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- 341 removals

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1 \title{International Attitudes Toward  
Global Policies %
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7 We document majority support for po  
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Germany, Spain, and the UK, we test s  
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f salience in policy circles.
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8 The GCS is supported by three quart  
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or increased foreign aid. In sum, we  
provide evidence that global policies  
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12 \textbf{JEL codes:} P48, Q58, H23, Q54 %

13

14 \textbf{Keywords:} Climate change, global policies, cap-and-trade, attitudes, survey.%

15

16 \tableofcontents

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19 \section{Introduction}%

20 Major sustainability objectives could be achieved by global approaches to mitigating climate change and poverty involving transfers from high- to lower-income countries \cite{budolfson_climate_2021,franks_mobilizing_2018,dennig_inequality_2015,soergel_combining_2021,bauer_quantification_2020,cramton_global_2017}. For instance, a global wealth tax could finance the Sustainable Development Goals \cite{piketty_brief_2022}. More specifically, if merely 35\% of the revenue were allocated for this purpose, a global 2\% tax on individual wealth in excess of \\$5 million could significantly reduce poverty as it would mechanically increase low-income countries' national income by 50\% (as computed on the \href{https://wid.world/world-wealth-tax-simulator/}{WID wealth tax simulator}). Besides, global carbon pricing is widely regarded by economists as the benchmark climate policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon emissions externality. In an early analysis of global climate policy, \cite{grubb_greenhouse_1990} states: ``by far the best combination of long term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity, is obtained from a system based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions which are allocated on an adult per capita basis'', i.e., equally among human adults. Support f

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17

18 \section{Introduction}%

or such solution, which we call the `Global Climate Scheme'', has been renewed ever since \citep{hoel_carbon_1991,agarwal_global_1991,bertram_tradeable_1992,baer_equity_2000,jamieson_climate_2001,blanchard_major_2021,rajan_global_2021}.

21

22 While international negotiations have not yet led to ambitious globally redistributive policies, recent developments suggest that such a change might be underway. The International Maritime Organization is poised to adopt a global carbon levy on maritime fuel; the \citet{african_union_african_2023} calls for a global carbon taxation regime; the \citet{un_promotion_2023} is setting up a Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation; Brazil uses its presidency of the G20 in 2024 to propose a global wealth tax, %

23 \href{https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2023/03/14/taxation-mondiale-sur-les-ultrariches-ce-que-nous-avons-reussi-pour-les-multinationales-nous-devons-le-faire-pour-les-grandes-fortunes_6165354_3232.html}{backed} by 130 Members of the European Parliament; etc.

24

25 A key condition for implementing global policies has remained largely undressed: the support of citizens. Using a Global survey on 40,680 respondents from 20 high- and middle-income countries, we reveal substantial support for those policies, especially global climate policies and a global tax on the wealthiest aimed at financing low-income countries (other questions from these surveys are analyzed in a companion paper, \citealp{dechezlepretre_fighting_2022}). Interestingly, even in wealthy nations that would bear a significant burden, majorities of citizens express support for such globally redistributive policies. To better understand public support for global policies in high-income countries, we conduct Complementary surveys a

mong 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, the U.S., and the UK.

26

27 By studying in depth the support for global policies, we are making an ambitious shift in the methodological approach of attitudinal surveys. In general, academic surveys focus on studying effect sizes of some treatment on political attitudes, or the socio-demographic factors that correlate with attitudes (e.g., \citealp{kuziemko_how_2015,douenne_yellow_2022}). The magnitude of support for a given proposal is often regarded as problematic to estimate satisfactorily. %

28 The measure of support is usually left to non-academic pollsters, who rarely apply all the academic best practices: transparency, representative sampling, neutral and precise wording of questions, comparison with existing literature, use of multiple questions and complementary methods to correctly interpret the results. Although it is challenging to estimate the extent of support, this question seems too important not to be addressed using scientific methods. Absent large scale measurements of public opinion like referenda, surveys remain the best method to assess support or opposition to given policies. In this paper, after a worldwide assessment in the Global survey, we use Complementary surveys to carefully measure the support for global policies in Western countries. We inquire the support for various policies, approach the question from diverse angles, and run a battery of pre-registered tests to check whether stated support estimates are reliable.

19

20 Major sustainability objectives could be achieved by global approaches to mitigating climate change and poverty involving transfers from high- to lower-income countries.\citep{budolfson_climate_2021,franks_mobilizing_2018,dennig_inequality_2015,soergel_combining_2021,bauer_quantification_2020,cramton_global_2017}

21 Especially, global carbon pricing is widely regarded by economists as the benchmark climate policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon emissions externality. A version of global carbon pricing as a system based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions is prominently discussed in environmental economics.\citep{grubb_greenhouse_1990,hoel_carbon_1991,agarwal_global_1991,bertram_tradeable_1992,baer_equity_2000,jamieson_climate_2001,blanchard_major_2021} It would work as follows: It implements a cap on carbon emissions to limit global warming below 2°C . The emission rights are auctioned each year to polluting firms and fund a global basic income, alleviating extreme poverty. The emission rights would be allocated

22 equally among human adults, yielding redistribution from richer to poorer countries. It would combine long-term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity.\citep{grubb_greenhouse_1990} We call this established approach to global carbon pricing the ``Global Climate Scheme'' (GCS).

29

30 The focus of the Complementary survey is a specific policy aimed at addressing both climate change and poverty, referred to as the ``Global Climate Scheme'' (GCS). It implements a cap on carbon emissions to limit global warming below 2\textdegree{}C. The emission rights are auctioned each year to polluting firms and fund a global basic income, alleviating extreme poverty.

31 This archetypal policy exposes respondents to the key trade-off between the benefits and costs of globally redistributive climate policies, as respondents are made aware of the cost that the GCS entails for their country's people.

32

23 While international negotiations have not yet led to ambitious globally redistributive policies, %
 24 some recent prominent attempts are that at the %
 25 African Union \href{https://media.africaclimatesummit.org/NAIROBI+Declaration+FURTHER+edited+060923+EN+920AM.pdf}{calls for} a global carbon taxation regime, %
 26 the UN \href{https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4032838}{is setting up} a Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation and %
 27 Brazil is proposing
 28 a global wealth tax at the G20. %

29

30 A key factor for implementing global policies has remained largely unaddressed: the support of citizens. Using a global survey on 40,680 respondents from 20 high- and middle-income countries, we reveal substantial support for global climate policies and, in addition, a global tax on the wealthiest aimed at financing low-income countries. Surprisingly, even in wealthy nations that would bear a significant burden, majorities of citizens express support for such globally redistributive policies. To better understand public support for global policies in high-income countries, the main analysis of this article is conducted with surveys among 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, the UK, and the U.S.

31 The focus of the main surveys is to study how respondents react to the key trade-off between the benefits and costs of globally redistributive climate policies. In our survey respondents are made aware of the cost that the GCS entails for their country's people, that is average Westerners would incur a net loss. Our main result is that the GCS is supported by three quarters of Europeans and more than half of Americans.

32

33 After checking that respondents have understood the policy and its cost, we measure the support in a direct \textit{Yes}/\textit{No} question. The GCS is supported by three quarters of Europeans and more than half of Americans. Then, we test for social desirability bias using a list experiment. We find no evidence that people exaggerate their support in the direct question. To assess whether the support would diminish in a context with real stakes, we ask respondents whether they are willing to sign a petition in favor of the GCS, after informing them that the question results will be communicated to their head of state's office. The support is sustained in an environment that approaches real stakes. We then carry out conjoint analyses to neutralize experimenter demand and investigate the priority given to global policies compared to other types of policies. Conjoint analyses reveal that a political platform is more likely to be preferred if it contains the GCS or a global tax on millionaires, and that global policies rank high in the prioritization of policies. Our randomized experiments also show that a candidate would not lose vote intentions by endorsing the GCS, and might even gain up to 11 points in a country like France. An analysis of open-ended fields confirms that support for the GCS is real, and indicates that appeal of the GCS comes from its international nature and its impacts on climate, more than on global poverty. %

34 We also test other global policies and universalistic attitudes. Support is very strong for a global tax on millionaires, and the median respondent prefers to allocate 30\% of the revenues of such a tax to low-income countries. Majorities are willing to increase foreign aid, but only if some conditions are respected, such as making sure the aid is well spent and other high-income countries also increase their contribution. Questions on unive

33 Furthermore, we test the robustness of this conclusion by a wide variety of methods. First, we control for social desirability bias using a list experiment. We find no evidence that people exaggerate their support in the direct question. Second, to assess whether the support would diminish in a context with real stakes, we ask respondents whether they are willing to sign a petition in favor of the GCS, after informing them that the question results will be communicated to their head of state's office. The support is sustained in an environment that approaches real stakes. Third, we carry out conjoint analyses to neutralize experimenter demand and investigate the priority given to global policies compared to other types of policies. Conjoint analyses reveal that a political platform is more likely to be preferred if it contains the GCS or a global tax on millionaires, and that global policies rank high in the prioritization of policies. Our randomized experiments also show that a candidate would not lose vote intentions by endorsing the GCS, and might even gain up to 11 points in France. Fourth, an analysis of open-ended fields indicates that the appeal of the GCS comes from its international nature and its impacts on climate, more than on global poverty. %

34 To put our main finding in context, we also test other global policies and universalistic attitudes. Support is very strong for a global tax on millionaires, and the median respondent prefers to allocate 30\% of the revenues of such a tax to low-income countries. Majorities are willing to increase foreign aid, but only if some conditions are respected, such as making sure the aid is well spent and other high-income countries also increase th

realistic values, including a donation experiment, confirm the congruence of underlying values with the support for specific policies. Our diverse approaches also help understand what drives the support. For instance, the evidence indicates that one key reason why increasing foreign aid is not as popular as global policies lies in its unilateral nature. We reckon that survey evidence is no panacea, as attitudes can be ambivalent and context-dependent. Nevertheless, we arguably employ the best available methods to address potential concerns, including an experiment assessing how support might be affected by a negative media campaign.

35

36 Overall, our results %

37 point out to strong and genuine support for global climate and redistributive policies, as our experiments confirm the stated support found in direct questions. This suggests that carefully administered surveys can be used to measure the level of support for a given policy. Our results contribute to the literature on attitudes toward climate policy, confirming that climate policy is preferred at a global level \citep{issp_international_2010, beiser-mcgrath_could_2019, sivenon_attitudes_2022, meilland_international_2023}, where it is more effective and fair. Indeed, the Global Climate Scheme is largely supported, but a similar policy at the national level is opposed by a majority in many countries \citep{dechezlepretre_fighting_2022}, despite lower costs. Noting that only 13% of French people declared support for a national carbon tax with cash transfers during the Yellow Vests movement \citep{douenne_yellow_2022}, surveys appear to accurately reflect the level of support. Therefore, unless support for global policies disappears once they enter the public debate, it seems unlikely that a policy such as the GCS would face major protests.

air contribution. Questions on universalistic values, including a donation experiment, confirm the congruence of underlying values with the support for specific policies. Our diverse approaches also help understand what drives the support. For instance, the evidence indicates that one key reason why increasing foreign aid is not as popular as global policies lies in its unilateral nature.

35

36 Overall, our results %

37 point out to strong and genuine support for global climate and redistributive policies, as our experiments confirm the stated support found in direct questions.

38 In our discussion we offer potential explanations behind the lack of prominence of global policies in the public debate despite this strong support.

39 Finally, while our findings underscore a majority support for global policies, converging results from independent surveys are needed to ascertain such novel evidence. %

40 \paragraph{Literature}

41

42 International surveys have shown wide spread support for costly climate action \citep{dechezlepretre_fighting_2022,leiserowitz_international_2022}. For instance, using representative samples in 125 countries covering 96\% of the world's greenhouse gas emissions, \cite{andre_globally_2024} show that 69\% of the global population express willingness to contribute 1\% of their income to fight global warming. International surveys have also uncovered near consensus that ``present economic differences between rich and poor countries are too large'' (overall, 78\% agree and 5\% disagree) in each of 29 countries \citep{issp_international_2019}.

