

International Majorities Genuinely Support Global Redistributive and Climate Policies

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Abstract

We document majority support for policies entailing global redistribution and climate mitigation. Surveys on 40,680 respondents in 20 countries show strong stated support for a global carbon price funding equal cash transfers, called the “Global Climate Scheme” (GCS). Through our main surveys on 8,000 respondents in the U.S., France, Germany, Spain, and the UK, we test several hypotheses that could reconcile strong stated support with scarce occurrences in public debates. Three quarters of Europeans and half of Americans support the GCS, even as they understand the policy’s cost to them. Using different experiments, we show that the support for the GCS is sincere and that electoral candidates could win votes by endorsing it. More generally, we document widespread support for other globally redistributive policies, such as increased foreign aid or a wealth tax funding low-income countries. In sum, global policies are genuinely supported by majorities, even in wealthy, contributing countries.

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69 **1 Introduction**

70 Major sustainability objectives could be achieved by global approaches to mitigating
 71 climate change and poverty involving transfers from high- to lower-income countries.^{1–6}
 72 For instance, a global wealth tax could finance the Sustainable Development Goals.⁷ More
 73 specifically, if merely 35% of the revenue were allocated for this purpose, a global 2% tax
 74 on individual wealth in excess of \$5 million could significantly reduce poverty as it would
 75 mechanically increase low-income countries' national income by 50% (as computed on
 76 the [WID wealth tax simulator](#)). Besides, global carbon pricing is widely regarded by
 77 economists as the benchmark climate policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon
 78 emissions externality. As early as 1990, Michael Grubb stated:⁸ "by far the best com-
 79 bination of long term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity, is obtained from a
 80 system based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions which are allocated on an adult
 81 per capita basis", i.e., equally among human adults. Support for such solution, which we
 82 call the "Global Climate Scheme", has been renewed ever since.^{9–14}

83 While international negotiations have not yet led to ambitious globally redistributive
 84 policies, recent developments suggest that such a change might be underway. The African
 85 Union [calls for](#) a global carbon taxation regime, the UN [is setting up](#) a Framework Con-
 86 vention on International Tax Cooperation, the G20 is studying a global wealth tax, etc.

87 A key condition for implementing global policies has remained largely unaddressed:
88 the support of citizens. Using a Global survey on 40,680 respondents from 20 high-
89 and middle-income countries, we reveal substantial support for those policies, especially
90 global climate policies and a global tax on the wealthiest aimed at financing low-income
91 countries (other questions from this survey are analyzed in a companion paper¹⁵). In-
92 terestingly, even in wealthy nations that would bear a significant burden, majorities of
93 citizens express support for such globally redistributive policies. To better understand
94 public support for global policies in high-income countries, we conduct our Main sur-
95 veys among 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, the UK, and the U.S.

96 The focus of the Main surveys is a specific policy aimed at addressing both climate
97 change and poverty, referred to as the “Global Climate Scheme” (GCS). It implements
98 a cap on carbon emissions to limit global warming below 2°C. The emission rights are
99 auctioned each year to polluting firms and fund a global basic income, alleviating extreme
100 poverty. This archetypal policy exposes respondents to the key trade-off between the
101 benefits and costs of globally redistributive climate policies, as respondents are made
102 aware of the cost that the GCS entails for their country’s people.

103 After checking that respondents have understood the policy and its cost, we measure
104 the support in a direct Yes/No question. The GCS is supported by three quarters of Eu-
105 ropeans and more than half of Americans. Then, we test for social desirability bias using
106 a list experiment. We find no evidence that people exaggerate their support in the direct
107 question. To assess whether the support would diminish in a context with real stakes,
108 we ask respondents whether they are willing to sign a petition in favor of the GCS, after
109 informing them that the question results will be communicated to their head of state’s
110 office. The support is sustained in an environment that approaches real stakes. We then
111 carry out conjoint analyses to neutralize experimenter demand and investigate the prior-
112 ity given to global policies compared to other types of policies. Conjoint analyses reveal
113 that a political platform is more likely to be preferred if it contains the GCS or a global tax
114 on millionaires, and that global policies rank high in the prioritization of policies. Our
115 randomized experiments also show that a candidate would not lose vote intentions by
116 endorsing the GCS, and might even gain up to 11 points in a country like France. An
117 analysis of open-ended fields confirms that support for the GCS is real, and indicates that
118 appeal of the GCS comes from its international nature and its impacts on climate, more
119 than on global poverty. We also test other global policies and universalistic attitudes. Sup-
120 port is very strong for a global tax on millionaires, and the median respondent prefers to

121 allocate 30% of the revenues of such a tax to low-income countries. Majorities are willing
122 to increase foreign aid, but only if some conditions are respected, such as making sure
123 the aid is well spent and other high-income countries also increase their contribution.
124 Questions on universalistic values, including a donation experiment, confirm the congru-
125 ence of underlying values with the support for specific policies. Our diverse approaches
126 also help understand what drives the support. For instance, the evidence indicates that
127 one key reason why increasing foreign aid is not as popular as global policies lies in its
128 unilateral nature.

129 Overall, our results point out to strong and genuine support for global climate and
130 redistributive policies, as our experiments confirm the stated support found in direct
131 questions. Our results contribute to the literature on attitudes toward climate policy, con-
132 firming that climate policy is preferred at a global level,^{16–19} where it is more effective
133 and fair. While 3,354 economists supported a national carbon tax financing equal cash
134 transfers in the *Wall Street Journal*, numerous surveys have shown that support for such
135 policy is mixed at best.^{20;15;21–23} Meanwhile, the GCS — the global version of this policy
136 — is largely supported, despite higher costs in high-income countries. In our discussion
137 we offer potential explanations behind the lack of prominence of global policies in the
138 public debate despite this strong support.

139 **Literature** International surveys have shown widespread support for costly climate ac-
140 tion.^{15;24} For instance, representative surveys in 125 countries covering 96% of the world's
141 greenhouse gas emissions show that 69% of the global population express willingness
142 to contribute 1% of their income to fight global warming.²⁵ International surveys have
143 also uncovered near consensus that “present economic differences between rich and poor
144 countries are too large” (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree) in each of 29 countries.²⁶

145 Yet, few prior attitudinal surveys have examined global redistributive policies. A no-
146 table exception tests the support for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples in five
147 countries, representative along gender and age.²⁷ For a given variant, the sample size is
148 about 167 respondents per country. They find over 80% support for any variant in India,
149 between 50% and 65% in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43% to 59% in the U.S.,
150 depending on the variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding an equal
151 cash transfer for each human is close to 50% in high-income countries (e.g., at 44% in the
152 U.S.). These figures are consistent with our results from the *Global survey* (see Figure 2),
153 where the support is lower for a tax that would “only” reduce CO₂ emissions than for

¹⁵⁴ a quota that would unambiguously achieve the climate target. Relatedly, 66% of Americans support providing “financial aid and technical support to developing countries that agree to limit their greenhouse gas emissions”,²⁸ and 90% of Germans want some degree of global redistribution.²⁹ Besides, in surveys conducted in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S., support ranges from 55% to 74% for “a global democracy including both a global government and a global parliament, directly elected by the world population, to recommend and implement policies on global issues”.³⁰ Through an experiment, this paper also finds that, in countries where the government stems from a coalition, voting shares would shift by 8 (Brazil) to 12 p.p. (Germany) from parties who are said to oppose global democracy to parties that supposedly support it. For instance, when Germans respondents were told that (only) the Greens and the Left support global democracy, these parties gained respectively 9 and 3 p.p. in vote intentions.

¹⁶⁶ Appendix A contains a broader literature review including further attitudinal surveys on global policies (A.1.1); prior work on attitudes toward climate burden sharing (Appendix A.1.2), attitudes toward foreign aid (Appendix A.1.3); global carbon pricing (Appendix A.2.1), global redistribution (Appendix A.2.3), basic income (Appendix A.2.4), and global democracy (Appendix A.2.5).

¹⁷¹ 2 Results


¹⁷² 2.1 Data

¹⁷³ The study relies on two sets of surveys: the *Global* survey and the *Main* surveys.

¹⁷⁴ **Global Survey** The *Global* survey, conducted in 2021 by Dechezleprêtre et al.,¹⁵ involved 40,680 respondents from 20 countries, representing approximately 72% of global CO₂ emissions. This survey serves as the basis for measuring stated support for various global policies worldwide. Detailed information about the data collection process, sample representativeness, and analysis of questions on national policies can be found in the companion paper.¹⁵

¹⁸⁰ **Main Surveys** To delve deeper into the sincerity and rationales behind support for the GCS and attitudes towards global policies, global redistribution, and universalistic values, we conducted the Main surveys in 2023. These surveys are based on a sample of

Figure 1: Main surveys' structure. Cf. also Figure S48 for the treatment branches.



¹⁸³ 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, the UK, and the U.S. The European survey (*Eu*) comprises 3,000 respondents, while the U.S. sample was collected in two separate waves: *US1* with 3,000 respondents and *US2* with 2,000 respondents. The survey questions in both the European and U.S. surveys are identical (see Figure 1), except for an additional question in *US2* that uses results from *US1* to assess the bandwagon effect.


¹⁸⁸ The Main surveys ensured representativeness along key dimensions: gender, income, age, highest diploma, and degree of urbanization. The *Eu* survey is also representative of its four countries in terms of population size, while the *US1* and *US2* surveys are representative in terms of region and ethnicity. Tables S8-S9 detail how our samples match population frequencies. More detail on data collection is given in Section Methods. The questionnaires used in the surveys are provided in Appendices C and D.

¹⁹⁴ 2.2 Global support

¹⁹⁵ The Global survey shows strong support for climate policies enacted at the global level (Figure 2). When asked "At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle

197 climate change need to be put in place?", 70% (in the U.S.) to 94% (in Japan) choose the
 198 global level. The next most popular choice is the federal or continental level, favored
 199 by 52% of Americans and less than half of European respondents. Local policies receive
 200 the least support. This preference for climate policies implemented at the global scale
 201 is in line with the literature¹⁷ and consistent with individuals' concerns for the fairness
 202 and effectiveness of such policies, which have been identified as two of the three key
 203 determinants of support, besides self-interest.^{31;20;15} It could also stem from conditional
 204 cooperation, although previous studies suggest that the support for climate policies does
 205 not depend on climate action abroad.^{32;33}

Figure 2: Support for global climate policies.



Note 1: The numbers represent *relative* support, i.e. the share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* among non-*indifferent* answers (in percent, $n = 40,680$). The color blue denotes a relative majority. See Figure S11 for the absolute support. (Questions A-I).

Note 2: *In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

206 Among the four global climate policies examined in the *Global* survey, three policies

garner high support across all countries (Figure 2). These policies include a global democratic assembly on climate change, a global tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries contingent on their climate action, and a global carbon budget of +2°C divided among countries based on tradable shares (or “global quota”), with the allocation of country shares unspecified (see wording in Appendix C). The three policies garner a majority of absolute support (i.e., “somewhat” or “strong” support) in all countries (except in the U.S. for the global assembly, 48% absolute support). In high-income countries, the global quota policy obtains 64% absolute support and 84% relative support (i.e., excluding “in-different” answers).

Following the support for the global quota, respondents are asked about their preferences for dividing the carbon budget among countries, as depicted in the third block of Figure 2. Consistent with the existing literature (see Appendix A.1.2), an equal per capita allocation of emission rights emerges as the preferred burden-sharing principle, garnering absolute majority support in all countries and never below 84% relative support. Taking into account historical responsibilities or vulnerability to climate damages is also popular, albeit with less consensus, while grandfathering (i.e., allocation of emission shares in proportion to current emissions) receives the least support in all countries.

A global carbon tax that funds a global basic income should produce the same distributional outcomes as a global tradable quota with equal per capita emission rights (provided that each country returns the revenues from emissions trading equally to its citizens and to the extent that the carbon price is the same). The support for the global carbon tax is also tested and its redistributive effects – the average increase in expenditures along with the amount of the basic income – are specified to the respondents explicitly (see box below and Appendix D, p. 87). The support for the carbon tax is lower than for the quota, particularly in high-income countries, and there is no relative majority for the tax in Anglo-Saxon countries (consistently with the levels of support found in the only previous study that tested a global carbon tax²⁷). Two possible reasons for this lower support are that distributive effects are made salient in the case of the tax, and that people may prefer a quota, perhaps because they find it more effective than a tax to reduce emissions. The combination of both reasons is consistent with the level of support for the global quota once we make the distributive effects salient, as we do in the Main surveys.

²³⁸ **2.3 Stated support for the Global Climate Scheme**

²³⁹ The Main surveys (*US1, US2, Eu*) include a comprehensive exploration of citizens'
²⁴⁰ attitudes towards the GCS. We present to respondents a detailed description of the GCS
²⁴¹ and explain its distributive effects, including specific amounts at stake (as specified in
²⁴² the box below). Furthermore, we assess respondents' understanding of the GCS with
²⁴³ incentivized questions to test their comprehension of the expected financial outcome for
²⁴⁴ typical individuals in high-income countries (loss) and the poorest individuals globally
²⁴⁵ (gain), followed by the provision of correct answers (Figures S12-S13). The same approach
²⁴⁶ is applied to a National Redistribution scheme (NR) targeting top incomes with the aim
²⁴⁷ of financing cash transfers to all adults, calibrated to offset the monetary loss of the GCS
²⁴⁸ for the median emitter in their country. We evaluate respondents' understanding that the
²⁴⁹ richest would lose and the typical fellow citizens would gain from that policy. Subse-
²⁵⁰ quently, we summarize both schemes to enhance respondents' recall. Additionally, we
²⁵¹ present a final incentivized comprehension question and provide the expected answer
²⁵² that the combined GCS and NR would result in no net gain or loss for a typical fellow
²⁵³ citizen. Finally, respondents are directly asked to express their support for the GCS and
²⁵⁴ NR using a simple Yes/No question.

The Global Climate Scheme The GCS consists of global emissions trading with emission rights being auctioned each year to polluting firms, and of a global basic income, funded by the auction revenues. Using the price and emissions trajectories from the report by Stern & Stiglitz,³⁴ and in particular a carbon price of \$90/tCO₂ in 2030, we estimate that the basic income would amount to \$30 per month for every human adult (see details in Appendix E). We describe the GCS to the respondents as a "climate club" and we specify its redistributive effects: The 700 million people with less than \$2/day [in Purchasing Power Parity] would be lifted out of extreme poverty, and fossil fuel price increases would cost the typical person in their country a specified amount (see Appendix D for details). The monthly median net cost is \$85 in the U.S., €10 in France, €25 in Germany, €5 in Spain, £20 in the UK.

²⁵⁵

²⁵⁶ The stated support for the GCS is 54% in the U.S. and 76% in Europe, while the support
²⁵⁷ for NR is very similar: 56% and 73% respectively (Figures 3, S1). Appendix F examines the
²⁵⁸ sociodemographic determinants of support for the GCS as well as the beliefs correlated
²⁵⁹ with the support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income. The strongest

²⁶⁰ correlates are political leaning, trust in the government and perceptions that the policy is
²⁶¹ effective at reducing emissions or in one's self-interest.

²⁶² 2.4 Robustness and sincerity of support for the GCS

²⁶³ We use several methods to assess the sincerity of the support for the GCS: a list ex-
²⁶⁴ periment, a real-stake petition, conjoint analyses, and the prioritization of policies. All
²⁶⁵ methods suggest that the support is either completely sincere, or the share of insincere
²⁶⁶ answers is limited.

²⁶⁷ 2.4.1 List experiment

²⁶⁸ By asking *how many* policies within a list respondents support and varying the list
²⁶⁹ among respondents, a list experiment allows identifying the tacit support for a policy of
²⁷⁰ interest. For example, say a first subsample faces the list of policies A, B, and C, while a
²⁷¹ second subsamples faces the list A, B, C, and GCS. We do not need to know which policies
²⁷² each respondent support to estimate the average (tacit) support for the GCS, we simply
²⁷³ need to compute the difference in the average number of supported policies between
²⁷⁴ the two random subsamples.³⁵ In our case, as shown in Table 1, the tacit support for the
²⁷⁵ GCS measured through the list experiment is not significantly lower than the direct stated
²⁷⁶ support. Hence, we do not find a social desirability bias in our study.

²⁷⁷ 2.4.2 Petition

²⁷⁸ We ask respondents whether they are willing to sign a petition in support of either
²⁷⁹ the GCS or NR policy. We inform them that the petition results will be sent to the head
²⁸⁰ of state's office, highlighting the proportion of fellow citizens endorsing the respective
²⁸¹ scheme. Even when framed as a petition that might have real stakes, both policies con-
²⁸² tinue to receive majority support. In the U.S., we find no significant difference between
²⁸³ the support in the petitions and the simple questions (GCS: $p = .30$; NR: $p = .76$). In Eu-
²⁸⁴ rope, the petition leads to a comparable lower support for both the GCS (7 p.p., $p = 10^{-5}$)
²⁸⁵ and NR (4 p.p., $p = .008$). While some European respondents are unwilling to sign a
²⁸⁶ petition for policies they are expected to support, this phenomenon is not specific to the
²⁸⁷ GCS, and the overall willingness to sign a petition remains strong, with 69% expressing
²⁸⁸ support for the GCS and 67% for NR.

289 **2.4.3 Conjoint analyses**

290 In order to assess the public support for the GCS in conjunction with other policies, we
291 conduct a series of conjoint analyses. We ask respondents to make five choices between
292 pairs of political platforms.

293 The first conjoint analysis suggests that the GCS is supported independently of being
294 complemented by the National Redistribution Scheme and a national climate policy (C).
295 The second analysis indicates majority support for the GCS and for C, which are seen as
296 neither complement nor substitute (see [Methods](#)). A minor share of respondents like a
297 national climate policy and dislike a global one, but as many people prefer a global rather
298 than a national policy; and there is no evidence that implementing NR would increase the
299 support for the GCS.

300 In the third analysis, we present two random branches of the sample with hypothetical
301 progressive and conservative platforms that differ only by the presence (or not) of the
302 GCS in the progressive platform. Table 2 shows that a progressive candidate would not
303 significantly lose voting share by endorsing the GCS in any country, and may even gain
304 11 p.p. ($p = .005$) in voting intention in France.

305 Our last two analyses make respondents choose between two random platforms. In
306 Europe, respondents are prompted to imagine that a left or center-left coalition will win
307 the next election and asked what platform they would prefer that coalition to have cam-
308 paigned on. In the U.S., the question is framed as a hypothetical duel in a Democratic
309 primary, and asked only to non-Republicans ($n = 2,218$), i.e. the respondents who declare
310 as political affiliation *Democrat*, *Independent*, *Non-Affiliated* or *Other*. In the fourth analysis,
311 a policy (or an absence of policy) is randomly drawn for each platform in each of five
312 categories: *economic issues*, *societal issues*, *climate policy*, *tax system*, *foreign policy* (Figure
313 [S2](#)).

314 In the UK, Germany, and France, a platform is about 9 to 13 p.p. more likely to be
315 preferred if it includes the GCS rather than no foreign policy. This effect is between 1
316 and 4 p.p. and no longer significant in the U.S. (among non-Republicans) and in Spain.
317 Moreover, a platform that includes a global tax on millionaires rather than no foreign
318 policy is 5 to 13 p.p. more likely to be preferred in all countries (the effect is significant
319 and at least 9 p.p. in all countries but Spain). Similarly, a global democratic assembly on
320 climate change has a significant effect of 8 to 12 p.p. in the U.S. (among non-Republicans),
321 Germany, and France. These effects are large, and not far from the effects of the policies
322 most influential on the platforms, which range between 15 and 18 p.p. in most countries

³²³ (and 27 p.p. in Spain), and all relate to improved public services (in particular healthcare,
³²⁴ housing, and education).

³²⁵ The fifth analysis draws random platforms similarly, except that candidate A's plat-
³²⁶ form always contains the GCS while B's includes no foreign policy. In this case, A is
³²⁷ chosen by 60% of Europeans and 58% of non-Republican Americans (Figure S3). Over-
³²⁸ all, taking the U.S. as an example, our conjoint analyses indicate that a candidate at the
³²⁹ Democratic primary would have more chances to obtain the nomination by endorsing the
³³⁰ GCS, and this endorsement would not penalize her or him at the presidential election.

³³¹ 2.4.4 Prioritization

³³² Towards the end of the survey, we ask respondents to allocate 100 points among six
³³³ randomly selected policies from the previous conjoint analyses, using sliders. The instruc-
³³⁴ tion was to distribute the points based on their level of support, with a higher allocation
³³⁵ indicating greater support for a policy. As a result, the average support across policies is
³³⁶ 16.67 points. In each country, the GCS ranks in the middle of all policies or above, with
³³⁷ an average number of points from 15.4 in the U.S. to 22.9 in Germany.

³³⁸ Interestingly, in Germany, the most prioritized policy is the global tax on millionaires,
³³⁹ while the GCS is the second most prioritized policy. The global tax on millionaires con-
³⁴⁰ sistently ranks no lower than fifth position (out of 15 or 17 policies) in every country,
³⁴¹ garnering an average of 18.3 points in Spain to 22.9 points in Germany.

³⁴² 2.4.5 Pros and Cons

³⁴³ We survey respondents to gather their perspectives on the pros and cons of the GCS,
³⁴⁴ randomly utilizing an open-ended or a closed question. In the closed question format,
³⁴⁵ respondents tend to consider every argument as important in determining their support
³⁴⁶ or opposition to the GCS (see Figure S17).

³⁴⁷ The open-ended question provides more insights into what people associate with the
³⁴⁸ GCS when prompted to think about it. Analyzing keywords in the responses (automati-
³⁴⁹ cally translated into English), the most frequently mentioned topics are the international
³⁵⁰ aspect and the environment, each appearing in approximately one-quarter of the answers
³⁵¹ (see Figure S19). This is followed by discussions on the effects of the GCS on poverty and
³⁵² prices, each mentioned by about one-tenth of the respondents. We also manually clas-
³⁵³ sified each answer into different categories (see Figure S18). This exercise confirms the

³⁵⁴ findings from the automatic search: the environmental benefit of the GCS is the most
³⁵⁵ commonly discussed topic, while obstacles to implementation or agreement on the pro-
³⁵⁶ posal are relatively infrequently mentioned.

