International Attitudes Toward Global Policies

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Abstract

A global carbon price funding a global basic income, called the "Global Climate Scheme" (GCS), would be an effective and progressive way to combat climate change and poverty. Yet, such policy is mostly absent from political platforms and the policy debate. Using surveys on 40,680 respondents in 20 countries covering 72% of global CO_2 emissions, we document majority support for this and other global policies. Using a complementary survey on 8,000 respondents in the U.S., France, Germany, Spain and the U.K., we test several hypotheses that could reconcile strong stated support with a lack of salience of these issues. We find that the stated support is mostly sincere, as a list experiment shows no evidence of social desirability bias, majorities are willing to sign a real-stake petition, and global redistributive policies rank high in the prioritization of policies. Conjoint analyses reveal that a progressive candidate would not significantly lose voting share by endorsing the GCS in any country, and may even gain 11 p.p. in France. Likewise, a platform is more likely to be preferred if it contains the GCS or a global tax on millionaires. Accurate beliefs about the level of support for the GCS dismisses the hypothesis of pluralistic ignorance of the support. Universalistic attitudes are confirmed in more general questions, including an incentivized donation. In sum, our findings indicate that global policies are genuinely supported by a majority of the population. Public opinion is therefore not the reason that they do not prominently enter political debates.

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1 Introduction

The most pressing challenges of our time, such as poverty and climate change, transcend national borders, necessitating global solutions. However, achieving international cooperation to address these global issues has proven to be a complex endeavor. Disagreements on burden-sharing and differing priorities among nations often hinder effective collaboration. The success of global policies heavily depends on public opinion, particularly the willingness of citizens in affluent countries to bear the costs associated with poverty reduction and climate change mitigation. This paper aims to investigate public attitudes towards global policies, with a specific focus on policies addressing poverty and climate change.

To explore public attitudes, we used surveys administered to over 40,000 respondents from 20 high- and middle-income countries covering 72% of global CO_2 emissions. The responses reveal substantial support for global policies, including a global carbon cap

and trade, a global climate assembly, and a global millionaire tax aimed at financing low-income country infrastructure, contingent upon their climate action.[1] Remarkably, even in wealthy nations that would bear a significant burden, a majority of respondents expressed support for globally redistributive measures.

To gain deeper insights into the factors shaping public support in these countries, we conducted complementary surveys among 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, the U.S., and the U.K. The focus of these surveys was on a specific policy aimed at addressing both climate change and extreme poverty, referred to as the "Global Climate Scheme" (GCS). This policy consists of a global cap-and-trade system where emission rights are auctioned each year to polluting firms, and of a global basic income funded by the auction revenues. Through the implementation of various methods, including a list experiment, a real-stake petition, and conjoint analysis, our study demonstrates the genuine and robust support for the GCS among respondents.

Our findings reveal that the GCS not only garners sincere support but also ranks high in terms of people's prioritization when compared to alternative policies in an allocation-based question. Additionally, our conjoint analysis provides further evidence challenging the hypothesis that policymakers would risk losing public support by endorsing the GCS. Moreover, through the use of both open-ended and close-ended questions, we identify the key determinants shaping individuals' attitudes towards the policy. Among the most prevalent factors influencing public opinion were arguments pertaining to the global impacts of the GCS, specifically in relation to its potential effects on the environment and poverty alleviation. These results align with our broader findings, including respondents' universalistic attitudes measured in the survey.

These findings underscore a strong demand for globally redistributive climate policies, even in the absence of significant policy implementation. In our discussion we offer potential explanations behind this policy implementation gap.

Literature. The literature review is relegated to Appendix **??**. It includes references to the few other attitudinal surveys on global policies (e.g. Carattini et al. (2019); Ghassim et al. (2022); ISSP (2019), see Appendix **??**); a critical review of the literature on attitudes toward climate burden sharing (Appendix **??**); references to the large literature on attitudes toward foreign aid (Appendix **??**); and introduction to the literatures on global carbon

[1] A global 2% tax on individual wealth in excess of $5 million would collect $816 billion every year, leaving unaffected 99.9% of people (ref). If 35% of these potential revenues were allocated to low-income countries, their national income would increase by 50%.

pricing (Appendix **??**), global redistribution (Appendix **??**), basic income (Appendix **??**), and global democracy (Appendix **??**).

