

A Global Climate Plan

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Introduction

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Meeting the Paris target

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This Global Climate Scheme garners majority support in the 20 countries surveyed.

Support for the Global Climate Scheme

International surveys with a focus on the West

Global survey (02/2021–02/2022) by **Dechezleprêtre et al. (2022)**


20 countries; 2,000 respondents per country; median duration: 28 min.

Complementary surveys (01–04/2023) by **Fabre, Douenne & Mattauch (2023)** – bit.ly/Fabre2023

Eu: 3,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, UK; 20 min.

US1: 3,000 respondents from the U.S.; 14 min.


US2: 2,000 respondents from the U.S.; 11 min.



Stated support


Global survey: Global policies are strongly supported.

Share of support (somewhat or strongly) for the main global policies among non-*indifferent*. ▶ Absolute ▶ National




Level at which climate policies are needed (Multiple choice question)

- Global
- Federal/Continental
- State/National
- Local




Global climate policies (5-Likert scale)

- Global carbon budget (+2°C) divided in tradable country shares
- Global tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries
- Global democratic assembly on climate change
- Global tax on GHG financing a global basic income



Burden sharing preferences for the global carbon budget (5-Likert)

- Emission share should be in proportion to population*
- Countries that have emitted more since 1990 should receive a lower share*
- Countries that will be hurt more by CC should receive a higher share*
- Emission share should be in proportion to current emissions



The Global Climate Scheme (GCS)

Our main policy of interest is the GCS, a **global emissions trading system funding a global basic income**:

At the Paris agreement in 2015, all countries have agreed to contain global warming “well below +2 °C”. To limit global warming to this level, **there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally**.


To meet the climate target, a limited number of permits to emit greenhouse gases can be created globally. Polluting firms would be required to buy permits to cover their emissions. Such a policy would **make fossil fuel companies pay** for their emissions and progressively raise the price of fossil fuels. **Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions.**

In accordance with the principle that each human has an equal right to pollute, the revenues generated by the sale of permits could finance a global basic income. **Each adult in the world would receive \$30/month**, thereby lifting out of extreme poverty the 700 million people who earn less than \$2/day.

The typical [American] would lose out financially [\$85] per month (as he or she would face [\$115] per month in price increases, which is higher than the \$30 they would receive).

The policy could be put in place as soon as countries totaling more than 60% of global emissions agree on it. Countries that would refuse to take part in the policy could face sanctions (like tariffs) from the rest of the World and would be excluded from the basic income.


Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme



Support for the Global Climate Scheme

We test understanding of the distributive effects of the GCS (and then give the expected answer) in an incentivized way. ▶ [Understanding](#)

Do you support...? Yes/No (Percentage of Yes) ▶ [Perceptions](#) ▶ [Complementary policies](#) ▶ [By vote](#) ▶ [National policies](#)



Sincerity of the support for the GCS

List experiment

We ask *Among the policies below, how many do you support?*, randomly varying the list of policies.

The difference in mean number of supported policies for lists with and without the GCS should equal the support for GCS. If the tacit support is lower, it may indicate a social desirability bias.

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| | Number of supported policies | | |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | All | U.S. | Europe |
| List contains: GCS | 0.624*** (0.028) | 0.524*** (0.041) | 0.724*** (0.036) |
| <i>Support for GCS</i> | 0.65 | 0.542 | 0.757 |
| <i>Social desirability bias</i> | -0.025 | -0.019 | -0.033 |
| <i>80% C.I. for the bias</i> | [-0.06; 0.01] | [-0.07; 0.04] | [-0.08; 0.01] |
| Constant | 1.317 | 1.147 | 1.486 |
| Observations | 6,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 |
| R ² | 0.089 | 0.065 | 0.125 |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

⇒ No (significant) social desirability bias.

Conjoint analyses: influence on electoral prospects

Choice between a conservative platform and a progressive platform with/without the GCS.

Imagine if the two favorite candidates in your constituency in the next general election campaigned with the following policies in their party's platforms.

Which of these candidates would you vote for?

| Candidate A | Candidate B |
|---|--|
| Windfall tax on oil companies | Cut the burden of tax on business |
| Ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030 | £100 billion for infrastructures like road and rail |
| £150 billion to upgrade schools, hospitals, care homes and council houses | Tougher sentencing for the worst offenders and 10,000 more prison places |
| National redistribution scheme | Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation |
| Global climate scheme | |

Candidate A

Candidate B

None of them

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Candidate A

Candidate B

None of them

Conjoint analyses: influence on electoral prospects

Table 1: Imagine if the [Democratic and Republican presidential candidates in 2024] campaigned with the following policies in their platforms. [Credible Progressive and Conservative platforms]

Which of these candidates would you vote for? *A; B; None of them*

[FR: second round of presidential; DE, ES, UK: two favorite candidates in one's constituency]

| | Prefers the Progressive platform | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------|---------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| | All | United States | France | Germany | UK | Spain |
| GCS in Progressive platform | 0.028* (0.014) | 0.029 (0.022) | 0.112*** (0.041) | 0.015 (0.033) | 0.008 (0.040) | -0.015 (0.038) |
| Constant | 0.623 | 0.604 | 0.55 | 0.7 | 0.551 | 0.775 |
| Observations | 5,202 | 2,619 | 605 | 813 | 661 | 504 |
| R ² | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.013 | 0.0003 | 0.0001 | 0.0003 |

Note: The 14% of *None* answers have been excluded from the regression samples. GCS has no significant influence on them.

A progressive candidate would not lose votes by endorsing the GCS, and could even gain 11 p.p.*** in France.

Conjoint analyses: influence on preferred platform (UK)

► EU ► FR ► U.S.

Imagine that the Labour wins the next elections. Here are two possible platforms on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a pool of credible Labour policies).
(...) which of these platforms do you prefer?

