

International Attitudes Toward Global Policies

Supplementary Material

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
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39 Main figures

Figure 1: Relative support for global climate policies. (Reproduced from [Dechezleprêtre et al. \(2022\)](#), Figure A21.)



Note 1: The numbers represent the share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* among non-*indifferent* answers (in percent, $n = 40,680$). The color blue denotes a relative majority. See Figure A3 for the absolute support. (Questions A-I).

Note 2: *In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

Figure 2: Relative support for various global policies (percentage of *somewhat* or *strong support*, after excluding *indifferent* answers). (Questions 44 and 45; See Figure A25 for the absolute support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	55	71	72	70	79	70
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	68	82	82	82	85	81
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	60	76	77	79	79	71
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	46	53	53	43	62	61
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	58	71	69	69	78	72
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	62	73	58	73	80	83
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	63	80	80	78	81	83
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	62	87	90	86	91	87
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	46	62	58	62	65	67
National tax on millionaires funding public services	73	85	81	87	89	88
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	69	84	84	84	87	83

Figure 3: Support for the GCS, NR and the combination of GCS, NR and C. (Questions 35, 36, 20, 22 and 26).

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)	54	76	80	71	81	74
National redistribution scheme (NR)	56	73	77	66	79	75
National climate policy + GCS + NR	52	74	79	69	81	70

Table 1: Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list.

	Number of supported policies		
	All	U.S.	Europe
List contains: GCS	0.624*** (0.028)	0.524*** (0.041)	0.724*** (0.036)
<i>Support for GCS</i>	0.65	0.542	0.757
<i>Social desirability bias</i>	-0.025	-0.019	-0.033
<i>80% C.I. for the bias</i>	[-0.06; 0.01]	[-0.07; 0.04]	[-0.08; 0.01]
Constant	1.317	1.147	1.486
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000
R ²	0.089	0.065	0.125

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 2: Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. (Question 28)

	Prefers the Progressive platform					
	All	United States	France	Germany	UK	Spain
GCS in Progressive platform	0.028* (0.014)	0.029 (0.022)	0.112*** (0.041)	0.015 (0.033)	0.008 (0.040)	-0.015 (0.038)
Constant	0.623	0.604	0.55	0.7	0.551	0.775
Observations	5,202	2,619	605	813	661	504
R ²	0.001	0.001	0.013	0.0003	0.0001	0.0003

Note: The 14% of *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples. GCS has no significant influence on them. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

Figure 4: Percent of global wealth tax that should finance low-income countries (*mean*). (Question 37)




Figure 5: Attitudes regarding the evolution of [own country] foreign aid. (Question 46)




Figure 6: Conditions at which foreign aid should be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish an increase of foreign aid at some conditions.] (Question 47)




Figure 7: Reasons why foreign aid should not be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish a decrease or stability of foreign aid.] (Question 48)





Figure 8: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See English translations in Figure A8; Question 29)

(a) U.S. (Asked only to non-Republicans)



(b) France



(c) Germany

Klimaschutz:

- Verpflichtende Solaranlagen auf allen geeigneten Dächern
- Plan zur Wärmedämmung
- Verbot des Verkaufs von Neuwagen mit Verbrennungsmotor bis 2030

Wirtschaftspolitik:

- Erhöhung des Regelsatzes des Bürgergelds auf bis zu 600€ pro Monat
- Bürgerversicherung als gerechtere Sozialversicherung
- Staatschuldenquote auf unter 60% reduzieren
- Investitionen für Gigabit-Netzwerke bereitstellen

Außenpolitik:

- Globales Klimaprogramm
- Globale Steuer auf Millionäre
- Globale demokratische Versammlung zum Klimawandel
- Verdoppelung der Mittel für die Entwicklungshilfe in einkommensschwachen Ländern


Gesellschaft:

- Volksscheid auf Bundesebene

- Cannabis-Legalisierung

Steuerpolitik:

- Nationales Umverteilungsprogramm
- Die Vermögenssteuer wieder in Kraft setzen



(d) Spain

Política climática:

- 100% de electricidad producida con energías renovables en 2040
- Plan de aislamiento térmico
- Prohibir la venta de coches nuevos con motor de combustión para 2030

Asuntos económicos:

- Más necesidades sanitarias dentro del sistema público (cuidado dental, gafas, salud mental)
- Ingreso Básico Garantizado de 600€ al mes
- Jornada laboral de 34 horas semanales
- Inversión en el sistema educativo y universalización de la educación preescolar

Política exterior:


- Plan climático global
- Impuesto mundial a los millonarios
- Asamblea democrática mundial sobre el cambio climático
- Duplicar la ayuda exterior a los países de renta baja

Asuntos sociales:

- Reformar la ley electoral para hacer el Senado más proporcional
- Abolición de la prostitución

Sistema fiscal:

- Plan de redistribución nacional
- Aumentar los impuestos sobre las rentas superiores a 100.000 euros anuales



(e) UK

Climate policy:

- Ban of most polluting vehicles in city centers (low-emission zones)
- Thermal insulation plan
- Ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030

Economic issues:

- £150 billion to upgrade schools, hospitals, care homes and council houses
- Real Living Wage of £11 per hour for all workers aged 16 and over
- Reduce the average full-time weekly working hours to 32
- Re-establish neighbourhood policing and recruit 2,000 more frontline officers

Foreign policy:

- Global climate scheme
- Global tax on millionaires
- Global democratic assembly on climate change
- Doubling foreign aid

Societal issues:

- Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation
- Legalization of cannabis

Tax system:

- National redistribution scheme
- Wealth tax




Figure 9: Influence of the GCS on preferred platform:

Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question 30; in the U.S., asked only to non-Republicans.)





Figure 10: Beliefs regarding the support for the GCS and NR. (Questions 21 and 23)



40 **1 Methods**

41 **1.1 Data and questionnaires**

42 **Data collection** The paper utilizes two sets of surveys: the *Global* survey and the *Com-*
43 *plementary* surveys. The *Complementary* surveys consist of two U.S. surveys, *US1* and
44 *US2*, and one European survey, *Eu*. The *Global* survey was conducted from March 2021 to
45 March 2022 on 40,680 respondents from 20 countries (with 1,465 to 2,488 respondents per
46 country). *US1* collected responses from 3,000 participants between January and March
47 2023, while *US2* gathered data from 2,000 respondents between March and April 2023. *Eu*
48 included 3,000 participants and was conducted from February to March 2023. We used
49 the survey companies *Dynata* and *Respondi*. To ensure representative samples, we em-
50 ployed stratified quotas based on gender, age (5 brackets), income (4), region (4), and ed-
51 ucation level (3), as well as ethnicity (3) for the U.S. We also incorporated survey weights
52 throughout the analysis to account for any remaining imbalances. These weights were
53 constructed using the quota variables as well as the degree of urbanity, and trimmed
54 between 0.25 and 4. By applying weights, the results are fully representative of the re-
55 spective countries. Results at the European level apply different weights which ensure
56 representativeness of the combined four European countries. Supplementary Section G
57 confirms that our samples closely match population frequencies in high-income countries.
58 In middle-income countries, the samples are only representative of the online population
59 (young, graduated and urban people are over-represented).

60 **Data quality** The median duration is 28 minutes for the *Global* survey, 14 min for *US1*,
61 11 min for *US2*, and 20 min for *Eu*. To ensure the best possible data quality, we exclude
62 respondents who fail an attention test or rush through the survey (i.e., answer in less than
63 11.5 minutes in the *Global* survey, 4 minutes in *US1* or *US2*, 6 minutes in *Eu*). We study
64 the determinants of attrition in Supplementary Section H. Some socio-demographics drop
65 out significantly more frequently than others, but the coefficients remain small, indicating
66 that our results are not driven by selection bias.

67 **Questionnaires and raw results** The questionnaire and raw results of the *Global* survey
68 can be found in the Appendix of the companion paper (Dechezleprêtre et al. 2022). The
69 raw results are reported in Supplementary Section B while the surveys' structures and
70 questionnaires are given in Supplementary Sections C and D. The questionnaires are the

⁷¹ same as the ones given *ex ante* in the registration plan (osf.io/fy6gd).

⁷² **Incentives** To encourage accurate and truthful responses, several questions of the *US1* survey use incentives. For each of the three comprehension questions that follow the policy descriptions, we randomly select and reward three respondents who provide correct answers with a \$50 gift certificate. Similarly, for questions involving estimating support shares for the GCS and NR, three participants with the closest guesses to the actual values receive a \$50 gift certificate. In the donation lottery question, we randomly select one respondent and split the \$100 prize between the NGO GiveDirectly and the winner according to the winner's choice. In total, our incentives scheme distributes gift certificates (and donations) for a value of \$850. Finally, respondents have an incentive to answer truthfully to the petition question, as they are aware that the results for that question (the share of respondents supporting the policy) will be transmitted to the head of state's office.

⁸⁴

1.2 Methodology

⁸⁵ **National Redistribution scheme** After describing the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) to the respondents, we assess respondents' understanding of the GCS with incentivized questions to test their comprehension of the expected financial outcome for typical individuals in high-income countries (loss) and the poorest individuals globally (gain), followed by the provision of correct answers (Figures A4-A5). The same approach is then applied to a National Redistribution scheme. NR targets the top 5% (in the U.S.) or top 1% (in Europe) with the aim of financing cash transfers to all adults,¹ calibrated to offset the monetary loss of the GCS for the median emitter in their country. We evaluate respondents' understanding that the richest would lose and the typical fellow citizens would gain from that policy. Subsequently, we summarize both schemes to enhance respondents' recall. Additionally, we present a final incentivized comprehension question and provide the expected answer that the combined GCS and NR would result in no net gain or loss for a typical fellow citizen.

⁹⁸ We introduced NR in the questionnaire because we formulated the hypothesis that the GCS would be more supported if complemented with NR. As shown in conjoint analyses (see below), this hypothesis turned out to be false.

¹The wider base in the U.S. was chosen because emissions are larger in the U.S. than in Europe, and it would hardly be feasible to offset the median American's loss by taxing only the top 1%.

¹⁰¹ We also used NR at several occasions in the questionnaire (the list experiment, the
¹⁰² petition, and second-order beliefs) as a point of comparison with the GCS (see Supple-
¹⁰³ mentary Section D). The rationale was to test whether we found higher or smaller effects
¹⁰⁴ for the GCS compared to a benchmark policy: NR. Overall, we find similar effects for the
¹⁰⁵ GCS and for NR.

¹⁰⁶ **Support for the GCS** The 95% confidence intervals are [52.4%, 55.9%] in the U.S. and
¹⁰⁷ [74.2%, 77.2%] in Europe. The average support is computed with survey weights, employ-
¹⁰⁸ ing weights based on quota variables, which exclude vote. Another method to reweigh
¹⁰⁹ the raw results involves running a regression of the support for the GCS on sociodemo-
¹¹⁰ graphic characteristics (including vote) and multiplying each coefficient by the popula-
¹¹¹ tion frequencies. This alternative approach yields similar figures: 76% in Europe and 52%
¹¹² or 53% in the U.S. (depending on whether individuals who did not disclose their vote are
¹¹³ classified as non-voters or excluded). Notably, the average support excluding non-voters
¹¹⁴ is 54% in the U.S.

¹¹⁵ Though the level of support for the GCS is significantly lower in swing States (at 51%)
¹¹⁶ that are key to win U.S. elections, the electoral effect of endorsing the GCS remains non-
¹¹⁷ significantly different from zero (at +1.2 p.p.) in these States. Note that we define swing
¹¹⁸ states as the 8 states with less than 5 p.p. margin of victory in the 2020 election (MI,
¹¹⁹ NV, PA, WI, AZ, GA, NC, FL). The results are robust to using the 3 p.p. threshold (that
¹²⁰ excludes FL) instead.

¹²¹ **Global wealth tax estimates** A 2% tax on net wealth exceeding \$5 million would annu-
¹²² ally raise \$816 billion, leaving unaffected 99.9% of the world population. More specifi-
¹²³ cally, it would collect €5 billion in Spain, €16 billion in France, £20 billion in the UK, €44
¹²⁴ billion in Germany, \$430 billion in the U.S., and \$1 billion collectively in all low-income
¹²⁵ countries (28 countries, home to 700 million people). These Figures come from the [WID](#)
¹²⁶ [wealth tax simulator](#) of [Chancel et al. \(2022\)](#).

¹²⁷ **List experiment** We utilize the difference-in-means estimator, and confidence intervals
¹²⁸ are computed using Monte Carlo simulation with the R package *list* by [Imai \(2011\)](#).

¹²⁹ **Petition** Paired weighted *t*-tests are conducted to test the equality in support for a policy
¹³⁰ among respondents who were questioned about the policy in the petition.

¹³¹ **Conjoint analysis** In order to assess the public support for the GCS in conjunction with
¹³² other policies, we conduct a series of conjoint analyses. We ask respondents to make five
¹³³ choices between pairs of political platforms. In the main text, we do not present the first
¹³⁴ two conjoint analyses.

¹³⁵ The first conjoint analysis suggests that the GCS is supported independently of be-
¹³⁶ ing complemented by the National Redistribution Scheme and a national climate policy
¹³⁷ (“Coal exit” in the U.S., “Thermal insulation plan” in Europe, denoted C).²

¹³⁸ For the second analysis, we split the sample into four random branches.³ The out-
¹³⁹ come is that there is majority support for the GCS and for C, which are seen as neither
¹⁴⁰ complement nor substitute. A minor share of respondents like a national climate policy
¹⁴¹ and dislike a global one, but as many people prefer a global rather than a national policy;
¹⁴² and there is no evidence that implementing NR would increase the support for the GCS.

¹⁴³ The effects reported as the changes in likelihood that a platform is preferred are the
¹⁴⁴ Average Marginal Component Effects ([Hainmueller et al. 2014](#)). The policies studied are
¹⁴⁵ progressive policies prominent in the country. Except for the category *foreign policy*, which
¹⁴⁶ features the GCS 42% of the time, they are drawn uniformly.

¹⁴⁷ **Pros and cons** Surprisingly, the support for National Redistribution also decreased by
¹⁴⁸ 7 p.p. following the closed question about the GCS. This suggests that some individuals
¹⁴⁹ may lack attention and confuse the two policies, or that contemplating the pros and cons
¹⁵⁰ alters the mood of some people, moving them away from their initial positive impression.

¹⁵¹ 1.3 Sources

¹⁵² Detailed sources for the questionnaires and the figures are given in the [Supplementary](#)
¹⁵³ [Spreadsheet](#).

²Indeed, 54% of U.S. respondents and 74% of European ones prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to the combination of C and NR alone, indicating similar support for the GCS conditional on NR and C than for the GCS alone (Figure [A7](#)).

³Results from the first branch show that the support for the GCS conditional on NR, at 55% in the U.S. ($n = 757$) and 77% in Europe ($n = 746$), is not significantly different from the support for the GCS alone. This suggests that rejection of the GCS is not driven by the cost of the policy on oneself. The second branch shows that the support for C conditional on NR is somewhat higher, at 62% in the U.S. ($n = 751$) and 84% in Europe ($n = 747$). However, the third one shows no significant preference for C compared to GCS (both conditional on NR), neither in Europe, where GCS is preferred by 52% ($n = 741$) nor in the U.S., where C is preferred by 53% ($n = 721$). The fourth branch shows that 55% in the U.S. ($n = 771$) and 77% in Europe ($n = 766$) prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to NR alone.

154 **A Literature review**

155 **A.1 Attitudes and perceptions**

156 **A.1.1 Population attitudes on global policies**

157 **Carattini et al. (2019)** test the support for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples
158 in five countries, representative along gender and age. For a given variant, the sample
159 size is about 167 respondents per country. They find over 80% support for any variant in
160 India, between 50% and 65% in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43% to 59% in
161 the U.S., depending on the variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding
162 an equal dividend for each human is close to 50% in high-income countries (e.g., at 44%
163 in the U.S.), consistently with our results from the *Global* survey (see Figure 1). This is
164 another piece of evidence that the support is lower for a tax that would “only” reduce CO₂
165 emissions than for a quota that would unambiguously achieve the climate target. Using
166 a conjoint analysis in the U.S. and Germany, **Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019b)** find
167 that the support for a carbon tax increases by up to 50% if it applies to all industrialized
168 countries rather than exclusively to one’s own country.

