

# International Attitudes Toward Global Policies

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**Major sustainability objectives could be achieved by global approaches to climate change and inequality. For instance, a global carbon price funding a global basic income, called the “Global Climate Scheme” (GCS), would jointly combat climate change and poverty. We analyse surveys over 40,000 respondents from 20 high- and middle-income countries,<sup>1</sup> and conduct complementary surveys on 8,000 respondents from the U.S. and four European countries. The GCS is supported by three quarters of Europeans and half of Americans, even as they understand the policy’s cost to them. Using different experiments, we show that the support for the GCS is sincere and that electoral candidates could win votes by endorsing it. More generally, we document widespread support for other global redistribution policies, such as a wealth tax funding low-income countries. In sum, we provide evidence that global**

20 **policies are genuinely supported by majorities, even in wealthy nations that would bear the**  
21 **burden.**

22 Major sustainability objectives could be achieved by global cooperation policies involving  
23 transfers from high- to lower-income countries.<sup>2–8</sup> Yet international negotiations have not led to  
24 ambitious global policies. We examine a key condition for achieving sustainability objectives:  
25 the support of citizens for globally redistributive policies. Recent surveys administered to over  
26 40,000 respondents from 20 high- and middle-income countries reveal substantial support for those  
27 policies, especially global climate policies and a global tax on the wealthiest aimed at financing  
28 low-income countries (other questions from these surveys are analyzed in a companion paper<sup>1</sup>).

29 To gain insights into the factors shaping public support for global policies in high-income  
30 countries, we conduct complementary surveys among 8,000 respondents from France, Germany,  
31 Spain, the U.S., and the UK. The focus of our approach is a specific policy aimed at addressing  
32 both climate change and poverty, referred to as the “Global Climate Scheme” (GCS). It implements  
33 a cap on carbon emissions to limit global warming below 2°C. The emission rights are auctioned  
34 each year to polluting firms and fund a global basic income, alleviating extreme poverty. In the  
35 wording of the question, respondents are made aware of the cost to themselves of such global  
36 redistribution. The GCS is supported by three quarters of Europeans and half of Americans. We  
37 test whether support of the expressed preference is sincere: a list experiment shows no evidence of  
38 social desirability bias in survey responses, majorities are willing to sign a real-stake petition,  
39 and global redistribution ranks high in the prioritization of policies. Conjoint analyses reveal

that a political platform is more likely to be preferred if it contains the GCS or a global tax on millionaires.

**Literature** A wealth of studies have examined public support for national carbon pricing policies.<sup>1,9–11</sup> Yet, few prior attitudinal surveys have examined policies for global redistribution. They find agreement close to 50% in high-income countries for global carbon taxes with international per capita redistribution;<sup>12</sup> and near consensus that “present economic differences between rich and poor countries are too large” (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree) in each of 29 countries.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, correcting misperceptions concerning one’s position in the world’s income distribution does not affect the support for global redistributive policies.<sup>8</sup> Besides, an international study of the support for global democracy finds that, in countries governed by a coalition, voting shares would shift by 8 (Brazil) to 12 p.p. (Germany) from parties that are said to oppose global democracy to parties that supposedly support it.<sup>14</sup> Supplementary Section A summarises attitudinal surveys on global policies; prior work on attitudes toward climate burden sharing, attitudes toward foreign aid; global carbon pricing, global redistribution, basic income, and global democracy.

## Results

**Data** The study relies on two sets of representative surveys. The figure on global policies originates from a *Global* survey, conducted for another paper that focuses on attitudes toward climate change and national climate policies.<sup>1</sup> The *Global* survey was conducted in 2021–2022 on 40,680 respondents from 20 countries covering 72% of global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. We conducted *Complementary* surveys

in the U.S. (*US1*: N=3,000, *US2*: N=2,000) and four European countries (*Eu*: N=3,000) in 2023  
(See [Methods](#) for details on data collection and data quality).


## **Stated support for global policies**

**Global support** The Global survey shows strong support for climate policies enacted at the global level (Figure 1). When asked “At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be put in place?”, 70% (U.S.) to 94% (Japan) choose the global level.

