

International Attitudes Toward Global Policies

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Abstract

A global carbon price funding a global basic income, called the “Global Climate Scheme” (GCS), would be an effective and progressive way to combat climate change and poverty. Yet, such policy is mostly absent from political platforms and the policy debate. Using surveys on 40,680 respondents in 20 countries covering 72% of global CO₂ emissions, we document majority support for this and other global policies. Using a complementary survey on 8,000 respondents in the U.S., France, Germany, Spain and the UK, we test several hypotheses that could reconcile strong stated support with a lack of salience of these issues. The complementary analyses show that the stated support is mostly sincere, as a list experiment shows no evidence of social desirability bias, majorities are also willing to sign a real-stake petition, and global redistributive policies rank high in the prioritization of policies. Conjoint analyses reveal that a progressive candidate would not significantly lose voting share by endorsing the GCS in any country, and may even gain 11 p.p. in France. Likewise, a platform is more likely to be preferred if it contains the GCS or a global tax on millionaires. Accurate beliefs about the level of support for the GCS dismisses the hypothesis of pluralistic ignorance of the support. Universalistic attitudes are confirmed in more general questions, suggesting that the support cannot be explained away by malleable opinion or experimenter demand. In sum, our findings indicate that global policies are genuinely supported by a majority of the population. Public opinion is therefore not the reason that they do not prominently enter political debates.

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Contents

| | |
|--|-----------|
| Contents | 2 |
| 1 Introduction | 4 |
| 2 Results | 5 |
| 2.1 Data | 5 |
| 2.2 International support | 5 |
| 2.3 Stated support for various policies | 8 |
| 2.3.1 Global Climate Scheme | 8 |
| 2.3.2 Global wealth tax | 9 |
| 2.3.3 Other global policies | 9 |
| 2.3.4 Foreign aid | 10 |
| 2.4 Sincerity of support | 12 |
| 2.4.1 List experiment | 13 |
| 2.4.2 Petition | 13 |
| 2.4.3 Conjoint analyses | 14 |
| 2.4.4 Prioritization | 18 |
| 2.5 Second-order beliefs | 19 |
| 2.6 Pros and cons | 20 |
| 2.7 Universalistic values | 21 |
| 3 Discussion | 22 |
| Methods | 23 |
| Bibliography | 24 |
| A Literature review | 36 |
| A.1 Attitudes and perceptions | 36 |
| A.1.1 Population attitudes on global policies | 36 |
| A.1.2 Population attitudes on climate burden sharing | 37 |
| A.1.3 Population attitudes on foreign aid | 39 |
| A.1.4 Population attitudes on rich tax | 40 |
| A.1.5 Population attitudes on ethical norms | 41 |
| A.1.6 Second-order beliefs | 42 |
| A.2 Proposals and analyses of global policy-making | 42 |
| A.2.1 Global carbon pricing | 42 |
| A.2.2 Climate burden sharing | 44 |
| A.2.3 Global redistribution | 49 |
| A.2.4 Basic income | 50 |
| A.2.5 Global democracy | 50 |

| | |
|--|------------|
| B Raw results | 52 |
| C Questionnaire of the global survey (section on global policies) | 71 |
| D Questionnaire of the complementary surveys | 74 |
| E Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme | 97 |
| F Determinants of support | 101 |
| G Representativeness of the surveys | 102 |
| H Attrition analysis | 104 |
| List of Tables | 107 |
| List of Figures | 107 |

1 Introduction

Extreme poverty and climate change are among the most critical issues of our time. The first could be solved by redistributive transfers, the second by capping global emissions. A fair and effective policy to tackle these two problems is the “Global Climate Scheme” (GCS), which combines these two solutions. The GCS consists of a global cap-and-trade system, where emission rights are auctioned each year to polluting firms, and of a global basic income, funded by the auction revenues.

Extreme poverty is parallel to global inequality, as the GDP per capita (in 2021, in purchasing power parity) is 26 times larger in high-income countries (home to 1.2 billion people) than in low-income countries (700 million), 59 times larger in the U.S. than in the DRC, and 172 times larger in Luxembourg than in Burundi. Indeed, in each of 29 countries, [ISSP \(2019\)](#) uncover near consensus that “Present economic differences between rich and poor countries are too large” (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree). A global 2% tax on individual wealth in excess of \$5 million would collect \$816 billion every year, leaving unaffected 99.9% of people.¹ If 35% of these potential revenues were allocated to low-income countries, their national income would increase by 50%.

In this paper, we study attitudes toward global policies that address climate change, global poverty or inequalities, with a focus on the GCS. Using an international survey on climate attitudes, we document majority support for global policies like the GCS and a global millionaire tax in 20 among the largest countries. Yet, such global policies are nowhere to be seen in policy debates. Why? To explain this paradox (absence of the policy despite majority stated support), we run complementary surveys on 8,000 American and European respondents and test different hypotheses: insincerity of support for the GCS, pluralistic ignorance (i.e. false belief that most do not support it), defavorable electoral outcomes for a candidate that would support it, or low priority given to global issues. Furthermore, we also study attitudes toward other global policies, global redistribution, and universalistic values.

Literature. The literature review is relegated to Appendix A. It includes references to the few other attitudinal surveys on global policies (e.g. [Carattini et al. \(2019\)](#); [Ghassim et al. \(2022\)](#); [ISSP \(2019\)](#), see Appendix A.1.1); a critical review of the literature on attitudes toward climate burden sharing (Appendix A.1.2); references to the large literature

¹Figures come from [Chancel et al. \(2022\)](#), the [WID wealth tax simulator](#), and the World Bank.

on attitudes toward foreign aid (Appendix A.1.3); and introduction to the literatures on global carbon pricing (Appendix A.2.1), global redistribution (Appendix A.2.3), basic income (Appendix A.2.4), and global democracy (Appendix A.2.5).

2 Results

2.1 Data

Stated support for different global policies has been measured in a survey on climate attitudes conducted in 2021 on 40,680 respondents from 20 countries covering 72% of global CO₂ emissions (the questions of this survey on national policies are analysed in another paper: Dechezleprêtre et al. 2022). We conduct complementary surveys in the U.S. and four European countries to study in detail the sincerity and rationales behind the support for the GCS, the attitudes toward various global policies, global redistribution, and universalistic values. The U.S. survey has been divided in two waves: *US1* and *US2*, with respectively 3,000 and 2,000 respondents. The European survey, called *Eu*, combines the two U.S. waves (just without one question of *US2* that uses results from *US1*). The *Eu* survey comprises 3,000 respondents representative of France, Germany, Spain and the UK, along the dimensions of gender, income, age, highest diploma, country, and degree of urbanisation. The U.S. samples are representative along the same dimensions (with *region* instead of *country*) as well as along ethnicity. Tables A4-A5 confirm that our samples closely match population frequencies. The questionnaires are given in Appendices C and D.

Table 1: Characteristics of the different surveys.


| Survey | Global | Eu | US1 | US2 |
|------------------|--------------|----------------|-------|-------|
| Country coverage | 20 countries | FR, DE, ES, UK | U.S. | U.S. |
| Sample size | 40,680 | 3,000 | 3,000 | 2,000 |

2.2 International support

The global survey shows strong support for climate policies enacted at the global level (Figure 1). When asked “At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate

Figure 1: Relative support for global climate policies.

Share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* among non-*indifferent* answers (in percent, $n = 40,680$). The color blue denotes a relative majority. See Figure A3 for the absolute support. (Questions A-I)



*In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

change need to be put in place?", 70% (in the U.S.) to 94% (in Japan) choose the global level. Meanwhile, the European level is chosen by less than half of the European respondents while the federal level is chosen by only 52% of U.S. respondents. More local levels are generally chosen less than broader ones. This preference for the global level is in line with Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019b) and consistent with (at least) two of the three key motives for supporting climate policies identified in the literature (Dechezleprêtre et al. 2022; Douenne & Fabre 2022; Klenert et al. 2018): effectiveness and fairness (the third being self-interest).

Several global policies obtain an absolute majority (i.e. *somewhat* or *strong*) support in all countries: "a tax on all millionaires in dollars around the world to finance low-income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate action [which] would

finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education”, “a global democratic assembly whose role would be to draft international treaties against climate change [where] each adult across the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly” (though this one receives only 48% of support in the U.S.), and an international emissions trading system where “countries that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less than their share”. In high-income countries, this global quota obtains 64% of absolute support and 84% of relative support (i.e. excluding *indifferent* answers). The support is even higher in middle-income countries, though one should interpret the results with caution in middle-income countries as their samples are only representative of the online population (young, graduated and urban people are over-represented).

After the support for the global quota, respondents are asked how the carbon budget should be divided among countries. Consistent with the literature (see Appendix A.1.2), the preferred burden-sharing rule is to allocate the rights to emit on an equal per capita basis: this fairness principle secures an absolute majority support in all countries, and a relative majority support never below 84%. Taking into account historical responsibilities or vulnerability to climate damages is also popular, though less consensual, while grandfathering (i.e. allocating emission shares in proportion to current emissions) comes last everywhere.

The Global Climate Scheme, i.e. a global quota where emission rights are allocated on an equal per capita basis, has the same distributive effects as a global carbon tax that would fund a global basic income. The support for the latter policy is also tested, and there the redistributive effects are specified to the respondents (the average increase in expenditures along with the amount of the basic income, see the box below). The levels of support are consistent with the findings of Carattini et al. (2019), the only previous study that tested a global carbon tax. Despite their similarity, the global tax is less supported than the global quota, and it even fails to obtain a relative majority in Anglo-saxon countries. This lower support is likely due to the facts that distributive effects are made salient in the case of the tax, and that people may find a quota more effective than a tax to reduce emissions. This interpretation is consistent with the level of support for the global quota once we make the distributive effects salient, which we do in the complementary surveys.

2.3 Stated support for various policies

The remainder of the paper analyzes the results from the complementary surveys in the U.S. and in Europe. This Section covers the stated support for different global redistributive policies.

2.3.1 Global Climate Scheme

In the complementary surveys, we describe the Global Climate Scheme, explain its distributive effects (specifying the amounts at stake, cf. the box below), test the understanding that typical people would lose in high-income countries and that the poorest humans would win using an incentivized question, and then give the correct answer. We proceed the same way for a National Redistribution Scheme (NR) that would tax the top 5% (in the U.S.) or the top 1% (in Europe) to finance cash transfers to all adults (calibrated to offset the monetary loss of the GCS for the median emitter), expecting people to find out at the comprehension question that the richest would lose and the typical people in their country would win. Then, we summarize both schemes to make sure that the respondents remember them. Right after, we ask a last incentivized question of comprehension, and later give the expected answer that a typical fellow citizen would neither win nor lose with the GCS and NR combined. Finally, we directly ask the support for the GCS and for NR in a simple Yes/No question. The stated support for the GCS is at 54% in the U.S. and 76% in Europe, and the support for NR is very close, at 56 and 73%, respectively (Figure 2). Appendix F presents the sociodemographic determinants of the support for the GCS, and shows e.g. a stronger support among young people.

Figure 2: Support for the GCS, NR and the combination of GCS, NR and C. (Questions 20, 22 and 26).

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|-------------------------------------|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Global climate scheme (GCS) | 53 | 76 | 80 | 71 | 81 | 74 |
| National redistribution scheme (NR) | 56 | 73 | 77 | 66 | 79 | 75 |
| National climate policy + GCS + NR | 52 | 74 | 79 | 69 | 81 | 70 |

The Global Climate Scheme The GCS consists of a global cap-and-trade system, where emission rights are auctioned each year to polluting firms, and of a global basic income, funded by the auction revenues. Using the price and emissions trajectories from the report by Stern & Stiglitz (2017), and in particular a carbon price of \$90/tCO₂ in 2030, we estimate that the basic income would amount to \$30 per month for each human above 15 (see details in Appendix E). When describing the GCS to the respondents, we specify its redistributive effects. Namely, the 700 million people with less than \$2/day would be lifted out of extreme poverty, and fossil price increases would cost the typical person in their country a specified amount, despite the basic income (see the exact wording in Appendix D). This median net cost is \$85 in the U.S., €10 in France, €25 in Germany, €5 in Spain, £20 in the UK.

2.3.2 Global wealth tax


Consistent with the global survey's results, a "tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-income countries" receives an absolute majority support of more than 67% in every country, only 5 p.p. lower than a national millionaires tax overall (Figure 4). To random subsamples, we ask respondents how the revenues of a global tax on individual wealth in excess of \$5 million should be shared with low-income countries, after describing how much revenues such a tax would raise in their country vs. in low-income countries.² To some respondents ($n = 891$), we ask what percentage of the global tax revenues should be pooled to finance low-income countries. In each country, at least 88% of respondents answer a positive amount, with an overall average of 30% (Germany) to 36% (U.S., France) (Figure 3). To some other respondents ($n = 859$), we ask whether they would prefer that each country retains the revenues it collected or that half of the revenues be pooled to finance low-income countries. About half of the people prefer to channel half of the tax revenues to low-income countries.

2.3.3 Other global policies

We also test support for other global policies (Figure 4). All receive relative majority support in each country except two: the "cancellation of low-income countries' pub-

²Namely, a 2% tax on net wealth above \$5 million would raise each year €5 billion in Spain, €16 billion in France, £20 billion in the UK, €44 billion in Germany, \$430 billion in the U.S., and \$1 billion in all low-income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700 million people).

Figure 3: Percent of global wealth tax that should finance low-income countries (*mean*). (Question 37)



lic debt” and “a maximum wealth limit” (the latter obtains relative majority support in Europe but not in the U.S., despite the cap being defined as \$10 billion the U.S. instead of €/£100 million in Europe). Climate-related policies are particularly popular: “high-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries” obtains absolute majority support everywhere while loss and damages compensation (which was approved at the COP27) receives a relative support of 55% (U.S.) to 81% (Spain).

2.3.4 Foreign aid

After providing the amount “spent on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries” (in proportion to their country’s government spending and GDP), less than 16% state that their country’s foreign aid should be reduced while 62% state that it should be increased, including 17% who support an unconditional increase (Figure 5). To the 45% who answer that aid should be increased but only if some conditions are respected, we later ask them what condition(s) should be required (Figure 6). The three conditions most chosen are largely respected by the Global Climate Scheme: “that we can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted” (chosen by 73%), “that recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights” (67%), and “that other high-income countries also increase their foreign aid” (48%). On the other side, not wishing to increase their country’s foreign aid is mostly justified by prioritizing one’s fellow citizens or viewing each country as responsible for its own fate (Figure 7). In an open-ended question asking what high-income countries should do to fight extreme poverty, a large majority of Americans expressed that more help is needed (Figure A35). The most cited form of aid proposed is monetary, followed by investments in education.

Figure 4: Relative support for various global policies (percentage of *somewhat* or *strong support*, after excluding *indifferent* answers). (Questions 44 and 45; See Figure A22 for the absolute support.)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages | 55 | 71 | 72 | 70 | 79 | 70 |
| High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries | 68 | 82 | 82 | 82 | 85 | 81 |
| High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change | 60 | 76 | 77 | 79 | 79 | 71 |
| Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt | 46 | 53 | 53 | 43 | 62 | 61 |
| Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population | 58 | 71 | 69 | 69 | 78 | 72 |
| Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries | 62 | 73 | 58 | 73 | 80 | 83 |
| A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage | 63 | 80 | 80 | 78 | 81 | 83 |
| Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets | 62 | 87 | 90 | 86 | 91 | 87 |
| A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human | 46 | 62 | 58 | 62 | 65 | 67 |
| National tax on millionaires | 73 | 85 | 81 | 87 | 89 | 88 |
| Global tax on millionaires | 69 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 87 | 83 |

Figure 5: Attitudes regarding the evolution of [own country] foreign aid. (Question 46)




Figure 6: Conditions at which foreign aid should be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish an increase of foreign aid at some conditions.] (Question 47)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| That recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights | 61 | 72 | 76 | 70 | 74 | 66 |
| That recipient countries cooperate to fight illegal migrations | 36 | 49 | 46 | 53 | 56 | 39 |
| That other high-income countries also increase their foreign aid | 45 | 51 | 52 | 51 | 49 | 49 |
| That this is financed by increased taxes on millionaires | 36 | 38 | 33 | 41 | 35 | 41 |
| That we can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted | 68 | 77 | 79 | 80 | 72 | 76 |

Figure 7: Reasons why foreign aid should not be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish a decrease or stability of foreign aid.] (Question 48)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Aid perpetuates poverty as it makes people feel less responsible for themselves | 29 | 30 | 31 | 35 | 31 | 24 |
| Aid is not effective as most of it is diverted | 40 | 53 | 48 | 57 | 60 | 49 |
| Aid is a pressure tactic for high-income countries that prevents low-income countries from developing freely | 16 | 16 | 15 | 14 | 23 | 13 |
| [Country] is not responsible for what happens in other countries | 45 | 30 | 28 | 30 | 20 | 37 |
| Charity begins at home: there is already a lot to do to support the [country] people in need | 63 | 63 | 51 | 62 | 71 | 69 |

2.4 Sincerity of support

We use several methods to assess the sincerity of the support for the Global Climate Scheme: a list experiment, a real-stake petition, conjoint analyses, and the prioritization of policies. All methods suggest that the support is either completely sincere, or the share of insincere answers is limited.

2.4.1 List experiment

By asking *how many* policies within a list respondents support and varying the list among respondents, a list experiment allows identifying the tacit support for a policy of interest. The tacit support is estimated as the difference in the average number of policies supported between two groups, whose list differ only by the inclusion (or not) of that policy (Hainmueller et al. 2014). List experiments have been used to reveal a social desirability bias that silences either racism in Southern U.S. (Kuklinski et al. 1997) or the opposition to the invasion of Ukraine in Russia (Chapkovski & Schaub 2022). As shown in Table 2, the tacit support for the GCS measured through the list experiment is not significantly lower than the direct stated support.³ Thus, we cannot reject an absence of social desirability bias in our case.

