policy.  
312 This effect is between 1 and 4 p.p. and no longer significant in the U.S. (among non-  
313 Republicans) and in Spain. Moreover, a platform that includes a global tax on millionaires  
314 rather than no foreign policy is 5 to 13 p.p. more likely to be preferred in all countries  
315 (the effect is significant and at least 9 p.p. in all countries but Spain). Similarly, a global  
316 democratic assembly on climate change has a significant effect of 8 to 12 p.p. in the U.S.  
317 (among non-Republicans), Germany, and France. These effects are large, and not far from  
318 the effects of the policies most influential on the platforms, which range between 15 and  
319 18 p.p. in most countries (27 p.p. in Spain), and all relate to improved public services (in  
320 particular healthcare, housing, and education).

321 The fifth analysis draws random platforms similarly, except that candidate A's plat-  
322 form always contains the GCS while B's includes no foreign policy. In this case, A is  
323 chosen by 60% of Europeans and 58% of non-Republican Americans (Figure S3).

324 Overall, taking the U.S. as an example, our conjoint analyses indicate that a candidate  
325 at the Democratic primary would have more chances to obtain the nomination by en-  
326 dorsing the GCS, and this endorsement would not penalize her or him at the presidential

<sup>327</sup> election. This result relates to the finding that 12% of Germans shift their voting intention  
<sup>328</sup> from SPD and CDU/CSU to the Greens and the Left when they are told that the latter  
<sup>329</sup> parties support global democracy.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>330</sup> **2.4.4 Prioritization**

<sup>331</sup> Towards the end of the survey, we ask respondents to allocate 100 points among six  
<sup>332</sup> randomly selected policies from the previous conjoint analyses, using sliders. The instruc-  
<sup>333</sup> tion was to distribute the points based on their level of support, with a higher allocation  
<sup>334</sup> indicating greater support for a policy. As a result, the average support across policies is  
<sup>335</sup> 16.67 points. In each country, the GCS ranks in the middle of all policies or above, with  
<sup>336</sup> an average number of points from 15.4 in the U.S. to 22.9 in Germany.

<sup>337</sup> Interestingly, in Germany, the most prioritized policy is the global tax on millionaires,  
<sup>338</sup> while the GCS is the second most prioritized policy. The global tax on millionaires con-  
<sup>339</sup> sistently ranks no lower than fifth position (out of 15 or 17 policies) in every country,  
<sup>340</sup> garnering an average of 18.3 points in Spain to 22.9 points in Germany.

<sup>341</sup> **2.4.5 Pros and Cons**

<sup>342</sup> We survey respondents to gather their perspectives on the pros and cons of the GCS,  
<sup>343</sup> randomly utilizing an open-ended or a closed question. In the closed question format,  
<sup>344</sup> respondents tend to consider every argument as important in determining their support  
<sup>345</sup> or opposition to the GCS (see Figure S17).

<sup>346</sup> The open-ended question provides more insights into what people associate with the  
<sup>347</sup> GCS when prompted to think about it. Analyzing keywords in the responses (automati-  
<sup>348</sup> cally translated into English), the most frequently mentioned topics are the international  
<sup>349</sup> dimension and the environment, each appearing in approximately one-quarter of the  
<sup>350</sup> answers (see Figure S19). This is followed by discussions on the effects of the GCS on  
<sup>351</sup> poverty and prices, each mentioned by about one-tenth of the respondents. We also man-  
<sup>352</sup> ually classified each answer into different categories (see Figure S18). This exercise con-  
<sup>353</sup> firms the findings from the automatic search: the environmental benefit of the GCS is the  
<sup>354</sup> most commonly discussed topic, while obstacles to implementation or agreement on the  
<sup>355</sup> proposal are relatively infrequently mentioned.

<sup>356</sup> In the US2 survey, we divided the sample into four random branches. Two branches  
<sup>357</sup> were presented the pros and cons questions (either in open or closed format) *before* being

358 asked about their support for the GCS or NR. Another branch received information on  
359 the actual level of support for the GCS and NR (estimated in *US1*, see box p. 14), and  
360 one control group received none of these treatments. The objective of the “pros and cons  
361 treatment” was to mimic a “campaign effect”, which refers to the shift in opinion result-  
362 ing from media coverage of the proposal.<sup>39;40</sup> To conservatively estimate the effect of a  
363 (potentially negative) campaign, we intentionally included more cons (6) than pros (3).  
364 Interestingly, the support for the GCS decreased by 11 p.p. ( $t(1,996)=-3.5$ ,  $p=5 \cdot 10^{-4}$ ,  
365 95% CI=[-.17, -.05]) after respondents viewed a list of its pros and cons. Notably, the  
366 support also decreased by 7 p.p. ( $t(1,996)=-2.3$ ,  $p=.02$ , 95% CI=[-.13, -.01]) after respon-  
367 dents were asked to consider the pros and cons in an open-ended question. Despite some  
368 significant effects of pondering the pros and cons, approximately half of the Americans  
369 express support for the GCS across all treatment branches (see Table S1). Although sup-  
370 port remains significant, these results suggest that the public success of the GCS would  
371 be sensitive to the content of the debate about it, and oriented by the discourse adopted  
372 by interest groups.

**Second-order Beliefs** To explain the strong support for the GCS despite its ab-  
sence from political platforms and public debate, we hypothesized pluralistic igno-  
rance, i.e. that the public and policymakers mistakenly perceive the GCS as unpop-  
ular. As a result, individuals might conceal their support for such globally redis-  
tributive policy, believing that advocating for it would be futile.

In the case of Americans, their beliefs about the level of support for the GCS are  
relatively accurate (Figure S4). The mean perceived support is 52% (with quartiles  
of 36%, 52%, and 68%), which closely aligns with the actual support of 54%. Euro-  
peans, on the other hand, underestimate the support by 17 p.p. Nonetheless, 65% of  
them correctly estimate that the GCS garners majority support, and the mean per-  
ceived support is 59% (and quartiles of 43%, 61%, and 74%), compared to the actual  
support of 76%. Second-order beliefs are equally accurate for NR in the U.S. and  
similarly underestimated in Europe. Finally, consistent with Americans accurately  
perceiving the levels of support for the GCS or NR, providing information on the  
actual level had no significant effect on their support in the *US2* survey (effect=.025,  
 $t(1,998)=1.1$ ,  $p=.26$ , 95% CI=[-.02, .07]).

374 **2.5 Stated support for global redistribution**

375 We also assess support for a range of other international policies (Figure 3) as well as  
376 unilateral foreign aid.

377 **2.5.1 International policies**

378 Most policies garner relative majority support in each country, with two exceptions:  
379 the “cancellation of low-income countries’ public debt” and “a maximum wealth limit”  
380 for each individual (Figure 3). There is relative majority support for it in Europe but  
381 not in the U.S., despite the cap being set at \$10 billion in the U.S. compared to €/£100  
382 million in Europe. Notably, climate-related policies enjoy significant popularity, with  
383 “high-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries” receiving  
384 absolute majority support in all countries surveyed. Additionally, relative support for  
385 loss and damages compensation, as approved in principle at the international climate  
386 negotiations in 2022 (“COP27”), ranges from 55% (U.S.) to 81% (Spain).

387 Consistent with the results of the global survey, a “tax on millionaires of all countries  
388 to finance low-income countries” garners relative support of over 69% in each country,  
389 only 5 p.p. lower than a national millionaires tax overall. In random subsamples, we  
390 inquire about respondents’ preferences regarding the redistribution of revenues from a  
391 global tax on individual wealth exceeding \$5 million, after providing information on the  
392 revenue raised by such a tax in their country compared to low-income countries. We  
393 ask certain respondents ( $n = 1,283$ ) what percentage of the global tax revenues should be  
394 pooled to finance low-income countries. In each country, at least 88% of respondents in-  
395 dicate a positive amount, with an average of one-third (Figure S5). To other respondents  
396 ( $n = 1,233$ ), we inquire whether they would prefer each country to retain all the revenues  
397 it collects or that half of the revenues be pooled to finance low-income countries. Ap-  
398 proximately half of the respondents opt to allocate half of the tax revenues to low-income  
399 countries, consistently with the other variant of the question.

400 **2.5.2 Foreign aid**

401 In addition, we provide respondents with information about the actual amount “spent  
402 on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries” relative to their country’s gov-  
403 ernment spending and GDP. Less than 16% of respondents state that their country’s for-  
404 eign aid should be reduced, while 62% express support for increasing it, including 17%

Figure 3: Relative support for various global policies. (percentage of *somewhat* or *strong support*, after excluding *indifferent* answers; \*except for GCS: percentage of Yes in a Yes/No question, preferred share: percentage of answers  $\geq 30\%$ , and foreign aid: percentage of unconditional or conditional increase rather than decrease or stable aid). Shares of *indifferent* answers range from 10% to 40%, with quartiles 19%, 25%, and 32%. (p. 89, Questions 20, 36, 43, 44, and 45; See Figure S33 for the absolute support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)*	54	76	80	71	81	74
National tax on millionaires funding public services	73	85	81	87	89	88
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	69	84	84	84	87	83
Preferred share of global wealth tax for low-income countries: 30% or more*	50	54	53	50	57	54
[Country]'s foreign aid should be increased*	60	64	63	68	69	56
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	60	76	77	79	79	71
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	68	82	82	82	85	81
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	55	71	72	70	79	70
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	46	53	53	43	62	61
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	58	71	69	69	78	72
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	62	73	58	73	80	83
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	63	80	80	78	81	83
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	62	87	90	86	91	87
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	46	62	58	62	65	67

<sup>405</sup> who support an unconditional increase (Figure S6). Among the 45% who think aid should  
<sup>406</sup> be increased under certain conditions, we subsequently ask them to specify the conditions  
<sup>407</sup> they deem necessary (Figure S7). The three most commonly selected conditions are that:

408 “we can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted” (73% chose this  
409 condition), “recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights” (67%),  
410 and “other high-income countries also increase their foreign aid” (48%). On the other  
411 hand, respondents who do not wish to increase their country’s foreign aid primarily jus-  
412 tify their view by prioritizing the well-being of their fellow citizens or by perceiving each  
413 country as responsible for its own fate (Figure S8). In response to an open-ended ques-  
414 tion regarding measures high-income countries should take to fight extreme poverty, a  
415 large majority of Americans expressed that more help is needed (Figure S46). The most  
416 commonly suggested form of aid is financial support, closely followed by investments in  
417 education.

418 We also inquire about the perceived amount of foreign aid. Consistent with prior re-  
419 search (see Appendix A.1.3), most people overestimate the actual amount of foreign aid  
420 (Figure S25). We then elicit respondents’ preferred amount of foreign aid, after randomly  
421 presenting them with either the actual amount or no information. Most of the respon-  
422 dents who learn the actual amount choose a bracket at least as high as the actual one, and  
423 most of those without the information choose a bracket at least as high as the perceived  
424 one (Figures S28–S27). Finally, we ask a last question to the respondents who received  
425 the information. To those who prefer an increase of foreign aid, we ask how they would  
426 finance it: by far, the preferred source of funding is higher taxes on the wealthiest (Figure  
427 S30). To those who prefer a reduction, we ask how they would use the funds becoming  
428 available: In every country, more people choose higher spending on education or health-  
429 care rather than lower taxes (Figure S31).

## 430 2.6 Universalistic values

431 We ask broad questions on people’s values to assess whether their core values are  
432 consistent with support for specific policies. When we ask respondents which group they  
433 defend when they vote, 20% choose “sentient beings (humans and animals),” 22% choose  
434 “humans,” 33% select their “fellow citizens” (or “Europeans”), 15% choose “My family  
435 and myself,” and the remaining 10% choose another group (mainly “My State or region”  
436 or “People sharing my culture or religion”). Notably, a majority of left-wing voters choose  
437 *humans or sentient beings*.

438 Answers to this and other broad value questions are consistent with half of Americans  
439 and three quarters of Europeans supporting global policies like the GCS: people are al-  
440 most as much willing to make a donation to poor Africans than to poor fellow citizens in

<sup>441</sup> a lottery experiment, most respondents find that global poverty and climate change are  
<sup>442</sup> bigger problems than national inequality, and most respondents wish that their diplomats  
<sup>443</sup> take into account global justice (see [Methods](#) for details).

## <sup>444</sup> 3 Discussion

<sup>445</sup> In our analysis, we have uncovered strong and genuine support for global redistributive  
<sup>446</sup> policies.

<sup>447</sup> We conclude by providing hypotheses to reconcile the scarcity of global policies in the  
<sup>448</sup> public debate with our findings that they would be widely accepted. The first two are  
<sup>449</sup> variations of pluralistic ignorance, and the last three represent complementary explana-  
<sup>450</sup> tions.

<sup>451</sup> First, there may be pluralistic ignorance *among policymakers* regarding universalistic  
<sup>452</sup> values, support for the GCS, or the electoral advantage of endorsing it. Second, citizens  
<sup>453</sup> or policymakers may believe that globally redistributive policies are politically infeasi-  
<sup>454</sup> ble in some key (potentially foreign) countries such as the U.S. Third, political discourse  
<sup>455</sup> centrally happens at the national level, shaped by national media and institutions such  
<sup>456</sup> as the voting system. National framing by political voices may create biases and sup-  
<sup>457</sup> press universalistic values. Fourth, many individuals, including policymakers, may be  
<sup>458</sup> unaware of specific proposals or may perceive global redistributive policies as ill-defined  
<sup>459</sup> or technically infeasible, ultimately dismissing them as unrealistic. Fifth, just as policy is  
<sup>460</sup> disproportionately influenced by the economic elites,<sup>41–43</sup> public debate may be shaped  
<sup>461</sup> by the wealthiest, who have vested interests in preventing global redistribution.

<sup>462</sup> Uncovering evidence to support the above hypotheses could draw attention to global  
<sup>463</sup> policies in the public debate and contribute to their increased prominence. Their confir-  
<sup>464</sup> mation would further support the conclusion that there exists substantial public support  
<sup>465</sup> for global policies addressing climate change and global inequality, even in high-income  
<sup>466</sup> countries.

## <sup>467</sup> Methods

<sup>468</sup> **Pre-registration.** The project is approved by Economics & Business Ethics Committee (EBEC) at  
<sup>469</sup> the University of Amsterdam (EB-1113) and was preregistered in the Open Science Foundation  
<sup>470</sup> registry ([osf.io/fy6gd](https://osf.io/fy6gd)). The study did not deviate from the registration: the questionnaires and  
<sup>471</sup> the hypotheses tests used are the same as the ones *given ex ante*. Informed consent was obtained

472 from all respondents, randomized treatment branches were unknown to the respondents, and our  
473 research complies with all relevant ethical regulations. Respondents were compensated with gift  
474 certificates for a value of €1 after participation. No statistical methods were used to pre-determine  
475 sample sizes but our sample sizes match those reported in similar publications.<sup>19;14–16;18</sup>

476 **Data collection.** The paper utilizes two sets of surveys: the *global* survey and the *m* surveys. The  
477 *global* surveys consist of two U.S. surveys, *US1* and *US2*, and one European survey, *Eu*. The *global*  
478 survey was conducted from March 2021 to March 2022 on 40,680 respondents from 20 countries  
479 (with 1,465 to 2,488 respondents per country). *US1* collected responses from 3,000 respondents be-  
480 tween January and March 2023, while *US2* gathered data from 2,000 respondents between March  
481 and April 2023. *Eu* included 3,000 respondents and was conducted from February to March 2023.  
482 We used the survey companies *Dynata* and *Respondi*. To ensure representative samples, we em-  
483 ployed stratified quotas based on gender, age (5 brackets), income (4), region (4), education level  
484 (3), and ethnicity (3) for the U.S. We also incorporated survey weights throughout the analysis to  
485 account for any remaining imbalances. These weights were constructed using the quota variables  
486 as well as the degree of urbanity, and trimmed between 0.25 and 4. Stratified quotas followed by  
487 reweighting is the usual method to reduce selection bias from opt-in online panels, when better  
488 sampling methods (such as compulsory participation of random dwellings) are unavailable.<sup>44</sup> By  
489 applying weights, the results are fully representative of the respective countries along the above  
490 mentioned dimensions. Results at the European level apply different weights which ensure rep-  
491 resentativeness of the combined four European countries. Appendix G shows how our samples  
492 compare to actual population frequencies. Our samples match the actual frequencies well, except  
493 for some imbalances in specific quota demographics —such as gender in the UK (43% of women  
494 instead of 50%) or urbanity in Spain (15% rural instead of 26%)— that are corrected through our  
495 survey weights, and in the U.S. vote (which does not affect our results, as shown by the results  
496 reweighted by vote in the *Support for the GCS* section below). Appendix I shows that the treat-  
497 ment branches are balanced. Appendix J runs placebo tests of the effects of each treatment on  
498 unrelated outcomes. We do not find effects of earlier treatments on unrelated outcomes arriving  
499 later in the survey. Appendix K shows that our results are unchanged when including inattentive  
500 respondents.

501 **Data quality.** The median duration is 28 minutes for the *global* survey, 14 min for *US1*, 11 min  
502 for *US2*, and 20 min for *Eu*. To ensure the best possible data quality, we exclude respondents who  
503 fail an attention test or rush through the survey (i.e., answer in less than 11.5 minutes in the *global*  
504 survey, 4 minutes in *US1* or *US2*, 6 minutes in *Eu*). At the end of the survey, we ask whether  
505 respondents thought that our survey was politically biased and offer to provide some feedback.  
506 67% of the respondents found the survey unbiased. 25% found it left-wing biased, and 8% found

507 it right-wing biased.

508 **Questionnaires and raw results.** The raw results are reported in Appendix B while the surveys'  
509 structures and questionnaires are given in Appendices C and D. Details on the *global* survey can  
510 be found in the Appendix of Dechezleprêtre et al. (forthcoming).<sup>19</sup> Country-specific raw results  
511 are also available as supplementary material files: [US](#), [EU](#), [FR](#), [DE](#), [ES](#), [UK](#).

512 **Incentives.** To encourage accurate and truthful responses, several questions of the Western sur-  
513 veys use incentives. For each of the three comprehension questions that follow the policy descrip-  
514 tions, we randomly select and reward three respondents who provide correct answers with a \$50  
515 gift certificate. Similarly, for questions involving estimating support shares for the GCS and NR,  
516 three respondents with the closest guesses to the actual values receive a \$50 gift certificate. In the  
517 donation lottery question, we randomly select one respondent and split the \$100 prize between  
518 the NGO GiveDirectly and the winner according to the winner's choice. In total, our incentives  
519 scheme distributes gift certificates (and donations) for a value of \$850. Finally, respondents have  
520 an incentive to answer truthfully to the petition question, as they are aware that the results for  
521 that question (the share of respondents supporting the policy) will be transmitted to their head of  
522 state's office.

523 **Absolute vs. relative support.** In most questions, support or opposition for a policy is asked  
524 using a 5-Likert scale, with compulsory response and *Indifferent* as the middle option. We call  
525 *absolute support* the share of *Somewhat* or *Strong support*. We generally favor the notion of *relative*  
526 *support*, which reports the share of support after excluding *Indifferent* answers. Indeed, the *relative*  
527 *support* is better suited to assess whether there are more people in favor vs. against a policy.

528 **Support for the GCS.** The 95% confidence intervals are [52.4%, 55.9%] in the U.S. and [74.2%, 77.2%]  
529 in Europe. The average support is computed with survey weights, employing weights based on  
530 quota variables, which exclude vote. Another method to reweigh the raw results involves running  
531 a regression of the support for the GCS on sociodemographic characteristics (including vote) and  
532 multiplying each coefficient by the population frequencies. This alternative approach yields sim-  
533 ilar figures: 76% in Europe and 52% or 53% in the U.S. (depending on whether individuals who  
534 did not disclose their vote are classified as non-voters or excluded). Notably, the average support  
535 among voters is 54% in the U.S., with 74% support among Biden voters vs. 26% among Trump  
536 voters (see Figure S47).

537 Though the level of support for the GCS is significantly lower in swing States (at 51%) that  
538 are key to win U.S. elections, the electoral effect of endorsing the GCS remains non-significantly  
539 different from zero (at +1.2 p.p.) in these States. Note that we define swing states as the 8 states

540 with less than 5 p.p. margin of victory in the 2020 election (MI, NV, PA, WI, AZ, GA, NC, FL). The  
541 results are unchanged if we use the 3 p.p. threshold (that excludes FL) instead.