2 Results

2.1 Data

The study relies on two sets of surveys: the *Global* survey and the *Complementary* surveys (see Table 1).

Table 1: Summary of the surveys used in the analysis.

	Global survey	**Complementary surveys**		
***Name* (region)**	*Global* (20 high and middle-income countries)	*US1* (U.S.)	*US2* (U.S.)	*Eu* (France, Germany, Spain, U.K.)
Sample size	40,680	3,000	2,000	3,000
Main purpose	Stated support for global policies	Focus on GCS (sincerity, rationales, etc.) + Support for global redistribution + Universalistic values		

Global Survey The *Global* survey, conducted in 2021, involved 40,680 respondents from 20 countries, representing approximately 72% of global CO2 emissions. This survey serves as the basis for measuring stated support for various global policies worldwide. Detailed information about the data collection process, sample representativeness, and analysis of questions on national policies can be found in Dechezleprêtre et al. 2022.

Complementary Surveys To delve deeper into the sincerity and rationales behind support for the GCS and attitudes towards global policies, global redistribution, and universalistic values, complementary surveys were conducted in 2023. These surveys included a sample of 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, the U.K., and the U.S. The European survey (*Eu*) comprised 3,000 respondents, while the U.S. sample was collected in two separate waves: *US1* with 3,000 respondents and *US2* with 2,000 respondents. The survey questions in both the European and U.S. surveys were identical, except for an additional question introduced in *US2* that uses results from *US1*.

The complementary surveys ensured representativeness along key dimensions such as gender, income, age, highest diploma, and degree of urbanization. The *Eu* survey is

also representative of its four countries in terms of population size, while the *US1* and *US2* surveys are representative in terms of region and ethnicity. Details regarding the representativeness of the samples are provided in Tables **??-??**. The questionnaires used in the surveys are provided in Appendices **??** and **??**.

2.2 Stated support for global policies

The results from both the *Global* and *Complementary* surveys demonstrate robust support for global policies across all surveyed countries, with a clear preference for addressing climate action on a global scale over regional, national, or local approaches.

2.2.1 Global survey

Figure 1: Relative support for global climate policies.



Note 1: The numbers represent the share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* among non-*indifferent* answers (in percent, n = 40,680). The color blue denotes a relative majority. See Figure **??** for the absolute support. (Questions **??-??**)
Note 2: *In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question **??**.

Figure 1 provides insights into respondents' preferences regarding the implementation of public policies to address climate change. When asked about the appropriate level for climate policies, a significant majority of respondents (ranging from 70% in the U.S. to 94% in Japan) chose the global level, as shown in the first block of Figure 1. The next most popular choice was the federal or continental level, favored by 52% of Americans and less than half of European respondents. Local policies received the least support in almost all countries. This preference for climate policies implemented at the global scale is in line with Beiser-McGrath and Bernauer (2019) and consistent with individuals' concerns for the fairness and effectiveness of such policies, which have been identified as two of the three key determinants of support (alongside self-interest) in the literature (Dechezleprêtre et al. 2022; Douenne and Fabre 2022; Klenert et al. 2018).

Among the four global climate policies examined in the *Global* survey, three policies garnered massive support across all countries, as displayed in the second block of Figure 1. These policies include a global democratic assembly on climate change, a global tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries contingent on their climate action, and a global carbon budget of +2°C divided among countries based on tradable shares.[2] In high-income countries, the global quota policy obtained 64% absolute support (i.e., "somewhat" or "strong" support) and 84% relative support (excluding "indifferent" answers). Support for this policy was even higher in middle-income countries, although caution is advised when interpreting the results in these countries due to the over-representation of young, educated, and urban populations in the online sample.

