

Title: International Attitudes Toward Global Policies

Authors: Adrien Fabre^{1,2*}, Thomas Douenne³, Linus Mattauch^{4,5,6}

Affiliations: ¹Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique; Paris, France.

²Centre International de Recherches sur l'Environnement et le Développement; Nogent-sur-Marne, France.

³University of Amsterdam; Amsterdam, Netherlands.

⁴Technical University Berlin; Berlin, Germany.

⁵Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research; Potsdam, Germany.

⁶University of Oxford; Oxford, United Kingdom.

*Corresponding author. Email: adrien.fabre@cnrs.fr.

Abstract: Major sustainability objectives could be achieved by global approaches to climate change and inequality, yet evidence on the support for global policies is scarce. Using surveys over 48,000 respondents from 20 countries, we find strong support for an effective way to jointly combat climate change and poverty: a global carbon price funding a global basic income, called the “Global Climate Scheme” (GCS). Using different experiments, we show that the support for the GCS is sincere and that electoral candidates could win votes by endorsing it. We document widespread support for other global redistribution policies, such as a wealth tax funding low-income countries. Our findings indicate that global policies are genuinely supported by majorities of the population, even in wealthy nations that would bear the burden.

One-Sentence Summary: Representative surveys reveal strong and genuine support worldwide for global climate and redistribution policies.

Main Text:

Major sustainability objectives could be achieved by global cooperation policies involving transfers from high- to lower-income countries (1–7). We examine a key condition for sustainability: the support of citizens for globally redistributive policies, studied only by scant prior attitudinal surveys (8–10). Using surveys over 40,000 respondents from 20 high- and middle-income countries, we document substantial support for global policies.

To gain insights into the factors shaping public support for global policies in high-income countries, we conduct complementary surveys among 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, the U.S., and the UK. The focus of our approach is a specific policy aimed at addressing both climate change and poverty, referred to as the “Global Climate Scheme” (GCS). It implements a cap on carbon emissions to limit global warming below 2°C. The emission rights are auctioned each year to polluting firms and fund a global basic income, alleviating extreme poverty. The GCS is supported by three quarters of Europeans and half of Americans. We test whether support of the expressed preference is sincere: a list experiment shows no evidence of social desirability bias in survey responses, majorities are willing to sign a real-stake petition, and global redistribution ranks high in the prioritization of policies. Conjoint analyses reveal that a political platform is more likely to be preferred if it contains the GCS or a global tax on millionaires. In sum, our findings indicate that global redistributive policies are genuinely supported by a majority of the population.

Results

Data

We assess the stated support for different global policies in a survey on climate attitudes conducted 5 in 2021 on 40,680 respondents from 20 countries. The questions on national policies are analyzed in another paper (8).

To test the strength and sincerity of the support for global policies, we conduct complementary surveys in the U.S. and Europe. The U.S. survey has been divided in two waves, with respectively 3,000 and 2,000 respondents. The European questionnaire combines the two U.S. ones. It was 10 conducted on 3,000 respondents representative of France, Germany, Spain, and the UK.

The surveys are administrated online. The samples are representative along the dimensions of gender, income, age, highest diploma, region, and degree of urbanization.

Supplementary Materials include methods, a comprehensive literature review, questionnaires, raw results, representativeness and attrition analyses. The project was preregistered on osf.io/fy6gd.

Stated support for global policies

Global support

The global survey shows strong support for climate policies enacted at the global level (Fig. 1). When asked “At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be put in place?”, 70% (in the U.S.) to 94% (in Japan) choose the global level.


20 Three policies (out of four) garner high support across all countries: a global democratic assembly on climate change, a global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries, and a global emissions trading system (or “global quota”). The three policies obtain a majority of absolute support (i.e., “somewhat” or “strong” support) in all countries (except in the U.S. for the global assembly, 48% absolute support). In high-income countries, the global quota obtains 64% absolute support and 84% relative support (i.e., excluding “indifferent” answers).

25 Following the support for the global quota, respondents are asked about their preferences for dividing the carbon budget among countries. An equal per capita allocation of emission rights emerges as the preferred burden-sharing principle, garnering absolute majority support in all countries and never below 84% relative support. Taking into account historical responsibilities or vulnerability to climate damages is also popular, albeit with less consensus, while grandfathering (i.e., allocation of emission shares in proportion to current emissions) receives the least support in all countries.

30 A global quota with equal per capita emission rights produces the same distributional outcomes as a global carbon tax that funds a global basic income. The support for such global carbon tax is also tested and its redistributive effects – the average increase in expenditures along with the amount of the basic income – are specified to the respondents explicitly. The support for the carbon tax is lower than for the quota, particularly in high-income countries, and there is no relative majority for the tax in Anglo-Saxon countries. Two possible reasons for this lower support are that 35 distributive effects are made salient in the case of the tax, and that citizens may find a quota more effective than a tax to reduce emissions. This interpretation is consistent with the level of support for the global quota once we make the distributive effects salient, as we do in the complementary surveys.

Fig. 1 Relative support for global climate policies (Percentage of "Somewhat" or "Strongly support" among non-"indifferent" answers, n = 40,680). Source: (8). For absolute support, see fig. S1.

*In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently.



5

Global Climate Scheme

The complementary surveys (*US1, US2, Eu*) include a comprehensive exploration of citizens' attitudes toward the GCS. The GCS consists of global emissions trading with emission rights auctioned each year to polluting firms, and of a global basic income of \$30/month, funded by the auction revenues. Using incentivized comprehension questions and providing the correct answers afterwards, we make sure that the respondents understand the redistributive effects of the GCS: The 700 million people with less than \$2/day would be lifted out of extreme poverty, and fossil fuel price increases would cost the typical person in their country a specified amount, e.g. \$85/month in the U.S.¹

10

15 Respondents are asked to express their support for the GCS using a simple Yes/No question. The stated support for the GCS is 54% in the U.S. and 76% in Europe.

Global wealth tax

20 Consistent with the results of the global survey, a "tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-income countries" garners absolute majority support of over 67% in each country, only 5 p.p. lower than a national millionaires tax overall (Fig. 2). In random subsamples, we inquire about respondents' preferences regarding the redistribution of revenues from a global tax on individual wealth. We ask certain respondents (n = 1,283) what percentage of global tax revenues should be pooled to finance low-income countries. In each country, at least 88% of respondents indicate a positive amount, with an average ranging from 30% (Germany) to 36% (U.S., France) (fig. S3). To other respondents (n = 1,233), we inquire whether they would prefer each country to retain all

25¹ The monthly median net cost is \$85 in the U.S., €10 in France, €25 in Germany, €5 in Spain, £20 in the UK. Its estimation relies on the price and emissions trajectories from the Stern-Stiglitz report, and in particular a carbon price of \$90/tCO₂ in 2030.

the revenues it collects or that half of the revenues be pooled to finance low-income countries. Approximately half of the respondents opt to allocate half of the tax revenues to low-income countries.

5 *Fig. 2 Relative support for various global policies. (Percentage of "Somewhat" or "Strongly support" among non-"indifferent" answers – *except for the GCS: Share of "Yes" in a simple Yes/No question, n = 8,000). For absolute support, see fig. S2.*

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)*	54	76	80	71	81	74
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	55	71	72	70	79	70
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	68	82	82	82	85	81
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	60	76	77	79	79	71
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	46	53	53	43	62	61
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	58	71	69	69	78	72
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	62	73	58	73	80	83
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	63	80	80	78	81	83
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	62	87	90	86	91	87
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	46	62	58	62	65	67
National tax on millionaires funding public services	73	85	81	87	89	88
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	69	84	84	84	87	83

10 *Other global policies*

Other global redistributive policies garner majority support across all countries (Fig. 2).

15 *Foreign aid*

We provide respondents with information about the actual amount “spent on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries” relative to their country’s government spending and GDP. Less than 16% of respondents state that their country’s foreign aid should be reduced, while 62% express support for increasing it, including 17% who support an unconditional increase (fig. S4). Among the 45% who think aid should be increased under certain conditions, we subsequently ask them to specify the conditions they deem necessary (fig. S5). The three most commonly selected conditions are: “we can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted” (73% chose this condition), “that recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights” (67%), and “that other high-income countries also increase their foreign aid” (48%). On the other hand, respondents who do not wish to increase their country’s foreign aid primarily justify their view by prioritizing the well-being of their fellow citizens or by perceiving each country as

responsible for its own fate (fig. S6). In response to an open-ended question regarding measures high-income countries should take to fight extreme poverty, a large majority of Americans expressed that more help is needed. The most commonly suggested form of aid is financial support, closely followed by investments in education.

5

We also inquire about the perceived amount of foreign aid. Most people overestimate the actual amount of foreign aid. We then elicit respondents' preferred amount of foreign aid, after randomly presenting them with either the actual amount or no information. Most of the respondents who learn the actual amount choose a bracket at least as high as the actual one, and most of those without the information choose a bracket at least as high as the perceived one.

10

Finally, we ask a last question to the respondents who received the information. To those who prefer an increase of foreign aid, we ask how they would finance it and find that the preferred source of funding is overwhelmingly higher taxes on the wealthiest. To those who prefer a reduction, we ask how they would use the funds becoming available:

15

In every country, more people choose higher spending on education or healthcare rather than lower taxes.

Robustness and sincerity of support for the GCS

20

We use several methods to assess the sincerity of the support for the GCS. All methods suggest that the support is either completely sincere, or the share of insincere answers is limited.

List experiment

25

By asking *how many* policies within a list respondents support, and adding for some respondents the GCS in the list, we identify the tacit support for that policy. It is not significantly different from the stated support (table S1). Hence, we do not find a social desirability bias: people faithfully report their opinion on the GCS.

Petition

30

In a real-stake question, we ask respondents whether they are willing to sign a petition in support of the GCS, informing them that the results of that question will be sent to the head of state's office. In the U.S., we find no significant difference between the support in the real-stake petition and the simple question ($p = 0.30$). In Europe, the petition leads to a lower support (-7 p.p., $p=10^{-5}$), but the support remains strong, at 69%.

35

Conjoint analyses

40

To assess the electoral potential of endorsing the GCS, we present to two random branches hypothetical progressive and conservative platforms that differ only by the presence (or not) of the GCS in the progressive platform. Table 1 shows that a progressive candidate would not significantly lose voting share by endorsing the GCS in any country, and may even gain 11 p.p. ($p = .005$) in voting intention in France and 3 p.p. ($p = .13$) in the U.S.

Table 1 Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the Global Climate Scheme.

	Prefers the Progressive platform					
	All	United States	France	Germany	UK	Spain
GCS in Progressive platform	0.028* (0.014)	0.029 (0.022)	0.112*** (0.041)	0.015 (0.033)	0.008 (0.040)	-0.015 (0.038)
Constant	0.623	0.604	0.55	0.7	0.551	0.775
Observations	5,202	2,619	605	813	661	504
R ²	0.001	0.001	0.013	0.0003	0.0001	0.0003

Note: The 14% of *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples. GCS has no significant influence on them. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

We also make respondents choose between two pairs of random platforms (in the U.S., these questions are framed as a Democratic primary and asked only to non-Republicans). In the first question, a policy (or an absence of policy) is randomly drawn for each platform in each of five categories. In the UK, Germany, and France, a platform is about 9 to 13 p.p. more likely to be preferred if it includes the GCS rather than no foreign policy (fig. S7). This effect is between 1 and 4 p.p. and no longer significant in the U.S. and in Spain. Moreover, a platform that includes a global tax on millionaires rather than no foreign policy is 5 to 13 percentage points (p.p.) more likely to be preferred in all countries (the effect is significant and at least 9 p.p. in all countries but Spain). Similarly, a global democratic assembly on climate change has a significant effect of 8 to 12 p.p. in the U.S., Germany, and France. These effects are large, and not far from the effects of the policies most influential on the platforms, which range between 15 and 18 p.p. in most countries (and 27 p.p. in Spain), and all relate to improved public services.

The second question draws random platforms similarly, except that candidate A's platform always contains the GCS while B's includes no foreign policy. In this case, A is chosen by 60% in Europe and 58% in the U.S. (fig. S8).

Overall, taking the U.S. as an example, our conjoint analyses indicate that a candidate at the Democratic primary would have more chances to obtain the nomination by endorsing the GCS, and this endorsement would not penalize her or him at the presidential election.

Prioritization

Toward the end of the survey, we ask respondents to allocate 100 points among six randomly selected policies from the previous conjoint analyses, using sliders. The instruction was to distribute the points based on their level of support, with a higher allocation indicating greater support for a policy. In each country, the GCS ranks in the middle of all policies or above, with an average number of points from 15.4 in the U.S. to 22.9 in Germany. Interestingly, in Germany, the most prioritized policy is the global tax on millionaires, while the GCS came in as the second most prioritized policy. The global tax on millionaires consistently ranks no lower than fifth position (out of 15 or 17 policies) in every country, garnering an average of 18.3 points in Spain to 22.9 points in Germany.

Pros and Cons

We survey respondents to gather their perspectives on the pros and cons of the GCS, utilizing either an open-ended or a closed question. Due to the limited variation in the ratings for each element, the closed question format is inconclusive. Analyzing keywords in the responses

(automatically translated into English), the most frequently mentioned topic is the environmental benefit of the GCS, while obstacles to implementation or agreement on the proposal are relatively infrequently mentioned.

In the *US2* survey, we divided the sample into four random branches. Two branches were presented the pros and cons questions (either in open or closed format) *before* being asked about their support for the GCS. Another branch received information on the actual level of support for the GCS (estimated in *US1*), and one control group received none of these treatments. The objective of this “pros and cons treatment” was to simulate a “campaign effect”, which refers to the shift in opinion resulting from media coverage of the proposal. To conservatively estimate the effect of a (potentially negative) campaign, we intentionally included more cons (6) than pros (3). Interestingly, the support for the GCS decreased by 11 p.p. after participants viewed a list of its pros and cons. Notably, the support also decreased by 7 p.p. after participants were asked to consider the pros and cons in an open-ended question. Although support remains significant, these results suggest that the public success of the GCS would be sensitive to the content of the debate about it, and subject to the discourse adopted by interest groups.

Universalistic values

We also elicit underlying values, to test whether values are consistent with people’s support for specific policies. Most people express some degree of universalism, consistently with the support for specific policies.

When we ask participants which group they defend when they vote, 20% choose “sentient beings (humans and animals),” 22% choose “humans,” 33% select their “fellow citizens” (or “Europeans”), 15% choose “My family and myself,” and the remaining 10% choose another group (mainly “My State or region” or “People sharing my culture or religion”). Notably, a majority of left-wing voters choose “humans” or “sentient beings”.

When asked what their country’s diplomats should defend in international climate negotiations, only 11% prefer their country’s “interests, even if it goes against global justice”. In contrast, 30% prefer global justice (with or without consideration of national interests), and the bulk of respondents (38%) prefer their country’s “interests, to the extent it respects global justice.”

Furthermore, when we ask participants to assess the extent to which climate change, global poverty, and inequality in their country are issues, climate change is generally viewed as the most significant problem (with a mean score of 0.59 after recoding answers between -2 and 2). This is followed by global poverty (0.42) and national inequality (0.37).

Finally, we conducted a lottery experiment. Respondents had to choose the proportion of the \$100 prize they would keep for themselves versus give to a person living in poverty. The charity donation is directed either to an African individual or a fellow citizen, depending on the respondent’s random assignment. In Europe, we observe no significant variation in the willingness to donate based on the recipient’s origin. In the U.S., the donations to Africans are 3 p.p. lower, but the slightly lower donations to Africans are entirely driven by Trump voters and non-voters.

Second-order Beliefs

To explain the strong support for the GCS despite its absence from political platforms and public debate, we hypothesized pluralistic ignorance, i.e. that the public and policymakers mistakenly perceive the GCS as unpopular. The evidence for pluralistic ignorance is limited based on an incentivized question about perceived support.

Beliefs about the level of support for the GCS are fairly accurate for U.S. subjects (fig. S9). The mean perceived support is 52% (with quartiles of 36%, 52%, and 68%), which closely aligns with the actual support of 53%. Europeans, on the other hand, underestimate the support by 17 p.p. Nonetheless, 65% of them correctly estimate that the GCS garners majority support, and the mean perceived support is 59% (and quartiles of 43%, 61%, and 74%). Finally, consistent with U.S. subjects accurately perceiving the levels of support for the GCS, providing information on the actual level had no significant effect on their support in the *US2* survey.

15

Discussion

Having ruled out insincerity and underestimation of fellow citizens' support as potential explanations for the scarcity of global policies in the public debate, we propose different alternative explanations.

First, there may be pluralistic ignorance *among policymakers*. Second, policymakers may believe that globally redistributive policies are politically infeasible in some key countries like the U.S. Third, political discourse centrally happens at the national level, shaped by media and institutions such as voting. In turn, national framing may suppress universalistic values.

In any case, our findings indicate that public opinion is not the reason why global redistributive policies do not prominently enter political debates.

References and Notes

1. Budolfson, M. et al. Climate action with revenue recycling has benefits for poverty, inequality and well-being. *Nature Climate Change* (2021).
2. Franks, M., Lessmann, K., Jakob, M., Steckel, J. C. & Edenhofer, O. Mobilizing domestic resources for the Agenda 2030 via carbon pricing. *Nature Sustainability* (2018).
3. Dennig, F., Budolfson, M. B., Fleurbaey, M., Siebert, A. & Socolow, R. H. Inequality, climate impacts on the future poor, and carbon prices. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* (2015).
4. Soergel, B., Kriegler, E., Bodirsky, B. L., Bauer, N., Leimbach, M. & Popp, A. Combining ambitious climate policies with efforts to eradicate poverty. *Nature Communications* (2021).
5. Bauer, N. et al. Quantification of an efficiency–sovereignty trade-off in climate policy. *Nature* (2020).
6. Cramton, P. C., MacKay, D. J. C. & Ockenfels, A. (eds.) Global Carbon Pricing: The Path to Climate Cooperation (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2017).
7. Fehr, D., Mollerstrom, J. & Perez-Truglia, R. Your Place in the World: Relative Income and Global Inequality. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* (2022).
8. Dechezleprêtre, A., Fabre, A., Kruse, T., Sanchez Chico, A., Planterose, B. & Stantcheva, S. Fighting Climate Change: International Attitudes toward Climate Policies. *NBER Working Paper* (2022)
9. Carattini, S., Steffen K., & Orlov A. How to Win Public Support for a Global Carbon Tax. *Nature* (2019)
10. Ghassim, F., Koenig-Archibugi M., & Cabrera L. Public Opinion on Institutional Designs for the United Nations: An International Survey Experiment. *International Studies Quarterly* (2022)

Acknowledgments: We thank Antoine Dechezleprêtre, Tobias Kruse, Blueberry Planterose, Ana Sanchez Chico, and Stefanie Stantcheva for their invaluable inputs for the project. We thank Antonio Bento, Dietmar Fehr, and Auriane Meiland for feedback. We further thank Jakob Niemann, Laura Schepp, Martín Fernández-Sánchez, Samuel Gervais, Samuel Haddad, and Guadalupe Manzo for assistance.

5

Funding: University of Amsterdam; TU Berlin; Robert Bosch Foundation

Author contributions: Conceptualization: AF, TD, LM; Methodology: AF, TD, LM; Investigation: AF; Visualization: AF; Funding acquisition: TD, LM; Project administration: AF; Writing – original draft: AF; Writing – review & editing: AF, TD, LM

10

Competing interests: Fabre serves as president of Global Redistribution Advocates.

Data and materials availability: All data and code of the *Complementary* surveys as well as figures of the paper are available on github.com/bixiou/international_attitudes_toward_global_policies. Data and code for the *Global* survey will be made public upon publication.

15

Supplementary Materials

Supplementary Materials include *Supplementary Figures and Tables*, and *Materials and Methods*, itself including different sections: *Methods*, *Literature Review*, *Raw results*, *Questionnaires*, *Net gains from the GCS*, *Determinants of support*, *Representativeness of the survey*, and *Attrition analysis*.

20

We do not fully comply with *Science*'s guidelines but we will in case of a revision.

International Attitudes Toward Global Policies Supplementary Material

Adrien Fabre*, Thomas Douenne[†] and Linus Mattauch[‡]

October 27, 2023

Contents

7	Contents	1
8	A Supplementary Figures and Tables	3
9	B Methods	11
10	B.1 Data and questionnaires	11
11	B.2 Methodology	12
12	B.3 Sources	14
13	C Literature review	15
14	C.1 Attitudes and perceptions	15
15	C.1.1 Population attitudes on global policies	15
16	C.1.2 Population attitudes on climate burden sharing	16
17	C.1.3 Population attitudes on foreign aid	18
18	C.1.4 Population attitudes on rich tax	19
19	C.1.5 Population attitudes on ethical norms	20
20	C.1.6 Second-order beliefs	21
21	C.2 Proposals and analyses of global policy-making	22
22	C.2.1 Global carbon pricing	22

*CNRS, CIRED. E-mail: adrien.fabre@cnrs.fr (corresponding author).


[†]University of Amsterdam

[‡]Technical University Berlin, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research – Member of the Leibniz Association and University of Oxford

23	C.2.2 Climate burden sharing	23
24	C.2.3 Global redistribution	28
25	C.2.4 Basic income	29
26	C.2.5 Global democracy	30
27	D Raw results	31
28	E Questionnaire of the global survey (section on global policies)	52
29	F Questionnaire of the complementary surveys	55
30	G Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme	78
31	H Determinants of support	82
32	I Representativeness of the surveys	83
33	J Attrition analysis	85
34	Bibliography	88
35	List of Tables	99
36	List of Figures	99

³⁷ A Supplementary Figures and Tables

Figure S1: Absolute support for global climate policies. (Reproduced from [Dechezleprêtre et al. \(2022\)](#), Figure A21.)



Note 1: Percentage of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* ($n = 40,680$). The color blue denotes an absolute majority. (Questions A-I).

