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32 Main text figures and tables

Figure 1: Structure of Western survey, cf. also Figure S41 for the treatment branches.





Figure 2: Relative Support for global climate policies.



Note 1: The numbers represent *relative support*, i.e. the share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* among non-*indifferent* answers (in percent, $n = 40,680$). Shares of indifferent answers range from 11% to 48%, with quartiles 20%, 27%, and 33%. The color blue denotes a relative majority. See Figure S4 for the absolute support. (Questions A-I).

Note 2: *In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

Table 1: Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list. The tacit support for the GCS is estimated by regressing the number of supported policies on the presence of the GCS in the list of policies. The social desirability is estimated as the difference between the tacit and stated support (see Methods), and it is not significantly different from zero even at a 20% threshold (as shown by the 80% Confidence Interval).

	Number of supported policies		
	All	U.S.	Europe
List contains: GCS	0.624*** (0.028)	0.524*** (0.041)	0.724*** (0.036)
<i>Support for GCS</i>	0.65	0.542	0.757
<i>Social desirability bias</i>	-0.026	-0.019	-0.033
<i>80% C.I. for the bias</i>	[-0.06; 0.01]	[-0.07; 0.04]	[-0.08; 0.01]
Constant	1.317	1.147	1.486
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000
R ²	0.089	0.065	0.125

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 2: Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. (Question 28)

	Prefers the Progressive platform					
	All	United States	France	Germany	UK	Spain
GCS in Progressive platform	0.028*	0.029	0.112***	0.015	0.008	-0.015
P-value	0.057	0.185	0.007	0.647	0.844	0.698
t	1.90	1.33	2.73	0.46	0.20	-0.39
95% C.I.	[-.00; .06]	[-.01; .07]	[.03; .19]	[-.05; .08]	[-.07; .09]	[-.09; .06]
Constant	0.623	0.604	0.55	0.7	0.551	0.775
Observations	5,202	2,619	605	813	661	504
R ²	0.001	0.001	0.013	0.0003	0.0001	0.0003

Note: Simple OLS model with robust standard errors (HC1). The 14% of *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples. GCS has no significant influence on them. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

Figure 3: Relative support for various global policies. (percentage of *somewhat* or *strong support*, after excluding *indifferent* answers; *except for GCS: percentage of Yes in a Yes/No question, preferred share: percentage of answers $\geq 30\%$, and foreign aid: percentage of unconditional or conditional increase rather than decrease or stable aid). Shares of indifferent answers range from 10% to 40%, with quartiles 19%, 25%, and 32%. (p. 63, Questions 20, 36, 43, 44, and 45; See Figure S26 for the absolute support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)*	54	76	80	71	81	74
National tax on millionaires funding public services	73	85	81	87	89	88
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	69	84	84	84	87	83
Preferred share of global wealth tax for low-income countries: 30% or more*	50	54	53	50	57	54
[Country]'s foreign aid should be increased*	60	64	63	68	69	56
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	60	76	77	79	79	71
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	68	82	82	82	85	81
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	55	71	72	70	79	70
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	46	53	53	43	62	61
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	58	71	69	69	78	72
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	62	73	58	73	80	83
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	63	80	80	78	81	83
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	62	87	90	86	91	87
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	46	62	58	62	65	67

Table ED1: Effects on the support for the GCS of a question on its pros and cons (either in open-ended or closed format) and on information about the actual support, in the U.S. (See Section D in the US2 Questionnaire)

	Support			
	Global Climate Scheme		National Redistribution	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Control group mean	0.557	0.557	0.569	0.569
Treatment: Open-ended field on GCS pros & cons	-0.073** (0.035)	-0.073** (0.031)	-0.035 (0.035)	-0.031 (0.032)
Treatment: Closed questions on GCS pros & cons	-0.109*** (0.034)	-0.096*** (0.031)	-0.065* (0.034)	-0.062** (0.031)
Treatment: Info on actual support for GCS and NR	-0.021 (0.034)	-0.017 (0.031)	0.048 (0.033)	0.054* (0.031)
Includes controls		✓		✓
Observations	2,000	1,995	2,000	1,995
R ²	0.007	0.169	0.007	0.153

Table ED2: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality. (Question 33)

	Donation to poor people (in %)			
	All	US	US	Eu
Poor is in own country	0.590 (0.799)	2.509** (1.152)	0.046 (1.691)	-1.349 (1.108)
Poor is in own country × Vote: <i>not</i> Biden			3.954* (2.279)	
Mean	34.034	33.658	33.658	34.41
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000	3,000
R ²	0.0001	0.002	0.034	0.0005

Table ED3: Average Marginal Component Effects of global policies.


	Effect	Obs.	t	P-value	95% C.I.
FR; Global Climate Plan	0.13***	1456	3.5	$5 \cdot 10^{-4}$	[0.06; 0.21]
DE; Global Climate Plan	0.09**	1958	2.8	0.005	[0.03; 0.16]
ES; Global Climate Plan	0.04	1086	0.82	0.411	[-0.05; 0.12]
UK; Global Climate Plan	0.09*	1498	2.31	0.021	[0.01; 0.16]
US; Global Climate Plan	0.01	4436	0.61	0.539	[-0.03; 0.06]
FR; Global Millionaire Tax	0.11*	1456	2.49	0.013	[0.02; 0.2]
DE; Global Millionaire Tax	0.09*	1958	2.3	0.022	[0.01; 0.18]
ES; Global Millionaire Tax	0.05	1086	0.91	0.365	[-0.06; 0.16]
UK; Global Millionaire Tax	0.13**	1498	2.86	0.004	[0.04; 0.22]
US; Global Millionaire Tax	0.09**	4436	3.16	0.002	[0.03; 0.14]
FR; Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change	0.12*	1456	2.52	0.012	[0.03; 0.21]
DE; Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change	0.1*	1958	2.52	0.012	[0.02; 0.18]
ES; Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change	-0.01	1086	-0.22	0.829	[-0.12; 0.1]
UK; Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change	0.07	1498	1.56	0.12	[-0.02; 0.17]
US; Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change	0.08**	4436	2.93	0.003	[0.03; 0.13]

Figure ED1: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See non-translated versions in Figure S9; Question 29)

(a) U.S. (Asked only to non-Republicans)




(b) France




(c) Germany

- Climate policy:
- Obligatory solar systems on all suitable roofs
 - Thermal insulation plan
 - Ban on the sale of new cars with internal combustion engines by 2030
- Economic issues:
- Increase in the standard rate of citizen income to up to €600 per month
 - Citizens' insurance (Bürgerversicherung) as fairer social insurance
 - Reduce the national debt ratio to below 60%
 - Deploy investments for gigabit networks
- Foreign policy:
- Global Climate Plan
 - Global Millionaire Tax
 - Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change
 - Double foreign aid to low-income countries
- Societal issues:
- Referendum at the federal level
 - Cannabis Legalization
- Tax system:
- National redistribution plan
 - Reinstate the wealth tax



(d) Spain

- Climate policy:
- 100% electricity produced with renewable energy by 2040
 - Thermal insulation plan
 - Ban the sale of new cars with combustion engines by 2030
- Economic issues:
- Broader health coverage within the public system (dental care, glasses, mental health)
 - Guaranteed Basic Income of €600 per month
 - 34 hour work week
 - Investment in the educational system and universalization of preschool education
- Foreign policy:
- Global Climate Plan
 - Global Millionaire Tax
 - Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change
 - Double foreign aid to low-income countries
- Societal issues:
- Reform the electoral law to make the Senate more proportional
 - Abolition of prostitution
- Tax system:
- National redistribution plan
 - Increase taxes on income above 100,000 euros per year



(e) UK

- Climate policy:
- Ban of most polluting vehicles in city centers (low-emission zones)
 - Thermal insulation plan
 - Ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030
- Economic issues:
- £150 billion to upgrade schools, hospitals, care homes and council houses
 - Real Living Wage of £11 per hour for all workers aged 16 and over
 - Reduce the average full-time weekly working hours to 32
 - Re-establish neighbourhood policing and recruit 2,000 more frontline officers
- Foreign policy:
- Global climate scheme
 - Global tax on millionaires
 - Global democratic assembly on climate change
 - Doubling foreign aid
- Societal issues:
- Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation
 - Legalization of cannabis
- Tax system:
- National redistribution scheme
 - Wealth tax




Figure ED2: Influence of the GCS on preferred platform:
 Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question 30; in the U.S., asked only to non-Republicans.)




Figure ED3: Beliefs regarding the support for the GCS and NR. (Questions 21 and 23)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Belief about GCS	52	59	61	56	63	57
Support for the GCS	54	76	80	71	81	74
Belief about NR	55	58	60	53	62	59
Support for NR	56	73	77	66	79	75

Figure ED4: Percent of global wealth tax that should finance low-income countries (*mean*).
 “Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all countries around the world. (...)
 What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of retained in the country’s national budget)?” (Question 36)




Figure ED5: Attitudes regarding the evolution of [own country] foreign aid. (Question 45)




Figure ED6: Conditions at which foreign aid should be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish an increase of foreign aid at some conditions.] (Question 46)




Figure ED7: Reasons why foreign aid should not be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish a decrease or stability of foreign aid.] (Question 47)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Aid perpetuates poverty as it makes people feel less responsible for themselves	29	30	31	35	31	24
Aid is not effective as most of it is diverted	40	53	48	57	60	49
Aid is a pressure tactic for high-income countries that prevents low-income countries from developing freely	16	16	15	14	23	13
[Country] is not responsible for what happens in other countries	45	30	28	30	20	37
Charity begins at home: there is already a lot to do to support the [country] people in need	63	63	51	62	71	69

³³ **A Literature review**

³⁴ **A.1 Attitudes and perceptions**

³⁵ **A.1.1 Population attitudes on global policies**

³⁶ Using representative samples in 125 countries covering 96% of the world's greenhouse
³⁷ gas emissions, Andre et al. (2024) show that 69% of the global population express willing-
³⁸ ness to contribute 1% of their income to fight global warming.¹ Carattini et al. (2019) test
³⁹ the support for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples in five countries, represen-
⁴⁰ tative along gender and age. For a given variant, the sample size is about 167 respondents
⁴¹ per country. They find over 80% support for any variant in India, between 50% and 65%
⁴² in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43% to 59% in the U.S., depending on the
⁴³ variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding an equal dividend for each
⁴⁴ human is close to 50% in high-income countries (e.g., at 44% in the U.S.), consistently
⁴⁵ with our results from the *Global* survey (see Figure 2). This is another piece of evidence
⁴⁶ that the support is lower for a tax that would "only" reduce CO₂ emissions than for a
⁴⁷ quota that would unambiguously achieve the climate target. In a survey over 15 coun-
⁴⁸ tries, Bloodworth & Callegari (2023) find 73% agreement to tax fossil fuel companies and
⁴⁹ finance climate action in poorer countries. Using a conjoint analysis in the U.S. and Ger-
⁵⁰ many, Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019) find that the support for a carbon tax increases
⁵¹ by up to 50% if it applies to all industrialized countries rather than exclusively to one's
⁵² own country.

⁵³ In surveys conducted in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S., Ghassim (2020)
⁵⁴ finds support ranging from 55% to 74% for "a global democracy including both a global
⁵⁵ government and a global parliament, directly elected by the world population, to recom-
⁵⁶ mend and implement policies on global issues". Ghassim & Pauli (2024) also finds strong
⁵⁷ support for a democratic world government in surveys over 17 countries. Furthermore,
⁵⁸ through an experiment, Ghassim (2020) finds that, in countries where the government
⁵⁹ stems from a coalition, voting shares would shift by 8 (Brazil) to 12 p.p. (Germany) from
⁶⁰ parties who are said to oppose global democracy to parties that supposedly support it.
⁶¹ For instance, when Germans respondents were told that (only) the Greens and the Left
⁶² support global democracy, these parties gained respectively 9 and 3 p.p. in vote inten-
⁶³ tions, while the SPD and the CDU-CSU each lost 6 p.p. Ghassim (2020) also presents

¹However, Ipsos (2023) find no majority support when the amount is not specified, despite strong agree-
ment for own individual action.

64 survey results showing strong majorities in favor of the direct election of one's country's
65 UN representative in all 18 surveyed countries. Similarly, in each of 10 countries, there
66 are clear majorities in favor of "a new supranational entity [taking] enforceable global de-
67 cisions in order to solve global risks" (Global Challenges Foundation 2018). Remarkably,
68 already in 1946, 54% of Americans agreed (while 24% disagreed) that "the UN should be
69 strengthened to make it a world government with the power to control the armed forces
70 of all nations" (Gallup 1946). Furthermore, in surveys conducted in Argentina, China,
71 India, Russia, Spain, and the U.S., Ghassim et al. (2022) find majority support for UN
72 reforms that would make United Nations' decisions binding, give veto powers to a few
73 other major countries at the Security Council, or complement the highest body of the UN
74 with a chamber of directly elected representatives.

75 Relatedly, Meilland et al. (2024) find that both Americans and French people prefer
76 an international settlement of climate justice, even if it encroaches on sovereignty. In a
77 2013 survey conducted in China, Germany, and the U.S., Schleich et al. (2016) show that
78 over three-quarter of people think that international climate agreements reached so far
79 are not successful and that future agreements are important. In Finland, Sivonen (2022)
80 finds that that support for a carbon tax is higher if implemented at the global level (54%)
81 rather than at the national level (40%).

82 The results from these specific questions are in line with the answers to more gen-
83 eral questions. In each of 36 countries, ISSP (2010) find near consensus that "for envi-
84 ronmental problems, there should be international agreements that [their country] and
85 other countries should be made to follow" (overall, 82% agree and 4% disagree). In each
86 of 29 countries, ISSP (2019) uncover near consensus that "Present economic differences
87 between rich and poor countries are too large" (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree).
88 Leiserowitz et al. (2021) reveal that 66% of Americans support providing "financial aid
89 and technical support to developing countries that agree to limit their greenhouse gas
90 emissions." Fehr et al. (2022) find that 90% of Germans want some degree of global redis-
91 tribution.

92 A.1.2 Population attitudes on climate burden sharing

93 Despite differences in the description of fairness principles, surveys on burden-sharing
94 rules show consistent attitudes. Or at least, their seemingly contradictory results can be
95 made compatible with the following interpretation: Concerning emissions reductions,
96 most people want that every country engage in strong and collective decarbonization ef-

97 forts, with a global quota converging to climate neutrality in the medium run. Concerning
98 the financial effort, most people support high-emitting countries paying and low-income
99 countries receiving funding. The most supported rules are those perceived as equitable,
100 in particular an equal right to emit per person.

101 This interpretation helps to understand the apparent differences between articles that
102 approach burden sharing from different angles: cost sharing (in money terms), effort shar-
103 ing (in terms of emissions reductions), or resource sharing (in terms of rights to emit).
104 Existing papers adopt either the cost sharing or effort sharing approach, which preclude
105 any country from being a net receiver of funds. Also, by focusing on *either* the financial
106 or the decarbonization effort, these surveys miss the other half of the picture, which can
107 explain why some papers find strong support for the ability-to-pay principle while others
108 find strong support for grandfathering (defined as emissions reductions being the same
109 in every country). The literature follows these approaches to align with the notions used
110 by the UNFCCC. Yet, we argue that the resource sharing approach is preferable for un-
111 covering attitudes, as it unambiguously describes the distributive implications of each
112 rule while achieving an efficient geographical distribution of emissions reductions and
113 explicitly allowing for monetary gains for some countries.

114 Now, let us summarize the results of the different papers in the light of this clarifica-
115 tion. [Schleich et al. \(2016\)](#) find an identical ranking of support for burden-sharing prin-
116 ciples in China, Germany, and the U.S.: polluter-pays followed by ability-to-pay, equal
117 emissions per capita, and grandfathering. Note that the authors do not allow for emis-
118 sions trading in their description of equal *emissions per capita*, which may explain its rel-
119 atively low support. Yet, the relative support for egalitarianism also depends on how
120 *the other* rules are described. Indeed, [Carlsson et al. \(2011\)](#) find that Swedes prefer that
121 “all countries are allowed to emit an equal amount per capita” rather than options where
122 emissions are reduced based on current or historical emissions, for which it is explicitly
123 stated that high-emitting countries “will continue to emit more than others”. [Bechtel &](#)
124 [Scheve \(2013\)](#) find agreement that rich countries should pay more and historical emis-
125 sions should matter, but that efforts should not be solely borne by wealthy nations. More
126 precisely, their conjoint analysis conducted in France, Germany, the UK, and the U.S.
127 shows that a climate agreement is 15 p.p. more likely to be preferred (to a random alter-
128 native) if it includes 160 countries rather than 20, and 5 p.p. less likely to be preferred
129 if “only rich countries pay” compared to other burden-sharing rules: “rich countries pay
130 more than poor”, “countries pay proportional to current emissions” or “countries pay

¹³¹ proportional to historical emissions". In Germany and the U.S., [Gampfer et al. \(2014\)](#) also
¹³² find stronger support for funding climate action in low-income countries when cost is
¹³³ shared with other countries. Using a choice experiment, [Carlsson et al. \(2013\)](#) find that the
¹³⁴ least preferred option in China and the U.S. is when low-emitting countries are exempted
¹³⁵ from any effort. Ability-to-pay is appreciated in both countries and is the preferred op-
¹³⁶ tion in the U.S., though the preferred option in China is another one that accounts for
¹³⁷ historical responsibility. In the U.S. and France, [Meilland et al. \(2024\)](#) find that the most
¹³⁸ favored fairness principle is that "all countries commit to converge to the same average
¹³⁹ of total emissions per inhabitant, compatible with a controlled climate change". Further-
¹⁴⁰ more, in each country, 73% disagree with grandfathering defined as "countries which
¹⁴¹ emitted a lot of carbon in the past have a right to continue emitting more than others in
¹⁴² the future". The study by [Meilland et al. \(2024\)](#) contains many other results: for instance,
¹⁴³ majorities prefer to hold countries accountable for their consumption-based rather than
¹⁴⁴ territorial emissions, and the median choice regarding historical responsibility is to hold
¹⁴⁵ a country accountable for its post-1990 emissions (rather than post-1850 or just their cur-
¹⁴⁶ rent emissions). Finally, in each of 28 (among the largest) countries, [Dabla-Norris et al.](#)
¹⁴⁷ ([2023](#)) find strong majority for "all countries" to the question "Which countries do you
¹⁴⁸ think should be paying to reduce carbon emissions?". When asked to choose between a
¹⁴⁹ cost sharing based on *current* vs. *accumulated historic emissions*, a majority prefers *current*
¹⁵⁰ *emissions* in all countries but China and Saudi Arabia (where the two options are close to
¹⁵¹ equally preferred).