Table 2: Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list.

| | Number of supported policies | | |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | All | US | Europe |
| List contains: GCS | 0.624*** (0.028) | 0.524*** (0.041) | 0.724*** (0.036) |
| <i>Support for GCS</i> | 0.65 | 0.542 | 0.757 |
| <i>Social desirability bias</i> | -0.026 | -0.018 | -0.033 |
| <i>80% C.I. for the bias</i> | [-0.06; 0.01] | [-0.07; 0.01] | [-0.08; 0.01] |
| Constant | 1.317 | 1.147 | 1.486 |
| Observations | 6,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 |
| R ² | 0.089 | 0.065 | 0.125 |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

2.4.2 Petition

We ask the respondents whether they are willing to sign a petition (either for the GCS or NR) and inform them that “we will send the results to the [head of state]’s office, informing [them] what share of [fellow citizens] are willing to endorse the [Global Climate / National Redistribution] Scheme”. Both policies still obtain majority support when

³We use the difference-in-means estimator. The confidence intervals are computed through Monte Carlo simulation using the R package *list* (see Imai 2011).

the support is framed as a real-stake petition. In the U.S., we cannot reject equality between the support in the real-stake petitions and the simple questions (GCS: $p = .30$; NR: $p = .76$).⁴ In Europe, the support is significantly lower in the petition, by 7 p.p. for the GCS ($p = 10^{-5}$) and 4 p.p. for NR ($p = .008$). Although a few Europeans are not willing to sign a petition for a policy they are supposed to support, this affects both policies tested, and the willingness to sign a real-stake petition is still strong: 69% for the GCS and 67% for NR.

2.4.3 Conjoint analyses

In our *conjoint analyses*, we ask respondents to make five choices between pairs of political platforms. The first conjoint analysis suggests that the GCS is supported for itself, independently of being complemented by the National Redistribution Scheme and a national climate policy (“Coal exit” in the U.S., “Thermal insulation plan” in Europe, denoted C).⁵ For the second analysis, we split the sample into four random branches.⁶ These four questions show that: there is majority support for the GCS and for a national climate policy C, which are seen as neither complement nor substitute; a few people seem to like a national climate policy and dislike a global one, but as many people prefer a global rather than a national policy; and there is no evidence that a National Redistribution would increase the support for the GCS.

In the third analysis, we present to two random branches of the sample hypothetical progressive and conservative platforms that differ only by the presence (or not) of the GCS in the progressive platform. Table 3 shows that a progressive candidate would not significantly lose voting share by endorsing the GCS in any country, and may even gain 11 p.p. ($p = .005$) in voting intention in France. Although not significant at the 5%

⁴We run paired weighted *t*-tests, i.e. we test the equality in support for a policy on the subsample of respondents who are questioned about this policy for the petition.

⁵Indeed, 54% of U.S. respondents and 74% of European ones prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to the combination of C and NR alone, indicating a similar support for the GCS conditional on NR and C than for the GCS alone (Figure A7).

⁶Results from the first branch show that the support for the GCS conditional on NR, at 55% in the U.S. ($n = 757$) and 77% in Europe ($n = 746$), is not significantly different from the support for the GCS alone. This suggests that rejection to the GCS is not driven by the cost of the policy on oneself. The second branch shows that the support for C conditional on NR is somewhat higher, at 62% in the U.S. ($n = 751$) and 84% in Europe ($n = 747$). However, the third one shows no significant preference for C compared to GCS (both conditional on NR), neither in Europe, where GCS is preferred by 52% ($n = 741$) nor in the U.S., where C is preferred by 53% ($n = 721$). The fourth branch shows that 55% in the U.S. ($n = 771$) and 77% in Europe ($n = 766$) prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to NR alone.

threshold, the effect is also positive at 3 p.p. ($p = .13$) in the U.S. In the U.S., swing states⁷ are key to win elections. Though the level of support for the GCS is significantly lower in swing states (at 51%), the electoral effect of endorsing the GCS remains non-significantly different from zero (at +1.2 p.p.) in swing states.

Table 3: Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. (Question 28)

| | Prefers the Progressive platform | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------|----------|---------|---------|---------|
| | All | United States | France | Germany | UK | Spain |
| GCS in Progressive platform | 0.028* | 0.029 | 0.112*** | 0.015 | 0.008 | -0.015 |
| | (0.014) | (0.022) | (0.041) | (0.033) | (0.040) | (0.038) |
| Constant | 0.623 | 0.604 | 0.55 | 0.7 | 0.551 | 0.775 |
| Observations | 5,202 | 2,619 | 605 | 813 | 661 | 504 |
| R ² | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.013 | 0.0003 | 0.0001 | 0.0003 |

Note: The 14% of *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples. GCS has no significant influence on them. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Our last two analyses (four and five) make people choose between two random platforms. In Europe, respondents are prompted to imagine that a left- or center-left coalition will win the next election and are asked what platform they would prefer that coalition to have campaigned on. In the U.S., the question is framed as a hypothetical duel in a Democratic primary, and asked only to non-Republicans ($n = 2,218$), i.e. the respondents who choose *Democrat*, *Independent*, *Non-Affiliated* or *Other* for their political affiliation. In the fourth analysis, a policy (or an absence of policy) is randomly drawn for each platform in each of five categories: *economic issues*, *societal issues*, *climate policy*, *tax system*, *foreign policy* (Figure 8). Except for the category *foreign policy*, which features the GCS 42% of the time, the policies are prominent progressive policies and they are drawn uniformly. In the UK, Germany, and France, a platform is about 9 to 13 p.p. more likely to be preferred if it includes the GCS rather than no foreign policy.⁸ This effect is between 1 and 4 p.p. and no longer significant in the U.S. and in Spain. Moreover, a platform that includes a global tax on millionaires rather than no foreign policy is 5 to 13 percentage points (p.p.) more likely to be preferred in all countries (the effect is significant and at least 9 p.p. in all

⁷We define swing states as the 8 states with less than 5 p.p. margin of victory in the 2020 election (MI, NV, PA, WI, AZ, GA, NC, FL). The results are robust to using the 3 p.p. threshold (that excludes FL) instead.

⁸This is the Average Marginal Component Effect computed following Hainmueller et al. (2014).

Figure 8: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (Question 29)

(a) U.S. (Asked only to non-Republicans)



(b) France



(c) Germany

Klimaschutz:

- Verpflichtende Solaranlagen auf allen geeigneten Dächern
- Plan zur Wärmedämmung
- Verbot des Verkaufs von Neuwagen mit Verbrennungsmotor bis 2030

Wirtschaftspolitik:

- Erhöhung des Regelsatzes des Bürgergelds auf bis zu 600€ pro Monat
- Bürgerversicherung als gerechtere Sozialversicherung
- Staatschuldenquote auf unter 60% reduzieren
- Investitionen für Gigabit-Netzwerke bereitstellen

Außenpolitik:

- Globales Klimaprogramm
- Globale Steuer auf Millionäre
- Globale demokratische Versammlung zum Klimawandel
- Verdoppelung der Mittel für die Entwicklungshilfe in einkommensschwachen Ländern


Gesellschaft:

- Volksscheid auf Bundesebene

- Cannabis-Legalisierung

Steuerpolitik:

- Nationales Umverteilungsprogramm
- Die Vermögenssteuer wieder in Kraft setzen



(d) Spain

Política climática:

- 100% de electricidad producida con energías renovables en 2040
- Plan de aislamiento térmico
- Prohibir la venta de coches nuevos con motor de combustión para 2030

Asuntos económicos:

- Más necesidades sanitarias dentro del sistema público (cuidado dental, gafas, salud mental)
- Ingreso Básico Garantizado de 600€ al mes
- Jornada laboral de 34 horas semanales
- Inversión en el sistema educativo y universalización de la educación preescolar

Política exterior:


- Plan climático global
- Impuesto mundial a los millonarios
- Asamblea democrática mundial sobre el cambio climático
- Duplicar la ayuda exterior a los países de renta baja

Asuntos sociales:

- Reformar la ley electoral para hacer el Senado más proporcional
- Abolición de la prostitución

Sistema fiscal:

- Plan de redistribución nacional
- Aumentar los impuestos sobre las rentas superiores a 100.000 euros anuales



(e) UK

Climate policy:

- Ban of most polluting vehicles in city centers (low-emission zones)
- Thermal insulation plan
- Ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030

Economic issues:

- £150 billion to upgrade schools, hospitals, care homes and council houses
- Real Living Wage of £11 per hour for all workers aged 16 and over
- Reduce the average full-time weekly working hours to 32
- Re-establish neighbourhood policing and recruit 2,000 more frontline officers

Foreign policy:


- Global climate scheme
- Global tax on millionaires
- Global democratic assembly on climate change
- Doubling foreign aid

Societal issues:

- Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation
- Legalization of cannabis

Tax system:

- National redistribution scheme
- Wealth tax




countries but Spain). Likewise, a global democratic assembly on climate change has a significant effect of 8 to 12 p.p. in the U.S., Germany, and France. These effects are large, and not far from the effects of the policies most influential on the platforms, which range between 15 and 18 p.p. in most countries (and 27 p.p. in Spain), and all relate to improved public services (in particular healthcare, housing and education).

The fifth analysis draws random platforms in a similar ways, except that candidate A's platform always contains the GCS while B's includes no foreign policy. In this case, A is chosen by 60% in Europe and 58% in the U.S. (Figure 9). In the U.S. for example, our conjoint analyses indicate that a candidate at the Democratic primary would have more chances to obtain the nomination by endorsing the GCS, and this endorsement would not penalize her or him at the presidential election. This result reminds the finding that 12% of Germans shift their voting intention from SPD and CDU/CSU to the Greens and the Left when they are told that the latter parties support global democracy (Ghassim 2020).

Figure 9: Influence of the GCS on preferred platform:

Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question 30; in the U.S., asked only to non-Republicans.)



2.4.4 Prioritization

At the end of the survey, we pick six policies at random (and uniformly) among the policies used in the last conjoint analyses, and ask respondents to allocate 100 points among them (using sliders), with the instruction that “the more you give points to a policy, the more you support it”. For each policy presented, the average support is thus 16.67 points. In each country, the GCS ranks in the middle of all policies or at a higher rank, with an average number of points from 15.4 (U.S.) to 22.9 (Germany). In Germany, the the global tax on millionaires is the most prioritized policy and the GCS the second most. The global tax on millionaires ranks at worst in fifth position (out of 15 or 17) in every country, and receives an average number of points from 18.3 (Spain) to 22.9 (Germany). This ques-

tion further reveals the potential mismatch between policies prioritized by the public and those enacted by legislators. Indeed, to “ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030” is one of the three least prioritized policies in each country, with an average of 7.8 (France) to 11.4 (UK), and yet the European Union and California have enacted to phase out new combustion-engine cars by 2035.

2.5 Second-order beliefs

To explain a strong support for the GCS despite its absence from political platforms and the public debate, we hypothesized pluralistic ignorance, i.e. that most people and policy-makers wrongly perceive the GCS as unpopular. People would then hide their support for such globally redistributive policies, knowing that advocating for them would be vain. We find limited evidence for pluralistic ignorance in an incentivized question on the perceived support (Figure 10). Americans have quite accurate beliefs regarding the level of support for the GCS. Indeed, the mean (resp. quartiles) perceived support is 52% (resp. 36%, 52%, 68%) vs. an actual support of 53%. Europeans underestimate the support by 17 p.p., but 65% of them correctly guess that the GCS obtains a majority (mean of 59% and quartiles of 43%, 61%, 74% vs. an actual support of 76%). For the record, the second-order beliefs are equally accurate for the National Redistribution Scheme in the U.S., and equally underestimated in Europe.

Figure 10: Beliefs regarding the support for the GCS and NR. (Questions 21 and 23)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|---------------------|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Belief about GCS | 52 | 59 | 61 | 56 | 63 | 57 |
| Support for the GCS | 54 | 76 | 80 | 71 | 81 | 74 |
| Belief about NR | 55 | 58 | 60 | 53 | 62 | 59 |
| Support for NR | 56 | 73 | 77 | 66 | 79 | 75 |

2.6 Pros and cons

We ask respondents what are the pros and cons of the GCS, either in an open-ended or in a closed question. In the closed question, people tend to find every argument presented as important to determine their support or opposition to the GCS (Figure A8). The least important element is that the GCS “would penalize my household” (60% find this important in Europe – $n=1,505$, 75% in the U.S. – $n=493$). The most important elements differ in both regions: in Europe, it is that the GCS “would succeed in limiting climate change” and “would reduce poverty in low-income countries” (85% each) while in the U.S., it is “having enough information on this scheme” (89%) followed by “it could foster global cooperation” (82%). Given the small variation in the importance of each element, the closed question is not very informative.

The open-ended question gives interesting insight into “what comes to [people’s] mind” when “thinking of the GCS”. Searching for keywords in the fields (automatically translated into English), the topics that appear most frequently are the international aspect and the environment (each in about one quarter of answers, see Figure A10), followed by the effects on poverty and on prices (about one tenth each). We also classified manually each answer into different categories (Figure A9). This exercise confirms the automatic search: the most frequent topic is the environmental benefit of the GCS, while the obstacles to implement it or to get agreement on it are relatively seldom mentioned.⁹

In the US2 survey, we displayed these questions only to random subsamples, *before* asking for the support to the GCS or NR. The sample was divided into four branches: two with questions on pros and cons (either in closed or open form), one with information on the actual level of support for the GCS and NR (estimated in US1), and one control (without these questions).¹⁰ Despite some significant effects of pondering pros

⁹Besides, one in four people explicitly cite a pro or a con. Few people express explicitly their support or opposition, or exhibit a misunderstanding. Only 11% of answers are empty or express a lack of opinion, though one quarter are unclassifiable (either because the idea they convey is rare or because it is nonsensical or out of topic).

¹⁰Consistent with Americans correctly perceiving the levels of support for the GCS or NR, providing information on the actual level has no substantial effect on their support. In the closed question on pros and cons, we deliberately included more cons (6) than pros (3) to conservatively estimate what could be the campaign effect on the GCS, i.e. the shift in opinion due to media coverage of the proposal. The campaign effect could play a role, as the support for the GCS decreases by 11 p.p. after people see a list of its pros and cons. More surprisingly, the support for National Redistribution also decreases (by 7 p.p.) after the closed question on the GCS. This suggests that some people may lack attention and confuse the two policies, or that pondering pros and cons changes the mood of some people, away from a positive first impression. Indeed, the support also decreases, by 7 p.p., after people are asked to think about its pros and cons in an open-ended question.

and cons(Table A1), about half of Americans support the GCS in all treatment branches. To the extent that effects would be similar in Europe, this suggests that the GCS would still obtain strong majority support among Europeans after it enters the public debate.

2.7 Universalistic values

We ask broad questions on people's values to see whether their core values are consistent with universalism. When asked what group they defend when they vote, 20% choose "sentient beings (humans and animals)", 22% "humans", 33% their fellow citizens (or "Europeans"), 15% "My family and myself", and the rest (10%) choose another group (mostly "My State or region" or "People sharing my culture or religion"). The first two categories can be described as universalist, and they represent close to one out of two people. The share of universalist even constitutes a majority of left-wing voters. When asked what should their country's diplomats defend in international climate negotiations, only 11% prefer their country's "interests, even if it goes against global justice"; 30% prefer global justice (mitigated or not by national interests) and the bulk of respondents (38%) prefer their country's "interests, to the extent it respects global justice". Furthermore, when asked to judge the extent to which climate change, global poverty, and inequality in their country are an issue, climate change is generally viewed as the biggest problem (with a mean of 0.59 once we recode answers between -2 and 2), followed by global poverty (0.42) and national inequality (0.37).

Finally, we elicit universalistic values through a lottery experiment. We automatically enroll the respondents in a lottery with one \$100 prize. Respondents have to choose which share of the prize to keep for themself vs. give to a person living in poverty. The charity donation is destined either for an African or a fellow citizen, depending on the respondent's random branch. We observe no significant variation in the willingness to donate in function of the recipient's origin in Europe, and a donation lower by 3 p.p. for the African in the U.S. (the average donation is 34%). Moreover, the slightly lower donations to Africans are entirely driven by right-wing voters or non-voters.

Overall, answers to these broad value questions are consistent with half of Americans and three quarters of Europeans supporting global policies like the GCS: people are almost as much willing to give to poor Africans than to poor fellow citizens, find that global issues are among the biggest problems, almost half of them are universalist when they vote, and most of them wish that their diplomats take into account global justice.

3 Discussion

In 20 among the largest countries, we find strong majority support for global climate policies, even in high-income countries that would financially lose from the globally redistributive policies that we test. The complementary surveys in the U.S. and four European countries confirm these results. For example, there is a strong support for global taxes on the wealthiest, and majority support for our main policy of interest, a Global Climate Scheme that would establish both carbon pricing at the global level through an emissions trading system, and a global basic income funded by its revenues. A list experiment and a real-stake petition show that the support for the GCS is mostly sincere. This genuine support is confirmed by the prioritization of this global climate policy above some prominent national climate policies, and consistent with close to half of the population holding universalistic (rather than nationalistic or egoistic) values. Moreover, the conjoint analyses reveals that a progressive candidate should not lose voting shares by endorsing the GCS, and should even get a voting share 11 p.p. higher in France. Likewise, a candidate endorsing the GCS would win votes at a U.S. Democratic primary, while in Europe, a progressive platform including the GCS would be preferred to a platform not including it. Besides a potential lack of sincerity or weak opinions, we dismiss another hypothesis that could have explained the scarcity of global policies in the public debate despite a strong support: that people underestimate the support of their fellow citizens. As we ruled out all hypotheses of our registration plan,¹¹ we now need to study new explanations.

We see five potential explanations for the scarce mention of globally redistributive policies in the public debate and political platforms. Among the new hypotheses, the first two are variations of pluralistic ignorance, and the last two represent complementary (rather than substitute) explanations. First, there may be pluralistic ignorance of universalistic values, of the support for the GCS, or of the electoral advantage of endorsing it *among policy makers*. Second, people or policy makers may believe that globally redistributive policies are politically infeasible in some key (potentially foreign) countries like the U.S. We intend to test these hypotheses by running a survey on Members of the European Parliament. Third, most institutions are national: the largest scale votes take place at the national level, most media target a national audience, most commentators frame their discourse from a national perspective and portray relations to foreign countries as con-

¹¹The project was preregistered in the Open Science Foundation registry (osf.io/fy6gd).

fictual. The prominence of national institutions may create a nationalistic bias in political thoughts, silencing people's univeralistic values. Fourth, most people and perhaps even most policy makers may have simply never heard of specific global redistributive policies, let alone built their political ideas upon it. Being unaware of prominent global policy proposals, people or policy makers would cautiously doubt that they are well-specified or technically implementable, and would therefore dismiss them as unrealistic. The ignorance of the GCS itself seems supported by the feedback fields, where the most common answer is a variation upon "thank you for this interesting, thought-provoking survey". Fifth, just as policy is disproportionately influenced by the economic elites ([Gilens & Page 2014](#); [Persson & Sundell 2023](#)), public debate may be shaped by the wealthiest, who have a vested interest in preventing global redistribution.