Note 2: *In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

Figure S2: Absolute support for various global policies (percentage of *somewhat* or *strong support*). (Questions 44 and 45.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	41	54	52	53	62	51
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	53	65	62	66	68	62
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	45	58	55	60	62	54
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	31	37	36	30	45	40
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	34	44	44	43	52	43
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	39	49	39	51	50	54
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	42	55	54	54	61	53
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	44	70	73	70	72	65
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	34	45	40	48	44	50
National tax on millionaires funding public services	62	76	70	79	79	77
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	58	71	69	72	78	71

Figure S3: Percent of global wealth tax that should finance low-income countries (*mean*). (Question 37)




Table S1: Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list.

	Number of supported policies		
	All	US	Europe
List contains: GCS	0.624*** (0.028)	0.524*** (0.041)	0.724*** (0.036)
<i>Support for GCS</i>	0.65	0.542	0.757
<i>Social desirability bias</i>	-0.026	-0.018	-0.033
<i>80% C.I. for the bias</i>	[-0.06; 0.01]	[-0.07; 0.01]	[-0.08; 0.01]
Constant	1.317	1.147	1.486
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000
R ²	0.089	0.065	0.125

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table S2: Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. (Question 28)

	Prefers the Progressive platform					
	All	United States	France	Germany	UK	Spain
GCS in Progressive platform	0.028* (0.014)	0.029 (0.022)	0.112*** (0.041)	0.015 (0.033)	0.008 (0.040)	-0.015 (0.038)
Constant	0.623	0.604	0.55	0.7	0.551	0.775
Observations	5,202	2,619	605	813	661	504
R ²	0.001	0.001	0.013	0.0003	0.0001	0.0003

Note: The 14% of *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples. GCS has no significant influence on them. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

Figure S4: Attitudes regarding the evolution of [own country] foreign aid. (Question 46)




Figure S5: Conditions at which foreign aid should be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish an increase of foreign aid at some conditions.] (Question 47)




Figure S6: Reasons why foreign aid should not be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish a decrease or stability of foreign aid.] (Question 48)






Figure S7: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See English translations in Figure S17; Question 29)

(a) U.S. (Asked only to non-Republicans)




(b) France




(c) Germany

- Klimaschutz:
- Verpflichtende Solaranlagen auf allen geeigneten Dächern
 - Plan zur Wärmedämmung
 - Verbot des Verkaufs von Neuwagen mit Verbrennungsmotor bis 2030
- Wirtschaftspolitik:
- Erhöhung des Regelsatzes des Bürgergelds auf bis zu 600€ pro Monat
 - Bürgerversicherung als gerechtere Sozialversicherung
 - Staatschuldenquote auf unter 60% reduzieren
 - Investitionen für Gigabit-Netzwerke bereitstellen
- Außenpolitik:
- Globales Klimaprogramm
 - Globale Steuer auf Millionäre
 - Globale demokratische Versammlung zum Klimawandel
 - Verdoppelung der Mittel für die Entwicklungshilfe in einkommensschwachen Ländern
- Gesellschaft:
- Volksscheid auf Bundesebene
 - Cannabis-Legalisierung
- Steuerpolitik:
- Nationales Umverteilungsprogramm
 - Die Vermögenssteuer wieder in Kraft setzen



(d) Spain

- Política climática:
- 100% de electricidad producida con energías renovables en 2040
 - Plan de aislamiento térmico
 - Prohibir la venta de coches nuevos con motor de combustión para 2030
- Asuntos económicos:
- Más necesidades sanitarias dentro del sistema público (cuidado dental, gafas, salud mental)
 - Ingreso Básico Garantizado de 600€ al mes
 - Jornada laboral de 34 horas semanales
 - Inversión en el sistema educativo y universalización de la educación preescolar
- Política exterior:
- Plan climático global
 - Impuesto mundial a los millonarios
 - Asamblea democrática mundial sobre el cambio climático
 - Duplicar la ayuda exterior a los países de renta baja
- Asuntos sociales:
- Reformar la ley electoral para hacer el Senado más proporcional
 - Abolición de la prostitución
- Sistema fiscal:
- Plan de redistribución nacional
 - Aumentar los impuestos sobre las rentas superiores a 100.000 euros anuales



(e) UK

- Climate policy:
- Ban of most polluting vehicles in city centers (low-emission zones)
 - Thermal insulation plan
 - Ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030
- Economic issues:
- £150 billion to upgrade schools, hospitals, care homes and council houses
 - Real Living Wage of £11 per hour for all workers aged 16 and over
 - Reduce the average full-time weekly working hours to 32
 - Re-establish neighbourhood policing and recruit 2,000 more frontline officers
- Foreign policy:
- Global climate scheme
 - Global tax on millionaires
 - Global democratic assembly on climate change
 - Doubling foreign aid
- Societal issues:
- Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation
 - Legalization of cannabis
- Tax system:
- National redistribution scheme
 - Wealth tax




Figure S8: Influence of the GCS on preferred platform:

Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question 30; in the U.S., asked only to non-Republicans.)





Figure S9: Beliefs regarding the support for the GCS and NR. (Questions 21 and 23)



³⁸ **B Methods**

³⁹ **B.1 Data and questionnaires**

⁴⁰ **Data collection** The paper utilizes two sets of surveys: the *Global* survey and the *Com-*
⁴¹ *plementary* surveys. The *Complementary* surveys consist of two U.S. surveys, *US1* and
⁴² *US2*, and one European survey, *Eu*. The *Global* survey was conducted from March 2021 to
⁴³ March 2022 on 40,680 respondents from 20 countries (with 1,465 to 2,488 respondents per
⁴⁴ country). *US1* collected responses from 3,000 participants between January and March
⁴⁵ 2023, while *US2* gathered data from 2,000 respondents between March and April 2023. *Eu*
⁴⁶ included 3,000 participants and was conducted from February to March 2023. We used
⁴⁷ the survey companies *Dynata* and *Respondi*. To ensure representative samples, we em-
⁴⁸ ployed stratified quotas based on gender, age (5 brackets), income (4), region (4), and ed-
⁴⁹ ucation level (3), as well as ethnicity (3) for the U.S. We also incorporated survey weights
⁵⁰ throughout the analysis to account for any remaining imbalances. These weights were
⁵¹ constructed using the quota variables as well as the degree of urbanity, and trimmed
⁵² between 0.25 and 4. By applying weights, the results are fully representative of the re-
⁵³spective countries. Results at the European level apply different weights which ensure
⁵⁴ representativeness of the combined four European countries. Supplementary Section I
⁵⁵ confirms that our samples closely match population frequencies in high-income countries.
⁵⁶ In middle-income countries, the samples are only representative of the online population
⁵⁷ (young, graduated and urban people are over-represented).

⁵⁸ **Data quality** The median duration is 28 minutes for the *Global* survey, 14 min for *US1*,
⁵⁹ 11 min for *US2*, and 20 min for *Eu*. To ensure the best possible data quality, we exclude
⁶⁰ respondents who fail an attention test or rush through the survey (i.e., answer in less than
⁶¹ 11.5 minutes in the *Global* survey, 4 minutes in *US1* or *US2*, 6 minutes in *Eu*). We study
⁶² the determinants of attrition in Supplementary Section J. Some socio-demographics drop
⁶³ out significantly more frequently than others, but the coefficients remain small, indicating
⁶⁴ that our results are not driven by selection bias.

⁶⁵ **Questionnaires and raw results** The questionnaire and raw results of the *Global* survey
⁶⁶ can be found in the Appendix of the companion paper (Dechezleprêtre et al. 2022). The
⁶⁷ raw results are reported in Supplementary Section D while the surveys' structures and
⁶⁸ questionnaires are given in Supplementary Sections E and F. The questionnaires are the

69 same as the ones given *ex ante* in the registration plan (osf.io/fy6gd).

70 **Incentives** To encourage accurate and truthful responses, several questions of the *US1*
71 survey use incentives. For each of the three comprehension questions that follow the pol-
72 icy descriptions, we randomly select and reward three respondents who provide correct
73 answers with a \$50 gift certificate. Similarly, for questions involving estimating support
74 shares for the GCS and NR, three participants with the closest guesses to the actual val-
75 ues receive a \$50 gift certificate. In the donation lottery question, we randomly select one
76 respondent and split the \$100 prize between the NGO GiveDirectly and the winner ac-
77 cording to the winner’s choice. In total, our incentives scheme distributes gift certificates
78 (and donations) for a value of \$850. Finally, respondents have an incentive to answer
79 truthfully to the petition question, as they are aware that the results for that question
80 (the share of respondents supporting the policy) will be transmitted to the head of state’s
81 office.

82 **B.2 Methodology**

83 **National Redistribution scheme** After describing the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) to
84 the respondents, we assess respondents’ understanding of the GCS with incentivized
85 questions to test their comprehension of the expected financial outcome for typical in-
86 dividuals in high-income countries (loss) and the poorest individuals globally (gain), fol-
87 lowed by the provision of correct answers (Figures S12-S13). The same approach is then
88 applied to a National Redistribution scheme. NR targets the top 5% (in the U.S.) or top
89 1% (in Europe) with the aim of financing cash transfers to all adults,¹ calibrated to off-
90 set the monetary loss of the GCS for the median emitter in their country. We evaluate
91 respondents’ understanding that the richest would lose and the typical fellow citizens
92 would gain from that policy. Subsequently, we summarize both schemes to enhance re-
93 spondents’ recall. Additionally, we present a final incentivized comprehension question
94 and provide the expected answer that the combined GCS and NR would result in no net
95 gain or loss for a typical fellow citizen.

96 We introduced NR in the questionnaire because we formulated the hypothesis that the
97 GCS would be more supported if complemented with NR. As shown in conjoint analyses
98 (see below), this hypothesis turned out to be false.

¹The wider base in the U.S. was chosen because emissions are larger in the U.S. than in Europe, and it would hardly be feasible to offset the median American’s loss by taxing only the top 1%.

⁹⁹ We also used NR at several occasions in the questionnaire (the list experiment, the
¹⁰⁰ petition, and second-order beliefs) as a point of comparison with the GCS (see Supple-
¹⁰¹ mentary Section F). The rationale was to test whether we found higher or smaller effects
¹⁰² for the GCS compared to a benchmark policy: NR. Overall, we find similar effects for the
¹⁰³ GCS and for NR.

¹⁰⁴ **Support for the GCS** The 95% confidence intervals are [52.4%, 55.9%] in the U.S. and
¹⁰⁵ [74.2%, 77.2%] in Europe. The average support is computed with survey weights, employ-
¹⁰⁶ ing weights based on quota variables, which exclude vote. Another method to reweigh
¹⁰⁷ the raw results involves running a regression of the support for the GCS on sociodemo-
¹⁰⁸ graphic characteristics (including vote) and multiplying each coefficient by the popula-
¹⁰⁹ tion frequencies. This alternative approach yields similar figures: 76% in Europe and 52%
¹¹⁰ or 53% in the U.S. (depending on whether individuals who did not disclose their vote are
¹¹¹ classified as non-voters or excluded). Notably, the average support excluding non-voters
¹¹² is 54% in the U.S.

¹¹³ Though the level of support for the GCS is significantly lower in swing States (at 51%)
¹¹⁴ that are key to win U.S. elections, the electoral effect of endorsing the GCS remains non-
¹¹⁵ significantly different from zero (at +1.2 p.p.) in these States. Note that we define swing
¹¹⁶ states as the 8 states with less than 5 p.p. margin of victory in the 2020 election (MI,
¹¹⁷ NV, PA, WI, AZ, GA, NC, FL). The results are robust to using the 3 p.p. threshold (that
¹¹⁸ excludes FL) instead.

¹¹⁹ **Global wealth tax estimates** A 2% tax on net wealth exceeding \$5 million would annu-
¹²⁰ ally raise \$816 billion, leaving unaffected 99.9% of the world population. More specifi-
¹²¹ cally, it would collect €5 billion in Spain, €16 billion in France, £20 billion in the UK, €44
¹²² billion in Germany, \$430 billion in the U.S., and \$1 billion collectively in all low-income
¹²³ countries (28 countries, home to 700 million people). These Figures come from the [WID](#)
¹²⁴ [wealth tax simulator](#) of [Chancel et al. \(2022\)](#).

¹²⁵ **List experiment** We utilize the difference-in-means estimator, and confidence intervals
¹²⁶ are computed using Monte Carlo simulation with the R package *list* by [Imai \(2011\)](#).

¹²⁷ **Petition** Paired weighted *t*-tests are conducted to test the equality in support for a policy
¹²⁸ among respondents who were questioned about the policy in the petition.

¹²⁹ **Conjoint analysis** In order to assess the public support for the GCS in conjunction with
¹³⁰ other policies, we conduct a series of conjoint analyses. We ask respondents to make five
¹³¹ choices between pairs of political platforms. In the main text, we do not present the first
¹³² two conjoint analyses.

¹³³ The first conjoint analysis suggests that the GCS is supported independently of be-
¹³⁴ ing complemented by the National Redistribution Scheme and a national climate policy
¹³⁵ (“Coal exit” in the U.S., “Thermal insulation plan” in Europe, denoted C).²

¹³⁶ For the second analysis, we split the sample into four random branches.³ The out-
¹³⁷ come is that there is majority support for the GCS and for C, which are seen as neither
¹³⁸ complement nor substitute. A minor share of respondents like a national climate policy
¹³⁹ and dislike a global one, but as many people prefer a global rather than a national policy;
¹⁴⁰ and there is no evidence that implementing NR would increase the support for the GCS.

¹⁴¹ The effects reported as the changes in likelihood that a platform is preferred are the
¹⁴² Average Marginal Component Effects ([Hainmueller et al. 2014](#)). The policies studied are
¹⁴³ progressive policies prominent in the country. Except for the category *foreign policy*, which
¹⁴⁴ features the GCS 42% of the time, they are drawn uniformly.

¹⁴⁵ **Pros and cons** Surprisingly, the support for National Redistribution also decreased by
¹⁴⁶ 7 p.p. following the closed question about the GCS. This suggests that some individuals
¹⁴⁷ may lack attention and confuse the two policies, or that contemplating the pros and cons
¹⁴⁸ alters the mood of some people, moving them away from their initial positive impression.

¹⁴⁹ B.3 Sources

¹⁵⁰ Detailed sources for the questionnaires and the figures are given in the [Supplementary](#)
¹⁵¹ [Spreadsheet](#).

²Indeed, 54% of U.S. respondents and 74% of European ones prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to the combination of C and NR alone, indicating similar support for the GCS conditional on NR and C than for the GCS alone (Figure S16).

³Results from the first branch show that the support for the GCS conditional on NR, at 55% in the U.S. ($n = 757$) and 77% in Europe ($n = 746$), is not significantly different from the support for the GCS alone. This suggests that rejection of the GCS is not driven by the cost of the policy on oneself. The second branch shows that the support for C conditional on NR is somewhat higher, at 62% in the U.S. ($n = 751$) and 84% in Europe ($n = 747$). However, the third one shows no significant preference for C compared to GCS (both conditional on NR), neither in Europe, where GCS is preferred by 52% ($n = 741$) nor in the U.S., where C is preferred by 53% ($n = 721$). The fourth branch shows that 55% in the U.S. ($n = 771$) and 77% in Europe ($n = 766$) prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to NR alone.

152 **C Literature review**

153 **C.1 Attitudes and perceptions**

154 **C.1.1 Population attitudes on global policies**

155 Carattini et al. (2019) test the support for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples
156 in five countries, representative along gender and age. For a given variant, the sample
157 size is about 167 respondents per country. They find over 80% support for any variant in
158 India, between 50% and 65% in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43% to 59% in
159 the U.S., depending on the variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding
160 an equal dividend for each human is close to 50% in high-income countries (e.g., at 44%
161 in the U.S.), consistently with our results from the *Global* survey (see Figure S1). This is
162 another piece of evidence that the support is lower for a tax that would “only” reduce CO₂
163 emissions than for a quota that would unambiguously achieve the climate target. Using
164 a conjoint analysis in the U.S. and Germany, Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019b) find
165 that the support for a carbon tax increases by up to 50% if it applies to all industrialized
166 countries rather than exclusively to one’s own country.

167 In surveys conducted in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S., Ghassim (2020)
168 finds support ranging from 55% to 74% for “a global democracy including both a global
169 government and a global parliament, directly elected by the world population, to recom-
170 mend and implement policies on global issues”. Through an experiment, he also finds
171 that, in countries where the government stems from a coalition, voting shares would shift
172 by 8 (Brazil) to 12 p.p. (Germany) from parties who are said to oppose global democracy
173 to parties that supposedly support it. For instance, when Germans respondents were told
174 that (only) the Greens and the Left support global democracy, these parties gained re-
175 spectively 9 and 3 p.p. in vote intentions, while the SPD and the CDU-CSU each lost 6
176 p.p. Ghassim (2020) also presents survey results showing strong majorities in favor of the
177 direct election of one’s country’s UN representative in all 18 surveyed countries. Simi-
178 larly, in each of 10 countries, there are clear majorities in favor of “a new supranational
179 entity [taking] enforceable global decisions in order to solve global risks” (Global Chal-
180 lenges Foundation 2018). Remarkably, already in 1946, 54% of Americans agreed (while
181 24% disagreed) that “the UN should be strengthened to make it a world government with
182 the power to control the armed forces of all nations” (Gallup 1946). Furthermore, in sur-
183 veys conducted in Argentina, China, India, Russia, Spain, and the U.S., Ghassim et al.

¹⁸⁴ (2022) find majority support for UN reforms that would make United Nations' decisions
¹⁸⁵ binding, give veto powers to a few other major countries at the Security Council, or com-
¹⁸⁶ plement the highest body of the UN with a chamber of directly elected representatives.

¹⁸⁷ Relatedly, Meiland et al. (2023) find that both Americans and French people prefer an
¹⁸⁸ international settlement of climate justice, even if it encroaches on sovereignty. In a 2013
¹⁸⁹ survey conducted in China, Germany, and the U.S., Schleich et al. (2016) show that over
¹⁹⁰ three-quarter of people think that international climate agreements reached so far are not
¹⁹¹ successful and that future agreements are important. In Finland, Sivonen (2022) finds that
¹⁹² that support for a carbon tax is higher if implemented at the global level (54%) rather than
¹⁹³ at the national level (40%).

¹⁹⁴ The results from these specific questions are in line with the answers to more general
¹⁹⁵ questions. In each of 36 countries, ISSP (2010) find near consensus that "for environ-
¹⁹⁶ mental problems, there should be international agreements that [their country] and other
¹⁹⁷ countries should be made to follow" (overall, 82% agree and 4% disagree). In each of
¹⁹⁸ 29 countries, ISSP (2019) uncover near consensus that "Present economic differences be-
¹⁹⁹ tween rich and poor countries are too large" (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree). Fehr
²⁰⁰ et al. (2022) find that 90% of Germans want some degree of global redistribution.

²⁰¹ C.1.2 Population attitudes on climate burden sharing

²⁰² Despite differences in the description of fairness principles, surveys on burden-sharing
²⁰³ rules show consistent attitudes. Or at least, their seemingly contradictory results can be
²⁰⁴ made compatible with the following interpretation: Concerning emissions reductions,
²⁰⁵ most people want that every country engage in strong and collective decarbonization ef-
²⁰⁶ forts, with a global quota converging to climate neutrality in the medium run. Concerning
²⁰⁷ the financial effort, most people support high-emitting countries paying and low-income
²⁰⁸ countries receiving funding. The most supported rules are those perceived as equitable,
²⁰⁹ in particular an equal right to emit per person.

²¹⁰ This interpretation helps to understand the apparent differences between articles that
²¹¹ approach burden sharing from different angles: cost sharing (in money terms), effort shar-
²¹² ing (in terms of emissions reductions), or resource sharing (in terms of rights to emit).
²¹³ Existing papers adopt either the cost sharing or effort sharing approach, which preclude
²¹⁴ any country from being a net receiver of funds. Also, by focusing on *either* the financial
²¹⁵ or the decarbonization effort, these surveys miss the other half of the picture, which can
²¹⁶ explain why some papers find strong support for the ability-to-pay principle while others

217 find strong support for grandfathering (defined as emissions reductions being the same
218 in every country). The literature follows these approaches to align with the notions used
219 by the UNFCCC. Yet, we argue that the resource sharing approach is preferable for un-
220 covering attitudes, as it unambiguously describes the distributive implications of each
221 rule while achieving an efficient geographical distribution of emissions reductions and
222 explicitly allowing for monetary gains for some countries.

223 Now, let us summarize the results of the different papers in the light of this clarifica-
224 tion. Schleich et al. (2016) find an identical ranking of support for burden-sharing prin-
225 ciples in China, Germany, and the U.S.: polluter-pays followed by ability-to-pay, equal
226 emissions per capita, and grandfathering. Note that the authors do not allow for emis-
227 sions trading in their description of equal *emissions per capita*, which may explain its rel-
228 atively low support. Yet, the relative support for egalitarianism also depends on how
229 *the other* rules are described. Indeed, Carlsson et al. (2011) find that Swedes prefer that
230 “all countries are allowed to emit an equal amount per capita” rather than options where
231 emissions are reduced based on current or historical emissions, for which it is explicitly
232 stated that high-emitting countries “will continue to emit more than others”. Bechtel &
233 Scheve (2013) find agreement that rich countries should pay more and historical emissions
234 should matter, but that efforts should not be solely borne by wealthy nations. More pre-
235 cisely, their conjoint analysis conducted in France, Germany, the UK, and the U.S. shows
236 that a climate agreement is 15 p.p. more likely to be preferred (to a random alternative) if
237 it includes 160 countries rather than 20, and 5 p.p. less likely to be preferred if “only rich
238 countries pay” compared to other burden-sharing rules: “rich countries pay more than
239 poor”, “countries pay proportional to current emissions” or “countries pay proportional
240 to historical emissions”. Using a choice experiment, Carlsson et al. (2013) find that the
241 least preferred option in China and the U.S. is when low-emitting countries are exempted
242 from any effort. Ability-to-pay is appreciated in both countries and is the preferred op-
243 tion in the U.S., though the preferred option in China is another one that accounts for
244 historical responsibility. In the U.S. and France, Meiland et al. (2023) find that the most
245 favored fairness principle is that “all countries commit to converge to the same average
246 of total emissions per inhabitant, compatible with a controlled climate change”. Further-
247 more, in each country, 73% disagree with grandfathering defined as “countries which
248 emitted a lot of carbon in the past have a right to continue emitting more than others in
249 the future”. The study by Meiland et al. (2023) contains many other results: for instance,
250 majorities prefer to hold countries accountable for their consumption-based rather than

territorial emissions, and the median choice regarding historical responsibility is to hold a country accountable for its post-1990 emissions (rather than post-1850 or just their current emissions). Finally, in each of 28 (among the largest) countries, Dabla-Norris et al. (2023) find strong majority for “all countries” to the question “Which countries do you think should be paying to reduce carbon emissions?”. When asked to choose between a cost sharing based on *current* vs. *accumulated historic emissions*, a majority prefers *current emissions* in all countries but China and Saudi Arabia (where the two options are close to equally preferred).

