

¹ International Majorities Genuinely Support Global ² Redistribution and Climate Policies

Adrien Fabre*, Thomas Douenne[†] and Linus Mattauch[‡]

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Abstract

We document majority support for policies entailing global redistribution and climate mitigation. Surveys on 40,680 respondents in 20 countries show strong stated support for a global carbon price funding equal cash transfers, called the “Global Climate Scheme” (GCS). Through our main surveys on 8,000 respondents in the U.S., France, Germany, Spain, and the UK, we test several hypotheses that could reconcile strong stated support with scarce occurrences in public debates. Three quarters of Europeans and half of Americans support the GCS, even as they understand the policy’s cost to them. Using different experiments, we show that the support for the GCS is sincere and that electoral candidates could win votes by endorsing it. More generally, we document widespread support for other globally redistributive policies, such as increased foreign aid or a wealth tax funding low-income countries. In sum, global policies are genuinely supported by majorities, even in wealthy, contributing countries.

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*CNRS, CIRED. E-mail: adrien.fabre@cnrs.fr (corresponding author).

[†]University of Amsterdam

[‡]Technical University Berlin, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research – Member of the Leibniz Association and University of Oxford

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69 **1 Introduction**

70 Major sustainability objectives could be achieved by global approaches to mitigating
 71 climate change and poverty involving transfers from high- to lower-income countries.^{1–6}
 72 For instance, a global wealth tax could finance the Sustainable Development Goals.⁷ More
 73 specifically, if merely 35% of the revenue were allocated for this purpose, a global 2% tax
 74 on individual wealth in excess of \$5 million could significantly reduce poverty as it would
 75 mechanically increase low-income countries' national income by 50% (as computed on
 76 the [WID wealth tax simulator](#)). Besides, global carbon pricing is widely regarded by
 77 economists as the benchmark climate policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon
 78 emissions externality. As early as 1990, Michael Grubb stated:⁸ "by far the best com-
 79 bination of long term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity, is obtained from a
 80 system based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions which are allocated on an adult
 81 per capita basis", i.e., equally among human adults. Support for such solution, which we
 82 call the "Global Climate Scheme", has been renewed ever since.^{9–14}

83 While international negotiations have not yet led to ambitious globally redistributive
 84 policies, recent developments suggest that such a change might be underway. The African
 85 Union [calls for](#) a global carbon taxation regime, the UN [is setting up](#) a Framework Con-
 86 vention on International Tax Cooperation, the G20 is studying a global wealth tax, etc.

87 A key condition for implementing global policies has remained largely unaddressed:
88 the support of citizens. Using a Global survey on 40,680 respondents from 20 high-
89 and middle-income countries, we reveal substantial support for those policies, especially
90 global climate policies and a global tax on the wealthiest aimed at financing low-income
91 countries (other questions from this survey are analyzed in a companion paper¹⁵). In-
92 terestingly, even in wealthy nations that would bear a significant burden, majorities of
93 citizens express support for such globally redistributive policies. To better understand
94 public support for global policies in high-income countries, we conduct our Main sur-
95 veys among 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, the UK, and the U.S.

96 The focus of the Main surveys is a specific policy aimed at addressing both climate
97 change and poverty, referred to as the “Global Climate Scheme” (GCS). It implements
98 a cap on carbon emissions to limit global warming below 2°C. The emission rights are
99 auctioned each year to polluting firms and fund a global basic income, alleviating extreme
100 poverty. This archetypal policy exposes respondents to the key trade-off between the
101 benefits and costs of globally redistributive climate policies, as respondents are made
102 aware of the cost that the GCS entails for their country’s people.

103 After checking that respondents have understood the policy and its cost, we measure
104 the support in a direct Yes/No question. The GCS is supported by three quarters of Eu-
105 ropeans and more than half of Americans. Then, we test for social desirability bias using
106 a list experiment. We find no evidence that people exaggerate their support in the direct
107 question. To assess whether the support would diminish in a context with real stakes,
108 we ask respondents whether they are willing to sign a petition in favor of the GCS, after
109 informing them that the question results will be communicated to their head of state’s
110 office. The support is sustained in an environment that approaches real stakes. We then
111 carry out conjoint analyses to neutralize experimenter demand and investigate the prior-
112 ity given to global policies compared to other types of policies. Conjoint analyses reveal
113 that a political platform is more likely to be preferred if it contains the GCS or a global tax
114 on millionaires, and that global policies rank high in the prioritization of policies. Our
115 randomized experiments also show that a candidate would not lose vote intentions by
116 endorsing the GCS, and might even gain up to 11 points in a country like France. An
117 analysis of open-ended fields confirms that support for the GCS is real, and indicates that
118 appeal of the GCS comes from its international nature and its impacts on climate, more
119 than on global poverty. We also test other global policies and universalistic attitudes. Sup-
120 port is very strong for a global tax on millionaires, and the median respondent prefers to

121 allocate 30% of the revenues of such a tax to low-income countries. Majorities are willing
122 to increase foreign aid, but only if some conditions are respected, such as making sure
123 the aid is well spent and other high-income countries also increase their contribution.
124 Questions on universalistic values, including a donation experiment, confirm the congru-
125 ence of underlying values with the support for specific policies. Our diverse approaches
126 also help understand what drives the support. For instance, the evidence indicates that
127 one key reason why increasing foreign aid is not as popular as global policies lies in its
128 unilateral nature.

129 Overall, our results point out to strong and genuine support for global climate and re-
130 distributive policies, as our experiments confirm the stated support found in direct ques-
131 tions. Our results contribute to the literature on attitudes toward climate policy, confirm-
132 ing that climate policy is preferred at a global level,^{16–19} where it is more effective and
133 fair. Indeed, the Global Climate Scheme is largely supported, but a similar policy at the
134 national level is opposed by a majority in many countries,¹⁵ despite lower costs. Noting
135 that only 13% of French people declared supporting a national carbon tax with cash trans-
136 fers during the Yellow Vests movement,²⁰ surveys appear to accurately reflect the level
137 of support. Therefore, unless support for global policies disappear once they enter the
138 public debate, it seems unlikely that a policy such as the GCS would face major protests.
139 In our discussion we offer potential explanations behind the lack of prominence of global
140 policies in the public debate despite this strong support.

141 **Literature** International surveys have shown widespread support for costly climate ac-
142 tion.^{15;21} For instance, representative surveys in 125 countries covering 96% of the world's
143 greenhouse gas emissions show that 69% of the global population express willingness
144 to contribute 1% of their income to fight global warming.²² International surveys have
145 also uncovered near consensus that "present economic differences between rich and poor
146 countries are too large" (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree) in each of 29 countries.²³

147 Yet, few prior attitudinal surveys have examined global redistributive policies. A no-
148 table exception tests the support for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples in five
149 countries, representative along gender and age.²⁴ For a given variant, the sample size is
150 about 167 respondents per country. They find over 80% support for any variant in India,
151 between 50% and 65% in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43% to 59% in the U.S.,
152 depending on the variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding an equal
153 cash transfer for each human is close to 50% in high-income countries (e.g., at 44% in the

¹⁵⁴ U.S.). These figures are consistent with our results from the *Global* survey (see Figure 2),
¹⁵⁵ where the support is lower for a tax that would “only” reduce CO₂ emissions than for
¹⁵⁶ a quota that would unambiguously achieve the climate target. Relatedly, 66% of Ameri-
¹⁵⁷ cans support providing “financial aid and technical support to developing countries that
¹⁵⁸ agree to limit their greenhouse gas emissions”;²⁵ and 90% of Germans want some degree
¹⁵⁹ of global redistribution.²⁶ Besides, in surveys conducted in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the
¹⁶⁰ UK and the U.S., support ranges from 55% to 74% for “a global democracy including both
¹⁶¹ a global government and a global parliament, directly elected by the world population,
¹⁶² to recommend and implement policies on global issues”.²⁷ Through an experiment, this
¹⁶³ paper also finds that, in countries where the government stems from a coalition, voting
¹⁶⁴ shares would shift by 8 (Brazil) to 12 p.p. (Germany) from parties who are said to oppose
¹⁶⁵ global democracy to parties that supposedly support it. For instance, when Germans re-
¹⁶⁶ spondents were told that (only) the Greens and the Left support global democracy, these
¹⁶⁷ parties gained respectively 9 and 3 p.p. in vote intentions.

¹⁶⁸ Appendix A contains a broader literature review including further attitudinal sur-
¹⁶⁹ veys on global policies (A.1.1); prior work on attitudes toward climate burden sharing
¹⁷⁰ (Appendix A.1.2), attitudes toward foreign aid (Appendix A.1.3); global carbon pricing
¹⁷¹ (Appendix A.2.1), global redistribution (Appendix A.2.3), basic income (Appendix A.2.4),
¹⁷² and global democracy (Appendix A.2.5).

¹⁷³ 2 Results


¹⁷⁴ 2.1 Data

¹⁷⁵ The study relies on two sets of surveys: the *Global* survey and the *Main* surveys.

¹⁷⁶ **Global Survey** The *Global* survey, conducted in 2021, involved 40,680 respondents from
¹⁷⁷ 20 countries, representing approximately 72% of global CO₂ emissions. This survey serves
¹⁷⁸ as the basis for measuring stated support for various global policies worldwide. Detailed
¹⁷⁹ information about the data collection process, sample representativeness, and analysis of
¹⁸⁰ questions on national policies can be found in a companion paper.¹⁵

¹⁸¹ **Main Surveys** To delve deeper into the sincerity and rationales behind support for the
¹⁸² GCS and attitudes towards global policies, global redistribution, and universalistic val-

Figure 1: Main surveys' structure. Cf. also Figure S48 for the treatment branches.



¹⁸³ ues, we conducted the Main surveys in 2023. These surveys are based on a sample of
¹⁸⁴ 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, the UK, and the U.S. The European sur-
¹⁸⁵vey (*Eu*) comprises 3,000 respondents, while the U.S. sample was collected in two sep-
¹⁸⁶arate waves: *US1* with 3,000 respondents and *US2* with 2,000 respondents. The survey
¹⁸⁷questions in both the European and U.S. surveys are identical (see Figure 1), except for an
¹⁸⁸additional question in *US2* that uses results from *US1* to assess the bandwagon effect.

¹⁸⁹ The Main surveys ensured representativeness along key dimensions: gender, income,
¹⁹⁰age, highest diploma, and degree of urbanization. The *Eu* survey is also representative
¹⁹¹of its four countries in terms of population size, while the *US1* and *US2* surveys are rep-
¹⁹²resentative in terms of region and ethnicity. Tables S8-S9 detail how our samples match
¹⁹³population frequencies. More detail on data collection is given in Section Methods. The
¹⁹⁴questionnaires used in the surveys are provided in Appendices C and D.