If any (or several) of the remaining hypotheses is confirmed by evidence, we could draw the same conclusion: There is a strong support for global policies that address climate change and global inequality, even in high-income countries, and the frontier of what is considered politically realistic might soon shift on this issue. Uncovering evidence for this might actually contribute itself to garner more attention to global policies in the public debate.

Methods

Data collection. The paper relies on two different sets of surveys. The first set of surveys was conducted between March 2021 and March 2022 on 40,680 respondents from 20 countries (between 1,465 and 2,488 respondents per country). The first U.S. complementary, denoted US1, was conducted on 3,000 U.S. respondents between January and March 2023, while the second, US2, was conducted on 2,000 respondents between March and April 2023. The Eu complementary survey was conducted on 3,000 respondents between February and March 2023. We used the survey companies *Dynata* and *Respondi*. Stratified quotas ensure that the samples are representative along the dimensions of gender, age (5 brackets), income (4), region (4), education level (3), as well as ethnicity (3) for the U.S. To correct for small remaining imbalances, we apply survey weights throughout the analysis, constructed using the quotas variables as well as the degree of urbanity, and trimmed between 0.25 and 4. Weights make the results fully representative of the country (or of the four European countries combined in the case of results at the European level, where different weights are used). Appendix G confirms that our samples are representative of the population.

Data quality. The median duration is 28 minutes for the global survey and 15 minutes in the US1 survey. To ensure the best possible data quality, we exclude respondents who fail an attention test

or rush through the survey (i.e. answer in less than 11.5 minutes in the global survey, 4 minutes in US1 or US2, 6 minutes in Eu).

Questionnaires and raw results. The questionnaire and raw results of the global survey can be found in the Appendix of the companion paper ([Dechezleprêtre et al. 2022](#)). The raw results are reported in Appendix [B¹²](#) while the surveys' structures and questionnaires are given in Appendices [C](#) and [D](#). The questionnaires are the same as the ones given *ex ante* in the registration plan ([osf.io/fy6gd](#)).

Incentives. To encourage respondents to answer accurately and truthfully, several questions of the US1 survey use incentives. For each of the three comprehension questions that follow the policies' descriptions, we reward three (randomly drawn) respondents with the correct answer with a \$50 gift certificate. For each of the questions asking respondents to guess the share of support for the GCS and NR, we reward three people who are closest to the true value with a \$50 gift certificate. For the donation lottery question, we randomly draw one respondent and split the \$100 prize between the NGO GiveDirectly and the winner according to the winner's choice. In total, our incentives scheme distributes gift certificates (and donation) for a value of \$850. Finally, respondents have an incentive to answer truthfully to the petition question, given that they know that the results to that question (the share of respondents supporting the policy) will be transmitted to the U.S. President's office.

Data and code availability

All data and code of the complementary surveys as well as figures of the paper are available on [github.com/bixiou/global_tax_attitudes](#). Data and code for the global survey will be made public upon publication.

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¹²Country-specific raw results are also available as supplementary material files: [US](#), [EU](#), [FR](#), [DE](#), [ES](#), [UK](#).

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A Literature review

A.1 Attitudes and perceptions

A.1.1 Population attitudes on global policies

[Carattini et al. \(2019\)](#) test the support for different variants of a global carbon tax, but their samples are representative only along gender and age, and as respondents face only one variant, the sample size for a given variant is about 167 respondents per country. They find more than 80% of support for any variant in India, between 50 and 65% in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43 to 59% of support in the U.S., depending on the variant. The support for a global carbon tax funding an equal dividend for each human is close to 50% in high-income countries (e.g. at 44% in the U.S.), consistently with what we find in the global survey (see Figure 1). This is another piece of evidence that the support is lower for a tax that would “only” reduce CO₂ emissions than for a quota that would unambiguously achieve the climate target. Using a conjoint analysis in the U.S. and Germany, [Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer \(2019b\)](#) find that the support for a carbon tax increases by up to 50% if it applies to all industrialized countries rather than just one’s own country.

In surveys in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S., [Ghassim \(2020\)](#) finds 55 to 74% of support for “a global democracy including both a global government and a global parliament, directly elected by the world population, to recommend and implement policies on global issues”. Using an experiment, he also finds that, in countries where the government stems from a coalition, voting shares would shift by 8 (Brazil) to 12 p.p. (Germany) from parties who are said to oppose global democracy to parties that supposedly support it. For example, the Greens and the Left gained respectively 9 and 3 p.p. in vote intentions while the SPD and the CDU-CSU each lost 6 p.p., when Germans respondents were told that (only) the former parties support global democracy. [Ghassim \(2020\)](#) also document survey results which show strong majorities support in each of 18 countries for the direct election of one’s country’s UN representative. Similarly, in each of 10 countries, there are clear majorities in favor of “a new supranational entity [taking] enforceable global decisions in order to solve global risks” ([Global Challenges Foundation 2018](#)). Actually, already in 1946, 54% of Americans agreed (and 24% disagreed) that “the UN should be strengthened to make it a world government with the power to control the armed forces of all nations” ([Gallup 1946](#)). In surveys in Argentina, China, India,

Russia, Spain, and the U.S., Ghassim et al. (2022) find support for UN reform that would make United Nations' decisions binding, give veto powers at the Security Council to a few other major countries, and complement the highest body of the UN with a chamber of directly elected representatives.

Relatedly, Meilland et al. (2023) find that Americans and French people prefer an international settlement of climate justice even if it impedes on sovereignty. In a 2013 survey in China, Germany and the U.S., Schleich et al. (2016) show that more than three quarter of people think that international climate agreements reached so far are not successful and that future agreements are important. In Finland, Sivonen (2022) finds that a carbon tax receives higher support if enacted at the global level (54%) rather than at the national level (40%).

These specific questions are in line with the answers to more general questions. In each of 36 countries, ISSP (2010) find near consensus that “for environmental problems, there should be international agreements that [their country] and other countries should be made to follow” (overall, 82% agree and 4% disagree). In each of 29 countries, ISSP (2019) uncover near consensus that “Present economic differences between rich and poor countries are too large” (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree).

A.1.2 Population attitudes on climate burden sharing

Despite their differences in the description of the fairness principles, the surveys on burden-sharing rules show consistent attitudes. Or at least, their various results can be made compatible with the following interpretation: Concerning emissions reductions, most people want that every country engage in strong decarbonization effort together, with a global quota converging to climate neutrality in the medium run. Concerning the financial effort, most people support high-emitting countries paying and low-income countries receiving funding. The most supported rules are those that appear equitable, in particular an equal right to emit per person.

This interpretation helps understanding the apparent differences between articles, which approach burden sharing from different angles: cost sharing (i.e. in money terms), effort sharing (in terms of emissions reductions), or resource sharing (in terms of rights to emit). Extant papers adopt the cost sharing or effort sharing approaches and preclude any country being a net receiver of money. Also, by focusing on *either* the financial or the decarbonization effort, these surveys miss the other half of the picture, which can explain why some papers find strong support for the ability-to-pay principle while others

find strong support for grandfathering (defined as emissions reductions being the same in every country). The literature follows these approaches to stick to the terms used by the UNFCCC. Yet, we argue that the resource sharing approach is preferable to uncover attitudes, as it unambiguously describes the distributive implications of each rule while achieving an efficient location of emissions reductions and explicitly allowing for monetary gains for some countries.

Now, let us summarize the different papers' results in the light of this clarification. [Schleich et al. \(2016\)](#) find an identical ranking in the support for the burden-sharing principles in China, Germany, and the U.S.: polluter-pays followed by ability-to-pay, equal emissions per capita, and grandfathering. Note that the authors do not allow for emissions trading in their description of equal *emissions per capita*, which may explain its relatively low support. Yet, the relative support for egalitarianism also depends on how *the other* rules are described. Indeed, [Carlsson et al. \(2011\)](#) find that Swedes prefer that "all countries are allowed to emit an equal amount per capita" rather than options where emissions are reduced in relation to current or historical emissions for which it is explicitly written that high-emitting countries "will continue to emit more than others". [Bechtel & Scheve \(2013\)](#) find agreement that rich countries should pay more and historical emissions matter, but that rich countries should not be the only ones to make the efforts. More precisely, their conjoint analysis in France, Germany, the UK and the U.S. shows that a climate agreement is 15 p.p. more likely to be preferred (to a random alternative) if it includes 160 countries rather than 20, and 5 p.p. less likely to be preferred if "only rich countries pay" compared to other burden-sharing rules: "rich countries pay more than poor", "countries pay proportional to current emissions" or "countries pay proportional to historical emissions". Using a choice experiment, [Carlsson et al. \(2013\)](#) find that the least preferred option in China and the U.S. is when low-emitting countries are exempted from any effort. Ability-to-pay is appreciated in both countries, though the preferred option in China is another one, which accounts for historical responsibility. In the U.S. and France, [Meilland et al. \(2023\)](#) find that the most favored fairness principle is that "all countries commit to converge to the same average of total emissions per inhabitant, compatible with a controlled climate change". Furthermore, in each country, 73% disagree with grandfathering defined as "countries which emitted a lot of carbon in the past have a right to continue emitting more than others in the future". [Meilland et al. \(2023\)](#) contain many other results, for example majorities prefer to hold countries accountable for their consumption-based rather than territorial emissions, and the median choice regard-

ing historical responsibility is to hold a country accountable for their post-1990 emissions (rather than post-1850 or just their current emissions). Finally, in each of 28 (among the largest) countries, Dabla-Norris et al. (2023) find strong majority for “all countries” to the question “Which countries do you think should be paying to reduce carbon emissions?”. Asked to choose between a cost sharing based on *current* vs. *accumulated historic emissions*, a majority prefers *current emissions* in all countries but China and Saudi Arabia (where the two options are close to equally preferred).

A.1.3 Population attitudes on foreign aid

There is an extensive literature on attitudes toward foreign aid in donor countries. Its main insights are that most people overestimate the amount of foreign aid and that only a minority wants a cut in foreign aid compared to actual amounts, especially once they know them.

PIPA (2001) shows that 83% of Americans support a multilateral effort to cut world hunger in half. PIPA (2008) shows that in each of 20 countries, a majority thinks that developed countries “have a moral responsibility to work to reduce hunger and severe poverty in poor countries”, with an average agreement of 81%. In 7 OECD countries, they find that at least 75% are willing to pay for a program to cut hunger in half (at an estimated cost of e.g. \$50 a year for each American).

Kaufmann et al. (2012) find that in each of 24 countries, perceived aid is overestimated, on average by a factor 7. In most countries, desired aid is larger than perceived aid.¹³ They show that those in the top income quintile desire aid 0.13 p.p. lower than those in the bottom 40% – which is very close to what we find. Then, using a theoretical model as well as correlations between the level of lobbying and the actual aid (controlling for desired aid), they argue that the gap between actual and desired aid is due to political influence of the rich who defend their vested interests. In Kaufmann et al. (2012), the U.S. is an outlier: desired aid is at the other countries’ average (3% of GNI), but as misperceptions are enormous, perceived aid is twice as large as desired aid. Indeed, Gilens (2001) shows that even American with high political knowledge misperceive actual aid, and finds that 17% fewer of them want to cut aid when we provide them specific information about aid amount. Similarly, Nair (2018) finds that the relatively low support for aid in the U.S. is driven by information on global distribution, as people underestimate their rank by 27

¹³Kaufmann et al. (2012) offer the best results on desired aid because (as Hudson & van Heerde (2012) criticize), other studies did not take into account misperceptions of actual aid.

centiles on average and overestimate the global median income by a factor 10.

Hudson & van Heerde (2012) offer a critical review of the literature and show that the strong support for poverty alleviation largely stems from intrinsic altruism. Indeed, citing DFID (2009) and PIPA (2001), they note that 47% of British people find that the aid is wasted (mainly due to corruption), while Americans estimate that less than a quarter of the aid reaches people who really need it and more than half ends up in the hands of corrupt government officials. And yet, most people still support aid, suggesting that they have nonutilitarian motives for doing so. Consistent with Henson et al. (2010), Bauhr et al. (2013) find that support for aid is reduced by perception of corruption in recipient countries. However, this effect is reduced by the aid-corruption paradox: most corrupt countries need more help. Bodenstein & Faust (2017) further show that right-wing Europeans or those who perceive strong corruption in their country are more likely to agree that recipient countries should “follow certain rules regarding democracy, human rights and governance as a condition for receiving EU development aid.” Using a 2002 Gallup survey as well as the 2006 World Values Survey, and consistently with Bayram (2017), Paxton & Knack (2012) show that the main determinants for wanting more aid are trust, left-wing ideology, interest in politics, and being a woman (all positively associated).

A.1.4 Population attitudes on rich tax

We are not aware of any previous survey on a global wealth tax,¹⁴ though surveys consistently show strong level of support from national wealth taxes. In a comprehensive survey in the UK, Rowlingson et al. (2021) show that a wealth tax is the preferred option to raise revenues, that only 8% state that total net wealth should not be taxed (with little differences between Labour and Conservative voters), and find that the preferred design would be a 1% or 3% tax on net wealth above £1 million. By asking how much taxes per year should a person with a certain income and wealth level pay, Fisman et al. (2017) finds that the average Americans favors a 0.8% linear tax rate on unspecified wealth until \$2 million (the highest wealth level tested), and a 3% linear rate on inherited wealth. Through a conjoint analysis in three high-income countries, Schechtl & Tisch (2023) find widespread support for a wealth tax (from 78% in the U.S. to 86% in Germany and the UK), with a preference for an exemption threshold at \$/€1 million (rather than 500,000 or 2 million) and little influence of the tax rate or tax unit on the preferred design. In

¹⁴We did not find any using the combination of “survey” or “attitudes” with “wealth tax” or “global wealth tax” in Google Scholar.

21 OECD countries, the [OECD \(2019\)](#) uncovers strong majority support for higher taxes on the rich to support the poor (with nearly 70% overall agreement and less than 20% disagreement). [Isbell \(2022\)](#) finds similarly high level of support in 34 African countries. In the UK, [Patriotic Millionaires \(2022\)](#) find 69% support (and 7% opposition) for a 1.1% tax on wealth in excess of £10 million. In the U.S., [Americans for Tax Fairness \(2021\)](#) find 67 to 71% support to “raise taxes for those earning more than \$400,000 a year”, “raise the income tax rate for those earning over \$1 million a year by 10 percentage points”, or “apply a 2% tax on an individual’s wealth above \$50 million each year, and 3% on wealth above \$1 billion”.

A.1.5 Population attitudes on ethical norms

Universalism Different papers assess belonging to a global identity (see [Reyzen & Katzarska-Miller \(2018\)](#) for a review). In the 2005-2008 wave of the World Values Survey, [Bayram \(2015\)](#) notes that “78% of the participants in 57 countries see themselves as citizens of the world”, though the [2017-2022 wave](#) reveals that more people feel close to their town, region or country than to the world. [Enke et al. \(2023b\)](#) measure universalism, by asking American respondents to split \$100 between a random stranger and a random person with the same income but closer to them. They distinguish different facets of universalism, and define *foreign universalism* as giving to a foreigner rather than a fellow citizen. They find a home bias for most people, which may partly be due to concerns for inequality, as the split involves two persons with the same income, with the foreigner most certainly living in a poorer country than the American and thus enjoying a higher social status. That being said, a home bias probably remains once removing the concern for inequality, as 84% of Americans agree that “taking care of problems at home is more important than giving aid to foreign countries” ([PIPA 2001](#)). [Enke et al. \(2023a\)](#) measure universalism and analyze its correlates in 7 countries, and [Cappelen et al. \(2022\)](#) deploy this method in 60 countries. In a lab experiment with students in the U.S., [Cherry et al. \(2017\)](#) show that a substantial share of people prefer policies detrimental to them due to their egalitarian worldview.

Free-riding Although researchers have long explained the lack of climate action by free-riding, surveys consistently show that people support climate mitigation in their country even if other countries defect. [Bernauer & Gampfer \(2015\)](#) show this for Americans and Indians, who both overestimate their country’s emissions at one third of global total.

Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019a) show this in the U.S. and China using an experimental design. McEvoy & Cherry (2016) show that Americans mostly invoke leadership and morality to justify unilateral climate action. Using a range of methods, Aklin & Mildenberger (2020) show that the empirical evidence for free-riding is not compelling, and that climate inaction can be equally well explained by distributive conflicts. Finally, through a review of the literature, McGrath & Bernauer (2017) show that climate attitudes are largely nonreciprocal, and primarily driven by values and perceptions of the policies, rather than by considerations of what other countries do.

A.1.6 Second-order beliefs

Allport (1924) introduced the concept of pluralistic ignorance: a shared misperception concerning others' beliefs. The concept became notorious when O'Gorman (1975) showed that, towards the end of the civil rights movement, 47% of Americans believed that most white people favored segregation while only 18% actually did so. PIPA (2001) has shown that 75% of Americans are willing to pay \$50 a year to cut world hunger in half (the cost of the program), but only 32% think that the majority would be willing to pay. Andre et al. (2021) have documented pluralistic ignorance of climate-friendly norms in the U.S. Similarly, Sparkman et al. (2022) show that Americans underestimate the support for climate policies by nearly half, while Drews et al. (2022) document pluralistic ignorance of carbon tax support in Spain. Geiger & Swim (2016) show that pluralistic ignorance about concern for climate change leads people to talk less about it as many self-silence themselves.

A.2 Proposals and analyses of global policy-making

A.2.1 Global carbon pricing

Economists generally consider global carbon pricing as the benchmark climate policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon emissions externality. For example, Hoel (1991) shows that an international carbon tax can be designed so that it is both efficient and satisfies whatever distributional objectives one might have. Concerning the distributional objective, Grubb (1990), Agarwal & Narain (1991) and Bertram (1992) were the first advocates of an equal right to emit for each human. As Grubb (1990) states it: "by far the best combination of long term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity, is obtained from a system based upon tradable permits for carbon emission which are allocated on

an adult per capita basis". The support for such solution has been renewed ever since (Baer et al. 2000; Blanchard & Tirole 2021; Jamieson 2001; Rajan 2021).