Among the four global climate policies examined in the *Global* survey, three policies garner high support across all countries (Figure 1): a global democratic assembly on climate change, a global tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries contingent on their climate action, and a global carbon budget of +2°C divided among countries based on tradable shares (or “global quota”), with the allocation of country shares unspecified. The three policies garner a majority of absolute support (i.e., “somewhat” or “strong” support) in all countries (except in the U.S. for the global assembly, 48% absolute support). In high-income countries, the global quota obtains 64% absolute support and 84% relative support (i.e., excluding “indifferent” answers).

Following the support for the global quota, respondents are asked about their preferences for dividing the carbon budget among countries (see third block of Figure 1). Consistent with the existing literature (see Supplementary Section A.1.2), an equal per capita allocation of emission rights emerges as the preferred burden-sharing principle, garnering absolute majority support in all

Figure 1: Relative support for global climate policies (Reproduced from Dechezleprêtre et al. (2022),<sup>1</sup> Figure A21.).



Note 1: The numbers represent the share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* among non-*indifferent* answers (in percent,  $n = 40,680$ ). The color blue denotes a relative majority. See Supplementary Figure A3 for the absolute support. (Questions A-I in Supplementary Section C).

Note 2: \*In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F in Supplementary Section C.

77 countries and never below 84% relative support. Taking into account historical responsibilities or  
 78 vulnerability to climate damages is also popular, albeit with less consensus, while grandfathering  
 79 (i.e., allocation of emission shares in proportion to current emissions) receives the least support in

80 all countries.

81 A global quota with equal per capita emission rights should produce the same distributional  
82 outcomes as a global carbon tax that funds a global basic income. The support for the global  
83 carbon tax is also tested and its redistributive effects – the average increase in expenditures along  
84 with the amount of the basic income – are specified to the respondents explicitly. The support for  
85 the carbon tax is lower than for the quota, particularly in high-income countries, and there is no  
86 relative majority for the tax in Anglo-Saxon countries. Two possible reasons are that distributive  
87 effects are made salient in the case of the tax, and that citizens may prefer a quota, perhaps because  
88 they find it more effective than a tax to reduce emissions. This interpretation is consistent with the  
89 level of support for the global quota once we make the distributive effects salient, as we do in the  
90 complementary surveys.

91 **Global Climate Scheme** The complementary surveys (*US1*, *US2*, *Eu*) consist of a comprehensive  
92 exploration of citizens' attitudes toward the GCS. We present to respondents a detailed description  
93 of the GCS and explain its distributive effects, including specific amounts at stake (see box below  
94 and Supplementary Section D). Furthermore, we assess respondents' understanding of the GCS  
95 with incentivized questions to test their comprehension of the expected financial outcome for  
96 typical individuals in their country (loss) and the poorest individuals globally (gain), followed by  
97 the provision of correct answer. That is, respondents are made aware and we find they understand  
98 that the policy will make people in their country poorer. The same approach is applied to a  
99 National Redistribution scheme (NR) targeting the top 5% (in the U.S.) or top 1% (in Europe)

with the aim of financing cash transfers to all adults, calibrated to offset the monetary loss of the GCS for the median emitter in their country. We evaluate respondents' understanding that the richest would lose and the typical fellow citizens would gain from that policy. Subsequently, we summarize both schemes to enhance respondents' recall. Additionally, we present a final incentivized comprehension question and provide the expected answer that the combined GCS and NR would result in no net gain or loss for a typical fellow citizen. Finally, respondents are directly asked to express their support for the GCS and NR using a simple *Yes/No* question.

The stated support for the GCS is 54% in the U.S. and 76% in Europe (Figure 2), while the support for NR is very similar: 56% and 73% respectively (Supplementary Figure 3). Supplementary Section F presents the sociodemographic determinants of GCS support, showing, for instance, stronger support among young people.