195 **2.2 Global support**


196 The Global survey shows strong support for climate policies enacted at the global
197 level (Figure 2). When asked “At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle
198 climate change need to be put in place?”, 70% (in the U.S.) to 94% (in Japan) choose the
199 global level. The next most popular choice is the federal or continental level, favored
200 by 52% of Americans and less than half of European respondents. Local policies receive
201 the least support. This preference for climate policies implemented at the global scale
202 is in line with the literature¹⁷ and consistent with individuals’ concerns for the fairness
203 and effectiveness of such policies, which have been identified as two of the three key
204 determinants of support, besides self-interest.^{28;20;15} It could also stem from conditional
205 cooperation, although previous studies indicate that the support for climate policies does
206 not depend on climate action abroad.^{29;30}

207 Among the four global climate policies examined in the *Global* survey, three policies
208 garner high support across all countries (Figure 2). These policies include a global demo-
209 cratic assembly on climate change, a global tax on millionaires to finance low-income
210 countries contingent on their climate action, and a global carbon budget of +2°C divided
211 among countries based on tradable shares (or “global quota”), with the allocation of coun-
212 try shares unspecified (see wording in Appendix C). The three policies garner a majority
213 of absolute support (i.e., “somewhat” or “strong” support) in all countries (except in the
214 U.S. for the global assembly, 48% absolute support). In high-income countries, the global
215 quota policy obtains 64% absolute support and 84% relative support (i.e., excluding “in-
216 different” answers).

217 Following the support for the global quota, respondents are asked about their pref-
218 erences for dividing the carbon budget among countries, as depicted in the third block
219 of Figure 2. Consistent with the existing literature (see Appendix A.1.2), an equal per
220 capita allocation of emission rights emerges as the preferred burden-sharing principle,
221 garnering absolute majority support in all countries and never below 84% relative sup-
222 port. Taking into account historical responsibilities or vulnerability to climate damages is
223 also popular, albeit with less consensus, while grandfathering (i.e., allocation of emission
224 shares in proportion to current emissions) receives the least support in all countries.

225 A global carbon tax that funds a global basic income should produce the same dis-
226 tributional outcomes as a global tradable quota with equal per capita emission rights
227 (provided that each country returns equally to its citizens the revenues from emissions
228 trading and to the extent that the carbon price is the same). The support for the global car-

Figure 2: Relative support for global climate policies.



Note 1: The numbers represent the share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* among non-*indifferent* answers (in percent, $n = 40,680$). The color blue denotes a relative majority. See Figure S11 for the absolute support. (Questions A-I).

Note 2: *In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

229 bon tax is also tested and its redistributive effects – the average increase in expenditures
 230 along with the amount of the basic income – are specified to the respondents explicitly
 231 (see box below and Appendix D, p. 86). The support for the carbon tax is lower than for
 232 the quota, particularly in high-income countries, and there is no relative majority for the
 233 tax in Anglo-Saxon countries (consistently with the levels of support found in the only
 234 previous study that tested a global carbon tax²⁴). Two possible reasons for this lower
 235 support are that distributive effects are made salient in the case of the tax, and that peo-
 236 ple may prefer a quota, perhaps because they find it more effective than a tax to reduce
 237 emissions. The combination of both reasons is consistent with the level of support for the
 238 global quota once we make the distributive effects salient, as we do in the Main surveys.

²³⁹ **2.3 Stated support for the Global Climate Scheme**

²⁴⁰ The Main surveys (*US1, US2, Eu*) include a comprehensive exploration of citizens'
²⁴¹ attitudes towards the GCS. We present to respondents a detailed description of the GCS
²⁴² and explain its distributive effects, including specific amounts at stake (as specified in
²⁴³ the box below). Furthermore, we assess respondents' understanding of the GCS with
²⁴⁴ incentivized questions to test their comprehension of the expected financial outcome for
²⁴⁵ typical individuals in high-income countries (loss) and the poorest individuals globally
²⁴⁶ (gain), followed by the provision of correct answers (Figures [S12-S13](#)). The same approach
²⁴⁷ is applied to a National Redistribution scheme (NR) targeting top incomes with the aim
²⁴⁸ of financing cash transfers to all adults, calibrated to offset the monetary loss of the GCS
²⁴⁹ for the median emitter in their country. We evaluate respondents' understanding that the
²⁵⁰ richest would lose and the typical fellow citizens would gain from that policy. Subse-
²⁵¹ quently, we summarize both schemes to enhance respondents' recall. Additionally, we
²⁵² present a final incentivized comprehension question and provide the expected answer
²⁵³ that the combined GCS and NR would result in no net gain or loss for a typical fellow
²⁵⁴ citizen. Finally, respondents are directly asked to express their support for the GCS and
²⁵⁵ NR using a simple Yes/No question.

The Global Climate Scheme The GCS consists of global emissions trading with emission rights being auctioned each year to polluting firms, and of a global basic income, funded by the auction revenues. Using the price and emissions trajectories from the report by Stern & Stiglitz,³¹ and in particular a carbon price of \$90/tCO₂ in 2030, we estimate that the basic income would amount to \$30 per month for every human adult (see details in Appendix [E](#)). We describe the GCS to the respondents as a "climate club" and we specify its redistributive effects: The 700 million people with less than \$2/day [in Purchasing Power Parity] would be lifted out of extreme poverty, and fossil fuel price increases would cost the typical person in their country a specified amount (see Appendix [D](#) for details). The monthly median net cost is \$85 in the U.S., €10 in France, €25 in Germany, €5 in Spain, £20 in the UK.

²⁵⁶

²⁵⁷ The stated support for the GCS is 54% in the U.S. and 76% in Europe, while the support
²⁵⁸ for NR is very similar: 56% and 73% respectively (see Figure [S1](#)). Appendix [F](#) examines
²⁵⁹ the sociodemographic determinants of support for the GCS as well as the beliefs corre-
²⁶⁰ lated with the support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income. The

²⁶¹ strongest correlates are political leaning, trust in the government and perceptions that the
²⁶² policy is effective at reducing emissions or in one's self-interest.

²⁶³ 2.4 Robustness and sincerity of support for the GCS

²⁶⁴ We use several methods to assess the sincerity of the support for the GCS: a list ex-
²⁶⁵ periment, a real-stake petition, conjoint analyses, and the prioritization of policies. All
²⁶⁶ methods suggest that the support is either completely sincere, or the share of insincere
²⁶⁷ answers is limited.

²⁶⁸ 2.4.1 List experiment

²⁶⁹ By asking *how many* policies within a list respondents support and varying the list
²⁷⁰ among respondents, a list experiment allows identifying the tacit support for a policy of
²⁷¹ interest. For example, say a first subsample faces the list of policies A, B, and C, while a
²⁷² second subsamples faces the list A, B, C, and GCS. We do not need to know which policies
²⁷³ each respondent support to estimate the average (tacit) support for the GCS, we simply
²⁷⁴ need to compute the difference in the average number of supported policies between
²⁷⁵ the two random subsamples.³² In our case, as shown in Table 1, the tacit support for the
²⁷⁶ GCS measured through the list experiment is not significantly lower than the direct stated
²⁷⁷ support. Hence, we do not find a social desirability bias in our study.

²⁷⁸ 2.4.2 Petition

²⁷⁹ We ask respondents whether they are willing to sign a petition in support of either
²⁸⁰ the GCS or NR policy. We inform them that the petition results will be sent to the head
²⁸¹ of state's office, highlighting the proportion of fellow citizens endorsing the respective
²⁸² scheme. Even when framed as a petition that might have real stakes, both policies con-
²⁸³ tinue to receive majority support. In the U.S., we find no significant difference between
²⁸⁴ the support in the petitions and the simple questions (GCS: $p = .30$; NR: $p = .76$). In Eu-
²⁸⁵ rope, the petition leads to a comparable lower support for both the GCS (7 p.p., $p = 10^{-5}$)
²⁸⁶ and NR (4 p.p., $p = .008$). While some European respondents are unwilling to sign a
²⁸⁷ petition for policies they are expected to support, this phenomenon is not specific to the
²⁸⁸ GCS, and the overall willingness to sign a petition remains strong, with 69% expressing
²⁸⁹ support for the GCS and 67% for NR.

290 **2.4.3 Conjoint analyses**

291 In order to assess the public support for the GCS in conjunction with other policies, we
292 conduct a series of conjoint analyses. We ask respondents to make five choices between
293 pairs of political platforms.

294 The first conjoint analysis suggests that the GCS is supported independently of being
295 complemented by the National Redistribution Scheme and a national climate policy (C).
296 The second analysis indicates majority support for the GCS and for C, which are seen as
297 neither complement nor substitute (see [Methods](#)). A minor share of respondents like a
298 national climate policy and dislike a global one, but as many people prefer a global rather
299 than a national policy; and there is no evidence that implementing NR would increase the
300 support for the GCS.

301 In the third analysis, we present two random branches of the sample with hypothetical
302 progressive and conservative platforms that differ only by the presence (or not) of the
303 GCS in the progressive platform. Table 2 shows that a progressive candidate would not
304 significantly lose voting share by endorsing the GCS in any country, and may even gain
305 11 p.p. ($p = .005$) in voting intention in France.

306 Our last two analyses make respondents choose between two random platforms. In
307 Europe, respondents are prompted to imagine that a left or center-left coalition will win
308 the next election and asked what platform they would prefer that coalition to have cam-
309 paigned on. In the U.S., the question is framed as a hypothetical duel in a Democratic
310 primary, and asked only to non-Republicans ($n = 2,218$), i.e. the respondents who declare
311 as political affiliation *Democrat*, *Independent*, *Non-Affiliated* or *Other*. In the fourth analysis,
312 a policy (or an absence of policy) is randomly drawn for each platform in each of five
313 categories: *economic issues*, *societal issues*, *climate policy*, *tax system*, *foreign policy* (Figure
314 [S2](#)).

315 In the UK, Germany, and France, a platform is about 9 to 13 p.p. more likely to be
316 preferred if it includes the GCS rather than no foreign policy. This effect is between 1
317 and 4 p.p. and no longer significant in the U.S. (among non-Republicans) and in Spain.
318 Moreover, a platform that includes a global tax on millionaires rather than no foreign
319 policy is 5 to 13 p.p. more likely to be preferred in all countries (the effect is significant
320 and at least 9 p.p. in all countries but Spain). Similarly, a global democratic assembly on
321 climate change has a significant effect of 8 to 12 p.p. in the U.S. (among non-Republicans),
322 Germany, and France. These effects are large, and not far from the effects of the policies
323 most influential on the platforms, which range between 15 and 18 p.p. in most countries

³²⁴ (and 27 p.p. in Spain), and all relate to improved public services (in particular healthcare,
³²⁵ housing, and education).

³²⁶ The fifth analysis draws random platforms similarly, except that candidate A's plat-
³²⁷ form always contains the GCS while B's includes no foreign policy. In this case, A is
³²⁸ chosen by 60% of Europeans and 58% of non-Republican Americans (Figure S3). Over-
³²⁹ all, taking the U.S. as an example, our conjoint analyses indicate that a candidate at the
³³⁰ Democratic primary would have more chances to obtain the nomination by endorsing the
³³¹ GCS, and this endorsement would not penalize her or him at the presidential election.

³³² 2.4.4 Prioritization

³³³ Towards the end of the survey, we ask respondents to allocate 100 points among six
³³⁴ randomly selected policies from the previous conjoint analyses, using sliders. The instruc-
³³⁵ tion was to distribute the points based on their level of support, with a higher allocation
³³⁶ indicating greater support for a policy. As a result, the average support across policies is
³³⁷ 16.67 points. In each country, the GCS ranks in the middle of all policies or above, with
³³⁸ an average number of points from 15.4 in the U.S. to 22.9 in Germany.

³³⁹ Interestingly, in Germany, the most prioritized policy is the global tax on millionaires,
³⁴⁰ while the GCS is the second most prioritized policy. The global tax on millionaires con-
³⁴¹ sistently ranks no lower than fifth position (out of 15 or 17 policies) in every country,
³⁴² garnering an average of 18.3 points in Spain to 22.9 points in Germany.