¹⁵² A.1.3 Population attitudes on foreign aid

¹⁵³ There is an extensive literature on attitudes towards foreign aid in donor countries.
¹⁵⁴ The key findings indicate that most people overestimate the amount of foreign aid and
¹⁵⁵ that only a minority wants a cut in foreign aid compared to actual amounts, especially
¹⁵⁶ once they become aware of them.

¹⁵⁷ For instance, [PIPA \(2001\)](#) shows that 83% of Americans support a multilateral effort
¹⁵⁸ to cut world hunger in half. [PIPA \(2008\)](#) shows that in each of 20 countries, a majority
¹⁵⁹ thinks that developed countries "have a moral responsibility to work to reduce hunger
¹⁶⁰ and severe poverty in poor countries", with an average agreement of 81%. In 7 OECD
¹⁶¹ countries, the study finds that at least 75% of respondents are willing to pay for a pro-
¹⁶² gram to cut hunger in half (at an estimated cost of, e.g., \$50 a year for each American).
¹⁶³ Eurobarometer data shows majority support to comply with the promise to increase aid

164 (Cho 2024).

165 Kaufmann et al. (2019) find that perceived aid is overestimated in each of the 24 coun-
166 tries they study, on average by a factor of 7. In most countries, desired aid is larger than
167 perceived aid.² They show that individuals in the top income quintile desire aid 0.13
168 p.p. lower than those in the bottom 40% – which is very close to what we find. By em-
169 ploying a theoretical model and examining correlations between lobbying and actual aid
170 (controling for desired aid), they argue that the gap between actual and desired aid stems
171 from the political influence of the rich who defend their vested interests. In Kaufmann
172 et al. (2012), the U.S. is an outlier: desired aid is at the other countries' average (3% of
173 GNI), but as misperceptions are enormous, perceived aid is twice as large as desired aid.
174 Indeed, Gilens (2001) shows that even Americans with high political knowledge misper-
175 ceive actual aid, and finds that 17% fewer of them want to cut aid when we provide them
176 specific information about the amount of aid. Similarly, Nair (2018) finds that the rela-
177 tively low support for aid in the U.S. is driven by information on global distribution, as
178 people underestimate their rank by 27 centiles on average and overestimate the global
179 median income by a factor 10. This could explain why in the 2000–2004 waves of the GSS,
180 over 60 percent of Americans state that the government is spending too much on foreign
181 aid (Okten & Osili 2007).

182 Hudson & van Heerde (2012) provide a critical review of the literature and show that
183 the strong support for poverty alleviation largely stems from intrinsic altruism. They note
184 that, according to DFID (2009) and PIPA (2001), 47% of British people find that the aid
185 is wasted (mainly due to corruption), while Americans estimate that less than a quarter
186 of the aid reaches those in need, with over half ending up in the hands of corrupt gov-
187 ernment officials. Despite these perceptions, most people still support aid, suggesting
188 the presence of nonutilitarian motives. Consistent with Henson et al. (2010), Bauhr et al.
189 (2013) find that support for aid is reduced by the perception of corruption in recipient
190 countries. However, this effect is mitigated by the aid-corruption paradox: countries with
191 higher levels of corruption often need more help. Bodenstein & Faust (2017) further show
192 that right-wing Europeans, as well as those who perceive strong corruption in their coun-
193 try, are more likely to agree that recipient countries should “follow certain rules regarding
194 democracy, human rights and governance as a condition for receiving EU development
195 aid.” Using a 2002 Gallup survey and the 2006 World Values Survey, and in line with

²Kaufmann et al. (2012) offer the best results on desired aid because (as Hudson & van Heerde (2012) criticize), other studies did not take into account misperceptions of actual aid.

¹⁹⁶ Heinrich et al. (2018) in the U.S., Bayram (2017) and Paxton & Knack (2012) show that the
¹⁹⁷ main determinants for wanting more aid are trust, left-wing ideology, interest in politics,
¹⁹⁸ and being a woman (all positively associated).

¹⁹⁹ While foreign aid is generally unilateral, discretionary, and often used as a bargaining
²⁰⁰ chip, global redistribution is conceived as multilateral, rule-based, and with dedicated
²⁰¹ funding. Our paper finds much stronger support for global redistributive policies than
²⁰² for increased foreign aid. The difference in attitudes between unilateral foreign aid and
²⁰³ global policies is consistent with the literature on foreign aid. Indeed, it can be explained
²⁰⁴ by the observation that people prefer multilateral policies and often view foreign aid as
²⁰⁵ inefficient in reducing poverty. Therefore, we contribute to the theory of attitudes towards
²⁰⁶ global transfers by showing that when such transfers are multilateral and trusted to be
²⁰⁷ effective, they would be largely supported.

²⁰⁸ A.1.4 Population attitudes on taxes on the rich

²⁰⁹ We are not aware of any previous survey on a global wealth tax,³ though surveys
²¹⁰ consistently show strong support for national wealth taxes. In a comprehensive survey
²¹¹ conducted in the UK, Rowlingson et al. (2021) show that a wealth tax is the preferred
²¹² option for raising revenues. Only 8% of respondents state that total net wealth should not
²¹³ be taxed (with little differences between Labour and Conservative voters). The study also
²¹⁴ finds that the preferred design would be a 1% or 3% tax on net wealth above £1 million. By
²¹⁵ asking how much taxes per year should a person with a certain income and wealth level
²¹⁶ pay, Fisman et al. (2017) finds that the average American favors a 0.8% linear tax rate
²¹⁷ on unspecified wealth up to \$2 million (the highest wealth level tested), and a 3% linear
²¹⁸ rate on inherited wealth. Through a conjoint analysis conducted in three high-income
²¹⁹ countries, Schechtl & Tisch (2023) find widespread support for a wealth tax (from 78% in
²²⁰ the U.S. to 86% in Germany and the UK), with a preference for an exemption threshold
²²¹ set at \$/€1 million (rather than 500,000 or 2 million) with the tax rate and tax unit having
²²² little influence on the preferred design. In 21 OECD countries, the OECD (2019) uncovers
²²³ strong majority support for higher taxes on the rich to support the poor, with nearly
²²⁴ 70% overall agreement and less than 20% disagreement. Isbell (2022) finds similarly high
²²⁵ level of support in 34 African countries. In the UK, Patriotic Millionaires (2022) find 69%
²²⁶ support (and 7% opposition) for a 1.1% tax on wealth in excess of £10 million. In the

³We did not find any using the combination of “survey” or “attitudes” with “wealth tax” or “global wealth tax” in Google Scholar.

²²⁷ U.S., [Americans for Tax Fairness \(2021\)](#) find that 67% to 71% of the respondents support
²²⁸ to “raise taxes for those earning more than \$400,000 a year”, “raise the income tax rate
²²⁹ for those earning over \$1 million a year by 10 percentage points”, or “apply a 2% tax on
²³⁰ an individual’s wealth above \$50 million each year, and 3% on wealth above \$1 billion”.
²³¹ [Patriotic Millionaires \(2024\)](#) indicate that millionaires themselves agree to be taxed: out
²³² of 2,385 millionaires contacted through wealth councillors, 74% support “increased tax on
²³³ very wealthy individuals” and 58% support a 2% wealth tax above \$10 million. Finally,
²³⁴ in surveys in Germany and the U.S., [Ferreira et al. \(2024\)](#) finds strong majority support
²³⁵ for a limit on income or wealth.

²³⁶ A.1.5 Population attitudes on ethical norms

²³⁷ As argued by [Nyborg et al. \(2016\)](#), social norms can be the solution to the collective
²³⁸ action problem. As such, universalistic values and free-riding attitudes are key.

²³⁹ **Universalism** Various studies have examined the concept of global identity (see [Rey-](#)
²⁴⁰ [sen & Katzarska-Miller \(2018\)](#) for a review). In the 2005-2008 wave of the World Values
²⁴¹ Survey, [Bayram \(2015\)](#) notes that “78% of the participants in 57 countries see themselves
²⁴² as citizens of the world”, though the [2017-2022 wave](#) reveals that more people feel close
²⁴³ to their town, region or country than to the world. [Nation \(2024\)](#) finds large variation
²⁴⁴ across 21 countries, as 31% to 88% of respondents (excluding *indifferent* answers) consider
²⁴⁵ themselves “more a world citizen than a citizen of [their] country” (with similar shares
²⁴⁶ agreeing that “[their] taxes should go towards solving global problems”).

²⁴⁷ [Enke et al. \(2023\)](#) measure universalism at the U.S. district level using donation data,
²⁴⁸ and find that a district’s universalism predicts electoral outcomes better than its income
²⁴⁹ or education level. To measure universalism at the individual level, [Enke et al. \(2023\)](#)
²⁵⁰ ask American respondents to split \$100 between a random stranger and a random person
²⁵¹ with the same income but closer to them. They distinguish different facets of universal-
²⁵² ism, and define *foreign universalism* as the inclination to give to a foreigner rather than a
²⁵³ fellow citizen. They find a home bias for most people, which could partly be attributed to
²⁵⁴ concerns about inequality, as the split involves two persons with the same income, with
²⁵⁵ the foreigner most certainly living in a poorer country than the American and thus en-
²⁵⁶ joying a higher social status. That being said, a home bias probably remains even after
²⁵⁷ accounting for concerns about inequality: [Prather \(2013\)](#) also finds a home bias in the
²⁵⁸ U.S., and 84% of Americans agree that “taking care of problems at home is more impor-

tant than giving aid to foreign countries" (PIPA 2001). Enke et al. (2023) also measure universalism and analyze its correlates in 7 countries, and Cappelen et al. (2022) deploy this method in 60 countries. In a lab experiment with students in the U.S., Cherry et al. (2017) show that a substantial share of people prefer policies detrimental to them due to their egalitarian worldview. Leiserowitz (2006) shows that 68% of Americans are most concerned about the impacts of climate change on "people all over the world" (50%) or "non-human nature" (18%) rather than themselves and their family (12%) or the U.S. (9%).⁴ A 2017 survey by Focus 2030 shows that 40% of French people agree "fighting poverty in developing countries should be one of the priorities of the European Union" while only 19% disagree. Waytz et al. (2019) show that left-leaning people exhibit a wider "moral circle". Jaeger & Wilks (2023) find that judgments of moral concern are equally well explained by characteristics of the judge and the evaluated target.

Free-riding Despite the long-standing explanation of the lack of climate action as a result of free-riding, surveys consistently show that people support climate mitigation action in their own country, even in the absence of such action in other countries. Bernauer & Gampfer (2015) show this for Americans and Indians, who both overestimate their country's emissions at one third of the global total. Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019) show this in the U.S. and China using an experimental design. McEvoy & Cherry (2016) show that Americans mostly invoke leadership and morality to justify unilateral climate action. Using a range of methods, Aklin & Mildenberger (2020) show that the empirical evidence for free-riding is not compelling, and that climate inaction can be equally well explained by distributive conflicts. Finally, review of the literature by McGrath & Bernauer (2017) shows that climate attitudes are largely nonreciprocal, and primarily driven by values and perceptions of the policies, rather than by considerations of what other countries do.

A.1.6 Second-order beliefs

Allport (1924) introduced the concept of pluralistic ignorance: a shared misperception concerning others' beliefs. The concept became notorious when O'Gorman (1975) showed that, towards the end of the civil rights movement, 47% of Americans believed that a majority of white people supported segregation, while only 18% did so. PIPA (2001) has shown that while 75% of Americans are willing to contribute \$50 annually to halve

⁴Unpublished survey results of Dechezleprêtre et al. (forthcoming) find similar figures in 2024.

290 world hunger (the cost of the program), only 32% believed that the majority would share
291 this willingness. Pluralistic ignorance regarding climate-friendly norms in the United
292 States has been documented by ? (?), who further show that correcting the mispercep-
293 tions would be effective to enhance pro-climate behaviors. Relatedly, **Sparkman et al.**
294 (2022) show that Americans underestimate the support for climate policies by nearly half,
295 while **Drews et al. (2022)** document pluralistic ignorance of carbon tax support in Spain.
296 Additionally, **Geiger & Swim (2016)** show that pluralistic ignorance regarding concern for
297 climate change leads people to self-silence, resulting in reduced discussions on the topic.

298 A.1.7 Elite attitudes

299 In a survey of climate negotiators on their preferences in terms of burden-sharing,
300 **Lange et al. (2007)** uncovers a mix of self-serving bias and support for the egalitarian
301 principle. **Dannenberg et al. (2010)** elicit climate negotiators' equity preferences and find
302 that regional differences in addressing climate change are driven more by national inter-
303 ests than by different equity concerns. **Hjerpe et al. (2011)** indicate that voluntary con-
304 tribution, indicated as willingness to contribute, was the least preferred principle among
305 both negotiators and observers. Three of the four principles for allocating mitigation
306 commitments were recognized widely across the major geographical regions: historical
307 responsibilities, ability-to-pay, and equal per capita emissions. This result is confirmed
308 by **Kesternich et al. (2021)**, who observe tendencies for a more harmonized view among
309 key groups towards the ability-to-pay rule in a setting of weighted burden sharing rules.
310 **Mildenberger & Tingley (2019)** survey elites (Congress staffers and international relations
311 scholars) as well as the population in U.S. and China. They document pluralistic igno-
312 rance of pro-climate attitudes, egocentric bias, and increasing support after beliefs are
313 updated.

314 A.2 Proposals and analyses of global policy-making

315 A.2.1 Global carbon pricing

316 Global carbon pricing is widely regarded by economists as the benchmark climate
317 policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon emissions externality. For instance, **Hoel**
318 (1991) shows that an international carbon tax can be designed to simultaneously achieve
319 efficiency and accommodate any distributional objective. Concerning the distributional
320 objective, **Grubb (1990)**, **Agarwal & Narain (1991)** and **Bertram (1992)** were the first to

advocate for an equal right to emit for each human. As Grubb (1990) states it: "by far the best combination of long term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity, is obtained from a system based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions which are allocated on an adult per capita basis".⁵ Support for such solution has been renewed ever since (Baer et al. 2000; Jamieson 2001; Blanchard & Tirole 2021; Rajan 2021).

While many endorse the egalitarian allocation of emissions permits, economists also considered this outcome as politically unfeasible. Thus, to preserve the current level of inequalities and to preclude transfers between countries, they adjusted their (integrated assessment) models by assigning more weight to the interest of rich countries (Stanton 2011).

Gollier & Tirole (2015) synthesize the distributional decision with a *generosity* parameter which would allocate emissions permit to countries in proportion to their population if set to one, in proportion to their emissions (on the start date of the policy) if set to zero, and as a mixture of the egalitarian and grandfathering rules if set in between. Using a similar formula in the context of a tax, Cramton et al. (2015) (summarized in MacKay et al. 2015) propose that countries with emissions per capita around the average fix the generosity parameter, so that it is strategically chosen to maximize the tax rate, and to fix the tax rate at the minimum price proposed by participating countries. Negotiations would exclude countries with low ambition beforehand; and the treaty would impose trade sanctions on non-participating countries. van den Bergh et al. (2020) propose a "dual-track transition to global carbon pricing": an expanding climate club that would integrate existing and new emissions trading systems, and a reorientation of UNFCCC negotiations towards a global carbon price and burden-sharing rules. The IMF (2019) also supports global carbon pricing or, as a first step, a carbon price floor. They propose either differentiated prices among countries or international transfers, and estimate that a price of \$75/tCO₂ in 2030 would be compatible with a 2°C trajectory.

Other authors have put forth more radical proposals. For instance, Weitzman (2017) envisions a World Climate Assembly with proportional representation at the global scale, so that the median (human) voter would choose the carbon price level. To finance an adaptation fund, Chancel & Piketty (2015) propose a global *progressive* carbon tax (or a progressive tax on air tickets as a first step), so that rich people (who are high emitters) contribute more to the public good. Fleurbaey & Zuber (2013) highlight that, given that current emitters are probably richer than future victims of climate change damages, cli-

⁵By "adult per capita", Grubb (1990) means that permits would be allocated equally among adults.

³⁵⁴ mate policies deserve a *negative* discount rate. In other words, we cannot dissociate the
³⁵⁵ climate issue from global inequalities, and an ethical response to this issue requires global
³⁵⁶ redistribution.