169 In surveys conducted in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S., **Ghassim (2020)**
170 finds support ranging from 55% to 74% for “a global democracy including both a global
171 government and a global parliament, directly elected by the world population, to recom-
172 mend and implement policies on global issues”. Through an experiment, he also finds
173 that, in countries where the government stems from a coalition, voting shares would shift
174 by 8 (Brazil) to 12 p.p. (Germany) from parties who are said to oppose global democracy
175 to parties that supposedly support it. For instance, when Germans respondents were told
176 that (only) the Greens and the Left support global democracy, these parties gained re-
177 spectively 9 and 3 p.p. in vote intentions, while the SPD and the CDU-CSU each lost 6
178 p.p. **Ghassim (2020)** also presents survey results showing strong majorities in favor of the
179 direct election of one’s country’s UN representative in all 18 surveyed countries. Simi-
180 larly, in each of 10 countries, there are clear majorities in favor of “a new supranational
181 entity [taking] enforceable global decisions in order to solve global risks” (**Global Chal-**
182 **lenges Foundation 2018**). Remarkably, already in 1946, 54% of Americans agreed (while
183 24% disagreed) that “the UN should be strengthened to make it a world government with
184 the power to control the armed forces of all nations” (**Gallup 1946**). Furthermore, in sur-
185 veys conducted in Argentina, China, India, Russia, Spain, and the U.S., **Ghassim et al.**

¹⁸⁶ (2022) find majority support for UN reforms that would make United Nations' decisions
¹⁸⁷ binding, give veto powers to a few other major countries at the Security Council, or com-
¹⁸⁸ plement the highest body of the UN with a chamber of directly elected representatives.

¹⁸⁹ Relatedly, Meiland et al. (2023) find that both Americans and French people prefer an
¹⁹⁰ international settlement of climate justice, even if it encroaches on sovereignty. In a 2013
¹⁹¹ survey conducted in China, Germany, and the U.S., Schleich et al. (2016) show that over
¹⁹² three-quarter of people think that international climate agreements reached so far are not
¹⁹³ successful and that future agreements are important. In Finland, Sivonen (2022) finds that
¹⁹⁴ that support for a carbon tax is higher if implemented at the global level (54%) rather than
¹⁹⁵ at the national level (40%).

¹⁹⁶ The results from these specific questions are in line with the answers to more general
¹⁹⁷ questions. In each of 36 countries, ISSP (2010) find near consensus that "for environ-
¹⁹⁸ mental problems, there should be international agreements that [their country] and other
¹⁹⁹ countries should be made to follow" (overall, 82% agree and 4% disagree). In each of
²⁰⁰ 29 countries, ISSP (2019) uncover near consensus that "Present economic differences be-
²⁰¹ tween rich and poor countries are too large" (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree). Fehr
²⁰² et al. (2022) find that 90% of Germans want some degree of global redistribution.

²⁰³ A.1.2 Population attitudes on climate burden sharing

²⁰⁴ Despite differences in the description of fairness principles, surveys on burden-sharing
²⁰⁵ rules show consistent attitudes. Or at least, their seemingly contradictory results can be
²⁰⁶ made compatible with the following interpretation: Concerning emissions reductions,
²⁰⁷ most people want that every country engage in strong and collective decarbonization ef-
²⁰⁸ forts, with a global quota converging to climate neutrality in the medium run. Concerning
²⁰⁹ the financial effort, most people support high-emitting countries paying and low-income
²¹⁰ countries receiving funding. The most supported rules are those perceived as equitable,
²¹¹ in particular an equal right to emit per person.

²¹² This interpretation helps to understand the apparent differences between articles that
²¹³ approach burden sharing from different angles: cost sharing (in money terms), effort shar-
²¹⁴ ing (in terms of emissions reductions), or resource sharing (in terms of rights to emit).
²¹⁵ Existing papers adopt either the cost sharing or effort sharing approach, which preclude
²¹⁶ any country from being a net receiver of funds. Also, by focusing on *either* the financial
²¹⁷ or the decarbonization effort, these surveys miss the other half of the picture, which can
²¹⁸ explain why some papers find strong support for the ability-to-pay principle while others

219 find strong support for grandfathering (defined as emissions reductions being the same
220 in every country). The literature follows these approaches to align with the notions used
221 by the UNFCCC. Yet, we argue that the resource sharing approach is preferable for un-
222 covering attitudes, as it unambiguously describes the distributive implications of each
223 rule while achieving an efficient geographical distribution of emissions reductions and
224 explicitly allowing for monetary gains for some countries.

225 Now, let us summarize the results of the different papers in the light of this clarifica-
226 tion. Schleich et al. (2016) find an identical ranking of support for burden-sharing prin-
227 ciples in China, Germany, and the U.S.: polluter-pays followed by ability-to-pay, equal
228 emissions per capita, and grandfathering. Note that the authors do not allow for emis-
229 sions trading in their description of equal *emissions per capita*, which may explain its rel-
230 atively low support. Yet, the relative support for egalitarianism also depends on how
231 *the other* rules are described. Indeed, Carlsson et al. (2011) find that Swedes prefer that
232 “all countries are allowed to emit an equal amount per capita” rather than options where
233 emissions are reduced based on current or historical emissions, for which it is explicitly
234 stated that high-emitting countries “will continue to emit more than others”. Bechtel &
235 Scheve (2013) find agreement that rich countries should pay more and historical emissions
236 should matter, but that efforts should not be solely borne by wealthy nations. More pre-
237 cisely, their conjoint analysis conducted in France, Germany, the UK, and the U.S. shows
238 that a climate agreement is 15 p.p. more likely to be preferred (to a random alternative) if
239 it includes 160 countries rather than 20, and 5 p.p. less likely to be preferred if “only rich
240 countries pay” compared to other burden-sharing rules: “rich countries pay more than
241 poor”, “countries pay proportional to current emissions” or “countries pay proportional
242 to historical emissions”. Using a choice experiment, Carlsson et al. (2013) find that the
243 least preferred option in China and the U.S. is when low-emitting countries are exempted
244 from any effort. Ability-to-pay is appreciated in both countries and is the preferred op-
245 tion in the U.S., though the preferred option in China is another one that accounts for
246 historical responsibility. In the U.S. and France, Meiland et al. (2023) find that the most
247 favored fairness principle is that “all countries commit to converge to the same average
248 of total emissions per inhabitant, compatible with a controlled climate change”. Further-
249 more, in each country, 73% disagree with grandfathering defined as “countries which
250 emitted a lot of carbon in the past have a right to continue emitting more than others in
251 the future”. The study by Meiland et al. (2023) contains many other results: for instance,
252 majorities prefer to hold countries accountable for their consumption-based rather than

territorial emissions, and the median choice regarding historical responsibility is to hold a country accountable for its post-1990 emissions (rather than post-1850 or just their current emissions). Finally, in each of 28 (among the largest) countries, Dabla-Norris et al. (2023) find strong majority for “all countries” to the question “Which countries do you think should be paying to reduce carbon emissions?”. When asked to choose between a cost sharing based on *current* vs. *accumulated historic emissions*, a majority prefers *current emissions* in all countries but China and Saudi Arabia (where the two options are close to equally preferred).

A.1.3 Population attitudes on foreign aid

There is an extensive literature on attitudes towards foreign aid in donor countries. The key findings indicate that most people overestimate the amount of foreign aid and that only a minority wants a cut in foreign aid compared to actual amounts, especially once they become aware of them.

For instance, PIPA (2001) shows that 83% of Americans support a multilateral effort to cut world hunger in half. PIPA (2008) shows that in each of 20 countries, a majority thinks that developed countries “have a moral responsibility to work to reduce hunger and severe poverty in poor countries”, with an average agreement of 81%. In 7 OECD countries, the study finds that at least 75% of respondents are willing to pay for a program to cut hunger in half (at an estimated cost of, e.g., \$50 a year for each American).

Kaufmann et al. (2012) find that perceived aid is overestimated in each of the 24 countries they study, on average by a factor of 7. In most countries, desired aid is larger than perceived aid.⁴ They show that individuals in the top income quintile desire aid 0.13 p.p. lower than those in the bottom 40% – which is very close to what we find. By employing a theoretical model and examining correlations between lobbying and actual aid (controlling for desired aid), they argue that the gap between actual and desired aid stems from the political influence of the rich who defend their vested interests. In Kaufmann et al. (2012), the U.S. is an outlier: desired aid is at the other countries’ average (3% of GNI), but as misperceptions are enormous, perceived aid is twice as large as desired aid. Indeed, Gilens (2001) shows that even Americans with high political knowledge misperceive actual aid, and finds that 17% fewer of them want to cut aid when we provide them specific information about the amount of aid. Similarly, Nair (2018) finds that the rela-

⁴Kaufmann et al. (2012) offer the best results on desired aid because (as Hudson & van Heerde (2012) criticize), other studies did not take into account misperceptions of actual aid.

²⁸⁴ tively low support for aid in the U.S. is driven by information on global distribution, as
²⁸⁵ people underestimate their rank by 27 centiles on average and overestimate the global
²⁸⁶ median income by a factor 10.

²⁸⁷ **Hudson & van Heerde (2012)** provide a critical review of the literature and show that
²⁸⁸ the strong support for poverty alleviation largely stems from intrinsic altruism. They
²⁸⁹ note that, according to **DFID (2009)** and **PIPA (2001)**, 47% of British people find that the
²⁹⁰ aid is wasted (mainly due to corruption), while Americans estimate that less than a quar-
²⁹¹ ter of the aid reaches those in need, with over half ending up in the hands of corrupt
²⁹² government officials. Despite these perceptions, most people still support aid, suggest-
²⁹³ ing the presence of nonutilitarian motives. Consistent with **Henson et al. (2010)**, **Bauhr**
²⁹⁴ **et al. (2013)** find that support for aid is reduced by the perception of corruption in recipi-
²⁹⁵ ent countries. However, this effect is mitigated by the aid-corruption paradox: countries
²⁹⁶ with higher levels of corruption often need more help. **Bodenstein & Faust (2017)** fur-
²⁹⁷ ther show that right-wing Europeans, as well as those who perceive strong corruption
²⁹⁸ in their country, are more likely to agree that recipient countries should “follow certain
²⁹⁹ rules regarding democracy, human rights and governance as a condition for receiving EU
³⁰⁰ development aid.” Using a 2002 Gallup survey and the 2006 World Values Survey, and
³⁰¹ in line with **Bayram (2017)**, **Paxton & Knack (2012)** show that the main determinants for
³⁰² wanting more aid are trust, left-wing ideology, interest in politics, and being a woman (all
³⁰³ positively associated).

³⁰⁴ **A.1.4 Population attitudes on taxes on the rich**

³⁰⁵ We are not aware of any previous survey on a global wealth tax,⁵ though surveys
³⁰⁶ consistently show strong support for national wealth taxes. In a comprehensive survey
³⁰⁷ conducted in the UK, **Rowlingson et al. (2021)** show that a wealth tax is the preferred
³⁰⁸ option for raising revenues. Only 8% of respondents state that total net wealth should not
³⁰⁹ be taxed (with little differences between Labour and Conservative voters). The study also
³¹⁰ finds that the preferred design would be a 1% or 3% tax on net wealth above £1 million. By
³¹¹ asking how much taxes per year should a person with a certain income and wealth level
³¹² pay, **Fisman et al. (2017)** finds that the average American favors a 0.8% linear tax rate
³¹³ on unspecified wealth up to \$2 million (the highest wealth level tested), and a 3% linear
³¹⁴ rate on inherited wealth. Through a conjoint analysis conducted in three high-income

⁵We did not find any using the combination of “survey” or “attitudes” with “wealth tax” or “global wealth tax” in Google Scholar.

³¹⁵ countries, Schecht & Tisch (2023) find widespread support for a wealth tax (from 78% in
³¹⁶ the U.S. to 86% in Germany and the UK), with a preference for an exemption threshold
³¹⁷ set at \$/€1 million (rather than 500,000 or 2 million) with the tax rate and tax unit having
³¹⁸ little influence on the preferred design. In 21 OECD countries, the OECD (2019) uncovers
³¹⁹ strong majority support for higher taxes on the rich to support the poor, with nearly
³²⁰ 70% overall agreement and less than 20% disagreement. Isbell (2022) finds similarly high
³²¹ level of support in 34 African countries. In the UK, Patriotic Millionaires (2022) find 69%
³²² support (and 7% opposition) for a 1.1% tax on wealth in excess of £10 million. In the
³²³ U.S., Americans for Tax Fairness (2021) find that 67% to 71% of the respondents support
³²⁴ to “raise taxes for those earning more than \$400,000 a year”, “raise the income tax rate
³²⁵ for those earning over \$1 million a year by 10 percentage points”, or “apply a 2% tax on
³²⁶ an individual’s wealth above \$50 million each year, and 3% on wealth above \$1 billion”.
³²⁷ Scheve & Stasavage (2017) discuss three potential explanations for why we do not observe
³²⁸ more wealth redistribution: that other issues are more important to citizens, that citizens
³²⁹ do not support wealth redistribution, and that decisions are not taken democratically.

³³⁰ A.1.5 Population attitudes on ethical norms

³³¹ **Universalism** Various studies have examined the concept of global identity (see Reysen
³³² & Katzarska-Miller (2018) for a review). In the 2005-2008 wave of the World Values Sur-
³³³vey, Bayram (2015) notes that “78% of the participants in 57 countries see themselves as
³³⁴ citizens of the world”, though the 2017-2022 wave reveals that more people feel close to
³³⁵ their town, region or country than to the world. Enke et al. (2023a) measure universal-
³³⁶ism at the U.S. district level using donation data, and find that a district’s universalism
³³⁷ predicts electoral outcomes better than its income or education level. To measure uni-
³³⁸versalism at the individual level, Enke et al. (2023c) ask American respondents to split
³³⁹ \$100 between a random stranger and a random person with the same income but closer
³⁴⁰ to them. They distinguish different facets of universalism, and define *foreign universalism*
³⁴¹ as the inclination to give to a foreigner rather than a fellow citizen. They find a home bias
³⁴² for most people, which could partly be attributed to concerns about inequality, as the split
³⁴³ involves two persons with the same income, with the foreigner most certainly living in
³⁴⁴ a poorer country than the American and thus enjoying a higher social status. That being
³⁴⁵ said, a home bias probably remains even after accounting for concerns about inequality,
³⁴⁶ as 84% of Americans agree that “taking care of problems at home is more important than
³⁴⁷ giving aid to foreign countries” (PIPA 2001). Enke et al. (2023b) also measure univer-

348 salism and analyze its correlates in 7 countries, and Cappelen et al. (2022) deploy this
349 method in 60 countries. In a lab experiment with students in the U.S., Cherry et al. (2017)
350 show that a substantial share of people prefer policies detrimental to them due to their
351 egalitarian worldview. Waytz et al. (2019) show that left-leaning people exhibit a wider
352 “moral circle”. Jaeger & Wilks (2023) find that judgments of moral concern are equally
353 well explained by characteristics of the judge and the evaluated target.

354 **Free-riding** Despite the long-standing explanation of the lack of climate action as a re-
355 sult of free-riding, surveys consistently show that people support climate mitigation ac-
356 tion in their own country, even in the absence of such action in other countries. Bernauer
357 & Gampfer (2015) show this for Americans and Indians, who both overestimate their
358 country’s emissions at one third of the global total. Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019a)
359 show this in the U.S. and China using an experimental design. McEvoy & Cherry (2016)
360 show that Americans mostly invoke leadership and morality to justify unilateral climate
361 action. Using a range of methods, Aklin & Mildenberger (2020) show that the empiri-
362 cal evidence for free-riding is not compelling, and that climate inaction can be equally
363 well explained by distributive conflicts. Finally, review of the literature by McGrath &
364 Bernauer (2017) shows that climate attitudes are largely nonreciprocal, and primarily
365 driven by values and perceptions of the policies, rather than by considerations of what
366 other countries do.

367 A.1.6 Second-order beliefs

368 Allport (1924) introduced the concept of pluralistic ignorance: a shared misperception
369 concerning others’ beliefs. The concept became notorious when O’Gorman (1975) showed
370 that, towards the end of the civil rights movement, 47% of Americans believed that a ma-
371 jority of white people supported segregation, while only 18% did so. PIPA (2001) has
372 shown that while 75% of Americans are willing to contribute \$50 annually to halve world
373 hunger (the cost of the program), only 32% believed that the majority would share this
374 willingness. Pluralistic ignorance regarding climate-friendly norms in the United States
375 has been documented by Andre et al. (2022), who further show that correcting the misper-
376 ceptions would be effective to enhance pro-climate behaviors. Relatedly, Sparkman et al.
377 (2022) show that Americans underestimate the support for climate policies by nearly half,
378 while Drews et al. (2022) document pluralistic ignorance of carbon tax support in Spain.
379 Additionally, Geiger & Swim (2016) show that pluralistic ignorance regarding concern for

³⁸⁰ climate change leads people to self-silence, resulting in reduced discussions on the topic.

³⁸¹ A.2 Proposals and analyses of global policy-making

³⁸² A.2.1 Global carbon pricing

³⁸³ Global carbon pricing is widely regarded by economists as the benchmark climate
³⁸⁴ policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon emissions externality. For instance, *Hoel*
³⁸⁵ (1991) shows that an international carbon tax can be designed to simultaneously achieve
³⁸⁶ efficiency and accommodate any distributional objective. Concerning the distributional
³⁸⁷ objective, *Grubb* (1990), *Agarwal & Narain* (1991) and *Bertram* (1992) were the first to
³⁸⁸ advocate for an equal right to emit for each human. As *Grubb* (1990) states it: “by far the
³⁸⁹ best combination of long term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity, is obtained
³⁹⁰ from a system based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions which are allocated on
³⁹¹ an adult per capita basis”.⁶ Support for such solution has been renewed ever since (*Baer*
³⁹² et al. 2000; *Blanchard & Tirole* 2021; *Jamieson* 2001; *Rajan* 2021).