³⁴³ 2.4.5 Pros and Cons

³⁴⁴ We survey respondents to gather their perspectives on the pros and cons of the GCS,
³⁴⁵ randomly utilizing an open-ended or a closed question. In the closed question format,
³⁴⁶ respondents tend to consider every argument as important in determining their support
³⁴⁷ or opposition to the GCS (see Figure S17).

³⁴⁸ The open-ended question provides more insights into what people associate with the
³⁴⁹ GCS when prompted to think about it. Analyzing keywords in the responses (automati-
³⁵⁰ cally translated into English), the most frequently mentioned topics are the international
³⁵¹ aspect and the environment, each appearing in approximately one-quarter of the answers
³⁵² (see Figure S19). This is followed by discussions on the effects of the GCS on poverty and
³⁵³ prices, each mentioned by about one-tenth of the respondents. We also manually clas-
³⁵⁴ sified each answer into different categories (see Figure S18). This exercise confirms the

³⁵⁵ findings from the automatic search: the environmental benefit of the GCS is the most
³⁵⁶ commonly discussed topic, while obstacles to implementation or agreement on the pro-
³⁵⁷ posal are relatively infrequently mentioned.

³⁵⁸ In the *US2* survey, we divided the sample into four random branches. Two branches
³⁵⁹ were presented the pros and cons questions (either in open or closed format) *before* be-
³⁶⁰ ing asked about their support for the GCS or NR. Another branch received information
³⁶¹ on the actual level of support for the GCS and NR (estimated in *US1*, see box p. 14),
³⁶² and one control group received none of these treatments. The objective of the “pros and
³⁶³ cons treatment” was to mimic a “campaign effect”, which refers to the shift in opinion
³⁶⁴ resulting from media coverage of the proposal. To conservatively estimate the effect of
³⁶⁵ a (potentially negative) campaign, we intentionally included more cons (6) than pros (3).
³⁶⁶ Interestingly, the support for the GCS decreased by 11 p.p. after respondents viewed a list
³⁶⁷ of its pros and cons. Notably, the support also decreased by 7 p.p. after respondents were
³⁶⁸ asked to consider the pros and cons in an open-ended question. Despite some significant
³⁶⁹ effects of pondering the pros and cons, approximately half of the Americans express sup-
³⁷⁰ port for the GCS across all treatment branches (see Table S1). Although support remains
³⁷¹ significant, these results suggest that the public success of the GCS would be sensitive to
³⁷² the content of the debate about it, and subject to the discourse adopted by interest groups.

Second-order Beliefs To explain the strong support for the GCS despite its ab-
sence from political platforms and public debate, we hypothesized pluralistic igno-
rance, i.e. that the public and policymakers mistakenly perceive the GCS as unpop-
ular. As a result, individuals might conceal their support for such globally redis-
tributive policies, believing that advocating for them would be futile.

In the case of Americans, their beliefs about the level of support for the GCS are
relatively accurate (Figure S4). The mean perceived support is 52% (with quartiles
of 36%, 52%, and 68%), which closely aligns with the actual support of 53%. Euro-
peans, on the other hand, underestimate the support by 17 p.p. Nonetheless, 65% of
them correctly estimate that the GCS garners majority support, and the mean per-
ceived support is 59% (and quartiles of 43%, 61%, and 74%), compared to the actual
support of 76%. Second-order beliefs are equally accurate for NR in the U.S. and
similarly underestimated in Europe. Finally, consistent with Americans accurately
perceiving the levels of support for the GCS or NR, providing information on the
actual level had no significant effect on their support in the *US2* survey.

³⁷⁴ **2.5 Stated support for global redistribution**

³⁷⁵ **2.5.1 Global wealth tax**

³⁷⁶ Consistent with the results of the Global survey, a “tax on millionaires of all countries
³⁷⁷ to finance low-income countries” garners relative support of over 69% in each country,
³⁷⁸ only 5 p.p. lower than a national millionaires tax overall (Figure 3). In random subsam-
³⁷⁹ ples, we inquire about respondents’ preferences regarding the redistribution of revenues
³⁸⁰ from a global tax on individual wealth exceeding \$5 million, after providing information
³⁸¹ on the revenue raised by such a tax in their country compared to low-income countries.
³⁸² We ask certain respondents ($n = 1,283$) what percentage of global tax revenues should be
³⁸³ pooled to finance low-income countries. In each country, at least 88% of respondents in-
³⁸⁴ dicate a positive amount, with an average of one-third (Figure S5). To other respondents
³⁸⁵ ($n = 1,233$), we inquire whether they would prefer each country to retain all the revenues
³⁸⁶ it collects or that half of the revenues be pooled to finance low-income countries. Ap-
³⁸⁷ proximately half of the respondents opt to allocate half of the tax revenues to low-income
³⁸⁸ countries, consistently with the other variant of the question.

³⁸⁹ **2.5.2 Other global policies**

³⁹⁰ We also assess support for other global policies (Figure 3). Most policies garner rel-
³⁹¹ ative majority support in each country, with two exceptions: the “cancellation of low-
³⁹² income countries’ public debt” and “a maximum wealth limit” for each individual. The
³⁹³ latter policy obtains relative majority support in Europe but not in the U.S., despite the
³⁹⁴ cap being set at \$10 billion in the U.S. compared to €/£100 million in Europe. Notably,
³⁹⁵ climate-related policies enjoy significant popularity, with “high-income countries funding
³⁹⁶ renewable energy in low-income countries” receiving absolute majority support across all
³⁹⁷ surveyed countries. Additionally, relative support for loss and damages compensation, as
³⁹⁸ approved in principle at the international climate negotiations in 2022 (“COP27”), ranges
³⁹⁹ from 55% (U.S.) to 81% (Spain).

⁴⁰⁰ **2.5.3 Foreign aid**

⁴⁰¹ We provide respondents with information about the actual amount “spent on foreign
⁴⁰² aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries” relative to their country’s government
⁴⁰³ spending and GDP. Less than 16% of respondents state that their country’s foreign aid

Figure 3: Relative support for various global policies (percentage of *somewhat* or *strong support*, after excluding *indifferent* answers). (Questions 44 and 45; See Figure S33 for the absolute support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	55	71	72	70	79	70
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	68	82	82	82	85	81
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	60	76	77	79	79	71
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	46	53	53	43	62	61
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	58	71	69	69	78	72
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	62	73	58	73	80	83
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	63	80	80	78	81	83
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	62	87	90	86	91	87
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	46	62	58	62	65	67
National tax on millionaires funding public services	73	85	81	87	89	88
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	69	84	84	84	87	83

404 should be reduced, while 62% express support for increasing it, including 17% who sup-
 405 port an unconditional increase (Figure S6). Among the 45% who think aid should be
 406 increased under certain conditions, we subsequently ask them to specify the conditions
 407 they deem necessary (Figure S7). The three most commonly selected conditions are: "we
 408 can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted" (73% chose this con-
 409 dition), "that recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights" (67%),
 410 and "that other high-income countries also increase their foreign aid" (48%). On the other
 411 hand, respondents who do not wish to increase their country's foreign aid primarily jus-
 412 tify their view by prioritizing the well-being of their fellow citizens or by perceiving each
 413 country as responsible for its own fate (Figure S8). In response to an open-ended ques-
 414 tion regarding measures high-income countries should take to fight extreme poverty, a

⁴¹⁵ large majority of Americans expressed that more help is needed (Figure S46). The most
⁴¹⁶ commonly suggested form of aid is financial support, closely followed by investments in
⁴¹⁷ education.

⁴¹⁸ We also inquire about the perceived amount of foreign aid. Consistent with prior re-
⁴¹⁹ search (see Appendix A.1.3), most people overestimate the actual amount of foreign aid
⁴²⁰ (Figure S25). We then elicit respondents' preferred amount of foreign aid, after randomly
⁴²¹ presenting them with either the actual amount or no information. Most of the respon-
⁴²² dents who learn the actual amount choose a bracket at least as high as the actual one, and
⁴²³ most of those without the information choose a bracket at least as high as the perceived
⁴²⁴ one (Figures S28–S27). Finally, we ask a last question to the respondents who received
⁴²⁵ the information. To those who prefer an increase of foreign aid, we ask how they would
⁴²⁶ finance it: by far, the preferred source of funding is higher taxes on the wealthiest (Figure
⁴²⁷ S30). To those who prefer a reduction, we ask how they would use the funds becoming
⁴²⁸ available: In every country, more people choose higher spending on education or health-
⁴²⁹ care rather than lower taxes (Figure S31).

Universalistic values We also elicit underlying values, to test whether broad values are consistent with people’s support for specific policies. When we ask respondents which group they defend when they vote, 20% choose “sentient beings (humans and animals),” 22% choose “humans,” 33% select their “fellow citizens” (or “Europeans”), 15% choose “My family and myself,” and the remaining 10% choose another group (mainly “My State or region” or “People sharing my culture or religion”). The first two categories, representing close to one out of two people, can be described as universalist in their vote. Notably, a majority of left-wing voters are universalist in their vote (see Figure S47).

When asked what their country’s diplomats should defend in international climate negotiations, only 11% prefer their country’s “interests, even if it goes against global justice.” In contrast, 30% prefer global justice (with or without consideration of national interests), and the bulk of respondents (38%) prefer their country’s “interests, to the extent it respects global justice.”

Furthermore, when we ask respondents to assess the extent to which climate change, global poverty, and inequality in their country are issues, climate change is generally viewed as the most significant problem (with a mean score of 0.59 after recoding answers between -2 and 2). This is followed by global poverty (0.42) and national inequality (0.37).

Finally, we conduct a lottery experiment to elicit universalistic values. Respondents were automatically enrolled in a lottery with a \$100 prize and had to choose the proportion of the prize they would keep for themselves versus give to a person living in poverty. The charity donation is directed either to an African individual or a fellow citizen, depending on the respondent’s random assignment. In Europe, we observe no significant variation in the willingness to donate based on the recipient’s origin. In the U.S., the donations to Africans are 3 p.p. lower (with an average donation of 34%), but the slightly lower donations to Africans are entirely driven by Trump voters and non-voters (Table S2).

430

431 3 Discussion

432 Our point of departure are recent surveys conducted in 20 of the largest countries, as
433 they reveal strong majority support for global redistributive and climate policies, even in

434 high-income countries that would financially lose from them. The results from the Main
435 surveys conducted in the U.S. and four European countries reinforce these findings. We
436 find strong support for global taxes on the wealthiest individuals, as well as majority sup-
437 port for our main policy of interest – the Global Climate Scheme (GCS). The GCS encom-
438 passes carbon pricing at a global level through an emissions trading system, accompanied
439 by a global basic income funded by the scheme's revenues. Additional experiments, such
440 as a list experiment and a real-stake petition, demonstrate that the support for the GCS is
441 real. Such genuine support is further substantiated by the prioritization of the GCS over
442 prominent national climate policies and aligned with a significant portion of the popu-
443 lation holding universalistic values rather than nationalistic or egoistic ones. Moreover,
444 the conjoint analyses indicate that a progressive candidate would not lose voting shares
445 by endorsing the GCS, and may even gain 11 p.p. in voting shares in France. Similarly,
446 a candidate endorsing the GCS would gain votes in a U.S. Democratic primary, while in
447 Europe, a progressive platform that includes the GCS would be preferred over one that
448 does not.