43

44 Yet, few prior attitudinal surveys have examined global redistributive pol

38 They contribute to a body of literature on attitudes toward climate policy, which confirms that climate policy is preferred at a global level,\citep{issp_international_2010,beiser-mcgrath_could_2019,sivonen_attitudes_2022,meilland_international_2023} where it is more effective and fair.

39 While 3,354 economists supported a national carbon tax financing equal cash transfers in the \href{https://www.clcouncil.org/media/EconomistsStatement.pdf}{Wall Street Journal}, numerous surveys have shown that public support for such policy is mixed.\citep{douenne_yellow_2022,dechezlepretre_fighting_nodate,carattini_overcoming_2018,maestre-andres_perceived_2019,milkenberger_limited_2022,sommer_supporting_2022} Meanwhile, the GCS --- the global version of this policy --- is largely supported, despite higher costs in high-income countries.

40 In the Discussion we offer potential explanations that could reconcile the strong support for global policies with their lack of prominence in the public debate. %

41 \paragraph{Literature}

42

43 International surveys have shown wide spread support for costly climate action.\citep{dechezlepretre_fighting_nodate,leiserowitz_international_2022} For instance, representative surveys in 125 countries covering 96\% of the world's greenhouse gas emissions show that 69\% of the global population express willingness to contribute 1\% of their income to fight global warming.\cite{andre_globally_2024} International surveys have also uncovered near consensus that ``present economic differences between rich and poor countries are too large'' (overall, 78\% agree and 5\% disagree) in each of 29 countries.\citep{issp_international_2019}

44

45 Yet, few prior attitudinal surveys have examined global redistributive pol

icies.

- 45 A notable exception is \citet{carattini_how_2019}, who test the support for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples in five countries, representative along gender and age. For a given variant, the sample size is about 167 respondents per country. They find over 80\% support for any variant in India, between 50\% and 65\% in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43\% to 59\% in the U.S., depending on the variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding an equal cash transfer for each human is close to 50\% in high-income countries (e.g., at 44\% in the U.S.). These figures are consistent with our results from the \textit{Global} survey (see Figure \ref{fig:oecd}), where the support is lower for a tax that would ``only'' reduce CO₂ emissions than for a quota that would unambiguously achieve the climate target.
- 46 Relatedly, \cite{leiserowitz_public_2021} reveal that 66\% of Americans support providing ``financial aid and technical support to developing countries that agree to limit their greenhouse gas emissions''; and \citet{fehr_your_2022} find that 90\% of Germans want some degree of global redistribution.
- 47 Besides, in surveys conducted in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S., \citet{ghassim_who_2020} finds support ranging from 55\% to 74\% for ``a global democracy including both a global government and a global parliament, directly elected by the world population, to recommend and implement policies on global issues''. %
- 48 Through an experiment, he also finds that, in countries where the government stems from a coalition, voting shares would shift by 8 (Brazil) to 12 p.p. (Germany) from parties who are said to oppose global democracy to parties that supposedly support it. For instance, when Germans respondents were told that (only) the Greens and the Left support global democracy, the

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- 46 A notable exception tests the support for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples in five countries, representative along gender and age.\cite{carattini_how_2019} For a given variant, the sample size is about 167 respondents per country. They find over 80\% support for any variant in India, between 50\% and 65\% in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43\% to 59\% in the U.S., depending on the variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding an equal cash transfer for each human is close to 50\% in high-income countries. %

e parties gained respectively 9 and 3 p.p. in vote intentions, while the SPD and the CDU-CSU each lost 6 p.p.

49

50 Appendix \ref{sec:literature} contains a broader literature review including further attitudinal surveys on global policies (\ref{subsubsec:literature_attitudes_policies}); prior work on attitudes toward climate burden sharing (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_attitudes_burden_sharing}), attitudes toward foreign aid (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_foreign_aid}); global carbon pricing (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_pricing}), global redistribution (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_redistribution}), basic income (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_basic_income}), and global democracy (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_democracy}).

47

48 Further evidence of the popularity of global redistribution is provided by the finding that 66\% of Americans support providing ``financial aid and technical support to developing countries that agree to limit their greenhouse gas emissions'';\cite{leiserowitz_public_2021} and 90\% of Germans want some degree of global redistribution.\cite{fehr_your_2022}

49 Besides, in surveys conducted in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S., support ranges from 55\% to 74\% for ``a global democracy including both a global government and a global parliament, directly elected by the world population, to recommend and implement policies on global issues'', and similar support is found in surveys over 17 countries.\cite{ghassim_who_2020,ghassim_who_2024} %

50

51 Appendix \ref{sec:literature} contains a broader literature review including further attitudinal surveys on global policies (\ref{subsubsec:literature_attitudes_policies}); prior work on attitudes toward climate burden sharing (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_attitudes_burden_sharing}), attitudes toward foreign aid (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_foreign_aid}), global carbon pricing (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_pricing}), global redistribution (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_redistribution}), basic income (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_basic_income}), and global

51

52 \section{Results}

53 The presentation of results proceeds as follows: after briefly describing the survey data (\ref{subsec:data}), we first document broad international support for global approaches to climate policy that lead to global redistribution (\ref{subsubsec:global_support}). Subsequently, we present specific findings from surveys in the U.S. and Europe that document support for the GCS, wealth taxes, and foreign aid in those countries (\ref{subsubsec:support_gcs}-\ref{subsubsec:support_foreign_aid}). We proceed to study the support for the Global Climate Scheme in more detail, by means of a list experiment, petition, conjoint analysis, prioritization task, and by eliciting pros and cons (\ref{subsec:robustness_sincerity}). To understand the gap between support for global policies and their appearance in public discussion, we conclude by reporting results on underlying universalistic values (\ref{subsec:universalistic}) and beliefs about the support of others (\ref{subsec:second_order_beliefs}).

54

55 \subsection{Data}\label{subsec:data}

56

57 The study relies on two sets of surveys: the \textit{Global} survey and the \textit{Complementary} surveys (see Table \ref{tab:survey_summary}).

58 \renewcommand{\thetable}{S\arabic{table}}

59 \begin{table}[h]

52

53 \section{Results}

democracy (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_democracy}).

54

55 \subsection{Data}\label{subsec:data}

56

57 We use unanalysed questions from a global survey conducted in 2021 that involved 40,680 respondents from 20 countries, representing approximately 72 \% of global CO₂ emissions.

58 This survey (henceforth: global survey) serves as the basis for measuring stated support for various global policies worldwide.

59 Detailed information about the data collection process, sample representativeness, and analysis of questions on national policies can be found in the companion paper.\cite{dechezlepretre_fighting_nodate}

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60 \caption[Surveys summary]{[For Supplementary Material] Summary of the surveys used in the analysis.}

61 %
62 \label{tab:survey_summary}

63 \centering

64 \begin{tabular}
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67 \hline \\[-1.8ex]

68 & \textit{Global survey} & \multicolumn{3}{c}{\textit{Complementary sur

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60 To delve deeper into the sincerity and rationales behind support for the GCS and attitudes towards global policies, global redistribution, and universalistic values, we conducted further surveys in 2023 (henceforth: main surveys). These surveys are based on a sample of 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, the UK, and the U.S. The European survey (\textit{Eu}) comprises 3,000 respondents, while the U.S. sample was collected in two separate waves: \textit{US1} with 3,000 respondents and \textit{US2} with 2,000 respondents. The survey questions in both the European and U.S. surveys are identical (see Figure \ref{fig:flow_simple}), except for an additional question in \textit{US2} that uses results from \textit{US1} to assess the bandwagon effect.

61 \begin{figure}[h!]
62 \caption[Main surveys' structure]{Structure of main survey, cf. also Figure \ref{fig:flow_combined} for the treatment branches.}\label{fig:flow_simple}

63 \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegraphics[width=.58\textwidth]{../questionnaire/survey_flow-simple.pdf}}

64 \end{figure}

65 The main surveys ensured representativeness along key dimensions: gender, income, age, highest diploma, and degree of urbanization. The \textit{Eu} survey is also representative of its four countries in terms of population size, while the \textit{US1} and \textit{US2} surveys are representative in terms of region and ethnicity.

66 Tables \ref{tab:representativeness_waves}-\ref{tab:representativeness_EU} detail how our samples match population frequencies.

67 More detail on data collection is given in Section \nameref{sec:methods}. The questionnaires used in the surveys are provided in Appendices \ref{app:questionnaire_oecd} and \ref{app:questionnaire}.

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69 \\\[-1.8ex] Survey & \textit{Global}  
& \textit{Eu} & \textit{US1} & \texti  
t{US2} \\  
70 \hline \\\[-1.8ex]  
71 Country coverage & 20 countries & F  
R, DE, ES, UK & U.S. & U.S. \\  
72 Sample size & 40,680 & 3,000 & 3,00  
0 & 2,000 \\  
73 Main purpose & \makecell{Stated sup  
port \\\for global policies} & \multic  
olumn{3}{c}{\makecell{Focus on GCS (s  
incerity, rationales, etc.) \\\+ Suppo  
rt for global redistribution \\\+ Univ  
ersalistic values}} \\  
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78 \end{tabular}  
79 \end{table}  
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81 \renewcommand{\thetable}{\arabic{tabl  
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82  
83 \paragraph{Global Survey}  
84  
85 The \textit{Global} survey, conducted  
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r various global policies worldwide.  
Detailed information about the data c  
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iveness, and analysis of questions on  
national policies can be found in \ci  
tet{dechezlepretre_fighting_2022}.  
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87 \paragraph{Complementary Surveys}\lab  
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90

91 The **complementary** surveys ensured representativeness along key dimensions: gender, income, age, highest diploma, and degree of urbanization. The \textit{Eu} survey is also representative of its four countries in terms of population size, while the \textit{US1} and \textit{US2} surveys are representative in terms of region and ethnicity. Tables \ref{tab:representativeness_waves}-\ref{tab:representativeness_EU} **confirm that** our samples **closely** match population frequencies. More detail on data collection is given in Section \nameref{sec:methods}. The questionnaires used in the surveys are provided in Appendices \ref{app:questionnaire_oecd} and \ref{app:questionnaire}.

92

93 \subsection{Stated support for global policies}\label{subsec:stated_support_t}

94 \subsubsection{Global support}\label{subsubsec:global_support}

95

96 The **Global survey shows** strong support for climate policies enacted at the global level (Figure \ref{fig:oecd}). %

97 When asked ``At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be put in place?``, 70\% (in the U.S.) to 94\% (in Japan) choose the global level. The next most popular choice is the federal or continental level, favored by 52\% of Americans and less than half of Europe

68

69 \subsection{Global support}\label{subsubsec:global_support}

70

71 **We find** strong support for climate policies enacted at the global level **when analysing the global survey** (Figure \ref{fig:oecd}). %

72 When asked ``At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be put in place?``, 70\% (in the U.S.) to 94\% (in Japan) choose the global level. The next most popular choice is the federal or continental level, favored by 52\% of Americans and less than half of Europe

an respondents. Local policies receive the least support. This preference for climate policies implemented at the global scale is in line with \cite{beiser-mcgrath_could_2019} and consistent with individuals' concerns for the fairness and effectiveness of such policies, which have been identified as two of the three key determinants of support, besides self-interest \citep{klenert_making_2018,douenne_yellow_2022,dechezlepretre_fighting_2022}.

an respondents. Local policies receive the least support. This preference for climate policies implemented at the global scale is in line with earlier contributions \cite{beiser-mcgrath_could_2019,bechtel_mass_2013,sivonen_attitudes_2022} %

73 and consistent with individuals' concerns for the fairness and effectiveness of such policies, which have been identified as two of the three key determinants of support, besides self-interest.\citep{klenert_making_2018,douenne_yellow_2022,dechezlepretre_fighting_nodate} It could also stem from conditional cooperation,\citep{barrett_self-enforcing_1994} even if previous studies suggest that the support for climate policies does not depend on climate action abroad \citep{aklin_prisoners_2020,tingley_conditional_2014}. %

98 \begin{figure}[h!]