Following the support for the global quota, respondents were asked about their preferences for dividing the carbon budget among countries, as depicted in the third block of Figure 1. Consistent with the existing literature (see Appendix **??**), an equal per capita allocation of emission rights emerged as the preferred burden-sharing principle, garnering majority support in all countries and never dropping below 84% relative support. Considering historical responsibilities or vulnerability to climate damages was also popular, albeit with less consensus, while grand-fathering (proportional allocation of emission

[2]The policies were all described with further details to make sure people understood them. Specifically, the policies were presented as follows: an international emissions trading system where "countries that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less than their share"; "a tax on all millionaires in dollars around the world to finance low-income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate action [which] would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education"; "a global democratic assembly whose role would be to draft international treaties against climate change [where] each adult across the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly".

shares based on current emissions) received the least support across all countries.

Interestingly, the Global Climate Scheme (GCS), which entails a global quota with equal per capita emission rights, produces the same distributional outcomes as a global carbon tax that funds a global basic income. However, support for the global carbon tax is notably lower, particularly in high-income countries, where it fails to secure a relative majority, especially in Anglo-Saxon countries.[3] One possible reason for this discrepancy is the explicit emphasis on the redistributive effects associated with the tax in the survey. The survey informs respondents that the $30 per month basic income would lift 700 million people earning less than $2/day out of extreme poverty, while fossil price increases would impose costs (specified in the survey) on the typical person in their country. Although other factors such as perceptions of effectiveness may also influence support for a quota versus a tax, this interpretation aligns with the level of support for the global quota when distributive effects are made salient, as we do in the complementary surveys.

2.2.2 Complementary surveys

Global Climate Scheme In the complementary surveys (*US1*, *US2*, *Eu*), we provide a comprehensive exploration of citizens' attitudes towards the GCS. We present to respondents a detailed description of the GCS and explain its distributive effects, including specific amounts at stake (as specified in the box below). Furthermore, we assess respondents' understanding of the GCS by posing incentivized questions to test their comprehension of the expected outcome for typical individuals in high-income countries (loss) and the poorest individuals globally (gain), followed by the provision of correct answers. The same approach is applied to evaluate respondents' understanding of a National Redistribution scheme (NR) targeting the top 5% (in the U.S.) or top 1% (in Europe) with the aim of financing cash transfers to all adults, calibrated to offset the monetary loss of the GCS for the median emitter in their country. Subsequently, we summarize both schemes to enhance respondents' recall. Additionally, we present a final incentivized comprehension question and provide the expected answer that the combined GCS and NR would result in no net gain or loss for a typical fellow citizen. Finally, participants are directly asked to express their support for the GCS and NR using a simple *Yes*/*No* question. The stated support for the GCS stands at 54% in the U.S. and 76% in Europe,[4] while the sup-

[3] The levels of support are consistent with the findings of Carattini et al. (2019), the only previous study that tested a global carbon tax.

[4] The 95% confidence intervals are $[52.4\%, 55.9\%]$ in the U.S. and $[74.2\%, 77.2\%]$ in Europe. The average support is computed with survey weights, employing weights based on quota variables, which exclude

port for NR closely follows, at 56% and 73% respectively (see Figure **??**). Appendix **??** provides further insight into the sociodemographic determinants of GCS support, highlighting, for instance, a stronger support among young individuals.

The Global Climate Scheme The GCS consists of a global cap-and-trade system, where emission rights are auctioned each year to polluting firms, and of a global basic income, funded by the auction revenues. Using the price and emissions trajectories from the report by Stern and Stiglitz (2017), and in particular a carbon price of \$90/tCO_2 in 2030, we estimate that the basic income would amount to \$30 per month for each human above 15 (see details in Appendix **??**). When describing the GCS to the respondents, we specify its redistributive effects. Namely, the 700 million people with less than \$2/day would be lifted out of extreme poverty, and fossil price increases would cost the typical person in their country a specified amount, despite the basic income (see the exact wording in Appendix **??**). This median net cost is \$85 in the U.S., €10 in France, €25 in Germany, €5 in Spain, £20 in the U.K.