C.1.3 Population attitudes on foreign aid

There is an extensive literature on attitudes towards foreign aid in donor countries. The key findings indicate that most people overestimate the amount of foreign aid and that only a minority wants a cut in foreign aid compared to actual amounts, especially once they become aware of them.

For instance, PIPA (2001) shows that 83% of Americans support a multilateral effort to cut world hunger in half. PIPA (2008) shows that in each of 20 countries, a majority thinks that developed countries “have a moral responsibility to work to reduce hunger and severe poverty in poor countries”, with an average agreement of 81%. In 7 OECD countries, the study finds that at least 75% of respondents are willing to pay for a program to cut hunger in half (at an estimated cost of, e.g., \$50 a year for each American).

Kaufmann et al. (2012) find that perceived aid is overestimated in each of the 24 countries they study, on average by a factor of 7. In most countries, desired aid is larger than perceived aid.⁴ They show that individuals in the top income quintile desire aid 0.13 p.p. lower than those in the bottom 40% – which is very close to what we find. By employing a theoretical model and examining correlations between lobbying and actual aid (controlling for desired aid), they argue that the gap between actual and desired aid stems from the political influence of the rich who defend their vested interests. In Kaufmann et al. (2012), the U.S. is an outlier: desired aid is at the other countries’ average (3% of GNI), but as misperceptions are enormous, perceived aid is twice as large as desired aid. Indeed, Gilens (2001) shows that even Americans with high political knowledge misperceive actual aid, and finds that 17% fewer of them want to cut aid when we provide them specific information about the amount of aid. Similarly, Nair (2018) finds that the rela-

⁴Kaufmann et al. (2012) offer the best results on desired aid because (as Hudson & van Heerde (2012) criticize), other studies did not take into account misperceptions of actual aid.

tively low support for aid in the U.S. is driven by information on global distribution, as people underestimate their rank by 27 centiles on average and overestimate the global median income by a factor 10.

Hudson & van Heerde (2012) provide a critical review of the literature and show that the strong support for poverty alleviation largely stems from intrinsic altruism. They note that, according to DFID (2009) and PIPA (2001), 47% of British people find that the aid is wasted (mainly due to corruption), while Americans estimate that less than a quarter of the aid reaches those in need, with over half ending up in the hands of corrupt government officials. Despite these perceptions, most people still support aid, suggesting the presence of nonutilitarian motives. Consistent with Henson et al. (2010), Bauhr et al. (2013) find that support for aid is reduced by the perception of corruption in recipient countries. However, this effect is mitigated by the aid-corruption paradox: countries with higher levels of corruption often need more help. Bodenstein & Faust (2017) further show that right-wing Europeans, as well as those who perceive strong corruption in their country, are more likely to agree that recipient countries should “follow certain rules regarding democracy, human rights and governance as a condition for receiving EU development aid.” Using a 2002 Gallup survey and the 2006 World Values Survey, and in line with Bayram (2017), Paxton & Knack (2012) show that the main determinants for wanting more aid are trust, left-wing ideology, interest in politics, and being a woman (all positively associated).

C.1.4 Population attitudes on rich tax

We are not aware of any previous survey on a global wealth tax,⁵ though surveys consistently show strong support for national wealth taxes. In a comprehensive survey conducted in the UK, Rowlingson et al. (2021) show that a wealth tax is the preferred option for raising revenues. Only 8% of respondents state that total net wealth should not be taxed (with little differences between Labour and Conservative voters). The study also finds that the preferred design would be a 1% or 3% tax on net wealth above £1 million. By asking how much taxes per year should a person with a certain income and wealth level pay, Fisman et al. (2017) finds that the average American favors a 0.8% linear tax rate on unspecified wealth up to \$2 million (the highest wealth level tested), and a 3% linear rate on inherited wealth. Through a conjoint analysis conducted in three high-income

⁵We did not find any using the combination of “survey” or “attitudes” with “wealth tax” or “global wealth tax” in Google Scholar.

³¹³ countries, Schecht & Tisch (2023) find widespread support for a wealth tax (from 78% in
³¹⁴ the U.S. to 86% in Germany and the UK), with a preference for an exemption threshold
³¹⁵ set at \$/€1 million (rather than 500,000 or 2 million) with the tax rate and tax unit having
³¹⁶ little influence on the preferred design. In 21 OECD countries, the OECD (2019) uncovers
³¹⁷ strong majority support for higher taxes on the rich to support the poor, with nearly
³¹⁸ 70% overall agreement and less than 20% disagreement. Isbell (2022) finds similarly high
³¹⁹ level of support in 34 African countries. In the UK, Patriotic Millionaires (2022) find 69%
³²⁰ support (and 7% opposition) for a 1.1% tax on wealth in excess of £10 million. In the U.S.,
³²¹ Americans for Tax Fairness (2021) find that 67% to 71% of the respondents support to
³²² “raise taxes for those earning more than \$400,000 a year”, “raise the income tax rate for
³²³ those earning over \$1 million a year by 10 percentage points”, or “apply a 2% tax on an
³²⁴ individual’s wealth above \$50 million each year, and 3% on wealth above \$1 billion”.

³²⁵ C.1.5 Population attitudes on ethical norms

³²⁶ **Universalism** Various studies have examined the concept of global identity (see Reysen
³²⁷ & Katzarska-Miller (2018) for a review). In the 2005-2008 wave of the World Values Sur-
³²⁸vey, Bayram (2015) notes that “78% of the participants in 57 countries see themselves as
³²⁹ citizens of the world”, though the 2017-2022 wave reveals that more people feel close to
³³⁰ their town, region or country than to the world. Enke et al. (2023a) measure universal-
³³¹ism at the U.S. district level using donation data, and find that a district’s universalism
³³² predicts electoral outcomes better than its income or education level. To measure uni-
³³³versalism at the individual level, Enke et al. (2023c) ask American respondents to split
³³⁴ \$100 between a random stranger and a random person with the same income but closer
³³⁵ to them. They distinguish different facets of universalism, and define *foreign universalism*
³³⁶ as the inclination to give to a foreigner rather than a fellow citizen. They find a home bias
³³⁷ for most people, which could partly be attributed to concerns about inequality, as the split
³³⁸ involves two persons with the same income, with the foreigner most certainly living in
³³⁹ a poorer country than the American and thus enjoying a higher social status. That being
³⁴⁰ said, a home bias probably remains even after accounting for concerns about inequality,
³⁴¹ as 84% of Americans agree that “taking care of problems at home is more important than
³⁴² giving aid to foreign countries” (PIPA 2001). Enke et al. (2023b) also measure univer-
³⁴³salism and analyze its correlates in 7 countries, and Cappelen et al. (2022) deploy this
³⁴⁴ method in 60 countries. In a lab experiment with students in the U.S., Cherry et al. (2017)
³⁴⁵ show that a substantial share of people prefer policies detrimental to them due to their

³⁴⁶ egalitarian worldview. Waytz et al. (2019) show that left-leaning people exhibit a wider
³⁴⁷ “moral circle”. Jaeger & Wilks (2023) find that judgments of moral concern are equally
³⁴⁸ well explained by characteristics of the judge and the evaluated target.

³⁴⁹ **Free-riding** Despite the long-standing explanation of the lack of climate action as a re-
³⁵⁰ sult of free-riding, surveys consistently show that people support climate mitigation ac-
³⁵¹ tion in their own country, even in the absence of such action in other countries. Bernauer
³⁵² & Gampfer (2015) show this for Americans and Indians, who both overestimate their
³⁵³ country’s emissions at one third of the global total. Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019a)
³⁵⁴ show this in the U.S. and China using an experimental design. McEvoy & Cherry (2016)
³⁵⁵ show that Americans mostly invoke leadership and morality to justify unilateral climate
³⁵⁶ action. Using a range of methods, Aklin & Mildenberger (2020) show that the empiri-
³⁵⁷ cal evidence for free-riding is not compelling, and that climate inaction can be equally
³⁵⁸ well explained by distributive conflicts. Finally, review of the literature by McGrath &
³⁵⁹ Bernauer (2017) shows that climate attitudes are largely nonreciprocal, and primarily
³⁶⁰ driven by values and perceptions of the policies, rather than by considerations of what
³⁶¹ other countries do.

³⁶² C.1.6 Second-order beliefs

³⁶³ Allport (1924) introduced the concept of pluralistic ignorance: a shared misperception
³⁶⁴ concerning others’ beliefs. The concept became notorious when O’Gorman (1975) showed
³⁶⁵ that, towards the end of the civil rights movement, 47% of Americans believed that a ma-
³⁶⁶ jority of white people supported segregation, while only 18% did so. PIPA (2001) has
³⁶⁷ shown that while 75% of Americans are willing to contribute \$50 annually to halve world
³⁶⁸ hunger (the cost of the program), only 32% believed that the majority would share this
³⁶⁹ willingness. Pluralistic ignorance regarding climate-friendly norms in the United States
³⁷⁰ has been documented by Andre et al. (2022), who further show that correcting the misper-
³⁷¹ ceptions would be effective to enhance pro-climate behaviors. Relatedly, Sparkman et al.
³⁷² (2022) show that Americans underestimate the support for climate policies by nearly half,
³⁷³ while Drews et al. (2022) document pluralistic ignorance of carbon tax support in Spain.
³⁷⁴ Additionally, Geiger & Swim (2016) show that pluralistic ignorance regarding concern for
³⁷⁵ climate change leads people to self-silence, resulting in reduced discussions on the topic.

³⁷⁶ **C.2 Proposals and analyses of global policy-making**

³⁷⁷ **C.2.1 Global carbon pricing**

³⁷⁸ Global carbon pricing is widely regarded by economists as the benchmark climate
³⁷⁹ policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon emissions externality. For instance, [Hoel](#)
³⁸⁰ ([1991](#)) shows that an international carbon tax can be designed to simultaneously achieve
³⁸¹ efficiency and accommodate any distributional objective. Concerning the distributional
³⁸² objective, [Grubb](#) ([1990](#)), [Agarwal & Narain](#) ([1991](#)) and [Bertram](#) ([1992](#)) were the first to
³⁸³ advocate for an equal right to emit for each human. As [Grubb](#) ([1990](#)) states it: "by far the
³⁸⁴ best combination of long term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity, is obtained
³⁸⁵ from a system based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions which are allocated on
³⁸⁶ an adult per capita basis".⁶ Support for such solution has been renewed ever since ([Baer](#)
³⁸⁷ [et al.](#) [2000](#); [Blanchard & Tirole](#) [2021](#); [Jamieson](#) [2001](#); [Rajan](#) [2021](#)).

³⁸⁸ While many endorse the egalitarian allocation of emissions permits, economists also
³⁸⁹ considered this outcome as politically unfeasible. Thus, to preserve the current level of
³⁹⁰ inequalities and to preclude transfers between countries, they adjusted their (integrated
³⁹¹ assessment) models by assigning more weight to the interest of rich countries ([Stanton](#)
³⁹² [2011](#)).

³⁹³ [Gollier & Tirole](#) ([2015](#)) synthesize the distributional decision with a *generosity* parameter
³⁹⁴ which would allocate emissions permit to countries in proportion to their population
³⁹⁵ if set to one, in proportion to their emissions (on the start date of the policy) if set to zero,
³⁹⁶ and as a mixture of the egalitarian and grandfathering rules if set in between. Using a
³⁹⁷ similar formula in the context of a tax, [Cramton et al.](#) ([2015](#)) (summarized in [MacKay](#)
³⁹⁸ [et al.](#) [2015](#)) propose that countries with emissions per capita around the average fix the
³⁹⁹ generosity parameter, so that it is strategically chosen to maximize the tax rate, and to
⁴⁰⁰ fix the tax rate at the minimum price proposed by participating countries. Negotiations
⁴⁰¹ would exclude countries with low ambition beforehand; and the treaty would impose
⁴⁰² trade sanctions on non-participating countries. [van den Bergh et al.](#) ([2020](#)) propose a
⁴⁰³ "dual-track transition to global carbon pricing": an expanding climate club that would
⁴⁰⁴ integrate existing and new emissions trading systems, and a reorientation of UNFCCC
⁴⁰⁵ negotiations towards a global carbon price and burden-sharing rules. The [IMF](#) ([2019](#))
⁴⁰⁶ also supports global carbon pricing or, as a first step, a carbon price floor. They propose
⁴⁰⁷ either differentiated prices among countries or international transfers, and estimate that

⁶By "adult per capita", [Grubb](#) ([1990](#)) means that permits would be allocated equally among adults.

⁴⁰⁸ a price of \$75/tCO₂ in 2030 would be compatible with a 2°C trajectory.

⁴⁰⁹ Other authors have put forth more radical proposals. For instance, Weitzman (2017)
⁴¹⁰ envisions a World Climate Assembly with proportional representation at the global scale,
⁴¹¹ so that the median (human) voter would choose the carbon price level. To finance an
⁴¹² adaptation fund, Chancel & Piketty (2015) propose a global *progressive* carbon tax (or a
⁴¹³ progressive tax on air tickets as a first step), so that rich people (who are high emitters)
⁴¹⁴ contribute more to the public good. Fleurbaey & Zuber (2013) highlight that, given that
⁴¹⁵ current emitters are probably richer than future victims of climate change damages, cli-
⁴¹⁶ mate policies deserve a *negative* discount rate. In other words, we cannot dissociate the
⁴¹⁷ climate issue from global inequalities, and an ethical response to this issue requires global
⁴¹⁸ redistribution.

⁴¹⁹ C.2.2 Climate burden sharing

⁴²⁰ The literature has discussed different burden-sharing principles. While there is no
⁴²¹ agreement on their definitions as different approaches are used (cost sharing, effort shar-
⁴²² ing, or resource sharing, see Section C.1.2), we describe here the burden-sharing princi-
⁴²³ ples consistently using the resource sharing approach (i.e., allocating emissions rights).
⁴²⁴ For other papers that define or compare different burden-sharing principles, see Leim-
⁴²⁵ bach & Giannousakis (2019); Vaillancourt & Waaub (2004); Zhou & Wang (2016).

⁴²⁶ **Equal per capita.** The simplest principle is perhaps to allocate each year's global carbon
⁴²⁷ quota based on an equal right to emit per capita, or an equal right to emit for each adult.
⁴²⁸ Implementing this principle would result in large transfers from high-emitting to low-
⁴²⁹ emitting countries.

⁴³⁰ **Grandfathering.** In contrast, *grandfathering* entails allocating emissions rights in pro-
⁴³¹ portion to current emissions. From the perspective of allocating carbon pricing revenues
⁴³² between countries, grandfathering amounts to each country retaining the revenues it col-
⁴³³ lects. Given that nations are sovereign and have not agreed to share emissions rights,
⁴³⁴ this principle can be considered as the default option against which the other ones can be
⁴³⁵ compared in terms of distributive effects.

⁴³⁶ **Historical responsibilities.** At the opposite end of the spectrum is the principle of *his-
437 torical responsibilities*, which assigns to each country a carbon budget proportional to its

⁴³⁸ population. Countries that have emitted more than the average have accumulated a car-
⁴³⁹ bon debt towards countries that have emitted less, which have a carbon credit.⁷

⁴⁴⁰ To fully specify this rule, one needs to define a start date for the responsibilities on
⁴⁴¹ past emissions and specify how to account for population size. 1990 is often chosen as
⁴⁴² a start year as it is the date of the first IPCC assessment report, marking the widespread
⁴⁴³ acknowledgment of climate change, though variants include 1972, 1960, 1950 or 1850.⁸
⁴⁴⁴ Several solutions have been proposed to account for evolving populations, none of which
⁴⁴⁵ is flawless. Matthews (2015) allocates emissions rights on a given year proportionally to
⁴⁴⁶ the countries' populations in that year. An alternative is to use fixed populations, such
⁴⁴⁷ as the populations at the chosen start year (Neumayer 2000), or at a future date such
⁴⁴⁸ as projected when the global total population will reach 9 billion (Raupach et al. 2014).
⁴⁴⁹ Fanning & Hickel (2023) convert the projected climate debt up to 2050 into monetary
⁴⁵⁰ terms in a 1.5°C scenario.

⁴⁵¹ The rationale for using fixed populations is to prevent countries from intentionally
⁴⁵² increasing their population size to gain more emissions rights. However, this approach
⁴⁵³ treats countries with different demographic trajectories similarly, effectively penalizing
⁴⁵⁴ countries which grow more than others (if past populations are used) or grow more than
⁴⁵⁵ expected (if future populations are used). Using current populations like Matthews (2015)
⁴⁵⁶ also comes with its own problems. Consider two countries having contributed very little
⁴⁵⁷ to cumulative emissions, with the same emissions per capita but different demographic
⁴⁵⁸ patterns: country A's population has doubled in the last 30 years, while country B's pop-
⁴⁵⁹ ulation has remained stable. Despite the similar present situation, country B would ac-
⁴⁶⁰ cumulate more carbon credit than country A. Essentially, compensating country B more
⁴⁶¹ due to its past population size amounts to compensating the dead although it is future
⁴⁶² generations who will suffer. That being said, using current populations is likely a more
⁴⁶³ viable solution than relying on fixed populations since, in practice, countries with similar
⁴⁶⁴ emissions per capita tend to have relatively similar demographic trajectories.

⁴⁶⁵ **Ability to pay.** Another prominent burden-sharing principle is the ability to pay whereby
⁴⁶⁶ richer countries should contribute more to mitigation efforts. To operationalize this prin-
⁴⁶⁷ ciple, Baer et al. (2008) define *capacity* as the share of global income above an exemption

⁷It is not clear how these debts would be settled. Approaches could involve carbon removal from the atmosphere, or using a conventional social cost of carbon to monetize them, by crediting (positively or negatively) emissions rights to countries in an international carbon market.

⁸Climate equity monitor uses 1850 for example.

468 threshold. They use the threshold of \$7,500 per year (in 2005 PPP), which corresponds to
469 the top 28% of the global income distribution. According to this principle, the effort of a
470 country should be proportional to the revenues it would raise with a linear income tax on
471 individual income above \$7,500.


472 **Climate Equity Reference Framework** Baer et al. (2008) propose another effort-sharing
473 method, the *Climate Equity Reference Framework* (CERF), which blends the ability to pay
474 principle with their version of historical responsibilities. They define *responsibility* as fol-
475 lows: they determine the mitigation requirement as the emissions gap between the Busi-
476 ness as Usual scenario from IEA (2007) and a 2°C (with 68-86% probability) scenario.
477 The mitigation requirement is then allocated to countries proportionally to their cumu-
478 lative emissions (starting in 1990). The emissions right of a country according to their
479 *responsibility* are then determined by its Business as Usual emissions minus its mitigation
480 requirement. A country's emissions right, dubbed its *greenhouse development right* (GDR),
481 is defined using a combination of *capacity* (C) and *responsibility* (R) to allocate the miti-
482 gation requirement between countries. This allocation key is called the *Responsibility and*
483 *Capacity Indicator* (RCI) and defined as $RCI = R^a \cdot C^{1-a}$, with $a = .4$.

484 This choice of parameter may seem somewhat arbitrary, but the **EcoEquity calculator**
485 allows for a customization all CERF parameters (Holz et al. 2019). The Climate Action
486 Network has adopted the CERF as its *fair share* framework, though the different national
487 chapters of the organization could not agree on a choice of parameters (Athanasou et al.
488 2022).⁹

489 The CERF approach was adopted by a prominent network of climate NGOs because
490 it operationalizes the principle of *common but differentiated responsibilities and respective ca-*
491 *pabilities* recognized by the UNFCCC. However, this approach suffers from three draw-
492 backs. First, its definition of historical responsibility as an effort sharing principle is in-
493 consistent with the principle of an equal right of cumulative emissions per capita, which
494 is a resource sharing principle. For instance, consider a fully decarbonized country that
495 has exhausted *exactly* its cumulative carbon budget. According to the CERF notion of *re-*

⁹The U.S. Climate Action Network and the think tank EcoEquity (funded by Tom Athanasiou and late Paul Baer) choose the following parameters: an equal weight for R and C ($a = .5$), their own **business as usual projections** of CO₂ emissions based on trends of GDP growth and emissions intensity reduction, a 1.5°C (Low Energy Demand) pathway, 1950 as the start year for responsibility, a gradual inclusion of income to compute *capacity* (which adds complexity to the calculation) from a full exemption of the bottom 70% (\$7,500 per year) linearly to a full inclusion of the top 2% (\$72,211), the inclusion of non-CO₂ gases but not of emissions embodied in trade (i.e. imported emissions) nor LULUCF (land-use).

Figure S10: Net gains from the CERF burden-sharing rule in 2030.




Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO₂.