99 %

100 \caption[Relative support for global climate policies]{Relative support for global climate policies.}

101 \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegraphics[width=1.2\textwidth]

102 {../figures/OECD/Heatplot_global_tax_attitudes_share.pdf}}\label{fig:oced}%

103 {\footnotesize \quad \quad Note 1: The numbers represent the share of \textit{Somewhat} or \textit{Strongly support} among non-\textit{indifferent} answers (in percent, \$n\$ = 40,680). The color blue denotes a relative majority. See Figure \ref{fig:oced_absolute} for the absolute support. (Questions \ref{q:scale}-\ref{q:millionaire_tax})%

74 \begin{figure}[h!]

75 %

76 \caption[Relative support for global climate policies]{Support for global climate policies.}

77 \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegraphics[width=1.2\textwidth]

78 {../figures/OECD/Heatplot_global_tax_attitudes_share.pdf}}\label{fig:oced}%

79 {\footnotesize \quad \quad Note 1: The numbers represent \textit{relative} support, i.e. the share of \textit{Somewhat} or \textit{Strongly support} among non-\textit{indifferent} answers (in percent, \$n\$ = 40,680). The color blue denotes a relative majority. See Figure \ref{fig:oced_absolute} for the absolute support. (Questions \ref{q:scale}-\ref{q:millionaire_tax})%

104). \\ Note 2: *In Denmark, France and
the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question \ref{q:burden_sharing_asterisk}.
}
105 \end{figure}
106

107 Among the four global climate policies examined in the \textit{Global} survey, three policies garner high support across all countries (Figure \ref{fig:oced}). These policies include a global democratic assembly on climate change, a global tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries contingent on their climate action, and a global carbon budget of +2\textdegree{}C divided among countries based on tradable shares (or ``global quota''), with the allocation of country shares unspecified.\footnote{The policies were all described with further details to make sure people understood them. Specifically, the policies were presented as follows: an international emissions trading system where ``countries that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less than their share''; ``a tax on all millionaires in dollars around the world to finance low-income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate action [which] would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education''; ``a global democratic assembly whose role would be to draft international treaties against climate change [where] each adult across the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly''.} The three policies garner a majority of absolute support (i.e., ``somewhat'' or ``strong'' support) in all countries (except in the U.S. for the global assembly, 48\% absolute support). In high-income countries, the global quota policy obtains 64\% absolute support and 84\% relative support (i.e., excluding ``indifferent'' answers). %

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the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question \ref{q:burden_sharing_asterisk}.
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81 \end{figure}
82

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108

109 Following the support for the global quota, respondents are asked about their preferences for dividing the carbon budget among countries, as depicted in the third block of Figure \ref{fig:oece}. Consistent with the existing literature (see Appendix \ref{subsec:literature_attitudes_burden_sharing}), an equal per capita allocation of emission rights emerges as the preferred burden-sharing principle, garnering absolute majority support in all countries and never below 84\% relative support. Taking into account historical responsibilities or vulnerability to climate damages is also popular, albeit with less consensus, while grandfathering (i.e., allocation of emission shares in proportion to current emissions) receives the least support in all countries.

110

111 A global quota with equal per capita emission rights should produce the same distributional outcomes as a global carbon tax that funds a global basic income.\footnote{Similarly, a global quota with grandfathering is equivalent to a global carbon tax where each country keeps the revenues it collects.} The support for the global carbon tax is also tested and its redistributive effects -- the average increase in expenditures along with the amount of the basic income -- are specified to the respondents explicitly (see box below and Appendix \ref{app:questionnaire}, p. \pageref{subsec:questionnaire_GCS}). %

84

The three policies garner a majority of absolute support (i.e., ``somewhat'' or ``strong'' support) in all countries (except in the U.S. for the global assembly, 48\% absolute support). In high-income countries, the global quota policy obtains 64\% absolute support and 84\% relative support (i.e., excluding ``indifferent'' answers). %

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87

88 A global carbon tax that funds a global basic income should produce the same distributional outcomes as a global tradable quota with equal per capita emission rights (to the extent that the carbon price is the same and provided that each country returns the revenues from emissions trading equally to its citizens). %

112 The support for the carbon tax is lower than for the quota, particularly in high-income countries, and there is no relative majority for the tax in Anglo-Saxon countries.^{\footnote{The levels of support are consistent with the findings of \citet{carattini_how_2019}, the only previous study that tested a global carbon tax.}} Two possible reasons for this lower support are that distributive effects are made salient in the case of the tax, and that people may prefer a quota, perhaps because they find it more effective than a tax to reduce emissions. This interpretation is consistent with the level of support for the global quota once we make the distributive effects salient, as we do in the complementary surveys.

113 \subsubsection{Global Climate Scheme}
 \label{subsubsec:support_gcs}

114

115 The complementary surveys (\textit{US1}, \textit{US2}, \textit{Eu}) consist of a comprehensive exploration of citizens' attitudes towards the GCS. We present to respondents a detailed description of the GCS and explain its distributive effects, including specific amounts at stake (as specified in the box below). Furthermore, we assess

89 The support for the global carbon tax is also tested and its redistributive effects -- the average increase in expenditures along with the amount of the basic income -- are specified to the respondents explicitly (see box below and Appendix \ref{app:questionnaire}, p.\pageref{subsec:questionnaire_GCS}). %

90 The support for the carbon tax is lower than for the quota, particularly in high-income countries, and there is no relative majority for the tax in Anglo-Saxon countries (consistently with the levels of support found in the only previous study that tested a global carbon tax\cite{carattini_how_2019}). %

91 Two possible reasons for this lower support are that distributive effects are specified explicitly in the case of the tax, and that people may prefer a quota, perhaps because they find it more effective than a tax to reduce emissions. The two reasons are consistent with the intermediate level of support for the GCS in the main survey, which is based on a global quota but where the question specifies explicitly the distributive effects. %

92

93 \subsection{Stated support for the Global Climate Scheme}\label{subsec:gcs_stated_support}

s respondents' understanding of the GCS with incentivized questions to test their comprehension of the expected financial outcome for typical individuals in high-income countries (loss) and the poorest individuals globally (gain), followed by the provision of correct answers (Figures \ref{fig:understood_each}-\ref{fig:understood_score}). %

116 The same approach is applied to a National Redistribution scheme (NR) targeting the top 5\% (in the U.S.) or to p 1\% (in Europe) with the aim of financing cash transfers to all adults s,\footnote{The wider base in the U.S. was chosen because emissions are larger in the U.S. than in Europe, and it would hardly be feasible to offset the median American's loss by taxing only the top 1\%.} calibrated to offset the monetary loss of the GCS for the median emitter in their country. We evaluate respondents' understanding that the richest would lose and the typical fellow citizens would gain from that policy. %

94

95 The main surveys (\textit{US1}, \textit{US2}, \textit{Eu}) include a comprehensive exploration of citizens' attitudes towards the GCS. We present to respondents a detailed description of the GCS and explain its distributive effects, including specific amounts at stake (as specified in the box below). Furthermore, we assess respondents' understanding of the GCS with incentivized questions to test their comprehension of the expected financial outcome for typical individuals in high-income countries (loss) and the poorest individuals globally (gain), followed by the provision of correct answers (Figures \ref{fig:understood_each}-\ref{fig:understood_score}). %

96

97 For comparison, %

98 the same approach is applied to a National Redistribution scheme (NR) targeting top incomes %

99 with the aim of financing cash transfers to all adults, %

117 Subsequently, we summarize both schemes to enhance respondents' recall. Additionally, we present a final incentivized comprehension question and provide the expected answer that the combined GCS and NR would result in no net gain or loss for a typical fellow citizen. Finally, respondents are directly asked to express their support for the GCS and NR using a simple \textit{Yes}/\textit{No} question.

118 The stated support for the GCS is 54\% in the U.S. and 76\% in Europe,\footnote{The 95\% confidence intervals are \$[52.4\%, 55.9\%]\$ in the U.S. and \$[74.2\%, 77.2\%]\$ in Europe. The average support is computed with survey weights, employing weights based on quota variables, which exclude vote. Another method to reweigh the raw results involves running a regression of the support for the GCS on sociodemographic characteristics (including vote) and multiplying each coefficient by the population frequencies. This alternative approach yields similar figures: 76\% in Europe and 52\% or 53\% in the U.S. (depending on whether individuals who did not disclose their vote are classified as non-voters or excluded). Notably, the average support excluding non-voters is 54\% in the U.S.} while the support for NR is very similar: 56\% and 73\% respectively (see Figure \ref{fig:support_binary}). Appendix \ref{app:determinants} examines the sociodemographic determinants of support for the GCS as well as the beliefs correlated with the support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income. The strongest correlates are political leaning, trust in the government and perceptions that the policy is effective at re

100 calibrated to offset the monetary losses of the GCS for the median emitter in their country. We evaluate respondents' understanding that the richest would lose and the typical fellow citizens would gain from that policy. %

101 Subsequently, we summarize both schemes to enhance respondents' recall. Additionally, we present a final incentivized comprehension question and provide the expected answer that the combined GCS and NR would result in no net gain or loss for a typical fellow citizen. Finally, respondents are directly asked to express their support for the GCS and NR using a simple \textit{Yes}/\textit{No} question.

102

ducing emissions or in one's self-interest. %

119

120 `\begin{tcolorbox}\label{box:GCS}`

121 `\paragraph{The Global Climate Scheme}` The GCS consists of global emissions trading with emission rights being auctioned each year to polluting firms, and of a global basic income, funded by the auction revenues. Using the price and emissions trajectories from the report by `\cite{stern_report_2017}`, and in particular a carbon price of $\$90/\text{tCO}_2$ in 2030, we estimate that the basic income would amount to $\$30$ per month for every human over the age of 15 (see details in Appendix `\ref{app:gain_gcs}`). %

122 We describe the GCS to the respondents as a ``climate club'' and we specify its redistributive effects: The 700 million people with less than $\$2/$

103 Our main result is that stated support for the GCS is 54\% in the U.S. and 76\% in Europe, while the support for NR is very similar: 56\% and 73\% respectively (Figures `\ref{fig:support}`, `\ref{fig:support_binary}`).

104 Appendix `\ref{app:determinants}` examines the sociodemographic determinants of support for the GCS as well as the beliefs correlated with the support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income. The strongest correlates are political leaning, trust in the government and perceptions that climate policies are effective at reducing emissions or in one's self-interest.

105

106 Finding majority support for the GCS runs counter to the conventional skepticism about the feasibility of global cooperation to mitigating climate change. %

107 This motivates the subsequent analysis of robustness and sincerity, novel to attitudinal surveys on instrument choice for environmental policy. %

108

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112 We describe the GCS to the respondents as a ``climate club'' and we specify its redistributive effects: The 700 million people with less than $\$2/$

day [in Purchasing Power Parity] would be lifted out of extreme poverty, and fossil fuel price increases would cost the typical person in their country a specified amount (see Appendix \ref{subsec:questionnaire_GCS} for details). The monthly median net cost is \\$85 in the U.S., \euro{}10 in France, \euro{}25 in Germany, \euro{}5 in Spain, £20 in the UK.

123 \end{tcolorbox}

124 \setcounter{figure}{0}

125 \renewcommand{\thefigure}{S\arabic{figure}}

126 \begin{figure}[h!]

127 \caption[Support for the Global Climate Scheme]{[For Supplementary Material, except first row to be included in Figure \ref{fig:support}] Support for the GCS, NR and the combination of GCS, NR and C. \\\(p. \pageref{subsec:questionnaire_GCS}, Questions \ref{q:gcs_support}, \ref{q:nr_support}, \ref{q:global_tax}, \ref{q:national_tax}, and \ref{q:crg_support}).%

128 }\label{fig:support_binary}

129 \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegraphics[width=.9\textwidth]{../figures/country_comparison/support_binary_positive.pdf}}

130 \end{figure}

131

132 \subsubsection{Other global policies} \label{subsubsec:support_other_global_policies} %

133

134 We also assess support for other global policies (Figure \ref{fig:support}).

135 Most policies garner relative majority support in each country, with two exceptions: the ``cancellation of low-income countries' public debt'' and ``a maximum wealth limit'' for each individual.