Global wealth tax Consistent with the results of the global survey, a "tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-income countries conditional on their climate action" garners majority support of over 67% in each country, only 5 p.p. lower than an overall national millionaires tax (Figure 2). In random subsamples, we inquire about respondents' preferences regarding the distribution of revenues from a global tax on individual wealth exceeding \$5 million, after providing information on the revenue raised by such a tax in their country compared to low-income countries.[5] To certain respondents (n = 891), we ask what percentage of global tax revenues should be pooled to finance low-income countries. In each country, at least 88% of respondents indicate a positive amount, with an average ranging from 30% (Germany) to 36% (U.S., France) (Figure **??**). To other respondents (n = 859), we inquire whether they would prefer their country to retain all the collected revenues or allocate half of the revenues to finance low-income countries. Ap-

vote. Another method to reweigh the raw results involves running a regression of the support for the GCS on sociodemographic characteristics (including vote) and multiplying each coefficient by the population frequencies. This alternative approach yields similar figures: 76% in Europe and 52% or 53% in the U.S. (depending on whether individuals who did not disclose their vote are classified as non-voters or excluded). Notably, the average support, excluding non-voters, is 54% in the U.S.

[5] For instance, a 2% tax on net wealth exceeding \$5 million would annually raise €5 billion in Spain, €16 billion in France, £20 billion in the U.K., €44 billion in Germany, \$430 billion in the U.S., and \$1 billion collectively in all low-income countries (28 countries, home to 700 million people).

Figure 2: Relative support for various global policies (percentage of *somewhat* or *strong support*, after excluding *indifferent* answers). (Questions **??** and **??**; See Figure **??** for the absolute support.)



proximately half of the respondents opt to allocate half of the tax revenues to low-income countries.

Other global policies We also assess support for other global policies (Figure 2). Most policies garnered majority support in each country, with two exceptions: the "cancellation of low-income countries' public debt" and "a maximum wealth limit." The latter policy obtained relative majority support in Europe but not in the U.S., despite the cap being set at $10 billion in the U.S. compared to €/£100 million in Europe. Notably, climate-related policies enjoyed significant popularity, with "high-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries" receiving absolute majority support across all surveyed countries. Additionally, support for loss and damages compensation, as approved at COP27, ranged from 55% (U.S.) to 81% (Spain).

Foreign aid After providing respondents with information about the amount "spent on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries" (relative to their country's government spending and GDP), less than 16% of respondents believe that their country's foreign aid should be reduced, while 62% express support for increasing it, including

17% who advocate for an unconditional increase (Figure **??**). Among the 45% who believe aid should be increased under certain conditions, we later ask them to specify the conditions they deem necessary (Figure **??**). The three most commonly selected conditions are: "ensuring aid reaches people in need and is not diverted" (73% chose this condition), "recipient countries' compliance with climate targets and human rights" (67%), and "other high-income countries increasing their foreign aid" (48%).[6] On the other hand, respondents who do not wish to increase their country's foreign aid primarily justify their stance by prioritizing the well-being of their fellow citizens or by perceiving each country as responsible for its own fate (Figure **??**). In response to an open-ended question regarding measures high-income countries should take to combat extreme poverty, a significant majority of Americans emphasized the need for increased assistance (Figure **??**). The most commonly suggested form of aid was financial support, closely followed by investments in education.

2.3 Robustness and sincerity of support for the GCS

We use several methods to assess the sincerity of the support for the GCS: a list experiment, a real-stake petition, conjoint analyses, and the prioritization of policies. All methods suggest that the support is either completely sincere, or the share of insincere answers is limited.

2.3.1 List experiment

A list experiment is employed to gauge tacit support for a specific policy of interest by asking respondents how many policies within a given list they support. By varying the list among respondents, the difference in average support for a policy can be used to estimate tacit support, revealing potential social desirability biases (Hainmueller et al. 2014). This methodology has previously unveiled hidden racism in the Southern U.S. (Kuklinski et al. 1997) and opposition to the invasion of Ukraine in Russia (Chapkovski and Schaub 2022). In our case, as shown in Table 2, the tacit support for the GCS measured through the list experiment is not significantly lower than the direct stated support.[7] Hence, we find no evidence to reject the absence of a social desirability bias in our study.