While many endorse the egalitarian allocation of emissions permits, economists also considered this outcome as politically unrealistic. Thus, they tweaked their (integrated assessment) models by assigning more weight to rich countries' interests to preserve the current level of inequalities between countries, precluding any transfer between them (Stanton 2011).

Gollier & Tirole (2015) synthesize the distributional decision with a *generosity* parameter which would allocate emissions permit to countries in proportion to their population if set to one, in proportion to their emissions (on the start date of the policy) if set to zero, and as a mixture of the egalitarian and grandfathering rules if set in between. Using a similar formula in the context of a tax, Cramton et al. (2015) (summarized in MacKay et al. 2015) propose that countries around the average emission per capita fix the generosity parameter, so that it is strategically chosen to maximize the tax rate, and to fix the tax rate at the minimum price proposed by participating countries. Negotiations would exclude countries with low ambition beforehand; and the treaty would impose trade sanctions on non-participating countries. van den Bergh et al. (2020) propose a "dual-track transition to global carbon pricing": an expanding climate club that would integrate existing and new emissions trading systems, and a reorientation of UNFCCC negotiations towards a global carbon price and burden-sharing rules. The IMF (2019) also supports global carbon pricing or, as a first step, a carbon price floor. They propose either differentiated prices among countries, or international transfers, and estimate that a price of \$75/tCO₂ in 2030 would be compatible with a 2°C trajectory.

Other authors have advanced more radical ideas. Weitzman (2017) envisions a World Climate Assembly with proportional representation at the global scale, so that the median (human) voter would choose the carbon price level. To finance an adaptation fund, Chancel & Piketty (2015) propose a global *progressive* carbon tax (or a progressive tax on air tickets as a first step), so that rich people (who are high emitters) contribute more to the public good. Fleurbaey & Zuber (2013) highlight that, given that current emitters are probably richer than future victims of climate change damages, climate policies deserve a *negative* discount rate. Said differently, we cannot abstract the climate issue from global inequalities, and an ethical response requires global redistribution.

A.2.2 Climate burden sharing

The literature has discussed different burden-sharing principles. While there is no common agreement on the definitions as different approaches are used (cost sharing, effort sharing or resource sharing, see Section A.1.2), we describe here the burden-sharing principles in a consistent manner using the resource sharing approach (i.e. allocating emissions rights).

Equal per capita. The simplest one is perhaps to allocate each year's global carbon quota according to an equal right to emit per capita, or an equal right for each adult. Granting an equal right to emit would imply large transfers from high-emitting to low-emitting countries.

Grandfathering. On the contrary, *grandfathering* would grant emissions rights in proportion to current emissions. From the perspective of allocating carbon pricing revenues between countries, grandfathering amounts to each country retaining the revenues it collects. Given that nations are sovereign and have not agreed to share emissions rights, this principle can be considered as the default option to which the other ones can be compared, in terms of distributive effects.

Historical responsibilities. At the opposite side of the spectrum is *historical responsibilities*, which grants to countries a carbon budget proportional to their population. Countries that have emitted more than average have accumulated a carbon debt towards countries that have emitted less, which have a carbon credit.¹⁵

To fully specify this rule, one needs to define a start date for the responsibilities on past emissions, and to specify how the population size is accounted for. 1990 is often chosen as a start year as it is the date of the first IPCC assessment report and climate change was widely acknowledged around that time, though variants include 1972, 1960, 1950 or 1850.¹⁶ Several solutions have been proposed to account for evolving populations, none of which is perfect. Matthews (2015) allocates emissions rights on a given year proportionally to the countries' populations in that year. An alternative is to use fixed populations, chosen either as the start year populations (Neumayer 2000), or at a future

¹⁵It is not clear how these debts would be settled. Perhaps using a conventional social cost of carbon to monetize them, by crediting (positively or negatively) emissions rights to countries in an international carbon market, or by means of carbon removal from the atmosphere.

¹⁶Climate equity monitor uses 1850 for example.

date like projections of populations when the global total will reach 9 billion (Raupach et al. 2014).

The rationale for using fixed populations is to avoid the incentive for a country to grow its population to obtain more rights to emit. However, this solution treats similarly countries with different demographic trajectories, effectively penalizing countries which grow more than others (if past populations are used) or grow more than expected (if future populations are used). Using current populations like Matthews (2015) also comes with its own problems. Think of two countries having contributed very little to cumulative emissions, with the same emissions per capita but different demography: country A's population has doubled in the last 30 years while country B's has remained stable. Country B will have accumulated more carbon credit than country A, despite a similar situation in the present. In effect, compensating country B more because it was more populous in the past amounts to compensating the deads although it is future generations who will suffer. That being said, using current populations is probably a better solution than using fixed populations as in practice, demographic trajectories of countries with similar emissions per capita are not too far apart.

Ability to pay. Another prominent burden-sharing principle is the ability to pay: richer countries should contribute more to mitigation efforts. To operationalize this principle, Baer et al. (2008) define *capacity* as the share of global income above an exemption threshold. They use the threshold of \$7,500 per year (in 2005 PPP), which corresponds to the top 28% of the global income distribution. According to this principle, the effort of a country should be proportional to the revenues it would raise with a linear income tax on individual income above \$7,500.

Climate Equity Reference Framework Baer et al. (2008) propose another effort-sharing method, the *Climate Equity Reference Framework* (CERF), which blends the ability to pay with their version of historical responsibilities. They define *responsibility* as follows: they determine the mitigation requirement as the emissions gap between the Business as Usual scenario from IEA (2007) and a 2°C (with 68-86% probability) scenario. They then allocate the mitigation requirement to countries in proportion to their cumulative emissions (starting in 1990). The emissions rights of a country according to their *responsibility* is then given by its Business as Usual emissions minus its mitigation requirement. A country's emissions right, dubbed its *greenhouse development right* (GDR), is defined similarly, ex-

cept that a blend of *capacity* (C) and *responsibility* (R) is used to allocate the mitigation requirement between countries. This allocation key is called the *Responsibility and Capacity Indicator* (RCI) and defined as $RCI = R^a \cdot C^{1-a}$, with $a = .4$.

This choice of parameter appears somewhat arbitrary, but the [EcoEquity calculator](#) allows to customize all CERF parameters ([Holz et al. 2019](#)). The Climate Action Network chose to adopt the CERF as its *fair share* framework, though the different national chapters of the organization could not agree on a choice of parameters ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)).¹⁷

The CERF approach was adopted by a prominent network of climate NGOs because it operationalize the principle of *common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities* recognized by the UNFCCC. However, this approach suffers from three important limitations. First, its definition of historical responsibility as an effort sharing principle is inconsistent with the principle of an equal right of cumulative emissions per capita, which is a resource sharing principle. Indeed, imagine a country that is fully decarbonized and has exhausted *exactly* its cumulative carbon budget. Because it developed before the others, it has relatively high cumulative emissions, hence must highly contribute to mitigation effort according to the CERF notion of *responsibility*. Yet, according to the usual definition based on an equal right of cumulative emissions p.c., the historical responsibility approach should leave this country with no liability as it has not exceeded its carbon budget. Second, a country with moderate incomes¹⁸ and low historical responsibility would have a relatively low effort, even if its emissions per capita are high. In other words, the CERF approach favors countries which have experienced recent growth. Third, the poorest countries would be granted emissions rights close to the Business as Usual trajectory, as they would bear virtually none of the effort. But this trajectory carries the current (unfair) income distribution and amounts to grandfathering. As an example, the DRC's baseline trajectory for emissions¹⁹ is 0.8 tCO₂ p.c. in 2030, which is five times less than the world average emissions right per capita. Should the DRC grow faster than projected in the baseline, then under this framework it would actually have to pay to the rest of the world for mitigation efforts. This is what is likely to happen to countries like Mexico or


¹⁷The [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) and the think tank [EcoEquity](#) (funded by Tom Athanasiou and late Paul Baer) choose the following parameters: an equal weight for R and C ($a = .5$), their own [business as usual projections](#) of CO₂ emissions based on trends of GDP growth and emissions intensity reduction, a 1.5°C (Low Energy Demand) pathway, 1950 as the start year for responsibility, a gradual inclusion of income to compute *capacity* (complexifying the above) from a full exemption of the bottom 70% (\$7,500 per year) linearly to a full inclusion of the top 2% (\$72,211), the inclusion of non-CO₂ gases but not of emissions embodied in trade (i.e. imported emissions) nor LULUCF (land-use).

¹⁸Using the above parameters, moderate incomes means few income above the global 70th. percentile.

¹⁹The baseline trajectory is computed as the “product of the projected GDP and CO₂ emission intensity”.

Senegal, from our simulation of the net gains of CERF compared to a situation without international transfers (see Figure A1). Conversely, in a resource sharing approach like the equal per capita one, low-income countries would receive emissions rights in excess of their projected trajectory, which could translate into transfers coming from high-income countries. By construction, such transfers do not occur in an effort sharing approach like the CERF. Compared to an equal right to emit per capita, this method favors countries like China (whose emissions are allowed to remain stable over 2020-2030 instead of a reduction by 35-40%) and penalizes regions like Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (see Figure A2).


Figure A1: Net gains from the CERF burden-sharing rule in 2030.



Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the U.S. Climate Action Network (Athanasio et al. 2022) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment (Johansson et al. 2012) and a price of \$144/tCO₂.

Contraction and Convergence. Meyer (2004) defines a blend of grandfathering and equal per capita called contraction and convergence (C&C). This rule grants (tradable) emissions rights to each country, starting at their current emission level and converging linearly to an equal per capita level at some pre-specified date. The *contraction* part comes from the reduction of total emissions rights in line with the climate objective. When discussed around year 2000, the convergence date was specified between 2020 and 2050.

Figure A2: Difference between net gains from Greenhouse Development Rights and equal rights per capita.



Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO₂.

This rule, advocated by the Global Commons Institute (a UK think tank), was on the agenda from COP2 to COP15 (in Copenhagen), including at Kyoto, and endorsed by the European Parliament in 1998. More recently, [Gignac & Matthews \(2015\)](#) show how C&C can be made consistent with historical responsibilities, by computing carbon debts and credits until the date of convergence.

Assessments of the NDCs against burden-sharing principles. The regime established by the 2015 Paris agreement to regulate climate change respects none of the burden-sharing principles, and relies instead on voluntary contributions of each country, known as the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Therefore, a literature (reviewed by [Höhne et al. 2014](#)) assesses the NDCs against the emissions reduction objective and different burden-sharing principles. [Gao et al. \(2019\)](#) expresses the NDCs in terms of emissions in 2030 and infers the rise in temperature implied by the NDCs. [van den Berg et al. \(2020\)](#) is the most recent and complete assessment of NDCs against burden-sharing principles (see also [Raupach et al. 2014](#); [Robiou du Pont et al. 2016, 2017](#)).

A.2.3 Global redistribution

Addressing global poverty, inequalities and climate change are at the heart of the universally agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). Bolch et al. (2022) have pointed out that low-income countries generally do not have enough domestic resources to eliminate their poverty gap in the short run. This shows that international transfers would be needed to rapidly end global poverty. In *Beyond the Welfare State*, Gunnar Myrdal (1960) called for a *welfare world*. He used his Nobel lecture to recommend an increase of foreign aid to low-income countries as “The type of marginal foreign aid we have provided, is clearly not enough to meet their barest needs” (Myrdal 1975).

Following the labor theory of value, a strand of economists have argued that global inequalities stem from unequal exchange in international trade (Arghiri 1972). Indeed, the stark disparity in wages between countries implies that one unit of labor exported by an American commands five units of labor embodied in goods imported to the U.S., while Ethiopians need to export 50 units of labor to get one in their imports (Alsamawi et al. 2014; Reyes et al. 2017). Taking stock, Hickel (2017) proposes to globally establish minimum wages at 50% of the local median wage. Hickel (2017) also suggests other solutions against global inequality, which inspired our questionnaire: cancellation of low-income countries’ public debt, fair trade (in particular no tariffs from high-income countries, reduced patent protections, reduced farming subsidies in rich countries), measures against tax evasion (e.g. a global financial register), land reform, and a fair international climate policy.

Piketty (2014) prominently defends a progressive wealth tax at the global level, though he did not specify whether the revenues should fund international transfers.

Kopczuk et al. (2005) compute the optimal linear income tax rates for all countries in two ways: globally centralized and decentralized (i.e. in each country, without international transfers). They show that the average decentralized rate is 41%. The global one 62%, which would finance a basic income of 250\$/month (higher than 73 countries’ GDP per capita). From a current global Gini index of 0.695, they show that decentralized optimal taxation would barely reduce global inequality to 0.69, while global taxation would bring the Gini down to 0.25. Current foreign aid can only be rationalized if the U.S. attaches 2,000 less value to a citizen in poorest countries than to an American (or 1,000 less if half of the transfers are diverted due to corruption).

A.2.4 Basic income

Unconditional cash transfers (UCT) are increasingly seen as an effective way to end extreme poverty. Indeed, positive results from randomized controlled trials are accumulating: [Gangopadhyay et al. \(2015\)](#) find that UCT outperform a food subsidy; [Haushofer & Shapiro \(2016\)](#) find significant impacts on health, economic outcomes, and psychological well-being; [Egger et al. \(2022\)](#) find large positive spillovers on non-recipient people, and minimal inflation. Reviews of extant research confirm the positive outcomes of UCT ([Bastagli et al. 2016](#); [Standing 2014](#)).

Although delivering cash to remote places and avoiding fraud is challenging in regions without a proper civil register, mobile phones could be used as tools for banking and biometric identification ([Harnett 2017](#)). While many places are still lacking internet access, progress is rapid in satellite internet access, and some argue that it could soon become cheap and ubiquitous ([Hanson 2016](#)).

A.2.5 Global democracy

The idea of world federalism follows a long tradition, dating back at least to [Kant \(1795\)](#), who argued that this was the necessary condition for perpetual peace. International organizations were eventually created to foster peace, though the League of Nations and its successor, the United Nations, never succeeded in avoiding military conflicts. Many have argued that we need stronger and more democratic global institutions, competent to address global challenges like extreme poverty, climate change, wars, pandemics, or financial stability. Before World War II, feminist and pacifist [Maverick Lloyd & Schwimmer \(1937\)](#) founded the *Campaign for World Government*, defending direct representation at the global scale. [Einstein \(1947\)](#) called for the subordination of the UN Security Council to the General Assembly, and the direct election of UN delegates. Since 2007, individuals and institutions from more than 150 countries have endorsed the appeal for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA), including 1,800 member of parliament, heads of state, as well the European Parliament, the Pan-African Parliament, and the Latin-American Parliament. The UNPA calls for a gradual implementation of a democratic assembly, starting with a consultative assembly composed of members of national parliaments, allowing for the direction election of its members in voluntary countries, and evolving toward a world parliament able to adopt binding regulations once all members are directly elected ([Leinen & Bummel 2018](#)). Besides the UNPA, various scholars


have proposed different models of global democracy, ranging from deliberative spaces to a world federation ([Archibugi et al. 2011](#)). While the most radical proposals are still out of sight, an assembly of random citizens representative of the world population has already been convened. It has produced a joint statement at the COP26 ([Global Assembly 2022](#)), and a similar *World Citizens' Assembly* should soon follow.

B Raw results

Country-specific raw results are also available as supplementary material files: [US](#), [EU](#), [FR](#), [DE](#), [ES](#), [UK](#).

Figure A3: Absolute support for global climate policies.

Share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* (in percent, $n = 40,680$). The color blue denotes an absolute majority. See Figure 1 for the relative support. (Questions A-I)



*In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

Figure A4: Correct answers to comprehension questions (in percent). (Questions 16-18)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| With NR, typical [country] people win and richest lose | 68 | 73 | 76 | 73 | 73 | 70 |
| With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win | 60 | 68 | 62 | 72 | 67 | 67 |
| With GCS+NR, typical [country] people neither win nor lose | 54 | 60 | 63 | 59 | 57 | 61 |

Figure A5: Number of correct answers to comprehension questions (mean). (Questions 16-18)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Number of correct answers to understanding questions | 1.8 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |

Figure A6: List experiment: mean number of supported policies. (Section 2.4.1, Question 24)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|-----------------------|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| List exp.: NR/GCS/C/O | 2 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 2.2 | 2.7 | 2.6 |
| List exp.: NR/C/O | 1.4 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 1.6 | 2 | 1.9 |
| List exp.: GCS/C/O | 1.4 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 1.8 |
| List exp.: C/O | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.3 |

Figure A7: Conjoint analyses 1 and 2. (Section 2.4.3, Questions 25-27)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|-----------------------------|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Global climate scheme (GCS) | 53 | 76 | 80 | 71 | 81 | 74 |
| C+NR+GCS preferred to C+NR | 55 | 74 | 79 | 71 | 78 | 68 |
| NR+GCS preferred to NR | 55 | 77 | 79 | 74 | 79 | 77 |
| NR+C preferred to NR | 62 | 84 | 88 | 83 | 84 | 82 |
| GCS+NR preferred to C+NR | 47 | 52 | 53 | 53 | 49 | 52 |
| NR+C+GCS preferred to NR | 55 | 77 | 86 | 73 | 83 | 72 |

Table A1: Effects on the support for the GCS of a question on its pros and cons and on information about the actual support, in the U.S. (See Section D in the US2 Questionnaire)

| | Support | | | |
|--|-----------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|
| | Global Climate Scheme | | National Redistribution | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Control group mean | 0.557 | 0.557 | 0.569 | 0.569 |
| Treatment: Open-ended field on GCS pros & cons | -0.073** (0.035) | -0.071** (0.031) | -0.035 (0.035) | -0.030 (0.032) |
| Treatment: Closed questions on GCS pros & cons | -0.109*** (0.034) | -0.096*** (0.031) | -0.065* (0.034) | -0.062** (0.031) |
| Treatment: Info on actual support for GCS and NR | -0.021 (0.034) | -0.015 (0.031) | 0.048 (0.033) | 0.056* (0.031) |
| Includes controls | | ✓ | | ✓ |
| Observations | 2,000 | 1,995 | 2,000 | 1,995 |
| R ² | 0.007 | 0.170 | 0.007 | 0.154 |