³⁵⁷ **A.2.2 Climate burden sharing**

³⁵⁸ The literature has discussed different burden-sharing principles (Ringius et al. 2002).
³⁵⁹ While there is no agreement on their definitions as different approaches are used (cost
³⁶⁰ sharing, effort sharing, or resource sharing, see Section A.1.2), we describe here the burden-
³⁶¹ sharing principles consistently using the resource sharing approach (i.e., allocating emis-
³⁶² sions rights). For other papers that define or compare different burden-sharing principles,
³⁶³ see Vaillancourt & Waaub (2004), Zhou & Wang (2016), Leimbach & Giannousakis (2019).

³⁶⁴ **Equal per capita.** The simplest principle is perhaps to allocate each year's global carbon
³⁶⁵ quota based on an equal right to emit per capita, or an equal right to emit for each adult.
³⁶⁶ Implementing this principle would result in large transfers from high-emitting to low-
³⁶⁷ emitting countries (Young-Brun et al. 2023).

³⁶⁸ **Grandfathering.** In contrast, *grandfathering* entails allocating emissions rights in pro-
³⁶⁹ portion to current emissions. From the perspective of allocating carbon pricing revenues
³⁷⁰ between countries, grandfathering amounts to each country retaining the revenues it col-
³⁷¹ lects. Given that nations are sovereign and have not agreed to share emissions rights,
³⁷² this principle can be considered as the default option against which the other ones can be
³⁷³ compared in terms of distributive effects.

³⁷⁴ **Historical responsibilities.** At the opposite end of the spectrum is the principle of *his-
375 torical responsibilities*, which assigns to each country a carbon budget proportional to its
³⁷⁶ population. Countries that have emitted more than the average have accumulated a car-
³⁷⁷ bon debt towards countries that have emitted less, which have a carbon credit.⁶

³⁷⁸ To fully specify this rule, one needs to define a start date for the responsibilities on
³⁷⁹ past emissions and specify how to account for population size. 1990 is often chosen as
³⁸⁰ a start year as it is the date of the first IPCC assessment report, marking the widespread

⁶It is not clear how these debts would be settled. Approaches could involve carbon removal from the atmosphere, or using a conventional social cost of carbon to monetize them, by crediting (positively or negatively) emissions rights to countries in an international carbon market.

³⁸¹ acknowledgment of climate change, though variants include 1972, 1960, 1950 or 1850.⁷
³⁸² Several solutions have been proposed to account for evolving populations, none of which
³⁸³ is flawless. Matthews (2015) allocates emissions rights on a given year proportionally to
³⁸⁴ the countries' populations in that year. An alternative is to use fixed populations, such
³⁸⁵ as the populations at the chosen start year (Neumayer 2000), or at a future date such
³⁸⁶ as projected when the global total population will reach 9 billion (Raupach et al. 2014).
³⁸⁷ Fanning & Hickel (2023) convert the projected climate debt up to 2050 into monetary
³⁸⁸ terms in a 1.5°C scenario.

³⁸⁹ The rationale for using fixed populations is to prevent countries from intentionally
³⁹⁰ increasing their population size to gain more emissions rights. However, this approach
³⁹¹ treats countries with different demographic trajectories similarly, effectively penalizing
³⁹² countries which grow more than others (if past populations are used) or grow more than
³⁹³ expected (if future populations are used). Using current populations like Matthews (2015)
³⁹⁴ also comes with its own problems. Consider two countries having contributed very little
³⁹⁵ to cumulative emissions, with the same emissions per capita but different demographic
³⁹⁶ patterns: country A's population has doubled in the last 30 years, while country B's pop-
³⁹⁷ulation has remained stable. Despite the similar present situation, country B would ac-
³⁹⁸cumulate more carbon credit than country A. Essentially, compensating country B more
³⁹⁹ due to its past population size amounts to compensating the dead although it is future
⁴⁰⁰ generations who will suffer. That being said, using current populations is likely a more
⁴⁰¹viable solution than relying on fixed populations since, in practice, countries with similar
⁴⁰²emissions per capita tend to have relatively similar demographic trajectories.

⁴⁰³ **Ability to pay.** Another prominent burden-sharing principle is the ability to pay whereby
⁴⁰⁴ richer countries should contribute more to mitigation efforts. To operationalize this prin-
⁴⁰⁵ciple, Baer et al. (2008) define *capacity* as the share of global income above an exemption
⁴⁰⁶threshold. They use the threshold of \$7,500 per year (in 2005 PPP), which corresponds to
⁴⁰⁷the top 28% of the global income distribution. According to this principle, the effort of a
⁴⁰⁸country should be proportional to the revenues it would raise with a linear income tax on
⁴⁰⁹individual income above \$7,500.

⁴¹⁰ **Climate Equity Reference Framework** Baer et al. (2008) propose another effort-sharing
⁴¹¹method, the *Climate Equity Reference Framework* (CERF), which blends the ability to pay

⁷Climate equity monitor uses 1850 for example.

principle with their version of historical responsibilities. They define *responsibility* as follows: they determine the mitigation requirement as the emissions gap between the Business as Usual scenario from IEA (2007) and a 2°C (with 68-86% probability) scenario. The mitigation requirement is then allocated to countries proportionally to their cumulative emissions (starting in 1990). The emissions right of a country according to their *responsibility* are then determined by its Business as Usual emissions minus its mitigation requirement. A country's emissions right, dubbed its *greenhouse development right* (GDR), is defined using a combination of *capacity* (C) and *responsibility* (R) to allocate the mitigation requirement between countries. This allocation key is called the *Responsibility and Capacity Indicator* (RCI) and defined as $RCI = R^a \cdot C^{1-a}$, with $a = .4$.

This choice of parameter may seem somewhat arbitrary, but the [EcoEquity calculator](#) allows for a customization all CERF parameters (Holz et al. 2018; Holz et al. 2019). The Climate Action Network has adopted the CERF as its *fair share* framework, though the different national chapters of the organization could not agree on a choice of parameters (Athanasou et al. 2022).⁸

The CERF approach was adopted by a prominent network of climate NGOs because it operationalizes the principle of *common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities* recognized by the UNFCCC. However, this approach suffers from three drawbacks. First, its definition of historical responsibility as an effort sharing principle is inconsistent with the principle of an equal right of cumulative emissions per capita, which is a resource sharing principle. For instance, consider a fully decarbonized country that has exhausted *exactly* its cumulative carbon budget. According to the CERF notion of *responsibility*, this country would still be expected to contribute significantly to mitigation efforts due to its relatively high cumulative emissions. Yet, according to the usual definition of the historical responsibility based on an equal right of cumulative emissions p.c., this country would have no liability as it has not exceeded its carbon budget. Second, a country with moderate incomes⁹ and low historical responsibility would be assigned a relatively low effort, even if its emissions per capita are high. In other words, the CERF

⁸The U.S. Climate Action Network and the think tank EcoEquity (funded by Tom Athanasiou and late Paul Baer) choose the following parameters: an equal weight for R and C ($a = .5$), their own **business as usual projections** of CO₂ emissions based on trends of GDP growth and emissions intensity reduction, a 1.5°C (Low Energy Demand) pathway, 1950 as the start year for responsibility, a gradual inclusion of income to compute *capacity* (which adds complexity to the calculation) from a full exemption of the bottom 70% (\$7,500 per year) linearly to a full inclusion of the top 2% (\$72,211), the inclusion of non-CO₂ gases but not of emissions embodied in trade (i.e. imported emissions) nor LULUCF (land-use).

⁹Using the above parameters, moderate incomes means few incomes above the global 70th. percentile.


approach favors countries that have experienced recent growth. Third, the poorest countries would be granted emissions rights close to the Business as Usual trajectory, as they would bear virtually none of the effort. But this trajectory carries the current (unfair) income distribution and amounts to grandfathering. For example, the baseline trajectory for emissions¹⁰ in the DRC entail 0.8 tCO₂ p.c. in 2030, which is five times less than the world average emissions right per capita. In this framework, if the DRC were to grow faster than projected in the baseline, it would actually have to pay to the rest of the world for mitigation efforts. This is what is likely to happen to countries like Mexico or Senegal, from our simulation of the net gains of CERF compared to a situation without international transfers (see Figure S1). In contrast, a resource sharing approach based on equal per capita emissions would result in low-income countries receiving emissions rights exceeding their projected trajectories, leading to transfers from high-income countries. By construction, such transfers do not occur in an effort sharing approach like the CERF, implying lower transfers to low-income countries. Compared to an equal right to emit per capita, this method favors countries like China (whose emissions are allowed to remain stable over 2020-2030 instead of a reduction of 35-40%) and penalizes regions like Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (see Figure S2).

Contraction and Convergence. Meyer (2004) defines a rule called *contraction and convergence* (C&C), which combines elements of grandfathering and equal per capita approaches. According to C&C, each country is granted (tradable) emissions rights, starting at their current emission level and converging linearly to an equal per capita level at some pre-specified date. The *contraction* part refers to the reduction of total emissions rights in line with the climate objective. When discussed around year 2000, the convergence date was specified between 2020 and 2050. This rule, advocated by the Global Commons Institute (a UK think tank), was on the agenda from COP2 to COP15 (i.e., until Copenhagen, and including in Kyoto), including at Kyoto, and was endorsed by the European Parliament in 1998. More recently, Gignac & Matthews (2015) have shown how C&C can be made consistent with historical responsibilities by computing carbon debts and credits until the convergence date.

Assessments of the NDCs against burden-sharing principles. The regime established by the 2015 Paris agreement to regulate climate change respects none of the burden-

¹⁰The baseline trajectory is computed as the “product of the projected GDP and CO₂ emission intensity”.

Figure S1: Net gains from the CERF burden-sharing rule in 2030.




Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO₂.

sharing principles and relies instead on voluntary contributions from each country, known as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). A body of literature (reviewed by [Höhne et al. 2014](#)) assesses the NDCs against the emissions reduction objective and different burden-sharing principles. To evaluate the NDCs, [Gao et al. \(2019\)](#) examine their emissions projections for 2030 and estimate the resulting increase in temperature. The most recent and comprehensive assessment of NDCs against burden-sharing principles is conducted by [van den Berg et al. \(2020\)](#) (see also [Raupach et al. 2014](#); [Robiou du Pont et al. 2016](#); [Robiou du Pont et al. 2017](#)).

479 A.2.3 Global redistribution

480 **Lack of cooperation vs. lack of redistribution.** Major social science scholarship from
 481 Realism in International Relations to game theory of international environmental agree-
 482 ments in economics has pointed to lack of cooperation as the major obstacle to global
 483 sustainability ([Waltz 1979](#); [Snidal 1991](#); [Barrett 1994](#); [Nordhaus 2015](#)). Another body of
 484 literature on international climate cooperation emphasises redistribution from North to
 485 South as a key condition for making global climate policy work, noting the historical

Figure S2: Difference between net gains from Greenhouse Development Rights and equal rights per capita.



Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with $>50\%$ chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO₂.

486 responsibility of major emitters in the Global North ([Parks & Roberts 2008](#); [Friman &](#)

487 [Strandberg 2014](#); [Bou-Habib 2019](#); [Aklin & Mildenberger 2020](#)). Taking the second per-

488 spective, making progress on international climate policy also requires a decision on how

489 the burden of climate change mitigation can be shared fairly. This raises the question of

490 whether citizens around the world support such global redistribution policies or, more

491 specifically, whether citizens in high-income countries are willing to make sacrifices to

492 combat climate change and extreme poverty.

493 While we cannot test conditional cooperation as part of the present analysis, our em-

494 pirical results document that if the North-South redistribution would be implemented as

495 part of global climate policies, they would receive strong public support.

496 **Studies on global redistribution** Addressing global poverty, inequalities, and climate

497 change are central to the universally agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). As

498 highlighted by [Bolch et al. \(2022\)](#) and [Fabre \(2024\)](#), low-income countries often lack suf-

499 ficient domestic resources to eradicate poverty in the short term, indicating the need for

500 international transfers to rapidly end global poverty. In *Beyond the Welfare State*, Gunnar
501 Myrdal (1960) called for a *welfare world*. In his Nobel lecture, he emphasized the neces-
502 sity of increasing foreign aid to low-income countries, stating that “The type of marginal
503 foreign aid we have provided, is clearly not enough to meet their barest needs” (Myrdal
504 1975).

505 Drawing on the labor theory of value, some economists have argued that global in-
506 equalities arise from unequal exchange in international trade (Arghiri 1972). Indeed, the
507 stark disparity in wages between countries implies that one unit of labor exported by an
508 American commands five units of labor embodied in imported goods, whereas Ethiopi-
509 ans need to export 50 units of labor to obtain one unit through imports (Alsamawi et al.
510 2014; Reyes et al. 2017). Taking stock, Hickel (2017) proposes to globally establish mini-
511 mum wages at 50% of the local median wage. Hickel (2017) also suggests other solutions
512 against global inequality, which served as inspiration for our questionnaire. These mea-
513 sures include the cancellation of low-income countries’ public debt, fair trade practices
514 (such as eliminating tariffs from high-income countries, reducing patent protections, and
515 reducing farming subsidies in rich countries), initiatives to combat tax evasion (e.g., im-
516 plementing a global financial register), land reform, and a fair international climate policy.

517 Piketty (2014) prominently advocates for a progressive wealth tax on a global scale,
518 and Piketty (2022) suggests to allocate its revenues to countries in proportion to their
519 population.

520 Kopczuk et al. (2005) compute the optimal linear income tax rates for all countries in
521 two ways: globally centralized and decentralized (i.e., within each country and without
522 international transfers). They show that the average decentralized rate is 41%. In con-
523 trast, the global rate is 62%, which would generate funds to finance a basic income of
524 250\$/month (higher than the GPD per capita of 73 countries). From a current global Gini
525 index of 0.695, they show that decentralized optimal taxation would only marginally re-
526 duce global inequality to 0.69, whereas global taxation would significantly decrease the
527 Gini to 0.25. The study also shows that the existing level of foreign aid can only be ratio-
528 nalized if the U.S. attaches 2,000 less value to a citizen in the poorest countries than to an
529 American citizen (or 1,000 less if half of the transfers are diverted due to corruption).

530 A.2.4 Basic income

531 Unconditional cash transfers (UCT) are increasingly seen as an effective way to end ex-
532 treme poverty. A growing body of evidence from randomized control trials supports this

notion: [Gangopadhyay et al. \(2015\)](#) find that UCT outperform a food subsidy; [Haushofer & Shapiro \(2016\)](#) find significant impacts on health, economic outcomes, and psychological well-being; [Egger et al. \(2022\)](#) find large positive spillovers on non-recipient people, and minimal inflation. Reviews of existing research further confirm the positive outcomes of UCT ([Standing 2014](#); [Bastagli et al. 2016](#)).

While the delivery of cash to remote areas and the prevention of fraud is challenging in regions without a proper civil register, the use of mobile phones as banking and biometric identification tools could provide viable solutions ([Harnett 2017](#)). Although many places still lack internet access, satellite internet technology shows promising progress, with some experts suggesting that it could soon become affordable and universally accessible ([Hanson 2016](#)).

A.2.5 Global democracy

The idea of world federalism has a long-standing history, dating back at least to [Kant \(1795\)](#), who argued that a world federation was essential for achieving perpetual peace. International organizations were eventually created to foster peace, though the League of Nations and its successor, the United Nations, never succeeded in avoiding military conflicts. Many have argued that we need stronger and more democratic global institutions, competent to address global challenges such as extreme poverty, climate change, wars, pandemics, or financial stability. Before World War II, feminist and pacifist [Maverick Lloyd & Schwimmer \(1937\)](#) founded the *Campaign for World Government*, advocating for direct representation at the global scale. [Einstein \(1947\)](#) called for the subordination of the UN Security Council to the General Assembly and the direct election of UN delegates. Since 2007, there has been widespread support for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA) from individuals and institutions in over 150 countries, including 1,800 member of parliament, heads of state, as well the European Parliament, the Pan-African Parliament, and the Latin-American Parliament. The UNPA campaign calls for a gradual implementation of a democratic assembly, starting with a consultative assembly composed of members of national parliaments, allowing for the direct election of its members in voluntary countries, and progressing towards a world parliament with binding legislative powers once all members are directly elected ([Leinen & Bummel 2018](#)). Besides the UNPA, various scholars have put forward different models of global democracy, ranging from deliberative spaces to a world federation ([Archibugi et al. 2011](#)). While the most radical proposals may still be on the horizon, an assembly of random citizens represen-

⁵⁶⁶ tative of the world population has already been convened. It has produced a joint state-
⁵⁶⁷ ment at the COP26 ([Global Assembly 2022](#)), and a similar *World Citizens' Assembly* should
⁵⁶⁸ soon follow. Using surveys covering 86% of global population, [Hale & Koenig-Archipugi](#)
⁵⁶⁹ ([2019](#)) find that the world as a whole is less polarized than some countries and argue
⁵⁷⁰ against the fear people's views would be too diverse for a functioning global democracy.

571 **B Raw results**


572 Country-specific raw results are also available as supplementary material files: **US**,
573 **EU, FR, DE, ES, UK**.

Figure S3: Support for the GCS, NR and the combination of GCS, NR and C (*Yes/No* questions).
(p. 63, Questions 20, 22, 35, 34, and 26).

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)	54	76	80	71	81	74
National redistribution scheme (NR)	56	73	77	66	79	75
National climate policy + GCS + NR	52	74	79	69	81	70

Figure S4: Absolute support for global climate policies.

Share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* (in percent, $n = 40,680$). The color blue denotes an absolute majority. See Figure 2 for the relative support. (Questions A-I of the global survey.)