³⁹³ While many endorse the egalitarian allocation of emissions permits, economists also
³⁹⁴ considered this outcome as politically unfeasible. Thus, to preserve the current level of
³⁹⁵ inequalities and to preclude transfers between countries, they adjusted their (integrated
³⁹⁶ assessment) models by assigning more weight to the interest of rich countries (*Stanton*
³⁹⁷ 2011).

³⁹⁸ *Gollier & Tirole* (2015) synthesize the distributional decision with a *generosity* parameter
³⁹⁹ which would allocate emissions permit to countries in proportion to their population
⁴⁰⁰ if set to one, in proportion to their emissions (on the start date of the policy) if set to zero,
⁴⁰¹ and as a mixture of the egalitarian and grandfathering rules if set in between. Using a
⁴⁰² similar formula in the context of a tax, *Cramton et al.* (2015) (summarized in *MacKay*
⁴⁰³ et al. 2015) propose that countries with emissions per capita around the average fix the
⁴⁰⁴ generosity parameter, so that it is strategically chosen to maximize the tax rate, and to
⁴⁰⁵ fix the tax rate at the minimum price proposed by participating countries. Negotiations
⁴⁰⁶ would exclude countries with low ambition beforehand; and the treaty would impose
⁴⁰⁷ trade sanctions on non-participating countries. *van den Bergh et al.* (2020) propose a
⁴⁰⁸ “dual-track transition to global carbon pricing”: an expanding climate club that would
⁴⁰⁹ integrate existing and new emissions trading systems, and a reorientation of UNFCCC
⁴¹⁰ negotiations towards a global carbon price and burden-sharing rules. The ? also sup-

⁶By “adult per capita”, *Grubb* (1990) means that permits would be allocated equally among adults.

⁴¹¹ ports global carbon pricing or, as a first step, a carbon price floor. They propose either
⁴¹² differentiated prices among countries or international transfers, and estimate that a price
⁴¹³ of \$75/tCO₂ in 2030 would be compatible with a 2°C trajectory.

⁴¹⁴ Other authors have put forth more radical proposals. For instance, Weitzman (2017)
⁴¹⁵ envisions a World Climate Assembly with proportional representation at the global scale,
⁴¹⁶ so that the median (human) voter would choose the carbon price level. To finance an
⁴¹⁷ adaptation fund, Chancel & Piketty (2015) propose a global *progressive* carbon tax (or a
⁴¹⁸ progressive tax on air tickets as a first step), so that rich people (who are high emitters)
⁴¹⁹ contribute more to the public good. Fleurbaey & Zuber (2013) highlight that, given that
⁴²⁰ current emitters are probably richer than future victims of climate change damages, cli-
⁴²¹ mate policies deserve a *negative* discount rate. In other words, we cannot dissociate the
⁴²² climate issue from global inequalities, and an ethical response to this issue requires global
⁴²³ redistribution.

⁴²⁴ A.2.2 Climate burden sharing

⁴²⁵ The literature has discussed different burden-sharing principles. While there is no
⁴²⁶ agreement on their definitions as different approaches are used (cost sharing, effort shar-
⁴²⁷ ing, or resource sharing, see Section A.1.2), we describe here the burden-sharing princi-
⁴²⁸ ples consistently using the resource sharing approach (i.e., allocating emissions rights).
⁴²⁹ For other papers that define or compare different burden-sharing principles, see Leim-
⁴³⁰ bach & Giannousakis (2019); Vaillancourt & Waaub (2004); Zhou & Wang (2016).

⁴³¹ **Equal per capita.** The simplest principle is perhaps to allocate each year's global carbon
⁴³² quota based on an equal right to emit per capita, or an equal right to emit for each adult.
⁴³³ Implementing this principle would result in large transfers from high-emitting to low-
⁴³⁴ emitting countries.

⁴³⁵ **Grandfathering.** In contrast, *grandfathering* entails allocating emissions rights in pro-
⁴³⁶ portion to current emissions. From the perspective of allocating carbon pricing revenues
⁴³⁷ between countries, grandfathering amounts to each country retaining the revenues it col-
⁴³⁸ lects. Given that nations are sovereign and have not agreed to share emissions rights,
⁴³⁹ this principle can be considered as the default option against which the other ones can be
⁴⁴⁰ compared in terms of distributive effects.

⁴⁴¹ **Historical responsibilities.** At the opposite end of the spectrum is the principle of *his-*
⁴⁴² *torical responsibilities*, which assigns to each country a carbon budget proportional to its
⁴⁴³ population. Countries that have emitted more than the average have accumulated a car-
⁴⁴⁴ bon debt towards countries that have emitted less, which have a carbon credit.⁷

⁴⁴⁵ To fully specify this rule, one needs to define a start date for the responsibilities on
⁴⁴⁶ past emissions and specify how to account for population size. 1990 is often chosen as
⁴⁴⁷ a start year as it is the date of the first IPCC assessment report, marking the widespread
⁴⁴⁸ acknowledgment of climate change, though variants include 1972, 1960, 1950 or 1850.⁸
⁴⁴⁹ Several solutions have been proposed to account for evolving populations, none of which
⁴⁵⁰ is flawless. Matthews (2015) allocates emissions rights on a given year proportionally to
⁴⁵¹ the countries' populations in that year. An alternative is to use fixed populations, such
⁴⁵² as the populations at the chosen start year (Neumayer 2000), or at a future date such
⁴⁵³ as projected when the global total population will reach 9 billion (Raupach et al. 2014).
⁴⁵⁴ Fanning & Hickel (2023) convert the projected climate debt up to 2050 into monetary
⁴⁵⁵ terms in a 1.5°C scenario.

⁴⁵⁶ The rationale for using fixed populations is to prevent countries from intentionally
⁴⁵⁷ increasing their population size to gain more emissions rights. However, this approach
⁴⁵⁸ treats countries with different demographic trajectories similarly, effectively penalizing
⁴⁵⁹ countries which grow more than others (if past populations are used) or grow more than
⁴⁶⁰ expected (if future populations are used). Using current populations like Matthews (2015)
⁴⁶¹ also comes with its own problems. Consider two countries having contributed very little
⁴⁶² to cumulative emissions, with the same emissions per capita but different demographic
⁴⁶³ patterns: country A's population has doubled in the last 30 years, while country B's pop-
⁴⁶⁴ ulation has remained stable. Despite the similar present situation, country B would ac-
⁴⁶⁵ cumulate more carbon credit than country A. Essentially, compensating country B more
⁴⁶⁶ due to its past population size amounts to compensating the dead although it is future
⁴⁶⁷ generations who will suffer. That being said, using current populations is likely a more
⁴⁶⁸ viable solution than relying on fixed populations since, in practice, countries with similar
⁴⁶⁹ emissions per capita tend to have relatively similar demographic trajectories.

⁷It is not clear how these debts would be settled. Approaches could involve carbon removal from the atmosphere, or using a conventional social cost of carbon to monetize them, by crediting (positively or negatively) emissions rights to countries in an international carbon market.

⁸Climate equity monitor uses 1850 for example.

470 **Ability to pay.** Another prominent burden-sharing principle is the ability to pay whereby
471 richer countries should contribute more to mitigation efforts. To operationalize this prin-
472 ciple, Baer et al. (2008) define *capacity* as the share of global income above an exemption
473 threshold. They use the threshold of \$7,500 per year (in 2005 PPP), which corresponds to
474 the top 28% of the global income distribution. According to this principle, the effort of a
475 country should be proportional to the revenues it would raise with a linear income tax on
476 individual income above \$7,500.


477 **Climate Equity Reference Framework** Baer et al. (2008) propose another effort-sharing
478 method, the *Climate Equity Reference Framework* (CERF), which blends the ability to pay
479 principle with their version of historical responsibilities. They define *responsibility* as fol-
480 lows: they determine the mitigation requirement as the emissions gap between the Busi-
481 ness as Usual scenario from IEA (2007) and a 2°C (with 68-86% probability) scenario.
482 The mitigation requirement is then allocated to countries proportionally to their cumu-
483 lative emissions (starting in 1990). The emissions right of a country according to their
484 *responsibility* are then determined by its Business as Usual emissions minus its mitigation
485 requirement. A country's emissions right, dubbed its *greenhouse development right* (GDR),
486 is defined using a combination of *capacity* (C) and *responsibility* (R) to allocate the miti-
487 gation requirement between countries. This allocation key is called the *Responsibility and*
488 *Capacity Indicator* (RCI) and defined as $RCI = R^a \cdot C^{1-a}$, with $a = .4$.

489 This choice of parameter may seem somewhat arbitrary, but the EcoEquity calculator
490 allows for a customization all CERF parameters (Holz et al. 2019). The Climate Action
491 Network has adopted the CERF as its *fair share* framework, though the different national
492 chapters of the organization could not agree on a choice of parameters (Athanasou et al.
493 2022).⁹

494 The CERF approach was adopted by a prominent network of climate NGOs because
495 it operationalizes the principle of *common but differentiated responsibilities and respective ca-*
496 *pabilities* recognized by the UNFCCC. However, this approach suffers from three draw-
497 backs. First, its definition of historical responsibility as an effort sharing principle is in-

⁹The U.S. Climate Action Network and the think tank EcoEquity (funded by Tom Athanasiou and late Paul Baer) choose the following parameters: an equal weight for R and C ($a = .5$), their own business as usual projections of CO₂ emissions based on trends of GDP growth and emissions intensity reduction, a 1.5°C (Low Energy Demand) pathway, 1950 as the start year for responsibility, a gradual inclusion of income to compute *capacity* (which adds complexity to the calculation) from a full exemption of the bottom 70% (\$7,500 per year) linearly to a full inclusion of the top 2% (\$72,211), the inclusion of non-CO₂ gases but not of emissions embodied in trade (i.e. imported emissions) nor LULUCF (land-use).

Figure A1: Net gains from the CERF burden-sharing rule in 2030.




Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO₂.

498 consistent with the principle of an equal right of cumulative emissions per capita, which
 499 is a resource sharing principle. For instance, consider a fully decarbonized country that
 500 has exhausted *exactly* its cumulative carbon budget. According to the CERF notion of *re-*
 501 *sponsibility*, this country would still be expected to contribute significantly to mitigation
 502 efforts due to its relatively high cumulative emissions. Yet, according to the usual defini-
 503 tion of the historical responsibility based on an equal right of cumulative emissions p.c.,
 504 this country would have no liability as it has not exceeded its carbon budget. Second, a
 505 country with moderate incomes¹⁰ and low historical responsibility would be assigned a
 506 relatively low effort, even if its emissions per capita are high. In other words, the CERF
 507 approach favors countries that have experienced recent growth. Third, the poorest coun-
 508 tries would be granted emissions rights close to the Business as Usual trajectory, as they
 509 would bear virtually none of the effort. But this trajectory carries the current (unfair) in-
 510 come distribution and amounts to grandfathering. For example, the baseline trajectory
 511 for emissions¹¹ in the DRC entail 0.8 tCO₂ p.c. in 2030, which is five times less than the

¹⁰Using the above parameters, moderate incomes means few incomes above the global 70th. percentile.

¹¹The baseline trajectory is computed as the “product of the projected GDP and CO₂ emission intensity”.

Figure A2: Difference between net gains from Greenhouse Development Rights and equal rights per capita.



Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO₂.

512 world average emissions right per capita. In this framework, if the DRC were to grow
 513 faster than projected in the baseline, it would actually have to pay to the rest of the world
 514 for mitigation efforts. This is what is likely to happen to countries like Mexico or Senegal,
 515 from our simulation of the net gains of CERF compared to a situation without interna-
 516 tional transfers (see Figure A1). In contrast, a resource sharing approach based on equal
 517 per capita emissions would result in low-income countries receiving emissions rights ex-
 518 ceeding their projected trajectories, leading to transfers from high-income countries. By
 519 construction, such transfers do not occur in an effort sharing approach like the CERF,
 520 implying lower transfers to low-income countries. Compared to an equal right to emit
 521 per capita, this method favors countries like China (whose emissions are allowed to re-
 522 main stable over 2020-2030 instead of a reduction of 35-40%) and penalizes regions like
 523 Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (see Figure A2).

524 **Contraction and Convergence.** Meyer (2004) defines a rule called *contraction and con-*
 525 *vergence* (C&C), which combines elements of grandfathering and equal per capita ap-

526 proaches. According to C&C, each country is granted (tradable) emissions rights, starting
527 at their current emission level and converging linearly to an equal per capita level at some
528 pre-specified date. The *contraction* part refers to the reduction of total emissions rights in
529 line with the climate objective. When discussed around year 2000, the convergence date
530 was specified between 2020 and 2050. This rule, advocated by the Global Commons Insti-
531 tute (a UK think tank), was on the agenda from COP2 to COP15 (i.e., until Copenhagen,
532 and including in Kyoto), including at Kyoto, and was endorsed by the European Parlia-
533 ment in 1998. More recently, Gignac & Matthews (2015) have shown how C&C can be
534 made consistent with historical responsibilities by computing carbon debts and credits
535 until the convergence date.

536 **Assessments of the NDCs against burden-sharing principles.** The regime established
537 by the 2015 Paris agreement to regulate climate change respects none of the burden-
538 sharing principles and relies instead on voluntary contributions from each country, known
539 as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). A body of literature (reviewed by Höhne
540 et al. 2014) assesses the NDCs against the emissions reduction objective and different
541 burden-sharing principles. To evaluate the NDCs, Gao et al. (2019) examine their emis-
542 sions projections for 2030 and estimate the resulting increase in temperature. The most
543 recent and comprehensive assessment of NDCs against burden-sharing principles is con-
544 ducted by van den Berg et al. (2020) (see also Raupach et al. 2014; Robiou du Pont et al.
545 2016, 2017).

546 A.2.3 Global redistribution

547 Addressing global poverty, inequalities, and climate change are central to the univer-
548 sally agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). As highlighted by Bolch et al. (2022),
549 low-income countries often lack sufficient domestic resources to eradicate poverty in the
550 short term, indicating the need for international transfers to rapidly end global poverty.
551 In *Beyond the Welfare State*, Gunnar Myrdal (1960) called for a *welfare world*. In his Nobel
552 lecture, he emphasized the necessity of increasing foreign aid to low-income countries,
553 stating that “The type of marginal foreign aid we have provided, is clearly not enough to
554 meet their barest needs” (Myrdal 1975).

555 Drawing on the labor theory of value, some economists have argued that global in-
556 equalities arise from unequal exchange in international trade (Arghiri 1972). Indeed, the
557 stark disparity in wages between countries implies that one unit of labor exported by an

558 American commands five units of labor embodied in imported goods, whereas Ethiopi-
559 ans need to export 50 units of labor to obtain one unit through imports (Alsamawi et al.
560 2014; Reyes et al. 2017). Taking stock, Hickel (2017) proposes to globally establish mini-
561 mum wages at 50% of the local median wage. Hickel (2017) also suggests other solutions
562 against global inequality, which served as inspiration for our questionnaire. These mea-
563 sures include the cancellation of low-income countries' public debt, fair trade practices
564 (such as eliminating tariffs from high-income countries, reducing patent protections, and
565 reducing farming subsidies in rich countries), initiatives to combat tax evasion (e.g., im-
566 plementing a global financial register), land reform, and a fair international climate policy.

567 Piketty (2014) prominently advocates for a progressive wealth tax on a global scale,
568 although he does not specify whether the resulting revenues should fund international
569 transfers.

570 Kopczuk et al. (2005) compute the optimal linear income tax rates for all countries in
571 two ways: globally centralized and decentralized (i.e., within each country and without
572 international transfers). They show that the average decentralized rate is 41%. In con-
573 trast, the global rate is 62%, which would generate funds to finance a basic income of
574 250\$/month (higher than the GPD per capita of 73 countries). From a current global Gini
575 index of 0.695, they show that decentralized optimal taxation would only marginally re-
576 duce global inequality to 0.69, whereas global taxation would significantly decrease the
577 Gini to 0.25. The study also shows that the existing level of foreign aid can only be ratio-
578 nalized if the U.S. attaches 2,000 less value to a citizen in the poorest countries than to an
579 American citizen (or 1,000 less if half of the transfers are diverted due to corruption).

580 A.2.4 Basic income

581 Unconditional cash transfers (UCT) are increasingly seen as an effective way to end ex-
582 treme poverty. A growing body of evidence from randomized control trials supports this
583 notion: Gangopadhyay et al. (2015) find that UCT outperform a food subsidy; Haushofer
584 & Shapiro (2016) find significant impacts on health, economic outcomes, and psycholog-
585 ical well-being; Egger et al. (2022) find large positive spillovers on non-recipient people,
586 and minimal inflation. Reviews of existing research further confirm the positive outcomes
587 of UCT (Bastagli et al. 2016; Standing 2014).