⁴⁹⁶ *sponsibility*, this country would still be expected to contribute significantly to mitigation
⁴⁹⁷ efforts due to its relatively high cumulative emissions. Yet, according to the usual defini-
⁴⁹⁸ tion of the historical responsibility based on an equal right of cumulative emissions p.c.,
⁴⁹⁹ this country would have no liability as it has not exceeded its carbon budget. Second, a
⁵⁰⁰ country with moderate incomes¹⁰ and low historical responsibility would be assigned a
⁵⁰¹ relatively low effort, even if its emissions per capita are high. In other words, the CERF
⁵⁰² approach favors countries that have experienced recent growth. Third, the poorest coun-
⁵⁰³ tries would be granted emissions rights close to the Business as Usual trajectory, as they
⁵⁰⁴ would bear virtually none of the effort. But this trajectory carries the current (unfair) in-
⁵⁰⁵ come distribution and amounts to grandfathering. For example, the baseline trajectory
⁵⁰⁶ for emissions¹¹ in the DRC entail 0.8 tCO₂ p.c. in 2030, which is five times less than the
⁵⁰⁷ world average emissions right per capita. In this framework, if the DRC were to grow
⁵⁰⁸ faster than projected in the baseline, it would actually have to pay to the rest of the world
⁵⁰⁹ for mitigation efforts. This is what is likely to happen to countries like Mexico or Senegal,

¹⁰Using the above parameters, moderate incomes means few incomes above the global 70th. percentile.

¹¹The baseline trajectory is computed as the “product of the projected GDP and CO₂ emission intensity”.

Figure S11: Difference between net gains from Greenhouse Development Rights and equal rights per capita.



Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO₂.

from our simulation of the net gains of CERF compared to a situation without international transfers (see Figure S10). In contrast, a resource sharing approach based on equal per capita emissions would result in low-income countries receiving emissions rights exceeding their projected trajectories, leading to transfers from high-income countries. By construction, such transfers do not occur in an effort sharing approach like the CERF, implying lower transfers to low-income countries. Compared to an equal right to emit per capita, this method favors countries like China (whose emissions are allowed to remain stable over 2020-2030 instead of a reduction of 35-40%) and penalizes regions like Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (see Figure S11).

Contraction and Convergence. Meyer (2004) defines a rule called *contraction and convergence* (C&C), which combines elements of grandfathering and equal per capita approaches. According to C&C, each country is granted (tradable) emissions rights, starting at their current emission level and converging linearly to an equal per capita level at some pre-specified date. The *contraction* part refers to the reduction of total emissions rights in

524 line with the climate objective. When discussed around year 2000, the convergence date
525 was specified between 2020 and 2050. This rule, advocated by the Global Commons Insti-
526 tute (a UK think tank), was on the agenda from COP2 to COP15 (i.e., until Copenhagen,
527 and including in Kyoto), including at Kyoto, and was endorsed by the European Parlia-
528 ment in 1998. More recently, [Gignac & Matthews \(2015\)](#) have shown how C&C can be
529 made consistent with historical responsibilities by computing carbon debts and credits
530 until the convergence date.

531 **Assessments of the NDCs against burden-sharing principles.** The regime established
532 by the 2015 Paris agreement to regulate climate change respects none of the burden-
533 sharing principles and relies instead on voluntary contributions from each country, known
534 as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). A body of literature (reviewed by [Höhne
535 et al. 2014](#)) assesses the NDCs against the emissions reduction objective and different
536 burden-sharing principles. To evaluate the NDCs, [Gao et al. \(2019\)](#) examine their emis-
537 sions projections for 2030 and estimate the resulting increase in temperature. The most
538 recent and comprehensive assessment of NDCs against burden-sharing principles is con-
539 ducted by [van den Berg et al. \(2020\)](#) (see also [Raupach et al. 2014](#); [Robiou du Pont et al.
540 2016, 2017](#)).

541 C.2.3 Global redistribution

542 Addressing global poverty, inequalities, and climate change are central to the univer-
543 sally agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). As highlighted by [Bolch et al. \(2022\)](#),
544 low-income countries often lack sufficient domestic resources to eradicate poverty in the
545 short term, indicating the need for international transfers to rapidly end global poverty.
546 In *Beyond the Welfare State*, Gunnar Myrdal (1960) called for a *welfare world*. In his Nobel
547 lecture, he emphasized the necessity of increasing foreign aid to low-income countries,
548 stating that “The type of marginal foreign aid we have provided, is clearly not enough to
549 meet their barest needs” ([Myrdal 1975](#)).

550 Drawing on the labor theory of value, some economists have argued that global in-
551 equalities arise from unequal exchange in international trade ([Arghiri 1972](#)). Indeed, the
552 stark disparity in wages between countries implies that one unit of labor exported by an
553 American commands five units of labor embodied in imported goods, whereas Ethiopi-
554 ans need to export 50 units of labor to obtain one unit through imports ([Alsamawi et al.
555 2014; Reyes et al. 2017](#)). Taking stock, [Hickel \(2017\)](#) proposes to globally establish mini-

556 mum wages at 50% of the local median wage. [Hickel \(2017\)](#) also suggests other solutions
557 against global inequality, which served as inspiration for our questionnaire. These mea-
558 sures include the cancellation of low-income countries' public debt, fair trade practices
559 (such as eliminating tariffs from high-income countries, reducing patent protections, and
560 reducing farming subsidies in rich countries), initiatives to combat tax evasion (e.g., im-
561 plementing a global financial register), land reform, and a fair international climate policy.

562 [Piketty \(2014\)](#) prominently advocates for a progressive wealth tax on a global scale,
563 although he does not specify whether the resulting revenues should fund international
564 transfers.

565 [Kopczuk et al. \(2005\)](#) compute the optimal linear income tax rates for all countries in
566 two ways: globally centralized and decentralized (i.e., within each country and without
567 international transfers). They show that the average decentralized rate is 41%. In con-
568 trast, the global rate is 62%, which would generate funds to finance a basic income of
569 250\$/month (higher than the GPD per capita of 73 countries). From a current global Gini
570 index of 0.695, they show that decentralized optimal taxation would only marginally re-
571 duce global inequality to 0.69, whereas global taxation would significantly decrease the
572 Gini to 0.25. The study also shows that the existing level of foreign aid can only be ratio-
573 nalized if the U.S. attaches 2,000 less value to a citizen in the poorest countries than to an
574 American citizen (or 1,000 less if half of the transfers are diverted due to corruption).

575 C.2.4 Basic income

576 Unconditional cash transfers (UCT) are increasingly seen as an effective way to end ex-
577 treme poverty. A growing body of evidence from randomized control trials supports this
578 notion: [Gangopadhyay et al. \(2015\)](#) find that UCT outperform a food subsidy; [Haushofer & Shapiro \(2016\)](#) find significant impacts on health, economic outcomes, and psycholog-
579 ical well-being; [Egger et al. \(2022\)](#) find large positive spillovers on non-recipient people,
580 and minimal inflation. Reviews of existing research further confirm the positive outcomes
581 of UCT ([Bastagli et al. 2016; Standing 2014](#)).

583 While the delivery of cash to remote areas and the prevention of fraud is challenging
584 in regions without a proper civil register, the use of mobile phones as banking and bio-
585 metric identification tools could provide viable solutions ([Harnett 2017](#)). Although many
586 places still lack internet access, satellite internet technology shows promising progress,
587 with some experts suggesting that it could soon become affordable and universally ac-
588 cessible ([Hanson 2016](#)).

589 **C.2.5 Global democracy**

590 The idea of world federalism has a long-standing history, dating back at least to Kant
591 (1795), who argued that a world federation was essential for achieving perpetual peace.
592 International organizations were eventually created to foster peace, though the League
593 of Nations and its successor, the United Nations, never succeeded in avoiding military
594 conflicts. Many have argued that we need stronger and more democratic global institu-
595 tions, competent to address global challenges such as extreme poverty, climate change,
596 wars, pandemics, or financial stability. Before World War II, feminist and pacifist Maver-
597 ick Lloyd & Schwimmer (1937) founded the *Campaign for World Government*, advocating
598 for direct representation at the global scale. Einstein (1947) called for the subordination of
599 the UN Security Council to the General Assembly and the direct election of UN delegates.
600 Since 2007, there has been widespread support for a United Nations Parliamentary As-
601 sembly (UNPA) from individuals and institutions in over 150 countries, including 1,800
602 member of parliament, heads of state, as well the European Parliament, the Pan-African
603 Parliament, and the Latin-American Parliament. The UNPA campaign calls for a gradual
604 implementation of a democratic assembly, starting with a consultative assembly com-
605 posed of members of national parliaments, allowing for the direct election of its members
606 in voluntary countries, and progressing towards a world parliament with binding legisla-
607 tive powers once all members are directly elected (Leinen & Bummel 2018). Besides the
608 UNPA, various scholars have put forward different models of global democracy, ranging
609 from deliberative spaces to a world federation (Archibugi et al. 2011). While the most rad-
610 ical proposals may still be on the horizon, an assembly of random citizens representative
611 of the world population has already been convened. It has produced a joint statement at
612 the COP26 (Global Assembly 2022), and a similar *World Citizens' Assembly* should soon
613 follow.

614 D Raw results

615 Country-specific raw results are also available as supplementary material files: [US](#),
 616 [EU](#), [FR](#), [DE](#), [ES](#), [UK](#).

Figure S12: Correct answers to comprehension questions (in percent). (Questions [16-18](#))

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
With NR, typical [country] people win and richest lose	68	73	76	73	73	70
With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win	60	68	62	72	67	67
With GCS+NR, typical [country] people neither win nor lose	54	60	63	59	57	61

Figure S13: Number of correct answers to comprehension questions (mean). (Questions [16-18](#))




Figure S14: Support for the GCS, NR and the combination of GCS, NR and C. (Questions [20](#), [22](#) and [26](#))




Figure S15: List experiment: mean number of supported policies. (Question 24)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
List exp.: NR/GCS/C/O	2	2.5	2.8	2.2	2.7	2.6
List exp.: NR/C/O	1.4	1.9	2.1	1.6	2	1.9
List exp.: GCS/C/O	1.4	1.9	2.1	1.7	1.9	1.8
List exp.: C/O	0.9	1.1	1.3	0.9	1.1	1.3

Figure S16: Conjoint analyses 1 and 2. (Questions 25-27)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)	54	76	80	71	81	74
C+NR+GCS preferred to C+NR	55	74	79	71	78	68
NR+GCS preferred to NR	55	77	79	74	79	77
NR+C preferred to NR	62	84	88	83	84	82
GCS+NR preferred to C+NR	47	52	53	53	49	52
NR+C+GCS preferred to NR	55	77	86	73	83	72

Figure S17: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See original translations in Figure S7; Question 29)




Figure S18: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements seen as important for supporting the GCS in a 4-Likert scale (in percent). (Question 32)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
It would succeed in limiting climate change	78	85	85	86	86	83
It would hurt the [Country] economy	81	67	61	67	66	69
It would penalize my household	75	60	55	63	59	63
It would make people change their lifestyle	78	79	83	79	78	77
It would reduce poverty in low-income countries	77	85	88	85	86	81
It might be detrimental to some poor countries	79	72	79	67	78	70
It could foster global cooperation	82	81	81	82	85	80
It could fuel corruption in low-income countries	79	75	82	69	79	72
It could be subject to fraud	80	79	80	74	83	81
It would be technically difficult to put in place	77	71	74	62	79	71
Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences	89	82	89	68	91	88

Figure S19: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements found in the open-ended field on the GCS (manually recoded, in percent). (Question 31)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
environment	26	31	37	26	43	24
unclassifiable	25	24	23	28	25	22
pro	22	23	21	22	33	20
con	22	17	12	18	20	16
cost	17	12	11	14	17	7
poorest humans	11	7	6	9	5	6
tax redistribution	10	7	11	8	4	9
support	8	6	3	5	6	8
oppose	7	3	2	3	1	4
don't know	6	8	10	8	7	10
empty	6	3	0	0	0	13
difficult agreement	5	10	7	12	8	8
difficult implement	3	5	5	6	4	6
misunderstands gcs	3	2	2	1	3	1
misunderstands question	2	2	1	3	3	3

Figure S20: Perceptions of the GCS. Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent). (Question 31)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
world: international world country global	28	22	23	19	22	23
environment: climat environment animal emission natur	26	21	17	28	21	17
poorest: poor low-income 700 poverty	16	8	8	9	4	10
pro: pro pro: pros pros:	16	3	0	1	9	5
con: con con: cons cons:	15	4	0	1	8	6
cost: cost expensive higher price 85 inflation	13	7	5	9	7	6
tax: tax	8	3	4	3	2	2
redistribution: rich redistribu	8	4	5	4	3	5
implementation: implement enforce polic monitor	6	4	5	6	0	5
agreement: agree accept participat	3	4	5	6	2	3

Table S3: Effects on the support for the GCS of a question on its pros and cons and on information about the actual support, in the U.S. (See Section F in the US2 Questionnaire)

	Support			
	Global Climate Scheme		National Redistribution	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Control group mean	0.557	0.557	0.569	0.569
Treatment: Open-ended field on GCS pros & cons	-0.073** (0.035)	-0.071** (0.031)	-0.035 (0.035)	-0.030 (0.032)
Treatment: Closed questions on GCS pros & cons	-0.109*** (0.034)	-0.096*** (0.031)	-0.065* (0.034)	-0.062** (0.031)
Treatment: Info on actual support for GCS and NR	-0.021 (0.034)	-0.015 (0.031)	0.048 (0.033)	0.056* (0.031)
Includes controls		✓		✓
Observations	2,000	1,995	2,000	1,995
R ²	0.007	0.170	0.007	0.154

Figure S21: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality (mean). (Question 34)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Donation to own country	35	34	31	38	34	32
Donation to Africa	32	35	33	41	32	33

Table S4: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality. (Question 34)

	Donation to poor people (in %)			
	All	US	US	Eu
Poor is in own country	0.590 (0.799)	2.509** (1.152)	0.046 (1.691)	-1.349 (1.108)
Poor is in own country × Vote: <i>not</i> Biden			3.954* (2.279)	
Mean	34.034	33.658	33.658	34.41
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000	3,000
R ²	0.0001	0.002	0.034	0.0005

Figure S22: Support for a global wealth tax.

"Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-income countries?

Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education." (Question 35)




Figure S23: Support for a national wealth tax financing public services like healthcare, education, and social housing. (Question 36)




Figure S24: Preferred share of global wealth tax revenues that should be pooled to finance low-income countries. (Question 37)




Figure S25: Support for sharing half of global tax revenues with low-income countries, rather than each country retaining all the revenues it collects (in percent). (Question 38)



Figure S26: Actual, perceived and preferred amount of foreign aid, with random info (or not) on actual amount. (Mean, Questions 39, 40)




Figure S27: Preferred foreign aid (after info or after perception). (Questions 39 and 40)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as current	70	75	91	76	77	57
Preferred foreign aid is higher than current	47	59	75	58	63	43
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as perceived	57	74	83	79	77	58
Preferred foreign aid is higher than perceived	37	53	64	59	54	39

Figure S28: Perceived foreign aid. “From your best guess, what percentage of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?” (Question 39)

Actual values: France: 0.8%; Germany: 1.3%; Spain: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%; U.S.: 0.4%.




Figure S29: Preferred foreign aid (without info on actual amount).

"If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?" (Question 40)




Figure S30: Preferred foreign aid (after info on actual amount).

"Actually, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid.

If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?" (Question 40)




Figure S31: Preferences for funding increased foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]
 "How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent) (Question 41)




Figure S32: Preferences of spending following reduced foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]
 "How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent) (Question 42)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Higher spending on defense	19	23	11	21	17	31
Higher spending on retirement pensions	23	41	22	51	57	35
Higher spending on healthcare	40	57	31	42	80	70
Higher spending on welfare benefits	13	20	7	19	39	20
Higher spending on education	30	45	31	47	58	43
Higher spending on other programs	6	6	6	4	9	8
Lower taxes on the wealthiest	5	2	5	2	0	2
Lower corporate income tax rate	12	6	10	4	8	6
Lower personal income tax rates	48	29	26	27	37	30
Lower public deficit	32	24	21	13	41	21

Figure S33: Willingness to sign real-stake petition for the Global Climate Scheme or National Redistribution, compared to stated support in corresponding subsamples (e.g. support for the GCS in the branch where the petition was about the GCS). (Question 43)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Petition for the GCS	51	69	69	66	78	69
(Comparable) support for the GCS	53	76	81	74	81	74
Petition for NR	57	67	65	66	74	68
(Comparable) support for NR	58	72	76	65	78	75

Figure S34: Preferred approach of diplomats at international climate negotiations.
In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend [own country] interests or global justice? (Question 49)




Figure S35: Percent of selected issues viewed as important.
“To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem?” (Question 56)




Figure S36: Group defended when voting.
“What group do you defend when you vote?” (Question 57)




Figure S37: Mean prioritization of policies.

Mean number of points allocated policies to express intensity of support (among six policies chosen at random). Blue color means that the policy has been awarded more points than the average policy. (Question 58)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	13	21	10	14	35	31
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	23	22	25	21	22	23
econ3	21	15	13	18	17	13
econ4	28	22	27	17	24	20
soc1	10	17	13	17	12	21
soc2	13	9	14	8	10	8
climate1	14	15	11	18	20	12
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	20	18	22	19	15	17
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030	11	9	8	8	9	11
tax1: National redistribution scheme	14	15	16	15	15	15
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	19	19	21	18	17	19
foreign1: Global climate scheme	15	20	20	23	16	17
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	21	20	20	23	19	20
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	15	15	15	17	14	13
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	9	11	13	14	9	8

Figure S38: Positive prioritization of policies.

Percent of people allocating a positive number of points to policies, expressing their support (among six policies chosen at random). (Question 58)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	64	78	61	67	96	95
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	83	86	85	84	87	89
econ3	81	69	50	78	80	68
econ4	88	86	91	79	89	85
soc1	57	75	69	74	74	78
soc2	58	58	72	53	64	48
climate1	70	76	65	79	89	75
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	79	83	86	84	78	80
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030	62	58	56	48	60	70
tax1: National redistribution scheme	67	79	79	76	82	79
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	80	79	76	78	83	85
foreign1: Global climate scheme	71	83	84	85	84	78
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	80	81	79	83	82	82
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	71	77	79	74	83	76
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	58	70	79	74	74	57

Figure S39: Charity donation.

"How much did you give to charities in 2022?" (Question 50)




Figure S40: Interest in politics.

"To what extent are you interested in politics?" (Question 51)




Figure S41: Desired involvement of government (from 1 to 5). (Question 52)




Figure S42: Political leaning on economics (from 1: Left to 5: Right). (Question 53)




Figure S43: Voted in last election. (Question 54)




Figure S44: Vote in last election (aggregated). PNR includes people who did not vote or prefer not to answer. (Question 55)




Figure S45: Perception that survey was biased.
“Do you feel that this survey was politically biased?” (Question 61)




Figure S46: Opinion on the fight against extreme poverty.

“According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme poverty in low-income countries?” (Question 62)

(a) Elements found in the open-ended field on the question
 (manually recoded, in percent)



(b) Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).




Figure S47: Main attitudes by vote (“Right” spans from Center-right to Far right).
 (Relative support in percent in Questions 20, 35, 45, 46, 49)

	Europe Left	Europe PNR/Non-voter	Europe Right	U.S. Left	U.S. PNR/Non-voter	U.S. Right
Support for the GCS	85	72	71	74	53	26
Global tax on millionaires	94	83	76	85	71	40
Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries	61	52	45	55	67	41
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	73	65	52	62	49	23
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	93	79	74	87	70	38
[Country]'s foreign aid should be increased	93	83	72	92	81	48
Universalist	56	48	26	53	49	23

617 E Questionnaire of the global survey (section on global poli-
618 cies)

619 A. At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be
620 put in place? (Multiple answers are possible) [Figures S1 and ??]
621 *Global; [Federal / European / ...]; [State / National]; Local*

622 B. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “[country] should take mea-
623 sures to fight climate change.”
624 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly*
625 *agree*

626 C. How should [country] climate policies depend on what other countries do?
627 • If other countries do more, [country] should do...
628 • If other countries do less, [country] should do...

629 *Much less; Less; About the same; More; Much more*

630 D. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] All countries have signed the
631 Paris agreement that aims to contain global warming “well below +2 °C”. To limit
632 global warming to this level, there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we
633 can emit globally, called the carbon budget. Each country could aim to emit less
634 than a share of the carbon budget. To respect the global carbon budget, countries
635 that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less
636 than their share.

637 Do you support such a policy? [Figures S1 and ??]

638 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
639 *support*

640 E. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] Suppose the above policy is in
641 place. How should the carbon budget be divided among countries? [Figures S1 and
642 ??]

643 *The emission share of a country should be proportional to its population, so that each human*
644 *has an equal right to emit.; The emission share of a country should be proportional to its*
645 *current emissions, so that those who already emit more have more rights to emit.; Countries*
646 *that have emitted more over the past decades (from 1990 onwards) should receive a lower*

647 *emission share, because they have already used some of their fair share.; Countries that will*
648 *be hurt more by climate change should receive a higher emission share, to compensate them*
649 *for the damages.*

650 F. [In the U.S., Denmark, and France only] To achieve a given reduction of greenhouse
651 gas emissions globally, costly investments are needed. Ideally, how should countries
652 bear the costs of fighting climate change?

- 653 • Countries should pay in proportion to their income
- 654 • Countries should pay in proportion to their current emissions [Used as a sub-
655 stitute to the equal right per capita in Figure S1]
- 656 • Countries should pay in proportion to their past emissions (from 1990 on-
657 wards) [Used as a substitute to historical responsibilities in Figure S1]
- 658 • The richest countries should pay it all, so that the poorest countries do not have
659 to pay anything
- 660 • The richest countries should pay even more, to help vulnerable countries face
661 adverse consequences: vulnerable countries would then receive money instead
662 of paying [Used as a substitute to compensating vulnerable countries in Figures
663 S1 and ??]