[6] It is worth noting that these conditions align closely with the principles of the GCS.

[7] We utilize the difference-in-means estimator, and confidence intervals are computed using Monte Carlo simulation with the R package *list* (Imai 2011).

Table 2: Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list.

	Number of supported policies		
	All	US	Eu
List contains: GCS	0.624^{***}	0.524^{***}	0.724^{***}
	(0.028)	(0.041)	(0.036)
Support for GCS	0.617	0.542	0.757
Social desirability bias	-0.026	-0.018	-0.033
80% C.I. for the bias	$[-0.06; 0.01]$	$[-0.07; 0.01]$	$[-0.08; 0.01]$
Constant	1.317	1.147	1.486
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000
R^2	0.089	0.065	0.125
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

2.3.2 Petition

Respondents are asked whether they would be willing to sign a petition in support of either the GCS or NR policy. They are informed that the petition results will be sent to the head of state's office, highlighting the proportion of fellow citizens endorsing the respective scheme. Even when framed as a real-stake petition, both policies continue to receive majority support. In the United States, we find no significant difference between the support in the real-stake petitions and the simple questions (GCS: $p = .30$; NR: $p = .76$).[8] In Europe, the petition leads to a comparable decrease in support for both the GCS (7 p.p., $p = 10^{-5}$) and NR (4 p.p., $p = .008$). While some respondents show hesitancy in signing a petition for policies they are expected to support, this effect is not specific to the GCS, and the overall willingness to sign a real-stake petition remains strong, with 69% expressing support for the GCS and 67% for NR.

2.3.3 Conjoint analyses

In order to assess the public support for the GCS in conjunction with other policies, we conducted a series of conjoint analyses. We asked respondents to make five choices between pairs of political platforms.

[8]Paired weighted *t*-tests are conducted to test the equality in support for a policy among respondents who were questioned about the policy in the petition.

The first conjoint analysis suggests that the GCS is supported for itself, independently of being complemented by the NR scheme and a national climate policy ("Coal exit" in the U.S., "Thermal insulation plan" in Europe, denoted C).[9] For the second analysis, we split the sample into four random branches.[10] These four questions show that: there is majority support for the GCS and for C, which are seen as neither complement nor substitute; a few people seem to like a national climate policy and dislike a global one, but as many people prefer a global rather than a national policy; and there is no evidence that a NR scheme would increase the support for the GCS.

Table 3: Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. (Question **??**)

	Prefers the Progressive platform					
	All	United States	France	Germany	UK	Spain
GCS in Progressive platform	0.028*	0.029	0.112***	0.015	0.008	−0.015
	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.041)	(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.038)
Constant	0.623	0.604	0.55	0.7	0.551	0.775
Observations	5,202	2,619	605	813	661	504
R^2	0.001	0.001	0.013	0.0003	0.0001	0.0003

Note: The 14% of *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples. GCS has no significant influence on them. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$.

In the third analysis, we present to two random branches of the sample hypothetical progressive and conservative platforms that differ only by the presence (or not) of the GCS in the progressive platform. Table 3 shows that a progressive candidate would not significantly lose voting share by endorsing the GCS in any country, and may even gain 11 p.p. ($p = .005$) in voting intention in France. The effect is also positive at 3 p.p. ($p = .13$) in the U.S., although not significant at the 5% threshold. Though the level of support

[9] Indeed, 54% of U.S. respondents and 74% of European ones prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to the combination of C and NR alone, indicating a similar support for the GCS conditional on NR and C than for the GCS alone (Figure **??**).