542 **List experiment.** List experiments have been used to reveal social desirability bias, silencing ei-  
543 ther racism in the Southern U.S.<sup>45</sup> or opposition to the invasion of Ukraine in Russia.<sup>46</sup> In our case,  
544 the question reads: “Beware, this question is quite unusual. Among the policies below, **how many**  
545 do you support?” The list of policies randomly varies across respondents, and includes a subset of  
546 GCS, NR (National Redistribution scheme), C (“Coal exit” in the U.S., “Thermal insulation plan”  
547 in Europe) and O (“Marriage only for opposite-sex couples in the U.S.”, “Death penalty for major  
548 crimes” in Europe). There are four branches: GCS/NR/C/O; GCS/C/O; NR/C/O; C/O. To esti-  
549 mate the tacit average support for the GCS and NR, we regress the number of supported policies  
550 on indicators that the list includes GCS and NR. We utilize the difference-in-means estimator, and  
551 confidence intervals are computed using Monte Carlo simulation with the R package *list*.<sup>38</sup>

552 **Petition.** The respondent is randomly assigned a branch where the petition relates to the GCS or  
553 the National Redistribution scheme. The question reads: “Would you be willing to sign a petition  
554 for the [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme?

555 As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President’s office], inform-  
556 ing him what share of [American] people are willing to endorse the [Global climate / National  
557 redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign, only your answer here is required and  
558 remains anonymous.)”.

559 Paired weighted *t*-tests are conducted to test the equality in support for a policy among re-  
560 spondents who were questioned about the policy in the petition.

561 **Conjoint analyses.** The first conjoint analysis suggests that the GCS is supported independently  
562 of being complemented by the National Redistribution Scheme and a national climate policy  
563 (“Coal exit” in the U.S., “Thermal insulation plan” in Europe, denoted C). Indeed, 54% of U.S.  
564 respondents and 74% of European ones prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to the com-  
565 bination of C and NR alone, indicating similar support for the GCS conditional on NR and C than  
566 for the GCS alone (Figure S15).

567 In the second conjoint analysis, results from the first branch show that the support for the GCS  
568 conditional on NR, at 55% in the U.S. ( $n = 757$ ) and 77% in Europe ( $n = 746$ ), is not significantly  
569 different from the support for the GCS alone. This suggests that rejection of the GCS is not driven  
570 by the cost of the policy on oneself. The second branch shows that the support for C conditional  
571 on NR is somewhat higher, at 62% in the U.S. ( $n = 751$ ) and 84% in Europe ( $n = 747$ ). However,  
572 the third one shows no significant preference for C compared to GCS (both conditional on NR),  
573 neither in Europe, where GCS is preferred by 52% ( $n = 741$ ) nor in the U.S., where C is preferred

<sup>574</sup> by 53% ( $n = 721$ ). The fourth branch shows that 55% in the U.S. ( $n = 771$ ) and 77% in Europe ( $n =$   
<sup>575</sup> 766) prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to NR alone.

<sup>576</sup> The effects reported in the fourth analysis are the Average Marginal Component Effects.<sup>47</sup> The  
<sup>577</sup> policies studied are progressive policies prominent in the country. Except for the category *foreign*  
<sup>578</sup> *policy*, which features the GCS 42% of the time, they are drawn uniformly.

<sup>579</sup> **Prioritization.** The prioritization allows inferring individual-level preferences for one policy  
<sup>580</sup> over another, including in their intensity. This somewhat differs from a conjoint analysis, which  
<sup>581</sup> only allows inferring individual-level preferences for one platform over another or collective-level  
<sup>582</sup> preferences for one policy over another. Also, by comparing platforms, conjoint analyses may be  
<sup>583</sup> subject to interaction effects between policies of a platform (which can be seen as complementary,  
<sup>584</sup> substitute, or antagonistic) while the prioritization frames the policies as independent.

<sup>585</sup> This question sheds light on a potential discrepancy between the policy priorities of the public  
<sup>586</sup> and those enacted by legislators. For instance, while the European Union and California have  
<sup>587</sup> enacted plans to phase out new combustion-engine cars by 2035, the proposal to “ban the sale of  
<sup>588</sup> new combustion-engine cars by 2030” emerged as one of the three least prioritized policies in each  
<sup>589</sup> country, with an average allocation of 7.8 points in France to 11.4 points in the UK.

<sup>590</sup> **Open-ended question on the GCS.** Around one in four respondents explicitly cites pros or cons.  
<sup>591</sup> Few individuals explicitly express support or opposition, and misunderstandings are rare. Only  
<sup>592</sup> 11% of the responses are empty or express a lack of opinion, though one-quarter are unclassifiable  
<sup>593</sup> due to the rarity, nonsensical nature, or irrelevance of the conveyed idea.

<sup>594</sup> **Pros and cons.** In the closed question, the least important aspect was the negative impact on  
<sup>595</sup> their household, with 60% in Europe ( $n=1,505$ ) and 75% in the U.S. ( $n=493$ ) finding it important.  
<sup>596</sup> The most important elements differ between Europe and the U.S. In Europe, the key factors are  
<sup>597</sup> the GCS’s potential to limit climate change and reduce poverty in low-income countries, both  
<sup>598</sup> deemed important by 85% of respondents. In the U.S., having sufficient information about the  
<sup>599</sup> scheme ranks highest at 89%, followed by its potential to foster global cooperation at 82%.

<sup>600</sup> Surprisingly, the support for National Redistribution also decreased by 7 p.p. following the  
<sup>601</sup> closed question about the GCS. This suggests that some individuals may lack attention and con-  
<sup>602</sup> fuse the two policies, or that contemplating the pros and cons alters the mood of some people,  
<sup>603</sup> moving them away from their initial positive impression.

<sup>604</sup> **Universalistic values** When asked what their country’s diplomats should defend in interna-  
<sup>605</sup> tional climate negotiations, only 11% prefer their country’s “interests, even if it goes against global  
<sup>606</sup> justice.” In contrast, 30% prefer global justice (with or without consideration of national interests),

607 and the bulk of respondents (38%) prefer their country's "interests, to the extent it respects global  
608 justice."

609 Furthermore, when we ask respondents to assess the extent to which climate change, global  
610 poverty, and inequality in their country are issues, climate change is generally viewed as the most  
611 significant problem (with a mean score of 0.59 after recoding answers between -2 and 2). This is  
612 followed by global poverty (0.42) and national inequality (0.37).

613 Finally, we conduct a lottery experiment. Respondents were automatically enrolled in a lottery  
614 with a \$100 prize and had to choose the proportion of the prize they would keep for themselves  
615 versus give to a person living in poverty. The charity donation is directed either to an African  
616 individual or a fellow citizen, depending on the respondent's random assignment. In Europe, we  
617 observe no significant variation in the willingness to donate based on the recipient's origin (in line  
618 with an earlier study<sup>48</sup>). In the U.S., the donations to Africans are 3 p.p. lower, but the slightly  
619 lower donations to Africans are entirely driven by Trump voters and non-voters (Table S2).

620 **Global wealth tax estimates.** A 2% tax on net wealth exceeding \$5 million would annually raise  
621 \$816 billion, leaving unaffected 99.9% of the world population. More specifically, it would collect  
622 €5 billion in Spain, €16 billion in France, £20 billion in the UK, €44 billion in Germany, \$430  
623 billion in the U.S., and \$1 billion collectively in all low-income countries (28 countries, home to  
624 700 million people). These Figures come from the [WID wealth tax simulator](#).<sup>49</sup>

625 **Design choices.** As global survey results indicated strong support for global redistributive poli-  
626 cies worldwide, we conducted our Western surveys to further investigate the surprisingly high  
627 support. Among the eight largest high-income countries, we selected the five ones with a rela-  
628 tively low level of support for global redistributive policies as observed in the global survey. We  
629 also focus on the GCS as its costs are less concentrated on the very rich, compared to other global  
630 redistributive policies, so we expected lower (or less genuine) support. By selecting countries that  
631 would lose from global redistribution, are less supportive than others, and focusing on less con-  
632 sensual policies, we aimed at conservatively assessing the level of support of world citizens for  
633 global redistribution.

634 We split the U.S. survey into two waves to test the effect on the support of providing the  
635 information on the actual support, and merged the *Eu* survey in one wave to get larger sample  
636 sizes and more power in the analyses.

637 To select the policies tested, we spanned three key areas for global redistribution: climate  
638 change, inequality, and global governance. We selected policies that are either on the agenda  
639 of international negotiations (international transfers for mitigation; adaptation; or loss and dam-  
640 ages; cancellation of public debt; reform of voting rights at the UN or IMF; global wealth tax) or  
641 advocated by prominent NGOs or scholars ([global asset registry](#); limits on wealth;<sup>50;51</sup> democratic

642 climate governance;<sup>52</sup> global minimum wage;<sup>53</sup> fair trade;<sup>54</sup> carbon pricing;<sup>6</sup> increased foreign  
643 aid).

644 **Data and code availability**

645 All data and code of the *global* surveys as well as figures of the paper are available on [10.5281/zen-](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1120224)  
646 [odo.1120224](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1120224). Data and code for the *g* survey will be made public upon publication.

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652 **Author Contributions**

653 A.F. collected and analysed the data, and drafted the questionnaire and the paper. T.D. and  
654 L.M. substantially revised the questionnaire and paper, and contributed to the conception and  
655 redaction.

656 **Competing interests**

657 Fabre declares that he also serves as president of Global Redistribution Advocates.

Table 1: Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list. The tacit support for the GCS is estimated by regressing the number of supported policies on the presence of the GCS in the list of policies. The social desirability is estimated as the difference between the tacit and stated support, and it is not significantly different from zero even at a 20% threshold (see [Methods](#)).

	Number of supported policies		
	All	U.S.	Europe
List contains: GCS	0.624*** (0.028)	0.524*** (0.041)	0.724*** (0.036)
<i>Support for GCS</i>	0.65	0.542	0.757
<i>Social desirability bias</i>	-0.025	-0.019	-0.034
<i>80% C.I. for the bias</i>	[-0.06; 0.01]	[-0.07; 0.03]	[-0.08; 0.01]
Constant	1.317	1.147	1.486
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000
R <sup>2</sup>	0.089	0.065	0.125

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 2: Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. ([Question 28](#))

	Prefers the Progressive platform					
	All	United States	France	Germany	UK	Spain
GCS in Progressive platform	0.028**	0.029	0.112***	0.015	0.008	-0.015
P-value	0.039	0.132	0.005	0.639	0.839	0.696
t	2.07	1.51	2.83	0.47	0.20	-0.39
95% C.I.	[.00; .05]	[-.01; .07]	[.03; .19]	[-.05; .08]	[-.07; .08]	[-.09; .06]
Constant	0.623	0.604	0.55	0.7	0.551	0.775
Observations	5,202	2,619	605	813	661	504
R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.001	0.013	0.0003	0.0001	0.0003

Note: Simple OLS model. The 14% of *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples. GCS has no significant influence on them. \*p < 0.1; \*\*p < 0.05; \*\*\*p < 0.01.

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## Extended data

Table S1: Effects on the support for the GCS of a question on its pros and cons (either in open-ended or closed format) and on information about the actual support, in the U.S. (See Section D in the US2 Questionnaire) [\(Back to Section 2.4.5\)](#)

	Support			
	Global Climate Scheme		National Redistribution	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Control group mean	0.557	0.557	0.569	0.569
Treatment: Open-ended field on GCS pros & cons	-0.073** (0.035)	-0.071** (0.031)	-0.035 (0.035)	-0.030 (0.032)
Treatment: Closed questions on GCS pros & cons	-0.109*** (0.034)	-0.096*** (0.031)	-0.065* (0.034)	-0.062** (0.031)
Treatment: Info on actual support for GCS and NR	-0.021 (0.034)	-0.015 (0.031)	0.048 (0.033)	0.056* (0.031)
Includes controls		✓		✓
Observations	2,000	1,995	2,000	1,995
R <sup>2</sup>	0.007	0.170	0.007	0.154

Figure S1: [For Supplementary Material] Support for the GCS, NR and the combination of GCS, NR and C (Yes/No questions).  
(p. 89, Questions 20, 22, 34, 35, and 26).




Table S2: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality. (Question 33) [\(Back to Section 2.6\)](#)


	Donation to poor people (in %)			
	All	US	US	Eu
Poor is in own country	0.590 (0.799)	2.509** (1.152)	0.046 (1.691)	-1.349 (1.108)
Poor is in own country $\times$ Vote: <i>not</i> Biden			3.954* (2.279)	
Mean	34.034	33.658	33.658	34.41
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000	3,000
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0001	0.002	0.034	0.0005

Table S3: Average Marginal Component Effects of global policies.


	Effect	Obs.	t	P-value	95% C.I.
FR; Global Climate Plan	0.13***	1456	3.5	$5 \cdot 10^{-4}$	[0.06; 0.21]
DE; Global Climate Plan	0.09**	1958	2.8	0.005	[0.03; 0.16]
ES; Global Climate Plan	0.04	1086	0.82	0.411	[-0.05; 0.12]
UK; Global Climate Plan	0.09*	1498	2.31	0.021	[0.01; 0.16]
US; Global Climate Plan	0.01	4436	0.61	0.539	[-0.03; 0.06]
FR; Global Millionaire Tax	0.11*	1456	2.49	0.013	[0.02; 0.2]
DE; Global Millionaire Tax	0.09*	1958	2.3	0.022	[0.01; 0.18]
ES; Global Millionaire Tax	0.05	1086	0.91	0.365	[-0.06; 0.16]
UK; Global Millionaire Tax	0.13**	1498	2.86	0.004	[0.04; 0.22]
US; Global Millionaire Tax	0.09**	4436	3.16	0.002	[0.03; 0.14]
FR; Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change	0.12*	1456	2.52	0.012	[0.03; 0.21]
DE; Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change	0.1*	1958	2.52	0.012	[0.02; 0.18]
ES; Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change	-0.01	1086	-0.22	0.829	[-0.12; 0.1]
UK; Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change	0.07	1498	1.56	0.12	[-0.02; 0.17]
US; Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change	0.08**	4436	2.93	0.003	[0.03; 0.13]

Figure S2: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See non-translated versions in Figure S16; Question 29)


(a) U.S. (Asked only to non-Republicans)




(b) France



(c) Germany



(d) Spain



(e) UK




Figure S3: Influence of the GCS on preferred platform:

Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question 30; in the U.S., asked only to non-Republicans.)




Figure S4: Beliefs regarding the support for the GCS and NR. (Questions 21 and 23)




Figure S5: Percent of global wealth tax that should finance low-income countries (*mean*).

“Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all countries around the world. (...)

What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of retained in the country’s national budget)?” (Question 36)




Figure S6: Attitudes regarding the evolution of [own country] foreign aid. (Question 45)




Figure S7: Conditions at which foreign aid should be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish an increase of foreign aid at some conditions.] (Question 46)





Figure S8: Reasons why foreign aid should not be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish a decrease or stability of foreign aid.] (Question 47)



834 **A Literature review**

835 **A.1 Attitudes and perceptions**

836 **A.1.1 Population attitudes on global policies**

837 Using representative samples in 125 countries covering 96% of the world's greenhouse  
838 gas emissions, Andre et al. (2024) show that 69% of the global population express willingness  
839 to contribute 1% of their income to fight global warming.<sup>1</sup> Carattini et al. (2019) test  
840 the support for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples in five countries, representative  
841 along gender and age. For a given variant, the sample size is about 167 respondents per country.  
842 They find over 80% support for any variant in India, between 50% and 65% in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43% to 59% in the U.S., depending on the  
843 variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding an equal dividend for each  
844 human is close to 50% in high-income countries (e.g., at 44% in the U.S.), consistently  
845 with our results from the *Global* survey (see Figure 2). This is another piece of evidence  
846 that the support is lower for a tax that would "only" reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions than for a  
847 quota that would unambiguously achieve the climate target. In a survey over 15 countries,  
848 Bloodworth & Callegari (2023) find 73% agreement to tax fossil fuel companies and  
849 finance climate action in poorer countries. Using a conjoint analysis in the U.S. and Germany,  
850 Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019) find that the support for a carbon tax increases  
851 by up to 50% if it applies to all industrialized countries rather than exclusively to one's  
852 own country.

854 In surveys conducted in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S., Ghassim (2020)  
855 finds support ranging from 55% to 74% for "a global democracy including both a global  
856 government and a global parliament, directly elected by the world population, to recom-  
857 mend and implement policies on global issues". Ghassim & Pauli (2024) also finds strong  
858 support for a democratic world government in surveys over 17 countries. Furthermore,  
859 through an experiment, Ghassim (2020) finds that, in countries where the government  
860 stems from a coalition, voting shares would shift by 8 (Brazil) to 12 p.p. (Germany) from  
861 parties who are said to oppose global democracy to parties that supposedly support it.  
862 For instance, when Germans respondents were told that (only) the Greens and the Left  
863 support global democracy, these parties gained respectively 9 and 3 p.p. in vote inten-  
864 tions, while the SPD and the CDU-CSU each lost 6 p.p. Ghassim (2020) also presents

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<sup>1</sup>However, Ipsos (2023) find no majority support when the amount is not specified, despite strong agreement for own individual action.

865 survey results showing strong majorities in favor of the direct election of one's country's  
866 UN representative in all 18 surveyed countries. Similarly, in each of 10 countries, there  
867 are clear majorities in favor of "a new supranational entity [taking] enforceable global de-  
868 cisions in order to solve global risks" (Global Challenges Foundation 2018). Remarkably,  
869 already in 1946, 54% of Americans agreed (while 24% disagreed) that "the UN should be  
870 strengthened to make it a world government with the power to control the armed forces  
871 of all nations" (Gallup 1946). Furthermore, in surveys conducted in Argentina, China,  
872 India, Russia, Spain, and the U.S., Ghassim et al. (2022) find majority support for UN  
873 reforms that would make United Nations' decisions binding, give veto powers to a few  
874 other major countries at the Security Council, or complement the highest body of the UN  
875 with a chamber of directly elected representatives.

876 Relatedly, Meilland et al. (2024) find that both Americans and French people prefer  
877 an international settlement of climate justice, even if it encroaches on sovereignty. In a  
878 2013 survey conducted in China, Germany, and the U.S., Schleich et al. (2016) show that  
879 over three-quarter of people think that international climate agreements reached so far  
880 are not successful and that future agreements are important. In Finland, Sivonen (2022)  
881 finds that that support for a carbon tax is higher if implemented at the global level (54%)  
882 rather than at the national level (40%).

883 The results from these specific questions are in line with the answers to more gen-  
884 eral questions. In each of 36 countries, ISSP (2010) find near consensus that "for envi-  
885 ronmental problems, there should be international agreements that [their country] and  
886 other countries should be made to follow" (overall, 82% agree and 4% disagree). In each  
887 of 29 countries, ISSP (2019) uncover near consensus that "Present economic differences  
888 between rich and poor countries are too large" (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree).  
889 Leiserowitz et al. (2021) reveal that 66% of Americans support providing "financial aid  
890 and technical support to developing countries that agree to limit their greenhouse gas  
891 emissions." Fehr et al. (2022) find that 90% of Germans want some degree of global redis-  
892 tribution.

### 893 A.1.2 Population attitudes on climate burden sharing

894 Despite differences in the description of fairness principles, surveys on burden-sharing  
895 rules show consistent attitudes. Or at least, their seemingly contradictory results can be  
896 made compatible with the following interpretation: Concerning emissions reductions,  
897 most people want that every country engage in strong and collective decarbonization ef-

898 forts, with a global quota converging to climate neutrality in the medium run. Concerning  
899 the financial effort, most people support high-emitting countries paying and low-income  
900 countries receiving funding. The most supported rules are those perceived as equitable,  
901 in particular an equal right to emit per person.

902 This interpretation helps to understand the apparent differences between articles that  
903 approach burden sharing from different angles: cost sharing (in money terms), effort shar-  
904 ing (in terms of emissions reductions), or resource sharing (in terms of rights to emit).  
905 Existing papers adopt either the cost sharing or effort sharing approach, which preclude  
906 any country from being a net receiver of funds. Also, by focusing on *either* the financial  
907 or the decarbonization effort, these surveys miss the other half of the picture, which can  
908 explain why some papers find strong support for the ability-to-pay principle while others  
909 find strong support for grandfathering (defined as emissions reductions being the same  
910 in every country). The literature follows these approaches to align with the notions used  
911 by the UNFCCC. Yet, we argue that the resource sharing approach is preferable for un-  
912 covering attitudes, as it unambiguously describes the distributive implications of each  
913 rule while achieving an efficient geographical distribution of emissions reductions and  
914 explicitly allowing for monetary gains for some countries.

