

International Majorities Genuinely Support Global Redistributive and Climate Policies

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Abstract

We document majority support for policies entailing global redistribution and climate mitigation. Surveys on 40,680 respondents in 20 countries show strong stated support for a global carbon price funding equal cash transfers, called the “Global Climate Scheme” (GCS). Through our main surveys on 8,000 respondents in the U.S., France, Germany, Spain, and the UK, we test several hypotheses that could reconcile strong stated support with scarce occurrences in public debates. Three quarters of Europeans and half of Americans support the GCS, even as they understand the policy’s cost to them. Using different experiments, we show that the support for the GCS is sincere and that electoral candidates could win votes by endorsing it. More generally, we document widespread support for other globally redistributive policies, such as increased foreign aid or a wealth tax funding low-income countries. In sum, global policies are genuinely supported by majorities, even in wealthy, contributing countries.

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69 **1 Introduction**

70 Major sustainability objectives could be achieved by global approaches to mitigating
 71 climate change and poverty involving transfers from high- to lower-income countries.^{1–6}
 72 Especially, global carbon pricing is widely regarded by economists as the benchmark cli-
 73 mate policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon emissions externality. A version
 74 of global carbon pricing as a system based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions
 75 is prominently discussed in environmental economics.^{7–13} It would work as follows: It
 76 implements a cap on carbon emissions to limit global warming below 2°C. The emission
 77 rights are auctioned each year to polluting firms and fund a global basic income, alle-
 78 viating extreme poverty. The emission rights would be allocated equally among human
 79 adults, yielding redistribution from richer to poorer countries. It would combine long-
 80 term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity.⁷ We call this established approach to
 81 global carbon pricing the “Global Climate Scheme” (GCS).

82 While international negotiations have not yet led to ambitious globally redistributive
 83 policies, some recent prominent attempts are that the African Union **calls for** a global
 84 carbon taxation regime, the UN **is setting up** a Framework Convention on International
 85 Tax Cooperation and Brazil is proposing a global wealth tax at the G20.

86 A key factor for implementing global policies has remained largely unaddressed: the

87 support of citizens. Using a global survey on 40,680 respondents from 20 high- and
88 middle-income countries, we reveal substantial support for global climate policies and, in
89 addition, a global tax on the wealthiest aimed at financing low-income countries. Surpris-
90 ingly, even in wealthy nations that would bear a significant burden, majorities of citizens
91 express support for such globally redistributive policies. To better understand public
92 support for global policies in high-income countries, the main analysis of this article is
93 conducted with surveys among 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, the UK,
94 and the U.S.

95 The focus of the main surveys is to study how respondents react to the key trade-off
96 between the benefits and costs of globally redistributive climate policies. In our survey
97 respondents are made aware of the cost that the GCS entails for their country's people,
98 that is average Westerners would incur a net loss. Our main result is that the GCS is
99 supported by three quarters of Europeans and more than half of Americans.

100 Furthermore, we test the robustness of this conclusion by a wide variety of methods.
101 First, we control for social desirability bias using a list experiment. We find no evidence
102 that people exaggerate their support in the direct question. Second, to assess whether the
103 support would diminish in a context with real stakes, we ask respondents whether they
104 are willing to sign a petition in favor of the GCS, after informing them that the question
105 results will be communicated to their head of state's office. The support is sustained in an
106 environment that approaches real stakes. Third, we carry out conjoint analyses to neutral-
107 ize experimenter demand and investigate the priority given to global policies compared
108 to other types of policies. Conjoint analyses reveal that a political platform is more likely
109 to be preferred if it contains the GCS or a global tax on millionaires, and that global poli-
110 cies rank high in the prioritization of policies. Our randomized experiments also show
111 that a candidate would not lose vote intentions by endorsing the GCS, and might even
112 gain up to 11 points in France. Fourth, an analysis of open-ended fields indicates that
113 the appeal of the GCS comes from its international nature and its impacts on climate,
114 more than on global poverty. To put our main finding in context, we also test other global
115 policies and universalistic attitudes. Support is very strong for a global tax on million-
116 aires, and the median respondent prefers to allocate 30% of the revenues of such a tax
117 to low-income countries. Majorities are willing to increase foreign aid, but only if some
118 conditions are respected, such as making sure the aid is well spent and other high-income
119 countries also increase their contribution. Questions on universalistic values, including a
120 donation experiment, confirm the congruence of underlying values with the support for

¹²¹ specific policies. Our diverse approaches also help understand what drives the support.
¹²² For instance, the evidence indicates that one key reason why increasing foreign aid is not
¹²³ as popular as global policies lies in its unilateral nature.

¹²⁴ Overall, our results point out to strong and genuine support for global climate and re-
¹²⁵ distributive policies, as our experiments confirm the stated support found in direct ques-
¹²⁶ tions. They contribute to a body of literature on attitudes toward climate policy, which
¹²⁷ confirms that climate policy is preferred at a global level,^{14–17} where it is more effective
¹²⁸ and fair. While 3,354 economists supported a national carbon tax financing equal cash
¹²⁹ transfers in the *Wall Street Journal*, numerous surveys have shown that public support
¹³⁰ for such policy is mixed.^{18–23} Meanwhile, the GCS — the global version of this policy
¹³¹ — is largely supported, despite higher costs in high-income countries. In the Discussion
¹³² we offer potential explanations that could reconcile the strong support for global policies
¹³³ with their lack of prominence in the public debate.

¹³⁴ **Literature** International surveys have shown widespread support for costly climate ac-
¹³⁵ tion.^{19,24} For instance, representative surveys in 125 countries covering 96% of the world's
¹³⁶ greenhouse gas emissions show that 69% of the global population express willingness
¹³⁷ to contribute 1% of their income to fight global warming.²⁵ International surveys have
¹³⁸ also uncovered near consensus that “present economic differences between rich and poor
¹³⁹ countries are too large” (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree) in each of 29 countries.²⁶

¹⁴⁰ Yet, few prior attitudinal surveys have examined global redistributive policies. A no-
¹⁴¹ table exception tests the support for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples in five
¹⁴² countries, representative along gender and age.²⁷ For a given variant, the sample size is
¹⁴³ about 167 respondents per country. They find over 80% support for any variant in India,
¹⁴⁴ between 50% and 65% in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43% to 59% in the U.S.,
¹⁴⁵ depending on the variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding an equal
¹⁴⁶ cash transfer for each human is close to 50% in high-income countries.

¹⁴⁷ Further evidence of the popularity of global redistribution is provided by the finding
¹⁴⁸ that 66% of Americans support providing “financial aid and technical support to develop-
¹⁴⁹ ing countries that agree to limit their greenhouse gas emissions”;²⁸ and 90% of Germans
¹⁵⁰ want some degree of global redistribution.²⁹ Besides, in surveys conducted in Brazil, Ger-
¹⁵¹ many, Japan, the UK and the U.S., support ranges from 55% to 74% for “a global democ-
¹⁵² racy including both a global government and a global parliament, directly elected by the
¹⁵³ world population, to recommend and implement policies on global issues”, and similar

¹⁵⁴ support is found in surveys over 17 countries.^{30:31}

¹⁵⁵ Appendix A contains a broader literature review including further attitudinal sur-
¹⁵⁶ veys on global policies (A.1.1); prior work on attitudes toward climate burden sharing
¹⁵⁷ (Appendix A.1.2), attitudes toward foreign aid (Appendix A.1.3), global carbon pricing
¹⁵⁸ (Appendix A.2.1), global redistribution (Appendix A.2.3), basic income (Appendix A.2.4),
¹⁵⁹ and global democracy (Appendix A.2.5).

¹⁶⁰ 2 Results


¹⁶¹ 2.1 Data

¹⁶² We use unanalysed questions from a global survey conducted in 2021 that involved
¹⁶³ 40,680 respondents from 20 countries, representing approximately 72% of global CO₂
¹⁶⁴ emissions. This survey (henceforth: global survey) serves as the basis for measuring
¹⁶⁵ stated support for various global policies worldwide. Detailed information about the
¹⁶⁶ data collection process, sample representativeness, and analysis of questions on national
¹⁶⁷ policies can be found in the companion paper.¹⁹

¹⁶⁸ To delve deeper into the sincerity and rationales behind support for the GCS and at-
¹⁶⁹ titudes towards global policies, global redistribution, and universalistic values, we con-
¹⁷⁰ ducted further surveys in 2023 (henceforth: main surveys). These surveys are based on
¹⁷¹ a sample of 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, the UK, and the U.S. The
¹⁷² European survey (*Eu*) comprises 3,000 respondents, while the U.S. sample was collected
¹⁷³ in two separate waves: *US1* with 3,000 respondents and *US2* with 2,000 respondents. The
¹⁷⁴ survey questions in both the European and U.S. surveys are identical (see Figure 1), ex-
¹⁷⁵ cept for an additional question in *US2* that uses results from *US1* to assess the bandwagon
¹⁷⁶ effect.

¹⁷⁷ The main surveys ensured representativeness along key dimensions: gender, income,
¹⁷⁸ age, highest diploma, and degree of urbanization. The *Eu* survey is also representative
¹⁷⁹ of its four countries in terms of population size, while the *US1* and *US2* surveys are rep-
¹⁸⁰ resentative in terms of region and ethnicity. Tables S8-S9 detail how our samples match
¹⁸¹ population frequencies. More detail on data collection is given in Section Methods. The
¹⁸² questionnaires used in the surveys are provided in Appendices C and D.

Figure 1: Structure of main survey, cf. also Figure S48 for the treatment branches.




¹⁸³ 2.2 Global support

¹⁸⁴ We find strong support for climate policies enacted at the global level when analysing
¹⁸⁵ the global survey (Figure 2). When asked “At which level(s) do you think public policies
¹⁸⁶ to tackle climate change need to be put in place?”, 70% (in the U.S.) to 94% (in Japan)
¹⁸⁷ choose the global level. The next most popular choice is the federal or continental level,
¹⁸⁸ favored by 52% of Americans and less than half of European respondents. Local policies
¹⁸⁹ receive the least support. This preference for climate policies implemented at the global
¹⁹⁰ scale is in line with earlier contributions ^{15;32;16} and consistent with individuals’ concerns
¹⁹¹ for the fairness and effectiveness of such policies, which have been identified as two of
¹⁹² the three key determinants of support, besides self-interest. ^{33;18;19} It could also stem from
¹⁹³ conditional cooperation, ³⁴ even if previous studies suggest that the support for climate
¹⁹⁴ policies does not depend on climate action abroad ^{35;36}.

¹⁹⁵ Among the four global climate policies examined, three policies garner high support
¹⁹⁶ across all countries (Figure 2). These policies include a global democratic assembly on
¹⁹⁷ climate change, a global tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries contingent

Figure 2: Support for global climate policies.



Note 1: The numbers represent *relative support*, i.e. the share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* among non-*indifferent* answers (in percent, $n = 40,680$). The color blue denotes a relative majority. See Figure S11 for the absolute support. (Questions A-I).

Note 2: *In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

on their climate action, and a global carbon budget of +2°C divided among countries based on tradable shares (or “global quota”), with the allocation of country shares unspecified (see wording in Appendix C). The three policies garner a majority of absolute support (i.e., “somewhat” or “strong” support) in all countries (except in the U.S. for the global assembly, 48% absolute support). In high-income countries, the global quota policy obtains 64% absolute support and 84% relative support (i.e., excluding “indifferent” answers).

Following the support for the global quota, respondents are asked about their preferences for dividing the carbon budget among countries, as depicted in the third block of Figure 2. Consistent with the existing literature (see Appendix A.1.2), an equal per

²⁰⁸ capita allocation of emission rights emerges as the preferred burden-sharing principle,
²⁰⁹ garnering absolute majority support in all countries and never below 84% relative sup-
²¹⁰ port. Taking into account historical responsibilities or vulnerability to climate damages is
²¹¹ also popular, albeit with less consensus, while grandfathering (i.e., allocation of emission
²¹² shares in proportion to current emissions) receives the least support in all countries.

²¹³ A global carbon tax that funds a global basic income should produce the same dis-
²¹⁴ tributional outcomes as a global tradable quota with equal per capita emission rights (to
²¹⁵ the extent that the carbon price is the same and provided that each country returns the
²¹⁶ revenues from emissions trading equally to its citizens). The support for the global car-
²¹⁷ bon tax is also tested and its redistributive effects – the average increase in expenditures
²¹⁸ along with the amount of the basic income – are specified to the respondents explicitly
²¹⁹ (see box below and Appendix D, p.[88](#)). The support for the carbon tax is lower than for
²²⁰ the quota, particularly in high-income countries, and there is no relative majority for the
²²¹ tax in Anglo-Saxon countries (consistently with the levels of support found in the only
²²² previous study that tested a global carbon tax²⁷). Two possible reasons for this lower
²²³ support are that distributive effects are specified explicitly in the case of the tax, and that
²²⁴ people may prefer a quota, perhaps because they find it more effective than a tax to re-
²²⁵ duce emissions. The two reasons are consistent with the intermediate level of support
²²⁶ for the GCS in the main survey, which is based on a global quota but where the question
²²⁷ specifies explicitly the distributive effects.

²²⁸ 2.3 Stated support for the Global Climate Scheme

²²⁹ The main surveys (*US1, US2, Eu*) include a comprehensive exploration of citizens'
²³⁰ attitudes towards the GCS. We present to respondents a detailed description of the GCS
²³¹ and explain its distributive effects, including specific amounts at stake (as specified in
²³² the box below). Furthermore, we assess respondents' understanding of the GCS with
²³³ incentivized questions to test their comprehension of the expected financial outcome for
²³⁴ typical individuals in high-income countries (loss) and the poorest individuals globally
²³⁵ (gain), followed by the provision of correct answers (Figures S12-S13).

²³⁶ For comparison, the same approach is applied to a National Redistribution scheme
²³⁷ (NR) targeting top incomes with the aim of financing cash transfers to all adults, cali-
²³⁸ brated to offset the monetary loss of the GCS for the median emitter in their country. We
²³⁹ evaluate respondents' understanding that the richest would lose and the typical fellow
²⁴⁰ citizens would gain from that policy. Subsequently, we summarize both schemes to en-

²⁴¹ hance respondents' recall. Additionally, we present a final incentivized comprehension
²⁴² question and provide the expected answer that the combined GCS and NR would result
²⁴³ in no net gain or loss for a typical fellow citizen. Finally, respondents are directly asked
²⁴⁴ to express their support for the GCS and NR using a simple Yes/No question.

The Global Climate Scheme The GCS consists of global emissions trading with emission rights being auctioned each year to polluting firms, and of a global basic income, funded by the auction revenues. Using the price and emissions trajectories from the report by Stern & Stiglitz,³⁷ and in particular a carbon price of \$90/tCO₂ in 2030, we estimate that the basic income would amount to \$30 per month for every human adult (see details in Appendix E). We describe the GCS to the respondents as a "climate club" and we specify its redistributive effects: The 700 million people with less than \$2/day [in Purchasing Power Parity] would be lifted out of extreme poverty, and fossil fuel price increases would cost the typical person in their country a specified amount (see Appendix D for details). The monthly median net cost is \$85 in the U.S., €10 in France, €25 in Germany, €5 in Spain, £20 in the UK.

²⁴⁵

²⁴⁶ Our main result is that stated support for the GCS is 54% in the U.S. and 76% in Eu-
²⁴⁷ rope, while the support for NR is very similar: 56% and 73% respectively (Figures 3, S1).
²⁴⁸ Appendix F examines the sociodemographic determinants of support for the GCS as well
²⁴⁹ as the beliefs correlated with the support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic
²⁵⁰ income. The strongest correlates are political leaning, trust in the government and per-
²⁵¹ ceptions that climate policies are effective at reducing emissions or in one's self-interest.

²⁵² Finding majority support for the GCS runs counter to the conventional skepticism
²⁵³ about the feasibility of global solidarity to addressing climate change. This motivates the
²⁵⁴ subsequent analysis of robustness and sincerity, novel to attitudinal surveys on instru-
²⁵⁵ ment choice for environmental policy.

²⁵⁶ 2.4 Robustness and sincerity of support for the GCS

²⁵⁷ We use several methods to assess the sincerity of the support for the GCS: a list ex-
²⁵⁸ periment, a real-stake petition, conjoint analyses, and the prioritization of policies. All
²⁵⁹ methods suggest that the support is either completely sincere, or the share of insincere
²⁶⁰ answers is limited.

261 **2.4.1 List experiment**

262 By asking *how many* policies within a list respondents support and varying the list
263 among respondents, a list experiment allows identifying the tacit support for a policy of
264 interest. For example, say a first subsample faces the list of policies A, B, and C, while a
265 second subsamples faces the list A, B, C, and GCS. We do not need to know which policies
266 each respondent support to estimate the average (tacit) support for the GCS, we simply
267 need to compute the difference in the average number of supported policies between
268 the two random subsamples.³⁸ In our case, as shown in Table 1, the tacit support for the
269 GCS measured through the list experiment is not significantly lower than the direct stated
270 support. Hence, we do not find a social desirability bias in our study.

271 **2.4.2 Petition**

272 We ask respondents whether they are willing to sign a petition in support of either
273 the GCS or NR policy. We inform them that the petition results will be sent to the head
274 of state's office, highlighting the proportion of fellow citizens endorsing the respective
275 scheme. Even when framed as a petition that might have real stakes, both policies con-
276 tinue to receive majority support. In the U.S., we find no significant difference between
277 the support in the petitions and the simple questions (GCS: $p = .30$; NR: $p = .76$). In Eu-
278 rope, the petition leads to a comparable lower support for both the GCS (7 p.p., $p = 10^{-5}$)
279 and NR (4 p.p., $p = .008$). While some European respondents are unwilling to sign a
280 petition for policies they are expected to support, this phenomenon is not specific to the
281 GCS, and the overall willingness to sign a petition remains strong, with 69% expressing
282 support for the GCS and 67% for NR.

283 **2.4.3 Conjoint analyses**

284 In order to assess the public support for the GCS in conjunction with other policies, we
285 conduct a series of conjoint analyses. We ask respondents to make five choices between
286 pairs of political platforms. Each choice is meant at testing a different hypothesis on the
287 support for the GCS in relation to other policies or voting.

288 The first conjoint analysis suggests that the GCS is supported independently of being
289 complemented by the National Redistribution Scheme and a national climate policy (C).
290 The second analysis indicates majority support for the GCS and for C, which are seen as
291 neither complement nor substitute (see [Methods](#)). A minor share of respondents like a

²⁹² national climate policy and dislike a global one, but as many people prefer a global rather
²⁹³ than a national policy; and there is no evidence that implementing NR would increase the
²⁹⁴ support for the GCS.

²⁹⁵ In the third analysis, we present two random branches of the sample with hypothetical
²⁹⁶ progressive and conservative platforms that differ only by the presence (or not) of the
²⁹⁷ GCS in the progressive platform. Table 2 shows that a progressive candidate would not
²⁹⁸ significantly lose voting share by endorsing the GCS in any country, and may even gain
²⁹⁹ 11 p.p. ($p = .005$) in voting intention in France.

³⁰⁰ Our last two analyses make respondents choose between two random platforms. In
³⁰¹ Europe, respondents are prompted to imagine that a left or center-left coalition will win
³⁰² the next election and asked what platform they would prefer that coalition to have cam-
³⁰³ paigned on. In the U.S., the question is framed as a hypothetical duel in a Democratic
³⁰⁴ primary, and asked only to non-Republicans ($n = 2,218$), i.e. the respondents who declare
³⁰⁵ as political affiliation *Democrat, Independent, Non-Affiliated* or *Other*.

³⁰⁶ In the fourth analysis, a policy (or an absence of policy) is randomly drawn for each
³⁰⁷ platform in each of five categories: *economic issues, societal issues, climate policy, tax system,*
³⁰⁸ *foreign policy* (Figure S2). In the UK, Germany, and France, a platform is about 9 to 13 p.p.
³⁰⁹ more likely to be preferred if it includes the GCS rather than no foreign policy. This effect
³¹⁰ is between 1 and 4 p.p. and no longer significant in the U.S. (among non-Republicans)
³¹¹ and in Spain. Moreover, a platform that includes a global tax on millionaires rather than
³¹² no foreign policy is 5 to 13 p.p. more likely to be preferred in all countries (the effect is
³¹³ significant and at least 9 p.p. in all countries but Spain). Similarly, a global democratic
³¹⁴ assembly on climate change has a significant effect of 8 to 12 p.p. in the U.S. (among non-
³¹⁵ Republicans), Germany, and France. These effects are large, and not far from the effects
³¹⁶ of the policies most influential on the platforms, which range between 15 and 18 p.p. in
³¹⁷ most countries (27 p.p. in Spain), and all relate to improved public services (in particular
³¹⁸ healthcare, housing, and education).

³¹⁹ The fifth analysis draws random platforms similarly, except that candidate A's plat-
³²⁰ form always contains the GCS while B's includes no foreign policy. In this case, A is
³²¹ chosen by 60% of Europeans and 58% of non-Republican Americans (Figure S3).

³²² Overall, taking the U.S. as an example, our conjoint analyses indicate that a candidate
³²³ at the Democratic primary would have more chances to obtain the nomination by en-
³²⁴ dorsing the GCS, and this endorsement would not penalize her or him at the presidential
³²⁵ election. This result relates to the finding that 12% of Germans shift their voting intention

³²⁶ from SPD and CDU/CSU to the Greens and the Left when they are told that the latter
³²⁷ parties support global democracy.³⁰

³²⁸ 2.4.4 Prioritization

³²⁹ Towards the end of the survey, we ask respondents to allocate 100 points among six
³³⁰ randomly selected policies from the previous conjoint analyses, using sliders. The instruc-
³³¹ tion was to distribute the points based on their level of support, with a higher allocation
³³² indicating greater support for a policy. As a result, the average support across policies is
³³³ 16.67 points. In each country, the GCS ranks in the middle of all policies or above, with
³³⁴ an average number of points from 15.4 in the U.S. to 22.9 in Germany.

³³⁵ Interestingly, in Germany, the most prioritized policy is the global tax on millionaires,
³³⁶ while the GCS is the second most prioritized policy. The global tax on millionaires con-
³³⁷ sistently ranks no lower than fifth position (out of 15 or 17 policies) in every country,
³³⁸ garnering an average of 18.3 points in Spain to 22.9 points in Germany.