136 The latter policy obtains relative majority support in Europe but not in the U.S., despite the cap being set at \\$10 billion in the U.S. compared to \euro{}100 million in Europe. Notably, climate-related policies enjoy significant popularity, with ``high-inc

day [in Purchasing Power Parity] would be lifted out of extreme poverty, and fossil fuel price increases would cost the typical person in their country a specified amount (see Appendix \ref{subsec:questionnaire_GCS} for details). The monthly median net cost is \\$85 in the U.S., \euro{}10 in France, \euro{}25 in Germany, \euro{}5 in Spain, £20 in the UK.

113 \end{tcolorbox}

ome countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries'' receiving absolute majority support across all surveyed countries. Additionally, relative support for loss and damages compensation, as approved in principle at the international climate negotiations in 2022 ('`COP27''), ranges from 55\% (U.S.) to 81\% (Spain), with absolute support ranging from 41\% to 62\%.

137

138 \subsubsection{Global wealth tax}\label{subsubsec:support_global_wealth_tax}

139

140 Consistent with the results of the global survey, a ``tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-income countries'' garners absolute majority support of over 67\% in each country, only 5 p.p. lower than a national millionaires tax overall (Figure \ref{fig:support}). In random subsamples, we inquire about respondents' preferences regarding the redistribution of revenues from a global tax on individual wealth exceeding \\$5 million, after providing information on the revenue raised by such a tax in their country compared to low-income countries.\footnote{A 2\% tax on net wealth exceeding \\$5 million would annually raise \\$816 billion, leaving unaffected 99.9\% of the world population. More specifically, it would collect \euro{}5 billion in Spain, \euro{}16 billion in France, £20 billion in the UK, \euro{}44 billion in Germany, \\$430 billion in the U.S., and \\$1 billion collectively in all low-income countries (28 countries, home to 700 million people).%}

141 } We ask certain respondents (\$n\$ = 1,283) what percentage of global tax revenues should be pooled to finance low-income countries. In each country, at least 88\% of respondents indicate a positive amount, with an average ranging from 30\% (Germany) to 36\% (U.S., France) (Figure \ref{fig:global_share_mean}). To other respondents

(\$n\$ = 1,233), we inquire whether the y would prefer each country to retain all the revenues it collects or that half of the revenues be pooled to finance low-income countries. Approximately half of the respondents opt to allocate half of the tax revenues to low-income countries.

```
142 \begin{figure}
143   \centering
144   \caption[Preferred share of wealth tax for low-income countries]{[For Supplementary Material] Percent of global wealth tax that should finance low-income countries (\textit{mean}). (Question \ref{q:global_tax_global_share})} %
145   \includegraphics[width=1\textwidth]{../figures/country_comparison/global_tax_global_share_mean.pdf} \label{fig:global_share_mean}
146 \end{figure}
```

147

148

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149 \setcounter{figure}{1}

150 \renewcommand{\thefigure}{\arabic{figure}}
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114

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115 \subsection{Stated support for global redistribution}\label{subsec:support_other}
116 We also assess support for a range of other international policies (Figure \ref{fig:support}) as well as unilateral foreign aid. %
117 \subsubsection{International policies}\label{subsubsec:support_other_global_policies} %
```

118