915 Now, let us summarize the results of the different papers in the light of this clarifica-  
916 tion. [Schleich et al. \(2016\)](#) find an identical ranking of support for burden-sharing prin-  
917 ciples in China, Germany, and the U.S.: polluter-pays followed by ability-to-pay, equal  
918 emissions per capita, and grandfathering. Note that the authors do not allow for emis-  
919 sions trading in their description of equal *emissions per capita*, which may explain its rel-  
920 atively low support. Yet, the relative support for egalitarianism also depends on how  
921 *the other* rules are described. Indeed, [Carlsson et al. \(2011\)](#) find that Swedes prefer that  
922 “all countries are allowed to emit an equal amount per capita” rather than options where  
923 emissions are reduced based on current or historical emissions, for which it is explicitly  
924 stated that high-emitting countries “will continue to emit more than others”. [Bechtel &](#)  
925 [Scheve \(2013\)](#) find agreement that rich countries should pay more and historical emis-  
926 sions should matter, but that efforts should not be solely borne by wealthy nations. More  
927 precisely, their conjoint analysis conducted in France, Germany, the UK, and the U.S.  
928 shows that a climate agreement is 15 p.p. more likely to be preferred (to a random alter-  
929 native) if it includes 160 countries rather than 20, and 5 p.p. less likely to be preferred  
930 if “only rich countries pay” compared to other burden-sharing rules: “rich countries pay  
931 more than poor”, “countries pay proportional to current emissions” or “countries pay

proportional to historical emissions". In Germany and the U.S., Gampfer et al. (2014) also find stronger support for funding climate action in low-income countries when cost is shared with other countries. Using a choice experiment, Carlsson et al. (2013) find that the least preferred option in China and the U.S. is when low-emitting countries are exempted from any effort. Ability-to-pay is appreciated in both countries and is the preferred option in the U.S., though the preferred option in China is another one that accounts for historical responsibility. In the U.S. and France, Meilland et al. (2024) find that the most favored fairness principle is that "all countries commit to converge to the same average of total emissions per inhabitant, compatible with a controlled climate change". Furthermore, in each country, 73% disagree with grandfathering defined as "countries which emitted a lot of carbon in the past have a right to continue emitting more than others in the future". The study by Meilland et al. (2024) contains many other results: for instance, majorities prefer to hold countries accountable for their consumption-based rather than territorial emissions, and the median choice regarding historical responsibility is to hold a country accountable for its post-1990 emissions (rather than post-1850 or just their current emissions). Finally, in each of 28 (among the largest) countries, Dabla-Norris et al. (2023) find strong majority for "all countries" to the question "Which countries do you think should be paying to reduce carbon emissions?". When asked to choose between a cost sharing based on *current* vs. *accumulated historic emissions*, a majority prefers *current emissions* in all countries but China and Saudi Arabia (where the two options are close to equally preferred).

[\(Back to Section 2.2\)](#)

### 953 A.1.3 Population attitudes on foreign aid

954 There is an extensive literature on attitudes towards foreign aid in donor countries.  
955 The key findings indicate that most people overestimate the amount of foreign aid and  
956 that only a minority wants a cut in foreign aid compared to actual amounts, especially  
957 once they become aware of them.

958 For instance, PIPA (2001) shows that 83% of Americans support a multilateral effort  
959 to cut world hunger in half. PIPA (2008) shows that in each of 20 countries, a majority  
960 thinks that developed countries "have a moral responsibility to work to reduce hunger  
961 and severe poverty in poor countries", with an average agreement of 81%. In 7 OECD  
962 countries, the study finds that at least 75% of respondents are willing to pay for a pro-  
963 gram to cut hunger in half (at an estimated cost of, e.g., \$50 a year for each American).  
964 Eurobarometer data shows majority support to comply with the promise to increase aid

965 (Cho 2024).

966 Kaufmann et al. (2019) find that perceived aid is overestimated in each of the 24 coun-  
967 tries they study, on average by a factor of 7. In most countries, desired aid is larger than  
968 perceived aid.<sup>2</sup> They show that individuals in the top income quintile desire aid 0.13  
969 p.p. lower than those in the bottom 40% – which is very close to what we find. By em-  
970 ploying a theoretical model and examining correlations between lobbying and actual aid  
971 (controlling for desired aid), they argue that the gap between actual and desired aid stems  
972 from the political influence of the rich who defend their vested interests. In Kaufmann  
973 et al. (2012), the U.S. is an outlier: desired aid is at the other countries' average (3% of  
974 GNI), but as misperceptions are enormous, perceived aid is twice as large as desired aid.  
975 Indeed, Gilens (2001) shows that even Americans with high political knowledge misper-  
976 ceive actual aid, and finds that 17% fewer of them want to cut aid when we provide them  
977 specific information about the amount of aid. Similarly, Nair (2018) finds that the rela-  
978 tively low support for aid in the U.S. is driven by information on global distribution, as  
979 people underestimate their rank by 27 centiles on average and overestimate the global  
980 median income by a factor 10. This could explain why in the 2000–2004 waves of the GSS,  
981 over 60 percent of Americans state that the government is spending too much on foreign  
982 aid (Okten & Osili 2007).

983 Hudson & van Heerde (2012) provide a critical review of the literature and show that  
984 the strong support for poverty alleviation largely stems from intrinsic altruism. They note  
985 that, according to DFID (2009) and PIPA (2001), 47% of British people find that the aid  
986 is wasted (mainly due to corruption), while Americans estimate that less than a quarter  
987 of the aid reaches those in need, with over half ending up in the hands of corrupt gov-  
988 ernment officials. Despite these perceptions, most people still support aid, suggesting  
989 the presence of nonutilitarian motives. Consistent with Henson et al. (2010), Bauhr et al.  
990 (2013) find that support for aid is reduced by the perception of corruption in recipient  
991 countries. However, this effect is mitigated by the aid-corruption paradox: countries with  
992 higher levels of corruption often need more help. Bodenstein & Faust (2017) further show  
993 that right-wing Europeans, as well as those who perceive strong corruption in their coun-  
994 try, are more likely to agree that recipient countries should “follow certain rules regarding  
995 democracy, human rights and governance as a condition for receiving EU development  
996 aid.” Using a 2002 Gallup survey and the 2006 World Values Survey, and in line with

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<sup>2</sup>Kaufmann et al. (2012) offer the best results on desired aid because (as Hudson & van Heerde (2012) criticize), other studies did not take into account misperceptions of actual aid.

<sup>997</sup> Heinrich et al. (2018) in the U.S., Bayram (2017) and Paxton & Knack (2012) show that the  
<sup>998</sup> main determinants for wanting more aid are trust, left-wing ideology, interest in politics,  
<sup>999</sup> and being a woman (all positively associated).

<sup>1000</sup> While foreign aid is generally unilateral, discretionary, and often used as a bargaining  
<sup>1001</sup> chip, global redistribution is conceived as multilateral, rule-based, and with dedicated  
<sup>1002</sup> funding. Our paper finds much stronger support for global redistributive policies than  
<sup>1003</sup> for increased foreign aid. The difference in attitudes between unilateral foreign aid and  
<sup>1004</sup> global policies is consistent with the literature on foreign aid. Indeed, it can be explained  
<sup>1005</sup> by the observation that people prefer multilateral policies and often view foreign aid as  
<sup>1006</sup> inefficient in reducing poverty. Therefore, we contribute to the theory of attitudes towards  
<sup>1007</sup> global transfers by showing that when such transfers are multilateral and trusted to be  
<sup>1008</sup> effective, they would be largely supported.

(Back to Section 2.5.2)

#### <sup>1009</sup> A.1.4 Population attitudes on taxes on the rich

<sup>1010</sup> We are not aware of any previous survey on a global wealth tax,<sup>3</sup> though surveys  
<sup>1011</sup> consistently show strong support for national wealth taxes. In a comprehensive survey  
<sup>1012</sup> conducted in the UK, Rowlingson et al. (2021) show that a wealth tax is the preferred  
<sup>1013</sup> option for raising revenues. Only 8% of respondents state that total net wealth should not  
<sup>1014</sup> be taxed (with little differences between Labour and Conservative voters). The study also  
<sup>1015</sup> finds that the preferred design would be a 1% or 3% tax on net wealth above £1 million. By  
<sup>1016</sup> asking how much taxes per year should a person with a certain income and wealth level  
<sup>1017</sup> pay, Fisman et al. (2017) finds that the average American favors a 0.8% linear tax rate  
<sup>1018</sup> on unspecified wealth up to \$2 million (the highest wealth level tested), and a 3% linear  
<sup>1019</sup> rate on inherited wealth. Through a conjoint analysis conducted in three high-income  
<sup>1020</sup> countries, Schechtl & Tisch (2023) find widespread support for a wealth tax (from 78% in  
<sup>1021</sup> the U.S. to 86% in Germany and the UK), with a preference for an exemption threshold  
<sup>1022</sup> set at \$/€1 million (rather than 500,000 or 2 million) with the tax rate and tax unit having  
<sup>1023</sup> little influence on the preferred design. In 21 OECD countries, the OECD (2019) uncovers  
<sup>1024</sup> strong majority support for higher taxes on the rich to support the poor, with nearly  
<sup>1025</sup> 70% overall agreement and less than 20% disagreement. Isbell (2022) finds similarly high  
<sup>1026</sup> level of support in 34 African countries. In the UK, Patriotic Millionaires (2022) find 69%  
<sup>1027</sup> support (and 7% opposition) for a 1.1% tax on wealth in excess of £10 million. In the

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<sup>3</sup>We did not find any using the combination of “survey” or “attitudes” with “wealth tax” or “global wealth tax” in Google Scholar.

1028 U.S., [Americans for Tax Fairness \(2021\)](#) find that 67% to 71% of the respondents support  
1029 to “raise taxes for those earning more than \$400,000 a year”, “raise the income tax rate  
1030 for those earning over \$1 million a year by 10 percentage points”, or “apply a 2% tax on  
1031 an individual’s wealth above \$50 million each year, and 3% on wealth above \$1 billion”.  
1032 [Patriotic Millionaires \(2024\)](#) indicate that millionaires themselves agree to be taxed: out  
1033 of 2,385 millionaires contacted through wealth councillors, 74% support “increased tax on  
1034 very wealthy individuals” and 58% support a 2% wealth tax above \$10 million. Finally,  
1035 in surveys in Germany and the U.S., [Ferreira et al. \(2024\)](#) finds strong majority support  
1036 for a limit on income or wealth.

### 1037 A.1.5 Population attitudes on ethical norms

1038 As argued by [Nyborg et al. \(2016\)](#), social norms can be the solution to the collective  
1039 action problem. As such, universalistic values and free-riding attitudes are key.

1040 **Universalism** Various studies have examined the concept of global identity (see [Rey-](#)  
1041 [sen & Katzarska-Miller \(2018\)](#) for a review). In the 2005-2008 wave of the World Values  
1042 Survey, [Bayram \(2015\)](#) notes that “78% of the participants in 57 countries see themselves  
1043 as citizens of the world”, though the [2017-2022 wave](#) reveals that more people feel close  
1044 to their town, region or country than to the world. [Nation \(2024\)](#) finds large variation  
1045 across 21 countries, as 31% to 88% of respondents (excluding *indifferent* answers) consider  
1046 themselves “more a world citizen than a citizen of [their] country” (with similar shares  
1047 agreeing that “[their] taxes should go towards solving global problems”).

1048 [Enke et al. \(2023\)](#) measure universalism at the U.S. district level using donation data,  
1049 and find that a district’s universalism predicts electoral outcomes better than its income  
1050 or education level. To measure universalism at the individual level, [Enke et al. \(2023\)](#)  
1051 ask American respondents to split \$100 between a random stranger and a random person  
1052 with the same income but closer to them. They distinguish different facets of universal-  
1053 ism, and define *foreign universalism* as the inclination to give to a foreigner rather than a  
1054 fellow citizen. They find a home bias for most people, which could partly be attributed to  
1055 concerns about inequality, as the split involves two persons with the same income, with  
1056 the foreigner most certainly living in a poorer country than the American and thus en-  
1057 joying a higher social status. That being said, a home bias probably remains even after  
1058 accounting for concerns about inequality: [Prather \(2013\)](#) also finds a home bias in the  
1059 U.S., and 84% of Americans agree that “taking care of problems at home is more impor-

tant than giving aid to foreign countries" (PIPA 2001). Enke et al. (2023) also measure universalism and analyze its correlates in 7 countries, and Cappelen et al. (2022) deploy this method in 60 countries. In a lab experiment with students in the U.S., Cherry et al. (2017) show that a substantial share of people prefer policies detrimental to them due to their egalitarian worldview. Leiserowitz (2006) shows that 68% of Americans are most concerned about the impacts of climate change on "people all over the world" (50%) or "non-human nature" (18%) rather than themselves and their family (12%) or the U.S. (9%).<sup>4</sup> A 2017 survey by Focus 2030 shows that 40% of French people agree "fighting poverty in developing countries should be one of the priorities of the European Union" while only 19% disagree. Waytz et al. (2019) show that left-leaning people exhibit a wider "moral circle". Jaeger & Wilks (2023) find that judgments of moral concern are equally well explained by characteristics of the judge and the evaluated target.

**Free-riding** Despite the long-standing explanation of the lack of climate action as a result of free-riding, surveys consistently show that people support climate mitigation action in their own country, even in the absence of such action in other countries. Bernauer & Gampfer (2015) show this for Americans and Indians, who both overestimate their country's emissions at one third of the global total. Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019) show this in the U.S. and China using an experimental design. McEvoy & Cherry (2016) show that Americans mostly invoke leadership and morality to justify unilateral climate action. Using a range of methods, Aklin & Mildenberger (2020) show that the empirical evidence for free-riding is not compelling, and that climate inaction can be equally well explained by distributive conflicts. Finally, review of the literature by McGrath & Bernauer (2017) shows that climate attitudes are largely nonreciprocal, and primarily driven by values and perceptions of the policies, rather than by considerations of what other countries do.

### A.1.6 Second-order beliefs

Allport (1924) introduced the concept of pluralistic ignorance: a shared misperception concerning others' beliefs. The concept became notorious when O'Gorman (1975) showed that, towards the end of the civil rights movement, 47% of Americans believed that a majority of white people supported segregation, while only 18% did so. PIPA (2001) has shown that while 75% of Americans are willing to contribute \$50 annually to halve

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<sup>4</sup>Unpublished survey results of Dechezleprêtre et al. (forthcoming) find similar figures in 2024.

1091 world hunger (the cost of the program), only 32% believed that the majority would share  
1092 this willingness. Pluralistic ignorance regarding climate-friendly norms in the United  
1093 States has been documented by Andre et al. (2022), who further show that correcting the  
1094 misperceptions would be effective to enhance pro-climate behaviors. Relatedly, Spark-  
1095 man et al. (2022) show that Americans underestimate the support for climate policies  
1096 by nearly half, while Drews et al. (2022) document pluralistic ignorance of carbon tax  
1097 support in Spain. Additionally, Geiger & Swim (2016) show that pluralistic ignorance  
1098 regarding concern for climate change leads people to self-silence, resulting in reduced  
1099 discussions on the topic.

### 1100 **A.1.7 Elite attitudes**

1101 In a survey of climate negotiators on their preferences in terms of burden-sharing,  
1102 Lange et al. (2007) uncovers a mix of self-serving bias and support for the egalitarian  
1103 principle. Dannenberg et al. (2010) elicit climate negotiators' equity preferences and find  
1104 that regional differences in addressing climate change are driven more by national inter-  
1105 ests than by different equity concerns. Hjerpe et al. (2011) indicate that voluntary con-  
1106 tribution, indicated as willingness to contribute, was the least preferred principle among  
1107 both negotiators and observers. Three of the four principles for allocating mitigation  
1108 commitments were recognized widely across the major geographical regions: historical  
1109 responsibilities, ability-to-pay, and equal per capita emissions. This result is confirmed  
1110 by Kesternich et al. (2021), who observe tendencies for a more harmonized view among  
1111 key groups towards the ability-to-pay rule in a setting of weighted burden sharing rules.  
1112 Mildenberger & Tingley (2019) survey elites (Congress staffers and international relations  
1113 scholars) as well as the population in U.S. and China. They document pluralistic igno-  
1114 rance of pro-climate attitudes, egocentric bias, and increasing support after beliefs are  
1115 updated.

## 1116 **A.2 Proposals and analyses of global policy-making**

### 1117 **A.2.1 Global carbon pricing**

1118 Global carbon pricing is widely regarded by economists as the benchmark climate  
1119 policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon emissions externality. For instance, Hoel  
1120 (1991) shows that an international carbon tax can be designed to simultaneously achieve  
1121 efficiency and accommodate any distributional objective. Concerning the distributional

1122 objective, Grubb (1990), Agarwal & Narain (1991) and Bertram (1992) were the first to  
1123 advocate for an equal right to emit for each human. As Grubb (1990) states it: "by far the  
1124 best combination of long term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity, is obtained  
1125 from a system based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions which are allocated on  
1126 an adult per capita basis".<sup>5</sup> Support for such solution has been renewed ever since (Baer  
1127 et al. 2000; Jamieson 2001; Blanchard & Tirole 2021; Rajan 2021).

1128 While many endorse the egalitarian allocation of emissions permits, economists also  
1129 considered this outcome as politically unfeasible. Thus, to preserve the current level of  
1130 inequalities and to preclude transfers between countries, they adjusted their (integrated  
1131 assessment) models by assigning more weight to the interest of rich countries (Stanton  
1132 2011).

1133 Gollier & Tirole (2015) synthesize the distributional decision with a *generosity* parame-  
1134 ter which would allocate emissions permit to countries in proportion to their population  
1135 if set to one, in proportion to their emissions (on the start date of the policy) if set to zero,  
1136 and as a mixture of the egalitarian and grandfathering rules if set in between. Using a  
1137 similar formula in the context of a tax, Cramton et al. (2015) (summarized in MacKay  
1138 et al. 2015) propose that countries with emissions per capita around the average fix the  
1139 generosity parameter, so that it is strategically chosen to maximize the tax rate, and to  
1140 fix the tax rate at the minimum price proposed by participating countries. Negotiations  
1141 would exclude countries with low ambition beforehand; and the treaty would impose  
1142 trade sanctions on non-participating countries. van den Bergh et al. (2020) propose a  
1143 "dual-track transition to global carbon pricing": an expanding climate club that would  
1144 integrate existing and new emissions trading systems, and a reorientation of UNFCCC  
1145 negotiations towards a global carbon price and burden-sharing rules. The IMF (2019)  
1146 also supports global carbon pricing or, as a first step, a carbon price floor. They propose  
1147 either differentiated prices among countries or international transfers, and estimate that  
1148 a price of \$75/tCO<sub>2</sub> in 2030 would be compatible with a 2°C trajectory.

1149 Other authors have put forth more radical proposals. For instance, Weitzman (2017)  
1150 envisions a World Climate Assembly with proportional representation at the global scale,  
1151 so that the median (human) voter would choose the carbon price level. To finance an  
1152 adaptation fund, Chancel & Piketty (2015) propose a global *progressive* carbon tax (or a  
1153 progressive tax on air tickets as a first step), so that rich people (who are high emitters)  
1154 contribute more to the public good. Fleurbaey & Zuber (2013) highlight that, given that

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<sup>5</sup>By "adult per capita", Grubb (1990) means that permits would be allocated equally among adults.

1155 current emitters are probably richer than future victims of climate change damages, cli-  
1156 mate policies deserve a *negative* discount rate. In other words, we cannot dissociate the  
1157 climate issue from global inequalities, and an ethical response to this issue requires global  
1158 redistribution.

1159 **A.2.2 Climate burden sharing**

1160 The literature has discussed different burden-sharing principles (Ringius et al. 2002).  
1161 While there is no agreement on their definitions as different approaches are used (cost  
1162 sharing, effort sharing, or resource sharing, see Section A.1.2), we describe here the burden-  
1163 sharing principles consistently using the resource sharing approach (i.e., allocating emis-  
1164 sions rights). For other papers that define or compare different burden-sharing principles,  
1165 see Vaillancourt & Waaub (2004), Zhou & Wang (2016), Leimbach & Giannousakis (2019).

1166 **Equal per capita.** The simplest principle is perhaps to allocate each year's global carbon  
1167 quota based on an equal right to emit per capita, or an equal right to emit for each adult.  
1168 Implementing this principle would result in large transfers from high-emitting to low-  
1169 emitting countries (Young-Brun et al. 2023).

1170 **Grandfathering.** In contrast, *grandfathering* entails allocating emissions rights in pro-  
1171 portion to current emissions. From the perspective of allocating carbon pricing revenues  
1172 between countries, grandfathering amounts to each country retaining the revenues it col-  
1173 lects. Given that nations are sovereign and have not agreed to share emissions rights,  
1174 this principle can be considered as the default option against which the other ones can be  
1175 compared in terms of distributive effects.

1176 **Historical responsibilities.** At the opposite end of the spectrum is the principle of *his-  
1177 torical responsibilities*, which assigns to each country a carbon budget proportional to its  
1178 population. Countries that have emitted more than the average have accumulated a car-  
1179 bon debt towards countries that have emitted less, which have a carbon credit.<sup>6</sup>

1180 To fully specify this rule, one needs to define a start date for the responsibilities on  
1181 past emissions and specify how to account for population size. 1990 is often chosen as

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6It is not clear how these debts would be settled. Approaches could involve carbon removal from the atmosphere, or using a conventional social cost of carbon to monetize them, by crediting (positively or negatively) emissions rights to countries in an international carbon market.