³³⁹ 2.4.5 Pros and Cons

³⁴⁰ We survey respondents to gather their perspectives on the pros and cons of the GCS,
³⁴¹ randomly utilizing an open-ended or a closed question. In the closed question format,
³⁴² respondents tend to consider every argument as important in determining their support
³⁴³ or opposition to the GCS (see Figure S17).

³⁴⁴ The open-ended question provides more insights into what people associate with the
³⁴⁵ GCS when prompted to think about it. Analyzing keywords in the responses (automati-
³⁴⁶ cally translated into English), the most frequently mentioned topics are the international
³⁴⁷ aspect and the environment, each appearing in approximately one-quarter of the answers
³⁴⁸ (see Figure S19). This is followed by discussions on the effects of the GCS on poverty and
³⁴⁹ prices, each mentioned by about one-tenth of the respondents. We also manually clas-
³⁵⁰ sified each answer into different categories (see Figure S18). This exercise confirms the
³⁵¹ findings from the automatic search: the environmental benefit of the GCS is the most
³⁵² commonly discussed topic, while obstacles to implementation or agreement on the pro-
³⁵³ posal are relatively infrequently mentioned.

³⁵⁴ In the US2 survey, we divided the sample into four random branches. Two branches
³⁵⁵ were presented the pros and cons questions (either in open or closed format) *before* be-
³⁵⁶ ing asked about their support for the GCS or NR. Another branch received information

³⁵⁷ on the actual level of support for the GCS and NR (estimated in *US1*, see box p. 14),
³⁵⁸ and one control group received none of these treatments. The objective of the “pros and
³⁵⁹ cons treatment” was to mimic a “campaign effect”, which refers to the shift in opinion
³⁶⁰ resulting from media coverage of the proposal.³⁹ To conservatively estimate the effect of
³⁶¹ a (potentially negative) campaign, we intentionally included more cons (6) than pros (3).
³⁶² Interestingly, the support for the GCS decreased by 11 p.p. after respondents viewed a list
³⁶³ of its pros and cons. Notably, the support also decreased by 7 p.p. after respondents were
³⁶⁴ asked to consider the pros and cons in an open-ended question. Despite some significant
³⁶⁵ effects of pondering the pros and cons, approximately half of the Americans express sup-
³⁶⁶ port for the GCS across all treatment branches (see Table S1). Although support remains
³⁶⁷ significant, these results suggest that the public success of the GCS would be sensitive
³⁶⁸ to the content of the debate about it, and oriented by the discourse adopted by interest
³⁶⁹ groups.

Second-order Beliefs To explain the strong support for the GCS despite its ab-
sence from political platforms and public debate, we hypothesized pluralistic igno-
rance, i.e. that the public and policymakers mistakenly perceive the GCS as unpop-
ular. As a result, individuals might conceal their support for such globally redis-
tributive policy, believing that advocating for it would be futile.

In the case of Americans, their beliefs about the level of support for the GCS are
relatively accurate (Figure S4). The mean perceived support is 52% (with quartiles
of 36%, 52%, and 68%), which closely aligns with the actual support of 54%. Euro-
peans, on the other hand, underestimate the support by 17 p.p. Nonetheless, 65% of
them correctly estimate that the GCS garners majority support, and the mean per-
ceived support is 59% (and quartiles of 43%, 61%, and 74%), compared to the actual
support of 76%. Second-order beliefs are equally accurate for NR in the U.S. and
similarly underestimated in Europe. Finally, consistent with Americans accurately
perceiving the levels of support for the GCS or NR, providing information on the
actual level had no significant effect on their support in the *US2* survey.

³⁷⁰

³⁷¹ 2.5 Stated support for global redistribution

³⁷² We also assess support for a range of other international policies (Figure 3) as well as
³⁷³ unilateral foreign aid.

374 **2.5.1 International policies**

375 Most policies garner relative majority support in each country, with two exceptions:
376 the “cancellation of low-income countries’ public debt” and “a maximum wealth limit”
377 for each individual (Figure 3). The latter policy garners relative majority support in Eu-
378 rope but not in the U.S., despite the cap being set at \$10 billion in the U.S. compared
379 to €/£100 million in Europe. Notably, climate-related policies enjoy significant popu-
380 larity, with “high-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries”
381 receiving absolute majority support across all surveyed countries. Additionally, relative
382 support for loss and damages compensation, as approved in principle at the international
383 climate negotiations in 2022 (“COP27”), ranges from 55% (U.S.) to 81% (Spain).

384 Consistent with the results of the global survey, a “tax on millionaires of all countries
385 to finance low-income countries” garners relative support of over 69% in each country,
386 only 5 p.p. lower than a national millionaires tax overall. In random subsamples, we
387 inquire about respondents’ preferences regarding the redistribution of revenues from a
388 global tax on individual wealth exceeding \$5 million, after providing information on the
389 revenue raised by such a tax in their country compared to low-income countries. We
390 ask certain respondents ($n = 1,283$) what percentage of the global tax revenues should be
391 pooled to finance low-income countries. In each country, at least 88% of respondents in-
392 dicate a positive amount, with an average of one-third (Figure S5). To other respondents
393 ($n = 1,233$), we inquire whether they would prefer each country to retain all the revenues
394 it collects or that half of the revenues be pooled to finance low-income countries. Ap-
395 proximately half of the respondents opt to allocate half of the tax revenues to low-income
396 countries, consistently with the other variant of the question.

397 **2.5.2 Foreign aid**

398 In addition, we provide respondents with information about the actual amount “spent
399 on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries” relative to their country’s gov-
400 ernment spending and GDP. Less than 16% of respondents state that their country’s for-
401 eign aid should be reduced, while 62% express support for increasing it, including 17%
402 who support an unconditional increase (Figure S6). Among the 45% who think aid should
403 be increased under certain conditions, we subsequently ask them to specify the conditions
404 they deem necessary (Figure S7). The three most commonly selected conditions are that:
405 “we can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted” (73% chose this

Figure 3: Support for various global policies. (*relative support*: percentage of *somewhat or strong support*, after excluding *indifferent* answers; *except for GCS: percentage of *Yes* in a *Yes/No* question). (p. 88, Questions 20, 44 and 45; See Figure S33 for the absolute support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)*	54	76	80	71	81	74
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	55	71	72	70	79	70
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	68	82	82	82	85	81
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	60	76	77	79	79	71
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	46	53	53	43	62	61
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	58	71	69	69	78	72
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	62	73	58	73	80	83
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	63	80	80	78	81	83
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	62	87	90	86	91	87
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	46	62	58	62	65	67
National tax on millionaires funding public services	73	85	81	87	89	88
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	69	84	84	84	87	83

condition), “recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights” (67%), and “other high-income countries also increase their foreign aid” (48%). On the other hand, respondents who do not wish to increase their country’s foreign aid primarily justify their view by prioritizing the well-being of their fellow citizens or by perceiving each country as responsible for its own fate (Figure S8). In response to an open-ended question regarding measures high-income countries should take to fight extreme poverty, a large majority of Americans expressed that more help is needed (Figure S46). The most commonly suggested form of aid is financial support, closely followed by investments in education.

415 We also inquire about the perceived amount of foreign aid. Consistent with prior re-
416 search (see Appendix A.1.3), most people overestimate the actual amount of foreign aid
417 (Figure S25). We then elicit respondents' preferred amount of foreign aid, after randomly
418 presenting them with either the actual amount or no information. Most of the respon-
419 dents who learn the actual amount choose a bracket at least as high as the actual one, and
420 most of those without the information choose a bracket at least as high as the perceived
421 one (Figures S28–S27). Finally, we ask a last question to the respondents who received
422 the information. To those who prefer an increase of foreign aid, we ask how they would
423 finance it: by far, the preferred source of funding is higher taxes on the wealthiest (Figure
424 S30). To those who prefer a reduction, we ask how they would use the funds becoming
425 available: In every country, more people choose higher spending on education or health-
426 care rather than lower taxes (Figure S31).

427 2.6 Universalistic values

428 We elicit underlying values, to test whether broad values are consistent with people's
429 support for specific policies. When we ask respondents which group they defend when
430 they vote, 20% choose "sentient beings (humans and animals)," 22% choose "humans,"
431 33% select their "fellow citizens" (or "Europeans"), 15% choose "My family and myself,"
432 and the remaining 10% choose another group (mainly "My State or region" or "People
433 sharing my culture or religion"). Notably, a majority of left-wing voters choose *humans* or
434 *sentient beings*.

435 Answers to this and other broad value questions are consistent with half of Ameri-
436 cans and three quarters of Europeans supporting global policies like the GCS: people are
437 almost as much willing to make a donation to poor Africans than to poor fellow citizens
438 in a lottery experiment, most respondents find that global issues are among the biggest
439 problems, and most respondents wish that their diplomats take into account global justice
440 (see Methods for details).

441 3 Discussion

442 In our analysis, we have uncovered strong and genuine support for global redistribu-
443 tive policies. One limitation to this finding, inherent to any inquiry into hypothetical
444 policies, is that the support might change once global policies are discussed in the public

⁴⁴⁵ debate (as explored in the paragraph on *Pros and Cons*).

⁴⁴⁶ We conclude by providing hypotheses to reconcile the scarcity of global policies in the
⁴⁴⁷ public debate with our findings that they would be widely accepted. The first two are
⁴⁴⁸ variations of pluralistic ignorance, and the last three represent complementary explana-
⁴⁴⁹ tions.

⁴⁵⁰ First, there may be pluralistic ignorance *among policymakers* regarding universalistic
⁴⁵¹ values, support for the GCS, or the electoral advantage of endorsing it. Second, people or
⁴⁵² policymakers may believe that globally redistributive policies are politically infeasible in
⁴⁵³ some key (potentially foreign) countries like the U.S. Third, political discourse centrally
⁴⁵⁴ happens at the national level, shaped by national media and institutions such as voting.
⁴⁵⁵ National framing by political voices may create biases and suppress universalistic values.
⁴⁵⁶ Fourth, many individuals, including policymakers, may perceive global redistributive
⁴⁵⁷ policies as ill-defined or technically infeasible, ultimately dismissing them as unrealistic.
⁴⁵⁸ In particular, policymakers may have insider information about the technical feasibility of
⁴⁵⁹ such policies. Alternatively, the perception of unrealism may stem from an unawareness
⁴⁶⁰ of specific proposals. Fifth, just as policy is disproportionately influenced by the economic
⁴⁶¹ elites,^{40;41} public debate may be shaped by the wealthiest, who have vested interests in
⁴⁶² preventing global redistribution.

⁴⁶³ Confirmation of any of these hypotheses would lead to a common conclusion: there
⁴⁶⁴ exists substantial public support for global policies addressing climate change and global
⁴⁶⁵ inequality, even in high-income countries. Uncovering evidence to support the above
⁴⁶⁶ hypotheses could draw attention to global policies in the public debate and contribute to
⁴⁶⁷ their increased prominence.

⁴⁶⁸ Methods

⁴⁶⁹ **Pre-registration.** The project is approved by Economics & Business Ethics Committee (EBEC) at
⁴⁷⁰ the University of Amsterdam (EB-1113) and was preregistered in the Open Science Foundation
⁴⁷¹ registry (osf.io/fy6gd). The study did not deviate from the registration: the questionnaires and
⁴⁷² the hypotheses tests used are the same as the ones *given ex ante*. Informed consent was obtained
⁴⁷³ from all respondents, randomized treatment branches were unknown to the respondents, and our
⁴⁷⁴ research complies with all relevant ethical regulations. Respondents were compensated with gift
⁴⁷⁵ certificates for a value of €1 per interview. No statistical methods were used to pre-determine
⁴⁷⁶ sample sizes but our sample sizes match those reported in similar publications.^{19;14–16;18}

⁴⁷⁷ **Data collection.** The paper utilizes two sets of surveys: the *global* survey and the *m* surveys. The
⁴⁷⁸ *main* surveys consist of two U.S. surveys, *US1* and *US2*, and one European survey, *Eu*. The *global*
⁴⁷⁹ survey was conducted from March 2021 to March 2022 on 40,680 respondents from 20 countries
⁴⁸⁰ (with 1,465 to 2,488 respondents per country). *US1* collected responses from 3,000 respondents be-
⁴⁸¹ tween January and March 2023, while *US2* gathered data from 2,000 respondents between March
⁴⁸² and April 2023. *Eu* included 3,000 respondents and was conducted from February to March 2023.
⁴⁸³ We used the survey companies *Dynata* and *Respondi*. To ensure representative samples, we em-
⁴⁸⁴ ployed stratified quotas based on gender, age (5 brackets), income (4), region (4), education level
⁴⁸⁵ (3), and ethnicity (3) for the U.S. We also incorporated survey weights throughout the analysis to
⁴⁸⁶ account for any remaining imbalances. These weights were constructed using the quota variables
⁴⁸⁷ as well as the degree of urbanity, and trimmed between 0.25 and 4. Stratified quotas followed by
⁴⁸⁸ reweighting is the usual method to reduce selection bias from opt-in online panels, when better
⁴⁸⁹ sampling methods (such as compulsory participation of random dwellings) are unavailable.⁴² By
⁴⁹⁰ applying weights, the results are fully representative of the respective countries along the above
⁴⁹¹ mentioned dimensions. Results at the European level apply different weights which ensure rep-
⁴⁹² resentativeness of the combined four European countries. Appendix G shows how our samples
⁴⁹³ compare to actual population frequencies. Our samples match the actual frequencies well, except
⁴⁹⁴ for some imbalance in the U.S. vote (which does not affect our results, as shown by the results
⁴⁹⁵ reweighted by vote in the *Support for the GCS* section below). Appendix I shows that the treat-
⁴⁹⁶ ment branches are balanced. Appendix J runs placebo tests of the effects of each treatment on
⁴⁹⁷ unrelated outcomes. We do not find effects of earlier treatments on unrelated outcomes arriving
⁴⁹⁸ later in the survey. Appendix K shows that our results are unchanged when including inattentive
⁴⁹⁹ respondents.

⁵⁰⁰ **Data quality.** The median duration is 28 minutes for the *global* survey, 14 min for *US1*, 11 min
⁵⁰¹ for *US2*, and 20 min for *Eu*. To ensure the best possible data quality, we exclude respondents who
⁵⁰² fail an attention test or rush through the survey (i.e., answer in less than 11.5 minutes in the *global*
⁵⁰³ survey, 4 minutes in *US1* or *US2*, 6 minutes in *Eu*). At the end of the survey, we ask whether
⁵⁰⁴ respondents thought that our survey was politically biased and offer to provide some feedback.
⁵⁰⁵ 67% of the respondents found the survey unbiased. 25% found it left-wing biased, and 8% found
⁵⁰⁶ it right-wing biased.

⁵⁰⁷ **Questionnaires and raw results.** The raw results are reported in Appendix B while the surveys'
⁵⁰⁸ structures and questionnaires are given in Appendices C and D. Details on the *global* survey can be
⁵⁰⁹ found in the Appendix of the companion paper.¹⁹ Country-specific raw results are also available
⁵¹⁰ as supplementary material files: US, EU, FR, DE, ES, UK.

511 **Incentives.** To encourage accurate and truthful responses, several questions of the main surveys
512 use incentives. For each of the three comprehension questions that follow the policy descrip-
513 tions, we randomly select and reward three respondents who provide correct answers with a \$50
514 gift certificate. Similarly, for questions involving estimating support shares for the GCS and NR,
515 three respondents with the closest guesses to the actual values receive a \$50 gift certificate. In the
516 donation lottery question, we randomly select one respondent and split the \$100 prize between
517 the NGO GiveDirectly and the winner according to the winner's choice. In total, our incentives
518 scheme distributes gift certificates (and donations) for a value of \$850. Finally, respondents have
519 an incentive to answer truthfully to the petition question, as they are aware that the results for
520 that question (the share of respondents supporting the policy) will be transmitted to their head of
521 state's office.

522 **Absolute vs. relative support.** In most questions, support or opposition for a policy is asked
523 using a 5-Likert scale, with compulsory response and *Indifferent* as the middle option. We call
524 *absolute support* the share of *Somewhat* or *Strong support*. We generally favor the notion of *relative*
525 *support*, which reports the share of support after excluding *Indifferent* answers. Indeed, the *relative*
526 *support* is better suited to assess whether there are more people in favor vs. against a policy.

527 **Support for the GCS.** The 95% confidence intervals are [52.4%, 55.9%] in the U.S. and [74.2%, 77.2%]
528 in Europe. The average support is computed with survey weights, employing weights based on
529 quota variables, which exclude vote. Another method to reweigh the raw results involves running
530 a regression of the support for the GCS on sociodemographic characteristics (including vote) and
531 multiplying each coefficient by the population frequencies. This alternative approach yields sim-
532 ilar figures: 76% in Europe and 52% or 53% in the U.S. (depending on whether individuals who
533 did not disclose their vote are classified as non-voters or excluded). Notably, the average support
534 among voters is 54% in the U.S., with 74% support among Biden voters vs. 26% among Trump
535 voters (see Figure S47).

536 Though the level of support for the GCS is significantly lower in swing States (at 51%) that
537 are key to win U.S. elections, the electoral effect of endorsing the GCS remains non-significantly
538 different from zero (at +1.2 p.p.) in these States. Note that we define swing states as the 8 states
539 with less than 5 p.p. margin of victory in the 2020 election (MI, NV, PA, WI, AZ, GA, NC, FL). The
540 results are unchanged if we use the 3 p.p. threshold (that excludes FL) instead.

541 **List experiment.** List experiments have been used to reveal social desirability bias, silencing ei-
542 ther racism in the Southern U.S.⁴³ or opposition to the invasion of Ukraine in Russia.⁴⁴ In our case,
543 the question reads: "Beware, this question is quite unusual. Among the policies below, **how many**
544 do you support?" The list of policies randomly varies across respondents, and includes a subset of

545 GCS, NR (National Redistribution scheme), C (“Coal exit” in the U.S., “Thermal insulation plan”
546 in Europe) and O (“Marriage only for opposite-sex couples in the U.S.”, “Death penalty for major
547 crimes” in Europe). There are four branches: GCS/NR/C/O; GCS/C/O; NR/C/O; C/O. To esti-
548 mate the tacit average support for the GCS and NR, we regress the number of supported policies
549 on indicators that the list includes GCS and NR. We utilize the difference-in-means estimator, and
550 confidence intervals are computed using Monte Carlo simulation with the R package *list*.³⁸

551 **Petition.** The respondent is randomly assigned a branch where the petition relates to the GCS or
552 the National Redistribution scheme. The question reads: “Would you be willing to sign a petition
553 for the [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme?

554 As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President’s office], inform-
555 ing him what share of [American] people are willing to endorse the [Global climate / National
556 redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign, only your answer here is required and
557 remains anonymous.”).

558 Paired weighted *t*-tests are conducted to test the equality in support for a policy among re-
559 spondents who were questioned about the policy in the petition.

560 **Conjoint analyses.** The first conjoint analysis suggests that the GCS is supported independently
561 of being complemented by the National Redistribution Scheme and a national climate policy
562 (“Coal exit” in the U.S., “Thermal insulation plan” in Europe, denoted C). Indeed, 54% of U.S.
563 respondents and 74% of European ones prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to the com-
564 bination of C and NR alone, indicating similar support for the GCS conditional on NR and C than
565 for the GCS alone (Figure S15).

566 In the second conjoint analysis, results from the first branch show that the support for the GCS
567 conditional on NR, at 55% in the U.S. ($n = 757$) and 77% in Europe ($n = 746$), is not significantly
568 different from the support for the GCS alone. This suggests that rejection of the GCS is not driven
569 by the cost of the policy on oneself. The second branch shows that the support for C conditional
570 on NR is somewhat higher, at 62% in the U.S. ($n = 751$) and 84% in Europe ($n = 747$). However,
571 the third one shows no significant preference for C compared to GCS (both conditional on NR),
572 neither in Europe, where GCS is preferred by 52% ($n = 741$) nor in the U.S., where C is preferred
573 by 53% ($n = 721$). The fourth branch shows that 55% in the U.S. ($n = 771$) and 77% in Europe ($n =$
574 766) prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to NR alone.

575 The effects reported in the fourth analysis are the Average Marginal Component Effects.⁴⁵ The
576 policies studied are progressive policies prominent in the country. Except for the category *foreign*
577 *policy*, which features the GCS 42% of the time, they are drawn uniformly.

578 **Prioritization.** The prioritization allows inferring individual-level preferences for one policy
579 over another, including in their intensity. This somewhat differs from a conjoint analysis, which
580 only allows inferring individual-level preferences for one platform over another or collective-level
581 preferences for one policy over another. Also, by comparing platforms, conjoint analyses may be
582 subject to interaction effects between policies of a platform (which can be seen as complementary,
583 substitute, or antagonistic) while the prioritization frames the policies as independent.

584 This question sheds light on a potential discrepancy between the policy priorities of the public
585 and those enacted by legislators. For instance, while the European Union and California have
586 enacted plans to phase out new combustion-engine cars by 2035, the proposal to “ban the sale of
587 new combustion-engine cars by 2030” emerged as one of the three least prioritized policies in each
588 country, with an average allocation of 7.8 points in France to 11.4 points in the UK.

589 **Open-ended question on the GCS.** Around one in four respondents explicitly cites pros or cons.
590 Few individuals explicitly express support or opposition, and misunderstandings are rare. Only
591 11% of the responses are empty or express a lack of opinion, though one-quarter are unclassifiable
592 due to the rarity, nonsensical nature, or irrelevance of the conveyed idea.

593 **Pros and cons.** In the closed question, the least important aspect was the negative impact on
594 their household, with 60% in Europe ($n=1,505$) and 75% in the U.S. ($n=493$) finding it important.
595 The most important elements differ between Europe and the U.S. In Europe, the key factors are
596 the GCS’s potential to limit climate change and reduce poverty in low-income countries, both
597 deemed important by 85% of respondents. In the U.S., having sufficient information about the
598 scheme ranks highest at 89%, followed by its potential to foster global cooperation at 82%.