*In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

Figure S5: Correct answers to comprehension questions (in percent). (Questions 16-18)




Figure S6: Number of correct answers to comprehension questions (mean). (Questions 16-18)




Figure S7: List experiment: mean number of supported policies. (Question 24)




Figure S8: Conjoint analyses 1 and 2. (Questions 25-27)




Figure S9: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See English translations in Figure ED1; Question 29)

(a) Germany


Klimaschutz:
 Verpflichtende Solaranlagen auf allen geeigneten Dächern
 Plan zur Wärmedämmung
 Verbot des Verkaufs von Neuwagen mit Verbrennungsmotor bis 2030

Wirtschaftspolitik:
 Erhöhung des Regelsatzes des Bürgergelds auf bis zu 600€ pro Monat
 Bürgerversicherung als gerechtere Sozialversicherung
 Staatsschuldenquote auf unter 60% reduzieren
 Investitionen für Gigabit–Netzwerke bereitstellen

Außenpolitik:
 Globales Klimaprogramm
 Globale Steuer auf Millionäre
 Globale demokratische Versammlung zum Klimawandel
 Verdopplung der Mittel für die Entwicklungshilfe in einkommensschwachen Ländern

Gesellschaft:
 Volksentscheid auf Bundesebene
 Cannabis-Legalisierung

Steuerpolitik:
 Nationales Umverteilungsprogramm
 Die Vermögenssteuer wieder in Kraft setzen



(b) France


Climat:
 Interdiction des véhicules les plus polluants dans les centres-villes (ZFE)
 Plan pour l'isolation thermique
 Interdiction de la vente de voitures thermiques neuves d'ici 2030

Économie:
 Versement du RSA aux 18–25 ans sans emploi
 SMIC à 1600€ net par mois
 Recul de l'âge légal de départ à la retraite à 65 ans
 Hausse de 20% du financement de l'hôpital public et de l'Éducation nationale

Politique étrangère:
 Plan mondial pour le climat
 Taxe mondiale sur les millionnaires
 Assemblée démocratique mondiale sur le changement climatique
 Doubler l'aide au développement des pays à faibles revenus

Démocratie:
 Élection des députés à la proportionnelle
 Référendum d'Initiative Citoyenne (RIC)

Fiscalité:
 Plan de redistribution nationale
 Rétablissement de l'impôt sur la fortune (ISF)



(c) Spain

Política climática:
 100% de electricidad producida con energías renovables en 2040
 Plan de aislamiento térmico
 Prohibir la venta de coches nuevos con motor de combustión para 2030

Asuntos económicos:
 Más necesidades sanitarias dentro del sistema público (cuidado dental, gafas, salud mental)
 Ingreso Básico Garantizado de 600€ al mes
 Jornada laboral de 34 horas semanales
 Inversión en el sistema educativo y universalización de la educación preescolar

Política exterior:
 Plan climático global
 Impuesto mundial a los millonarios
 Asamblea democrática mundial sobre el cambio climático
 Duplicar la ayuda exterior a los países de renta baja

Asuntos sociales:
 Reformar la ley electoral para hacer el Senado más proporcional
 Abolición de la prostitución

Sistema fiscal:
 Plan de redistribución nacional
 Aumentar los impuestos sobre las rentas superiores a 100.000 euros anuales




Figure S10: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements seen as important for supporting the GCS in a 4-Likert scale (in percent). (Question 32)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
It would succeed in limiting climate change	78	85	85	86	86	83
It would hurt the [Country] economy	81	67	61	67	66	69
It would penalize my household	75	60	55	63	59	63
It would make people change their lifestyle	78	79	83	79	78	77
It would reduce poverty in low-income countries	77	85	88	85	86	81
It might be detrimental to some poor countries	79	72	79	67	78	70
It could foster global cooperation	82	81	81	82	85	80
It could fuel corruption in low-income countries	79	75	82	69	79	72
It could be subject to fraud	80	79	80	74	83	81
It would be technically difficult to put in place	77	71	74	62	79	71
Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences	89	82	89	68	91	88

Figure S11: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements found in the open-ended field on the GCS (manually recoded, in percent).

"When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to your mind? Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme." (Question 31)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
environment	26	31	37	26	43	24
unclassifiable	25	24	23	28	25	22
pro	22	23	21	22	33	20
con	22	17	12	18	20	16
cost	17	12	11	14	17	7
poorest humans	11	7	6	9	5	6
tax redistribution	10	7	11	8	4	9
support	8	6	3	5	6	8
oppose	7	3	2	3	1	4
don't know	6	8	10	8	7	10
empty	6	3	0	0	0	13
difficult agreement	5	10	7	12	8	8
difficult implement	3	5	5	6	4	6
misunderstands gcs	3	2	2	1	3	1
misunderstands question	2	2	1	3	3	3

Figure S12: Perceptions of the GCS. Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).

"When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to your mind? Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme." (Question 31)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
world: international world country global	28	22	23	19	22	23
environment: climat environment animal emission natur	26	21	17	28	21	17
poorest: poor low-income 700 poverty	16	8	8	9	4	10
pro: pro pros pros pros:	16	3	0	1	9	5
con: con cons cons cons:	15	4	0	1	8	6
cost: cost expensive higher price 85 inflation	13	7	5	9	7	6
tax: tax	8	3	4	3	2	2
redistribution: rich redistribu	8	4	5	4	3	5
implementation: implement enforce polic monitor	6	4	5	6	0	5
agreement: agree accept participat	3	4	5	6	2	3

Figure S13: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality (mean). (Question 33)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Donation to own country	35	34	31	38	34	32
Donation to Africa	32	35	33	41	32	33

Figure S14: Support for a national wealth tax.

"Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: affordable housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and schools]?" (Question 34)




Figure S15: Support for a global wealth tax.

"Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-income countries?

Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education." (Question 35)




Figure S16: Preferred share of global wealth tax revenues that should be pooled to finance low-income countries. (Question 36)




Figure S17: Support for sharing half of global tax revenues with low-income countries, rather than each country retaining all the revenues it collects (in percent). (Question 37)




Figure S18: Perceived foreign aid. “From your best guess, what percentage of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?” (Question 38)

Actual values: France: 0.8%; Germany: 1.3%; Spain: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%; U.S.: 0.4%.




Figure S19: Preferred foreign aid (without info on actual amount).

"If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?" (Question 39)




Figure S20: Preferred foreign aid (after info on actual amount).

"Actually, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid.

If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?" (Question 39)




Figure S21: Actual, perceived and preferred amount of foreign aid, with random info (or not) on actual amount. (*Mean* in percent of public spending, Questions 38, 39)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Actual foreign aid (in % of public spending)	0.4	1.1	0.8	1.3	0.5	1.7
Belief about foreign aid	4.7	2.9	2.7	2.9	2.8	3.5
Preferred foreign aid (with info)	1.8	2.7	3.4	2.9	2.1	2.5
Preferred foreign aid (no info)	4	3.9	4.7	4.4	3.1	3.4

Figure S22: Preferred foreign aid (after info or after perception). (Questions 38 and 39)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as current	70	75	91	76	77	57
Preferred foreign aid is higher than current	47	59	75	58	63	43
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as perceived	57	74	83	79	77	58
Preferred foreign aid is higher than perceived	37	53	64	59	54	39

Figure S23: Preferences for funding increased foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]
 "How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent) (Question 40)




Figure S24: Preferences of spending following reduced foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]
 "How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent) (Question 41)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Higher spending on defense	19	23	11	21	17	31
Higher spending on retirement pensions	23	41	22	51	57	35
Higher spending on healthcare	40	57	31	42	80	70
Higher spending on welfare benefits	13	20	7	19	39	20
Higher spending on education	30	45	31	47	58	43
Higher spending on other programs	6	6	6	4	9	8
Lower taxes on the wealthiest	5	2	5	2	0	2
Lower corporate income tax rate	12	6	10	4	8	6
Lower personal income tax rates	48	29	26	27	37	30
Lower public deficit	32	24	21	13	41	21

Figure S25: Willingness to sign real-stake petition for the Global Climate Scheme or National Redistribution, compared to stated support in corresponding subsamples (e.g. support for the GCS in the branch where the petition was about the GCS). (Question 42)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Petition for the GCS	51	69	69	66	78	69
(Comparable) support for the GCS	53	76	81	74	81	74
Petition for NR	57	67	65	66	74	68
(Comparable) support for NR	58	72	76	65	78	75

Figure S26: Absolute support for various global policies (Percent of (*somewhat or strong*) support). (Questions 43 and 44. See Figure 3 for the relative support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	41	54	52	53	62	51
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	53	65	62	66	68	62
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	45	58	55	60	62	54
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	31	37	36	30	45	40
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	34	44	44	43	52	43
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	39	49	39	51	50	54
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	42	55	54	54	61	53
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	44	70	73	70	72	65
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	34	45	40	48	44	50
National tax on millionaires funding public services	62	76	70	79	79	77
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	58	71	69	72	78	71

Figure S27: Preferred approach of diplomats at international climate negotiations. In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend [own country] interests or global justice? (Question 48)




Figure S28: Percent of selected issues viewed as important.
 “To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem?” (Question 55)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Income inequality in [Country]	55	59	54	58	71	57
Climate change	59	66	66	63	73	63
Global poverty	50	57	50	58	75	49

Figure S29: Group defended when voting.
 “What group do you defend when you vote?” (Question 56)




Figure S30: Mean prioritization of policies.

Mean number of points allocated policies to express intensity of support (among six policies chosen at random). Blue color means that the policy has been awarded more points than the average policy.

"In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

How do you allocate the points among the following policies?" (Question 57)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	13	21	10	14	35	31
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	23	22	25	21	22	23
econ3	21	15	13	18	17	13
econ4	28	22	27	17	24	20
soc1	10	17	13	17	12	21
soc2	13	9	14	8	10	8
climate1	14	15	11	18	20	12
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	20	18	22	19	15	17
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030	11	9	8	8	9	11
tax1: National redistribution scheme	14	15	16	15	15	15
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	19	19	21	18	17	19
foreign1: Global climate scheme	15	20	20	23	16	17
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	21	20	20	23	19	20
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	15	15	15	17	14	13
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	9	11	13	14	9	8

Figure S31: Positive prioritization of policies.

Percent of people allocating a positive number of points to policies, expressing their support (among six policies chosen at random).

"In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

How do you allocate the points among the following policies?" (Question 57)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	64	78	61	67	96	95
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	83	86	85	84	87	89
econ3	81	69	50	78	80	68
econ4	88	86	91	79	89	85
soc1	57	75	69	74	74	78
soc2	58	58	72	53	64	48
climate1	70	76	65	79	89	75
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	79	83	86	84	78	80
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030	62	58	56	48	60	70
tax1: National redistribution scheme	67	79	79	76	82	79
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	80	79	76	78	83	85
foreign1: Global climate scheme	71	83	84	85	84	78
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	80	81	79	83	82	82
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	71	77	79	74	83	76
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	58	70	79	74	74	57

Figure S32: Charity donation.

"How much did you give to charities in 2022?" (Question 49)




Figure S33: Interest in politics.

"To what extent are you interested in politics?" (Question 50)




Figure S34: Desired involvement of government (from 1 to 5). (Question 51)




Figure S35: Political leaning on economics (from 1: Left to 5: Right). (Question 52)




Figure S36: Voted in last election. (Question 53)




Figure S37: Vote in last election (aggregated). PNR includes people who did not vote or prefer not to answer. (Question 54)




Figure S38: Perception that survey was biased.
“Do you feel that this survey was politically biased?” (Question 60)





Figure S39: Opinion on the fight against extreme poverty.

“According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme poverty in low-income countries?” (Question 61)

(a) Elements found in the open-ended field on the question
(manually recoded, in percent)



(b) Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).




Figure S40: Main attitudes by vote (“Right” spans from Center-right to Far right).
 (Relative support in percent in Questions 20, 35, 44, 45, 48)

	Europe Left	Europe PNR/Non-voter	Europe Right	U.S. Left	U.S. PNR/Non-voter	U.S. Right
Support for the GCS	85	72	71	74	53	26
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	94	83	76	85	71	40
Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries*	61	52	45	55	67	41
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	73	65	52	62	49	23
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	93	79	74	87	70	38
[Country]'s foreign aid should be increased	78	62	54	75	64	34
Universalist*	56	48	26	53	49	23

574 C Questionnaire of the global survey (section on global
575 policies)

576 A. At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be
577 put in place? (Multiple answers are possible) [Figures 2 and S4]
578 *Global; [Federal / European / ...]; [State / National]; Local*

579 B. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “[country] should take mea-
580 sures to fight climate change.”
581 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly
582 agree*

583 C. How should [country] climate policies depend on what other countries do?
584 • If other countries do more, [country] should do...
585 • If other countries do less, [country] should do...

586 *Much less; Less; About the same; More; Much more*

587 D. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] All countries have signed the
588 Paris agreement that aims to contain global warming “well below +2 °C’. To limit
589 global warming to this level, there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we
590 can emit globally, called the carbon budget. Each country could aim to emit less
591 than a share of the carbon budget. To respect the global carbon budget, countries
592 that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less
593 than their share.

594 Do you support such a policy? [Figures 2 and S4]
595 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
596 support*

597 E. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] Suppose the above policy is in
598 place. How should the carbon budget be divided among countries? [Figures 2 and
599 S4]
600 *The emission share of a country should be proportional to its population, so that each human
601 has an equal right to emit.; The emission share of a country should be proportional to its
602 current emissions, so that those who already emit more have more rights to emit.; Countries
603 that have emitted more over the past decades (from 1990 onwards) should receive a lower*

604 *emission share, because they have already used some of their fair share.; Countries that will*
605 *be hurt more by climate change should receive a higher emission share, to compensate them*
606 *for the damages.*

607 F. [In the U.S., Denmark, and France only] To achieve a given reduction of greenhouse
608 gas emissions globally, costly investments are needed. Ideally, how should countries
609 bear the costs of fighting climate change?

- 610 • Countries should pay in proportion to their income
- 611 • Countries should pay in proportion to their current emissions [Used as a sub-
612 stitute to the equal right per capita in Figure 2]
- 613 • Countries should pay in proportion to their past emissions (from 1990 on-
614 wards) [Used as a substitute to historical responsibilities in Figure 2]
- 615 • The richest countries should pay it all, so that the poorest countries do not have
616 to pay anything
- 617 • The richest countries should pay even more, to help vulnerable countries face
618 adverse consequences: vulnerable countries would then receive money instead
619 of paying [Used as a substitute to compensating vulnerable countries in Figures
620 2 and S4]

621 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly*
622 *agree*

623 G. Do you support or oppose establishing a global democratic assembly whose role
624 would be to draft international treaties against climate change? Each adult across
625 the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly. [Figures 2 and S4]
626 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
627 *support*

628 H. Imagine the following policy: a global tax on greenhouse gas emissions funding a
629 global basic income. Such a policy would progressively raise the price of fossil fuels
630 (for example, the price of gasoline would increase by [40 cents per gallon] in the
631 first years). Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil
632 fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Revenues from the tax would be used to
633 finance a basic income of [\$30] per month to each human adult, thereby lifting the
634 700 million people who earn less than \$2/day out of extreme poverty. The average

635 [American] person would lose a bit from this policy as they would face [\$130] per
636 month in price increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive.

637 Do you support or oppose such a policy? [Figures 2 and S4]

638 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
639 *support*


- 640 I. Do you support or oppose a tax on all millionaires around the world to finance low-
641 income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate ac-
642 tion? This would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drink-
643 ing water, healthcare, and education. [Figures 2 and S4]
644 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
645 *support*

646 **D Questionnaire of the Western surveys**

647 Below, we provide the generic questionnaire (based on the U.S. version), which roughly
648 corresponds to the *Eu* questionnaire as well as the combination of the *US1* and *US2* ques-
649 tionnaire. The main difference between Europe and the U.S. is that we split the *US2*
650 sample into four random branches to include some treatments before the Section D on
651 the GCS. Besides the control group, the treatments are: information regarding the sup-
652 port of Americans for the GCS and NR, an open-ended field, and a closed question on the
653 pros and cons of the GCS. The pros and cons of the GCS are also asked in *Eu* (likewise,
654 either as an open-ended field or a question), but only in Section D, after the support.

655 At each section or question, square brackets specify in which questionnaires it is present
656 (*US1*, *US2* and/or *Eu*) as well as country specificities. Figure S41 displays the structure of
657 each questionnaire. Each treatment randomization is independent. Qualtrics and Word
658 versions of the questionnaires in each language are available on our [public repository](#),
659 together with a spreadsheet that summarizes country specificities and our sources.

Figure S41: Western surveys' structure. Cf. Figure 1 for a simplified version.



660 [Eu, US1, US2] Socio-demographic characteristics

661 1. Welcome to this survey!

662
663 This survey is **anonymous** and is conducted for research purposes on a representa-
664 tive sample of [1,000 British people].

665
666 It takes [US1, US2: 10 to 15 min; Eu: around 20 min] to complete.

667
668 The survey contains lotteries and awards for those who get the correct answer to
669 some understanding questions.

670 If you are attentive and lucky, you can win up to [US1, Eu: \$350; US2: \$150] in
671 points. (See terms and conditions).

672 Please answer every question carefully.

673
674 Do you agree to participate in the survey?

675 Yes; No

676 2. What is your gender? [gender]

677 Woman; Man; Other

678 3. How old are you? [age]

679 Below 18; 18 to 20; 21 to 24; 25 to 29; 30 to 34; 35 to 39; 40 to 44; 45 to 49; 50 to 54; 55 to
680 59; 60 to 64; 65 to 69; 70 to 74; 75 to 79; 80 to 84; 85 to 89; 90 to 99; 100 or above

681 4. [Eu] In which country do you live? [country]

682 France; Germany; Spain; United Kingdom; Other

683 5. What is your ZIP code? [zipcode UK: What is your Outcode (the left part of your
684 postcode, e.g. if your postcode is N7 8H7, just enter N7)?]