449 Having ruled out insincerity as potential explanation for the scarcity of global policies
450 in the public debate, we propose alternative explanations. The first two are variations of
451 pluralistic ignorance, and the last three represent complementary explanations.

452 First, there may be pluralistic ignorance *among policymakers* regarding universalistic
453 values, support for the GCS, or the electoral advantage of endorsing it. Second, people or
454 policymakers may believe that globally redistributive policies are politically infeasible in
455 some key (potentially foreign) countries like the U.S. Third, political discourse centrally
456 happens at the national level, shaped by national media and institutions such as voting.
457 National framing by political voices may create biases and suppress universalistic values.
458 Fourth, many individuals, including policymakers, may perceive global redistributive
459 policies as ill-defined or technically infeasible, ultimately dismissing them as unrealistic.
460 In particular, policymakers may have insider information about the technical feasibility of
461 such policies. Alternatively, the perception of unrealism may stem from an unawareness
462 of specific proposals. Fifth, just as policy is disproportionately influenced by the economic
463 elites,^{33;34} public debate may be shaped by the wealthiest, who have vested interests in
464 preventing global redistribution.

465 Confirmation of any of these hypotheses would lead to a common conclusion: there
466 exists substantial support for global policies addressing climate change and global in-
467 equality, even in high-income countries, and the perceived boundaries of political realism

468 on this issue may soon shift. Uncovering evidence to support the above hypotheses could
469 draw attention to global policies in the public debate and contribute to their increased
470 prominence.

471 **Methods**

472 **Pre-registration.** The project is approved by Economics & Business Ethics Committee (EBEC) at
473 the University of Amsterdam (EB-1113) and was preregistered in the Open Science Foundation
474 registry (osf.io/fy6gd). The study did not deviate from the registration: the questionnaires and
475 the hypotheses tests used are the same as the ones *given ex ante*. Informed consent was obtained
476 from all respondents, randomized treatment branches were unknown to the respondents, and our
477 research complies with all relevant ethical regulations. Respondents were compensated with gift
478 certificates for a value of €1 per interview. No statistical methods were used to pre-determine
479 sample sizes but our sample sizes are those reported in previous publications.^{15-18,20}

480 **Data collection.** The paper utilizes two sets of surveys: the *Global* survey and the *Main* sur-
481 veys. The *Main* surveys consist of two U.S. surveys, *US1* and *US2*, and one European survey, *Eu*.
482 The *Global* survey was conducted from March 2021 to March 2022 on 40,680 respondents from
483 20 countries (with 1,465 to 2,488 respondents per country). *US1* collected responses from 3,000
484 respondents between January and March 2023, while *US2* gathered data from 2,000 respondents
485 between March and April 2023. *Eu* included 3,000 respondents and was conducted from February
486 to March 2023. We used the survey companies *Dynata* and *Respondi*. To ensure representative
487 samples, we employed stratified quotas based on gender, age (5 brackets), income (4), region (4),
488 education level (3), and ethnicity (3) for the U.S. We also incorporated survey weights throughout
489 the analysis to account for any remaining imbalances. These weights were constructed using the
490 quota variables as well as the degree of urbanity, and trimmed between 0.25 and 4. Stratified quo-
491 tas followed by reweighting is the usual method to reduce selection bias from opt-in online panels,
492 when better sampling methods (such as compulsory participation of random dwellings) are un-
493 available.³⁵ By applying weights, the results are fully representative of the respective countries
494 along the above mentioned dimensions. Results at the European level apply different weights
495 which ensure representativeness of the combined four European countries. Appendix G shows
496 how our samples compare to actual population frequencies. Our samples match well actual fre-
497 quencies, except for some imbalance on vote in the U.S. (which does not affect our results, as show
498 the results reweighted by vote in the below section *Support for the GCS*). Appendix I shows that the
499 treatment branches are balanced. Appendix J runs placebo tests of the effects of each treatment on
500 unrelated outcomes. We do not find effects of earlier treatments on unrelated outcomes arriving
501 later in the survey. Appendix K shows that our results are unchanged when including inattentive

502 respondents.

503 **Data quality.** The median duration is 28 minutes for the *Global* survey, 14 min for *US1*, 11 min
504 for *US2*, and 20 min for *Eu*. To ensure the best possible data quality, we exclude respondents
505 who fail an attention test or rush through the survey (i.e., answer in less than 11.5 minutes in
506 the *Global* survey, 4 minutes in *US1* or *US2*, 6 minutes in *Eu*). At the end of the survey, we ask
507 whether respondents thought that our survey was politically biased and provide some feedback.
508 67% of the respondents found the survey unbiased. 25% found it left-wing biased, and 8% found
509 it right-wing biased.

510 **Questionnaires and raw results.** The questionnaire and raw results of the *Global* survey can
511 be found in the Appendix of the companion paper.¹⁵ The raw results are reported in Appendix
512 B while the surveys' structures and questionnaires are given in Appendices C and D. Country-
513 specific raw results are also available as supplementary material files: US, EU, FR, DE, ES, UK.

514 **Incentives.** To encourage accurate and truthful responses, several questions of the *US1* survey
515 use incentives. For each of the three comprehension questions that follow the policy descrip-
516 tions, we randomly select and reward three respondents who provide correct answers with a \$50
517 gift certificate. Similarly, for questions involving estimating support shares for the GCS and NR,
518 three respondents with the closest guesses to the actual values receive a \$50 gift certificate. In the
519 donation lottery question, we randomly select one respondent and split the \$100 prize between
520 the NGO GiveDirectly and the winner according to the winner's choice. In total, our incentives
521 scheme distributes gift certificates (and donations) for a value of \$850. Finally, respondents have
522 an incentive to answer truthfully to the petition question, as they are aware that the results for
523 that question (the share of respondents supporting the policy) will be transmitted to their head of
524 state's office.

525 **Absolute vs. relative support.** In most questions, support or opposition for a policy is asked
526 using a 5-Likert scale, with *Indifferent* as the middle option and compulsory response. We call
527 *absolute support* the share of *Somewhat* or *Strong support*. We generally favor the notion of *relative*
528 *support*, which reports the share of support after excluding *Indifferent* answers. Indeed, the *relative*
529 *support* is better suited to assess whether there is more people in favor vs. against a policy.

530 **Support for the GCS.** The 95% confidence intervals are [52.4%, 55.9%] in the U.S. and [74.2%, 77.2%]
531 in Europe. The average support is computed with survey weights, employing weights based on
532 quota variables, which exclude vote. Another method to reweigh the raw results involves running
533 a regression of the support for the GCS on sociodemographic characteristics (including vote) and

534 multiplying each coefficient by the population frequencies. This alternative approach yields sim-
535 ilar figures: 76% in Europe and 52% or 53% in the U.S. (depending on whether individuals who
536 did not disclose their vote are classified as non-voters or excluded). Notably, the average support
537 excluding non-voters is 54% in the U.S.

538 Though the level of support for the GCS is significantly lower in swing States (at 51%) that
539 are key to win U.S. elections, the electoral effect of endorsing the GCS remains non-significantly
540 different from zero (at +1.2 p.p.) in these States. Note that we define swing states as the 8 states
541 with less than 5 p.p. margin of victory in the 2020 election (MI, NV, PA, WI, AZ, GA, NC, FL). The
542 results are unchanged if we use the 3 p.p. threshold (that excludes FL) instead.

543 **List experiment.** List experiments have been used to reveal social desirability bias, silencing ei-
544 ther racism in the Southern U.S.³⁶ or opposition to the invasion of Ukraine in Russia.³⁷ In our case,
545 the question reads: “Beware, this question is quite unusual. Among the policies below, **how many**
546 do you support?” The list of policies randomly varies across respondents, and includes a subset of
547 GCS, NR (National Redistribution scheme), C (“Coal exit” in the U.S., “Thermal insulation plan”
548 in Europe) and O (“Marriage only for opposite-sex couples in the U.S.”, “Death penalty for major
549 crimes” in Europe). There are four branches: GCS/NR/C/O; GCS/C/O; NR/C/O; C/O. To esti-
550 mate the tacit average support for the GCS and NR, we regress the number of supported policies
551 on indicators that the list includes GCS and NR. We utilize the difference-in-means estimator, and
552 confidence intervals are computed using Monte Carlo simulation with the R package *list*.³²

553 **Petition.** The respondent is randomly assigned a branch where the petition relates to the GCS or
554 the National Redistribution scheme. The question reads: “Would you be willing to sign a petition
555 for the [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme?

556 As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President’s office], in-
557 forming him what share of American people are willing to endorse the [Global climate / National
558 redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign, only your answer here is required and
559 remains anonymous.)”.

560 Paired weighted *t*-tests are conducted to test the equality in support for a policy among re-
561 spondents who were questioned about the policy in the petition.

562 **Conjoint analyses.** The first conjoint analysis suggests that the GCS is supported independently
563 of being complemented by the National Redistribution Scheme and a national climate policy
564 (“Coal exit” in the U.S., “Thermal insulation plan” in Europe, denoted C). Indeed, 54% of U.S.
565 respondents and 74% of European ones prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to the com-
566 bination of C and NR alone, indicating similar support for the GCS conditional on NR and C than
567 for the GCS alone (Figure S15).

568 In the second conjoint analysis, results from the first branch show that the support for the GCS
569 conditional on NR, at 55% in the U.S. ($n = 757$) and 77% in Europe ($n = 746$), is not significantly
570 different from the support for the GCS alone. This suggests that rejection of the GCS is not driven
571 by the cost of the policy on oneself. The second branch shows that the support for C conditional
572 on NR is somewhat higher, at 62% in the U.S. ($n = 751$) and 84% in Europe ($n = 747$). However,
573 the third one shows no significant preference for C compared to GCS (both conditional on NR),
574 neither in Europe, where GCS is preferred by 52% ($n = 741$) nor in the U.S., where C is preferred
575 by 53% ($n = 721$). The fourth branch shows that 55% in the U.S. ($n = 771$) and 77% in Europe ($n =$
576 766) prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to NR alone.

577 The effects reported in the fourth analysis are the Average Marginal Component Effects.³⁸ The
578 policies studied are progressive policies prominent in the country. Except for the category *foreign*
579 *policy*, which features the GCS 42% of the time, they are drawn uniformly.

580 **Prioritization.** The prioritization allows inferring individual-level preferences for one policy
581 over another. This slightly differs from a conjoint analysis, which only allows inferring individual-
582 level preferences for one platform over another or collective-level preferences for one policy over
583 another. Also, by comparing platforms, conjoint analyses may be subject to interaction effects
584 between policies of a platform (which can be seen as complementary, subsitute, or antagonistic)
585 while the prioritization frames the policies as independent.

586 This question sheds light on a potential discrepancy between the policy priorities of the public
587 and those enacted by legislators. For instance, while the European Union and California have
588 enacted plans to phase out new combustion-engine cars by 2035, the proposal to “ban the sale of
589 new combustion-engine cars by 2030” emerged as one of the three least prioritized policies in each
590 country, with an average allocation of 7.8 points in France to 11.4 points in the UK.

591 **Open-ended question on the GCS.** Around one in four respondents explicitly cites pros or cons.
592 Few individuals explicitly express support or opposition, and misunderstandings are rare. Only
593 11% of the responses are empty or express a lack of opinion, though one-quarter are unclassifiable
594 due to the rarity, nonsensical nature, or irrelevance of the conveyed idea.