664 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly*
665 *agree*

666 G. Do you support or oppose establishing a global democratic assembly whose role
667 would be to draft international treaties against climate change? Each adult across
668 the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly. [Figures S1 and ??]
669 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
670 *support*

671 H. Imagine the following policy: a global tax on greenhouse gas emissions funding a
672 global basic income. Such a policy would progressively raise the price of fossil fuels
673 (for example, the price of gasoline would increase by [40 cents per gallon] in the
674 first years). Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil
675 fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Revenues from the tax would be used to
676 finance a basic income of [\$30] per month to each human adult, thereby lifting the
677 700 million people who earn less than \$2/day out of extreme poverty. The average

678 [American] person would lose a bit from this policy as they would face [\$130] per
679 month in price increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive.

680 Do you support or oppose such a policy? [Figures S1 and ??]

681 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
682 *support*

- 683 I. Do you support or oppose a tax on all millionaires around the world to finance low-
684 income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate ac-
685 tion? This would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drink-
686 ing water, healthcare, and education. [Figures S1 and ??]
687 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
688 *support*

689 F Questionnaire of the complementary surveys

690 Below, we provide the generic questionnaire (based on the U.S. version), which roughly
 691 corresponds to the *Eu* questionnaire as well as the combination of the *US1* and *US2* ques-
 692 tionnaire. The main difference between Europe and the U.S. is that we split the *US2*
 693 sample into four random branches to include some treatments before the Section F on the
 694 GCS. Besides the control group, the treatments are: information regarding the support of
 695 Americans for the GCS and NR, an open-ended field, and a closed question on the pros
 696 and cons of the GCS. The pros and cons of the GCS are also asked in *Eu* (likewise, either
 697 as an open-ended field or a question), but only in Section F, after the support.

698 At each section or question, we specify in square brackets in which questionnaires it is
 699 present (*US1*, *US2* and/or *Eu*) as well as country specificities. Figures S48-S50 also allow
 700 understanding the structure of each questionnaire. Qualtrics and Word versions of the
 701 questionnaires in each language are available on our [public repository](#), together with a
 702 spreadsheet that summarizes country specificities and our sources.

Figure S48: *Eu* survey structure




Figure S49: US1 survey structure





Figure S50: US2 survey structure



703 [Eu, US1, US2] Socio-demographic characteristics

704 1. Welcome to this survey!

705
706 This survey is **anonymous** and is conducted for research purposes on a representa-
707 tive sample of [1,000 British people].

708
709 It takes [US1, US2: 10 to 15 min; Eu: around 20 min] to complete.

710
711 The survey contains lotteries and awards for those who get the correct answer to
712 some understanding questions.

713 If you are attentive and lucky, you can win up to [US1, Eu: \$350; US2: \$150] in
714 points. (See terms and conditions).

715 Please answer every question carefully.

716
717 Do you agree to participate in the survey?

718 Yes; No

719 2. What is your gender?

720 Woman; Man; Other

721 3. How old are you?

722 Below 18; 18 to 20; 21 to 24; 25 to 29; 30 to 34; 35 to 39; 40 to 44; 45 to 49; 50 to 54; 55 to
723 59; 60 to 64; 65 to 69; 70 to 74; 75 to 79; 80 to 84; 85 to 89; 90 to 99; 100 or above

724 4. [Eu] In which country do you live?

725 France; Germany; Spain; United Kingdom; Other

726 5. What is your ZIP code? [UK: What is your Outcode (the left part of your postcode,
727 e.g. if your postcode is N7 8H7, just enter N7)?]

728 6. Do you live with your partner (if you have one)?

729 Yes; No

730 7. How many people are in your household? The household includes: you, the mem-
731 bers of your family who live with you, and your dependants.

732 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more

- 733 8. [Eu] How many children below 14 live with you?
- 734 1; 2; 3; 4 or more
- 735 9. [US1, US2] What race or ethnicity do you identify with? (Multiple answers are
- 736 possible)
- 737 White; Black or African American; Hispanic; Asian; American Indian or Alaskan Native;
- 738 Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; Other: {open field}; Prefer not to say
- 739 10. What is the [US1, US2: annual; Eu: monthly] gross income of your household (before
- 740 withholding tax)? This includes all income: wages, self-employment earnings, So-
- 741 cial Security benefits, pensions, investment income, welfare payments, and income
- 742 from other sources.
- 743 [US1, US2: Items based on household total income deciles and quartiles, namely:
- 744 Less than \$20,000; between \$20,001 and \$35,000; between \$35,001 and \$42,000; between
- 745 \$42,001 and \$50,000; between \$50,001 and \$65,000; between \$65,001 and \$82,000; between
- 746 \$82,001 and \$103,000; between \$103,001 and \$130,000; between \$130,001 and \$145,000;
- 747 between \$145,001 and \$165,000; between \$165,001 and \$250,000; More than \$250,000; I
- 748 prefer not to answer;
- 749 Eu: custom thresholds, taking into account household composition Questions 6-8,
- 750 and corresponding to the country's deciles and quartiles of standard of living, cf.
- 751 the sheet "Income" in [this spreadsheet](#)]
- 752 11. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
- 753 [Below upper secondary, Upper secondary, and Post secondary are coded as the first two,
- 754 middle three, and last three items, respectively.
- 755 US1, US2: Primary school or less; Eighth grade; Some high school; Regular high school
- 756 diploma/GED or alternative credential; Some college, no degree; 2-year college degree or as-
- 757 sociates degree (for example: AA, AS); Bachelor's degree (for example: BA, BS); Master's
- 758 degree or above (MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA, MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD, PhD);
- 759 FR: École primaire / Aucun; Brevet; CAP ou BEP; Baccalauréat professionnel ou tech-
- 760 nologique; Baccalauréat général; Bac +2 (BTS, DUT, DEUG...); Bac +3 (licence...); Bac
- 761 +5 ou plus (master, école d'ingénieur ou de commerce, doctorat, médecine, maîtrise, DEA,
- 762 DESS...)
- 763 DE: Keine abgeschlossene Schulbildung / Grundschule; Untere Sekundarstufe (z.B. Haupt-
- 764 oder Realschulabschluss); Erstausbildung; Beruflicher Abschluss / Ausbildung; Abitur;
- 765 Zweitausbildung; Bachelor oder Fachhochschulabschluss; Master-Abschluss oder höher

766 ES: *Educación primaria / No he completado la enseñanza básica; Educación secundaria obligatoria (ESO); Formación profesional básica (FP); Formación profesional de grado medio; Bachillerato; Formación profesional de grado superior; Grado universitario; Máster/doctorado*
767 UK: *Primary education or less; Some secondary school; GSCE; Vocational Upper secondary (Level 3 award, level 3 certificate, level 3 diploma, advanced apprenticeship, etc.); High school degree (A level); Higher vocational education (Level 4+ award, level 4+ certificate, level 4+ diploma, higher apprenticeship, etc.); Bachelor's Degree (BA, BSc, BEng, etc.); Postgraduate diploma or certificate, Master's Degree (MSc, MA, MBA, etc.) or Ph.D.]*

774 12. What is your employment status?

775 *Full-time employed; Part-time employed; Self-employed; Student; Retired; Unemployed*
776 *(searching for a job); Inactive (not searching for a job)*

777 13. Are you a homeowner or a tenant? (Multiple answers are possible)

778 *Tenant; Owner; Landlord renting out property; Hosted free of charge*

779 14. [If lives with partner: What is the estimated value of your household's assets (in
780 U.S. dollars)?]

781 If does not live with partner: What is the estimated value of your assets (in U.S.
782 dollars)?]

783 Include here all your possessions (home, car, savings, etc.) net of debt. For example,
784 if you own a house worth [\$]300,000 and you have [\$]100,000 left to repay on your
785 mortgage, your assets are [\$]200,000.

786 I estimate my [If lives with partner: household's] assets net of debt to be:

787 [Items based on the following individual wealth quintiles, doubled if lives with
788 partner. US1, US2: *Less than \$0 (I have a net debt); Close to \$0; Between \$4,000 and*
789 *\$60,000; Between \$60,000 and \$190,000; More than \$190,000;* For Eu, the thresholds are:
790 FR: €5/50/150/300k; DE: €0/35/130/280k; ES: €0/50/100/200k; UK: £3/45/115/270k]

793 15. [US1, US2 (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the vote question)] What
794 do you consider to be your political affiliation, as of today?

795 *Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other; Non-Affiliated*

796 [Eu, US1, US2] Global climate scheme

797 In the following, we describe two policies, on which we will survey your opinion.
798 To check that you have attentively read the descriptions, **we will ask some understanding questions afterwards: those who get correct answers can win up to \$150.**

800 **Global climate scheme:** At the Paris agreement in 2015, all countries have agreed
801 to contain global warming “well below +2 °C”. To limit global warming to this
802 level, **there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally.**

803 To meet the climate target, a limited number of permits to emit greenhouse gases
804 can be created globally. Polluting firms would be required to buy permits to cover
805 their emissions. Such a policy would **make fossil fuel companies pay** for their
806 emissions and progressively raise the price of fossil fuels. **Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions.**

807 In accordance with the principle that each human has an equal right to pollute, the
808 revenues generated by the sale of permits could finance a global basic income. **Each adult in the world would receive [US1, US2: \$30/month; UK: \$30 (that is £25) per month; FR, DE, ES: €30/month],** thereby lifting out of extreme poverty the 700 million people who earn less than \$2/day.

809 **The typical [American] would lose out financially [US1, US2: \$85, FR: €10, DE:
810 €25, ES: €5, UK: £20] per month** (as he or she would face [\$115] per month in price
811 increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive).

812 The policy could be put in place as soon as countries totaling more than 60% of
813 global emissions agree on it. Countries that would refuse to take part in the policy
814 could face sanctions (like tariffs) from the rest of the World and would be excluded
815 from the basic income.)

- 816 16. Who would win or lose financially in the Global climate scheme? [Figure S12]

817 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

818 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

819 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.;*

820 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

821 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would lose and*

829 the 700 million poorest humans would win from the Global climate scheme. Now, here
830 is the second policy:

831

832 **National redistribution scheme:**

833 This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [US1, US2: 5%; Eu: 1%] and provide
834 cash transfers to all adults. More precisely, **each [American] adult would receive**
835 **[\$85] per month** (that is [\$1,000] per year). This would be financed by an increase
836 of the federal income tax on household income in excess of [US1, US2: \$315,000 per
837 year; FR: €15,000 per month; DE: €20,000 per month; ES: €10,000 per month; UK:
838 £15,000 per month], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000]. [US1,
839 US2: See more details.] ¹²

- 840 17. Who would win or lose financially in the National redistribution? [Figure S12]

841

842 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

843 Typical [Americans] would win and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Ameri-
844 cans] would win and the richest [Americans] would lose.; Typical [Americans] would lose
845 and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Americans] would lose and the richest
846 [Americans] would lose.

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would win and
848 the richest [Americans] would lose* from the National redistribution scheme.

849

850 To help you with the next question, here is a reminder of the policies:

851

852 **Global Climate scheme:**

853 To limit global warming and reach the international climate objective, the Global
854 climate scheme would **impose a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can
855 emit globally.**

¹²8% of U.S. respondents click. They then see the following text, based on taxjusticenow.org by Saez & Zucman (2019): *The marginal income tax rates would evolve as follows:*

Below \$315,000: unchanged

\$315,000 - \$400,000: current rate 32% => new rate 41%

\$400,000 - \$600,000: 35% => 50%

\$600,000 - \$2.5 million: 37% => 60%

\$2.5 - \$5 million: 37% => 65%

Above \$5 million: 37% => 70%

856 It would **make polluters pay** for their emissions, which in turn would increase fos-
857 sil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities.

858 The revenues would finance a **global basic income** of [\$30] per month for all hu-
859 mans, lifting out of extreme poverty the poorest billion people.

860 Considering the basic income and the fuel price increases, **the typical [American]**
861 **would lose out financially** [\$85] per month.

862

863 **National redistribution scheme:**

864 This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [5%] and provide cash transfers to
865 all adults. More precisely, **each [American] would receive** [\$85] per month. This
866 would be financed by an increase of the federal income tax on household income in
867 excess of [\$315,000 per year], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000
868 per year].

- 869 18. If both the Global climate scheme and the National redistribution scheme are imple-
870 mented, how would a typical [American] be financially affected? [Figure S12]

871 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

872 *A typical [American] would lose out financially.; A typical [American] would neither gain
873 nor lose.; A typical [American] would gain financially.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was that *A typical [American] would nei-
875 ther gain nor lose* from both schemes combined. [US1, Eu: Now, here are the last two
876 policies:]

877

878 **[US1: Coal exit:**

879 To reduce CO₂ emissions, this policy would require all U.S. coal power plants to be
880 phased out by 2030. Coal would be replaced by renewable sources like wind and
881 solar panels as well as stronger reliance on gas power plants.

882 **Eu: Thermal insulation plan:**

883 To reduce CO₂ emissions and energy insecurity, this policy would require that all
884 buildings meet energy efficiency targets: at least rating E in 2030 and rating C in
885 2040. The [UK] government would subsidise half the cost of insulation for all house-
886 holds, and up to 90% for the poorest households. Insulation work would cost [FR,
887 DE: €25; ES: €20; UK: £25] billion a year, but would deliver energy savings greater
888 than this cost.]

889

890 [US1: **Marriage only for opposite-sex couples:**

891 This policy is a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would legally
892 define marriage as a union of one man and one woman.

893 **Eu: Death penalty for major crimes:**

894 This measure would reintroduce capital punishment for major crimes such as ter-
895 rrorism and mass shootings.]

896

897 Now, we will ask your opinion on the [US1, Eu: four] policies.

898 [Click here for the reminder of the \[US1, Eu: first\] two policies.](#) [Clicking displays the
899 previous summarized descriptions.]

900 19. [US2] [4 Random branches: control (*nothing*); Question 31 (*field*); Question 32 (*impor-
901 tant*); or the following question (*info*).] For information, a recent survey has shown
902 that:

- 903 • 64% of Americans support the Global climate scheme.
904 • 72% of Americans support the National redistribution scheme.

905 20. Do you support the Global climate scheme? [Figure S14]

906 Yes; No

907 21. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the
908 previous question? [Figure S9]

909 The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

910 Percentage of [Americans] in favor of Global climate scheme [slider from 0 to 100]

911 22. Do you support the National redistribution scheme? [Figure S14]

912 Yes; No

913 23. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the
914 previous question? [Figure S9]

915 The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

916 Percentage of [Americans] in favor of National redistribution [slider from 0 to 100]

917 24. [Eu, US1] Beware, this question is quite unusual. Among the policies below, **how
918 many** do you support? [Figure S15, Table S1]

919 [Four random branches. Branch GCS/NR/C/O]

- 920
- 921 • Global climate scheme
 - 922 • National redistribution scheme
 - 923 • [Coal exit]
 - 924 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

925 0; 1; 2; 3; 4

926 [Branch GCS/C/O]

- 928
- 929 • Global climate scheme
 - 930 • [Coal exit]
 - 931 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

932 0; 1; 2; 3

933 [Branch NR/C/O]

- 935
- 936 • National redistribution scheme
 - 937 • [Coal exit]
 - 938 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

939 0; 1; 2; 3

940 [Branch C/O]

- 941
- 942 • [Coal exit]
 - 943 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

944 0; 1; 2

946 [Eu, US1] Conjoint analyses

- 947 25. Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you prefer? [Figure
948 S16]

949 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the
950 same time.

951 Bundle A	952 Bundle B
[Coal exit]	[Coal exit]
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme
Global climate scheme	

953 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 954 26. Do you support Bundle A (combining [Coal exit], the National redistribution scheme,
955 and the Global climate scheme)?[Figure S14]

956 Yes; No

- 957 27. [new page] Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you
958 prefer? [Figure S16]

959 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the
960 same time.

961 [Four random branches. Branch C + NR vs. GCS + NR]

962 Bundle A	963 Bundle B
[Coal exit]	Global climate scheme
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme

964 [Branch NR vs. NR + C + GCS]

965 Bundle A	966 Bundle B
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme [Coal exit] Global climate scheme

967 [Branch NR + GCS vs. NR]

Bundle A	Bundle B
National redistribution scheme Global climate scheme	National redistribution scheme

968 [Branch NR + C vs. NR]

Bundle A	Bundle B
National redistribution scheme [Coal exit]	National redistribution scheme

971 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

972 28. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and
973 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies
974 in their platforms.

975 *Eu: Imagine if [DE, ES, UK: the two favorite candidates in your constituency in the
976 next general election; FR: the two candidates in the second round of the next pres-
977 idential election] campaigned with the following policies in their party's platforms.]*

980 Which of these candidates would you vote for? [Table S2, Figure S16]

981 [Table S2. Two random branches: with and without the final row. The US1 version of the
982 policies is given below, see the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the European versions.]

Democrat	Republican
Increase corporate income tax rate from 21% to 28%	Decrease the payroll tax
Coal exit	Permit completion of the Keystone pipeline
Trillion dollar investment in childcare, healthcare, education and housing	Withdrawal of the Paris agreement
\$15 minimum wage	Marriage only for opposite-sex couples
National redistribution scheme	Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation
[Global climate scheme / no row]	[/ no row]

985

986 [US1: Democrat; Republican; None of them; Eu: Candidate A; Candidate B; None of them]

- 987 29. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and
988 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies
989 in their platforms.

990 *Eu (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the Section "Values and politics"):* Imagine
991 that [FR: the left or center-left; DE: a red-red-green coalition; ES: the PSOE; UK:
992 the Labour Party] wins the next [general] elections. Here are two possible platforms
993 on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a
994 pool of credible [FR: left or center-left, DE: left-wing parties'; ES: PSOE; UK: Labour]
995 policies).]

996

997 [US1: Which of these candidates do you prefer?

998 *Eu: Even if you [FR: are not from the left or center-left; DE: do not support the left-*
999 *wing parties; ES: do not support the PSOE; UK: do not support the Labour Party],*
1000 *which of these platforms do you prefer?]*

1001 [Figures S7, S17; see also the sheet "Policies" in *this spreadsheet* for the possible policies.]

	[Candidate A]	[Candidate B]	
1002	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]

1003 [US1: Candidate A; Candidate B; Eu: Platform A; Platform B]

- 1004 30. [new page] [Same wording and conditions as above. For brevity, only the UK version is
1005 given here.] Imagine that the Labour Party wins the next general elections. Here are
1006 two possible platforms on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are
1007 randomly drawn from a pool of credible Labour policies).

1008

1009 Even if you do not support the Labour Party, which of these platforms do you pre-
1010 fer? [Figure S7]

		Platform A	Platform B
1011	[Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order]	[Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy]	[Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy]
	Foreign policy	Global climate scheme	-
1012	<i>Platform A; Platform B</i>		

1013 **[Eu, US2] Perceptions of the GCS**

1014 [Eu: two random branches. US2: four random branches and the question is asked (if asked)
1015 before Question 20]

1016 31. [Branch: field] When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to
1017 your mind?

1018 Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme. [Figures S19, S20]
1019 {Open field}

1020 32. [Branch: important] When determining your support or opposition to the Global
1021 climate scheme, which points are important to you? [Figure S18]

- 1022 • It would succeed in limiting climate change.
- 1023 • It would hurt the [U.S.] economy.
- 1024 • It would penalize my household.
- 1025 • It would make people change their lifestyle.
- 1026 • It would reduce poverty in low-income countries.
- 1027 • It might be detrimental to some poor countries.
- 1028 • It could foster global cooperation.
- 1029 • It could fuel corruption in low-income countries.
- 1030 • It could be subject to fraud.
- 1031 • It would be technically difficult to put in place.
- 1032 • Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences.

1033 *Not at all important; Not so important; Quite important; Very important*

1034 [Eu, US1] Donation lottery

1035 33. Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).

1036 *Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*

1037 34. [Two random branches] By taking this survey, you are automatically entered into a
1038 lottery to win [\$]100 in panel points. This lottery is unrelated to the previous ones
1039 that rewarded answers’ accuracy. In a few days you will know whether you have
1040 been selected in the lottery. The payment will be made to you in the same way as
1041 your compensation for this survey, so no further action is required on your part.

1042
1043 Should you be selected in the lottery, you can also donate a part of this additional
1044 compensation to [[American] / African] people living in poverty through [US1: the
1045 charity GiveDirectly. The charity GiveDirectly; Eu: a charity. We would channel this
1046 donation to a charity that] provides small amounts of cash to people in need in [[the
1047 U.S] / Africa].

1048
1049 **In case you are winner of the lottery, what share of the [\$]100 would you donate
1050 to [[American] / African] people living in poverty [US1: through GiveDirectly]?
1051 [Figure S21, Table S4]**

1052 *Amount donated to [[American] / African] people in need (in [\$]) [slider from 0 to 100]*

1053 [Eu, US2] Wealth tax

1054 [Four random branches: Question 35 then Question 36 (global first); Question 36 then Ques-
1055 tion 35 (national first); Question 37 (global share); Question 38 (sharing)]

1056 35. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-
1057 income countries?

1058 Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking
1059 water, healthcare, and education. [Figures S14, S22]

1060 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1061 support*

1062 36. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: afford-
1063 able housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and
1064 schools]? [Figures S14, S23]

1065 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1066 *support*

1067 37. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all
1068 countries around the world. In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount
1069 to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE: €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2:
1070 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount
1071 to [\$]1 billion in all low-income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700
1072 million people, most of them in Africa).

1073 Each country would retain part of the revenues it collects, and the remaining part
1074 would be pooled at the global level to finance infrastructure and public services in
1075 low-income countries.

1076
1077 What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of re-
1078 tained in the country's national budget)? [\[Figure S24\]](#)

1079 Percent of global wealth tax that should go to low-income countries [slider from 0 to 100]

1080 38. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in
1081 all countries around the world.