685 6. Do you live with your partner (if you have one)? [couple]

686 Yes; No

687 7. How many people are in your household? The household includes: you, the mem-
688 bers of your family who live with you, and your dependants. [hh_size]

689 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more

- 690 8. [Eu] How many children below 14 live with you? [Nb_children_14]
691 1; 2; 3; 4 or more
- 692 9. [US1, US2] What race or ethnicity do you identify with? (Multiple answers are
693 possible) [race]
694 White; Black or African American; Hispanic; Asian; American Indian or Alaskan Native;
695 Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; Other: {open field}; Prefer not to say
- 696 10. What is the [US1, US2: annual; Eu: monthly] gross income of your household (before
697 withholding tax)? This includes all income: wages, self-employment earnings, So-
698 cial Security benefits, pensions, investment income, welfare payments, and income
699 from other sources. [income]
700 [US1, US2: Items based on household total income deciles and quartiles, namely:
701 Less than \$20,000; between \$20,001 and \$35,000; between \$35,001 and \$42,000; between
702 \$42,001 and \$50,000; between \$50,001 and \$65,000; between \$65,001 and \$82,000; between
703 \$82,001 and \$103,000; between \$103,001 and \$130,000; between \$130,001 and \$145,000;
704 between \$145,001 and \$165,000; between \$165,001 and \$250,000; More than \$250,000; I
705 prefer not to answer;
706 Eu: custom thresholds, taking into account household composition Questions 6-8,
707 and corresponding to the country's deciles and quartiles of standard of living, cf.
708 the sheet "Income" in [this spreadsheet](#)]
- 709 11. What is the highest level of education you have completed? [education, post_secondary]
710 [Below upper secondary, Upper secondary, and Post secondary are coded as the first two,
711 middle three, and last three items, respectively.
712 US1, US2: Primary school or less; Eighth grade; Some high school; Regular high school
713 diploma/GED or alternative credential; Some college, no degree; 2-year college degree or as-
714 sociates degree (for example: AA, AS); Bachelor's degree (for example: BA, BS); Master's
715 degree or above (MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA, MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD, PhD);
716 FR: École primaire / Aucun; Brevet; CAP ou BEP; Baccalauréat professionnel ou tech-
717 nologique; Baccalauréat général; Bac +2 (BTS, DUT, DEUG...); Bac +3 (licence...); Bac
718 +5 ou plus (master, école d'ingénieur ou de commerce, doctorat, médecine, maîtrise, DEA,
719 DESS...)
720 DE: Keine abgeschlossene Schulbildung / Grundschule; Untere Sekundarstufe (z.B. Haupt-
721 oder Realschulabschluss); Erstausbildung; Beruflicher Abschluss / Ausbildung; Abitur;
722 Zweitausbildung; Bachelor oder Fachhochschulabschluss; Master-Abschluss oder höher

723 ES: *Educación primaria / No he completado la enseñanza básica; Educación secundaria obligatoria (ESO); Formación profesional básica (FP); Formación profesional de grado medio; Bachillerato; Formación profesional de grado superior; Grado universitario; Máster/doctorado*
724 UK: *Primary education or less; Some secondary school; GSCE; Vocational Upper secondary (Level 3 award, level 3 certificate, level 3 diploma, advanced apprenticeship, etc.); High school degree (A level); Higher vocational education (Level 4+ award, level 4+ certificate, level 4+ diploma, higher apprenticeship, etc.); Bachelor's Degree (BA, BSc, BEng, etc.); Postgraduate diploma or certificate, Master's Degree (MSc, MA, MBA, etc.) or Ph.D.]*

- 731 12. What is your employment status? [employment_agg]

732 *Full-time employed; Part-time employed; Self-employed; Student; Retired; Unemployed*
733 *(searching for a job); Inactive (not searching for a job)*

- 734 13. Are you a homeowner or a tenant? (Multiple answers are possible) [home_...]

735 *Tenant; Owner; Landlord renting out property; Hosted free of charge*

- 736 14. [If lives with partner: What is the estimated value of your household's assets (in
737 U.S. dollars)? [wealth]]

738 If does not live with partner: What is the estimated value of your assets (in U.S.
739 dollars)?]

740 Include here all your possessions (home, car, savings, etc.) net of debt. For example,
741 if you own a house worth [\$]300,000 and you have [\$]100,000 left to repay on your
742 mortgage, your assets are [\$]200,000.

743 I estimate my [If lives with partner: household's] assets net of debt to be:

744 [Items based on the following individual wealth quintiles, doubled if lives with
745 partner. US1, US2: *Less than \$0 (I have a net debt); Close to \$0; Between \$4,000 and*
746 *\$60,000; Between \$60,000 and \$190,000; More than \$190,000;* For Eu, the thresholds are:
747 FR: €5/50/150/300k; DE: €0/35/130/280k; ES: €0/50/100/200k; UK: £3/45/115/270k]

- 750 15. [US1, US2 (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the vote question)] What

751 do you consider to be your political affiliation, as of today? [political_affiliation]
752 *Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other; Non-Affiliated*

753 [Eu, US1, US2] Global climate scheme

754 In the following, we describe two policies, on which we will survey your opinion.
755 To check that you have attentively read the descriptions, **we will ask some understanding questions afterwards: those who get correct answers can win up to \$150.**

757 **Global climate scheme:** At the Paris agreement in 2015, all countries have agreed
758 to contain global warming “well below +2 °C”. To limit global warming to this
759 level, **there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally.**

760 To meet the climate target, a limited number of permits to emit greenhouse gases
761 can be created globally. Polluting firms would be required to buy permits to cover
762 their emissions. Such a policy would **make fossil fuel companies pay** for their
763 emissions and progressively raise the price of fossil fuels. **Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions.**

766 In accordance with the principle that each human has an equal right to pollute, the
767 revenues generated by the sale of permits could finance a global basic income. **Each**
768 **adult in the world would receive [US1, US2: \$30/month; UK: \$30 (that is £25) per**
769 **month; FR, DE, ES: €30/month], thereby lifting out of extreme poverty the 700 mil-**
770 **lion people who earn less than \$2/day.**

771 **The typical [American] would lose out financially [US1, US2: \$85, FR: €10, DE:**
772 **€25, ES: €5, UK: £20] per month** (as he or she would face [\$115] per month in price
773 increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive).

774 The policy could be put in place as soon as countries totaling more than 60% of
775 global emissions agree on it. Countries that would refuse to take part in the policy
776 could face sanctions (like tariffs) from the rest of the World and would be excluded
777 from the basic income.

- 778 16. Who would win or lose financially in the Global climate scheme? [Figure S5; gcs_win_lose]

780 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

781 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

782 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.;*

783 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

784 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would lose and*

786 *the 700 million poorest humans would win* from the Global climate scheme. Now, here
787 is the second policy:

788

789 **National redistribution scheme:**

790 This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [US1, US2: 5%; Eu: 1%]¹¹ and provide
791 cash transfers to all adults. More precisely, **each [American] adult would receive**
792 **[\$85] per month** (that is [\$1,000] per year). This would be financed by an increase
793 of the federal income tax on household income in excess of [US1, US2: \$315,000 per
794 year; FR: €15,000 per month; DE: €20,000 per month; ES: €10,000 per month; UK:
795 £15,000 per month], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000]. [US1,
796 US2: See more details.] ¹²

- 797 17. Who would win or lose financially in the National redistribution? [Figure S5; nr_win_lose]

798

799 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

800 *Typical [Americans] would win and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Ameri-*
801 *cans] would win and the richest [Americans] would lose.; Typical [Americans] would lose*
802 *and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Americans] would lose and the richest*
803 *[Americans] would lose.*

804

805 [new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would win and*
806 *the richest [Americans] would lose* from the National redistribution scheme.

807

808 To help you with the next question, here is a reminder of the policies:

809

810 **Global Climate scheme:**

811 To limit global warming and reach the international climate objective, the Global

¹¹The wider base in the U.S. was chosen because emissions are larger in the U.S. than in Europe, and it would hardly be feasible to offset the median American's loss from the GCS by taxing only the top 1%.

¹²8% of U.S. respondents click. They then see the following text, based on taxjusticenow.org by Saez & Zucman (2019): *The marginal income tax rates would evolve as follows:*

Below \$315,000: unchanged

\$315,000 - \$400,000: current rate 32% => new rate 41%

\$400,000 - \$600,000: 35% => 50%

\$600,000 - \$2.5 million: 37% => 60%

\$2.5 - \$5 million: 37% => 65%

Above \$5 million: 37% => 70%

812 climate scheme would **impose a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can**
813 **emit globally.**

814 It would **make polluters pay** for their emissions, which in turn would increase fos-
815 sil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities.

816 The revenues would finance a **global basic income** of [\$30] per month for all hu-
817 mans, lifting out of extreme poverty the poorest billion people.

818 Considering the basic income and the fuel price increases, **the typical [American]**
819 **would lose out financially [\$85] per month.**

820

821 **National redistribution scheme:**

822 This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [5%] and provide cash transfers to
823 all adults. More precisely, **each [American] would receive [\$85] per month.** This
824 would be financed by an increase of the federal income tax on household income in
825 excess of [\$315,000 per year], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000
826 per year].

- 827 18. If both the Global climate scheme and the National redistribution scheme are im-
828 plemented, how would a typical [American] be financially affected? [Figure S5;
829 both_win_lose]

830 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

831 *A typical [American] would lose out financially.; A typical [American] would neither gain
832 nor lose.; A typical [American] would gain financially.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was that *A typical [American] would nei-*
834 *ther gain nor lose from both schemes combined.* [US1, Eu: Now, here are the last two
835 policies:]

836

837 **[US1: Coal exit:**

838 To reduce CO₂ emissions, this policy would require all U.S. coal power plants to be
839 phased out by 2030. Coal would be replaced by renewable sources like wind and
840 solar panels as well as stronger reliance on gas power plants.

841 *Eu: **Thermal insulation plan:***

842 To reduce CO₂ emissions and energy insecurity, this policy would require that all
843 buildings meet energy efficiency targets: at least rating E in 2030 and rating C in
844 2040. The [UK] government would subsidise half the cost of insulation for all house-

845 holds, and up to 90% for the poorest households. Insulation work would cost [FR,
846 DE: €25; ES: €20; UK: £25] billion a year, but would deliver energy savings greater
847 than this cost.]

848

849 **[US1: Marriage only for opposite-sex couples:**

850 This policy is a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would legally
851 define marriage as a union of one man and one woman.

852 **Eu: Death penalty for major crimes:**

853 This measure would reintroduce capital punishment for major crimes such as ter-
854 rrorism and mass shootings.]

855

856 Now, we will ask your opinion on the [US1, Eu: four] policies.

857 Click here for the reminder of the [US1, Eu: first] two policies. [Clicking displays the
858 previous summarized descriptions.]

859 19. [US2] [4 Random branches: control (*nothing*); Question 31 (*field*); Question 32 (*impor-
860 tant*); or the following question (*info*).] For information, a recent survey has shown
861 that: [branch_gcs_..., info_support]

- 862
- 64% of Americans support the Global climate scheme.
 - 72% of Americans support the National redistribution scheme.

864 20. Do you support the Global climate scheme? [Figure S3; gcs_support]

865 Yes; No

866 21. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the
867 previous question? [Figure ED3; gcs_belief]

868 The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

869 Percentage of [Americans] in favor of Global climate scheme [slider from 0 to 100]

870 22. Do you support the National redistribution scheme? [Figure S3; nr_support]

871 Yes; No

872 23. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the
873 previous question? [Figure ED3; nr_belief]

874 The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

875 Percentage of [Americans] in favor of National redistribution [slider from 0 to 100]

- 876 24. [Eu, US1] Beware, this question is quite unusual. Among the policies below, **how**
877 **many** do you support? [Figure S7, Table 1; list_exp]
878 [Four random branches. Branch GCS/NR/C/O; branch_list_exp]

879 • Global climate scheme
880 • National redistribution scheme
881 • [Coal exit]
882 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

883 0; 1; 2; 3; 4

884 [Branch GCS/C/O]

885 • Global climate scheme
886 • [Coal exit]
887 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

888 0; 1; 2; 3

889 [Branch NR/C/O]

890 • National redistribution scheme
891 • [Coal exit]
892 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

893 0; 1; 2; 3
894 [Branch C/O]

895 • [Coal exit]
896 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

897 0; 1; 2
898
899
900
901
902
903
904

905 [Eu, US1] Conjoint analyses

- 906 25. Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you prefer? [Figure
907 S8; conjoint_crg_cr]

908 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the
909 same time.

910 Bundle A	911 Bundle B
[Coal exit]	[Coal exit]
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme
Global climate scheme	

912 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 913 26. Do you support Bundle A (combining [Coal exit], the National redistribution scheme,
914 and the Global climate scheme)?[Figure S3; cgr_support]

915 Yes; No

- 916 27. [new page] Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you
917 prefer? [Figure S8; conjoint_b, branch_conjoint_b]

918 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the
919 same time.

920 [Four random branches. Branch C + NR vs. GCS + NR; conjoint_cr_gr]

921 Bundle A	922 Bundle B
[Coal exit]	Global climate scheme
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme

923 [Branch NR vs. NR + C + GCS; conjoint_r_rcg]

924 Bundle A	925 Bundle B
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme [Coal exit] Global climate scheme

926 [Branch NR + GCS vs. NR; conjoint_rg_r]

Bundle A	Bundle B
National redistribution scheme Global climate scheme	National redistribution scheme

927
928 [Branch NR + C vs. NR; conjoint_rc_r]

Bundle A	Bundle B
National redistribution scheme [Coal exit]	National redistribution scheme

930
931
932 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 933 28. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and
934 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies
935 in their platforms.

936 *Eu: Imagine if [DE, ES, UK: the two favorite candidates in your constituency in the
937 next general election; FR: the two candidates in the second round of the next pres-
938 idential election] campaigned with the following policies in their party's platforms.]*

939
940 Which of these candidates would you vote for? [Table 2, Figure S8; conjoint_c, branch_conjoint_

941 [Table 2. Two random branches: with and without the final row. The US1 version of the poli-
942 cies is given below, see the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the European versions.]

	Democrat	Republican
	Increase corporate income tax rate from 21% to 28%	Decrease the payroll tax
943	Coal exit	Permit completion of the Keystone pipeline
	Trillion dollar investment in childcare, healthcare, education and housing	Withdrawal of the Paris agreement
944	\$15 minimum wage	Marriage only for opposite-sex couples
	National redistribution scheme	Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation
945	[Global climate scheme / no row]	[/ no row]

[US1: Democrat; Republican; None of them; Eu: Candidate A; Candidate B; None of them]

- 946 29. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and
 947 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies
 948 in their platforms.

949 *Eu (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the Section “Values and politics”): Imagine*
 950 *that [FR: the left or center-left; DE: a red-red-green coalition; ES: the PSOE; UK:*
 951 *the Labour Party] wins the next [general] elections. Here are two possible platforms*
 952 *on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a*
 953 *pool of credible [FR: left or center-left, DE: left-wing parties’; ES: PSOE; UK: Labour]*
 954 *policies).]*

955
 956 [US1: Which of these candidates do you prefer?

957 *Eu: Even if you [FR: are not from the left or center-left; DE: do not support the left-*
 958 *wing parties; ES: do not support the PSOE; UK: do not support the Labour Party],*
 959 *which of these platforms do you prefer?]*

960 [Figures ED1, S9; see also the sheet “Policies” in *this spreadsheet* for the possible policies.;
 961 conjoint_left_a_b]

	[Candidate A]	[Candidate B]
962	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]

963 [US1: Candidate A; Candidate B; Eu: Platform A; Platform B]

- 964 30. [new page] [Same wording and conditions as above. For brevity, only the UK version
 965 is given here.; conjoint_left_ag_b] Imagine that the Labour Party wins the next
 966 general elections. Here are two possible platforms on which it may campaign (the
 967 policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a pool of credible Labour poli-
 968 cies).

969
 970 Even if you do not support the Labour Party, which of these platforms do you pre-
 971 fer? [Figure ED1]

	Platform A	Platform B
972	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	Foreign policy	Global climate scheme
973		-

Platform A; Platform B

974 [Eu, US2] Perceptions of the GCS

975 [Eu: two random branches. US2: four random branches and the question is asked (if asked)

976 before Question 20; branch_gcs]

- 977 31. [Branch: field] When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to
 978 your mind?

979 Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme. [Figures S11, S12; gcs_field]
 980 {Open field}

981 32. [Branch: important] When determining your support or opposition to the Global
982 climate scheme, which points are important to you? [Figure S10; important_...]

- 983 • It would succeed in limiting climate change.
- 984 • It would hurt the [U.S.] economy.
- 985 • It would penalize my household.
- 986 • It would make people change their lifestyle.
- 987 • It would reduce poverty in low-income countries.
- 988 • It might be detrimental to some poor countries.
- 989 • It could foster global cooperation.
- 990 • It could fuel corruption in low-income countries.
- 991 • It could be subject to fraud.
- 992 • It would be technically difficult to put in place.
- 993 • Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences.

994 *Not at all important; Not so important; Quite important; Very important*

995 **[Eu, US1] Donation lottery**

996 *US1 Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention). [attention_test]*
997 *Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*

998 33. [*Two random branches*] By taking this survey, you are automatically entered into a
999 lottery to win [\$]100 in panel points. This lottery is unrelated to the previous ones
1000 that rewarded answers’ accuracy. In a few days you will know whether you have
1001 been selected in the lottery. The payment will be made to you in the same way as
1002 your compensation for this survey, so no further action is required on your part.