1182 a start year as it is the date of the first IPCC assessment report, marking the widespread  
1183 acknowledgment of climate change, though variants include 1972, 1960, 1950 or 1850.<sup>7</sup>  
1184 Several solutions have been proposed to account for evolving populations, none of which  
1185 is flawless. Matthews (2015) allocates emissions rights on a given year proportionally to  
1186 the countries' populations in that year. An alternative is to use fixed populations, such  
1187 as the populations at the chosen start year (Neumayer 2000), or at a future date such  
1188 as projected when the global total population will reach 9 billion (Raupach et al. 2014).  
1189 Fanning & Hickel (2023) convert the projected climate debt up to 2050 into monetary  
1190 terms in a 1.5°C scenario.

1191 The rationale for using fixed populations is to prevent countries from intentionally  
1192 increasing their population size to gain more emissions rights. However, this approach  
1193 treats countries with different demographic trajectories similarly, effectively penalizing  
1194 countries which grow more than others (if past populations are used) or grow more than  
1195 expected (if future populations are used). Using current populations like Matthews (2015)  
1196 also comes with its own problems. Consider two countries having contributed very little  
1197 to cumulative emissions, with the same emissions per capita but different demographic  
1198 patterns: country A's population has doubled in the last 30 years, while country B's pop-  
1199 ulation has remained stable. Despite the similar present situation, country B would ac-  
1200 cumulate more carbon credit than country A. Essentially, compensating country B more  
1201 due to its past population size amounts to compensating the dead although it is future  
1202 generations who will suffer. That being said, using current populations is likely a more  
1203 viable solution than relying on fixed populations since, in practice, countries with similar  
1204 emissions per capita tend to have relatively similar demographic trajectories.

1205 **Ability to pay.** Another prominent burden-sharing principle is the ability to pay whereby  
1206 richer countries should contribute more to mitigation efforts. To operationalize this prin-  
1207 ciple, Baer et al. (2008) define *capacity* as the share of global income above an exemption  
1208 threshold. They use the threshold of \$7,500 per year (in 2005 PPP), which corresponds to  
1209 the top 28% of the global income distribution. According to this principle, the effort of a  
1210 country should be proportional to the revenues it would raise with a linear income tax on  
1211 individual income above \$7,500.

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<sup>7</sup>Climate equity monitor uses 1850 for example.

1212    **Climate Equity Reference Framework** Baer et al. (2008) propose another effort-sharing  
1213    method, the *Climate Equity Reference Framework* (CERF), which blends the ability to pay  
1214    principle with their version of historical responsibilities. They define *responsibility* as fol-  
1215    lows: they determine the mitigation requirement as the emissions gap between the Busi-  
1216    ness as Usual scenario from IEA (2007) and a 2°C (with 68-86% probability) scenario.  
1217    The mitigation requirement is then allocated to countries proportionally to their cumu-  
1218    lative emissions (starting in 1990). The emissions right of a country according to their  
1219    *responsibility* are then determined by its Business as Usual emissions minus its mitigation  
1220    requirement. A country's emissions right, dubbed its *greenhouse development right* (GDR),  
1221    is defined using a combination of *capacity* (C) and *responsibility* (R) to allocate the miti-  
1222    gation requirement between countries. This allocation key is called the *Responsibility and*  
1223    *Capacity Indicator* (RCI) and defined as  $RCI = R^a \cdot C^{1-a}$ , with  $a = .4$ .

1224    This choice of parameter may seem somewhat arbitrary, but the [EcoEquity calculator](#)  
1225    allows for a customization all CERF parameters (Holz et al. 2018; Holz et al. 2019). The  
1226    Climate Action Network has adopted the CERF as its *fair share* framework, though the  
1227    different national chapters of the organization could not agree on a choice of parameters  
1228    (Athanasios et al. 2022).<sup>8</sup>

1229    The CERF approach was adopted by a prominent network of climate NGOs because  
1230    it operationalizes the principle of *common but differentiated responsibilities and respective ca-*  
1231    *pabilities* recognized by the UNFCCC. However, this approach suffers from three draw-  
1232    backs. First, its definition of historical responsibility as an effort sharing principle is in-  
1233    consistent with the principle of an equal right of cumulative emissions per capita, which  
1234    is a resource sharing principle. For instance, consider a fully decarbonized country that  
1235    has exhausted *exactly* its cumulative carbon budget. According to the CERF notion of *re-*  
1236    *sponsibility*, this country would still be expected to contribute significantly to mitigation  
1237    efforts due to its relatively high cumulative emissions. Yet, according to the usual defini-  
1238    tion of the historical responsibility based on an equal right of cumulative emissions p.c.,  
1239    this country would have no liability as it has not exceeded its carbon budget. Second, a

---

<sup>8</sup>The U.S. Climate Action Network and the think tank EcoEquity (funded by Tom Athanasiou and late Paul Baer) choose the following parameters: an equal weight for R and C ( $a = .5$ ), their own business as usual projections of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions based on trends of GDP growth and emissions intensity reduction, a 1.5°C (Low Energy Demand) pathway, 1950 as the start year for responsibility, a gradual inclusion of income to compute capacity (which adds complexity to the calculation) from a full exemption of the bottom 70% (\$7,500 per year) linearly to a full inclusion of the top 2% (\$72,211), the inclusion of non-CO<sub>2</sub> gases but not of emissions embodied in trade (i.e. imported emissions) nor LULUCF (land-use).


country with moderate incomes<sup>9</sup> and low historical responsibility would be assigned a relatively low effort, even if its emissions per capita are high. In other words, the CERF approach favors countries that have experienced recent growth. Third, the poorest countries would be granted emissions rights close to the Business as Usual trajectory, as they would bear virtually none of the effort. But this trajectory carries the current (unfair) income distribution and amounts to grandfathering. For example, the baseline trajectory for emissions<sup>10</sup> in the DRC entail 0.8 tCO<sub>2</sub> p.c. in 2030, which is five times less than the world average emissions right per capita. In this framework, if the DRC were to grow faster than projected in the baseline, it would actually have to pay to the rest of the world for mitigation efforts. This is what is likely to happen to countries like Mexico or Senegal, from our simulation of the net gains of CERF compared to a situation without international transfers (see Figure S9). In contrast, a resource sharing approach based on equal per capita emissions would result in low-income countries receiving emissions rights exceeding their projected trajectories, leading to transfers from high-income countries. By construction, such transfers do not occur in an effort sharing approach like the CERF, implying lower transfers to low-income countries. Compared to an equal right to emit per capita, this method favors countries like China (whose emissions are allowed to remain stable over 2020-2030 instead of a reduction of 35-40%) and penalizes regions like Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (see Figure S10).

**Contraction and Convergence.** Meyer (2004) defines a rule called *contraction and convergence* (C&C), which combines elements of grandfathering and equal per capita approaches. According to C&C, each country is granted (tradable) emissions rights, starting at their current emission level and converging linearly to an equal per capita level at some pre-specified date. The *contraction* part refers to the reduction of total emissions rights in line with the climate objective. When discussed around year 2000, the convergence date was specified between 2020 and 2050. This rule, advocated by the Global Commons Institute (a UK think tank), was on the agenda from COP2 to COP15 (i.e., until Copenhagen, and including in Kyoto), including at Kyoto, and was endorsed by the European Parliament in 1998. More recently, Gignac & Matthews (2015) have shown how C&C can be made consistent with historical responsibilities by computing carbon debts and credits until the convergence date.

<sup>9</sup>Using the above parameters, moderate incomes means few incomes above the global 70th. percentile.

<sup>10</sup>The baseline trajectory is computed as the “product of the projected GDP and CO<sub>2</sub> emission intensity”.

Figure S9: Net gains from the CERF burden-sharing rule in 2030.




Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO<sub>2</sub>.

1271 **Assessments of the NDCs against burden-sharing principles.** The regime established  
 1272 by the 2015 Paris agreement to regulate climate change respects none of the burden-  
 1273 sharing principles and relies instead on voluntary contributions from each country, known  
 1274 as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). A body of literature (reviewed by [Höhne](#)  
 1275 [et al. 2014](#)) assesses the NDCs against the emissions reduction objective and different  
 1276 burden-sharing principles. To evaluate the NDCs, [Gao et al. \(2019\)](#) examine their emis-  
 1277 sions projections for 2030 and estimate the resulting increase in temperature. The most  
 1278 recent and comprehensive assessment of NDCs against burden-sharing principles is con-  
 1279 ducted by [van den Berg et al. \(2020\)](#) (see also [Raupach et al. 2014](#); [Robiou du Pont et al.](#)  
 1280 [2016](#); [Robiou du Pont et al. 2017](#)).

### 1281 A.2.3 Global redistribution

1282 **Lack of cooperation vs. lack of redistribution.** Major social science scholarship from  
 1283 Realism in International Relations to game theory of international environmental agree-  
 1284 ments in economics has pointed to lack of cooperation as the major obstacle to global  
 1285 sustainability ([Waltz 1979](#); [Snidal 1991](#); [Barrett 1994](#); [Nordhaus 2015](#)). Another body of

Figure S10: Difference between net gains from Greenhouse Development Rights and equal rights per capita.



Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO<sub>2</sub>.

literature on international climate cooperation emphasises redistribution from North to South as a key condition for making global climate policy work, noting the historical responsibility of major emitters in the Global North ([Parks & Roberts 2008; Friman & Strandberg 2014; Bou-Habib 2019; Aklin & Mildenberger 2020](#)). Taking the second perspective, making progress on international climate policy also requires a decision on how the burden of climate change mitigation can be shared fairly. This raises the question of whether citizens around the world support such global redistribution policies or, more specifically, whether citizens in high-income countries are willing to make sacrifices to combat climate change and extreme poverty.

While we cannot test conditional cooperation as part of the present analysis, our empirical results document that if the North-South redistribution would be implemented as part of global climate policies, they would receive strong public support.

**Studies on global redistribution** Addressing global poverty, inequalities, and climate change are central to the universally agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). As

1300 highlighted by Bolch et al. (2022) and Fabre (2024), low-income countries often lack suf-  
1301 ficient domestic resources to eradicate poverty in the short term, indicating the need for  
1302 international transfers to rapidly end global poverty. In *Beyond the Welfare State*, Gunnar  
1303 Myrdal (1960) called for a *welfare world*. In his Nobel lecture, he emphasized the neces-  
1304 sity of increasing foreign aid to low-income countries, stating that “The type of marginal  
1305 foreign aid we have provided, is clearly not enough to meet their barest needs” (Myrdal  
1306 1975).

1307 Drawing on the labor theory of value, some economists have argued that global in-  
1308 equalities arise from unequal exchange in international trade (Arghiri 1972). Indeed, the  
1309 stark disparity in wages between countries implies that one unit of labor exported by an  
1310 American commands five units of labor embodied in imported goods, whereas Ethiopi-  
1311 ans need to export 50 units of labor to obtain one unit through imports (Alsamawi et al.  
1312 2014; Reyes et al. 2017). Taking stock, Hickel (2017) proposes to globally establish mini-  
1313 mum wages at 50% of the local median wage. Hickel (2017) also suggests other solutions  
1314 against global inequality, which served as inspiration for our questionnaire. These mea-  
1315 sures include the cancellation of low-income countries’ public debt, fair trade practices  
1316 (such as eliminating tariffs from high-income countries, reducing patent protections, and  
1317 reducing farming subsidies in rich countries), initiatives to combat tax evasion (e.g., im-  
1318 plementing a global financial register), land reform, and a fair international climate policy.

1319 Piketty (2014) prominently advocates for a progressive wealth tax on a global scale,  
1320 and Piketty (2022) suggests to allocate its revenues to countries in proportion to their  
1321 population.

1322 Kopczuk et al. (2005) compute the optimal linear income tax rates for all countries in  
1323 two ways: globally centralized and decentralized (i.e., within each country and without  
1324 international transfers). They show that the average decentralized rate is 41%. In con-  
1325 trast, the global rate is 62%, which would generate funds to finance a basic income of  
1326 250\$/month (higher than the GPD per capita of 73 countries). From a current global Gini  
1327 index of 0.695, they show that decentralized optimal taxation would only marginally re-  
1328 duce global inequality to 0.69, whereas global taxation would significantly decrease the  
1329 Gini to 0.25. The study also shows that the existing level of foreign aid can only be ratio-  
1330 nalized if the U.S. attaches 2,000 less value to a citizen in the poorest countries than to an  
1331 American citizen (or 1,000 less if half of the transfers are diverted due to corruption).

1332 **A.2.4 Basic income**

1333 Unconditional cash transfers (UCT) are increasingly seen as an effective way to end ex-  
1334 treme poverty. A growing body of evidence from randomized control trials supports this  
1335 notion: [Gangopadhyay et al. \(2015\)](#) find that UCT outperform a food subsidy; [Haushofer](#)  
1336 & [Shapiro \(2016\)](#) find significant impacts on health, economic outcomes, and psycholog-  
1337 ical well-being; [Egger et al. \(2022\)](#) find large positive spillovers on non-recipient people,  
1338 and minimal inflation. Reviews of existing research further confirm the positive outcomes  
1339 of UCT ([Standing 2014](#); [Bastagli et al. 2016](#)).

1340 While the delivery of cash to remote areas and the prevention of fraud is challenging  
1341 in regions without a proper civil register, the use of mobile phones as banking and bio-  
1342 metric identification tools could provide viable solutions ([Harnett 2017](#)). Although many  
1343 places still lack internet access, satellite internet technology shows promising progress,  
1344 with some experts suggesting that it could soon become affordable and universally ac-  
1345 cessible ([Hanson 2016](#)).

1346 **A.2.5 Global democracy**

1347 The idea of world federalism has a long-standing history, dating back at least to [Kant](#)  
1348 ([1795](#)), who argued that a world federation was essential for achieving perpetual peace.  
1349 International organizations were eventually created to foster peace, though the League  
1350 of Nations and its successor, the United Nations, never succeeded in avoiding military  
1351 conflicts. Many have argued that we need stronger and more democratic global institu-  
1352 tions, competent to address global challenges such as extreme poverty, climate change,  
1353 wars, pandemics, or financial stability. Before World War II, feminist and pacifist [Maver-](#)  
1354 [ick Lloyd & Schwimmer \(1937\)](#) founded the *Campaign for World Government*, advocating  
1355 for direct representation at the global scale. [Einstein \(1947\)](#) called for the subordination of  
1356 the UN Security Council to the General Assembly and the direct election of UN delegates.  
1357 Since 2007, there has been widespread support for a United Nations Parliamentary As-  
1358 sembly (UNPA) from individuals and institutions in over 150 countries, including 1,800  
1359 member of parliament, heads of state, as well the European Parliament, the Pan-African  
1360 Parliament, and the Latin-American Parliament. The UNPA campaign calls for a gradual  
1361 implementation of a democratic assembly, starting with a consultative assembly com-  
1362 posed of members of national parliaments, allowing for the direct election of its members  
1363 in voluntary countries, and progressing towards a world parliament with binding legisla-


<sup>1364</sup> tive powers once all members are directly elected (Leinen & Bummel 2018). Besides the  
<sup>1365</sup> UNPA, various scholars have put forward different models of global democracy, ranging  
<sup>1366</sup> from deliberative spaces to a world federation (Archibugi et al. 2011). While the most  
<sup>1367</sup> radical proposals may still be on the horizon, an assembly of random citizens represen-  
<sup>1368</sup> tative of the world population has already been convened. It has produced a joint state-  
<sup>1369</sup> ment at the COP26 (Global Assembly 2022), and a similar *World Citizens' Assembly* should  
<sup>1370</sup> soon follow. Using surveys covering 86% of global population, Hale & Koenig-Archibugi  
<sup>1371</sup> (2019) find that the world as a whole is less polarized than some countries and argue  
<sup>1372</sup> against the fear people's views would be too diverse for a functioning global democracy.

1373 **B Raw results**

1374 Country-specific raw results are also available as supplementary material files: **US**,  
 1375 **EU, FR, DE, ES, UK**.

Figure S11: Absolute support for global climate policies.

Share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* (in percent,  $n = 40,680$ ). The color blue denotes an absolute majority. See Figure 2 for the relative support. (Questions A-I of the global survey.)



\*In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

Figure S12: Correct answers to comprehension questions (in percent). (Questions 16-18)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
With NR, typical [country] people win and richest lose	68	73	76	73	73	70
With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win	60	68	62	72	67	67
With GCS+NR, typical [country] people neither win nor lose	54	60	63	59	57	61

Figure S13: Number of correct answers to comprehension questions (mean). (Section 2.3, Questions 16-18)




Figure S14: List experiment: mean number of supported policies. (Section 2.4.1, Question 24)




Figure S15: Conjoint analyses 1 and 2. (Questions 25-27, Back to Section 2.4.3)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)	54	76	80	71	81	74
C+NR+GCS preferred to C+NR	55	74	79	71	78	68
NR+GCS preferred to NR	55	77	79	74	79	77
NR+C preferred to NR	62	84	88	83	84	82
GCS+NR preferred to C+NR	47	52	53	53	49	52
NR+C+GCS preferred to NR	55	77	86	73	83	72

Figure S16: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See English translations in Figure S2; Question 29)




Figure S17: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements seen as important for supporting the GCS in a 4-Likert scale (in percent). (Question 32) [\(Back to Section 2.4.5\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
It would succeed in limiting climate change	78	85	85	86	86	83
It would hurt the [Country] economy	81	67	61	67	66	69
It would penalize my household	75	60	55	63	59	63
It would make people change their lifestyle	78	79	83	79	78	77
It would reduce poverty in low-income countries	77	85	88	85	86	81
It might be detrimental to some poor countries	79	72	79	67	78	70
It could foster global cooperation	82	81	81	82	85	80
It could fuel corruption in low-income countries	79	75	82	69	79	72
It could be subject to fraud	80	79	80	74	83	81
It would be technically difficult to put in place	77	71	74	62	79	71
Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences	89	82	89	68	91	88

Figure S18: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements found in the open-ended field on the GCS (manually recoded, in percent).

"When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to your mind?

Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme." (Question 31) (Back to Section 2.4.5)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
environment	26	31	37	26	43	24
unclassifiable	25	24	23	28	25	22
pro	22	23	21	22	33	20
con	22	17	12	18	20	16
cost	17	12	11	14	17	7
poorest humans	11	7	6	9	5	6
tax redistribution	10	7	11	8	4	9
support	8	6	3	5	6	8
oppose	7	3	2	3	1	4
don't know	6	8	10	8	7	10
empty	6	3	0	0	0	13
difficult agreement	5	10	7	12	8	8
difficult implement	3	5	5	6	4	6
misunderstands gcs	3	2	2	1	3	1
misunderstands question	2	2	1	3	3	3

Figure S19: Perceptions of the GCS. Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).

"When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to your mind?

Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme." (Question 31) [\(Back to Section 2.4.5\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
world: international world country global	28	22	23	19	22	23
environment: climat environment animal emission natur	26	21	17	28	21	17
poorest: poor low-income 700 poverty	16	8	8	9	4	10
pro: pro  pros pros pros:	16	3	0	1	9	5
con: con  con:  cons cons:	15	4	0	1	8	6
cost: cost expensive higher price 85 inflation	13	7	5	9	7	6
tax: tax	8	3	4	3	2	2
redistribution: rich redistribu	8	4	5	4	3	5
implementation: implement enforce polic monitor	6	4	5	6	0	5
agreement: agree accept participat	3	4	5	6	2	3

Figure S20: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality (mean). (Question 33) [\(Back to Section 2.6\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Donation to own country	35	34	31	38	34	32
Donation to Africa	32	35	33	41	32	33

Figure S21: Support for a global wealth tax.

"Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-income countries?

Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education." (Question 34)




Figure S22: Support for a national wealth tax.

"Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: affordable housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and schools]?" (Question 35)




Figure S23: Preferred share of global wealth tax revenues that should be pooled to finance low-income countries. (Question 36)




Figure S24: Support for sharing half of global tax revenues with low-income countries, rather than each country retaining all the revenues it collects (in percent). (Question 37)



Figure S25: Perceived foreign aid. “From your best guess, what percentage of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?” (Question 38) (Back to Section 2.5.2)

Actual values: France: 0.8%; Germany: 1.3%; Spain: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%; U.S.: 0.4%.




Figure S26: Preferred foreign aid (without info on actual amount).

"If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?" (Question 39) (Back to Section 2.5.2)




Figure S27: Preferred foreign aid (after info on actual amount).

"Actually, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid.