588 While the delivery of cash to remote areas and the prevention of fraud is challenging
589 in regions without a proper civil register, the use of mobile phones as banking and bio-
590 metric identification tools could provide viable solutions (Harnett 2017). Although many

⁵⁹¹ places still lack internet access, satellite internet technology shows promising progress,
⁵⁹² with some experts suggesting that it could soon become affordable and universally ac-
⁵⁹³ cessible ([Hanson 2016](#)).

⁵⁹⁴ **A.2.5 Global democracy**


⁵⁹⁵ The idea of world federalism has a long-standing history, dating back at least to [Kant](#)
⁵⁹⁶ ([1795](#)), who argued that a world federation was essential for achieving perpetual peace.
⁵⁹⁷ International organizations were eventually created to foster peace, though the League
⁵⁹⁸ of Nations and its successor, the United Nations, never succeeded in avoiding military
⁵⁹⁹ conflicts. Many have argued that we need stronger and more democratic global institu-
⁶⁰⁰ tions, competent to address global challenges such as extreme poverty, climate change,
⁶⁰¹ wars, pandemics, or financial stability. Before World War II, feminist and pacifist [Maver-](#)
⁶⁰² [ick Lloyd & Schwimmer \(1937\)](#) founded the *Campaign for World Government*, advocating
⁶⁰³ for direct representation at the global scale. [Einstein \(1947\)](#) called for the subordination of
⁶⁰⁴ the UN Security Council to the General Assembly and the direct election of UN delegates.
⁶⁰⁵ Since 2007, there has been widespread support for a United Nations Parliamentary As-
⁶⁰⁶ semby (UNPA) from individuals and institutions in over 150 countries, including 1,800
⁶⁰⁷ member of parliament, heads of state, as well the European Parliament, the Pan-African
⁶⁰⁸ Parliament, and the Latin-American Parliament. The UNPA campaign calls for a gradual
⁶⁰⁹ implementation of a democratic assembly, starting with a consultative assembly com-
⁶¹⁰ posed of members of national parliaments, allowing for the direct election of its members
⁶¹¹ in voluntary countries, and progressing towards a world parliament with binding legisla-
⁶¹² tive powers once all members are directly elected ([Leinen & Bummel 2018](#)). Besides the
⁶¹³ UNPA, various scholars have put forward different models of global democracy, ranging
⁶¹⁴ from deliberative spaces to a world federation ([Archibugi et al. 2011](#)). While the most rad-
⁶¹⁵ ical proposals may still be on the horizon, an assembly of random citizens representative
⁶¹⁶ of the world population has already been convened. It has produced a joint statement at
⁶¹⁷ the COP26 ([Global Assembly 2022](#)), and a similar *World Citizens' Assembly* should soon
⁶¹⁸ follow.

619 B Raw results

620 Country-specific raw results are also available as supplementary material files: **US**,
 621 **EU**, **FR**, **DE**, **ES**, **UK**.

Figure A3: Absolute support for global climate policies (Reproduced from *Dechezleprêtre et al. 2022*, Figure A20.).

Share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* (in percent, $n = 40,680$). The color blue denotes an absolute majority. See Figure 1 for the relative support. (Questions A-I of the global survey.)



*In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

Figure A4: Correct answers to comprehension questions (in percent). (Questions 16-18)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
With NR, typical [country] people win and richest lose	68	73	76	73	73	70
With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win	60	68	62	72	67	67
With GCS+NR, typical [country] people neither win nor lose	54	60	63	59	57	61

Figure A5: Number of correct answers to comprehension questions (mean). (Questions 16-18)




Figure A6: List experiment: mean number of supported policies. (Question 24)




Figure A7: Conjoint analyses 1 and 2. (Questions 25-27)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)	54	76	80	71	81	74
C+NR+GCS preferred to C+NR	55	74	79	71	78	68
NR+GCS preferred to NR	55	77	79	74	79	77
NR+C preferred to NR	62	84	88	83	84	82
GCS+NR preferred to C+NR	47	52	53	53	49	52
NR+C+GCS preferred to NR	55	77	86	73	83	72

Table A1: Effects on the support for the GCS of a question on its pros and cons and on information about the actual support, in the U.S. (See Section D in the US2 Questionnaire)

	Support			
	Global Climate Scheme		National Redistribution	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Control group mean	0.557	0.557	0.569	0.569
Treatment: Open-ended field on GCS pros & cons	-0.073** (0.035)	-0.071** (0.031)	-0.035 (0.035)	-0.030 (0.032)
Treatment: Closed questions on GCS pros & cons	-0.109*** (0.034)	-0.096*** (0.031)	-0.065* (0.034)	-0.062** (0.031)
Treatment: Info on actual support for GCS and NR	-0.021 (0.034)	-0.015 (0.031)	0.048 (0.033)	0.056* (0.031)
Includes controls		✓		✓
Observations	2,000	1,995	2,000	1,995
R ²	0.007	0.170	0.007	0.154

Figure A8: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See original translations in Figure 8; Question 29)




Figure A9: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements seen as important for supporting the GCS in a 4-Likert scale (in percent). (Question 32)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
It would succeed in limiting climate change	78	85	85	86	86	83
It would hurt the [Country] economy	81	67	61	67	66	69
It would penalize my household	75	60	55	63	59	63
It would make people change their lifestyle	78	79	83	79	78	77
It would reduce poverty in low-income countries	77	85	88	85	86	81
It might be detrimental to some poor countries	79	72	79	67	78	70
It could foster global cooperation	82	81	81	82	85	80
It could fuel corruption in low-income countries	79	75	82	69	79	72
It could be subject to fraud	80	79	80	74	83	81
It would be technically difficult to put in place	77	71	74	62	79	71
Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences	89	82	89	68	91	88

Figure A10: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements found in the open-ended field on the GCS (manually recoded, in percent). (Question 31)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
environment	26	31	37	26	43	24
unclassifiable	25	24	23	28	25	22
pro	22	23	21	22	33	20
con	22	17	12	18	20	16
cost	17	12	11	14	17	7
poorest humans	11	7	6	9	5	6
tax redistribution	10	7	11	8	4	9
support	8	6	3	5	6	8
oppose	7	3	2	3	1	4
don't know	6	8	10	8	7	10
empty	6	3	0	0	0	13
difficult agreement	5	10	7	12	8	8
difficult implement	3	5	5	6	4	6
misunderstands gcs	3	2	2	1	3	1
misunderstands question	2	2	1	3	3	3

Figure A11: Perceptions of the GCS. Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent). (Question 31)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
world: international world country global	28	22	23	19	22	23
environment: climate environment animal emission nature	26	21	17	28	21	17
poorest: poor low-income 700 poverty	16	8	8	9	4	10
pro: pro pros pros:	16	3	0	1	9	5
con: con con: cons cons:	15	4	0	1	8	6
cost: cost expensive higher price 85 inflation	13	7	5	9	7	6
tax: tax	8	3	4	3	2	2
redistribution: rich redistribution	8	4	5	4	3	5
implementation: implement enforce policy monitor	6	4	5	6	0	5
agreement: agree accept participate	3	4	5	6	2	3

Figure A12: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality (mean). (Question 34)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Donation to own country	35	34	31	38	34	32
Donation to Africa	32	35	33	41	32	33

Table A2: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality. (Question 34)

	Donation to poor people (in %)			
	All	US	US	Eu
Poor is in own country	0.590 (0.799)	2.509** (1.152)	0.046 (1.691)	-1.349 (1.108)
Poor is in own country × Vote: <i>not</i> Biden			3.954* (2.279)	
Mean	34.034	33.658	33.658	34.41
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000	3,000
R ²	0.0001	0.002	0.034	0.0005

Figure A13: Support for a global wealth tax.

"Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-income countries?

Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education." (Question 35)




Figure A14: Support for a national wealth tax financing public services like healthcare, education, and social housing. (Question 36)




Figure A15: Preferred share of global wealth tax revenues that should be pooled to finance low-income countries. (Question 37)




Figure A16: Support for sharing half of global tax revenues with low-income countries, rather than each country retaining all the revenues it collects (in percent). (Question 38)



Figure A17: Actual, perceived and preferred amount of foreign aid, with random info (or not) on actual amount. (Mean, Questions 39, 40)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Actual foreign aid (in % of public spending)	0.4	1.1	0.8	1.3	0.5	1.7
Belief about foreign aid	4.7	2.9	2.7	2.9	2.8	3.5
Preferred foreign aid (with info)	1.8	2.7	3.4	2.9	2.1	2.5
Preferred foreign aid (no info)	4	3.9	4.7	4.4	3.1	3.4

Figure A18: Preferred foreign aid (after info or after perception). (Questions 39 and 40)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as current	70	75	91	76	77	57
Preferred foreign aid is higher than current	47	59	75	58	63	43
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as perceived	57	74	83	79	77	58
Preferred foreign aid is higher than perceived	37	53	64	59	54	39

Figure A19: Perceived foreign aid. “From your best guess, what percentage of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?” (Question 39)

Actual values: France: 0.8%; Germany: 1.3%; Spain: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%; U.S.: 0.4%.




Figure A20: Preferred foreign aid (without info on actual amount).

“If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?” (Question 40)




Figure A21: Preferred foreign aid (after info on actual amount).

"Actually, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid.

If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?" (Question 40)




Figure A22: Preferences for funding increased foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]
 "How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent) (Question 41)




Figure A23: Preferences of spending following reduced foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]
 "How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent) (Question 42)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Higher spending on defense	19	23	11	21	17	31
Higher spending on retirement pensions	23	41	22	51	57	35
Higher spending on healthcare	40	57	31	42	80	70
Higher spending on welfare benefits	13	20	7	19	39	20
Higher spending on education	30	45	31	47	58	43
Higher spending on other programs	6	6	6	4	9	8
Lower taxes on the wealthiest	5	2	5	2	0	2
Lower corporate income tax rate	12	6	10	4	8	6
Lower personal income tax rates	48	29	26	27	37	30
Lower public deficit	32	24	21	13	41	21

Figure A24: Willingness to sign real-stake petition for the Global Climate Scheme or National Redistribution, compared to stated support in corresponding subsamples (e.g. support for the GCS in the branch where the petition was about the GCS). (Question 43)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Petition for the GCS	51	69	69	66	78	69
(Comparable) support for the GCS	53	76	81	74	81	74
Petition for NR	57	67	65	66	74	68
(Comparable) support for NR	58	72	76	65	78	75

Figure A25: Absolute support for various global policies (Percent of (*somewhat or strong*) support). (Questions 44 and 45. See Figure 2 for the relative support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	41	54	52	53	62	51
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	53	65	62	66	68	62
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	45	58	55	60	62	54
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	31	37	36	30	45	40
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	34	44	44	43	52	43
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	39	49	39	51	50	54
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	42	55	54	54	61	53
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	44	70	73	70	72	65
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	34	45	40	48	44	50
National tax on millionaires funding public services	62	76	70	79	79	77
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	58	71	69	72	78	71

Figure A26: Preferred approach of diplomats at international climate negotiations.
In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend [own country] interests or global justice? (Question 49)




Figure A27: Percent of selected issues viewed as important.
 “To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem?” (Question 56)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Income inequality in [Country]	55	59	54	58	71	57
Climate change	59	66	66	63	73	63
Global poverty	50	57	50	58	75	49

Figure A28: Group defended when voting.
 “What group do you defend when you vote?” (Question 57)




Figure A29: Mean prioritization of policies.

Mean number of points allocated policies to express intensity of support (among six policies chosen at random). Blue color means that the policy has been awarded more points than the average policy. (Question 58)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	13	21	10	14	35	31
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	23	22	25	21	22	23
econ3	21	15	13	18	17	13
econ4	28	22	27	17	24	20
soc1	10	17	13	17	12	21
soc2	13	9	14	8	10	8
climate1	14	15	11	18	20	12
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	20	18	22	19	15	17
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030	11	9	8	8	9	11
tax1: National redistribution scheme	14	15	16	15	15	15
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	19	19	21	18	17	19
foreign1: Global climate scheme	15	20	20	23	16	17
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	21	20	20	23	19	20
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	15	15	15	17	14	13
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	9	11	13	14	9	8

Figure A30: Positive prioritization of policies.

Percent of people allocating a positive number of points to policies, expressing their support (among six policies chosen at random). (Question 58)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	64	78	61	67	96	95
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	83	86	85	84	87	89
econ3	81	69	50	78	80	68
econ4	88	86	91	79	89	85
soc1	57	75	69	74	74	78
soc2	58	58	72	53	64	48
climate1	70	76	65	79	89	75
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	79	83	86	84	78	80
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030	62	58	56	48	60	70
tax1: National redistribution scheme	67	79	79	76	82	79
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	80	79	76	78	83	85
foreign1: Global climate scheme	71	83	84	85	84	78
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	80	81	79	83	82	82
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	71	77	79	74	83	76
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	58	70	79	74	74	57

Figure A31: Charity donation.

"How much did you give to charities in 2022?" (Question 50)




Figure A32: Interest in politics.

"To what extent are you interested in politics?" (Question 51)




Figure A33: Desired involvement of government (from 1 to 5). (Question 52)




Figure A34: Political leaning on economics (from 1: Left to 5: Right). (Question 53)




Figure A35: Voted in last election. (Question 54)




Figure A36: Vote in last election (aggregated). PNR includes people who did not vote or prefer not to answer. (Question 55)




Figure A37: Perception that survey was biased.
“Do you feel that this survey was politically biased?” (Question 61)





Figure A38: Opinion on the fight against extreme poverty.

“According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme poverty in low-income countries?” (Question 62)

(a) Elements found in the open-ended field on the question
 (manually recoded, in percent)



(b) Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).




Figure A39: Main attitudes by vote (“Right” spans from Center-right to Far right).
 (Relative support in percent in Questions 20, 35, 45, 46, 49)

	Europe Left	Europe PNR/Non-voter	Europe Right	U.S. Left	U.S. PNR/Non-voter	U.S. Right
Support for the GCS	85	72	71	74	53	26
Global tax on millionaires	94	83	76	85	71	40
Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries	61	52	45	55	67	41
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	73	65	52	62	49	23
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	93	79	74	87	70	38
[Country]'s foreign aid should be increased	93	83	72	92	81	48
Universalist	56	48	26	53	49	23

622 C Questionnaire of the global survey (section on global
623 policies)

624 A. At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be
625 put in place? (Multiple answers are possible) [Figures 1 and A3]
626 *Global; [Federal / European / ...]; [State / National]; Local*

627 B. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “[country] should take mea-
628 sures to fight climate change.”
629 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly
630 agree*

631 C. How should [country] climate policies depend on what other countries do?
632 • If other countries do more, [country] should do...
633 • If other countries do less, [country] should do...

634 *Much less; Less; About the same; More; Much more*

635 D. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] All countries have signed the
636 Paris agreement that aims to contain global warming “well below +2 °C”. To limit
637 global warming to this level, there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we
638 can emit globally, called the carbon budget. Each country could aim to emit less
639 than a share of the carbon budget. To respect the global carbon budget, countries
640 that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less
641 than their share.

642 Do you support such a policy? [Figures 1 and A3]
643 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
644 support*

645 E. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] Suppose the above policy is in
646 place. How should the carbon budget be divided among countries? [Figures 1 and
647 A3]
648 *The emission share of a country should be proportional to its population, so that each human
649 has an equal right to emit.; The emission share of a country should be proportional to its
650 current emissions, so that those who already emit more have more rights to emit.; Countries
651 that have emitted more over the past decades (from 1990 onwards) should receive a lower*

652 *emission share, because they have already used some of their fair share.; Countries that will*
653 *be hurt more by climate change should receive a higher emission share, to compensate them*
654 *for the damages.*

655 F. [In the U.S., Denmark, and France only] To achieve a given reduction of greenhouse
656 gas emissions globally, costly investments are needed. Ideally, how should countries
657 bear the costs of fighting climate change?

- 658 • Countries should pay in proportion to their income
- 659 • Countries should pay in proportion to their current emissions [Used as a sub-
660 stitute to the equal right per capita in Figure 1]
- 661 • Countries should pay in proportion to their past emissions (from 1990 on-
662 wards) [Used as a substitute to historical responsibilities in Figure 1]
- 663 • The richest countries should pay it all, so that the poorest countries do not have
664 to pay anything
- 665 • The richest countries should pay even more, to help vulnerable countries face
666 adverse consequences: vulnerable countries would then receive money instead
667 of paying [Used as a substitute to compensating vulnerable countries in Figures
668 1 and A3]

669 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly*
670 *agree*

671 G. Do you support or oppose establishing a global democratic assembly whose role
672 would be to draft international treaties against climate change? Each adult across
673 the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly. [Figures 1 and A3]
674 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
675 *support*

676 H. Imagine the following policy: a global tax on greenhouse gas emissions funding a
677 global basic income. Such a policy would progressively raise the price of fossil fuels
678 (for example, the price of gasoline would increase by [40 cents per gallon] in the
679 first years). Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil
680 fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Revenues from the tax would be used to
681 finance a basic income of [\$30] per month to each human adult, thereby lifting the
682 700 million people who earn less than \$2/day out of extreme poverty. The average

683 [American] person would lose a bit from this policy as they would face [\$130] per
684 month in price increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive.