1003
1004 Should you be selected in the lottery, you can also donate a part of this additional
1005 compensation to [[American] / African] people living in poverty through [US1: the
1006 charity GiveDirectly. The charity GiveDirectly; Eu: a charity. We would channel this
1007 donation to a charity that] provides small amounts of cash to people in need in [[the
1008 U.S] / Africa].

1009

1010 **In case you are winner of the lottery, what share of the [\$]100 would you donate**
1011 **to [[American] / African] people living in poverty [US1: through GiveDirectly]?**
1012 [*Figure S13, Table ED2; donation, branch_donation*]
1013 *Amount donated to [[American] / African] people in need (in [\$]) [slider from 0 to 100]*

1014 **[Eu, US2] Wealth tax**

1015 [*Four random branches: Question 35 then Question 34 (global_first); Question 34 then Ques-*
1016 *tion 35 (national_first); Question 36 (global_share); Question 37 (sharing); branch_global_tax*]

1017 34. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: afford-
1018 able housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and
1019 schools]? [*Figures S3, S14; national_tax_support*]

1020 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1021 *support*

1022 35. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-
1023 income countries?

1024 Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking
1025 water, healthcare, and education. [*Figures S3, S15; global_tax_support*]

1026 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1027 *support*

1028 36. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all
1029 countries around the world. In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount
1030 to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE: €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2:
1031 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount
1032 to [\$]1 billion in all low-income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700
1033 million people, most of them in Africa).

1034 Each country would retain part of the revenues it collects, and the remaining part
1035 would be pooled at the global level to finance infrastructure and public services in
1036 low-income countries.

1037
1038 What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of re-
1039 tained in the country's national budget)? [*Figures ED4, S16; global_tax_global_share*]
1040 *Percent of global wealth tax that should go to low-income countries [slider from 0 to 100]*

1041 37. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in
1042 all countries around the world.

1043 In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE:
1044 €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2: 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES:
1045 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount to [\$]1 billion in all low-
1046 income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700 million people, most of
1047 them in Africa).

1048 Which of the following options would you prefer? [Figure S17; global_tax_sharing]

- 1049 • The whole wealth tax financing national budgets in each country. For ex-
1050 ample, in [US2: the U.S., it could finance affordable housing and universal
1051 childcare/pre-K.; Eu-UK: the UK, it could finance the National Health Service
1052 and state-funded schools].
- 1053 • Half of the wealth tax financing national budgets in each country, half of it
1054 financing low-income countries. For example, it could finance [US2: universal
1055 childcare/pre-K in the U.S.; Eu-UK: state-funded schools in the UK] and access
1056 to drinking water, healthcare, and education in Africa.

1057 **[Eu, US2] Foreign aid**

1058 US2 Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention). [attention_test]
1059 *Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*

1060 38. From your best guess, what percentage of [U.S.] government spending is allocated
1061 to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?

1062
1063 For your information, government spending totals [US2: 38%; FR: 55%; DE: 45%; ES:
1064 42%; UK: 41%] of [U.S.] GDP, it includes [US2: federal, State; Eu: national] and local
1065 government spending, and apart from foreign aid, it covers the following items: de-
1066 fense, social security (retirement pensions), health [US2: (including Medicare and
1067 Medicaid)], welfare benefits [US2: (including food stamps and EITC)], education,
1068 roads, justice, other programs [US2: and federal agencies (including in energy, sci-
1069 ence...)]. [Figure S18; foreign_aid_belief]

1070 *Less than 0.1%; 0.1% to 0.2%; 0.3% to 0.5%; 0.6% to 1.0%; 1.1% to 1.7%; 1.8% to 2.6%;
1071 2.7% to 4%; 4.1% to 6%; 6.1% to 9%; 9.1% to 13%; 13.1% to 25%; More than 25%*

- 1072 39. [Two random branches: with or without information on actual amount] [Info: Actually,
1073 [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [the U.S.] government spend-
1074 ing is allocated to foreign aid.]

1075

1076

If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate
1077 to foreign aid? [Figures S21, S22, S19 and S20; foreign_aid_preferred, branch_foreign_aid_pre

- 1078 40. [Asked iff branch: Info and preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than actual for-
1079 eign aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to increase [U.S.] foreign
1080 aid.

1081

1082 How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers
1083 possible) [Figure S23; foreign_aid_raise_how_...]

1084 Lower spending on defense; Lower spending on retirement pensions; Lower spending on
1085 healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Lower spending on welfare benefits [US2: (like
1086 EITC or food stamps)]; Lower spending on education; Lower spending on other programs
1087 [US2: and federal agencies]; Higher taxes on the wealthiest; Higher corporate income tax
1088 rate; Higher personal income tax rates; Higher public deficit

- 1089 41. [Asked iff branch: Info and preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than actual foreign
1090 aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to reduce [U.S.] foreign aid.

1091

1092 How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible) [Fig-
1093 ure S24; foreign_aid_reduce_how_...]

1094 Higher spending on defense; Higher spending on retirement pensions; Higher spending on
1095 healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Higher spending on welfare benefits [US2:
1096 (like EITC or food stamps)]; Higher spending on education; over spending on other pro-
1097 grams [US2: and federal agencies]; Lower taxes on the wealthiest; Lower corporate income
1098 tax rate; Lower personal income tax rates; Lower public deficit

1099 **[Eu, US1] Petition**

- 1100 42. [Two random branches] Would you be willing to sign a petition for the [Global climate
1101 / National redistribution] scheme? [Figure S25; branch_petition, petition, petition_gcs]

1102

1103 As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President's

1104 office], informing him what share of American people are willing to endorse the
1105 [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign,
1106 only your answer here is required and remains anonymous.) Yes; No

1107 **[Eu, US1] Other policies**

1108 43. The following policies are discussed at international negotiations on how to deal
1109 with climate change. [Figures 3 and S26; variables_climate_policies]

1110
1111 Do you support or oppose the following policies?

- 1112 • Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for
1113 climate damages [climate_compensation_support]
- 1114 • High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries [climate_mitigat]
- 1115 • High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income
1116 countries adapt to climate change [climate_adaptation_support]

1117 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1118 support*

1119 44. Do you support or oppose the following global policies? [Figures 3 and S26; variables_global_pol]

- 1120 • Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt [debt_cancellation_support]
- 1121 • Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting
1122 right proportional to its population [democratise_un_imf_support]
- 1123 • Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries [remove_tariffs_support]
- 1124 • A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage [global_min_wage_support]
- 1125 • Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of
1126 all assets [global_register_support]
- 1127 • A maximum wealth limit of [US1: \$10 billion; Eu: [€]100 million] for each
1128 human [cap_wealth_support]

1129 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1130 support*

1131 45. Currently, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [U.S.] govern-
1132 ment spending (that is, [US1: 0.2%; FR: 0.4%; DE: 0.6%; ES: 0.2%; UK: 0.7%] of [U.S.]
1133 GDP) is spent on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries. [Figure
1134 [ED5](#); [foreign_aid_raise_support](#)]

1135

1136 Do you support [the U.S.] transferring more money to low-income countries?
1137 *Yes, [U.S.] foreign aid should be increased.; Yes, but only if some conditions are met.; No,
1138 [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.; No, [U.S.] foreign aid should be reduced.*

1139 46. [Asked only if *Yes, but only if some conditions are met.* is chosen] What conditions
1140 should be required for [the U.S.] to increase its foreign aid? (Multiple answers pos-
1141 sible) [Figures [ED6](#), [S21](#); [foreign_aid_condition_...](#)]
*That recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights.; That recipient
1142 countries cooperate to fight illegal migrations.; That other high-income countries also in-
1143 crease their foreign aid.; That this is financed by increased taxes on millionaires.; That we
1144 can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted.; Other: [open field]*

1145

1146 47. [Asked only if *No, [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.* or *No, [U.S.] foreign aid
1147 should be reduced.* is chosen] Why do you oppose [the U.S.] increasing its foreign
1148 aid? (Multiple answers possible) [Figure [ED7](#); [foreign_aid_no_](#)]
*Aid perpetuates poverty as it makes people feel less responsible for themselves.; Aid is not
1149 effective as most of it is diverted.; Aid is a pressure tactic for high-income countries that
1150 prevents low-income countries from developing freely.; [The U.S.] is not responsible for what
1151 happens in other countries.; Charity begins at home: there is already a lot to do to support
1152 the American people in need.; Other: [open field]*

1153

1154 **[Eu, US1, US2] Values and politics**

1155 48. [Eu (where it is instead asked at the beginning of Section “Other Policies”), US1]
1156 In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend
1157 [U.S.] interests or global justice? [Figure [S27](#); [negotiation](#)]
*[U.S.] interests, even if it goes against global justice; [U.S.] interests, to the extent it re-
1158 spects global justice; Indifferent or don’t know; Global justice, to the extent it respects [U.S.]
1159 interests; Global justice, even if it goes against [U.S.] interests*

1160

1161 49. How much did you give to charities in 2022? [Figure [S32](#); [donation_charities](#)]

1162 *I did not make donations to charities last year.; Less than [\$]100.; Between [\$]101 and*
1163 *[\$]500.; Between [\$]501 and [\$]1,000.; Between [\$]1,001 and [\$]5,000.; More than [\$]5,000.*

1164 50. To what extent are you interested in politics? [Figure S33; interested_politics]
1165 *Not at all; A little; Moderately; A lot; A great deal*

1166 51. Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means you think
1167 the government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic
1168 government functions, and 5 means you think the government should take active
1169 steps in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens? [Figure S34;
1170 involvement_govt]

1171 *Desired involvement of government [slider from 1 to 5]*

1172 52. **On economic policy matters**, where do you see yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where
1173 1 is Left (favoring equality and government interventions) and 5 is Right (favoring
1174 free competition and little government intervention)? [Figure S35; left_right]
1175 *Left (1) to Right (5) on economic issues [slider from 1 to 5]*

1176 53. Did you vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election? [Figure S36; vote_participation]
1177 *Yes; No: I didn't have the right to vote in the U.S.; Prefer not to say*

1178 54. [If voted: Which candidate did you vote for in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election?
1179 If did not vote: Even if you did not vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election,
1180 please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who
1181 represents your views more closely.] [Figure S37; vote_factor, voted]
1182 *[US1, US2: Biden; Trump; Jorgensen; Hawkins; Prefer not to say*

1183 FR: candidates at the 2022 presidential election

1184 DE: parties with more than 1% of votes at the 2021 federal election and *Other*

1185 ES: lists with more than 0.9% at the November 2019 general election and *Other*

1186 UK: parties with more than 0.5% of votes at the 2019 general election and *Other*]

1187 55. To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem? [Figure S28; variables_problem]

- 1188 • Income inequality in [the U.S.] [problem_inequality]
- 1189 • Climate change [problem_climate]
- 1190 • Global poverty [problem_poverty]

1191 *Not an important issue for me; An issue but there are other priorities; An issue but we*
1192 *already do what we can; An important issue, we should do more; One of the most pressing*
1193 *issue of our time*

- 1194 56. What group do you defend when you vote? [Figure S29; group_defended]
1195 *Sentient beings (humans and animals); Humans; [Eu: Europeans]; [Americans]; People*
1196 *sharing my culture or religion; [US1, US2: My State]; [US1, US2: My town; Eu: My*
1197 *country, region or town]; My relatives and/or colleagues; My family and myself*

1198 **[Eu, US1] Prioritization**

- 1199 57. In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The
1200 more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

1201
1202 How do you allocate the points among the following policies? [Figures S30 and S31;
1203 points_foreign1_gcs, points_...]

1204
1205 You can adjust the number of points either using the slider or entering the num-
1206 ber of your choice on the right-hand-side. **The sum of points must equal exactly**
1207 **100**. By pushing the last slider to the right, the total will automatically adjust to 100.
1208 Please read the 6 options before making your choice.

1209 See the sheet “Policies” in [this spreadsheet](#) for the pool of policies in each country.
1210 [sliders from 0 to 100]

1211 **[FR, DE, ES] ETS2**

- 1212 58. Similar to the Global Climate Scheme, the European Climate Scheme would impose
1213 a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit across the EU in the buildings
1214 and transport sectors. It would make polluters pay for their emissions, which in turn
1215 would increase fossil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities. Several options
1216 are possible regarding the use of the scheme’s revenues:

- 1217 • Provide an equal cash transfer of €105 per year to each European.
1218 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European, proportional to their
1219 country’s emissions: people in countries with higher emissions per person (like
1220 Germany) would receive more than people in countries with lower emissions

1221 (like Romania). For information, people in [Germany] would receive €[FR:
1222 110; DE: 130; ES: 90]/year.

- 1223
- Finance low-carbon investments: thermal insulation of buildings, switch to
1224 clean sources of heating, public transportation, and charging stations for elec-
1225 tric vehicles.
 - Provide cash transfers to the most vulnerable half of Europeans and finance
1226 low-carbon investments.
1227

1228 Do you support or oppose the European Climate Scheme in case the revenue is used
1229 to...? [Fig. 1 in [Funke et al. \(2024\)](#); variables_ets2_support]

- 1230
- Provide an equal cash transfer to each European [ets2_equal_cash_support]
 - Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European [ets2_country_cash_support]
 - Finance low-carbon investments [ets2_investments_support]
 - Provide cash transfers for the most vulnerable Europeans and low-carbon in-
1233 vestments [ets2_vulnerable_investments_support]
1234

1235 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1236 support*

1237 59. [Asked iff none of the four variants of the European Climate Scheme is (somewhat or
1238 strongly) supported] Why do you not support a European Climate Scheme? (Mul-
1239 tiple answers possible) [ets2_no_...]

1240 *I am opposed to climate policy being decided at the EU level, it should be decided at the na-
1241 tional level;*

1242 *I would prefer if the revenues were used in a different way (beyond the four suggestions
1243 above) than previously suggested;*

1244 *I would prefer if decreasing carbon emissions were regulated by other climate policies;*

1245 *I am generally opposed to additional, or more ambitious, climate policies;*

1246 *I do not fully understand how the European Climate Scheme is supposed to work;*

1247 *I don't know*

1248 **[Eu, US1, US2] Feedback**

1249 60. Do you feel that this survey was politically biased? [Figure S38; survey_biased]

1250 *Yes, left-wing biased; Yes, right-wing biased; No, I do not feel it was biased*

- 1251 61. [US2 Asked only to one random third of the respondents, instead of the feedback Question 62] According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme
1252 poverty in low-income countries? [Figure S39; poverty_field, branch_poverty_field]
1253 {Open field}
1254
- 1255 62. The survey is nearing completion. You can now enter any comments, thoughts or
1256 suggestions in the field below. [comment_field]
1257 {Open field}
- 1258 63. Lastly, are you interested to be interviewed by a researcher (through videoconfer-
1259 encing) for 30 min?
- 1260
- 1261 This is totally optional and will not be rewarded. [interview]
1262 Yes; No

1263 E Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme

1264 To specify the GCS, we use the IEA's 2DS scenario (IEA 2017), which is consistent
1265 with limiting the global average temperature increase to 2°C with a probability of at least
1266 50%. The paper by Hood (2017) contributing to the Report of the High-Level Commission
1267 on Carbon Prices (Stern & Stiglitz 2017) presents a price corridor compatible with this
1268 emissions scenario, from which we take the midpoint. The product of these two series
1269 provides an estimate of the revenues expected from a global carbon price. We then use
1270 the UN median scenario of future population aged over 15 years (*adults*, for short). We
1271 derive the basic income that could be paid to all adults by recycling the revenues from
1272 the global carbon price: evolving between \$20 and \$30 per month, with a peak in 2030.
1273 Accounting for the lower price levels in low-income countries, an additional income of
1274 \$30 per month would allow **670 million people** to escape extreme poverty, defined with
1275 the threshold of \$2.15 per day in purchasing power parity.¹³

1276 To estimate the increase in fossil fuel expenditures (or "cost") in each country by 2030,
1277 we make a key assumption concerning the evolution of the carbon footprints per adult:
1278 that they will decrease by the same proportion in each country. We use data from the
1279 Global Carbon Project (Peters et al. 2012). In 2030, the average carbon footprint of a
1280 country c , e_c , evolves from baseline year b proportionally to the evolution of its adult
1281 population $\Delta p_c = p_c^{2030} / p_c^b$. Thus, the global share of country c 's carbon footprint, s_c ,
1282 is proportional to $\sigma_c = e_c \Delta p_c$, and as countries' shares sum to 1, $s_c = \frac{\sigma_c}{\sum_k \sigma_k}$. Multiplying
1283 country c 's emission share with global revenues in 2030, R , and dividing by c 's adult pop-
1284 ulation in year y , yields its average cost per adult: $R \cdot s_c / p_c^y$. Using findings from Ivanova
1285 & Wood (2020) for Europe and Fremstad & Paul (2019) for the U.S., we approximate the
1286 median cost as 90% of the average cost. Finally, the net gain is given by the basic income
1287 (\$30 per month) minus the cost. We provided consistent estimates of net gains in all sur-
1288 veys (using $y = b = 2015$), though in the global survey we gave the average net gains
1289 vs. the median ones in the Western surveys. The latter are shown in Figure S42. For the
1290 record, Table S1 also provides an estimate of *average* net gains (computed with $b = 2019$)

¹³The average carbon footprint of Sub-Saharan Africa is 0.75tCO₂ per capita (World Bank), and it is even lower for people living in extreme poverty, under one tenth of the world average of about 5tCO₂ per capita (Chancel & Piketty 2015). Under a GCS with a cash transfer of \$30 per person, if one's emission is one tenth of the world average, their net gain would be \$27 per month in nominal terms. In regions with extreme poverty like Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding high-income countries), the conversion factor from Market Exchange Rate to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is 2.4 (computed as the ratio of the World Bank series relating the GDP per capita of Sub-Saharan Africa in PPP and nominal). Therefore, the net gain for the extreme poor is \$65 per month (or \$2.13 a day) in PPP, enough to lift them out of extreme poverty.