Climate policy:

- Ban of most polluting vehicles in city centers (low-emission zones)
- Thermal insulation plan
- Ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030

Economic issues:

- £150 billion to upgrade schools, hospitals, care homes and council houses
- Real Living Wage of £11 per hour for all workers aged 16 and over
- Reduce the average full-time weekly working hours to 32
- Re-establish neighbourhood policing and recruit 2,000 more frontline officers

Foreign policy:


- Global climate scheme
- Global tax on millionaires
- Global democratic assembly on climate change
- Doubling foreign aid

Societal issues:

- Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation
- Legalization of cannabis

Tax system:

- National redistribution scheme
- Wealth tax




Conjoint analyses: influence on preferred platform

We ask the preference between two progressive platforms, where each measure is taken at random. The GCS is included in one of the platforms.

Imagine that a [Left or Center-left coalition wins the next elections]. Here are two possible platforms on which [the coalition] may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a pool of credible [Left/Center-left] policies).

Even if you do not support the Left, which of these platforms do you prefer?

[FR: Left or center-left; DE: rot-rot-grüne; ES: PSOE; UK: Labour; US: Democratic primary (*not asked to Republican*)]



Random programs: A+GCS preferred to B

58 60 61 59 65 58

⇒ Majorities prefer platforms that include the GCS.

Support for other global policies

Support for other global policies

► Foreign aid

Do you support or oppose...? 5-Likert scale (Percentage of Support among non-Indifferent)


| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages | 55 | 71 | 72 | 70 | 79 | 70 |
| High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries | 68 | 82 | 82 | 82 | 85 | 81 |
| High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change | 60 | 76 | 77 | 79 | 79 | 71 |
| Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt | 46 | 53 | 53 | 43 | 62 | 61 |
| Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population | 58 | 71 | 69 | 69 | 78 | 72 |
| Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries | 62 | 73 | 58 | 73 | 80 | 83 |
| A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage | 63 | 80 | 80 | 78 | 81 | 83 |
| Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets | 62 | 87 | 90 | 86 | 91 | 87 |
| A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human | 46 | 62 | 58 | 62 | 65 | 67 |
| National tax on millionaires funding public services | 73 | 85 | 81 | 87 | 89 | 88 |
| Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries | 69 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 87 | 83 |

Support for a global wealth tax

► Foreign aid

We describe a global tax on wealth in excess of \$/€/£ 5 million who should get the revenues

Percent of wealth tax that should go to low-income countries (*mean*):



The Global Climate Plan

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
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Carattini et al. (2019) find support of $\approx 80\%$ in India and $\approx 50\%$ in the U.S., UK, Australia for a global tax and dividend.


The trajectories

Global trajectories estimated for the Global Climate Plan (GCP)




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
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A carbon border adjustment would prevent carbon leakage.

The unadjusted distributive effects

Distributive effects of the Global Climate Scheme in 2030.



Participation mechanisms

Basing the union's carbon budget on **equal rights per capita**:

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Each country is granted a trajectory of carbon allowances, converging to zero in 2080.

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
They can opt out from the carbon border adjustment.

⇒ The states of California, New York, Illinois, Massachusetts... could join.

The proposed allocation of emissions allowances


Table 2: Carbon budget over 2030–2080 (in GtCO₂)

| | Africa | China | Latin America | India | Europe | Other LMIC Asia | Union | World |
|-------------------|--------|-------|---------------|-------|--------|-----------------|-------|-------|
| Equal p.c. | 166 | 120 | 61 | 133 | 46 | 11.5 | 653 | 754 |
| Proposal | 145 | 154 | 61 | 133 | 32 | 115 | 653 | 754 |




The distributive effects

Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan in 2030. [► More maps](#)



The distributive effects

Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan throughout the century. [► More maps](#)



Scenarios with non-universal participation


Table 3: Main features of different scenarios of climate union.

| Union scenario | Emissions covered | Population covered | Basic income in 2040 (/month) | EU loss in 2040 (share of its GDP) | Temperature increase in 2100 (in °C) |
|----------------|-------------------|--------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|
| All countries | 100% | 100% | 44 | 0.6% | 1.8 |
| All but OPEC | 90% | 97% | 39 | 0.6% | 1.9 |
| Optimistic | 74% | 91% | 28 | 0.8% | 2.0 |
| Central | 67% | 88% | 23 | 0.9% | 2.0 |
| Prudent | 63% | 85% | 20 | 0.9% | 2.1 |
| Africa EU | 12% | 23% | 26 | 0.8% | 2.5 |

Scenarios with non-universal participation

Optimistic scenario.


Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan throughout the century.



Scenarios with non-universal participation

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LICs (in particular in **Africa**) would obtain **sizable transfers** by selling allowances. By forgoing allowances to high emitters like China, LICs would encourage them to join, raising the carbon price. This apparent renouncement from LICs could even lead to additional transfers in their favor.

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A fair international financial system: debt relief, rechanneling of SDRs, recapitalization of MDBs...


Towards an international tax system

Estimate of **revenue collected** by new global taxes (**in \$ billion per year**).

| Wealth Tax (3% above \$100M) | Financial Transactions Tax | Carbon price floor (10 \$/tCO ₂) | Maritime fuel levy (100 \$/tCO ₂) | Aviation fuel levy (300 \$/tCO ₂) | Corporate income tax (at 21%) | Total |
|------------------------------------|----------------------------------|--|---|---|-------------------------------------|-------|
| 765 | 327 | 356 | 104 | 223 | 299 | 2,074 |

Towards an international tax system


Net gain for state budgets from new taxes and transfers (revenue + net transfer): All countries' govts gain.



Towards an international tax system

International transfers to be financed by new global taxes.

The instruments proposed entail **North-South transfers of \$766 billion** per year.



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Embrace the consensus on **equal per capita allocation** and **negotiate a common price or quantity target**.

Break the deadlock of international negotiations by providing low-income countries with resources.

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Poorer countries should financially gain, rich countries should contribute.

Thank you for attention!