[10] Results from the first branch show that the support for the GCS conditional on NR, at 55% in the U.S. (n = 757) and 77% in Europe (n = 746), is not significantly different from the support for the GCS alone. This suggests that rejection to the GCS is not driven by the cost of the policy on oneself. The second branch shows that the support for C conditional on NR is somewhat higher, at 62% in the U.S. (n = 751) and 84% in Europe (n = 747). However, the third one shows no significant preference for C compared to GCS (both conditional on NR), neither in Europe, where GCS is preferred by 52% (n = 741) nor in the U.S., where C is preferred by 53% (n = 721). The fourth branch shows that 55% in the U.S. (n = 771) and 77% in Europe (n = 766) prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to NR alone.

for the GCS is significantly lower in swing States (at 51%) that are key to win elections, the electoral effect of endorsing the GCS remains non-significantly different from zero (at +1.2 p.p.) in these States.[11]

Our last two analyses (four and five) make people choose between two random platforms. In Europe, respondents are prompted to imagine that a left- or center-left coalition will win the next election and are asked what platform they would prefer that coalition to have campaigned on. In the U.S., the question is framed as a hypothetical duel in a Democratic primary, and asked only to non-Republicans (n = 2,218), i.e. the respondents who choose *Democrat*, *Independent*, *Non-Affiliated* or *Other* for their political affiliation. In the fourth analysis, a policy (or an absence of policy) is randomly drawn for each platform in each of five categories: *economic issues*, *societal issues*, *climate policy*, *tax system*, *foreign policy* (Figure **??**). Except for the category *foreign policy*, which features the GCS 42% of the time, the policies are prominent progressive policies and they are drawn uniformly. In the U.K., Germany, and France, a platform is about 9 to 13 p.p. more likely to be preferred if it includes the GCS rather than no foreign policy.[12] This effect is between 1 and 4 p.p. and no longer significant in the U.S. and in Spain. Moreover, a platform that includes a global tax on millionaires rather that no foreign policy is 5 to 13 percentage points (p.p.) more likely to be preferred in all countries (the effect is significant and at least 9 p.p. in all countries but Spain). Likewise, a global democratic assembly on climate change has a significant effect of 8 to 12 p.p. in the U.S., Germany, and France. These effects are large, and not far from the effects of the policies most influential on the platforms, which range between 15 and 18 p.p. in most countries (and 27 p.p. in Spain), and all relate to improved public services (in particular healthcare, housing and education).

The fifth analysis draws random platforms in a similar ways, except that candidate A's platform always contains the GCS while B's includes no foreign policy. In this case, A is chosen by 60% in Europe and 58% in the U.S. (Figure **??**). In the U.S. for example, our conjoint analyses indicate that a candidate at the Democratic primary would have more chances to obtain the nomination by endorsing the GCS, and this endorsement would not penalize her or him at the presidential election. This result reminds the finding that 12% of Germans shift their voting intention from SPD and CDU/CSU to the Greens and the Left when they are told that the latter parties support global democracy (Ghassim 2020).

[11] We define swing states as the 8 states with less than 5 p.p. margin of victory in the 2020 election (MI, NV, PA, WI, AZ, GA, NC, FL). The results are robust to using the 3 p.p. threshold (that excludes FL) instead.

[12] This is the Average Marginal Component Effect computed following Hainmueller et al. (2014).

2.3.4 Prioritization

Towards the end of the survey, respondents were asked to allocate 100 points among six randomly selected policies from the previous conjoint analyses, using sliders. The instruction provided was to distribute the points based on their level of support, with a higher allocation indicating greater support for a policy. As a result, each policy received an average support of 16.67 points. The GCS ranked in the middle or higher among all policies in each country, receiving an average of 15.4 points in the U.S. and 22.9 points in Germany.

Interestingly, in Germany, the most prioritized policy was the global tax on millionaires, while the GCS came in as the second most prioritized policy. The global tax on millionaires consistently ranked no lower than fifth position (out of 15 or 17 policies) in every country, garnering an average of 18.3 points in Spain to 22.9 points in Germany.

This question sheds light on a potential discrepancy between the policy priorities of the public and those enacted by legislators. For instance, while the European Union and California have enacted plans to phase out new combustion-engine cars by 2035, the proposal to "ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030" emerged as one of the three least prioritized policies in each country, with an average allocation of 7.8 points in France and 11.4 points in the U.K.