Figure A8: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements seen as important for supporting the GCS in a 4-Likert scale (in percent). (Question 32)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|---|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| It would succeed in limiting climate change | 78 | 85 | 85 | 86 | 86 | 83 |
| It would hurt the [Country] economy | 81 | 67 | 61 | 67 | 66 | 69 |
| It would penalize my household | 75 | 60 | 55 | 63 | 59 | 63 |
| It would make people change their lifestyle | 78 | 79 | 83 | 79 | 78 | 77 |
| It would reduce poverty in low-income countries | 77 | 85 | 88 | 85 | 86 | 81 |
| It might be detrimental to some poor countries | 79 | 72 | 79 | 67 | 78 | 70 |
| It could foster global cooperation | 82 | 81 | 81 | 82 | 85 | 80 |
| It could fuel corruption in low-income countries | 79 | 75 | 82 | 69 | 79 | 72 |
| It could be subject to fraud | 80 | 79 | 80 | 74 | 83 | 81 |
| It would be technically difficult to put in place | 77 | 71 | 74 | 62 | 79 | 71 |
| Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences | 89 | 82 | 89 | 68 | 91 | 88 |

Figure A9: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements found in the open-ended field on the GCS (manually recoded, in percent). (Question 31)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|-------------------------|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| environment | 26 | 31 | 37 | 26 | 43 | 24 |
| unclassifiable | 25 | 24 | 23 | 28 | 25 | 22 |
| pro | 22 | 23 | 21 | 22 | 33 | 20 |
| con | 22 | 17 | 12 | 18 | 20 | 16 |
| cost | 17 | 12 | 11 | 14 | 17 | 7 |
| poorest humans | 11 | 7 | 6 | 9 | 5 | 6 |
| tax redistribution | 10 | 7 | 11 | 8 | 4 | 9 |
| support | 8 | 6 | 3 | 5 | 6 | 8 |
| oppose | 7 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 4 |
| don't know | 6 | 8 | 10 | 8 | 7 | 10 |
| empty | 6 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13 |
| difficult agreement | 5 | 10 | 7 | 12 | 8 | 8 |
| difficult implement | 3 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 4 | 6 |
| misunderstands gcs | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 |
| misunderstands question | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 |

Figure A10: Perceptions of the GCS. Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent). (Question 31)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|---|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| world: international world country global | 28 | 22 | 23 | 19 | 22 | 23 |
| environment: climate environment animal emission nature | 26 | 21 | 17 | 28 | 21 | 17 |
| poorest: poor low-income 700 poverty | 16 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 4 | 10 |
| pro: pro pros pros pros: | 16 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 5 |
| con: con con: cons cons: | 15 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 6 |
| cost: cost expensive higher price 85 inflation | 13 | 7 | 5 | 9 | 7 | 6 |
| tax: tax | 8 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| redistribution: rich redistribution | 8 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 5 |
| implementation: implement enforce policy monitor | 6 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 5 |
| agreement: agree accept participate | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 2 | 3 |

Figure A11: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality (mean). (Question 34)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|-------------------------|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Donation to own country | 35 | 34 | 31 | 38 | 34 | 32 |
| Donation to Africa | 32 | 35 | 33 | 41 | 32 | 33 |

Figure A12: Support for a global wealth tax.

"Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-income countries?

Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education." (Question 35)




Figure A13: Support for a national wealth tax financing public services like healthcare, education, and social housing. (Question 36)




Figure A14: Preferred share of global wealth tax revenues that should be pooled to finance low-income countries. (Question 37)




Figure A15: Support for sharing half of global tax revenues with low-income countries, rather than each country retaining all the revenues it collects (in percent). (Question 38)



Figure A16: Perceived foreign aid. “From your best guess, what percentage of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?” (Question 39)




Figure A17: Preferred foreign aid (without info on actual amount).

"If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?" (Question 40)




Figure A18: Preferred foreign aid (after info on actual amount).

"Actually, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid.

If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?" (Question 40)




Figure A19: Preferences for funding increased foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]
 "How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent) (Question 41)




Figure A20: Preferences of spending following reduced foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]
 "How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent) (Question 42)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Higher spending on defense | 19 | 23 | 11 | 21 | 17 | 31 |
| Higher spending on retirement pensions | 23 | 41 | 22 | 51 | 57 | 35 |
| Higher spending on healthcare | 40 | 57 | 31 | 42 | 80 | 70 |
| Higher spending on welfare benefits | 13 | 20 | 7 | 19 | 39 | 20 |
| Higher spending on education | 30 | 45 | 31 | 47 | 58 | 43 |
| Higher spending on other programs | 6 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 9 | 8 |
| Lower taxes on the wealthiest | 5 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| Lower corporate income tax rate | 12 | 6 | 10 | 4 | 8 | 6 |
| Lower personal income tax rates | 48 | 29 | 26 | 27 | 37 | 30 |
| Lower public deficit | 32 | 24 | 21 | 13 | 41 | 21 |

Figure A21: Willingness to sign real-stake petition for the Global Climate Scheme or National Redistribution, compared to stated support in corresponding subsamples (e.g. support for the GCS in the branch where the petition was about the GCS). (Question 43)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|----------------------------------|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Petition for the GCS | 51 | 69 | 69 | 66 | 78 | 69 |
| (Comparable) support for the GCS | 53 | 76 | 81 | 74 | 81 | 74 |
| Petition for NR | 57 | 67 | 65 | 66 | 74 | 68 |
| (Comparable) support for NR | 58 | 72 | 76 | 65 | 78 | 75 |

Figure A22: Absolute support for various global policies (Percent of (*somewhat or strong*) support). (Questions 44 and 45. See Figure 4 for the relative support.)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages | 41 | 54 | 52 | 53 | 62 | 51 |
| High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries | 53 | 65 | 62 | 66 | 68 | 62 |
| High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change | 45 | 58 | 55 | 60 | 62 | 54 |
| Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt | 31 | 37 | 36 | 30 | 45 | 40 |
| Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population | 34 | 44 | 44 | 43 | 52 | 43 |
| Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries | 39 | 49 | 39 | 51 | 50 | 54 |
| A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage | 42 | 55 | 54 | 54 | 61 | 53 |
| Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets | 44 | 70 | 73 | 70 | 72 | 65 |
| A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human | 34 | 45 | 40 | 48 | 44 | 50 |
| National tax on millionaires | 62 | 76 | 70 | 79 | 79 | 77 |
| Global tax on millionaires | 58 | 71 | 69 | 72 | 78 | 71 |

Figure A23: Preferred approach of diplomats at international climate negotiations.
In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend [own country] interests or global justice? (Question 49)




Figure A24: Percent of selected issues viewed as important.
 “To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem?” (Question 56)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--------------------------------|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Income inequality in [Country] | 55 | 59 | 54 | 58 | 71 | 57 |
| Climate change | 59 | 66 | 66 | 63 | 73 | 63 |
| Global poverty | 50 | 57 | 50 | 58 | 75 | 49 |

Figure A25: Group defended when voting.
 “What group do you defend when you vote?” (Question 57)




Figure A26: Mean prioritization of policies.

Mean number of points allocated policies to express intensity of support (among six policies chosen at random). Blue color means that the policy has been awarded more points than the average policy. (Question 58)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| econ1 | 13 | 21 | 10 | 14 | 35 | 31 |
| econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung) | 23 | 22 | 25 | 21 | 22 | 23 |
| econ3 | 21 | 15 | 13 | 18 | 17 | 13 |
| econ4 | 28 | 22 | 27 | 17 | 24 | 20 |
| soc1 | 10 | 17 | 13 | 17 | 12 | 21 |
| soc2 | 13 | 9 | 14 | 8 | 10 | 8 |
| climate1 | 14 | 15 | 11 | 18 | 20 | 12 |
| climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport) | 20 | 18 | 22 | 19 | 15 | 17 |
| climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030 | 11 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 11 |
| tax1: National redistribution scheme | 14 | 15 | 16 | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes) | 19 | 19 | 21 | 18 | 17 | 19 |
| foreign1: Global climate scheme | 15 | 20 | 20 | 23 | 16 | 17 |
| foreign2: Global tax on millionaires | 21 | 20 | 20 | 23 | 19 | 20 |
| foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change | 15 | 15 | 15 | 17 | 14 | 13 |
| foreign4: Doubling foreign aid | 9 | 11 | 13 | 14 | 9 | 8 |

Figure A27: Positive prioritization of policies.

Percent of people allocating a positive number of points to policies, expressing their support (among six policies chosen at random). (Question 58)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| econ1 | 64 | 78 | 61 | 67 | 96 | 95 |
| econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung) | 83 | 86 | 85 | 84 | 87 | 89 |
| econ3 | 81 | 69 | 50 | 78 | 80 | 68 |
| econ4 | 88 | 86 | 91 | 79 | 89 | 85 |
| soc1 | 57 | 75 | 69 | 74 | 74 | 78 |
| soc2 | 58 | 58 | 72 | 53 | 64 | 48 |
| climate1 | 70 | 76 | 65 | 79 | 89 | 75 |
| climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport) | 79 | 83 | 86 | 84 | 78 | 80 |
| climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030 | 62 | 58 | 56 | 48 | 60 | 70 |
| tax1: National redistribution scheme | 67 | 79 | 79 | 76 | 82 | 79 |
| tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes) | 80 | 79 | 76 | 78 | 83 | 85 |
| foreign1: Global climate scheme | 71 | 83 | 84 | 85 | 84 | 78 |
| foreign2: Global tax on millionaires | 80 | 81 | 79 | 83 | 82 | 82 |
| foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change | 71 | 77 | 79 | 74 | 83 | 76 |
| foreign4: Doubling foreign aid | 58 | 70 | 79 | 74 | 74 | 57 |

Figure A28: Charity donation.

"How much did you give to charities in 2022?" (Question 50)




Figure A29: Interest in politics.

"To what extent are you interested in politics?" (Question 51)




Figure A30: Desired involvement of government (from 1 to 5). (Question 52)




Figure A31: Political leaning on economics (from 1: Left to 5: Right). (Question 53)




Figure A32: Voted in last election. (Question 54)




Figure A33: Vote in last election (aggregated). PNR includes people who did not vote or prefer not to answer. (Question 55)




Figure A34: Perception that survey was biased.
“Do you feel that this survey was politically biased?” (Question 61)






Figure A35: Opinion on the fight against extreme poverty.

“According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme poverty in low-income countries?” (Question 62)

(a) Elements found in the open-ended field on the question
 (manually recoded, in percent)



(b) Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).



C Questionnaire of the global survey (section on global policies)

- A. At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be put in place? (Multiple answers are possible) [Figures 1 and A3]
Global; [Federal / European / ...]; [State / National]; Local

- B. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “[country] should take measures to fight climate change.”

Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree

- C. How should [country] climate policies depend on what other countries do?

- If other countries do more, [country] should do...
- If other countries do less, [country] should do...

Much less; Less; About the same; More; Much more

- D. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] All countries have signed the Paris agreement that aims to contain global warming “well below +2 °C”. To limit global warming to this level, there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally, called the carbon budget. Each country could aim to emit less than a share of the carbon budget. To respect the global carbon budget, countries that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less than their share.

Do you support such a policy? [Figures 1 and A3]

Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support

- E. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] Suppose the above policy is in place. How should the carbon budget be divided among countries? [Figures 1 and A3]

The emission share of a country should be proportional to its population, so that each human has an equal right to emit.; The emission share of a country should be proportional to its current emissions, so that those who already emit more have more rights to emit.; Countries that have emitted more over the past decades (from 1990 onwards) should receive a lower

emission share, because they have already used some of their fair share.; Countries that will be hurt more by climate change should receive a higher emission share, to compensate them for the damages.

F. [In the U.S., Denmark, and France only] To achieve a given reduction of greenhouse gas emissions globally, costly investments are needed. Ideally, how should countries bear the costs of fighting climate change?

- Countries should pay in proportion to their income
- Countries should pay in proportion to their current emissions [Used as a substitute to the equal right per capita in Figure 1]
- Countries should pay in proportion to their past emissions (from 1990 onwards) [Used as a substitute to historical responsibilities in Figure 1]
- The richest countries should pay it all, so that the poorest countries do not have to pay anything
- The richest countries should pay even more, to help vulnerable countries face adverse consequences: vulnerable countries would then receive money instead of paying [Used as a substitute to compensating vulnerable countries in Figures 1 and A3]

Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly agree

G. Do you support or oppose establishing a global democratic assembly whose role would be to draft international treaties against climate change? Each adult across the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly. [Figures 1 and A3]
Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support

H. Imagine the following policy: a global tax on greenhouse gas emissions funding a global basic income. Such a policy would progressively raise the price of fossil fuels (for example, the price of gasoline would increase by [40 cents per gallon] in the first years). Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Revenues from the tax would be used to finance a basic income of [\$30] per month to each human adult, thereby lifting the 700 million people who earn less than \$2/day out of extreme poverty. The average

British person would lose a bit from this policy as they would face [\$130] per month in price increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive.

Do you support or oppose such a policy? [Figures 1 and A3]

Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support

- I. Do you support or oppose a tax on all millionaires around the world to finance low-income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate action? This would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education. [Figures 1 and A3]
Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support

D Questionnaire of the complementary surveys

Below, we provide the generic questionnaire (based on the U.S. version), which roughly corresponds to the Eu questionnaire as well as the combination of the US1 and US2 questionnaire. The main difference between Europe and the U.S. is that we split the US2 sample into four random branches to include some treatments before the Section D on the GCS. Besides the control group, the treatments are: information regarding the support of Americans for the GCS and NR, an open-ended field, and a closed question on the pros and cons of the GCS. The pros and cons of the GCS are also asked in Eu (likewise, either as an open-ended field or a question), but only in Section D, after the support.

At each section or question, we specify in square brackets in which questionnaires it is present (US1, US2 and/or Eu) as well as country specificities. Figures A36-A38 also allow understanding the structure of each questionnaire. Qualtrics and Word versions of the questionnaires in each language are available on our [public repository](#), together with a spreadsheet that summarizes country specificities and our sources.

Figure A36: Eu survey structure




Figure A37: US1 survey structure





Figure A38: US2 survey structure



[Eu, US1, US2] Socio-demographic characteristics

1. Welcome to this survey!

This survey is **anonymous** and is conducted **for research** purposes on a representative sample of [1,000 British people].

It takes [US1, US2: 10 to 15 min; Eu: around **20 min**] to complete.

The survey contains lotteries and awards for those who get the correct answer to some understanding questions.

If you are attentive and lucky, **you can win up to** [US1, Eu: \$350; US2: \$150] in points. ([See terms and conditions](#)).

Please answer every question carefully.

Do you agree to participate in the survey?

Yes; No

2. What is your gender?

Woman; Man; Other

3. How old are you?

Below 18; 18 to 20; 21 to 24; 25 to 29; 30 to 34; 35 to 39; 40 to 44; 45 to 49; 50 to 54; 55 to 59; 60 to 64; 65 to 69; 70 to 74; 75 to 79; 80 to 84; 85 to 89; 90 to 99; 100 or above

4. [Eu] In which country do you live?

France; Germany; Spain; United Kingdom; Other

5. What is your ZIP code? [UK: What is your Outcode (the left part of your postcode, e.g. if your postcode is N7 8H7, just enter N7)?]

6. Do you live with your partner (if you have one)?

Yes; No

7. How many people are in your household? The household includes: you, the members of your family who live with you, and your dependants.

1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more

8. [Eu] How many children below 14 live with you?
1; 2; 3; 4 or more
9. [US1, US2] What race or ethnicity do you identify with? (Multiple answers are possible)
White; Black or African American; Hispanic; Asian; American Indian or Alaskan Native; Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; Other: {open field}; Prefer not to say
10. What is the [US1, US2: *annual*; Eu: *monthly*] gross income of your household (before withholding tax)? This includes all income: wages, self-employment earnings, Social Security benefits, pensions, investment income, welfare payments, and income from other sources.
[US1, US2: Items based on household total income deciles and quartiles, namely:
Less than \$20,000; between \$20,001 and \$35,000; between \$35,001 and \$42,000; between \$42,001 and \$50,000; between \$50,001 and \$65,000; between \$65,001 and \$82,000; between \$82,001 and \$103,000; between \$103,001 and \$130,000; between \$130,001 and \$145,000; between \$145,001 and \$165,000; between \$165,001 and \$250,000; More than \$250,000; I prefer not to answer;
Eu: custom thresholds, taking into account household composition Questions 6-8, and corresponding to the country's deciles and quartiles of standard of living, cf. the sheet "Income" in [this spreadsheet](#)]
11. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
[*Below upper secondary, Upper secondary, and Post secondary* are coded as the first two, middle three, and last three items, respectively.
US1, US2: *Primary school or less; Eighth grade; Some high school; Regular high school diploma/GED or alternative credential; Some college, no degree; 2-year college degree or associates degree (for example: AA, AS); Bachelor's degree (for example: BA, BS); Master's degree or above (MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA, MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD, PhD); FR: École primaire / Aucun; Brevet; CAP ou BEP; Baccalauréat professionnel ou technologique; Baccalauréat général; Bac +2 (BTS, DUT, DEUG...); Bac +3 (licence...); Bac +5 ou plus (master, école d'ingénieur ou de commerce, doctorat, médecine, maîtrise, DEA, DESS...)*
DE: *Keine abgeschlossene Schulbildung / Grundschule; Untere Sekundarstufe (z.B. Haupt- oder Realschulabschluss); Erstausbildung; Beruflicher Abschluss / Ausbildung; Abitur; Zweitausbildung; Bachelor oder Fachhochschulabschluss; Master-Abschluss oder höher*

ES: *Educación primaria / No he completado la enseñanza básica; Educación secundaria obligatoria (ESO); Formación profesional básica (FP); Formación profesional de grado medio; Bachillerato; Formación profesional de grado superior; Grado universitario; Máster/doctorado*
UK: *Primary education or less; Some secondary school; GSCE; Vocational Upper secondary (Level 3 award, level 3 certificate, level 3 diploma, advanced apprenticeship, etc.); High school degree (A level); Higher vocational education (Level 4+ award, level 4+ certificate, level 4+ diploma, higher apprenticeship, etc.); Bachelor's Degree (BA, BSc, BEng, etc.); Postgraduate diploma or certificate, Master's Degree (MSc, MA, MBA, etc.) or Ph.D.]*

12. What is your employment status?

Full-time employed; Part-time employed; Self-employed; Student; Retired; Unemployed (searching for a job); Inactive (not searching for a job)

13. Are you a homeowner or a tenant? (Multiple answers are possible)

Tenant; Owner; Landlord renting out property; Hosted free of charge

14. [If lives with partner: What is the estimated value of your household's assets (in U.S. dollars)?