Livre: bit.ly/plan_mondial_climat
Book: bit.ly/bookGCP

**UN PLAN MONDIAL
POUR LE CLIMAT
ET CONTRE L'EXTRÊME
PAUVRETÉ**

PRÉFACE DE
GABRIEL ZUCMAN



@adrien_fabre

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Satellite internet access might soon become cheap and ubiquitous (Hanson 2016).

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Market design: Carbon offsets should not be allowed. Borrowing and banking emissions permits should be limited.

Appendix


Additional results

Conditions for increased foreign aid

[» Go back](#)

[Info on actual amount]. Do you support [the U.S.] transferring more money to low-income countries?


■ No, should be reduced ■ No, should remain stable ■ Yes, but at some conditions ■ Yes, should be increased




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
[If *at some conditions*] What conditions should be required for [the U.S.] to increase its foreign aid?




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[» Go back](#)

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People want to help people (not oligarchs) and to foster climate action and human rights.


National preference is the main reason behind not wanting increased foreign aid.

Preferences over public spending

[» Go back](#)


Your previous answer shows that you would like to increase [UK] foreign aid.

How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers possible)



Your previous answer shows that you would like to reduce [UK] foreign aid.

How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible)



People want better public services and higher taxes on the wealthiest.

Support for increased foreign aid

[» Go back](#)

Actual, perceived and preferred amount of foreign aid, with random info (or not) on actual amount. (*Mean*)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Actual foreign aid (in % of public spending) | 0.4 | 1.1 | 0.8 | 1.3 | 0.5 | 1.7 |
| Belief about foreign aid | 4.7 | 2.9 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 3.5 |
| Preferred foreign aid (with info) | 1.8 | 2.7 | 3.4 | 2.9 | 2.1 | 2.5 |
| Preferred foreign aid (no info) | 4 | 3.9 | 4.7 | 4.4 | 3.1 | 3.4 |

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Support for increased foreign aid: from previous question, and directly asked (with info).

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|---|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as current | 70 | 75 | 91 | 76 | 77 | 57 |
| Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as perceived | 57 | 74 | 83 | 79 | 77 | 58 |
| Supports increasing foreign aid (incl. with conditions) | 60 | 64 | 63 | 68 | 69 | 56 |


Actual foreign aid is overestimated.

Majorities support more foreign aid.

Perceptions of the Global Climate Scheme

[Go back](#)

When determining your support or opposition to the Global climate scheme, which points are important to you?



Conjoint analyses: interaction with other policies

[» Go back](#)

National climate policy (C) is as supported as the GCS, but no substitute for it.

Support for the GCS does not increase when complemented by National Redistribution.


⇒ Confirms that the **monetary loss is not a primary concern** for one's attitude toward the GCS.

Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you prefer?

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|-----------------------------|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Global climate scheme (GCS) | 54 | 76 | 80 | 71 | 81 | 74 |
| NR+GCS preferred to NR | 55 | 77 | 79 | 74 | 79 | 77 |
| C+NR+GCS preferred to C+NR | 55 | 74 | 79 | 71 | 78 | 68 |
| NR+C preferred to NR | 62 | 84 | 88 | 83 | 84 | 82 |
| GCS+NR preferred to C+NR | 47 | 52 | 53 | 53 | 49 | 52 |

Conjoint analyses: influence on preferred platform (Eu) [» Go back](#)

(...) Even if you do not support the Left, which of these platforms do you prefer?



Europeans prefer platforms that include the GCS and without the ban on thermal cars (a planned policy).

The effect of GCS is among the highest (wealth tax, better public services, higher minimum wage).

Conjoint analyses: influence on preferred platform (France) [▶ Go back](#)

France shows that there can be a **mismatch between preferred policies** (insulation plan, public services, global tax, GCS) **and enacted policies** (higher retirement age and ban on thermal cars: the least preferred).

Imaginez que la gauche ou le centre gauche gagne les prochaines élections en 2027. Voici deux programmes possibles sur lesquels elle pourrait faire campagne (...), lequel de ces programmes préférez-vous ?

Climat:

Interdiction des véhicules les plus polluants dans les centres-villes (ZFE)

Plan pour l'isolation thermique

Interdiction de la vente de voitures thermiques neuves d'ici 2030

Économie:

Versement du RSA aux 18-25 ans sans emploi

SMIC à 1600€ net par mois

Recul de l'âge légal de départ à la retraite à 65 ans

Hausse de 20% du financement de l'hôpital public et de l'Éducation nationale

Politique étrangère:

Plan mondial pour le climat

Taxe mondiale sur les millionnaires

Assemblée démocratique mondiale sur le changement climatique

Doubler l'aide au développement des pays à faibles revenus

Démocratie:


Élection des députés à la proportionnelle

Référendum d'Initiative Citoyenne (RIC)

Fiscalité:

Plan de redistribution nationale

Rétablissement de l'impôt sur la fortune (ISF)



Conjoint analyses: influence on preferred platform (U.S.)

[Go back](#)

Endorsing the GCS is not determinant to gain the Democratic primary.

[Only on non-Republican] Imagine that at the 2024 Democratic party presidential primaries, the two main candidates campaign with the following key policies in their platforms.

Which of these candidates do you prefer?

Climate policy:

Ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030

Coal exit

Trillion dollar investment in clean transportation infrastructure and building insulation

Economic issues:

\$15 minimum wage

Funding affordable housing

Student loan forgiveness

Universal childcare/pre-K

Foreign policy:

Doubling foreign aid

Global climate scheme

Global democratic assembly on climate change

Global tax on millionaires

Societal issues:

Expanding the Supreme Court

Handgun ban


Making abortion a right at the federal level

Tax system:

Increase corporate income tax rate from 21% to 28%

National redistribution scheme

Wealth tax



Conjoint analyses: influence on preferred platform (Germany)

[Go back](#)

Endorsing the GCS is not determinant to gain the Democratic primary.

Imagine that a Rot-Rot-Grüne coalition wins the next elections. Here are two possible platforms on which the coalition may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a pool of credible left-wing policies).

(...) Even if you do not support the Left, which of these platforms do you prefer?