³⁵⁷ In the *US2* survey, we divided the sample into four random branches. Two branches
³⁵⁸ were presented the pros and cons questions (either in open or closed format) *before* be-
³⁵⁹ ing asked about their support for the GCS or NR. Another branch received information
³⁶⁰ on the actual level of support for the GCS and NR (estimated in *US1*, see box p. 14),
³⁶¹ and one control group received none of these treatments. The objective of the “pros and
³⁶² cons treatment” was to mimic a “campaign effect”, which refers to the shift in opinion
³⁶³ resulting from media coverage of the proposal. To conservatively estimate the effect of
³⁶⁴ a (potentially negative) campaign, we intentionally included more cons (6) than pros (3).
³⁶⁵ Interestingly, the support for the GCS decreased by 11 p.p. after respondents viewed a list
³⁶⁶ of its pros and cons. Notably, the support also decreased by 7 p.p. after respondents were
³⁶⁷ asked to consider the pros and cons in an open-ended question. Despite some significant
³⁶⁸ effects of pondering the pros and cons, approximately half of the Americans express sup-
³⁶⁹ port for the GCS across all treatment branches (see Table S1). Although support remains
³⁷⁰ significant, these results suggest that the public success of the GCS would be sensitive to
³⁷¹ the content of the debate about it, and subject to the discourse adopted by interest groups.

Second-order Beliefs To explain the strong support for the GCS despite its ab-
sence from political platforms and public debate, we hypothesized pluralistic igno-
rance, i.e. that the public and policymakers mistakenly perceive the GCS as unpop-
ular. As a result, individuals might conceal their support for such globally redis-
tributive policies, believing that advocating for them would be futile.

In the case of Americans, their beliefs about the level of support for the GCS are
relatively accurate (Figure S4). The mean perceived support is 52% (with quartiles
of 36%, 52%, and 68%), which closely aligns with the actual support of 53%. Euro-
peans, on the other hand, underestimate the support by 17 p.p. Nonetheless, 65% of
them correctly estimate that the GCS garners majority support, and the mean per-
ceived support is 59% (and quartiles of 43%, 61%, and 74%), compared to the actual
support of 76%. Second-order beliefs are equally accurate for NR in the U.S. and
similarly underestimated in Europe. Finally, consistent with Americans accurately
perceiving the levels of support for the GCS or NR, providing information on the
actual level had no significant effect on their support in the *US2* survey.

³⁷³ **2.5 Stated support for global redistribution**

³⁷⁴ **2.5.1 Global wealth tax**

³⁷⁵ Consistent with the results of the Global survey, a “tax on millionaires of all countries
³⁷⁶ to finance low-income countries” garners relative support of over 69% in each country,
³⁷⁷ only 5 p.p. lower than a national millionaires tax overall (Figure 3). In random subsam-
³⁷⁸ ples, we inquire about respondents’ preferences regarding the redistribution of revenues
³⁷⁹ from a global tax on individual wealth exceeding \$5 million, after providing information
³⁸⁰ on the revenue raised by such a tax in their country compared to low-income countries.
³⁸¹ We ask certain respondents ($n = 1,283$) what percentage of global tax revenues should be
³⁸² pooled to finance low-income countries. In each country, at least 88% of respondents in-
³⁸³ dicate a positive amount, with an average of one-third (Figure S5). To other respondents
³⁸⁴ ($n = 1,233$), we inquire whether they would prefer each country to retain all the revenues
³⁸⁵ it collects or that half of the revenues be pooled to finance low-income countries. Ap-
³⁸⁶ proximately half of the respondents opt to allocate half of the tax revenues to low-income
³⁸⁷ countries, consistently with the other variant of the question.

³⁸⁸ **2.5.2 Other global policies**

³⁸⁹ We also assess support for other global policies (Figure 3). Most policies garner rel-
³⁹⁰ ative majority support in each country, with two exceptions: the “cancellation of low-
³⁹¹ income countries’ public debt” and “a maximum wealth limit” for each individual. The
³⁹² latter policy obtains relative majority support in Europe but not in the U.S., despite the
³⁹³ cap being set at \$10 billion in the U.S. compared to €/£100 million in Europe. Notably,
³⁹⁴ climate-related policies enjoy significant popularity, with “high-income countries funding
³⁹⁵ renewable energy in low-income countries” receiving absolute majority support across all
³⁹⁶ surveyed countries. Additionally, relative support for loss and damages compensation, as
³⁹⁷ approved in principle at the international climate negotiations in 2022 (“COP27”), ranges
³⁹⁸ from 55% (U.S.) to 81% (Spain).

³⁹⁹ **2.5.3 Foreign aid**

⁴⁰⁰ We provide respondents with information about the actual amount “spent on foreign
⁴⁰¹ aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries” relative to their country’s government
⁴⁰² spending and GDP. Less than 16% of respondents state that their country’s foreign aid

Figure 3: Support for various global policies. (*relative support*: percentage of *somewhat* or *strong support*, after excluding *indifferent* answers; *except for GCS: percentage of *Yes* in a *Yes/No* question). (p. 87, Questions 20, 44 and 45; See Figure S33 for the absolute support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)*	54	76	80	71	81	74
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	55	71	72	70	79	70
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	68	82	82	82	85	81
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	60	76	77	79	79	71
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	46	53	53	43	62	61
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	58	71	69	69	78	72
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	62	73	58	73	80	83
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	63	80	80	78	81	83
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	62	87	90	86	91	87
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	46	62	58	62	65	67
National tax on millionaires funding public services	73	85	81	87	89	88
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	69	84	84	84	87	83

403 should be reduced, while 62% express support for increasing it, including 17% who sup-
 404 port an unconditional increase (Figure S6). Among the 45% who think aid should be
 405 increased under certain conditions, we subsequently ask them to specify the conditions
 406 they deem necessary (Figure S7). The three most commonly selected conditions are: “we
 407 can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted” (73% chose this con-
 408 dition), “that recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights” (67%),
 409 and “that other high-income countries also increase their foreign aid” (48%). On the other
 410 hand, respondents who do not wish to increase their country’s foreign aid primarily jus-
 411 tify their view by prioritizing the well-being of their fellow citizens or by perceiving each

⁴¹² country as responsible for its own fate (Figure S8). In response to an open-ended question regarding measures high-income countries should take to fight extreme poverty, a
⁴¹³ large majority of Americans expressed that more help is needed (Figure S46). The most
⁴¹⁴ commonly suggested form of aid is financial support, closely followed by investments in
⁴¹⁵ education.
⁴¹⁶

⁴¹⁷ We also inquire about the perceived amount of foreign aid. Consistent with prior re-
⁴¹⁸ search (see Appendix A.1.3), most people overestimate the actual amount of foreign aid
⁴¹⁹ (Figure S25). We then elicit respondents' preferred amount of foreign aid, after randomly
⁴²⁰ presenting them with either the actual amount or no information. Most of the respon-
⁴²¹ dents who learn the actual amount choose a bracket at least as high as the actual one, and
⁴²² most of those without the information choose a bracket at least as high as the perceived
⁴²³ one (Figures S28–S27). Finally, we ask a last question to the respondents who received
⁴²⁴ the information. To those who prefer an increase of foreign aid, we ask how they would
⁴²⁵ finance it: by far, the preferred source of funding is higher taxes on the wealthiest (Figure
⁴²⁶ S30). To those who prefer a reduction, we ask how they would use the funds becoming
⁴²⁷ available: In every country, more people choose higher spending on education or health-
⁴²⁸ care rather than lower taxes (Figure S31).

Universalistic values We elicit underlying values, to test whether broad values are consistent with people's support for specific policies. When we ask respondents which group they defend when they vote, 20% choose "sentient beings (humans and animals)," 22% choose "humans," 33% select their "fellow citizens" (or "Europeans"), 15% choose "My family and myself," and the remaining 10% choose another group (mainly "My State or region" or "People sharing my culture or religion"). Notably, a majority of left-wing voters choose *humans* or *sentient beings*.

When asked what their country's diplomats should defend in international climate negotiations, only 11% prefer their country's "interests, even if it goes against global justice." In contrast, 30% prefer global justice (with or without consideration of national interests), and the bulk of respondents (38%) prefer their country's "interests, to the extent it respects global justice."

Furthermore, when we ask respondents to assess the extent to which climate change, global poverty, and inequality in their country are issues, climate change is generally viewed as the most significant problem (with a mean score of 0.59 after recoding answers between -2 and 2). This is followed by global poverty (0.42) and national inequality (0.37).

Finally, we conduct a lottery experiment to elicit. Respondents were automatically enrolled in a lottery with a \$100 prize and had to choose the proportion of the prize they would keep for themselves versus give to a person living in poverty. The charity donation is directed either to an African individual or a fellow citizen, depending on the respondent's random assignment. In Europe, we observe no significant variation in the willingness to donate based on the recipient's origin. In the U.S., the donations to Africans are 3 p.p. lower, but the slightly lower donations to Africans are entirely driven by Trump voters and non-voters (Table S2).

429

430 3 Discussion

431 Our point of departure are recent surveys conducted in 20 of the largest countries, as
432 they reveal strong majority support for global redistributive and climate policies, even in
433 high-income countries that would financially lose from them. The results from the Main
434 surveys conducted in the U.S. and four European countries reinforce these findings. We
435 find strong support for global taxes on the wealthiest individuals, as well as majority sup-

⁴³⁶ port for our main policy of interest – the Global Climate Scheme (GCS). The GCS encom-
⁴³⁷ passes carbon pricing at a global level through an emissions trading system, accompanied
⁴³⁸ by a global basic income funded by the scheme’s revenues. Additional experiments, such
⁴³⁹ as a list experiment and a real-stake petition, demonstrate that the support for the GCS is
⁴⁴⁰ real. Such genuine support is further substantiated by the prioritization of the GCS over
⁴⁴¹ prominent national climate policies and aligned with a significant portion of the popu-
⁴⁴² lation holding universalistic values rather than nationalistic or egoistic ones. Moreover,
⁴⁴³ the conjoint analyses indicate that a progressive candidate would not lose voting shares
⁴⁴⁴ by endorsing the GCS, and may even gain 11 p.p. in voting shares in France. Similarly,
⁴⁴⁵ a candidate endorsing the GCS would gain votes in a U.S. Democratic primary, while in
⁴⁴⁶ Europe, a progressive platform that includes the GCS would be preferred over one that
⁴⁴⁷ does not.

⁴⁴⁸ Having ruled out insincerity as potential explanation for the scarcity of global policies
⁴⁴⁹ in the public debate, we propose alternative explanations. The first two are variations of
⁴⁵⁰ pluralistic ignorance, and the last three represent complementary explanations.

⁴⁵¹ First, there may be pluralistic ignorance *among policymakers* regarding universalistic
⁴⁵² values, support for the GCS, or the electoral advantage of endorsing it. Second, people or
⁴⁵³ policymakers may believe that globally redistributive policies are politically infeasible in
⁴⁵⁴ some key (potentially foreign) countries like the U.S. Third, political discourse centrally
⁴⁵⁵ happens at the national level, shaped by national media and institutions such as voting.
⁴⁵⁶ National framing by political voices may create biases and suppress universalistic values.
⁴⁵⁷ Fourth, many individuals, including policymakers, may perceive global redistributive
⁴⁵⁸ policies as ill-defined or technically infeasible, ultimately dismissing them as unrealistic.
⁴⁵⁹ In particular, policymakers may have insider information about the technical feasibility of
⁴⁶⁰ such policies. Alternatively, the perception of unrealism may stem from an unawareness
⁴⁶¹ of specific proposals. Fifth, just as policy is disproportionately influenced by the economic
⁴⁶² elites,^{36;37} public debate may be shaped by the wealthiest, who have vested interests in
⁴⁶³ preventing global redistribution.

⁴⁶⁴ Confirmation of any of these hypotheses would lead to a common conclusion: there
⁴⁶⁵ exists substantial support for global policies addressing climate change and global in-
⁴⁶⁶ equality, even in high-income countries, and the perceived boundaries of political realism
⁴⁶⁷ on this issue may soon shift. Uncovering evidence to support the above hypotheses could
⁴⁶⁸ draw attention to global policies in the public debate and contribute to their increased
⁴⁶⁹ prominence.

470 **Methods**

471 **Pre-registration.** The project is approved by Economics & Business Ethics Committee (EBEC) at
472 the University of Amsterdam (EB-1113) and was preregistered in the Open Science Foundation
473 registry (osf.io/fy6gd). The study did not deviate from the registration: the questionnaires and
474 the hypotheses tests used are the same as the ones *given ex ante*. Informed consent was obtained
475 from all respondents, randomized treatment branches were unknown to the respondents, and our
476 research complies with all relevant ethical regulations. Respondents were compensated with gift
477 certificates for a value of €1 per interview. No statistical methods were used to pre-determine
478 sample sizes but our sample sizes are those reported in previous publications.^{15–18;20}

479 **Data collection.** The paper utilizes two sets of surveys: the *Global* survey and the *Main* sur-
480 veys. The *Main* surveys consist of two U.S. surveys, *US1* and *US2*, and one European survey, *Eu*.
481 The *Global* survey was conducted from March 2021 to March 2022 on 40,680 respondents from
482 20 countries (with 1,465 to 2,488 respondents per country). *US1* collected responses from 3,000
483 respondents between January and March 2023, while *US2* gathered data from 2,000 respondents
484 between March and April 2023. *Eu* included 3,000 respondents and was conducted from February
485 to March 2023. We used the survey companies *Dynata* and *Respondi*. To ensure representative
486 samples, we employed stratified quotas based on gender, age (5 brackets), income (4), region (4),
487 education level (3), and ethnicity (3) for the U.S. We also incorporated survey weights throughout
488 the analysis to account for any remaining imbalances. These weights were constructed using the
489 quota variables as well as the degree of urbanity, and trimmed between 0.25 and 4. Stratified quo-
490 tas followed by reweighting is the usual method to reduce selection bias from opt-in online panels,
491 when better sampling methods (such as compulsory participation of random dwellings) are un-
492 available.³⁸ By applying weights, the results are fully representative of the respective countries
493 along the above mentioned dimensions. Results at the European level apply different weights
494 which ensure representativeness of the combined four European countries. Appendix G shows
495 how our samples compare to actual population frequencies. Our samples match well actual fre-
496 quencies, except for some imbalance on vote in the U.S. (which does not affect our results, as show
497 the results reweighted by vote in the below section *Support for the GCS*). Appendix I shows that the
498 treatment branches are balanced. Appendix J runs placebo tests of the effects of each treatment on
499 unrelated outcomes. We do not find effects of earlier treatments on unrelated outcomes arriving
500 later in the survey. Appendix K shows that our results are unchanged when including inattentive
501 respondents.

502 **Data quality.** The median duration is 28 minutes for the *Global* survey, 14 min for *US1*, 11 min
503 for *US2*, and 20 min for *Eu*. To ensure the best possible data quality, we exclude respondents who

504 fail an attention test or rush through the survey (i.e., answer in less than 11.5 minutes in the *Global*
505 survey, 4 minutes in *US1* or *US2*, 6 minutes in *Eu*). At the end of the survey, we ask whether
506 respondents thought that our survey was politically biased and want to provide some feedback.
507 67% of the respondents found the survey unbiased. 25% found it left-wing biased, and 8% found
508 it right-wing biased.

509 **Questionnaires and raw results.** The questionnaire and raw results of the *Global* survey can
510 be found in the Appendix of the companion paper.¹⁵ The raw results are reported in Appendix
511 **B** while the surveys' structures and questionnaires are given in Appendices **C** and **D**. Country-
512 specific raw results are also available as supplementary material files: **US**, **EU**, **FR**, **DE**, **ES**, **UK**.

513 **Incentives.** To encourage accurate and truthful responses, several questions of the *US1* survey
514 use incentives. For each of the three comprehension questions that follow the policy descrip-
515 tions, we randomly select and reward three respondents who provide correct answers with a \$50
516 gift certificate. Similarly, for questions involving estimating support shares for the GCS and NR,
517 three respondents with the closest guesses to the actual values receive a \$50 gift certificate. In the
518 donation lottery question, we randomly select one respondent and split the \$100 prize between
519 the NGO GiveDirectly and the winner according to the winner's choice. In total, our incentives
520 scheme distributes gift certificates (and donations) for a value of \$850. Finally, respondents have
521 an incentive to answer truthfully to the petition question, as they are aware that the results for
522 that question (the share of respondents supporting the policy) will be transmitted to their head of
523 state's office.

524 **Absolute vs. relative support.** In most questions, support or opposition for a policy is asked
525 using a 5-Likert scale, with *Indifferent* as the middle option and compulsory response. We call
526 *absolute support* the share of *Somewhat* or *Strong support*. We generally favor the notion of *relative*
527 *support*, which reports the share of support after excluding *Indifferent* answers. Indeed, the *relative*
528 *support* is better suited to assess whether there are more people in favor vs. against a policy.

529 **Support for the GCS.** The 95% confidence intervals are [52.4%, 55.9%] in the U.S. and [74.2%, 77.2%]
530 in Europe. The average support is computed with survey weights, employing weights based on
531 quota variables, which exclude vote. Another method to reweigh the raw results involves running
532 a regression of the support for the GCS on sociodemographic characteristics (including vote) and
533 multiplying each coefficient by the population frequencies. This alternative approach yields sim-
534 ilar figures: 76% in Europe and 52% or 53% in the U.S. (depending on whether individuals who
535 did not disclose their vote are classified as non-voters or excluded). Notably, the average support
536 excluding non-voters is 54% in the U.S.

537 Though the level of support for the GCS is significantly lower in swing States (at 51%) that
538 are key to win U.S. elections, the electoral effect of endorsing the GCS remains non-significantly
539 different from zero (at +1.2 p.p.) in these States. Note that we define swing states as the 8 states
540 with less than 5 p.p. margin of victory in the 2020 election (MI, NV, PA, WI, AZ, GA, NC, FL). The
541 results are unchanged if we use the 3 p.p. threshold (that excludes FL) instead.

542 **List experiment.** List experiments have been used to reveal social desirability bias, silencing ei-
543 ther racism in the Southern U.S.³⁹ or opposition to the invasion of Ukraine in Russia.⁴⁰ In our case,
544 the question reads: “Beware, this question is quite unusual. Among the policies below, **how many**
545 do you support?” The list of policies randomly varies across respondents, and includes a subset of
546 GCS, NR (National Redistribution scheme), C (“Coal exit” in the U.S., “Thermal insulation plan”
547 in Europe) and O (“Marriage only for opposite-sex couples in the U.S.”, “Death penalty for major
548 crimes” in Europe). There are four branches: GCS/NR/C/O; GCS/C/O; NR/C/O; C/O. To esti-
549 mate the tacit average support for the GCS and NR, we regress the number of supported policies
550 on indicators that the list includes GCS and NR. We utilize the difference-in-means estimator, and
551 confidence intervals are computed using Monte Carlo simulation with the R package *list*.³⁵

552 **Petition.** The respondent is randomly assigned a branch where the petition relates to the GCS or
553 the National Redistribution scheme. The question reads: “Would you be willing to sign a petition
554 for the [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme?

555 As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President’s office], in-
556 forming him what share of American people are willing to endorse the [Global climate / National
557 redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign, only your answer here is required and
558 remains anonymous.”).

559 Paired weighted *t*-tests are conducted to test the equality in support for a policy among re-
560 spondents who were questioned about the policy in the petition.

561 **Conjoint analyses.** The first conjoint analysis suggests that the GCS is supported independently
562 of being complemented by the National Redistribution Scheme and a national climate policy
563 (“Coal exit” in the U.S., “Thermal insulation plan” in Europe, denoted C). Indeed, 54% of U.S.
564 respondents and 74% of European ones prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to the com-
565 bination of C and NR alone, indicating similar support for the GCS conditional on NR and C than
566 for the GCS alone (Figure S15).

567 In the second conjoint analysis, results from the first branch show that the support for the GCS
568 conditional on NR, at 55% in the U.S. ($n = 757$) and 77% in Europe ($n = 746$), is not significantly
569 different from the support for the GCS alone. This suggests that rejection of the GCS is not driven
570 by the cost of the policy on oneself. The second branch shows that the support for C conditional

571 on NR is somewhat higher, at 62% in the U.S. ($n = 751$) and 84% in Europe ($n = 747$). However,
572 the third one shows no significant preference for C compared to GCS (both conditional on NR),
573 neither in Europe, where GCS is preferred by 52% ($n = 741$) nor in the U.S., where C is preferred
574 by 53% ($n = 721$). The fourth branch shows that 55% in the U.S. ($n = 771$) and 77% in Europe ($n =$
575 766) prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to NR alone.

576 The effects reported in the fourth analysis are the Average Marginal Component Effects.⁴¹ The
577 policies studied are progressive policies prominent in the country. Except for the category *foreign*
578 *policy*, which features the GCS 42% of the time, they are drawn uniformly.

579 **Prioritization.** The prioritization allows inferring individual-level preferences for one policy
580 over another, including in their intensity. This somewhat differs from a conjoint analysis, which
581 only allows inferring individual-level preferences for one platform over another or collective-level
582 preferences for one policy over another. Also, by comparing platforms, conjoint analyses may be
583 subject to interaction effects between policies of a platform (which can be seen as complementary,
584 substitute, or antagonistic) while the prioritization frames the policies as independent.

585 This question sheds light on a potential discrepancy between the policy priorities of the public
586 and those enacted by legislators. For instance, while the European Union and California have
587 enacted plans to phase out new combustion-engine cars by 2035, the proposal to “ban the sale of
588 new combustion-engine cars by 2030” emerged as one of the three least prioritized policies in each
589 country, with an average allocation of 7.8 points in France to 11.4 points in the UK.