```
119 Most policies garner relative majority support in each country, with two exceptions: the ``cancellation of low-income countries' public debt'' and ``a maximum wealth limit'' for each individual (Figure \ref{fig:support}). %
120 The latter policy garners relative majority support in Europe but not in the U.S., despite the cap being set at \$10 billion in the U.S. compared to \euro{}/£100 million in Europe. Notably, climate-related policies enjoy significant popularity, with ``high-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries'' receiving
```

151 \begin{figure}
 152 %
 153 \caption[Relative support for further global policies]{Relative support for various global policies (percentage of \textit{somewhat} or \textit{strong support}, after excluding \textit{indifferent} answers). (Questions \ref{q:climate_policies} and \ref{q:other_policies}); See Figure \ref{fig:s

absolute majority support across all surveyed countries. Additionally, relative support for loss and damages compensation, as approved in principle at the international climate negotiations in 2022 ('COP27'), ranges from 55\% (U.S.) to 81\% (Spain). %
 121 Consistent with the results of the global survey,
 122 a 'tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-income countries' garners relative support of over 69\% in each country, only 5 p.p. lower than a national millionaires tax overall. In random subsamples, we inquire about respondents' preferences regarding the redistribution of revenues from a global tax on individual wealth exceeding \\$5 million, after providing information on the revenue raised by such a tax in their country compared to low-income countries.
 123 We ask certain respondents ($n = 1,283$) what percentage of the global tax revenues should be pooled to finance low-income countries. In each country, at least 88\% of respondents indicate a positive amount, with an average of one-third %
 124 (Figure \ref{fig:global_share_mean}). To other respondents ($n = 1,233$), we inquire whether they would prefer each country to retain all the revenues it collects or that half of the revenues be pooled to finance low-income countries. Approximately half of the respondents opt to allocate half of the tax revenues to low-income countries, consistently with the other variant of the question.

125 \begin{figure}
 126 %
 127 \caption[Relative support for other global policies]{Support for various global policies. (\textit{relative support}: percentage of \textit{somewhat} or \textit{strong support}, after excluding \textit{indifferent} answers; *except for GCS: percentage of \textit{Yes} in a \textit{Yes}/\textit{No} question). (p. \pageref{subsec:que

upport_likert_positive} for the absolute support.)%

154 }

155 \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/country_comparison/support_likert_share.pdf}}\label{fig:support}

156 \end{figure}

157 \renewcommand{\thefigure}{S\arabic{figure}}

158

159 \subsubsection{Foreign aid}\label{subsubsec:support_foreign_aid} %

160

161 We provide respondents with information about the actual amount ``spent on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries'' relative to their country's government spending and GDP. Less than 16\% of respondents state that their country's foreign aid should be reduced, while 62\% express support for increasing it, including 17\% who support an unconditional increase (Figure \ref{fig:foreign_aid_raise_support}). Among the 45\% who think aid should be increased under certain conditions, we subsequently ask them to specify the conditions they deem necessary (Figure \ref{fig:foreign_aid_condition}). The three most commonly selected conditions are: ``we can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted'' (73\% chose this condition), ``that recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights'' (67\%), and ``that other high-income countries also increase their foreign aid'' (48\%).\footnote{It is worth noting that these conditions align closely with the principles of the GCS.}

162 On the other hand, respondents who do not wish to increase their country's foreign aid primarily justify their view by prioritizing the well-being of

stionnaire_GCS}, Questions \ref{q:gcs_support}, \ref{q:climate_policies} and \ref{q:other_policies}; See Figure \ref{fig:support_likert_positive} for the absolute support.)%

128 }

129 \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/country_comparison/support_likert_gcs_share.pdf}}\label{fig:support}

130 \end{figure}

131

132 \subsubsection{Foreign aid}\label{subsubsec:support_foreign_aid} %

133

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135 On the other hand, respondents who do not wish to increase their country's foreign aid primarily justify their view by prioritizing the well-being of

their fellow citizens or by perceiv-
ing each country as responsible for its
own fate (Figure \ref{fig:foreign_aid
_no}). In response to an open-ended q
uestion regarding measures high-incom
e countries should take to fight extr
eme poverty, a large majority of Amer
icans expressed that more help is nee
ded (Figure \ref{fig:poverty_field}).
The most commonly suggested form of a
id is financial support, closely foll
owed by investments in education.

163 We also inquire about the perceived a
mount of foreign aid. Consistent with
prior research (see Appendix \ref{sub
subsec:literature_foreign_aid}), most
people overestimate the actual amount
of foreign aid (Figure \ref{fig:forei
gn_aid_belief}). We then elicit respo
ndents' preferred amount of foreign a
id, after randomly presenting them wi
th either the actual amount or no inf
ormation. Most of the respondents who
learn the actual amount choose a brac
ket at least as high as the actual on
e, and most of those without the info
rmation choose a bracket at least as
high as the perceived one (Figures \r
ef{fig:foreign_aid_amount}--\ref{fig:
foreign_aid_preferred_info}). Finall
y, we ask a last question to the resp
ondents who received the information.
To those who prefer an increase of fo
reign aid, we ask how they would fina
nce it: by far, the preferred source
of funding is higher taxes on the wea
lthiest (Figure \ref{fig:foreign_aid_
raise_how}). To those who prefer a re
duction, we ask how they would use th
e funds becoming available: %

164 In every country, more people choose
higher spending on education or healt
hcare rather than lower taxes (Figure
\ref{fig:foreign_aid_reduce_how}).

165

166 \begin{figure}[h!]
167 \caption[Attitudes on the evolution
of foreign aid]{[For Supplementary Ma
terial] Attitudes regarding the evolu
tion of [own country] foreign aid. (Q

their fellow citizens or by perceiv-
ing each country as responsible for its
own fate (Figure \ref{fig:foreign_aid
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ef{fig:foreign_aid_amount}--\ref{fig:
foreign_aid_preferred_info}). Finall
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raise_how}). To those who prefer a re
duction, we ask how they would use th
e funds becoming available: %

138 In every country, more people choose
higher spending on education or healt
hcare rather than lower taxes (Figure
\ref{fig:foreign_aid_reduce_how}).

139

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question \ref{q:foreign_aid_raise_support}})\label{fig:foreign_aid_raise_support}
168 \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/country_comparison/foreign_aid_raise_support.pdf}}
169 \end{figure}
170
171 \begin{figure}[h!]
172 \caption[Conditions at which foreign aid should be increased]{[For Supplementary Material] Conditions at which foreign aid should be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish an increase of foreign aid at some conditions.] (Question \ref{q:foreign_aid_condition}})\label{fig:foreign_aid_condition}
173 \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/country_comparison/foreign_aid_condition_positive.pdf}}
174 \end{figure}
175
176 \begin{figure}[h!]
177 \caption[Reasons why foreign aid should not be increased]{[For Supplementary Material] Reasons why foreign aid should not be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish a decrease or stability of foreign aid.] (Question \ref{q:foreign_aid_no}})\label{fig:foreign_aid_no}
178 \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/country_comparison/foreign_aid_no_positive.pdf}}
179 \end{figure}

180 \subsection{Robustness and sincerity of support for the GCS}\label{subsection:robustness_sincerity}
181 We use several methods to assess the sincerity of the support for the GCS: a list experiment, a real-stake petition, conjoint analyses, and the prioritization of policies. All methods suggest that the support is either completely sincere, or the share of insincere answers is limited.

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182

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\subsection{Robustness and sincerity of support for the GCS}\label{subsection:robustness_sincerity}
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142

183 \subsubsection{List experiment}\label
 {subsubsec:list_exp} %

184

185 By asking \textit{how many} policies within a list respondents support and varying the list among respondents, a list experiment allows identifying the tacit support for a policy of interest. The tacit support is estimated as the difference in the average number of policies supported between two groups, whose list differ only by the inclusion of that policy \citep{hainmueller_causal_2014}. %

186 For example, say a first subsample faces the list of policies A, B, and C, while a second subsample faces the list A, B, C, and GCS. We do not need to know which policies each respondent support to estimate the average (tacit) support for the GCS, we simply need to compute the difference in the average number of supported policies between the two random subsamples.

187 List experiments have been used to reveal social desirability bias, silencing either racism in the Southern U.S. \citep{kuklinski_racial_1997} or opposition to the invasion of Ukraine in Russia \citep{chapkovski_solid_2022}. %

188 In our case, as shown in Table \ref{tab:list_exp}, the tacit support for the GCS measured through the list experiment is not significantly lower than the direct stated support.\footnote{We utilize the difference-in-means estimator, and confidence intervals are computed using Monte Carlo simulation with the R package \textit{list} \citep{imai_multivariate_2011}.} Hence, we do not find a social desirability bias in our study.

189 \begin{table}[h]

190 %

191 %

192 \caption[List experiment: tacit support for the GCS]{Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list. %

143 \subsubsection{List experiment}\label
 {subsubsec:list_exp} %

144

145 By asking \textit{how many} policies within a list respondents support and varying the list among respondents, a list experiment allows identifying the tacit support for a policy of interest.

146 For example, say a first subsample faces the list of policies A, B, and C, while a second subsample faces the list A, B, C, and GCS. We do not need to know which policies each respondent support to estimate the average (tacit) support for the GCS, we simply need to compute the difference in the average number of supported policies between the two random subsamples.\citep{imai_multivariate_2011}

147 In our case, as shown in Table \ref{tab:list_exp}, the tacit support for the GCS measured through the list experiment is not significantly lower than the direct stated support. %

148 Hence, we do not find a social desirability bias in our study.

193 The tacit support for the GCS is estimated by regressing the number of supported policies on the presence of the GCS in the list of policies. The social desirability is estimated as the difference between the tacit and stated support, and it is not significantly different from zero even at a 20\% threshold (see \nameref{sec:methods}).

194 }\label{tab:list_exp}

195 \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\input{../tables/continents/reg_list_exp_g.tex}}

196 }

197 %

198 \end{table}

199

200 \subsubsection{Petition}\label{subsubsec:petition} %

201

202 We ask respondents whether they are willing to sign a petition in support of either the GCS or NR policy. We inform them that the petition results will be sent to the head of state's office, highlighting the proportion of fellow citizens endorsing the respective scheme. Even when framed as a **real-stake petition**, both policies continue to receive majority support. In the U.S., we find no significant difference between the support in the **real-stake** petitions and the simple questions (GCS: $p=.30$; NR: $p=.76$).\footnote{Paired weighted \textit{t}-tests are conducted to test the equality in support for a policy among respondents who were questioned about the policy in the petition.} In Europe, the petition leads to a comparable lower support for both the GCS (7 p.p., $p=10^{-5}$) and NR (4 p.p., $p=.008$). While some European respondents are unwilling to sign a petition for policies they are expected to support, this **effect** is not specific to the GCS, and the overall willingness to sign a **real-stake** petition remains strong, with 69\% expressing support for the GCS and 67\% for NR.

149

150 \subsubsection{Petition}\label{subsubsec:petition} %

151

152 We ask respondents whether they are willing to sign a petition in support of either the GCS or NR policy. We inform them that the petition results will be sent to the head of state's office, highlighting the proportion of fellow citizens endorsing the respective scheme. Even when framed as a **petition that might have real stakes**, both policies continue to receive majority support. In the U.S., we find no significant difference between the support in the %

203

204 \subsubsection{Conjoint analyses}\label{subsubsec:conjoint} %

205

206 In order to assess the public support for the GCS in conjunction with other policies, we conduct a series of conjoint analyses. We ask respondents to make five choices between pairs of political platforms.

207

208 The first conjoint analysis suggests that the GCS is supported independently of being complemented by the National Redistribution Scheme and a national climate policy ('Coal exit' in the U.S., 'Thermal insulation plan' in Europe, denoted C).\footnote{Indeed, 54\% of %

209 U.S. respondents and 74\% of %

210 European ones prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to the combination of C and NR alone, indicating simi

153 petitions and the simple questions (GCS: $p=.30$; NR: $p=.76$). %

154 In Europe, the petition leads to a comparable lower support for both the GCS (7 p.p., $p=10^{-5}$) and NR (4 p.p., $p=.008$). While some European respondents are unwilling to sign a petition for policies they are expected to support, this phenomenon is not specific to the GCS, and the overall willingness to sign a %

155 petition remains strong, with 69\% expressing support for the GCS and 67\% for NR.

156

157 \subsubsection{Conjoint analyses}\label{subsubsec:conjoint} %

158

159 In order to assess the public support for the GCS in conjunction with other policies, we conduct a series of conjoint analyses. We ask respondents to make five choices between pairs of political platforms. Each choice is meant at testing a different hypothesis on the support for the GCS in relation to other policies or voting.

160

161 The first conjoint analysis suggests that the GCS is supported independently of being complemented by the National Redistribution Scheme and a national climate policy (C). %

162 The second analysis indicates majority support for the GCS and for C, which are seen as neither complement nor substitute (see \nameref{sec:methods}). A minor share of respondents like a national climate policy and dislike a global one, but as many people prefer a global rather than a national policy; and there is no evidence that implementing NR would increase the support for the GCS.

lar support for the GCS conditional on NR and C than for the GCS alone (Figure \ref{fig:conjoint}).} %

211 For the second analysis, we split the sample into four random branches. \footnote{Results from the first branch show that the support for the GCS conditional on NR, at 55\% in the U.S. (\$n\$ = 757) and 77\% in Europe (\$n\$ = 746), is not significantly different from the support for the GCS alone. This suggests that rejection of the GCS is not driven by the cost of the policy on oneself. The second branch shows that the support for C conditional on NR is somewhat higher, at 62\% in the U.S. (\$n\$ = 751) and 84\% in Europe (\$n\$ = 747). However, the third one shows no significant preference for C compared to GCS (both conditional on NR), neither in Europe, where GCS is preferred by 52\% (\$n\$ = 741) nor in the U.S., where C is preferred by 53\% (\$n\$ = 721). The fourth branch shows that 55\% in the U.S. (\$n\$ = 771) and 77\% in Europe (\$n\$ = 766) prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to NR alone.} The outcome is that there is majority support for the GCS and for C, which are seen as neither complement nor substitute. A minor share of respondents like a national climate policy and dislike a global one, but as many people prefer a global rather than a national policy; and there is no evidence that implementing NR would increase the support for the GCS.

212 In the third analysis, we present two random branches of the sample with hypothetical progressive and conservative platforms that differ only by the presence (or not) of the GCS in the progressive platform. Table \ref{tab:conjoint_c} shows that a progressive candidate would not significantly lose voting share by endorsing the GCS in any country, and may even gain 11 p.p. (\$p\$ = .005) in voting intention in France. %

163 In the third analysis, we present two random branches of the sample with hypothetical progressive and conservative platforms that differ only by the presence (or not) of the GCS in the progressive platform. Table \ref{tab:conjoint_c} shows that a progressive candidate would not significantly lose voting share by endorsing the GCS in any country, and may even gain 11 p.p. (\$p\$ = .005) in voting intention in France. %

213 Though the level of support for the GCS is significantly lower in swing States (at 51\%) that are key to win U.S. elections, the electoral effect of endorsing the GCS remains non-significantly different from zero (at +1.2 p.p.) in these States.\footnote{We define swing states as the 8 states with less than 5 p.p. margin of victory in the 2020 election (MI, NV, PA, WI, AZ, GA, NC, FL). The results are robust to using the 3 p.p. threshold (that excludes FL) instead.}

214 \begin{table}[h]

215 %

216 \caption{Influence of the GCS on electoral prospects}{Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. (Question \ref{q:conjoint_c})}

217 %

218 } %

219 \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\input{../tables/country_comparison/conjoint_c_w_o_none.tex}}\label{tab:conjoint_c}

220 {\footnotesize \textit{Note:} Simple OLS model. The 14\% of \textit{None} of them} answers have been excluded from the regression samples. GCS has no significant influence on them. $^*p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$.

221 }

222 \end{table}

223 \begin{stretchpars}

224 Our last two analyses make respondents choose between two random platforms. In Europe, respondents are prompted to imagine that a left or center-left coalition will win the next election and are asked what platform they would prefer that coalition to have campaigned on. In the U.S., the question is framed as a hypothetical duel in a Democratic primary, and asked only to non-Republicans ($n = 2,218$), i.e. the respondents who declare as political affiliation \textit{Democrat}, \textit{Independent}, \textit{Non-Affiliated} or \textit{Other}. In the fo

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urth analysis, a policy (or an absence of policy) is randomly drawn for each platform in each of five categories: \textit{economic issues}, \textit{societal issues}, \textit{climate policy}, \textit{tax system}, \textit{foreign policy} (Figure \ref{fig:ca_r}).

225

226 Except for the category \textit{foreign policy}, which features the GCS 42 \% of the time, the policies are prominent progressive policies and they are drawn uniformly. %

227 In the UK, Germany, and France, a platform is about 9 to 13 p.p. more likely to be preferred if it includes the GCS rather than no foreign policy. \footnote{This is the Average Marginal Component Effect computed following \cite{hainmueller_causal_2014}.} This effect is between 1 and 4 p.p. and no longer significant in the U.S. and in Spain. Moreover, a platform that includes a global tax on millionaires rather than no foreign policy is 5 to 13 percentage points (p.p.) more likely to be preferred in all countries (the effect is significant and at least 9 p.p. in all countries but Spain).

228 Similarly, a global democratic assembly on climate change has a significant effect of 8 to 12 p.p. in the U.S., Germany, and France.

229 These effects are large, and not far from the effects of the policies most influential on the platforms, which range between 15 and 18 p.p. in most countries (and 27 p.p. in Spain), and all relate to improved public services (in particular healthcare, housing, and education).

165

166 In the fourth analysis, a policy (or an absence of policy) is randomly drawn for each platform in each of five categories: \textit{economic issues}, \textit{societal issues}, \textit{climate policy}, \textit{tax system}, \textit{foreign policy} (Figure \ref{fig:ca_r}).

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230 `\end{stretchpars}`

231

232 `\begin{figure}[h]`

233 `\caption[Preferences for various po
licies in political platforms]{[For S
upplementary Material] Effects of the
presence of a policy (rather than non
e from this domain) in a random platf
orm on the likelihood that it is pref
erred to another random platform. (Se
e English translations in Figure \ref
{fig:ca_r_en}; Question \ref{q:conjoi
nt_r}%`

234 `)}\label{fig:ca_r}`

235 `\begin{subfigure}{\textwidth}`

236 `\subcaption{U.S. (Asked only to n
on-Republicans)}`

237 `\includegraphics[width=\textwidt
h]{../figures/US1/ca_r.png}`

238 `\end{subfigure}`

239 `\begin{subfigure}{\textwidth}`

240 `\subcaption{France}`

241 `\includegraphics[width=\textwidt
h]{../figures/FR/ca_r.png}`

242 `\end{subfigure}`

243 `\end{figure}%`

244 `\clearpage`

170 These effects are large, and not far from the effects of the policies most influential on the platforms, which range between 15 and 18 p.p. in most countries (27 p.p. in Spain), and all relate to improved public services (in particular healthcare, housing, and education).

171

172 The fifth analysis draws random platforms similarly, except that candidate A's platform always contains the GCS while B's includes no foreign policy. In this case, A is chosen by 60\% of Europeans %

173 and 58\% of non-Republican Americans (Figure \ref{fig:conjoint_left_ag_b}). %

174

175 Overall, taking the U.S. as an example, our conjoint analyses indicate that a candidate at the Democratic primary would have more chances to obtain the nomination by endorsing the GCS, and this endorsement would not penalize her or him at the presidential election.

176 This result relates to the finding that at 12\% of Germans shift their voting intention from SPD and CDU/CSU to the Greens and the Left when they are told that the latter parties support global democracy.\citep{ghassim_who_2020}