If does not live with partner: What is the estimated value of your assets (in U.S. dollars)?]

Include here all your possessions (home, car, savings, etc.) net of debt. For example, if you own a house worth [\$]300,000 and you have [\$]100,000 left to repay on your mortgage, your assets are [\$]200,000.

I estimate my [If lives with partner: household's] assets net of debt to be:

[Items based on the following individual wealth quintiles, doubled if lives with partner. US1, US2: *Less than \$0 (I have a net debt); Close to \$0; Between \$4,000 and \$60,000; Between \$60,000 and \$190,000; More than \$190,000;* For Eu, the thresholds are: FR: €5/50/150/300k; DE: €0/35/130/280k; ES: €0/50/100/200k; UK: £3/45/115/270k]

15. [US1, US2 (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the vote question)] What do you consider to be your political affiliation, as of today?

Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other; Non-Affiliated

[Eu, US1, US2] Global climate scheme

In the following, we describe two policies, on which we will survey your opinion. To check that you have attentively read the descriptions, **we will ask some understanding questions afterwards: those who get correct answers can win up to \$150.**

Global climate scheme: At the Paris agreement in 2015, all countries have agreed to contain global warming “well below +2 °C”. To limit global warming to this level, **there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally.**

To meet the climate target, a limited number of permits to emit greenhouse gases can be created globally. Polluting firms would be required to buy permits to cover their emissions. Such a policy would **make fossil fuel companies pay** for their emissions and progressively raise the price of fossil fuels. **Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions.**

In accordance with the principle that each human has an equal right to pollute, the revenues generated by the sale of permits could finance a global basic income. **Each adult in the world would receive [US1, US2: \$30/month; UK: \$30 (that is £25) per month; FR, DE, ES: €30/month]**, thereby lifting out of extreme poverty the 700 million people who earn less than \$2/day.

The typical [American] would lose out financially [US1, US2: \$85, FR: €10, DE: €25, ES: €5, UK: £20] per month (as he or she would face [\$115] per month in price increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive).

The policy could be put in place as soon as countries totaling more than 60% of global emissions agree on it. Countries that would refuse to take part in the policy could face sanctions (like tariffs) from the rest of the World and would be excluded from the basic income.

16. Who would win or lose financially in the Global climate scheme? [Figure A4]

Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;

Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.;

Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;

Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would lose and*

the 700 million poorest humans would win from the Global climate scheme. Now, here is the second policy:

National redistribution scheme:

This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [US1, US2: 5%; Eu: 1%] and provide cash transfers to all adults. More precisely, **each [American] adult would receive [\$85] per month** (that is [\$1,000] per year). This would be financed by an increase of the federal income tax on household income in excess of [US1, US2: \$315,000 per year; FR: €15,000 per month; DE: €20,000 per month; ES: €10,000 per month; UK: £15,000 per month], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000]. [US1, US2: See more details.] ²⁰

17. Who would win or lose financially in the National redistribution? [Figure A4]

Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

Typical [Americans] would win and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Americans] would win and the richest [Americans] would lose.; Typical [Americans] would lose and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Americans] would lose and the richest [Americans] would lose.

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would win and the richest [Americans] would lose* from the National redistribution scheme.

To help you with the next question, here is a reminder of the policies:

Global Climate scheme:

To limit global warming and reach the international climate objective, the Global climate scheme would **impose a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally**.

²⁰8% of U.S. respondents click. They then see the following text, based on taxjusticenow.org by Saez & Zucman (2019): *The marginal income tax rates would evolve as follows:*

Below \$315,000: unchanged

\$315,000 - \$400,000: current rate 32% => new rate 41%

\$400,000 - \$600,000: 35% => 50%

\$600,000 - \$2.5 million: 37% => 60%

\$2.5 - \$5 million: 37% => 65%

Above \$5 million: 37% => 70%

It would **make polluters pay** for their emissions, which in turn would increase fossil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities.

The revenues would finance a **global basic income** of [\$30] per month for all humans, lifting out of extreme poverty the poorest billion people.

Considering the basic income and the fuel price increases, **the typical [American] would lose out financially** [\$85] per month.

National redistribution scheme:

This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [5%] and provide cash transfers to all adults. More precisely, **each [American] would receive** [\$85] per month. This would be financed by an increase of the federal income tax on household income in excess of [\$315,000 per year], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000 per year].

18. If both the Global climate scheme and the National redistribution scheme are implemented, how would a typical [American] be financially affected? [*Figure A4*]

Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

A typical [American] would lose out financially.; A typical [American] would neither gain nor lose.; A typical [American] would gain financially.

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was that *A typical [American] would neither gain nor lose* from both schemes combined. [US1, Eu: Now, here are the last two policies:]

[US1: Coal exit:

To reduce CO₂ emissions, this policy would require all U.S. coal power plants to be phased out by 2030. Coal would be replaced by renewable sources like wind and solar panels as well as stronger reliance on gas power plants.

Eu: Thermal insulation plan:

To reduce CO₂ emissions and energy insecurity, this policy would require that all buildings meet energy efficiency targets: at least rating E in 2030 and rating C in 2040. The [UK] government would subsidise half the cost of insulation for all households, and up to 90% for the poorest households. Insulation work would cost [FR, DE: €25; ES: €20; UK: £25] billion a year, but would deliver energy savings greater than this cost.]

[US1: **Marriage only for opposite-sex couples:**

This policy is a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would legally define marriage as a union of one man and one woman.

Eu: **Death penalty for major crimes:**

This measure would reintroduce capital punishment for major crimes such as terrorism and mass shootings.]

Now, we will ask your opinion on the [US1, Eu: four] policies.

[Click here for the reminder of the \[US1, Eu: first\] two policies.](#) [Clicking displays the previous summarized descriptions.]

19. [US2] [4 Random branches: control (*nothing*); Question 31 (*field*); Question 32 (*important*); or the following question (*info*).] For information, a recent survey has shown that:

- 64% of Americans support the Global climate scheme.
- 72% of Americans support the National redistribution scheme.

20. Do you support the Global climate scheme? [Figure 2]

Yes; No

21. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the previous question? [Figure 10]

The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

Percentage of [Americans] in favor of Global climate scheme [slider from 0 to 100]

22. Do you support the National redistribution scheme? [Figure 2]

Yes; No

23. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the previous question? [Figure 10]

The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

Percentage of [Americans] in favor of National redistribution [slider from 0 to 100]

24. [Eu, US1] Beware, this question is quite unusual. Among the policies below, **how many** do you support? [Figure A6, Table 2]

[Four random branches. Branch GCS/NR/C/O]

- Global climate scheme
- National redistribution scheme
- [Coal exit]
- [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

0; 1; 2; 3; 4

[Branch GCS/C/O]

- Global climate scheme
- [Coal exit]
- [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

0; 1; 2; 3

[Branch NR/C/O]

- National redistribution scheme
- [Coal exit]
- [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

0; 1; 2; 3

[Branch C/O]

- [Coal exit]
- [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

0; 1; 2

[Eu, US1] Conjoint analyses

25. Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you prefer? [Figure A7]

Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the same time.

| Bundle A | Bundle B |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| [Coal exit] | [Coal exit] |
| National redistribution scheme | National redistribution scheme |
| Global climate scheme | |

Bundle A; Bundle B

26. Do you support Bundle A (combining [Coal exit], the National redistribution scheme, and the Global climate scheme)?[Figure 2]

Yes; No

27. [new page] Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you prefer? [Figure A7]

Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the same time.

[Four random branches. Branch C + NR vs. GCS + NR]

| Bundle A | Bundle B |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| [Coal exit] | Global climate scheme |
| National redistribution scheme | National redistribution scheme |

[Branch NR vs. NR + C + GCS]

| Bundle A | Bundle B |
|--------------------------------|--|
| National redistribution scheme | National redistribution scheme [Coal exit] Global climate scheme |

[Branch NR + GCS vs. NR]

| Bundle A | Bundle B |
|---|--------------------------------|
| National redistribution scheme Global climate scheme | National redistribution scheme |

[Branch NR + C vs. NR]

| Bundle A | Bundle B |
|---|--------------------------------|
| National redistribution scheme [Coal exit] | National redistribution scheme |

Bundle A; Bundle B

28. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies in their platforms.
Eu: Imagine if [DE, ES, UK: the two favorite candidates in your constituency in the next general election; FR: the two candidates in the second round of the next presidential election] campaigned with the following policies in their party's platforms.]

Which of these candidates would you vote for? [Table 3, Figure A7]

[Table 3. Two random branches: with and without the final row. The US1 version of the policies is given below, see the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the European versions.]

| Democrat | Republican |
|--|--|
| Increase corporate income tax rate from 21% to 28% Coal exit Trillion dollar investment in childcare, healthcare, education and housing \$15 minimum wage National redistribution scheme [Global climate scheme / no row] | Decrease the payroll tax Permit completion of the Keystone pipeline Withdrawal of the Paris agreement Marriage only for opposite-sex couples Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation [/ no row] |

[US1: Democrat; Republican; None of them; Eu: Candidate A; Candidate B; None of them]

29. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies in their platforms.

Eu (*where it is instead asked toward the end, after the Section “Values and politics”*): Imagine that [FR: the left or center-left; DE: a red-red-green coalition; ES: the PSOE; UK: the Labour Party] wins the next [general] elections. Here are two possible platforms on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a pool of credible [FR: left or center-left, DE: left-wing parties'; ES: PSOE; UK: Labour] policies).]

[US1: Which of these candidates do you prefer?

Eu: Even if you [FR: are not from the left or center-left; DE: do not support the left-wing parties; ES: do not support the PSOE; UK: do not support the Labour Party], which of these platforms do you prefer?]

[Figure 8; see also the sheet “Policies” in *this spreadsheet* for the possible policies.]

| | [Candidate A] | [Candidate B] |
|--------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| [Policy field in random order] | [Random policy] | [Random policy] |
| [Policy field in random order] | [Random policy] | [Random policy] |
| [Policy field in random order] | [Random policy] | [Random policy] |
| [Policy field in random order] | [Random policy] | [Random policy] |
| [Policy field in random order] | [Random policy] | [Random policy] |

[US1: Candidate A; Candidate B; Eu: Platform A; Platform B]

30. [new page] [*Same wording and conditions as above. For brevity, only the UK version is given here.*] Imagine that the Labour Party wins the next general elections. Here are two possible platforms on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a pool of credible Labour policies).

Even if you do not support the Labour Party, which of these platforms do you prefer? [Figure 8]

| | Platform A | Platform B |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|
| [Policy field in random order] | [Random policy] | [Random policy] |
| [Policy field in random order] | [Random policy] | [Random policy] |
| [Policy field in random order] | [Random policy] | [Random policy] |
| [Policy field in random order] | [Random policy] | [Random policy] |
| Foreign policy | Global climate scheme | - |

Platform A; Platform B

[Eu, US2] Perceptions of the GCS

[Eu: two random branches. US2: four random branches and the question is asked (if asked) before Question 20]

31. [Branch: field] When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to your mind?

Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme. [Figures A9, A10]
{Open field}

32. [Branch: important] When determining your support or opposition to the Global climate scheme, which points are important to you? [Figure A8]

- It would succeed in limiting climate change.
- It would hurt the [U.S.] economy.
- It would penalize my household.
- It would make people change their lifestyle.
- It would reduce poverty in low-income countries.
- It might be detrimental to some poor countries.
- It could foster global cooperation.
- It could fuel corruption in low-income countries.
- It could be subject to fraud.
- It would be technically difficult to put in place.
- Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences.

Not at all important; Not so important; Quite important; Very important

[Eu, US1] Donation lottery

33. Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).
Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal
34. [Two random branches] By taking this survey, you are automatically entered into a lottery to win [\$]100 in panel points. This lottery is unrelated to the previous ones that rewarded answers’ accuracy. In a few days you will know whether you have been selected in the lottery. The payment will be made to you in the same way as your compensation for this survey, so no further action is required on your part.

Should you be selected in the lottery, you can also donate a part of this additional compensation to [[American] / African] people living in poverty through [US1: the charity GiveDirectly. The charity GiveDirectly; Eu: a charity. We would channel this donation to a charity that] provides small amounts of cash to people in need in [[the U.S] / Africa].

In case you are winner of the lottery, what share of the [\$]100 would you donate to [[American] / African] people living in poverty [US1: through GiveDirectly]? [Figure A11]

Amount donated to [[American] / African] people in need (in [\$]) [slider from 0 to 100]

[Eu, US2] Wealth tax

[Four random branches: Question 35 then Question 36 (global first); Question 36 then Question 35 (national first); Question 37 (global share); Question 38 (sharing)]

35. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-income countries?
Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education. [Figure A12]
Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support
36. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: affordable housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and schools]? [Figure A13]

Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support

37. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all countries around the world. In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE: €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2: 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount to [\$]1 billion in all low-income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700 million people, most of them in Africa).

Each country would retain part of the revenues it collects, and the remaining part would be pooled at the global level to finance infrastructure and public services in low-income countries.

What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of retained in the country's national budget)? [\[Figure A14\]](#)

Percent of global wealth tax that should go to low-income countries [slider from 0 to 100]

38. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all countries around the world.

In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE: €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2: 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount to [\$]1 billion in all low-income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700 million people, most of them in Africa).

Which of the following options would you prefer? [\[Figure A15\]](#)

- The whole wealth tax financing national budgets in each country. For example, in [US2: the U.S., it could finance affordable housing and universal childcare/pre-K.; Eu-UK: the UK, it could finance the National Health Service and state-funded schools].
- Half of the wealth tax financing national budgets in each country, half of it financing low-income countries. For example, it could finance [US2: universal childcare/pre-K in the U.S.; Eu-UK: state-funded schools in the UK] and access to drinking water, healthcare, and education in Africa.

[Eu, US2] Foreign aid

US2 Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).

Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal

39. From your best guess, what percentage of [U.S.] government spending is allocated to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?

For your information, government spending totals [US2: 38%; FR: 55%; DE: 45%; ES: 42%; UK: 41%] of [U.S.] GDP, it includes [US2: federal, State; Eu: national] and local government spending, and apart from foreign aid, it covers the following items: defense, social security (retirement pensions), health [US2: (including Medicare and Medicaid)], welfare benefits [US2: (including food stamps and EITC)], education, roads, justice, other programs [US2: and federal agencies (including in energy, science...)]. [[Figure A16](#)]

Less than 0.1%; 0.1% to 0.2%; 0.3% to 0.5%; 0.6% to 1.0%; 1.1% to 1.7%; 1.8% to 2.6%; 2.7% to 4%; 4.1% to 6%; 6.1% to 9%; 9.1% to 13%; 13.1% to 25%; More than 25%

40. [Two random branches: with or without information on actual amount] [Info: Actually, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [the U.S.] government spending is allocated to foreign aid.]

If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid? [[Figures A17 and A18](#)]

41. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to increase [U.S.] foreign aid.

How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers possible) [[Figure A19](#)]

Lower spending on defense; Lower spending on retirement pensions; Lower spending on healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Lower spending on welfare benefits [US2: (like EITC or food stamps)]; Lower spending on education; Lower spending on other programs [US2: and federal agencies]; Higher taxes on the wealthiest; Higher corporate income tax rate; Higher personal income tax rates; Higher public deficit

42. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to reduce [U.S.] foreign aid.

How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible) [Figure A20]

Higher spending on defense; Higher spending on retirement pensions; Higher spending on healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Higher spending on welfare benefits [US2: (like EITC or food stamps)]; Higher spending on education; Lower spending on other programs [US2: and federal agencies]; Lower taxes on the wealthiest; Lower corporate income tax rate; Lower personal income tax rates; Lower public deficit

[Eu, US1] Petition

43. [Two random branches] Would you be willing to sign a petition for the [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme? [Figure A21]

As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President's office], informing him what share of American people are willing to endorse the [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign, only your answer here is required and remains anonymous.) Yes; No

[Eu, US1] Other policies

44. The following policies are discussed at international negotiations on how to deal with climate change. [Figures 4 and A22]

Do you support or oppose the following policies?

- Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages
- High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries
- High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change

Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support

45. Do you support or oppose the following global policies? [Figures 4 and A22]

- Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt
- Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population
- Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries
- A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage
- Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets
- A maximum wealth limit of [US1: \$10 billion; Eu: [€]100 million] for each human

Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support

46. Currently, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [U.S.] government spending (that is, [US1: 0.2%; FR: 0.4%; DE: 0.6%; ES: 0.2%; UK: 0.7%] of [U.S.] GDP) is spent on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries. [Figure 5]

Do you support [the U.S.] transferring more money to low-income countries?

Yes, [U.S.] foreign aid should be increased.; Yes, but only if some conditions are met.; No, [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.; No, [U.S.] foreign aid should be reduced.