595 **Pros and cons.** In the closed question, the least important aspect was the negative impact on
596 their household, with 60% in Europe ($n=1,505$) and 75% in the U.S. ($n=493$) finding it important.
597 The most important elements differ between Europe and the U.S. In Europe, the key factors are
598 the GCS’s potential to limit climate change and reduce poverty in low-income countries, both
599 deemed important by 85% of respondents. In the U.S., having sufficient information about the
600 scheme ranks highest at 89%, followed by its potential to foster global cooperation at 82%.

601 Surprisingly, the support for National Redistribution also decreased by 7 p.p. following the
602 closed question about the GCS. This suggests that some individuals may lack attention and con-
603 fuse the two policies, or that contemplating the pros and cons alters the mood of some people,
604 moving them away from their initial positive impression.

605 **Global wealth tax estimates.** A 2% tax on net wealth exceeding \$5 million would annually raise
606 \$816 billion, leaving unaffected 99.9% of the world population. More specifically, it would collect
607 €5 billion in Spain, €16 billion in France, £20 billion in the UK, €44 billion in Germany, \$430
608 billion in the U.S., and \$1 billion collectively in all low-income countries (28 countries, home to
609 700 million people). These Figures come from the [WID wealth tax simulator](#).³⁹

610 **Design choices.** As Global survey results indicated strong support for global redistributive poli-
611 cies worldwide, we conducted our Main surveys to test the robustness of these results. Among
612 the eight largest high-income countries, we selected the five ones with a relatively low level of
613 support for global redistributive policies as observed in the Global survey. We also focus on the
614 GCS as its costs are less concentrated on the very rich, compared to other global redistributive
615 policies, so we expect lower (or less genuine) support. By selecting countries that would lose from
616 global redistribution, are less supportive than others, and focusing on less consensual policies, we
617 aimed at conservatively assessing the level of support of world citizens for global redistribution.

618 We split the U.S. survey into two waves to test the effect on the support of providing the
619 information on the actual support, and merged the *Eu* survey in one wave to get larger sample
620 sizes and more power in the analyses.

621 To select the policies tested, we spanned three key areas for global redistribution: climate
622 change, inequality, and global governance. We selected policies that are either on the agenda
623 of international negotiations (international transfers for mitigation; adaptation; or loss and dam-
624 ages; cancellation of public debt; reform of voting rights at the UN or IMF; global wealth tax) or
625 advocated by prominent NGOs or scholars ([global asset registry](#); limits on wealth;^{40,7} democratic
626 climate governance;⁴¹ global minimum wage;⁴² fair trade;⁴³ carbon pricing;⁶ [increased foreign](#)
627 [aid](#)).

628 Data and code availability

629 All data and code of the *Main* surveys as well as figures of the paper are available on [10.5281/zen-](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1120224)
630 [odo.1120224](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1120224) Data and code for the *Global* survey will be made public upon publication.

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636 **Author Contributions**

637 A.F. collected and analysed the data, and drafted the questionnaire and the paper. T.D. and
638 L.M. substantially revised the questionnaire and paper, and contributed to the conception and
639 redaction.

640 **Competing interests**

641 Fabre declares that he also serves as president of Global Redistribution Advocates.

Table 1: Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list. The tacit support for the GCS is estimated by regressing the number of supported policies on the presence of the GCS in the list of policies. The social desirability is estimated as the difference between the tacit and stated support, and it is not significantly different from zero even at a 20% threshold (see [Methods](#)).

	Number of supported policies		
	All	U.S.	Europe
List contains: GCS	0.624*** (0.028)	0.524*** (0.041)	0.724*** (0.036)
<i>Support for GCS</i>	0.65	0.542	0.757
<i>Social desirability bias</i>	-0.025	-0.019	-0.033
<i>80% C.I. for the bias</i>	[-0.06; 0.01]	[-0.07; 0.04]	[-0.08; 0.01]
Constant	1.317	1.147	1.486
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000
R ²	0.089	0.065	0.125

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 2: Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. (Question 28)

	Prefers the Progressive platform					
	All	United States	France	Germany	UK	Spain
GCS in Progressive platform	0.028* (0.014)	0.029 (0.022)	0.112*** (0.041)	0.015 (0.033)	0.008 (0.040)	-0.015 (0.038)
Constant	0.623	0.604	0.55	0.7	0.551	0.775
Observations	5,202	2,619	605	813	661	504
R ²	0.001	0.001	0.013	0.0003	0.0001	0.0003

Note: Simple OLS model. The 14% of *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples.

GCS has no significant influence on them. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

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Extended data

Table S1: Effects on the support for the GCS of a question on its pros and cons (either in open-ended or closed format) and on information about the actual support, in the U.S. (See Section D in the US2 Questionnaire) [\(Back to Section 2.4.5\)](#)

	Support			
	Global Climate Scheme		National Redistribution	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Control group mean	0.557	0.557	0.569	0.569
Treatment: Open-ended field on GCS pros & cons	-0.073** (0.035)	-0.071** (0.031)	-0.035 (0.035)	-0.030 (0.032)
Treatment: Closed questions on GCS pros & cons	-0.109*** (0.034)	-0.096*** (0.031)	-0.065* (0.034)	-0.062** (0.031)
Treatment: Info on actual support for GCS and NR	-0.021 (0.034)	-0.015 (0.031)	0.048 (0.033)	0.056* (0.031)
Includes controls		✓		✓
Observations	2,000	1,995	2,000	1,995
R ²	0.007	0.170	0.007	0.154

Figure S1: [For Supplementary Material, except first row to be included in Figure 3] Support for the GCS, NR and the combination of GCS, NR and C (Yes/No questions). (p. 86, Questions 20, 22, 35, 36, and 26).





Table S2: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality. (Question 34) [\(Back to Section 2.5.3\)](#)


	Donation to poor people (in %)			
	All	US	US	Eu
Poor is in own country	0.590 (0.799)	2.509** (1.152)	0.046 (1.691)	-1.349 (1.108)
Poor is in own country \times Vote: <i>not</i> Biden			3.954* (2.279)	
Mean	34.034	33.658	33.658	34.41
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000	3,000
R ²	0.0001	0.002	0.034	0.0005

Figure S2: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See non-translated versions in Figure S16; Question 29)


(a) U.S. (Asked only to non-Republicans)




(b) France



(c) Germany



(d) Spain



(e) UK




Figure S3: Influence of the GCS on preferred platform:

Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question 30; in the U.S., asked only to non-Republicans.)




Figure S4: Beliefs regarding the support for the GCS and NR. (Questions 21 and 23)




Figure S5: Percent of global wealth tax that should finance low-income countries (*mean*).

“Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all countries around the world. (...)

What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of retained in the country’s national budget)?” (Question 37)




Figure S6: Attitudes regarding the evolution of [own country] foreign aid. (Question 46)




Figure S7: Conditions at which foreign aid should be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish an increase of foreign aid at some conditions.] (Question 47)





Figure S8: Reasons why foreign aid should not be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish a decrease or stability of foreign aid.] (Question 48)



780 **A Literature review**

781 **A.1 Attitudes and perceptions**

782 **A.1.1 Population attitudes on global policies**

783 Using representative samples in 125 countries covering 96% of the world's greenhouse
784 gas emissions, Andre et al. (2024) show that 69% of the global population express willingness
785 to contribute 1% of their income to fight global warming. Carattini et al. (2019) test
786 the support for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples in five countries, representative
787 along gender and age. For a given variant, the sample size is about 167 respondents per country.
788 They find over 80% support for any variant in India, between 50% and 65% in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43% to 59% in the U.S., depending on the
789 variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding an equal dividend for each
790 human is close to 50% in high-income countries (e.g., at 44% in the U.S.), consistently with
791 our results from the *Global* survey (see Figure 2). This is another piece of evidence that the
792 support is lower for a tax that would "only" reduce CO₂ emissions than for a quota that
793 would unambiguously achieve the climate target. Using a conjoint analysis in the U.S.
794 and Germany, Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019) find that the support for a carbon tax
795 increases by up to 50% if it applies to all industrialized countries rather than exclusively
796 to one's own country.

797 In surveys conducted in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S., Ghassim (2020)
798 finds support ranging from 55% to 74% for "a global democracy including both a global
799 government and a global parliament, directly elected by the world population, to recom-
800 mend and implement policies on global issues". Through an experiment, he also finds
801 that, in countries where the government stems from a coalition, voting shares would shift
802 by 8 (Brazil) to 12 p.p. (Germany) from parties who are said to oppose global democracy
803 to parties that supposedly support it. For instance, when Germans respondents were
804 told that (only) the Greens and the Left support global democracy, these parties gained
805 respectively 9 and 3 p.p. in vote intentions, while the SPD and the CDU-CSU each lost
806 6 p.p. Ghassim (2020) also presents survey results showing strong majorities in favor of
807 the direct election of one's country's UN representative in all 18 surveyed countries. Sim-
808 ilarly, in each of 10 countries, there are clear majorities in favor of "a new supranational
809 entity [taking] enforceable global decisions in order to solve global risks" (Global Chal-
810 lenges Foundation 2018). Remarkably, already in 1946, 54% of Americans agreed (while

812 24% disagreed) that “the UN should be strengthened to make it a world government with
813 the power to control the armed forces of all nations” (Gallup 1946). Furthermore, in sur-
814 veys conducted in Argentina, China, India, Russia, Spain, and the U.S., Ghassim et al.
815 (2022) find majority support for UN reforms that would make United Nations’ decisions
816 binding, give veto powers to a few other major countries at the Security Council, or com-
817plement the highest body of the UN with a chamber of directly elected representatives.

818 Relatedly, Meiland et al. (2023) find that both Americans and French people prefer
819 an international settlement of climate justice, even if it encroaches on sovereignty. In a
820 2013 survey conducted in China, Germany, and the U.S., Schleich et al. (2016) show that
821 over three-quarter of people think that international climate agreements reached so far
822 are not successful and that future agreements are important. In Finland, Sivonen (2022)
823 finds that that support for a carbon tax is higher if implemented at the global level (54%)
824 rather than at the national level (40%).

825 The results from these specific questions are in line with the answers to more gen-
826 eral questions. In each of 36 countries, ISSP (2010) find near consensus that “for envi-
827 ronmental problems, there should be international agreements that [their country] and
828 other countries should be made to follow” (overall, 82% agree and 4% disagree). In each
829 of 29 countries, ISSP (2019) uncover near consensus that “Present economic differences
830 between rich and poor countries are too large” (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree).
831 Leiserowitz et al. (2021) reveal that 66% of Americans support providing “financial aid
832 and technical support to developing countries that agree to limit their greenhouse gas
833 emissions.” Fehr et al. (2022) find that 90% of Germans want some degree of global redis-
834 tribution.

835 A.1.2 Population attitudes on climate burden sharing

836 Despite differences in the description of fairness principles, surveys on burden-sharing
837 rules show consistent attitudes. Or at least, their seemingly contradictory results can be
838 made compatible with the following interpretation: Concerning emissions reductions,
839 most people want that every country engage in strong and collective decarbonization ef-
840 forts, with a global quota converging to climate neutrality in the medium run. Concerning
841 the financial effort, most people support high-emitting countries paying and low-income
842 countries receiving funding. The most supported rules are those perceived as equitable,
843 in particular an equal right to emit per person.