If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?" (Question 39) (Back to Section 2.5.2)




Figure S28: Actual, perceived and preferred amount of foreign aid, with random info (or not) on actual amount. (*Mean* in percent of public spending, Questions 38, 39) (Back to Section 2.5.2)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Actual foreign aid (in % of public spending)	0.4	1.1	0.8	1.3	0.5	1.7
Belief about foreign aid	4.7	2.9	2.7	2.9	2.8	3.5
Preferred foreign aid (with info)	1.8	2.7	3.4	2.9	2.1	2.5
Preferred foreign aid (no info)	4	3.9	4.7	4.4	3.1	3.4

Figure S29: Preferred foreign aid (after info or after perception). (Questions 38 and 39)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as current	70	75	91	76	77	57
Preferred foreign aid is higher than current	47	59	75	58	63	43
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as perceived	57	74	83	79	77	58
Preferred foreign aid is higher than perceived	37	53	64	59	54	39

Figure S30: Preferences for funding increased foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]  
 "How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent) (Question 40) (Back to Section 2.5.2)




Figure S31: Preferences of spending following reduced foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]  
 "How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent)  
 (Question 41) [\(Back to Section 2.5.2\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Higher spending on defense	19	23	11	21	17	31
Higher spending on retirement pensions	23	41	22	51	57	35
Higher spending on healthcare	40	57	31	42	80	70
Higher spending on welfare benefits	13	20	7	19	39	20
Higher spending on education	30	45	31	47	58	43
Higher spending on other programs	6	6	6	4	9	8
Lower taxes on the wealthiest	5	2	5	2	0	2
Lower corporate income tax rate	12	6	10	4	8	6
Lower personal income tax rates	48	29	26	27	37	30
Lower public deficit	32	24	21	13	41	21

Figure S32: Willingness to sign real-stake petition for the Global Climate Scheme or National Redistribution, compared to stated support in corresponding subsamples (e.g. support for the GCS in the branch where the petition was about the GCS). (Question 42)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Petition for the GCS	51	69	69	66	78	69
(Comparable) support for the GCS	53	76	81	74	81	74
Petition for NR	57	67	65	66	74	68
(Comparable) support for NR	58	72	76	65	78	75

Figure S33: Absolute support for various global policies (Percent of (*somewhat or strong*) support). (Questions 43 and 44. See Figure 3 for the relative support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	41	54	52	53	62	51
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	53	65	62	66	68	62
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	45	58	55	60	62	54
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	31	37	36	30	45	40
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	34	44	44	43	52	43
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	39	49	39	51	50	54
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	42	55	54	54	61	53
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	44	70	73	70	72	65
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	34	45	40	48	44	50
National tax on millionaires funding public services	62	76	70	79	79	77
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	58	71	69	72	78	71

Figure S34: Preferred approach of diplomats at international climate negotiations. In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend [own country] interests or global justice? (Question 48)




Figure S35: Percent of selected issues viewed as important.  
 “To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem?” (Question 55)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Income inequality in [Country]	55	59	54	58	71	57
Climate change	59	66	66	63	73	63
Global poverty	50	57	50	58	75	49

Figure S36: Group defended when voting.  
 “What group do you defend when you vote?” (Question 56)




Figure S37: Mean prioritization of policies.

Mean number of points allocated policies to express intensity of support (among six policies chosen at random). Blue color means that the policy has been awarded more points than the average policy.

"In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

How do you allocate the points among the following policies?" (Question 57)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	13	21	10	14	35	31
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	23	22	25	21	22	23
econ3	21	15	13	18	17	13
econ4	28	22	27	17	24	20
soc1	10	17	13	17	12	21
soc2	13	9	14	8	10	8
climate1	14	15	11	18	20	12
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	20	18	22	19	15	17
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030	11	9	8	8	9	11
tax1: National redistribution scheme	14	15	16	15	15	15
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	19	19	21	18	17	19
foreign1: Global climate scheme	15	20	20	23	16	17
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	21	20	20	23	19	20
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	15	15	15	17	14	13
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	9	11	13	14	9	8

Figure S38: Positive prioritization of policies.

Percent of people allocating a positive number of points to policies, expressing their support (among six policies chosen at random).

"In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

How do you allocate the points among the following policies?" (Question 57)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	64	78	61	67	96	95
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	83	86	85	84	87	89
econ3	81	69	50	78	80	68
econ4	88	86	91	79	89	85
soc1	57	75	69	74	74	78
soc2	58	58	72	53	64	48
climate1	70	76	65	79	89	75
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	79	83	86	84	78	80
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030	62	58	56	48	60	70
tax1: National redistribution scheme	67	79	79	76	82	79
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	80	79	76	78	83	85
foreign1: Global climate scheme	71	83	84	85	84	78
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	80	81	79	83	82	82
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	71	77	79	74	83	76
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	58	70	79	74	74	57

Figure S39: Charity donation.

"How much did you give to charities in 2022?" (Question 49)




Figure S40: Interest in politics.

"To what extent are you interested in politics?" (Question 50)




Figure S41: Desired involvement of government (from 1 to 5). (Question 51)




Figure S42: Political leaning on economics (from 1: Left to 5: Right). (Question 52)




Figure S43: Voted in last election. (Question 53)




Figure S44: Vote in last election (aggregated). PNR includes people who did not vote or prefer not to answer. (Question 54)




Figure S45: Perception that survey was biased.  
“Do you feel that this survey was politically biased?” (Question 60)





Figure S46: Opinion on the fight against extreme poverty.

“According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme poverty in low-income countries?” (Question 61) [\(Back to Section 2.5.2\)](#)

(a) Elements found in the open-ended field on the question  
(manually recoded, in percent)



(b) Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).




Figure S47: Main attitudes by vote (“Right” spans from Center-right to Far right).  
 (Relative support in percent in Questions 20, 34, 44, 45, 48) (Back to Section 2.6)

	Europe Left	Europe PNR/Non-voter	Europe Right	U.S. Left	U.S. PNR/Non-voter	U.S. Right
Support for the GCS	85	72	71	74	53	26
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	94	83	76	85	71	40
Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries*	61	52	45	55	67	41
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	73	65	52	62	49	23
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	93	79	74	87	70	38
[Country]'s foreign aid should be increased	78	62	54	75	64	34
Universalist*	56	48	26	53	49	23

1376 C Questionnaire of the global survey (section on global  
1377 policies)

1378 A. At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be  
1379 put in place? (Multiple answers are possible) [Figures 2 and S11]  
1380 Global; [Federal / European / ...]; [State / National]; Local

1381 B. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “[country] should take mea-  
1382 sures to fight climate change.”

1383 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly  
1384 agree*

1385 C. How should [country] climate policies depend on what other countries do?

- 1386 • If other countries do more, [country] should do...  
1387 • If other countries do less, [country] should do...

1388 *Much less; Less; About the same; More; Much more*

1389 D. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] All countries have signed the  
1390 Paris agreement that aims to contain global warming “well below +2 °C’. To limit  
1391 global warming to this level, there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we  
1392 can emit globally, called the carbon budget. Each country could aim to emit less  
1393 than a share of the carbon budget. To respect the global carbon budget, countries  
1394 that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less  
1395 than their share.

1396 Do you support such a policy? [Figures 2 and S11]

1397 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly  
1398 support*

1399 E. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] Suppose the above policy is in  
1400 place. How should the carbon budget be divided among countries? [Figures 2 and  
1401 S11]

1402 *The emission share of a country should be proportional to its population, so that each human  
1403 has an equal right to emit.; The emission share of a country should be proportional to its  
1404 current emissions, so that those who already emit more have more rights to emit.; Countries  
1405 that have emitted more over the past decades (from 1990 onwards) should receive a lower*

1406 *emission share, because they have already used some of their fair share.; Countries that will*  
1407 *be hurt more by climate change should receive a higher emission share, to compensate them*  
1408 *for the damages.*

1409 F. [In the U.S., Denmark, and France only] To achieve a given reduction of greenhouse  
1410 gas emissions globally, costly investments are needed. Ideally, how should countries  
1411 bear the costs of fighting climate change?

- 1412 • Countries should pay in proportion to their income
- 1413 • Countries should pay in proportion to their current emissions [Used as a sub-  
1414 stitute to the equal right per capita in Figure 2]
- 1415 • Countries should pay in proportion to their past emissions (from 1990 on-  
1416 wards) [Used as a substitute to historical responsibilities in Figure 2]
- 1417 • The richest countries should pay it all, so that the poorest countries do not have  
1418 to pay anything
- 1419 • The richest countries should pay even more, to help vulnerable countries face  
1420 adverse consequences: vulnerable countries would then receive money instead  
1421 of paying [Used as a substitute to compensating vulnerable countries in Figures  
1422 2 and S11]

1423 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly*  
1424 *agree*

1425 G. Do you support or oppose establishing a global democratic assembly whose role  
1426 would be to draft international treaties against climate change? Each adult across  
1427 the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly. [Figures 2 and S11]  
1428 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*  
1429 *support*

1430 H. Imagine the following policy: a global tax on greenhouse gas emissions funding a  
1431 global basic income. Such a policy would progressively raise the price of fossil fuels  
1432 (for example, the price of gasoline would increase by [40 cents per gallon] in the  
1433 first years). Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil  
1434 fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Revenues from the tax would be used to  
1435 finance a basic income of [\$30] per month to each human adult, thereby lifting the  
1436 700 million people who earn less than \$2/day out of extreme poverty. The average

1437 [American] person would lose a bit from this policy as they would face [\$130] per  
1438 month in price increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive.

1439 Do you support or oppose such a policy? [Figures 2 and S11]

1440 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*  
1441 *support*


- 1442 I. Do you support or oppose a tax on all millionaires around the world to finance low-  
1443 income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate ac-  
1444 tion? This would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drink-  
1445 ing water, healthcare, and education. [Figures 2 and S11]  
1446 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*  
1447 *support*

1448 **D Questionnaire of the Western surveys**

1449 Below, we provide the generic questionnaire (based on the U.S. version), which roughly  
1450 corresponds to the *Eu* questionnaire as well as the combination of the *US1* and *US2* ques-  
1451 tionnaire. The main difference between Europe and the U.S. is that we split the *US2*  
1452 sample into four random branches to include some treatments before the Section D on  
1453 the GCS. Besides the control group, the treatments are: information regarding the sup-  
1454 port of Americans for the GCS and NR, an open-ended field, and a closed question on the  
1455 pros and cons of the GCS. The pros and cons of the GCS are also asked in *Eu* (likewise,  
1456 either as an open-ended field or a question), but only in Section D, after the support.

1457 At each section or question, square brackets specify in which questionnaires it is present  
1458 (*US1*, *US2* and/or *Eu*) as well as country specificities. Figure S48 displays the structure of  
1459 each questionnaire. Each treatment randomization is independent. Qualtrics and Word  
1460 versions of the questionnaires in each language are available on our [public repository](#),  
1461 together with a spreadsheet that summarizes country specificities and our sources.

Figure S48: Western surveys' structure. Cf. Figure 1 for a simplified version.



1462 [Eu, US1, US2] Socio-demographic characteristics

1463 1. Welcome to this survey!

1464  
1465 This survey is **anonymous** and is conducted for research purposes on a representa-  
1466 tive sample of [1,000 British people].

1467  
1468 It takes [US1, US2: 10 to 15 min; Eu: around 20 min] to complete.

1469  
1470 The survey contains lotteries and awards for those who get the correct answer to  
1471 some understanding questions.

1472 If you are attentive and lucky, you can win up to [US1, Eu: \$350; US2: \$150] in  
1473 points. (See terms and conditions).

1474 Please answer every question carefully.

1475  
1476 Do you agree to participate in the survey?

1477 Yes; No

1478 2. What is your gender? [gender]

1479 Woman; Man; Other

1480 3. How old are you? [age]

1481 Below 18; 18 to 20; 21 to 24; 25 to 29; 30 to 34; 35 to 39; 40 to 44; 45 to 49; 50 to 54; 55 to  
1482 59; 60 to 64; 65 to 69; 70 to 74; 75 to 79; 80 to 84; 85 to 89; 90 to 99; 100 or above

1483 4. [Eu] In which country do you live? [country]

1484 France; Germany; Spain; United Kingdom; Other

1485 5. What is your ZIP code? [zipcode UK: What is your Outcode (the left part of your  
1486 postcode, e.g. if your postcode is N7 8H7, just enter N7)?]

1487 6. Do you live with your partner (if you have one)? [couple]

1488 Yes; No

1489 7. How many people are in your household? The household includes: you, the mem-  
1490 bers of your family who live with you, and your dependants. [hh\_size]

1491 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more

- 1492 8. [Eu] How many children below 14 live with you? [Nb\_children\_14]  
1493    1; 2; 3; 4 or more
- 1494 9. [US1, US2] What race or ethnicity do you identify with? (Multiple answers are  
1495 possible) [race]  
1496    White; Black or African American; Hispanic; Asian; American Indian or Alaskan Native;  
1497    Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; Other: {open field}; Prefer not to say
- 1498 10. What is the [US1, US2: annual; Eu: monthly] gross income of your household (before  
1499 withholding tax)? This includes all income: wages, self-employment earnings, So-  
1500 cial Security benefits, pensions, investment income, welfare payments, and income  
1501 from other sources. [income]  
1502    [US1, US2: Items based on household total income deciles and quartiles, namely:  
1503    Less than \$20,000; between \$20,001 and \$35,000; between \$35,001 and \$42,000; between  
1504    \$42,001 and \$50,000; between \$50,001 and \$65,000; between \$65,001 and \$82,000; between  
1505    \$82,001 and \$103,000; between \$103,001 and \$130,000; between \$130,001 and \$145,000;  
1506    between \$145,001 and \$165,000; between \$165,001 and \$250,000; More than \$250,000; I  
1507    prefer not to answer;  
1508    Eu: custom thresholds, taking into account household composition Questions 6-8,  
1509    and corresponding to the country's deciles and quartiles of standard of living, cf.  
1510    the sheet "Income" in [this spreadsheet](#)]
- 1511 11. What is the highest level of education you have completed? [education, post\_secondary]  
1512    [Below upper secondary, Upper secondary, and Post secondary are coded as the first two,  
1513    middle three, and last three items, respectively.  
1514    US1, US2: Primary school or less; Eighth grade; Some high school; Regular high school  
1515    diploma/GED or alternative credential; Some college, no degree; 2-year college degree or as-  
1516    sociates degree (for example: AA, AS); Bachelor's degree (for example: BA, BS); Master's  
1517    degree or above (MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA, MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD, PhD);  
1518    FR: École primaire / Aucun; Brevet; CAP ou BEP; Baccalauréat professionnel ou tech-  
1519    nologique; Baccalauréat général; Bac +2 (BTS, DUT, DEUG...); Bac +3 (licence...); Bac  
1520    +5 ou plus (master, école d'ingénieur ou de commerce, doctorat, médecine, maîtrise, DEA,  
1521    DESS...)  
1522    DE: Keine abgeschlossene Schulbildung / Grundschule; Untere Sekundarstufe (z.B. Haupt-  
1523    oder Realschulabschluss); Erstausbildung; Beruflicher Abschluss / Ausbildung; Abitur;  
1524    Zweitausbildung; Bachelor oder Fachhochschulabschluss; Master-Abschluss oder höher

1525 ES: *Educación primaria / No he completado la enseñanza básica; Educación secundaria obligatoria (ESO); Formación profesional básica (FP); Formación profesional de grado medio; Bachillerato; Formación profesional de grado superior; Grado universitario; Máster/doctorado*  
1526 UK: *Primary education or less; Some secondary school; GSCE; Vocational Upper secondary (Level 3 award, level 3 certificate, level 3 diploma, advanced apprenticeship, etc.); High school degree (A level); Higher vocational education (Level 4+ award, level 4+ certificate, level 4+ diploma, higher apprenticeship, etc.); Bachelor's Degree (BA, BSc, BEng, etc.); Postgraduate diploma or certificate, Master's Degree (MSc, MA, MBA, etc.) or Ph.D.]*

1533 12. What is your employment status? [employment\_agg]

1534 *Full-time employed; Part-time employed; Self-employed; Student; Retired; Unemployed*  
1535 *(searching for a job); Inactive (not searching for a job)*

1536 13. Are you a homeowner or a tenant? (Multiple answers are possible) [home\_...]

1537 *Tenant; Owner; Landlord renting out property; Hosted free of charge*

1538 14. [If lives with partner: What is the estimated value of your household's assets (in  
1539 U.S. dollars)? [wealth]]

1540 If does not live with partner: What is the estimated value of your assets (in U.S.  
1541 dollars)?]

1542 Include here all your possessions (home, car, savings, etc.) net of debt. For example,  
1543 if you own a house worth [\$]300,000 and you have [\$]100,000 left to repay on your  
1544 mortgage, your assets are [\$]200,000.

1545

1546 I estimate my [If lives with partner: household's] assets net of debt to be:

1547

1548 [Items based on the following individual wealth quintiles, doubled if lives with  
1549 partner. US1, US2: *Less than \$0 (I have a net debt); Close to \$0; Between \$4,000 and*  
1550 *\$60,000; Between \$60,000 and \$190,000; More than \$190,000;* For Eu, the thresholds are:  
1551 FR: €5/50/150/300k; DE: €0/35/130/280k; ES: €0/50/100/200k; UK: £3/45/115/270k]

1552 15. [US1, US2 (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the vote question)] What

1553 do you consider to be your political affiliation, as of today? [political\_affiliation]  
1554 *Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other; Non-Affiliated*

1555 [Eu, US1, US2] Global climate scheme

1556 In the following, we describe two policies, on which we will survey your opinion.  
1557 To check that you have attentively read the descriptions, **we will ask some understanding questions afterwards: those who get correct answers can win up to \$150.**

1559 **Global climate scheme:** At the Paris agreement in 2015, all countries have agreed  
1560 to contain global warming “well below +2 °C”. To limit global warming to this  
1561 level, **there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally.**

1562 To meet the climate target, a limited number of permits to emit greenhouse gases  
1563 can be created globally. Polluting firms would be required to buy permits to cover  
1564 their emissions. Such a policy would **make fossil fuel companies pay** for their  
1565 emissions and progressively raise the price of fossil fuels. **Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil fuels, reducing greenhouse gas**  
1566 **emissions.**

1568 In accordance with the principle that each human has an equal right to pollute, the  
1569 revenues generated by the sale of permits could finance a global basic income. **Each**  
1570 **adult in the world would receive [US1, US2: \$30/month; UK: \$30 (that is £25) per**  
1571 **month; FR, DE, ES: €30/month], thereby lifting out of extreme poverty the 700 mil-**  
1572 **lion people who earn less than \$2/day.**

1573 **The typical [American] would lose out financially [US1, US2: \$85, FR: €10, DE:**  
1574 **€25, ES: €5, UK: £20] per month** (as he or she would face [\$115] per month in price  
1575 increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive).

1576 The policy could be put in place as soon as countries totaling more than 60% of  
1577 global emissions agree on it. Countries that would refuse to take part in the policy  
1578 could face sanctions (like tariffs) from the rest of the World and would be excluded  
1579 from the basic income.

(Back to Section 2.2)

- 1580 16. Who would win or lose financially in the Global climate scheme? [Figure S12; gcs\_win\_lose]

1581  
1582 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1583 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

1584 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.;*

1585 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

1586 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would lose and*

1588       *the 700 million poorest humans would win* from the Global climate scheme. Now, here  
1589       is the second policy:

1590

1591       **National redistribution scheme:**

1592       This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [US1, US2: 5%; Eu: 1%]<sup>11</sup> and provide  
1593       cash transfers to all adults. More precisely, **each [American] adult would receive**  
1594       **[\$85] per month** (that is [\$1,000] per year). This would be financed by an increase  
1595       of the federal income tax on household income in excess of [US1, US2: \$315,000 per  
1596       year; FR: €15,000 per month; DE: €20,000 per month; ES: €10,000 per month; UK:  
1597       £15,000 per month], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000]. [US1,  
1598       US2: See more details.] <sup>12</sup>

- 1599       17. Who would win or lose financially in the National redistribution? [Figure S12;  
1600       nr\_win\_lose]

1601

1602       Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1603       Typical [Americans] would win and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Ameri-  
1604       cans] would win and the richest [Americans] would lose.; Typical [Americans] would lose  
1605       and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Americans] would lose and the richest  
1606       [Americans] would lose.

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would win and  
1608       the richest [Americans] would lose* from the National redistribution scheme.

1609

1610       To help you with the next question, here is a reminder of the policies:

1611

1612       **Global Climate scheme:**

1613       To limit global warming and reach the international climate objective, the Global

---

<sup>11</sup>The wider base in the U.S. was chosen because emissions are larger in the U.S. than in Europe, and it would hardly be feasible to offset the median American's loss from the GCS by taxing only the top 1%.

<sup>12</sup>8% of U.S. respondents click. They then see the following text, based on [taxjusticenow.org](http://taxjusticenow.org) by Saez & Zucman (2019): *The marginal income tax rates would evolve as follows:*

*Below \$315,000: unchanged*

*\$315,000 - \$400,000: current rate 32% => new rate 41%*

*\$400,000 - \$600,000: 35% => 50%*

*\$600,000 - \$2.5 million: 37% => 60%*

*\$2.5 - \$5 million: 37% => 65%*

*Above \$5 million: 37% => 70%*

1614 climate scheme would **impose a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can**  
1615 **emit globally.**

1616 It would **make polluters pay** for their emissions, which in turn would increase fos-  
1617 sil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities.