**The Global Climate Scheme** The GCS consists of global emissions trading with emission rights being auctioned each year to polluting firms, and of a global basic income, funded by the auction revenues. Using the price and emissions trajectories from the Stern-Stiglitz report,<sup>15</sup> and in particular a carbon price of \$90/tCO<sub>2</sub> in 2030, we estimate that the basic income would amount to \$30 per month for every human over the age of 15 (see details in Supplementary Section E). We describe the GCS to the respondents as a climate club and we specify its redistributive effects: The 700 million people with less than \$2/day [in Purchasing Power Parity] would be lifted out of extreme poverty, and fossil fuel price increases would cost the typical person in their country a specified amount (see Supplementary Section D). The monthly median net cost is \$85 in the U.S., €10 in France, €25 in Germany, €5 in Spain, £20 in the UK.

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**Global wealth tax** Consistent with the results of the global survey, a “tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-income countries” garners absolute majority support of over 67% in each country, only 5 p.p. lower than a national millionaires tax overall (Figure 2). In random subsamples, we inquire about respondents’ preferences regarding the redistribution of revenues from a global tax on individual wealth exceeding \$5 million, after providing information on the revenue raised by such a tax in their country compared to low-income countries. We ask certain respondents ( $n = 1,283$ ) what percentage of global tax revenues should be pooled to finance low-income countries. In each country, at least 88% of respondents indicate a positive amount, with an average ranging from 30% (Germany) to 36% (U.S., France) (Supplementary Figure 4). To



other respondents ( $n = 1,233$ ), we inquire whether they would prefer each country to retain all the revenues it collects or that half of the revenues be pooled to finance low-income countries. Approximately half of the respondents opt to allocate half of the tax revenues to low-income countries.

**Other global policies** Other global redistributive policies garner majority support across all countries (Figure 2).

**Foreign aid** We provide respondents with information about the actual amount “spent on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries” relative to their country’s government spending and GDP. Less than 16% of respondents state that their country’s foreign aid should be reduced, while 62% express support for increasing it, including 17% who support an unconditional increase (Supplementary Figure 5). Among the 45% who think aid should be increased under certain conditions, we subsequently ask them to specify the conditions they deem necessary (Supplementary Figure 6). The three most commonly selected conditions are: “we can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted” (73% chose this condition), “that recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights” (67%), and “that other high-income countries also increase their foreign aid” (48%). On the other hand, respondents who do not wish to increase their country’s foreign aid primarily justify their view by prioritizing the well-being of their fellow citizens or by perceiving each country as responsible for its own fate (Supplementary Figure 7). In response to an open-ended question regarding measures high-income countries should take to fight

Figure 2: Relative support for various global policies. (Questions 44 and 45 in Supplementary Section D; See Figure A25 for the absolute support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)*	54	76	80	71	81	74
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	55	71	72	70	79	70
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	68	82	82	82	85	81
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	60	76	77	79	79	71
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	46	53	53	43	62	61
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	58	71	69	69	78	72
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	62	73	58	73	80	83
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	63	80	80	78	81	83
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	62	87	90	86	91	87
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	46	62	58	62	65	67
National tax on millionaires funding public services	73	85	81	87	89	88
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	69	84	84	84	87	83

Note: The numbers represent the percentage of *somewhat* or *strong* support, after excluding *indifferent* answers.

\*Except for the GCS: Share of “Yes” in a simple *Yes/No* question.

140 extreme poverty, a large majority of Americans expressed that more help is needed (Supplementary  
141 Figure A38). The most commonly suggested form of aid is financial support, closely followed by  
142 investments in education.

We also inquire about the perceived amount of foreign aid. Consistent with prior research (see Supplementary Section A.1.3), most people overestimate the actual amount of foreign aid (Supplementary Figures A17, A19). We then elicit respondents' preferred amount of foreign aid, after randomly presenting them with either the actual amount or no information. Most of the respondents choose a bracket at least as high as the actual amount (when they receive the information) or the perceived one (when they do not), see Supplementary Figures A17–A21. Finally, we ask a last question to the respondents who received the information. To those who prefer an increase of foreign aid, we ask how they would finance it and find that the preferred source of funding is overwhelmingly higher taxes on the wealthiest (Supplementary Figure A22). To those who prefer a reduction, we ask how they would use the funds becoming available: In every country, more people choose higher spending on education or healthcare rather than lower taxes (Supplementary Figure A23).

**Robustness and sincerity of support for the GCS** We use several methods to assess the sincerity of the support for the GCS. All methods suggest that the support is either completely sincere, or the share of insincere answers is limited.