590 **Open-ended question on the GCS.** Around one in four respondents explicitly cites pros or cons.
591 Few individuals explicitly express support or opposition, and misunderstandings are rare. Only
592 11% of the responses are empty or express a lack of opinion, though one-quarter are unclassifiable
593 due to the rarity, nonsensical nature, or irrelevance of the conveyed idea.

594 **Pros and cons.** In the closed question, the least important aspect was the negative impact on
595 their household, with 60% in Europe ($n=1,505$) and 75% in the U.S. ($n=493$) finding it important.
596 The most important elements differ between Europe and the U.S. In Europe, the key factors are
597 the GCS’s potential to limit climate change and reduce poverty in low-income countries, both
598 deemed important by 85% of respondents. In the U.S., having sufficient information about the
599 scheme ranks highest at 89%, followed by its potential to foster global cooperation at 82%.

600 Surprisingly, the support for National Redistribution also decreased by 7 p.p. following the
601 closed question about the GCS. This suggests that some individuals may lack attention and con-
602 fuse the two policies, or that contemplating the pros and cons alters the mood of some people,
603 moving them away from their initial positive impression.

604 **Global wealth tax estimates.** A 2% tax on net wealth exceeding \$5 million would annually raise
605 \$816 billion, leaving unaffected 99.9% of the world population. More specifically, it would collect
606 €5 billion in Spain, €16 billion in France, £20 billion in the UK, €44 billion in Germany, \$430
607 billion in the U.S., and \$1 billion collectively in all low-income countries (28 countries, home to
608 700 million people). These Figures come from the WID wealth tax simulator.⁴²

609 **Design choices.** As Global survey results indicated strong support for global redistributive poli-
610 cies worldwide, we conducted our Main surveys to test the robustness of these results. Among
611 the eight largest high-income countries, we selected the five ones with a relatively low level of
612 support for global redistributive policies as observed in the Global survey. We also focus on the
613 GCS as its costs are less concentrated on the very rich, compared to other global redistributive
614 policies, so we expect lower (or less genuine) support. By selecting countries that would lose from
615 global redistribution, are less supportive than others, and focusing on less consensual policies, we
616 aimed at conservatively assessing the level of support of world citizens for global redistribution.

617 We split the U.S. survey into two waves to test the effect on the support of providing the
618 information on the actual support, and merged the *Eu* survey in one wave to get larger sample
619 sizes and more power in the analyses.

620 To select the policies tested, we spanned three key areas for global redistribution: climate
621 change, inequality, and global governance. We selected policies that are either on the agenda
622 of international negotiations (international transfers for mitigation; adaptation; or loss and dam-
623 ages; cancellation of public debt; reform of voting rights at the UN or IMF; global wealth tax) or
624 advocated by prominent NGOs or scholars ([global asset registry](#); limits on wealth;^{43;7} democratic
625 climate governance;⁴⁴ global minimum wage;⁴⁵ fair trade;⁴⁶ carbon pricing;⁶ [increased foreign
626 aid](#)).

627 Data and code availability

628 All data and code of the *Main* surveys as well as figures of the paper are available on [10.5281/zen-](#)
629 [odo.11202245](#) Data and code for the *Global* survey will be made public upon publication.

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635 **Author Contributions**

636 A.F. collected and analysed the data, and drafted the questionnaire and the paper. T.D. and
637 L.M. substantially revised the questionnaire and paper, and contributed to the conception and
638 redaction.

639 **Competing interests**

640 Fabre declares that he also serves as president of Global Redistribution Advocates.

Table 1: Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list. The tacit support for the GCS is estimated by regressing the number of supported policies on the presence of the GCS in the list of policies. The social desirability is estimated as the difference between the tacit and stated support, and it is not significantly different from zero even at a 20% threshold (see [Methods](#)).

	Number of supported policies		
	All	U.S.	Europe
List contains: GCS	0.624*** (0.028)	0.524*** (0.041)	0.724*** (0.036)
<i>Support for GCS</i>	0.65	0.542	0.757
<i>Social desirability bias</i>	-0.025	-0.019	-0.033
<i>80% C.I. for the bias</i>	[-0.06; 0.01]	[-0.07; 0.04]	[-0.08; 0.01]
Constant	1.317	1.147	1.486
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000
R ²	0.089	0.065	0.125

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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Table 2: Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. (Question 28)

	Prefers the Progressive platform					
	All	United States	France	Germany	UK	Spain
GCS in Progressive platform	0.028* (0.014)	0.029 (0.022)	0.112*** (0.041)	0.015 (0.033)	0.008 (0.040)	-0.015 (0.038)
Constant	0.623	0.604	0.55	0.7	0.551	0.775
Observations	5,202	2,619	605	813	661	504
R ²	0.001	0.001	0.013	0.0003	0.0001	0.0003

Note: Simple OLS model. The 14% of *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples.
GCS has no significant influence on them. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

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Extended data

Table S1: Effects on the support for the GCS of a question on its pros and cons (either in open-ended or closed format) and on information about the actual support, in the U.S. (See Section D in the US2 Questionnaire) [\(Back to Section 2.4.5\)](#)

	Support			
	Global Climate Scheme		National Redistribution	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Control group mean	0.557	0.557	0.569	0.569
Treatment: Open-ended field on GCS pros & cons	-0.073** (0.035)	-0.071** (0.031)	-0.035 (0.035)	-0.030 (0.032)
Treatment: Closed questions on GCS pros & cons	-0.109*** (0.034)	-0.096*** (0.031)	-0.065* (0.034)	-0.062** (0.031)
Treatment: Info on actual support for GCS and NR	-0.021 (0.034)	-0.015 (0.031)	0.048 (0.033)	0.056* (0.031)
Includes controls		✓		✓
Observations	2,000	1,995	2,000	1,995
R ²	0.007	0.170	0.007	0.154

Figure S1: [For Supplementary Material] Support for the GCS, NR and the combination of GCS, NR and C (Yes/No questions).
(p. 87, Questions 20, 22, 35, 36, and 26).





Table S2: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality. (Question 34) [\(Back to Section 2.5.3\)](#)


	Donation to poor people (in %)			
	All	US	US	Eu
Poor is in own country	0.590 (0.799)	2.509** (1.152)	0.046 (1.691)	-1.349 (1.108)
Poor is in own country \times Vote: <i>not</i> Biden			3.954* (2.279)	
Mean	34.034	33.658	33.658	34.41
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000	3,000
R ²	0.0001	0.002	0.034	0.0005

Figure S2: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See non-translated versions in Figure S16; Question 29)


(a) U.S. (Asked only to non-Republicans)




(b) France



(c) Germany



(d) Spain



(e) UK




Figure S3: Influence of the GCS on preferred platform:

Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question 30; in the U.S., asked only to non-Republicans.)




Figure S4: Beliefs regarding the support for the GCS and NR. (Questions 21 and 23)




Figure S5: Percent of global wealth tax that should finance low-income countries (*mean*). “Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all countries around the world. (...)

What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of retained in the country’s national budget)?” (Question 37)




Figure S6: Attitudes regarding the evolution of [own country] foreign aid. (Question 46)




Figure S7: Conditions at which foreign aid should be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish an increase of foreign aid at some conditions.] (Question 47)





Figure S8: Reasons why foreign aid should not be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish a decrease or stability of foreign aid.] (Question 48)



790 **A Literature review**

791 **A.1 Attitudes and perceptions**

792 **A.1.1 Population attitudes on global policies**

793 Using representative samples in 125 countries covering 96% of the world's greenhouse
794 gas emissions, Andre et al. (2024) show that 69% of the global population express willingness
795 to contribute 1% of their income to fight global warming. Carattini et al. (2019) test
796 the support for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples in five countries, representative
797 along gender and age. For a given variant, the sample size is about 167 respondents per country.
798 They find over 80% support for any variant in India, between 50% and 65% in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43% to 59% in the U.S., depending on the
799 variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding an equal dividend for each
800 human is close to 50% in high-income countries (e.g., at 44% in the U.S.), consistently with
801 our results from the *Global* survey (see Figure 2). This is another piece of evidence that the
802 support is lower for a tax that would "only" reduce CO₂ emissions than for a quota that
803 would unambiguously achieve the climate target. Using a conjoint analysis in the U.S.
804 and Germany, Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019) find that the support for a carbon tax
805 increases by up to 50% if it applies to all industrialized countries rather than exclusively
806 to one's own country.

807 In surveys conducted in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S., Ghassim (2020)
808 finds support ranging from 55% to 74% for "a global democracy including both a global
809 government and a global parliament, directly elected by the world population, to recom-
810 mend and implement policies on global issues". Through an experiment, he also finds
811 that, in countries where the government stems from a coalition, voting shares would shift
812 by 8 (Brazil) to 12 p.p. (Germany) from parties who are said to oppose global democracy
813 to parties that supposedly support it. For instance, when Germans respondents were
814 told that (only) the Greens and the Left support global democracy, these parties gained
815 respectively 9 and 3 p.p. in vote intentions, while the SPD and the CDU-CSU each lost
816 6 p.p. Ghassim (2020) also presents survey results showing strong majorities in favor of
817 the direct election of one's country's UN representative in all 18 surveyed countries. Sim-
818 ilarly, in each of 10 countries, there are clear majorities in favor of "a new supranational
819 entity [taking] enforceable global decisions in order to solve global risks" (Global Chal-
820 lenges Foundation 2018). Remarkably, already in 1946, 54% of Americans agreed (while
821

822 24% disagreed) that “the UN should be strengthened to make it a world government
823 with the power to control the armed forces of all nations” (Gallup 1946). Furthermore,
824 in surveys conducted in Argentina, China, India, Russia, Spain, and the U.S., Ghassim
825 et al. (2022) find majority support for UN reforms that would make United Nations’ de-
826 cisions binding, give veto powers to a few other major countries at the Security Council,
827 or complement the highest body of the UN with a chamber of directly elected represen-
828 tatives.

829 Relatedly, Meilland et al. (2023) find that both Americans and French people prefer
830 an international settlement of climate justice, even if it encroaches on sovereignty. In a
831 2013 survey conducted in China, Germany, and the U.S., Schleich et al. (2016) show that
832 over three-quarter of people think that international climate agreements reached so far
833 are not successful and that future agreements are important. In Finland, Sivonen (2022)
834 finds that that support for a carbon tax is higher if implemented at the global level (54%)
835 rather than at the national level (40%).

836 The results from these specific questions are in line with the answers to more gen-
837 eral questions. In each of 36 countries, ISSP (2010) find near consensus that “for envi-
838 ronmental problems, there should be international agreements that [their country] and
839 other countries should be made to follow” (overall, 82% agree and 4% disagree). In each
840 of 29 countries, ISSP (2019) uncover near consensus that “Present economic differences
841 between rich and poor countries are too large” (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree).
842 Leiserowitz et al. (2021) reveal that 66% of Americans support providing “financial aid
843 and technical support to developing countries that agree to limit their greenhouse gas
844 emissions.” Fehr et al. (2022) find that 90% of Germans want some degree of global redis-
845 tribution.

846 A.1.2 Population attitudes on climate burden sharing

847 Despite differences in the description of fairness principles, surveys on burden-sharing
848 rules show consistent attitudes. Or at least, their seemingly contradictory results can be
849 made compatible with the following interpretation: Concerning emissions reductions,
850 most people want that every country engage in strong and collective decarbonization ef-
851 forts, with a global quota converging to climate neutrality in the medium run. Concerning
852 the financial effort, most people support high-emitting countries paying and low-income
853 countries receiving funding. The most supported rules are those perceived as equitable,
854 in particular an equal right to emit per person.

855 This interpretation helps to understand the apparent differences between articles that
856 approach burden sharing from different angles: cost sharing (in money terms), effort shar-
857 ing (in terms of emissions reductions), or resource sharing (in terms of rights to emit).
858 Existing papers adopt either the cost sharing or effort sharing approach, which preclude
859 any country from being a net receiver of funds. Also, by focusing on *either* the financial
860 or the decarbonization effort, these surveys miss the other half of the picture, which can
861 explain why some papers find strong support for the ability-to-pay principle while others
862 find strong support for grandfathering (defined as emissions reductions being the same
863 in every country). The literature follows these approaches to align with the notions used
864 by the UNFCCC. Yet, we argue that the resource sharing approach is preferable for un-
865 covering attitudes, as it unambiguously describes the distributive implications of each
866 rule while achieving an efficient geographical distribution of emissions reductions and
867 explicitly allowing for monetary gains for some countries.

868 Now, let us summarize the results of the different papers in the light of this clarifica-
869 tion. Schleich et al. (2016) find an identical ranking of support for burden-sharing prin-
870 ciples in China, Germany, and the U.S.: polluter-pays followed by ability-to-pay, equal
871 emissions per capita, and grandfathering. Note that the authors do not allow for emis-
872 sions trading in their description of equal *emissions per capita*, which may explain its rel-
873 atively low support. Yet, the relative support for egalitarianism also depends on how
874 *the other* rules are described. Indeed, Carlsson et al. (2011) find that Swedes prefer that
875 “all countries are allowed to emit an equal amount per capita” rather than options where
876 emissions are reduced based on current or historical emissions, for which it is explicitly
877 stated that high-emitting countries “will continue to emit more than others”. Bechtel &
878 Scheve (2013) find agreement that rich countries should pay more and historical emis-
879 sions should matter, but that efforts should not be solely borne by wealthy nations. More
880 precisely, their conjoint analysis conducted in France, Germany, the UK, and the U.S.
881 shows that a climate agreement is 15 p.p. more likely to be preferred (to a random alter-
882 native) if it includes 160 countries rather than 20, and 5 p.p. less likely to be preferred
883 if “only rich countries pay” compared to other burden-sharing rules: “rich countries pay
884 more than poor”, “countries pay proportional to current emissions” or “countries pay
885 proportional to historical emissions”. In Germany and the U.S., Gampfer et al. (2014) also
886 find stronger support for funding climate action in low-income countries when cost is
887 shared with other countries. Using a choice experiment, Carlsson et al. (2013) find that the
888 least preferred option in China and the U.S. is when low-emitting countries are exempted

from any effort. Ability-to-pay is appreciated in both countries and is the preferred option in the U.S., though the preferred option in China is another one that accounts for historical responsibility. In the U.S. and France, Meilland et al. (2023) find that the most favored fairness principle is that “all countries commit to converge to the same average of total emissions per inhabitant, compatible with a controlled climate change”. Furthermore, in each country, 73% disagree with grandfathering defined as “countries which emitted a lot of carbon in the past have a right to continue emitting more than others in the future”. The study by Meilland et al. (2023) contains many other results: for instance, majorities prefer to hold countries accountable for their consumption-based rather than territorial emissions, and the median choice regarding historical responsibility is to hold a country accountable for its post-1990 emissions (rather than post-1850 or just their current emissions). Finally, in each of 28 (among the largest) countries, Dabla-Norris et al. (2023) find strong majority for “all countries” to the question “Which countries do you think should be paying to reduce carbon emissions?”. When asked to choose between a cost sharing based on *current* vs. *accumulated historic emissions*, a majority prefers *current emissions* in all countries but China and Saudi Arabia (where the two options are close to equally preferred).

(Back to Section 2.2)

906 A.1.3 Population attitudes on foreign aid

907 There is an extensive literature on attitudes towards foreign aid in donor countries.
908 The key findings indicate that most people overestimate the amount of foreign aid and
909 that only a minority wants a cut in foreign aid compared to actual amounts, especially
910 once they become aware of them.

911 For instance, PIPA (2001) shows that 83% of Americans support a multilateral effort
912 to cut world hunger in half. PIPA (2008) shows that in each of 20 countries, a majority
913 thinks that developed countries “have a moral responsibility to work to reduce hunger
914 and severe poverty in poor countries”, with an average agreement of 81%. In 7 OECD
915 countries, the study finds that at least 75% of respondents are willing to pay for a program
916 to cut hunger in half (at an estimated cost of, e.g., \$50 a year for each American).

917 Kaufmann et al. (2019) find that perceived aid is overestimated in each of the 24 countries they study, on average by a factor of 7. In most countries, desired aid is larger than
919 perceived aid.¹ They show that individuals in the top income quintile desire aid 0.13

¹Kaufmann et al. (2012) offer the best results on desired aid because (as Hudson & van Heerde (2012) criticize), other studies did not take into account misperceptions of actual aid.

920 p.p. lower than those in the bottom 40% – which is very close to what we find. By em-
921 ploying a theoretical model and examining correlations between lobbying and actual aid
922 (controling for desired aid), they argue that the gap between actual and desired aid stems
923 from the political influence of the rich who defend their vested interests. In [Kaufmann](#)
924 [et al.](#) (2012), the U.S. is an outlier: desired aid is at the other countries' average (3% of
925 GNI), but as misperceptions are enormous, perceived aid is twice as large as desired aid.
926 Indeed, [Gilens](#) (2001) shows that even Americans with high political knowledge misper-
927 ceive actual aid, and finds that 17% fewer of them want to cut aid when we provide them
928 specific information about the amount of aid. Similarly, [Nair](#) (2018) finds that the rela-
929 tively low support for aid in the U.S. is driven by information on global distribution, as
930 people underestimate their rank by 27 centiles on average and overestimate the global
931 median income by a factor 10.

932 [Hudson & van Heerde](#) (2012) provide a critical review of the literature and show that
933 the strong support for poverty alleviation largely stems from intrinsic altruism. They note
934 that, according to [DFID](#) (2009) and [PIPA](#) (2001), 47% of British people find that the aid
935 is wasted (mainly due to corruption), while Americans estimate that less than a quar-
936 ter of the aid reaches those in need, with over half ending up in the hands of corrupt
937 government officials. Despite these perceptions, most people still support aid, suggest-
938 ing the presence of nonutilitarian motives. Consistent with [Henson et al.](#) (2010), [Bauhr](#)
939 [et al.](#) (2013) find that support for aid is reduced by the perception of corruption in recipi-
940 ent countries. However, this effect is mitigated by the aid-corruption paradox: countries
941 with higher levels of corruption often need more help. [Bodenstein & Faust](#) (2017) fur-
942 ther show that right-wing Europeans, as well as those who perceive strong corruption
943 in their country, are more likely to agree that recipient countries should “follow certain
944 rules regarding democracy, human rights and governance as a condition for receiving EU
945 development aid.” Using a 2002 Gallup survey and the 2006 World Values Survey, and
946 in line with [Bayram](#) (2017), [Paxton & Knack](#) (2012) show that the main determinants for
947 wanting more aid are trust, left-wing ideology, interest in politics, and being a woman (all
948 positively associated).

(Back to Section 2.5.3)

949 While foreign aid is generally unilateral, discretionary, and often used as a bargaining
950 chip, global redistribution is conceived as multilateral, rule-based, and with dedicated
951 funding. Our paper finds much stronger support for global redistributive policies than
952 for increased foreign aid. The difference in attitudes between unilateral foreign aid and
953 global policies is consistent with the literature on foreign aid. Indeed, it can be explained

954 by the observation that people prefer multilateral policies and often view foreign aid as
955 inefficient in reducing poverty. Therefore, we contribute to the theory of attitudes towards
956 global transfers by showing that when such transfers are multilateral and trusted to be
957 effective, they would be largely supported.

958 **A.1.4 Population attitudes on taxes on the rich**

959 We are not aware of any previous survey on a global wealth tax,² though surveys
960 consistently show strong support for national wealth taxes. In a comprehensive survey
961 conducted in the UK, [Rowlingson et al. \(2021\)](#) show that a wealth tax is the preferred
962 option for raising revenues. Only 8% of respondents state that total net wealth should not
963 be taxed (with little differences between Labour and Conservative voters). The study also
964 finds that the preferred design would be a 1% or 3% tax on net wealth above £1 million. By
965 asking how much taxes per year should a person with a certain income and wealth level
966 pay, [Fisman et al. \(2017\)](#) finds that the average American favors a 0.8% linear tax rate
967 on unspecified wealth up to \$2 million (the highest wealth level tested), and a 3% linear
968 rate on inherited wealth. Through a conjoint analysis conducted in three high-income
969 countries, [Schechtl & Tisch \(2023\)](#) find widespread support for a wealth tax (from 78% in
970 the U.S. to 86% in Germany and the UK), with a preference for an exemption threshold
971 set at \$/€1 million (rather than 500,000 or 2 million) with the tax rate and tax unit having
972 little influence on the preferred design. In 21 OECD countries, the [OECD \(2019\)](#) uncovers
973 strong majority support for higher taxes on the rich to support the poor, with nearly
974 70% overall agreement and less than 20% disagreement. [Isbell \(2022\)](#) finds similarly high
975 level of support in 34 African countries. In the UK, [Patriotic Millionaires \(2022\)](#) find 69%
976 support (and 7% opposition) for a 1.1% tax on wealth in excess of £10 million. In the U.S.,
977 [Americans for Tax Fairness \(2021\)](#) find that 67% to 71% of the respondents support to
978 “raise taxes for those earning more than \$400,000 a year”, “raise the income tax rate for
979 those earning over \$1 million a year by 10 percentage points”, or “apply a 2% tax on an
980 individual’s wealth above \$50 million each year, and 3% on wealth above \$1 billion”.

981 **A.1.5 Population attitudes on ethical norms**

982 As argued by [Nybørg et al. \(2016\)](#), social norms can be the solution to the collective
983 action problem. As such, universalistic values and free-riding attitudes are key.

²We did not find any using the combination of “survey” or “attitudes” with “wealth tax” or “global wealth tax” in Google Scholar.