844 This interpretation helps to understand the apparent differences between articles that

845 approach burden sharing from different angles: cost sharing (in money terms), effort shar-
846 ing (in terms of emissions reductions), or resource sharing (in terms of rights to emit).
847 Existing papers adopt either the cost sharing or effort sharing approach, which preclude
848 any country from being a net receiver of funds. Also, by focusing on *either* the financial
849 or the decarbonization effort, these surveys miss the other half of the picture, which can
850 explain why some papers find strong support for the ability-to-pay principle while others
851 find strong support for grandfathering (defined as emissions reductions being the same
852 in every country). The literature follows these approaches to align with the notions used
853 by the UNFCCC. Yet, we argue that the resource sharing approach is preferable for un-
854 covering attitudes, as it unambiguously describes the distributive implications of each
855 rule while achieving an efficient geographical distribution of emissions reductions and
856 explicitly allowing for monetary gains for some countries.

857 Now, let us summarize the results of the different papers in the light of this clarifica-
858 tion. Schleich et al. (2016) find an identical ranking of support for burden-sharing prin-
859 ciples in China, Germany, and the U.S.: polluter-pays followed by ability-to-pay, equal
860 emissions per capita, and grandfathering. Note that the authors do not allow for emis-
861 sions trading in their description of equal *emissions per capita*, which may explain its rel-
862 atively low support. Yet, the relative support for egalitarianism also depends on how
863 *the other* rules are described. Indeed, Carlsson et al. (2011) find that Swedes prefer that
864 “all countries are allowed to emit an equal amount per capita” rather than options where
865 emissions are reduced based on current or historical emissions, for which it is explicitly
866 stated that high-emitting countries “will continue to emit more than others”. Bechtel &
867 Scheve (2013) find agreement that rich countries should pay more and historical emis-
868 sions should matter, but that efforts should not be solely borne by wealthy nations. More
869 precisely, their conjoint analysis conducted in France, Germany, the UK, and the U.S.
870 shows that a climate agreement is 15 p.p. more likely to be preferred (to a random alter-
871 native) if it includes 160 countries rather than 20, and 5 p.p. less likely to be preferred
872 if “only rich countries pay” compared to other burden-sharing rules: “rich countries pay
873 more than poor”, “countries pay proportional to current emissions” or “countries pay
874 proportional to historical emissions”. In Germany and the U.S., Gampfer et al. (2014) also
875 find stronger support for funding climate action in low-income countries when cost is
876 shared with other countries. Using a choice experiment, Carlsson et al. (2013) find that the
877 least preferred option in China and the U.S. is when low-emitting countries are exempted
878 from any effort. Ability-to-pay is appreciated in both countries and is the preferred op-

tion in the U.S., though the preferred option in China is another one that accounts for historical responsibility. In the U.S. and France, [Meilland et al. \(2023\)](#) find that the most favored fairness principle is that “all countries commit to converge to the same average of total emissions per inhabitant, compatible with a controlled climate change”. Furthermore, in each country, 73% disagree with grandfathering defined as “countries which emitted a lot of carbon in the past have a right to continue emitting more than others in the future”. The study by [Meilland et al. \(2023\)](#) contains many other results: for instance, majorities prefer to hold countries accountable for their consumption-based rather than territorial emissions, and the median choice regarding historical responsibility is to hold a country accountable for its post-1990 emissions (rather than post-1850 or just their current emissions). Finally, in each of 28 (among the largest) countries, [Dabla-Norris et al. \(2023\)](#) find strong majority for “all countries” to the question “Which countries do you think should be paying to reduce carbon emissions?”. When asked to choose between a cost sharing based on *current* vs. *accumulated historic emissions*, a majority prefers *current emissions* in all countries but China and Saudi Arabia (where the two options are close to equally preferred).

[\(Back to Section 2.2\)](#)

895 A.1.3 Population attitudes on foreign aid

896 There is an extensive literature on attitudes towards foreign aid in donor countries.
897 The key findings indicate that most people overestimate the amount of foreign aid and
898 that only a minority wants a cut in foreign aid compared to actual amounts, especially
899 once they become aware of them.

900 For instance, [PIPA \(2001\)](#) shows that 83% of Americans support a multilateral effort
901 to cut world hunger in half. [PIPA \(2008\)](#) shows that in each of 20 countries, a majority
902 thinks that developed countries “have a moral responsibility to work to reduce hunger
903 and severe poverty in poor countries”, with an average agreement of 81%. In 7 OECD
904 countries, the study finds that at least 75% of respondents are willing to pay for a program
905 to cut hunger in half (at an estimated cost of, e.g., \$50 a year for each American).

906 [Kaufmann et al. \(2019\)](#) find that perceived aid is overestimated in each of the 24 coun-
907 tries they study, on average by a factor of 7. In most countries, desired aid is larger than
908 perceived aid.¹ They show that individuals in the top income quintile desire aid 0.13
909 p.p. lower than those in the bottom 40% – which is very close to what we find. By em-

¹[Kaufmann et al. \(2012\)](#) offer the best results on desired aid because (as [Hudson & van Heerde \(2012\)](#) criticize), other studies did not take into account misperceptions of actual aid.

ploying a theoretical model and examining correlations between lobbying and actual aid (controling for desired aid), they argue that the gap between actual and desired aid stems from the political influence of the rich who defend their vested interests. In [Kaufmann et al. \(2012\)](#), the U.S. is an outlier: desired aid is at the other countries' average (3% of GNI), but as misperceptions are enormous, perceived aid is twice as large as desired aid. Indeed, [Gilens \(2001\)](#) shows that even Americans with high political knowledge misperceive actual aid, and finds that 17% fewer of them want to cut aid when we provide them specific information about the amount of aid. Similarly, [Nair \(2018\)](#) finds that the relatively low support for aid in the U.S. is driven by information on global distribution, as people underestimate their rank by 27 centiles on average and overestimate the global median income by a factor 10.

[Hudson & van Heerde \(2012\)](#) provide a critical review of the literature and show that the strong support for poverty alleviation largely stems from intrinsic altruism. They note that, according to [DFID \(2009\)](#) and [PIPA \(2001\)](#), 47% of British people find that the aid is wasted (mainly due to corruption), while Americans estimate that less than a quarter of the aid reaches those in need, with over half ending up in the hands of corrupt government officials. Despite these perceptions, most people still support aid, suggesting the presence of nonutilitarian motives. Consistent with [Henson et al. \(2010\)](#), [Bauhr et al. \(2013\)](#) find that support for aid is reduced by the perception of corruption in recipient countries. However, this effect is mitigated by the aid-corruption paradox: countries with higher levels of corruption often need more help. [Bodenstein & Faust \(2017\)](#) further show that right-wing Europeans, as well as those who perceive strong corruption in their country, are more likely to agree that recipient countries should "follow certain rules regarding democracy, human rights and governance as a condition for receiving EU development aid." Using a 2002 Gallup survey and the 2006 World Values Survey, and in line with [Bayram \(2017\)](#), [Paxton & Knack \(2012\)](#) show that the main determinants for wanting more aid are trust, left-wing ideology, interest in politics, and being a woman (all positively associated).

(Back to Section [2.5.3](#))

938 A.1.4 Population attitudes on taxes on the rich

939 We are not aware of any previous survey on a global wealth tax,² though surveys
940 consistently show strong support for national wealth taxes. In a comprehensive survey

²We did not find any using the combination of "survey" or "attitudes" with "wealth tax" or "global wealth tax" in Google Scholar.

conducted in the UK, [Rowlingson et al. \(2021\)](#) show that a wealth tax is the preferred option for raising revenues. Only 8% of respondents state that total net wealth should not be taxed (with little differences between Labour and Conservative voters). The study also finds that the preferred design would be a 1% or 3% tax on net wealth above £1 million. By asking how much taxes per year should a person with a certain income and wealth level pay, [Fisman et al. \(2017\)](#) finds that the average American favors a 0.8% linear tax rate on unspecified wealth up to \$2 million (the highest wealth level tested), and a 3% linear rate on inherited wealth. Through a conjoint analysis conducted in three high-income countries, [Schechtl & Tisch \(2023\)](#) find widespread support for a wealth tax (from 78% in the U.S. to 86% in Germany and the UK), with a preference for an exemption threshold set at \$/€1 million (rather than 500,000 or 2 million) with the tax rate and tax unit having little influence on the preferred design. In 21 OECD countries, the [OECD \(2019\)](#) uncovers strong majority support for higher taxes on the rich to support the poor, with nearly 70% overall agreement and less than 20% disagreement. [Isbell \(2022\)](#) finds similarly high level of support in 34 African countries. In the UK, [Patriotic Millionaires \(2022\)](#) find 69% support (and 7% opposition) for a 1.1% tax on wealth in excess of £10 million. In the U.S., [Americans for Tax Fairness \(2021\)](#) find that 67% to 71% of the respondents support to “raise taxes for those earning more than \$400,000 a year”, “raise the income tax rate for those earning over \$1 million a year by 10 percentage points”, or “apply a 2% tax on an individual’s wealth above \$50 million each year, and 3% on wealth above \$1 billion”.

A.1.5 Population attitudes on ethical norms

As argued by [Nyborg et al. \(2016\)](#), social norms can be the solution to the collective action problem. As such, universalistic values and free-riding attitudes are key.

Universalism Various studies have examined the concept of global identity (see [Rey-sen & Katzarska-Miller \(2018\)](#) for a review). In the 2005-2008 wave of the World Values Survey, [Bayram \(2015\)](#) notes that “78% of the participants in 57 countries see themselves as citizens of the world”, though the [2017-2022 wave](#) reveals that more people feel close to their town, region or country than to the world. [Enke et al. \(2023\)](#) measure universalism at the U.S. district level using donation data, and find that a district’s universalism predicts electoral outcomes better than its income or education level. To measure universalism at the individual level, [Enke et al. \(2023\)](#) ask American respondents to split \$100 between a random stranger and a random person with the same income but closer to

them. They distinguish different facets of universalism, and define *foreign universalism* as the inclination to give to a foreigner rather than a fellow citizen. They find a home bias for most people, which could partly be attributed to concerns about inequality, as the split involves two persons with the same income, with the foreigner most certainly living in a poorer country than the American and thus enjoying a higher social status. That being said, a home bias probably remains even after accounting for concerns about inequality, as 84% of Americans agree that “taking care of problems at home is more important than giving aid to foreign countries” (PIPA 2001). Enke et al. (2023) also measure universalism and analyze its correlates in 7 countries, and Cappelen et al. (2022) deploy this method in 60 countries. In a lab experiment with students in the U.S., Cherry et al. (2017) show that a substantial share of people prefer policies detrimental to them due to their egalitarian worldview. Waytz et al. (2019) show that left-leaning people exhibit a wider “moral circle”. Jaeger & Wilks (2023) find that judgments of moral concern are equally well explained by characteristics of the judge and the evaluated target.

Free-riding Despite the long-standing explanation of the lack of climate action as a result of free-riding, surveys consistently show that people support climate mitigation action in their own country, even in the absence of such action in other countries. Bernauer & Gampfer (2015) show this for Americans and Indians, who both overestimate their country’s emissions at one third of the global total. Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019) show this in the U.S. and China using an experimental design. McEvoy & Cherry (2016) show that Americans mostly invoke leadership and morality to justify unilateral climate action. Using a range of methods, Aklin & Mildenberger (2020) show that the empirical evidence for free-riding is not compelling, and that climate inaction can be equally well explained by distributive conflicts. Finally, review of the literature by McGrath & Bernauer (2017) shows that climate attitudes are largely nonreciprocal, and primarily driven by values and perceptions of the policies, rather than by considerations of what other countries do.