¹²⁹¹ and $y = 2030$).¹⁴

¹²⁹² Estimates of the net gains from the Global Climate Scheme are necessarily imprecise,
¹²⁹³ given the uncertainties surrounding the carbon price required to achieve emissions re-
¹²⁹⁴ ductions as well as each country's trajectory in terms of emissions and population. These
¹²⁹⁵ values are highly dependent on future (non-price) climate policies, technical progress,
¹²⁹⁶ and economic growth of each country, which are only partially known. Integrated As-
¹²⁹⁷ sessment Models have been used to derive a Global Energy Assessment (Johansson et al.
¹²⁹⁸ 2012), a 100% renewable scenario (Greenpeace 2015) as well as Shared Socioeconomic
¹²⁹⁹ Pathways (SSPs), which include consistent trajectories of population, emissions, and car-
¹³⁰⁰ bon price Bauer et al. (2017), Fricko et al. (2017), Riahi et al. (2017), van Vuuren et al.
¹³⁰¹ (2017). Instead of using some of these modelling trajectories, we relied on a simple and
¹³⁰² transparent formula, for a number of reasons. First and foremost, those trajectories de-
¹³⁰³ scribe territorial emissions while we need consumption-based emissions to compute the
¹³⁰⁴ incidence of the GCS. Second, the carbon price is relatively low in trajectories of SSPs that
¹³⁰⁵ contain global warming below 2°C (less than \$35/tCO₂ in 2030), so we conservatively
¹³⁰⁶ chose a method yielding a higher carbon price (\$90 in 2030). Third, modelling results are
¹³⁰⁷ available only for a few macro regions, while we wanted country by country estimates.
¹³⁰⁸ Finally, we have checked that the emissions per capita given by our method are broadly
¹³⁰⁹ in line with alternative methods, even if it tends to overestimate net gains in countries
¹³¹⁰ which will decarbonize less rapidly than average.¹⁵ For example, although countries' de-
¹³¹¹ carbonization plans should realign with the GCS in place, India might still decarbonize
¹³¹² less quickly than the European Union, so India's gain and the EU's loss might be over-
¹³¹³ estimated in our computations. For a more sophisticated version of the Global Climate
¹³¹⁴ Scheme which includes participation mechanisms preventing middle-income countries
¹³¹⁵ (like China) to lose from it and estimations of the Net Present Value by country, see Fabre
¹³¹⁶ (2023).

¹⁴2015 was the last year of data available when the global questionnaire was conceived (OECD data was then used – it does not cover all countries but give identical rounded estimates than those recomputed from the Global Carbon Project data for our Western surveys). 2030 was chosen as the reference year as it is the date at which global carbon price revenues are expected to peak (and the GCS redistributive effects would be largest), and the GCS could not realistically enter into force before that date. In the surveys, we chose $y = b = 2015$ rather than $b = 2019$ and $y = 2030$ to get more conservative estimates of the monthly cost in the U.S. (\$20 higher than the other option) and in Europe (€5 or £10 higher).

¹⁵Computations with alternative methods can be found on [our public repository](#).

Figure S42: Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme.




Table S1: Estimated net gain from the GCS in 2030 and carbon footprint by country.

	Mean net gain from the GCS (\$/month)	CO ₂ footprint per adult in 2019 (tCO ₂ /y)			
			Mexico	2	5.6
			Ukraine	2	5.6
			Uzbekistan*	4	5.1
			Argentina	5	4.9
			Thailand	6	4.6
			Egypt	12	3.6
			Indonesia	13	3.3
			Colombia	15	3.0
Saudi Arabia	-93	24.0	Brazil	15	2.9
United States	-77	21.0	Vietnam	15	2.9
Australia	-60	17.6	Peru	16	2.8
Canada	-56	16.7	Morocco	16	2.7
South Korea	-50	15.6	North Korea*	17	2.5
Germany	-30	11.7	India	18	2.4
Russia	-29	11.5	Philippines	18	2.3
Japan	-28	11.3	Pakistan	22	1.6
Malaysia	-21	10.0	Bangladesh	24	1.1
Iran	-19	9.5	Nigeria	25	1.0
Poland	-19	9.5	Kenya	25	0.9
United Kingdom	-18	9.4	Myanmar*	26	0.9
China	-14	8.6	Sudan*	26	0.9
Italy	-13	8.4	Tanzania	27	0.5
South Africa	-11	8.0	Afghanistan*	27	0.5
France	-10	7.8	Uganda	28	0.4
Iraq*	-8	7.4	Ethiopia	28	0.3
Spain	-6	7.0	Venezuela	29	0.3
Turkey	-2	6.2	DRC*	30	0.1
Algeria*	-1	6.0			

¹³¹⁷ Note: Asterisks denote countries where footprint is missing and territorial emissions is used instead.

¹³¹⁸ Values differ from Figure S42 as this table present estimates of *mean* net gain per adult in 2030, not at the

¹³¹⁹ present. Only the countries with more than 20 million adults (covering 87% of the global total) are shown.

F Determinants of support

Table S2: Determinants of support for the Global Climate Scheme.

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme						
	All	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Country: Germany	-0.157*** (0.022)		-0.144*** (0.022)				
Country: Spain	-0.044* (0.024)		-0.026 (0.024)				
Country: United Kingdom	-0.079*** (0.024)		-0.104*** (0.023)				
Country: United States	-0.375*** (0.019)						
Income quartile: 2	0.037** (0.017)	0.031 (0.022)	0.038 (0.023)	0.047 (0.043)	0.058 (0.049)	0.013 (0.053)	0.023 (0.043)
Income quartile: 3	0.042** (0.017)	0.033 (0.024)	0.049** (0.024)	0.080** (0.040)	0.059 (0.052)	0.074 (0.056)	-0.052 (0.052)
Income quartile: 4	0.056*** (0.018)	0.063** (0.026)	0.010 (0.026)	0.018 (0.047)	-0.015 (0.055)	-0.001 (0.056)	-0.005 (0.057)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.023* (0.012)	0.033* (0.017)	0.010 (0.018)	0.007 (0.029)	0.045 (0.039)	0.007 (0.039)	-0.010 (0.039)
Age: 25-34	-0.076*** (0.025)	-0.083*** (0.031)	-0.044 (0.035)	-0.031 (0.057)	-0.077 (0.083)	-0.050 (0.066)	-0.103 (0.091)
Age: 35-49	-0.101*** (0.024)	-0.108*** (0.030)	-0.069* (0.034)	-0.094* (0.055)	-0.009 (0.077)	-0.168** (0.070)	-0.050 (0.090)
Age: 50-64	-0.137*** (0.024)	-0.164*** (0.030)	-0.038 (0.035)	-0.039 (0.056)	-0.020 (0.082)	-0.146** (0.067)	-0.017 (0.087)
Age: 65+	-0.116*** (0.028)	-0.140*** (0.034)	-0.056 (0.044)	0.003 (0.076)	-0.045 (0.094)	-0.258*** (0.091)	0.011 (0.105)
Gender: Man	0.019* (0.011)	0.023 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.029)	-0.018 (0.033)	0.042 (0.038)	-0.005 (0.034)
Lives with partner	0.029** (0.013)	0.022 (0.017)	0.058*** (0.018)	0.070** (0.033)	0.082** (0.038)	0.017 (0.038)	0.040 (0.039)
Employment status: Retired	-0.020 (0.024)	-0.047 (0.030)	0.056 (0.038)	0.087 (0.081)	0.096 (0.075)	0.040 (0.082)	0.001 (0.073)
Employment status: Student	0.045 (0.033)	0.063 (0.048)	0.101** (0.044)	0.165* (0.085)	0.192** (0.087)	0.116 (0.074)	-0.021 (0.107)
Employment status: Working	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.021 (0.024)	0.011 (0.028)	0.082 (0.064)	0.006 (0.056)	-0.050 (0.056)	0.036 (0.051)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.331*** (0.013)	-0.435*** (0.017)	-0.106*** (0.019)	-0.131*** (0.035)	-0.004 (0.044)	-0.114*** (0.038)	-0.081** (0.041)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	-0.184*** (0.016)	-0.198*** (0.022)	-0.136*** (0.021)	-0.196*** (0.039)	-0.034 (0.043)	-0.116** (0.046)	-0.108*** (0.040)
Vote: Far right	-0.396*** (0.032)		-0.309*** (0.033)	-0.493*** (0.064)	-0.168*** (0.051)	-0.130 (0.102)	-0.314*** (0.080)
Urban	0.049*** (0.012)	0.074*** (0.018)	0.006 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.029)	0.019 (0.032)	-0.014 (0.036)	0.017 (0.033)
Race: White		-0.030 (0.019)					
Region: Northeast		0.009 (0.023)					
Region: South		0.011 (0.020)					
Region: West		0.011 (0.022)					
Swing State		-0.019 (0.017)					
Constant	1.048	0.729	0.89	0.7	0.732	0.935	0.886
Observations	7,986	4,992	2,994	977	727	748	542
R ²	0.160	0.180	0.064	0.116	0.067	0.043	0.063

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table S3: Support for the GCS regressed on comprehension of its financial effects.

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme					
	All	United States	France	Germany	United Kingdom	Spain
With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win	0.029** (0.012)	-0.004 (0.016)	0.043 (0.033)	0.051 (0.033)	0.040 (0.036)	0.038 (0.037)
Constant	0.596	0.53	0.764	0.677	0.707	0.796
Observations	8,000	5,000	729	979	749	543
R ²	0.001	0.00001	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.002

Table S4: Correlation between (*Somewhat or Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in high-income countries.

	Support for a global GHG tax and dividend											
	USA (1)	DNK (2)	FRA (3)	DEU (4)	ITA (5)	ESP (6)	GBR (7)	JPN (8)	POL (9)	AUS (10)	CAN (11)	KOR (12)
Control group mean	0.34	0.409	0.34	0.361	0.341	0.421	0.288	0.317	0.309	0.294	0.316	0.334
Trusts the government	0.040*** (0.013)	0.0005 (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.051*** (0.011)	0.061*** (0.012)	0.046*** (0.011)	0.050*** (0.012)	0.039*** (0.013)	0.023** (0.011)	0.041*** (0.013)	0.019 (0.012)	0.079*** (0.013)
Believes inequality is an important problem	0.038*** (0.014)	0.051*** (0.012)	0.045*** (0.013)	0.040*** (0.011)	0.023** (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.052*** (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)	0.009 (0.010)	0.005 (0.013)	0.031*** (0.012)	0.024** (0.012)
Worries about CC	0.006 (0.018)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.005 (0.016)	0.048*** (0.014)	0.023* (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.044*** (0.015)	0.014 (0.014)	0.018 (0.013)	0.036** (0.017)	0.004 (0.014)	0.015 (0.013)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	0.009 (0.015)	0.007 (0.012)	0.018 (0.014)	0.015 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.012)	0.032** (0.011)	0.027** (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.024** (0.014)	0.018 (0.015)	0.014 (0.014)	0.001 (0.013)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.059*** (0.015)	0.019 (0.013)	0.008 (0.014)	0.032** (0.013)	0.012 (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.006 (0.014)	0.037** (0.014)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.033** (0.016)	0.026* (0.014)	0.033** (0.013)
Understands emission across activities/regions	-0.018 (0.011)	0.009 (0.013)	0.003 (0.012)	0.023* (0.012)	0.007 (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.007 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.026** (0.011)	-0.002 (0.013)	0.003 (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	0.007 (0.012)	0.008 (0.014)	0.023 (0.014)	0.011 (0.012)	-0.0005 (0.012)	0.031*** (0.012)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.014 (0.011)	0.025* (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.024* (0.012)
Knows which gases cause CC	0.005 (0.011)	0.021* (0.012)	0.010 (0.013)	0.001 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.010)	0.020* (0.010)	0.015 (0.010)	0.017 (0.011)	0.011 (0.011)	-0.0003 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.013)
Understands impacts of CC	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.029*** (0.011)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.022* (0.012)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.024* (0.012)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	-0.005 (0.013)	0.007 (0.012)	0.021 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.014)	0.011 (0.014)	0.010 (0.013)	0.014 (0.013)	0.008 (0.013)	0.015 (0.013)	0.036** (0.016)	0.004 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.013)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	-0.013 (0.021)	0.037 (0.023)	0.043* (0.022)	-0.014 (0.020)	-0.038** (0.019)	0.029 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.017 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.006 (0.022)	0.021 (0.020)	-0.020 (0.019)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.086*** (0.024)	0.066*** (0.023)	0.075*** (0.023)	0.094*** (0.022)	0.105*** (0.020)	0.074*** (0.023)	0.091*** (0.021)	0.154*** (0.019)	0.089*** (0.020)	0.070*** (0.024)	0.053** (0.023)	0.112*** (0.020)
Believes own household would lose	-0.071*** (0.021)	-0.057*** (0.015)	-0.026 (0.020)	-0.087*** (0.017)	-0.066*** (0.017)	-0.053*** (0.017)	-0.073*** (0.017)	-0.008 (0.017)	-0.079*** (0.017)	-0.052*** (0.016)	-0.060*** (0.019)	-0.083*** (0.017)
Believes low-income earners will lose	-0.034* (0.019)	-0.020 (0.016)	-0.056*** (0.018)	-0.022 (0.017)	-0.021 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.016)	-0.015 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.056*** (0.017)	-0.025 (0.016)	-0.030 (0.020)	-0.056*** (0.018)
Believes high-income earners will lose	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.012)	0.013 (0.013)	0.003 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.007 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.025** (0.012)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.0004 (0.013)
Observations	2,218	2,013	2,006	2,006	2,088	2,268	2,025	1,990	2,053	1,978	2,022	1,932
R ²	0.329	0.241	0.237	0.295	0.211	0.216	0.272	0.222	0.214	0.272	0.254	0.228

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 of Dechezleprêtre et al. (forthcoming) for variable definitions.

Table S5: Correlation between (*Somewhat* or *Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in middle-income countries.

	Support for a global GHG tax and dividend							
	IDN (1)	ZAF (2)	MEX (3)	TUR (4)	IND (5)	BRA (6)	CHN (7)	UKR (8)
Control group mean	0.697	0.396	0.681	0.44	0.719	0.539	0.737	0.622
Trusts the government	0.051*** (0.012)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.040*** (0.014)	0.066*** (0.017)	0.065*** (0.015)	0.038** (0.015)	-0.011 (0.015)	0.061*** (0.014)
Believes inequality is an important problem	0.048** (0.011)	0.002 (0.014)	0.057*** (0.014)	0.028 (0.017)	0.092*** (0.016)	0.055*** (0.015)	-0.001 (0.015)	0.027 (0.018)
Worries about CC	0.003 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.016)	0.013 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.017)	-0.0002 (0.016)	0.032* (0.017)	-0.0002 (0.016)	0.046*** (0.016)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	0.020 (0.014)	0.026 (0.017)	0.004 (0.014)	0.039** (0.017)	0.022 (0.016)	0.019 (0.015)	0.034** (0.016)	0.018 (0.016)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.020* (0.011)	0.038** (0.016)	0.032* (0.017)	-0.002 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.015)	-0.017 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.018 (0.016)
Understands emission across activities/regions	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.013)	0.003 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.010)	0.039*** (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.00004 (0.013)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	-0.006 (0.009)	0.011 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.016)	0.0002 (0.012)	0.003 (0.014)	-0.052*** (0.016)	0.022 (0.014)
Knows which gases cause CC	-0.026*** (0.009)	0.019 (0.015)	0.035** (0.014)	0.015 (0.015)	0.020 (0.013)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.023* (0.012)	0.023 (0.015)
Understands impacts of CC	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.0005 (0.015)	0.009 (0.017)	0.043*** (0.014)	-0.023 (0.015)	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.014 (0.014)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	-0.010 (0.007)	0.009 (0.016)	0.015 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.013)	0.002 (0.011)	-0.016 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.010)	0.035** (0.015)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	0.023 (0.015)	0.002 (0.021)	0.019 (0.022)	0.044 (0.029)	0.021 (0.020)	0.032 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.018)	-0.023 (0.025)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.111*** (0.019)	0.073*** (0.022)	0.088*** (0.024)	0.078** (0.031)	0.034 (0.025)	0.129*** (0.022)	0.060*** (0.022)	0.138*** (0.025)
Believes own household would lose	-0.027 (0.021)	-0.044** (0.020)	-0.071*** (0.019)	-0.054** (0.024)	-0.012 (0.019)	-0.067*** (0.023)	-0.119*** (0.022)	-0.045** (0.021)
Believes low-income earners will lose	-0.059*** (0.020)	-0.016 (0.019)	0.003 (0.017)	-0.053** (0.023)	-0.055*** (0.019)	-0.013 (0.020)	0.001 (0.018)	0.004 (0.020)
Believes high-income earners will lose	0.026** (0.011)	-0.020 (0.015)	0.010 (0.013)	0.010 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.014)	0.003 (0.016)	-0.047*** (0.014)	-0.007 (0.013)
Observations	2,488	2,003	2,045	1,932	2,472	1,860	1,717	1,564
R ²	0.366	0.175	0.242	0.248	0.370	0.272	0.280	0.255

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 of Dechezleprêtre et al. (forthcoming) for variable definitions.