```
245 \begin{figure}[h!]\ContinuedFloat %
246 \begin{subfigure}{\textwidth}
247 \subcaption{Germany}
248 \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/DE/ca_r.png}
249 \end{subfigure}
250 \begin{subfigure}{\textwidth}
251 \subcaption{Spain}
252 \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/ES/ca_r.png}
253 \end{subfigure}
254 \begin{subfigure}{\textwidth}
255 \subcaption{UK}
256 \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/UK/ca_r.png}
257 \end{subfigure}
258 %
259 \end{figure}
260 \clearpage
261 \noindent
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265 \begin{figure}[h!]
266 \caption[Influence of the GCS on preferred platform]{[For Supplementary Material] Influence of the GCS on preferred platform:\\ Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question \ref{q:conjoint_d}; in the
```

U.S., asked only to non-Republican s.))\label{fig:conjoint_left_ag_b}

267 \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/country_comparison/conjoint_left_ag_b_binary_positive.pdf}}

268 \end{figure}

269 \subsubsection{Prioritization}\label{subsubsec:prioritization} %

270

271 Towards the end of the survey, we ask respondents to allocate 100 points among six randomly selected policies from the previous conjoint analyses, using sliders. The instruction was to distribute the points based on their level of support, with a higher allocation indicating greater support for a policy. %

272 As a result, the average support across policies is 16.67 points. %

273 In each country, the GCS ranks in the middle of all policies or above, with an average number of points from 15.4 in the U.S. to 22.9 in Germany.%

274

275 Interestingly, in Germany, the most prioritized policy is the global tax on millionaires, while the GCS is the second most prioritized policy. The global tax on millionaires consistently ranks no lower than fifth position (out of 15 or 17 policies) in every country, garnering an average of 18.3 points in Spain to 22.9 points in Germany.

276

277 This question sheds light on a potential discrepancy between the policy priorities of the public and those enacted by legislators. For instance, while the European Union and California have enacted plans to phase out new combustion-engine cars by 2035, the proposal to ``ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030'' emerged as one of the three least prioritized policies in each country, with an average allocation of 7.8 points in France to 11.4 points in the UK.

278

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184

279

280 \subsubsection{Pros and Cons}\label{s
ubsubsec:pros_cons}

281

282 We survey respondents to gather their perspectives on the pros and cons of the GCS, utilizing either an open-ended or a closed question. In the closed question format, respondents tend to consider every argument as important in determining their support or opposition to the GCS (see Figure \ref{fig:gcs_important}). Notably, the least important aspect was the negative impact on their household, with 60\% in Europe (\$n=1,505\$) and 75\% in the U.S. (\$n=493\$) finding it important. The most important elements differ between Europe and the U.S. In Europe, the key factors are the GCS's potential to limit climate change and reduce poverty in low-income countries, both deemed important by 85\% of respondents. In the U.S., having sufficient information about the scheme ranks highest at 89\%, followed by its potential to foster global cooperation at 82\%. However, due to the limited variation in the ratings for each element, the closed question format is inconclusive (Figure \ref{fig:gcs_important}). %

283

284 The open-ended question provides more insights into what people associate with the GCS when prompted to think about it. %

285 Analyzing keywords in the responses (automatically translated into English), the most frequently mentioned topics are the international aspect and the environment, each appearing in approximately one-quarter of the answers (see Figure \ref{fig:gcs_field_contains}). This is followed by discussions on the effects of the GCS on poverty and prices, each mentioned by about one-tenth of the respondents. We also manually classified each answer into different categories (see Figure \ref{fig:gcs_field}). This exercise c

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onfirms the findings from the automatic search: the environmental benefit of the GCS is the most commonly discussed topic, while obstacles to implementation or agreement on the proposal are relatively infrequently mentioned.%

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286 \footnote{Moreover, around one in four respondents explicitly cites pros or cons. Few individuals explicitly express support or opposition, and misunderstandings are rare. Only 11\% of the responses are empty or express a lack of opinion, though one-quarter are unclassifiable due to the rarity, nonsensical nature, or irrelevance of the conveyed idea.}%

287

192

288 In the \textit{US2} survey, we divided the sample into four random branches. Two branches were presented the pros and cons questions (either in open or closed format) \textit{before} being asked about their support for the GCS or NR. Another branch received information on the actual level of support for the GCS and NR (estimated in \textit{US1}, see Section \ref{subsec:second_order_beliefs}), and one control group received none of these treatments. %

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289 The objective of this ``pros and cons treatment'' was to simulate a ``campaign effect'', which refers to the shift in opinion resulting from media coverage of the proposal. To conservatively estimate the effect of a (potentially negative) campaign, we intentionally included more cons (6) than pros (3). Interestingly, the support for the GCS decreased by 11 p.p. after respondents viewed a list of its pros and cons.\footnote{Surprisingly, the support for National Redistribution also decreased by 7 p.p. following the closed question about the GCS. This suggests that some individuals may lack attention and confuse the two policies, or that contemplating the pros and cons alters the mood of some people, moving them away from their initial

194 and one control group received none of these treatments. %

l positive impression.} Notably, the support also decreased by 7 p.p. after respondents were asked to consider the pros and cons in an open-ended question. Although support remains significant, %

290 \footnote{Despite some significant effects of pondering the pros and cons, approximately half of the Americans express support for the GCS across all treatment branches (see Table \ref{tab:branch_gcs}).} these results suggest that the public success of the GCS would be sensitive to the content of the debate about it, and subject to the discourse adopted by interest groups. %

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197 these results suggest that the public success of the GCS would be sensitive to the content of the debate about it, and oriented by the discourse adopted by interest groups. %

198 \begin{tcolorbox}\label{subsec:second_order_beliefs}

199 \paragraph{Second-order Beliefs}

200 To explain the strong support for the GCS despite its absence from political platforms and public debate, we hypothesized pluralistic ignorance, i.e. that the public and policymakers mistakenly perceive the GCS as unpopular. As a result, individuals might conceal their support for such globally redistributive policy, believing that advocating for it would be futile.

201

202 In the case of Americans, their beliefs about the level of support for the GCS are relatively accurate (Figure \ref{fig:belief}). The mean perceived support is 52\% (with quartiles of 36

291

292 \subsection{Universalistic values}\label{subsec:universalistic}

293

294 We also elicit underlying values, to test whether broad values are consistent with people's support for specific policies. %

295 When we ask respondents which group they defend when they vote, %

296 20\% choose ``sentient beings (humans and animals),'' 22\% choose ``humans,'' 33\% select their ``fellow citizens'' (or ``Europeans''), 15\% choose ``My family and myself,'' and the remaining 10\% choose another group (mainly ``My State or region'' or ``People sharing my culture or religion''). The first two categories, representing close to one out of two people, can be described as universalist in their vote. Notably, a majority of left-wing voters can even be considered universalist voters (see Figure \ref{fig:main_by_vote} for main attitudes by vote).%

297

\%, 52\%, and 68\%), which closely aligns with the actual support of 54\%. Europeans, on the other hand, underestimate the support by 17 p.p. Nonetheless, 65\% of them correctly estimate that the GCS garners majority support, and the mean perceived support is 59\% (and quartiles of 43\%, 61\%, and 74\%), compared to the actual support of 76\%. %

203 Second-order beliefs are equally accurate for NR in the U.S. and similarly underestimated in Europe. %

204 Finally, consistent with Americans accurately perceiving the levels of support for the GCS or NR, providing information on the actual level had no significant effect on their support in the \textit{US2} survey. %

205 \end{tcolorbox}

206

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212 Notably, a majority of left-wing voters choose \textit{humans} or \textit{sentient beings}.

298 When asked what their country's diplo
mats should defend in international c
limate negotiations, only 11\% prefer
their country's ``interests, even if
it goes against global justice.'' In
contrast, 30\% prefer global justice
(with or without consideration of nat
ional interests), and the bulk of res
pondents (38\%) prefer their countr
y's ``interests, to the extent it res
pects global justice.''

299

300 Furthermore, when we ask respondents
to assess the extent to which climate
change, global poverty, and inequalit
y in their country are issues, climat
e change is generally viewed as the m
ost significant problem (with a mean
score of 0.59 after recoding answers
between -2 and 2). This is followed b
y global poverty (0.42) and national
inequality (0.37). %

301

302 Finally, we conduct a lottery experim
ent to elicit universalistic values.
Respondents were automatically enroll
ed in a lottery with a \\$100 prize an
d had to choose the proportion of the
prize they would keep for themselves
versus give to a person living in pov
erty. The charity donation is directe
d either to an African individual or
a fellow citizen, depending on the re
spondent's random assignment. In Euro
pe, we observe no significant variati
on in the willingness to donate based
on the recipient's origin. In the U.
S., the donations to Africans are 3
p.p. lower (with an average donation
of 34\%), but the slightly lower dona
tions to Africans are entirely driven
by Trump voters and non-voters (Table
\ref{tab:donation}).

303

304 Overall, answers to these broad value
questions are consistent with half of
Americans and three quarters of Europ
eans supporting global policies like
the GCS: people are almost as much wi
lling to give to poor Africans than t
o poor fellow citizens, find that glo
bal issues are among the biggest prob

lems, almost half of them are univers
alist when they vote, and most of the
m wish that their diplomats take into
account global justice.

305

306 \subsection{Second-order Beliefs}\lab
el{subsec:second_order_beliefs}

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GCS despite its absence from politica
l platforms and public debate, we hyp
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As a result, individuals might concea
l their support for such globally red
istributive policies, believing that
advocating for them would be futile.
However, the evidence for pluralistic
ignorance is limited based on an ince
ntivized question about perceived sup
port (Figure \ref{fig:belief}).

308

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iles of 36\%, 52\%, and 68\%), which
closely aligns with the actual suppor
t of 53\%. Europeans, on the other ha
nd, underestimate the support by 17
p.p. Nonetheless, 65\% of them correc
tly estimate that the GCS garners maj
ority support, and the mean perceived
support is 59\% (and quartiles of 43\
\%, 61\%, and 74\%), compared to the a
ctual support of 76\%. Second-order b
eliefs are equally accurate for NR in
the U.S. and similarly underestimated
in Europe. %

310 Finally, consistent with Americans ac
curately perceiving the levels of sup
port for the GCS or NR, providing inf
ormation on the actual level had no s
ignificant effect on their support in
the \textit{US2} survey. %

311

312 \begin{figure}[h!]

213

214 Answers to this and other broad value
questions are consistent with half of
Americans and three quarters of Europ
eans supporting global policies like
the GCS: people are almost as much wi

313 \caption[Beliefs about support fo
r the GCS and NR]{[For Supplementary
Material] Beliefs regarding the suppo
rt for the GCS and NR. (Questions \re
f{q:gcs_belief} and \ref{q:nr_belie
f})}\label{fig:belief}

314 \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegraphics[width=.7\textwidth]{../figure
s/country_comparison/belief_all_mean.
pdf}}

315 \end{figure}

316 \section{Discussion} %

317 Our point of departure are recent sur
veys conducted %

318 in 20 of the largest countries%

319 , as they reveal robust majority supp
ort for global redistributive and cli
mate policies, even in high-income co
untries that would financially lose f
rom them. The results from complement
ary surveys conducted in the U.S. and
four European countries %

320 reinforce these findings. We find str
ong support for global taxes on the w
ealthiest individuals, as well as maj
ority support for our main policy of
interest -- the Global Climate Scheme
(GCS). The GCS encompasses carbon pri
cing at a global level through an emi
ssions trading system, accompanied by
a global basic income funded by the s
cheme's revenues. Additional experime
nts, such as a list experiment and a
real-stake petition, demonstrate that
the support for the GCS is real.

321 Such genuine support is further subst
antiated by the prioritization of the
GCS over prominent national climate p
olicies and aligned with a significan
t portion of the population holding u
niversalistic values rather than nati
onalistic or egoistic ones. Moreover,
the conjoint analyses indicate that a

lling to make a donation to poor Afri
cans than to poor fellow citizens in