685 Do you support or oppose such a policy? [Figures 1 and A3]

686 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
687 *support*

688 I. Do you support or oppose a tax on all millionaires around the world to finance low-
689 income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate ac-
690 tion? This would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drink-
691 ing water, healthcare, and education. [Figures 1 and A3]

692 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
693 *support*

694 D Questionnaire of the complementary surveys

695 Below, we provide the generic questionnaire (based on the U.S. version), which roughly
 696 corresponds to the *Eu* questionnaire as well as the combination of the *US1* and *US2* ques-
 697 tionnaire. The main difference between Europe and the U.S. is that we split the *US2*
 698 sample into four random branches to include some treatments before the Section D on
 699 the GCS. Besides the control group, the treatments are: information regarding the sup-
 700 port of Americans for the GCS and NR, an open-ended field, and a closed question on the
 701 pros and cons of the GCS. The pros and cons of the GCS are also asked in *Eu* (likewise,
 702 either as an open-ended field or a question), but only in Section D, after the support.

703 At each section or question, square brackets specify in which questionnaires it is present
 704 (*US1*, *US2* and/or *Eu*) as well as country specificities. Figures A40-A42 displays the struc-
 705 ture of each questionnaire. Each treatment randomization is independent. Qualtrics and
 706 Word versions of the questionnaires in each language are available on our [public reposi-](#)
 707 [tory](#), together with a spreadsheet that summarizes country specificities and our sources.

Figure A40: *Eu* survey structure




Figure A41: US1 survey structure





Figure A42: US2 survey structure



708 [Eu, US1, US2] Socio-demographic characteristics

709 1. Welcome to this survey!

710
711 This survey is **anonymous** and is conducted for research purposes on a representa-
712 tive sample of [1,000 British people].

713
714 It takes [US1, US2: 10 to 15 min; Eu: around 20 min] to complete.

715
716 The survey contains lotteries and awards for those who get the correct answer to
717 some understanding questions.

718 If you are attentive and lucky, you can win up to [US1, Eu: \$350; US2: \$150] in
719 points. (See terms and conditions).

720 Please answer every question carefully.

721
722 Do you agree to participate in the survey?

723 Yes; No

724 2. What is your gender?

725 Woman; Man; Other

726 3. How old are you?

727 Below 18; 18 to 20; 21 to 24; 25 to 29; 30 to 34; 35 to 39; 40 to 44; 45 to 49; 50 to 54; 55 to
728 59; 60 to 64; 65 to 69; 70 to 74; 75 to 79; 80 to 84; 85 to 89; 90 to 99; 100 or above

729 4. [Eu] In which country do you live?

730 France; Germany; Spain; United Kingdom; Other

731 5. What is your ZIP code? [UK: What is your Outcode (the left part of your postcode,
732 e.g. if your postcode is N7 8H7, just enter N7)?]

733 6. Do you live with your partner (if you have one)?

734 Yes; No

735 7. How many people are in your household? The household includes: you, the mem-
736 bers of your family who live with you, and your dependants.

737 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more

- 738 8. [Eu] How many children below 14 live with you?
- 739 1; 2; 3; 4 or more
- 740 9. [US1, US2] What race or ethnicity do you identify with? (Multiple answers are
- 741 possible)
- 742 *White; Black or African American; Hispanic; Asian; American Indian or Alaskan Native;*
- 743 *Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; Other: {open field}; Prefer not to say*
- 744 10. What is the [US1, US2: annual; Eu: monthly] gross income of your household (before
- 745 withholding tax)? This includes all income: wages, self-employment earnings, So-
- 746 cial Security benefits, pensions, investment income, welfare payments, and income
- 747 from other sources.
- 748 [US1, US2: Items based on household total income deciles and quartiles, namely:
- 749 *Less than \$20,000; between \$20,001 and \$35,000; between \$35,001 and \$42,000; between*
- 750 *\$42,001 and \$50,000; between \$50,001 and \$65,000; between \$65,001 and \$82,000; between*
- 751 *\$82,001 and \$103,000; between \$103,001 and \$130,000; between \$130,001 and \$145,000;*
- 752 *between \$145,001 and \$165,000; between \$165,001 and \$250,000; More than \$250,000; I*
- 753 *prefer not to answer;*
- 754 Eu: custom thresholds, taking into account household composition Questions 6-8,
- 755 and corresponding to the country's deciles and quartiles of standard of living, cf.
- 756 the sheet "Income" in [this spreadsheet](#)]
- 757 11. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
- 758 [Below upper secondary, Upper secondary, and Post secondary are coded as the first two,
- 759 middle three, and last three items, respectively.
- 760 US1, US2: Primary school or less; Eighth grade; Some high school; Regular high school
- 761 diploma/GED or alternative credential; Some college, no degree; 2-year college degree or as-
- 762 sociates degree (for example: AA, AS); Bachelor's degree (for example: BA, BS); Master's
- 763 degree or above (MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA, MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD, PhD);
- 764 FR: École primaire / Aucun; Brevet; CAP ou BEP; Baccalauréat professionnel ou tech-
- 765 nologique; Baccalauréat général; Bac +2 (BTS, DUT, DEUG...); Bac +3 (licence...); Bac
- 766 +5 ou plus (master, école d'ingénieur ou de commerce, doctorat, médecine, maîtrise, DEA,
- 767 DESS...)
- 768 DE: Keine abgeschlossene Schulbildung / Grundschule; Untere Sekundarstufe (z.B. Haupt-
- 769 oder Realschulabschluss); Erstausbildung; Beruflicher Abschluss / Ausbildung; Abitur;
- 770 Zweitausbildung; Bachelor oder Fachhochschulabschluss; Master-Abschluss oder höher

771 ES: *Educación primaria / No he completado la enseñanza básica; Educación secundaria obligatoria (ESO); Formación profesional básica (FP); Formación profesional de grado medio; Bachillerato; Formación profesional de grado superior; Grado universitario; Máster/doctorado*
772 UK: *Primary education or less; Some secondary school; GSCE; Vocational Upper secondary (Level 3 award, level 3 certificate, level 3 diploma, advanced apprenticeship, etc.); High school degree (A level); Higher vocational education (Level 4+ award, level 4+ certificate, level 4+ diploma, higher apprenticeship, etc.); Bachelor's Degree (BA, BSc, BEng, etc.); Postgraduate diploma or certificate, Master's Degree (MSc, MA, MBA, etc.) or Ph.D.]*

779 12. What is your employment status?

780 *Full-time employed; Part-time employed; Self-employed; Student; Retired; Unemployed*
781 *(searching for a job); Inactive (not searching for a job)*

782 13. Are you a homeowner or a tenant? (Multiple answers are possible)

783 *Tenant; Owner; Landlord renting out property; Hosted free of charge*

784 14. [If lives with partner: What is the estimated value of your household's assets (in
785 U.S. dollars)?]

786 If does not live with partner: What is the estimated value of your assets (in U.S.
787 dollars)?]

788 Include here all your possessions (home, car, savings, etc.) net of debt. For example,
789 if you own a house worth [\$]300,000 and you have [\$]100,000 left to repay on your
790 mortgage, your assets are [\$]200,000.

791 I estimate my [If lives with partner: household's] assets net of debt to be:

792 [Items based on the following individual wealth quintiles, doubled if lives with
793 partner. US1, US2: *Less than \$0 (I have a net debt); Close to \$0; Between \$4,000 and*
794 *\$60,000; Between \$60,000 and \$190,000; More than \$190,000;* For Eu, the thresholds are:
795 FR: €5/50/150/300k; DE: €0/35/130/280k; ES: €0/50/100/200k; UK: £3/45/115/270k]

796 15. [US1, US2 (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the vote question)] What
797 do you consider to be your political affiliation, as of today?

800 *Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other; Non-Affiliated*

801 [Eu, US1, US2] Global climate scheme

802 In the following, we describe two policies, on which we will survey your opinion.
803 To check that you have attentively read the descriptions, **we will ask some understanding questions afterwards: those who get correct answers can win up to \$150.**

804
805 **Global climate scheme:** At the Paris agreement in 2015, all countries have agreed
806 to contain global warming “well below +2 °C”. To limit global warming to this
807 level, **there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally.**

808 To meet the climate target, a limited number of permits to emit greenhouse gases
809 can be created globally. Polluting firms would be required to buy permits to cover
810 their emissions. Such a policy would **make fossil fuel companies pay** for their
811 emissions and progressively raise the price of fossil fuels. **Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions.**

812
813 In accordance with the principle that each human has an equal right to pollute, the
814 revenues generated by the sale of permits could finance a global basic income. **Each adult in the world would receive [US1, US2: \$30/month; UK: \$30 (that is £25) per month; FR, DE, ES: €30/month],** thereby lifting out of extreme poverty the 700 million people who earn less than \$2/day.

815
816 **The typical [American] would lose out financially [US1, US2: \$85, FR: €10, DE: €25, ES: €5, UK: £20] per month** (as he or she would face [\$115] per month in price
817 increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive).

818 The policy could be put in place as soon as countries totaling more than 60% of
819 global emissions agree on it. Countries that would refuse to take part in the policy
820 could face sanctions (like tariffs) from the rest of the World and would be excluded
821 from the basic income.)

822 16. Who would win or lose financially in the Global climate scheme? [Figure A4]

823
824 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

825 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

826 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.;*

827 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

828 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would lose and*

834 the 700 million poorest humans would win from the Global climate scheme. Now, here
835 is the second policy:

836

837 **National redistribution scheme:**

838 This policy would **increase taxes on the top [US1, US2: 5%; Eu: 1%]** and provide
839 cash transfers to all adults. More precisely, **each [American] adult would receive**
840 **[\$85] per month** (that is [\$1,000] per year). This would be financed by an increase
841 of the federal income tax on household income in excess of **[US1, US2: \$315,000 per**
842 **year; FR: €15,000 per month; DE: €20,000 per month; ES: €10,000 per month; UK:**
843 **£15,000 per month], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000]. [US1,**
844 **US2: See more details.]**¹²

845 17. Who would win or lose financially in the National redistribution? [Figure A4]

846

847 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

848 Typical [Americans] would win and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Ameri-
849 cans] would win and the richest [Americans] would lose.; Typical [Americans] would lose
850 and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Americans] would lose and the richest
851 [Americans] would lose.

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would win and
853 the richest [Americans] would lose* from the National redistribution scheme.

854

855 To help you with the next question, here is a reminder of the policies:

856

857 **Global Climate scheme:**

858 To limit global warming and reach the international climate objective, the Global
859 climate scheme would **impose a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can
860 emit globally.**

¹²8% of U.S. respondents click. They then see the following text, based on taxjusticenow.org by Saez & Zucman (2019): *The marginal income tax rates would evolve as follows:*

Below \$315,000: unchanged

\$315,000 - \$400,000: current rate 32% => new rate 41%

\$400,000 - \$600,000: 35% => 50%

\$600,000 - \$2.5 million: 37% => 60%

\$2.5 - \$5 million: 37% => 65%

Above \$5 million: 37% => 70%

861 It would **make polluters pay** for their emissions, which in turn would increase fos-
862 sil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities.

863 The revenues would finance a **global basic income** of [\$30] per month for all hu-
864 mans, lifting out of extreme poverty the poorest billion people.

865 Considering the basic income and the fuel price increases, **the typical [American]**
866 **would lose out financially** [\$85] per month.

867

868 **National redistribution scheme:**

869 This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [5%] and provide cash transfers to
870 all adults. More precisely, **each [American] would receive** [\$85] per month. This
871 would be financed by an increase of the federal income tax on household income in
872 excess of [\$315,000 per year], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000
873 per year].

- 874 18. If both the Global climate scheme and the National redistribution scheme are imple-
875 mented, how would a typical [American] be financially affected? [*Figure A4*]

876 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

877 *A typical [American] would lose out financially.; A typical [American] would neither gain
878 nor lose.; A typical [American] would gain financially.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was that *A typical [American] would nei-
880 ther gain nor lose* from both schemes combined. [*US1, Eu:* Now, here are the last two
881 policies:]

882

883 **[US1: Coal exit:**

884 To reduce CO₂ emissions, this policy would require all U.S. coal power plants to be
885 phased out by 2030. Coal would be replaced by renewable sources like wind and
886 solar panels as well as stronger reliance on gas power plants.

887 **Eu: Thermal insulation plan:**

888 To reduce CO₂ emissions and energy insecurity, this policy would require that all
889 buildings meet energy efficiency targets: at least rating E in 2030 and rating C in
890 2040. The [UK] government would subsidise half the cost of insulation for all house-
891 holds, and up to 90% for the poorest households. Insulation work would cost [FR,
892 DE: €25; ES: €20; UK: £25] billion a year, but would deliver energy savings greater
893 than this cost.]

894

895 [US1: **Marriage only for opposite-sex couples:**

896 This policy is a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would legally
897 define marriage as a union of one man and one woman.

898 **Eu: Death penalty for major crimes:**

899 This measure would reintroduce capital punishment for major crimes such as ter-
900 rorism and mass shootings.]

901

902 Now, we will ask your opinion on the [US1, Eu: four] policies.

903 [Click here for the reminder of the \[US1, Eu: first\] two policies.](#) [Clicking displays the
904 previous summarized descriptions.]

905 19. [US2] [4 Random branches: control (*nothing*); Question 31 (*field*); Question 32 (*impor-
906 tant*); or the following question (*info*).] For information, a recent survey has shown
907 that:

- 908 • 64% of Americans support the Global climate scheme.
909 • 72% of Americans support the National redistribution scheme.

910 20. Do you support the Global climate scheme? [Figure 3]

911 Yes; No

912 21. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the
913 previous question? [Figure 10]

914 The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

915 Percentage of [Americans] in favor of Global climate scheme [slider from 0 to 100]

916 22. Do you support the National redistribution scheme? [Figure 3]

917 Yes; No

918 23. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the
919 previous question? [Figure 10]

920 The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

921 Percentage of [Americans] in favor of National redistribution [slider from 0 to 100]

922 24. [Eu, US1] Beware, this question is quite unusual. Among the policies below, **how
923 many** do you support? [Figure A6, Table 1]

924 [Four random branches. Branch GCS/NR/C/O]

- 925
- 926 • Global climate scheme
- 927 • National redistribution scheme
- 928 • [Coal exit]
- 929 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

930 0; 1; 2; 3; 4

931

932 [Branch GCS/C/O]

- 933
- 934 • Global climate scheme
- 935 • [Coal exit]
- 936 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

937 0; 1; 2; 3

938

939 [Branch NR/C/O]

- 940
- 941 • National redistribution scheme
- 942 • [Coal exit]
- 943 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

944 0; 1; 2; 3

945 [Branch C/O]

- 946
- 947 • [Coal exit]
- 948 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

949 0; 1; 2

951 [Eu, US1] Conjoint analyses

- 952 25. Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you prefer? [Figure
953 A7]

954 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the
955 same time.

956 Bundle A	956 Bundle B
[Coal exit]	[Coal exit]
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme
Global climate scheme	

957 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 959 26. Do you support Bundle A (combining [Coal exit], the National redistribution scheme,
960 and the Global climate scheme)?[Figure 3]

961 Yes; No

- 962 27. [new page] Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you
963 prefer? [Figure A7]

964 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the
965 same time.

966 [Four random branches. Branch C + NR vs. GCS + NR]

967 Bundle A	967 Bundle B
[Coal exit]	Global climate scheme
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme

969 [Branch NR vs. NR + C + GCS]

970 Bundle A	970 Bundle B
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme [Coal exit] Global climate scheme

972 [Branch NR + GCS vs. NR]

Bundle A	Bundle B
National redistribution scheme Global climate scheme	National redistribution scheme

973 [Branch NR + C vs. NR]

Bundle A	Bundle B
National redistribution scheme [Coal exit]	National redistribution scheme

974 975 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 976 977 978 28. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and
979 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies
980 in their platforms.

981 *Eu: Imagine if [DE, ES, UK: the two favorite candidates in your constituency in the
982 next general election; FR: the two candidates in the second round of the next pres-
983 idential election] campaigned with the following policies in their party's platforms.]*

984 985 Which of these candidates would you vote for? [Table 2, Figure A7]

986 987 988 [Table 2. Two random branches: with and without the final row. The US1 version of the poli-
cies is given below, see the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the European versions.]

Democrat	Republican
Increase corporate income tax rate from 21% to 28%	Decrease the payroll tax
Coal exit	Permit completion of the Keystone pipeline
Trillion dollar investment in childcare, healthcare, education and housing	Withdrawal of the Paris agreement
\$15 minimum wage	Marriage only for opposite-sex couples
National redistribution scheme	Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation
[Global climate scheme / no row]	[/ no row]

990
991 [US1: Democrat; Republican; None of them; Eu: Candidate A; Candidate B; None of them]

- 992 29. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and
993 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies
994 in their platforms.