1321 **G Representativeness of the surveys**

Table S6: Sample representativeness of the Western surveys.

	US1			US2			Eu		
	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample
Sample size		3,000	3,000		2,000	2,000		3,000	3,000
Gender: Woman	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.45	0.50	0.51	0.49	0.51
Gender: Man	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.49	0.55	0.50	0.49	0.51	0.49
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.11	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.18	0.15	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.18	0.15	0.17	0.15
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.24	0.26
Age: 65+	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.25	0.23	0.25
Diploma_25_64: Below upper secondary	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.13	0.14	0.13
Diploma_25_64: Upper secondary	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.28	0.23	0.19	0.23
Diploma_25_64: Post secondary	0.34	0.40	0.34	0.34	0.33	0.34	0.29	0.33	0.29
Race: White only	0.60	0.67	0.61	0.60	0.62	0.61			
Race: Hispanic	0.18	0.15	0.19	0.18	0.19	0.19			
Race: Black	0.13	0.16	0.14	0.13	0.17	0.14			
Region: Northeast	0.17	0.20	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.17			
Region: Midwest	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.21			
Region: South	0.38	0.39	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38			
Region: West	0.24	0.20	0.24	0.24	0.20	0.24			
Urban: TRUE	0.73	0.78	0.74	0.73	0.75	0.73			
Employment_18_64: Inactive	0.20	0.16	0.16	0.20	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.15
Employment_18_64: Unemployed	0.02	0.07	0.08	0.02	0.09	0.08	0.03	0.06	0.05
Vote: Left	0.32	0.47	0.45	0.32	0.46	0.45	0.30	0.32	0.32
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.32	0.32
Vote: Far right							0.10	0.10	0.10
Country: FR							0.24	0.24	0.24
Country: DE							0.33	0.33	0.33
Country: ES							0.18	0.18	0.18
Country: UK							0.25	0.25	0.25
Urbanity: Cities							0.43	0.49	0.43
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs							0.33	0.32	0.33
Urbanity: Rural							0.25	0.20	0.25

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

Table S7: Sample representativeness for each European country.

	FR			DE			ES			UK		
	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.									
Sample size		729	729		979	979		543	543		749	749
Gender: Woman	0.52	0.50	0.52	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.53	0.51	0.50	0.43	0.50
Gender: Man	0.48	0.50	0.48	0.49	0.48	0.49	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.50	0.57	0.50
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.29	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.19	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.19	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.33	0.25	0.25	0.18	0.25	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.14	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.07	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.12	0.16	0.12	0.17	0.20	0.17
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.31	0.24	0.22	0.26	0.22	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.24	0.18	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.24	0.19	0.24	0.28	0.23	0.28	0.27	0.28	0.27	0.25	0.30	0.25
Age: 65+	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.26	0.21	0.26	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.24
Diploma_25-64: Below upper secondary	0.11	0.19	0.11	0.10	0.14	0.10	0.24	0.16	0.25	0.12	0.09	0.12
Diploma_25-64: Upper secondary	0.26	0.16	0.26	0.27	0.20	0.27	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.21	0.23	0.21
Diploma_25-64: Post secondary	0.26	0.30	0.26	0.29	0.31	0.29	0.28	0.38	0.27	0.33	0.36	0.33
Urbanity: Cities	0.47	0.52	0.47	0.37	0.47	0.37	0.52	0.58	0.52	0.40	0.41	0.40
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.40	0.35	0.40	0.22	0.27	0.22	0.42	0.43	0.42
Urbanity: Rural	0.34	0.29	0.34	0.23	0.18	0.23	0.26	0.15	0.26	0.18	0.16	0.18
Employment_18-64: Inactive	0.20	0.19	0.18	0.15	0.14	0.11	0.20	0.13	0.12	0.16	0.16	0.17
Employment_18-64: Unemployed	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.11	0.12	0.02	0.03	0.04
Vote: Left	0.23	0.19	0.21	0.37	0.44	0.44	0.33	0.37	0.38	0.25	0.28	0.29
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.26	0.30	0.29	0.28	0.27	0.29	0.18	0.24	0.24	0.36	0.44	0.41
Vote: Far right	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.01	0.03	0.03

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. In this Table, weights are defined at the country level. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

¹³²² Similar tables for the global surveys can be found in Dechezleprêtre et al. (forthcoming).

¹³²³ [ing](#).

H Attrition analysis

Table S8: Attrition analysis for the US1 survey.

	Dropped out	Dropped out after socio-eco	Failed attention test	Duration (in min)	Duration below 4 min
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mean	0.08	0.059	0.082	21.198	0.016
Income quartile: 2	0.025*** (0.010)	0.025*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.740 (3.064)	-0.009 (0.006)
Income quartile: 3	0.062*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.754 (2.813)	-0.004 (0.007)
Income quartile: 4	0.035*** (0.011)	0.035*** (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-3.917 (2.798)	-0.003 (0.007)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.039*** (0.009)	0.039*** (0.009)	-0.000*** (0.000)	1.544 (2.665)	0.006 (0.006)
Age: 25-34	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.597 (2.604)	-0.031** (0.013)
Age: 35-49	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.824 (3.176)	-0.032** (0.013)
Age: 50-64	-0.060*** (0.015)	-0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	5.723** (2.763)	-0.039*** (0.012)
Age: 65+	0.048*** (0.017)	0.048*** (0.017)	0.000** (0.000)	8.952** (4.267)	-0.047*** (0.012)
Gender: Man	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.451 (2.210)	-0.0001 (0.005)
Urban	0.006 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.888** (2.443)	-0.004 (0.006)
Race: Black	0.020** (0.010)	0.020** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	8.554*** (2.600)	0.004 (0.007)
Race: Hispanic	0.021** (0.010)	0.021** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.119* (2.293)	-0.002 (0.007)
Region: Northeast	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-4.862 (4.782)	-0.004 (0.007)
Region: South	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-1.151 (4.710)	-0.004 (0.006)
Region: West	0.006 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-4.000 (4.305)	-0.003 (0.007)
Vote: Biden	-0.048*** (0.008)	-0.048*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-2.901 (2.379)	-0.009 (0.007)
Vote: Trump	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.145 (2.878)	-0.005 (0.008)
Observations	5,719	5,719	3,252	3,044	3,044
R ²	0.127	0.127	1.000	0.006	0.017

Table S9: Attrition analysis for the US2 survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 4 min (5)
Mean	0.095	0.074	0.092	16.338	0.052
Income quartile: 2	0.023* (0.013)	0.023* (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	1.352 (1.601)	-0.029** (0.014)
Income quartile: 3	0.054*** (0.014)	0.054*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	8.502 (9.649)	-0.009 (0.016)
Income quartile: 4	0.060*** (0.016)	0.060*** (0.016)	-0.000 (0.000)	5.254 (3.376)	0.0003 (0.017)
Diploma: Post secondary	-0.033*** (0.011)	-0.033*** (0.011)	0.000 (0.000)	1.601 (2.630)	0.012 (0.011)
Age: 25-34	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.929 (1.535)	-0.032 (0.024)
Age: 35-49	0.012 (0.014)	0.012 (0.014)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.076 (6.651)	-0.047** (0.022)
Age: 50-64	0.040*** (0.014)	0.040*** (0.014)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.364 (1.565)	-0.079*** (0.022)
Age: 65+	0.115*** (0.017)	0.115*** (0.017)	-0.000*** (0.000)	2.619 (3.150)	-0.095*** (0.022)
Gender: Man	-0.073*** (0.009)	-0.073*** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	4.707 (6.037)	0.010 (0.010)
Urban	0.019* (0.011)	0.019* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	1.766 (1.135)	0.005 (0.012)
Race: Black	0.060*** (0.015)	0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.673 (13.328)	-0.010 (0.015)
Race: Hispanic	0.079*** (0.014)	0.079*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	2.930 (1.813)	-0.027** (0.012)
Region: Northeast	-0.026* (0.014)	-0.026* (0.014)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.837 (2.855)	-0.011 (0.015)
Region: South	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.000 (0.000)	3.220 (5.002)	0.009 (0.014)
Region: West	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.000 (0.000)	-1.759 (1.942)	-0.009 (0.015)
Vote: Biden	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	3.230 (2.731)	-0.006 (0.014)
Vote: Trump	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.554 (1.272)	0.007 (0.016)
Observations	2,973	2,973	2,280	2,103	2,103
R ²	0.241	0.241	1.000	0.010	0.031

Table S10: Attrition analysis for the *Eu* survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 6 min (5)
Mean	0.067	0.044	0.151	54.602	0.039
Country: Germany	0.023** (0.010)	0.019** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.533 (18.906)	0.019* (0.010)
Country: Spain	-0.102*** (0.011)	-0.098*** (0.011)	0.000* (0.000)	-29.136* (15.948)	0.010 (0.010)
Country: United Kingdom	0.042*** (0.011)	0.043*** (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-7.458 (18.046)	0.010 (0.010)
Income quartile: 2	0.032*** (0.010)	0.029*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	32.749* (19.771)	-0.015 (0.010)
Income quartile: 3	0.049*** (0.010)	0.047*** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	6.130 (11.734)	-0.021** (0.010)
Income quartile: 4	0.024** (0.011)	0.021* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.659 (19.955)	-0.018* (0.011)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.035*** (0.008)	0.034*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	10.647 (12.959)	-0.007 (0.007)
Age: 25-34	0.028** (0.013)	0.025* (0.013)	-0.000*** (0.000)	36.132 (22.285)	-0.005 (0.018)
Age: 35-49	0.064*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	-0.000*** (0.000)	37.159** (17.190)	-0.013 (0.016)
Age: 50-64	0.085*** (0.013)	0.083*** (0.013)	-0.000 (0.000)	48.363** (22.526)	-0.063*** (0.015)
Age: 65+	0.117*** (0.014)	0.115*** (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	36.351** (14.226)	-0.061*** (0.015)
Gender: Man	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-22.980 (14.093)	0.009 (0.007)
Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs	0.006 (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-16.736 (17.256)	0.004 (0.008)
Degree of urbanization: Rural	0.023** (0.009)	0.023** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	-14.593 (19.733)	-0.001 (0.009)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.025*** (0.005)	-0.025*** (0.005)	0.000*** (0.000)	-17.558 (13.143)	0.019** (0.008)
Vote: Far right	0.005 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.000*** (0.000)	15.838 (32.281)	0.029** (0.014)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	0.023*** (0.006)	0.022*** (0.005)	0.000 (0.000)	24.631 (19.824)	0.030*** (0.010)
Observations	3,963	3,963	3,326	3,115	3,115
R ²	0.406	0.395	1.000	0.006	0.028

1325 **I Balance analysis**

Table S11: Balance analysis.

	List contains: G (1)	Branch petition: NR (2)	Branch donation: Own nation (3)	Branch conjoint 3: with GCS (4)
Mean	0.493	0.492	0.5	0.497
Country: Germany	-0.026 (0.026)	0.017 (0.026)	0.020 (0.026)	0.005 (0.026)
Country: Spain	0.025 (0.030)	0.026 (0.030)	0.026 (0.030)	0.043 (0.030)
Country: United Kingdom	0.002 (0.028)	0.018 (0.028)	0.037 (0.028)	0.063** (0.028)
Country: United States	-0.001 (0.024)	0.019 (0.024)	0.007 (0.024)	0.023 (0.024)
Income quartile: 2	-0.013 (0.021)	-0.024 (0.021)	0.012 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.021)
Income quartile: 3	0.021 (0.022)	-0.005 (0.022)	0.011 (0.022)	-0.004 (0.022)
Income quartile: 4	-0.001 (0.023)	-0.017 (0.023)	-0.013 (0.023)	0.0001 (0.023)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.008 (0.016)	0.014 (0.016)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.016)
Age: 25-34	0.023 (0.031)	-0.049 (0.031)	-0.003 (0.031)	-0.009 (0.031)
Age: 35-49	0.032 (0.030)	-0.002 (0.030)	-0.014 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.030)
Age: 50-64	0.030 (0.030)	-0.005 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.030)	-0.020 (0.030)
Age: 65+	0.029 (0.037)	-0.037 (0.037)	-0.015 (0.037)	-0.012 (0.037)
Gender: Man	0.024 (0.015)	0.012 (0.015)	0.002 (0.015)	-0.016 (0.015)
Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.0005 (0.017)	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.011 (0.017)
Degree of urbanization: Rural	0.013 (0.024)	0.017 (0.024)	-0.004 (0.024)	0.027 (0.024)
Employment status: Retired	-0.005 (0.032)	-0.031 (0.032)	-0.034 (0.032)	-0.016 (0.032)
Employment status: Student	0.005 (0.044)	-0.023 (0.044)	-0.033 (0.044)	-0.025 (0.044)
Employment status: Working	0.010 (0.024)	-0.027 (0.024)	-0.033 (0.024)	-0.012 (0.024)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.004 (0.017)	0.003 (0.017)	0.010 (0.017)	0.002 (0.017)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	0.001 (0.019)	0.014 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.019)	-0.012 (0.019)
Vote: Far right	0.009 (0.034)	0.030 (0.034)	0.023 (0.035)	0.038 (0.034)
Observations	5,991	5,991	5,991	5,991
R ²	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.003

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

¹³²⁶ **J Placebo tests**

Table S12: Placebo tests.

	G+R+C preferred to R+C (1)	Supports G+R+C (2)	Signs petition (3)	Share of policies supported (4)	Conjoint 5 A+CGS preferred to B (5)
Mean	0.642	0.63	0.612	0.532	0.591
Branch of list experiment: 1	-0.013 (0.019)	-0.024 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.018 (0.021)
Branch of list experiment: rgl	0.005 (0.019)	0.006 (0.019)	-0.002 (0.019)	0.001 (0.012)	0.010 (0.021)
Branch of list experiment: rl	-0.009 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.019)	0.022 (0.019)	0.007 (0.012)	0.007 (0.021)
Branch of petition: nr	0.011 (0.014)	0.006 (0.014)	0.022 (0.014)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.015)
Poor is in own country	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.014)	0.015 (0.014)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.020 (0.015)
Observations	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	5,218
R ²	0.0004	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

¹³²⁷ **K Main results on the extended sample**

¹³²⁸ As a robustness check, we reproduce our main results on the extended sample that
¹³²⁹ includes the 14% respondents who failed the attention check ($n = 9,318$). These results
¹³³⁰ are non-weighted. They closely match the results in our main specification. For example,
¹³³¹ the support for the GCS is 54% in the U.S. and 75% in Europe, while the same coefficients
¹³³² are significant for the list experiment.

Figure S43: [Extended sample] Main attitudes.
 (Relative support —unless *— in percent in Questions 20, 35, 44, 45, 48)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Support for the GCS	54	75	78	70	81	75
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	68	83	81	84	87	81
Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries*	52	52	45	60	59	44
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	47	62	57	62	65	65
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	69	82	80	82	86	80
[Country]'s foreign aid should be increased	32	55	53	61	59	45
Universalist*	43	41	35	49	44	36

Figure S44: [Extended sample] Influence of the GCS on preferred platform:
 Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than
 a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question 30; in the U.S., asked only to non-
 Republicans.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Random programs: A+GCS preferred to B	59	60	61	59	64	58

Table S13: [Extended sample] Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list. The tacit support for the GCS is estimated by regressing the number of supported policies on the presence of the GCS in the list of policies. The social desirability is estimated as the difference between the tacit and stated support, and it is not significantly different from zero even at a 20% threshold.

	Number of supported policies		
	All	U.S.	Europe
List contains: GCS	0.624*** (0.028)	0.524*** (0.041)	0.724*** (0.036)
<i>Support for GCS</i>	0.655	0.554	0.754
<i>Social desirability bias</i>	-0.026	-0.018	-0.034
<i>80% C.I. for the bias</i>	[-0.06; 0.01]	[-0.07; 0.04]	[-0.08; 0.01]
Constant	1.317	1.147	1.486
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000
R ²	0.089	0.065	0.125

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table S14: [Extended sample] Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. (Question 28)

	Prefers the Progressive platform					
	All	United States	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
GCS in Progressive platform	0.022* (0.013)	0.015 (0.018)	0.116*** (0.037)	-0.007 (0.032)	0.028 (0.038)	0.012 (0.037)
Constant	0.628	0.629	0.55	0.682	0.721	0.553
Observations	5,638	2,797	671	883	550	737
R ²	0.001	0.0002	0.014	0.0001	0.001	0.0001

Note: Simple OLS model. *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples. *p < 0.1;
p < 0.05; *p < 0.01.

₁₃₃₃ **L Effect of questionnaire framing**

₁₃₃₄ When comparing the samples *US1* and *US2*, we observe no effect of questionnaire
₁₃₃₅ framing (or block sequence) on the question “What group do you defend when you
₁₃₃₆ vote?”, common to all waves and placed close to the end of the questionnaire (Table S15).

Table S15: Effect of the wave (*US1* vs. *US2*) on the group defend when voting.
“What group do you defend when you vote?” (Question 56)

	Group defended when voting		
	Humans or Sentient beings	Fellow citizens	Family and self
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Wave: <i>US2</i>	−0.009 (0.014)	0.009 (0.014)	0.010 (0.011)
Mean	0.432	0.335	0.156
Observations	5,000	5,000	5,000
R ²	0.0001	0.0001	0.0002

Note: Simple OLS model. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

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