Klimaschutz:

Verpflichtende Solaranlagen auf allen geeigneten Dächern

Plan zur Wärmedämmung

Verbot des Verkaufs von Neuwagen mit Verbrennungsmotor bis 2030

Wirtschaftspolitik:

Erhöhung des Regelsatzes des Bürgergelds auf bis zu 600€ pro Monat

Bürgerversicherung als gerechtere Sozialversicherung

Staatsschuldenquote auf unter 60% reduzieren

Investitionen für Gigabit-Netzwerke bereitstellen

Außenpolitik:

Globales Klimaprogramm

Globale Steuer auf Millionäre

Globale demokratische Versammlung zum Klimawandel

Verdoppelung der Mittel für die Entwicklungshilfe in einkommensschwachen Ländern

Gesellschaft:


Volksentscheid auf Bundesebene

Cannabis-Legalisierung

Steuerpolitik:

Nationales Umverteilungsprogramm

Die Vermögenssteuer wieder in Kraft setzen



Conjoint analyses: influence on preferred platform (Spain) [» Go back](#)

Endorsing the GCS is not determinant to gain the Democratic primary.

Imagine that the PSOE wins the next elections. Here are two possible platforms on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a pool of credible PSOE policies).

(...) Even if you do not support the PSOE, which of these platforms do you prefer?

Política climática:

100% de electricidad producida con energías renovables en 2040

Plan de aislamiento térmico

Prohibir la venta de coches nuevos con motor de combustión para 2030

Asuntos económicos:

Más necesidades sanitarias dentro del sistema público (cuidado dental, gafas, salud mental)

Ingreso Básico Garantizado de 600€ al mes

Jornada laboral de 34 horas semanales

Inversión en el sistema educativo y universalización de la educación preescolar

Política exterior:

Plan climático global

Impuesto mundial a los millonarios

Asamblea democrática mundial sobre el cambio climático

Duplicar la ayuda exterior a los países de renta baja

Asuntos sociales:


Reformar la ley electoral para hacer el Senado más proporcional

Abolición de la prostitución

Sistema fiscal:

Plan de redistribución nacional

Aumentar los impuestos sobre las rentas superiores a 100.000 euros anuales



“you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

How do you allocate the points among the following policies?”
[6 policies taken at random]

GCS is as prioritized as the average policy, or even more in France and Germany.

It is more prioritized than some planned climate policies, like the ban on thermal cars.

The global tax on millionaires is among the most prioritized measures. It is prioritized as a national wealth tax, if not more.

Most prioritized are better public services and a higher minimum wage.

Prioritization

[Go back](#)


Mean number of points

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| econ1 | 13 | 21 | 10 | 14 | 35 | 31 |
| econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung) | 23 | 22 | 25 | 21 | 22 | 23 |
| econ3 | 21 | 15 | 13 | 18 | 17 | 13 |
| econ4 | 28 | 22 | 27 | 17 | 24 | 20 |
| soc1 | 10 | 17 | 13 | 17 | 12 | 21 |
| soc2 | 13 | 9 | 14 | 8 | 10 | 8 |
| climate1 | 14 | 15 | 11 | 18 | 20 | 12 |
| climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport) | 20 | 18 | 22 | 19 | 15 | 17 |
| climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030 | 11 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 11 |
| tax1: National redistribution scheme | 14 | 15 | 16 | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes) | 19 | 19 | 21 | 18 | 17 | 19 |
| foreign1: Global climate scheme | 15 | 20 | 20 | 23 | 16 | 17 |
| foreign2: Global tax on millionaires | 21 | 20 | 20 | 23 | 19 | 20 |
| foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change | 15 | 15 | 15 | 17 | 14 | 13 |
| foreign4: Doubling foreign aid | 9 | 11 | 13 | 14 | 9 | 8 |

International climate negotiations

[» Go back](#)

In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend [U.S.] interests or global justice?




The typical answer is to defend one's country's "interests, to the extent it respects global justice."
Only one eighth wants to defend one's country's "interests, even if it goes against global justice."

Group defended

[Go back](#)

What group do you defend when you vote?




The most defended group is one's fellow citizens.

40% are universalist, i.e. defend all humans or sentient beings.

Biggest issues

[Go back](#)

To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem? *5-Likert scale*
(Mean of answers recoded in [-2, +2])




People rank these the importance of these 3 issues as follows:

1. Climate change
2. Global poverty
3. Income inequality in their country

Eu questionnaire

[Go back](#)



Descriptive statistics

Main attitudes by vote

[» Go back](#)


Main attitudes by vote (“Right” spans from Center-right to Far right). (Relative support in percent)

| | Europe Left | Europe PNR/Non-voter | Europe Right | U.S. Left | U.S. PNR/Non-voter | U.S. Right |
|--|-------------|----------------------|--------------|-----------|--------------------|------------|
| Support for the GCS | 85 | 72 | 71 | 74 | 53 | 26 |
| Global tax on millionaires | 94 | 83 | 76 | 85 | 71 | 40 |
| Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries | 61 | 52 | 45 | 55 | 67 | 41 |
| A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human | 73 | 65 | 52 | 62 | 49 | 23 |
| High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries | 93 | 79 | 74 | 87 | 70 | 38 |
| [Country]'s foreign aid should be increased | 93 | 83 | 72 | 92 | 81 | 48 |
| Universalist | 56 | 48 | 26 | 53 | 49 | 23 |

Main attitudes by vote

[Go back](#)


Main attitudes by vote in France



Main attitudes by vote

[» Go back](#)


Main attitudes by vote in Germany



Main attitudes by vote

[» Go back](#)


Main attitudes by vote in Spain



Main attitudes by vote

[Go back](#)

Main attitudes by vote in the UK




Comprehension of the policies

Correct answers to comprehension questions (in percent). [▶ Go back](#)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| With NR, typical [country] people win and richest lose | 68 | 73 | 76 | 73 | 73 | 70 |
| With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win | 60 | 68 | 62 | 72 | 67 | 67 |
| With GCS+NR, typical [country] people neither win nor lose | 54 | 60 | 63 | 59 | 57 | 61 |

Comprehension of the policies

Number of correct answers to comprehension questions (mean). [► Go back](#)



Number of correct answers to understanding questions

1.8

2

2

2

2


2

Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan

Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan

[» Go back](#)


Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan in 2030.



Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan

[Go back](#)


Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan in 2040.



Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan

[Go back](#)


Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan in 2050.



Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan

[Go back](#)


Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan in 2060.



Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan

[» Go back](#)

Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan in 2070.



Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan

[» Go back](#)


Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan in 2080.



Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan

[Go back](#)


Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan in 2030.



Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan

[Go back](#)


Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan in 2040.



Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan

[» Go back](#)


Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan in 2050.



Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan

[Go back](#)


Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan in 2060.



Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan

[» Go back](#)

Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan in 2070.



Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan

[» Go back](#)


Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan in 2080.



Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan

[Go back](#)


Distributive effects of the Global Climate Scheme.



Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan

[» Go back](#)

Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan.



OECD

Relative support for national policies

[Go back](#)

| High-income | Australia | Canada | Denmark | France | Germany | Italy | Japan | Poland | South Korea | Spain | United Kingdom | United States | Middle-income | Brazil | China | India | Indonesia | Mexico | South Africa | Turkey | Ukraine |
|-------------|-----------|--------|---------|--------|---------|-------|-------|--------|-------------|-------|----------------|---------------|---------------|--------|-------|-------|-----------|--------|--------------|--------|---------|
|-------------|-----------|--------|---------|--------|---------|-------|-------|--------|-------------|-------|----------------|---------------|---------------|--------|-------|-------|-----------|--------|--------------|--------|---------|

Support for Main Climate Policies

Green infrastructure program

Ban on combustion-engine cars

Carbon tax with cash transfers

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 79 | 68 | 77 | 76 | 77 | 58 | 94 | 78 | 82 | 95 | 86 | 78 | 71 | 93 | 90 | 98 | 91 | 97 | 94 | 89 | 92 | 87 |
| 56 | 50 | 61 | 49 | 39 | 40 | 74 | 59 | 56 | 73 | 62 | 60 | 55 | 81 | 77 | 95 | 86 | 88 | 76 | 70 | 83 | 70 |
| 56 | 50 | 60 | 45 | 45 | 39 | 72 | 60 | 55 | 79 | 59 | 55 | 52 | 79 | 70 | 90 | 85 | 89 | 71 | 73 | 73 | 63 |

Support for Other Climate Policies

Subsidies to low-carbon technologies

Mandatory and subsidized insulation of buildings

Ban on polluting cars in city centers

Funding clean energy in low-income countries

Ban on combustion-engine cars w. alternatives available

Tax on flying (+20%)

Tax on fossil fuels (\$45/tCO2)

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 87 | 82 | 86 | 89 | 76 | 84 | 96 | 91 | 91 | 93 | 87 | 90 | 78 | 90 | 86 | 94 | 84 | 94 | 87 | 93 | 90 | 90 | |
| 84 | 86 | 83 | 84 | 81 | 77 | 90 | 83 | 88 | 95 | 86 | 89 | 71 | 90 | 98 | | | | | | 91 | 87 | 83 |
| 75 | 70 | 76 | 78 | 69 | 67 | 89 | 85 | 78 | 71 | 73 | 80 | 65 | 85 | 78 | 93 | 87 | 96 | 85 | 82 | 72 | 78 | |

Support for Carbon Tax With:

Subsidies to low-carbon tech.

Funding environmental infrastructures

Reduction in personal income taxes

Reduction in the public deficit

Cash transfers to the poorest households

Tax rebates for the most affected firms

Cash transfers to constrained households

Reduction in corporate income taxes

Equal cash transfers to all households

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 85 | 80 | 67 | 84 | 83 | 88 | 94 | 92 | 89 | 97 | 86 | 87 | 75 | 92 | 93 | 98 | 87 | 97 | 91 | 92 | 88 | 89 |
| 85 | 80 | 68 | 83 | 88 | 83 | 92 | 90 | 87 | 94 | 88 | 85 | 77 | 92 | 92 | 96 | 89 | 96 | 92 | 94 | 89 | 90 |
| 79 | 73 | 66 | 60 | 80 | 80 | 92 | 88 | 87 | 88 | 83 | 76 | 69 | 87 | 86 | 95 | 84 | 91 | 86 | 85 | 85 | 87 |

Support for Cattle-Related Policies

Subsidies on organic and local vegetables

Ban of intensive cattle farming

Removal of subsidies for cattle farming

A high tax on cattle products, doubling beef prices


| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|--|----|----|----|----|----|
| 75 | 59 | 69 | 72 | 73 | 74 | 90 | 72 | 89 | 84 | 78 | 70 | 64 | 82 | 77 | 96 | | 90 | 72 | 72 | 91 | 69 |
| 57 | 44 | 56 | 40 | 69 | 66 | 81 | 31 | 60 | 66 | 54 | 66 | 51 | 51 | 49 | 80 | | 61 | 59 | 36 | 42 | 31 |
| 49 | 44 | 51 | 43 | 41 | 61 | 65 | 26 | 50 | 52 | 52 | 54 | 55 | 54 | 60 | 78 | | 71 | 65 | 38 | 36 | 31 |

Support in high-income countries: Global tax and dividend \lesssim National tax and dividend < Global quota and dividend

Absolute support for global policies


[Go back](#)

Share of support (somewhat or strongly) for the main global policies among non-indifferent.