995 *Eu (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the Section "Values and politics"):* Imag-
996 ine that [FR: the left or center-left; DE: a red-red-green coalition; ES: the PSOE; UK:
997 the Labour Party] wins the next [general] elections. Here are two possible platforms
998 on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a
999 pool of credible [FR: left or center-left, DE: left-wing parties'; ES: PSOE; UK: Labour]
1000 policies).]

1001
1002 [US1: Which of these candidates do you prefer?

1003 *Eu: Even if you [FR: are not from the left or center-left; DE: do not support the left-
1004 wing parties; ES: do not support the PSOE; UK: do not support the Labour Party],
1005 which of these platforms do you prefer?]*

1006 [Figures 8, A8; see also the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the possible policies.]

	[Candidate A]	[Candidate B]	
1007	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]

1008 [US1: Candidate A; Candidate B; Eu: Platform A; Platform B]

- 1009 30. [new page] [Same wording and conditions as above. For brevity, only the UK version is
1010 given here.] Imagine that the Labour Party wins the next general elections. Here are
1011 two possible platforms on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are
1012 randomly drawn from a pool of credible Labour policies).

1013
1014 Even if you do not support the Labour Party, which of these platforms do you pre-
1015 fer? [Figure 8]

		Platform A	Platform B
1016	[Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order]	[Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy]	[Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy]
	Foreign policy	Global climate scheme	-
1017	<i>Platform A; Platform B</i>		

1018 **[Eu, US2] Perceptions of the GCS**

1019 [Eu: two random branches. US2: four random branches and the question is asked (if asked)
1020 before Question 20]

1021 31. [Branch: field] When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to
1022 your mind?

1023 Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme. [Figures A10, A11]
1024 {Open field}

1025 32. [Branch: important] When determining your support or opposition to the Global
1026 climate scheme, which points are important to you? [Figure A9]

- 1027 • It would succeed in limiting climate change.
- 1028 • It would hurt the [U.S.] economy.
- 1029 • It would penalize my household.
- 1030 • It would make people change their lifestyle.
- 1031 • It would reduce poverty in low-income countries.
- 1032 • It might be detrimental to some poor countries.
- 1033 • It could foster global cooperation.
- 1034 • It could fuel corruption in low-income countries.
- 1035 • It could be subject to fraud.
- 1036 • It would be technically difficult to put in place.
- 1037 • Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences.

1038 *Not at all important; Not so important; Quite important; Very important*

1039 [Eu, US1] Donation lottery

1040 33. Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).

1041 *Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*

1042 34. [Two random branches] By taking this survey, you are automatically entered into a
1043 lottery to win [\$]100 in panel points. This lottery is unrelated to the previous ones
1044 that rewarded answers’ accuracy. In a few days you will know whether you have
1045 been selected in the lottery. The payment will be made to you in the same way as
1046 your compensation for this survey, so no further action is required on your part.

1047

1048 Should you be selected in the lottery, you can also donate a part of this additional
1049 compensation to [[American] / African] people living in poverty through [US1: the
1050 charity GiveDirectly. The charity GiveDirectly; Eu: a charity. We would channel this
1051 donation to a charity that] provides small amounts of cash to people in need in [[the
1052 U.S] / Africa].

1053

1054 **In case you are winner of the lottery, what share of the [\$]100 would you donate**
1055 **to [[American] / African] people living in poverty [US1: through GiveDirectly]?**
1056 *[Figure A12, Table A2]*

1057 *Amount donated to [[American] / African] people in need (in [\$]) [slider from 0 to 100]*

1058 [Eu, US2] Wealth tax

1059 [Four random branches: Question 35 then Question 36 (global first); Question 36 then Ques-
1060 tion 35 (national first); Question 37 (global share); Question 38 (sharing)]

1061 35. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-
1062 income countries?

1063 Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking
1064 water, healthcare, and education. [Figures 3, A13]

1065 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1066 *support*

1067 36. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: afford-
1068 able housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and
1069 schools]? [Figures 3, A14]

1070 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1071 *support*

1072 37. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all
1073 countries around the world. In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount
1074 to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE: €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2:
1075 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount
1076 to [\$]1 billion in all low-income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700
1077 million people, most of them in Africa).

1078 Each country would retain part of the revenues it collects, and the remaining part
1079 would be pooled at the global level to finance infrastructure and public services in
1080 low-income countries.

1081
1082 What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of re-
1083 tained in the country's national budget)? [Figure A15]

1084 Percent of global wealth tax that should go to low-income countries [slider from 0 to 100]

1085 38. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in
1086 all countries around the world.

1087 In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE:
1088 €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2: 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES:
1089 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount to [\$]1 billion in all low-
1090 income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700 million people, most of
1091 them in Africa).

1092 Which of the following options would you prefer? [Figure A16]

- 1093 • The whole wealth tax financing national budgets in each country. For ex-
1094 ample, in [US2: the U.S., it could finance affordable housing and universal
1095 childcare/pre-K.; Eu-UK: the UK, it could finance the National Health Service
1096 and state-funded schools].
- 1097 • Half of the wealth tax financing national budgets in each country, half of it
1098 financing low-income countries. For example, it could finance [US2: universal
1099 childcare/pre-K in the U.S.; Eu-UK: state-funded schools in the UK] and access
1100 to drinking water, healthcare, and education in Africa.

1101 [Eu, US2] Foreign aid

1102 US2 Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).

1103 Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal

- 1104 39. From your best guess, what percentage of [U.S.] government spending is allocated
1105 to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?

1106

1107 For your information, government spending totals [US2: 38%; FR: 55%; DE: 45%; ES:
1108 42%; UK: 41%] of [U.S.] GDP, it includes [US2: federal, State; Eu: national] and local
1109 government spending, and apart from foreign aid, it covers the following items: de-
1110 fense, social security (retirement pensions), health [US2: (including Medicare and
1111 Medicaid)], welfare benefits [US2: (including food stamps and EITC)], education,
1112 roads, justice, other programs [US2: and federal agencies (including in energy, sci-
1113 ence...)]. [Figure A19]

1114 Less than 0.1%; 0.1% to 0.2%; 0.3% to 0.5%; 0.6% to 1.0%; 1.1% to 1.7%; 1.8% to 2.6%;
1115 2.7% to 4%; 4.1% to 6%; 6.1% to 9%; 9.1% to 13%; 13.1% to 25%; More than 25%

- 1116 40. [Two random branches: with or without information on actual amount] [Info: Actually,
1117 [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [the U.S.] government spend-
1118 ing is allocated to foreign aid.]

1119

1120 If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate
1121 to foreign aid? [Figures A17, A18, A20 and A21]

- 1122 41. [Asked iff branch: Info and preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than actual for-
1123 eign aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to increase [U.S.] foreign
1124 aid.

1125

1126 How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers
1127 possible) [Figure A22]

1128 Lower spending on defense; Lower spending on retirement pensions; Lower spending on
1129 healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Lower spending on welfare benefits [US2: (like
1130 EITC or food stamps)]; Lower spending on education; Lower spending on other programs
1131 [US2: and federal agencies]; Higher taxes on the wealthiest; Higher corporate income tax
1132 rate; Higher personal income tax rates; Higher public deficit

1133 42. [Asked iff branch: *Info* and preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than actual foreign
1134 aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to reduce [U.S.] foreign aid.

1135

1136 How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible) [*Figure A23*]
1137

1138 *Higher spending on defense; Higher spending on retirement pensions; Higher spending on
1139 healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Higher spending on welfare benefits [US2:
1140 like EITC or food stamps)]; Higher spending on education; lower spending on other pro-
1141 grams [US2: and federal agencies]; Lower taxes on the wealthiest; Lower corporate income
1142 tax rate; Lower personal income tax rates; Lower public deficit*

1143 **[Eu, US1] Petition**

1144 43. [*Two random branches*] Would you be willing to sign a petition for the [Global cli-
1145 mate / National redistribution] scheme? [*Figure A24*]

1146

1147 As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President's
1148 office], informing him what share of American people are willing to endorse the
1149 [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign,
1150 only your answer here is required and remains anonymous.) Yes; No

1151 **[Eu, US1] Other policies**

1152 44. The following policies are discussed at international negotiations on how to deal
1153 with climate change. [*Figures 2 and A25*]

1154

1155 Do you support or oppose the following policies?

- 1156 • Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for
1157 climate damages
- 1158 • High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries
- 1159 • High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income
1160 countries adapt to climate change

1161 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1162 support*

1163 45. Do you support or oppose the following global policies? [Figures 2 and A25]

- 1164 • Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt
- 1165 • Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting
1166 right proportional to its population
- 1167 • Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries
- 1168 • A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage
- 1169 • Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of
1170 all assets
- 1171 • A maximum wealth limit of [US1: \$10 billion; Eu: [€]100 million] for each
1172 human

1173 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1174 support*

1175 46. Currently, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [U.S.] government
1176 spending (that is, [US1: 0.2%; FR: 0.4%; DE: 0.6%; ES: 0.2%; UK: 0.7%] of [U.S.] GDP)
1177 is spent on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries. [Figure 5]

1178 Do you support [the U.S.] transferring more money to low-income countries?

1179 *Yes, [U.S.] foreign aid should be increased.; Yes, but only if some conditions are met.; No,
1180 [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.; No, [U.S.] foreign aid should be reduced.*

1182 47. [Asked only if *Yes, but only if some conditions are met.* is chosen] What conditions
1183 should be required for [the U.S.] to increase its foreign aid? (Multiple answers pos-
1184 sible) [Figures 6, A17]

1185 *That recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights.; That recipient
1186 countries cooperate to fight illegal migrations.; That other high-income countries also in-
1187 crease their foreign aid.; That this is financed by increased taxes on millionaires.; That we
1188 can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted.; Other: [open field]*

1189 48. [Asked only if *No, [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.* or *No, [U.S.] foreign aid
1190 should be reduced.* is chosen] Why do you oppose [the U.S.] increasing its foreign
1191 aid? (Multiple answers possible) [Figure 7]

1192 *Aid perpetuates poverty as it makes people feel less responsible for themselves.; Aid is not
1193 effective as most of it is diverted.; Aid is a pressure tactic for high-income countries that*

1194 *prevents low-income countries from developing freely.; [The U.S.] is not responsible for what*
1195 *happens in other countries.; Charity begins at home: there is already a lot to do to support*
1196 *the American people in need.; Other: [open field]*

1197 **[Eu, US1, US2] Values and politics**

- 1198 49. [Eu (where it is instead asked at the beginning of Section “Other Policies”), US1]
1199 In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend
1200 [U.S.] interests or global justice? [Figure A26]
1201 *[U.S.] interests, even if it goes against global justice; [U.S.] interests, to the extent it re-*
1202 *spects global justice; ndifferent or don’t know; Global justice, to the extent it respects [U.S.]*
1203 *interests; Global justice, even if it goes against [U.S.] interests*
- 1204 50. How much did you give to charities in 2022? [Figure A31]
1205 *I did not make donations to charities last year.; Less than [\$]100.; Between [\$]101 and*
1206 *[\$]500.; Between [\$]501 and [\$]1,000.; Between [\$]1,001 and [\$]5,000.; More than [\$]5,000.*
- 1207 51. To what extent are you interested in politics? [Figure A32]
1208 *Not at all; A little; Moderately; A lot; A great deal*
- 1209 52. Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means you think the
1210 government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic gov-
1211 ernment functions, and 5 means you think the government should take active steps
1212 in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens? [Figure A33]
1213 *Desired involvement of government [slider from 1 to 5]*
- 1214 53. **On economic policy matters**, where do you see yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where
1215 1 is Left (favoring equality and government interventions) and 5 is Right (favoring
1216 free competition and little government intervention)? [Figure A34]
1217 *Left (1) to Right (5) on economic issues [slider from 1 to 5]*
- 1218 54. Did you vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election? [Figure A35]
1219 *Yes; No: I didn’t have the right to vote in the U.S.; Prefer not to say*
- 1220 55. [If voted: Which candidate did you vote for in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election?
1221 If did not vote: Even if you did not vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election,
1222 please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who
1223 represents your views more closely.] [Figure A36]

1224 [US1, US2: Biden; Trump; Jorgensen; Hawkins; Prefer not to say
1225 FR: candidates at the 2022 presidential election
1226 DE: parties with more than 1% of votes at the 2021 federal election and *Other*
1227 ES: lists with more than 0.9% at the November 2019 general election and *Other*
1228 UK: parties with more than 0.5% of votes at the 2019 general election and *Other*]

1229 56. To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem? [Figure A27]

- 1230 • Income inequality in [the U.S.]
1231 • Climate change
1232 • Global poverty

1233 *Not an important issue for me; An issue but there are other priorities; An issue but we
1234 already do what we can; An important issue, we should do more; One of the most pressing
1235 issue of our time*

1236 57. What group do you defend when you vote? [Figure A28]

1237 *Sentient beings (humans and animals); Humans; [Eu: Europeans]; [Americans]; People
1238 sharing my culture or religion; [US1, US2: My State]; [US1, US2: My town; Eu: My
1239 country, region or town]; My relatives and/or colleagues; My family and myself*

1240 [Eu, US1] Prioritization

1241 58. In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The
1242 more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

1243 How do you allocate the points among the following policies? [Figures A29 and A30]

1244 You can adjust the number of points either using the slider or entering the num-
1245 ber of your choice on the right-hand-side. **The sum of points must equal exactly
1246 100.** By pushing the last slider to the right, the total will automatically adjust to 100.
1247 Please read the 6 options before making your choice.

1248 See the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the pool of policies in each country.

1249 [sliders from 0 to 100]

1252 [FR, DE, ES] ETS2

1253 59. Similar to the Global Climate Scheme, the European Climate Scheme would impose
1254 a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit across the EU in the buildings
1255 and transport sectors. It would make polluters pay for their emissions, which in turn
1256 would increase fossil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities. Several options
1257 are possible regarding the use of the scheme's revenues:

- 1258 • Provide an equal cash transfer of €105 per year to each European.
- 1259 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European, proportional to their
1260 country's emissions: people in countries with higher emissions per person (like
1261 Germany) would receive more than people in countries with lower emissions
1262 (like Romania). For information, people in [Germany] would receive €[FR:
1263 110; DE: 130; ES: 90]/year.
- 1264 • Finance low-carbon investments: thermal insulation of buildings, switch to
1265 clean sources of heating, public transportation, and charging stations for elec-
1266 tric vehicles.
- 1267 • Provide cash transfers to the most vulnerable half of Europeans and finance
1268 low-carbon investments.