**List experiment** We use a list experiment to identify the tacit support for the GCS. To do so, we ask *how many* policies within a list respondents support, and vary the list among respondents. The tacit support is estimated as the difference in the average number of policies supported between two random subsamples, whose list differ only by the inclusion of the GCS.<sup>16</sup> In our case, as shown in Table 1, the tacit support for the GCS measured through the list experiment is not significantly

lower than the direct stated support. Hence, we do not find a social desirability bias in our study.

**Petition** In a real-stake question, we ask respondents whether they are willing to sign a petition in support of either the GCS or NR policy, informing them that the results of that question will be sent to the head of state's office. In the U.S., we find no significant difference between the support in the real-stake petitions and the simple questions (GCS:  $p = .30$ ; NR:  $p = .76$ ). In Europe, the petition leads to a comparable lower support for both the GCS (7 p.p.,  $p = 10^{-5}$ ) and NR (4 p.p.,  $p = .008$ ), but the support remains strong, at 69% for the GCS.

**Conjoint analyses** To assess the public support for the GCS in conjunction with other policies, we ask respondents to make five choices between pairs of political platforms.

The first conjoint analysis suggests that the GCS is supported independently of being complemented by the National Redistribution Scheme and a national climate policy, denoted C. For the second analysis, we split the sample into four random branches. The outcome is that there is majority support for the GCS and for C, which are seen as neither complement nor substitute (Supplementary Figure A7). A minor share of respondents like a national climate policy and dislike a global one, but as many people prefer a global rather than a national policy; and there is no evidence that implementing NR would increase the support for the GCS.

In the third analysis, we present two random branches of the sample with hypothetical progressive and conservative platforms that differ only by the presence (or not) of the GCS in

the progressive platform. Table 2 shows that a progressive candidate would not significantly lose voting share by endorsing the GCS in any country, and may even gain 11 p.p. ( $p = .005$ ) in voting intention in France and 3 p.p. ( $p = .13$ ) in the U.S.

Our last two analyses make respondents choose between two random platforms (in the U.S., these questions are framed as a Democratic primary and asked only to non-Republicans). In the fourth analysis, a policy (or an absence of policy) is randomly drawn for each platform in each of five categories.

In the UK, Germany, and France, a platform is about 9 to 13 p.p. more likely to be preferred if it includes the GCS rather than no foreign policy (Supplementary Figure 8). This effect is between 1 and 4 p.p. and no longer significant in the U.S. and in Spain. Moreover, a platform that includes a global tax on millionaires rather than no foreign policy is 5 to 13 p.p. more likely to be preferred in all countries (the effect is significant and at least 9 p.p. in all countries but Spain). Similarly, a global democratic assembly on climate change has a significant effect of 8 to 12 p.p. in the U.S., Germany, and France. These effects are large, and not far from the effects of the policies most influential on the platforms, which range between 15 and 18 p.p. in most countries (and 27 p.p. in Spain), and all relate to improved public services.

The fifth analysis draws random platforms similarly, except that candidate A's platform always contains the GCS while B's includes no foreign policy. In this case, A is chosen by 60% in Europe and 58% in the U.S. (Supplementary Figure 9). Overall, taking the U.S. as an example, our conjoint analyses indicate that a candidate at the Democratic primary would have more chances to

obtain the nomination by endorsing the GCS, and this endorsement would not penalize her or him at the presidential election.

**Prioritization** Toward the end of the survey, we ask respondents to allocate 100 points among six randomly selected policies from the previous conjoint analyses, using sliders. The instruction was to distribute the points based on their level of support, with a higher allocation indicating greater support for a policy. In each country, the GCS ranks in the middle of all policies or above, with an average number of points from 15.4 in the U.S. to 22.9 in Germany (Supplementary Figure A29).

Interestingly, in Germany, the most prioritized policy is the global tax on millionaires, while the GCS is the second most prioritized policy. The global tax on millionaires consistently ranks no lower than fifth position (out of 15 or 17 policies) in every country, garnering an average of 18.3 points in Spain to 22.9 points in Germany.