1082 In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE:
1083 €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2: 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES:
1084 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount to [\$]1 billion in all low-
1085 income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700 million people, most of
1086 them in Africa).

1087 Which of the following options would you prefer? [\[Figure S25\]](#)

- 1088 • The whole wealth tax financing national budgets in each country. For ex-
1089 ample, in [US2: the U.S., it could finance affordable housing and universal
1090 childcare/pre-K.; Eu-UK: the UK, it could finance the National Health Service
1091 and state-funded schools].
- 1092 • Half of the wealth tax financing national budgets in each country, half of it
1093 financing low-income countries. For example, it could finance [US2: universal
1094 childcare/pre-K in the U.S.; Eu-UK: state-funded schools in the UK] and access
1095 to drinking water, healthcare, and education in Africa.

1096 [Eu, US2] Foreign aid

1097 US2 Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).

1098 Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal

1099 39. From your best guess, what percentage of [U.S.] government spending is allocated
1100 to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?

1101

1102 For your information, government spending totals [US2: 38%; FR: 55%; DE: 45%; ES:
1103 42%; UK: 41%] of [U.S.] GDP, it includes [US2: federal, State; Eu: national] and local
1104 government spending, and apart from foreign aid, it covers the following items: de-
1105 fense, social security (retirement pensions), health [US2: (including Medicare and
1106 Medicaid)], welfare benefits [US2: (including food stamps and EITC)], education,
1107 roads, justice, other programs [US2: and federal agencies (including in energy, sci-
1108 ence...)]. [Figure S28]

1109 Less than 0.1%; 0.1% to 0.2%; 0.3% to 0.5%; 0.6% to 1.0%; 1.1% to 1.7%; 1.8% to 2.6%;
1110 2.7% to 4%; 4.1% to 6%; 6.1% to 9%; 9.1% to 13%; 13.1% to 25%; More than 25%

1111 40. [Two random branches: with or without information on actual amount] [Info: Actually,
1112 [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [the U.S.] government spend-
1113 ing is allocated to foreign aid.]

1114

1115 If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate
1116 to foreign aid? [Figures S26, S27, S29 and S30]

1117 41. [Asked iff branch: Info and preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than actual for-
1118 eign aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to increase [U.S.] foreign
1119 aid.

1120

1121 How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers
1122 possible) [Figure S31]

1123 Lower spending on defense; Lower spending on retirement pensions; Lower spending on
1124 healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Lower spending on welfare benefits [US2: (like
1125 EITC or food stamps)]; Lower spending on education; Lower spending on other programs
1126 [US2: and federal agencies]; Higher taxes on the wealthiest; Higher corporate income tax
1127 rate; Higher personal income tax rates; Higher public deficit

1128 42. [Asked iff branch: *Info* and preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than actual foreign
1129 aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to reduce [U.S.] foreign aid.

1130

1131 How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible) [*Figure S32*]
1132

1133 *Higher spending on defense; Higher spending on retirement pensions; Higher spending on
1134 healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Higher spending on welfare benefits [US2:
1135 like EITC or food stamps)]; Higher spending on education; lower spending on other pro-
1136 grams [US2: and federal agencies]; Lower taxes on the wealthiest; Lower corporate income
1137 tax rate; Lower personal income tax rates; Lower public deficit*

1138 **[Eu, US1] Petition**

1139 43. [*Two random branches*] Would you be willing to sign a petition for the [Global cli-
1140 mate / National redistribution] scheme? [*Figure S33*]

1141

1142 As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President's
1143 office], informing him what share of American people are willing to endorse the
1144 [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign,
1145 only your answer here is required and remains anonymous.) Yes; No

1146 **[Eu, US1] Other policies**

1147 44. The following policies are discussed at international negotiations on how to deal
1148 with climate change. [*Figures S2 and ??*]

1149

1150 Do you support or oppose the following policies?

- 1151 • Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for
1152 climate damages
- 1153 • High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries
- 1154 • High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income
1155 countries adapt to climate change

1156 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1157 support*

1158 45. Do you support or oppose the following global policies? [Figures S2 and ??]

- 1159 • Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt
- 1160 • Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting
right proportional to its population
- 1161 • Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries
- 1162 • A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage
- 1163 • Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of
all assets
- 1164 • A maximum wealth limit of [US1: \$10 billion; Eu: [€]100 million] for each
1165 human

1166 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1167 support*

1170 46. Currently, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [U.S.] government
1171 spending (that is, [US1: 0.2%; FR: 0.4%; DE: 0.6%; ES: 0.2%; UK: 0.7%] of [U.S.] GDP)
1172 is spent on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries. [Figure S4]

1173 Do you support [the U.S.] transferring more money to low-income countries?

1174 *Yes, [U.S.] foreign aid should be increased.; Yes, but only if some conditions are met.; No,
1175 [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.; No, [U.S.] foreign aid should be reduced.*

1177 47. [Asked only if *Yes, but only if some conditions are met.* is chosen] What conditions
1178 should be required for [the U.S.] to increase its foreign aid? (Multiple answers pos-
1179 sible) [Figures S5, S26]

1180 *That recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights.; That recipient
1181 countries cooperate to fight illegal migrations.; That other high-income countries also in-
1182 crease their foreign aid.; That this is financed by increased taxes on millionaires.; That we
1183 can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted.; Other: [open field]*

1184 48. [Asked only if *No, [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.* or *No, [U.S.] foreign aid
1185 should be reduced.* is chosen] Why do you oppose [the U.S.] increasing its foreign
1186 aid? (Multiple answers possible) [Figure S6]

1187 *Aid perpetuates poverty as it makes people feel less responsible for themselves.; Aid is not
1188 effective as most of it is diverted.; Aid is a pressure tactic for high-income countries that*

1189 *prevents low-income countries from developing freely.; [The U.S.] is not responsible for what*
1190 *happens in other countries.; Charity begins at home: there is already a lot to do to support*
1191 *the American people in need.; Other: [open field]*

1192 **[Eu, US1, US2] Values and politics**

- 1193 49. [Eu (where it is instead asked at the beginning of Section “Other Policies”), US1]
1194 In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend
1195 [U.S.] interests or global justice? [Figure S34]
1196 *[U.S.] interests, even if it goes against global justice; [U.S.] interests, to the extent it re-*
1197 *spects global justice; ndifferent or don’t know; Global justice, to the extent it respects [U.S.]*
1198 *interests; Global justice, even if it goes against [U.S.] interests*
- 1199 50. How much did you give to charities in 2022? [Figure S39]
1200 *I did not make donations to charities last year.; Less than [\$]100.; Between [\$]101 and*
1201 *[\$]500.; Between [\$]501 and [\$]1,000.; Between [\$]1,001 and [\$]5,000.; More than [\$]5,000.*
- 1202 51. To what extent are you interested in politics? [Figure S40]
1203 *Not at all; A little; Moderately; A lot; A great deal*
- 1204 52. Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means you think the
1205 government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic gov-
1206 ernment functions, and 5 means you think the government should take active steps
1207 in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens? [Figure S41]
1208 *Desired involvement of government [slider from 1 to 5]*
- 1209 53. **On economic policy matters**, where do you see yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where
1210 1 is Left (favoring equality and government interventions) and 5 is Right (favoring
1211 free competition and little government intervention)? [Figure S42]
1212 *Left (1) to Right (5) on economic issues [slider from 1 to 5]*
- 1213 54. Did you vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election? [Figure S43]
1214 *Yes; No: I didn’t have the right to vote in the U.S.; Prefer not to say*
- 1215 55. [If voted: Which candidate did you vote for in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election?
1216 If did not vote: Even if you did not vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election,
1217 please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who
1218 represents your views more closely.] [Figure S44]

1219 [US1, US2: Biden; Trump; Jorgensen; Hawkins; Prefer not to say
1220 FR: candidates at the 2022 presidential election
1221 DE: parties with more than 1% of votes at the 2021 federal election and *Other*
1222 ES: lists with more than 0.9% at the November 2019 general election and *Other*
1223 UK: parties with more than 0.5% of votes at the 2019 general election and *Other*]

1224 56. To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem? [Figure S35]

- 1225 • Income inequality in [the U.S.]
1226 • Climate change
1227 • Global poverty

1228 *Not an important issue for me; An issue but there are other priorities; An issue but we
1229 already do what we can; An important issue, we should do more; One of the most pressing
1230 issue of our time*

1231 57. What group do you defend when you vote? [Figure S36]

1232 *Sentient beings (humans and animals); Humans; [Eu: Europeans]; [Americans]; People
1233 sharing my culture or religion; [US1, US2: My State]; [US1, US2: My town; Eu: My
1234 country, region or town]; My relatives and/or colleagues; My family and myself*

1235 [Eu, US1] Prioritization

1236 58. In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The
1237 more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

1238 How do you allocate the points among the following policies? [Figures S37 and S38]

1239 You can adjust the number of points either using the slider or entering the num-
1240 ber of your choice on the right-hand-side. **The sum of points must equal exactly
1241 100.** By pushing the last slider to the right, the total will automatically adjust to 100.
1242 Please read the 6 options before making your choice.

1243 See the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the pool of policies in each country.

1244 [sliders from 0 to 100]

1247 [FR, DE, ES] ETS2

1248 59. Similar to the Global Climate Scheme, the European Climate Scheme would impose
1249 a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit across the EU in the buildings
1250 and transport sectors. It would make polluters pay for their emissions, which in turn
1251 would increase fossil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities. Several options
1252 are possible regarding the use of the scheme's revenues:

- 1253 • Provide an equal cash transfer of €105 per year to each European.
- 1254 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European, proportional to their
1255 country's emissions: people in countries with higher emissions per person (like
1256 Germany) would receive more than people in countries with lower emissions
1257 (like Romania). For information, people in [Germany] would receive €[FR:
1258 110; DE: 130; ES: 90]/year.
- 1259 • Finance low-carbon investments: thermal insulation of buildings, switch to
1260 clean sources of heating, public transportation, and charging stations for elec-
1261 tric vehicles.
- 1262 • Provide cash transfers to the most vulnerable half of Europeans and finance
1263 low-carbon investments.

1264 Do you support or oppose the European Climate Scheme in case the revenue is used
1265 to... ?

- 1266 • Provide an equal cash transfer to each European
- 1267 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European
- 1268 • Finance low-carbon investments
- 1269 • Provide cash transfers for the most vulnerable Europeans and low-carbon in-
1270 vestments

1271 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1272 support*

1273 60. [Asked iff none of the four variants of the European Climate Scheme is (somewhat or
1274 strongly) supported] Why do you not support a European Climate Scheme? (Mul-
1275 tiple answers possible)

1276 *I am opposed to climate policy being decided at the EU level, it should be decided at the na-*
1277 *tional level;*
1278 *I would prefer if the revenues were used in a different way (beyond the four suggestions*
1279 *above) than previously suggested;*
1280 *I would prefer if decreasing carbon emissions were regulated by other climate policies;*
1281 *I am generally opposed to additional, or more ambitious, climate policies;*
1282 *I do not fully understand how the European Climate Scheme is supposed to work;*
1283 *I don't know*

1284 **[Eu, US1, US2] Feedback**

- 1285 61. Do you feel that this survey was politically biased? [Figure S45]
1286 *Yes, left-wing biased; Yes, right-wing biased; No, I do not feel it was biased*
- 1287 62. [US2 Asked only to one random third of the respondents, instead of the feedback Ques-
1288 tion 63] According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme
1289 poverty in low-income countries? [Figure S46]
1290 *{Open field}*
- 1291 63. The survey is nearing completion. You can now enter any comments, thoughts or
1292 suggestions in the field below.
1293 *{Open field}*
- 1294 64. Lastly, are you interested to be interviewed by a researcher (through videoconfer-
1295 encing) for 30 min?
1296
1297 This is totally optional and will not be rewarded.
1298 *Yes; No*

1299 G Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme

1300 To specify the GCS, we use the IEA's 2DS scenario (IEA 2017), which is consistent
1301 with limiting the global average temperature increase to 2°C with a probability of at least
1302 50%. The paper by Hood (2017) contributing to the Report of the High-Level Commission
1303 on Carbon Prices (Stern & Stiglitz 2017) presents a price corridor compatible with this
1304 emissions scenario, from which we take the midpoint. The product of these two series
1305 provides an estimate of the revenues expected from a global carbon price. We then use
1306 the UN median scenario of future population aged over 15 years (*adults*, for short). We
1307 derive the basic income that could be paid to all adults by recycling the revenues from
1308 the global carbon price: evolving between \$20 and \$30 per month, with a peak in 2030.
1309 Accounting for the lower price levels in low-income countries, an additional income of
1310 \$30 per month would allow **670 million people** to escape extreme poverty, defined with
1311 the threshold of \$2.15 per day in purchasing power parity.¹³

1312 To estimate the increase in fossil fuel expenditures (or "cost") in each country by 2030,
1313 we make a key assumption concerning the evolution of the carbon footprints per adult:
1314 that they will decrease by the same proportion in each country. We use data from the
1315 Global Carbon Project (Peters et al. 2012). In 2030, the average carbon footprint of a
1316 country c , e_c , evolves from baseline year b proportionally to the evolution of its adult
1317 population $\Delta p_c = p_c^{2030} / p_c^b$. Thus, the global share of country c 's carbon footprint, s_c ,
1318 is proportional to $\sigma_c = e_c \Delta p_c$, and as countries' shares sum to 1, $s_c = \frac{\sigma_c}{\sum_k \sigma_k}$. Multiplying
1319 country c 's emission share with global revenues in 2030, R , and dividing by c 's adult pop-
1320 ulation in year y , yields its average cost per adult: $R \cdot s_c / p_c^y$. Using findings from Ivanova
1321 & Wood (2020) for Europe and Fremstad & Paul (2019) for the U.S., we approximate the
1322 median cost as 90% of the average cost. Finally, the net gain is given by the basic income
1323 (\$30 per month) minus the cost. We provided consistent estimates of net gains in all sur-
1324 veys (using $y = b = 2015$), though in the global survey we gave the average net gains
1325 vs. the median ones in the complementary surveys. The latter are shown in Figure S51.
1326 For the record, Table S5 also provides an estimate of *average* net gains (computed with
1327 $b = 2019$ and $y = 2030$).¹⁴

¹³By taking the **ratio** of the World Bank series relating the GDP per capita of Sub-Saharan Africa in **PPP** and **nominal**, we obtain the purchasing power of \$1 in this region: \$2.4 in 2019.

¹⁴2015 was the last year of data available when the global questionnaire was conceived (OECD data was then used – it does not cover all countries but give identical rounded estimates than those recomputed from the Global Carbon Project data for our complementary surveys). 2030 was chosen as the reference year as it is the date at which global carbon price revenues are expected to peak (and the GCS redistributive effects

1328 Estimates of the net gains from the Global Climate Scheme are necessarily imprecise,
1329 given the uncertainties surrounding the carbon price required to achieve emissions re-
1330 ductions as well as each country's trajectory in terms of emissions and population. These
1331 values are highly dependent on future (non-price) climate policies, technical progress,
1332 and economic growth of each country, which are only partially known. Integrated As-
1333 sessment Models have been used to derive a Global Energy Assessment (Johansson et al.
1334 2012), a 100% renewable scenario (Greenpeace 2015) as well as Shared Socioeconomic
1335 Pathways (SSPs), which include consistent trajectories of population, emissions, and car-
1336 bon price (Bauer et al. 2017; Fricko et al. 2017; Riahi et al. 2017; van Vuuren et al. 2017).
1337 Instead of using some of these modelling trajectories, we relied on a simple and trans-
1338 parent formula, for a number of reasons. First and foremost, those trajectories describe
1339 territorial emissions while we need consumption-based emissions to compute the inci-
1340 dence of the GCS. Second, the carbon price is relatively low in trajectories of SSPs that
1341 contain global warming below 2°C (less than \$35/tCO₂ in 2030), so we conservatively
1342 chose a method yielding a higher carbon price (\$90 in 2030). Third, modelling results are
1343 available only for a few macro regions, while we wanted country by country estimates.
1344 Finally, we have checked that the emissions per capita given by our method are broadly
1345 in line with alternative methods, even if it tends to overestimate net gains in countries
1346 which will decarbonize less rapidly than average.¹⁵ For example, although countries' de-
1347 carbonization plans should realign with the GCS in place, India might still decarbonize
1348 less quickly than the European Union, so India's gain and the EU's loss might be over-
1349 estimated in our computations. For a more sophisticated version of the Global Climate
1350 Scheme which includes participation mechanisms preventing middle-income countries
1351 (like China) to lose from it and estimations of the Net Present Value by country, see Fabre
1352 (2023).

would be largest), and the GCS could not realistically enter into force before that date. In the surveys, we chose $y = b = 2015$ rather than $b = 2019$ and $y = 2030$ to get more conservative estimates of the monthly cost in the U.S. (\$20 higher than the other option) and in Europe (€5 or £10 higher).

¹⁵Computations with alternative methods can be found on [our public repository](#).

Figure S51: Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme.




Table S5: Estimated net gain from the GCS in 2030 and carbon footprint by country.

	Mean net gain from the GCS (\$/month)	CO ₂ footprint per adult in 2019 (tCO ₂ /y)			
Saudi Arabia	-92	24.0	Algeria*	-1	6.0
United States	-76	21.0	Mexico	2	5.6
Australia	-59	17.6	Ukraine	2	5.6
Canada	-55	16.7	Uzbekistan*	4	5.1
South Korea	-49	15.6	Argentina	5	4.9
Taiwan	-41	14.0	Thailand	7	4.6
Germany	-30	11.7	Egypt	12	3.6
Russia	-28	11.5	Indonesia	13	3.3
Japan	-27	11.3	Colombia	15	3.0
Malaysia	-21	10.0	Brazil	15	2.9
Iran	-19	9.5	Vietnam	16	2.9
Poland	-18	9.5	Peru	16	2.8
United Kingdom	-18	9.4	Morocco	16	2.7
China	-14	8.6	North Korea*	17	2.5
Italy	-12	8.4	India	18	2.4
South Africa	-11	8.0	Philippines	18	2.3
France	-10	7.8	Pakistan	22	1.6
Iraq*	-7	7.4	Bangladesh	24	1.1
Spain	-6	7.0	Nigeria	25	1.0
Turkey	-2	6.2	Kenya	25	0.9
			Myanmar*	26	0.9
			Sudan*	26	0.9
			Tanzania	27	0.5
			Afghanistan*	27	0.5
			Uganda	28	0.4
			Ethiopia	28	0.3
			Venezuela	29	0.3
			DRC*	30	0.1

¹³⁵³ Note: Asterisks denote countries where footprint is missing and territorial emissions is used instead.

¹³⁵⁴ Values differ from Figure S51 as this table present estimates of *mean* net gain per adult in 2030, not at the

¹³⁵⁵ present. Only the countries with more than 20 million adults (covering 87% of the global total) are shown.

H Determinants of support

Table S6: Determinants of support for the Global Climate Scheme.

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme						
	All	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Country: Germany	-0.157*** (0.022)		-0.144*** (0.022)				
Country: Spain	-0.044* (0.024)		-0.026 (0.024)				
Country: United Kingdom	-0.079*** (0.024)		-0.104*** (0.023)				
Country: United States	-0.375*** (0.019)						
Income quartile: 2	0.037** (0.017)	0.031 (0.022)	0.038 (0.023)	0.047 (0.043)	0.058 (0.049)	0.013 (0.053)	0.023 (0.043)
Income quartile: 3	0.042** (0.017)	0.033 (0.024)	0.049** (0.024)	0.080** (0.040)	0.059 (0.052)	0.074 (0.056)	-0.052 (0.052)
Income quartile: 4	0.056*** (0.018)	0.062** (0.026)	0.010 (0.026)	0.018 (0.047)	-0.015 (0.055)	-0.001 (0.056)	-0.005 (0.057)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.023* (0.012)	0.032* (0.017)	0.010 (0.018)	0.007 (0.029)	0.045 (0.039)	0.007 (0.039)	-0.010 (0.039)
Age: 25-34	-0.076*** (0.025)	-0.084*** (0.031)	-0.044 (0.035)	-0.031 (0.057)	-0.077 (0.083)	-0.050 (0.066)	-0.103 (0.091)
Age: 35-49	-0.101*** (0.024)	-0.109*** (0.030)	-0.069* (0.034)	-0.094* (0.055)	-0.009 (0.077)	-0.168** (0.070)	-0.050 (0.090)
Age: 50-64	-0.137*** (0.024)	-0.165*** (0.030)	-0.038 (0.035)	-0.039 (0.056)	-0.020 (0.082)	-0.146** (0.067)	-0.017 (0.087)
Age: 65+	-0.116*** (0.028)	-0.142*** (0.034)	-0.056 (0.044)	0.003 (0.076)	-0.045 (0.094)	-0.258*** (0.091)	0.011 (0.105)
Gender: Man	0.019* (0.011)	0.022 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.029)	-0.018 (0.033)	0.042 (0.038)	-0.005 (0.034)
Lives with partner	0.029** (0.013)	0.023 (0.017)	0.058*** (0.018)	0.070** (0.033)	0.082** (0.038)	0.017 (0.038)	0.040 (0.039)
Employment status: Retired	-0.020 (0.024)	-0.046 (0.030)	0.056 (0.038)	0.087 (0.081)	0.096 (0.075)	0.040 (0.082)	0.001 (0.073)
Employment status: Student	0.045 (0.033)	0.062 (0.048)	0.101** (0.044)	0.165* (0.085)	0.192** (0.087)	0.116 (0.074)	-0.021 (0.107)
Employment status: Working	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.020 (0.024)	0.011 (0.028)	0.082 (0.064)	0.006 (0.056)	-0.050 (0.056)	0.036 (0.051)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.331*** (0.013)	-0.435*** (0.017)	-0.106*** (0.019)	-0.131*** (0.035)	-0.004 (0.044)	-0.114*** (0.038)	-0.081** (0.041)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	-0.184*** (0.016)	-0.198*** (0.022)	-0.136*** (0.021)	-0.196*** (0.039)	-0.034 (0.043)	-0.116** (0.046)	-0.108*** (0.040)
Vote: Far right	-0.396*** (0.032)		-0.309*** (0.033)	-0.493*** (0.064)	-0.168*** (0.051)	-0.130 (0.102)	-0.314*** (0.080)
Urban	0.049*** (0.012)	0.072*** (0.018)	0.006 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.029)	0.019 (0.032)	-0.014 (0.036)	0.017 (0.033)
Race: White		-0.030 (0.019)					
Region: Northeast		0.010 (0.023)					
Region: South		0.006 (0.020)					
Region: West		0.010 (0.022)					
Swing State		-0.038** (0.019)					
Constant	1.048	0.736	0.89	0.7	0.732	0.935	0.886
Observations	7,986	4,992	2,994	977	727	748	542
R ²	0.160	0.181	0.064	0.116	0.067	0.043	0.063

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

I Representativeness of the surveys

Table S7: Sample representativeness of the complementary surveys.