Level at which climate policies are needed (Multiple choice question)

Global



Global climate policies (5-Likert scale)

Global tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries

Global carbon budget (+2°C) divided in tradable country shares

Global democratic assembly on climate change

Global tax on GHG financing a global basic income


Burden sharing preferences for the global carbon budget (5-Likert)

Emission share should be in proportion to population*


Countries that have emitted more since 1990 should receive a lower share*

Countries that will be hurt more by CC should receive a higher share*

Emission share should be in proportion to current emissions



Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “[country] should take measures to fight climate change.” [▶ Go back](#)




At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be put in place? (Multiple answers are possible) [► Go back](#)

| | High-income Australia | Canada | Denmark | France | Germany | Italy | Japan | Poland | South Korea | Spain | United Kingdom | United States | Middle-income | Brazil | China | India | Indonesia | Mexico | South Africa | Turkey | Ukraine | |
|---|--------------------------|--------|---------|--------|---------|-------|-------|--------|-------------|-------|----------------|---------------|---------------|--------|-------|-------|-----------|--------|--------------|--------|---------|----|
| Level of climate policies needed: global | 85 | 78 | 87 | 81 | 85 | 88 | 92 | 94 | 88 | 86 | 88 | 88 | 70 | 85 | 88 | 87 | 78 | 86 | 88 | 90 | 82 | 76 |
| Level of climate policies needed: federal/continental | 46 | 67 | 58 | 48 | 37 | 48 | 30 | NA | 40 | NA | 40 | 47 | 52 | 48 | 48 | 61 | 67 | 50 | 41 | 42 | 41 | 24 |
| Level of climate policies needed: state/national | 44 | 54 | 50 | 45 | 27 | 45 | 28 | 50 | 38 | 65 | 34 | 53 | 41 | 42 | 36 | 32 | 59 | 35 | 26 | 53 | 58 | 35 |
| Level of climate policies needed: local | 36 | 48 | 45 | 33 | 26 | 37 | 24 | 35 | 37 | 41 | 30 | 43 | 35 | 35 | 35 | 29 | 50 | 24 | 28 | 42 | 41 | 27 |


How should [country] climate policies depend on what other countries do?

If other countries do more, [country] should do... [▶ Go back](#)




How should [country] climate policies depend on what other countries do?

If other countries do less, [country] should do... [▶ Go back](#)



[Question non posée aux U.S., au Danemark et en France] All countries have signed the Paris agreement that aims to contain global warming “well below +2 °C”. To limit global warming to this level, there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally, called the carbon budget. Each country could aim to emit less than a share of the carbon budget. To respect the global carbon budget, countries that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less than their share.

Do you support such a policy? [► Go back](#)



[*Question not asked in the U.S., Denmark and France, answers to a similar question are displayed]

Suppose the above policy is in place. How should the carbon budget be divided among countries?

The emission share of a country should be proportional to its population, so that each human has an equal right


to emit.; The emission share of a country should be proportional to its current emissions, so that those who already emit more have more rights to emit.; Countries that have emitted more over the past decades (from 1990 onwards) should receive a lower emission share, because they have already used some of their fair share.;

Countries that will be hurt more by climate change should receive a higher emission share, to compensate them for the damages.

Percentage of support (somewhat or strong) among: *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support* [► Go back](#)


| | High-income Australia | Canada | Denmark* | France* | Germany | Italy | Japan | Poland | South Korea | Spain | United Kingdom | United States* | Middle-income | Brazil | China | India | Indonesia | Mexico | South Africa | Turkey | Ukraine | |
|---|--------------------------|--------|----------|---------|---------|-------|-------|--------|-------------|-------|----------------|----------------|---------------|--------|-------|-------|-----------|--------|--------------|--------|---------|-----------|
| Emission share should be in proportion to population* | 63 | 62 | 59 | 55 | 71 | 55 | 68 | 53 | 65 | 66 | 66 | 62 | 67 | 72 | 65 | 76 | 75 | 73 | 71 | 75 | 71 | 63 |
| Emission share should be in proportion to current emissions | 35 | 35 | 35 | NA | NA | 29 | 33 | 39 | 37 | 42 | 35 | 30 | NA | 50 | 41 | 65 | 60 | 62 | 40 | 38 | 55 | 3135 / 43 |

Do you support or oppose establishing a global democratic assembly whose role would be to draft international treaties against climate change? Each adult across the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly. [▶ Go back](#)




Imagine the following policy: a global tax on greenhouse gas emissions funding a global basic income. Such a policy would progressively raise the price of fossil fuels (for example, the price of gasoline would increase by [40 cents per gallon] in the first years). Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Revenues from the tax would be used to finance a basic income of [\$30] per month to each human adult, thereby lifting the 700 million people who earn less than \$2/day out of extreme poverty. The average British person would lose a bit from this policy as they would face [\$130] per month in price increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive.

Do you support or oppose such a policy? [► Go back](#)



Do you support or oppose a tax on all millionaires around the world to finance low-income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate action? This would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education. [► Go back](#)



Synthèse : Pourcentage de réponses positive (e.g. Plutôt/Très favorable). ▶ Go back