**Pros and Cons** We survey respondents to gather their perspectives on the pros and cons of the GCS, utilizing either an open-ended or a closed question. Due to the limited variation in the ratings for each element, the closed question format is inconclusive (Supplementary Figure A9).

Analyzing keywords in the responses (automatically translated into English), the most frequently mentioned topics are the international aspect and the environment, while obstacles to implementation or agreement on the proposal are relatively infrequently mentioned (Supplementary Figure A11).

In the *US2* survey, we divided the sample into four random branches. Two branches were presented the pros and cons questions (either in open or closed format) *before* being asked about their support for the GCS or NR. Another branch received information on the actual level of support for the GCS and NR (estimated in *US1*, see Section ), and one control group received none of these treatments. The objective of this “pros and cons treatment” was to simulate a “campaign effect”,<sup>17</sup> which refers to the shift in opinion resulting from media coverage of the proposal. To conservatively estimate the effect of a (potentially negative) campaign, we intentionally included more cons (6) than pros (3). Interestingly, the support for the GCS decreased by 11 p.p. after respondents viewed a list of its pros and cons. Notably, the support also decreased by 7 p.p. after respondents were asked to consider the pros and cons in an open-ended question. Although support remains significant, these results suggest that the support for the GCS is context-dependent, sensitive to the content of the debate about it, and subject to the discourse adopted by interest groups.

**Universalistic values** We also elicit underlying values, to test whether values are consistent with people’s support for specific policies. Most people express some degree of universalism, consistently with the support for specific policies.

When we ask respondents which group they defend when they vote, 20% choose “sentient beings (humans and animals),” 22% choose “humans,” 33% select their “fellow citizens” (or “Europeans”), 15% choose “My family and myself,” and the remaining 10% choose another group (mainly “My State or region” or “People sharing my culture or religion”). Notably, a majority of

left-wing choose “humans” or “sentient beings” (see Supplementary Figure A39 for main attitudes by vote).

When asked what their country’s diplomats should defend in international climate negotiations, only 11% prefer their country’s “interests, even if it goes against global justice” (Supplementary Figure A26). In contrast, 30% prefer global justice (with or without consideration of national interests), and the bulk of respondents (38%) prefer their country’s “interests, to the extent it respects global justice.”

Furthermore, when we ask respondents to assess the extent to which climate change, global poverty, and inequality in their country are issues, climate change is generally viewed as the most significant problem (with a mean score of 0.59 after recoding answers between  $-2$  and  $2$ ). This is followed by global poverty (0.42) and national inequality (0.37).

Finally, we conduct a lottery experiment. Respondents were automatically enrolled in a lottery with a \$100 prize and had to choose the proportion of the prize they would keep for themselves versus give to a person living in poverty. The charity donation is directed either to an African individual or a fellow citizen, depending on the respondent’s random assignment. In Europe, we observe no significant variation in the willingness to donate based on the recipient’s origin. In the U.S., the donations to Africans are 3 p.p. lower, but the slightly lower donations to Africans are entirely driven by Trump voters and non-voters (Supplementary Table A2).



**Second-order Beliefs** To explain the strong support for the GCS despite its absence from political platforms and public debate, we hypothesized pluralistic ignorance, i.e. that the public and policymakers mistakenly perceive the GCS as unpopular. The evidence for pluralistic ignorance is limited based on an incentivized question about perceived support (Supplementary Figure 10).

Beliefs about the level of support for the GCS are fairly accurate for U.S. subjects. The mean perceived support is 52% (with quartiles of 36%, 52%, and 68%), which closely aligns with the actual support of 53%. Europeans, on the other hand, underestimate the support by 17 p.p. Nonetheless, 65% of them correctly estimate that the GCS garners majority support, and the mean perceived support is 59% (and quartiles of 43%, 61%, and 74%). Finally, consistent with U.S. subjects accurately perceiving the levels of support for the GCS or NR, providing information on the actual level had no significant effect on their support in the *US2* survey.

## Discussion

We provide some cautious evidence that certain global climate and redistribution policies may be popular in the Global North. We find no evidence for insincerity or underestimation of fellow citizens' support as potential explanations for the scarcity of global policies in the public debate, though support for them might decay once they are debated. New hypotheses could explain the seeming inconsistency of the high support for global policies with their peripheral appearance in the policy sphere: First, policymakers may be unaware that global policies are popular. Second, policymakers may believe that global redistribution is politically infeasible in some key countries.