2.3.5 Pros and Cons

We surveyed respondents to gather their perspectives on the pros and cons of the GCS, utilizing both open-ended and closed questions. In the closed question format, individuals tended to consider every argument as important in determining their support or opposition to the GCS (see Figure **??**). Notably, the least important aspect was the potential impact on their household, with 60% in Europe (n=1,505) and 75% in the U.S. (n=493) finding it significant. The most important elements varied between Europe and the U.S. In Europe, the key factors were the GCS's potential to limit climate change and reduce poverty in low-income countries, both deemed important by 85% of respondents. In the U.S., having sufficient information about the scheme ranked highest at 89%, followed by its potential to foster global cooperation at 82%. However, due to the limited variation in the importance ratings for each element, the closed question format provided limited informative value.

On the other hand, the open-ended question provided intriguing insights into what

people associate with the GCS when prompted to think about it. Analyzing keywords in the responses (automatically translated into English), the most frequently mentioned topics were the international aspect and the environment, each appearing in approximately one quarter of the answers (see Figure **??**). This was followed by discussions on the effects of the GCS on poverty and prices, which were mentioned by about one-tenth of the respondents. Additionally, we manually classified each answer into different categories (see Figure **??**). This exercise confirmed the findings from the automatic search, emphasizing that the environmental benefits of the GCS were the most commonly discussed topic, while obstacles to implementation or agreement on the proposal were relatively infrequently mentioned.[13]

In the *US2* survey, we presented these questions to random subsamples *before* inquiring about support for the GCS or NR. The sample was divided into four branches: two branches with questions on pros and cons (either in closed or open form), one branch providing information on the actual level of support for the GCS and NR (estimated in *US1*), and one control group without these questions.[14] Despite some significant effects of pondering the pros and cons (see Table **??**), approximately half of the Americans expressed support for the GCS across all treatment branches. If similar effects were observed in Europe, it suggests that the GCS would still enjoy strong majority support among Europeans once it enters the public debate (Table **??**).

2.4 Universalistic values

To better understand people's support for specific policies, we also ask broad questions to study their universalistic values.

When participants were asked which group they defend when they vote, 20% chose

[13]Moreover, around one in four respondents explicitly cited pros or cons. Few individuals explicitly expressed support or opposition, and misunderstandings were rare. Only 11% of the responses were empty or expressed a lack of opinion, though one-quarter were unclassifiable due to the rarity, nonsensical nature, or irrelevance of the conveyed idea.

[14]Consistent with Americans accurately perceiving the levels of support for the GCS or NR, providing information on the actual level had no substantial effect on their support. In the closed question regarding pros and cons, we intentionally included more cons (6) than pros (3) to conservatively estimate the potential campaign effect on the GCS, which refers to the shift in opinion resulting from media coverage of the proposal. Interestingly, the support for the GCS decreased by 11 p.p. after participants viewed a list of its pros and cons. Surprisingly, the support for National Redistribution also decreased by 7 p.p. following the closed question about the GCS. This suggests that some individuals may lack attention and confuse the two policies, or that contemplating the pros and cons alters the mood of some people, moving them away from their initial positive impression. Notably, the support also decreased by 7 p.p. after participants were asked to consider the pros and cons in an open-ended question.

"sentient beings (humans and animals)," 22% chose "humans," 33% selected their fellow citizens (or "Europeans"), 15% chose "My family and myself," and the remaining 10% chose another group (mainly "My State or region" or "People sharing my culture or religion"). The first two categories, representing close to one out of two people, can be described as universalist. Notably, even a majority of left-wing voters hold universalistic values (see Figure **??** for main attitudes by vote).

Regarding the priorities of their country's diplomats in international climate negotiations, only 11% preferred their country's "interests, even if it goes against global justice." In contrast, 30% preferred global justice (with or without consideration of national interests), and the majority of respondents (38%) preferred their country's "interests, to the extent it respects global justice."

Furthermore, when participants were asked to assess the extent to which climate change, global poverty, and inequality in their country were issues, climate change was generally viewed as the most significant problem (with a mean score of 0.59 after recoding answers between -2 and 2). This was followed by global poverty (0.42) and national inequality (0.37).