984 **Universalism** Various studies have examined the concept of global identity (see Rey-
985 sen & Katzarska-Miller (2018) for a review). In the 2005-2008 wave of the World Values
986 Survey, Bayram (2015) notes that “78% of the participants in 57 countries see themselves
987 as citizens of the world”, though the 2017-2022 wave reveals that more people feel close
988 to their town, region or country than to the world. Enke et al. (2023) measure universal-
989 ism at the U.S. district level using donation data, and find that a district’s universalism
990 predicts electoral outcomes better than its income or education level. To measure univer-
991 salism at the individual level, Enke et al. (2023) ask American respondents to split \$100
992 between a random stranger and a random person with the same income but closer to
993 them. They distinguish different facets of universalism, and define *foreign universalism* as
994 the inclination to give to a foreigner rather than a fellow citizen. They find a home bias for
995 most people, which could partly be attributed to concerns about inequality, as the split
996 involves two persons with the same income, with the foreigner most certainly living in
997 a poorer country than the American and thus enjoying a higher social status. That being
998 said, a home bias probably remains even after accounting for concerns about inequal-
999 ity, as 84% of Americans agree that “taking care of problems at home is more important
1000 than giving aid to foreign countries” (PIPA 2001). Enke et al. (2023) also measure uni-
1001 versalism and analyze its correlates in 7 countries, and Cappelen et al. (2022) deploy this
1002 method in 60 countries. In a lab experiment with students in the U.S., Cherry et al. (2017)
1003 show that a substantial share of people prefer policies detrimental to them due to their
1004 egalitarian worldview. Waytz et al. (2019) show that left-leaning people exhibit a wider
1005 “moral circle”. Jaeger & Wilks (2023) find that judgments of moral concern are equally
1006 well explained by characteristics of the judge and the evaluated target.

1007 **Free-riding** Despite the long-standing explanation of the lack of climate action as a re-
1008 sult of free-riding, surveys consistently show that people support climate mitigation ac-
1009 tion in their own country, even in the absence of such action in other countries. Bernauer
1010 & Gampfer (2015) show this for Americans and Indians, who both overestimate their
1011 country’s emissions at one third of the global total. Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019)
1012 show this in the U.S. and China using an experimental design. McEvoy & Cherry (2016)
1013 show that Americans mostly invoke leadership and morality to justify unilateral climate
1014 action. Using a range of methods, Aklin & Mildenberger (2020) show that the empiri-
1015 cal evidence for free-riding is not compelling, and that climate inaction can be equally
1016 well explained by distributive conflicts. Finally, review of the literature by McGrath &

1017 Bernauer (2017) shows that climate attitudes are largely nonreciprocal, and primarily
1018 driven by values and perceptions of the policies, rather than by considerations of what
1019 other countries do.

1020 **A.1.6 Second-order beliefs**

1021 Allport (1924) introduced the concept of pluralistic ignorance: a shared mispercep-
1022 tion concerning others' beliefs. The concept became notorious when O'Gorman (1975)
1023 showed that, towards the end of the civil rights movement, 47% of Americans believed
1024 that a majority of white people supported segregation, while only 18% did so. PIPA (2001)
1025 has shown that while 75% of Americans are willing to contribute \$50 annually to halve
1026 world hunger (the cost of the program), only 32% believed that the majority would share
1027 this willingness. Pluralistic ignorance regarding climate-friendly norms in the United
1028 States has been documented by Andre et al. (2022), who further show that correcting the
1029 misperceptions would be effective to enhance pro-climate behaviors. Relatedly, Spark-
1030 man et al. (2022) show that Americans underestimate the support for climate policies
1031 by nearly half, while Drews et al. (2022) document pluralistic ignorance of carbon tax
1032 support in Spain. Additionally, Geiger & Swim (2016) show that pluralistic ignorance
1033 regarding concern for climate change leads people to self-silence, resulting in reduced
1034 discussions on the topic.

1035 **A.1.7 Elite attitudes**

1036 In a survey of climate negotiators on their preferences in terms of burden-sharing,
1037 Lange et al. (2007) uncovers a mix of self-serving bias and support for the egalitarian
1038 principle. Dannenberg et al. (2010) elicit climate negotiators' equity preferences and find
1039 that regional differences in addressing climate change are driven more by national inter-
1040 ests than by different equity concerns. Hjerpe et al. (2011) indicate that voluntary con-
1041 tribution, indicated as willingness to contribute, was the least preferred principle among
1042 both negotiators and observers. Three of the four principles for allocating mitigation
1043 commitments were recognized widely across the major geographical regions: historical
1044 responsibilities, ability-to-pay, and equal per capita emissions. This result is confirmed
1045 by Kesternich et al. (2021), who observe tendencies for a more harmonized view among
1046 key groups towards the ability-to-pay rule in a setting of weighted burden sharing rules.
1047 Mildenberger & Tingley (2019) survey elites (Congress staffers and international relations

1048 scholars) as well as the population in U.S. and China. They document pluralistic igno-
1049 rance of pro-climate attitudes, egocentric bias, and increasing support after beliefs are
1050 updated.

1051 A.2 Proposals and analyses of global policy-making

1052 A.2.1 Global carbon pricing

1053 Global carbon pricing is widely regarded by economists as the benchmark climate pol-
1054 icy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon emissions externality. For instance, Hoel (1991)
1055 shows that an international carbon tax can be designed to simultaneously achieve ef-
1056 ficiency and accommodate any distributional objective. Concerning the distributional
1057 objective, Grubb (1990), Agarwal & Narain (1991) and Bertram (1992) were the first to
1058 advocate for an equal right to emit for each human. As Grubb (1990) states it: "by far the
1059 best combination of long term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity, is obtained
1060 from a system based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions which are allocated on
1061 an adult per capita basis".³ Support for such solution has been renewed ever since (Baer
1062 et al. 2000; Jamieson 2001; Blanchard & Tirole 2021; Rajan 2021).

1063 While many endorse the egalitarian allocation of emissions permits, economists also
1064 considered this outcome as politically unfeasible. Thus, to preserve the current level of
1065 inequalities and to preclude transfers between countries, they adjusted their (integrated
1066 assessment) models by assigning more weight to the interest of rich countries (Stan-
1067 ton 2011).

1068 Gollier & Tirole (2015) synthesize the distributional decision with a *generosity* parame-
1069 ter which would allocate emissions permit to countries in proportion to their population
1070 if set to one, in proportion to their emissions (on the start date of the policy) if set to zero,
1071 and as a mixture of the egalitarian and grandfathering rules if set in between. Using a
1072 similar formula in the context of a tax, Cramton et al. (2015) (summarized in MacKay
1073 et al. 2015) propose that countries with emissions per capita around the average fix the
1074 generosity parameter, so that it is strategically chosen to maximize the tax rate, and to
1075 fix the tax rate at the minimum price proposed by participating countries. Negotiations
1076 would exclude countries with low ambition beforehand; and the treaty would impose
1077 trade sanctions on non-participating countries. van den Bergh et al. (2020) propose a
1078 "dual-track transition to global carbon pricing": an expanding climate club that would

3By "adult per capita", Grubb (1990) means that permits would be allocated equally among adults.

1079 integrate existing and new emissions trading systems, and a reorientation of UNFCCC
1080 negotiations towards a global carbon price and burden-sharing rules. The IMF (2019)
1081 also supports global carbon pricing or, as a first step, a carbon price floor. They propose
1082 either differentiated prices among countries or international transfers, and estimate that
1083 a price of \$75/tCO₂ in 2030 would be compatible with a 2°C trajectory.

1084 Other authors have put forth more radical proposals. For instance, Weitzman (2017)
1085 envisions a World Climate Assembly with proportional representation at the global scale,
1086 so that the median (human) voter would choose the carbon price level. To finance an
1087 adaptation fund, Chancel & Piketty (2015) propose a global *progressive* carbon tax (or a
1088 progressive tax on air tickets as a first step), so that rich people (who are high emitters)
1089 contribute more to the public good. Fleurbaey & Zuber (2013) highlight that, given that
1090 current emitters are probably richer than future victims of climate change damages, cli-
1091 mate policies deserve a *negative* discount rate. In other words, we cannot dissociate the
1092 climate issue from global inequalities, and an ethical response to this issue requires global
1093 redistribution.

1094 A.2.2 Climate burden sharing

1095 The literature has discussed different burden-sharing principles (Ringius et al. 2002).
1096 While there is no agreement on their definitions as different approaches are used (cost
1097 sharing, effort sharing, or resource sharing, see Section A.1.2), we describe here the burden-
1098 sharing principles consistently using the resource sharing approach (i.e., allocating emis-
1099 sions rights). For other papers that define or compare different burden-sharing principles,
1100 see Leimbach & Giannousakis; Zhou & Wang; Vaillancourt & Waaub (2019; 2016; 2004).

1101 **Equal per capita.** The simplest principle is perhaps to allocate each year's global carbon
1102 quota based on an equal right to emit per capita, or an equal right to emit for each adult.
1103 Implementing this principle would result in large transfers from high-emitting to low-
1104 emitting countries.

1105 **Grandfathering.** In contrast, *grandfathering* entails allocating emissions rights in pro-
1106 portion to current emissions. From the perspective of allocating carbon pricing revenues
1107 between countries, grandfathering amounts to each country retaining the revenues it col-
1108 lects. Given that nations are sovereign and have not agreed to share emissions rights,

¹¹⁰⁹ this principle can be considered as the default option against which the other ones can be
¹¹¹⁰ compared in terms of distributive effects.

¹¹¹¹ **Historical responsibilities.** At the opposite end of the spectrum is the principle of *his-*
¹¹¹² *torical responsibilities*, which assigns to each country a carbon budget proportional to its
¹¹¹³ population. Countries that have emitted more than the average have accumulated a car-
¹¹¹⁴ bon debt towards countries that have emitted less, which have a carbon credit.⁴

¹¹¹⁵ To fully specify this rule, one needs to define a start date for the responsibilities on
¹¹¹⁶ past emissions and specify how to account for population size. 1990 is often chosen as
¹¹¹⁷ a start year as it is the date of the first IPCC assessment report, marking the widespread
¹¹¹⁸ acknowledgment of climate change, though variants include 1972, 1960, 1950 or 1850.⁵
¹¹¹⁹ Several solutions have been proposed to account for evolving populations, none of which
¹¹²⁰ is flawless. Matthews (2015) allocates emissions rights on a given year proportionally to
¹¹²¹ the countries' populations in that year. An alternative is to use fixed populations, such
¹¹²² as the populations at the chosen start year (Neumayer 2000), or at a future date such
¹¹²³ as projected when the global total population will reach 9 billion (Raupach et al. 2014).
¹¹²⁴ Fanning & Hickel (2023) convert the projected climate debt up to 2050 into monetary
¹¹²⁵ terms in a 1.5°C scenario.

¹¹²⁶ The rationale for using fixed populations is to prevent countries from intentionally
¹¹²⁷ increasing their population size to gain more emissions rights. However, this approach
¹¹²⁸ treats countries with different demographic trajectories similarly, effectively penalizing
¹¹²⁹ countries which grow more than others (if past populations are used) or grow more than
¹¹³⁰ expected (if future populations are used). Using current populations like Matthews (2015)
¹¹³¹ also comes with its own problems. Consider two countries having contributed very little
¹¹³² to cumulative emissions, with the same emissions per capita but different demographic
¹¹³³ patterns: country A's population has doubled in the last 30 years, while country B's pop-
¹¹³⁴ ulation has remained stable. Despite the similar present situation, country B would ac-
¹¹³⁵ cumulate more carbon credit than country A. Essentially, compensating country B more
¹¹³⁶ due to its past population size amounts to compensating the dead although it is future
¹¹³⁷ generations who will suffer. That being said, using current populations is likely a more
¹¹³⁸ viable solution than relying on fixed populations since, in practice, countries with similar

⁴It is not clear how these debts would be settled. Approaches could involve carbon removal from the atmosphere, or using a conventional social cost of carbon to monetize them, by crediting (positively or negatively) emissions rights to countries in an international carbon market.

⁵Climate equity monitor uses 1850 for example.

1139 emissions per capita tend to have relatively similar demographic trajectories.

1140 **Ability to pay.** Another prominent burden-sharing principle is the ability to pay whereby
1141 richer countries should contribute more to mitigation efforts. To operationalize this prin-
1142 ciple, Baer et al. (2008) define *capacity* as the share of global income above an exemption
1143 threshold. They use the threshold of \$7,500 per year (in 2005 PPP), which corresponds to
1144 the top 28% of the global income distribution. According to this principle, the effort of a
1145 country should be proportional to the revenues it would raise with a linear income tax on
1146 individual income above \$7,500.


1147 **Climate Equity Reference Framework** Baer et al. (2008) propose another effort-sharing
1148 method, the *Climate Equity Reference Framework* (CERF), which blends the ability to pay
1149 principle with their version of historical responsibilities. They define *responsibility* as fol-
1150 lows: they determine the mitigation requirement as the emissions gap between the Busi-
1151 ness as Usual scenario from IEA (2007) and a 2°C (with 68-86% probability) scenario.
1152 The mitigation requirement is then allocated to countries proportionally to their cumu-
1153 lative emissions (starting in 1990). The emissions right of a country according to their
1154 *responsibility* are then determined by its Business as Usual emissions minus its mitigation
1155 requirement. A country's emissions right, dubbed its *greenhouse development right* (GDR),
1156 is defined using a combination of *capacity* (C) and *responsibility* (R) to allocate the miti-
1157 gation requirement between countries. This allocation key is called the *Responsibility and*
1158 *Capacity Indicator* (RCI) and defined as $RCI = R^a \cdot C^{1-a}$, with $a = .4$.

1159 This choice of parameter may seem somewhat arbitrary, but the EcoEquity calculator
1160 allows for a customization all CERF parameters (Holz et al. 2018; Holz et al. 2019). The
1161 Climate Action Network has adopted the CERF as its *fair share* framework, though the
1162 different national chapters of the organization could not agree on a choice of parameters
1163 (Athanssiou et al. 2022).⁶

1164 The CERF approach was adopted by a prominent network of climate NGOs because
1165 it operationalizes the principle of *common but differentiated responsibilities and respective ca-*

6The U.S. Climate Action Network and the think tank EcoEquity (funded by Tom Athanssiou and late Paul Baer) choose the following parameters: an equal weight for R and C ($a = .5$), their own business as usual projections of CO₂ emissions based on trends of GDP growth and emissions intensity reduction, a 1.5°C (Low Energy Demand) pathway, 1950 as the start year for responsibility, a gradual inclusion of income to compute *capacity* (which adds complexity to the calculation) from a full exemption of the bottom 70% (\$7,500 per year) linearly to a full inclusion of the top 2% (\$72,211), the inclusion of non-CO₂ gases but not of emissions embodied in trade (i.e. imported emissions) nor LULUCF (land-use).

Figure S9: Net gains from the CERF burden-sharing rule in 2030.




Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO₂.

¹¹⁶⁶ *pabilities* recognized by the UNFCCC. However, this approach suffers from three draw-
¹¹⁶⁷ backs. First, its definition of historical responsibility as an effort sharing principle is in-
¹¹⁶⁸ consistent with the principle of an equal right of cumulative emissions per capita, which
¹¹⁶⁹ is a resource sharing principle. For instance, consider a fully decarbonized country that
¹¹⁷⁰ has exhausted *exactly* its cumulative carbon budget. According to the CERF notion of *re-
¹¹⁷¹ sponsibility*, this country would still be expected to contribute significantly to mitigation
¹¹⁷² efforts due to its relatively high cumulative emissions. Yet, according to the usual defini-
¹¹⁷³ tion of the historical responsibility based on an equal right of cumulative emissions p.c.,
¹¹⁷⁴ this country would have no liability as it has not exceeded its carbon budget. Second, a
¹¹⁷⁵ country with moderate incomes⁷ and low historical responsibility would be assigned a
¹¹⁷⁶ relatively low effort, even if its emissions per capita are high. In other words, the CERF
¹¹⁷⁷ approach favors countries that have experienced recent growth. Third, the poorest coun-
¹¹⁷⁸ tries would be granted emissions rights close to the Business as Usual trajectory, as they
¹¹⁷⁹ would bear virtually none of the effort. But this trajectory carries the current (unfair) in-
¹¹⁸⁰ come distribution and amounts to grandfathering. For example, the baseline trajectory

⁷Using the above parameters, moderate incomes means few incomes above the global 70th. percentile.

Figure S10: Difference between net gains from Greenhouse Development Rights and equal rights per capita.



Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO₂.

for emissions⁸ in the DRC entail 0.8 tCO₂ p.c. in 2030, which is five times less than the world average emissions right per capita. In this framework, if the DRC were to grow faster than projected in the baseline, it would actually have to pay to the rest of the world for mitigation efforts. This is what is likely to happen to countries like Mexico or Senegal, from our simulation of the net gains of CERF compared to a situation without international transfers (see Figure S9). In contrast, a resource sharing approach based on equal per capita emissions would result in low-income countries receiving emissions rights exceeding their projected trajectories, leading to transfers from high-income countries. By construction, such transfers do not occur in an effort sharing approach like the CERF, implying lower transfers to low-income countries. Compared to an equal right to emit per capita, this method favors countries like China (whose emissions are allowed to remain stable over 2020-2030 instead of a reduction of 35-40%) and penalizes regions like Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (see Figure S10).

⁸The baseline trajectory is computed as the “product of the projected GDP and CO₂ emission intensity”.

1194 **Contraction and Convergence.** Meyer (2004) defines a rule called *contraction and con-*
1195 *vergence* (C&C), which combines elements of grandfathering and equal per capita ap-
1196 *proaches. According to C&C, each country is granted (tradable) emissions rights, starting*
1197 *at their current emission level and converging linearly to an equal per capita level at some*
1198 *pre-specified date. The *contraction* part refers to the reduction of total emissions rights in*
1199 *line with the climate objective. When discussed around year 2000, the convergence date*
1200 *was specified between 2020 and 2050. This rule, advocated by the Global Commons Insti-*
1201 *tute (a UK think tank), was on the agenda from COP2 to COP15 (i.e., until Copenhagen,*
1202 *and including in Kyoto), including at Kyoto, and was endorsed by the European Parlia-*
1203 *ment in 1998. More recently, Gignac & Matthews (2015) have shown how C&C can be*
1204 *made consistent with historical responsibilities by computing carbon debts and credits*
1205 *until the convergence date.*

1206 **Assessments of the NDCs against burden-sharing principles.** The regime established
1207 by the 2015 Paris agreement to regulate climate change respects none of the burden-
1208 sharing principles and relies instead on voluntary contributions from each country, known
1209 as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). A body of literature (reviewed by Höhne
1210 et al. 2014) assesses the NDCs against the emissions reduction objective and different
1211 burden-sharing principles. To evaluate the NDCs, Gao et al. (2019) examine their emis-
1212 sions projections for 2030 and estimate the resulting increase in temperature. The most
1213 recent and comprehensive assessment of NDCs against burden-sharing principles is con-
1214 ducted by van den Berg et al. (2020) (see also Raupach et al. 2014; Robiou du Pont
1215 et al. 2016; Robiou du Pont et al. 2017).

1216 A.2.3 Global redistribution

1217 **Lack of cooperation vs. lack of redistribution.** Major social science scholarship from
1218 Realism in International Relations to game theory of international environmental agree-
1219 ments in economics has pointed to lack of cooperation as the major obstacle to global
1220 sustainability (Waltz 1979; Snidal 1991; Barrett 1994; Nordhaus 2015). Another body of
1221 literature on international climate cooperation emphasises redistribution from North to
1222 South as a key condition for making global climate policy work, noting the historical
1223 responsibility of major emitters in the Global North (Parks & Roberts 2008; Friman &
1224 Strandberg 2014; Bou-Habib 2019; Aklin & Mildenberger 2020). Taking the second per-
1225 perspective, making progress on international climate policy also requires a decision on how

1226 the burden of climate change mitigation can be shared fairly. This raises the question of
1227 whether citizens around the world support such global redistribution policies or, more
1228 specifically, whether citizens in high-income countries are willing to make sacrifices to
1229 combat climate change and extreme poverty.

1230 While we cannot test conditional cooperation as part of the present analysis, our em-
1231 pirical results document that if the North-South redistribution would be implemented as
1232 part of global climate policies, they would receive strong public support.

1233 **Studies on global redistribution** Addressing global poverty, inequalities, and climate
1234 change are central to the universally agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). As
1235 highlighted by Bolch et al. (2022) and Fabre (2024), low-income countries often lack suf-
1236 ficient domestic resources to eradicate poverty in the short term, indicating the need for
1237 international transfers to rapidly end global poverty. In *Beyond the Welfare State*, Gun-
1238 nar Myrdal (1960) called for a *welfare world*. In his Nobel lecture, he emphasized the
1239 necessity of increasing foreign aid to low-income countries, stating that “The type of
1240 marginal foreign aid we have provided, is clearly not enough to meet their barest needs”
1241 (Myrdal 1975).

1242 Drawing on the labor theory of value, some economists have argued that global in-
1243 equalities arise from unequal exchange in international trade (Arghiri 1972). Indeed,
1244 the stark disparity in wages between countries implies that one unit of labor exported
1245 by an American commands five units of labor embodied in imported goods, whereas
1246 Ethiopians need to export 50 units of labor to obtain one unit through imports (Alsamawi
1247 et al. 2014; Reyes et al. 2017). Taking stock, Hickel (2017) proposes to globally establish
1248 minimum wages at 50% of the local median wage. Hickel (2017) also suggests other solu-
1249 tions against global inequality, which served as inspiration for our questionnaire. These
1250 measures include the cancellation of low-income countries’ public debt, fair trade prac-
1251 tices (such as eliminating tariffs from high-income countries, reducing patent protections,
1252 and reducing farming subsidies in rich countries), initiatives to combat tax evasion (e.g.,
1253 implementing a global financial register), land reform, and a fair international climate
1254 policy.

1255 Piketty (2014) prominently advocates for a progressive wealth tax on a global scale,
1256 and Piketty (2022) suggests to allocate its revenues to countries in proportion to their
1257 population.

1258 Kopczuk et al. (2005) compute the optimal linear income tax rates for all countries in

1259 two ways: globally centralized and decentralized (i.e., within each country and without
1260 international transfers). They show that the average decentralized rate is 41%. In con-
1261 trast, the global rate is 62%, which would generate funds to finance a basic income of
1262 250\$/month (higher than the GPD per capita of 73 countries). From a current global Gini
1263 index of 0.695, they show that decentralized optimal taxation would only marginally re-
1264 duce global inequality to 0.69, whereas global taxation would significantly decrease the
1265 Gini to 0.25. The study also shows that the existing level of foreign aid can only be ratio-
1266 nalized if the U.S. attaches 2,000 less value to a citizen in the poorest countries than to an
1267 American citizen (or 1,000 less if half of the transfers are diverted due to corruption).