Third, with political discourse focused on the national level, shaped by media and elections, national framing may suppress universalistic values.

## Methods

**Data collection.** The paper utilizes two sets of surveys: the *Global* survey and the *Complementary* surveys. The *Complementary* surveys consist of two U.S. surveys, *US1* and *US2*, and one European survey, *Eu*. The *Global* survey was conducted from March 2021 to March 2022 on 40,680 respondents from 20 countries (with 1,465 to 2,488 respondents per country). *US1* collected responses from 3,000 respondents between January and March 2023, while *US2* gathered data from 2,000 respondents between March and April 2023. *Eu* included 3,000 respondents and was conducted from February to March 2023. We used the survey companies *Dynata* and *Respondi*. To ensure representative samples, we employed stratified quotas based on gender, age (5 brackets), income (4), region (4), and education level (3), as well as ethnicity (3) for the U.S. We also incorporated survey weights throughout the analysis to account for any remaining imbalances. These weights were constructed using the quota variables as well as the degree of urbanity, and trimmed between 0.25 and 4. By applying weights, the results are fully representative of the respective countries. Results at the European level apply different weights which ensure representativeness of the combined four European countries. Supplementary Section G confirms that our samples closely match population frequencies in high-income countries. In middle-income countries, the samples are only representative of the online population (young, graduated and urban people are over-represented). Supplementary Material I shows that the treatment branches are balanced. Supplementary Material

J runs placebo tests of the effects of each treatment on unrelated outcomes. We do not find effects of earlier treatments on unrelated outcomes arriving later in the survey.

**Data quality.** The median duration is 28 minutes for the *Global* survey, 14 min for *US1*, 11 min for *US2*, and 20 min for *Eu*. To ensure the best possible data quality, we exclude respondents who fail an attention test or rush through the survey (i.e., answer in less than 11.5 minutes in the *Global* survey, 4 minutes in *US1* or *US2*, 6 minutes in *Eu*).

**Questionnaires and raw results.** The questionnaire and raw results of the *Global* survey can be found in the Appendix of the companion paper, Dechezleprêtre et al. (2022).<sup>1</sup> The raw results are reported in Supplementary Section B while the surveys' structures and questionnaires are given in Supplementary Sections C and D. The questionnaires are the same as the ones given *ex ante* in the registration plan ([osf.io/fy6gd](https://osf.io/fy6gd)).

**Incentives.** To encourage accurate and truthful responses, several questions of the *US1* survey use incentives. For each of the three comprehension questions that follow the policy descriptions, we randomly select and reward three respondents who provide correct answers with a \$50 gift certificate. Similarly, for questions involving estimating support shares for the GCS and NR, three respondents with the closest guesses to the actual values receive a \$50 gift certificate. In the donation lottery question, we randomly select one respondent and split the \$100 prize between the NGO GiveDirectly and the winner according to the winner's choice. In total, our incentives scheme distributes gift certificates (and donations) for a value of \$850. Finally, respondents have an incentive to answer truthfully to the petition question, as they are aware that the results for that

question (the share of respondents supporting the policy) will be transmitted to the head of state's office.

**Support for the GCS** The 95% confidence intervals are [52.4%, 55.9%] in the U.S. and [74.2%, 77.2%] in Europe. The average support is computed with survey weights, employing weights based on quota variables, which exclude vote. Another method to reweigh the raw results involves running a regression of the support for the GCS on sociodemographic characteristics (including vote) and multiplying each coefficient by the population frequencies. This alternative approach yields similar figures: 76% in Europe and 52% or 53% in the U.S. (depending on whether individuals who did not disclose their vote are classified as non-voters or excluded). Notably, the average support excluding non-voters is 54% in the U.S.

Though the level of support for the GCS is significantly lower in swing States (at 51%) that are key to win U.S. elections, the electoral effect of endorsing the GCS remains non-significantly different from zero (at +1.2 p.p.) in these States. Note that we define swing states as the 8 states with less than 5 p.p. margin of victory in the 2020 election (MI, NV, PA, WI, AZ, GA, NC, FL). The results are robust to using the 3 p.p. threshold (that excludes FL) instead.