1618 The revenues would finance a **global basic income** of [\$30] per month for all hu-  
1619 mans, lifting out of extreme poverty the poorest billion people.

1620 Considering the basic income and the fuel price increases, **the typical [American]**  
1621 **would lose out financially [\$85] per month.**

1622

1623 **National redistribution scheme:**

1624 This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [5%] and provide cash transfers to  
1625 all adults. More precisely, **each [American] would receive [\$85] per month.** This  
1626 would be financed by an increase of the federal income tax on household income in  
1627 excess of [\$315,000 per year], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000  
1628 per year].

- 1629 18. If both the Global climate scheme and the National redistribution scheme are im-  
1630 plemented, how would a typical [American] be financially affected? [*Figure S12;*  
1631 *both\_win\_lose*]

1632 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1633 *A typical [American] would lose out financially.; A typical [American] would neither gain*  
1634 *nor lose.; A typical [American] would gain financially.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was that *A typical [American] would nei-*  
1636 *ther gain nor lose from both schemes combined. [US1, Eu: Now, here are the last two*  
1637 *policies:]*

1638

1639 **[US1: Coal exit:**

1640 To reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, this policy would require all U.S. coal power plants to be  
1641 phased out by 2030. Coal would be replaced by renewable sources like wind and  
1642 solar panels as well as stronger reliance on gas power plants.

1643 *Eu: **Thermal insulation plan:***

1644 To reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and energy insecurity, this policy would require that all  
1645 buildings meet energy efficiency targets: at least rating E in 2030 and rating C in  
1646 2040. The [UK] government would subsidise half the cost of insulation for all house-

1647 holds, and up to 90% for the poorest households. Insulation work would cost [FR,  
1648 DE: €25; ES: €20; UK: £25] billion a year, but would deliver energy savings greater  
1649 than this cost. ]

1650  
1651 [US1: **Marriage only for opposite-sex couples:**

1652 This policy is a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would legally  
1653 define marriage as a union of one man and one woman.

1654 **Eu: Death penalty for major crimes:**

1655 This measure would reintroduce capital punishment for major crimes such as ter-  
1656 rrorism and mass shootings.]

1657  
1658 Now, we will ask your opinion on the [US1, Eu: four] policies.

1659 [Click here for the reminder of the \[US1, Eu: first\] two policies.](#) [Clicking displays the  
1660 previous summarized descriptions.]

1661 19. [US2] [4 Random branches: control (*nothing*); Question 31 (*field*); Question 32 (*impor-  
1662 tant*); or the following question (*info*).] For information, a recent survey has shown  
1663 that: [branch\_gcs\_..., info\_support]

- 1664 • 64% of Americans support the Global climate scheme.  
1665 • 72% of Americans support the National redistribution scheme.

1666 20. Do you support the Global climate scheme? [Figure S1; gcs\_support]

1667 Yes; No

1668 21. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the  
1669 previous question? [Figure S4; gcs\_belief]

1670 The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

1671 Percentage of [Americans] in favor of Global climate scheme [slider from 0 to 100]

1672 22. Do you support the National redistribution scheme? [Figure S1; nr\_support]

1673 Yes; No

1674 23. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the  
1675 previous question? [Figure S4; nr\_belief]

1676 The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

1677 Percentage of [Americans] in favor of National redistribution [slider from 0 to 100]

- 1678    24. [Eu, US1] Beware, this question is quite unusual. Among the policies below, **how**  
1679    **many** do you support? [Figure S14, Table 1; list\_exp]  
1680    [Four random branches. Branch GCS/NR/C/O; branch\_list\_exp ]  
  
1681       • Global climate scheme  
1682       • National redistribution scheme  
1683       • [Coal exit]  
1684       • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]  
  
1685    0; 1; 2; 3; 4  
  
1686    [Branch GCS/C/O]  
  
1687       • Global climate scheme  
1688       • [Coal exit]  
1689       • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]  
  
1690    0; 1; 2; 3  
  
1691    [Branch NR/C/O]  
  
1692       • National redistribution scheme  
1693       • [Coal exit]  
1694       • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]  
  
1695    0; 1; 2; 3  
1696    [Branch C/O]  
  
1697       • [Coal exit]  
1698       • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]  
  
1699    0; 1; 2  
1700    [Branch C/O]  
  
1701       • [Coal exit]  
1702       • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]  
  
1703    0; 1; 2  
1704    [Branch C/O]  
  
1705    0; 1; 2  
1706    [Branch C/O]

1707 [Eu, US1] Conjoint analyses

- 1708 25. Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you prefer? [Figure  
1709 S15; conjoint\_crg\_cr]

1710 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the  
1711 same time.

Bundle A	Bundle B
[Coal exit]	[Coal exit]
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme
Global climate scheme	

1713 1714 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 1715 26. Do you support Bundle A (combining [Coal exit], the National redistribution scheme,  
1716 and the Global climate scheme)?[Figure S1; cgr\_support]

1717 Yes; No

- 1718 27. [new page] Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you  
1719 prefer? [Figure S15; conjoint\_b, branch\_conjoint\_b]

1720 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the  
1721 same time.

1722 [Four random branches. Branch C + NR vs. GCS + NR; conjoint\_cr\_gr]

Bundle A	Bundle B
[Coal exit]	Global climate scheme
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme

1725 [Branch NR vs. NR + C + GCS; conjoint\_r\_rcg]

Bundle A	Bundle B
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme [Coal exit] Global climate scheme

1727 1728 [Branch NR + GCS vs. NR; conjoint\_rg\_r]

	<b>Bundle A</b>	<b>Bundle B</b>
1729	National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme
1730	Global climate scheme	

1731 [Branch NR + C vs. NR; conjoint\_rc\_r]

	<b>Bundle A</b>	<b>Bundle B</b>
1732	National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme
1733	[Coal exit]	

1734 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 1735 28. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and  
 1736 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies  
 1737 in their platforms.

1738 *Eu: Imagine if [DE, ES, UK: the two favorite candidates in your constituency in the  
 1739 next general election; FR: the two candidates in the second round of the next pres-  
 1740 idential election] campaigned with the following policies in their party's platforms.]*

1741  
 1742 Which of these candidates would you vote for? [Table 2, Figure S15; conjoint\_c, branch\_conjoint  
 1743 [Table 2. Two random branches: with and without the final row. The US1 version of the poli-  
 1744 cies is given below, see the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the European versions.]

	<b>Democrat</b>	<b>Republican</b>
	Increase corporate income tax rate from 21% to 28% Coal exit Trillion dollar investment in childcare, healthcare, education and housing \$15 minimum wage National redistribution scheme [Global climate scheme / no row]	Decrease the payroll tax Permit completion of the Keystone pipeline Withdrawal of the Paris agreement Marriage only for opposite-sex couples Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation [ / no row]
1745		
1746		
1747	[US1: Democrat; Republican; None of them; Eu: Candidate A; Candidate B; None of them]	

- 1748 29. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and  
 1749 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies  
 1750 in their platforms.

1751 *Eu (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the Section “Values and politics”): Imagine that [FR: the left or center-left; DE: a red-red-green coalition; ES: the PSOE; UK: the Labour Party] wins the next [general] elections. Here are two possible platforms on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a pool of credible [FR: left or center-left, DE: left-wing parties'; ES: PSOE; UK: Labour] policies).]*

1757 [US1: Which of these candidates do you prefer?

1758 *Eu: Even if you [FR: are not from the left or center-left; DE: do not support the left-wing parties; ES: do not support the PSOE; UK: do not support the Labour Party], which of these platforms do you prefer?]*

1759 [Figures S2, S16; see also the sheet “Policies” in *this spreadsheet* for the possible policies.;  
 1760 conjoint\_left\_a\_b]

	[Candidate A]	[Candidate B]
1764	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]

1765 [US1: Candidate A; Candidate B; Eu: Platform A; Platform B]

- 1766 30. [new page] [Same wording and conditions as above. For brevity, only the UK version  
 1767 is given here.; conjoint\_left\_ag\_b] Imagine that the Labour Party wins the next  
 1768 general elections. Here are two possible platforms on which it may campaign (the  
 1769 policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a pool of credible Labour poli-  
 1770 cies).

1771 Even if you do not support the Labour Party, which of these platforms do you pre-  
 1772 fer? [Figure S2]

	Platform A	Platform B
1774	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	<b>Foreign policy</b>	Global climate scheme
1775	Platform A; Platform B	-

1776 **[Eu, US2] Perceptions of the GCS**

1777 [Eu: two random branches. US2: four random branches and the question is asked (if asked)

1778 before Question 20; branch\_gcs ]

- 1779 31. [Branch: field] When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to  
 1780 your mind?

1781 Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme. [Figures S18, S19; gcs\_field]  
 1782 {Open field}

- 1783 32. [Branch: important] When determining your support or opposition to the Global  
1784 climate scheme, which points are important to you? [Figure S17; important\_...]
- 1785 • It would succeed in limiting climate change.  
1786 • It would hurt the [U.S.] economy.  
1787 • It would penalize my household.  
1788 • It would make people change their lifestyle.  
1789 • It would reduce poverty in low-income countries.  
1790 • It might be detrimental to some poor countries.  
1791 • It could foster global cooperation.  
1792 • It could fuel corruption in low-income countries.  
1793 • It could be subject to fraud.  
1794 • It would be technically difficult to put in place.  
1795 • Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences.

1796 *Not at all important; Not so important; Quite important; Very important*

1797 **[Eu, US1] Donation lottery**

1798 US1 Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention). [attention\_test]  
1799 *Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*

- 1800 33. [*Two random branches*] By taking this survey, you are automatically entered into a  
1801 lottery to win [\$]100 in panel points. This lottery is unrelated to the previous ones  
1802 that rewarded answers’ accuracy. In a few days you will know whether you have  
1803 been selected in the lottery. The payment will be made to you in the same way as  
1804 your compensation for this survey, so no further action is required on your part.

1805  
1806 Should you be selected in the lottery, you can also donate a part of this additional  
1807 compensation to [[American] / African] people living in poverty through [US1: the  
1808 charity GiveDirectly. The charity GiveDirectly; Eu: a charity. We would channel this  
1809 donation to a charity that] provides small amounts of cash to people in need in [[the  
1810 U.S] / Africa].

1811

1812     **In case you are winner of the lottery, what share of the [\$]100 would you donate**  
1813     **to [[American] / African] people living in poverty [US1: through GiveDirectly]?**  
1814     **[Figure S20, Table S2; donation, branch\_donation]**  
1815     *Amount donated to [[American] / African] people in need (in [\$]) [slider from 0 to 100]*

1816     **[Eu, US2] Wealth tax**

1817     *[Four random branches: Question 34 then Question 35 (global\_first); Question 35 then Ques-*  
1818     *tion 34 (national\_first); Question 36 (global\_share); Question 37 (sharing); branch\_global\_tax]*

1819     34. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-  
1820     income countries?

1821     Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking  
1822     water, healthcare, and education. *[Figures S1, S21; global\_tax\_support]*

1823     *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*  
1824     *support*

1825     35. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: afford-  
1826     able housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and  
1827     schools]? *[Figures S1, S22; national\_tax\_support]*

1828     *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*  
1829     *support*

1830     36. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all  
1831     countries around the world. In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount  
1832     to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE: €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2:  
1833     2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount  
1834     to [\$]1 billion in all low-income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700  
1835     million people, most of them in Africa).

1836     Each country would retain part of the revenues it collects, and the remaining part  
1837     would be pooled at the global level to finance infrastructure and public services in  
1838     low-income countries.

1839  
1840     What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of re-  
1841     tained in the country's national budget)? *[Figures S5, S23; global\_tax\_global\_share]*  
1842     *Percent of global wealth tax that should go to low-income countries [slider from 0 to 100]*

1843     37. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in  
1844       all countries around the world.

1845       In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE:  
1846       €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2: 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES:  
1847       0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount to [\$]1 billion in all low-  
1848       income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700 million people, most of  
1849       them in Africa).

1850       Which of the following options would you prefer? [Figure S24; global\_tax\_sharing]

- 1851       • The whole wealth tax financing national budgets in each country. For ex-  
1852       ample, in [US2: the U.S., it could finance affordable housing and universal  
1853       childcare/pre-K.; Eu-UK: the UK, it could finance the National Health Service  
1854       and state-funded schools].
- 1855       • Half of the wealth tax financing national budgets in each country, half of it  
1856       financing low-income countries. For example, it could finance [US2: universal  
1857       childcare/pre-K in the U.S.; Eu-UK: state-funded schools in the UK] and access  
1858       to drinking water, healthcare, and education in Africa.

1859       **[Eu, US2] Foreign aid**

1860       US2 Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention). [attention\_test]  
1861       *Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*

1862       38. From your best guess, what percentage of [U.S.] government spending is allocated  
1863       to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?

1864  
1865       For your information, government spending totals [US2: 38%; FR: 55%; DE: 45%; ES:  
1866       42%; UK: 41%] of [U.S.] GDP, it includes [US2: federal, State; Eu: national] and local  
1867       government spending, and apart from foreign aid, it covers the following items: de-  
1868       fense, social security (retirement pensions), health [US2: (including Medicare and  
1869       Medicaid)], welfare benefits [US2: (including food stamps and EITC)], education,  
1870       roads, justice, other programs [US2: and federal agencies (including in energy, sci-  
1871       ence...)]. [Figure S25; foreign\_aid\_belief]

1872       *Less than 0.1%; 0.1% to 0.2%; 0.3% to 0.5%; 0.6% to 1.0%; 1.1% to 1.7%; 1.8% to 2.6%;  
1873       2.7% to 4%; 4.1% to 6%; 6.1% to 9%; 9.1% to 13%; 13.1% to 25%; More than 25%*

- 1874 39. [Two random branches: with or without information on actual amount] [Info: Actually,  
1875 [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [the U.S.] government spend-  
1876 ing is allocated to foreign aid.]

1877

1878

If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate  
1879 to foreign aid? [Figures S28, S29, S26 and S27; foreign\_aid\_preferred, branch\_foreign\_aid\_pre

- 1880 40. [Asked iff branch: Info and preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than actual for-  
1881 eign aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to increase [U.S.] foreign  
1882 aid.

1883

1884

How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers  
1885 possible) [Figure S30; foreign\_aid\_raise\_how\_...]

1886

Lower spending on defense; Lower spending on retirement pensions; Lower spending on  
1887 healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Lower spending on welfare benefits [US2: (like  
1888 EITC or food stamps)]; Lower spending on education; Lower spending on other programs  
1889 [US2: and federal agencies]; Higher taxes on the wealthiest; Higher corporate income tax  
1890 rate; Higher personal income tax rates; Higher public deficit

1891

1892

41. [Asked iff branch: Info and preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than actual foreign  
aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to reduce [U.S.] foreign aid.

1893

1894

How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible) [Fig-  
1895 ure S31; foreign\_aid\_reduce\_how\_...]

1896

1897

Higher spending on defense; Higher spending on retirement pensions; Higher spending on  
1898 healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Higher spending on welfare benefits [US2:  
1899 (like EITC or food stamps)]; Higher spending on education; over spending on other pro-  
1900 grams [US2: and federal agencies]; Lower taxes on the wealthiest; Lower corporate income  
tax rate; Lower personal income tax rates; Lower public deficit

1901

## [Eu, US1] Petition

1902

1903

42. [Two random branches] Would you be willing to sign a petition for the [Global climate  
/ National redistribution] scheme? [Figure S32; branch\_petition, petition, petition\_gcs]

1904

1905

As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President's

1906 office], informing him what share of American people are willing to endorse the  
1907 [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign,  
1908 only your answer here is required and remains anonymous.) Yes; No

1909 **[Eu, US1] Other policies**

1910 43. The following policies are discussed at international negotiations on how to deal  
1911 with climate change. [Figures 3 and S33; variables\_climate\_policies]

1912  
1913 Do you support or oppose the following policies?

- 1914
- 1915 • Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for  
climate damages [climate\_compensation\_support]
  - 1916 • High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries [climate\_mitigat]
  - 1917 • High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income  
1918 countries adapt to climate change [climate\_adaptation\_support]

1919 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly  
1920 support*

1921 44. Do you support or oppose the following global policies? [Figures 3 and S33; variables\_global\_pol]

- 1922
- 1923 • Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt [debt\_cancellation\_support]
  - 1924 • Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting  
right proportional to its population [democratise\_un\_imf\_support]
  - 1925 • Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries [remove\_tariffs\_support]
  - 1926 • A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage [global\_min\_wage\_support]
  - 1927 • Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of  
1928 all assets [global\_register\_support]
  - 1929 • A maximum wealth limit of [US1: \$10 billion; Eu: [€]100 million] for each  
1930 human [cap\_wealth\_support]

1931 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly  
1932 support*

1933 45. Currently, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [U.S.] govern-  
1934 ment spending (that is, [US1: 0.2%; FR: 0.4%; DE: 0.6%; ES: 0.2%; UK: 0.7%] of [U.S.]  
1935 GDP) is spent on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries. [Figure S6;  
1936 foreign\_aid\_raise\_support]

1937

1938 Do you support [the U.S.] transferring more money to low-income countries?  
1939 Yes, [U.S.] foreign aid should be increased.; Yes, but only if some conditions are met.; No,  
1940 [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.; No, [U.S.] foreign aid should be reduced.

1941 46. [Asked only if Yes, but only if some conditions are met. is chosen] What conditions  
1942 should be required for [the U.S.] to increase its foreign aid? (Multiple answers pos-  
1943 sible) [Figures S7, S28; foreign\_aid\_condition\_...]  
1944 That recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights.; That recipient  
1945 countries cooperate to fight illegal migrations.; That other high-income countries also in-  
1946 crease their foreign aid.; That this is financed by increased taxes on millionaires.; That we  
1947 can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted.; Other: [open field]

1948 47. [Asked only if No, [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable. or No, [U.S.] foreign aid  
1949 should be reduced. is chosen] Why do you oppose [the U.S.] increasing its foreign  
1950 aid? (Multiple answers possible) [Figure S8; foreign\_aid\_no\_]  
1951 Aid perpetuates poverty as it makes people feel less responsible for themselves.; Aid is not  
1952 effective as most of it is diverted.; Aid is a pressure tactic for high-income countries that  
1953 prevents low-income countries from developing freely.; [The U.S.] is not responsible for what  
1954 happens in other countries.; Charity begins at home: there is already a lot to do to support  
1955 the American people in need.; Other: [open field]

1956 **[Eu, US1, US2] Values and politics**

1957 48. [Eu (where it is instead asked at the beginning of Section "Other Policies"), US1]  
1958 In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend  
1959 [U.S.] interests or global justice? [Figure S34; negotiation]  
1960 [U.S.] interests, even if it goes against global justice; [U.S.] interests, to the extent it re-  
1961 spects global justice; Indifferent or don't know; Global justice, to the extent it respects [U.S.]  
1962 interests; Global justice, even if it goes against [U.S.] interests

1963 49. How much did you give to charities in 2022? [Figure S39; donation\_charities]

1964      *I did not make donations to charities last year.; Less than [\$]100.; Between [\$]101 and*  
1965      *[\$]500.; Between [\$]501 and [\$]1,000.; Between [\$]1,001 and [\$]5,000.; More than [\$]5,000.*

1966      50. To what extent are you interested in politics? [Figure S40; interested\_politics]  
1967      *Not at all; A little; Moderately; A lot; A great deal*

1968      51. Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means you think  
1969      the government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic  
1970      government functions, and 5 means you think the government should take active  
1971      steps in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens? [Figure S41;  
1972      involvement\_govt]

1973      *Desired involvement of government [slider from 1 to 5]*

1974      52. **On economic policy matters**, where do you see yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where  
1975      1 is Left (favoring equality and government interventions) and 5 is Right (favoring  
1976      free competition and little government intervention)? [Figure S42; left\_right]  
1977      *Left (1) to Right (5) on economic issues [slider from 1 to 5]*

1978      53. Did you vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election? [Figure S43; vote\_participation]  
1979      *Yes; No: I didn't have the right to vote in the U.S.; Prefer not to say*

1980      54. [If voted: Which candidate did you vote for in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election?  
1981      If did not vote: Even if you did not vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election,  
1982      please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who  
1983      represents your views more closely.] [Figure S44; vote\_factor, voted]  
1984      *[US1, US2: Biden; Trump; Jorgensen; Hawkins; Prefer not to say*

1985      FR: candidates at the 2022 presidential election

1986      DE: parties with more than 1% of votes at the 2021 federal election and *Other*

1987      ES: lists with more than 0.9% at the November 2019 general election and *Other*

1988      UK: parties with more than 0.5% of votes at the 2019 general election and *Other*]

1989      55. To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem? [Figure S35; variables\_problem]

- 1990      • Income inequality in [the U.S.] [problem\_inequality]
- 1991      • Climate change [problem\_climate]
- 1992      • Global poverty [problem\_poverty]

1993      *Not an important issue for me; An issue but there are other priorities; An issue but we already do what we can; An important issue, we should do more; One of the most pressing issue of our time*

1996      56. What group do you defend when you vote? [Figure S36; group\_defended]  
1997      *Sentient beings (humans and animals); Humans; [Eu: Europeans]; [Americans]; People sharing my culture or religion; [US1, US2: My State]; [US1, US2: My town; Eu: My country, region or town]; My relatives and/or colleagues; My family and myself*

## 2000    **[Eu, US1] Prioritization**

2001      57. In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

2003  
2004      How do you allocate the points among the following policies? [Figures S37 and S38;  
2005      points\_foreign1\_gcs, points\_...]