599 Surprisingly, the support for National Redistribution also decreased by 7 p.p. following the
600 closed question about the GCS. This suggests that some individuals may lack attention and con-
601 fuse the two policies, or that contemplating the pros and cons alters the mood of some people,
602 moving them away from their initial positive impression.

603 **Universalistic values** When asked what their country’s diplomats should defend in interna-
604 tional climate negotiations, only 11% prefer their country’s “interests, even if it goes against global
605 justice.” In contrast, 30% prefer global justice (with or without consideration of national interests),
606 and the bulk of respondents (38%) prefer their country’s “interests, to the extent it respects global
607 justice.”

608 Furthermore, when we ask respondents to assess the extent to which climate change, global
609 poverty, and inequality in their country are issues, climate change is generally viewed as the most
610 significant problem (with a mean score of 0.59 after recoding answers between -2 and 2). This is
611 followed by global poverty (0.42) and national inequality (0.37).

612 Finally, we conduct a lottery experiment. Respondents were automatically enrolled in a lottery
613 with a \$100 prize and had to choose the proportion of the prize they would keep for themselves
614 versus give to a person living in poverty. The charity donation is directed either to an African
615 individual or a fellow citizen, depending on the respondent's random assignment. In Europe, we
616 observe no significant variation in the willingness to donate based on the recipient's origin. In the
617 U.S., the donations to Africans are 3 p.p. lower, but the slightly lower donations to Africans are
618 entirely driven by Trump voters and non-voters (Table S2).

619 **Global wealth tax estimates.** A 2% tax on net wealth exceeding \$5 million would annually raise
620 \$816 billion, leaving unaffected 99.9% of the world population. More specifically, it would collect
621 €5 billion in Spain, €16 billion in France, £20 billion in the UK, €44 billion in Germany, \$430
622 billion in the U.S., and \$1 billion collectively in all low-income countries (28 countries, home to
623 700 million people). These Figures come from the [WID wealth tax simulator](#).⁴⁶

624 **Design choices.** As global survey results indicated strong support for global redistributive poli-
625 cies worldwide, we conducted our main surveys to further investigate the surprisingly high sup-
626 port. Among the eight largest high-income countries, we selected the five ones with a relatively
627 low level of support for global redistributive policies as observed in the global survey. We also
628 focus on the GCS as its costs are less concentrated on the very rich, compared to other global re-
629 distributive policies, so we expected lower (or less genuine) support. By selecting countries that
630 would lose from global redistribution, are less supportive than others, and focusing on less con-
631 sensual policies, we aimed at conservatively assessing the level of support of world citizens for
632 global redistribution.

633 We split the U.S. survey into two waves to test the effect on the support of providing the
634 information on the actual support, and merged the *Eu* survey in one wave to get larger sample
635 sizes and more power in the analyses.

636 To select the policies tested, we spanned three key areas for global redistribution: climate
637 change, inequality, and global governance. We selected policies that are either on the agenda
638 of international negotiations (international transfers for mitigation; adaptation; or loss and dam-
639 ages; cancellation of public debt; reform of voting rights at the UN or IMF; global wealth tax) or
640 advocated by prominent NGOs or scholars ([global asset registry](#); limits on wealth;^{47;48} democratic
641 climate governance;⁴⁹ global minimum wage;⁵⁰ fair trade;⁵¹ carbon pricing;⁶ [increased foreign](#)
642 [aid](#)).

643 **Data and code availability**

644 All data and code of the *main* surveys as well as figures of the paper are available on [10.5281/zen-](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.11202245)
645 [odo.11202245](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.11202245). Data and code for the *g* survey will be made public upon publication.

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651 **Author Contributions**

652 A.F. collected and analysed the data, and drafted the questionnaire and the paper. T.D. and
653 L.M. substantially revised the questionnaire and paper, and contributed to the conception and
654 redaction.

655 **Competing interests**

656 Fabre declares that he also serves as president of Global Redistribution Advocates.

Table 1: Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list. The tacit support for the GCS is estimated by regressing the number of supported policies on the presence of the GCS in the list of policies. The social desirability is estimated as the difference between the tacit and stated support, and it is not significantly different from zero even at a 20% threshold (see [Methods](#)).

	Number of supported policies		
	All	U.S.	Europe
List contains: GCS	0.624*** (0.028)	0.524*** (0.041)	0.724*** (0.036)
<i>Support for GCS</i>	0.65	0.542	0.757
<i>Social desirability bias</i>	-0.025	-0.019	-0.033
<i>80% C.I. for the bias</i>	[-0.06; 0.01]	[-0.07; 0.04]	[-0.08; 0.01]
Constant	1.317	1.147	1.486
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000
R ²	0.089	0.065	0.125

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 2: Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. ([Question 28](#))

	Prefers the Progressive platform					
	All	United States	France	Germany	UK	Spain
GCS in Progressive platform	0.028 (0.039)	0.029 (0.132)	0.112*** (0.005)	0.015 (0.639)	0.008 (0.839)	-0.015 (0.696)
Constant	0.623	0.604	0.55	0.7	0.551	0.775
Observations	5,202	2,619	605	813	661	504
R ²	0.001	0.001	0.013	0.0003	0.0001	0.0003

Note: Simple OLS model. P-values are reported in parentheses. The 14% of *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples. GCS has no significant influence on them. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

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Extended data

Table S1: Effects on the support for the GCS of a question on its pros and cons (either in open-ended or closed format) and on information about the actual support, in the U.S. (See Section D in the US2 Questionnaire) [\(Back to Section 2.4.5\)](#)

	Support			
	Global Climate Scheme		National Redistribution	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Control group mean	0.557	0.557	0.569	0.569
Treatment: Open-ended field on GCS pros & cons	-0.073** (0.035)	-0.071** (0.031)	-0.035 (0.035)	-0.030 (0.032)
Treatment: Closed questions on GCS pros & cons	-0.109*** (0.034)	-0.096*** (0.031)	-0.065* (0.034)	-0.062** (0.031)
Treatment: Info on actual support for GCS and NR	-0.021 (0.034)	-0.015 (0.031)	0.048 (0.033)	0.056* (0.031)
Includes controls		✓		✓
Observations	2,000	1,995	2,000	1,995
R ²	0.007	0.170	0.007	0.154

Figure S1: [For Supplementary Material] Support for the GCS, NR and the combination of GCS, NR and C (Yes/No questions).
(p. 88, Questions 20, 22, 35, 36, and 26).





Table S2: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality. (Question 34) [\(Back to Section 2.6\)](#)


	Donation to poor people (in %)			
	All	US	US	Eu
Poor is in own country	0.590 (0.799)	2.509** (1.152)	0.046 (1.691)	-1.349 (1.108)
Poor is in own country \times Vote: <i>not</i> Biden			3.954* (2.279)	
Mean	34.034	33.658	33.658	34.41
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000	3,000
R ²	0.0001	0.002	0.034	0.0005

Figure S2: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See non-translated versions in Figure S16; Question 29)


(a) U.S. (Asked only to non-Republicans)




(b) France



(c) Germany



(d) Spain



(e) UK




Figure S3: Influence of the GCS on preferred platform:

Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question 30; in the U.S., asked only to non-Republicans.)




Figure S4: Beliefs regarding the support for the GCS and NR. (Questions 21 and 23)




Figure S5: Percent of global wealth tax that should finance low-income countries (*mean*).

“Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all countries around the world. (...)

What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of retained in the country’s national budget)?” (Question 37)




Figure S6: Attitudes regarding the evolution of [own country] foreign aid. (Question 46)




Figure S7: Conditions at which foreign aid should be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish an increase of foreign aid at some conditions.] (Question 47)





Figure S8: Reasons why foreign aid should not be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish a decrease or stability of foreign aid.] (Question 48)



821 **A Literature review**

822 **A.1 Attitudes and perceptions**

823 **A.1.1 Population attitudes on global policies**

824 Using representative samples in 125 countries covering 96% of the world's greenhouse
825 gas emissions, Andre et al. (2024) show that 69% of the global population express willing-
826 ness to contribute 1% of their income to fight global warming.¹ Carattini et al. (2019) test
827 the support for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples in five countries, represen-
828 tative along gender and age. For a given variant, the sample size is about 167 respondents
829 per country. They find over 80% support for any variant in India, between 50% and 65%
830 in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43% to 59% in the U.S., depending on the
831 variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding an equal dividend for each
832 human is close to 50% in high-income countries (e.g., at 44% in the U.S.), consistently
833 with our results from the *Global* survey (see Figure 2). This is another piece of evidence
834 that the support is lower for a tax that would "only" reduce CO₂ emissions than for a
835 quota that would unambiguously achieve the climate target. In a survey over 15 coun-
836 tries, Bloodworth & Callegari (2023) find 73% agreement to tax fossil fuel companies and
837 finance climate action in poorer countries. Using a conjoint analysis in the U.S. and Ger-
838 many, Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019) find that the support for a carbon tax increases
839 by up to 50% if it applies to all industrialized countries rather than exclusively to one's
840 own country.

841 In surveys conducted in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S., Ghassim (2020)
842 finds support ranging from 55% to 74% for "a global democracy including both a global
843 government and a global parliament, directly elected by the world population, to recom-
844 mend and implement policies on global issues". Ghassim & Pauli (2024) also finds strong
845 support for a democratic world government in surveys over 17 countries. Furthermore,
846 through an experiment, Ghassim (2020) finds that, in countries where the government
847 stems from a coalition, voting shares would shift by 8 (Brazil) to 12 p.p. (Germany) from
848 parties who are said to oppose global democracy to parties that supposedly support it.
849 For instance, when Germans respondents were told that (only) the Greens and the Left
850 support global democracy, these parties gained respectively 9 and 3 p.p. in vote inten-
851 tions, while the SPD and the CDU-CSU each lost 6 p.p. Ghassim (2020) also presents

¹However, Ipsos (2023) find no majority support when the amount is not specified, despite strong agree-
ment for own individual action.

852 survey results showing strong majorities in favor of the direct election of one's country's
853 UN representative in all 18 surveyed countries. Similarly, in each of 10 countries, there
854 are clear majorities in favor of "a new supranational entity [taking] enforceable global de-
855 cisions in order to solve global risks" (Global Challenges Foundation 2018). Remarkably,
856 already in 1946, 54% of Americans agreed (while 24% disagreed) that "the UN should be
857 strengthened to make it a world government with the power to control the armed forces
858 of all nations" (Gallup 1946). Furthermore, in surveys conducted in Argentina, China,
859 India, Russia, Spain, and the U.S., Ghassim et al. (2022) find majority support for UN
860 reforms that would make United Nations' decisions binding, give veto powers to a few
861 other major countries at the Security Council, or complement the highest body of the UN
862 with a chamber of directly elected representatives.

863 Relatedly, Meilland et al. (2023) find that both Americans and French people prefer
864 an international settlement of climate justice, even if it encroaches on sovereignty. In a
865 2013 survey conducted in China, Germany, and the U.S., Schleich et al. (2016) show that
866 over three-quarter of people think that international climate agreements reached so far
867 are not successful and that future agreements are important. In Finland, Sivonen (2022)
868 finds that that support for a carbon tax is higher if implemented at the global level (54%)
869 rather than at the national level (40%).

870 The results from these specific questions are in line with the answers to more gen-
871 eral questions. In each of 36 countries, ISSP (2010) find near consensus that "for envi-
872 ronmental problems, there should be international agreements that [their country] and
873 other countries should be made to follow" (overall, 82% agree and 4% disagree). In each
874 of 29 countries, ISSP (2019) uncover near consensus that "Present economic differences
875 between rich and poor countries are too large" (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree).
876 Leiserowitz et al. (2021) reveal that 66% of Americans support providing "financial aid
877 and technical support to developing countries that agree to limit their greenhouse gas
878 emissions." Fehr et al. (2022) find that 90% of Germans want some degree of global redis-
879 tribution.

880 A.1.2 Population attitudes on climate burden sharing

881 Despite differences in the description of fairness principles, surveys on burden-sharing
882 rules show consistent attitudes. Or at least, their seemingly contradictory results can be
883 made compatible with the following interpretation: Concerning emissions reductions,
884 most people want that every country engage in strong and collective decarbonization ef-

885 forts, with a global quota converging to climate neutrality in the medium run. Concerning
886 the financial effort, most people support high-emitting countries paying and low-income
887 countries receiving funding. The most supported rules are those perceived as equitable,
888 in particular an equal right to emit per person.

889 This interpretation helps to understand the apparent differences between articles that
890 approach burden sharing from different angles: cost sharing (in money terms), effort shar-
891 ing (in terms of emissions reductions), or resource sharing (in terms of rights to emit).
892 Existing papers adopt either the cost sharing or effort sharing approach, which preclude
893 any country from being a net receiver of funds. Also, by focusing on *either* the financial
894 or the decarbonization effort, these surveys miss the other half of the picture, which can
895 explain why some papers find strong support for the ability-to-pay principle while others
896 find strong support for grandfathering (defined as emissions reductions being the same
897 in every country). The literature follows these approaches to align with the notions used
898 by the UNFCCC. Yet, we argue that the resource sharing approach is preferable for un-
899 covering attitudes, as it unambiguously describes the distributive implications of each
900 rule while achieving an efficient geographical distribution of emissions reductions and
901 explicitly allowing for monetary gains for some countries.

902 Now, let us summarize the results of the different papers in the light of this clarifica-
903 tion. [Schleich et al. \(2016\)](#) find an identical ranking of support for burden-sharing prin-
904 ciples in China, Germany, and the U.S.: polluter-pays followed by ability-to-pay, equal
905 emissions per capita, and grandfathering. Note that the authors do not allow for emis-
906 sions trading in their description of equal *emissions per capita*, which may explain its rel-
907 atively low support. Yet, the relative support for egalitarianism also depends on how
908 *the other* rules are described. Indeed, [Carlsson et al. \(2011\)](#) find that Swedes prefer that
909 “all countries are allowed to emit an equal amount per capita” rather than options where
910 emissions are reduced based on current or historical emissions, for which it is explicitly
911 stated that high-emitting countries “will continue to emit more than others”. [Bechtel &](#)
912 [Scheve \(2013\)](#) find agreement that rich countries should pay more and historical emis-
913 sions should matter, but that efforts should not be solely borne by wealthy nations. More
914 precisely, their conjoint analysis conducted in France, Germany, the UK, and the U.S.
915 shows that a climate agreement is 15 p.p. more likely to be preferred (to a random alter-
916 native) if it includes 160 countries rather than 20, and 5 p.p. less likely to be preferred
917 if “only rich countries pay” compared to other burden-sharing rules: “rich countries pay
918 more than poor”, “countries pay proportional to current emissions” or “countries pay

proportional to historical emissions". In Germany and the U.S., Gampfer et al. (2014) also find stronger support for funding climate action in low-income countries when cost is shared with other countries. Using a choice experiment, Carlsson et al. (2013) find that the least preferred option in China and the U.S. is when low-emitting countries are exempted from any effort. Ability-to-pay is appreciated in both countries and is the preferred option in the U.S., though the preferred option in China is another one that accounts for historical responsibility. In the U.S. and France, Meilland et al. (2023) find that the most favored fairness principle is that "all countries commit to converge to the same average of total emissions per inhabitant, compatible with a controlled climate change". Furthermore, in each country, 73% disagree with grandfathering defined as "countries which emitted a lot of carbon in the past have a right to continue emitting more than others in the future". The study by Meilland et al. (2023) contains many other results: for instance, majorities prefer to hold countries accountable for their consumption-based rather than territorial emissions, and the median choice regarding historical responsibility is to hold a country accountable for its post-1990 emissions (rather than post-1850 or just their current emissions). Finally, in each of 28 (among the largest) countries, Dabla-Norris et al. (2023) find strong majority for "all countries" to the question "Which countries do you think should be paying to reduce carbon emissions?". When asked to choose between a cost sharing based on *current* vs. *accumulated historic emissions*, a majority prefers *current emissions* in all countries but China and Saudi Arabia (where the two options are close to equally preferred).

[\(Back to Section 2.2\)](#)

940 A.1.3 Population attitudes on foreign aid

941 There is an extensive literature on attitudes towards foreign aid in donor countries.
942 The key findings indicate that most people overestimate the amount of foreign aid and
943 that only a minority wants a cut in foreign aid compared to actual amounts, especially
944 once they become aware of them.

945 For instance, PIPA (2001) shows that 83% of Americans support a multilateral effort
946 to cut world hunger in half. PIPA (2008) shows that in each of 20 countries, a majority
947 thinks that developed countries "have a moral responsibility to work to reduce hunger
948 and severe poverty in poor countries", with an average agreement of 81%. In 7 OECD
949 countries, the study finds that at least 75% of respondents are willing to pay for a program
950 to cut hunger in half (at an estimated cost of, e.g., \$50 a year for each American).

951 Kaufmann et al. (2019) find that perceived aid is overestimated in each of the 24 coun-

tries they study, on average by a factor of 7. In most countries, desired aid is larger than perceived aid.² They show that individuals in the top income quintile desire aid 0.13 p.p. lower than those in the bottom 40% – which is very close to what we find. By employing a theoretical model and examining correlations between lobbying and actual aid (controlling for desired aid), they argue that the gap between actual and desired aid stems from the political influence of the rich who defend their vested interests. In Kaufmann et al. (2012), the U.S. is an outlier: desired aid is at the other countries' average (3% of GNI), but as misperceptions are enormous, perceived aid is twice as large as desired aid. Indeed, Gilens (2001) shows that even Americans with high political knowledge misperceive actual aid, and finds that 17% fewer of them want to cut aid when we provide them specific information about the amount of aid. Similarly, Nair (2018) finds that the relatively low support for aid in the U.S. is driven by information on global distribution, as people underestimate their rank by 27 centiles on average and overestimate the global median income by a factor 10.

Hudson & van Heerde (2012) provide a critical review of the literature and show that the strong support for poverty alleviation largely stems from intrinsic altruism. They note that, according to DFID (2009) and PIPA (2001), 47% of British people find that the aid is wasted (mainly due to corruption), while Americans estimate that less than a quarter of the aid reaches those in need, with over half ending up in the hands of corrupt government officials. Despite these perceptions, most people still support aid, suggesting the presence of nonutilitarian motives. Consistent with Henson et al. (2010), Bauhr et al. (2013) find that support for aid is reduced by the perception of corruption in recipient countries. However, this effect is mitigated by the aid-corruption paradox: countries with higher levels of corruption often need more help. Bodenstein & Faust (2017) further show that right-wing Europeans, as well as those who perceive strong corruption in their country, are more likely to agree that recipient countries should “follow certain rules regarding democracy, human rights and governance as a condition for receiving EU development aid.” Using a 2002 Gallup survey and the 2006 World Values Survey, and in line with Bayram (2017), Paxton & Knack (2012) show that the main determinants for wanting more aid are trust, left-wing ideology, interest in politics, and being a woman (all positively associated).

(Back to Section 2.5.2)

While foreign aid is generally unilateral, discretionary, and often used as a bargaining

²Kaufmann et al. (2012) offer the best results on desired aid because (as Hudson & van Heerde (2012) criticize), other studies did not take into account misperceptions of actual aid.

chip, global redistribution is conceived as multilateral, rule-based, and with dedicated funding. Our paper finds much stronger support for global redistributive policies than for increased foreign aid. The difference in attitudes between unilateral foreign aid and global policies is consistent with the literature on foreign aid. Indeed, it can be explained by the observation that people prefer multilateral policies and often view foreign aid as inefficient in reducing poverty. Therefore, we contribute to the theory of attitudes towards global transfers by showing that when such transfers are multilateral and trusted to be effective, they would be largely supported.

992 A.1.4 Population attitudes on taxes on the rich

993 We are not aware of any previous survey on a global wealth tax,³ though surveys
994 consistently show strong support for national wealth taxes. In a comprehensive survey
995 conducted in the UK, [Rowlingson et al. \(2021\)](#) show that a wealth tax is the preferred
996 option for raising revenues. Only 8% of respondents state that total net wealth should not
997 be taxed (with little differences between Labour and Conservative voters). The study also
998 finds that the preferred design would be a 1% or 3% tax on net wealth above £1 million. By
999 asking how much taxes per year should a person with a certain income and wealth level
1000 pay, [Fisman et al. \(2017\)](#) finds that the average American favors a 0.8% linear tax rate
1001 on unspecified wealth up to \$2 million (the highest wealth level tested), and a 3% linear
1002 rate on inherited wealth. Through a conjoint analysis conducted in three high-income
1003 countries, [Schechtl & Tisch \(2023\)](#) find widespread support for a wealth tax (from 78% in
1004 the U.S. to 86% in Germany and the UK), with a preference for an exemption threshold
1005 set at \$/€1 million (rather than 500,000 or 2 million) with the tax rate and tax unit having
1006 little influence on the preferred design. In 21 OECD countries, the [OECD \(2019\)](#) uncovers
1007 strong majority support for higher taxes on the rich to support the poor, with nearly
1008 70% overall agreement and less than 20% disagreement. [Isbell \(2022\)](#) finds similarly high
1009 level of support in 34 African countries. In the UK, [Patriotic Millionaires \(2022\)](#) find 69%
1010 support (and 7% opposition) for a 1.1% tax on wealth in excess of £10 million. In the
1011 U.S., [Americans for Tax Fairness \(2021\)](#) find that 67% to 71% of the respondents support
1012 to “raise taxes for those earning more than \$400,000 a year”, “raise the income tax rate
1013 for those earning over \$1 million a year by 10 percentage points”, or “apply a 2% tax on
1014 an individual’s wealth above \$50 million each year, and 3% on wealth above \$1 billion”.

³We did not find any using the combination of “survey” or “attitudes” with “wealth tax” or “global wealth tax” in Google Scholar.

1015 Patriotic Millionaires (2024) indicate that millionaires themselves agree to be taxed: out
1016 of 2,385 millionaires contacted through wealth councillors, 74% support “increased tax on
1017 very wealthy individuals” and 58% support a 2% wealth tax above \$10 million. Finally,
1018 in surveys in Germany and the U.S., Ferreira et al. (2024) finds strong majority support
1019 for a limit on income or wealth.

1020 **A.1.5 Population attitudes on ethical norms**

1021 As argued by Nyborg et al. (2016), social norms can be the solution to the collective
1022 action problem. As such, universalistic values and free-riding attitudes are key.

1023 **Universalism** Various studies have examined the concept of global identity (see Rey-
1024 sen & Katzarska-Miller (2018) for a review). In the 2005-2008 wave of the World Values
1025 Survey, Bayram (2015) notes that “78% of the participants in 57 countries see themselves
1026 as citizens of the world”, though the 2017-2022 wave reveals that more people feel close
1027 to their town, region or country than to the world. Enke et al. (2023) measure universal-
1028 ism at the U.S. district level using donation data, and find that a district’s universalism
1029 predicts electoral outcomes better than its income or education level. To measure univer-
1030 salism at the individual level, Enke et al. (2023) ask American respondents to split \$100
1031 between a random stranger and a random person with the same income but closer to
1032 them. They distinguish different facets of universalism, and define *foreign universalism* as
1033 the inclination to give to a foreigner rather than a fellow citizen. They find a home bias for
1034 most people, which could partly be attributed to concerns about inequality, as the split
1035 involves two persons with the same income, with the foreigner most certainly living in
1036 a poorer country than the American and thus enjoying a higher social status. That being
1037 said, a home bias probably remains even after accounting for concerns about inequality,
1038 as 84% of Americans agree that “taking care of problems at home is more important than
1039 giving aid to foreign countries” (PIPA 2001). Enke et al. (2023) also measure universalism
1040 and analyze its correlates in 7 countries, and Cappelen et al. (2022) deploy this method
1041 in 60 countries. In a lab experiment with students in the U.S., Cherry et al. (2017) show
1042 that a substantial share of people prefer policies detrimental to them due to their egali-
1043 tarian worldview. Leiserowitz (2006) shows that 68% of Americans are most concerned
1044 about the impacts of climate change on “people all over the world” (50%) or “non-human
1045 nature” (18%) rather than themselves and their family (12%) or the U.S. (9%).⁴ A 2017

⁴Unpublished survey results of Dechezleprêtre et al. (forthcoming) find similar figures in 2024.

1046 survey by Focus 2030 shows that 40% of French people agree “fighting poverty in devel-
1047 oping countries should be one of the priorities of the European Union” while only 19%
1048 disagree. Waytz et al. (2019) show that left-leaning people exhibit a wider “moral circle”.
1049 Jaeger & Wilks (2023) find that judgments of moral concern are equally well explained by
1050 characteristics of the judge and the evaluated target.

1051 **Free-riding** Despite the long-standing explanation of the lack of climate action as a re-
1052 sult of free-riding, surveys consistently show that people support climate mitigation ac-
1053 tion in their own country, even in the absence of such action in other countries. Bernauer
1054 & Gampfer (2015) show this for Americans and Indians, who both overestimate their
1055 country’s emissions at one third of the global total. Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019)
1056 show this in the U.S. and China using an experimental design. McEvoy & Cherry (2016)
1057 show that Americans mostly invoke leadership and morality to justify unilateral climate
1058 action. Using a range of methods, Aklin & Mildenberger (2020) show that the empiri-
1059 cal evidence for free-riding is not compelling, and that climate inaction can be equally
1060 well explained by distributive conflicts. Finally, review of the literature by McGrath &
1061 Bernauer (2017) shows that climate attitudes are largely nonreciprocal, and primarily
1062 driven by values and perceptions of the policies, rather than by considerations of what
1063 other countries do.

1064 A.1.6 Second-order beliefs

1065 Allport (1924) introduced the concept of pluralistic ignorance: a shared mispercep-
1066 tion concerning others’ beliefs. The concept became notorious when O’Gorman (1975)
1067 showed that, towards the end of the civil rights movement, 47% of Americans believed
1068 that a majority of white people supported segregation, while only 18% did so. PIPA (2001)
1069 has shown that while 75% of Americans are willing to contribute \$50 annually to halve
1070 world hunger (the cost of the program), only 32% believed that the majority would share
1071 this willingness. Pluralistic ignorance regarding climate-friendly norms in the United
1072 States has been documented by Andre et al. (2022), who further show that correcting the
1073 misperceptions would be effective to enhance pro-climate behaviors. Relatedly, Spark-
1074 man et al. (2022) show that Americans underestimate the support for climate policies
1075 by nearly half, while Drews et al. (2022) document pluralistic ignorance of carbon tax
1076 support in Spain. Additionally, Geiger & Swim (2016) show that pluralistic ignorance
1077 regarding concern for climate change leads people to self-silence, resulting in reduced

1078 discussions on the topic.

1079 A.1.7 Elite attitudes

1080 In a survey of climate negotiators on their preferences in terms of burden-sharing,
1081 Lange et al. (2007) uncovers a mix of self-serving bias and support for the egalitarian
1082 principle. Dannenberg et al. (2010) elicit climate negotiators' equity preferences and find
1083 that regional differences in addressing climate change are driven more by national inter-
1084 ests than by different equity concerns. Hjerpe et al. (2011) indicate that voluntary con-
1085 tribution, indicated as willingness to contribute, was the least preferred principle among
1086 both negotiators and observers. Three of the four principles for allocating mitigation
1087 commitments were recognized widely across the major geographical regions: historical
1088 responsibilities, ability-to-pay, and equal per capita emissions. This result is confirmed
1089 by Kesternich et al. (2021), who observe tendencies for a more harmonized view among
1090 key groups towards the ability-to-pay rule in a setting of weighted burden sharing rules.
1091 Mildenberger & Tingley (2019) survey elites (Congress staffers and international relations
1092 scholars) as well as the population in U.S. and China. They document pluralistic igno-
1093 rance of pro-climate attitudes, egocentric bias, and increasing support after beliefs are
1094 updated.

1095 A.2 Proposals and analyses of global policy-making

1096 A.2.1 Global carbon pricing

1097 Global carbon pricing is widely regarded by economists as the benchmark climate
1098 policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon emissions externality. For instance, Hoel
1099 (1991) shows that an international carbon tax can be designed to simultaneously achieve
1100 efficiency and accommodate any distributional objective. Concerning the distributional
1101 objective, Grubb (1990), Agarwal & Narain (1991) and Bertram (1992) were the first to
1102 advocate for an equal right to emit for each human. As Grubb (1990) states it: "by far the
1103 best combination of long term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity, is obtained
1104 from a system based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions which are allocated on
1105 an adult per capita basis".⁵ Support for such solution has been renewed ever since (Baer
1106 et al. 2000; Jamieson 2001; Blanchard & Tirole 2021; Rajan 2021).

⁵By "adult per capita", Grubb (1990) means that permits would be allocated equally among adults.

1107 While many endorse the egalitarian allocation of emissions permits, economists also
1108 considered this outcome as politically unfeasible. Thus, to preserve the current level of
1109 inequalities and to preclude transfers between countries, they adjusted their (integrated
1110 assessment) models by assigning more weight to the interest of rich countries (Stanton
1111 2011).

1112 [Gollier & Tirole \(2015\)](#) synthesize the distributional decision with a *generosity* parame-
1113 ter which would allocate emissions permit to countries in proportion to their population
1114 if set to one, in proportion to their emissions (on the start date of the policy) if set to zero,
1115 and as a mixture of the egalitarian and grandfathering rules if set in between. Using a
1116 similar formula in the context of a tax, [Cramton et al. \(2015\)](#) (summarized in [MacKay
et al. 2015](#)) propose that countries with emissions per capita around the average fix the
1117 generosity parameter, so that it is strategically chosen to maximize the tax rate, and to
1118 fix the tax rate at the minimum price proposed by participating countries. Negotiations
1119 would exclude countries with low ambition beforehand; and the treaty would impose
1120 trade sanctions on non-participating countries. [van den Bergh et al. \(2020\)](#) propose a
1121 “dual-track transition to global carbon pricing”: an expanding climate club that would
1122 integrate existing and new emissions trading systems, and a reorientation of UNFCCC
1123 negotiations towards a global carbon price and burden-sharing rules. The [IMF \(2019\)](#)
1124 also supports global carbon pricing or, as a first step, a carbon price floor. They propose
1125 either differentiated prices among countries or international transfers, and estimate that
1126 a price of \$75/tCO₂ in 2030 would be compatible with a 2°C trajectory.

1127 Other authors have put forth more radical proposals. For instance, [Weitzman \(2017\)](#)
1128 envisions a World Climate Assembly with proportional representation at the global scale,
1129 so that the median (human) voter would choose the carbon price level. To finance an
1130 adaptation fund, [Chancel & Piketty \(2015\)](#) propose a global *progressive* carbon tax (or a
1131 progressive tax on air tickets as a first step), so that rich people (who are high emitters)
1132 contribute more to the public good. [Fleurbaey & Zuber \(2013\)](#) highlight that, given that
1133 current emitters are probably richer than future victims of climate change damages, cli-
1134 mate policies deserve a *negative* discount rate. In other words, we cannot dissociate the
1135 climate issue from global inequalities, and an ethical response to this issue requires global
1136 redistribution.

1138 **A.2.2 Climate burden sharing**

1139 The literature has discussed different burden-sharing principles (Ringius et al. 2002).
1140 While there is no agreement on their definitions as different approaches are used (cost
1141 sharing, effort sharing, or resource sharing, see Section A.1.2), we describe here the burden-
1142 sharing principles consistently using the resource sharing approach (i.e., allocating emis-
1143 sions rights). For other papers that define or compare different burden-sharing principles,
1144 see Leimbach & Giannousakis; Zhou & Wang; Vaillancourt & Waaub (2019; 2016; 2004).

1145 **Equal per capita.** The simplest principle is perhaps to allocate each year's global carbon
1146 quota based on an equal right to emit per capita, or an equal right to emit for each adult.
1147 Implementing this principle would result in large transfers from high-emitting to low-
1148 emitting countries (Young-Brun et al. 2023).

1149 **Grandfathering.** In contrast, *grandfathering* entails allocating emissions rights in pro-
1150 portion to current emissions. From the perspective of allocating carbon pricing revenues
1151 between countries, grandfathering amounts to each country retaining the revenues it col-
1152 lects. Given that nations are sovereign and have not agreed to share emissions rights,
1153 this principle can be considered as the default option against which the other ones can be
1154 compared in terms of distributive effects.

1155 **Historical responsibilities.** At the opposite end of the spectrum is the principle of *his-
1156 torical responsibilities*, which assigns to each country a carbon budget proportional to its
1157 population. Countries that have emitted more than the average have accumulated a car-
1158 bon debt towards countries that have emitted less, which have a carbon credit.⁶

1159 To fully specify this rule, one needs to define a start date for the responsibilities on
1160 past emissions and specify how to account for population size. 1990 is often chosen as
1161 a start year as it is the date of the first IPCC assessment report, marking the widespread
1162 acknowledgment of climate change, though variants include 1972, 1960, 1950 or 1850.⁷
1163 Several solutions have been proposed to account for evolving populations, none of which
1164 is flawless. Matthews (2015) allocates emissions rights on a given year proportionally to
1165 the countries' populations in that year. An alternative is to use fixed populations, such

⁶It is not clear how these debts would be settled. Approaches could involve carbon removal from the atmosphere, or using a conventional social cost of carbon to monetize them, by crediting (positively or negatively) emissions rights to countries in an international carbon market.

⁷Climate equity monitor uses 1850 for example.

¹¹⁶⁶ as the populations at the chosen start year ([Neumayer 2000](#)), or at a future date such
¹¹⁶⁷ as projected when the global total population will reach 9 billion ([Raupach et al. 2014](#)).
¹¹⁶⁸ [Fanning & Hickel \(2023\)](#) convert the projected climate debt up to 2050 into monetary
¹¹⁶⁹ terms in a 1.5°C scenario.

¹¹⁷⁰ The rationale for using fixed populations is to prevent countries from intentionally
¹¹⁷¹ increasing their population size to gain more emissions rights. However, this approach
¹¹⁷² treats countries with different demographic trajectories similarly, effectively penalizing
¹¹⁷³ countries which grow more than others (if past populations are used) or grow more than
¹¹⁷⁴ expected (if future populations are used). Using current populations like [Matthews \(2015\)](#)
¹¹⁷⁵ also comes with its own problems. Consider two countries having contributed very little
¹¹⁷⁶ to cumulative emissions, with the same emissions per capita but different demographic
¹¹⁷⁷ patterns: country A's population has doubled in the last 30 years, while country B's pop-
¹¹⁷⁸ ulation has remained stable. Despite the similar present situation, country B would ac-
¹¹⁷⁹ cumulate more carbon credit than country A. Essentially, compensating country B more
¹¹⁸⁰ due to its past population size amounts to compensating the dead although it is future
¹¹⁸¹ generations who will suffer. That being said, using current populations is likely a more
¹¹⁸² viable solution than relying on fixed populations since, in practice, countries with similar
¹¹⁸³ emissions per capita tend to have relatively similar demographic trajectories.

¹¹⁸⁴ **Ability to pay.** Another prominent burden-sharing principle is the ability to pay whereby
¹¹⁸⁵ richer countries should contribute more to mitigation efforts. To operationalize this prin-
¹¹⁸⁶ ciple, [Baer et al. \(2008\)](#) define *capacity* as the share of global income above an exemption
¹¹⁸⁷ threshold. They use the threshold of \$7,500 per year (in 2005 PPP), which corresponds to
¹¹⁸⁸ the top 28% of the global income distribution. According to this principle, the effort of a
¹¹⁸⁹ country should be proportional to the revenues it would raise with a linear income tax on
¹¹⁹⁰ individual income above \$7,500.

¹¹⁹¹ **Climate Equity Reference Framework** [Baer et al. \(2008\)](#) propose another effort-sharing
¹¹⁹² method, the *Climate Equity Reference Framework* (CERF), which blends the ability to pay
¹¹⁹³ principle with their version of historical responsibilities. They define *responsibility* as fol-
¹¹⁹⁴ lows: they determine the mitigation requirement as the emissions gap between the Busi-
¹¹⁹⁵ ness as Usual scenario from [IEA \(2007\)](#) and a 2°C (with 68-86% probability) scenario.
¹¹⁹⁶ The mitigation requirement is then allocated to countries proportionally to their cumu-
¹¹⁹⁷ lative emissions (starting in 1990). The emissions right of a country according to their

1198 responsibility are then determined by its Business as Usual emissions minus its mitigation
1199 requirement. A country's emissions right, dubbed its *greenhouse development right* (GDR),
1200 is defined using a combination of *capacity* (C) and *responsibility* (R) to allocate the miti-
1201 gation requirement between countries. This allocation key is called the *Responsibility and*
1202 *Capacity Indicator* (RCI) and defined as $RCI = R^a \cdot C^{1-a}$, with $a = .4$.

1203 This choice of parameter may seem somewhat arbitrary, but the [EcoEquity calculator](#)
1204 allows for a customization all CERF parameters ([Holz et al. 2018](#); [Holz et al. 2019](#)). The
1205 Climate Action Network has adopted the CERF as its *fair share* framework, though the
1206 different national chapters of the organization could not agree on a choice of parameters
1207 ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)).⁸

1208 The CERF approach was adopted by a prominent network of climate NGOs because
1209 it operationalizes the principle of *common but differentiated responsibilities and respective ca-*
1210 *pabilities* recognized by the UNFCCC. However, this approach suffers from three draw-
1211 backs. First, its definition of historical responsibility as an effort sharing principle is in-
1212 consistent with the principle of an equal right of cumulative emissions per capita, which
1213 is a resource sharing principle. For instance, consider a fully decarbonized country that
1214 has exhausted *exactly* its cumulative carbon budget. According to the CERF notion of *re-*
1215 *sponsibility*, this country would still be expected to contribute significantly to mitigation
1216 efforts due to its relatively high cumulative emissions. Yet, according to the usual defini-
1217 tion of the historical responsibility based on an equal right of cumulative emissions p.c.,
1218 this country would have no liability as it has not exceeded its carbon budget. Second, a
1219 country with moderate incomes⁹ and low historical responsibility would be assigned a
1220 relatively low effort, even if its emissions per capita are high. In other words, the CERF
1221 approach favors countries that have experienced recent growth. Third, the poorest coun-
1222 tries would be granted emissions rights close to the Business as Usual trajectory, as they
1223 would bear virtually none of the effort. But this trajectory carries the current (unfair) in-
1224 come distribution and amounts to grandfathering. For example, the baseline trajectory
1225 for emissions¹⁰ in the DRC entail 0.8 tCO₂ p.c. in 2030, which is five times less than the


⁸The [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) and the think tank [EcoEquity](#) (funded by Tom Athanasiou and late Paul Baer) choose the following parameters: an equal weight for R and C ($a = .5$), their own [business as usual projections](#) of CO₂ emissions based on trends of GDP growth and emissions intensity reduction, a 1.5°C (Low Energy Demand) pathway, 1950 as the start year for responsibility, a gradual inclusion of income to compute *capacity* (which adds complexity to the calculation) from a full exemption of the bottom 70% (\$7,500 per year) linearly to a full inclusion of the top 2% (\$72,211), the inclusion of non-CO₂ gases but not of emissions embodied in trade (i.e. imported emissions) nor LULUCF (land-use).

⁹Using the above parameters, moderate incomes means few incomes above the global 70th. percentile.

¹⁰The baseline trajectory is computed as the “product of the projected GDP and CO₂ emission intensity”.

1226 world average emissions right per capita. In this framework, if the DRC were to grow
 1227 faster than projected in the baseline, it would actually have to pay to the rest of the world
 1228 for mitigation efforts. This is what is likely to happen to countries like Mexico or Senegal,
 1229 from our simulation of the net gains of CERF compared to a situation without interna-
 1230 tional transfers (see Figure S9). In contrast, a resource sharing approach based on equal
 1231 per capita emissions would result in low-income countries receiving emissions rights ex-
 1232 ceeding their projected trajectories, leading to transfers from high-income countries. By
 1233 construction, such transfers do not occur in an effort sharing approach like the CERF,
 1234 implying lower transfers to low-income countries. Compared to an equal right to emit
 1235 per capita, this method favors countries like China (whose emissions are allowed to re-
 1236 main stable over 2020-2030 instead of a reduction of 35-40%) and penalizes regions like
 1237 Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (see Figure S10).


Figure S9: Net gains from the CERF burden-sharing rule in 2030.



Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO₂.

1238 **Contraction and Convergence.** Meyer (2004) defines a rule called *contraction and con-*
 1239 *vergence* (C&C), which combines elements of grandfathering and equal per capita ap-
 1240 proaches. According to C&C, each country is granted (tradable) emissions rights, starting

Figure S10: Difference between net gains from Greenhouse Development Rights and equal rights per capita.



Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO₂.

at their current emission level and converging linearly to an equal per capita level at some pre-specified date. The *contraction* part refers to the reduction of total emissions rights in line with the climate objective. When discussed around year 2000, the convergence date was specified between 2020 and 2050. This rule, advocated by the Global Commons Institute (a UK think tank), was on the agenda from COP2 to COP15 (i.e., until Copenhagen, and including in Kyoto), including at Kyoto, and was endorsed by the European Parliament in 1998. More recently, [Gignac & Matthews \(2015\)](#) have shown how C&C can be made consistent with historical responsibilities by computing carbon debts and credits until the convergence date.

Assessments of the NDCs against burden-sharing principles. The regime established by the 2015 Paris agreement to regulate climate change respects none of the burden-sharing principles and relies instead on voluntary contributions from each country, known as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). A body of literature (reviewed by [Höhne et al. 2014](#)) assesses the NDCs against the emissions reduction objective and different

burden-sharing principles. To evaluate the NDCs, Gao et al. (2019) examine their emissions projections for 2030 and estimate the resulting increase in temperature. The most recent and comprehensive assessment of NDCs against burden-sharing principles is conducted by van den Berg et al. (2020) (see also Raupach et al. 2014; Robiou du Pont et al. 2016; Robiou du Pont et al. 2017).

A.2.3 Global redistribution

Lack of cooperation vs. lack of redistribution. Major social science scholarship from Realism in International Relations to game theory of international environmental agreements in economics has pointed to lack of cooperation as the major obstacle to global sustainability (Waltz 1979; Snidal 1991; Barrett 1994; Nordhaus 2015). Another body of literature on international climate cooperation emphasises redistribution from North to South as a key condition for making global climate policy work, noting the historical responsibility of major emitters in the Global North (Parks & Roberts 2008; Friman & Strandberg 2014; Bou-Habib 2019; Aklin & Mildenberger 2020). Taking the second perspective, making progress on international climate policy also requires a decision on how the burden of climate change mitigation can be shared fairly. This raises the question of whether citizens around the world support such global redistribution policies or, more specifically, whether citizens in high-income countries are willing to make sacrifices to combat climate change and extreme poverty.

While we cannot test conditional cooperation as part of the present analysis, our empirical results document that if the North-South redistribution would be implemented as part of global climate policies, they would receive strong public support.

Studies on global redistribution Addressing global poverty, inequalities, and climate change are central to the universally agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). As highlighted by Bolch et al. (2022) and Fabre (2024), low-income countries often lack sufficient domestic resources to eradicate poverty in the short term, indicating the need for international transfers to rapidly end global poverty. In *Beyond the Welfare State*, Gunnar Myrdal (1960) called for a *welfare world*. In his Nobel lecture, he emphasized the necessity of increasing foreign aid to low-income countries, stating that “The type of marginal foreign aid we have provided, is clearly not enough to meet their barest needs” (Myrdal 1975).

Drawing on the labor theory of value, some economists have argued that global in-

1287 equalities arise from unequal exchange in international trade (Arghiri 1972). Indeed, the
1288 stark disparity in wages between countries implies that one unit of labor exported by an
1289 American commands five units of labor embodied in imported goods, whereas Ethiopi-
1290 ans need to export 50 units of labor to obtain one unit through imports (Alsamawi et al.
1291 2014; Reyes et al. 2017). Taking stock, Hickel (2017) proposes to globally establish mini-
1292 mum wages at 50% of the local median wage. Hickel (2017) also suggests other solutions
1293 against global inequality, which served as inspiration for our questionnaire. These mea-
1294 sures include the cancellation of low-income countries' public debt, fair trade practices
1295 (such as eliminating tariffs from high-income countries, reducing patent protections, and
1296 reducing farming subsidies in rich countries), initiatives to combat tax evasion (e.g., im-
1297 plementing a global financial register), land reform, and a fair international climate policy.

1298 Piketty (2014) prominently advocates for a progressive wealth tax on a global scale,
1299 and Piketty (2022) suggests to allocate its revenues to countries in proportion to their
1300 population.

1301 Kopczuk et al. (2005) compute the optimal linear income tax rates for all countries in
1302 two ways: globally centralized and decentralized (i.e., within each country and without
1303 international transfers). They show that the average decentralized rate is 41%. In con-
1304 trast, the global rate is 62%, which would generate funds to finance a basic income of
1305 250\$/month (higher than the GPD per capita of 73 countries). From a current global Gini
1306 index of 0.695, they show that decentralized optimal taxation would only marginally re-
1307 duce global inequality to 0.69, whereas global taxation would significantly decrease the
1308 Gini to 0.25. The study also shows that the existing level of foreign aid can only be ratio-
1309 nalized if the U.S. attaches 2,000 less value to a citizen in the poorest countries than to an
1310 American citizen (or 1,000 less if half of the transfers are diverted due to corruption).

1311 A.2.4 Basic income

1312 Unconditional cash transfers (UCT) are increasingly seen as an effective way to end ex-
1313 treme poverty. A growing body of evidence from randomized control trials supports this
1314 notion: Gangopadhyay et al. (2015) find that UCT outperform a food subsidy; Haushofer
1315 & Shapiro (2016) find significant impacts on health, economic outcomes, and psycholog-
1316 ical well-being; Egger et al. (2022) find large positive spillovers on non-recipient people,
1317 and minimal inflation. Reviews of existing research further confirm the positive outcomes
1318 of UCT (Standing 2014; Bastagli et al. 2016).

1319 While the delivery of cash to remote areas and the prevention of fraud is challenging

1320 in regions without a proper civil register, the use of mobile phones as banking and bio-
1321 metric identification tools could provide viable solutions (Harnett 2017). Although many
1322 places still lack internet access, satellite internet technology shows promising progress,
1323 with some experts suggesting that it could soon become affordable and universally ac-
1324 cessible (Hanson 2016).

1325 **A.2.5 Global democracy**


1326 The idea of world federalism has a long-standing history, dating back at least to Kant
1327 (1795), who argued that a world federation was essential for achieving perpetual peace.
1328 International organizations were eventually created to foster peace, though the League
1329 of Nations and its successor, the United Nations, never succeeded in avoiding military
1330 conflicts. Many have argued that we need stronger and more democratic global institu-
1331 tions, competent to address global challenges such as extreme poverty, climate change,
1332 wars, pandemics, or financial stability. Before World War II, feminist and pacifist Maver-
1333 ick Lloyd & Schwimmer (1937) founded the *Campaign for World Government*, advocating
1334 for direct representation at the global scale. Einstein (1947) called for the subordination of
1335 the UN Security Council to the General Assembly and the direct election of UN delegates.
1336 Since 2007, there has been widespread support for a United Nations Parliamentary As-
1337 sembly (UNPA) from individuals and institutions in over 150 countries, including 1,800
1338 member of parliament, heads of state, as well the European Parliament, the Pan-African
1339 Parliament, and the Latin-American Parliament. The UNPA campaign calls for a gradual
1340 implementation of a democratic assembly, starting with a consultative assembly com-
1341 posed of members of national parliaments, allowing for the direct election of its members
1342 in voluntary countries, and progressing towards a world parliament with binding legisla-
1343 tive powers once all members are directly elected (Leinen & Bummel 2018). Besides the
1344 UNPA, various scholars have put forward different models of global democracy, ranging
1345 from deliberative spaces to a world federation (Archibugi et al. 2011). While the most
1346 radical proposals may still be on the horizon, an assembly of random citizens representa-
1347 tive of the world population has already been convened. It has produced a joint statement
1348 at the COP26 (Global Assembly 2022), and a similar *World Citizens' Assembly* should soon
1349 follow.

1350 B Raw results

1351 Country-specific raw results are also available as supplementary material files: [US](#),
 1352 [EU](#), [FR](#), [DE](#), [ES](#), [UK](#).

Figure S11: Absolute support for global climate policies.

Share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* (in percent, $n = 40,680$). The color blue denotes an absolute majority. See Figure 2 for the relative support. (Questions A-I of the global survey.)



*In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

Figure S12: Correct answers to comprehension questions (in percent). (Questions 16-18)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
With NR, typical [country] people win and richest lose	68	73	76	73	73	70
With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win	60	68	62	72	67	67
With GCS+NR, typical [country] people neither win nor lose	54	60	63	59	57	61

Figure S13: Number of correct answers to comprehension questions (mean). (Section 2.3, Questions 16-18)




Figure S14: List experiment: mean number of supported policies. (Section 2.4.1, Question 24)




Figure S15: Conjoint analyses 1 and 2. (Questions 25-27, Back to Section 2.4.3)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)	54	76	80	71	81	74
C+NR+GCS preferred to C+NR	55	74	79	71	78	68
NR+GCS preferred to NR	55	77	79	74	79	77
NR+C preferred to NR	62	84	88	83	84	82
GCS+NR preferred to C+NR	47	52	53	53	49	52
NR+C+GCS preferred to NR	55	77	86	73	83	72

Figure S16: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See English translations in Figure S2; Question 29)




Figure S17: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements seen as important for supporting the GCS in a 4-Likert scale (in percent). (Question 32) [\(Back to Section 2.4.5\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
It would succeed in limiting climate change	78	85	85	86	86	83
It would hurt the [Country] economy	81	67	61	67	66	69
It would penalize my household	75	60	55	63	59	63
It would make people change their lifestyle	78	79	83	79	78	77
It would reduce poverty in low-income countries	77	85	88	85	86	81
It might be detrimental to some poor countries	79	72	79	67	78	70
It could foster global cooperation	82	81	81	82	85	80
It could fuel corruption in low-income countries	79	75	82	69	79	72
It could be subject to fraud	80	79	80	74	83	81
It would be technically difficult to put in place	77	71	74	62	79	71
Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences	89	82	89	68	91	88

Figure S18: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements found in the open-ended field on the GCS (manually recoded, in percent).

"When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to your mind?

Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme." (Question 31) (Back to Section 2.4.5)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
environment	26	31	37	26	43	24
unclassifiable	25	24	23	28	25	22
pro	22	23	21	22	33	20
con	22	17	12	18	20	16
cost	17	12	11	14	17	7
poorest humans	11	7	6	9	5	6
tax redistribution	10	7	11	8	4	9
support	8	6	3	5	6	8
oppose	7	3	2	3	1	4
don't know	6	8	10	8	7	10
empty	6	3	0	0	0	13
difficult agreement	5	10	7	12	8	8
difficult implement	3	5	5	6	4	6
misunderstands gcs	3	2	2	1	3	1
misunderstands question	2	2	1	3	3	3

Figure S19: Perceptions of the GCS. Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).

"When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to your mind?

Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme." (Question 31) [\(Back to Section 2.4.5\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
world: international world country global	28	22	23	19	22	23
environment: climat environment animal emission natur	26	21	17	28	21	17
poorest: poor low-income 700 poverty	16	8	8	9	4	10
pro: pro pros pros pro:	16	3	0	1	9	5
con: con con: cons cons:	15	4	0	1	8	6
cost: cost expensive higher price 85 inflation	13	7	5	9	7	6
tax: tax	8	3	4	3	2	2
redistribution: rich redistribu	8	4	5	4	3	5
implementation: implement enforce polic monitor	6	4	5	6	0	5
agreement: agree accept participat	3	4	5	6	2	3

Figure S20: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality (mean). (Question 34) [\(Back to Section 2.6\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Donation to own country	35	34	31	38	34	32
Donation to Africa	32	35	33	41	32	33

Figure S21: Support for a global wealth tax.

"Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-income countries?

Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education." (Question 35)




Figure S22: Support for a national wealth tax.

"Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: affordable housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and schools]?" (Question 36)




Figure S23: Preferred share of global wealth tax revenues that should be pooled to finance low-income countries. (Question 37)




Figure S24: Support for sharing half of global tax revenues with low-income countries, rather than each country retaining all the revenues it collects (in percent). (Question 38)




Figure S25: Perceived foreign aid. “From your best guess, what percentage of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?” (Question 39) (Back to Section 2.5.2)

Actual values: France: 0.8%; Germany: 1.3%; Spain: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%; U.S.: 0.4%.




Figure S26: Preferred foreign aid (without info on actual amount).

"If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?" (Question 40) (Back to Section 2.5.2)




Figure S27: Preferred foreign aid (after info on actual amount).

"Actually, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid.

If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?" (Question 40) (Back to Section 2.5.2)




Figure S28: Actual, perceived and preferred amount of foreign aid, with random info (or not) on actual amount. (*Mean* in percent of public spending, Questions 39, 40) (Back to Section 2.5.2)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Actual foreign aid (in % of public spending)	0.4	1.1	0.8	1.3	0.5	1.7
Belief about foreign aid	4.7	2.9	2.7	2.9	2.8	3.5
Preferred foreign aid (with info)	1.8	2.7	3.4	2.9	2.1	2.5
Preferred foreign aid (no info)	4	3.9	4.7	4.4	3.1	3.4

Figure S29: Preferred foreign aid (after info or after perception). (Questions 39 and 40)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as current	70	75	91	76	77	57
Preferred foreign aid is higher than current	47	59	75	58	63	43
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as perceived	57	74	83	79	77	58
Preferred foreign aid is higher than perceived	37	53	64	59	54	39

Figure S30: Preferences for funding increased foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]
 "How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent) (Question 41) (Back to Section 2.5.2)




Figure S31: Preferences of spending following reduced foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]
 "How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent)
 (Question 42) [\(Back to Section 2.5.2\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Higher spending on defense	19	23	11	21	17	31
Higher spending on retirement pensions	23	41	22	51	57	35
Higher spending on healthcare	40	57	31	42	80	70
Higher spending on welfare benefits	13	20	7	19	39	20
Higher spending on education	30	45	31	47	58	43
Higher spending on other programs	6	6	6	4	9	8
Lower taxes on the wealthiest	5	2	5	2	0	2
Lower corporate income tax rate	12	6	10	4	8	6
Lower personal income tax rates	48	29	26	27	37	30
Lower public deficit	32	24	21	13	41	21

Figure S32: Willingness to sign real-stake petition for the Global Climate Scheme or National Redistribution, compared to stated support in corresponding subsamples (e.g. support for the GCS in the branch where the petition was about the GCS). (Question 43)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Petition for the GCS	51	69	69	66	78	69
(Comparable) support for the GCS	53	76	81	74	81	74
Petition for NR	57	67	65	66	74	68
(Comparable) support for NR	58	72	76	65	78	75

Figure S33: Absolute support for various global policies (Percent of (*somewhat or strong*) support). (Questions 44 and 45. See Figure 3 for the relative support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	41	54	52	53	62	51
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	53	65	62	66	68	62
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	45	58	55	60	62	54
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	31	37	36	30	45	40
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	34	44	44	43	52	43
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	39	49	39	51	50	54
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	42	55	54	54	61	53
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	44	70	73	70	72	65
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	34	45	40	48	44	50
National tax on millionaires funding public services	62	76	70	79	79	77
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	58	71	69	72	78	71

Figure S34: Preferred approach of diplomats at international climate negotiations. In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend [own country] interests or global justice? (Question 49)




Figure S35: Percent of selected issues viewed as important.
 “To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem?” (Question 56)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Income inequality in [Country]	55	59	54	58	71	57
Climate change	59	66	66	63	73	63
Global poverty	50	57	50	58	75	49

Figure S36: Group defended when voting.
 “What group do you defend when you vote?” (Question 57)




Figure S37: Mean prioritization of policies.

Mean number of points allocated policies to express intensity of support (among six policies chosen at random). Blue color means that the policy has been awarded more points than the average policy.

"In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

How do you allocate the points among the following policies?" (Question 58)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	13	21	10	14	35	31
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	23	22	25	21	22	23
econ3	21	15	13	18	17	13
econ4	28	22	27	17	24	20
soc1	10	17	13	17	12	21
soc2	13	9	14	8	10	8
climate1	14	15	11	18	20	12
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	20	18	22	19	15	17
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030	11	9	8	8	9	11
tax1: National redistribution scheme	14	15	16	15	15	15
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	19	19	21	18	17	19
foreign1: Global climate scheme	15	20	20	23	16	17
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	21	20	20	23	19	20
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	15	15	15	17	14	13
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	9	11	13	14	9	8

Figure S38: Positive prioritization of policies.

Percent of people allocating a positive number of points to policies, expressing their support (among six policies chosen at random).

"In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

How do you allocate the points among the following policies?" (Question 58)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	64	78	61	67	96	95
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	83	86	85	84	87	89
econ3	81	69	50	78	80	68
econ4	88	86	91	79	89	85
soc1	57	75	69	74	74	78
soc2	58	58	72	53	64	48
climate1	70	76	65	79	89	75
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	79	83	86	84	78	80
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030	62	58	56	48	60	70
tax1: National redistribution scheme	67	79	79	76	82	79
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	80	79	76	78	83	85
foreign1: Global climate scheme	71	83	84	85	84	78
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	80	81	79	83	82	82
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	71	77	79	74	83	76
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	58	70	79	74	74	57

Figure S39: Charity donation.

"How much did you give to charities in 2022?" (Question 50)




Figure S40: Interest in politics.

"To what extent are you interested in politics?" (Question 51)




Figure S41: Desired involvement of government (from 1 to 5). (Question 52)




Figure S42: Political leaning on economics (from 1: Left to 5: Right). (Question 53)




Figure S43: Voted in last election. (Question 54)




Figure S44: Vote in last election (aggregated). PNR includes people who did not vote or prefer not to answer. (Question 55)




Figure S45: Perception that survey was biased.
“Do you feel that this survey was politically biased?” (Question 61)





Figure S46: Opinion on the fight against extreme poverty.

“According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme poverty in low-income countries?” (Question 62) [\(Back to Section 2.5.2\)](#)

(a) Elements found in the open-ended field on the question
(manually recoded, in percent)



(b) Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).




Figure S47: Main attitudes by vote (“Right” spans from Center-right to Far right).
 (Relative support in percent in Questions 20, 35, 45, 46, 49) (Back to Section 2.6)

	Europe Left	Europe PNR/Non-voter	Europe Right	U.S. Left	U.S. PNR/Non-voter	U.S. Right
Support for the GCS	85	72	71	74	53	26
Global tax on millionaires	94	83	76	85	71	40
Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries	61	52	45	55	67	41
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	73	65	52	62	49	23
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	93	79	74	87	70	38
[Country]'s foreign aid should be increased	93	83	72	92	81	48
Universalist	56	48	26	53	49	23

1353 C Questionnaire of the global survey (section on global
1354 policies)

1355 A. At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be
1356 put in place? (Multiple answers are possible) [Figures 2 and S11]
1357 Global; [Federal / European / ...]; [State / National]; Local

1358 B. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “[country] should take mea-
1359 sures to fight climate change.”

1360 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly
1361 agree*

1362 C. How should [country] climate policies depend on what other countries do?

- 1363 • If other countries do more, [country] should do...
1364 • If other countries do less, [country] should do...

1365 *Much less; Less; About the same; More; Much more*

1366 D. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] All countries have signed the
1367 Paris agreement that aims to contain global warming “well below +2 °C’. To limit
1368 global warming to this level, there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we
1369 can emit globally, called the carbon budget. Each country could aim to emit less
1370 than a share of the carbon budget. To respect the global carbon budget, countries
1371 that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less
1372 than their share.

1373 Do you support such a policy? [Figures 2 and S11]

1374 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1375 support*

1376 E. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] Suppose the above policy is in
1377 place. How should the carbon budget be divided among countries? [Figures 2 and
1378 S11]

1379 *The emission share of a country should be proportional to its population, so that each human
1380 has an equal right to emit.; The emission share of a country should be proportional to its
1381 current emissions, so that those who already emit more have more rights to emit.; Countries
1382 that have emitted more over the past decades (from 1990 onwards) should receive a lower*

1383 *emission share, because they have already used some of their fair share.; Countries that will*
1384 *be hurt more by climate change should receive a higher emission share, to compensate them*
1385 *for the damages.*

1386 F. [In the U.S., Denmark, and France only] To achieve a given reduction of greenhouse
1387 gas emissions globally, costly investments are needed. Ideally, how should countries
1388 bear the costs of fighting climate change?

- 1389 • Countries should pay in proportion to their income
- 1390 • Countries should pay in proportion to their current emissions [Used as a sub-
1391 stitute to the equal right per capita in Figure 2]
- 1392 • Countries should pay in proportion to their past emissions (from 1990 on-
1393 wards) [Used as a substitute to historical responsibilities in Figure 2]
- 1394 • The richest countries should pay it all, so that the poorest countries do not have
1395 to pay anything
- 1396 • The richest countries should pay even more, to help vulnerable countries face
1397 adverse consequences: vulnerable countries would then receive money instead
1398 of paying [Used as a substitute to compensating vulnerable countries in Figures
1399 2 and S11]

1400 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly*
1401 *agree*

1402 G. Do you support or oppose establishing a global democratic assembly whose role
1403 would be to draft international treaties against climate change? Each adult across
1404 the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly. [Figures 2 and S11]
1405 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1406 *support*

1407 H. Imagine the following policy: a global tax on greenhouse gas emissions funding a
1408 global basic income. Such a policy would progressively raise the price of fossil fuels
1409 (for example, the price of gasoline would increase by [40 cents per gallon] in the
1410 first years). Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil
1411 fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Revenues from the tax would be used to
1412 finance a basic income of [\$30] per month to each human adult, thereby lifting the
1413 700 million people who earn less than \$2/day out of extreme poverty. The average

1414 [American] person would lose a bit from this policy as they would face [\$130] per
1415 month in price increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive.

1416 Do you support or oppose such a policy? [Figures 2 and S11]

1417 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1418 *support*


- 1419 I. Do you support or oppose a tax on all millionaires around the world to finance low-
1420 income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate ac-
1421 tion? This would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drink-
1422 ing water, healthcare, and education. [Figures 2 and S11]
1423 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1424 *support*

1425 **D Questionnaire of the complementary surveys**

1426 Below, we provide the generic questionnaire (based on the U.S. version), which roughly
1427 corresponds to the *Eu* questionnaire as well as the combination of the *US1* and *US2* ques-
1428 tionnaire. The main difference between Europe and the U.S. is that we split the *US2*
1429 sample into four random branches to include some treatments before the Section D on
1430 the GCS. Besides the control group, the treatments are: information regarding the sup-
1431 port of Americans for the GCS and NR, an open-ended field, and a closed question on the
1432 pros and cons of the GCS. The pros and cons of the GCS are also asked in *Eu* (likewise,
1433 either as an open-ended field or a question), but only in Section D, after the support.

1434 At each section or question, square brackets specify in which questionnaires it is present
1435 (*US1*, *US2* and/or *Eu*) as well as country specificities. Figure S48 displays the structure of
1436 each questionnaire. Each treatment randomization is independent. Qualtrics and Word
1437 versions of the questionnaires in each language are available on our [public repository](#),
1438 together with a spreadsheet that summarizes country specificities and our sources.

Figure S48: Main surveys' structure. Cf. Figure 1 for a simplified version.



1439 [Eu, US1, US2] Socio-demographic characteristics

1440 1. Welcome to this survey!

1441
1442 This survey is **anonymous** and is conducted for research purposes on a representa-
1443 tive sample of [1,000 British people].

1444
1445 It takes [US1, US2: 10 to 15 min; Eu: around 20 min] to complete.

1446
1447 The survey contains lotteries and awards for those who get the correct answer to
1448 some understanding questions.

1449 If you are attentive and lucky, you can win up to [US1, Eu: \$350; US2: \$150] in
1450 points. (See terms and conditions).

1451 Please answer every question carefully.

1452
1453 Do you agree to participate in the survey?

1454 Yes; No

1455 2. What is your gender?

1456 Woman; Man; Other

1457 3. How old are you?

1458 Below 18; 18 to 20; 21 to 24; 25 to 29; 30 to 34; 35 to 39; 40 to 44; 45 to 49; 50 to 54; 55 to
1459 59; 60 to 64; 65 to 69; 70 to 74; 75 to 79; 80 to 84; 85 to 89; 90 to 99; 100 or above

1460 4. [Eu] In which country do you live?

1461 France; Germany; Spain; United Kingdom; Other

1462 5. What is your ZIP code? [UK: What is your Outcode (the left part of your postcode,
1463 e.g. if your postcode is N7 8H7, just enter N7)?]

1464 6. Do you live with your partner (if you have one)?

1465 Yes; No

1466 7. How many people are in your household? The household includes: you, the mem-
1467 bers of your family who live with you, and your dependants.

1468 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more

1469 8. [Eu] How many children below 14 live with you?

1470 1; 2; 3; 4 or more

1471 9. [US1, US2] What race or ethnicity do you identify with? (Multiple answers are
1472 possible)

1473 White; Black or African American; Hispanic; Asian; American Indian or Alaskan Native;
1474 Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; Other: {open field}; Prefer not to say

1475 10. What is the [US1, US2: annual; Eu: monthly] gross income of your household (before
1476 withholding tax)? This includes all income: wages, self-employment earnings, So-
1477 cial Security benefits, pensions, investment income, welfare payments, and income
1478 from other sources.

1479 [US1, US2: Items based on household total income deciles and quartiles, namely:
1480 Less than \$20,000; between \$20,001 and \$35,000; between \$35,001 and \$42,000; between
1481 \$42,001 and \$50,000; between \$50,001 and \$65,000; between \$65,001 and \$82,000; between
1482 \$82,001 and \$103,000; between \$103,001 and \$130,000; between \$130,001 and \$145,000;
1483 between \$145,001 and \$165,000; between \$165,001 and \$250,000; More than \$250,000; I
1484 prefer not to answer;

1485 Eu: custom thresholds, taking into account household composition Questions 6-8,
1486 and corresponding to the country's deciles and quartiles of standard of living, cf.
1487 the sheet "Income" in [this spreadsheet](#)]

1488 11. What is the highest level of education you have completed?

1489 [Below upper secondary, Upper secondary, and Post secondary are coded as the first two,
1490 middle three, and last three items, respectively.

1491 US1, US2: Primary school or less; Eighth grade; Some high school; Regular high school
1492 diploma/GED or alternative credential; Some college, no degree; 2-year college degree or as-
1493 sociates degree (for example: AA, AS); Bachelor's degree (for example: BA, BS); Master's
1494 degree or above (MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA, MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD, PhD);
1495 FR: École primaire / Aucun; Brevet; CAP ou BEP; Baccalauréat professionnel ou tech-
1496 nologique; Baccalauréat général; Bac +2 (BTS, DUT, DEUG...); Bac +3 (licence...); Bac
1497 +5 ou plus (master, école d'ingénieur ou de commerce, doctorat, médecine, maîtrise, DEA,
1498 DESS...)

1499 DE: Keine abgeschlossene Schulbildung / Grundschule; Untere Sekundarstufe (z.B. Haupt-
1500 oder Realschulabschluss); Erstausbildung; Beruflicher Abschluss / Ausbildung; Abitur;
1501 Zweitausbildung; Bachelor oder Fachhochschulabschluss; Master-Abschluss oder höher

1502 ES: *Educación primaria / No he completado la enseñanza básica; Educación secundaria obligatoria (ESO); Formación profesional básica (FP); Formación profesional de grado medio; Bachillerato; Formación profesional de grado superior; Grado universitario; Máster/doctorado*
1503 UK: *Primary education or less; Some secondary school; GSCE; Vocational Upper secondary (Level 3 award, level 3 certificate, level 3 diploma, advanced apprenticeship, etc.); High school degree (A level); Higher vocational education (Level 4+ award, level 4+ certificate, level 4+ diploma, higher apprenticeship, etc.); Bachelor's Degree (BA, BSc, BEng, etc.); Postgraduate diploma or certificate, Master's Degree (MSc, MA, MBA, etc.) or Ph.D.]*

1510 12. What is your employment status?

1511 *Full-time employed; Part-time employed; Self-employed; Student; Retired; Unemployed*
1512 *(searching for a job); Inactive (not searching for a job)*

1513 13. Are you a homeowner or a tenant? (Multiple answers are possible)

1514 *Tenant; Owner; Landlord renting out property; Hosted free of charge*

1515 14. [If lives with partner: What is the estimated value of your household's assets (in
1516 U.S. dollars)?

1517 If does not live with partner: What is the estimated value of your assets (in U.S.
1518 dollars)?]

1519 Include here all your possessions (home, car, savings, etc.) net of debt. For example,
1520 if you own a house worth [\$]300,000 and you have [\$]100,000 left to repay on your
1521 mortgage, your assets are [\$]200,000.

1522 I estimate my [If lives with partner: household's] assets net of debt to be:

1523 [Items based on the following individual wealth quintiles, doubled if lives with
1524 partner. US1, US2: *Less than \$0 (I have a net debt); Close to \$0; Between \$4,000 and*
1525 *\$60,000; Between \$60,000 and \$190,000; More than \$190,000;* For Eu, the thresholds are:
1526 FR: €5/50/150/300k; DE: €0/35/130/280k; ES: €0/50/100/200k; UK: £3/45/115/270k]

1527 15. [US1, US2 (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the vote question)] What
1528 do you consider to be your political affiliation, as of today?

1529 *Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other; Non-Affiliated*

1532 [Eu, US1, US2] Global climate scheme

1533 In the following, we describe two policies, on which we will survey your opinion.
1534 To check that you have attentively read the descriptions, **we will ask some under-**
1535 **standing questions afterwards: those who get correct answers can win up to \$150.**

1536 **Global climate scheme:** At the Paris agreement in 2015, all countries have agreed
1537 to contain global warming “well below +2 °C”. To limit global warming to this
1538 level, **there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally.**

1539 To meet the climate target, a limited number of permits to emit greenhouse gases
1540 can be created globally. Polluting firms would be required to buy permits to cover
1541 their emissions. Such a policy would **make fossil fuel companies pay** for their
1542 emissions and progressively raise the price of fossil fuels. **Higher prices would en-**
1543 **courage people and companies to use less fossil fuels, reducing greenhouse gas**
1544 **emissions.**

1545 In accordance with the principle that each human has an equal right to pollute, the
1546 revenues generated by the sale of permits could finance a global basic income. **Each**
1547 **adult in the world would receive [US1, US2: \$30/month; UK: \$30 (that is £25) per**
1548 **month; FR, DE, ES: €30/month], thereby lifting out of extreme poverty the 700 mil-**
1549 **lion people who earn less than \$2/day.**

1550 **The typical [American] would lose out financially [US1, US2: \$85, FR: €10, DE:**
1551 **€25, ES: €5, UK: £20] per month** (as he or she would face [\$115] per month in price
1552 increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive).

1553 The policy could be put in place as soon as countries totaling more than 60% of
1554 global emissions agree on it. Countries that would refuse to take part in the policy
1555 could face sanctions (like tariffs) from the rest of the World and would be excluded
1556 from the basic income.

(Back to Section 2.2)

1557 16. Who would win or lose financially in the Global climate scheme? [Figure S12]

1558
1559 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1560 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

1561 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.;*

1562 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

1563 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would lose and*

1565 *the 700 million poorest humans would win* from the Global climate scheme. Now, here
1566 is the second policy:

1567

1568 **National redistribution scheme:**

1569 This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [US1, US2: 5%; Eu: 1%]¹¹ and provide
1570 cash transfers to all adults. More precisely, **each [American] adult would receive**
1571 **[\$85] per month** (that is [\$1,000] per year). This would be financed by an increase
1572 of the federal income tax on household income in excess of [US1, US2: \$315,000 per
1573 year; FR: €15,000 per month; DE: €20,000 per month; ES: €10,000 per month; UK:
1574 £15,000 per month], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000]. [US1,
1575 US2: See more details.]¹²

1576 17. Who would win or lose financially in the National redistribution? [Figure S12]

1577

1578 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1579 Typical [Americans] would win and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Ameri-
1580 cans] would win and the richest [Americans] would lose.; Typical [Americans] would lose
1581 and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Americans] would lose and the richest
1582 [Americans] would lose.

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would win and
1584 the richest [Americans] would lose* from the National redistribution scheme.

1585

1586 To help you with the next question, here is a reminder of the policies:

1587

1588 **Global Climate scheme:**

1589 To limit global warming and reach the international climate objective, the Global
1590 climate scheme would **impose a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can**

¹¹The wider base in the U.S. was chosen because emissions are larger in the U.S. than in Europe, and it would hardly be feasible to offset the median American's loss from the GCS by taxing only the top 1%.

¹²8% of U.S. respondents click. They then see the following text, based on taxjusticenow.org by Saez & Zucman (2019): *The marginal income tax rates would evolve as follows:*

Below \$315,000: unchanged

\$315,000 - \$400,000: current rate 32% => new rate 41%

\$400,000 - \$600,000: 35% => 50%

\$600,000 - \$2.5 million: 37% => 60%

\$2.5 - \$5 million: 37% => 65%

Above \$5 million: 37% => 70%

1591 **emit globally.**

1592 It would **make polluters pay** for their emissions, which in turn would increase fos-
1593 sil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities.

1594 The revenues would finance a **global basic income** of [\$30] per month for all hu-
1595 mans, lifting out of extreme poverty the poorest billion people.

1596 Considering the basic income and the fuel price increases, **the typical [American]**
1597 **would lose out financially [\$85] per month.**

1598
1599 **National redistribution scheme:**

1600 This policy would **increase taxes on the top [5%]** and provide cash transfers to
1601 all adults. More precisely, **each [American] would receive [\$85] per month.** This
1602 would be financed by an increase of the federal income tax on household income in
1603 excess of [\$315,000 per year], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000
1604 per year].

- 1605 18. If both the Global climate scheme and the National redistribution scheme are imple-
1606 mented, how would a typical [American] be financially affected? [*Figure S12*]
1607 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.
1608 *A typical [American] would lose out financially.; A typical [American] would neither gain
1609 nor lose.; A typical [American] would gain financially.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was that *A typical [American] would nei-
1611 ther gain nor lose* from both schemes combined. [*US1, Eu:* Now, here are the last two
1612 policies:]

1613
1614 **[US1: Coal exit:**

1615 To reduce CO₂ emissions, this policy would require all U.S. coal power plants to be
1616 phased out by 2030. Coal would be replaced by renewable sources like wind and
1617 solar panels as well as stronger reliance on gas power plants.

1618 **Eu: Thermal insulation plan:**

1619 To reduce CO₂ emissions and energy insecurity, this policy would require that all
1620 buildings meet energy efficiency targets: at least rating E in 2030 and rating C in
1621 2040. The [UK] government would subsidise half the cost of insulation for all house-
1622 holds, and up to 90% for the poorest households. Insulation work would cost [FR,
1623 DE: €25; ES: €20; UK: £25] billion a year, but would deliver energy savings greater

1624 than this cost.]

1625

1626 **[US1: Marriage only for opposite-sex couples:**

1627 This policy is a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would legally
1628 define marriage as a union of one man and one woman.

1629 ***Eu: Death penalty for major crimes:***

1630 This measure would reintroduce capital punishment for major crimes such as ter-
1631 rrorism and mass shootings.]

1632

1633 Now, we will ask your opinion on the [US1, Eu: four] policies.

1634 [Click here for the reminder of the \[US1, Eu: first\] two policies.](#) [Clicking displays the
1635 previous summarized descriptions.]

- 1636 19. [US2] [4 Random branches: control (*nothing*); Question 31 (*field*); Question 32 (*impor-*
1637 *tant*); or the following question (*info*).] For information, a recent survey has shown
1638 that:

- 1639 • 64% of Americans support the Global climate scheme.
1640 • 72% of Americans support the National redistribution scheme.

- 1641 20. Do you support the Global climate scheme? [*Figure S1*]

1642 Yes; No

- 1643 21. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the
1644 previous question? [*Figure S4*]

1645 The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

1646 *Percentage of [Americans] in favor of Global climate scheme* [slider from 0 to 100]

- 1647 22. Do you support the National redistribution scheme? [*Figure S1*]

1648 Yes; No

- 1649 23. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the
1650 previous question? [*Figure S4*]

1651 The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

1652 *Percentage of [Americans] in favor of National redistribution* [slider from 0 to 100]

- 1653 24. [Eu, US1] Beware, this question is quite unusual. Among the policies below, **how**
1654 **many** do you support? [*Figure S14, Table 1*]

1655 [Four random branches. Branch GCS/NR/C/O]

- 1656
- 1657 • Global climate scheme
- 1658 • National redistribution scheme
- 1659 • [Coal exit]
- 1660 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

1661 0; 1; 2; 3; 4

1662

1663 [Branch GCS/C/O]

1664

- 1665 • Global climate scheme
- 1666 • [Coal exit]
- 1667 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

1668 0; 1; 2; 3

1669

1670 [Branch NR/C/O]

1671

- 1672 • National redistribution scheme
- 1673 • [Coal exit]
- 1674 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

1675 0; 1; 2; 3

1676 [Branch C/O]

1677

- 1678 • [Coal exit]
- 1679 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

1680 0; 1; 2

1681

1682 [Eu, US1] Conjoint analyses

- 1683 25. Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you prefer? [Figure
1684 S15]

1685 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the
1686 same time.

Bundle A	Bundle B
[Coal exit]	[Coal exit]
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme
Global climate scheme	

1688 1689 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 1690 26. Do you support Bundle A (combining [Coal exit], the National redistribution scheme,
1691 and the Global climate scheme)?[Figure S1]

1692 Yes; No

- 1693 27. [new page] Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you
1694 prefer? [Figure S15]

1695 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the
1696 same time.

1697 [Four random branches. Branch C + NR vs. GCS + NR]

Bundle A	Bundle B
[Coal exit]	Global climate scheme
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme

1700 [Branch NR vs. NR + C + GCS]

Bundle A	Bundle B
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme [Coal exit] Global climate scheme

1702 1703 [Branch NR + GCS vs. NR]

	Bundle A	Bundle B
1704	National redistribution scheme Global climate scheme	National redistribution scheme
1705		

1706 [Branch NR + C vs. NR]

	Bundle A	Bundle B
1707	National redistribution scheme [Coal exit]	National redistribution scheme
1708		

1709 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 1710 28. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and
 1711 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies
 1712 in their platforms.
 1713 *Eu: Imagine if [DE, ES, UK: the two favorite candidates in your constituency in the
 1714 next general election; FR: the two candidates in the second round of the next pres-
 1715 idential election] campaigned with the following policies in their party's platforms.]*

1716
 1717 Which of these candidates would you vote for? [Table 2, Figure S15]

1718 [Table 2. Two random branches: with and without the final row. The US1 version of the poli-
 1719 cies is given below, see the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the European versions.]

	Democrat	Republican
	Increase corporate income tax rate from 21% to 28%	Decrease the payroll tax
	Coal exit	Permit completion of the Keystone pipeline
1720	Trillion dollar investment in childcare, healthcare, education and housing	Withdrawal of the Paris agreement
	\$15 minimum wage	Marriage only for opposite-sex couples
	National redistribution scheme	Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation
	[Global climate scheme / no row]	[/ no row]

1721

1722 [US1: Democrat; Republican; None of them; Eu: Candidate A; Candidate B; None of them]

- 1723 29. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and
1724 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies
1725 in their platforms.

1726 *Eu (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the Section "Values and politics"):* Imag-
1727 ine that [FR: the left or center-left; DE: a red-red-green coalition; ES: the PSOE; UK:
1728 the Labour Party] wins the next [general] elections. Here are two possible platforms
1729 on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a
1730 pool of credible [FR: left or center-left, DE: left-wing parties'; ES: PSOE; UK: Labour]
1731 policies).]

1732

1733 [US1: Which of these candidates do you prefer?

1734 *Eu: Even if you [FR: are not from the left or center-left; DE: do not support the left-*
1735 *wing parties; ES: do not support the PSOE; UK: do not support the Labour Party],*
1736 *which of these platforms do you prefer?]*

1737 [Figures S2, S16; see also the sheet "Policies" in *this spreadsheet* for the possible policies.]

	[Candidate A]	[Candidate B]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
1738	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]

1739 [US1: Candidate A; Candidate B; Eu: Platform A; Platform B]

- 1740 30. [new page] [Same wording and conditions as above. For brevity, only the UK version is
1741 given here.] Imagine that the Labour Party wins the next general elections. Here are
1742 two possible platforms on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are
1743 randomly drawn from a pool of credible Labour policies).

1744

1745 Even if you do not support the Labour Party, which of these platforms do you pre-
1746 fer? [Figure S2]

		Platform A	Platform B
1747	[Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order]	[Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy]	[Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy]
	Foreign policy	Global climate scheme	-
1748	<i>Platform A; Platform B</i>		

1749 **[Eu, US2] Perceptions of the GCS**

1750 [Eu: two random branches. US2: four random branches and the question is asked (if asked)
1751 before Question 20]

1752 31. [Branch: field] When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to
1753 your mind?

1754 Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme. [Figures S18, S19]
1755 {Open field}

1756 32. [Branch: important] When determining your support or opposition to the Global
1757 climate scheme, which points are important to you? [Figure S17]

- 1758 • It would succeed in limiting climate change.
- 1759 • It would hurt the [U.S.] economy.
- 1760 • It would penalize my household.
- 1761 • It would make people change their lifestyle.
- 1762 • It would reduce poverty in low-income countries.
- 1763 • It might be detrimental to some poor countries.
- 1764 • It could foster global cooperation.
- 1765 • It could fuel corruption in low-income countries.
- 1766 • It could be subject to fraud.
- 1767 • It would be technically difficult to put in place.
- 1768 • Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences.

1769 *Not at all important; Not so important; Quite important; Very important*

1770 [Eu, US1] Donation lottery

1771 33. Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).

1772 *Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*

1773 34. [Two random branches] By taking this survey, you are automatically entered into a
1774 lottery to win [\$]100 in panel points. This lottery is unrelated to the previous ones
1775 that rewarded answers’ accuracy. In a few days you will know whether you have
1776 been selected in the lottery. The payment will be made to you in the same way as
1777 your compensation for this survey, so no further action is required on your part.

1778

1779 Should you be selected in the lottery, you can also donate a part of this additional
1780 compensation to [[American] / African] people living in poverty through [US1: the
1781 charity GiveDirectly. The charity GiveDirectly; Eu: a charity. We would channel this
1782 donation to a charity that] provides small amounts of cash to people in need in [[the
1783 U.S] / Africa].

1784

1785 **In case you are winner of the lottery, what share of the [\$]100 would you donate**
1786 **to [[American] / African] people living in poverty [US1: through GiveDirectly]?**
1787 *[Figure S20, Table S2]*

1788 *Amount donated to [[American] / African] people in need (in [\$]) [slider from 0 to 100]*

1789 [Eu, US2] Wealth tax

1790 [Four random branches: Question 35 then Question 36 (global first); Question 36 then Ques-
1791 tion 35 (national first); Question 37 (global share); Question 38 (sharing)]

1792 35. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-
1793 income countries?

1794 Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking
1795 water, healthcare, and education. *[Figures S1, S21]*

1796 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1797 *support*

1798 36. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: afford-
1799 able housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and
1800 schools]? *[Figures S1, S22]*

1801 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1802 *support*

1803 37. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all
1804 countries around the world. In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount
1805 to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE: €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2:
1806 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount
1807 to [\$]1 billion in all low-income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700
1808 million people, most of them in Africa).

1809 Each country would retain part of the revenues it collects, and the remaining part
1810 would be pooled at the global level to finance infrastructure and public services in
1811 low-income countries.

1812 What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of re-
1813 tained in the country's national budget)? [Figures S5, S23]

1814 *Percent of global wealth tax that should go to low-income countries [slider from 0 to 100]*

1816 38. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in
1817 all countries around the world.

1818 In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE:
1819 €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2: 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES:
1820 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount to [\$]1 billion in all low-
1821 income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700 million people, most of
1822 them in Africa).

1823 Which of the following options would you prefer? [Figure S24]

- 1824 • The whole wealth tax financing national budgets in each country. For ex-
1825 ample, in [US2: the U.S., it could finance affordable housing and universal
1826 childcare/pre-K.; Eu-UK: the UK, it could finance the National Health Service
1827 and state-funded schools].
- 1828 • Half of the wealth tax financing national budgets in each country, half of it
1829 financing low-income countries. For example, it could finance [US2: universal
1830 childcare/pre-K in the U.S.; Eu-UK: state-funded schools in the UK] and access
1831 to drinking water, healthcare, and education in Africa.

1832 [Eu, US2] Foreign aid

1833 US2 Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).

1834 Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal

- 1835 39. From your best guess, what percentage of [U.S.] government spending is allocated
1836 to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?

1837

1838 For your information, government spending totals [US2: 38%; FR: 55%; DE: 45%; ES:
1839 42%; UK: 41%] of [U.S.] GDP, it includes [US2: federal, State; Eu: national] and local
1840 government spending, and apart from foreign aid, it covers the following items: de-
1841 fense, social security (retirement pensions), health [US2: (including Medicare and
1842 Medicaid)], welfare benefits [US2: (including food stamps and EITC)], education,
1843 roads, justice, other programs [US2: and federal agencies (including in energy, sci-
1844 ence...)]. [Figure S25]

1845 Less than 0.1%; 0.1% to 0.2%; 0.3% to 0.5%; 0.6% to 1.0%; 1.1% to 1.7%; 1.8% to 2.6%;
1846 2.7% to 4%; 4.1% to 6%; 6.1% to 9%; 9.1% to 13%; 13.1% to 25%; More than 25%

- 1847 40. [Two random branches: with or without information on actual amount] [Info: Actually,
1848 [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [the U.S.] government spend-
1849 ing is allocated to foreign aid.]

1850

1851 If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate
1852 to foreign aid? [Figures S28, S29, S26 and S27]

- 1853 41. [Asked iff branch: Info and preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than actual for-
1854 eign aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to increase [U.S.] foreign
1855 aid.

1856

1857 How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers
1858 possible) [Figure S30]

1859 Lower spending on defense; Lower spending on retirement pensions; Lower spending on
1860 healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Lower spending on welfare benefits [US2: (like
1861 EITC or food stamps)]; Lower spending on education; Lower spending on other programs
1862 [US2: and federal agencies]; Higher taxes on the wealthiest; Higher corporate income tax
1863 rate; Higher personal income tax rates; Higher public deficit

1864 42. [Asked iff branch: *Info* and preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than actual foreign
1865 aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to reduce [U.S.] foreign aid.

1866

1867 How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible) [*Figure S31*]
1868

1869 *Higher spending on defense; Higher spending on retirement pensions; Higher spending on
1870 healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Higher spending on welfare benefits [US2:
1871 like EITC or food stamps)]; Higher spending on education; lower spending on other pro-
1872 grams [US2: and federal agencies]; Lower taxes on the wealthiest; Lower corporate income
1873 tax rate; Lower personal income tax rates; Lower public deficit*

1874 **[Eu, US1] Petition**

1875 43. [*Two random branches*] Would you be willing to sign a petition for the [Global cli-
1876 mate / National redistribution] scheme? [*Figure S32*]

1877

1878 As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President's
1879 office], informing him what share of American people are willing to endorse the
1880 [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign,
1881 only your answer here is required and remains anonymous.) Yes; No

1882 **[Eu, US1] Other policies**

1883 44. The following policies are discussed at international negotiations on how to deal
1884 with climate change. [*Figures 3 and S33*]

1885

1886 Do you support or oppose the following policies?

- 1887 • Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for
1888 climate damages
- 1889 • High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries
- 1890 • High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income
1891 countries adapt to climate change

1892 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1893 support*

1894 45. Do you support or oppose the following global policies? [Figures 3 and S33]

- 1895 • Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt
- 1896 • Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting
1897 right proportional to its population
- 1898 • Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries
- 1899 • A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage
- 1900 • Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of
1901 all assets
- 1902 • A maximum wealth limit of [US1: \$10 billion; Eu: [€]100 million] for each
1903 human

1904 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1905 support*

1906 46. Currently, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [U.S.] government
1907 spending (that is, [US1: 0.2%; FR: 0.4%; DE: 0.6%; ES: 0.2%; UK: 0.7%] of [U.S.] GDP)
1908 is spent on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries. [Figure S6]

1910 Do you support [the U.S.] transferring more money to low-income countries?

1911 *Yes, [U.S.] foreign aid should be increased.; Yes, but only if some conditions are met.; No,
1912 [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.; No, [U.S.] foreign aid should be reduced.*

1913 47. [Asked only if *Yes, but only if some conditions are met.* is chosen] What conditions
1914 should be required for [the U.S.] to increase its foreign aid? (Multiple answers pos-
1915 sible) [Figures S7, S28]

1916 *That recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights.; That recipient
1917 countries cooperate to fight illegal migrations.; That other high-income countries also in-
1918 crease their foreign aid.; That this is financed by increased taxes on millionaires.; That we
1919 can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted.; Other: [open field]*

1920 48. [Asked only if *No, [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.* or *No, [U.S.] foreign aid
1921 should be reduced.* is chosen] Why do you oppose [the U.S.] increasing its foreign
1922 aid? (Multiple answers possible) [Figure S8]

1923 *Aid perpetuates poverty as it makes people feel less responsible for themselves.; Aid is not
1924 effective as most of it is diverted.; Aid is a pressure tactic for high-income countries that*

1925 *prevents low-income countries from developing freely.; [The U.S.] is not responsible for what*
1926 *happens in other countries.; Charity begins at home: there is already a lot to do to support*
1927 *the American people in need.; Other: [open field]*

1928 **[Eu, US1, US2] Values and politics**

- 1929 49. [Eu (where it is instead asked at the beginning of Section “Other Policies”), US1]
1930 In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend
1931 [U.S.] interests or global justice? [*Figure S34*]
1932 *[U.S.] interests, even if it goes against global justice; [U.S.] interests, to the extent it re-*
1933 *spects global justice; Indifferent or don't know; Global justice, to the extent it respects [U.S.]*
1934 *interests; Global justice, even if it goes against [U.S.] interests*
- 1935 50. How much did you give to charities in 2022? [*Figure S39*]
1936 *I did not make donations to charities last year.; Less than [\$]100.; Between [\$]101 and*
1937 *[\$]500.; Between [\$]501 and [\$]1,000.; Between [\$]1,001 and [\$]5,000.; More than [\$]5,000.*
- 1938 51. To what extent are you interested in politics? [*Figure S40*]
1939 *Not at all; A little; Moderately; A lot; A great deal*
- 1940 52. Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means you think the
1941 government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic gov-
1942 ernment functions, and 5 means you think the government should take active steps
1943 in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens? [*Figure S41*]
1944 *Desired involvement of government [slider from 1 to 5]*
- 1945 53. **On economic policy matters**, where do you see yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where
1946 1 is Left (favoring equality and government interventions) and 5 is Right (favoring
1947 free competition and little government intervention)? [*Figure S42*]
1948 *Left (1) to Right (5) on economic issues [slider from 1 to 5]*
- 1949 54. Did you vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election? [*Figure S43*]
1950 *Yes; No: I didn't have the right to vote in the U.S.; Prefer not to say*
- 1951 55. [If voted: Which candidate did you vote for in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election?
1952 If did not vote: Even if you did not vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election,
1953 please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who
1954 represents your views more closely.] [*Figure S44*]

1955 [US1, US2: Biden; Trump; Jorgensen; Hawkins; Prefer not to say
1956 FR: candidates at the 2022 presidential election
1957 DE: parties with more than 1% of votes at the 2021 federal election and *Other*
1958 ES: lists with more than 0.9% at the November 2019 general election and *Other*
1959 UK: parties with more than 0.5% of votes at the 2019 general election and *Other*]

1960 56. To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem? [Figure S35]

- 1961 • Income inequality in [the U.S.]
1962 • Climate change
1963 • Global poverty

1964 *Not an important issue for me; An issue but there are other priorities; An issue but we
1965 already do what we can; An important issue, we should do more; One of the most pressing
1966 issue of our time*

1967 57. What group do you defend when you vote? [Figure S36]

1968 *Sentient beings (humans and animals); Humans; [Eu: Europeans]; [Americans]; People
1969 sharing my culture or religion; [US1, US2: My State]; [US1, US2: My town; Eu: My
1970 country, region or town]; My relatives and/or colleagues; My family and myself*

1971 [Eu, US1] Prioritization

1972 58. In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The
1973 more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

1974
1975 How do you allocate the points among the following policies? [Figures S37 and S38]

1976 You can adjust the number of points either using the slider or entering the num-
1977 ber of your choice on the right-hand-side. **The sum of points must equal exactly
1978 100.** By pushing the last slider to the right, the total will automatically adjust to 100.
1979 Please read the 6 options before making your choice.

1980 See the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the pool of policies in each country.
1981
1982 [sliders from 0 to 100]

1983 [FR, DE, ES] ETS2

1984 59. Similar to the Global Climate Scheme, the European Climate Scheme would impose
1985 a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit across the EU in the buildings
1986 and transport sectors. It would make polluters pay for their emissions, which in turn
1987 would increase fossil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities. Several options
1988 are possible regarding the use of the scheme's revenues:

- 1989 • Provide an equal cash transfer of €105 per year to each European.
- 1990 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European, proportional to their
1991 country's emissions: people in countries with higher emissions per person (like
1992 Germany) would receive more than people in countries with lower emissions
1993 (like Romania). For information, people in [Germany] would receive €[FR:
1994 110; DE: 130; ES: 90]/year.
- 1995 • Finance low-carbon investments: thermal insulation of buildings, switch to
1996 clean sources of heating, public transportation, and charging stations for elec-
1997 tric vehicles.
- 1998 • Provide cash transfers to the most vulnerable half of Europeans and finance
1999 low-carbon investments.

2000 Do you support or oppose the European Climate Scheme in case the revenue is used
2001 to... ?

- 2002 • Provide an equal cash transfer to each European
- 2003 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European
- 2004 • Finance low-carbon investments
- 2005 • Provide cash transfers for the most vulnerable Europeans and low-carbon in-
2006 vestments

2007 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
2008 support*

2009 60. [Asked iff none of the four variants of the European Climate Scheme is (somewhat or
2010 strongly) supported] Why do you not support a European Climate Scheme? (Mul-
2011 tiple answers possible)

2012 *I am opposed to climate policy being decided at the EU level, it should be decided at the na-*
2013 *tional level;*

2014 *I would prefer if the revenues were used in a different way (beyond the four suggestions*
2015 *above) than previously suggested;*

2016 *I would prefer if decreasing carbon emissions were regulated by other climate policies;*

2017 *I am generally opposed to additional, or more ambitious, climate policies;*

2018 *I do not fully understand how the European Climate Scheme is supposed to work;*

2019 *I don't know*

2020 **[Eu, US1, US2] Feedback**

- 2021 61. Do you feel that this survey was politically biased? [Figure S45]
2022 *Yes, left-wing biased; Yes, right-wing biased; No, I do not feel it was biased*
- 2023 62. [US2 Asked only to one random third of the respondents, instead of the feedback Ques-
2024 *tion 63] According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme*
2025 *poverty in low-income countries? [Figure S46]*
2026 *{Open field}*
- 2027 63. The survey is nearing completion. You can now enter any comments, thoughts or
2028 *suggestions in the field below.*
2029 *{Open field}*
- 2030 64. Lastly, are you interested to be interviewed by a researcher (through videoconfer-
2031 *encing) for 30 min?*
- 2032 This is totally optional and will not be rewarded.
2033 *Yes; No*

2035 E Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme

2036 To specify the GCS, we use the IEA's 2DS scenario (IEA 2017), which is consistent
2037 with limiting the global average temperature increase to 2°C with a probability of at least
2038 50%. The paper by Hood (2017) contributing to the Report of the High-Level Commission
2039 on Carbon Prices (Stern & Stiglitz 2017) presents a price corridor compatible with this
2040 emissions scenario, from which we take the midpoint. The product of these two series
2041 provides an estimate of the revenues expected from a global carbon price. We then use
2042 the UN median scenario of future population aged over 15 years (*adults*, for short). We
2043 derive the basic income that could be paid to all adults by recycling the revenues from
2044 the global carbon price: evolving between \$20 and \$30 per month, with a peak in 2030.
2045 Accounting for the lower price levels in low-income countries, an additional income of
2046 \$30 per month would allow **670 million people** to escape extreme poverty, defined with
2047 the threshold of \$2.15 per day in purchasing power parity.¹³

2048 To estimate the increase in fossil fuel expenditures (or “cost”) in each country by 2030,
2049 we make a key assumption concerning the evolution of the carbon footprints per adult:
2050 that they will decrease by the same proportion in each country. We use data from the
2051 Global Carbon Project (Peters et al. 2012). In 2030, the average carbon footprint of a
2052 country c , e_c , evolves from baseline year b proportionally to the evolution of its adult
2053 population $\Delta p_c = p_c^{2030} / p_c^b$. Thus, the global share of country c 's carbon footprint, s_c ,
2054 is proportional to $\sigma_c = e_c \Delta p_c$, and as countries' shares sum to 1, $s_c = \frac{\sigma_c}{\sum_k \sigma_k}$. Multiplying
2055 country c 's emission share with global revenues in 2030, R , and dividing by c 's adult pop-
2056 ulation in year y , yields its average cost per adult: $R \cdot s_c / p_c^y$. Using findings from Ivanova
2057 & Wood (2020) for Europe and Fremstad & Paul (2019) for the U.S., we approximate the
2058 median cost as 90% of the average cost. Finally, the net gain is given by the basic income
2059 (\$30 per month) minus the cost. We provided consistent estimates of net gains in all sur-
2060 veys (using $y = b = 2015$), though in the global survey we gave the average net gains
2061 vs. the median ones in the complementary surveys. The latter are shown in Figure S49.
2062 For the record, Table S3 also provides an estimate of *average* net gains (computed with

¹³The average carbon footprint of Sub-Saharan Africa is 0.75tCO₂ per capita (World Bank), and it is even lower for people living in extreme poverty, under one tenth of the world average of about 5tCO₂ per capita (Chancel & Piketty 2015). Under a GCS with a cash transfer of \$30 per person, if one's emission is one tenth of the world average, their net gain would be \$27 per month in nominal terms. In regions with extreme poverty like Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding high-income countries), the conversion factor from Market Exchange Rate to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is 2.4 (computed as the ratio of the World Bank series relating the GDP per capita of Sub-Saharan Africa in PPP and nominal). Therefore, the net gain for the extreme poor is \$65 per month (or \$2.13 a day) in PPP, enough to lift them out of extreme poverty.

2063 $b = 2019$ and $y = 2030$).¹⁴

2064 Estimates of the net gains from the Global Climate Scheme are necessarily imprecise,
2065 given the uncertainties surrounding the carbon price required to achieve emissions
2066 reductions as well as each country's trajectory in terms of emissions and population. These
2067 values are highly dependent on future (non-price) climate policies, technical progress,
2068 and economic growth of each country, which are only partially known. Integrated As-
2069 sessment Models have been used to derive a Global Energy Assessment (Johansson et al.
2070 2012), a 100% renewable scenario (Greenpeace 2015) as well as Shared Socioeconomic
2071 Pathways (SSPs), which include consistent trajectories of population, emissions, and car-
2072 bon price (Riahi et al.; Bauer et al.; van Vuuren et al.; Fricko et al. 2017; 2017; 2017; 2017).
2073 Instead of using some of these modelling trajectories, we relied on a simple and trans-
2074 parent formula, for a number of reasons. First and foremost, those trajectories describe
2075 territorial emissions while we need consumption-based emissions to compute the inci-
2076 dence of the GCS. Second, the carbon price is relatively low in trajectories of SSPs that
2077 contain global warming below 2°C (less than \$35/tCO₂ in 2030), so we conservatively
2078 chose a method yielding a higher carbon price (\$90 in 2030). Third, modelling results are
2079 available only for a few macro regions, while we wanted country by country estimates.
2080 Finally, we have checked that the emissions per capita given by our method are broadly
2081 in line with alternative methods, even if it tends to overestimate net gains in countries
2082 which will decarbonize less rapidly than average.¹⁵ For example, although countries' de-
2083 carbonization plans should realign with the GCS in place, India might still decarbonize
2084 less quickly than the European Union, so India's gain and the EU's loss might be over-
2085 estimated in our computations. For a more sophisticated version of the Global Climate
2086 Scheme which includes participation mechanisms preventing middle-income countries
2087 (like China) to lose from it and estimations of the Net Present Value by country, see Fabre
2088 (2023).

(Back to Section 2.3)

¹⁴2015 was the last year of data available when the global questionnaire was conceived (OECD data was then used – it does not cover all countries but give identical rounded estimates than those recomputed from the Global Carbon Project data for our complementary surveys). 2030 was chosen as the reference year as it is the date at which global carbon price revenues are expected to peak (and the GCS redistributive effects would be largest), and the GCS could not realistically enter into force before that date. In the surveys, we chose $y = b = 2015$ rather than $b = 2019$ and $y = 2030$ to get more conservative estimates of the monthly cost in the U.S. (\$20 higher than the other option) and in Europe (€5 or £10 higher).

¹⁵Computations with alternative methods can be found on [our public repository](#).

Figure S49: Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme.




Table S3: Estimated net gain from the GCS in 2030 and carbon footprint by country.

	Mean net gain from the GCS (\$/month)	CO ₂ footprint per adult in 2019 (tCO ₂ /y)			
Saudi Arabia	-93	24.0	Brazil	15	2.9
United States	-77	21.0	Vietnam	15	2.9
Australia	-60	17.6	Peru	16	2.8
Canada	-56	16.7	Morocco	16	2.7
South Korea	-50	15.6	North Korea*	17	2.5
Germany	-30	11.7	India	18	2.4
Russia	-29	11.5	Philippines	18	2.3
Japan	-28	11.3	Pakistan	22	1.6
Malaysia	-21	10.0	Bangladesh	24	1.1
Iran	-19	9.5	Nigeria	25	1.0
Poland	-19	9.5	Kenya	25	0.9
United Kingdom	-18	9.4	Myanmar*	26	0.9
China	-14	8.6	Sudan*	26	0.9
Italy	-13	8.4	Tanzania	27	0.5
South Africa	-11	8.0	Afghanistan*	27	0.5
France	-10	7.8	Uganda	28	0.4
Iraq*	-8	7.4	Ethiopia	28	0.3
Spain	-6	7.0	Venezuela	29	0.3
Turkey	-2	6.2	DRC*	30	0.1
Algeria*	-1	6.0			

²⁰⁸⁹ Note: Asterisks denote countries where footprint is missing and territorial emissions is used instead.

²⁰⁹⁰ Values differ from Figure S49 as this table present estimates of *mean* net gain per adult in 2030, not at the

²⁰⁹¹ present. Only the countries with more than 20 million adults (covering 87% of the global total) are shown.

F Determinants of support

Table S4: Determinants of support for the Global Climate Scheme. (Back to [2.3](#))

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme						
	All	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Country: Germany	-0.157*** (0.022)		-0.144*** (0.022)				
Country: Spain	-0.044* (0.024)		-0.026 (0.024)				
Country: United Kingdom	-0.079*** (0.024)		-0.104*** (0.023)				
Country: United States	-0.375*** (0.019)						
Income quartile: 2	0.037** (0.017)	0.031 (0.022)	0.038 (0.023)	0.047 (0.043)	0.058 (0.049)	0.013 (0.053)	0.023 (0.043)
Income quartile: 3	0.042** (0.017)	0.033 (0.024)	0.049** (0.024)	0.080** (0.040)	0.059 (0.052)	0.074 (0.056)	-0.052 (0.052)
Income quartile: 4	0.056*** (0.018)	0.062** (0.026)	0.010 (0.026)	0.018 (0.047)	-0.015 (0.055)	-0.001 (0.056)	-0.005 (0.057)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.023* (0.012)	0.032* (0.017)	0.010 (0.018)	0.007 (0.029)	0.045 (0.039)	0.007 (0.039)	-0.010 (0.039)
Age: 25-34	-0.076*** (0.025)	-0.084*** (0.031)	-0.044 (0.035)	-0.031 (0.057)	-0.077 (0.083)	-0.050 (0.066)	-0.103 (0.091)
Age: 35-49	-0.101*** (0.024)	-0.109*** (0.030)	-0.069* (0.034)	-0.094* (0.055)	-0.009 (0.077)	-0.168** (0.070)	-0.050 (0.090)
Age: 50-64	-0.137*** (0.024)	-0.165*** (0.030)	-0.038 (0.035)	-0.039 (0.056)	-0.020 (0.082)	-0.146** (0.067)	-0.017 (0.087)
Age: 65+	-0.116*** (0.028)	-0.142*** (0.034)	-0.056 (0.044)	0.003 (0.076)	-0.045 (0.094)	-0.258*** (0.091)	0.011 (0.105)
Gender: Man	0.019* (0.011)	0.022 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.029)	-0.018 (0.033)	0.042 (0.038)	-0.005 (0.034)
Lives with partner	0.029** (0.013)	0.023 (0.017)	0.058*** (0.018)	0.070** (0.033)	0.082** (0.038)	0.017 (0.038)	0.040 (0.039)
Employment status: Retired	-0.020 (0.024)	-0.046 (0.030)	0.056 (0.038)	0.087 (0.081)	0.096 (0.075)	0.040 (0.082)	0.001 (0.073)
Employment status: Student	0.045 (0.033)	0.062 (0.048)	0.101** (0.044)	0.165* (0.085)	0.192** (0.087)	0.116 (0.074)	-0.021 (0.107)
Employment status: Working	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.020 (0.024)	0.011 (0.028)	0.082 (0.064)	0.006 (0.056)	-0.050 (0.056)	0.036 (0.051)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.331*** (0.013)	-0.435*** (0.017)	-0.106*** (0.019)	-0.131*** (0.035)	-0.004 (0.044)	-0.114*** (0.038)	-0.081* (0.041)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	-0.184*** (0.016)	-0.198*** (0.022)	-0.136*** (0.021)	-0.196*** (0.039)	-0.034 (0.043)	-0.116** (0.046)	-0.108*** (0.040)
Vote: Far right	-0.396*** (0.032)		-0.309*** (0.033)	-0.493*** (0.064)	-0.168*** (0.051)	-0.130 (0.102)	-0.314*** (0.080)
Urban	0.049*** (0.012)	0.072*** (0.018)	0.006 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.029)	0.019 (0.032)	-0.014 (0.036)	0.017 (0.033)
Race: White		-0.030 (0.019)					
Region: Northeast		0.010 (0.023)					
Region: South		0.006 (0.020)					
Region: West		0.010 (0.022)					
Swing State		-0.038** (0.019)					
Constant	1.048	0.736	0.89	0.7	0.732	0.935	0.886
Observations	7,986	4,992	2,994	977	727	748	542
R ²	0.160	0.181	0.064	0.116	0.067	0.043	0.063

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table S5: Support for the GCS regressed on comprehension of its financial effects.

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme					
	All	United States	France	Germany	United Kingdom	Spain
With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win	0.029** (0.012)	-0.004 (0.016)	0.043 (0.033)	0.051 (0.033)	0.040 (0.036)	0.038 (0.037)
Constant	0.596	0.53	0.764	0.677	0.707	0.796
Observations	8,000	5,000	729	979	749	543
R ²	0.001	0.00001	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.002

Table S6: Correlation between (*Somewhat or Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in high-income countries.

	Support for a global GHG tax and dividend											
	USA (1)	DNK (2)	FRA (3)	DEU (4)	ITA (5)	ESP (6)	GBR (7)	JPN (8)	POL (9)	AUS (10)	CAN (11)	KOR (12)
Control group mean	0.34	0.409	0.34	0.361	0.341	0.421	0.288	0.317	0.309	0.294	0.316	0.334
Trusts the government	0.040*** (0.013)	0.0005 (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.051*** (0.011)	0.061*** (0.012)	0.046*** (0.011)	0.050*** (0.012)	0.039*** (0.013)	0.023** (0.011)	0.041*** (0.013)	0.019 (0.012)	0.079*** (0.013)
Believes inequality is an important problem	0.038*** (0.014)	0.051*** (0.012)	0.045*** (0.013)	0.040*** (0.011)	0.023** (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.052*** (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)	0.009 (0.010)	0.005 (0.013)	0.031*** (0.012)	0.024** (0.012)
Worries about CC	0.006 (0.018)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.005 (0.016)	0.048*** (0.014)	0.023* (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.044*** (0.015)	0.014 (0.014)	0.018 (0.013)	0.036** (0.017)	0.004 (0.014)	0.015 (0.013)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	0.009 (0.015)	0.007 (0.012)	0.018 (0.014)	0.015 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.032** (0.011)	0.027** (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.024** (0.015)	0.018 (0.014)	0.014 (0.014)	0.001 (0.013)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.059*** (0.015)	0.019 (0.013)	0.008 (0.014)	0.032** (0.013)	0.012 (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.006 (0.014)	0.037** (0.014)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.033** (0.016)	0.026* (0.014)	0.033** (0.013)
Understands emission across activities/regions	-0.018 (0.011)	0.009 (0.013)	0.003 (0.012)	0.023* (0.012)	0.007 (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.007 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.026** (0.012)	-0.002 (0.013)	0.003 (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	0.007 (0.012)	0.008 (0.014)	0.023 (0.014)	0.011 (0.012)	-0.0005 (0.012)	0.031*** (0.012)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.014 (0.011)	0.025* (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.024* (0.012)
Knows which gases cause CC	0.005 (0.011)	0.021* (0.012)	0.010 (0.013)	0.001 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.010)	0.020* (0.010)	0.015 (0.010)	0.017 (0.011)	0.011 (0.011)	-0.0003 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.013)
Understands impacts of CC	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.029*** (0.011)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.022* (0.012)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.024* (0.012)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	-0.005 (0.013)	0.007 (0.012)	0.021 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.014)	0.011 (0.014)	0.010 (0.013)	0.014 (0.013)	0.008 (0.013)	0.015 (0.013)	0.036** (0.016)	0.004 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.013)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	-0.013 (0.021)	0.037 (0.023)	0.043* (0.022)	-0.014 (0.020)	-0.038** (0.019)	0.029 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.017 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.006 (0.022)	0.021 (0.020)	-0.020 (0.019)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.086*** (0.024)	0.066*** (0.023)	0.075*** (0.023)	0.094*** (0.022)	0.105*** (0.020)	0.074*** (0.023)	0.091*** (0.021)	0.154*** (0.019)	0.089*** (0.020)	0.070*** (0.024)	0.053** (0.023)	0.112*** (0.020)
Believes own household would lose	-0.071*** (0.021)	-0.057*** (0.015)	-0.026 (0.020)	-0.087*** (0.017)	-0.066*** (0.017)	-0.053*** (0.017)	-0.073*** (0.017)	-0.008 (0.017)	-0.079*** (0.017)	-0.052*** (0.016)	-0.060*** (0.019)	-0.083*** (0.017)
Believes low-income earners will lose	-0.034* (0.019)	-0.020 (0.016)	-0.056*** (0.018)	-0.022 (0.017)	-0.021 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.016)	-0.015 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.056*** (0.017)	-0.025 (0.016)	-0.030 (0.020)	-0.056*** (0.018)
Believes high-income earners will lose	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.012)	0.013 (0.013)	0.003 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.007 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.025** (0.012)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.0004 (0.013)
Observations	2,218	2,013	2,006	2,006	2,088	2,268	2,025	1,990	2,053	1,978	2,022	1,932
R ²	0.329	0.241	0.237	0.295	0.211	0.216	0.272	0.222	0.214	0.272	0.254	0.228

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 of Dechezleprêtre et al. (forthcoming) for variable definitions.