a lottery experiment, most respondent
s find that global issues are among t
he biggest problems, and most respond
ents wish that their diplomats take i
nto account global justice (see \name
ref{sec:methods} for details).

215 \section{Discussion} %

progressive candidate would not lose voting shares by endorsing the GCS, and may even gain 11 p.p. in voting shares in France. Similarly, a candidate endorsing the GCS would gain votes in a U.S. Democratic primary, while in Europe, a progressive platform that includes the GCS would be preferred over one that does not.

322

323 Having ruled out insincerity and underestimation of fellow citizens' support as potential explanations for the scarcity of global policies in the public debate, we propose alternative explanations. %

324 The first two are variations of pluralistic ignorance, and the last three represent complementary explanations.

325

326 First, there may be pluralistic ignorance *\textit{among policymakers}* regarding universalistic values, support for the GCS, or the electoral advantage of endorsing it. Second, people or policymakers may believe that globally redistributive policies are politically infeasible in some key (potentially foreign) countries like the U.S. %

327 Third, political discourse centrally happens at the national level, shaped by national media and institutions such as voting.

328 National framing by political voices may create biases and suppress univer

216

217 In our analysis, we have uncovered strong and genuine support for global redistributive policies. One limitation to this finding, inherent to any inquiry into hypothetical policies, is that the support might change once global policies are discussed in the public debate (as explored in the paragraph on *\textit{Pros and Cons}*).

218

219 We conclude by providing hypotheses to reconcile the scarcity of global policies in the public debate with our findings that they would be widely accepted. %

220 The first two are variations of pluralistic ignorance, and the last three represent complementary explanations.

221

222 First, there may be pluralistic ignorance *\textit{among policymakers}* regarding universalistic values, support for the GCS, or the electoral advantage of endorsing it.

223 Second, people or policymakers may believe that globally redistributive policies are politically infeasible in some key (potentially foreign) countries like the U.S. %

224 Third, political discourse centrally happens at the national level, shaped by national media and institutions such as voting.

225 National framing by political voices may create biases and suppress univer

salistic values. %

329 Fourth, many individuals, including p
olicymakers, may perceive global redi
stributive policies as ill-defined or
technically infeasible, ultimately di
smissing them as unrealistic. In part
icular, policymakers may have insider
information about the technical feasi
bility of such policies. Alternativel
y, the perception of unrealism may st
em from an unawareness of specific pr
oposals. %

330 Fifth, just as policy is disproportio
nately influenced by the economic eli
tes \citep{gilens_testing_2014,persso
n_rich_2023}, public debate may be sha
ped by the wealthiest, who have vest
ed interests in preventing global red
istribution.

331

332 Confirmation of any of these hypothes
es would lead to a common conclusion:
there exists substantial support for
global policies addressing climate ch
ange and global inequality, even in h
igh-income countries, and the perceiv
ed boundaries of political realism on
this issue may soon shift. %

333 Uncovering evidence to support the ab
ove hypotheses could %

334 draw attention to global policies in
the public debate and contribute to t
heir increased prominence. %

335 \begin{small} %

336 \section*{\normalsize Methods}\label
{sec:methods} %

337 \addcontentsline{toc}{section}{\namer
ef{sec:methods}}

salistic values. %

226 Fourth, many individuals, including p
olicymakers, may perceive global redi
stributive policies as ill-defined or
technically infeasible, ultimately di
smissing them as unrealistic. In part
icular, policymakers may have insider
information about the technical feasi
bility of such policies. Alternativel
y, the perception of unrealism may st
em from an unawareness of specific pr
oposals. %

227 Fifth, just as policy is disproportio
nately influenced by the economic eli
tes,\citep{gilens_testing_2014,persso
n_rich_2023} public debate may be sha
ped by the wealthiest, who have veste
d interests in preventing global redi
stribution.

228

229 Confirmation of any of these hypothes
es would lead to a common conclusion:
there exists substantial public suppo
rt for global policies addressing cli
mate change and global inequality, ev
en in high-income countries. %

230 Uncovering evidence to support the ab
ove hypotheses could %

231 draw attention to global policies in
the public debate and contribute to t
heir increased prominence. %

232 \begin{small} %

233 \section*{\normalsize Methods}\label
{sec:methods} %

234 \addcontentsline{toc}{section}{\namer
ef{sec:methods}}

235

236 \paragraph{\small Pre-registration.}

237 The project is approved by Economics
& Business Ethics Committee (EBEC) a
t the University of Amsterdam (EB-111
3) and %

238 was preregistered in the Open Science
Foundation registry (\href{https://os
f.io/fy6gd}{osf.io/fy6gd}). The study
did not deviate from the registrati
on: the questionnaires and the hypothe
ses tests used are the same as the on

338 \paragraph{\small Data collection.} %
339

340 The paper utilizes two sets of survey
s: the \textit{Global} survey and the
\textit{Complementary} surveys. The
\textit{Complementary} surveys consis
t of two U.S. surveys, \textit{US1} a
nd \textit{US2}, and one European sur
vey, \textit{Eu}. The \textit{Global}
survey was conducted from March 2021
to March 2022 on 40,680 respondents f
rom 20 countries (with 1,465 to 2,488
respondents per country). \textit{US
1} collected responses from 3,000 res
pondents between January and March 20
23, while \textit{US2} gathered data
from 2,000 respondents between March
and April 2023. \textit{Eu} included
3,000 respondents and was conducted f
rom February to March 2023. We used t
he survey companies \emph{Dynata} and
\emph{Respondi}. To ensure representa
tive samples, we employed stratified
quotas based on gender, age (5 bracke
ts), income (4), region (4), educatio
n level (3), and ethnicity (3) for th
e U.S. We also incorporated survey we
ights throughout the analysis to acco
unt for any remaining imbalances. The
se weights were constructed using the
quota variables as well as the degree
of urbanity, and trimmed between 0.25
and 4. By applying weights, the resul
ts are fully representative of the re

es \href{https://osf.io/2b6vq}{given
\textit{ex ante}}. Informed consent w
as obtained from all respondents, ran
domized treatment branches were unknow
n to the respondents, and our research
h complies with all relevant ethical
regulations. Respondents were compens
ated with gift certificates for a val
ue of \euro{}1 per interview. No stat
istical methods were used to pre-dete
rmine sample sizes but our sample siz
es match those reported in similar pu
blications.\citep{dechezlepretre_figh
ting_nodate,issp_international_2010,b
eiser-mcgrath_could_2019,sivonen_atti
tudes_2022,douenne_yellow_2022}

239

240 \paragraph{\small Data collection.} %
241

242 The paper utilizes two sets of survey
s: the \textit{global} survey and the
\textit{m} surveys. The \textit{main}
surveys consist of two U.S. surveys,
\textit{US1} and \textit{US2}, and on
e European survey, \textit{Eu}. The
\textit{global} survey was conducted
from March 2021 to March 2022 on 40,6
80 respondents from 20 countries (wit
h 1,465 to 2,488 respondents per coun
try). \textit{US1} collected response
s from 3,000 respondents between Janu
ary and March 2023, while \textit{US
2} gathered data from 2,000 responden
ts between March and April 2023. \tex
tit{Eu} included 3,000 respondents an
d was conducted from February to Marc
h 2023. We used the survey companies
\emph{Dynata} and \emph{Respondi}. To
ensure representative samples, we emp
loyed stratified quotas based on gend
er, age (5 brackets), income (4), reg
ion (4), education level (3), and eth
nicity (3) for the U.S. We also incor
porated survey weights throughout the
analysis to account for any remaining
imbalances. These weights were constr
ucted using the quota variables as we
ll as the degree of urbanity, and tri
mmed between 0.25 and 4. Stratified q
uotas followed by reweighting is the
usual method to reduce selection bias

spective countries. Results at the European level apply different weights which ensure representativeness of the combined four European countries. Appendix \ref{app:representativeness} confirms that our samples are representative of the population. %

341 Appendix \ref{app:balance} shows that the treatment branches are balanced. Appendix \ref{app:placebo} runs placebo tests of the effects of each treatment on unrelated outcomes. We do not find effects of earlier treatments on unrelated outcomes arriving later in the survey.

342 \paragraph{\small Data quality.} %

343 The median duration is 28 minutes for the \textit{Global} survey, 14 min for \textit{US1}, 11 min for \textit{US2}, and 20 min for \textit{Eu}. To ensure the best possible data quality, we exclude respondents who fail an attention test or rush through the survey (i.e., answer in less than 11.5 minutes in the \textit{Global} survey, 4 minutes in \textit{US1} or \textit{US2}, 6 minutes in \textit{Eu}). %

from opt-in online panels, when better sampling methods (such as compulsory participation of random dwellings) are unavailable.\cite{scherpenzeel_how_2010} By applying weights, the results are fully representative of the respective countries along the above mentioned dimensions. %

243 Results at the European level apply different weights which ensure representativeness of the combined four European countries. Appendix \ref{app:representativeness} shows how our samples compare to actual population frequencies. Our samples match the actual frequencies well, except for some imbalance in the U.S. vote (which does not affect our results, as shown by the results reweighted by vote in the \textit{Support for the GCS} section below).

244 Appendix \ref{app:balance} shows that the treatment branches are balanced. Appendix \ref{app:placebo} runs placebo tests of the effects of each treatment on unrelated outcomes. We do not find effects of earlier treatments on unrelated outcomes arriving later in the survey. Appendix \ref{app:extended} shows that our results are unchanged when including inattentive respondents.

245 \paragraph{\small Data quality.} %

246 The median duration is 28 minutes for the \textit{global} survey, 14 min for \textit{US1}, 11 min for \textit{US2}, and 20 min for \textit{Eu}. To ensure the best possible data quality, we exclude respondents who fail an attention test or rush through the survey (i.e., answer in less than 11.5 minutes in the \textit{global} survey, 4 minutes in \textit{US1} or \textit{US2}, 6 minutes in \textit{Eu}). %

247 At the end of the survey, we ask whether respondents thought that our survey was politically biased and offer to provide some feedback. 67\% of the respondents found the survey unbiased. 25\% found it left-wing biased, and 8\% found it right-wing biased.

344

345 \paragraph{\small Questionnaires and
raw results.} %

346 The questionnaire and raw results of
the \textit{Global} survey can be fou
nd in the Appendix of the companion p
aper \citep{dechezlepretre_fighting_2
022}. %

347 The raw results are reported in Appen
dix \ref{app:raw_results}\footnote{Co
untry-specific raw results are also a
vailabale as supplementary material fi
les: \href{https://github.com/bixio
u/international_attitudes_toward_glob
al_policies/raw/main/paper/app_desc_s
tats_US.pdf}{US}, \href{https://githu
b.com/bixiou/international_attitudes_
toward_global_policies/raw/main/pape
r/app_desc_stats_EU.pdf}{EU}, \href{h
ttps://github.com/bixiou/internationa
l_attitudes_toward_global_policies/ra
w/main/paper/app_desc_stats_FR.pdf}{F
R}, \href{https://github.com/bixiou/i
nternational_attitudes_toward_global_
policies/raw/main/paper/app_desc_stat
s_DE.pdf}{DE}, \href{https://github.c

248

249 \paragraph{\small Questionnaires and
raw results.} %

250 The raw results are reported in Appen
dix \ref{app:raw_results} while the s
urveys' structures and questionnaires
are given in Appendices \ref{app:ques
tionnaire_oecd} and \ref{app:question
naire}. Details on the \textit{globa
l} survey can be found in the Appendi
x of the companion paper.\citep{deche
zlepretre_fighting_nodate} Country-sp
ecific raw results are also available
as supplementary material files: \hr
ef{https://github.com/bixiou/internat
ional_attitudes_toward_global_policie
s/raw/main/paper/app_desc_stats_US.pd
f}{US}, \href{https://github.com/bixi
ou/international_attitudes_toward_glo
bal_policies/raw/main/paper/app_desc_
stats_EU.pdf}{EU}, \href{https://gith
ub.com/bixiou/international_attitudes_
toward_global_policies/raw/main/pape
r/app_desc_stats_FR.pdf}{FR}, \href{h
ttps://github.com/bixiou/internationa
l_attitudes_toward_global_policies/ra
w/main/paper/app_desc_stats_DE.pdf}{D
E}, \href{https://github.com/bixiou/i
nternational_attitudes_toward_global_
policies/raw/main/paper/app_desc_stat
s_ES.pdf}{ES}, \href{https://github.c
om/bixiou/international_attitudes_tow
ard_global_policies/raw/main/paper/ap
p_desc_stats_UK.pdf}{UK}. %

om/bixiou/international_attitudes_toward_global_policies/raw/main/paper/app_desc_stats_ES.pdf}{ES}, \href{https://github.com/bixiou/international_attitudes_toward_global_policies/raw/main/paper/app_desc_stats_UK.pdf}{UK}.} while the surveys' structures and questionnaires are given in Appendices \ref{app:questionnaire_oecd} and \ref{app:questionnaire}. The questionnaires are the same as the ones given \textit{ex ante} in the registration plan (\href{https://osf.io/fy6gd}{osf.io/fy6gd}).

348 \paragraph{\small Incentives.} %

349 To encourage accurate and truthful responses, several questions of the \textit{US1} survey use incentives. For each of the three comprehension questions that follow the policy descriptions, we randomly select and reward three respondents who provide correct answers with a \\$50 gift certificate. Similarly, for questions involving estimating support shares for the GCS and NR, three respondents with the closest guesses to the actual values receive a \\$50 gift certificate. In the donation lottery question, we randomly select one respondent and split the \\$100 prize between the NGO GiveDirectly and the winner according to the winner's choice. In total, our incentives scheme distributes gift certificates (and donations) for a value of \\$850. Finally, respondents have an incentive to answer truthfully to the petition question, as they are aware that the results for that question (the share of respondents supporting the policy) will be transmitted to the U.S. President's office.