1268 A.2.4 Basic income

1269 Unconditional cash transfers (UCT) are increasingly seen as an effective way to end ex-
1270 treme poverty. A growing body of evidence from randomized control trials supports this
1271 notion: [Gangopadhyay et al. \(2015\)](#) find that UCT outperform a food subsidy; [Haushofer & Shapiro \(2016\)](#) find significant impacts on health, economic outcomes, and psycholog-
1272 ical well-being; [Egger et al. \(2022\)](#) find large positive spillovers on non-recipient people,
1273 and minimal inflation. Reviews of existing research further confirm the positive outcomes
1274 of UCT ([Standing 2014](#); [Bastagli et al. 2016](#)).

1275 While the delivery of cash to remote areas and the prevention of fraud is challenging
1276 in regions without a proper civil register, the use of mobile phones as banking and bio-
1277 metric identification tools could provide viable solutions ([Harnett 2017](#)). Although many
1278 places still lack internet access, satellite internet technology shows promising progress,
1279 with some experts suggesting that it could soon become affordable and universally ac-
1280 cessible ([Hanson 2016](#)).

1282 A.2.5 Global democracy

1283 The idea of world federalism has a long-standing history, dating back at least to [Kant \(1795\)](#),
1284 who argued that a world federation was essential for achieving perpetual peace. Inter-
1285 national organizations were eventually created to foster peace, though the League of Na-
1286 tions and its successor, the United Nations, never succeeded in avoiding military conflicts.
1287 Many have argued that we need stronger and more democratic global institutions, com-
1288 petent to address global challenges such as extreme poverty, climate change, wars, pan-
1289 demics, or financial stability. Before World War II, feminist and pacifist [Maverick Lloyd](#)


¹²⁹⁰ & Schwimmer (1937) founded the *Campaign for World Government*, advocating for direct
¹²⁹¹ representation at the global scale. Einstein (1947) called for the subordination of the UN
¹²⁹² Security Council to the General Assembly and the direct election of UN delegates. Since
¹²⁹³ 2007, there has been widespread support for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly
¹²⁹⁴ (UNPA) from individuals and institutions in over 150 countries, including 1,800 member
¹²⁹⁵ of parliament, heads of state, as well the European Parliament, the Pan-African Parlia-
¹²⁹⁶ ment, and the Latin-American Parliament. The UNPA campaign calls for a gradual im-
¹²⁹⁷ plementation of a democratic assembly, starting with a consultative assembly composed
¹²⁹⁸ of members of national parliaments, allowing for the direct election of its members in
¹²⁹⁹ voluntary countries, and progressing towards a world parliament with binding legisla-
¹³⁰⁰ tive powers once all members are directly elected (Leinen & Bummel 2018). Besides the
¹³⁰¹ UNPA, various scholars have put forward different models of global democracy, ranging
¹³⁰² from deliberative spaces to a world federation (Archibugi et al. 2011). While the most
¹³⁰³ radical proposals may still be on the horizon, an assembly of random citizens representa-
¹³⁰⁴ tive of the world population has already been convened. It has produced a joint statement
¹³⁰⁵ at the COP26 (Global Assembly 2022), and a similar *World Citizens' Assembly* should soon
¹³⁰⁶ follow.

1307 **B Raw results**

1308 Country-specific raw results are also available as supplementary material files: **US**,
 1309 **EU, FR, DE, ES, UK**.

Figure S11: Absolute support for global climate policies.

Share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* (in percent, $n = 40,680$). The color blue denotes an absolute majority. See Figure 2 for the relative support. (Questions A-I of the global survey.)



*In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

Figure S12: Correct answers to comprehension questions (in percent). (Questions 16-18)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
With NR, typical [country] people win and richest lose	68	73	76	73	73	70
With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win	60	68	62	72	67	67
With GCS+NR, typical [country] people neither win nor lose	54	60	63	59	57	61

Figure S13: Number of correct answers to comprehension questions (mean). (Section 2.3, Questions 16-18)




Figure S14: List experiment: mean number of supported policies. (Section 2.4.1, Question 24)




Figure S15: Conjoint analyses 1 and 2. (Questions 25-27, Back to Section 2.4.3)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)	54	76	80	71	81	74
C+NR+GCS preferred to C+NR	55	74	79	71	78	68
NR+GCS preferred to NR	55	77	79	74	79	77
NR+C preferred to NR	62	84	88	83	84	82
GCS+NR preferred to C+NR	47	52	53	53	49	52
NR+C+GCS preferred to NR	55	77	86	73	83	72

Figure S16: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See English translations in Figure S2; Question 29)




Figure S17: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements seen as important for supporting the GCS in a 4-Likert scale (in percent). (Question 32) [\(Back to Section 2.4.5\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
It would succeed in limiting climate change	78	85	85	86	86	83
It would hurt the [Country] economy	81	67	61	67	66	69
It would penalize my household	75	60	55	63	59	63
It would make people change their lifestyle	78	79	83	79	78	77
It would reduce poverty in low-income countries	77	85	88	85	86	81
It might be detrimental to some poor countries	79	72	79	67	78	70
It could foster global cooperation	82	81	81	82	85	80
It could fuel corruption in low-income countries	79	75	82	69	79	72
It could be subject to fraud	80	79	80	74	83	81
It would be technically difficult to put in place	77	71	74	62	79	71
Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences	89	82	89	68	91	88

Figure S18: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements found in the open-ended field on the GCS (manually recoded, in percent).

"When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to your mind?

Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme." (Question 31) (Back to Section 2.4.5)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
environment	26	31	37	26	43	24
unclassifiable	25	24	23	28	25	22
pro	22	23	21	22	33	20
con	22	17	12	18	20	16
cost	17	12	11	14	17	7
poorest humans	11	7	6	9	5	6
tax redistribution	10	7	11	8	4	9
support	8	6	3	5	6	8
oppose	7	3	2	3	1	4
don't know	6	8	10	8	7	10
empty	6	3	0	0	0	13
difficult agreement	5	10	7	12	8	8
difficult implement	3	5	5	6	4	6
misunderstands gcs	3	2	2	1	3	1
misunderstands question	2	2	1	3	3	3

Figure S19: Perceptions of the GCS. Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).

"When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to your mind?

Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme." (Question 31) [\(Back to Section 2.4.5\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
world: international world country global	28	22	23	19	22	23
environment: climat environment animal emission natur	26	21	17	28	21	17
poorest: poor low-income 700 poverty	16	8	8	9	4	10
pro: pro pros pros pros:	16	3	0	1	9	5
con: con con: cons cons:	15	4	0	1	8	6
cost: cost expensive higher price 85 inflation	13	7	5	9	7	6
tax: tax	8	3	4	3	2	2
redistribution: rich redistribu	8	4	5	4	3	5
implementation: implement enforce polic monitor	6	4	5	6	0	5
agreement: agree accept participat	3	4	5	6	2	3

Figure S20: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality (mean). (Question 34) [\(Back to Section 2.5.3\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Donation to own country	35	34	31	38	34	32
Donation to Africa	32	35	33	41	32	33

Figure S21: Support for a global wealth tax.

"Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-income countries?

Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education." (Question 35)




Figure S22: Support for a national wealth tax.

"Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: affordable housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and schools]?" (Question 36)




Figure S23: Preferred share of global wealth tax revenues that should be pooled to finance low-income countries. (Question 37)




Figure S24: Support for sharing half of global tax revenues with low-income countries, rather than each country retaining all the revenues it collects (in percent). (Question 38)




Figure S25: Perceived foreign aid. “From your best guess, what percentage of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?” (Question 39) (Back to Section 2.5.3)

Actual values: France: 0.8%; Germany: 1.3%; Spain: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%; U.S.: 0.4%.




Figure S26: Preferred foreign aid (without info on actual amount).

"If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?" (Question 40) (Back to Section 2.5.3)




Figure S27: Preferred foreign aid (after info on actual amount).

"Actually, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid.

If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?" (Question 40) (Back to Section 2.5.3)




Figure S28: Actual, perceived and preferred amount of foreign aid, with random info (or not) on actual amount. (*Mean* in percent of public spending, Questions 39, 40) (Back to Section 2.5.3)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Actual foreign aid (in % of public spending)	0.4	1.1	0.8	1.3	0.5	1.7
Belief about foreign aid	4.7	2.9	2.7	2.9	2.8	3.5
Preferred foreign aid (with info)	1.8	2.7	3.4	2.9	2.1	2.5
Preferred foreign aid (no info)	4	3.9	4.7	4.4	3.1	3.4

Figure S29: Preferred foreign aid (after info or after perception). (Questions 39 and 40)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as current	70	75	91	76	77	57
Preferred foreign aid is higher than current	47	59	75	58	63	43
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as perceived	57	74	83	79	77	58
Preferred foreign aid is higher than perceived	37	53	64	59	54	39

Figure S30: Preferences for funding increased foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]
 "How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent) (Question 41) (Back to Section 2.5.3)




Figure S31: Preferences of spending following reduced foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]
 "How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent)
 (Question 42) [\(Back to Section 2.5.3\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Higher spending on defense	19	23	11	21	17	31
Higher spending on retirement pensions	23	41	22	51	57	35
Higher spending on healthcare	40	57	31	42	80	70
Higher spending on welfare benefits	13	20	7	19	39	20
Higher spending on education	30	45	31	47	58	43
Higher spending on other programs	6	6	6	4	9	8
Lower taxes on the wealthiest	5	2	5	2	0	2
Lower corporate income tax rate	12	6	10	4	8	6
Lower personal income tax rates	48	29	26	27	37	30
Lower public deficit	32	24	21	13	41	21

Figure S32: Willingness to sign real-stake petition for the Global Climate Scheme or National Redistribution, compared to stated support in corresponding subsamples (e.g. support for the GCS in the branch where the petition was about the GCS). (Question 43)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Petition for the GCS	51	69	69	66	78	69
(Comparable) support for the GCS	53	76	81	74	81	74
Petition for NR	57	67	65	66	74	68
(Comparable) support for NR	58	72	76	65	78	75

Figure S33: Absolute support for various global policies (Percent of (*somewhat or strong*) support). (Questions 44 and 45. See Figure 3 for the relative support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	41	54	52	53	62	51
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	53	65	62	66	68	62
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	45	58	55	60	62	54
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	31	37	36	30	45	40
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	34	44	44	43	52	43
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	39	49	39	51	50	54
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	42	55	54	54	61	53
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	44	70	73	70	72	65
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	34	45	40	48	44	50
National tax on millionaires funding public services	62	76	70	79	79	77
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	58	71	69	72	78	71

Figure S34: Preferred approach of diplomats at international climate negotiations. In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend [own country] interests or global justice? (Question 49)




Figure S35: Percent of selected issues viewed as important.
 “To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem?” (Question 56)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Income inequality in [Country]	55	59	54	58	71	57
Climate change	59	66	66	63	73	63
Global poverty	50	57	50	58	75	49

Figure S36: Group defended when voting.
 “What group do you defend when you vote?” (Question 57)




Figure S37: Mean prioritization of policies.

Mean number of points allocated policies to express intensity of support (among six policies chosen at random). Blue color means that the policy has been awarded more points than the average policy.

"In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

How do you allocate the points among the following policies?" (Question 58)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	13	21	10	14	35	31
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	23	22	25	21	22	23
econ3	21	15	13	18	17	13
econ4	28	22	27	17	24	20
soc1	10	17	13	17	12	21
soc2	13	9	14	8	10	8
climate1	14	15	11	18	20	12
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	20	18	22	19	15	17
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030	11	9	8	8	9	11
tax1: National redistribution scheme	14	15	16	15	15	15
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	19	19	21	18	17	19
foreign1: Global climate scheme	15	20	20	23	16	17
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	21	20	20	23	19	20
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	15	15	15	17	14	13
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	9	11	13	14	9	8

Figure S38: Positive prioritization of policies.

Percent of people allocating a positive number of points to policies, expressing their support (among six policies chosen at random).

"In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

How do you allocate the points among the following policies?" (Question 58)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	64	78	61	67	96	95
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	83	86	85	84	87	89
econ3	81	69	50	78	80	68
econ4	88	86	91	79	89	85
soc1	57	75	69	74	74	78
soc2	58	58	72	53	64	48
climate1	70	76	65	79	89	75
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	79	83	86	84	78	80
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030	62	58	56	48	60	70
tax1: National redistribution scheme	67	79	79	76	82	79
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	80	79	76	78	83	85
foreign1: Global climate scheme	71	83	84	85	84	78
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	80	81	79	83	82	82
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	71	77	79	74	83	76
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	58	70	79	74	74	57

Figure S39: Charity donation.

"How much did you give to charities in 2022?" (Question 50)




Figure S40: Interest in politics.

"To what extent are you interested in politics?" (Question 51)




Figure S41: Desired involvement of government (from 1 to 5). (Question 52)




Figure S42: Political leaning on economics (from 1: Left to 5: Right). (Question 53)




Figure S43: Voted in last election. (Question 54)




Figure S44: Vote in last election (aggregated). PNR includes people who did not vote or prefer not to answer. (Question 55)




Figure S45: Perception that survey was biased.
“Do you feel that this survey was politically biased?” (Question 61)





Figure S46: Opinion on the fight against extreme poverty.

“According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme poverty in low-income countries?” (Question 62) [\(Back to Section 2.5.3\)](#)

(a) Elements found in the open-ended field on the question
(manually recoded, in percent)



(b) Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).




Figure S47: Main attitudes by vote (“Right” spans from Center-right to Far right).
 (Relative support in percent in Questions 20, 35, 45, 46, 49) (Back to Section 2.5.3)

	Europe Left	Europe PNR/Non-voter	Europe Right	U.S. Left	U.S. PNR/Non-voter	U.S. Right
Support for the GCS	85	72	71	74	53	26
Global tax on millionaires	94	83	76	85	71	40
Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries	61	52	45	55	67	41
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	73	65	52	62	49	23
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	93	79	74	87	70	38
[Country]’s foreign aid should be increased	93	83	72	92	81	48
Universalist	56	48	26	53	49	23

1310 C Questionnaire of the global survey (section on global
1311 policies)

1312 A. At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be
1313 put in place? (Multiple answers are possible) [Figures 2 and S11]
1314 Global; [Federal / European / ...]; [State / National]; Local

1315 B. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “[country] should take mea-
1316 sures to fight climate change.”

1317 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly
1318 agree*

1319 C. How should [country] climate policies depend on what other countries do?

- 1320 • If other countries do more, [country] should do...
1321 • If other countries do less, [country] should do...

1322 *Much less; Less; About the same; More; Much more*

1323 D. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] All countries have signed the
1324 Paris agreement that aims to contain global warming “well below +2 °C’. To limit
1325 global warming to this level, there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we
1326 can emit globally, called the carbon budget. Each country could aim to emit less
1327 than a share of the carbon budget. To respect the global carbon budget, countries
1328 that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less
1329 than their share.

1330 Do you support such a policy? [Figures 2 and S11]

1331 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1332 support*

1333 E. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] Suppose the above policy is in
1334 place. How should the carbon budget be divided among countries? [Figures 2 and
1335 S11]

1336 *The emission share of a country should be proportional to its population, so that each human
1337 has an equal right to emit.; The emission share of a country should be proportional to its
1338 current emissions, so that those who already emit more have more rights to emit.; Countries
1339 that have emitted more over the past decades (from 1990 onwards) should receive a lower*

1340 *emission share, because they have already used some of their fair share.; Countries that will*
1341 *be hurt more by climate change should receive a higher emission share, to compensate them*
1342 *for the damages.*

1343 F. [In the U.S., Denmark, and France only] To achieve a given reduction of greenhouse
1344 gas emissions globally, costly investments are needed. Ideally, how should countries
1345 bear the costs of fighting climate change?

- 1346 • Countries should pay in proportion to their income
- 1347 • Countries should pay in proportion to their current emissions [Used as a sub-
1348 stitute to the equal right per capita in Figure 2]
- 1349 • Countries should pay in proportion to their past emissions (from 1990 on-
1350 wards) [Used as a substitute to historical responsibilities in Figure 2]
- 1351 • The richest countries should pay it all, so that the poorest countries do not have
1352 to pay anything
- 1353 • The richest countries should pay even more, to help vulnerable countries face
1354 adverse consequences: vulnerable countries would then receive money instead
1355 of paying [Used as a substitute to compensating vulnerable countries in Figures
1356 2 and S11]

1357 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly*
1358 *agree*

1359 G. Do you support or oppose establishing a global democratic assembly whose role
1360 would be to draft international treaties against climate change? Each adult across
1361 the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly. [Figures 2 and S11]
1362 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1363 *support*

1364 H. Imagine the following policy: a global tax on greenhouse gas emissions funding a
1365 global basic income. Such a policy would progressively raise the price of fossil fuels
1366 (for example, the price of gasoline would increase by [40 cents per gallon] in the
1367 first years). Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil
1368 fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Revenues from the tax would be used to
1369 finance a basic income of [\$30] per month to each human adult, thereby lifting the
1370 700 million people who earn less than \$2/day out of extreme poverty. The average

1371 [American] person would lose a bit from this policy as they would face [\$130] per
1372 month in price increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive.

1373 Do you support or oppose such a policy? [Figures 2 and S11]

1374 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1375 *support*


- 1376 I. Do you support or oppose a tax on all millionaires around the world to finance low-
1377 income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate ac-
1378 tion? This would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drink-
1379 ing water, healthcare, and education. [Figures 2 and S11]
1380 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1381 *support*

1382 **D Questionnaire of the complementary surveys**

1383 Below, we provide the generic questionnaire (based on the U.S. version), which roughly
1384 corresponds to the *Eu* questionnaire as well as the combination of the *US1* and *US2* ques-
1385 tionnaire. The main difference between Europe and the U.S. is that we split the *US2*
1386 sample into four random branches to include some treatments before the Section D on
1387 the GCS. Besides the control group, the treatments are: information regarding the sup-
1388 port of Americans for the GCS and NR, an open-ended field, and a closed question on the
1389 pros and cons of the GCS. The pros and cons of the GCS are also asked in *Eu* (likewise,
1390 either as an open-ended field or a question), but only in Section D, after the support.

1391 At each section or question, square brackets specify in which questionnaires it is present
1392 (*US1*, *US2* and/or *Eu*) as well as country specificities. Figure S48 displays the structure of
1393 each questionnaire. Each treatment randomization is independent. Qualtrics and Word
1394 versions of the questionnaires in each language are available on our [public repository](#),
1395 together with a spreadsheet that summarizes country specificities and our sources.

Figure S48: Main surveys' structure. Cf. Figure 1 for a simplified version.



1396 [Eu, US1, US2] Socio-demographic characteristics

1397 1. Welcome to this survey!

1398
1399 This survey is **anonymous** and is conducted for research purposes on a representa-
1400 tive sample of [1,000 British people].

1401
1402 It takes [US1, US2: 10 to 15 min; Eu: around 20 min] to complete.

1403
1404 The survey contains lotteries and awards for those who get the correct answer to
1405 some understanding questions.

1406 If you are attentive and lucky, you can win up to [US1, Eu: \$350; US2: \$150] in
1407 points. (See terms and conditions).

1408 Please answer every question carefully.

1409
1410 Do you agree to participate in the survey?

1411 Yes; No

1412 2. What is your gender?

1413 Woman; Man; Other

1414 3. How old are you?

1415 Below 18; 18 to 20; 21 to 24; 25 to 29; 30 to 34; 35 to 39; 40 to 44; 45 to 49; 50 to 54; 55 to
1416 59; 60 to 64; 65 to 69; 70 to 74; 75 to 79; 80 to 84; 85 to 89; 90 to 99; 100 or above

1417 4. [Eu] In which country do you live?

1418 France; Germany; Spain; United Kingdom; Other

1419 5. What is your ZIP code? [UK: What is your Outcode (the left part of your postcode,
1420 e.g. if your postcode is N7 8H7, just enter N7)?]

1421 6. Do you live with your partner (if you have one)?

1422 Yes; No

1423 7. How many people are in your household? The household includes: you, the mem-
1424 bers of your family who live with you, and your dependants.

1425 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more

1426 8. [Eu] How many children below 14 live with you?

1427 1; 2; 3; 4 or more

1428 9. [US1, US2] What race or ethnicity do you identify with? (Multiple answers are
1429 possible)

1430 White; Black or African American; Hispanic; Asian; American Indian or Alaskan Native;
1431 Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; Other: {open field}; Prefer not to say

1432 10. What is the [US1, US2: annual; Eu: monthly] gross income of your household (before
1433 withholding tax)? This includes all income: wages, self-employment earnings, So-
1434 cial Security benefits, pensions, investment income, welfare payments, and income
1435 from other sources.

1436 [US1, US2: Items based on household total income deciles and quartiles, namely:
1437 Less than \$20,000; between \$20,001 and \$35,000; between \$35,001 and \$42,000; between
1438 \$42,001 and \$50,000; between \$50,001 and \$65,000; between \$65,001 and \$82,000; between
1439 \$82,001 and \$103,000; between \$103,001 and \$130,000; between \$130,001 and \$145,000;
1440 between \$145,001 and \$165,000; between \$165,001 and \$250,000; More than \$250,000; I
1441 prefer not to answer;

1442 Eu: custom thresholds, taking into account household composition Questions 6-8,
1443 and corresponding to the country's deciles and quartiles of standard of living, cf.
1444 the sheet "Income" in [this spreadsheet](#)]

1445 11. What is the highest level of education you have completed?

1446 [Below upper secondary, Upper secondary, and Post secondary are coded as the first two,
1447 middle three, and last three items, respectively.