| | High-income | Australia | Canada | Denmark* | France* | Germany | Italy | Japan | Poland | South Korea | Spain | United Kingdom | United States* | Middle-income | Brazil | China | India | Indonesia | Mexico | South Africa | Turkey | Ukraine |
|---|-------------|-----------|--------|----------|---------|---------|-------|-------|--------|-------------|-------|----------------|----------------|---------------|--------|-------|-------|-----------|--------|--------------|--------|---------|
| Level of climate policies needed: global | 85 | 78 | 87 | 81 | 85 | 88 | 92 | 94 | 88 | 86 | 88 | 88 | 70 | 85 | 88 | 87 | 78 | 86 | 88 | 90 | 82 | 76 |
| Level of climate policies needed: federal/continental | 46 | 67 | 58 | 48 | 37 | 48 | 30 | NA | 40 | NA | 40 | 47 | 52 | 48 | 48 | 61 | 67 | 50 | 41 | 42 | 41 | 24 |
| Level of climate policies needed: state/national | 44 | 54 | 50 | 45 | 27 | 45 | 28 | 50 | 38 | 65 | 34 | 53 | 41 | 42 | 36 | 32 | 59 | 35 | 26 | 53 | 58 | 35 |
| Level of climate policies needed: local | 36 | 48 | 45 | 33 | 26 | 37 | 24 | 35 | 37 | 41 | 30 | 43 | 35 | 35 | 35 | 29 | 50 | 24 | 28 | 42 | 41 | 27 |
| If other do more, [country] should do more | 46 | 50 | 53 | 40 | 37 | 42 | 52 | 59 | 36 | 35 | 44 | 49 | 55 | 63 | 65 | 67 | 73 | 71 | 57 | 60 | 71 | 32 |
| If other do less, [country] should do more | 56 | 55 | 57 | 54 | 47 | 51 | 74 | 62 | 57 | 44 | 64 | 53 | 58 | 76 | 74 | 69 | 75 | 82 | 80 | 78 | 79 | 60 |
| Global carbon budget (+2°C) divided in tradable country shares | 62 | 57 | 64 | NA | NA | 52 | 69 | 50 | 59 | 71 | 71 | 66 | NA | 74 | 69 | 78 | 78 | 77 | 76 | 71 | 68 | 76 |
| Emission share should be in proportion to population* | 63 | 62 | 59 | 55 | 71 | 55 | 68 | 53 | 65 | 66 | 66 | 62 | 67 | 72 | 65 | 76 | 75 | 73 | 71 | 75 | 71 | 63 |
| Emission share should be in proportion to current emissions | 35 | 35 | 35 | NA | NA | 29 | 33 | 39 | 37 | 42 | 35 | 30 | NA | 50 | 41 | 65 | 60 | 62 | 40 | 38 | 55 | 31 |
| Countries that have emitted more since 1990 should receive a lower share* | 44 | 42 | 45 | 28 | 54 | 45 | 51 | 42 | 44 | 48 | 48 | 42 | 41 | 58 | 56 | 65 | 67 | 63 | 47 | 53 | 58 | 52 |
| Countries that will be hurt more by CC should receive a higher share* | 44 | 42 | 39 | 41 | 51 | 37 | 42 | 51 | 53 | 43 | 48 | 38 | 41 | 63 | 58 | 74 | 72 | 70 | 54 | 61 | 60 | 47 |
| Global democratic assembly on climate change | 57 | 52 | 54 | 51 | 55 | 56 | 68 | 61 | 63 | 57 | 68 | 53 | 48 | 75 | 64 | 86 | 77 | 78 | 76 | 70 | 72 | 73 |
| Global tax on GHG financing a global basic income | 34 | 29 | 32 | 41 | 34 | 36 | 34 | 32 | 31 | 33 | 42 | 29 | 34 | 61 | 54 | 74 | 72 | 70 | 68 | 40 | 44 | 62 |
| Global tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries | 64 | 58 | 67 | 55 | 65 | 65 | 72 | 64 | 62 | 65 | 75 | 65 | 53 | 78 | 73 | 86 | 80 | 83 | 78 | 71 | 73 | 83 |

Synthèse : Pourcentage de réponses positive (e.g. *Plutôt/Très favorable*) parmi les non *indifférents*. [▶ Go back](#)

| | High-income | Australia | Canada | Denmark* | France* | Germany | Italy | Japan | Poland | South Korea | Spain | United Kingdom | United States* | Middle-income | Brazil | China | India | Indonesia | Mexico | South Africa | Turkey | Ukraine |
|---|-------------|-----------|--------|----------|---------|---------|-------|-------|--------|-------------|-------|----------------|----------------|---------------|--------|-------|-------|-----------|--------|--------------|--------|---------|
| Level of climate policies needed: global | 85 | 78 | 87 | 81 | 85 | 88 | 92 | 94 | 88 | 86 | 88 | 70 | 85 | 88 | 87 | 78 | 86 | 88 | 90 | 82 | 76 | |
| Level of climate policies needed: federal/continental | 46 | 67 | 58 | 48 | 37 | 48 | 30 | NA | 40 | NA | 40 | 47 | 52 | 48 | 48 | 61 | 67 | 50 | 41 | 42 | 41 | 24 |
| Level of climate policies needed: state/national | 44 | 54 | 50 | 45 | 27 | 45 | 28 | 50 | 38 | 65 | 34 | 53 | 41 | 42 | 36 | 32 | 59 | 35 | 26 | 53 | 58 | 35 |
| Level of climate policies needed: local | 36 | 48 | 45 | 33 | 26 | 37 | 24 | 35 | 37 | 41 | 30 | 43 | 35 | 35 | 35 | 29 | 50 | 24 | 28 | 42 | 41 | 27 |
| If other do more, [country] should do more | 88 | 84 | 91 | 87 | 88 | 82 | 91 | 92 | 82 | 90 | 89 | 90 | 87 | 91 | 89 | 95 | 86 | 94 | 92 | 89 | 93 | 80 |
| If other do less, [country] should do more | 88 | 82 | 86 | 91 | 87 | 82 | 95 | 91 | 89 | 90 | 91 | 85 | 86 | 93 | 93 | 93 | 89 | 96 | 97 | 93 | 92 | 87 |
| Global carbon budget (+2°C) divided in tradable country shares | 84 | 79 | 85 | NA | NA | 74 | 89 | 82 | 81 | 92 | 85 | 90 | NA | 90 | 82 | 95 | 89 | 95 | 92 | 90 | 88 | 88 |
| Emission share should be in proportion to population* | 88 | 87 | 87 | 90 | 90 | 85 | 91 | 84 | 89 | 91 | 89 | 88 | 87 | 91 | 84 | 96 | 91 | 94 | 92 | 93 | 90 | 85 |
| Emission share should be in proportion to current emissions | 54 | 55 | 53 | NA | NA | 47 | 46 | 63 | 57 | 68 | 49 | 48 | NA | 69 | 53 | 86 | 77 | 88 | 56 | 55 | 77 | 46 |
| Countries that have emitted more since 1990 should receive a lower share* | 72 | 69 | 73 | 57 | 80 | 76 | 80 | 69 | 71 | 75 | 74 | 72 | 68 | 82 | 79 | 92 | 86 | 91 | 75 | 73 | 81 | 74 |
| Countries that will be hurt more by CC should receive a higher share* | 71 | 71 | 68 | 62 | 74 | 67 | 71 | 84 | 80 | 72 | 75 | 68 | 59 | 84 | 78 | 95 | 90 | 91 | 77 | 81 | 83 | 69 |
| Global democratic assembly on climate change | 81 | 74 | 80 | 77 | 82 | 76 | 90 | 88 | 85 | 85 | 88 | 77 | 71 | 91 | 84 | 97 | 88 | 96 | 94 | 89 | 87 | 93 |
| Global tax on GHG financing a global basic income | 49 | 41 | 44 | 57 | 51 | 52 | 55 | 53 | 47 | 53 | 50 | 40 | 49 | 79 | 76 | 92 | 88 | 91 | 83 | 54 | 60 | 77 |
| Global tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries | 82 | 74 | 84 | 72 | 86 | 83 | 90 | 88 | 80 | 89 | 86 | 85 | 73 | 92 | 86 | 98 | 92 | 97 | 93 | 89 | 87 | 94 |