	US1			US2			Eu		
	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample
Sample size		3,000	3,000		2,000	2,000		3,000	3,000
Gender: Woman	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.45	0.50	0.51	0.49	0.51
Gender: Man	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.49	0.55	0.50	0.49	0.51	0.49
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.11	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.18	0.15	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.18	0.15	0.17	0.15
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.24	0.26
Age: 65+	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.25	0.23	0.25
Diploma_25_64: Below upper secondary	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.13	0.14	0.13
Diploma_25_64: Upper secondary	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.28	0.23	0.19	0.23
Diploma_25_64: Post secondary	0.34	0.40	0.34	0.34	0.33	0.34	0.29	0.33	0.29
Race: White only	0.60	0.67	0.61	0.60	0.62	0.61			
Race: Hispanic	0.18	0.15	0.19	0.18	0.19	0.19			
Race: Black	0.13	0.16	0.14	0.13	0.17	0.14			
Region: Northeast	0.17	0.20	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.17			
Region: Midwest	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.21			
Region: South	0.38	0.39	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38			
Region: West	0.24	0.20	0.24	0.24	0.20	0.24			
Urban: TRUE	0.73	0.78	0.74	0.73	0.75	0.73			
Employment_18_64: Inactive	0.20	0.16	0.16	0.20	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.15
Employment_18_64: Unemployed	0.02	0.07	0.08	0.02	0.09	0.08	0.03	0.06	0.05
Vote: Left	0.32	0.47	0.45	0.32	0.46	0.45	0.30	0.32	0.32
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.32	0.32
Vote: Far right							0.10	0.10	0.10
Country: FR							0.24	0.24	0.24
Country: DE							0.33	0.33	0.33
Country: ES							0.18	0.18	0.18
Country: UK							0.25	0.25	0.25
Urbanity: Cities							0.43	0.49	0.43
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs							0.33	0.32	0.33
Urbanity: Rural							0.25	0.20	0.25

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

Table S8: Sample representativeness for each European country.

	FR			DE			ES			UK		
	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.									
Sample size		729	729		979	979		543	543		749	749
Gender: Woman	0.52	0.50	0.52	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.53	0.51	0.50	0.43	0.50
Gender: Man	0.48	0.50	0.48	0.49	0.48	0.49	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.50	0.57	0.50
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.29	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.19	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.19	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.33	0.25	0.25	0.18	0.25	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.14	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.07	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.12	0.16	0.12	0.17	0.20	0.17
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.31	0.24	0.22	0.26	0.22	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.24	0.18	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.24	0.19	0.24	0.28	0.23	0.28	0.27	0.28	0.27	0.25	0.30	0.25
Age: 65+	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.26	0.21	0.26	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.24
Diploma_25-64: Below upper secondary	0.11	0.19	0.11	0.10	0.14	0.10	0.24	0.16	0.25	0.12	0.09	0.12
Diploma_25-64: Upper secondary	0.26	0.16	0.26	0.27	0.20	0.27	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.21	0.23	0.21
Diploma_25-64: Post secondary	0.26	0.30	0.26	0.29	0.31	0.29	0.28	0.38	0.27	0.33	0.36	0.33
Urbanity: Cities	0.47	0.52	0.47	0.37	0.47	0.37	0.52	0.58	0.52	0.40	0.41	0.40
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.40	0.35	0.40	0.22	0.27	0.22	0.42	0.43	0.42
Urbanity: Rural	0.34	0.29	0.34	0.23	0.18	0.23	0.26	0.15	0.26	0.18	0.16	0.18
Employment_18-64: Inactive	0.20	0.19	0.18	0.15	0.14	0.11	0.20	0.13	0.12	0.16	0.16	0.17
Employment_18-64: Unemployed	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.11	0.12	0.02	0.03	0.04
Vote: Left	0.23	0.19	0.21	0.37	0.44	0.44	0.33	0.37	0.38	0.25	0.28	0.29
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.26	0.30	0.29	0.28	0.27	0.29	0.18	0.24	0.24	0.36	0.44	0.41
Vote: Far right	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.01	0.03	0.03

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. In this Table, weights are defined at the country level. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

1358

Similar tables for the global surveys can be found in [Dechezleprêtre et al. \(2022\)](#).

J Attrition analysis

Table S9: Attrition analysis for the US1 survey.

	Dropped out	Dropped out after socio-eco	Failed attention test	Duration (in min)	Duration below 4 min
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mean	0.08	0.059	0.082	21.198	0.016
Income quartile: 2	0.025*** (0.010)	0.025*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.740 (3.064)	-0.009 (0.006)
Income quartile: 3	0.062*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.754 (2.813)	-0.004 (0.007)
Income quartile: 4	0.035*** (0.011)	0.035*** (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-3.917 (2.798)	-0.003 (0.007)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.039*** (0.009)	0.039*** (0.009)	-0.000*** (0.000)	1.544 (2.665)	0.006 (0.006)
Age: 25-34	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.597 (2.604)	-0.031** (0.013)
Age: 35-49	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.824 (3.176)	-0.032** (0.013)
Age: 50-64	-0.060*** (0.015)	-0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	5.723** (2.763)	-0.039*** (0.012)
Age: 65+	0.048*** (0.017)	0.048*** (0.017)	0.000** (0.000)	8.952** (4.267)	-0.047*** (0.012)
Gender: Man	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.451 (2.210)	-0.0001 (0.005)
Urban	0.006 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.888** (2.443)	-0.004 (0.006)
Race: Black	0.020** (0.010)	0.020** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	8.554*** (2.600)	0.004 (0.007)
Race: Hispanic	0.021** (0.010)	0.021** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.119* (2.293)	-0.002 (0.007)
Region: Northeast	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-4.862 (4.782)	-0.004 (0.007)
Region: South	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-1.151 (4.710)	-0.004 (0.006)
Region: West	0.006 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-4.000 (4.305)	-0.003 (0.007)
Vote: Biden	-0.048*** (0.008)	-0.048*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-2.901 (2.379)	-0.009 (0.007)
Vote: Trump	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.145 (2.878)	-0.005 (0.008)
Observations	5,719	5,719	3,252	3,044	3,044
R ²	0.127	0.127	1.000	0.006	0.017

Table S10: Attrition analysis for the US2 survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 4 min (5)
Mean	0.095	0.074	0.092	16.338	0.052
Income quartile: 2	0.023* (0.013)	0.023* (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	1.352 (1.601)	-0.029** (0.014)
Income quartile: 3	0.054*** (0.014)	0.054*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	8.502 (9.649)	-0.009 (0.016)
Income quartile: 4	0.060*** (0.016)	0.060*** (0.016)	-0.000 (0.000)	5.254 (3.376)	0.0003 (0.017)
Diploma: Post secondary	-0.033*** (0.011)	-0.033*** (0.011)	0.000 (0.000)	1.601 (2.630)	0.012 (0.011)
Age: 25-34	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.929 (1.535)	-0.032 (0.024)
Age: 35-49	0.012 (0.014)	0.012 (0.014)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.076 (6.651)	-0.047** (0.022)
Age: 50-64	0.040*** (0.014)	0.040*** (0.014)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.364 (1.565)	-0.079*** (0.022)
Age: 65+	0.115*** (0.017)	0.115*** (0.017)	-0.000*** (0.000)	2.619 (3.150)	-0.095*** (0.022)
Gender: Man	-0.073*** (0.009)	-0.073*** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	4.707 (6.037)	0.010 (0.010)
Urban	0.019* (0.011)	0.019* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	1.766 (1.135)	0.005 (0.012)
Race: Black	0.060*** (0.015)	0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.673 (13.328)	-0.010 (0.015)
Race: Hispanic	0.079*** (0.014)	0.079*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	2.930 (1.813)	-0.027** (0.012)
Region: Northeast	-0.026* (0.014)	-0.026* (0.014)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.837 (2.855)	-0.011 (0.015)
Region: South	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.000 (0.000)	3.220 (5.002)	0.009 (0.014)
Region: West	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.000 (0.000)	-1.759 (1.942)	-0.009 (0.015)
Vote: Biden	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	3.230 (2.731)	-0.006 (0.014)
Vote: Trump	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.554 (1.272)	0.007 (0.016)
Observations	2,973	2,973	2,280	2,103	2,103
R ²	0.241	0.241	1.000	0.010	0.031

Table S11: Attrition analysis for the Eu survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 6 min (5)
Mean	0.067	0.044	0.151	54.602	0.039
Country: Germany	0.023** (0.010)	0.019** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.533 (18.906)	0.019* (0.010)
Country: Spain	-0.102*** (0.011)	-0.098*** (0.011)	0.000* (0.000)	-29.136* (15.948)	0.010 (0.010)
Country: United Kingdom	0.042*** (0.011)	0.043*** (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-7.458 (18.046)	0.010 (0.010)
Income quartile: 2	0.032*** (0.010)	0.029*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	32.749* (19.771)	-0.015 (0.010)
Income quartile: 3	0.049*** (0.010)	0.047*** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	6.130 (11.734)	-0.021** (0.010)
Income quartile: 4	0.024** (0.011)	0.021* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.659 (19.955)	-0.018* (0.011)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.035*** (0.008)	0.034*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	10.647 (12.959)	-0.007 (0.007)
Age: 25-34	0.028** (0.013)	0.025* (0.013)	-0.000*** (0.000)	36.132 (22.285)	-0.005 (0.018)
Age: 35-49	0.064*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	-0.000*** (0.000)	37.159** (17.190)	-0.013 (0.016)
Age: 50-64	0.085*** (0.013)	0.083*** (0.013)	-0.000 (0.000)	48.363** (22.526)	-0.063*** (0.015)
Age: 65+	0.117*** (0.014)	0.115*** (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	36.351** (14.226)	-0.061*** (0.015)
Gender: Man	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-22.980 (14.093)	0.009 (0.007)
Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs	0.006 (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-16.736 (17.256)	0.004 (0.008)
Degree of urbanization: Rural	0.023** (0.009)	0.023** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	-14.593 (19.733)	-0.001 (0.009)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.025*** (0.005)	-0.025*** (0.005)	0.000*** (0.000)	-17.558 (13.143)	0.019** (0.008)
Vote: Far right	0.005 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.000*** (0.000)	15.838 (32.281)	0.029** (0.014)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	0.023*** (0.006)	0.022*** (0.005)	0.000 (0.000)	24.631 (19.824)	0.030*** (0.010)
Observations	3,963	3,963	3,326	3,115	3,115
R ²	0.406	0.395	1.000	0.006	0.028

1360 **Bibliography**

- 1361 A. Agarwal & S. Narain. Global Warming in an Unequal World: A Case of Environmental
1362 Colonialism. Technical report, India Centre for Science and Environment, 1991. [Link](#).
1363 [22](#)
- 1364 M. Aklin & M. Mildenberger. Prisoners of the Wrong Dilemma: Why Distributive Con-
1365 flict, Not Collective Action, Characterizes the Politics of Climate Change. *Global Envi-*
1366 *ronmental Politics*, 2020. [Link](#). [21](#)
- 1367 F. H. Allport. *Social Psychology*. Journal of Philosophy Inc, 1924. [21](#)
- 1368 A. Alsamawi, J. Murray, & M. Lenzen. The Employment Footprints of Nations. *Journal of*
1369 *Industrial Ecology*, 2014. [Link](#). [28](#)
- 1370 Americans for Tax Fairness. Support for Biden's Tax and Economic Plans. Technical
1371 report, 2021. [Link](#). [20](#)
- 1372 P. Andre, T. Boneva, F. Chopra, & A. Falk. Misperceived Social Norms and Willingness to
1373 Act Against Climate Change. 2022. [21](#)
- 1374 D. Archibugi, M. Koenig-Archibugi, & R. Marchetti. *Global Democracy: Normative and*
1375 *Empirical Perspectives*. Cambridge University Press, 2011. [Link](#). [30](#)
- 1376 E. Arghiri. *Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism in Trade*. 1972. [28](#)
- 1377 T. Athanasiou, C. Holz, & S. Kartha. Fair Shares – Lessons from Practice, Thoughts on
1378 Strategy. 2022. [25](#), [26](#), [27](#)
- 1379 P. Baer, J. Harte, B. Haya, A. V. Herzog, J. Holdren, N. E. Hultman, D. M. Kammen, R. B.
1380 Norgaard, & L. Raymond. Equity and Greenhouse Gas Responsibility. *Science*, 2000.
1381 [Link](#). [22](#)
- 1382 P. Baer, G. Fieldman, T. Athanasiou, & S. Kartha. Greenhouse Development Rights: To-
1383 wards an equitable framework for global climate policy. *Cambridge Review of Interna-*
1384 *tional Affairs*, 2008. [Link](#). [24](#), [25](#)
- 1385 F. Bastagli, J. Hagen-Zanker, L. Harman, V. Barca, G. Sturge, & T. Schmidt. Cash transfers:
1386 What does the evidence say? Technical report, ODI, 2016. [29](#)

- 1387 N. Bauer, K. Calvin, J. Emmerling, O. Fricko, S. Fujimori, J. Hilaire, J. Eom, V. Krey,
1388 E. Kriegler, I. Mouratiadou, H. Sytze de Boer, M. van den Berg, S. Carrara, V. Daioglou,
1389 L. Drouet, J. E. Edmonds, D. Gernaat, P. Havlik, N. Johnson, D. Klein, P. Kyle,
1390 G. Marangoni, T. Masui, R. C. Pietzcker, M. Strubegger, M. Wise, K. Riahi, & D. P.
1391 van Vuuren. Shared Socio-Economic Pathways of the Energy Sector – Quantifying the
1392 Narratives. *Global Environmental Change*, 2017. [Link](#). 79
- 1393 M. Bauhr, N. Charron, & N. Nasiritousi. Does Corruption Cause Aid Fatigue? Public
1394 Opinion and the Aid-Corruption Paradox. *International Studies Quarterly*, 2013. [Link](#).
1395 19
- 1396 A. B. Bayram. What drives modern Diogenes? Individual values and cosmopolitan alle-
1397 giance. *European Journal of International Relations*, 2015. [Link](#). 20
- 1398 A. B. Bayram. Aiding Strangers: Generalized Trust and the Moral Basis of Public Support
1399 for Foreign Development Aid. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2017. [Link](#). 19
- 1400 M. M. Bechtel & K. F. Scheve. Mass support for global climate agreements depends on
1401 institutional design. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 2013. [Link](#). 17
- 1402 L. F. Beiser-McGrath & T. Bernauer. Commitment failures are unlikely to undermine
1403 public support for the Paris agreement. *Nature Climate Change*, 2019. [Link](#). 21
- 1404 L. F. Beiser-McGrath & T. Bernauer. Could revenue recycling make effective carbon taxa-
1405 tion politically feasible? *Science Advances*, 2019. [Link](#). 15
- 1406 T. Bernauer & R. Gampfer. How robust is public support for unilateral climate policy?
1407 *Environmental Science & Policy*, 2015. [Link](#). 21
- 1408 G. Bertram. Tradeable emission permits and the control of greenhouse gases. *The Journal
1409 of Development Studies*, 1992. [Link](#). 22
- 1410 O. Blanchard & J. Tirole. Major Future Economic Challenges. 2021. [Link](#). 22
- 1411 T. Bodenstein & J. Faust. Who Cares? European Public Opinion on Foreign Aid and
1412 Political Conditionality. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2017. [Link](#). 19
- 1413 K. B. Bolch, L. Ceriani, & L. F. López-Calva. The arithmetics and politics of domestic
1414 resource mobilization for poverty eradication. *World Development*, 2022. [Link](#). 28

- ¹⁴¹⁵ A. W. Cappelen, B. Enke, & B. Tungodden. Universalism: Global Evidence, 2022. [Link](#).
- ¹⁴¹⁶ [20](#)
- ¹⁴¹⁷ S. Carattini, S. Kallbekken, & A. Orlov. How to win public support for a global carbon tax. *Nature*, 2019. [Link](#). [15](#)
- ¹⁴¹⁹ F. Carlsson, M. Kataria, E. Lampi, Å. Löfgren, & T. Sterner. Is fairness blind?—The effect of framing on preferences for effort-sharing rules. *Ecological Economics*, 2011. [Link](#). [17](#)
- ¹⁴²¹ F. Carlsson, M. Kataria, A. Krupnick, E. Lampi, Å. Löfgren, P. Qin, & T. Sterner. A fair share: Burden-sharing preferences in the United States and China. *Resource and Energy Economics*, 2013. [Link](#). [17](#)
- ¹⁴²⁴ L. Chancel & T. Piketty. Carbon and inequality: From Kyoto to Paris. 2015. [23](#)
- ¹⁴²⁵ L. Chancel, T. Piketty, E. Saez, & G. Zucman. World Inequality Report 2022. 2022. [Link](#).
- ¹⁴²⁶ [13](#)
- ¹⁴²⁷ T. L. Cherry, S. Kallbekken, & S. Kroll. Accepting market failure: Cultural worldviews and the opposition to corrective environmental policies. *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*, 2017. [Link](#). [20](#)
- ¹⁴³⁰ P. Cramton, A. Ockenfels, & S. Stoft. An International Carbon-Price Commitment Promotes Cooperation. *Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy*, 2015. [Link](#). [22](#)
- ¹⁴³² E. Dabla-Norris, T. Helbling, S. Khalid, H. Khan, G. Magistretti, A. Sollaci, & K. Srinivasan. Public Perceptions of Climate Mitigation Policies: Evidence from Cross-Country Surveys. *Staff Discussion Notes*, 2023. [Link](#). [18](#)
- ¹⁴³⁵ A. Dechezleprêtre, A. Fabre, T. Kruse, B. Planterose, A. Sanchez Chico, & S. Stantcheva. Fighting climate change: International attitudes toward climate policies. *NBER Working Paper*, 2022. [Link](#). [3](#), [11](#), [84](#)
- ¹⁴³⁸ D. f. I. D. DFID. *Aid under Pressure: Support for Development Assistance in a Global Economic Downturn, Fourth Report of Session 2008-09, Vol. 1: Report, Together with Formal Minutes*. The Stationery Office, 2009. ISBN 978-0-215-53050-9. [19](#)
- ¹⁴⁴¹ S. Drews, I. Savin, & J. C. J. M. van den Bergh. Biased perceptions of other people's attitudes to carbon taxation. *Energy Policy*, 2022. [Link](#). [21](#)

- ¹⁴⁴³ D. Egger, J. Haushofer, E. Miguel, P. Niehaus, & M. Walker. General Equilibrium Effects
¹⁴⁴⁴ of Cash Transfers: Experimental Evidence From Kenya. *Econometrica*, 2022. [Link](#). 29
- ¹⁴⁴⁵ A. Einstein. To the General Assembly of the United Nations, 1947. 30
- ¹⁴⁴⁶ B. Enke, R. Fisman, L. Mota Freitas, & S. Sun. Universalism and Political Representation:
¹⁴⁴⁷ Evidence from the Field, 2023. [Link](#). 20
- ¹⁴⁴⁸ B. Enke, R. Rodríguez-Padilla, & F. Zimmermann. Moral universalism and the structure
¹⁴⁴⁹ of ideology. *Review of Economic Studies*, 2023. 20
- ¹⁴⁵⁰ B. Enke, R. Rodríguez-Padilla, & F. Zimmermann. Moral Universalism: Measurement
¹⁴⁵¹ and Economic Relevance. *Management Science*, 2023. 20
- ¹⁴⁵² A. Fabre. The Global Climate Plan – Policy Brief. Technical report, Global Redistribution
¹⁴⁵³ Advocates, 2023. [Link](#). 79
- ¹⁴⁵⁴ A. L. Fanning & J. Hickel. Compensation for atmospheric appropriation. *Nature Sustainability*,
¹⁴⁵⁵ 2023. [Link](#). 24
- ¹⁴⁵⁶ D. Fehr, J. Mollerstrom, & R. Perez-Truglia. Your Place in the World: Relative Income and
¹⁴⁵⁷ Global Inequality. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 2022. [Link](#). 16
- ¹⁴⁵⁸ R. Fisman, K. Gladstone, I. Kuziemko, & S. Naidu. Do Americans Want to Tax Capital?
¹⁴⁵⁹ Evidence from Online Surveys. Working Paper 23907, National Bureau of Economic
¹⁴⁶⁰ Research, 2017. [Link](#). 19
- ¹⁴⁶¹ M. Fleurbaey & S. Zuber. Climate Policies Deserve a Negative Discount Rate. *Chicago*
¹⁴⁶² *Journal of International Law*, 2013. [Link](#). 23
- ¹⁴⁶³ A. Fremstad & M. Paul. The Impact of a Carbon Tax on Inequality. *Ecological Economics*,
¹⁴⁶⁴ 2019. [Link](#). 78
- ¹⁴⁶⁵ O. Fricko, P. Havlik, J. Rogelj, Z. Klimont, M. Gusti, N. Johnson, P. Kolp, M. Strubegger,
¹⁴⁶⁶ H. Valin, M. Amann, T. Ermolieva, N. Forsell, M. Herrero, C. Heyes, G. Kindermann,
¹⁴⁶⁷ V. Krey, D. L. McCollum, M. Obersteiner, S. Pachauri, S. Rao, E. Schmid, W. Schoepp, &
¹⁴⁶⁸ K. Riahi. The marker quantification of the Shared Socioeconomic Pathway 2: A middle-
¹⁴⁶⁹ of-the-road scenario for the 21st century. *Global Environmental Change*, 2017. [Link](#). 79
- ¹⁴⁷⁰ I. Gallup. Seventy Years of U.S. Public Opinion on the United Nations, 1946. [Link](#). 15