47. [Asked only if *Yes, but only if some conditions are met.* is chosen] What conditions should be required for [the U.S.] to increase its foreign aid? (Multiple answers possible) [Figure 6]

That recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights.; That recipient countries cooperate to fight illegal migrations.; That other high-income countries also increase their foreign aid.; That this is financed by increased taxes on millionaires.; That we can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted.; Other: [open field]

48. [Asked only if *No, [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.* or *No, [U.S.] foreign aid should be reduced.* is chosen] Why do you oppose [the U.S.] increasing its foreign

aid? (Multiple answers possible) [Figure 7]

Aid perpetuates poverty as it makes people feel less responsible for themselves.; Aid is not effective as most of it is diverted.; Aid is a pressure tactic for high-income countries that prevents low-income countries from developing freely.; [The U.S.] is not responsible for what happens in other countries.; Charity begins at home: there is already a lot to do to support the American people in need.; Other: [open field]

[Eu, US1, US2] Values and politics

49. [Eu (where it is instead asked at the beginning of Section “Other Policies”), US1] In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend [U.S.] interests or global justice? [Figure A23]
[U.S.] interests, even if it goes against global justice; [U.S.] interests, to the extent it respects global justice; ndifferent or don't know; Global justice, to the extent it respects [U.S.] interests; Global justice, even if it goes against [U.S.] interests
50. How much did you give to charities in 2022? [Figure A28]
I did not make donations to charities last year.; Less than [\$]100.; Between [\$]101 and [\$]500.; Between [\$]501 and [\$]1,000.; Between [\$]1,001 and [\$]5,000.; More than [\$]5,000.
51. To what extent are you interested in politics? [Figure A29]
Not at all; A little; Moderately; A lot; A great deal
52. Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means you think the government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic government functions, and 5 means you think the government should take active steps in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens? [Figure A30]
Desired involvement of government [slider from 1 to 5]
53. **On economic policy matters**, where do you see yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is Left (favoring equality and government interventions) and 5 is Right (favoring free competition and little government intervention)? [Figure A31]
Left (1) to Right (5) on economic issues [slider from 1 to 5]
54. Did you vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election? [Figure A32]
Yes; No: I didn't have the right to vote in the U.S.; Prefer not to say

55. [If voted: Which candidate did you vote for in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election? If did not vote: Even if you did not vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election, please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who represents your views more closely.] [Figure A33]
[US1, US2: Biden; Trump; Jorgensen; Hawkins; Prefer not to say
FR: candidates at the 2022 presidential election
DE: parties with more than 1% of votes at the 2021 federal election and Other
ES: lists with more than 0.9% at the November 2019 general election and Other
UK: parties with more than 0.5% of votes at the 2019 general election and Other]

56. To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem? [Figure A24]

- Income inequality in [the U.S.]
- Climate change
- Global poverty

Not an important issue for me; An issue but there are other priorities; An issue but we already do what we can; An important issue, we should do more; One of the most pressing issue of our time

57. What group do you defend when you vote? [Figure A25]

Sentient beings (humans and animals); Humans; [Eu: Europeans]; [Americans]; People sharing my culture or religion; [US1, US2: My State]; [US1, US2: My town; Eu: My country, region or town]; My relatives and/or colleagues; My family and myself

[Eu, US1] Prioritization

58. In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

How do you allocate the points among the following policies? [Figures A26 and A27]

You can adjust the number of points either using the slider or entering the number of your choice on the right-hand-side. **The sum of points must equal exactly 100.** By pushing the last slider to the right, the total will automatically adjust to 100. Please read the 6 options before making your choice.

*See the sheet “Policies” in [this spreadsheet](#) for the pool of policies in each country.
[sliders from 0 to 100]*

[FR, DE, ES] ETS2

59. Similar to the Global Climate Scheme, the European Climate Scheme would impose a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit across the EU in the buildings and transport sectors. It would make polluters pay for their emissions, which in turn would increase fossil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities. Several options are possible regarding the use of the scheme’s revenues:

- Provide an equal cash transfer of €105 per year to each European.
- Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European, proportional to their country’s emissions: people in countries with higher emissions per person (like Germany) would receive more than people in countries with lower emissions (like Romania). For information, people in [Germany] would receive €[FR: 110; DE: 130; ES: 90]/year.
- Finance low-carbon investments: thermal insulation of buildings, switch to clean sources of heating, public transportation, and charging stations for electric vehicles.
- Provide cash transfers to the most vulnerable half of Europeans and finance low-carbon investments.

Do you support or oppose the European Climate Scheme in case the revenue is used to... ?

- Provide an equal cash transfer to each European
- Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European
- Finance low-carbon investments
- Provide cash transfers for the most vulnerable Europeans and low-carbon investments

Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support

60. [Asked iff none of the four variants of the European Climate Scheme is (somewhat or strongly) supported] Why do you not support a European Climate Scheme? (Multiple answers possible)

I am opposed to climate policy being decided at the EU level, it should be decided at the national level;

I would prefer if the revenues were used in a different way (beyond the four suggestions above) than previously suggested;

I would prefer if decreasing carbon emissions were regulated by other climate policies;

I am generally opposed to additional, or more ambitious, climate policies;

I do not fully understand how the European Climate Scheme is supposed to work;

I don't know

[Eu, US1, US2] Feedback

61. Do you feel that this survey was politically biased? [Figure A34]

Yes, left-wing biased; Yes, right-wing biased; No, I do not feel it was biased

62. [US2 Asked only to one random third of the respondents, instead of the feedback Question 63] According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme poverty in low-income countries? [Figure A35]

{Open field}

63. The survey is nearing completion. You can now enter any comments, thoughts or suggestions in the field below.

{Open field}

64. Lastly, are you interested to be interviewed by a researcher (through videoconferencing) for 30 min?

This is totally optional and will not be rewarded.

Yes; No

E Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme

To specify the GCS, we use the IEA's 2DS scenario (IEA 2017), which is consistent with limiting the global average temperature increase to 2°C with a probability of at least 50%. The paper by Hood (2017) contributing to the Report of the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices (Stern & Stiglitz 2017) presents a price corridor compatible with this emissions scenario, from which we take the midpoint. The product of these two series provides an estimate of the revenues expected from a global carbon price. We then use the UN median scenario of future population aged over 15 years (*adults*, for short). We derive the basic income that could be paid to all adults by recycling the revenues from the global carbon price: evolving between \$20 and \$30 per month, with a peak in 2030. Accounting for the lower price levels in low-income countries, an additional income of \$30 per month would allow **670 million people** to escape extreme poverty, defined with the threshold of \$2.15 per day in purchasing power parity.²¹

To estimate the increase in fossil fuel expenditures (or “cost”) in each country by 2030, we make a key assumption concerning the evolution of the carbon footprints per adult: that they will decrease by the same proportion in each country. We use data from the Global Carbon Project (Peters et al. 2012). In 2030, the average carbon footprint of a country c , e_c , evolves from baseline year b proportionally to the evolution of its adult population $\Delta p_c = p_c^{2030} / p_c^b$. Thus, the global share of country c 's carbon footprint, s_c , is proportional to $\sigma_c = e_c \Delta p_c$, and as countries' shares sum to 1, $s_c = \frac{\sigma_c}{\sum_k \sigma_k}$. Multiplying country c 's emission share with global revenues in 2030, R , and dividing by c 's adult population in year y , yields its average cost per adult: $R \cdot s_c / p_c^y$. Using findings from Ivanova & Wood (2020) for Europe and Fremstad & Paul (2019) for the U.S., we approximate the median cost as 90% of the average cost. Finally, the net gain is given by the basic income (\$30 per month) minus the cost. We provided consistent estimates of net gains in all surveys (using $y = b = 2015$), though in the global survey we gave the average net gains vs. the median ones in the complementary surveys. The latter are shown in Figure A39. For the record, Table A2 also provides an estimate of *average* net gains (computed with $b = 2019$ and $y = 2030$).²²

²¹By taking the **ratio** of the World Bank series relating the GDP per capita of Sub-Saharan Africa in **PPP** and **nominal**, we obtain the purchasing power of \$1 in this region: \$2.4 in 2019.

²²2015 was the last year of data available when the global questionnaire was conceived (**OECD data** was then used – it does not cover all countries but give identical rounded estimates than those recomputed from the Global Carbon Project data for our complementary surveys). 2030 was chosen as the reference year as it is the date at which global carbon price revenues are expected to peak (and the GCS redistributive effects

Estimates of the net gains from the Global Climate Scheme are necessarily imprecise, given the uncertainties surrounding the carbon price required to achieve emissions reductions as well as each country's trajectory in terms of emissions and population. These values are highly dependent on future (non-price) climate policies, technical progress, and economic growth of each country, which are only partially known. Integrated Assessment Models have been used to derive a Global Energy Assessment (Johansson et al. 2012), a 100% renewable scenario (Greenpeace 2015) as well as Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs), which include consistent trajectories of population, emissions, and carbon price (Bauer et al. 2017; Fricko et al. 2017; Riahi et al. 2017; van Vuuren et al. 2017). Instead of using some of these modelling trajectories, we relied on a simple and transparent formula, for a number of reasons. First and foremost, those trajectories describe territorial emissions while we need consumption-based emissions to compute the incidence of the GCS. Second, the carbon price is relatively low in trajectories of SSPs that contain global warming below 2°C (less than \$35/tCO₂ in 2030), so we conservatively chose a method yielding a higher carbon price (\$90 in 2030). Third, modelling results are available only for a few macro regions, while we wanted country by country estimates. Finally, we have checked that the emissions per capita given by our method are broadly in line with alternative methods, even if it tends to overestimate net gains in countries which will decarbonize less rapidly than average.²³ For example, although countries' decarbonization plans should realign with the GCS in place, India might still decarbonize less quickly than the European Union, so India's gain and the EU's loss might be overestimated in our computations. For a more sophisticated version of the Global Climate Scheme which includes participation mechanisms preventing middle-income countries (like China) to lose from it and estimations of the Net Present Value by country, see Fabre (2023).

would be largest), and the GCS could not realistically enter into force before that date. In the surveys, we chose $y = b = 2015$ rather than $b = 2019$ and $y = 2030$ to get more conservative estimates of the monthly cost in the U.S. (\$20 higher than the other option) and in Europe (€5 or £10 higher).

²³Computations with alternative methods can be found on [our public repository](#).

Figure A39: Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme.




Table A2: Estimated net gain from the GCS in 2030 and carbon footprint by country.

| | Mean net gain from the GCS (\$/month) | CO ₂ footprint per adult in 2019 (tCO ₂ /y) | | | |
|----------------|---|---|--------------|----|-----|
| Saudi Arabia | -92 | 24.0 | Algeria* | -1 | 6.0 |
| United States | -76 | 21.0 | Mexico | 2 | 5.6 |
| Australia | -59 | 17.6 | Ukraine | 2 | 5.6 |
| Canada | -55 | 16.7 | Uzbekistan* | 4 | 5.1 |
| South Korea | -49 | 15.6 | Argentina | 5 | 4.9 |
| Taiwan | -41 | 14.0 | Thailand | 7 | 4.6 |
| Germany | -30 | 11.7 | Egypt | 12 | 3.6 |
| Russia | -28 | 11.5 | Indonesia | 13 | 3.3 |
| Japan | -27 | 11.3 | Colombia | 15 | 3.0 |
| Malaysia | -21 | 10.0 | Brazil | 15 | 2.9 |
| Iran | -19 | 9.5 | Vietnam | 16 | 2.9 |
| Poland | -18 | 9.5 | Peru | 16 | 2.8 |
| United Kingdom | -18 | 9.4 | Morocco | 16 | 2.7 |
| China | -14 | 8.6 | North Korea* | 17 | 2.5 |
| Italy | -12 | 8.4 | India | 18 | 2.4 |
| South Africa | -11 | 8.0 | Philippines | 18 | 2.3 |
| France | -10 | 7.8 | Pakistan | 22 | 1.6 |
| Iraq* | -7 | 7.4 | Bangladesh | 24 | 1.1 |
| Spain | -6 | 7.0 | Nigeria | 25 | 1.0 |
| Turkey | -2 | 6.2 | Kenya | 25 | 0.9 |
| | | | Myanmar* | 26 | 0.9 |
| | | | Sudan* | 26 | 0.9 |
| | | | Tanzania | 27 | 0.5 |
| | | | Afghanistan* | 27 | 0.5 |
| | | | Uganda | 28 | 0.4 |
| | | | Ethiopia | 28 | 0.3 |
| | | | Venezuela | 29 | 0.3 |
| | | | DRC* | 30 | 0.1 |

Note: Asterisks denote countries where footprint is missing and territorial emissions is used instead. Values differ from Figure A39 as this table present estimates of *mean* net gain per adult in 2030, not at the present. Only the countries with more than 20 million adults (covering 87% of the global total) are shown.

F Determinants of support

Table A3: Determinants of support for the Global Climate Scheme.

| | Supports the Global Climate Scheme | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | All | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
| Country: Germany | -0.157*** (0.022) | | -0.144*** (0.022) | | | | |
| Country: Spain | -0.044* (0.024) | | -0.026 (0.024) | | | | |
| Country: United Kingdom | -0.079*** (0.024) | | -0.104*** (0.023) | | | | |
| Country: United States | -0.375*** (0.019) | | | | | | |
| Income quartile: 2 | 0.037** (0.017) | 0.031 (0.022) | 0.038 (0.023) | 0.047 (0.043) | 0.058 (0.049) | 0.013 (0.053) | 0.023 (0.043) |
| Income quartile: 3 | 0.042** (0.017) | 0.033 (0.024) | 0.049** (0.024) | 0.080** (0.040) | 0.059 (0.052) | 0.074 (0.056) | -0.052 (0.052) |
| Income quartile: 4 | 0.056*** (0.018) | 0.062** (0.026) | 0.010 (0.026) | 0.018 (0.047) | -0.015 (0.055) | -0.001 (0.056) | -0.005 (0.057) |
| Diploma: Post secondary | 0.023* (0.012) | 0.032* (0.017) | 0.010 (0.018) | 0.007 (0.029) | 0.045 (0.039) | 0.007 (0.039) | -0.010 (0.039) |
| Age: 25-34 | -0.076*** (0.025) | -0.084*** (0.031) | -0.044 (0.035) | -0.031 (0.057) | -0.077 (0.083) | -0.050 (0.066) | -0.103 (0.091) |
| Age: 35-49 | -0.101*** (0.024) | -0.109*** (0.030) | -0.069* (0.034) | -0.094* (0.055) | -0.009 (0.077) | -0.168** (0.070) | -0.050 (0.090) |
| Age: 50-64 | -0.137*** (0.024) | -0.165*** (0.030) | -0.038 (0.035) | -0.039 (0.056) | -0.020 (0.082) | -0.146** (0.067) | -0.017 (0.087) |
| Age: 65+ | -0.116*** (0.028) | -0.142*** (0.034) | -0.056 (0.044) | 0.003 (0.076) | -0.045 (0.094) | -0.258*** (0.091) | 0.011 (0.105) |
| Gender: Man | 0.019* (0.011) | 0.022 (0.015) | -0.010 (0.016) | -0.014 (0.029) | -0.018 (0.033) | 0.042 (0.038) | -0.005 (0.034) |
| Lives with partner | 0.029** (0.013) | 0.023 (0.017) | 0.058*** (0.018) | 0.070** (0.033) | 0.082** (0.038) | 0.017 (0.038) | 0.040 (0.039) |
| Employment status: Retired | -0.020 (0.024) | -0.046 (0.030) | 0.056 (0.038) | 0.087 (0.081) | 0.096 (0.075) | 0.040 (0.082) | 0.001 (0.073) |
| Employment status: Student | 0.045 (0.033) | 0.062 (0.048) | 0.101** (0.044) | 0.165* (0.085) | 0.192** (0.087) | 0.116 (0.074) | -0.021 (0.107) |
| Employment status: Working | -0.016 (0.019) | -0.020 (0.024) | 0.011 (0.028) | 0.082 (0.064) | 0.006 (0.056) | -0.050 (0.056) | 0.036 (0.051) |
| Vote: Center-right or Right | -0.331*** (0.013) | -0.435*** (0.017) | -0.106*** (0.019) | -0.131*** (0.035) | -0.004 (0.044) | -0.114*** (0.038) | -0.081** (0.041) |
| Vote: PNR/Non-voter | -0.184*** (0.016) | -0.198*** (0.022) | -0.136*** (0.021) | -0.196*** (0.039) | -0.034 (0.043) | -0.116** (0.046) | -0.108*** (0.040) |
| Vote: Far right | -0.396*** (0.032) | | -0.309*** (0.033) | -0.493*** (0.064) | -0.168*** (0.051) | -0.130 (0.102) | -0.314*** (0.080) |
| Urban | 0.049*** (0.012) | 0.072*** (0.018) | 0.006 (0.016) | -0.002 (0.029) | 0.019 (0.032) | -0.014 (0.036) | 0.017 (0.033) |
| Race: White | | -0.030 (0.019) | | | | | |
| Region: Northeast | | 0.010 (0.023) | | | | | |
| Region: South | | 0.006 (0.020) | | | | | |
| Region: West | | 0.010 (0.022) | | | | | |
| Swing State | | -0.038** (0.019) | | | | | |
| Constant | 1.048 | 0.736 | 0.89 | 0.7 | 0.732 | 0.935 | 0.886 |
| Observations | 7,986 | 4,992 | 2,994 | 977 | 727 | 748 | 542 |
| R ² | 0.160 | 0.181 | 0.064 | 0.116 | 0.067 | 0.043 | 0.063 |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

G Representativeness of the surveys

Table A4: Sample representativeness of the complementary surveys.