1000 A.1.6 Second-order beliefs

Allport (1924) introduced the concept of pluralistic ignorance: a shared misperception concerning others’ beliefs. The concept became notorious when O’Gorman (1975) showed that, towards the end of the civil rights movement, 47% of Americans believed that a majority of white people supported segregation, while only 18% did so. PIPA (2001)

1005 has shown that while 75% of Americans are willing to contribute \$50 annually to halve
1006 world hunger (the cost of the program), only 32% believed that the majority would share
1007 this willingness. Pluralistic ignorance regarding climate-friendly norms in the United
1008 States has been documented by Andre et al. (2022), who further show that correcting the
1009 misperceptions would be effective to enhance pro-climate behaviors. Relatedly, Spark-
1010 man et al. (2022) show that Americans underestimate the support for climate policies
1011 by nearly half, while Drews et al. (2022) document pluralistic ignorance of carbon tax
1012 support in Spain. Additionally, Geiger & Swim (2016) show that pluralistic ignorance
1013 regarding concern for climate change leads people to self-silence, resulting in reduced
1014 discussions on the topic.

1015 **A.1.7 Elite attitudes**

1016 In a survey of climate negotiators on their preferences in terms of burden-sharing,
1017 Lange et al. (2007) uncovers a mix of self-serving bias and support for the egalitarian
1018 principle. Dannenberg et al. (2010) elicit climate negotiators' equity preferences and find
1019 that regional differences in addressing climate change are driven more by national inter-
1020 ests than by different equity concerns. Hjerpe et al. (2011) indicate that voluntary con-
1021 tribution, indicated as willingness to contribute, was the least preferred principle among
1022 both negotiators and observers. Three of the four principles for allocating mitigation
1023 commitments were recognized widely across the major geographical regions: historical
1024 responsibilities, ability-to-pay, and equal per capita emissions. This result is confirmed
1025 by Kesternich et al. (2021), who observe tendencies for a more harmonized view among
1026 key groups towards the ability-to-pay rule in a setting of weighted burden sharing rules.
1027 Mildenberger & Tingley (2019) survey elites (Congress staffers and international relations
1028 scholars) as well as the population in U.S. and China. They document pluralistic igno-
1029 rance of pro-climate attitudes, egocentric bias, and increasing support after beliefs are
1030 updated.

1031 **A.2 Proposals and analyses of global policy-making**

1032 **A.2.1 Global carbon pricing**

1033 Global carbon pricing is widely regarded by economists as the benchmark climate
1034 policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon emissions externality. For instance, Hoel
1035 (1991) shows that an international carbon tax can be designed to simultaneously achieve

efficiency and accommodate any distributional objective. Concerning the distributional objective, Grubb (1990), Agarwal & Narain (1991) and Bertram (1992) were the first to advocate for an equal right to emit for each human. As Grubb (1990) states it: "by far the best combination of long term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity, is obtained from a system based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions which are allocated on an adult per capita basis".³ Support for such solution has been renewed ever since (Baer et al.; Jamieson; Blanchard & Tirole; Rajan 2000; 2001; 2021; 2021).

While many endorse the egalitarian allocation of emissions permits, economists also considered this outcome as politically unfeasible. Thus, to preserve the current level of inequalities and to preclude transfers between countries, they adjusted their (integrated assessment) models by assigning more weight to the interest of rich countries (Stanton 2011).

Gollier & Tirole (2015) synthesize the distributional decision with a *generosity* parameter which would allocate emissions permit to countries in proportion to their population if set to one, in proportion to their emissions (on the start date of the policy) if set to zero, and as a mixture of the egalitarian and grandfathering rules if set in between. Using a similar formula in the context of a tax, Cramton et al. (2015) (summarized in MacKay et al. 2015) propose that countries with emissions per capita around the average fix the generosity parameter, so that it is strategically chosen to maximize the tax rate, and to fix the tax rate at the minimum price proposed by participating countries. Negotiations would exclude countries with low ambition beforehand; and the treaty would impose trade sanctions on non-participating countries. van den Bergh et al. (2020) propose a "dual-track transition to global carbon pricing": an expanding climate club that would integrate existing and new emissions trading systems, and a reorientation of UNFCCC negotiations towards a global carbon price and burden-sharing rules. The IMF (2019) also supports global carbon pricing or, as a first step, a carbon price floor. They propose either differentiated prices among countries or international transfers, and estimate that a price of \$75/tCO₂ in 2030 would be compatible with a 2°C trajectory.

Other authors have put forth more radical proposals. For instance, Weitzman (2017) envisions a World Climate Assembly with proportional representation at the global scale, so that the median (human) voter would choose the carbon price level. To finance an adaptation fund, Chancel & Piketty (2015) propose a global *progressive* carbon tax (or a progressive tax on air tickets as a first step), so that rich people (who are high emitters)

³By "adult per capita", Grubb (1990) means that permits would be allocated equally among adults.

contribute more to the public good. [Fleurbaeay & Zuber \(2013\)](#) highlight that, given that current emitters are probably richer than future victims of climate change damages, climate policies deserve a *negative* discount rate. In other words, we cannot dissociate the climate issue from global inequalities, and an ethical response to this issue requires global redistribution.

1074 A.2.2 Climate burden sharing

1075 The literature has discussed different burden-sharing principles ([Ringius et al. 2002](#)).
1076 While there is no agreement on their definitions as different approaches are used (cost
1077 sharing, effort sharing, or resource sharing, see Section [A.1.2](#)), we describe here the burden-
1078 sharing principles consistently using the resource sharing approach (i.e., allocating emis-
1079 sions rights). For other papers that define or compare different burden-sharing principles,
1080 see [Leimbach & Giannousakis; Zhou & Wang; Vaillancourt & Waaub \(2019; 2016; 2004\)](#).

1081 **Equal per capita.** The simplest principle is perhaps to allocate each year's global carbon
1082 quota based on an equal right to emit per capita, or an equal right to emit for each adult.
1083 Implementing this principle would result in large transfers from high-emitting to low-
1084 emitting countries.

1085 **Grandfathering.** In contrast, *grandfathering* entails allocating emissions rights in pro-
1086 portion to current emissions. From the perspective of allocating carbon pricing revenues
1087 between countries, grandfathering amounts to each country retaining the revenues it col-
1088 lects. Given that nations are sovereign and have not agreed to share emissions rights,
1089 this principle can be considered as the default option against which the other ones can be
1090 compared in terms of distributive effects.

1091 **Historical responsibilities.** At the opposite end of the spectrum is the principle of *his-
1092 torical responsibilities*, which assigns to each country a carbon budget proportional to its
1093 population. Countries that have emitted more than the average have accumulated a car-
1094 bon debt towards countries that have emitted less, which have a carbon credit.⁴

⁴It is not clear how these debts would be settled. Approaches could involve carbon removal from the atmosphere, or using a conventional social cost of carbon to monetize them, by crediting (positively or negatively) emissions rights to countries in an international carbon market.

1095 To fully specify this rule, one needs to define a start date for the responsibilities on
1096 past emissions and specify how to account for population size. 1990 is often chosen as
1097 a start year as it is the date of the first IPCC assessment report, marking the widespread
1098 acknowledgment of climate change, though variants include 1972, 1960, 1950 or 1850.⁵
1099 Several solutions have been proposed to account for evolving populations, none of which
1100 is flawless. Matthews (2015) allocates emissions rights on a given year proportionally to
1101 the countries' populations in that year. An alternative is to use fixed populations, such
1102 as the populations at the chosen start year (Neumayer 2000), or at a future date such
1103 as projected when the global total population will reach 9 billion (Raupach et al. 2014).
1104 Fanning & Hickel (2023) convert the projected climate debt up to 2050 into monetary
1105 terms in a 1.5°C scenario.

1106 The rationale for using fixed populations is to prevent countries from intentionally
1107 increasing their population size to gain more emissions rights. However, this approach
1108 treats countries with different demographic trajectories similarly, effectively penalizing
1109 countries which grow more than others (if past populations are used) or grow more than
1110 expected (if future populations are used). Using current populations like Matthews (2015)
1111 also comes with its own problems. Consider two countries having contributed very little
1112 to cumulative emissions, with the same emissions per capita but different demographic
1113 patterns: country A's population has doubled in the last 30 years, while country B's pop-
1114 ulation has remained stable. Despite the similar present situation, country B would ac-
1115 cumulate more carbon credit than country A. Essentially, compensating country B more
1116 due to its past population size amounts to compensating the dead although it is future
1117 generations who will suffer. That being said, using current populations is likely a more
1118 viable solution than relying on fixed populations since, in practice, countries with similar
1119 emissions per capita tend to have relatively similar demographic trajectories.

1120 **Ability to pay.** Another prominent burden-sharing principle is the ability to pay whereby
1121 richer countries should contribute more to mitigation efforts. To operationalize this prin-
1122 ciple, Baer et al. (2008) define *capacity* as the share of global income above an exemption
1123 threshold. They use the threshold of \$7,500 per year (in 2005 PPP), which corresponds to
1124 the top 28% of the global income distribution. According to this principle, the effort of a
1125 country should be proportional to the revenues it would raise with a linear income tax on
1126 individual income above \$7,500.

⁵Climate equity monitor uses 1850 for example.


1127 **Climate Equity Reference Framework** Baer et al. (2008) propose another effort-sharing
1128 method, the *Climate Equity Reference Framework* (CERF), which blends the ability to pay
1129 principle with their version of historical responsibilities. They define *responsibility* as fol-
1130 lows: they determine the mitigation requirement as the emissions gap between the Busi-
1131 ness as Usual scenario from IEA (2007) and a 2°C (with 68-86% probability) scenario.
1132 The mitigation requirement is then allocated to countries proportionally to their cumu-
1133 lative emissions (starting in 1990). The emissions right of a country according to their
1134 *responsibility* are then determined by its Business as Usual emissions minus its mitigation
1135 requirement. A country's emissions right, dubbed its *greenhouse development right* (GDR),
1136 is defined using a combination of *capacity* (C) and *responsibility* (R) to allocate the miti-
1137 gation requirement between countries. This allocation key is called the *Responsibility and*
1138 *Capacity Indicator* (RCI) and defined as $RCI = R^a \cdot C^{1-a}$, with $a = .4$.