2006  
2007      You can adjust the number of points either using the slider or entering the number of your choice on the right-hand-side. **The sum of points must equal exactly 100**. By pushing the last slider to the right, the total will automatically adjust to 100.  
2008      Please read the 6 options before making your choice.

2009  
2010      See the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the pool of policies in each country.  
2011      [sliders from 0 to 100]

## 2013    **[FR, DE, ES] ETS2**

2014      58. Similar to the Global Climate Scheme, the European Climate Scheme would impose a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit across the EU in the buildings and transport sectors. It would make polluters pay for their emissions, which in turn would increase fossil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities. Several options are possible regarding the use of the scheme's revenues:

- 2015  
2016  
2017  
2018
- 2019      • Provide an equal cash transfer of €105 per year to each European.
  - 2020      • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European, proportional to their country's emissions: people in countries with higher emissions per person (like Germany) would receive more than people in countries with lower emissions

2023 (like Romania). For information, people in [Germany] would receive €[FR:  
2024 110; DE: 130; ES: 90]/year.

- 2025 • Finance low-carbon investments: thermal insulation of buildings, switch to  
2026 clean sources of heating, public transportation, and charging stations for elec-  
2027 tric vehicles.  
2028 • Provide cash transfers to the most vulnerable half of Europeans and finance  
2029 low-carbon investments.

2030 Do you support or oppose the European Climate Scheme in case the revenue is used  
2031 to...? [Fig. 1 in [Funke et al. \(2024\)](#); variables\_ets2\_support]

- 2032 • Provide an equal cash transfer to each European [ets2\_equal\_cash\_support]  
2033 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European [ets2\_country\_cash\_support]  
2034 • Finance low-carbon investments [ets2\_investments\_support]  
2035 • Provide cash transfers for the most vulnerable Europeans and low-carbon in-  
2036 vestments [ets2\_vulnerable\_investments\_support]

2037 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*  
2038 *support*

2039 59. [Asked iff none of the four variants of the European Climate Scheme is (somewhat or  
2040 strongly) supported] Why do you not support a European Climate Scheme? (Mul-  
2041 tiple answers possible) [ets2\_no\_...]

2042 *I am opposed to climate policy being decided at the EU level, it should be decided at the na-*  
2043 *tional level;*

2044 *I would prefer if the revenues were used in a different way (beyond the four suggestions*  
2045 *above) than previously suggested;*

2046 *I would prefer if decreasing carbon emissions were regulated by other climate policies;*

2047 *I am generally opposed to additional, or more ambitious, climate policies;*

2048 *I do not fully understand how the European Climate Scheme is supposed to work;*

2049 *I don't know*

## 2050 **[Eu, US1, US2] Feedback**

2051 60. Do you feel that this survey was politically biased? [Figure S45; survey\_biased]

2052 *Yes, left-wing biased; Yes, right-wing biased; No, I do not feel it was biased*

- 2053        61. [US2 Asked only to one random third of the respondents, instead of the feedback Question 62] According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme  
2054        poverty in low-income countries? [Figure S46; poverty\_field, branch\_poverty\_field]  
2055        {Open field}  
2056
- 2057        62. The survey is nearing completion. You can now enter any comments, thoughts or  
2058        suggestions in the field below. [comment\_field]  
2059        {Open field}
- 2060        63. Lastly, are you interested to be interviewed by a researcher (through videoconfer-  
2061        encing) for 30 min?  
2062  
2063        This is totally optional and will not be rewarded. [interview]  
2064        Yes; No

## 2065 E Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme

2066 To specify the GCS, we use the IEA's 2DS scenario (IEA 2017), which is consistent  
2067 with limiting the global average temperature increase to 2°C with a probability of at least  
2068 50%. The paper by Hood (2017) contributing to the Report of the High-Level Commission  
2069 on Carbon Prices (Stern & Stiglitz 2017) presents a price corridor compatible with this  
2070 emissions scenario, from which we take the midpoint. The product of these two series  
2071 provides an estimate of the revenues expected from a global carbon price. We then use  
2072 the UN median scenario of future population aged over 15 years (*adults*, for short). We  
2073 derive the basic income that could be paid to all adults by recycling the revenues from  
2074 the global carbon price: evolving between \$20 and \$30 per month, with a peak in 2030.  
2075 Accounting for the lower price levels in low-income countries, an additional income of  
2076 \$30 per month would allow **670 million people** to escape extreme poverty, defined with  
2077 the threshold of \$2.15 per day in purchasing power parity.<sup>13</sup>

2078 To estimate the increase in fossil fuel expenditures (or “cost”) in each country by 2030,  
2079 we make a key assumption concerning the evolution of the carbon footprints per adult:  
2080 that they will decrease by the same proportion in each country. We use data from the  
2081 Global Carbon Project (Peters et al. 2012). In 2030, the average carbon footprint of a  
2082 country  $c$ ,  $e_c$ , evolves from baseline year  $b$  proportionally to the evolution of its adult  
2083 population  $\Delta p_c = p_c^{2030} / p_c^b$ . Thus, the global share of country  $c$ 's carbon footprint,  $s_c$ ,  
2084 is proportional to  $\sigma_c = e_c \Delta p_c$ , and as countries' shares sum to 1,  $s_c = \frac{\sigma_c}{\sum_k \sigma_k}$ . Multiplying  
2085 country  $c$ 's emission share with global revenues in 2030,  $R$ , and dividing by  $c$ 's adult pop-  
2086 ulation in year  $y$ , yields its average cost per adult:  $R \cdot s_c / p_c^y$ . Using findings from Ivanova  
2087 & Wood (2020) for Europe and Fremstad & Paul (2019) for the U.S., we approximate the  
2088 median cost as 90% of the average cost. Finally, the net gain is given by the basic income  
2089 (\$30 per month) minus the cost. We provided consistent estimates of net gains in all sur-  
2090 veys (using  $y = b = 2015$ ), though in the global survey we gave the average net gains  
2091 vs. the median ones in the Western surveys. The latter are shown in Figure S49. For the  
2092 record, Table S4 also provides an estimate of *average* net gains (computed with  $b = 2019$ )

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<sup>13</sup>The average carbon footprint of Sub-Saharan Africa is 0.75tCO<sub>2</sub> per capita (World Bank), and it is even lower for people living in extreme poverty, under one tenth of the world average of about 5tCO<sub>2</sub> per capita (Chancel & Piketty 2015). Under a GCS with a cash transfer of \$30 per person, if one's emission is one tenth of the world average, their net gain would be \$27 per month in nominal terms. In regions with extreme poverty like Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding high-income countries), the conversion factor from Market Exchange Rate to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is 2.4 (computed as the ratio of the World Bank series relating the GDP per capita of Sub-Saharan Africa in PPP and nominal). Therefore, the net gain for the extreme poor is \$65 per month (or \$2.13 a day) in PPP, enough to lift them out of extreme poverty.

2093 and  $y = 2030$ ).<sup>14</sup>

2094 Estimates of the net gains from the Global Climate Scheme are necessarily imprecise,  
2095 given the uncertainties surrounding the carbon price required to achieve emissions  
2096 reductions as well as each country's trajectory in terms of emissions and population. These  
2097 values are highly dependent on future (non-price) climate policies, technical progress,  
2098 and economic growth of each country, which are only partially known. Integrated As-  
2099 sessment Models have been used to derive a Global Energy Assessment (Johansson et al.  
2100 2012), a 100% renewable scenario (Greenpeace 2015) as well as Shared Socioeconomic  
2101 Pathways (SSPs), which include consistent trajectories of population, emissions, and car-  
2102 bon price Bauer et al. (2017), Fricko et al. (2017), (Riahi et al. 2017), van Vuuren et al.  
2103 (2017). Instead of using some of these modelling trajectories, we relied on a simple and  
2104 transparent formula, for a number of reasons. First and foremost, those trajectories de-  
2105 scribe territorial emissions while we need consumption-based emissions to compute the  
2106 incidence of the GCS. Second, the carbon price is relatively low in trajectories of SSPs that  
2107 contain global warming below 2°C (less than \$35/tCO<sub>2</sub> in 2030), so we conservatively  
2108 chose a method yielding a higher carbon price (\$90 in 2030). Third, modelling results are  
2109 available only for a few macro regions, while we wanted country by country estimates.  
2110 Finally, we have checked that the emissions per capita given by our method are broadly  
2111 in line with alternative methods, even if it tends to overestimate net gains in countries  
2112 which will decarbonize less rapidly than average.<sup>15</sup> For example, although countries' de-  
2113 carbonization plans should realign with the GCS in place, India might still decarbonize  
2114 less quickly than the European Union, so India's gain and the EU's loss might be over-  
2115 estimated in our computations. For a more sophisticated version of the Global Climate  
2116 Scheme which includes participation mechanisms preventing middle-income countries  
2117 (like China) to lose from it and estimations of the Net Present Value by country, see Fabre  
2118 (2023).

(Back to Section 2.3)

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<sup>14</sup>2015 was the last year of data available when the global questionnaire was conceived (OECD data was then used – it does not cover all countries but give identical rounded estimates than those recomputed from the Global Carbon Project data for our Western surveys). 2030 was chosen as the reference year as it is the date at which global carbon price revenues are expected to peak (and the GCS redistributive effects would be largest), and the GCS could not realistically enter into force before that date. In the surveys, we chose  $y = b = 2015$  rather than  $b = 2019$  and  $y = 2030$  to get more conservative estimates of the monthly cost in the U.S. (\$20 higher than the other option) and in Europe (€5 or £10 higher).

<sup>15</sup>Computations with alternative methods can be found on [our public repository](#).

Figure S49: Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme.




Table S4: Estimated net gain from the GCS in 2030 and carbon footprint by country.

	Mean net gain from the GCS (\$/month)	CO <sub>2</sub> footprint per adult in 2019 (tCO <sub>2</sub> /y)			
Saudi Arabia	-93	24.0	Brazil	15	2.9
United States	-77	21.0	Vietnam	15	2.9
Australia	-60	17.6	Peru	16	2.8
Canada	-56	16.7	Morocco	16	2.7
South Korea	-50	15.6	North Korea*	17	2.5
Germany	-30	11.7	India	18	2.4
Russia	-29	11.5	Philippines	18	2.3
Japan	-28	11.3	Pakistan	22	1.6
Malaysia	-21	10.0	Bangladesh	24	1.1
Iran	-19	9.5	Nigeria	25	1.0
Poland	-19	9.5	Kenya	25	0.9
United Kingdom	-18	9.4	Myanmar*	26	0.9
China	-14	8.6	Sudan*	26	0.9
Italy	-13	8.4	Tanzania	27	0.5
South Africa	-11	8.0	Afghanistan*	27	0.5
France	-10	7.8	Uganda	28	0.4
Iraq*	-8	7.4	Ethiopia	28	0.3
Spain	-6	7.0	Venezuela	29	0.3
Turkey	-2	6.2	DRC*	30	0.1
Algeria*	-1	6.0			

<sup>2119</sup> Note: Asterisks denote countries where footprint is missing and territorial emissions is used instead.

<sup>2120</sup> Values differ from Figure S49 as this table present estimates of *mean* net gain per adult in 2030, not at the

<sup>2121</sup> present. Only the countries with more than 20 million adults (covering 87% of the global total) are shown.

2122 F Determinants of support

Table S5: Determinants of support for the Global Climate Scheme. (Back to [2.3](#))

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme						
	All	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Country: Germany	-0.157*** (0.022)		-0.144*** (0.022)				
Country: Spain	-0.044* (0.024)		-0.026 (0.024)				
Country: United Kingdom	-0.079*** (0.024)		-0.104*** (0.023)				
Country: United States	-0.375*** (0.019)						
Income quartile: 2	0.037** (0.017)	0.031 (0.022)	0.038 (0.023)	0.047 (0.043)	0.058 (0.049)	0.013 (0.053)	0.023 (0.043)
Income quartile: 3	0.042** (0.017)	0.033 (0.024)	0.049** (0.024)	0.080** (0.040)	0.059 (0.052)	0.074 (0.056)	-0.052 (0.052)
Income quartile: 4	0.056*** (0.018)	0.062** (0.026)	0.010 (0.026)	0.018 (0.047)	-0.015 (0.055)	-0.001 (0.056)	-0.005 (0.057)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.023* (0.012)	0.032* (0.017)	0.010 (0.018)	0.007 (0.029)	0.045 (0.039)	0.007 (0.039)	-0.010 (0.039)
Age: 25-34	-0.076*** (0.025)	-0.084*** (0.031)	-0.044 (0.035)	-0.031 (0.057)	-0.077 (0.083)	-0.050 (0.066)	-0.103 (0.091)
Age: 35-49	-0.101*** (0.024)	-0.109*** (0.030)	-0.069* (0.034)	-0.094* (0.055)	-0.009 (0.077)	-0.168** (0.070)	-0.050 (0.090)
Age: 50-64	-0.137*** (0.024)	-0.165*** (0.030)	-0.038 (0.035)	-0.039 (0.056)	-0.020 (0.082)	-0.146** (0.067)	-0.017 (0.087)
Age: 65+	-0.116*** (0.028)	-0.142*** (0.034)	-0.056 (0.044)	0.003 (0.076)	-0.045 (0.094)	-0.258*** (0.091)	0.011 (0.105)
Gender: Man	0.019* (0.011)	0.022 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.029)	-0.018 (0.033)	0.042 (0.038)	-0.005 (0.034)
Lives with partner	0.029** (0.013)	0.023 (0.017)	0.058*** (0.018)	0.070** (0.033)	0.082** (0.038)	0.017 (0.038)	0.040 (0.039)
Employment status: Retired	-0.020 (0.024)	-0.046 (0.030)	0.056 (0.038)	0.087 (0.081)	0.096 (0.075)	0.040 (0.082)	0.001 (0.073)
Employment status: Student	0.045 (0.033)	0.062 (0.048)	0.101** (0.044)	0.165* (0.085)	0.192** (0.087)	0.116 (0.074)	-0.021 (0.107)
Employment status: Working	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.020 (0.024)	0.011 (0.028)	0.082 (0.064)	0.006 (0.056)	-0.050 (0.056)	0.036 (0.051)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.331*** (0.013)	-0.435*** (0.017)	-0.106*** (0.019)	-0.131*** (0.035)	-0.004 (0.044)	-0.114*** (0.038)	-0.081** (0.041)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	-0.184*** (0.016)	-0.198*** (0.022)	-0.136*** (0.021)	-0.196*** (0.039)	-0.034 (0.043)	-0.116** (0.046)	-0.108*** (0.040)
Vote: Far right	-0.396*** (0.032)		-0.309*** (0.033)	-0.493*** (0.064)	-0.168*** (0.051)	-0.130 (0.102)	-0.314*** (0.080)
Urban	0.049*** (0.012)	0.072*** (0.018)	0.006 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.029)	0.019 (0.032)	-0.014 (0.036)	0.017 (0.033)
Race: White		-0.030 (0.019)					
Region: Northeast		0.010 (0.023)					
Region: South		0.006 (0.020)					
Region: West		0.010 (0.022)					
Swing State		-0.038** (0.019)					
Constant	1.048	0.736	0.89	0.7	0.732	0.935	0.886
Observations	7,986	4,992	2,994	977	727	748	542
R <sup>2</sup>	0.160	0.181	0.064	0.116	0.067	0.043	0.063

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table S6: Support for the GCS regressed on comprehension of its financial effects.

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme					
	All	United States	France	Germany	United Kingdom	Spain
With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win	0.029** (0.012)	-0.004 (0.016)	0.043 (0.033)	0.051 (0.033)	0.040 (0.036)	0.038 (0.037)
Constant	0.596	0.53	0.764	0.677	0.707	0.796
Observations	8,000	5,000	729	979	749	543
R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.00001	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.002

Table S7: Correlation between (*Somewhat or Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in high-income countries.

	Support for a global GHG tax and dividend											
	USA (1)	DNK (2)	FRA (3)	DEU (4)	ITA (5)	ESP (6)	GBR (7)	JPN (8)	POL (9)	AUS (10)	CAN (11)	KOR (12)
Control group mean	0.34	0.409	0.34	0.361	0.341	0.421	0.288	0.317	0.309	0.294	0.316	0.334
Trusts the government	0.040*** (0.013)	0.0005 (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.051*** (0.011)	0.061*** (0.012)	0.046*** (0.011)	0.050*** (0.012)	0.039*** (0.013)	0.023** (0.011)	0.041*** (0.013)	0.019 (0.012)	0.079*** (0.013)
Believes inequality is an important problem	0.038*** (0.014)	0.051*** (0.012)	0.045*** (0.013)	0.040*** (0.011)	0.023** (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.052*** (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)	0.009 (0.010)	0.005 (0.013)	0.031*** (0.012)	0.024** (0.012)
Worries about CC	0.006 (0.018)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.005 (0.016)	0.048*** (0.014)	0.023* (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.044*** (0.015)	0.014 (0.014)	0.018 (0.013)	0.036** (0.017)	0.004 (0.014)	0.015 (0.013)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	0.009 (0.015)	0.007 (0.012)	0.018 (0.014)	0.015 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.032** (0.011)	0.027** (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.024** (0.015)	0.018 (0.014)	0.014 (0.014)	0.001 (0.013)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.059*** (0.015)	0.019 (0.013)	0.008 (0.014)	0.032** (0.013)	0.012 (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.006 (0.014)	0.037** (0.014)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.033** (0.016)	0.026* (0.014)	0.033** (0.013)
Understands emission across activities/regions	-0.018 (0.011)	0.009 (0.013)	0.003 (0.012)	0.023* (0.012)	0.007 (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.007 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.026** (0.012)	-0.002 (0.013)	0.003 (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	0.007 (0.012)	0.008 (0.014)	0.023 (0.014)	0.011 (0.012)	-0.0005 (0.012)	0.031*** (0.012)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.014 (0.011)	0.025* (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.024* (0.012)
Knows which gases cause CC	0.005 (0.011)	0.021* (0.012)	0.010 (0.013)	0.001 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.010)	0.020* (0.010)	0.015 (0.010)	0.017 (0.011)	0.011 (0.011)	-0.0003 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.013)
Understands impacts of CC	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.029*** (0.011)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.022* (0.012)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.024* (0.012)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	-0.005 (0.013)	0.007 (0.012)	0.021 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.014)	0.011 (0.014)	0.010 (0.013)	0.014 (0.013)	0.008 (0.013)	0.015 (0.013)	0.036** (0.016)	0.004 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.013)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	-0.013 (0.021)	0.037 (0.023)	0.043* (0.022)	-0.014 (0.020)	-0.038** (0.019)	0.029 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.017 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.006 (0.022)	0.021 (0.020)	-0.020 (0.019)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.086*** (0.024)	0.066*** (0.023)	0.075*** (0.023)	0.094*** (0.022)	0.105*** (0.020)	0.074*** (0.023)	0.091*** (0.021)	0.154*** (0.019)	0.089*** (0.020)	0.070*** (0.024)	0.053** (0.023)	0.112*** (0.020)
Believes own household would lose	-0.071*** (0.021)	-0.057*** (0.015)	-0.026 (0.020)	-0.087*** (0.017)	-0.066*** (0.017)	-0.053*** (0.017)	-0.073*** (0.017)	-0.008 (0.017)	-0.079*** (0.017)	-0.052*** (0.016)	-0.060*** (0.019)	-0.083*** (0.017)
Believes low-income earners will lose	-0.034* (0.019)	-0.020 (0.016)	-0.056*** (0.018)	-0.022 (0.017)	-0.021 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.016)	-0.015 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.056*** (0.017)	-0.025 (0.016)	-0.030 (0.020)	-0.056*** (0.018)
Believes high-income earners will lose	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.012)	0.013 (0.013)	0.003 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.007 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.025** (0.012)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.0004 (0.013)
Observations	2,218	2,013	2,006	2,006	2,088	2,268	2,025	1,990	2,053	1,978	2,022	1,932
R <sup>2</sup>	0.329	0.241	0.237	0.295	0.211	0.216	0.272	0.222	0.214	0.272	0.254	0.228

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 of Dechezleprêtre et al. (forthcoming) for variable definitions.

Table S8: Correlation between (*Somewhat* or *Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in middle-income countries.