Principales des attitudes sur les politiques mondiales

Pourcentage de réponses positive (e.g. Plutôt/Très favorable). [► Go back](#)

| | High-income | Australia | Canada | Denmark* | France* | Germany | Italy | Japan | Poland | South Korea | Spain | United Kingdom | United States* | Middle-income | Brazil | China | India | Indonesia | Mexico | South Africa | Turkey | Ukraine |
|--|-------------|-----------|--------|----------|---------|---------|-------|-------|--------|-------------|-------|----------------|----------------|---------------|--------|-------|-------|-----------|--------|--------------|--------|---------|
| Level of climate policies needed: global | 85 | 78 | 87 | 81 | 85 | 88 | 92 | 94 | 88 | 86 | 88 | 88 | 70 | 85 | 88 | 87 | 78 | 86 | 88 | 90 | 82 | 76 |
| Global carbon budget (+2°C) divided in tradable country shares | 62 | 57 | 64 | NA | NA | 52 | 69 | 50 | 59 | 71 | 71 | 66 | NA | 74 | 69 | 78 | 78 | 77 | 76 | 71 | 68 | 76 |
| Emission share should be in proportion to population* | 63 | 62 | 59 | 55 | 71 | 55 | 68 | 53 | 65 | 66 | 66 | 62 | 67 | 72 | 65 | 76 | 75 | 73 | 71 | 75 | 71 | 63 |
| Global democratic assembly on climate change | 57 | 52 | 54 | 51 | 55 | 56 | 68 | 61 | 63 | 57 | 68 | 53 | 48 | 75 | 64 | 86 | 77 | 78 | 76 | 70 | 72 | 73 |
| Global tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries | 64 | 58 | 67 | 55 | 65 | 65 | 72 | 64 | 62 | 65 | 75 | 65 | 53 | 78 | 73 | 86 | 80 | 83 | 78 | 71 | 73 | 83 |

Principales attitudes sur les politiques mondiales

Pourcentage de réponses positive (e.g. *Plutôt/Très favorable*) parmi les non *indifférents*. [► Go back](#)

| | High-income Australia | Canada | Denmark* | France* | Germany | Italy | Japan | Poland | South Korea | Spain | United Kingdom | United States* | Middle-income | Brazil | China | India | Indonesia | Mexico | South Africa | Turkey | Ukraine | |
|--|--------------------------|--------|----------|---------|---------|-------|-------|--------|-------------|-------|----------------|----------------|---------------|--------|-------|-------|-----------|--------|--------------|--------|---------|----|
| Level of climate policies needed: global | 85 | 78 | 87 | 81 | 85 | 88 | 92 | 94 | 88 | 86 | 88 | 70 | 85 | 88 | 87 | 78 | 86 | 88 | 90 | 82 | 76 | |
| Global carbon budget (+2°C) divided in tradable country shares | 84 | 79 | 85 | NA | NA | 74 | 89 | 82 | 81 | 92 | 85 | 90 | NA | 90 | 82 | 95 | 89 | 95 | 92 | 90 | 88 | 88 |
| Emission share should be in proportion to population* | 88 | 87 | 87 | 90 | 90 | 85 | 91 | 84 | 89 | 91 | 89 | 88 | 87 | 91 | 84 | 96 | 91 | 94 | 92 | 93 | 90 | 85 |
| Global democratic assembly on climate change | 81 | 74 | 80 | 77 | 82 | 76 | 90 | 88 | 85 | 85 | 88 | 77 | 71 | 91 | 84 | 97 | 88 | 96 | 94 | 89 | 87 | 93 |
| Global tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries | 82 | 74 | 84 | 72 | 86 | 83 | 90 | 88 | 80 | 89 | 86 | 85 | 73 | 92 | 86 | 98 | 92 | 97 | 93 | 89 | 87 | 94 |

Principales attitudes sur les politiques mondiales

Moyennes des réponses, recodées en [-2; +2]. [▶ Go back](#)

| | High-income | Australia | Canada | Denmark* | France* | Germany | Italy | Japan | Poland | South Korea | Spain | United Kingdom | United States* | Middle-income | Brazil | China | India | Indonesia | Mexico | South Africa | Turkey | Ukraine |
|--|-------------|-----------|--------|----------|---------|---------|-------|-------|--------|-------------|-------|----------------|----------------|---------------|--------|-------|-------|-----------|--------|--------------|--------|---------|
| Level of climate policies needed: global | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.8 | |
| Global carbon budget (+2°C) divided in tradable country shares | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.7 | NA | NA | 0.4 | 0.8 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | NA | 1 | 0.9 | 1 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1 | 1 | 0.9 | 0.9 |
| Emission share should be in proportion to population* | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 1 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 1 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 1 | 1 | 0.7 |
| Global democratic assembly on climate change | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 1 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 1 | 1.2 | 1 | 0.9 | 1 | 0.9 |
| Global tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries | 0.8 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 1 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 1 | 0.8 | 0.5 | 1.1 | 1 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.1 | 1 | 1.1 | 1.2 |