Additionally, we conducted a lottery experiment to elicit universalistic values. Respondents were automatically enrolled in a lottery with a $100 prize and had to choose the proportion of the prize they would keep for themselves versus giving to a person living in poverty. The charity donation would be directed either to an African individual or a fellow citizen, depending on the respondent's random assignment. In Europe, we observed no significant variation in the willingness to donate based on the recipient's origin, while in the U.S., the donations to Africans were 3 p.p. lower (with an average donation of 34%). Moreover, the slightly lower donations to Africans were entirely driven by right-wing voters or non-voters.

2.5 Second-order Beliefs

To account for the strong support for the GCS despite its absence from political platforms and public debate, we proposed the hypothesis of pluralistic ignorance. This refers to the situation where both the general public and policymakers mistakenly perceive the GCS as unpopular. As a result, individuals might conceal their support for such globally redistributive policies, knowing that advocating for them would be futile. However, the evidence for pluralistic ignorance is limited based on an incentivized question about perceived support (Figure **??**).

In the case of Americans, their beliefs about the level of support for the GCS are relatively accurate. The mean perceived support is 52% (with quartiles of 36%, 52%, and 68%), which closely aligns with the actual support of 53%. Europeans, on the other hand, underestimate the support by 17 p.p. Nonetheless, 65% of them correctly estimate that the GCS garners majority support, with a mean of 59% (and quartiles of 43%, 61%, and 74%), compared to the actual support of 76%. It is worth noting that second-order beliefs are equally accurate for the NR scheme in the U.S. and similarly underestimated in Europe.

3 Discussion

Our research conducted in 20 of the largest countries reveals a robust majority support for global climate policies, even among high-income countries that would potentially experience financial losses from the globally redistributive policies examined. The complementary surveys conducted in the U.S. and four European countries reinforce these findings. Strong support is evident for global taxes on the wealthiest individuals, as well as majority support for our main policy of interest—the Global Climate Scheme (GCS). The GCS encompasses carbon pricing at a global level through an emissions trading system, accompanied by a global basic income funded by the scheme's revenues. Additional experiments, such as a list experiment and a real-stake petition, demonstrate that the support for the GCS is predominantly genuine. This genuine support is further substantiated by the prioritization of the GCS over prominent national climate policies and aligned with a significant portion of the population holding universalistic values rather than nationalistic or egoistic ones. Moreover, the conjoint analyses suggest that a progressive candidate would not lose voting shares by endorsing the GCS, and may even gain an 11 p.p. increase in voting shares in France. Similarly, a candidate endorsing the GCS would gain votes in a U.S. Democratic primary, while in Europe, a progressive platform that includes the GCS would be preferred over one that does not.

Having ruled out insincerity and underestimation of fellow citizens' support as potential explanations for the scarcity of global policies in the public debate, we propose five alternative explanations. The first two are variations of pluralistic ignorance, and the last two represent complementary (rather than substitute) explanations. Firstly, there may be pluralistic ignorance *among policymakers* regarding universalistic values, support for the GCS, or the electoral advantage of endorsing it. Secondly, people or policy makers may believe that globally redistributive policies are politically infeasible in some key

(potentially foreign) countries like the U.S. We intend to test these hypotheses by running a survey on Members of the European Parliament. Thirdly, the predominance of national institutions, national-focused media, and nationalistic framing by commentators may create a bias in political discourse, stifling universalistic values. Fourth, many individuals, including policymakers, may simply be unaware of specific global redistributive policies, let alone base their political ideas on them. This lack of awareness may lead people to perceive such policies as ill-defined or technically unfeasible, ultimately dismissing them as unrealistic. The ignorance of the GCS itself finds support in the feedback fields, where a common response is some variation of "thank you for this interesting, thought-provoking survey." Fifth, just as policy is disproportionately influenced by the economic elites (**??**), public debate may be shaped by the wealthiest, who have a vested interest in preventing global redistribution.

Confirmation of any of these hypotheses would lead to a common conclusion: there exists substantial support for global policies addressing climate change and global inequality, even in high-income countries, and the perceived boundaries of political realism on this issue may soon shift. Uncovering evidence to support these hypotheses could help draw attention to global policies in the public debate and contribute to their increased prominence.

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