1269 Do you support or oppose the European Climate Scheme in case the revenue is used
1270 to... ?

- 1271 • Provide an equal cash transfer to each European
- 1272 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European
- 1273 • Finance low-carbon investments
- 1274 • Provide cash transfers for the most vulnerable Europeans and low-carbon in-
1275 vestments

1276 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1277 support*

1278 60. [Asked iff none of the four variants of the European Climate Scheme is (somewhat or
1279 strongly) supported] Why do you not support a European Climate Scheme? (Mul-
1280 tiple answers possible)

1281 *I am opposed to climate policy being decided at the EU level, it should be decided at the na-*
1282 *tional level;*
1283 *I would prefer if the revenues were used in a different way (beyond the four suggestions*
1284 *above) than previously suggested;*
1285 *I would prefer if decreasing carbon emissions were regulated by other climate policies;*
1286 *I am generally opposed to additional, or more ambitious, climate policies;*
1287 *I do not fully understand how the European Climate Scheme is supposed to work;*
1288 *I don't know*

1289 **[Eu, US1, US2] Feedback**

- 1290 61. Do you feel that this survey was politically biased? [Figure A37]
1291 *Yes, left-wing biased; Yes, right-wing biased; No, I do not feel it was biased*
- 1292 62. [US2 Asked only to one random third of the respondents, instead of the feedback Ques-
1293 tion 63] According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme
1294 poverty in low-income countries? [Figure A38]
1295 *{Open field}*
- 1296 63. The survey is nearing completion. You can now enter any comments, thoughts or
1297 suggestions in the field below.
1298 *{Open field}*
- 1299 64. Lastly, are you interested to be interviewed by a researcher (through videoconfer-
1300 encing) for 30 min?
1301
1302 This is totally optional and will not be rewarded.
1303 *Yes; No*

1304 **E Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme**

1305 To specify the GCS, we use the IEA's 2DS scenario (IEA 2017), which is consistent
1306 with limiting the global average temperature increase to 2°C with a probability of at least
1307 50%. The paper by Hood (2017) contributing to the Report of the High-Level Commission
1308 on Carbon Prices (Stern & Stiglitz 2017) presents a price corridor compatible with this
1309 emissions scenario, from which we take the midpoint. The product of these two series
1310 provides an estimate of the revenues expected from a global carbon price. We then use
1311 the UN median scenario of future population aged over 15 years (*adults*, for short). We
1312 derive the basic income that could be paid to all adults by recycling the revenues from
1313 the global carbon price: evolving between \$20 and \$30 per month, with a peak in 2030.
1314 Accounting for the lower price levels in low-income countries, an additional income of
1315 \$30 per month would allow **670 million people** to escape extreme poverty, defined with
1316 the threshold of \$2.15 per day in purchasing power parity.¹³

1317 To estimate the increase in fossil fuel expenditures (or "cost") in each country by 2030,
1318 we make a key assumption concerning the evolution of the carbon footprints per adult:
1319 that they will decrease by the same proportion in each country. We use data from the
1320 Global Carbon Project (Peters et al. 2012). In 2030, the average carbon footprint of a
1321 country c , e_c , evolves from baseline year b proportionally to the evolution of its adult
1322 population $\Delta p_c = p_c^{2030} / p_c^b$. Thus, the global share of country c 's carbon footprint, s_c ,
1323 is proportional to $\sigma_c = e_c \Delta p_c$, and as countries' shares sum to 1, $s_c = \frac{\sigma_c}{\sum_k \sigma_k}$. Multiplying
1324 country c 's emission share with global revenues in 2030, R , and dividing by c 's adult pop-
1325 ulation in year y , yields its average cost per adult: $R \cdot s_c / p_c^y$. Using findings from Ivanova
1326 & Wood (2020) for Europe and Fremstad & Paul (2019) for the U.S., we approximate the
1327 median cost as 90% of the average cost. Finally, the net gain is given by the basic income
1328 (\$30 per month) minus the cost. We provided consistent estimates of net gains in all sur-
1329 veys (using $y = b = 2015$), though in the global survey we gave the average net gains
1330 vs. the median ones in the complementary surveys. The latter are shown in Figure A43.
1331 For the record, Table A3 also provides an estimate of *average* net gains (computed with

¹³The average carbon footprint of Sub-Saharan Africa is 0.75tCO₂ per capita (World Bank), and it is even lower for people living in extreme poverty, under one tenth of the world average of about 5tCO₂ per capita (Chancel & Piketty 2015). Under a GCS with a cash transfer of \$30 per person, if one's emission is one tenth of the world average, their net gain would be \$27 per month in nominal terms. In regions with extreme poverty like Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding high-income countries), the conversion factor from Market Exchange Rate to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is 2.4 (computed as the ratio of the World Bank series relating the GDP per capita of Sub-Saharan Africa in PPP and nominal). Therefore, the net gain for the extreme poor is \$65 per month (or \$2.13 a day) in PPP, enough to lift them out of extreme poverty.

₁₃₃₂ $b = 2019$ and $y = 2030$).¹⁴

₁₃₃₃ Estimates of the net gains from the Global Climate Scheme are necessarily imprecise,
₁₃₃₄ given the uncertainties surrounding the carbon price required to achieve emissions re-
₁₃₃₅ ductions as well as each country's trajectory in terms of emissions and population. These
₁₃₃₆ values are highly dependent on future (non-price) climate policies, technical progress,
₁₃₃₇ and economic growth of each country, which are only partially known. Integrated As-
₁₃₃₈ sessment Models have been used to derive a Global Energy Assessment (Johansson et al.
₁₃₃₉ 2012), a 100% renewable scenario (Greenpeace 2015) as well as Shared Socioeconomic
₁₃₄₀ Pathways (SSPs), which include consistent trajectories of population, emissions, and car-
₁₃₄₁ bon price (Bauer et al. 2017; Fricko et al. 2017; Riahi et al. 2017; van Vuuren et al. 2017).
₁₃₄₂ Instead of using some of these modelling trajectories, we relied on a simple and trans-
₁₃₄₃ parent formula, for a number of reasons. First and foremost, those trajectories describe
₁₃₄₄ territorial emissions while we need consumption-based emissions to compute the inci-
₁₃₄₅ dence of the GCS. Second, the carbon price is relatively low in trajectories of SSPs that
₁₃₄₆ contain global warming below 2°C (less than \$35/tCO₂ in 2030), so we conservatively
₁₃₄₇ chose a method yielding a higher carbon price (\$90 in 2030). Third, modelling results are
₁₃₄₈ available only for a few macro regions, while we wanted country by country estimates.
₁₃₄₉ Finally, we have checked that the emissions per capita given by our method are broadly
₁₃₅₀ in line with alternative methods, even if it tends to overestimate net gains in countries
₁₃₅₁ which will decarbonize less rapidly than average.¹⁵ For example, although countries' de-
₁₃₅₂ carbonization plans should realign with the GCS in place, India might still decarbonize
₁₃₅₃ less quickly than the European Union, so India's gain and the EU's loss might be over-
₁₃₅₄ estimated in our computations. For a more sophisticated version of the Global Climate
₁₃₅₅ Scheme which includes participation mechanisms preventing middle-income countries
₁₃₅₆ (like China) to lose from it and estimations of the Net Present Value by country, see Fabre
₁₃₅₇ (2023).

¹⁴2015 was the last year of data available when the global questionnaire was conceived (OECD data was then used – it does not cover all countries but give identical rounded estimates than those recomputed from the Global Carbon Project data for our complementary surveys). 2030 was chosen as the reference year as it is the date at which global carbon price revenues are expected to peak (and the GCS redistributive effects would be largest), and the GCS could not realistically enter into force before that date. In the surveys, we chose $y = b = 2015$ rather than $b = 2019$ and $y = 2030$ to get more conservative estimates of the monthly cost in the U.S. (\$20 higher than the other option) and in Europe (€5 or £10 higher).

¹⁵Computations with alternative methods can be found on [our public repository](#).

Figure A43: Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme.




Table A3: Estimated net gain from the GCS in 2030 and carbon footprint by country.

	Mean net gain from the GCS (\$/month)	CO ₂ footprint per adult in 2019 (tCO ₂ /y)			
Saudi Arabia	-92	24.0	Algeria*	-1	6.0
United States	-76	21.0	Mexico	2	5.6
Australia	-59	17.6	Ukraine	2	5.6
Canada	-55	16.7	Uzbekistan*	4	5.1
South Korea	-49	15.6	Argentina	5	4.9
Taiwan	-41	14.0	Thailand	7	4.6
Germany	-30	11.7	Egypt	12	3.6
Russia	-28	11.5	Indonesia	13	3.3
Japan	-27	11.3	Colombia	15	3.0
Malaysia	-21	10.0	Brazil	15	2.9
Iran	-19	9.5	Vietnam	16	2.9
Poland	-18	9.5	Peru	16	2.8
United Kingdom	-18	9.4	Morocco	16	2.7
China	-14	8.6	North Korea*	17	2.5
Italy	-12	8.4	India	18	2.4
South Africa	-11	8.0	Philippines	18	2.3
France	-10	7.8	Pakistan	22	1.6
Iraq*	-7	7.4	Bangladesh	24	1.1
Spain	-6	7.0	Nigeria	25	1.0
Turkey	-2	6.2	Kenya	25	0.9
			Myanmar*	26	0.9
			Sudan*	26	0.9
			Tanzania	27	0.5
			Afghanistan*	27	0.5
			Uganda	28	0.4
			Ethiopia	28	0.3
			Venezuela	29	0.3
			DRC*	30	0.1

¹³⁵⁸ Note: Asterisks denote countries where footprint is missing and territorial emissions is used instead.

¹³⁵⁹ Values differ from Figure A43 as this table present estimates of *mean* net gain per adult in 2030, not at the

¹³⁶⁰ present. Only the countries with more than 20 million adults (covering 87% of the global total) are shown.

F Determinants of support

Table A4: Determinants of support for the Global Climate Scheme.

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme						
	All	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Country: Germany	-0.157*** (0.022)		-0.144*** (0.022)				
Country: Spain	-0.044* (0.024)		-0.026 (0.024)				
Country: United Kingdom	-0.079*** (0.024)		-0.104*** (0.023)				
Country: United States	-0.375*** (0.019)						
Income quartile: 2	0.037** (0.017)	0.031 (0.022)	0.038 (0.023)	0.047 (0.043)	0.058 (0.049)	0.013 (0.053)	0.023 (0.043)
Income quartile: 3	0.042** (0.017)	0.033 (0.024)	0.049** (0.024)	0.080** (0.040)	0.059 (0.052)	0.074 (0.056)	-0.052 (0.052)
Income quartile: 4	0.056*** (0.018)	0.062** (0.026)	0.010 (0.026)	0.018 (0.047)	-0.015 (0.055)	-0.001 (0.056)	-0.005 (0.057)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.023* (0.012)	0.032* (0.017)	0.010 (0.018)	0.007 (0.029)	0.045 (0.039)	0.007 (0.039)	-0.010 (0.039)
Age: 25-34	-0.076*** (0.025)	-0.084*** (0.031)	-0.044 (0.035)	-0.031 (0.057)	-0.077 (0.083)	-0.050 (0.066)	-0.103 (0.091)
Age: 35-49	-0.101*** (0.024)	-0.109*** (0.030)	-0.069* (0.034)	-0.094* (0.055)	-0.009 (0.077)	-0.168** (0.070)	-0.050 (0.090)
Age: 50-64	-0.137*** (0.024)	-0.165*** (0.030)	-0.038 (0.035)	-0.039 (0.056)	-0.020 (0.082)	-0.146** (0.067)	-0.017 (0.087)
Age: 65+	-0.116*** (0.028)	-0.142*** (0.034)	-0.056 (0.044)	0.003 (0.076)	-0.045 (0.094)	-0.258*** (0.091)	0.011 (0.105)
Gender: Man	0.019* (0.011)	0.022 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.029)	-0.018 (0.033)	0.042 (0.038)	-0.005 (0.034)
Lives with partner	0.029** (0.013)	0.023 (0.017)	0.058*** (0.018)	0.070** (0.033)	0.082** (0.038)	0.017 (0.038)	0.040 (0.039)
Employment status: Retired	-0.020 (0.024)	-0.046 (0.030)	0.056 (0.038)	0.087 (0.081)	0.096 (0.075)	0.040 (0.082)	0.001 (0.073)
Employment status: Student	0.045 (0.033)	0.062 (0.048)	0.101** (0.044)	0.165* (0.085)	0.192** (0.087)	0.116 (0.074)	-0.021 (0.107)
Employment status: Working	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.020 (0.024)	0.011 (0.028)	0.082 (0.064)	0.006 (0.056)	-0.050 (0.056)	0.036 (0.051)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.331*** (0.013)	-0.435*** (0.017)	-0.106*** (0.019)	-0.131*** (0.035)	-0.004 (0.044)	-0.114*** (0.038)	-0.081** (0.041)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	-0.184*** (0.016)	-0.198*** (0.022)	-0.136*** (0.021)	-0.196*** (0.039)	-0.034 (0.043)	-0.116** (0.046)	-0.108*** (0.040)
Vote: Far right	-0.396*** (0.032)		-0.309*** (0.033)	-0.493*** (0.064)	-0.168*** (0.051)	-0.130 (0.102)	-0.314*** (0.080)
Urban	0.049*** (0.012)	0.072*** (0.018)	0.006 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.029)	0.019 (0.032)	-0.014 (0.036)	0.017 (0.033)
Race: White		-0.030 (0.019)					
Region: Northeast		0.010 (0.023)					
Region: South		0.006 (0.020)					
Region: West		0.010 (0.022)					
Swing State		-0.038** (0.019)					
Constant	1.048	0.736	0.89	0.7	0.732	0.935	0.886
Observations	7,986	4,992	2,994	977	727	748	542
R ²	0.160	0.181	0.064	0.116	0.067	0.043	0.063

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A5: Support for the GCS regressed on comprehension of its financial effects.

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme					
	All	United States	France	Germany	United Kingdom	Spain
With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win	0.029** (0.012)	-0.004 (0.016)	0.043 (0.033)	0.051 (0.033)	0.040 (0.036)	0.038 (0.037)
Constant	0.596	0.53	0.764	0.677	0.707	0.796
Observations	8,000	5,000	729	979	749	543
R ²	0.001	0.00001	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.002

Table A6: Correlation between (*Somewhat* or *Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in high-income countries.

	Support for a global GHG tax and dividend											
	USA (1)	DNK (2)	FRA (3)	DEU (4)	ITA (5)	ESP (6)	GBR (7)	JPN (8)	POL (9)	AUS (10)	CAN (11)	KOR (12)
Control group mean	0.34	0.409	0.34	0.361	0.341	0.421	0.288	0.317	0.309	0.294	0.316	0.334
Trusts the government	0.040*** (0.013)	0.0005 (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.051*** (0.011)	0.061*** (0.012)	0.046*** (0.011)	0.050*** (0.012)	0.039*** (0.013)	0.023** (0.011)	0.041*** (0.013)	0.019 (0.012)	0.079*** (0.013)
Believes inequality is an important problem	0.038*** (0.014)	0.051*** (0.012)	0.045*** (0.013)	0.040*** (0.011)	0.023** (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.052*** (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)	0.009 (0.010)	0.005 (0.013)	0.031*** (0.012)	0.024** (0.012)
Worries about CC	0.006 (0.018)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.005 (0.016)	0.048*** (0.014)	0.023* (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.044*** (0.015)	0.014 (0.014)	0.018 (0.013)	0.036** (0.017)	0.004 (0.014)	0.015 (0.013)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	0.009 (0.015)	0.007 (0.012)	0.018 (0.014)	0.015 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.012)	0.032** (0.011)	0.027** (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.024** (0.014)	0.018 (0.015)	0.014 (0.014)	0.001 (0.013)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.059*** (0.015)	0.019 (0.013)	0.008 (0.014)	0.032** (0.013)	0.012 (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.006 (0.014)	0.037** (0.014)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.033** (0.016)	0.026* (0.014)	0.033** (0.013)
Understands emission across activities/regions	-0.018 (0.011)	0.009 (0.013)	0.003 (0.012)	0.023* (0.012)	0.007 (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.007 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.026** (0.011)	-0.002 (0.013)	0.003 (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	0.007 (0.012)	0.008 (0.014)	0.023 (0.014)	0.011 (0.012)	-0.0005 (0.012)	0.031*** (0.012)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.014 (0.011)	0.025* (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.024* (0.012)
Knows which gases cause CC	0.005 (0.011)	0.021* (0.012)	0.010 (0.013)	0.001 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.010)	0.020* (0.010)	0.015 (0.010)	0.017 (0.011)	0.011 (0.011)	-0.0003 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.013)
Understands impacts of CC	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.029*** (0.011)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.022* (0.012)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.024* (0.012)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	-0.005 (0.013)	0.007 (0.012)	0.021 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.014)	0.011 (0.014)	0.010 (0.013)	0.014 (0.013)	0.008 (0.013)	0.015 (0.013)	0.036** (0.016)	0.004 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.013)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	-0.013 (0.021)	0.037 (0.023)	0.043* (0.022)	-0.014 (0.020)	-0.038** (0.019)	0.029 (0.020)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.017 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.006 (0.022)	0.021 (0.020)	-0.020 (0.019)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.086*** (0.024)	0.066*** (0.023)	0.075*** (0.023)	0.094*** (0.022)	0.105*** (0.020)	0.074*** (0.023)	0.091*** (0.021)	0.154*** (0.019)	0.089*** (0.020)	0.070*** (0.024)	0.053** (0.023)	0.112*** (0.020)
Believes own household would lose	-0.071*** (0.021)	-0.057*** (0.015)	-0.026 (0.020)	-0.087*** (0.017)	-0.066*** (0.017)	-0.053*** (0.017)	-0.073*** (0.017)	-0.008 (0.017)	-0.079*** (0.017)	-0.052*** (0.016)	-0.060*** (0.019)	-0.083*** (0.017)
Believes low-income earners will lose	-0.034* (0.019)	-0.020 (0.016)	-0.056*** (0.018)	-0.022 (0.017)	-0.021 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.016)	-0.015 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.056*** (0.017)	-0.025 (0.016)	-0.030 (0.020)	-0.056*** (0.018)
Believes high-income earners will lose	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.012)	0.013 (0.013)	0.003 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.007 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.025** (0.012)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.0004 (0.013)
Observations	2,218	2,013	2,006	2,006	2,088	2,268	2,025	1,990	2,053	1,978	2,022	1,932
R ²	0.329	0.241	0.237	0.295	0.211	0.216	0.272	0.222	0.214	0.272	0.254	0.228

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 of Dechezleprêtre et al. (2022) for variable definitions.

Table A7: Correlation between (*Somewhat* or *Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in middle-income countries.

