International Attitudes Toward Global Policies

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The "global climate scheme" (a global carbon price funding a global basic income) would be an effective and progressive way to combat climate change, and poverty. Yet, such policy is mostly absent from political platforms and the policy debate. Using surveys on 40,000 respondents in 20 countries covering 72% of global CO_2 emissions, we document majority support for this and other global policies. Using a complementary survey on 3,000 U.S. respondents,we test several hypotheses that could could reconcile strong stated support with a lack of salience of these issues. The complementary analyses show that the stated support is mostly sincere, although we cannot rule out insincerity for 3% to 9% of the population from the willingness to sign a real-stake petition and a list experiment, respectively. Global redistributive policies rank high (though not highest) in the prioritization of policies. Conjoint analyses reveal that the Democratic party would not significantly lose votes if it endorsed the global climate scheme, while a candidate at the Democratic primary would actually win votes by doing so. Accurate beliefs about the level of support for the scheme dismisses the hypothesis of pluralistic ignorance of the support. Strong universalistic attitudes are con-

firmed in more general questions, suggesting that the support cannot be explained away by malleable opinion or experimenter demand. Finally, we conclude that there is no compelling reason why global policies do not enter the public debate or political platforms, as they seem genuinely supported by a majority of the population.

Ethical theories often warrent transfers from high- to low-income people, hence from high- to low-income countries. This is the case of utilitarianism, the benchmark ethical theory used in economics. Utilitarianism assigns the same weight to each person and thus considers that a dollar is better allocated to a low-income person, which has a higher marginal utility than a high-income person.[1]

Addressing global poverty, inequalities and climate change are at the heart of the universally agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). It has been pointed out that low-income countries generally do not have enough domestic resources to eliminate the poverty gap in the short run.[2] In other words, it would hardly be possible to achieve the first SDG and end extreme poverty by 2030 without international transfers.

Climate change is another issue that calls for a global response and international transfers. Postulating that each human has an equal right to emit CO_2, low emitters have a legitimate claim *vis-à-vis* high emitters, that can be settled by monetary transfers. Coupling this burden-sharing principle to the carbon budget (remaining emissions that would be compatible with the Paris agreement) naturally defines a global climate policy. We call it the "Global climate scheme" and denote it G; it consists of a global cap-and-trade system where emission rights are auctioned each year

to polluting firms and the revenues finance a global basic income. Using the price and emissions trajectories from the Stern-Stiglitz report,[3] we estimate that the basic income would amount to $30 per month for each human above 15 in 2030, enough to lift out of extreme poverty the 700 million people who live with less than PPP $2 per day. Conversely, high emitters like a typical American (with median U.S. CO_2 emissions) would lose in net $85 per month, as they would face $115 per month in price increases (assuming a carbon price of $90/t$CO_2$ in 2030).

If high emitters share universalistic ethical values, we expect strong support for G, even in high-income countries. On the contrary, if people defend their own financial interest, we expect low support for G in high-income countries.

In this paper, we study attitudes toward global policies that address climate change, global poverty or inequalities, with a focus on G. We measure stated support for different global policies using unpublished results from a survey[?] on climate attitudes conducted in 2021 on 40,680 respondents from 20 countries covering 72% of global CO_2 emissions. We then conduct a representative survey on 3,000 U.S. respondents to study in detail the sincerity and rationales behind the support for G, the attitudes toward various global policies, global redistribution, and universalistic values.

1 Results

Global support The global survey shows strong support for climate policies at the global level (Figure 1). When asked "At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be put in place?", 70% (in the U.S.) to 94% (in Japan) choose the global level. Meanwhile,

the European level is chosen by less than half of the European respondents while the federal level is chosen by only 52% of U.S. respondents. More local levels are generally chosen less than broader ones. This preference for the global level is consistent with the two of the three key motives identified to support climate policies:[4–6] effectiveness and fairness (the third being self-interest).

Several global policies obtain an absolute majority support in all countries: "a tax on all millionaires in dollars around the world to finance low-income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate action [which] would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education", "a global democratic assembly whose role would be to draft international treaties against climate change [where] each adult across the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly" (though this one receives only 48% of support in the U.S.), and an international emission trading scheme where "countries that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less than their share". In high-income countries, this global quota obtains 64% of absolute (i.e. *somewhat* or *strong*) support and 84% of relative support (i.e. excluding *indifferent* answers). The support is even higher in middle-income countries, though one should interpret the results with caution in middle-income countries as their samples are only representative of the online population (young, graduated and urban people are over-represented). After the support for the global quota, we ask how the carbon budget should be divided among countries. The preferred burden-sharing rule is to allocate the rights to emit on an equal per capita basis: this fairness principle secures an absolute majority support in all countries, and a relative majority support never below 84%. Taking into account historical responsibilities and vulnerability to climate damages is also popular, though less con-

Figure 1: Share of support (somewhat or strongly) for the main global policies among non-*indifferent* (n = 40,680).



sensual, while grand-fathering (i.e. allocating emission shares in proportion to current emissions) comes last everywhere.

Stated support for various policies

Sincerity of support

Second-order beliefs

Universalistic values

Table 1: Number of supported policies in the list experiment in function of the composition of the list. G stands for the Global climate scheme and R for the National redistribution scheme (n = 3,000).

	Number of supported policies
Mean	1.364
List contains: G	0.464***
	(0.054)
List contains: R	0.494***
	(0.053)
List contains: G $\times$ R	$-$0.001
	(0.091)
Observations	1,799
R^2	0.111

Figure 2: Support for various global policies in the U.S. (n = 3,000).



2 Discussion

Methods

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Figure 3: Prioritization of policies. Each respondent faces six policies taken at random from the ones below and allocates 100 points among them to signal the strength of their support for each one (n = 3,000).



Figure 4: Conjoint analysis (asked only to non-Republicans). Average Marginal Component Effects (relative to the baseline: an absence of policy of that category) of policies in the choice of candidate for a hypothetical duel in the 2024 Democratic primary, where both platforms are randomly drawn (n = 2,000).



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