	Support for a global GHG tax and dividend							
	IDN (1)	ZAF (2)	MEX (3)	TUR (4)	IND (5)	BRA (6)	CHN (7)	UKR (8)
Control group mean	0.697	0.396	0.681	0.44	0.719	0.539	0.737	0.622
Trusts the government	0.051*** (0.012)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.040*** (0.014)	0.066*** (0.017)	0.065*** (0.015)	0.038** (0.015)	-0.011 (0.015)	0.061*** (0.014)
Believes inequality is an important problem	0.048** (0.011)	0.002 (0.014)	0.057*** (0.014)	0.028 (0.017)	0.092*** (0.016)	0.055*** (0.015)	-0.001 (0.015)	0.027 (0.018)
Worries about CC	0.003 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.016)	0.013 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.017)	-0.0002 (0.016)	0.032* (0.017)	-0.0002 (0.016)	0.046*** (0.016)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	0.020 (0.014)	0.026 (0.017)	0.004 (0.014)	0.039** (0.017)	0.022 (0.016)	0.019 (0.015)	0.034** (0.016)	0.018 (0.016)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.020* (0.011)	0.038** (0.016)	0.032* (0.017)	-0.002 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.015)	-0.017 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.018 (0.016)
Understands emission across activities/regions	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.013)	0.003 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.010)	0.039*** (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.00004 (0.013)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	-0.006 (0.009)	0.011 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.016)	0.0002 (0.012)	0.003 (0.014)	-0.052*** (0.016)	0.022 (0.014)
Knows which gases cause CC	-0.026*** (0.009)	0.019 (0.015)	0.035** (0.014)	0.015 (0.015)	0.020 (0.013)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.023* (0.012)	0.023 (0.015)
Understands impacts of CC	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.0005 (0.015)	0.009 (0.017)	0.043*** (0.014)	-0.023 (0.015)	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.014 (0.014)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	-0.010 (0.007)	0.009 (0.016)	0.015 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.013)	0.002 (0.011)	-0.016 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.010)	0.035** (0.015)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	0.023 (0.015)	0.002 (0.021)	0.019 (0.022)	0.044 (0.029)	0.021 (0.020)	0.032 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.018)	-0.023 (0.025)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.111*** (0.019)	0.073*** (0.022)	0.088*** (0.024)	0.078** (0.031)	0.034 (0.025)	0.129*** (0.022)	0.060*** (0.022)	0.138*** (0.025)
Believes own household would lose	-0.027 (0.021)	-0.044** (0.020)	-0.071*** (0.019)	-0.054** (0.024)	-0.012 (0.019)	-0.067*** (0.023)	-0.119*** (0.022)	-0.045** (0.021)
Believes low-income earners will lose	-0.059*** (0.020)	-0.016 (0.019)	0.003 (0.017)	-0.053** (0.023)	-0.055*** (0.019)	-0.013 (0.020)	0.001 (0.018)	0.004 (0.020)
Believes high-income earners will lose	0.026** (0.011)	-0.020 (0.015)	0.010 (0.013)	0.010 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.014)	0.003 (0.016)	-0.047*** (0.014)	-0.007 (0.013)
Observations	2,488	2,003	2,045	1,932	2,472	1,860	1,717	1,564
R <sup>2</sup>	0.366	0.175	0.242	0.248	0.370	0.272	0.280	0.255

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 of Dechezleprêtre et al. (forthcoming) for variable definitions.

<sup>2123</sup> G Representativeness of the surveys

Table S9: Sample representativeness of the Western surveys. (Back to [2.1](#))

	US1			US2			Eu		
	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample
Sample size		3,000	3,000		2,000	2,000		3,000	3,000
Gender: Woman	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.45	0.50	0.51	0.49	0.51
Gender: Man	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.49	0.55	0.50	0.49	0.51	0.49
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.11	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.18	0.15	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.18	0.15	0.17	0.15
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.24	0.26
Age: 65+	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.25	0.23	0.25
Diploma_25_64: Below upper secondary	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.13	0.14	0.13
Diploma_25_64: Upper secondary	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.28	0.23	0.19	0.23
Diploma_25_64: Post secondary	0.34	0.40	0.34	0.34	0.33	0.34	0.29	0.33	0.29
Race: White only	0.60	0.67	0.61	0.60	0.62	0.61			
Race: Hispanic	0.18	0.15	0.19	0.18	0.19	0.19			
Race: Black	0.13	0.16	0.14	0.13	0.17	0.14			
Region: Northeast	0.17	0.20	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.17			
Region: Midwest	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.21			
Region: South	0.38	0.39	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38			
Region: West	0.24	0.20	0.24	0.24	0.20	0.24			
Urban: TRUE	0.73	0.78	0.74	0.73	0.75	0.73			
Employment_18_64: Inactive	0.20	0.16	0.16	0.20	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.15
Employment_18_64: Unemployed	0.02	0.07	0.08	0.02	0.09	0.08	0.03	0.06	0.05
Vote: Left	0.32	0.47	0.45	0.32	0.46	0.45	0.30	0.32	0.32
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.32	0.32
Vote: Far right							0.10	0.10	0.10
Country: FR							0.24	0.24	0.24
Country: DE							0.33	0.33	0.33
Country: ES							0.18	0.18	0.18
Country: UK							0.25	0.25	0.25
Urbanity: Cities							0.43	0.49	0.43
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs							0.33	0.32	0.33
Urbanity: Rural							0.25	0.20	0.25

*Note:* This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

Table S10: Sample representativeness for each European country. (Back to [2.1](#))

	FR			DE			ES			UK		
	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.									
Sample size		729	729		979	979		543	543		749	749
Gender: Woman	0.52	0.50	0.52	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.53	0.51	0.50	0.43	0.50
Gender: Man	0.48	0.50	0.48	0.49	0.48	0.49	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.50	0.57	0.50
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.29	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.19	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.19	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.33	0.25	0.25	0.18	0.25	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.14	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.07	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.12	0.16	0.12	0.17	0.20	0.17
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.31	0.24	0.22	0.26	0.22	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.24	0.18	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.24	0.19	0.24	0.28	0.23	0.28	0.27	0.28	0.27	0.25	0.30	0.25
Age: 65+	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.26	0.21	0.26	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.24
Diploma_25-64: Below upper secondary	0.11	0.19	0.11	0.10	0.14	0.10	0.24	0.16	0.25	0.12	0.09	0.12
Diploma_25-64: Upper secondary	0.26	0.16	0.26	0.27	0.20	0.27	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.21	0.23	0.21
Diploma_25-64: Post secondary	0.26	0.30	0.26	0.29	0.31	0.29	0.28	0.38	0.27	0.33	0.36	0.33
Urbanity: Cities	0.47	0.52	0.47	0.37	0.47	0.37	0.52	0.58	0.52	0.40	0.41	0.40
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.40	0.35	0.40	0.22	0.27	0.22	0.42	0.43	0.42
Urbanity: Rural	0.34	0.29	0.34	0.23	0.18	0.23	0.26	0.15	0.26	0.18	0.16	0.18
Employment_18-64: Inactive	0.20	0.19	0.18	0.15	0.14	0.11	0.20	0.13	0.12	0.16	0.16	0.17
Employment_18-64: Unemployed	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.11	0.12	0.02	0.03	0.04
Vote: Left	0.23	0.19	0.21	0.37	0.44	0.44	0.33	0.37	0.38	0.25	0.28	0.29
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.26	0.30	0.29	0.28	0.27	0.29	0.18	0.24	0.24	0.36	0.44	0.41
Vote: Far right	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.01	0.03	0.03

*Note:* This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. In this Table, weights are defined at the country level. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

<sup>2124</sup> Similar tables for the global surveys can be found in [Dechezleprêtre et al. \(forthcoming\)](#).  
<sup>2125</sup> [ing](#).

2126 H Attrition analysis

Table S11: Attrition analysis for the US1 survey.

	Dropped out	Dropped out after socio-eco	Failed attention test	Duration (in min)	Duration below 4 min
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mean	0.08	0.059	0.082	21.198	0.016
Income quartile: 2	0.025*** (0.010)	0.025*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.740 (3.064)	-0.009 (0.006)
Income quartile: 3	0.062*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.754 (2.813)	-0.004 (0.007)
Income quartile: 4	0.035*** (0.011)	0.035*** (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-3.917 (2.798)	-0.003 (0.007)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.039*** (0.009)	0.039*** (0.009)	-0.000*** (0.000)	1.544 (2.665)	0.006 (0.006)
Age: 25-34	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.597 (2.604)	-0.031** (0.013)
Age: 35-49	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.824 (3.176)	-0.032** (0.013)
Age: 50-64	-0.060*** (0.015)	-0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	5.723** (2.763)	-0.039*** (0.012)
Age: 65+	0.048*** (0.017)	0.048*** (0.017)	0.000** (0.000)	8.952** (4.267)	-0.047*** (0.012)
Gender: Man	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.451 (2.210)	-0.0001 (0.005)
Urban	0.006 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.888** (2.443)	-0.004 (0.006)
Race: Black	0.020** (0.010)	0.020** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	8.554*** (2.600)	0.004 (0.007)
Race: Hispanic	0.021** (0.010)	0.021** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.119* (2.293)	-0.002 (0.007)
Region: Northeast	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-4.862 (4.782)	-0.004 (0.007)
Region: South	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-1.151 (4.710)	-0.004 (0.006)
Region: West	0.006 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-4.000 (4.305)	-0.003 (0.007)
Vote: Biden	-0.048*** (0.008)	-0.048*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-2.901 (2.379)	-0.009 (0.007)
Vote: Trump	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.145 (2.878)	-0.005 (0.008)
Observations	5,719	5,719	3,252	3,044	3,044
R <sup>2</sup>	0.127	0.127	1.000	0.006	0.017

Table S12: Attrition analysis for the US2 survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 4 min (5)
Mean	0.095	0.074	0.092	16.338	0.052
Income quartile: 2	0.023* (0.013)	0.023* (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	1.352 (1.601)	-0.029** (0.014)
Income quartile: 3	0.054*** (0.014)	0.054*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	8.502 (9.649)	-0.009 (0.016)
Income quartile: 4	0.060*** (0.016)	0.060*** (0.016)	-0.000 (0.000)	5.254 (3.376)	0.0003 (0.017)
Diploma: Post secondary	-0.033*** (0.011)	-0.033*** (0.011)	0.000 (0.000)	1.601 (2.630)	0.012 (0.011)
Age: 25-34	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.929 (1.535)	-0.032 (0.024)
Age: 35-49	0.012 (0.014)	0.012 (0.014)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.076 (6.651)	-0.047** (0.022)
Age: 50-64	0.040*** (0.014)	0.040*** (0.014)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.364 (1.565)	-0.079*** (0.022)
Age: 65+	0.115*** (0.017)	0.115*** (0.017)	-0.000*** (0.000)	2.619 (3.150)	-0.095*** (0.022)
Gender: Man	-0.073*** (0.009)	-0.073*** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	4.707 (6.037)	0.010 (0.010)
Urban	0.019* (0.011)	0.019* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	1.766 (1.135)	0.005 (0.012)
Race: Black	0.060*** (0.015)	0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.673 (13.328)	-0.010 (0.015)
Race: Hispanic	0.079*** (0.014)	0.079*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	2.930 (1.813)	-0.027** (0.012)
Region: Northeast	-0.026* (0.014)	-0.026* (0.014)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.837 (2.855)	-0.011 (0.015)
Region: South	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.000 (0.000)	3.220 (5.002)	0.009 (0.014)
Region: West	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.000 (0.000)	-1.759 (1.942)	-0.009 (0.015)
Vote: Biden	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	3.230 (2.731)	-0.006 (0.014)
Vote: Trump	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.554 (1.272)	0.007 (0.016)
Observations	2,973	2,973	2,280	2,103	2,103
R <sup>2</sup>	0.241	0.241	1.000	0.010	0.031

Table S13: Attrition analysis for the *Eu* survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 6 min (5)
Mean	0.067	0.044	0.151	54.602	0.039
Country: Germany	0.023** (0.010)	0.019** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.533 (18.906)	0.019* (0.010)
Country: Spain	-0.102*** (0.011)	-0.098*** (0.011)	0.000* (0.000)	-29.136* (15.948)	0.010 (0.010)
Country: United Kingdom	0.042*** (0.011)	0.043*** (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-7.458 (18.046)	0.010 (0.010)
Income quartile: 2	0.032*** (0.010)	0.029*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	32.749* (19.771)	-0.015 (0.010)
Income quartile: 3	0.049*** (0.010)	0.047*** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	6.130 (11.734)	-0.021** (0.010)
Income quartile: 4	0.024** (0.011)	0.021* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.659 (19.955)	-0.018* (0.011)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.035*** (0.008)	0.034*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	10.647 (12.959)	-0.007 (0.007)
Age: 25-34	0.028** (0.013)	0.025* (0.013)	-0.000*** (0.000)	36.132 (22.285)	-0.005 (0.018)
Age: 35-49	0.064*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	-0.000*** (0.000)	37.159** (17.190)	-0.013 (0.016)
Age: 50-64	0.085*** (0.013)	0.083*** (0.013)	-0.000 (0.000)	48.363** (22.526)	-0.063*** (0.015)
Age: 65+	0.117*** (0.014)	0.115*** (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	36.351** (14.226)	-0.061*** (0.015)
Gender: Man	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-22.980 (14.093)	0.009 (0.007)
Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs	0.006 (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-16.736 (17.256)	0.004 (0.008)
Degree of urbanization: Rural	0.023** (0.009)	0.023** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	-14.593 (19.733)	-0.001 (0.009)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.025*** (0.005)	-0.025*** (0.005)	0.000*** (0.000)	-17.558 (13.143)	0.019** (0.008)
Vote: Far right	0.005 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.000*** (0.000)	15.838 (32.281)	0.029** (0.014)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	0.023*** (0.006)	0.022*** (0.005)	0.000 (0.000)	24.631 (19.824)	0.030*** (0.010)
Observations	3,963	3,963	3,326	3,115	3,115
R <sup>2</sup>	0.406	0.395	1.000	0.006	0.028

<sub>2127</sub> I Balance analysis

Table S14: Balance analysis.

	List contains: G (1)	Branch petition: NR (2)	Branch donation: Own nation (3)	Branch conjoint 3: with GCS (4)
Mean	0.496	0.493	0.5	0.499
Country: Germany	-0.026 (0.026)	0.017 (0.026)	0.020 (0.026)	0.005 (0.026)
Country: Spain	0.025 (0.030)	0.026 (0.030)	0.026 (0.030)	0.043 (0.030)
Country: United Kingdom	0.002 (0.028)	0.018 (0.028)	0.037 (0.028)	0.063** (0.028)
Country: United States	-0.001 (0.024)	0.019 (0.024)	0.007 (0.024)	0.023 (0.024)
Income quartile: 2	-0.013 (0.021)	-0.024 (0.021)	0.012 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.021)
Income quartile: 3	0.021 (0.022)	-0.005 (0.022)	0.011 (0.022)	-0.004 (0.022)
Income quartile: 4	-0.001 (0.023)	-0.017 (0.023)	-0.013 (0.023)	0.0001 (0.023)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.008 (0.016)	0.014 (0.016)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.016)
Age: 25-34	0.023 (0.031)	-0.049 (0.031)	-0.003 (0.031)	-0.009 (0.031)
Age: 35-49	0.032 (0.030)	-0.002 (0.030)	-0.014 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.030)
Age: 50-64	0.030 (0.030)	-0.005 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.030)	-0.020 (0.030)
Age: 65+	0.029 (0.037)	-0.037 (0.037)	-0.015 (0.037)	-0.012 (0.037)
Gender: Man	0.024 (0.015)	0.012 (0.015)	0.002 (0.015)	-0.016 (0.015)
Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.0005 (0.017)	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.011 (0.017)
Degree of urbanization: Rural	0.013 (0.024)	0.017 (0.024)	-0.004 (0.024)	0.027 (0.024)
Employment status: Retired	-0.005 (0.032)	-0.031 (0.032)	-0.034 (0.032)	-0.016 (0.032)
Employment status: Student	0.005 (0.044)	-0.023 (0.044)	-0.033 (0.044)	-0.025 (0.044)
Employment status: Working	0.010 (0.024)	-0.027 (0.024)	-0.033 (0.024)	-0.012 (0.024)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.004 (0.017)	0.003 (0.017)	0.010 (0.017)	0.002 (0.017)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	0.001 (0.019)	0.014 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.019)	-0.012 (0.019)
Vote: Far right	0.009 (0.034)	0.030 (0.034)	0.023 (0.035)	0.038 (0.034)
Observations	5,991	5,991	5,991	5,991
R <sup>2</sup>	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.003

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

<sup>2128</sup> **J Placebo tests**

Table S15: Placebo tests.

	G+R+C preferred to R+C (1)	Supports G+R+C (2)	Signs petition (3)	Share of policies supported (4)	Conjoint 5 A+CGS preferred to B (5)
Mean	0.645	0.633	0.611	0.535	0.596
Branch of list experiment: 1	-0.013 (0.019)	-0.024 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.018 (0.021)
Branch of list experiment: rgl	0.005 (0.019)	0.006 (0.019)	-0.002 (0.019)	0.001 (0.012)	0.010 (0.021)
Branch of list experiment: rl	-0.009 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.019)	0.022 (0.019)	0.007 (0.012)	0.007 (0.021)
Branch of petition: nr	0.011 (0.014)	0.006 (0.014)	0.022 (0.014)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.015)
Poor is in own country	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.014)	0.015 (0.014)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.020 (0.015)
Observations	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	5,218
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0004	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001

*Note:* Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

<sup>2129</sup> **K Main results on the extended sample**

<sup>2130</sup> As a robustness check, we reproduce our main results on the extended sample that  
<sup>2131</sup> includes the 14% respondents who failed the attention check ( $n = 9,318$ ). These results  
<sup>2132</sup> are non-weighted. They closely match the results in our main specification. For example,  
<sup>2133</sup> the support for the GCS is 54% in the U.S. and 75% in Europe, while the same coefficients  
<sup>2134</sup> are significant for the list experiment.

Figure S50: [Extended sample] Main attitudes by vote (“Right” spans from Center-right to Far right).

(Relative support in percent in Questions 20, 34, 44, 45, 48)

(Back to Section 2.6)

	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom	United States
Support for the GCS	75	78	70	81	75	54
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	83	81	84	87	81	68
Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries*	52	45	60	59	44	52
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	62	57	62	65	65	47
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	82	80	82	86	80	69
[Country]'s foreign aid should be increased	83	87	87	89	69	77
Universalist*	41	35	49	44	36	43

Figure S51: [Extended sample] Influence of the GCS on preferred platform: Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question 30; in the U.S., asked only to non-Republicans.)

	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom	United States
Random programs: A+GCS preferred to B	60	61	59	64	58	59

Table S16: [Extended sample] Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list. The tacit support for the GCS is estimated by regressing the number of supported policies on the presence of the GCS in the list of policies. The social desirability is estimated as the difference between the tacit and stated support, and it is not significantly different from zero even at a 20% threshold (see [Methods](#)).

	Number of supported policies		
	All	U.S.	Europe
List contains: GCS	0.624*** (0.028)	0.524*** (0.041)	0.724*** (0.036)
<i>Support for GCS</i>	NA	0.554	0.754
<i>Social desirability bias</i>	-0.025	-0.017	-0.033
<i>80% C.I. for the bias</i>	[-0.06; 0.01]	[-0.07; 0.04]	[-0.08; 0.01]
Constant	1.317	1.147	1.486
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000
R <sup>2</sup>	0.089	0.065	0.125

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table S17: [Extended sample] Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. ([Question 28](#))

	Prefers the Progressive platform					
	All	United States	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
GCS in Progressive platform	0.022* (0.013)	0.015 (0.018)	0.116*** (0.037)	-0.007 (0.032)	0.028 (0.038)	0.012 (0.037)
Constant	0.628	0.629	0.55	0.682	0.721	0.553
Observations	5,638	2,797	671	883	550	737
R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.0002	0.014	0.0001	0.001	0.0001

Note: Simple OLS model. *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples. \*p < 0.1;  
\*\*p < 0.05; \*\*\*p < 0.01.

<sub>2135</sub> **L Effect of questionnaire framing**

<sub>2136</sub> When comparing the samples *US1* and *US2*, we observe no effect of questionnaire  
<sub>2137</sub> framing (or block sequence) on the question “What group do you defend when you  
<sub>2138</sub> vote?”, common to all waves and placed close to the end of the questionnaire (Table S18).

Table S18: Effect of the wave (*US1* vs. *US2*) on the group defend when voting.  
“What group do you defend when you vote?” (Question 56)

	Group defended when voting		
	Humans or Sentient beings	Fellow citizens	Family and self
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Wave: <i>US2</i>	−0.009 (0.014)	0.009 (0.014)	0.010 (0.011)
Mean	0.432	0.335	0.156
Observations	5,000	5,000	5,000
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0001	0.0001	0.0002

*Note:* Simple OLS model. \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

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