251 \paragraph{\small Incentives.} %

252 To encourage accurate and truthful responses, several questions of the main surveys use incentives. For each of the three comprehension questions that follow the policy descriptions, we randomly select and reward three respondents who provide correct answers with a \\$50 gift certificate. Similarly, for questions involving estimating support shares for the GCS and NR, three respondents with the closest guesses to the actual values receive a \\$50 gift certificate. In the donation lottery question, we randomly select one respondent and split the \\$100 prize between the NGO GiveDirectly and the winner according to the winner's choice. In total, our incentives scheme distributes gift certificates (and donations) for a value of \\$850. Finally, respondents have an incentive to answer truthfully to the petition question, as they are aware that the results for that question (the share of respondents supporting the policy) will be transmitted to their head of state's office.

253 \paragraph{\small Absolute vs. relative support.}

254 In most questions, support or opposition for a policy is asked using a 5-Likert scale, with compulsory response and \textit{Indifferent} as the middle option. We call \textit{absolute support} the share of \textit{Somewhat} or \textit{Strong support}. We genera

lly favor the notion of \textit{relative support}, which reports the share of support after excluding \textit{In different} answers. Indeed, the \textit{relative support} is better suited to assess whether there are more people in favor vs. against a policy.

255

256 \paragraph{\small Support for the GCS.}

257 The 95\% confidence intervals are \$[52.4\%, 55.9\%]\$ in the U.S. and \$[74.2\%, 77.2\%]\$ in Europe. The average support is computed with survey weights, employing weights based on quota variables, which exclude vote. Another method to reweigh the raw results involves running a regression of the support for the GCS on sociodemographic characteristics (including vote) and multiplying each coefficient by the population frequencies. This alternative approach yields similar figures: 76\% in Europe and 52\% or 53\% in the U.S. (depending on whether individuals who did not disclose their vote are classified as non-voters or excluded). Notably, the average support among voters is 54\% in the U.S., with 74\% support among Biden voters vs. 26\% among Trump voters (see Figure \ref{fig:main_by_vote}).

258

259 Though the level of support for the GCS is significantly lower in swing States (at 51\%) that are key to win U.S. elections, the electoral effect of endorsing the GCS remains non-significantly different from zero (at +1.2 p.p.) in these States. Note that we define swing states as the 8 states with less than 5 p.p. margin of victory in the 2020 election (MI, NV, PA, WI, AZ, GA, NC, FL). The results are unchanged if we use the 3 p.p. threshold (that excludes FL) instead.

260

261 \paragraph{\small List experiment.} %

262 List experiments have been used to reveal social desirability bias, silencing either racism in the Southern U.S. \citep{kuklinski_racial_1997} or op

position to the invasion of Ukraine in Russia.\citep{chapkovski_solid_2022} %

263 In our case, the question reads: ``Be ware, this question is quite unusual. Among the policies below, \textbf{how many} do you support?'' The list of policies randomly varies across respondents, and includes a subset of GCS, NR (National Redistribution scheme), C (``Coal exit'' in the U.S., ``Thermal insulation plan'' in Europe) and O (``Marriage only for opposite-sex couples in the U.S.'', ``Death penalty for major crimes'' in Europe). There are four branches: GCS/NR/C/O; GCS/C/O; NR/C/O; C/O. To estimate the tacit average support for the GCS and NR, we regress the number of supported policies on indicators that the list includes GCS and NR.

264 We utilize the difference-in-means estimator, and confidence intervals are computed using Monte Carlo simulation with the R package \textit{list}.\citep{imai_multivariate_2011}

265

266 \paragraph{\small Petition.}

267 The respondent is randomly assigned a branch where the petition relates to the GCS or the National Redistribution scheme. The question reads: ``Would you be willing to sign a petition for the [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme? \ As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President's office], informing him what share of [American] people are willing to endorse the [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign, only your answer here is required and remains anonymous.)''.

268

269 Paired weighted \textit{t}-tests are conducted to test the equality in support for a policy among respondents who were questioned about the policy in the petition.

270

271 \paragraph{\small Conjoint analyses.}

272 The first conjoint analysis suggests that the GCS is supported independently of being complemented by the National Redistribution Scheme and a national climate policy ('Coal exit' in the U.S., 'Thermal insulation plan' in Europe, denoted C). Indeed, 54\% of %

273 U.S. respondents and 74\% of %

274 European ones prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to the combination of C and NR alone, indicating similar support for the GCS conditional on NR and C than for the GCS alone (Figure \ref{fig:conjoint}).

275

276 In the second conjoint analysis, results from the first branch show that the support for the GCS conditional on NR, at 55\% in the U.S. (\$n\$ = 757) and 77\% in Europe (\$n\$ = 746), is not significantly different from the support for the GCS alone. This suggests that rejection of the GCS is not driven by the cost of the policy on oneself. The second branch shows that the support for C conditional on NR is somewhat higher, at 62\% in the U.S. (\$n\$ = 751) and 84\% in Europe (\$n\$ = 747). However, the third one shows no significant preference for C compared to GCS (both conditional on NR), neither in Europe, where GCS is preferred by 52\% (\$n\$ = 741) nor in the U.S., where C is preferred by 53\% (\$n\$ = 721). The fourth branch shows that 55\% in the U.S. (\$n\$ = 771) and 77\% in Europe (\$n\$ = 766) prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to NR alone.

277

278 The effects reported in the fourth analysis are the Average Marginal Component Effects.\cite{hainmueller_causal_2014} The policies studied are progressive policies prominent in the country. Except for the category \textit{foreign policy}, which features the GCS 42\% of the time, they are drawn uniformly.

279

280 \paragraph{\small Prioritization.}

281 The prioritization allows inferring individual-level preferences for one policy over another, including in their intensity. This somewhat differs from a conjoint analysis, which only allows inferring individual-level preferences for one platform over another or collective-level preferences for one policy over another. Also, by comparing platforms, conjoint analyses may be subject to interaction effects between policies of a platform (which can be seen as complementary, substitute, or antagonistic) while the prioritization frames the policies as independent.

282

283 This question sheds light on a potential discrepancy between the policy priorities of the public and those enacted by legislators. For instance, while the European Union and California have enacted plans to phase out new combustion-engine cars by 2035, the proposal to ``ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030'' emerged as one of the three least prioritized policies in each country, with an average allocation of 7.8 points in France to 11.4 points in the UK.

284

285 \paragraph{\small Open-ended question on the GCS.}

286 Around one in four respondents explicitly cites pros or cons. Few individuals explicitly express support or opposition, and misunderstandings are rare. Only 11\% of the responses are empty or express a lack of opinion, though one-quarter are unclassifiable due to the rarity, nonsensical nature, or irrelevance of the conveyed idea.

287

288 \paragraph{\small Pros and cons.}

289 In the closed question, the least important aspect was the negative impact on their household, with 60\% in Europe ($n=1,505$) and 75\% in the U.S. ($n=493$) finding it important. The most important elements differ between Europe and the U.S. In Europe, the key factors are the GCS's potential to

limit climate change and reduce poverty in low-income countries, both deemed important by 85\% of respondents. In the U.S., having sufficient information about the scheme ranks highest at 89\%, followed by its potential to foster global cooperation at 82\%.

290

291 Surprisingly, the support for National Redistribution also decreased by 7 p.p. following the closed question about the GCS. This suggests that some individuals may lack attention and confuse the two policies, or that contemplating the pros and cons alters the mood of some people, moving them away from their initial positive impression.

292

293 \paragraph{\small Universalistic values}

294 When asked what their country's diplomats should defend in international climate negotiations, only 11\% prefer their country's ``interests, even if it goes against global justice.'' In contrast, 30\% prefer global justice (with or without consideration of national interests), and the bulk of respondents (38\%) prefer their country's ``interests, to the extent it respects global justice.''

295

296 Furthermore, when we ask respondents to assess the extent to which climate change, global poverty, and inequality in their country are issues, climate change is generally viewed as the most significant problem %

297 (with a mean score of 0.59 after recording answers between -2 and 2). This is followed by global poverty (0.42) and national inequality (0.37). %

298

299 Finally, we conduct a lottery experiment. %

300 Respondents were automatically enrolled in a lottery with a \\$100 prize and had to choose the proportion of the prize they would keep for themselves versus give to a person living in poverty. The %

301 charity donation is directed either to an African individual or a fellow citizen, depending on the respondent's random assignment. In Europe, we observe no significant variation in the willingness to donate based on the recipient's origin. In the U.S., the donations to Africans are 3 p.p. lower, %

302 but the slightly lower donations to Africans are entirely driven by Trump voters and non-voters (Table \ref{tab:donation}).

303

304 \paragraph{\small Global wealth tax estimates.}

305 A 2\% tax on net wealth exceeding \\$/5 million would annually raise \\$/816 billion, leaving unaffected 99.9\% of the world population. More specifically, it would collect \euro{}5 billion in Spain, \euro{}16 billion in France, £20 billion in the UK, \euro{}44 billion in Germany, \\$/430 billion in the U.S., and \\$/1 billion collectively in all low-income countries (28 countries, home to 700 million people). These Figures come from the \href{https://wid.world/world-wealth-tax-simulator/}{WID wealth tax simulator}. \cite{chancel_world_2022}

306 \paragraph{\small Design choices.}

307

308 As global survey results indicated strong support for global redistributive policies worldwide, we conducted our main surveys to further investigate the surprisingly high support. %

309 Among the eight largest high-income countries, we selected the five ones with a relatively low level of support for global redistributive policies as observed in the global survey. We also focus on the GCS as its costs are less concentrated on the very rich, compared to other global redistributive policies, so we expected lower (or less genuine) support. By selecting countries that would lose from global redistribution, are less supportive than others, and focusing on less consensual policies, we aimed at conservati

350 \section*{\normalsize Data and code a
vailability}

351

352 All data and code of the \textit{Comp
lementary} surveys as well as figures
of the paper are available on \href{h
ttps://github.com/bixiou/internationa
l_attitudes_toward_global_policies}{g
ithub.com/bixiou/global_tax_attitud
es}. Data and code for the \textit{Gl
obal} survey will be made public upon
publication. %

vely assessing the level of support o
f world citizens for global redistrib
ution.

310

311 We split the U.S. survey into two wav
es to test the effect on the support
of providing the information on the a
ctual support, and merged the \textit
{Eu} survey in one wave to get larger
sample sizes and more power in the an
alyses.

312

313 To select the policies tested, we spa
nned three key areas for global redis
tribution: climate change, inequalit
y, and global governance. We selected
policies that are either on the agend
a of international negotiations (inte
rnational transfers for mitigation; a
daptation; or loss and damages; cance
llation of public debt; reform of vot
ing rights at the UN or IMF; global w
ealth tax) or advocated by prominent
NGOs or scholars (\href{https://stati
c1.squarespace.com/static/5a0c602bf43
b5594845abb81/t/5c988368eef1a1538c2ae
7eb/1553498989927/GAR.pdf}{global ass
et registry}; limits on wealth;\citep
{robeyns_limitarianism_2024,piketty_b
rief_2022} democratic climate governa
nce;\citep{dryzek_global_2011} global
minimum wage;\citep{palley_financial_
2013} fair trade;\citep{hickel_divide
2017} carbon pricing;\citep{cramton
global_2017} \href{https://concordeur
ope.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/CO
NCORD_AidWatch_Report_2019_web.pdf}{i
ncreased foreign aid}).

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315 \section*{\normalsize Data and code a
vailability}

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317 All data and code of the \textit{mai
n} surveys as well as figures of the
paper are available on \href{https://
zenodo.org/doi/10.5281/zenodo.1120224
5}{10.5281/zenodo.11202245}. %

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318 Data and code for the `\textit{g}` survey will be made public upon publication. %

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