	Support for a global GHG tax and dividend							
	IDN (1)	ZAF (2)	MEX (3)	TUR (4)	IND (5)	BRA (6)	CHN (7)	UKR (8)
Control group mean	0.697	0.396	0.681	0.44	0.719	0.539	0.737	0.622
Trusts the government	0.051*** (0.012)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.040*** (0.014)	0.066*** (0.017)	0.065*** (0.015)	0.038** (0.015)	-0.011 (0.015)	0.061*** (0.014)
Believes inequality is an important problem	0.048** (0.011)	0.002 (0.014)	0.057*** (0.015)	0.028 (0.017)	0.092*** (0.016)	0.055*** (0.015)	-0.001 (0.015)	0.027 (0.018)
Worries about CC	0.003 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.016)	0.013 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.017)	-0.0002 (0.016)	0.032* (0.017)	-0.0002 (0.016)	0.046*** (0.016)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	0.020 (0.014)	0.026 (0.017)	0.004 (0.014)	0.039** (0.017)	0.022 (0.016)	0.019 (0.015)	0.034** (0.016)	0.018 (0.016)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.020* (0.011)	0.038** (0.016)	0.032* (0.017)	-0.002 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.015)	-0.017 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.018 (0.016)
Understands emission across activities/regions	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.013)	0.003 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.010)	0.039*** (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.00004 (0.013)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	-0.006 (0.009)	0.011 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.016)	0.0002 (0.012)	0.003 (0.014)	-0.052*** (0.016)	0.022 (0.014)
Knows which gases cause CC	-0.026*** (0.009)	0.019 (0.015)	0.035** (0.014)	0.015 (0.015)	0.020 (0.013)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.023* (0.012)	0.023 (0.015)
Understands impacts of CC	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.0005 (0.015)	0.009 (0.017)	0.043*** (0.014)	-0.023 (0.015)	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.014 (0.014)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	-0.010 (0.007)	0.009 (0.016)	0.015 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.013)	0.002 (0.011)	-0.016 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.010)	0.035** (0.015)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	0.023 (0.015)	0.002 (0.021)	0.019 (0.022)	0.044 (0.029)	0.021 (0.020)	0.032 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.018)	-0.023 (0.025)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.111*** (0.019)	0.073*** (0.022)	0.088*** (0.024)	0.078** (0.031)	0.034 (0.025)	0.129*** (0.022)	0.060*** (0.022)	0.138*** (0.025)
Believes own household would lose	-0.027 (0.021)	-0.044** (0.020)	-0.071*** (0.019)	-0.054** (0.024)	-0.012 (0.019)	-0.067*** (0.023)	-0.119*** (0.022)	-0.045** (0.021)
Believes low-income earners will lose	-0.059*** (0.020)	-0.016 (0.019)	0.003 (0.017)	-0.053** (0.023)	-0.055*** (0.019)	-0.013 (0.020)	0.001 (0.018)	0.004 (0.020)
Believes high-income earners will lose	0.026** (0.011)	-0.020 (0.015)	0.010 (0.013)	0.010 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.014)	0.003 (0.016)	-0.047*** (0.014)	-0.007 (0.013)
Observations	2,488	2,003	2,045	1,932	2,472	1,860	1,717	1,564
R ²	0.366	0.175	0.242	0.248	0.370	0.272	0.280	0.255

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * $p<0.1$; ** $p<0.05$; *** $p<0.01$. See Appendix A-1 of Dechezleprêtre et al. (2022) for variable definitions.

G Representativeness of the surveys

Table A8: Sample representativeness of the complementary surveys.

	US1			US2			Eu		
	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample
Sample size		3,000	3,000		2,000	2,000		3,000	3,000
Gender: Woman	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.45	0.50	0.51	0.49	0.51
Gender: Man	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.49	0.55	0.50	0.49	0.51	0.49
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.11	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.18	0.15	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.18	0.15	0.17	0.15
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.24	0.26
Age: 65+	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.25	0.23	0.25
Diploma_25_64: Below upper secondary	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.13	0.14	0.13
Diploma_25_64: Upper secondary	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.28	0.23	0.19	0.23
Diploma_25_64: Post secondary	0.34	0.40	0.34	0.34	0.33	0.34	0.29	0.33	0.29
Race: White only	0.60	0.67	0.61	0.60	0.62	0.61			
Race: Hispanic	0.18	0.15	0.19	0.18	0.19	0.19			
Race: Black	0.13	0.16	0.14	0.13	0.17	0.14			
Region: Northeast	0.17	0.20	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.17			
Region: Midwest	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.21			
Region: South	0.38	0.39	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38			
Region: West	0.24	0.20	0.24	0.24	0.20	0.24			
Urban: TRUE	0.73	0.78	0.74	0.73	0.75	0.73			
Employment_18_64: Inactive	0.20	0.16	0.16	0.20	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.15
Employment_18_64: Unemployed	0.02	0.07	0.08	0.02	0.09	0.08	0.03	0.06	0.05
Vote: Left	0.32	0.47	0.45	0.32	0.46	0.45	0.30	0.32	0.32
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.32	0.32
Vote: Far right							0.10	0.10	0.10
Country: FR							0.24	0.24	0.24
Country: DE							0.33	0.33	0.33
Country: ES							0.18	0.18	0.18
Country: UK							0.25	0.25	0.25
Urbanity: Cities							0.43	0.49	0.43
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs							0.33	0.32	0.33
Urbanity: Rural							0.25	0.20	0.25

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

Table A9: Sample representativeness for each European country.

	FR			DE			ES			UK		
	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.									
Sample size		729	729		979	979		543	543		749	749
Gender: Woman	0.52	0.50	0.52	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.53	0.51	0.50	0.43	0.50
Gender: Man	0.48	0.50	0.48	0.49	0.48	0.49	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.50	0.57	0.50
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.29	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.19	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.19	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.33	0.25	0.25	0.18	0.25	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.14	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.07	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.12	0.16	0.12	0.17	0.20	0.17
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.31	0.24	0.22	0.26	0.22	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.24	0.18	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.24	0.19	0.24	0.28	0.23	0.28	0.27	0.28	0.27	0.25	0.30	0.25
Age: 65+	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.26	0.21	0.26	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.24
Diploma_25-64: Below upper secondary	0.11	0.19	0.11	0.10	0.14	0.10	0.24	0.16	0.25	0.12	0.09	0.12
Diploma_25-64: Upper secondary	0.26	0.16	0.26	0.27	0.20	0.27	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.21	0.23	0.21
Diploma_25-64: Post secondary	0.26	0.30	0.26	0.29	0.31	0.29	0.28	0.38	0.27	0.33	0.36	0.33
Urbanity: Cities	0.47	0.52	0.47	0.37	0.47	0.37	0.52	0.58	0.52	0.40	0.41	0.40
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.40	0.35	0.40	0.22	0.27	0.22	0.42	0.43	0.42
Urbanity: Rural	0.34	0.29	0.34	0.23	0.18	0.23	0.26	0.15	0.26	0.18	0.16	0.18
Employment_18-64: Inactive	0.20	0.19	0.18	0.15	0.14	0.11	0.20	0.13	0.12	0.16	0.16	0.17
Employment_18-64: Unemployed	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.11	0.12	0.02	0.03	0.04
Vote: Left	0.23	0.19	0.21	0.37	0.44	0.44	0.33	0.37	0.38	0.25	0.28	0.29
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.26	0.30	0.29	0.28	0.27	0.29	0.18	0.24	0.24	0.36	0.44	0.41
Vote: Far right	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.01	0.03	0.03

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. In this Table, weights are defined at the country level. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

¹³⁶³ Similar tables for the global surveys can be found in [Dechezleprêtre et al. \(2022\)](#).

H Attrition analysis

Table A10: Attrition analysis for the US1 survey.

	Dropped out	Dropped out after socio-eco	Failed attention test	Duration (in min)	Duration below 4 min
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mean	0.08	0.059	0.082	21.198	0.016
Income quartile: 2	0.025*** (0.010)	0.025*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.740 (3.064)	-0.009 (0.006)
Income quartile: 3	0.062*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.754 (2.813)	-0.004 (0.007)
Income quartile: 4	0.035*** (0.011)	0.035*** (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-3.917 (2.798)	-0.003 (0.007)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.039*** (0.009)	0.039*** (0.009)	-0.000*** (0.000)	1.544 (2.665)	0.006 (0.006)
Age: 25-34	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.597 (2.604)	-0.031** (0.013)
Age: 35-49	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.824 (3.176)	-0.032** (0.013)
Age: 50-64	-0.060*** (0.015)	-0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	5.723** (2.763)	-0.039*** (0.012)
Age: 65+	0.048*** (0.017)	0.048*** (0.017)	0.000** (0.000)	8.952** (4.267)	-0.047*** (0.012)
Gender: Man	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.451 (2.210)	-0.0001 (0.005)
Urban	0.006 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.888** (2.443)	-0.004 (0.006)
Race: Black	0.020** (0.010)	0.020** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	8.554*** (2.600)	0.004 (0.007)
Race: Hispanic	0.021** (0.010)	0.021** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.119* (2.293)	-0.002 (0.007)
Region: Northeast	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-4.862 (4.782)	-0.004 (0.007)
Region: South	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-1.151 (4.710)	-0.004 (0.006)
Region: West	0.006 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-4.000 (4.305)	-0.003 (0.007)
Vote: Biden	-0.048*** (0.008)	-0.048*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-2.901 (2.379)	-0.009 (0.007)
Vote: Trump	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.145 (2.878)	-0.005 (0.008)
Observations	5,719	5,719	3,252	3,044	3,044
R ²	0.127	0.127	1.000	0.006	0.017

Table A11: Attrition analysis for the US2 survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 4 min (5)
Mean	0.095	0.074	0.092	16.338	0.052
Income quartile: 2	0.023* (0.013)	0.023* (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	1.352 (1.601)	-0.029** (0.014)
Income quartile: 3	0.054*** (0.014)	0.054*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	8.502 (9.649)	-0.009 (0.016)
Income quartile: 4	0.060*** (0.016)	0.060*** (0.016)	-0.000 (0.000)	5.254 (3.376)	0.0003 (0.017)
Diploma: Post secondary	-0.033*** (0.011)	-0.033*** (0.011)	0.000 (0.000)	1.601 (2.630)	0.012 (0.011)
Age: 25-34	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.929 (1.535)	-0.032 (0.024)
Age: 35-49	0.012 (0.014)	0.012 (0.014)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.076 (6.651)	-0.047** (0.022)
Age: 50-64	0.040*** (0.014)	0.040*** (0.014)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.364 (1.565)	-0.079*** (0.022)
Age: 65+	0.115*** (0.017)	0.115*** (0.017)	-0.000*** (0.000)	2.619 (3.150)	-0.095*** (0.022)
Gender: Man	-0.073*** (0.009)	-0.073*** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	4.707 (6.037)	0.010 (0.010)
Urban	0.019* (0.011)	0.019* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	1.766 (1.135)	0.005 (0.012)
Race: Black	0.060*** (0.015)	0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.673 (13.328)	-0.010 (0.015)
Race: Hispanic	0.079*** (0.014)	0.079*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	2.930 (1.813)	-0.027** (0.012)
Region: Northeast	-0.026* (0.014)	-0.026* (0.014)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.837 (2.855)	-0.011 (0.015)
Region: South	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.000 (0.000)	3.220 (5.002)	0.009 (0.014)
Region: West	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.000 (0.000)	-1.759 (1.942)	-0.009 (0.015)
Vote: Biden	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	3.230 (2.731)	-0.006 (0.014)
Vote: Trump	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.554 (1.272)	0.007 (0.016)
Observations	2,973	2,973	2,280	2,103	2,103
R ²	0.241	0.241	1.000	0.010	0.031

Table A12: Attrition analysis for the Eu survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 6 min (5)
Mean	0.067	0.044	0.151	54.602	0.039
Country: Germany	0.023** (0.010)	0.019** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.533 (18.906)	0.019* (0.010)
Country: Spain	-0.102*** (0.011)	-0.098*** (0.011)	0.000* (0.000)	-29.136* (15.948)	0.010 (0.010)
Country: United Kingdom	0.042*** (0.011)	0.043*** (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-7.458 (18.046)	0.010 (0.010)
Income quartile: 2	0.032*** (0.010)	0.029*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	32.749* (19.771)	-0.015 (0.010)
Income quartile: 3	0.049*** (0.010)	0.047*** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	6.130 (11.734)	-0.021** (0.010)
Income quartile: 4	0.024** (0.011)	0.021* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.659 (19.955)	-0.018* (0.011)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.035*** (0.008)	0.034*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	10.647 (12.959)	-0.007 (0.007)
Age: 25-34	0.028** (0.013)	0.025* (0.013)	-0.000*** (0.000)	36.132 (22.285)	-0.005 (0.018)
Age: 35-49	0.064*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	-0.000*** (0.000)	37.159** (17.190)	-0.013 (0.016)
Age: 50-64	0.085*** (0.013)	0.083*** (0.013)	-0.000 (0.000)	48.363** (22.526)	-0.063*** (0.015)
Age: 65+	0.117*** (0.014)	0.115*** (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	36.351** (14.226)	-0.061*** (0.015)
Gender: Man	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-22.980 (14.093)	0.009 (0.007)
Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs	0.006 (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-16.736 (17.256)	0.004 (0.008)
Degree of urbanization: Rural	0.023** (0.009)	0.023** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	-14.593 (19.733)	-0.001 (0.009)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.025*** (0.005)	-0.025*** (0.005)	0.000*** (0.000)	-17.558 (13.143)	0.019** (0.008)
Vote: Far right	0.005 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.000*** (0.000)	15.838 (32.281)	0.029** (0.014)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	0.023*** (0.006)	0.022*** (0.005)	0.000 (0.000)	24.631 (19.824)	0.030*** (0.010)
Observations	3,963	3,963	3,326	3,115	3,115
R ²	0.406	0.395	1.000	0.006	0.028

1365 I Balance analysis

Table A13: Balance analysis.

	List contains: G (1)	Branch petition: NR (2)	Branch donation: Own nation (3)	Branch conjoint 3: with GCS (4)
Mean	0.496	0.493	0.5	0.499
Country: Germany	-0.026 (0.026)	0.017 (0.026)	0.020 (0.026)	0.005 (0.026)
Country: Spain	0.025 (0.030)	0.026 (0.030)	0.026 (0.030)	0.043 (0.030)
Country: United Kingdom	0.002 (0.028)	0.018 (0.028)	0.037 (0.028)	0.063** (0.028)
Country: United States	-0.001 (0.024)	0.019 (0.024)	0.007 (0.024)	0.023 (0.024)
Income quartile: 2	-0.013 (0.021)	-0.024 (0.021)	0.012 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.021)
Income quartile: 3	0.021 (0.022)	-0.005 (0.022)	0.011 (0.022)	-0.004 (0.022)
Income quartile: 4	-0.001 (0.023)	-0.017 (0.023)	-0.013 (0.023)	0.0001 (0.023)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.008 (0.016)	0.014 (0.016)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.016)
Age: 25-34	0.023 (0.031)	-0.049 (0.031)	-0.003 (0.031)	-0.009 (0.031)
Age: 35-49	0.032 (0.030)	-0.002 (0.030)	-0.014 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.030)
Age: 50-64	0.030 (0.030)	-0.005 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.030)	-0.020 (0.030)
Age: 65+	0.029 (0.037)	-0.037 (0.037)	-0.015 (0.037)	-0.012 (0.037)
Gender: Man	0.024 (0.015)	0.012 (0.015)	0.002 (0.015)	-0.016 (0.015)
Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.0005 (0.017)	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.011 (0.017)
Degree of urbanization: Rural	0.013 (0.024)	0.017 (0.024)	-0.004 (0.024)	0.027 (0.024)
Employment status: Retired	-0.005 (0.032)	-0.031 (0.032)	-0.034 (0.032)	-0.016 (0.032)
Employment status: Student	0.005 (0.044)	-0.023 (0.044)	-0.033 (0.044)	-0.025 (0.044)
Employment status: Working	0.010 (0.024)	-0.027 (0.024)	-0.033 (0.024)	-0.012 (0.024)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.004 (0.017)	0.003 (0.017)	0.010 (0.017)	0.002 (0.017)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	0.001 (0.019)	0.014 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.019)	-0.012 (0.019)
Vote: Far right	0.009 (0.034)	0.030 (0.034)	0.023 (0.035)	0.038 (0.034)
Observations	5,991	5,991	5,991	5,991
R ²	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.003

J Placebo tests

Table A14: Placebo tests.

	G+R+C preferred to R+C (1)	Supports G+R+C (2)	Signs petition (3)	Share of policies supported (4)	Conjoint 5 A+CGS preferred to B (5)
Mean	0.645	0.633	0.611	0.535	0.596
Branch of list experiment: l	-0.013 (0.019)	-0.024 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.018 (0.021)
Branch of list experiment: rgl	0.005 (0.019)	0.006 (0.019)	-0.002 (0.019)	0.001 (0.012)	0.010 (0.021)
Branch of list experiment: rl	-0.009 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.019)	0.022 (0.019)	0.007 (0.012)	0.007 (0.021)
Branch of petition: nr	0.011 (0.014)	0.006 (0.014)	0.022 (0.014)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.015)
Poor is in own country	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.014)	0.015 (0.014)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.020 (0.015)
Observations	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	5,218
R ²	0.0004	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001

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