1448 US1, US2: Primary school or less; Eighth grade; Some high school; Regular high school
1449 diploma/GED or alternative credential; Some college, no degree; 2-year college degree or as-
1450 sociates degree (for example: AA, AS); Bachelor's degree (for example: BA, BS); Master's
1451 degree or above (MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA, MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD, PhD);
1452 FR: École primaire / Aucun; Brevet; CAP ou BEP; Baccalauréat professionnel ou tech-
1453 nologique; Baccalauréat général; Bac +2 (BTS, DUT, DEUG...); Bac +3 (licence...); Bac
1454 +5 ou plus (master, école d'ingénieur ou de commerce, doctorat, médecine, maîtrise, DEA,
1455 DESS...)

1456 DE: Keine abgeschlossene Schulbildung / Grundschule; Untere Sekundarstufe (z.B. Haupt-
1457 oder Realschulabschluss); Erstausbildung; Beruflicher Abschluss / Ausbildung; Abitur;
1458 Zweitausbildung; Bachelor oder Fachhochschulabschluss; Master-Abschluss oder höher

1459 ES: *Educación primaria / No he completado la enseñanza básica; Educación secundaria obligatoria (ESO); Formación profesional básica (FP); Formación profesional de grado medio; Bachillerato; Formación profesional de grado superior; Grado universitario; Máster/doctorado*
1460 UK: *Primary education or less; Some secondary school; GSCE; Vocational Upper secondary (Level 3 award, level 3 certificate, level 3 diploma, advanced apprenticeship, etc.); High school degree (A level); Higher vocational education (Level 4+ award, level 4+ certificate, level 4+ diploma, higher apprenticeship, etc.); Bachelor's Degree (BA, BSc, BEng, etc.); Postgraduate diploma or certificate, Master's Degree (MSc, MA, MBA, etc.) or Ph.D.]*

1467 12. What is your employment status?

1468 *Full-time employed; Part-time employed; Self-employed; Student; Retired; Unemployed*
1469 *(searching for a job); Inactive (not searching for a job)*

1470 13. Are you a homeowner or a tenant? (Multiple answers are possible)

1471 *Tenant; Owner; Landlord renting out property; Hosted free of charge*

1472 14. [If lives with partner: What is the estimated value of your household's assets (in
1473 U.S. dollars)?

1474 If does not live with partner: What is the estimated value of your assets (in U.S.
1475 dollars)?]

1476 Include here all your possessions (home, car, savings, etc.) net of debt. For example,
1477 if you own a house worth [\$]300,000 and you have [\$]100,000 left to repay on your
1478 mortgage, your assets are [\$]200,000.

1479 I estimate my [If lives with partner: household's] assets net of debt to be:

1480 [Items based on the following individual wealth quintiles, doubled if lives with
1481 partner. US1, US2: *Less than \$0 (I have a net debt); Close to \$0; Between \$4,000 and*
1482 *\$60,000; Between \$60,000 and \$190,000; More than \$190,000;* For Eu, the thresholds are:
1483 FR: €5/50/150/300k; DE: €0/35/130/280k; ES: €0/50/100/200k; UK: £3/45/115/270k]

1484 15. [US1, US2 (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the vote question)] What
1485 do you consider to be your political affiliation, as of today?

1486 *Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other; Non-Affiliated*

1489 [Eu, US1, US2] Global climate scheme

1490 In the following, we describe two policies, on which we will survey your opinion.
1491 To check that you have attentively read the descriptions, **we will ask some understanding questions afterwards: those who get correct answers can win up to \$150.**

1492 **Global climate scheme:** At the Paris agreement in 2015, all countries have agreed
1493 to contain global warming “well below +2 °C”. To limit global warming to this
1494 level, **there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally.**

1495 To meet the climate target, a limited number of permits to emit greenhouse gases
1496 can be created globally. Polluting firms would be required to buy permits to cover
1497 their emissions. Such a policy would **make fossil fuel companies pay** for their
1498 emissions and progressively raise the price of fossil fuels. **Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions.**

1502 In accordance with the principle that each human has an equal right to pollute, the
1503 revenues generated by the sale of permits could finance a global basic income. **Each**
1504 **adult in the world would receive [US1, US2: \$30/month; UK: \$30 (that is £25) per**
1505 **month; FR, DE, ES: €30/month], thereby lifting out of extreme poverty the 700 mil-**
1506 **lion people who earn less than \$2/day.**

1507 **The typical [American] would lose out financially [US1, US2: \$85, FR: €10, DE:**
1508 **€25, ES: €5, UK: £20] per month** (as he or she would face [\$115] per month in price
1509 increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive).

1510 The policy could be put in place as soon as countries totaling more than 60% of
1511 global emissions agree on it. Countries that would refuse to take part in the policy
1512 could face sanctions (like tariffs) from the rest of the World and would be excluded
1513 from the basic income.

(Back to Section 2.2)

1514 16. Who would win or lose financially in the Global climate scheme? [Figure S12]

1515
1516 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1517 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

1518 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.;*

1519 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

1520 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would lose and*

1522 the 700 million poorest humans would win from the Global climate scheme. Now, here
1523 is the second policy:

1524

1525 **National redistribution scheme:**

1526 This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [US1, US2: 5%; Eu: 1%]⁹ and provide
1527 cash transfers to all adults. More precisely, **each [American] adult would receive**
1528 **[\$85] per month** (that is [\$1,000] per year). This would be financed by an increase
1529 of the federal income tax on household income in excess of [US1, US2: \$315,000 per
1530 year; FR: €15,000 per month; DE: €20,000 per month; ES: €10,000 per month; UK:
1531 £15,000 per month], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000]. [US1,
1532 US2: See more details.]¹⁰

1533 17. Who would win or lose financially in the National redistribution? [Figure S12]

1534

1535 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1536 Typical [Americans] would win and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Ameri-
1537 cans] would win and the richest [Americans] would lose.; Typical [Americans] would lose
1538 and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Americans] would lose and the richest
1539 [Americans] would lose.

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would win and
1541 the richest [Americans] would lose* from the National redistribution scheme.

1542

1543 To help you with the next question, here is a reminder of the policies:

1544

1545 **Global Climate scheme:**

1546 To limit global warming and reach the international climate objective, the Global
1547 climate scheme would **impose a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can**

⁹The wider base in the U.S. was chosen because emissions are larger in the U.S. than in Europe, and it would hardly be feasible to offset the median American's loss from the GCS by taxing only the top 1%.

¹⁰8% of U.S. respondents click. They then see the following text, based on taxjusticenow.org by Saez & Zucman (2019): *The marginal income tax rates would evolve as follows:*

Below \$315,000: unchanged

\$315,000 - \$400,000: current rate 32% => new rate 41%

\$400,000 - \$600,000: 35% => 50%

\$600,000 - \$2.5 million: 37% => 60%

\$2.5 - \$5 million: 37% => 65%

Above \$5 million: 37% => 70%

1548 **emit globally.**

1549 It would **make polluters pay** for their emissions, which in turn would increase fos-
1550 sil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities.

1551 The revenues would finance a **global basic income** of [\$30] per month for all hu-
1552 mans, lifting out of extreme poverty the poorest billion people.

1553 Considering the basic income and the fuel price increases, **the typical [American]**
1554 **would lose out financially [\$85] per month.**

1555
1556 **National redistribution scheme:**

1557 This policy would **increase taxes on the top [5%]** and provide cash transfers to
1558 all adults. More precisely, **each [American] would receive [\$85] per month.** This
1559 would be financed by an increase of the federal income tax on household income in
1560 excess of [\$315,000 per year], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000
1561 per year].

- 1562 18. If both the Global climate scheme and the National redistribution scheme are imple-
1563 mented, how would a typical [American] be financially affected? [*Figure S12*]
1564 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.
1565 *A typical [American] would lose out financially.; A typical [American] would neither gain
1566 nor lose.; A typical [American] would gain financially.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was that *A typical [American] would nei-
1568 ther gain nor lose* from both schemes combined. [*US1, Eu:* Now, here are the last two
1569 policies:]

1570
1571 **[US1: Coal exit:**

1572 To reduce CO₂ emissions, this policy would require all U.S. coal power plants to be
1573 phased out by 2030. Coal would be replaced by renewable sources like wind and
1574 solar panels as well as stronger reliance on gas power plants.

1575 *Eu: Thermal insulation plan:*

1576 To reduce CO₂ emissions and energy insecurity, this policy would require that all
1577 buildings meet energy efficiency targets: at least rating E in 2030 and rating C in
1578 2040. The [UK] government would subsidise half the cost of insulation for all house-
1579 holds, and up to 90% for the poorest households. Insulation work would cost [FR,
1580 DE: €25; ES: €20; UK: £25] billion a year, but would deliver energy savings greater

1581 than this cost.]

1582

1583 **[US1: Marriage only for opposite-sex couples:**

1584 This policy is a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would legally
1585 define marriage as a union of one man and one woman.

1586 ***Eu: Death penalty for major crimes:***

1587 This measure would reintroduce capital punishment for major crimes such as ter-
1588 rrorism and mass shootings.]

1589

1590 Now, we will ask your opinion on the [US1, Eu: four] policies.

1591 [Click here for the reminder of the \[US1, Eu: first\] two policies.](#) [Clicking displays the
1592 previous summarized descriptions.]

- 1593 19. [US2] [4 Random branches: control (*nothing*); Question 31 (*field*); Question 32 (*impor-*
1594 *tant*); or the following question (*info*).] For information, a recent survey has shown
1595 that:

- 1596 • 64% of Americans support the Global climate scheme.
1597 • 72% of Americans support the National redistribution scheme.

- 1598 20. Do you support the Global climate scheme? [*Figure S1*]

1599 Yes; No

- 1600 21. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the
1601 previous question? [*Figure S4*]

1602 The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

1603 *Percentage of [Americans] in favor of Global climate scheme* [slider from 0 to 100]

- 1604 22. Do you support the National redistribution scheme? [*Figure S1*]

1605 Yes; No

- 1606 23. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the
1607 previous question? [*Figure S4*]

1608 The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

1609 *Percentage of [Americans] in favor of National redistribution* [slider from 0 to 100]

- 1610 24. [Eu, US1] Beware, this question is quite unusual. Among the policies below, **how**
1611 **many** do you support? [*Figure S14, Table 1*]

1612 [Four random branches. Branch GCS/NR/C/O]

1613

- 1614 • Global climate scheme
- 1615 • National redistribution scheme
- 1616 • [Coal exit]
- 1617 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

1618 0; 1; 2; 3; 4

1619

1620 [Branch GCS/C/O]

1621

- 1622 • Global climate scheme
- 1623 • [Coal exit]
- 1624 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

1625 0; 1; 2; 3

1626

1627 [Branch NR/C/O]

1628

- 1629 • National redistribution scheme
- 1630 • [Coal exit]
- 1631 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

1632 0; 1; 2; 3

1633 [Branch C/O]

1634

- 1635 • [Coal exit]
- 1636 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

1637 0; 1; 2

1638

1639 [Eu, US1] Conjoint analyses

- 1640 25. Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you prefer? [Figure
1641 S15]

1642 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the
1643 same time.

1644	Bundle A	Bundle B
	[Coal exit] National redistribution scheme Global climate scheme	[Coal exit] National redistribution scheme
1645		
1646	<i>Bundle A; Bundle B</i>	

- 1647 26. Do you support Bundle A (combining [Coal exit], the National redistribution scheme,
1648 and the Global climate scheme)?[Figure S1]

1649 Yes; No

- 1650 27. [new page] Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you
1651 prefer? [Figure S15]

1652 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the
1653 same time.

1654 [Four random branches. Branch C + NR vs. GCS + NR]

1655	Bundle A	Bundle B
	[Coal exit] National redistribution scheme	Global climate scheme
1656		National redistribution scheme

1657 [Branch NR vs. NR + C + GCS]

1658	Bundle A	Bundle B
	National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme [Coal exit] Global climate scheme

1659 1660 [Branch NR + GCS vs. NR]

	Bundle A	Bundle B
1661	National redistribution scheme Global climate scheme	National redistribution scheme
1662		

1663 [Branch NR + C vs. NR]

	Bundle A	Bundle B
1664	National redistribution scheme [Coal exit]	National redistribution scheme
1665		

1666 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 1667 28. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and
 1668 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies
 1669 in their platforms.
 1670 *Eu: Imagine if [DE, ES, UK: the two favorite candidates in your constituency in the
 1671 next general election; FR: the two candidates in the second round of the next pres-
 1672 idential election] campaigned with the following policies in their party's platforms.]*

1673 Which of these candidates would you vote for? [Table 2, Figure S15]

1674 [Table 2. Two random branches: with and without the final row. The US1 version of the poli-
 1675 cies is given below, see the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the European versions.]

	Democrat	Republican
	Increase corporate income tax rate from 21% to 28%	Decrease the payroll tax
	Coal exit	Permit completion of the Keystone pipeline
1677	Trillion dollar investment in childcare, healthcare, education and housing	Withdrawal of the Paris agreement
	\$15 minimum wage	Marriage only for opposite-sex couples
	National redistribution scheme	Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation
	[Global climate scheme / no row]	[/ no row]

1678

1679 [US1: Democrat; Republican; None of them; Eu: Candidate A; Candidate B; None of them]

- 1680 29. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and
1681 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies
1682 in their platforms.

1683 *Eu (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the Section "Values and politics"):* Imag-
1684 ine that [FR: the left or center-left; DE: a red-red-green coalition; ES: the PSOE; UK:
1685 the Labour Party] wins the next [general] elections. Here are two possible platforms
1686 on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a
1687 pool of credible [FR: left or center-left, DE: left-wing parties'; ES: PSOE; UK: Labour]
1688 policies).]

1689

1690 [US1: Which of these candidates do you prefer?

1691 *Eu: Even if you [FR: are not from the left or center-left; DE: do not support the left-
1692 wing parties; ES: do not support the PSOE; UK: do not support the Labour Party],
1693 which of these platforms do you prefer?]*

1694 [Figures S2, S16; see also the sheet "Policies" in *this spreadsheet* for the possible policies.]

	[Candidate A]	[Candidate B]	
1695	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]

1696 [US1: Candidate A; Candidate B; Eu: Platform A; Platform B]

- 1697 30. [new page] [Same wording and conditions as above. For brevity, only the UK version is
1698 given here.] Imagine that the Labour Party wins the next general elections. Here are
1699 two possible platforms on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are
1700 randomly drawn from a pool of credible Labour policies).

1701

1702 Even if you do not support the Labour Party, which of these platforms do you pre-
1703 fer? [Figure S2]

		Platform A	Platform B
1704	[Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order]	[Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy]	[Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy]
1705	Foreign policy	Global climate scheme	-
	<i>Platform A; Platform B</i>		

1706 **[Eu, US2] Perceptions of the GCS**

1707 [Eu: two random branches. US2: four random branches and the question is asked (if asked)
1708 before Question 20]

1709 31. [Branch: field] When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to
1710 your mind?

1711 Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme. [Figures S18, S19]
1712 {Open field}

1713 32. [Branch: important] When determining your support or opposition to the Global
1714 climate scheme, which points are important to you? [Figure S17]

- 1715 • It would succeed in limiting climate change.
- 1716 • It would hurt the [U.S.] economy.
- 1717 • It would penalize my household.
- 1718 • It would make people change their lifestyle.
- 1719 • It would reduce poverty in low-income countries.
- 1720 • It might be detrimental to some poor countries.
- 1721 • It could foster global cooperation.
- 1722 • It could fuel corruption in low-income countries.
- 1723 • It could be subject to fraud.
- 1724 • It would be technically difficult to put in place.
- 1725 • Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences.

1726 *Not at all important; Not so important; Quite important; Very important*

1727 [Eu, US1] Donation lottery

1728 33. Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).

1729 *Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*

1730 34. [Two random branches] By taking this survey, you are automatically entered into a
1731 lottery to win [\$]100 in panel points. This lottery is unrelated to the previous ones
1732 that rewarded answers’ accuracy. In a few days you will know whether you have
1733 been selected in the lottery. The payment will be made to you in the same way as
1734 your compensation for this survey, so no further action is required on your part.

1735

1736 Should you be selected in the lottery, you can also donate a part of this additional
1737 compensation to [[American] / African] people living in poverty through [US1: the
1738 charity GiveDirectly. The charity GiveDirectly; Eu: a charity. We would channel this
1739 donation to a charity that] provides small amounts of cash to people in need in [[the
1740 U.S] / Africa].

1741

1742 **In case you are winner of the lottery, what share of the [\$]100 would you donate**
1743 **to [[American] / African] people living in poverty [US1: through GiveDirectly]?**
1744 *[Figure S20, Table S2]*

1745 *Amount donated to [[American] / African] people in need (in [\$]) [slider from 0 to 100]*

1746 [Eu, US2] Wealth tax

1747 [Four random branches: Question 35 then Question 36 (global first); Question 36 then Ques-
1748 tion 35 (national first); Question 37 (global share); Question 38 (sharing)]

1749 35. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-
1750 income countries?

1751 Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking
1752 water, healthcare, and education. *[Figures S1, S21]*

1753 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1754 *support*

1755 36. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: afford-
1756 able housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and
1757 schools]? *[Figures S1, S22]*

1758 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1759 *support*

1760 37. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all
1761 countries around the world. In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount
1762 to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE: €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2:
1763 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount
1764 to [\$]1 billion in all low-income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700
1765 million people, most of them in Africa).

1766 Each country would retain part of the revenues it collects, and the remaining part
1767 would be pooled at the global level to finance infrastructure and public services in
1768 low-income countries.

1769
1770 What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of re-
1771 tained in the country's national budget)? [Figures S5, S23]

1772 *Percent of global wealth tax that should go to low-income countries [slider from 0 to 100]*

1773 38. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in
1774 all countries around the world.

1775 In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE:
1776 €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2: 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES:
1777 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount to [\$]1 billion in all low-
1778 income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700 million people, most of
1779 them in Africa).

1780 Which of the following options would you prefer? [Figure S24]

- 1781 • The whole wealth tax financing national budgets in each country. For ex-
1782 ample, in [US2: the U.S., it could finance affordable housing and universal
1783 childcare/pre-K.; Eu-UK: the UK, it could finance the National Health Service
1784 and state-funded schools].
- 1785 • Half of the wealth tax financing national budgets in each country, half of it
1786 financing low-income countries. For example, it could finance [US2: universal
1787 childcare/pre-K in the U.S.; Eu-UK: state-funded schools in the UK] and access
1788 to drinking water, healthcare, and education in Africa.

1789 [Eu, US2] Foreign aid

1790 US2 Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).

1791 *Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*

- 1792 39. From your best guess, what percentage of [U.S.] government spending is allocated
1793 to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?

1794

1795 For your information, government spending totals [US2: 38%; FR: 55%; DE: 45%; ES:
1796 42%; UK: 41%] of [U.S.] GDP, it includes [US2: federal, State; Eu: national] and local
1797 government spending, and apart from foreign aid, it covers the following items: de-
1798 fense, social security (retirement pensions), health [US2: (including Medicare and
1799 Medicaid)], welfare benefits [US2: (including food stamps and EITC)], education,
1800 roads, justice, other programs [US2: and federal agencies (including in energy, sci-
1801 ence...)]. [Figure S25]

1802 *Less than 0.1%; 0.1% to 0.2%; 0.3% to 0.5%; 0.6% to 1.0%; 1.1% to 1.7%; 1.8% to 2.6%;
1803 2.7% to 4%; 4.1% to 6%; 6.1% to 9%; 9.1% to 13%; 13.1% to 25%; More than 25%*

- 1804 40. [Two random branches: with or without information on actual amount] [Info: Actually,
1805 [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [the U.S.] government spend-
1806 ing is allocated to foreign aid.]

1807

1808 If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate
1809 to foreign aid? [Figures S28, S29, S26 and S27]

- 1810 41. [Asked iff branch: Info and preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than actual for-
1811 eign aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to increase [U.S.] foreign
1812 aid.

1813

1814 How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers
1815 possible) [Figure S30]

1816 *Lower spending on defense; Lower spending on retirement pensions; Lower spending on
1817 healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Lower spending on welfare benefits [US2: (like
1818 EITC or food stamps)]; Lower spending on education; Lower spending on other programs
1819 [US2: and federal agencies]; Higher taxes on the wealthiest; Higher corporate income tax
1820 rate; Higher personal income tax rates; Higher public deficit*

1821 42. [Asked iff branch: *Info* and preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than actual foreign
1822 aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to reduce [U.S.] foreign aid.

1823

1824 How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible) [*Figure S31*]
1825

1826 *Higher spending on defense; Higher spending on retirement pensions; Higher spending on
1827 healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Higher spending on welfare benefits [US2:
1828 like EITC or food stamps)]; Higher spending on education; lower spending on other pro-
1829 grams [US2: and federal agencies]; Lower taxes on the wealthiest; Lower corporate income
1830 tax rate; Lower personal income tax rates; Lower public deficit*

1831 **[Eu, US1] Petition**

1832 43. [*Two random branches*] Would you be willing to sign a petition for the [Global cli-
1833 mate / National redistribution] scheme? [*Figure S32*]

1834

1835 As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President's
1836 office], informing him what share of American people are willing to endorse the
1837 [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign,
1838 only your answer here is required and remains anonymous.) Yes; No

1839 **[Eu, US1] Other policies**

1840 44. The following policies are discussed at international negotiations on how to deal
1841 with climate change. [*Figures 3 and S33*]

1842

1843 Do you support or oppose the following policies?

- 1844
- 1845 • Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for
 climate damages
 - 1846 • High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries
 - 1847 • High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income
 countries adapt to climate change
- 1848

1849 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1850 support*

1851 45. Do you support or oppose the following global policies? [Figures 3 and S33]

- 1852 • Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt
- 1853 • Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting
1854 right proportional to its population
- 1855 • Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries
- 1856 • A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage
- 1857 • Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of
1858 all assets
- 1859 • A maximum wealth limit of [US1: \$10 billion; Eu: [€]100 million] for each
1860 human

1861 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1862 support*

1863 46. Currently, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [U.S.] government
1864 spending (that is, [US1: 0.2%; FR: 0.4%; DE: 0.6%; ES: 0.2%; UK: 0.7%] of [U.S.] GDP)
1865 is spent on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries. [Figure S6]

1866
1867 Do you support [the U.S.] transferring more money to low-income countries?