- ¹⁴⁷¹ S. Gangopadhyay, R. Lensink, & B. Yadav. Cash or In-kind Transfers? Evidence from a
¹⁴⁷² Randomised Controlled Trial in Delhi, India. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 2015.
¹⁴⁷³ [Link](#). 29
- ¹⁴⁷⁴ G. Gao, M. Chen, J. Wang, K. Yang, Y. Xian, X. Shi, & K. Wang. Sufficient or insufficient:
¹⁴⁷⁵ Assessment of the intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) of the
¹⁴⁷⁶ world's major greenhouse gas emitters. *Frontiers of Engineering Management*, 2019. [Link](#).
¹⁴⁷⁷ 28
- ¹⁴⁷⁸ N. Geiger & J. K. Swim. Climate of silence: Pluralistic ignorance as a barrier to climate
¹⁴⁷⁹ change discussion. *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 2016. [Link](#). 21
- ¹⁴⁸⁰ F. Ghassim. *Who on Earth Wants Global Democracy – and Why (Not)? A Theoretical and*
¹⁴⁸¹ *Experimental Study of International Public Opinion*. PhD thesis, University of Oxford,
¹⁴⁸² 2020. [Link](#). 15
- ¹⁴⁸³ F. Ghassim, M. Koenig-Archibugi, & L. Cabrera. Public Opinion on Institutional Designs
¹⁴⁸⁴ for the United Nations: An International Survey Experiment. *International Studies Quar-*
¹⁴⁸⁵ *terly*, 2022. [Link](#). 15
- ¹⁴⁸⁶ R. Gignac & H. D. Matthews. Allocating a 2 °C cumulative carbon budget to countries.
¹⁴⁸⁷ *Environmental Research Letters*, 2015. [Link](#). 28
- ¹⁴⁸⁸ M. Gilens. Political Ignorance and Collective Policy Preferences. *American Political Science*
¹⁴⁸⁹ *Review*, 2001. [Link](#). 18
- ¹⁴⁹⁰ . Global Assembly. Report of the 2021 Global Assembly on the Climate and Ecological
¹⁴⁹¹ Crisis. Technical report, 2022. [Link](#). 30
- ¹⁴⁹² . Global Challenges Foundation. Attitudes to global risk and governance survey 2018.
¹⁴⁹³ Technical report, 2018. [Link](#). 15
- ¹⁴⁹⁴ C. Gollier & J. Tirole. Negotiating Effective Institutions Against Climate Change. *Eco-*
¹⁴⁹⁵ *nomics of Energy & Environmental Policy*, 2015. [Link](#). 22
- ¹⁴⁹⁶ Greenpeace. Energy [r]evolution - a sustainable world energy outlook 2015, 2015. [Link](#).
¹⁴⁹⁷ 79
- ¹⁴⁹⁸ M. Grubb. The Greenhouse Effect: Negotiating Targets. *International Affairs (Royal Institute*
¹⁴⁹⁹ *of International Affairs 1944-)*, 1990. [Link](#). 22

- 1500 J. Hainmueller, D. J. Hopkins, & T. Yamamoto. Causal Inference in Conjoint Analysis:
1501 Understanding Multidimensional Choices via Stated Preference Experiments. *Political*
1502 *Analysis*, 2014. [Link](#). 14
- 1503 W. A. Hanson. Satellite Internet in the Mobile Age. *New Space*, 2016. [Link](#). 29
- 1504 P. Harnett. Taking Tax to the Global Level Combining Southern Initiatives to Create a
1505 World Basic Income. Technical report, World Basic Income, 2017. [Link](#). 29
- 1506 J. Haushofer & J. Shapiro. The Short-term Impact of Unconditional Cash Transfers to
1507 the Poor: Experimental Evidence from Kenya. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2016.
1508 [Link](#). 29
- 1509 S. Henson, J. Lindstrom, L. Haddad, & R. Mulmi. Public Perceptions of International
1510 Development and Support for Aid in the UK: Results of a Qualitative Enquiry. *IDS*
1511 *Working Papers*, 2010. [Link](#). 19
- 1512 J. Hickel. *The Divide: A Brief Guide to Global Inequality and Its Solutions*. Heinemann, 2017.
1513 ISBN 978-1-78515-112-5. [Link](#). 28, 29
- 1514 M. Hoel. Carbon taxes: An international tax or harmonized domestic taxes. *CICERO*
1515 *Working Paper*, 1991. [Link](#). 22
- 1516 N. Höhne, M. den Elzen, & D. Escalante. Regional GHG reduction targets based on effort
1517 sharing: A comparison of studies. *Climate Policy*, 2014. [Link](#). 28
- 1518 C. Holz, E. Kemp-Benedict, T. Athanasiou, & S. Kartha. The Climate Equity Reference
1519 Calculator. *Journal of Open Source Software*, 2019. [Link](#). 25
- 1520 C. Hood. Input to the High-level Economic Commission on Carbon Prices, 2017. [Link](#). 78
- 1521 D. Hudson & J. van Heerde. 'A Mile Wide and an Inch Deep': Surveys of Public Attitudes
1522 towards Development Aid. *International Journal of Development Education and Global*
1523 *Learning*, 2012. [Link](#). 18, 19
- 1524 . IEA. World Energy Outlook. Technical report, 2007. [Link](#). 25
- 1525 IEA. *Energy Technology Perspectives 2017*. 2017. [Link](#). 78
- 1526 K. Imai. Multivariate Regression Analysis for the Item Count Technique. *Journal of the*
1527 *American Statistical Association*, 2011. [Link](#). 13

- 1528 IMF, editor. *How to Mitigate Climate Change*. Washington, DC, 2019. ISBN 978-1-4983-
1529 2122-8. [22](#)
- 1530 T. Isbell. Footing the bill? Technical report, Afrobarometer, 2022. [Link](#). [20](#)
- 1531 ISSP. International Social Survey Programme: Environment III. 2010. [Link](#). [16](#)
- 1532 ISSP. International Social Survey Programme ISSP 2019 - Social Inequality V. 2019. [Link](#).
1533 [16](#)
- 1534 D. Ivanova & R. Wood. The unequal distribution of household carbon footprints in Eu-
1535 rope and its link to sustainability. *Global Sustainability*, 2020. [Link](#). [78](#)
- 1536 B. Jaeger & M. Wilks. The Relative Importance of Target and Judge Characteristics in
1537 Shaping the Moral Circle. *Cognitive Science*, 2023. [Link](#). [21](#)
- 1538 D. Jamieson. Climate Change and Global Environmental Justice. 2001. [Link](#). [22](#)
- 1539 T. B. Johansson, A. Patwardhan, N. Nakićenović, L. Gomez-Echeverri, & International
1540 Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, editors. *Global Energy Assessment (GEA)*. Cam-
1541 bridge University Press ; International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Cam-
1542 bridge : Laxenburg, Austria, 2012. ISBN 978-1-107-00519-8 978-0-521-18293-5. [26](#), [27](#),
1543 [79](#)
- 1544 I. Kant. *Zum ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf*. 1795. ISBN 978-1-4840-4926-6. [30](#)
- 1545 D. Kaufmann, E. F. McGuirk, & P. C. Vicente. Foreign Aid Preferences and Perceptions in
1546 Donor Countries. 2012. [18](#)
- 1547 W. Kopczuk, J. Slemrod, & S. Yitzhaki. The limitations of decentralized world redistribu-
1548 tion: An optimal taxation approach. *European Economic Review*, 2005. [Link](#). [29](#)
- 1549 M. Leimbach & A. Giannousakis. Burden sharing of climate change mitigation: Global
1550 and regional challenges under shared socio-economic pathways. *Climatic Change*, 2019.
1551 [Link](#). [23](#)
- 1552 J. Leinen & A. Bummel. *A World Parliament: Governance and Democracy in the 21st Century*.
1553 Democracy Without Borders, Berlin, 2018. ISBN 978-3-942282-13-0. [30](#)
- 1554 D. J. C. MacKay, P. Cramton, A. Ockenfels, & S. Stoft. Price carbon - I will if you will.
1555 *Nature*, 2015. [22](#)

- 1556 H. D. Matthews. Quantifying historical carbon and climate debts among nations. *Nature Climate Change*, 2015. [Link](#). 24
1557
- 1558 L. Maverick Lloyd & R. Schwimmer. Chaos, War, and a New World Order. Technical report, 1937. [Link](#). 30
1559
- 1560 D. M. McEvoy & T. L. Cherry. The prospects for Paris: Behavioral insights into unconditional cooperation on climate change. *Palgrave Communications*, 2016. [Link](#). 21
1561
- 1562 L. F. McGrath & T. Bernauer. How strong is public support for unilateral climate policy and what drives it? *WIREs Climate Change*, 2017. [Link](#). 21
1563
- 1564 A. Meilland, Y. Kervinio, & A. Méjean. International climate justice: What the people think. 2023. 16, 17
1565
- 1566 A. Meyer. Briefing: Contraction and convergence. *Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers - Engineering Sustainability*, 2004. [Link](#). 27
1567
- 1568 G. Myrdal. *Beyond the Welfare State: Economic Planning and its International Implications*. Praeger, yale university press edition, 1960. ISBN 978-0-313-23697-6. 28
1569
- 1570 G. Myrdal. The Equality Issue in World Development. *The Swedish Journal of Economics*, 1975. [Link](#). 28
1571
- 1572 G. Nair. Misperceptions of Relative Affluence and Support for International Redistribution. *The Journal of Politics*, 2018. [Link](#). 18
1573
- 1574 E. Neumayer. In defence of historical accountability for greenhouse gas emissions. *Eco-logical Economics*, 2000. [Link](#). 24
1575
- 1576 OECD. *Main Findings from the 2018 Risks That Matter Survey*. OECD, 2019. ISBN 978-92-
1577 64-35751-8. [Link](#). 20
- 1578 H. J. O'Gorman. Pluralistic ignorance and white estimates of white support for racial
1579 segregation. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1975. [Link](#). 21
- 1580 . Patriotic Millionaires. Patriotic Millionaires Survey. Technical report, 2022. [Link](#). 20
- 1581 P. Paxton & S. Knack. Individual and country-level factors affecting support for foreign
1582 aid. *International Political Science Review*, 2012. [Link](#). 19

- 1583 G. P. Peters, S. J. Davis, & R. Andrew. A synthesis of carbon in international trade. *Biogeosciences*, 2012. [Link](#). 78
- 1585 T. Piketty. *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2014.
- 1586 ISBN 978-0-674-43000-6. 29
- 1587 P. o. I. P. A. PIPA. Americans on Foreign Aid and World Hunger A Study of U.S. Public Attitudes. Technical report, PIPA, 2001. [Link](#). 18, 19, 20, 21
- 1589 P. o. I. P. A. PIPA. Publics in Developed Countries Ready to Contribute Funds Necessary to Cut Hunger in Half By 2015. Technical report, 2008. [Link](#). 18
- 1591 R. G. Rajan. A Global Incentive to Reduce Emissions, 2021. [Link](#). 22
- 1592 M. R. Raupach, S. J. Davis, G. P. Peters, R. M. Andrew, J. G. Canadell, P. Ciais, P. Friedling-stein, F. Jotzo, D. P. van Vuuren, & C. Le Quéré. Sharing a quota on cumulative carbon emissions. *Nature Climate Change*, 2014. [Link](#). 24, 28
- 1595 R. Reyes, M. Lenzen, & J. Murray. Better Global Assessment of Worker Inequality: Commitment on “The Employment Footprints of Nations”. *Journal of Industrial Ecology*, 2017.
- 1596 [Link](#). 28
- 1598 S. Reysen & I. Katzarska-Miller. *The Psychology of Global Citizenship: A Review of Theory and Research*. Lexington Books, Lanham, 2018. ISBN 978-1-4985-7029-9. 20
- 1600 K. Riahi, D. P. van Vuuren, E. Kriegler, J. Edmonds, B. C. O'Neill, S. Fujimori, N. Bauer, K. Calvin, R. Dellink, O. Fricko, W. Lutz, A. Popp, J. C. Cuaresma, S. Kc, M. Leimbach, L. Jiang, T. Kram, S. Rao, J. Emmerling, K. Ebi, T. Hasegawa, P. Havlik, F. Humpenöder, L. A. Da Silva, S. Smith, E. Stehfest, V. Bosetti, J. Eom, D. Gernaat, T. Masui, J. Rogelj, J. Strefler, L. Drouet, V. Krey, G. Luderer, M. Harmsen, K. Takahashi, L. Baumstark, J. C. Doelman, M. Kainuma, Z. Klimont, G. Marangoni, H. Lotze-Campen, M. Obersteiner, A. Tabeau, & M. Tavoni. The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways and their energy, land use, and greenhouse gas emissions implications: An overview. *Global Environmental Change*, 2017. [Link](#). 79
- 1609 Y. Robiou du Pont, M. L. Jeffery, J. Gütschow, P. Christoff, & M. Meinshausen. National contributions for decarbonizing the world economy in line with the G7 agreement. *Environmental Research Letters*, 2016. [Link](#). 28

- ₁₆₁₂ Y. Robiou du Pont, M. L. Jeffery, J. Gütschow, J. Rogelj, P. Christoff, & M. Meinshausen.
₁₆₁₃ Equitable mitigation to achieve the Paris Agreement goals. *Nature Climate Change*, 2017.
₁₆₁₄ [Link.](#) 28
- ₁₆₁₅ K. Rowlingson, A. Sood, & T. Tu. Public attitudes to a wealth tax: The importance of
₁₆₁₆ 'capacity to pay'. *Fiscal Studies*, 2021. [Link.](#) 19
- ₁₆₁₇ E. Saez & G. Zucman. *The Triumph of Injustice: How the Rich Dodge Taxes and How to Make
Them Pay*. W. W. Norton & Company, New York, NY, first edition edition, 2019. ISBN
₁₆₁₉ 978-1-324-00272-7. [61](#)
- ₁₆₂₀ M. Schecht & D. Tisch. Tax principles, policy feedback and self-interest: Cross-national
₁₆₂₁ experimental evidence on wealth tax preferences. *Socio-Economic Review*, 2023. [Link.](#) 20
- ₁₆₂₂ J. Schleich, E. Dütschke, C. Schwirplies, & A. Ziegler. Citizens' perceptions of justice in
₁₆₂₃ international climate policy: An empirical analysis. *Climate Policy*, 2016. [Link.](#) 16, 17
- ₁₆₂₄ J. Sivonen. Attitudes toward global and national climate policies in Finland – The signif-
₁₆₂₅ icance of climate change risk perception and urban/rural-domicile. *GeoJournal*, 2022.
₁₆₂₆ [Link.](#) 16
- ₁₆₂₇ G. Sparkman, N. Geiger, & E. U. Weber. Americans experience a false social reality by
₁₆₂₈ underestimating popular climate policy support by nearly half. *Nature Communications*,
₁₆₂₉ 2022. [Link.](#) 21
- ₁₆₃₀ G. Standing. A little more, how much it is...: Piloting basic income transfers in madhya
₁₆₃₁ pradesh, india. Technical report. Technical report, UNICEF, 2014. [Link.](#) 29
- ₁₆₃₂ E. A. Stanton. Negishi welfare weights in integrated assessment models: The mathematics
₁₆₃₃ of global inequality. *Climatic Change*, 2011. [Link.](#) 22
- ₁₆₃₄ N. Stern & J. E. Stiglitz. Report of the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices. Technical
₁₆₃₅ report, Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, 2017. [Link.](#) 78
- ₁₆₃₆ K. Vaillancourt & J.-P. Waaub. Equity in international greenhouse gases abatement sce-
₁₆₃₇ narios: A multicriteria approach. *European Journal of Operational Research*, 2004. [Link.](#)
₁₆₃₈ 23
- ₁₆₃₉ N. J. van den Berg, H. L. van Soest, A. F. Hof, M. G. J. den Elzen, D. P. van Vuuren,
₁₆₄₀ W. Chen, L. Drouet, J. Emmerling, S. Fujimori, N. Höhne, A. C. Köberle, D. McCollum,

- 1641 R. Schaeffer, S. Shekhar, S. S. Vishwanathan, Z. Vrontisi, & K. Blok. Implications of
1642 various effort-sharing approaches for national carbon budgets and emission pathways.
1643 *Climatic Change*, 2020. [Link](#). 28
- 1644 J. C. J. M. van den Bergh, A. Angelsen, A. Baranzini, W. J. W. Botzen, S. Carattini, S. Drews,
1645 T. Dunlop, E. Galbraith, E. Gsotzbauer, R. B. Howarth, E. Padilla, J. Roca, & R. C.
1646 Schmidt. A dual-track transition to global carbon pricing. *Climate Policy*, 2020. [Link](#). 22
- 1647 D. P. van Vuuren, E. Stehfest, D. E. H. J. Gernaat, J. C. Doelman, M. van den Berg,
1648 M. Harmsen, H. S. de Boer, L. F. Bouwman, V. Daioglou, O. Y. Edelenbosch, B. Girod,
1649 T. Kram, L. Lassaletta, P. L. Lucas, H. van Meijl, C. Müller, B. J. van Ruijven, S. van der
1650 Sluis, & A. Tabeau. Energy, land-use and greenhouse gas emissions trajectories under
1651 a green growth paradigm. *Global Environmental Change*, 2017. [Link](#). 79
- 1652 A. Waytz, R. Iyer, L. Young, J. Haidt, & J. Graham. Ideological differences in the expanse
1653 of the moral circle. *Nature Communications*, 2019. [Link](#). 21
- 1654 M. L. Weitzman. On a World Climate Assembly and the Social Cost of Carbon. *Economica*,
1655 2017. [Link](#). 23
- 1656 P. Zhou & M. Wang. Carbon dioxide emissions allocation: A review. *Ecological Economics*,
1657 2016. [Link](#). 23

1658 **List of Tables**

1659 S1	List experiment: tacit support for the GCS	5
1660 S2	Influence of the GCS on electoral prospects	5
1661 S3	Campaign and bandwagon effects on the support for the GCS.	36
1662 S4	Donation to Africa vs. own country	37
1663 S5	Estimated net gain from the GCS in 2030 and carbon footprint by country. .	81
1664 S6	Determinants of support for the GCS	82
1665 S7	Sample representativeness of US1, US2, Eu	83
1666 S8	Sample representativeness of each European country	84
1667 S9	Attrition analysis: US1	85
1668 S10	Attrition analysis: US2	86
1669 S11	Attrition analysis: Eu	87

1670 **List of Figures**

1671 S1	Absolute support for global climate policies	3
1672 S2	Absolute support for further global policies	4
1673 S3	Preferred share of wealth tax for low-income countries	4
1674 S4	Attitudes on the evolution of foreign aid	6
1675 S5	Conditions at which foreign aid should be increased	6
1676 S6	Reasons why foreign aid should not be increased	7
1677 S7	Preferences for various policies in political platforms	8
1678 S8	Influence of the GCS on preferred platform	10
1679 S9	Beliefs about support for the GCS and NR	10
1680 S10	Net gains with the CERF burden-sharing rule.	26
1681 S11	Comparison between GDR and equal per capita burden-sharing rules. . . .	27
1682 S12	Comprehension	31
1683 S13	Comprehension score	31
1684 S14	Support for the Global Climate Scheme	31
1685 S15	List experiment	32
1686 S16	Conjoint analyses 1 and 2	32
1687 S17	Preferences for various policies in political platforms (English)	33
1688 S18	Perceptions of the GCS	34
1689 S19	Classification of open-ended field on the GCS	35

1690	S20 Topics of open-ended field on the GCS	36
1691	S21 Donation to Africa vs. own country	37
1692	S22 Support for a global wealth tax	38
1693	S23 Support for a national wealth tax	38
1694	S24 Preferred share of global tax for low-income countries	39
1695	S25 Support for sharing half of global tax revenues with low-income countries	39
1696	S26 Actual, perceived and preferred amount of foreign aid (mean)	39
1697	S27 Preferred foreign aid (summary)	40
1698	S28 Perceived foreign aid	40
1699	S29 Preferred foreign aid (without info on actual amount)	41
1700	S30 Preferred foreign aid (after info on actual amount)	41
1701	S31 Preferences for funding increased foreign aid	42
1702	S32 Preferences of spending following reduced foreign aid	43
1703	S33 Willingness to sign a real-stake petition	43
1704	S34 Preferred approach for international climate negotiations	44
1705	S35 Importance of selected issues	44
1706	S36 Group defended when voting	44
1707	S37 Mean prioritization of policies	45
1708	S38 Positive prioritization of policies	46
1709	S39 Charity donation	46
1710	S40 Interest in politics	47
1711	S41 Desired involvement of government	47
1712	S42 Political leaning	48
1713	S43 Voted in last election	48
1714	S44 Vote in last election	49
1715	S45 Perception that survey was biased	49
1716	S46 Classification of open-ended field on extreme poverty	50
1717	S47 Main attitudes by vote	51
1718	S48 <i>Eu</i> survey structure	55
1719	S49 <i>US1</i> survey structure	56
1720	S50 <i>US2</i> survey structure	56
1721	S51 Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme.	80