| | US1 | | | US2 | | | Eu | | |
|--------------------------------------|------|--------|-----------------|------|--------|-----------------|------|--------|-----------------|
| | Pop. | Sample | Weighted sample | Pop. | Sample | Weighted sample | Pop. | Sample | Weighted sample |
| Sample size | | 3,000 | 3,000 | | 2,000 | 2,000 | | 3,000 | 3,000 |
| Gender: Woman | 0.51 | 0.52 | 0.51 | 0.51 | 0.45 | 0.50 | 0.51 | 0.49 | 0.51 |
| Gender: Man | 0.49 | 0.47 | 0.49 | 0.49 | 0.55 | 0.50 | 0.49 | 0.51 | 0.49 |
| Income_quartile: 1 | 0.25 | 0.27 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.28 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.28 | 0.25 |
| Income_quartile: 2 | 0.25 | 0.24 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.23 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.23 | 0.25 |
| Income_quartile: 3 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.26 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 |
| Income_quartile: 4 | 0.25 | 0.23 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.22 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.24 | 0.25 |
| Age: 18-24 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.10 |
| Age: 25-34 | 0.18 | 0.15 | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.16 | 0.18 | 0.15 | 0.17 | 0.15 |
| Age: 35-49 | 0.24 | 0.25 | 0.24 | 0.24 | 0.25 | 0.24 | 0.24 | 0.25 | 0.24 |
| Age: 50-64 | 0.25 | 0.27 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.26 | 0.24 | 0.26 |
| Age: 65+ | 0.21 | 0.21 | 0.21 | 0.21 | 0.22 | 0.21 | 0.25 | 0.23 | 0.25 |
| Diploma_25_64: Below upper secondary | 0.06 | 0.02 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.13 | 0.14 | 0.13 |
| Diploma_25_64: Upper secondary | 0.28 | 0.25 | 0.28 | 0.28 | 0.29 | 0.28 | 0.23 | 0.19 | 0.23 |
| Diploma_25_64: Post secondary | 0.34 | 0.40 | 0.34 | 0.34 | 0.33 | 0.34 | 0.29 | 0.33 | 0.29 |
| Race: White only | 0.60 | 0.67 | 0.61 | 0.60 | 0.62 | 0.61 | | | |
| Race: Hispanic | 0.18 | 0.15 | 0.19 | 0.18 | 0.19 | 0.19 | | | |
| Race: Black | 0.13 | 0.16 | 0.14 | 0.13 | 0.17 | 0.14 | | | |
| Region: Northeast | 0.17 | 0.20 | 0.17 | 0.17 | 0.19 | 0.17 | | | |
| Region: Midwest | 0.21 | 0.22 | 0.21 | 0.21 | 0.23 | 0.21 | | | |
| Region: South | 0.38 | 0.39 | 0.38 | 0.38 | 0.38 | 0.38 | | | |
| Region: West | 0.24 | 0.20 | 0.24 | 0.24 | 0.20 | 0.24 | | | |
| Urban: TRUE | 0.73 | 0.78 | 0.74 | 0.73 | 0.75 | 0.73 | | | |
| Employment_18_64: Inactive | 0.20 | 0.16 | 0.16 | 0.20 | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.17 | 0.15 | 0.15 |
| Employment_18_64: Unemployed | 0.02 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.03 | 0.06 | 0.05 |
| Vote: Left | 0.32 | 0.47 | 0.45 | 0.32 | 0.46 | 0.45 | 0.30 | 0.32 | 0.32 |
| Vote: Center-right or Right | 0.30 | 0.31 | 0.31 | 0.30 | 0.29 | 0.29 | 0.28 | 0.32 | 0.32 |
| Vote: Far right | | | | | | | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.10 |
| Country: FR | | | | | | | 0.24 | 0.24 | 0.24 |
| Country: DE | | | | | | | 0.33 | 0.33 | 0.33 |
| Country: ES | | | | | | | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.18 |
| Country: UK | | | | | | | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 |
| Urbanity: Cities | | | | | | | 0.43 | 0.49 | 0.43 |
| Urbanity: Towns and suburbs | | | | | | | 0.33 | 0.32 | 0.33 |
| Urbanity: Rural | | | | | | | 0.25 | 0.20 | 0.25 |

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in

Table A5: Sample representativeness for each European country.

| | FR | | | DE | | | ES | | | UK | | |
|--------------------------------------|------|------|---------------|------|------|---------------|------|------|---------------|------|------|---------------|
| | Pop. | Sam. | Wght. sam. |
| Sample size | | 729 | 729 | | 979 | 979 | | 543 | 543 | | 749 | 749 |
| Gender: Woman | 0.52 | 0.50 | 0.52 | 0.51 | 0.52 | 0.51 | 0.51 | 0.53 | 0.51 | 0.50 | 0.43 | 0.50 |
| Gender: Man | 0.48 | 0.50 | 0.48 | 0.49 | 0.48 | 0.49 | 0.49 | 0.47 | 0.49 | 0.50 | 0.57 | 0.50 |
| Income_quartile: 1 | 0.25 | 0.31 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.29 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.27 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.26 | 0.25 |
| Income_quartile: 2 | 0.25 | 0.17 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.31 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.19 | 0.25 |
| Income_quartile: 3 | 0.25 | 0.19 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.28 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.26 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.26 | 0.25 |
| Income_quartile: 4 | 0.25 | 0.33 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.18 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.17 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.28 | 0.25 |
| Age: 18-24 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.09 | 0.14 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.10 | 0.07 | 0.10 |
| Age: 25-34 | 0.15 | 0.14 | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.17 | 0.15 | 0.12 | 0.16 | 0.12 | 0.17 | 0.20 | 0.17 |
| Age: 35-49 | 0.24 | 0.31 | 0.24 | 0.22 | 0.26 | 0.22 | 0.28 | 0.25 | 0.28 | 0.24 | 0.18 | 0.24 |
| Age: 50-64 | 0.24 | 0.19 | 0.24 | 0.28 | 0.23 | 0.28 | 0.27 | 0.28 | 0.27 | 0.25 | 0.30 | 0.25 |
| Age: 65+ | 0.25 | 0.24 | 0.25 | 0.26 | 0.21 | 0.26 | 0.25 | 0.22 | 0.25 | 0.24 | 0.25 | 0.24 |
| Diploma_25-64: Below upper secondary | 0.11 | 0.19 | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.14 | 0.10 | 0.24 | 0.16 | 0.25 | 0.12 | 0.09 | 0.12 |
| Diploma_25-64: Upper secondary | 0.26 | 0.16 | 0.26 | 0.27 | 0.20 | 0.27 | 0.16 | 0.15 | 0.16 | 0.21 | 0.23 | 0.21 |
| Diploma_25-64: Post secondary | 0.26 | 0.30 | 0.26 | 0.29 | 0.31 | 0.29 | 0.28 | 0.38 | 0.27 | 0.33 | 0.36 | 0.33 |
| Urbanity: Cities | 0.47 | 0.52 | 0.47 | 0.37 | 0.47 | 0.37 | 0.52 | 0.58 | 0.52 | 0.40 | 0.41 | 0.40 |
| Urbanity: Towns and suburbs | 0.19 | 0.19 | 0.19 | 0.40 | 0.35 | 0.40 | 0.22 | 0.27 | 0.22 | 0.42 | 0.43 | 0.42 |
| Urbanity: Rural | 0.34 | 0.29 | 0.34 | 0.23 | 0.18 | 0.23 | 0.26 | 0.15 | 0.26 | 0.18 | 0.16 | 0.18 |
| Employment_18-64: Inactive | 0.20 | 0.19 | 0.18 | 0.15 | 0.14 | 0.11 | 0.20 | 0.13 | 0.12 | 0.16 | 0.16 | 0.17 |
| Employment_18-64: Unemployed | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.07 | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.04 |
| Vote: Left | 0.23 | 0.19 | 0.21 | 0.37 | 0.44 | 0.44 | 0.33 | 0.37 | 0.38 | 0.25 | 0.28 | 0.29 |
| Vote: Center-right or Right | 0.26 | 0.30 | 0.29 | 0.28 | 0.27 | 0.29 | 0.18 | 0.24 | 0.24 | 0.36 | 0.44 | 0.41 |
| Vote: Far right | 0.23 | 0.22 | 0.22 | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.03 |

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. In this Table, weights are defined at the country level. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in

Similar tables for the global surveys can be found in [Dechezleprêtre et al. \(2022\)](#).

H Attrition analysis

Table A6: Attrition analysis for the US1 survey.

| | Dropped out | Dropped out after socio-eco | Failed attention test | Duration (in min) | Duration below 4 min |
|-------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Mean | 0.092 | 0.073 | 0.076 | 21.564 | 0.018 |
| Income quartile: 2 | -0.006 (0.011) | -0.006 (0.011) | -0.022* (0.012) | -0.714 (3.218) | -0.009 (0.006) |
| Income quartile: 3 | 0.001 (0.013) | 0.001 (0.013) | -0.030*** (0.011) | 0.499 (2.856) | -0.002 (0.007) |
| Income quartile: 4 | 0.001 (0.016) | 0.001 (0.016) | -0.009 (0.015) | -3.516 (3.331) | 0.004 (0.010) |
| Diploma: Post secondary | 0.004 (0.010) | 0.004 (0.010) | -0.001 (0.009) | 1.736 (2.752) | 0.004 (0.006) |
| Age: 25-34 | -0.054*** (0.017) | -0.054*** (0.017) | 0.006 (0.020) | -0.792 (2.640) | -0.033** (0.013) |
| Age: 35-49 | -0.040** (0.016) | -0.040** (0.016) | -0.008 (0.018) | 3.768 (3.087) | -0.033** (0.014) |
| Age: 50-64 | -0.028* (0.017) | -0.028* (0.017) | -0.047*** (0.016) | 4.687* (2.694) | -0.043*** (0.013) |
| Age: 65+ | 0.056*** (0.021) | 0.056*** (0.021) | -0.055*** (0.016) | 7.896* (4.585) | -0.052*** (0.012) |
| Gender: Man | -0.050*** (0.008) | -0.050*** (0.008) | 0.020** (0.009) | 0.160 (2.576) | 0.002 (0.005) |
| Urban | -0.003 (0.010) | -0.003 (0.010) | 0.010 (0.011) | 4.989** (2.428) | -0.005 (0.006) |
| Race: Black | 0.037*** (0.013) | 0.037*** (0.013) | 0.010 (0.014) | 7.738** (3.083) | 0.004 (0.009) |
| Race: Hispanic | 0.044*** (0.014) | 0.044*** (0.014) | 0.018 (0.016) | 2.207 (2.523) | -0.001 (0.009) |
| Region: Northeast | -0.001 (0.013) | -0.001 (0.013) | 0.004 (0.013) | -5.474 (5.304) | -0.005 (0.008) |
| Region: South | -0.006 (0.011) | -0.006 (0.011) | 0.009 (0.012) | -0.962 (4.978) | -0.004 (0.007) |
| Region: West | 0.006 (0.014) | 0.006 (0.014) | -0.022* (0.013) | -5.075 (4.983) | -0.002 (0.009) |
| Observations | 4,500 | 4,500 | 2,854 | 2,688 | 2,688 |
| R ² | 0.023 | 0.023 | 0.030 | 0.005 | 0.018 |

Table A7: Attrition analysis for the US2 survey.

| | Dropped out (1) | Dropped out after socio-eco (2) | Failed attention test (3) | Duration (in min) (4) | Duration below 4 min (5) |
|-------------------------|----------------------|--|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Mean | 0.095 | 0.074 | 0.092 | 16.338 | 0.052 |
| Income quartile: 2 | -0.007 (0.013) | -0.007 (0.013) | -0.068*** (0.015) | 1.444 (1.601) | -0.029** (0.013) |
| Income quartile: 3 | 0.020 (0.015) | 0.020 (0.015) | -0.031* (0.017) | 8.630 (9.816) | -0.009 (0.015) |
| Income quartile: 4 | 0.009 (0.017) | 0.009 (0.017) | -0.023 (0.020) | 5.532 (3.594) | 0.0002 (0.017) |
| Diploma: Post secondary | -0.044*** (0.012) | -0.044*** (0.012) | -0.012 (0.012) | 2.295 (3.067) | 0.010 (0.011) |
| Age: 25-34 | 0.024 (0.015) | 0.024 (0.015) | 0.011 (0.024) | -0.743 (1.437) | -0.032 (0.024) |
| Age: 35-49 | 0.019 (0.014) | 0.019 (0.014) | 0.004 (0.022) | 9.366 (6.911) | -0.047** (0.022) |
| Age: 50-64 | 0.037** (0.014) | 0.037** (0.014) | -0.057*** (0.021) | 0.703 (1.350) | -0.078*** (0.021) |
| Age: 65+ | 0.092*** (0.019) | 0.092*** (0.019) | -0.073*** (0.021) | 3.145 (2.738) | -0.095*** (0.021) |
| Gender: Man | -0.085*** (0.011) | -0.085*** (0.011) | 0.018 (0.012) | 4.670 (6.036) | 0.010 (0.010) |
| Urban | 0.018 (0.012) | 0.018 (0.012) | 0.015 (0.014) | 1.985 (1.213) | 0.005 (0.012) |
| Race: Black | 0.039** (0.016) | 0.039** (0.016) | 0.013 (0.018) | 19.755 (13.916) | -0.013 (0.014) |
| Race: Hispanic | 0.037** (0.015) | 0.037** (0.015) | -0.025 (0.016) | 3.358* (1.957) | -0.029** (0.012) |
| Region: Northeast | -0.0005 (0.015) | -0.0005 (0.015) | 0.018 (0.018) | -0.701 (2.859) | -0.011 (0.015) |
| Region: South | 0.007 (0.013) | 0.007 (0.013) | 0.001 (0.015) | 3.051 (4.911) | 0.009 (0.014) |
| Region: West | 0.001 (0.014) | 0.001 (0.014) | 0.010 (0.018) | -1.659 (1.936) | -0.010 (0.015) |
| Observations | 2,973 | 2,973 | 2,280 | 2,103 | 2,103 |
| R ² | 0.054 | 0.054 | 0.031 | 0.009 | 0.031 |

Table A8: Attrition analysis for the Eu survey.

| | Dropped out | Dropped out after socio-eco | Failed attention test | Duration (in min) | Duration below 6 min |
|---|----------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Mean | 0.067 | 0.044 | 0.151 | 54.602 | 0.039 |
| Country: ES | -0.055*** (0.011) | -0.050*** (0.011) | 0.006 (0.011) | -35.375* (18.649) | -0.006 (0.010) |
| Country: FR | -0.020 (0.012) | -0.016 (0.012) | 0.031*** (0.012) | -5.377 (20.286) | -0.012 (0.009) |
| Country: UK | 0.039*** (0.014) | 0.043*** (0.014) | 0.027** (0.011) | -19.224 (17.882) | -0.006 (0.009) |
| Income quartile: 2 | 0.003 (0.012) | 0.001 (0.012) | -0.028** (0.013) | 29.027 (20.302) | -0.016 (0.010) |
| Income quartile: 3 | -0.001 (0.013) | -0.002 (0.013) | -0.059*** (0.011) | 0.678 (12.284) | -0.023** (0.010) |
| Income quartile: 4 | -0.028* (0.014) | -0.029** (0.014) | -0.045*** (0.013) | 11.603 (18.776) | -0.019* (0.010) |
| Diploma: Post secondary | -0.007 (0.011) | -0.007 (0.010) | -0.033*** (0.009) | 7.918 (12.848) | -0.008 (0.007) |
| Age: 25-34 | 0.022* (0.013) | 0.019 (0.013) | 0.031* (0.019) | 36.191* (21.496) | -0.004 (0.018) |
| Age: 35-49 | 0.049*** (0.013) | 0.047*** (0.013) | -0.008 (0.016) | 34.108** (15.221) | -0.013 (0.016) |
| Age: 50-64 | 0.070*** (0.014) | 0.068*** (0.014) | -0.011 (0.017) | 45.820** (21.671) | -0.063*** (0.015) |
| Age: 65+ | 0.137*** (0.016) | 0.135*** (0.016) | -0.013 (0.017) | 29.582** (13.099) | -0.062*** (0.015) |
| Gender: Man | -0.034*** (0.009) | -0.034*** (0.009) | 0.012 (0.009) | -25.172* (14.587) | 0.010 (0.007) |
| Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs | 0.004 (0.010) | 0.002 (0.010) | -0.017* (0.010) | -15.348 (17.562) | 0.007 (0.008) |
| Degree of urbanization: Rural | -0.001 (0.013) | -0.001 (0.013) | -0.017 (0.011) | -14.010 (20.315) | 0.001 (0.009) |
| Observations | 3,963 | 3,963 | 3,326 | 3,115 | 3,115 |
| R ² | 0.038 | 0.038 | 0.024 | 0.004 | 0.024 |

List of Tables

| | | |
|----|--|-----|
| 1 | Surveys summary | 5 |
| 2 | List experiment: tacit support for the GCS | 13 |
| 3 | Influence of the GCS on electoral prospects | 15 |
| A1 | Campaign and bandwagon effects on the support for the GCS. | 54 |
| A2 | Estimated net gain from the GCS in 2030 and carbon footprint by country. . | 100 |
| A3 | Determinants of support for the GCS | 101 |
| A4 | Sample representativeness of US1, US2, Eu | 102 |
| A5 | Sample representativeness of each European country | 103 |
| A6 | Attrition analysis: US1 | 104 |
| A7 | Attrition analysis: US2 | 105 |
| A8 | Attrition analysis: Eu | 106 |

List of Figures

| | | |
|----|---|----|
| 1 | Relative support for global climate policies | 6 |
| 2 | Support for the Global Climate Scheme | 8 |
| 3 | Preferred share of wealth tax for low-income countries | 10 |
| 4 | Relative support for various global policies | 11 |
| 5 | Attitudes on the evolution of foreign aid | 11 |
| 6 | Conditions at which foreign aid should be increased | 12 |
| 7 | Reasons why foreign aid should not be increased | 12 |
| 8 | Preferences for various policies in political platforms | 16 |
| 9 | Influence of the GCS on preferred platform | 18 |
| 10 | Beliefs about support for the GCS and NR | 19 |
| A1 | Net gains with the CERF burden-sharing rule. | 47 |
| A2 | Comparison between GDR and equal per capita burden-sharing rules. . . | 48 |
| A3 | Absolute support for global climate policies | 52 |
| A4 | Comprehension | 53 |
| A5 | Comprehension score | 53 |
| A6 | List experiment | 53 |
| A7 | Conjoint analyses 1 and 2 | 54 |
| A8 | Perceptions of the GCS | 55 |
| A9 | Classification of open-ended field on the GCS | 56 |

| | |
|---|----|
| A10 Topics of open-ended field on the GCS | 57 |
| A11 Donation to Africa vs. own country | 57 |
| A12 Support for a global wealth tax | 58 |
| A13 Support for a national wealth tax | 58 |
| A14 Preferred share of global tax for low-income countries | 59 |
| A15 Support for sharing half of global tax revenues with low-income countries | 59 |
| A16 Perceived foreign aid | 59 |
| A17 Preferred foreign aid (without info on actual amount) | 60 |
| A18 Preferred foreign aid (after info on actual amount) | 60 |
| A19 Preferences for funding increased foreign aid | 61 |
| A20 Preferences of spending following reduced foreign aid | 62 |
| A21 Willingness to sign a real-stake petition | 62 |
| A22 Absolute support for various global policies | 63 |
| A23 Preferred approach for international climate negotiations | 63 |
| A24 Importance of selected issues | 64 |
| A25 Group defended when voting | 64 |
| A26 Mean prioritization of policies | 65 |
| A27 Positive prioritization of policies | 66 |
| A28 Charity donation | 66 |
| A29 Interest in politics | 67 |
| A30 Desired involvement of government | 67 |
| A31 Political leaning | 68 |
| A32 Voted in last election | 68 |
| A33 Vote in last election | 69 |
| A34 Perception that survey was biased | 69 |
| A35 Classification of open-ended field on extreme poverty | 70 |
| A36 Eu survey structure | 74 |
| A37 US1 survey structure | 75 |
| A38 US2 survey structure | 75 |
| A39 Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme. | 99 |