1868 *Yes, [U.S.] foreign aid should be increased.; Yes, but only if some conditions are met.; No,
1869 [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.; No, [U.S.] foreign aid should be reduced.*

1870 47. [Asked only if *Yes, but only if some conditions are met.* is chosen] What conditions
1871 should be required for [the U.S.] to increase its foreign aid? (Multiple answers pos-
1872 sible) [Figures S7, S28]

1873 *That recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights.; That recipient
1874 countries cooperate to fight illegal migrations.; That other high-income countries also in-
1875 crease their foreign aid.; That this is financed by increased taxes on millionaires.; That we
1876 can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted.; Other: [open field]*

1877 48. [Asked only if *No, [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.* or *No, [U.S.] foreign aid
1878 should be reduced.* is chosen] Why do you oppose [the U.S.] increasing its foreign
1879 aid? (Multiple answers possible) [Figure S8]

1880 *Aid perpetuates poverty as it makes people feel less responsible for themselves.; Aid is not
1881 effective as most of it is diverted.; Aid is a pressure tactic for high-income countries that*

1882 *prevents low-income countries from developing freely.; [The U.S.] is not responsible for what*
1883 *happens in other countries.; Charity begins at home: there is already a lot to do to support*
1884 *the American people in need.; Other: [open field]*

1885 **[Eu, US1, US2] Values and politics**

- 1886 49. [Eu (where it is instead asked at the beginning of Section “Other Policies”), US1]
1887 In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend
1888 [U.S.] interests or global justice? [Figure S34]
1889 *[U.S.] interests, even if it goes against global justice; [U.S.] interests, to the extent it re-*
1890 *spects global justice; Indifferent or don't know; Global justice, to the extent it respects [U.S.]*
1891 *interests; Global justice, even if it goes against [U.S.] interests*
- 1892 50. How much did you give to charities in 2022? [Figure S39]
1893 *I did not make donations to charities last year.; Less than [\$]100.; Between [\$]101 and*
1894 *[\$]500.; Between [\$]501 and [\$]1,000.; Between [\$]1,001 and [\$]5,000.; More than [\$]5,000.*
- 1895 51. To what extent are you interested in politics? [Figure S40]
1896 *Not at all; A little; Moderately; A lot; A great deal*
- 1897 52. Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means you think the
1898 government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic gov-
1899 ernment functions, and 5 means you think the government should take active steps
1900 in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens? [Figure S41]
1901 *Desired involvement of government [slider from 1 to 5]*
- 1902 53. **On economic policy matters**, where do you see yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where
1903 1 is Left (favoring equality and government interventions) and 5 is Right (favoring
1904 free competition and little government intervention)? [Figure S42]
1905 *Left (1) to Right (5) on economic issues [slider from 1 to 5]*
- 1906 54. Did you vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election? [Figure S43]
1907 *Yes; No: I didn't have the right to vote in the U.S.; Prefer not to say*
- 1908 55. [If voted: Which candidate did you vote for in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election?
1909 If did not vote: Even if you did not vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election,
1910 please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who
1911 represents your views more closely.] [Figure S44]

[US1, US2: Biden; Trump; Jorgensen; Hawkins; Prefer not to say
FR: candidates at the 2022 presidential election
DE: parties with more than 1% of votes at the 2021 federal election and *Other*
ES: lists with more than 0.9% at the November 2019 general election and *Other*
UK: parties with more than 0.5% of votes at the 2019 general election and *Other*

56. To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem? [Figure S35]

- Income inequality in [the U.S.]
- Climate change
- Global poverty

Not an important issue for me; An issue but there are other priorities; An issue but we already do what we can; An important issue, we should do more; One of the most pressing issue of our time

57. What group do you defend when you vote? [Figure S36]

Sentient beings (humans and animals); Humans; [Eu: Europeans]; [Americans]; People sharing my culture or religion; [US1, US2: My State]; [US1, US2: My town; Eu: My country, region or town]; My relatives and/or colleagues; My family and myself

[Eu, US1] Prioritization

58. In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

How do you allocate the points among the following policies? [Figures S37 and S38]

You can adjust the number of points either using the slider or entering the number of your choice on the right-hand-side. **The sum of points must equal exactly 100.** By pushing the last slider to the right, the total will automatically adjust to 100. Please read the 6 options before making your choice.

See the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the pool of policies in each country.

[sliders from 0 to 100]

1940 [FR, DE, ES] ETS2

1941 59. Similar to the Global Climate Scheme, the European Climate Scheme would impose
1942 a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit across the EU in the buildings
1943 and transport sectors. It would make polluters pay for their emissions, which in turn
1944 would increase fossil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities. Several options
1945 are possible regarding the use of the scheme's revenues:

- 1946 • Provide an equal cash transfer of €105 per year to each European.
- 1947 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European, proportional to their
1948 country's emissions: people in countries with higher emissions per person (like
1949 Germany) would receive more than people in countries with lower emissions
1950 (like Romania). For information, people in [Germany] would receive €[FR:
1951 110; DE: 130; ES: 90]/year.
- 1952 • Finance low-carbon investments: thermal insulation of buildings, switch to
1953 clean sources of heating, public transportation, and charging stations for elec-
1954 tric vehicles.
- 1955 • Provide cash transfers to the most vulnerable half of Europeans and finance
1956 low-carbon investments.

1957 Do you support or oppose the European Climate Scheme in case the revenue is used
1958 to... ?

- 1959 • Provide an equal cash transfer to each European
- 1960 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European
- 1961 • Finance low-carbon investments
- 1962 • Provide cash transfers for the most vulnerable Europeans and low-carbon in-
1963 vestments

1964 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1965 support*

1966 60. [Asked iff none of the four variants of the European Climate Scheme is (somewhat or
1967 strongly) supported] Why do you not support a European Climate Scheme? (Mul-
1968 tiple answers possible)

1969 *I am opposed to climate policy being decided at the EU level, it should be decided at the na-*
1970 *tional level;*
1971 *I would prefer if the revenues were used in a different way (beyond the four suggestions*
1972 *above) than previously suggested;*
1973 *I would prefer if decreasing carbon emissions were regulated by other climate policies;*
1974 *I am generally opposed to additional, or more ambitious, climate policies;*
1975 *I do not fully understand how the European Climate Scheme is supposed to work;*
1976 *I don't know*

1977 **[Eu, US1, US2] Feedback**

- 1978 61. Do you feel that this survey was politically biased? [Figure S45]
1979 *Yes, left-wing biased; Yes, right-wing biased; No, I do not feel it was biased*
- 1980 62. [US2 Asked only to one random third of the respondents, instead of the feedback Ques-
1981 tion 63] According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme
1982 poverty in low-income countries? [Figure S46]
1983 *{Open field}*
- 1984 63. The survey is nearing completion. You can now enter any comments, thoughts or
1985 suggestions in the field below.
1986 *{Open field}*
- 1987 64. Lastly, are you interested to be interviewed by a researcher (through videoconfer-
1988 encing) for 30 min?
1989
1990 This is totally optional and will not be rewarded.
1991 *Yes; No*

1992 E Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme

1993 To specify the GCS, we use the IEA's 2DS scenario (IEA 2017), which is consistent
1994 with limiting the global average temperature increase to 2°C with a probability of at least
1995 50%. The paper by Hood (2017) contributing to the Report of the High-Level Commission
1996 on Carbon Prices (Stern & Stiglitz 2017) presents a price corridor compatible with this
1997 emissions scenario, from which we take the midpoint. The product of these two series
1998 provides an estimate of the revenues expected from a global carbon price. We then use
1999 the UN median scenario of future population aged over 15 years (*adults*, for short). We
2000 derive the basic income that could be paid to all adults by recycling the revenues from
2001 the global carbon price: evolving between \$20 and \$30 per month, with a peak in 2030.
2002 Accounting for the lower price levels in low-income countries, an additional income of
2003 \$30 per month would allow **670 million people** to escape extreme poverty, defined with
2004 the threshold of \$2.15 per day in purchasing power parity.¹¹

2005 To estimate the increase in fossil fuel expenditures (or “cost”) in each country by 2030,
2006 we make a key assumption concerning the evolution of the carbon footprints per adult:
2007 that they will decrease by the same proportion in each country. We use data from the
2008 Global Carbon Project (Peters et al. 2012). In 2030, the average carbon footprint of a
2009 country c , e_c , evolves from baseline year b proportionally to the evolution of its adult
2010 population $\Delta p_c = p_c^{2030} / p_c^b$. Thus, the global share of country c 's carbon footprint, s_c ,
2011 is proportional to $\sigma_c = e_c \Delta p_c$, and as countries' shares sum to 1, $s_c = \frac{\sigma_c}{\sum_k \sigma_k}$. Multiplying
2012 country c 's emission share with global revenues in 2030, R , and dividing by c 's adult pop-
2013 ulation in year y , yields its average cost per adult: $R \cdot s_c / p_c^y$. Using findings from Ivanova
2014 & Wood (2020) for Europe and Fremstad & Paul (2019) for the U.S., we approximate the
2015 median cost as 90% of the average cost. Finally, the net gain is given by the basic income
2016 (\$30 per month) minus the cost. We provided consistent estimates of net gains in all sur-
2017 veys (using $y = b = 2015$), though in the global survey we gave the average net gains
2018 vs. the median ones in the complementary surveys. The latter are shown in Figure S49.
2019 For the record, Table S3 also provides an estimate of *average* net gains (computed with

¹¹The average carbon footprint of Sub-Saharan Africa is 0.75tCO₂ per capita (World Bank), and it is even lower for people living in extreme poverty, under one tenth of the world average of about 5tCO₂ per capita (Chancel & Piketty 2015). Under a GCS with a cash transfer of \$30 per person, if one's emission is one tenth of the world average, their net gain would be \$27 per month in nominal terms. In regions with extreme poverty like Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding high-income countries), the conversion factor from Market Exchange Rate to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is 2.4 (computed as the ratio of the World Bank series relating the GDP per capita of Sub-Saharan Africa in PPP and nominal). Therefore, the net gain for the extreme poor is \$65 per month (or \$2.13 a day) in PPP, enough to lift them out of extreme poverty.

2020 $b = 2019$ and $y = 2030$).¹²

2021 Estimates of the net gains from the Global Climate Scheme are necessarily imprecise,
2022 given the uncertainties surrounding the carbon price required to achieve emissions reduc-
2023 tions as well as each country's trajectory in terms of emissions and population. These val-
2024 ues are highly dependent on future (non-price) climate policies, technical progress, and
2025 economic growth of each country, which are only partially known. Integrated Assessment
2026 Models have been used to derive a Global Energy Assessment (Johansson et al. 2012), a
2027 100% renewable scenario (Greenpeace 2015) as well as Shared Socioeconomic Pathways
2028 (SSPs), which include consistent trajectories of population, emissions, and carbon price
2029 (Riahi et al.; Bauer et al.; van Vuuren et al.; Fricko et al. 2017; 2017; 2017; 2017). Instead
2030 of using some of these modelling trajectories, we relied on a simple and transparent for-
2031 mula, for a number of reasons. First and foremost, those trajectories describe territorial
2032 emissions while we need consumption-based emissions to compute the incidence of the
2033 GCS. Second, the carbon price is relatively low in trajectories of SSPs that contain global
2034 warming below 2°C (less than \$35/tCO₂ in 2030), so we conservatively chose a method
2035 yielding a higher carbon price (\$90 in 2030). Third, modelling results are available only
2036 for a few macro regions, while we wanted country by country estimates. Finally, we
2037 have checked that the emissions per capita given by our method are broadly in line with
2038 alternative methods, even if it tends to overestimate net gains in countries which will de-
2039 carbonize less rapidly than average.¹³ For example, although countries' decarbonization
2040 plans should realign with the GCS in place, India might still decarbonize less quickly than
2041 the European Union, so India's gain and the EU's loss might be overestimated in our com-
2042 putations. For a more sophisticated version of the Global Climate Scheme which includes
2043 participation mechanisms preventing middle-income countries (like China) to lose from
2044 it and estimations of the Net Present Value by country, see Fabre (2023). (Back to Sec-
2045 tion 2.3)

¹²2015 was the last year of data available when the global questionnaire was conceived (OECD data was then used – it does not cover all countries but give identical rounded estimates than those recomputed from the Global Carbon Project data for our complementary surveys). 2030 was chosen as the reference year as it is the date at which global carbon price revenues are expected to peak (and the GCS redistributive effects would be largest), and the GCS could not realistically enter into force before that date. In the surveys, we chose $y = b = 2015$ rather than $b = 2019$ and $y = 2030$ to get more conservative estimates of the monthly cost in the U.S. (\$20 higher than the other option) and in Europe (€5 or £10 higher).

¹³Computations with alternative methods can be found on [our public repository](#).

Figure S49: Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme.




Table S3: Estimated net gain from the GCS in 2030 and carbon footprint by country.

	Mean net gain from the GCS (\$/month)	CO ₂ footprint per adult in 2019 (tCO ₂ /y)			
			Mexico	2	5.6
			Ukraine	2	5.6
			Uzbekistan*	4	5.1
			Argentina	5	4.9
			Thailand	6	4.6
			Egypt	12	3.6
			Indonesia	13	3.3
			Colombia	15	3.0
Saudi Arabia	-93	24.0	Brazil	15	2.9
United States	-77	21.0	Vietnam	15	2.9
Australia	-60	17.6	Peru	16	2.8
Canada	-56	16.7	Morocco	16	2.7
South Korea	-50	15.6	North Korea*	17	2.5
Germany	-30	11.7	India	18	2.4
Russia	-29	11.5	Philippines	18	2.3
Japan	-28	11.3	Pakistan	22	1.6
Malaysia	-21	10.0	Bangladesh	24	1.1
Iran	-19	9.5	Nigeria	25	1.0
Poland	-19	9.5	Kenya	25	0.9
United Kingdom	-18	9.4	Myanmar*	26	0.9
China	-14	8.6	Sudan*	26	0.9
Italy	-13	8.4	Tanzania	27	0.5
South Africa	-11	8.0	Afghanistan*	27	0.5
France	-10	7.8	Uganda	28	0.4
Iraq*	-8	7.4	Ethiopia	28	0.3
Spain	-6	7.0	Venezuela	29	0.3
Turkey	-2	6.2	DRC*	30	0.1
Algeria*	-1	6.0			

²⁰⁴⁶ Note: Asterisks denote countries where footprint is missing and territorial emissions is used instead.

²⁰⁴⁷ Values differ from Figure S49 as this table present estimates of *mean* net gain per adult in 2030, not at the

²⁰⁴⁸ present. Only the countries with more than 20 million adults (covering 87% of the global total) are shown.

F Determinants of support

Table S4: Determinants of support for the Global Climate Scheme. (Back to [2.3](#))

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme						
	All	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Country: Germany	-0.157*** (0.022)		-0.144*** (0.022)				
Country: Spain	-0.044* (0.024)		-0.026 (0.024)				
Country: United Kingdom	-0.079*** (0.024)		-0.104*** (0.023)				
Country: United States	-0.375*** (0.019)						
Income quartile: 2	0.037** (0.017)	0.031 (0.022)	0.038 (0.023)	0.047 (0.043)	0.058 (0.049)	0.013 (0.053)	0.023 (0.043)
Income quartile: 3	0.042** (0.017)	0.033 (0.024)	0.049** (0.024)	0.080** (0.040)	0.059 (0.052)	0.074 (0.056)	-0.052 (0.052)
Income quartile: 4	0.056*** (0.018)	0.062** (0.026)	0.010 (0.026)	0.018 (0.047)	-0.015 (0.055)	-0.001 (0.056)	-0.005 (0.057)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.023* (0.012)	0.032* (0.017)	0.010 (0.018)	0.007 (0.029)	0.045 (0.039)	0.007 (0.039)	-0.010 (0.039)
Age: 25-34	-0.076*** (0.025)	-0.084*** (0.031)	-0.044 (0.035)	-0.031 (0.057)	-0.077 (0.083)	-0.050 (0.066)	-0.103 (0.091)
Age: 35-49	-0.101*** (0.024)	-0.109*** (0.030)	-0.069* (0.034)	-0.094* (0.055)	-0.009 (0.077)	-0.168** (0.070)	-0.050 (0.090)
Age: 50-64	-0.137*** (0.024)	-0.165*** (0.030)	-0.038 (0.035)	-0.039 (0.056)	-0.020 (0.082)	-0.146** (0.067)	-0.017 (0.087)
Age: 65+	-0.116*** (0.028)	-0.142*** (0.034)	-0.056 (0.044)	0.003 (0.076)	-0.045 (0.094)	-0.258*** (0.091)	0.011 (0.105)
Gender: Man	0.019* (0.011)	0.022 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.029)	-0.018 (0.033)	0.042 (0.038)	-0.005 (0.034)
Lives with partner	0.029** (0.013)	0.023 (0.017)	0.058*** (0.018)	0.070** (0.033)	0.082** (0.038)	0.017 (0.038)	0.040 (0.039)
Employment status: Retired	-0.020 (0.024)	-0.046 (0.030)	0.056 (0.038)	0.087 (0.081)	0.096 (0.075)	0.040 (0.082)	0.001 (0.073)
Employment status: Student	0.045 (0.033)	0.062 (0.048)	0.101** (0.044)	0.165* (0.085)	0.192** (0.087)	0.116 (0.074)	-0.021 (0.107)
Employment status: Working	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.020 (0.024)	0.011 (0.028)	0.082 (0.064)	0.006 (0.056)	-0.050 (0.056)	0.036 (0.051)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.331*** (0.013)	-0.435*** (0.017)	-0.106*** (0.019)	-0.131*** (0.035)	-0.004 (0.044)	-0.114*** (0.038)	-0.081* (0.041)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	-0.184*** (0.016)	-0.198*** (0.022)	-0.136*** (0.021)	-0.196*** (0.039)	-0.034 (0.043)	-0.116** (0.046)	-0.108*** (0.040)
Vote: Far right	-0.396*** (0.032)		-0.309*** (0.033)	-0.493*** (0.064)	-0.168*** (0.051)	-0.130 (0.102)	-0.314*** (0.080)
Urban	0.049*** (0.012)	0.072*** (0.018)	0.006 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.029)	0.019 (0.032)	-0.014 (0.036)	0.017 (0.033)
Race: White		-0.030 (0.019)					
Region: Northeast		0.010 (0.023)					
Region: South		0.006 (0.020)					
Region: West		0.010 (0.022)					
Swing State		-0.038** (0.019)					
Constant	1.048	0.736	0.89	0.7	0.732	0.935	0.886
Observations	7,986	4,992	2,994	977	727	748	542
R ²	0.160	0.181	0.064	0.116	0.067	0.043	0.063

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table S5: Support for the GCS regressed on comprehension of its financial effects.

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme					
	All	United States	France	Germany	United Kingdom	Spain
With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win	0.029** (0.012)	-0.004 (0.016)	0.043 (0.033)	0.051 (0.033)	0.040 (0.036)	0.038 (0.037)
Constant	0.596	0.53	0.764	0.677	0.707	0.796
Observations	8,000	5,000	729	979	749	543
R ²	0.001	0.00001	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.002

Table S6: Correlation between (*Somewhat or Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in high-income countries.

	Support for a global GHG tax and dividend											
	USA (1)	DNK (2)	FRA (3)	DEU (4)	ITA (5)	ESP (6)	GBR (7)	JPN (8)	POL (9)	AUS (10)	CAN (11)	KOR (12)
Control group mean	0.34	0.409	0.34	0.361	0.341	0.421	0.288	0.317	0.309	0.294	0.316	0.334
Trusts the government	0.040*** (0.013)	0.0005 (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.051*** (0.011)	0.061*** (0.012)	0.046*** (0.011)	0.050*** (0.012)	0.039*** (0.013)	0.023** (0.011)	0.041*** (0.013)	0.019 (0.012)	0.079*** (0.013)
Believes inequality is an important problem	0.038*** (0.014)	0.051*** (0.012)	0.045*** (0.013)	0.040*** (0.011)	0.023** (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.052*** (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)	0.009 (0.010)	0.005 (0.013)	0.031*** (0.012)	0.024** (0.012)
Worries about CC	0.006 (0.018)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.005 (0.016)	0.048*** (0.014)	0.023* (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.044*** (0.015)	0.014 (0.014)	0.018 (0.013)	0.036** (0.017)	0.004 (0.014)	0.015 (0.013)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	0.009 (0.015)	0.007 (0.012)	0.018 (0.014)	0.015 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.032** (0.011)	0.027** (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.024** (0.015)	0.018 (0.014)	0.014 (0.014)	0.001 (0.013)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.059*** (0.015)	0.019 (0.013)	0.008 (0.014)	0.032** (0.013)	0.012 (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.006 (0.014)	0.037** (0.014)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.033** (0.016)	0.026* (0.014)	0.033** (0.013)
Understands emission across activities/regions	-0.018 (0.011)	0.009 (0.013)	0.003 (0.012)	0.023* (0.012)	0.007 (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.007 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.026** (0.012)	-0.002 (0.013)	0.003 (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	0.007 (0.012)	0.008 (0.014)	0.023 (0.014)	0.011 (0.012)	-0.0005 (0.012)	0.031*** (0.012)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.014 (0.011)	0.025* (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.024* (0.012)
Knows which gases cause CC	0.005 (0.011)	0.021* (0.012)	0.010 (0.013)	0.001 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.010)	0.020* (0.010)	0.015 (0.010)	0.017 (0.011)	0.011 (0.011)	-0.0003 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.013)
Understands impacts of CC	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.029*** (0.011)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.022* (0.012)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.024* (0.012)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	-0.005 (0.013)	0.007 (0.012)	0.021 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.014)	0.011 (0.014)	0.010 (0.013)	0.014 (0.013)	0.008 (0.013)	0.015 (0.013)	0.036** (0.016)	0.004 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.013)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	-0.013 (0.021)	0.037 (0.023)	0.043* (0.022)	-0.014 (0.020)	-0.038** (0.019)	0.029 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.017 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.006 (0.022)	0.021 (0.020)	-0.020 (0.019)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.086*** (0.024)	0.066*** (0.023)	0.075*** (0.023)	0.094*** (0.022)	0.105*** (0.020)	0.074*** (0.023)	0.091*** (0.021)	0.154*** (0.019)	0.089*** (0.020)	0.070*** (0.024)	0.053** (0.023)	0.112*** (0.020)
Believes own household would lose	-0.071*** (0.021)	-0.057*** (0.015)	-0.026 (0.020)	-0.087*** (0.017)	-0.066*** (0.017)	-0.053*** (0.017)	-0.073*** (0.017)	-0.008 (0.017)	-0.079*** (0.017)	-0.052*** (0.016)	-0.060*** (0.019)	-0.083*** (0.017)
Believes low-income earners will lose	-0.034* (0.019)	-0.020 (0.016)	-0.056*** (0.018)	-0.022 (0.017)	-0.021 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.016)	-0.015 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.056*** (0.017)	-0.025 (0.016)	-0.030 (0.020)	-0.056*** (0.018)
Believes high-income earners will lose	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.012)	0.013 (0.013)	0.003 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.007 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.025** (0.012)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.0004 (0.013)
Observations	2,218	2,013	2,006	2,006	2,088	2,268	2,025	1,990	2,053	1,978	2,022	1,932
R ²	0.329	0.241	0.237	0.295	0.211	0.216	0.272	0.222	0.214	0.272	0.254	0.228

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 of Dechezleprêtre et al. (forthcoming) for variable definitions.