**Global wealth tax estimates** A 2% tax on net wealth exceeding \$5 million would annually raise \$816 billion, leaving unaffected 99.9% of the world population. More specifically, it would collect €5 billion in Spain, €16 billion in France, £20 billion in the UK, €44 billion in Germany, \$430 billion in the U.S., and \$1 billion collectively in all low-income countries (28 countries, home to 700 million people). These Figures come from the [WID wealth tax simulator](#).<sup>18</sup>

**List experiment** We utilize the difference-in-means estimator, and confidence intervals are computed using Monte Carlo simulation with the R package *list*.<sup>19</sup>

**Petition** Paired weighted *t*-tests are conducted to test the equality in support for a policy among respondents who were questioned about the policy in the petition.

**Conjoint analysis** The effects reported in the fourth analyses are the Average Marginal Component Effects.<sup>16</sup> This method is common in the literature that explores attitudes towards taxation.<sup>20,21</sup> The policies studied are progressive policies prominent in the country. Except for the category *foreign policy*, which features the GCS 42% of the time, they are drawn uniformly.

**Prioritization** The prioritization (Question 58, Supplementary Figures A29 and A30) allows inferring individual-level preferences for one policy over another. This slightly differs from a conjoint analysis, which only allows inferring individual-level preferences for one platform over another or collective-level preferences for one policy over another. Also, by comparing platforms, conjoint analyses may be subject to interaction effects between policies of a platform (which can be seen as complementary, substitute, or antagonistic) while the prioritization frames the policies as independent.

**Pros and cons** Surprisingly, the support for National Redistribution also decreased by 7 p.p. following the closed question about the GCS. This suggests that some individuals may lack attention and confuse the two policies, or that contemplating the pros and cons alters the mood of some people, moving them away from their initial positive impression.

**Determinants of support** Supplementary Section F examines the sociodemographic determinants of support for the GCS as well as the beliefs correlated with the support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income. The strongest correlates are political leaning, trust in the government and perceptions that the policy is effective at reducing emissions or in one's self-interest.

**Sources** Detailed sources for the questionnaires and the figures are given in the **Supplementary Spreadsheet**.

**Data and code availability** All data and code of the *Complementary* surveys as well as figures of the paper are available on [github.com/bixiou/international\\_attitudes\\_toward\\_global\\_policies](https://github.com/bixiou/international_attitudes_toward_global_policies). Data and code for the *Global* survey will be made public upon publication.

1. Dechezleprêtre, A. *et al.* Fighting climate change: International attitudes toward climate policies. *NBER Working Paper* **30265** (2022). [1](#), [2](#), [3](#), [5](#), [19](#)
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Table 1: Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list. The tacit support for the GCS is estimated by regressing the number of supported policies on the presence of the GCS in the list of policies. The social desirability is estimated as the difference between the tacit and stated support, and it is not significantly different from zero even at a 20% threshold (see [Methods](#)).

	Number of supported policies		
	All	U.S.	Europe
List contains: GCS	0.624*** (0.028)	0.524*** (0.041)	0.724*** (0.036)
<i>Support for GCS</i>	0.65	0.542	0.757
<i>Social desirability bias</i>	−0.025	−0.019	−0.033
<i>80% C.I. for the bias</i>	[−0.06; 0.01]	[−0.07; 0.04]	[−0.08; 0.01]
Constant	1.317	1.147	1.486
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000
R <sup>2</sup>	0.089	0.065	0.125

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 2: Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not.  
 (Question 28 in Supplementary Section D) Which of these candidates would you vote for? *A*; *B*;  
*None of them*

	Prefers the Progressive platform					
	All	United States	France	Germany	UK	Spain
GCS in Progressive platform	0.028*	0.029	0.112***	0.015	0.008	−0.015
	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.041)	(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.038)
Constant	0.623	0.604	0.55	0.7	0.551	0.775
Observations	5,202	2,619	605	813	661	504
R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.001	0.013	0.0003	0.0001	0.0003

*Note:* Simple OLS model. The 14% of *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples. GCS has no significant influence on them. \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .