

International Attitudes Toward Global Policies

Supplementary Material

Adrien Fabre*, Thomas Douenne[†] and Linus Mattauch[‡]

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*CNRS, CIRED. E-mail: adrien.fabre@cnrs.fr (corresponding author).


[†]University of Amsterdam

[‡]Technical University Berlin, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research – Member of the Leibniz Association and University of Oxford

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33 Main figures

Figure 1: Relative support for global climate policies. (Reproduced from [Dechezleprêtre et al. \(2022\)](#), Figure A21.)



Note 1: The numbers represent the share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* among non-*indifferent* answers (in percent, $n = 40,680$). The color blue denotes a relative majority. See Figure A3 for the absolute support. (Questions A-I).

Note 2: *In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

Figure 2: Relative support for various global policies (percentage of *somewhat* or *strong support*, after excluding *indifferent* answers). (Questions 44 and 45; See Figure A25 for the absolute support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	55	71	72	70	79	70
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	68	82	82	82	85	81
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	60	76	77	79	79	71
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	46	53	53	43	62	61
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	58	71	69	69	78	72
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	62	73	58	73	80	83
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	63	80	80	78	81	83
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	62	87	90	86	91	87
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	46	62	58	62	65	67
National tax on millionaires funding public services	73	85	81	87	89	88
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	69	84	84	84	87	83

Figure 3: Support for the GCS, NR and the combination of GCS, NR and C. (Questions 35, 36, 20, 22 and 26).

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)	54	76	80	71	81	74
National redistribution scheme (NR)	56	73	77	66	79	75
National climate policy + GCS + NR	52	74	79	69	81	70

Table 1: Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list.

	Number of supported policies		
	All	US	Europe
List contains: GCS	0.624*** (0.028)	0.524*** (0.041)	0.724*** (0.036)
<i>Support for GCS</i>	0.65	0.542	0.757
<i>Social desirability bias</i>	-0.026	-0.018	-0.033
<i>80% C.I. for the bias</i>	[-0.06; 0.01]	[-0.07; 0.01]	[-0.08; 0.01]
Constant	1.317	1.147	1.486
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000
R ²	0.089	0.065	0.125

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 2: Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. (Question 28)

	Prefers the Progressive platform					
	All	United States	France	Germany	UK	Spain
GCS in Progressive platform	0.028* (0.014)	0.029 (0.022)	0.112*** (0.041)	0.015 (0.033)	0.008 (0.040)	-0.015 (0.038)
Constant	0.623	0.604	0.55	0.7	0.551	0.775
Observations	5,202	2,619	605	813	661	504
R ²	0.001	0.001	0.013	0.0003	0.0001	0.0003

Note: The 14% of *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples. GCS has no significant influence on them. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

Figure 4: Percent of global wealth tax that should finance low-income countries (*mean*). (Question 37)




Figure 5: Attitudes regarding the evolution of [own country] foreign aid. (Question 46)




Figure 6: Conditions at which foreign aid should be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish an increase of foreign aid at some conditions.] (Question 47)




Figure 7: Reasons why foreign aid should not be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish a decrease or stability of foreign aid.] (Question 48)





Figure 8: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See English translations in Figure A8; Question 29)

(a) U.S. (Asked only to non-Republicans)



(b) France



(c) Germany

Klimaschutz:

- Verpflichtende Solaranlagen auf allen geeigneten Dächern
- Plan zur Wärmedämmung
- Verbot des Verkaufs von Neuwagen mit Verbrennungsmotor bis 2030

Wirtschaftspolitik:

- Erhöhung des Regelsatzes des Bürgergelds auf bis zu 600€ pro Monat
- Bürgerversicherung als gerechtere Sozialversicherung
- Staatschuldenquote auf unter 60% reduzieren
- Investitionen für Gigabit-Netzwerke bereitstellen

Außenpolitik:

- Globales Klimaprogramm
- Globale Steuer auf Millionäre
- Globale demokratische Versammlung zum Klimawandel
- Verdoppelung der Mittel für die Entwicklungshilfe in einkommensschwachen Ländern


Gesellschaft:

- Volksscheid auf Bundesebene

- Cannabis-Legalisierung

Steuerpolitik:

- Nationales Umverteilungsprogramm
- Die Vermögenssteuer wieder in Kraft setzen



(d) Spain

Política climática:

- 100% de electricidad producida con energías renovables en 2040
- Plan de aislamiento térmico
- Prohibir la venta de coches nuevos con motor de combustión para 2030

Asuntos económicos:

- Más necesidades sanitarias dentro del sistema público (cuidado dental, gafas, salud mental)
- Ingreso Básico Garantizado de 600€ al mes
- Jornada laboral de 34 horas semanales
- Inversión en el sistema educativo y universalización de la educación preescolar

Política exterior:


- Plan climático global
- Impuesto mundial a los millonarios
- Asamblea democrática mundial sobre el cambio climático
- Duplicar la ayuda exterior a los países de renta baja

Asuntos sociales:

- Reformar la ley electoral para hacer el Senado más proporcional
- Abolición de la prostitución

Sistema fiscal:

- Plan de redistribución nacional
- Aumentar los impuestos sobre las rentas superiores a 100.000 euros anuales



(e) UK

Climate policy:

- Ban of most polluting vehicles in city centers (low-emission zones)
- Thermal insulation plan
- Ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030

Economic issues:

- £150 billion to upgrade schools, hospitals, care homes and council houses
- Real Living Wage of £11 per hour for all workers aged 16 and over
- Reduce the average full-time weekly working hours to 32
- Re-establish neighbourhood policing and recruit 2,000 more frontline officers

Foreign policy:

- Global climate scheme
- Global tax on millionaires
- Global democratic assembly on climate change
- Doubling foreign aid

Societal issues:

- Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation
- Legalization of cannabis

Tax system:

- National redistribution scheme
- Wealth tax




Figure 9: Influence of the GCS on preferred platform:

Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question 30; in the U.S., asked only to non-Republicans.)





Figure 10: Beliefs regarding the support for the GCS and NR. (Questions 21 and 23)



³⁴ **A Literature review**

³⁵ **A.1 Attitudes and perceptions**

³⁶ **A.1.1 Population attitudes on global policies**

³⁷ **Carattini et al. (2019)** test the support for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples
³⁸ in five countries, representative along gender and age. For a given variant, the sample
³⁹ size is about 167 respondents per country. They find over 80% support for any variant in
⁴⁰ India, between 50% and 65% in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43% to 59% in
⁴¹ the U.S., depending on the variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding
⁴² an equal dividend for each human is close to 50% in high-income countries (e.g., at 44%
⁴³ in the U.S.), consistently with our results from the *Global* survey (see Figure 1). This is
⁴⁴ another piece of evidence that the support is lower for a tax that would “only” reduce CO₂
⁴⁵ emissions than for a quota that would unambiguously achieve the climate target. Using
⁴⁶ a conjoint analysis in the U.S. and Germany, **Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019b)** find
⁴⁷ that the support for a carbon tax increases by up to 50% if it applies to all industrialized
⁴⁸ countries rather than exclusively to one’s own country.

⁴⁹ In surveys conducted in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S., **Ghassim (2020)**
⁵⁰ finds support ranging from 55% to 74% for “a global democracy including both a global
⁵¹ government and a global parliament, directly elected by the world population, to recom-
⁵² mend and implement policies on global issues”. Through an experiment, he also finds
⁵³ that, in countries where the government stems from a coalition, voting shares would shift
⁵⁴ by 8 (Brazil) to 12 p.p. (Germany) from parties who are said to oppose global democracy
⁵⁵ to parties that supposedly support it. For instance, when Germans respondents were told
⁵⁶ that (only) the Greens and the Left support global democracy, these parties gained re-
⁵⁷ spectively 9 and 3 p.p. in vote intentions, while the SPD and the CDU-CSU each lost 6
⁵⁸ p.p. **Ghassim (2020)** also presents survey results showing strong majorities in favor of the
⁵⁹ direct election of one’s country’s UN representative in all 18 surveyed countries. Simi-
⁶⁰ larly, in each of 10 countries, there are clear majorities in favor of “a new supranational
⁶¹ entity [taking] enforceable global decisions in order to solve global risks” (**Global Chal-**
⁶² **lenges Foundation 2018**). Remarkably, already in 1946, 54% of Americans agreed (while
⁶³ 24% disagreed) that “the UN should be strengthened to make it a world government with
⁶⁴ the power to control the armed forces of all nations” (**Gallup 1946**). Furthermore, in sur-
⁶⁵ veys conducted in Argentina, China, India, Russia, Spain, and the U.S., **Ghassim et al.**

66 (2022) find majority support for UN reforms that would make United Nations' decisions
67 binding, give veto powers to a few other major countries at the Security Council, or com-
68 plement the highest body of the UN with a chamber of directly elected representatives.

69 Relatedly, Meiland et al. (2023) find that both Americans and French people prefer an
70 international settlement of climate justice, even if it encroaches on sovereignty. In a 2013
71 survey conducted in China, Germany, and the U.S., Schleich et al. (2016) show that over
72 three-quarter of people think that international climate agreements reached so far are not
73 successful and that future agreements are important. In Finland, Sivonen (2022) finds that
74 that support for a carbon tax is higher if implemented at the global level (54%) rather than
75 at the national level (40%).

76 The results from these specific questions are in line with the answers to more general
77 questions. In each of 36 countries, ISSP (2010) find near consensus that "for environ-
78 mental problems, there should be international agreements that [their country] and other
79 countries should be made to follow" (overall, 82% agree and 4% disagree). In each of
80 29 countries, ISSP (2019) uncover near consensus that "Present economic differences be-
81 tween rich and poor countries are too large" (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree). Fehr
82 et al. (2022) find that 90% of Germans want some degree of global redistribution.

83 A.1.2 Population attitudes on climate burden sharing

84 Despite differences in the description of fairness principles, surveys on burden-sharing
85 rules show consistent attitudes. Or at least, their seemingly contradictory results can be
86 made compatible with the following interpretation: Concerning emissions reductions,
87 most people want that every country engage in strong and collective decarbonization ef-
88 forts, with a global quota converging to climate neutrality in the medium run. Concerning
89 the financial effort, most people support high-emitting countries paying and low-income
90 countries receiving funding. The most supported rules are those perceived as equitable,
91 in particular an equal right to emit per person.

92 This interpretation helps to understand the apparent differences between articles that
93 approach burden sharing from different angles: cost sharing (in money terms), effort shar-
94 ing (in terms of emissions reductions), or resource sharing (in terms of rights to emit).
95 Existing papers adopt either the cost sharing or effort sharing approach, which preclude
96 any country from being a net receiver of funds. Also, by focusing on *either* the financial
97 or the decarbonization effort, these surveys miss the other half of the picture, which can
98 explain why some papers find strong support for the ability-to-pay principle while others

99 find strong support for grandfathering (defined as emissions reductions being the same
100 in every country). The literature follows these approaches to align with the notions used
101 by the UNFCCC. Yet, we argue that the resource sharing approach is preferable for un-
102 covering attitudes, as it unambiguously describes the distributive implications of each
103 rule while achieving an efficient geographical distribution of emissions reductions and
104 explicitly allowing for monetary gains for some countries.

105 Now, let us summarize the results of the different papers in the light of this clarifica-
106 tion. Schleich et al. (2016) find an identical ranking of support for burden-sharing prin-
107 ciples in China, Germany, and the U.S.: polluter-pays followed by ability-to-pay, equal
108 emissions per capita, and grandfathering. Note that the authors do not allow for emis-
109 sions trading in their description of equal *emissions per capita*, which may explain its rel-
110 atively low support. Yet, the relative support for egalitarianism also depends on how
111 *the other* rules are described. Indeed, Carlsson et al. (2011) find that Swedes prefer that
112 “all countries are allowed to emit an equal amount per capita” rather than options where
113 emissions are reduced based on current or historical emissions, for which it is explicitly
114 stated that high-emitting countries “will continue to emit more than others”. Bechtel &
115 Scheve (2013) find agreement that rich countries should pay more and historical emissions
116 should matter, but that efforts should not be solely borne by wealthy nations. More pre-
117 cisely, their conjoint analysis conducted in France, Germany, the UK, and the U.S. shows
118 that a climate agreement is 15 p.p. more likely to be preferred (to a random alternative) if
119 it includes 160 countries rather than 20, and 5 p.p. less likely to be preferred if “only rich
120 countries pay” compared to other burden-sharing rules: “rich countries pay more than
121 poor”, “countries pay proportional to current emissions” or “countries pay proportional
122 to historical emissions”. Using a choice experiment, Carlsson et al. (2013) find that the
123 least preferred option in China and the U.S. is when low-emitting countries are exempted
124 from any effort. Ability-to-pay is appreciated in both countries and is the preferred op-
125 tion in the U.S., though the preferred option in China is another one that accounts for
126 historical responsibility. In the U.S. and France, Meiland et al. (2023) find that the most
127 favored fairness principle is that “all countries commit to converge to the same average
128 of total emissions per inhabitant, compatible with a controlled climate change”. Further-
129 more, in each country, 73% disagree with grandfathering defined as “countries which
130 emitted a lot of carbon in the past have a right to continue emitting more than others in
131 the future”. The study by Meiland et al. (2023) contains many other results: for instance,
132 majorities prefer to hold countries accountable for their consumption-based rather than

¹³³ territorial emissions, and the median choice regarding historical responsibility is to hold
¹³⁴ a country accountable for its post-1990 emissions (rather than post-1850 or just their cur-
¹³⁵ rent emissions). Finally, in each of 28 (among the largest) countries, **Dabla-Norris et al.**
¹³⁶ (2023) find strong majority for “all countries” to the question “Which countries do you
¹³⁷ think should be paying to reduce carbon emissions?”. When asked to choose between a
¹³⁸ cost sharing based on *current vs. accumulated historic emissions*, a majority prefers *current*
¹³⁹ *emissions* in all countries but China and Saudi Arabia (where the two options are close to
¹⁴⁰ equally preferred).

¹⁴¹ A.1.3 Population attitudes on foreign aid

¹⁴² There is an extensive literature on attitudes towards foreign aid in donor countries.
¹⁴³ The key findings indicate that most people overestimate the amount of foreign aid and
¹⁴⁴ that only a minority wants a cut in foreign aid compared to actual amounts, especially
¹⁴⁵ once they become aware of them.

¹⁴⁶ For instance, **PIPA** (2001) shows that 83% of Americans support a multilateral effort
¹⁴⁷ to cut world hunger in half. **PIPA** (2008) shows that in each of 20 countries, a majority
¹⁴⁸ thinks that developed countries “have a moral responsibility to work to reduce hunger
¹⁴⁹ and severe poverty in poor countries”, with an average agreement of 81%. In 7 OECD
¹⁵⁰ countries, the study finds that at least 75% of respondents are willing to pay for a program
¹⁵¹ to cut hunger in half (at an estimated cost of, e.g., \$50 a year for each American).

¹⁵² **Kaufmann et al.** (2012) find that perceived aid is overestimated in each of the 24 coun-
¹⁵³ tries they study, on average by a factor of 7. In most countries, desired aid is larger than
¹⁵⁴ perceived aid.¹ They show that individuals in the top income quintile desire aid 0.13
¹⁵⁵ p.p. lower than those in the bottom 40% – which is very close to what we find. By em-
¹⁵⁶ ploying a theoretical model and examining correlations between lobbying and actual aid
¹⁵⁷ (controling for desired aid), they argue that the gap between actual and desired aid stems
¹⁵⁸ from the political influence of the rich who defend their vested interests. In **Kaufmann**
¹⁵⁹ **et al.** (2012), the U.S. is an outlier: desired aid is at the other countries’ average (3% of
¹⁶⁰ GNI), but as misperceptions are enormous, perceived aid is twice as large as desired aid.
¹⁶¹ Indeed, **Gilens** (2001) shows that even Americans with high political knowledge misper-
¹⁶² ceive actual aid, and finds that 17% fewer of them want to cut aid when we provide them
¹⁶³ specific information about the amount of aid. Similarly, **Nair** (2018) finds that the rela-

¹**Kaufmann et al.** (2012) offer the best results on desired aid because (as **Hudson & van Heerde** (2012) criticize), other studies did not take into account misperceptions of actual aid.

¹⁶⁴ tively low support for aid in the U.S. is driven by information on global distribution, as
¹⁶⁵ people underestimate their rank by 27 centiles on average and overestimate the global
¹⁶⁶ median income by a factor 10.

¹⁶⁷ **Hudson & van Heerde (2012)** provide a critical review of the literature and show that
¹⁶⁸ the strong support for poverty alleviation largely stems from intrinsic altruism. They
¹⁶⁹ note that, according to **DFID (2009)** and **PIPA (2001)**, 47% of British people find that the
¹⁷⁰ aid is wasted (mainly due to corruption), while Americans estimate that less than a quar-
¹⁷¹ ter of the aid reaches those in need, with over half ending up in the hands of corrupt
¹⁷² government officials. Despite these perceptions, most people still support aid, suggest-
¹⁷³ ing the presence of nonutilitarian motives. Consistent with **Henson et al. (2010)**, **Bauhr**
¹⁷⁴ **et al. (2013)** find that support for aid is reduced by the perception of corruption in recipi-
¹⁷⁵ ent countries. However, this effect is mitigated by the aid-corruption paradox: countries
¹⁷⁶ with higher levels of corruption often need more help. **Bodenstein & Faust (2017)** fur-
¹⁷⁷ ther show that right-wing Europeans, as well as those who perceive strong corruption
¹⁷⁸ in their country, are more likely to agree that recipient countries should “follow certain
¹⁷⁹ rules regarding democracy, human rights and governance as a condition for receiving EU
¹⁸⁰ development aid.” Using a 2002 Gallup survey and the 2006 World Values Survey, and
¹⁸¹ in line with **Bayram (2017)**, **Paxton & Knack (2012)** show that the main determinants for
¹⁸² wanting more aid are trust, left-wing ideology, interest in politics, and being a woman (all
¹⁸³ positively associated).

¹⁸⁴ **A.1.4 Population attitudes on rich tax**

¹⁸⁵ We are not aware of any previous survey on a global wealth tax,² though surveys
¹⁸⁶ consistently show strong support for national wealth taxes. In a comprehensive survey
¹⁸⁷ conducted in the UK, **Rowlingson et al. (2021)** show that a wealth tax is the preferred
¹⁸⁸ option for raising revenues. Only 8% of respondents state that total net wealth should not
¹⁸⁹ be taxed (with little differences between Labour and Conservative voters). The study also
¹⁹⁰ finds that the preferred design would be a 1% or 3% tax on net wealth above £1 million. By
¹⁹¹ asking how much taxes per year should a person with a certain income and wealth level
¹⁹² pay, **Fisman et al. (2017)** finds that the average American favors a 0.8% linear tax rate
¹⁹³ on unspecified wealth up to \$2 million (the highest wealth level tested), and a 3% linear
¹⁹⁴ rate on inherited wealth. Through a conjoint analysis conducted in three high-income

²We did not find any using the combination of “survey” or “attitudes” with “wealth tax” or “global wealth tax” in Google Scholar.

countries, Schecht & Tisch (2023) find widespread support for a wealth tax (from 78% in the U.S. to 86% in Germany and the UK), with a preference for an exemption threshold set at \$/€1 million (rather than 500,000 or 2 million) with the tax rate and tax unit having little influence on the preferred design. In 21 OECD countries, the OECD (2019) uncovers strong majority support for higher taxes on the rich to support the poor, with nearly 70% overall agreement and less than 20% disagreement. Isbell (2022) finds similarly high level of support in 34 African countries. In the UK, Patriotic Millionaires (2022) find 69% support (and 7% opposition) for a 1.1% tax on wealth in excess of £10 million. In the U.S., Americans for Tax Fairness (2021) find that 67% to 71% of the respondents support to “raise taxes for those earning more than \$400,000 a year”, “raise the income tax rate for those earning over \$1 million a year by 10 percentage points”, or “apply a 2% tax on an individual’s wealth above \$50 million each year, and 3% on wealth above \$1 billion”.

A.1.5 Population attitudes on ethical norms

Universalism Various studies have examined the concept of global identity (see Reysen & Katzarska-Miller (2018) for a review). In the 2005-2008 wave of the World Values Survey, Bayram (2015) notes that “78% of the participants in 57 countries see themselves as citizens of the world”, though the 2017-2022 wave reveals that more people feel close to their town, region or country than to the world. Enke et al. (2023a) measure universalism at the U.S. district level using donation data, and find that a district’s universalism predicts electoral outcomes better than its income or education level. To measure universalism at the individual level, Enke et al. (2023c) ask American respondents to split \$100 between a random stranger and a random person with the same income but closer to them. They distinguish different facets of universalism, and define *foreign universalism* as the inclination to give to a foreigner rather than a fellow citizen. They find a home bias for most people, which could partly be attributed to concerns about inequality, as the split involves two persons with the same income, with the foreigner most certainly living in a poorer country than the American and thus enjoying a higher social status. That being said, a home bias probably remains even after accounting for concerns about inequality, as 84% of Americans agree that “taking care of problems at home is more important than giving aid to foreign countries” (PIPA 2001). Enke et al. (2023b) also measure universalism and analyze its correlates in 7 countries, and Cappelen et al. (2022) deploy this method in 60 countries. In a lab experiment with students in the U.S., Cherry et al. (2017) show that a substantial share of people prefer policies detrimental to them due to their

²²⁸ egalitarian worldview. Waytz et al. (2019) show that left-leaning people exhibit a wider
²²⁹ “moral circle”. Jaeger & Wilks (2021) find that judgments of moral concern are equally
²³⁰ well explained by characteristics of the judge and the evaluated target.

²³¹ **Free-riding** Despite the long-standing explanation of the lack of climate action as a re-
²³² sult of free-riding, surveys consistently show that people support climate mitigation ac-
²³³ tion in their own country, even in the absence of such action in other countries. Bernauer
²³⁴ & Gampfer (2015) show this for Americans and Indians, who both overestimate their
²³⁵ country’s emissions at one third of the global total. Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019a)
²³⁶ show this in the U.S. and China using an experimental design. McEvoy & Cherry (2016)
²³⁷ show that Americans mostly invoke leadership and morality to justify unilateral climate
²³⁸ action. Using a range of methods, Aklin & Mildenberger (2020) show that the empiri-
²³⁹ cal evidence for free-riding is not compelling, and that climate inaction can be equally
²⁴⁰ well explained by distributive conflicts. Finally, review of the literature by McGrath &
²⁴¹ Bernauer (2017) shows that climate attitudes are largely nonreciprocal, and primarily
²⁴² driven by values and perceptions of the policies, rather than by considerations of what
²⁴³ other countries do.

²⁴⁴ **A.1.6 Second-order beliefs**

²⁴⁵ Allport (1924) introduced the concept of pluralistic ignorance: a shared misperception
²⁴⁶ concerning others’ beliefs. The concept became notorious when O’Gorman (1975) showed
²⁴⁷ that, towards the end of the civil rights movement, 47% of Americans believed that a ma-
²⁴⁸ jority of white people supported segregation, while only 18% did so. PIPA (2001) has
²⁴⁹ shown that while 75% of Americans are willing to contribute \$50 annually to halve world
²⁵⁰ hunger (the cost of the program), only 32% believed that the majority would share this
²⁵¹ willingness. Pluralistic ignorance regarding climate-friendly norms in the United States
²⁵² has been documented by Andre et al. (2022), who further show that correcting the misper-
²⁵³ ceptions would be effective to enhance pro-climate behaviors. Relatedly, Sparkman et al.
²⁵⁴ (2022) show that Americans underestimate the support for climate policies by nearly half,
²⁵⁵ while Drews et al. (2022) document pluralistic ignorance of carbon tax support in Spain.
²⁵⁶ Additionally, Geiger & Swim (2016) show that pluralistic ignorance regarding concern for
²⁵⁷ climate change leads people to self-silence, resulting in reduced discussions on the topic.

258 **A.2 Proposals and analyses of global policy-making**

259 **A.2.1 Global carbon pricing**

260 Global carbon pricing is widely regarded by economists as the benchmark climate
261 policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon emissions externality. For instance, Hoel
262 (1991) shows that an international carbon tax can be designed to simultaneously achieve
263 efficiency and accommodate any distributional objective. Concerning the distributional
264 objective, Grubb (1990), Agarwal & Narain (1991) and Bertram (1992) were the first to
265 advocate for an equal right to emit for each human. As Grubb (1990) states it: "by far the
266 best combination of long term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity, is obtained
267 from a system based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions which are allocated on
268 an adult per capita basis".³ Support for such solution has been renewed ever since (Baer
269 et al. 2000; Blanchard & Tirole 2021; Jamieson 2001; Rajan 2021).

270 While many endorse the egalitarian allocation of emissions permits, economists also
271 considered this outcome as politically unfeasible. Thus, to preserve the current level of
272 inequalities and to preclude transfers between countries, they adjusted their (integrated
273 assessment) models by assigning more weight to the interest of rich countries (Stanton
274 2011).

275 Gollier & Tirole (2015) synthesize the distributional decision with a *generosity* parame-
276 ter which would allocate emissions permit to countries in proportion to their population
277 if set to one, in proportion to their emissions (on the start date of the policy) if set to zero,
278 and as a mixture of the egalitarian and grandfathering rules if set in between. Using a
279 similar formula in the context of a tax, Cramton et al. (2015) (summarized in MacKay
280 et al. 2015) propose that countries with emissions per capita around the average fix the
281 generosity parameter, so that it is strategically chosen to maximize the tax rate, and to
282 fix the tax rate at the minimum price proposed by participating countries. Negotiations
283 would exclude countries with low ambition beforehand; and the treaty would impose
284 trade sanctions on non-participating countries. van den Bergh et al. (2020) propose a
285 "dual-track transition to global carbon pricing": an expanding climate club that would
286 integrate existing and new emissions trading systems, and a reorientation of UNFCCC
287 negotiations towards a global carbon price and burden-sharing rules. The IMF (2019)
288 also supports global carbon pricing or, as a first step, a carbon price floor. They propose
289 either differentiated prices among countries or international transfers, and estimate that

³By "adult per capita", Grubb (1990) means that permits would be allocated equally among adults.

²⁹⁰ a price of \$75/tCO₂ in 2030 would be compatible with a 2°C trajectory.

²⁹¹ Other authors have put forth more radical proposals. For instance, Weitzman (2017)
²⁹² envisions a World Climate Assembly with proportional representation at the global scale,
²⁹³ so that the median (human) voter would choose the carbon price level. To finance an
²⁹⁴ adaptation fund, Chancel & Piketty (2015) propose a global *progressive* carbon tax (or a
²⁹⁵ progressive tax on air tickets as a first step), so that rich people (who are high emitters)
²⁹⁶ contribute more to the public good. Fleurbaey & Zuber (2013) highlight that, given that
²⁹⁷ current emitters are probably richer than future victims of climate change damages, cli-
²⁹⁸ mate policies deserve a *negative* discount rate. In other words, we cannot dissociate the
²⁹⁹ climate issue from global inequalities, and an ethical response to this issue requires global
³⁰⁰ redistribution.

³⁰¹ A.2.2 Climate burden sharing

³⁰² The literature has discussed different burden-sharing principles. While there is no
³⁰³ agreement on their definitions as different approaches are used (cost sharing, effort shar-
³⁰⁴ ing, or resource sharing, see Section A.1.2), we describe here the burden-sharing princi-
³⁰⁵ ples consistently using the resource sharing approach (i.e., allocating emissions rights).
³⁰⁶ For other papers that define or compare different burden-sharing principles, see Leim-
³⁰⁷ bach & Giannousakis (2019); Vaillancourt & Waaub (2004); Zhou & Wang (2016).

³⁰⁸ **Equal per capita.** The simplest principle is perhaps to allocate each year's global carbon
³⁰⁹ quota based on an equal right to emit per capita, or an equal right to emit for each adult.
³¹⁰ Implementing this principle would result in large transfers from high-emitting to low-
³¹¹ emitting countries.

³¹² **Grandfathering.** In contrast, *grandfathering* entails allocating emissions rights in pro-
³¹³ portion to current emissions. From the perspective of allocating carbon pricing revenues
³¹⁴ between countries, grandfathering amounts to each country retaining the revenues it col-
³¹⁵ lects. Given that nations are sovereign and have not agreed to share emissions rights,
³¹⁶ this principle can be considered as the default option against which the other ones can be
³¹⁷ compared in terms of distributive effects.

³¹⁸ **Historical responsibilities.** At the opposite end of the spectrum is the principle of *his-
319 torical responsibilities*, which assigns to each country a carbon budget proportional to its

³²⁰ population. Countries that have emitted more than the average have accumulated a carbon debt towards countries that have emitted less, which have a carbon credit.⁴

³²¹ To fully specify this rule, one needs to define a start date for the responsibilities on past emissions and specify how to account for population size. 1990 is often chosen as a start year as it is the date of the first IPCC assessment report, marking the widespread acknowledgment of climate change, though variants include 1972, 1960, 1950 or 1850.⁵

³²² Several solutions have been proposed to account for evolving populations, none of which is flawless. Matthews (2015) allocates emissions rights on a given year proportionally to the countries' populations in that year. An alternative is to use fixed populations, such as the populations at the chosen start year (Neumayer 2000), or at a future date such as projected when the global total population will reach 9 billion (Raupach et al. 2014). Fanning & Hickel (2023) convert the projected climate debt up to 2050 into monetary terms in a 1.5°C scenario.

³²³ The rationale for using fixed populations is to prevent countries from intentionally increasing their population size to gain more emissions rights. However, this approach treats countries with different demographic trajectories similarly, effectively penalizing countries which grow more than others (if past populations are used) or grow more than expected (if future populations are used). Using current populations like Matthews (2015) also comes with its own problems. Consider two countries having contributed very little to cumulative emissions, with the same emissions per capita but different demographic patterns: country A's population has doubled in the last 30 years, while country B's population has remained stable. Despite the similar present situation, country B would accumulate more carbon credit than country A. Essentially, compensating country B more due to its past population size amounts to compensating the dead although it is future generations who will suffer. That being said, using current populations is likely a more viable solution than relying on fixed populations since, in practice, countries with similar emissions per capita tend to have relatively similar demographic trajectories.

³⁴⁷ **Ability to pay.** Another prominent burden-sharing principle is the ability to pay whereby richer countries should contribute more to mitigation efforts. To operationalize this principle, Baer et al. (2008) define *capacity* as the share of global income above an exemption

⁴It is not clear how these debts would be settled. Approaches could involve carbon removal from the atmosphere, or using a conventional social cost of carbon to monetize them, by crediting (positively or negatively) emissions rights to countries in an international carbon market.

⁵Climate equity monitor uses 1850 for example.

350 threshold. They use the threshold of \$7,500 per year (in 2005 PPP), which corresponds to
351 the top 28% of the global income distribution. According to this principle, the effort of a
352 country should be proportional to the revenues it would raise with a linear income tax on
353 individual income above \$7,500.


354 **Climate Equity Reference Framework** Baer et al. (2008) propose another effort-sharing
355 method, the *Climate Equity Reference Framework* (CERF), which blends the ability to pay
356 principle with their version of historical responsibilities. They define *responsibility* as fol-
357 lows: they determine the mitigation requirement as the emissions gap between the Busi-
358 ness as Usual scenario from IEA (2007) and a 2°C (with 68-86% probability) scenario.
359 The mitigation requirement is then allocated to countries proportionally to their cumu-
360 lative emissions (starting in 1990). The emissions right of a country according to their
361 *responsibility* are then determined by its Business as Usual emissions minus its mitigation
362 requirement. A country's emissions right, dubbed its *greenhouse development right* (GDR),
363 is defined using a combination of *capacity* (C) and *responsibility* (R) to allocate the miti-
364 gation requirement between countries. This allocation key is called the *Responsibility and*
365 *Capacity Indicator* (RCI) and defined as $RCI = R^a \cdot C^{1-a}$, with $a = .4$.

366 This choice of parameter may seem somewhat arbitrary, but the **EcoEquity calculator**
367 allows for a customization all CERF parameters (Holz et al. 2019). The Climate Action
368 Network has adopted the CERF as its *fair share* framework, though the different national
369 chapters of the organization could not agree on a choice of parameters (Athanasou et al.
370 2022).⁶

371 The CERF approach was adopted by a prominent network of climate NGOs because
372 it operationalizes the principle of *common but differentiated responsibilities and respective ca-*
373 *pabilities* recognized by the UNFCCC. However, this approach suffers from three draw-
374 backs. First, its definition of historical responsibility as an effort sharing principle is in-
375 consistent with the principle of an equal right of cumulative emissions per capita, which
376 is a resource sharing principle. For instance, consider a fully decarbonized country that
377 has exhausted *exactly* its cumulative carbon budget. According to the CERF notion of *re-*

⁶The U.S. Climate Action Network and the think tank EcoEquity (funded by Tom Athanasiou and late Paul Baer) choose the following parameters: an equal weight for R and C ($a = .5$), their own **business as usual projections** of CO₂ emissions based on trends of GDP growth and emissions intensity reduction, a 1.5°C (Low Energy Demand) pathway, 1950 as the start year for responsibility, a gradual inclusion of income to compute *capacity* (which adds complexity to the calculation) from a full exemption of the bottom 70% (\$7,500 per year) linearly to a full inclusion of the top 2% (\$72,211), the inclusion of non-CO₂ gases but not of emissions embodied in trade (i.e. imported emissions) nor LULUCF (land-use).

Figure A1: Net gains from the CERF burden-sharing rule in 2030.




Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO₂.

³⁷⁸ *sponsibility*, this country would still be expected to contribute significantly to mitigation
³⁷⁹ efforts due to its relatively high cumulative emissions. Yet, according to the usual defini-
³⁸⁰ tion of the historical responsibility based on an equal right of cumulative emissions p.c.,
³⁸¹ this country would have no liability as it has not exceeded its carbon budget. Second, a
³⁸² country with moderate incomes⁷ and low historical responsibility would be assigned a
³⁸³ relatively low effort, even if its emissions per capita are high. In other words, the CERF
³⁸⁴ approach favors countries that have experienced recent growth. Third, the poorest coun-
³⁸⁵ tries would be granted emissions rights close to the Business as Usual trajectory, as they
³⁸⁶ would bear virtually none of the effort. But this trajectory carries the current (unfair) in-
³⁸⁷ come distribution and amounts to grandfathering. For example, the baseline trajectory
³⁸⁸ for emissions⁸ in the DRC entail 0.8 tCO₂ p.c. in 2030, which is five times less than the
³⁸⁹ world average emissions right per capita. In this framework, if the DRC were to grow
³⁹⁰ faster than projected in the baseline, it would actually have to pay to the rest of the world
³⁹¹ for mitigation efforts. This is what is likely to happen to countries like Mexico or Senegal,

⁷Using the above parameters, moderate incomes means few incomes above the global 70th. percentile.

⁸The baseline trajectory is computed as the “product of the projected GDP and CO₂ emission intensity”.

Figure A2: Difference between net gains from Greenhouse Development Rights and equal rights per capita.



Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO₂.

from our simulation of the net gains of CERF compared to a situation without international transfers (see Figure A1). In contrast, a resource sharing approach based on equal per capita emissions would result in low-income countries receiving emissions rights exceeding their projected trajectories, leading to transfers from high-income countries. By construction, such transfers do not occur in an effort sharing approach like the CERF, implying lower transfers to low-income countries. Compared to an equal right to emit per capita, this method favors countries like China (whose emissions are allowed to remain stable over 2020-2030 instead of a reduction of 35-40%) and penalizes regions like Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (see Figure A2).

Contraction and Convergence. Meyer (2004) defines a rule called *contraction and convergence* (C&C), which combines elements of grandfathering and equal per capita approaches. According to C&C, each country is granted (tradable) emissions rights, starting at their current emission level and converging linearly to an equal per capita level at some pre-specified date. The *contraction* part refers to the reduction of total emissions rights in

406 line with the climate objective. When discussed around year 2000, the convergence date
407 was specified between 2020 and 2050. This rule, advocated by the Global Commons Insti-
408 tute (a UK think tank), was on the agenda from COP2 to COP15 (i.e., until Copenhagen,
409 and including in Kyoto), including at Kyoto, and was endorsed by the European Parlia-
410 ment in 1998. More recently, [Gignac & Matthews \(2015\)](#) have shown how C&C can be
411 made consistent with historical responsibilities by computing carbon debts and credits
412 until the convergence date.

413 **Assessments of the NDCs against burden-sharing principles.** The regime established
414 by the 2015 Paris agreement to regulate climate change respects none of the burden-
415 sharing principles and relies instead on voluntary contributions from each country, known
416 as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). A body of literature (reviewed by [Höhne
et al. 2014](#)) assesses the NDCs against the emissions reduction objective and different
417 burden-sharing principles. To evaluate the NDCs, [Gao et al. \(2019\)](#) examine their emis-
418 sions projections for 2030 and estimate the resulting increase in temperature. The most
419 recent and comprehensive assessment of NDCs against burden-sharing principles is con-
420 ducted by [van den Berg et al. \(2020\)](#) (see also [Raupach et al. 2014](#); [Robiou du Pont et al.
2016, 2017](#)).

423 A.2.3 Global redistribution

424 Addressing global poverty, inequalities, and climate change are central to the univer-
425 sally agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). As highlighted by [Bolch et al. \(2022\)](#),
426 low-income countries often lack sufficient domestic resources to eradicate poverty in the
427 short term, indicating the need for international transfers to rapidly end global poverty.
428 In *Beyond the Welfare State*, Gunnar Myrdal (1960) called for a *welfare world*. In his Nobel
429 lecture, he emphasized the necessity of increasing foreign aid to low-income countries,
430 stating that “The type of marginal foreign aid we have provided, is clearly not enough to
431 meet their barest needs” ([Myrdal 1975](#)).

432 Drawing on the labor theory of value, some economists have argued that global in-
433 equalities arise from unequal exchange in international trade ([Arghiri 1972](#)). Indeed, the
434 stark disparity in wages between countries implies that one unit of labor exported by an
435 American commands five units of labor embodied in imported goods, whereas Ethiopi-
436 ans need to export 50 units of labor to obtain one unit through imports ([Alsamawi et al.
2014; Reyes et al. 2017](#)). Taking stock, [Hickel \(2017\)](#) proposes to globally establish mini-

⁴³⁸ mum wages at 50% of the local median wage. [Hickel \(2017\)](#) also suggests other solutions
⁴³⁹ against global inequality, which served as inspiration for our questionnaire. These mea-
⁴⁴⁰ sures include the cancellation of low-income countries' public debt, fair trade practices
⁴⁴¹ (such as eliminating tariffs from high-income countries, reducing patent protections, and
⁴⁴² reducing farming subsidies in rich countries), initiatives to combat tax evasion (e.g., im-
⁴⁴³ plementing a global financial register), land reform, and a fair international climate policy.

⁴⁴⁴ [Piketty \(2014\)](#) prominently advocates for a progressive wealth tax on a global scale,
⁴⁴⁵ although he does not specify whether the resulting revenues should fund international
⁴⁴⁶ transfers.

⁴⁴⁷ [Kopczuk et al. \(2005\)](#) compute the optimal linear income tax rates for all countries in
⁴⁴⁸ two ways: globally centralized and decentralized (i.e., within each country and without
⁴⁴⁹ international transfers). They show that the average decentralized rate is 41%. In con-
⁴⁵⁰ trast, the global rate is 62%, which would generate funds to finance a basic income of
⁴⁵¹ 250\$/month (higher than the GPD per capita of 73 countries). From a current global Gini
⁴⁵² index of 0.695, they show that decentralized optimal taxation would only marginally re-
⁴⁵³ duce global inequality to 0.69, whereas global taxation would significantly decrease the
⁴⁵⁴ Gini to 0.25. The study also shows that the existing level of foreign aid can only be ratio-
⁴⁵⁵ nalized if the U.S. attaches 2,000 less value to a citizen in the poorest countries than to an
⁴⁵⁶ American citizen (or 1,000 less if half of the transfers are diverted due to corruption).

⁴⁵⁷ A.2.4 Basic income

⁴⁵⁸ Unconditional cash transfers (UCT) are increasingly seen as an effective way to end ex-
⁴⁵⁹ treme poverty. A growing body of evidence from randomized control trials supports this
⁴⁶⁰ notion: [Gangopadhyay et al. \(2015\)](#) find that UCT outperform a food subsidy; [Haushofer & Shapiro \(2016\)](#) find significant impacts on health, economic outcomes, and psycholog-
⁴⁶¹ ical well-being; [Egger et al. \(2022\)](#) find large positive spillovers on non-recipient people,
⁴⁶² and minimal inflation. Reviews of existing research further confirm the positive outcomes
⁴⁶³ of UCT ([Bastagli et al. 2016; Standing 2014](#)).

⁴⁶⁴ While the delivery of cash to remote areas and the prevention of fraud is challenging
⁴⁶⁵ in regions without a proper civil register, the use of mobile phones as banking and bio-
⁴⁶⁶ metric identification tools could provide viable solutions ([Harnett 2017](#)). Although many
⁴⁶⁷ places still lack internet access, satellite internet technology shows promising progress,
⁴⁶⁸ with some experts suggesting that it could soon become affordable and universally ac-
⁴⁶⁹ cessible ([Hanson 2016](#)).

471 **A.2.5 Global democracy**


472 The idea of world federalism has a long-standing history, dating back at least to Kant
473 (1795), who argued that a world federation was essential for achieving perpetual peace.
474 International organizations were eventually created to foster peace, though the League
475 of Nations and its successor, the United Nations, never succeeded in avoiding military
476 conflicts. Many have argued that we need stronger and more democratic global institu-
477 tions, competent to address global challenges such as extreme poverty, climate change,
478 wars, pandemics, or financial stability. Before World War II, feminist and pacifist Maver-
479 ick Lloyd & Schwimmer (1937) founded the *Campaign for World Government*, advocating
480 for direct representation at the global scale. Einstein (1947) called for the subordination of
481 the UN Security Council to the General Assembly and the direct election of UN delegates.
482 Since 2007, there has been widespread support for a United Nations Parliamentary As-
483 sembly (UNPA) from individuals and institutions in over 150 countries, including 1,800
484 member of parliament, heads of state, as well the European Parliament, the Pan-African
485 Parliament, and the Latin-American Parliament. The UNPA campaign calls for a gradual
486 implementation of a democratic assembly, starting with a consultative assembly com-
487 posed of members of national parliaments, allowing for the direct election of its members
488 in voluntary countries, and progressing towards a world parliament with binding legisla-
489 tive powers once all members are directly elected (Leinen & Bummel 2018). Besides the
490 UNPA, various scholars have put forward different models of global democracy, ranging
491 from deliberative spaces to a world federation (Archibugi et al. 2011). While the most rad-
492 ical proposals may still be on the horizon, an assembly of random citizens representative
493 of the world population has already been convened. It has produced a joint statement at
494 the COP26 (Global Assembly 2022), and a similar *World Citizens' Assembly* should soon
495 follow.

496 B Raw results

497 Country-specific raw results are also available as supplementary material files: **US**,
 498 **EU**, **FR**, **DE**, **ES**, **UK**.

Figure A3: Absolute support for global climate policies (Reproduced from *Dechezleprêtre et al. 2022*, Figure A20.).

Share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* (in percent, $n = 40,680$). The color blue denotes an absolute majority. See Figure 1 for the relative support. (Questions A-I of the global survey.)



*In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

Figure A4: Correct answers to comprehension questions (in percent). (Questions 16-18)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
With NR, typical [country] people win and richest lose	68	73	76	73	73	70
With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win	60	68	62	72	67	67
With GCS+NR, typical [country] people neither win nor lose	54	60	63	59	57	61

Figure A5: Number of correct answers to comprehension questions (mean). (Questions 16-18)




Figure A6: List experiment: mean number of supported policies. (Question 24)




Figure A7: Conjoint analyses 1 and 2. (Questions 25-27)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)	54	76	80	71	81	74
C+NR+GCS preferred to C+NR	55	74	79	71	78	68
NR+GCS preferred to NR	55	77	79	74	79	77
NR+C preferred to NR	62	84	88	83	84	82
GCS+NR preferred to C+NR	47	52	53	53	49	52
NR+C+GCS preferred to NR	55	77	86	73	83	72

Table A1: Effects on the support for the GCS of a question on its pros and cons and on information about the actual support, in the U.S. (See Section D in the US2 Questionnaire)

	Support			
	Global Climate Scheme		National Redistribution	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Control group mean	0.557	0.557	0.569	0.569
Treatment: Open-ended field on GCS pros & cons	-0.073** (0.035)	-0.071** (0.031)	-0.035 (0.035)	-0.030 (0.032)
Treatment: Closed questions on GCS pros & cons	-0.109*** (0.034)	-0.096*** (0.031)	-0.065* (0.034)	-0.062** (0.031)
Treatment: Info on actual support for GCS and NR	-0.021 (0.034)	-0.015 (0.031)	0.048 (0.033)	0.056* (0.031)
Includes controls		✓		✓
Observations	2,000	1,995	2,000	1,995
R ²	0.007	0.170	0.007	0.154

Figure A8: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See original translations in Figure 8; Question 29)




Figure A9: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements seen as important for supporting the GCS in a 4-Likert scale (in percent). (Question 32)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
It would succeed in limiting climate change	78	85	85	86	86	83
It would hurt the [Country] economy	81	67	61	67	66	69
It would penalize my household	75	60	55	63	59	63
It would make people change their lifestyle	78	79	83	79	78	77
It would reduce poverty in low-income countries	77	85	88	85	86	81
It might be detrimental to some poor countries	79	72	79	67	78	70
It could foster global cooperation	82	81	81	82	85	80
It could fuel corruption in low-income countries	79	75	82	69	79	72
It could be subject to fraud	80	79	80	74	83	81
It would be technically difficult to put in place	77	71	74	62	79	71
Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences	89	82	89	68	91	88

Figure A10: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements found in the open-ended field on the GCS (manually recoded, in percent). (Question 31)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
environment	26	31	37	26	43	24
unclassifiable	25	24	23	28	25	22
pro	22	23	21	22	33	20
con	22	17	12	18	20	16
cost	17	12	11	14	17	7
poorest humans	11	7	6	9	5	6
tax redistribution	10	7	11	8	4	9
support	8	6	3	5	6	8
oppose	7	3	2	3	1	4
don't know	6	8	10	8	7	10
empty	6	3	0	0	0	13
difficult agreement	5	10	7	12	8	8
difficult implement	3	5	5	6	4	6
misunderstands gcs	3	2	2	1	3	1
misunderstands question	2	2	1	3	3	3

Figure A11: Perceptions of the GCS. Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent). (Question 31)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
world: international world country global	28	22	23	19	22	23
environment: climate environment animal emission nature	26	21	17	28	21	17
poorest: poor low-income 700 poverty	16	8	8	9	4	10
pro: pro pros pros pros:	16	3	0	1	9	5
con: con con: cons cons:	15	4	0	1	8	6
cost: cost expensive higher price 85 inflation	13	7	5	9	7	6
tax: tax	8	3	4	3	2	2
redistribution: rich redistribution	8	4	5	4	3	5
implementation: implement enforce policy monitor	6	4	5	6	0	5
agreement: agree accept participate	3	4	5	6	2	3

Figure A12: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality (mean). (Question 34)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Donation to own country	35	34	31	38	34	32
Donation to Africa	32	35	33	41	32	33

Table A2: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality. (Question 34)

	Donation to poor people (in %)			
	All	US	US	Eu
Poor is in own country	0.590 (0.799)	2.509** (1.152)	0.046 (1.691)	-1.349 (1.108)
Poor is in own country × Vote: <i>not</i> Biden			3.954* (2.279)	
Mean	34.034	33.658	33.658	34.41
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000	3,000
R ²	0.0001	0.002	0.034	0.0005

Figure A13: Support for a global wealth tax.

"Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-income countries?

Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education." (Question 35)




Figure A14: Support for a national wealth tax financing public services like healthcare, education, and social housing. (Question 36)




Figure A15: Preferred share of global wealth tax revenues that should be pooled to finance low-income countries. (Question 37)




Figure A16: Support for sharing half of global tax revenues with low-income countries, rather than each country retaining all the revenues it collects (in percent). (Question 38)



Figure A17: Actual, perceived and preferred amount of foreign aid, with random info (or not) on actual amount. (Mean, Questions 39, 40)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Actual foreign aid (in % of public spending)	0.4	1.1	0.8	1.3	0.5	1.7
Belief about foreign aid	4.7	2.9	2.7	2.9	2.8	3.5
Preferred foreign aid (with info)	1.8	2.7	3.4	2.9	2.1	2.5
Preferred foreign aid (no info)	4	3.9	4.7	4.4	3.1	3.4

Figure A18: Preferred foreign aid (after info or after perception). (Questions 39 and 40)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as current	70	75	91	76	77	57
Preferred foreign aid is higher than current	47	59	75	58	63	43
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as perceived	57	74	83	79	77	58
Preferred foreign aid is higher than perceived	37	53	64	59	54	39

Figure A19: Perceived foreign aid. “From your best guess, what percentage of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?” (Question 39)

Actual values: France: 0.8%; Germany: 1.3%; Spain: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%; U.S.: 0.4%.




Figure A20: Preferred foreign aid (without info on actual amount).

“If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?” (Question 40)




Figure A21: Preferred foreign aid (after info on actual amount).

"Actually, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid.

If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?" (Question 40)




Figure A22: Preferences for funding increased foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]
 "How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent) (Question 41)




Figure A23: Preferences of spending following reduced foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]
 "How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent) (Question 42)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Higher spending on defense	19	23	11	21	17	31
Higher spending on retirement pensions	23	41	22	51	57	35
Higher spending on healthcare	40	57	31	42	80	70
Higher spending on welfare benefits	13	20	7	19	39	20
Higher spending on education	30	45	31	47	58	43
Higher spending on other programs	6	6	6	4	9	8
Lower taxes on the wealthiest	5	2	5	2	0	2
Lower corporate income tax rate	12	6	10	4	8	6
Lower personal income tax rates	48	29	26	27	37	30
Lower public deficit	32	24	21	13	41	21

Figure A24: Willingness to sign real-stake petition for the Global Climate Scheme or National Redistribution, compared to stated support in corresponding subsamples (e.g. support for the GCS in the branch where the petition was about the GCS). (Question 43)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Petition for the GCS	51	69	69	66	78	69
(Comparable) support for the GCS	53	76	81	74	81	74
Petition for NR	57	67	65	66	74	68
(Comparable) support for NR	58	72	76	65	78	75

Figure A25: Absolute support for various global policies (Percent of (*somewhat or strong*) support). (Questions 44 and 45. See Figure 2 for the relative support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	41	54	52	53	62	51
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	53	65	62	66	68	62
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	45	58	55	60	62	54
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	31	37	36	30	45	40
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	34	44	44	43	52	43
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	39	49	39	51	50	54
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	42	55	54	54	61	53
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	44	70	73	70	72	65
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	34	45	40	48	44	50
National tax on millionaires funding public services	62	76	70	79	79	77
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	58	71	69	72	78	71

Figure A26: Preferred approach of diplomats at international climate negotiations.
In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend [own country] interests or global justice? (Question 49)




Figure A27: Percent of selected issues viewed as important.
 “To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem?” (Question 56)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Income inequality in [Country]	55	59	54	58	71	57
Climate change	59	66	66	63	73	63
Global poverty	50	57	50	58	75	49

Figure A28: Group defended when voting.
 “What group do you defend when you vote?” (Question 57)




Figure A29: Mean prioritization of policies.

Mean number of points allocated policies to express intensity of support (among six policies chosen at random). Blue color means that the policy has been awarded more points than the average policy. (Question 58)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	13	21	10	14	35	31
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	23	22	25	21	22	23
econ3	21	15	13	18	17	13
econ4	28	22	27	17	24	20
soc1	10	17	13	17	12	21
soc2	13	9	14	8	10	8
climate1	14	15	11	18	20	12
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	20	18	22	19	15	17
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030	11	9	8	8	9	11
tax1: National redistribution scheme	14	15	16	15	15	15
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	19	19	21	18	17	19
foreign1: Global climate scheme	15	20	20	23	16	17
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	21	20	20	23	19	20
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	15	15	15	17	14	13
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	9	11	13	14	9	8

Figure A30: Positive prioritization of policies.

Percent of people allocating a positive number of points to policies, expressing their support (among six policies chosen at random). (Question 58)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	64	78	61	67	96	95
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	83	86	85	84	87	89
econ3	81	69	50	78	80	68
econ4	88	86	91	79	89	85
soc1	57	75	69	74	74	78
soc2	58	58	72	53	64	48
climate1	70	76	65	79	89	75
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	79	83	86	84	78	80
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030	62	58	56	48	60	70
tax1: National redistribution scheme	67	79	79	76	82	79
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	80	79	76	78	83	85
foreign1: Global climate scheme	71	83	84	85	84	78
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	80	81	79	83	82	82
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	71	77	79	74	83	76
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	58	70	79	74	74	57

Figure A31: Charity donation.

"How much did you give to charities in 2022?" (Question 50)




Figure A32: Interest in politics.

"To what extent are you interested in politics?" (Question 51)




Figure A33: Desired involvement of government (from 1 to 5). (Question 52)




Figure A34: Political leaning on economics (from 1: Left to 5: Right). (Question 53)




Figure A35: Voted in last election. (Question 54)




Figure A36: Vote in last election (aggregated). PNR includes people who did not vote or prefer not to answer. (Question 55)




Figure A37: Perception that survey was biased.
“Do you feel that this survey was politically biased?” (Question 61)





Figure A38: Opinion on the fight against extreme poverty.

“According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme poverty in low-income countries?” (Question 62)

(a) Elements found in the open-ended field on the question
 (manually recoded, in percent)



(b) Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).




Figure A39: Main attitudes by vote (“Right” spans from Center-right to Far right).
 (Relative support in percent in Questions 20, 35, 45, 46, 49)

	Europe Left	Europe PNR/Non-voter	Europe Right	U.S. Left	U.S. PNR/Non-voter	U.S. Right
Support for the GCS	85	72	71	74	53	26
Global tax on millionaires	94	83	76	85	71	40
Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries	61	52	45	55	67	41
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	73	65	52	62	49	23
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	93	79	74	87	70	38
[Country]'s foreign aid should be increased	93	83	72	92	81	48
Universalist	56	48	26	53	49	23

499 C Questionnaire of the global survey (section on global
500 policies)

501 A. At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be
502 put in place? (Multiple answers are possible) [Figures 1 and A3]
503 *Global; [Federal / European / ...]; [State / National]; Local*

504 B. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “[country] should take mea-
505 sures to fight climate change.”

506 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly
507 agree*

508 C. How should [country] climate policies depend on what other countries do?

- 509
- 510 • If other countries do more, [country] should do...
 - 511 • If other countries do less, [country] should do...

512 *Much less; Less; About the same; More; Much more*

513 D. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] All countries have signed the
514 Paris agreement that aims to contain global warming “well below +2 °C”. To limit
515 global warming to this level, there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we
516 can emit globally, called the carbon budget. Each country could aim to emit less
517 than a share of the carbon budget. To respect the global carbon budget, countries
518 that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less
than their share.

519 Do you support such a policy? [Figures 1 and A3]

520 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
521 support*

522 E. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] Suppose the above policy is in
523 place. How should the carbon budget be divided among countries? [Figures 1 and
524 A3]

525 *The emission share of a country should be proportional to its population, so that each human
526 has an equal right to emit.; The emission share of a country should be proportional to its
527 current emissions, so that those who already emit more have more rights to emit.; Countries
528 that have emitted more over the past decades (from 1990 onwards) should receive a lower*

529 *emission share, because they have already used some of their fair share.; Countries that will*
530 *be hurt more by climate change should receive a higher emission share, to compensate them*
531 *for the damages.*

532 F. [In the U.S., Denmark, and France only] To achieve a given reduction of greenhouse
533 gas emissions globally, costly investments are needed. Ideally, how should countries
534 bear the costs of fighting climate change?

- 535 • Countries should pay in proportion to their income
- 536 • Countries should pay in proportion to their current emissions [Used as a sub-
537 stitute to the equal right per capita in Figure 1]
- 538 • Countries should pay in proportion to their past emissions (from 1990 on-
539 wards) [Used as a substitute to historical responsibilities in Figure 1]
- 540 • The richest countries should pay it all, so that the poorest countries do not have
541 to pay anything
- 542 • The richest countries should pay even more, to help vulnerable countries face
543 adverse consequences: vulnerable countries would then receive money instead
544 of paying [Used as a substitute to compensating vulnerable countries in Figures
545 1 and A3]

546 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly*
547 *agree*

548 G. Do you support or oppose establishing a global democratic assembly whose role
549 would be to draft international treaties against climate change? Each adult across
550 the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly. [Figures 1 and A3]
551 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
552 *support*

553 H. Imagine the following policy: a global tax on greenhouse gas emissions funding a
554 global basic income. Such a policy would progressively raise the price of fossil fuels
555 (for example, the price of gasoline would increase by [40 cents per gallon] in the
556 first years). Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil
557 fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Revenues from the tax would be used to
558 finance a basic income of [\$30] per month to each human adult, thereby lifting the
559 700 million people who earn less than \$2/day out of extreme poverty. The average

560 [American] person would lose a bit from this policy as they would face [\$130] per
561 month in price increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive.

562 Do you support or oppose such a policy? [Figures 1 and A3]

563 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
564 *support*

- 565 I. Do you support or oppose a tax on all millionaires around the world to finance low-
566 income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate ac-
567 tion? This would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drink-
568 ing water, healthcare, and education. [Figures 1 and A3]
569 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
570 *support*

571 D Questionnaire of the complementary surveys

572 Below, we provide the generic questionnaire (based on the U.S. version), which roughly
 573 corresponds to the *Eu* questionnaire as well as the combination of the *US1* and *US2* ques-
 574 tionnaire. The main difference between Europe and the U.S. is that we split the *US2*
 575 sample into four random branches to include some treatments before the Section D on
 576 the GCS. Besides the control group, the treatments are: information regarding the sup-
 577 port of Americans for the GCS and NR, an open-ended field, and a closed question on the
 578 pros and cons of the GCS. The pros and cons of the GCS are also asked in *Eu* (likewise,
 579 either as an open-ended field or a question), but only in Section D, after the support.

580 At each section or question, we specify in square brackets in which questionnaires it
 581 is present (*US1*, *US2* and/or *Eu*) as well as country specificities. Figures A40-A42 also
 582 allow understanding the structure of each questionnaire. Qualtrics and Word versions of
 583 the questionnaires in each language are available on our [public repository](#), together with
 584 a spreadsheet that summarizes country specificities and our sources.

Figure A40: *Eu* survey structure




Figure A41: US1 survey structure





Figure A42: US2 survey structure



585 [Eu, US1, US2] Socio-demographic characteristics

586 1. Welcome to this survey!

587
588 This survey is **anonymous** and is conducted for research purposes on a representa-
589 tive sample of [1,000 British people].

590
591 It takes [US1, US2: 10 to 15 min; Eu: around 20 min] to complete.

592
593 The survey contains lotteries and awards for those who get the correct answer to
594 some understanding questions.

595 If you are attentive and lucky, you can win up to [US1, Eu: \$350; US2: \$150] in
596 points. (See terms and conditions).

597 Please answer every question carefully.

598
599 **Do you agree to participate in the survey?**

600 Yes; No

601 2. What is your gender?

602 Woman; Man; Other

603 3. How old are you?

604 Below 18; 18 to 20; 21 to 24; 25 to 29; 30 to 34; 35 to 39; 40 to 44; 45 to 49; 50 to 54; 55 to
605 59; 60 to 64; 65 to 69; 70 to 74; 75 to 79; 80 to 84; 85 to 89; 90 to 99; 100 or above

606 4. [Eu] In which country do you live?

607 France; Germany; Spain; United Kingdom; Other

608 5. What is your ZIP code? [UK: What is your Outcode (the left part of your postcode,
609 e.g. if your postcode is N7 8H7, just enter N7)?]

610 6. Do you live with your partner (if you have one)?

611 Yes; No

612 7. How many people are in your household? The household includes: you, the mem-
613 bers of your family who live with you, and your dependants.

614 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more

- 615 8. [Eu] How many children below 14 live with you?
- 616 1; 2; 3; 4 or more
- 617 9. [US1, US2] What race or ethnicity do you identify with? (Multiple answers are
- 618 possible)
- 619 *White; Black or African American; Hispanic; Asian; American Indian or Alaskan Native;*
- 620 *Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; Other: {open field}; Prefer not to say*
- 621 10. What is the [US1, US2: annual; Eu: monthly] gross income of your household (before
- 622 withholding tax)? This includes all income: wages, self-employment earnings, So-
- 623 cial Security benefits, pensions, investment income, welfare payments, and income
- 624 from other sources.
- 625 [US1, US2: Items based on household total income deciles and quartiles, namely:
- 626 *Less than \$20,000; between \$20,001 and \$35,000; between \$35,001 and \$42,000; between*
- 627 *\$42,001 and \$50,000; between \$50,001 and \$65,000; between \$65,001 and \$82,000; between*
- 628 *\$82,001 and \$103,000; between \$103,001 and \$130,000; between \$130,001 and \$145,000;*
- 629 *between \$145,001 and \$165,000; between \$165,001 and \$250,000; More than \$250,000; I*
- 630 *prefer not to answer;*
- 631 *Eu: custom thresholds, taking into account household composition Questions 6-8,*
- 632 *and corresponding to the country's deciles and quartiles of standard of living, cf.*
- 633 *the sheet "Income" in [this spreadsheet](#)]*
- 634 11. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
- 635 *[Below upper secondary, Upper secondary, and Post secondary are coded as the first two,*
- 636 *middle three, and last three items, respectively.*
- 637 *US1, US2: Primary school or less; Eighth grade; Some high school; Regular high school*
- 638 *diploma/GED or alternative credential; Some college, no degree; 2-year college degree or as-*
- 639 *sociates degree (for example: AA, AS); Bachelor's degree (for example: BA, BS); Master's*
- 640 *degree or above (MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA, MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD, PhD);*
- 641 *FR: École primaire / Aucun; Brevet; CAP ou BEP; Baccalauréat professionnel ou tech-*
- 642 *nologique; Baccalauréat général; Bac +2 (BTS, DUT, DEUG...); Bac +3 (licence...); Bac*
- 643 *+5 ou plus (master, école d'ingénieur ou de commerce, doctorat, médecine, maîtrise, DEA,*
- 644 *DESS...)*
- 645 *DE: Keine abgeschlossene Schulbildung / Grundschule; Untere Sekundarstufe (z.B. Haupt-*
- 646 *oder Realschulabschluss); Erstausbildung; Beruflicher Abschluss / Ausbildung; Abitur;*
- 647 *Zweitausbildung; Bachelor oder Fachhochschulabschluss; Master-Abschluss oder höher*

648 ES: *Educación primaria / No he completado la enseñanza básica; Educación secundaria obli-*
649 *gatoria (ESO); Formación profesional básica (FP); Formación profesional de grado medio;*
650 *Bachillerato; Formación profesional de grado superior; Grado universitario; Máster/doctrado*
651 *UK: Primary education or less; Some secondary school; GSCE; Vocational Upper secondary*
652 *(Level 3 award, level 3 certificate, level 3 diploma, advanced apprenticeship, etc.); High*
653 *school degree (A level); Higher vocational education (Level 4+ award, level 4+ certificate,*
654 *level 4+ diploma, higher apprenticeship, etc.); Bachelor's Degree (BA, BSc, BEng, etc.);*
655 *Postgraduate diploma or certificate, Master's Degree (MSc, MA, MBA, etc.) or Ph.D.]*

656 12. What is your employment status?

657 *Full-time employed; Part-time employed; Self-employed; Student; Retired; Unemployed*
658 *(searching for a job); Inactive (not searching for a job)*

659 13. Are you a homeowner or a tenant? (Multiple answers are possible)

660 *Tenant; Owner; Landlord renting out property; Hosted free of charge*

661 14. [If lives with partner: What is the estimated value of your household's assets (in
662 U.S. dollars)?]

663 If does not live with partner: What is the estimated value of your assets (in U.S.
664 dollars)?]

665 Include here all your possessions (home, car, savings, etc.) net of debt. For example,
666 if you own a house worth [\$]300,000 and you have [\$]100,000 left to repay on your
667 mortgage, your assets are [\$]200,000.

668 I estimate my [If lives with partner: household's] assets net of debt to be:

669 [Items based on the following individual wealth quintiles, doubled if lives with
670 partner. US1, US2: *Less than \$0 (I have a net debt); Close to \$0; Between \$4,000 and*
671 *\$60,000; Between \$60,000 and \$190,000; More than \$190,000; For Eu, the thresholds are:*
672 *FR: €5/50/150/300k; DE: €0/35/130/280k; ES: €0/50/100/200k; UK: £3/45/115/270k]*

673 15. [US1, US2 (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the vote question)] What
674 do you consider to be your political affiliation, as of today?

675 *Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other; Non-Affiliated*

678 [Eu, US1, US2] Global climate scheme

679 In the following, we describe two policies, on which we will survey your opinion.
680 To check that you have attentively read the descriptions, **we will ask some under-**
681 **standing questions afterwards: those who get correct answers can win up to \$150.**

682 **Global climate scheme:** At the Paris agreement in 2015, all countries have agreed
683 to contain global warming “well below +2 °C”. To limit global warming to this
684 level, **there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally.**

685 To meet the climate target, a limited number of permits to emit greenhouse gases
686 can be created globally. Polluting firms would be required to buy permits to cover
687 their emissions. Such a policy would **make fossil fuel companies pay** for their
688 emissions and progressively raise the price of fossil fuels. **Higher prices would en-**
689 **courage people and companies to use less fossil fuels, reducing greenhouse gas**
690 **emissions.**

691 In accordance with the principle that each human has an equal right to pollute, the
692 revenues generated by the sale of permits could finance a global basic income. **Each**
693 **adult in the world would receive [US1, US2: \$30/month; UK: \$30 (that is £25) per**
694 **month; FR, DE, ES: €30/month], thereby lifting out of extreme poverty the 700 mil-**
695 **lion people who earn less than \$2/day.**

696 **The typical [American] would lose out financially [US1, US2: \$85, FR: €10, DE:**
697 **€25, ES: €5, UK: £20] per month** (as he or she would face [\$115] per month in price
698 increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive).

699 The policy could be put in place as soon as countries totaling more than 60% of
700 global emissions agree on it. Countries that would refuse to take part in the policy
701 could face sanctions (like tariffs) from the rest of the World and would be excluded
702 from the basic income.)

703 16. Who would win or lose financially in the Global climate scheme? [Figure A4]

704
705 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

706 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

707 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.;*

708 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

709 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would lose and*

711 *the 700 million poorest humans would win* from the Global climate scheme. Now, here
712 is the second policy:

713

714 **National redistribution scheme:**

715 This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [US1, US2: 5%; Eu: 1%] and provide
716 cash transfers to all adults. More precisely, **each [American] adult would receive**
717 **[\$85] per month** (that is [\$1,000] per year). This would be financed by an increase
718 of the federal income tax on household income in excess of [US1, US2: \$315,000 per
719 year; FR: €15,000 per month; DE: €20,000 per month; ES: €10,000 per month; UK:
720 £15,000 per month], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000]. [US1,
721 US2: See more details.] ⁹

- 722 17. Who would win or lose financially in the National redistribution? [Figure A4]

723

724 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

725 Typical [Americans] would win and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Ameri-
726 cans] would win and the richest [Americans] would lose.; Typical [Americans] would lose
727 and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Americans] would lose and the richest
728 [Americans] would lose.

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would win and
730 the richest [Americans] would lose* from the National redistribution scheme.

731

732 To help you with the next question, here is a reminder of the policies:

733

734 **Global Climate scheme:**

735 To limit global warming and reach the international climate objective, the Global
736 climate scheme would **impose a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can
737 emit globally.**

⁹8% of U.S. respondents click. They then see the following text, based on taxjusticenow.org by Saez & Zucman (2019): *The marginal income tax rates would evolve as follows:*

Below \$315,000: unchanged

\$315,000 - \$400,000: current rate 32% => new rate 41%

\$400,000 - \$600,000: 35% => 50%

\$600,000 - \$2.5 million: 37% => 60%

\$2.5 - \$5 million: 37% => 65%

Above \$5 million: 37% => 70%

738 It would **make polluters pay** for their emissions, which in turn would increase fos-
739 sil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities.

740 The revenues would finance a **global basic income** of [\$30] per month for all hu-
741 mans, lifting out of extreme poverty the poorest billion people.

742 Considering the basic income and the fuel price increases, **the typical [American]**
743 **would lose out financially** [\$85] per month.

744

745 **National redistribution scheme:**

746 This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [5%] and provide cash transfers to
747 all adults. More precisely, **each [American] would receive** [\$85] per month. This
748 would be financed by an increase of the federal income tax on household income in
749 excess of [\$315,000 per year], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000
750 per year].

- 751 18. If both the Global climate scheme and the National redistribution scheme are imple-
752 mented, how would a typical [American] be financially affected? [Figure A4]

753 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

754 *A typical [American] would lose out financially.; A typical [American] would neither gain
755 nor lose.; A typical [American] would gain financially.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was that *A typical [American] would nei-
757 ther gain nor lose* from both schemes combined. [US1, Eu: Now, here are the last two
758 policies:]

759

760 **[US1: Coal exit:**

761 To reduce CO₂ emissions, this policy would require all U.S. coal power plants to be
762 phased out by 2030. Coal would be replaced by renewable sources like wind and
763 solar panels as well as stronger reliance on gas power plants.

764 **Eu: Thermal insulation plan:**

765 To reduce CO₂ emissions and energy insecurity, this policy would require that all
766 buildings meet energy efficiency targets: at least rating E in 2030 and rating C in
767 2040. The [UK] government would subsidise half the cost of insulation for all house-
768 holds, and up to 90% for the poorest households. Insulation work would cost [FR,
769 DE: €25; ES: €20; UK: £25] billion a year, but would deliver energy savings greater
770 than this cost.]

771
772 [US1: **Marriage only for opposite-sex couples:**

773 This policy is a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would legally
774 define marriage as a union of one man and one woman.

775 **Eu: Death penalty for major crimes:**

776 This measure would reintroduce capital punishment for major crimes such as ter-
777 rrorism and mass shootings.]

779 Now, we will ask your opinion on the [US1, Eu: four] policies.

780 [Click here for the reminder of the \[US1, Eu: first\] two policies.](#) [Clicking displays the
781 previous summarized descriptions.]

782 19. [US2] [4 Random branches: control (*nothing*); Question 31 (*field*); Question 32 (*impor-
783 tant*); or the following question (*info*).] For information, a recent survey has shown
784 that:

- 785 • 64% of Americans support the Global climate scheme.
786 • 72% of Americans support the National redistribution scheme.

787 20. Do you support the Global climate scheme? [Figure 3]

788 Yes; No

789 21. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the
790 previous question? [Figure 10]

791 The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

792 Percentage of [Americans] in favor of Global climate scheme [slider from 0 to 100]

793 22. Do you support the National redistribution scheme? [Figure 3]

794 Yes; No

795 23. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the
796 previous question? [Figure 10]

797 The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

798 Percentage of [Americans] in favor of National redistribution [slider from 0 to 100]

799 24. [Eu, US1] Beware, this question is quite unusual. Among the policies below, **how
800 many** do you support? [Figure A6, Table 1]

801 [Four random branches. Branch GCS/NR/C/O]

- 802
- 803 • Global climate scheme
 - 804 • National redistribution scheme
 - 805 • [Coal exit]
 - 806 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

807 0; 1; 2; 3; 4

808 [Branch GCS/C/O]

- 809
- 810 • Global climate scheme
 - 811 • [Coal exit]
 - 812 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

813 0; 1; 2; 3

814 [Branch NR/C/O]

- 815
- 816 • National redistribution scheme
 - 817 • [Coal exit]
 - 818 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

819 0; 1; 2; 3

820 [Branch C/O]

- 821
- 822 • [Coal exit]
 - 823 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

824 0; 1; 2

828 [Eu, US1] Conjoint analyses

- 829 25. Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you prefer? [Figure
830 A7]

831 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the
832 same time.

833 Bundle A	Bundle B
[Coal exit]	[Coal exit]
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme
Global climate scheme	

834 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 835 26. Do you support Bundle A (combining [Coal exit], the National redistribution scheme,
836 and the Global climate scheme)?[Figure 3]

837 Yes; No

- 838 27. [new page] Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you
839 prefer? [Figure A7]

840 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the
841 same time.

842 [Four random branches. Branch C + NR vs. GCS + NR]

843 Bundle A	Bundle B
[Coal exit]	Global climate scheme
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme

844 [Branch NR vs. NR + C + GCS]

845 Bundle A	Bundle B
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme [Coal exit] Global climate scheme

846 [Branch NR + GCS vs. NR]

Bundle A	Bundle B
National redistribution scheme Global climate scheme	National redistribution scheme

850
851 [Branch NR + C vs. NR]

Bundle A	Bundle B
National redistribution scheme [Coal exit]	National redistribution scheme

852
853
854 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 855
856 28. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and
857 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies
858 in their platforms.

859 *Eu: Imagine if [DE, ES, UK: the two favorite candidates in your constituency in the
860 next general election; FR: the two candidates in the second round of the next pres-
861 idential election] campaigned with the following policies in their party's platforms.]*

862
863 Which of these candidates would you vote for? [Table 2, Figure A7]

864 [Table 2. Two random branches: with and without the final row. The US1 version of the poli-
865 cies is given below, see the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the European versions.]

Democrat	Republican
Increase corporate income tax rate from 21% to 28%	Decrease the payroll tax
Coal exit	Permit completion of the Keystone pipeline
Trillion dollar investment in childcare, healthcare, education and housing	Withdrawal of the Paris agreement
\$15 minimum wage	Marriage only for opposite-sex couples
National redistribution scheme	Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation
[Global climate scheme / no row]	[/ no row]

867

868 [US1: Democrat; Republican; None of them; Eu: Candidate A; Candidate B; None of them]

- 869 29. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and
870 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies
871 in their platforms.

872 *Eu (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the Section “Values and politics”): Imagine*
873 *that [FR: the left or center-left; DE: a red-red-green coalition; ES: the PSOE; UK:*
874 *the Labour Party] wins the next [general] elections. Here are two possible platforms*
875 *on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a*
876 *pool of credible [FR: left or center-left, DE: left-wing parties’; ES: PSOE; UK: Labour]*
877 *policies).]*

878

879 [US1: Which of these candidates do you prefer?

880 *Eu: Even if you [FR: are not from the left or center-left; DE: do not support the left-*
881 *wing parties; ES: do not support the PSOE; UK: do not support the Labour Party],*
882 *which of these platforms do you prefer?]*

883 [Figures 8, A8; see also the sheet “Policies” in *this spreadsheet* for the possible policies.]

	[Candidate A]	[Candidate B]
[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]

885 [US1: Candidate A; Candidate B; Eu: Platform A; Platform B]

- 886 30. [new page] [Same wording and conditions as above. For brevity, only the UK version is
887 given here.] Imagine that the Labour Party wins the next general elections. Here are
888 two possible platforms on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are
889 randomly drawn from a pool of credible Labour policies).

890

891 Even if you do not support the Labour Party, which of these platforms do you pre-
892 fer? [Figure 8]

	Platform A	Platform B	
893	[Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order]	[Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy]	[Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy]
894	Foreign policy	Global climate scheme	-
	<i>Platform A; Platform B</i>		

895 [Eu, US2] Perceptions of the GCS

896 [Eu: two random branches. US2: four random branches and the question is asked (if asked)
 897 before Question 20]

898 31. [Branch: field] When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to
 899 your mind?

900 Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme. [Figures A10, A11]
 901 {Open field}

902 32. [Branch: important] When determining your support or opposition to the Global
 903 climate scheme, which points are important to you? [Figure A9]

- 904 • It would succeed in limiting climate change.
- 905 • It would hurt the [U.S.] economy.
- 906 • It would penalize my household.
- 907 • It would make people change their lifestyle.
- 908 • It would reduce poverty in low-income countries.
- 909 • It might be detrimental to some poor countries.
- 910 • It could foster global cooperation.
- 911 • It could fuel corruption in low-income countries.
- 912 • It could be subject to fraud.
- 913 • It would be technically difficult to put in place.
- 914 • Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences.

915 *Not at all important; Not so important; Quite important; Very important*

916 [Eu, US1] Donation lottery

917 33. Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).

918 *Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*

919 34. [Two random branches] By taking this survey, you are automatically entered into a
920 lottery to win [\$]100 in panel points. This lottery is unrelated to the previous ones
921 that rewarded answers’ accuracy. In a few days you will know whether you have
922 been selected in the lottery. The payment will be made to you in the same way as
923 your compensation for this survey, so no further action is required on your part.

924
925 Should you be selected in the lottery, you can also donate a part of this additional
926 compensation to [[American] / African] people living in poverty through [US1: the
927 charity GiveDirectly. The charity GiveDirectly; Eu: a charity. We would channel this
928 donation to a charity that] provides small amounts of cash to people in need in [[the
929 U.S] / Africa].

930
931 **In case you are winner of the lottery, what share of the [\$]100 would you donate
932 to [[American] / African] people living in poverty [US1: through GiveDirectly]?
933 [Figure A12, Table A2]**

934 *Amount donated to [[American] / African] people in need (in [\$]) [slider from 0 to 100]*

935 [Eu, US2] Wealth tax

936 [Four random branches: Question 35 then Question 36 (global first); Question 36 then Ques-
937 tion 35 (national first); Question 37 (global share); Question 38 (sharing)]

938 35. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-
939 income countries?

940 Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking
941 water, healthcare, and education. [Figures 3, A13]

942 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
943 support*

944 36. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: afford-
945 able housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and
946 schools]? [Figures 3, A14]

947 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
948 *support*

- 949 37. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all
950 countries around the world. In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount
951 to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE: €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2:
952 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount
953 to [\$]1 billion in all low-income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700
954 million people, most of them in Africa).

955 Each country would retain part of the revenues it collects, and the remaining part
956 would be pooled at the global level to finance infrastructure and public services in
957 low-income countries.

958
959 What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of re-
960 tained in the country's national budget)? [\[Figure A15\]](#)

961 Percent of global wealth tax that should go to low-income countries [slider from 0 to 100]

- 962 38. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in
963 all countries around the world.

964 In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE:
965 €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2: 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES:
966 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount to [\$]1 billion in all low-
967 income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700 million people, most of
968 them in Africa).

969 Which of the following options would you prefer? [\[Figure A16\]](#)

- 970 • The whole wealth tax financing national budgets in each country. For ex-
971 ample, in [US2: the U.S., it could finance affordable housing and universal
972 childcare/pre-K.; Eu-UK: the UK, it could finance the National Health Service
973 and state-funded schools].
- 974 • Half of the wealth tax financing national budgets in each country, half of it
975 financing low-income countries. For example, it could finance [US2: universal
976 childcare/pre-K in the U.S.; Eu-UK: state-funded schools in the UK] and access
977 to drinking water, healthcare, and education in Africa.

978 [Eu, US2] Foreign aid

979 US2 Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).

980 *Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*

- 981 39. From your best guess, what percentage of [U.S.] government spending is allocated
982 to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?

983

984 For your information, government spending totals [US2: 38%; FR: 55%; DE: 45%; ES:
985 42%; UK: 41%] of [U.S.] GDP, it includes [US2: federal, State; Eu: national] and local
986 government spending, and apart from foreign aid, it covers the following items: de-
987 fense, social security (retirement pensions), health [US2: (including Medicare and
988 Medicaid)], welfare benefits [US2: (including food stamps and EITC)], education,
989 roads, justice, other programs [US2: and federal agencies (including in energy, sci-
990 ence...)]. [Figure A19]

991 *Less than 0.1%; 0.1% to 0.2%; 0.3% to 0.5%; 0.6% to 1.0%; 1.1% to 1.7%; 1.8% to 2.6%;
992 2.7% to 4%; 4.1% to 6%; 6.1% to 9%; 9.1% to 13%; 13.1% to 25%; More than 25%*

- 993 40. [Two random branches: with or without information on actual amount] [Info: Actually,
994 [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [the U.S.] government spend-
995 ing is allocated to foreign aid.]

996

997 If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate
998 to foreign aid? [Figures A17, A18, A20 and A21]

- 999 41. [Asked iff branch: Info and preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than actual for-
1000 eign aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to increase [U.S.] foreign
1001 aid.

1002

1003 How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers
1004 possible) [Figure A22]

1005 *Lower spending on defense; Lower spending on retirement pensions; Lower spending on
1006 healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Lower spending on welfare benefits [US2: (like
1007 EITC or food stamps)]; Lower spending on education; Lower spending on other programs
1008 [US2: and federal agencies]; Higher taxes on the wealthiest; Higher corporate income tax
1009 rate; Higher personal income tax rates; Higher public deficit*

1010 42. [Asked iff branch: *Info* and preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than actual foreign
1011 aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to reduce [U.S.] foreign aid.

1012

1013 How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible) [*Figure A23*]
1014

1015

1016 *Higher spending on defense; Higher spending on retirement pensions; Higher spending on*
1017 *healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Higher spending on welfare benefits [US2:*
1018 *(like EITC or food stamps)]; Higher spending on education; lower spending on other pro-*
1019 *grams [US2: and federal agencies]; Lower taxes on the wealthiest; Lower corporate income*
1019 *tax rate; Lower personal income tax rates; Lower public deficit*

1020 **[Eu, US1] Petition**

1021 43. [*Two random branches*] Would you be willing to sign a petition for the [Global cli-
1022 mate / National redistribution] scheme? [*Figure A24*]

1023

1024 As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President's
1025 office], informing him what share of American people are willing to endorse the
1026 [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign,
1027 only your answer here is required and remains anonymous.) Yes; No

1028 **[Eu, US1] Other policies**

1029 44. The following policies are discussed at international negotiations on how to deal
1030 with climate change. [*Figures 2 and A25*]

1031

1032 Do you support or oppose the following policies?

1033

- 1034 • Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for
1035 climate damages
- 1036 • High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries
- 1037 • High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income
1037 countries adapt to climate change

1038

1039 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1039 *support*

1040 45. Do you support or oppose the following global policies? [Figures 2 and A25]

- 1041 • Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt
- 1042 • Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting
1043 right proportional to its population
- 1044 • Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries
- 1045 • A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage
- 1046 • Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of
1047 all assets
- 1048 • A maximum wealth limit of [US1: \$10 billion; Eu: [€]100 million] for each
1049 human

1050 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1051 support*

1052 46. Currently, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [U.S.] government
1053 spending (that is, [US1: 0.2%; FR: 0.4%; DE: 0.6%; ES: 0.2%; UK: 0.7%] of [U.S.] GDP)
1054 is spent on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries. [Figure 5]

1055 Do you support [the U.S.] transferring more money to low-income countries?

1056 *Yes, [U.S.] foreign aid should be increased.; Yes, but only if some conditions are met.; No,
1057 [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.; No, [U.S.] foreign aid should be reduced.*

1059 47. [Asked only if *Yes, but only if some conditions are met.* is chosen] What conditions
1060 should be required for [the U.S.] to increase its foreign aid? (Multiple answers pos-
1061 sible) [Figures 6, A17]

1062 *That recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights.; That recipient
1063 countries cooperate to fight illegal migrations.; That other high-income countries also in-
1064 crease their foreign aid.; That this is financed by increased taxes on millionaires.; That we
1065 can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted.; Other: [open field]*

1066 48. [Asked only if *No, [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.* or *No, [U.S.] foreign aid
1067 should be reduced.* is chosen] Why do you oppose [the U.S.] increasing its foreign
1068 aid? (Multiple answers possible) [Figure 7]

1069 *Aid perpetuates poverty as it makes people feel less responsible for themselves.; Aid is not
1070 effective as most of it is diverted.; Aid is a pressure tactic for high-income countries that*

1071 *prevents low-income countries from developing freely.; [The U.S.] is not responsible for what*
1072 *happens in other countries.; Charity begins at home: there is already a lot to do to support*
1073 *the American people in need.; Other: [open field]*

1074 **[Eu, US1, US2] Values and politics**

- 1075 49. [Eu (where it is instead asked at the beginning of Section “Other Policies”), US1]
1076 In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend
1077 [U.S.] interests or global justice? [Figure A26]
1078 *[U.S.] interests, even if it goes against global justice; [U.S.] interests, to the extent it re-*
1079 *spects global justice; ndifferent or don’t know; Global justice, to the extent it respects [U.S.]*
1080 *interests; Global justice, even if it goes against [U.S.] interests*
- 1081 50. How much did you give to charities in 2022? [Figure A31]
1082 *I did not make donations to charities last year.; Less than [\$]100.; Between [\$]101 and*
1083 *[\$]500.; Between [\$]501 and [\$]1,000.; Between [\$]1,001 and [\$]5,000.; More than [\$]5,000.*
- 1084 51. To what extent are you interested in politics? [Figure A32]
1085 *Not at all; A little; Moderately; A lot; A great deal*
- 1086 52. Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means you think the
1087 government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic gov-
1088 ernment functions, and 5 means you think the government should take active steps
1089 in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens? [Figure A33]
1090 *Desired involvement of government [slider from 1 to 5]*
- 1091 53. **On economic policy matters**, where do you see yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where
1092 1 is Left (favoring equality and government interventions) and 5 is Right (favoring
1093 free competition and little government intervention)? [Figure A34]
1094 *Left (1) to Right (5) on economic issues [slider from 1 to 5]*
- 1095 54. Did you vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election? [Figure A35]
1096 *Yes; No: I didn’t have the right to vote in the U.S.; Prefer not to say*
- 1097 55. [If voted: Which candidate did you vote for in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election?
1098 If did not vote: Even if you did not vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election,
1099 please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who
1100 represents your views more closely.] [Figure A36]

1101 [US1, US2: Biden; Trump; Jorgensen; Hawkins; Prefer not to say
1102 FR: candidates at the 2022 presidential election
1103 DE: parties with more than 1% of votes at the 2021 federal election and *Other*
1104 ES: lists with more than 0.9% at the November 2019 general election and *Other*
1105 UK: parties with more than 0.5% of votes at the 2019 general election and *Other*]

1106 56. To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem? [Figure A27]

- 1107 • Income inequality in [the U.S.]
- 1108 • Climate change
- 1109 • Global poverty

1110 *Not an important issue for me; An issue but there are other priorities; An issue but we
1111 already do what we can; An important issue, we should do more; One of the most pressing
1112 issue of our time*

1113 57. What group do you defend when you vote? [Figure A28]

1114 *Sentient beings (humans and animals); Humans; [Eu: Europeans]; [Americans]; People
1115 sharing my culture or religion; [US1, US2: My State]; [US1, US2: My town; Eu: My
1116 country, region or town]; My relatives and/or colleagues; My family and myself*

1117 **[Eu, US1] Prioritization**

1118 58. In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The
1119 more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

1120 How do you allocate the points among the following policies? [Figures A29 and A30]

1121 You can adjust the number of points either using the slider or entering the num-
1122 ber of your choice on the right-hand-side. **The sum of points must equal exactly
1123 100.** By pushing the last slider to the right, the total will automatically adjust to 100.
1124 Please read the 6 options before making your choice.

1125 See the sheet “Policies” in [this spreadsheet](#) for the pool of policies in each country.

1126 [sliders from 0 to 100]

1129 [FR, DE, ES] ETS2

1130 59. Similar to the Global Climate Scheme, the European Climate Scheme would impose
1131 a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit across the EU in the buildings
1132 and transport sectors. It would make polluters pay for their emissions, which in turn
1133 would increase fossil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities. Several options
1134 are possible regarding the use of the scheme's revenues:

- 1135 • Provide an equal cash transfer of €105 per year to each European.
- 1136 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European, proportional to their
1137 country's emissions: people in countries with higher emissions per person (like
1138 Germany) would receive more than people in countries with lower emissions
1139 (like Romania). For information, people in [Germany] would receive €[FR:
1140 110; DE: 130; ES: 90]/year.
- 1141 • Finance low-carbon investments: thermal insulation of buildings, switch to
1142 clean sources of heating, public transportation, and charging stations for elec-
1143 tric vehicles.
- 1144 • Provide cash transfers to the most vulnerable half of Europeans and finance
1145 low-carbon investments.

1146 Do you support or oppose the European Climate Scheme in case the revenue is used
1147 to... ?

- 1148 • Provide an equal cash transfer to each European
- 1149 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European
- 1150 • Finance low-carbon investments
- 1151 • Provide cash transfers for the most vulnerable Europeans and low-carbon in-
1152 vestments

1153 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1154 support*

1155 60. [Asked iff none of the four variants of the European Climate Scheme is (somewhat or
1156 strongly) supported] Why do you not support a European Climate Scheme? (Mul-
1157 tiple answers possible)

1158 *I am opposed to climate policy being decided at the EU level, it should be decided at the na-*
1159 *tional level;*
1160 *I would prefer if the revenues were used in a different way (beyond the four suggestions*
1161 *above) than previously suggested;*
1162 *I would prefer if decreasing carbon emissions were regulated by other climate policies;*
1163 *I am generally opposed to additional, or more ambitious, climate policies;*
1164 *I do not fully understand how the European Climate Scheme is supposed to work;*
1165 *I don't know*

1166 **[Eu, US1, US2] Feedback**

- 1167 61. Do you feel that this survey was politically biased? [Figure A37]
1168 *Yes, left-wing biased; Yes, right-wing biased; No, I do not feel it was biased*
- 1169 62. [US2 Asked only to one random third of the respondents, instead of the feedback Ques-
1170 tion 63] According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme
1171 poverty in low-income countries? [Figure A38]
1172 *{Open field}*
- 1173 63. The survey is nearing completion. You can now enter any comments, thoughts or
1174 suggestions in the field below.
1175 *{Open field}*
- 1176 64. Lastly, are you interested to be interviewed by a researcher (through videoconfer-
1177 encing) for 30 min?
1178
1179 This is totally optional and will not be rewarded.
1180 *Yes; No*

1181 E Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme

1182 To specify the GCS, we use the IEA's 2DS scenario (IEA 2017), which is consistent
1183 with limiting the global average temperature increase to 2°C with a probability of at least
1184 50%. The paper by Hood (2017) contributing to the Report of the High-Level Commission
1185 on Carbon Prices (Stern & Stiglitz 2017) presents a price corridor compatible with this
1186 emissions scenario, from which we take the midpoint. The product of these two series
1187 provides an estimate of the revenues expected from a global carbon price. We then use
1188 the UN median scenario of future population aged over 15 years (*adults*, for short). We
1189 derive the basic income that could be paid to all adults by recycling the revenues from
1190 the global carbon price: evolving between \$20 and \$30 per month, with a peak in 2030.
1191 Accounting for the lower price levels in low-income countries, an additional income of
1192 \$30 per month would allow **670 million people** to escape extreme poverty, defined with
1193 the threshold of \$2.15 per day in purchasing power parity.¹⁰

1194 To estimate the increase in fossil fuel expenditures (or “cost”) in each country by 2030,
1195 we make a key assumption concerning the evolution of the carbon footprints per adult:
1196 that they will decrease by the same proportion in each country. We use data from the
1197 Global Carbon Project (Peters et al. 2012). In 2030, the average carbon footprint of a
1198 country c , e_c , evolves from baseline year b proportionally to the evolution of its adult
1199 population $\Delta p_c = p_c^{2030} / p_c^b$. Thus, the global share of country c 's carbon footprint, s_c ,
1200 is proportional to $\sigma_c = e_c \Delta p_c$, and as countries' shares sum to 1, $s_c = \frac{\sigma_c}{\sum_k \sigma_k}$. Multiplying
1201 country c 's emission share with global revenues in 2030, R , and dividing by c 's adult pop-
1202 ulation in year y , yields its average cost per adult: $R \cdot s_c / p_c^y$. Using findings from Ivanova
1203 & Wood (2020) for Europe and Fremstad & Paul (2019) for the U.S., we approximate the
1204 median cost as 90% of the average cost. Finally, the net gain is given by the basic income
1205 (\$30 per month) minus the cost. We provided consistent estimates of net gains in all sur-
1206 veys (using $y = b = 2015$), though in the global survey we gave the average net gains
1207 vs. the median ones in the complementary surveys. The latter are shown in Figure A43.
1208 For the record, Table A3 also provides an estimate of *average* net gains (computed with
1209 $b = 2019$ and $y = 2030$).¹¹

¹⁰By taking the **ratio** of the World Bank series relating the GDP per capita of Sub-Saharan Africa in **PPP** and **nominal**, we obtain the purchasing power of \$1 in this region: \$2.4 in 2019.

¹¹2015 was the last year of data available when the global questionnaire was conceived (OECD data was then used – it does not cover all countries but give identical rounded estimates than those recomputed from the Global Carbon Project data for our complementary surveys). 2030 was chosen as the reference year as it is the date at which global carbon price revenues are expected to peak (and the GCS redistributive effects

1210 Estimates of the net gains from the Global Climate Scheme are necessarily imprecise,
1211 given the uncertainties surrounding the carbon price required to achieve emissions re-
1212 ductions as well as each country's trajectory in terms of emissions and population. These
1213 values are highly dependent on future (non-price) climate policies, technical progress,
1214 and economic growth of each country, which are only partially known. Integrated As-
1215 sessment Models have been used to derive a Global Energy Assessment (Johansson et al.
1216 2012), a 100% renewable scenario (Greenpeace 2015) as well as Shared Socioeconomic
1217 Pathways (SSPs), which include consistent trajectories of population, emissions, and car-
1218 bon price (Bauer et al. 2017; Fricko et al. 2017; Riahi et al. 2017; van Vuuren et al. 2017).
1219 Instead of using some of these modelling trajectories, we relied on a simple and trans-
1220 parent formula, for a number of reasons. First and foremost, those trajectories describe
1221 territorial emissions while we need consumption-based emissions to compute the inci-
1222 dence of the GCS. Second, the carbon price is relatively low in trajectories of SSPs that
1223 contain global warming below 2°C (less than \$35/tCO₂ in 2030), so we conservatively
1224 chose a method yielding a higher carbon price (\$90 in 2030). Third, modelling results are
1225 available only for a few macro regions, while we wanted country by country estimates.
1226 Finally, we have checked that the emissions per capita given by our method are broadly
1227 in line with alternative methods, even if it tends to overestimate net gains in countries
1228 which will decarbonize less rapidly than average.¹² For example, although countries' de-
1229 carbonization plans should realign with the GCS in place, India might still decarbonize
1230 less quickly than the European Union, so India's gain and the EU's loss might be over-
1231 estimated in our computations. For a more sophisticated version of the Global Climate
1232 Scheme which includes participation mechanisms preventing middle-income countries
1233 (like China) to lose from it and estimations of the Net Present Value by country, see Fabre
1234 (2023).

would be largest), and the GCS could not realistically enter into force before that date. In the surveys, we chose $y = b = 2015$ rather than $b = 2019$ and $y = 2030$ to get more conservative estimates of the monthly cost in the U.S. (\$20 higher than the other option) and in Europe (€5 or £10 higher).

¹²Computations with alternative methods can be found on [our public repository](#).

Figure A43: Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme.




Table A3: Estimated net gain from the GCS in 2030 and carbon footprint by country.

	Mean net gain from the GCS (\$/month)	CO ₂ footprint per adult in 2019 (tCO ₂ /y)			
Saudi Arabia	-92	24.0	Algeria*	-1	6.0
United States	-76	21.0	Mexico	2	5.6
Australia	-59	17.6	Ukraine	2	5.6
Canada	-55	16.7	Uzbekistan*	4	5.1
South Korea	-49	15.6	Argentina	5	4.9
Taiwan	-41	14.0	Thailand	7	4.6
Germany	-30	11.7	Egypt	12	3.6
Russia	-28	11.5	Indonesia	13	3.3
Japan	-27	11.3	Colombia	15	3.0
Malaysia	-21	10.0	Brazil	15	2.9
Iran	-19	9.5	Vietnam	16	2.9
Poland	-18	9.5	Peru	16	2.8
United Kingdom	-18	9.4	Morocco	16	2.7
China	-14	8.6	North Korea*	17	2.5
Italy	-12	8.4	India	18	2.4
South Africa	-11	8.0	Philippines	18	2.3
France	-10	7.8	Pakistan	22	1.6
Iraq*	-7	7.4	Bangladesh	24	1.1
Spain	-6	7.0	Nigeria	25	1.0
Turkey	-2	6.2	Kenya	25	0.9
			Myanmar*	26	0.9
			Sudan*	26	0.9
			Tanzania	27	0.5
			Afghanistan*	27	0.5
			Uganda	28	0.4
			Ethiopia	28	0.3
			Venezuela	29	0.3
			DRC*	30	0.1

¹²³⁵ Note: Asterisks denote countries where footprint is missing and territorial emissions is used instead.

¹²³⁶ Values differ from Figure A43 as this table present estimates of *mean* net gain per adult in 2030, not at the present. Only the countries with more than 20 million adults (covering 87% of the global total) are shown.

F Determinants of support

Table A4: Determinants of support for the Global Climate Scheme.

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme						
	All	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Country: Germany	-0.157*** (0.022)		-0.144*** (0.022)				
Country: Spain	-0.044* (0.024)		-0.026 (0.024)				
Country: United Kingdom	-0.079*** (0.024)		-0.104*** (0.023)				
Country: United States	-0.375*** (0.019)						
Income quartile: 2	0.037** (0.017)	0.031 (0.022)	0.038 (0.023)	0.047 (0.043)	0.058 (0.049)	0.013 (0.053)	0.023 (0.043)
Income quartile: 3	0.042** (0.017)	0.033 (0.024)	0.049** (0.024)	0.080** (0.040)	0.059 (0.052)	0.074 (0.056)	-0.052 (0.052)
Income quartile: 4	0.056*** (0.018)	0.062** (0.026)	0.010 (0.026)	0.018 (0.047)	-0.015 (0.055)	-0.001 (0.056)	-0.005 (0.057)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.023* (0.012)	0.032* (0.017)	0.010 (0.018)	0.007 (0.029)	0.045 (0.039)	0.007 (0.039)	-0.010 (0.039)
Age: 25-34	-0.076*** (0.025)	-0.084*** (0.031)	-0.044 (0.035)	-0.031 (0.057)	-0.077 (0.083)	-0.050 (0.066)	-0.103 (0.091)
Age: 35-49	-0.101*** (0.024)	-0.109*** (0.030)	-0.069* (0.034)	-0.094* (0.055)	-0.009 (0.077)	-0.168** (0.070)	-0.050 (0.090)
Age: 50-64	-0.137*** (0.024)	-0.165*** (0.030)	-0.038 (0.035)	-0.039 (0.056)	-0.020 (0.082)	-0.146** (0.067)	-0.017 (0.087)
Age: 65+	-0.116*** (0.028)	-0.142*** (0.034)	-0.056 (0.044)	0.003 (0.076)	-0.045 (0.094)	-0.258*** (0.091)	0.011 (0.105)
Gender: Man	0.019* (0.011)	0.022 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.029)	-0.018 (0.033)	0.042 (0.038)	-0.005 (0.034)
Lives with partner	0.029** (0.013)	0.023 (0.017)	0.058*** (0.018)	0.070** (0.033)	0.082** (0.038)	0.017 (0.038)	0.040 (0.039)
Employment status: Retired	-0.020 (0.024)	-0.046 (0.030)	0.056 (0.038)	0.087 (0.081)	0.096 (0.075)	0.040 (0.082)	0.001 (0.073)
Employment status: Student	0.045 (0.033)	0.062 (0.048)	0.101** (0.044)	0.165* (0.085)	0.192** (0.087)	0.116 (0.074)	-0.021 (0.107)
Employment status: Working	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.020 (0.024)	0.011 (0.028)	0.082 (0.064)	0.006 (0.056)	-0.050 (0.056)	0.036 (0.051)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.331*** (0.013)	-0.435*** (0.017)	-0.106*** (0.019)	-0.131*** (0.035)	-0.004 (0.044)	-0.114*** (0.038)	-0.081** (0.041)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	-0.184*** (0.016)	-0.198*** (0.022)	-0.136*** (0.021)	-0.196*** (0.039)	-0.034 (0.043)	-0.116** (0.046)	-0.108*** (0.040)
Vote: Far right	-0.396*** (0.032)		-0.309*** (0.033)	-0.493*** (0.064)	-0.168*** (0.051)	-0.130 (0.102)	-0.314*** (0.080)
Urban	0.049*** (0.012)	0.072*** (0.018)	0.006 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.029)	0.019 (0.032)	-0.014 (0.036)	0.017 (0.033)
Race: White		-0.030 (0.019)					
Region: Northeast		0.010 (0.023)					
Region: South		0.006 (0.020)					
Region: West		0.010 (0.022)					
Swing State		-0.038** (0.019)					
Constant	1.048	0.736	0.89	0.7	0.732	0.935	0.886
Observations	7,986	4,992	2,994	977	727	748	542
R ²	0.160	0.181	0.064	0.116	0.067	0.043	0.063

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

G Representativeness of the surveys

Table A5: Sample representativeness of the complementary surveys.

	US1			US2			Eu		
	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample
Sample size		3,000	3,000		2,000	2,000		3,000	3,000
Gender: Woman	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.45	0.50	0.51	0.49	0.51
Gender: Man	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.49	0.55	0.50	0.49	0.51	0.49
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.11	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.18	0.15	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.18	0.15	0.17	0.15
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.24	0.26
Age: 65+	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.25	0.23	0.25
Diploma_25_64: Below upper secondary	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.13	0.14	0.13
Diploma_25_64: Upper secondary	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.28	0.23	0.19	0.23
Diploma_25_64: Post secondary	0.34	0.40	0.34	0.34	0.33	0.34	0.29	0.33	0.29
Race: White only	0.60	0.67	0.61	0.60	0.62	0.61			
Race: Hispanic	0.18	0.15	0.19	0.18	0.19	0.19			
Race: Black	0.13	0.16	0.14	0.13	0.17	0.14			
Region: Northeast	0.17	0.20	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.17			
Region: Midwest	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.21			
Region: South	0.38	0.39	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38			
Region: West	0.24	0.20	0.24	0.24	0.20	0.24			
Urban: TRUE	0.73	0.78	0.74	0.73	0.75	0.73			
Employment_18_64: Inactive	0.20	0.16	0.16	0.20	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.15
Employment_18_64: Unemployed	0.02	0.07	0.08	0.02	0.09	0.08	0.03	0.06	0.05
Vote: Left	0.32	0.47	0.45	0.32	0.46	0.45	0.30	0.32	0.32
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.32	0.32
Vote: Far right							0.10	0.10	0.10
Country: FR							0.24	0.24	0.24
Country: DE							0.33	0.33	0.33
Country: ES							0.18	0.18	0.18
Country: UK							0.25	0.25	0.25
Urbanity: Cities							0.43	0.49	0.43
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs							0.33	0.32	0.33
Urbanity: Rural							0.25	0.20	0.25

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

Table A6: Sample representativeness for each European country.

	FR			DE			ES			UK		
	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.									
Sample size		729	729		979	979		543	543		749	749
Gender: Woman	0.52	0.50	0.52	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.53	0.51	0.50	0.43	0.50
Gender: Man	0.48	0.50	0.48	0.49	0.48	0.49	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.50	0.57	0.50
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.29	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.19	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.19	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.33	0.25	0.25	0.18	0.25	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.14	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.07	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.12	0.16	0.12	0.17	0.20	0.17
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.31	0.24	0.22	0.26	0.22	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.24	0.18	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.24	0.19	0.24	0.28	0.23	0.28	0.27	0.28	0.27	0.25	0.30	0.25
Age: 65+	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.26	0.21	0.26	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.24
Diploma_25-64: Below upper secondary	0.11	0.19	0.11	0.10	0.14	0.10	0.24	0.16	0.25	0.12	0.09	0.12
Diploma_25-64: Upper secondary	0.26	0.16	0.26	0.27	0.20	0.27	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.21	0.23	0.21
Diploma_25-64: Post secondary	0.26	0.30	0.26	0.29	0.31	0.29	0.28	0.38	0.27	0.33	0.36	0.33
Urbanity: Cities	0.47	0.52	0.47	0.37	0.47	0.37	0.52	0.58	0.52	0.40	0.41	0.40
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.40	0.35	0.40	0.22	0.27	0.22	0.42	0.43	0.42
Urbanity: Rural	0.34	0.29	0.34	0.23	0.18	0.23	0.26	0.15	0.26	0.18	0.16	0.18
Employment_18-64: Inactive	0.20	0.19	0.18	0.15	0.14	0.11	0.20	0.13	0.12	0.16	0.16	0.17
Employment_18-64: Unemployed	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.11	0.12	0.02	0.03	0.04
Vote: Left	0.23	0.19	0.21	0.37	0.44	0.44	0.33	0.37	0.38	0.25	0.28	0.29
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.26	0.30	0.29	0.28	0.27	0.29	0.18	0.24	0.24	0.36	0.44	0.41
Vote: Far right	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.01	0.03	0.03

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. In this Table, weights are defined at the country level. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

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Similar tables for the global surveys can be found in [Dechezleprêtre et al. \(2022\)](#).

¹²⁴¹ H Attrition analysis

Table A7: Attrition analysis for the US1 survey.

	Dropped out	Dropped out after socio-eco	Failed attention test	Duration (in min)	Duration below 4 min
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mean	0.08	0.059	0.082	21.198	0.016
Income quartile: 2	0.025*** (0.010)	0.025*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.740 (3.064)	-0.009 (0.006)
Income quartile: 3	0.062*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.754 (2.813)	-0.004 (0.007)
Income quartile: 4	0.035*** (0.011)	0.035*** (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-3.917 (2.798)	-0.003 (0.007)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.039*** (0.009)	0.039*** (0.009)	-0.000*** (0.000)	1.544 (2.665)	0.006 (0.006)
Age: 25-34	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.597 (2.604)	-0.031** (0.013)
Age: 35-49	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.824 (3.176)	-0.032** (0.013)
Age: 50-64	-0.060*** (0.015)	-0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	5.723** (2.763)	-0.039*** (0.012)
Age: 65+	0.048*** (0.017)	0.048*** (0.017)	0.000** (0.000)	8.952** (4.267)	-0.047*** (0.012)
Gender: Man	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.451 (2.210)	-0.0001 (0.005)
Urban	0.006 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.888** (2.443)	-0.004 (0.006)
Race: Black	0.020** (0.010)	0.020** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	8.554*** (2.600)	0.004 (0.007)
Race: Hispanic	0.021** (0.010)	0.021** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.119* (2.293)	-0.002 (0.007)
Region: Northeast	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-4.862 (4.782)	-0.004 (0.007)
Region: South	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-1.151 (4.710)	-0.004 (0.006)
Region: West	0.006 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-4.000 (4.305)	-0.003 (0.007)
Vote: Biden	-0.048*** (0.008)	-0.048*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-2.901 (2.379)	-0.009 (0.007)
Vote: Trump	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.145 (2.878)	-0.005 (0.008)
Observations	5,719	5,719	3,252	3,044	3,044
R ²	0.127	0.127	1.000	0.006	0.017

Table A8: Attrition analysis for the US2 survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 4 min (5)
Mean	0.095	0.074	0.092	16.338	0.052
Income quartile: 2	0.023* (0.013)	0.023* (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	1.352 (1.601)	-0.029** (0.014)
Income quartile: 3	0.054*** (0.014)	0.054*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	8.502 (9.649)	-0.009 (0.016)
Income quartile: 4	0.060*** (0.016)	0.060*** (0.016)	-0.000 (0.000)	5.254 (3.376)	0.0003 (0.017)
Diploma: Post secondary	-0.033*** (0.011)	-0.033*** (0.011)	0.000 (0.000)	1.601 (2.630)	0.012 (0.011)
Age: 25-34	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.929 (1.535)	-0.032 (0.024)
Age: 35-49	0.012 (0.014)	0.012 (0.014)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.076 (6.651)	-0.047** (0.022)
Age: 50-64	0.040*** (0.014)	0.040*** (0.014)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.364 (1.565)	-0.079*** (0.022)
Age: 65+	0.115*** (0.017)	0.115*** (0.017)	-0.000*** (0.000)	2.619 (3.150)	-0.095*** (0.022)
Gender: Man	-0.073*** (0.009)	-0.073*** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	4.707 (6.037)	0.010 (0.010)
Urban	0.019* (0.011)	0.019* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	1.766 (1.135)	0.005 (0.012)
Race: Black	0.060*** (0.015)	0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.673 (13.328)	-0.010 (0.015)
Race: Hispanic	0.079*** (0.014)	0.079*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	2.930 (1.813)	-0.027** (0.012)
Region: Northeast	-0.026* (0.014)	-0.026* (0.014)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.837 (2.855)	-0.011 (0.015)
Region: South	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.000 (0.000)	3.220 (5.002)	0.009 (0.014)
Region: West	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.000 (0.000)	-1.759 (1.942)	-0.009 (0.015)
Vote: Biden	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	3.230 (2.731)	-0.006 (0.014)
Vote: Trump	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.554 (1.272)	0.007 (0.016)
Observations	2,973	2,973	2,280	2,103	2,103
R ²	0.241	0.241	1.000	0.010	0.031

Table A9: Attrition analysis for the Eu survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 6 min (5)
Mean	0.067	0.044	0.151	54.602	0.039
Country: Germany	0.023** (0.010)	0.019** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.533 (18.906)	0.019* (0.010)
Country: Spain	-0.102*** (0.011)	-0.098*** (0.011)	0.000* (0.000)	-29.136* (15.948)	0.010 (0.010)
Country: United Kingdom	0.042*** (0.011)	0.043*** (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-7.458 (18.046)	0.010 (0.010)
Income quartile: 2	0.032*** (0.010)	0.029*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	32.749* (19.771)	-0.015 (0.010)
Income quartile: 3	0.049*** (0.010)	0.047*** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	6.130 (11.734)	-0.021** (0.010)
Income quartile: 4	0.024** (0.011)	0.021* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.659 (19.955)	-0.018* (0.011)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.035*** (0.008)	0.034*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	10.647 (12.959)	-0.007 (0.007)
Age: 25-34	0.028** (0.013)	0.025* (0.013)	-0.000*** (0.000)	36.132 (22.285)	-0.005 (0.018)
Age: 35-49	0.064*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	-0.000*** (0.000)	37.159** (17.190)	-0.013 (0.016)
Age: 50-64	0.085*** (0.013)	0.083*** (0.013)	-0.000 (0.000)	48.363** (22.526)	-0.063*** (0.015)
Age: 65+	0.117*** (0.014)	0.115*** (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	36.351** (14.226)	-0.061*** (0.015)
Gender: Man	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-22.980 (14.093)	0.009 (0.007)
Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs	0.006 (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-16.736 (17.256)	0.004 (0.008)
Degree of urbanization: Rural	0.023** (0.009)	0.023** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	-14.593 (19.733)	-0.001 (0.009)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.025*** (0.005)	-0.025*** (0.005)	0.000*** (0.000)	-17.558 (13.143)	0.019** (0.008)
Vote: Far right	0.005 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.000*** (0.000)	15.838 (32.281)	0.029** (0.014)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	0.023*** (0.006)	0.022*** (0.005)	0.000 (0.000)	24.631 (19.824)	0.030*** (0.010)
Observations	3,963	3,963	3,326	3,115	3,115
R ²	0.406	0.395	1.000	0.006	0.028

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