Table S7: Correlation between (*Somewhat* or *Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in middle-income countries.

	Support for a global GHG tax and dividend							
	IDN (1)	ZAF (2)	MEX (3)	TUR (4)	IND (5)	BRA (6)	CHN (7)	UKR (8)
Control group mean	0.697	0.396	0.681	0.44	0.719	0.539	0.737	0.622
Trusts the government	0.051*** (0.012)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.040*** (0.014)	0.066*** (0.017)	0.065*** (0.015)	0.038** (0.015)	-0.011 (0.015)	0.061*** (0.014)
Believes inequality is an important problem	0.048** (0.011)	0.002 (0.014)	0.057*** (0.015)	0.028 (0.017)	0.092*** (0.016)	0.055*** (0.015)	-0.001 (0.015)	0.027 (0.018)
Worries about CC	0.003 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.016)	0.013 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.017)	-0.0002 (0.016)	0.032* (0.017)	-0.0002 (0.016)	0.046*** (0.016)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	0.020 (0.014)	0.026 (0.017)	0.004 (0.014)	0.039** (0.017)	0.022 (0.016)	0.019 (0.015)	0.034** (0.016)	0.018 (0.016)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.020* (0.011)	0.038** (0.016)	0.032* (0.017)	-0.002 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.015)	-0.017 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.018 (0.016)
Understands emission across activities/regions	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.013)	0.003 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.010)	0.039*** (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.00004 (0.013)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	-0.006 (0.009)	0.011 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.016)	0.0002 (0.012)	0.003 (0.014)	-0.052*** (0.016)	0.022 (0.014)
Knows which gases cause CC	-0.026*** (0.009)	0.019 (0.015)	0.035** (0.014)	0.015 (0.015)	0.020 (0.013)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.023* (0.012)	0.023 (0.015)
Understands impacts of CC	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.0005 (0.015)	0.009 (0.017)	0.043*** (0.014)	-0.023 (0.015)	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.014 (0.014)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	-0.010 (0.007)	0.009 (0.016)	0.015 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.013)	0.002 (0.011)	-0.016 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.010)	0.035** (0.015)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	0.023 (0.015)	0.002 (0.021)	0.019 (0.022)	0.044 (0.029)	0.021 (0.020)	0.032 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.018)	-0.023 (0.025)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.111*** (0.019)	0.073*** (0.022)	0.088*** (0.024)	0.078** (0.031)	0.034 (0.025)	0.129*** (0.022)	0.060*** (0.022)	0.138*** (0.025)
Believes own household would lose	-0.027 (0.021)	-0.044** (0.020)	-0.071*** (0.019)	-0.054** (0.024)	-0.012 (0.019)	-0.067*** (0.023)	-0.119*** (0.022)	-0.045** (0.021)
Believes low-income earners will lose	-0.059*** (0.020)	-0.016 (0.019)	0.003 (0.017)	-0.053** (0.023)	-0.055*** (0.019)	-0.013 (0.020)	0.001 (0.018)	0.004 (0.020)
Believes high-income earners will lose	0.026** (0.011)	-0.020 (0.015)	0.010 (0.013)	0.010 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.014)	0.003 (0.016)	-0.047*** (0.014)	-0.007 (0.013)
Observations	2,488	2,003	2,045	1,932	2,472	1,860	1,717	1,564
R ²	0.366	0.175	0.242	0.248	0.370	0.272	0.280	0.255

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 of Dechezleprêtre et al. (forthcoming) for variable definitions.

G Representativeness of the surveys

Table S8: Sample representativeness of the complementary surveys. (Back to [2.1](#))

	US1			US2			Eu		
	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample
Sample size		3,000	3,000		2,000	2,000		3,000	3,000
Gender: Woman	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.45	0.50	0.51	0.49	0.51
Gender: Man	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.49	0.55	0.50	0.49	0.51	0.49
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.11	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.18	0.15	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.18	0.15	0.17	0.15
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.24	0.26
Age: 65+	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.25	0.23	0.25
Diploma_25_64: Below upper secondary	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.13	0.14	0.13
Diploma_25_64: Upper secondary	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.28	0.23	0.19	0.23
Diploma_25_64: Post secondary	0.34	0.40	0.34	0.34	0.33	0.34	0.29	0.33	0.29
Race: White only	0.60	0.67	0.61	0.60	0.62	0.61			
Race: Hispanic	0.18	0.15	0.19	0.18	0.19	0.19			
Race: Black	0.13	0.16	0.14	0.13	0.17	0.14			
Region: Northeast	0.17	0.20	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.17			
Region: Midwest	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.21			
Region: South	0.38	0.39	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38			
Region: West	0.24	0.20	0.24	0.24	0.20	0.24			
Urban: TRUE	0.73	0.78	0.74	0.73	0.75	0.73			
Employment_18_64: Inactive	0.20	0.16	0.16	0.20	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.15
Employment_18_64: Unemployed	0.02	0.07	0.08	0.02	0.09	0.08	0.03	0.06	0.05
Vote: Left	0.32	0.47	0.45	0.32	0.46	0.45	0.30	0.32	0.32
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.32	0.32
Vote: Far right							0.10	0.10	0.10
Country: FR							0.24	0.24	0.24
Country: DE							0.33	0.33	0.33
Country: ES							0.18	0.18	0.18
Country: UK							0.25	0.25	0.25
Urbanity: Cities							0.43	0.49	0.43
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs							0.33	0.32	0.33
Urbanity: Rural							0.25	0.20	0.25

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

Table S9: Sample representativeness for each European country. (Back to [2.1](#))

	FR			DE			ES			UK		
	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.									
Sample size		729	729		979	979		543	543		749	749
Gender: Woman	0.52	0.50	0.52	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.53	0.51	0.50	0.43	0.50
Gender: Man	0.48	0.50	0.48	0.49	0.48	0.49	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.50	0.57	0.50
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.29	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.19	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.19	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.33	0.25	0.25	0.18	0.25	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.14	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.07	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.12	0.16	0.12	0.17	0.20	0.17
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.31	0.24	0.22	0.26	0.22	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.24	0.18	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.24	0.19	0.24	0.28	0.23	0.28	0.27	0.28	0.27	0.25	0.30	0.25
Age: 65+	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.26	0.21	0.26	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.24
Diploma_25-64: Below upper secondary	0.11	0.19	0.11	0.10	0.14	0.10	0.24	0.16	0.25	0.12	0.09	0.12
Diploma_25-64: Upper secondary	0.26	0.16	0.26	0.27	0.20	0.27	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.21	0.23	0.21
Diploma_25-64: Post secondary	0.26	0.30	0.26	0.29	0.31	0.29	0.28	0.38	0.27	0.33	0.36	0.33
Urbanity: Cities	0.47	0.52	0.47	0.37	0.47	0.37	0.52	0.58	0.52	0.40	0.41	0.40
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.40	0.35	0.40	0.22	0.27	0.22	0.42	0.43	0.42
Urbanity: Rural	0.34	0.29	0.34	0.23	0.18	0.23	0.26	0.15	0.26	0.18	0.16	0.18
Employment_18-64: Inactive	0.20	0.19	0.18	0.15	0.14	0.11	0.20	0.13	0.12	0.16	0.16	0.17
Employment_18-64: Unemployed	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.11	0.12	0.02	0.03	0.04
Vote: Left	0.23	0.19	0.21	0.37	0.44	0.44	0.33	0.37	0.38	0.25	0.28	0.29
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.26	0.30	0.29	0.28	0.27	0.29	0.18	0.24	0.24	0.36	0.44	0.41
Vote: Far right	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.01	0.03	0.03

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. In this Table, weights are defined at the country level. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

²⁰⁵¹ Similar tables for the global surveys can be found in [Dechezleprêtre et al. \(forthcoming\)](#).
²⁰⁵² [ing](#).

H Attrition analysis

Table S10: Attrition analysis for the US1 survey.

	Dropped out	Dropped out after socio-eco	Failed attention test	Duration (in min)	Duration below 4 min
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mean	0.08	0.059	0.082	21.198	0.016
Income quartile: 2	0.025*** (0.010)	0.025*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.740 (3.064)	-0.009 (0.006)
Income quartile: 3	0.062*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.754 (2.813)	-0.004 (0.007)
Income quartile: 4	0.035*** (0.011)	0.035*** (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-3.917 (2.798)	-0.003 (0.007)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.039*** (0.009)	0.039*** (0.009)	-0.000*** (0.000)	1.544 (2.665)	0.006 (0.006)
Age: 25-34	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.597 (2.604)	-0.031** (0.013)
Age: 35-49	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.824 (3.176)	-0.032** (0.013)
Age: 50-64	-0.060*** (0.015)	-0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	5.723** (2.763)	-0.039*** (0.012)
Age: 65+	0.048*** (0.017)	0.048*** (0.017)	0.000** (0.000)	8.952** (4.267)	-0.047*** (0.012)
Gender: Man	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.451 (2.210)	-0.0001 (0.005)
Urban	0.006 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.888** (2.443)	-0.004 (0.006)
Race: Black	0.020** (0.010)	0.020** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	8.554*** (2.600)	0.004 (0.007)
Race: Hispanic	0.021** (0.010)	0.021** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.119* (2.293)	-0.002 (0.007)
Region: Northeast	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-4.862 (4.782)	-0.004 (0.007)
Region: South	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-1.151 (4.710)	-0.004 (0.006)
Region: West	0.006 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-4.000 (4.305)	-0.003 (0.007)
Vote: Biden	-0.048*** (0.008)	-0.048*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-2.901 (2.379)	-0.009 (0.007)
Vote: Trump	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.145 (2.878)	-0.005 (0.008)
Observations	5,719	5,719	3,252	3,044	3,044
R ²	0.127	0.127	1.000	0.006	0.017

Table S11: Attrition analysis for the US2 survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 4 min (5)
Mean	0.095	0.074	0.092	16.338	0.052
Income quartile: 2	0.023* (0.013)	0.023* (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	1.352 (1.601)	-0.029** (0.014)
Income quartile: 3	0.054*** (0.014)	0.054*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	8.502 (9.649)	-0.009 (0.016)
Income quartile: 4	0.060*** (0.016)	0.060*** (0.016)	-0.000 (0.000)	5.254 (3.376)	0.0003 (0.017)
Diploma: Post secondary	-0.033*** (0.011)	-0.033*** (0.011)	0.000 (0.000)	1.601 (2.630)	0.012 (0.011)
Age: 25-34	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.929 (1.535)	-0.032 (0.024)
Age: 35-49	0.012 (0.014)	0.012 (0.014)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.076 (6.651)	-0.047** (0.022)
Age: 50-64	0.040*** (0.014)	0.040*** (0.014)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.364 (1.565)	-0.079*** (0.022)
Age: 65+	0.115*** (0.017)	0.115*** (0.017)	-0.000*** (0.000)	2.619 (3.150)	-0.095*** (0.022)
Gender: Man	-0.073*** (0.009)	-0.073*** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	4.707 (6.037)	0.010 (0.010)
Urban	0.019* (0.011)	0.019* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	1.766 (1.135)	0.005 (0.012)
Race: Black	0.060*** (0.015)	0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.673 (13.328)	-0.010 (0.015)
Race: Hispanic	0.079*** (0.014)	0.079*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	2.930 (1.813)	-0.027** (0.012)
Region: Northeast	-0.026* (0.014)	-0.026* (0.014)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.837 (2.855)	-0.011 (0.015)
Region: South	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.000 (0.000)	3.220 (5.002)	0.009 (0.014)
Region: West	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.000 (0.000)	-1.759 (1.942)	-0.009 (0.015)
Vote: Biden	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	3.230 (2.731)	-0.006 (0.014)
Vote: Trump	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.554 (1.272)	0.007 (0.016)
Observations	2,973	2,973	2,280	2,103	2,103
R ²	0.241	0.241	1.000	0.010	0.031

Table S12: Attrition analysis for the *Eu* survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 6 min (5)
Mean	0.067	0.044	0.151	54.602	0.039
Country: Germany	0.023** (0.010)	0.019** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.533 (18.906)	0.019* (0.010)
Country: Spain	-0.102*** (0.011)	-0.098*** (0.011)	0.000* (0.000)	-29.136* (15.948)	0.010 (0.010)
Country: United Kingdom	0.042*** (0.011)	0.043*** (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-7.458 (18.046)	0.010 (0.010)
Income quartile: 2	0.032*** (0.010)	0.029*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	32.749* (19.771)	-0.015 (0.010)
Income quartile: 3	0.049*** (0.010)	0.047*** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	6.130 (11.734)	-0.021** (0.010)
Income quartile: 4	0.024** (0.011)	0.021* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.659 (19.955)	-0.018* (0.011)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.035*** (0.008)	0.034*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	10.647 (12.959)	-0.007 (0.007)
Age: 25-34	0.028** (0.013)	0.025* (0.013)	-0.000*** (0.000)	36.132 (22.285)	-0.005 (0.018)
Age: 35-49	0.064*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	-0.000*** (0.000)	37.159** (17.190)	-0.013 (0.016)
Age: 50-64	0.085*** (0.013)	0.083*** (0.013)	-0.000 (0.000)	48.363** (22.526)	-0.063*** (0.015)
Age: 65+	0.117*** (0.014)	0.115*** (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	36.351** (14.226)	-0.061*** (0.015)
Gender: Man	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-22.980 (14.093)	0.009 (0.007)
Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs	0.006 (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-16.736 (17.256)	0.004 (0.008)
Degree of urbanization: Rural	0.023** (0.009)	0.023** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	-14.593 (19.733)	-0.001 (0.009)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.025*** (0.005)	-0.025*** (0.005)	0.000*** (0.000)	-17.558 (13.143)	0.019** (0.008)
Vote: Far right	0.005 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.000*** (0.000)	15.838 (32.281)	0.029** (0.014)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	0.023*** (0.006)	0.022*** (0.005)	0.000 (0.000)	24.631 (19.824)	0.030*** (0.010)
Observations	3,963	3,963	3,326	3,115	3,115
R ²	0.406	0.395	1.000	0.006	0.028

I Balance analysis

Table S13: Balance analysis.

	List contains: G (1)	Branch petition: NR (2)	Branch donation: Own nation (3)	Branch conjoint 3: with GCS (4)
Mean	0.496	0.493	0.5	0.499
Country: Germany	-0.026 (0.026)	0.017 (0.026)	0.020 (0.026)	0.005 (0.026)
Country: Spain	0.025 (0.030)	0.026 (0.030)	0.026 (0.030)	0.043 (0.030)
Country: United Kingdom	0.002 (0.028)	0.018 (0.028)	0.037 (0.028)	0.063** (0.028)
Country: United States	-0.001 (0.024)	0.019 (0.024)	0.007 (0.024)	0.023 (0.024)
Income quartile: 2	-0.013 (0.021)	-0.024 (0.021)	0.012 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.021)
Income quartile: 3	0.021 (0.022)	-0.005 (0.022)	0.011 (0.022)	-0.004 (0.022)
Income quartile: 4	-0.001 (0.023)	-0.017 (0.023)	-0.013 (0.023)	0.0001 (0.023)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.008 (0.016)	0.014 (0.016)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.016)
Age: 25-34	0.023 (0.031)	-0.049 (0.031)	-0.003 (0.031)	-0.009 (0.031)
Age: 35-49	0.032 (0.030)	-0.002 (0.030)	-0.014 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.030)
Age: 50-64	0.030 (0.030)	-0.005 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.030)	-0.020 (0.030)
Age: 65+	0.029 (0.037)	-0.037 (0.037)	-0.015 (0.037)	-0.012 (0.037)
Gender: Man	0.024 (0.015)	0.012 (0.015)	0.002 (0.015)	-0.016 (0.015)
Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.0005 (0.017)	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.011 (0.017)
Degree of urbanization: Rural	0.013 (0.024)	0.017 (0.024)	-0.004 (0.024)	0.027 (0.024)
Employment status: Retired	-0.005 (0.032)	-0.031 (0.032)	-0.034 (0.032)	-0.016 (0.032)
Employment status: Student	0.005 (0.044)	-0.023 (0.044)	-0.033 (0.044)	-0.025 (0.044)
Employment status: Working	0.010 (0.024)	-0.027 (0.024)	-0.033 (0.024)	-0.012 (0.024)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.004 (0.017)	0.003 (0.017)	0.010 (0.017)	0.002 (0.017)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	0.001 (0.019)	0.014 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.019)	-0.012 (0.019)
Vote: Far right	0.009 (0.034)	0.030 (0.034)	0.023 (0.035)	0.038 (0.034)
Observations	5,991	5,991	5,991	5,991
R ²	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.003

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

2055 **J Placebo tests**

Table S14: Placebo tests.

	G+R+C preferred to R+C (1)	Supports G+R+C (2)	Signs petition (3)	Share of policies supported (4)	Conjoint 5 A+CGS preferred to B (5)
Mean	0.645	0.633	0.611	0.535	0.596
Branch of list experiment: 1	-0.013 (0.019)	-0.024 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.018 (0.021)
Branch of list experiment: rgl	0.005 (0.019)	0.006 (0.019)	-0.002 (0.019)	0.001 (0.012)	0.010 (0.021)
Branch of list experiment: rl	-0.009 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.019)	0.022 (0.019)	0.007 (0.012)	0.007 (0.021)
Branch of petition: nr	0.011 (0.014)	0.006 (0.014)	0.022 (0.014)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.015)
Poor is in own country	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.014)	0.015 (0.014)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.020 (0.015)
Observations	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	5,218
R ²	0.0004	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

2056 **K Main results on the extended sample**

2057 As a robustness check, we reproduce our main results on the extended sample that
 2058 includes the 14% respondents who failed the attention check ($n = 9,318$). These results
 2059 are non-weighted. They closely match the results in our main specification. For example,
 2060 the support for the GCS is 54% in the U.S. and 75% in Europe, while the same coefficients
 2061 are significant for the list experiment.

Figure S50: [Extended sample] Main attitudes by vote (“Right” spans from Center-right to Far right).

(Relative support in percent in Questions 20, 35, 45, 46, 49)

(Back to Section 2.5.3)

	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom	United States
Support for the GCS	75	78	70	81	75	54
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	83	81	84	87	81	68
Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries*	52	45	60	59	44	52
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	62	57	62	65	65	47
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	82	80	82	86	80	69
[Country]'s foreign aid should be increased	83	87	87	89	69	77
Universalist*	41	35	49	44	36	43

Figure S51: [Extended sample] Influence of the GCS on preferred platform: Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question 30; in the U.S., asked only to non-Republicans.)

	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom	United States
Random programs: A+GCS preferred to B	60	61	59	64	58	59

Table S15: [Extended sample] Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list. The tacit support for the GCS is estimated by regressing the number of supported policies on the presence of the GCS in the list of policies. The social desirability is estimated as the difference between the tacit and stated support, and it is not significantly different from zero even at a 20% threshold (see [Methods](#)).

	Number of supported policies		
	All	U.S.	Europe
List contains: GCS	0.624*** (0.028)	0.524*** (0.041)	0.724*** (0.036)
<i>Support for GCS</i>	NA	0.554	0.754
<i>Social desirability bias</i>	-0.025	-0.017	-0.033
<i>80% C.I. for the bias</i>	[-0.06; 0.01]	[-0.07; 0.04]	[-0.08; 0.01]
Constant	1.317	1.147	1.486
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000
R ²	0.089	0.065	0.125

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table S16: [Extended sample] Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. ([Question 28](#))

	Prefers the Progressive platform					
	All	United States	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
GCS in Progressive platform	0.022* (0.013)	0.015 (0.018)	0.116*** (0.037)	-0.007 (0.032)	0.028 (0.038)	0.012 (0.037)
Constant	0.628	0.629	0.55	0.682	0.721	0.553
Observations	5,638	2,797	671	883	550	737
R ²	0.001	0.0002	0.014	0.0001	0.001	0.0001

Note: Simple OLS model. *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples. *p < 0.1;
p < 0.05; *p < 0.01.

2062 L Effect of questionnaire framing

2063 When comparing the samples *US1* and *US2*, we observe no effect of questionnaire
2064 framing (or block sequence) on the question “What group do you defend when you
2065 vote?”, common to all waves and placed close to the end of the questionnaire (Table S17).

Table S17: Effect of the wave (*US1* vs. *US2*) on the group defend when voting.
“What group do you defend when you vote?” (Question 57)

	Group defended when voting		
	Humans or Sentient beings	Fellow citizens	Family and self
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Wave: <i>US2</i>	−0.009 (0.014)	0.009 (0.014)	0.010 (0.011)
Mean	0.432	0.335	0.156
Observations	5,000	5,000	5,000
R ²	0.0001	0.0001	0.0002

Note: Simple OLS model. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

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