Table S7: Correlation between (*Somewhat* or *Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in middle-income countries.

	Support for a global GHG tax and dividend							
	IDN (1)	ZAF (2)	MEX (3)	TUR (4)	IND (5)	BRA (6)	CHN (7)	UKR (8)
Control group mean	0.697	0.396	0.681	0.44	0.719	0.539	0.737	0.622
Trusts the government	0.051*** (0.012)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.040*** (0.014)	0.066*** (0.017)	0.065*** (0.015)	0.038** (0.015)	-0.011 (0.015)	0.061*** (0.014)
Believes inequality is an important problem	0.048** (0.011)	0.002 (0.014)	0.057*** (0.015)	0.028 (0.017)	0.092*** (0.016)	0.055*** (0.015)	-0.001 (0.015)	0.027 (0.018)
Worries about CC	0.003 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.016)	0.013 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.017)	-0.0002 (0.016)	0.032* (0.017)	-0.0002 (0.016)	0.046*** (0.016)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	0.020 (0.014)	0.026 (0.017)	0.004 (0.014)	0.039** (0.017)	0.022 (0.016)	0.019 (0.015)	0.034** (0.016)	0.018 (0.016)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.020* (0.011)	0.038** (0.016)	0.032* (0.017)	-0.002 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.015)	-0.017 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.018 (0.016)
Understands emission across activities/regions	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.013)	0.003 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.010)	0.039*** (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.00004 (0.013)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	-0.006 (0.009)	0.011 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.016)	0.0002 (0.012)	0.003 (0.014)	-0.052*** (0.016)	0.022 (0.014)
Knows which gases cause CC	-0.026*** (0.009)	0.019 (0.015)	0.035** (0.014)	0.015 (0.015)	0.020 (0.013)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.023* (0.012)	0.023 (0.015)
Understands impacts of CC	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.0005 (0.015)	0.009 (0.017)	0.043*** (0.014)	-0.023 (0.015)	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.014 (0.014)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	-0.010 (0.007)	0.009 (0.016)	0.015 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.013)	0.002 (0.011)	-0.016 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.010)	0.035** (0.015)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	0.023 (0.015)	0.002 (0.021)	0.019 (0.022)	0.044 (0.029)	0.021 (0.020)	0.032 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.018)	-0.023 (0.025)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.111*** (0.019)	0.073*** (0.022)	0.088*** (0.024)	0.078** (0.031)	0.034 (0.025)	0.129*** (0.022)	0.060*** (0.022)	0.138*** (0.025)
Believes own household would lose	-0.027 (0.021)	-0.044** (0.020)	-0.071*** (0.019)	-0.054** (0.024)	-0.012 (0.019)	-0.067*** (0.023)	-0.119*** (0.022)	-0.045** (0.021)
Believes low-income earners will lose	-0.059*** (0.020)	-0.016 (0.019)	0.003 (0.017)	-0.053** (0.023)	-0.055*** (0.019)	-0.013 (0.020)	0.001 (0.018)	0.004 (0.020)
Believes high-income earners will lose	0.026** (0.011)	-0.020 (0.015)	0.010 (0.013)	0.010 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.014)	0.003 (0.016)	-0.047*** (0.014)	-0.007 (0.013)
Observations	2,488	2,003	2,045	1,932	2,472	1,860	1,717	1,564
R ²	0.366	0.175	0.242	0.248	0.370	0.272	0.280	0.255

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 of Dechezleprêtre et al. (forthcoming) for variable definitions.

G Representativeness of the surveys

Table S8: Sample representativeness of the complementary surveys. (Back to [2.1](#))

	US1			US2			Eu		
	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample
Sample size		3,000	3,000		2,000	2,000		3,000	3,000
Gender: Woman	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.45	0.50	0.51	0.49	0.51
Gender: Man	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.49	0.55	0.50	0.49	0.51	0.49
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.11	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.18	0.15	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.18	0.15	0.17	0.15
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.24	0.26
Age: 65+	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.25	0.23	0.25
Diploma_25_64: Below upper secondary	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.13	0.14	0.13
Diploma_25_64: Upper secondary	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.28	0.23	0.19	0.23
Diploma_25_64: Post secondary	0.34	0.40	0.34	0.34	0.33	0.34	0.29	0.33	0.29
Race: White only	0.60	0.67	0.61	0.60	0.62	0.61			
Race: Hispanic	0.18	0.15	0.19	0.18	0.19	0.19			
Race: Black	0.13	0.16	0.14	0.13	0.17	0.14			
Region: Northeast	0.17	0.20	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.17			
Region: Midwest	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.21			
Region: South	0.38	0.39	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38			
Region: West	0.24	0.20	0.24	0.24	0.20	0.24			
Urban: TRUE	0.73	0.78	0.74	0.73	0.75	0.73			
Employment_18_64: Inactive	0.20	0.16	0.16	0.20	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.15
Employment_18_64: Unemployed	0.02	0.07	0.08	0.02	0.09	0.08	0.03	0.06	0.05
Vote: Left	0.32	0.47	0.45	0.32	0.46	0.45	0.30	0.32	0.32
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.32	0.32
Vote: Far right							0.10	0.10	0.10
Country: FR							0.24	0.24	0.24
Country: DE							0.33	0.33	0.33
Country: ES							0.18	0.18	0.18
Country: UK							0.25	0.25	0.25
Urbanity: Cities							0.43	0.49	0.43
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs							0.33	0.32	0.33
Urbanity: Rural							0.25	0.20	0.25

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

Table S9: Sample representativeness for each European country. (Back to [2.1](#))

	FR			DE			ES			UK		
	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.									
Sample size		729	729		979	979		543	543		749	749
Gender: Woman	0.52	0.50	0.52	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.53	0.51	0.50	0.43	0.50
Gender: Man	0.48	0.50	0.48	0.49	0.48	0.49	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.50	0.57	0.50
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.29	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.19	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.19	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.33	0.25	0.25	0.18	0.25	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.14	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.07	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.12	0.16	0.12	0.17	0.20	0.17
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.31	0.24	0.22	0.26	0.22	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.24	0.18	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.24	0.19	0.24	0.28	0.23	0.28	0.27	0.28	0.27	0.25	0.30	0.25
Age: 65+	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.26	0.21	0.26	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.24
Diploma_25-64: Below upper secondary	0.11	0.19	0.11	0.10	0.14	0.10	0.24	0.16	0.25	0.12	0.09	0.12
Diploma_25-64: Upper secondary	0.26	0.16	0.26	0.27	0.20	0.27	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.21	0.23	0.21
Diploma_25-64: Post secondary	0.26	0.30	0.26	0.29	0.31	0.29	0.28	0.38	0.27	0.33	0.36	0.33
Urbanity: Cities	0.47	0.52	0.47	0.37	0.47	0.37	0.52	0.58	0.52	0.40	0.41	0.40
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.40	0.35	0.40	0.22	0.27	0.22	0.42	0.43	0.42
Urbanity: Rural	0.34	0.29	0.34	0.23	0.18	0.23	0.26	0.15	0.26	0.18	0.16	0.18
Employment_18-64: Inactive	0.20	0.19	0.18	0.15	0.14	0.11	0.20	0.13	0.12	0.16	0.16	0.17
Employment_18-64: Unemployed	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.11	0.12	0.02	0.03	0.04
Vote: Left	0.23	0.19	0.21	0.37	0.44	0.44	0.33	0.37	0.38	0.25	0.28	0.29
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.26	0.30	0.29	0.28	0.27	0.29	0.18	0.24	0.24	0.36	0.44	0.41
Vote: Far right	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.01	0.03	0.03

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. In this Table, weights are defined at the country level. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

²⁰⁹⁴ Similar tables for the global surveys can be found in [Dechezleprêtre et al. \(forthcoming\)](#).
²⁰⁹⁵ [ing](#).

H Attrition analysis

Table S10: Attrition analysis for the US1 survey.

	Dropped out	Dropped out after socio-eco	Failed attention test	Duration (in min)	Duration below 4 min
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mean	0.08	0.059	0.082	21.198	0.016
Income quartile: 2	0.025*** (0.010)	0.025*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.740 (3.064)	-0.009 (0.006)
Income quartile: 3	0.062*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.754 (2.813)	-0.004 (0.007)
Income quartile: 4	0.035*** (0.011)	0.035*** (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-3.917 (2.798)	-0.003 (0.007)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.039*** (0.009)	0.039*** (0.009)	-0.000*** (0.000)	1.544 (2.665)	0.006 (0.006)
Age: 25-34	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.597 (2.604)	-0.031** (0.013)
Age: 35-49	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.824 (3.176)	-0.032** (0.013)
Age: 50-64	-0.060*** (0.015)	-0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	5.723** (2.763)	-0.039*** (0.012)
Age: 65+	0.048*** (0.017)	0.048*** (0.017)	0.000** (0.000)	8.952** (4.267)	-0.047*** (0.012)
Gender: Man	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.451 (2.210)	-0.0001 (0.005)
Urban	0.006 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.888** (2.443)	-0.004 (0.006)
Race: Black	0.020** (0.010)	0.020** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	8.554*** (2.600)	0.004 (0.007)
Race: Hispanic	0.021** (0.010)	0.021** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.119* (2.293)	-0.002 (0.007)
Region: Northeast	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-4.862 (4.782)	-0.004 (0.007)
Region: South	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-1.151 (4.710)	-0.004 (0.006)
Region: West	0.006 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-4.000 (4.305)	-0.003 (0.007)
Vote: Biden	-0.048*** (0.008)	-0.048*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-2.901 (2.379)	-0.009 (0.007)
Vote: Trump	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.145 (2.878)	-0.005 (0.008)
Observations	5,719	5,719	3,252	3,044	3,044
R ²	0.127	0.127	1.000	0.006	0.017

Table S11: Attrition analysis for the US2 survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 4 min (5)
Mean	0.095	0.074	0.092	16.338	0.052
Income quartile: 2	0.023* (0.013)	0.023* (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	1.352 (1.601)	-0.029** (0.014)
Income quartile: 3	0.054*** (0.014)	0.054*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	8.502 (9.649)	-0.009 (0.016)
Income quartile: 4	0.060*** (0.016)	0.060*** (0.016)	-0.000 (0.000)	5.254 (3.376)	0.0003 (0.017)
Diploma: Post secondary	-0.033*** (0.011)	-0.033*** (0.011)	0.000 (0.000)	1.601 (2.630)	0.012 (0.011)
Age: 25-34	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.929 (1.535)	-0.032 (0.024)
Age: 35-49	0.012 (0.014)	0.012 (0.014)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.076 (6.651)	-0.047** (0.022)
Age: 50-64	0.040*** (0.014)	0.040*** (0.014)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.364 (1.565)	-0.079*** (0.022)
Age: 65+	0.115*** (0.017)	0.115*** (0.017)	-0.000*** (0.000)	2.619 (3.150)	-0.095*** (0.022)
Gender: Man	-0.073*** (0.009)	-0.073*** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	4.707 (6.037)	0.010 (0.010)
Urban	0.019* (0.011)	0.019* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	1.766 (1.135)	0.005 (0.012)
Race: Black	0.060*** (0.015)	0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.673 (13.328)	-0.010 (0.015)
Race: Hispanic	0.079*** (0.014)	0.079*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	2.930 (1.813)	-0.027** (0.012)
Region: Northeast	-0.026* (0.014)	-0.026* (0.014)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.837 (2.855)	-0.011 (0.015)
Region: South	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.000 (0.000)	3.220 (5.002)	0.009 (0.014)
Region: West	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.000 (0.000)	-1.759 (1.942)	-0.009 (0.015)
Vote: Biden	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	3.230 (2.731)	-0.006 (0.014)
Vote: Trump	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.554 (1.272)	0.007 (0.016)
Observations	2,973	2,973	2,280	2,103	2,103
R ²	0.241	0.241	1.000	0.010	0.031

Table S12: Attrition analysis for the *Eu* survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 6 min (5)
Mean	0.067	0.044	0.151	54.602	0.039
Country: Germany	0.023** (0.010)	0.019** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.533 (18.906)	0.019* (0.010)
Country: Spain	-0.102*** (0.011)	-0.098*** (0.011)	0.000* (0.000)	-29.136* (15.948)	0.010 (0.010)
Country: United Kingdom	0.042*** (0.011)	0.043*** (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-7.458 (18.046)	0.010 (0.010)
Income quartile: 2	0.032*** (0.010)	0.029*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	32.749* (19.771)	-0.015 (0.010)
Income quartile: 3	0.049*** (0.010)	0.047*** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	6.130 (11.734)	-0.021** (0.010)
Income quartile: 4	0.024** (0.011)	0.021* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.659 (19.955)	-0.018* (0.011)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.035*** (0.008)	0.034*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	10.647 (12.959)	-0.007 (0.007)
Age: 25-34	0.028** (0.013)	0.025* (0.013)	-0.000*** (0.000)	36.132 (22.285)	-0.005 (0.018)
Age: 35-49	0.064*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	-0.000*** (0.000)	37.159** (17.190)	-0.013 (0.016)
Age: 50-64	0.085*** (0.013)	0.083*** (0.013)	-0.000 (0.000)	48.363** (22.526)	-0.063*** (0.015)
Age: 65+	0.117*** (0.014)	0.115*** (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	36.351** (14.226)	-0.061*** (0.015)
Gender: Man	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-22.980 (14.093)	0.009 (0.007)
Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs	0.006 (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-16.736 (17.256)	0.004 (0.008)
Degree of urbanization: Rural	0.023** (0.009)	0.023** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	-14.593 (19.733)	-0.001 (0.009)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.025*** (0.005)	-0.025*** (0.005)	0.000*** (0.000)	-17.558 (13.143)	0.019** (0.008)
Vote: Far right	0.005 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.000*** (0.000)	15.838 (32.281)	0.029** (0.014)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	0.023*** (0.006)	0.022*** (0.005)	0.000 (0.000)	24.631 (19.824)	0.030*** (0.010)
Observations	3,963	3,963	3,326	3,115	3,115
R ²	0.406	0.395	1.000	0.006	0.028

2097 **I Balance analysis**

Table S13: Balance analysis.

	List contains: G (1)	Branch petition: NR (2)	Branch donation: Own nation (3)	Branch conjoint 3: with GCS (4)
Mean	0.496	0.493	0.5	0.499
Country: Germany	-0.026 (0.026)	0.017 (0.026)	0.020 (0.026)	0.005 (0.026)
Country: Spain	0.025 (0.030)	0.026 (0.030)	0.026 (0.030)	0.043 (0.030)
Country: United Kingdom	0.002 (0.028)	0.018 (0.028)	0.037 (0.028)	0.063** (0.028)
Country: United States	-0.001 (0.024)	0.019 (0.024)	0.007 (0.024)	0.023 (0.024)
Income quartile: 2	-0.013 (0.021)	-0.024 (0.021)	0.012 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.021)
Income quartile: 3	0.021 (0.022)	-0.005 (0.022)	0.011 (0.022)	-0.004 (0.022)
Income quartile: 4	-0.001 (0.023)	-0.017 (0.023)	-0.013 (0.023)	0.0001 (0.023)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.008 (0.016)	0.014 (0.016)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.016)
Age: 25-34	0.023 (0.031)	-0.049 (0.031)	-0.003 (0.031)	-0.009 (0.031)
Age: 35-49	0.032 (0.030)	-0.002 (0.030)	-0.014 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.030)
Age: 50-64	0.030 (0.030)	-0.005 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.030)	-0.020 (0.030)
Age: 65+	0.029 (0.037)	-0.037 (0.037)	-0.015 (0.037)	-0.012 (0.037)
Gender: Man	0.024 (0.015)	0.012 (0.015)	0.002 (0.015)	-0.016 (0.015)
Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.0005 (0.017)	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.011 (0.017)
Degree of urbanization: Rural	0.013 (0.024)	0.017 (0.024)	-0.004 (0.024)	0.027 (0.024)
Employment status: Retired	-0.005 (0.032)	-0.031 (0.032)	-0.034 (0.032)	-0.016 (0.032)
Employment status: Student	0.005 (0.044)	-0.023 (0.044)	-0.033 (0.044)	-0.025 (0.044)
Employment status: Working	0.010 (0.024)	-0.027 (0.024)	-0.033 (0.024)	-0.012 (0.024)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.004 (0.017)	0.003 (0.017)	0.010 (0.017)	0.002 (0.017)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	0.001 (0.019)	0.014 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.019)	-0.012 (0.019)
Vote: Far right	0.009 (0.034)	0.030 (0.034)	0.023 (0.035)	0.038 (0.034)
Observations	5,991	5,991	5,991	5,991
R ²	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.003

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

²⁰⁹⁸ **J Placebo tests**

Table S14: Placebo tests.

	G+R+C preferred to R+C (1)	Supports G+R+C (2)	Signs petition (3)	Share of policies supported (4)	Conjoint 5 A+CGS preferred to B (5)
Mean	0.645	0.633	0.611	0.535	0.596
Branch of list experiment: 1	-0.013 (0.019)	-0.024 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.018 (0.021)
Branch of list experiment: rgl	0.005 (0.019)	0.006 (0.019)	-0.002 (0.019)	0.001 (0.012)	0.010 (0.021)
Branch of list experiment: rl	-0.009 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.019)	0.022 (0.019)	0.007 (0.012)	0.007 (0.021)
Branch of petition: nr	0.011 (0.014)	0.006 (0.014)	0.022 (0.014)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.015)
Poor is in own country	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.014)	0.015 (0.014)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.020 (0.015)
Observations	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	5,218
R ²	0.0004	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

²⁰⁹⁹ **K Main results on the extended sample**

²¹⁰⁰ As a robustness check, we reproduce our main results on the extended sample that
²¹⁰¹ includes the 14% respondents who failed the attention check ($n = 9,318$). These results
²¹⁰² are non-weighted. They closely match the results in our main specification. For example,
²¹⁰³ the support for the GCS is 54% in the U.S. and 75% in Europe, while the same coefficients
²¹⁰⁴ are significant for the list experiment.

Figure S50: [Extended sample] Main attitudes by vote (“Right” spans from Center-right to Far right).

(Relative support in percent in Questions 20, 35, 45, 46, 49)

[\(Back to Section 2.6\)](#)

	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom	United States
Support for the GCS	75	78	70	81	75	54
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	83	81	84	87	81	68
Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries*	52	45	60	59	44	52
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	62	57	62	65	65	47
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	82	80	82	86	80	69
[Country]'s foreign aid should be increased	83	87	87	89	69	77
Universalist*	41	35	49	44	36	43

Figure S51: [Extended sample] Influence of the GCS on preferred platform: Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question 30; in the U.S., asked only to non-Republicans.)

	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom	United States
Random programs: A+GCS preferred to B	60	61	59	64	58	59

Table S15: [Extended sample] Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list. The tacit support for the GCS is estimated by regressing the number of supported policies on the presence of the GCS in the list of policies. The social desirability is estimated as the difference between the tacit and stated support, and it is not significantly different from zero even at a 20% threshold (see [Methods](#)).

	Number of supported policies		
	All	U.S.	Europe
List contains: GCS	0.624*** (0.028)	0.524*** (0.041)	0.724*** (0.036)
<i>Support for GCS</i>	NA	0.554	0.754
<i>Social desirability bias</i>	-0.025	-0.017	-0.033
<i>80% C.I. for the bias</i>	[-0.06; 0.01]	[-0.07; 0.04]	[-0.08; 0.01]
Constant	1.317	1.147	1.486
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000
R ²	0.089	0.065	0.125

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table S16: [Extended sample] Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. ([Question 28](#))

	Prefers the Progressive platform					
	All	United States	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
GCS in Progressive platform	0.022* (0.013)	0.015 (0.018)	0.116*** (0.037)	-0.007 (0.032)	0.028 (0.038)	0.012 (0.037)
Constant	0.628	0.629	0.55	0.682	0.721	0.553
Observations	5,638	2,797	671	883	550	737
R ²	0.001	0.0002	0.014	0.0001	0.001	0.0001

Note: Simple OLS model. *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples. *p < 0.1;
p < 0.05; *p < 0.01.

2105 **L Effect of questionnaire framing**

2106 When comparing the samples *US1* and *US2*, we observe no effect of questionnaire
2107 framing (or block sequence) on the question “What group do you defend when you
2108 vote?”, common to all waves and placed close to the end of the questionnaire (Table S17).

Table S17: Effect of the wave (*US1* vs. *US2*) on the group defend when voting.
“What group do you defend when you vote?” (Question 57)

	Group defended when voting		
	Humans or Sentient beings	Fellow citizens	Family and self
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Wave: <i>US2</i>	−0.009 (0.014)	0.009 (0.014)	0.010 (0.011)
Mean	0.432	0.335	0.156
Observations	5,000	5,000	5,000
R ²	0.0001	0.0001	0.0002

Note: Simple OLS model. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

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