1139 This choice of parameter may seem somewhat arbitrary, but the [EcoEquity calculator](#)
1140 allows for a customization all CERF parameters (Holz et al.; Holz et al. 2018; 2019). The
1141 Climate Action Network has adopted the CERF as its *fair share* framework, though the
1142 different national chapters of the organization could not agree on a choice of parameters
1143 (Athanasou et al. 2022).⁶

1144 The CERF approach was adopted by a prominent network of climate NGOs because
1145 it operationalizes the principle of *common but differentiated responsibilities and respective ca-*
1146 *pabilities* recognized by the UNFCCC. However, this approach suffers from three draw-
1147 backs. First, its definition of historical responsibility as an effort sharing principle is in-
1148 consistent with the principle of an equal right of cumulative emissions per capita, which
1149 is a resource sharing principle. For instance, consider a fully decarbonized country that
1150 has exhausted *exactly* its cumulative carbon budget. According to the CERF notion of *re-*
1151 *sponsibility*, this country would still be expected to contribute significantly to mitigation
1152 efforts due to its relatively high cumulative emissions. Yet, according to the usual defini-
1153 tion of the historical responsibility based on an equal right of cumulative emissions p.c.,
1154 this country would have no liability as it has not exceeded its carbon budget. Second, a

⁶The U.S. Climate Action Network and the think tank EcoEquity (funded by Tom Athanasiou and late Paul Baer) choose the following parameters: an equal weight for R and C ($a = .5$), their own **business as usual projections** of CO₂ emissions based on trends of GDP growth and emissions intensity reduction, a 1.5°C (Low Energy Demand) pathway, 1950 as the start year for responsibility, a gradual inclusion of income to compute *capacity* (which adds complexity to the calculation) from a full exemption of the bottom 70% (\$7,500 per year) linearly to a full inclusion of the top 2% (\$72,211), the inclusion of non-CO₂ gases but not of emissions embodied in trade (i.e. imported emissions) nor LULUCF (land-use).

Figure S9: Net gains from the CERF burden-sharing rule in 2030.




Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO₂.

country with moderate incomes⁷ and low historical responsibility would be assigned a relatively low effort, even if its emissions per capita are high. In other words, the CERF approach favors countries that have experienced recent growth. Third, the poorest countries would be granted emissions rights close to the Business as Usual trajectory, as they would bear virtually none of the effort. But this trajectory carries the current (unfair) income distribution and amounts to grandfathering. For example, the baseline trajectory for emissions⁸ in the DRC entail 0.8 tCO₂ p.c. in 2030, which is five times less than the world average emissions right per capita. In this framework, if the DRC were to grow faster than projected in the baseline, it would actually have to pay to the rest of the world for mitigation efforts. This is what is likely to happen to countries like Mexico or Senegal, from our simulation of the net gains of CERF compared to a situation without international transfers (see Figure S9). In contrast, a resource sharing approach based on equal per capita emissions would result in low-income countries receiving emissions rights exceeding their projected trajectories, leading to transfers from high-income countries. By

⁷Using the above parameters, moderate incomes means few incomes above the global 70th. percentile.

⁸The baseline trajectory is computed as the “product of the projected GDP and CO₂ emission intensity”.

Figure S10: Difference between net gains from Greenhouse Development Rights and equal rights per capita.



Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with $>50\%$ chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO₂.

construction, such transfers do not occur in an effort sharing approach like the CERF, implying lower transfers to low-income countries. Compared to an equal right to emit per capita, this method favors countries like China (whose emissions are allowed to remain stable over 2020-2030 instead of a reduction of 35-40%) and penalizes regions like Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (see Figure S10).

Contraction and Convergence. Meyer (2004) defines a rule called *contraction and convergence* (C&C), which combines elements of grandfathering and equal per capita approaches. According to C&C, each country is granted (tradable) emissions rights, starting at their current emission level and converging linearly to an equal per capita level at some pre-specified date. The *contraction* part refers to the reduction of total emissions rights in line with the climate objective. When discussed around year 2000, the convergence date was specified between 2020 and 2050. This rule, advocated by the Global Commons Institute (a UK think tank), was on the agenda from COP2 to COP15 (i.e., until Copenhagen, and including in Kyoto), including at Kyoto, and was endorsed by the European Parlia-

¹¹⁸³ ment in 1998. More recently, Gignac & Matthews (2015) have shown how C&C can be
¹¹⁸⁴ made consistent with historical responsibilities by computing carbon debts and credits
¹¹⁸⁵ until the convergence date.

¹¹⁸⁶ **Assessments of the NDCs against burden-sharing principles.** The regime established
¹¹⁸⁷ by the 2015 Paris agreement to regulate climate change respects none of the burden-
¹¹⁸⁸ sharing principles and relies instead on voluntary contributions from each country, known
¹¹⁸⁹ as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). A body of literature (reviewed by Höhne
¹¹⁹⁰ et al. 2014) assesses the NDCs against the emissions reduction objective and different
¹¹⁹¹ burden-sharing principles. To evaluate the NDCs, Gao et al. (2019) examine their emis-
¹¹⁹² sions projections for 2030 and estimate the resulting increase in temperature. The most
¹¹⁹³ recent and comprehensive assessment of NDCs against burden-sharing principles is con-
¹¹⁹⁴ ducted by van den Berg et al. (2020) (see also Robiou du Pont et al.; Robiou du Pont
¹¹⁹⁵ et al.; Raupach et al. 2016; 2017; 2014).

¹¹⁹⁶ A.2.3 Global redistribution

¹¹⁹⁷ Addressing global poverty, inequalities, and climate change are central to the univer-
¹¹⁹⁸ sally agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). As highlighted by Bolch et al. (2022),
¹¹⁹⁹ low-income countries often lack sufficient domestic resources to eradicate poverty in the
¹²⁰⁰ short term, indicating the need for international transfers to rapidly end global poverty.
¹²⁰¹ In *Beyond the Welfare State*, Gunnar Myrdal (1960) called for a *welfare world*. In his Nobel
¹²⁰² lecture, he emphasized the necessity of increasing foreign aid to low-income countries,
¹²⁰³ stating that “The type of marginal foreign aid we have provided, is clearly not enough to
¹²⁰⁴ meet their barest needs” (Myrdal 1975).

¹²⁰⁵ Drawing on the labor theory of value, some economists have argued that global in-
¹²⁰⁶ equalities arise from unequal exchange in international trade (Arghiri 1972). Indeed,
¹²⁰⁷ the stark disparity in wages between countries implies that one unit of labor exported
¹²⁰⁸ by an American commands five units of labor embodied in imported goods, whereas
¹²⁰⁹ Ethiopians need to export 50 units of labor to obtain one unit through imports (Alsamawi
¹²¹⁰ et al.; Reyes et al. 2014; 2017). Taking stock, Hickel (2017) proposes to globally establish
¹²¹¹ minimum wages at 50% of the local median wage. Hickel (2017) also suggests other solu-
¹²¹² tions against global inequality, which served as inspiration for our questionnaire. These
¹²¹³ measures include the cancellation of low-income countries’ public debt, fair trade prac-
¹²¹⁴ tices (such as eliminating tariffs from high-income countries, reducing patent protections,

1215 and reducing farming subsidies in rich countries), initiatives to combat tax evasion (e.g.,
1216 implementing a global financial register), land reform, and a fair international climate
1217 policy.

1218 [Piketty \(2014\)](#) prominently advocates for a progressive wealth tax on a global scale,
1219 although he does not specify whether the resulting revenues should fund international
1220 transfers.

1221 [Kopczuk et al. \(2005\)](#) compute the optimal linear income tax rates for all countries in
1222 two ways: globally centralized and decentralized (i.e., within each country and without
1223 international transfers). They show that the average decentralized rate is 41%. In con-
1224 trast, the global rate is 62%, which would generate funds to finance a basic income of
1225 250\$/month (higher than the GPD per capita of 73 countries). From a current global Gini
1226 index of 0.695, they show that decentralized optimal taxation would only marginally re-
1227 duce global inequality to 0.69, whereas global taxation would significantly decrease the
1228 Gini to 0.25. The study also shows that the existing level of foreign aid can only be ratio-
1229 nalized if the U.S. attaches 2,000 less value to a citizen in the poorest countries than to an
1230 American citizen (or 1,000 less if half of the transfers are diverted due to corruption).

1231 A.2.4 Basic income

1232 Unconditional cash transfers (UCT) are increasingly seen as an effective way to end ex-
1233 treme poverty. A growing body of evidence from randomized control trials supports this
1234 notion: [Gangopadhyay et al. \(2015\)](#) find that UCT outperform a food subsidy; [Haushofer](#)
1235 & [Shapiro \(2016\)](#) find significant impacts on health, economic outcomes, and psycholog-
1236 ical well-being; [Egger et al. \(2022\)](#) find large positive spillovers on non-recipient people,
1237 and minimal inflation. Reviews of existing research further confirm the positive outcomes
1238 of UCT ([Standing; Bastagli et al. 2014; 2016](#)).

1239 While the delivery of cash to remote areas and the prevention of fraud is challenging
1240 in regions without a proper civil register, the use of mobile phones as banking and bio-
1241 metric identification tools could provide viable solutions ([Harnett 2017](#)). Although many
1242 places still lack internet access, satellite internet technology shows promising progress,
1243 with some experts suggesting that it could soon become affordable and universally ac-
1244 cessible ([Hanson 2016](#)).

1245 **A.2.5 Global democracy**


1246 The idea of world federalism has a long-standing history, dating back at least to Kant
1247 (1795), who argued that a world federation was essential for achieving perpetual peace.
1248 International organizations were eventually created to foster peace, though the League
1249 of Nations and its successor, the United Nations, never succeeded in avoiding military
1250 conflicts. Many have argued that we need stronger and more democratic global institu-
1251 tions, competent to address global challenges such as extreme poverty, climate change,
1252 wars, pandemics, or financial stability. Before World War II, feminist and pacifist Maver-
1253 ick Lloyd & Schwimmer (1937) founded the *Campaign for World Government*, advocating
1254 for direct representation at the global scale. Einstein (1947) called for the subordination of
1255 the UN Security Council to the General Assembly and the direct election of UN delegates.
1256 Since 2007, there has been widespread support for a United Nations Parliamentary As-
1257 sembly (UNPA) from individuals and institutions in over 150 countries, including 1,800
1258 member of parliament, heads of state, as well the European Parliament, the Pan-African
1259 Parliament, and the Latin-American Parliament. The UNPA campaign calls for a gradual
1260 implementation of a democratic assembly, starting with a consultative assembly com-
1261 posed of members of national parliaments, allowing for the direct election of its members
1262 in voluntary countries, and progressing towards a world parliament with binding legisla-
1263 tive powers once all members are directly elected (Leinen & Bummel 2018). Besides the
1264 UNPA, various scholars have put forward different models of global democracy, ranging
1265 from deliberative spaces to a world federation (Archibugi et al. 2011). While the most
1266 radical proposals may still be on the horizon, an assembly of random citizens representa-
1267 tive of the world population has already been convened. It has produced a joint statement
1268 at the COP26 (Global Assembly 2022), and a similar *World Citizens' Assembly* should soon
1269 follow.

1270 B Raw results

1271 Country-specific raw results are also available as supplementary material files: **US**,
 1272 **EU, FR, DE, ES, UK**.

Figure S11: Absolute support for global climate policies.

Share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* (in percent, $n = 40,680$). The color blue denotes an absolute majority. See Figure 2 for the relative support. (Questions A-I of the global survey.)



*In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

Figure S12: Correct answers to comprehension questions (in percent). (Questions 16-18)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
With NR, typical [country] people win and richest lose	68	73	76	73	73	70
With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win	60	68	62	72	67	67
With GCS+NR, typical [country] people neither win nor lose	54	60	63	59	57	61

Figure S13: Number of correct answers to comprehension questions (mean). (Section 2.3, Questions 16-18)




Figure S14: List experiment: mean number of supported policies. (Section 2.4.1, Question 24)




Figure S15: Conjoint analyses 1 and 2. (Questions 25-27, Back to Section 2.4.3)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)	54	76	80	71	81	74
C+NR+GCS preferred to C+NR	55	74	79	71	78	68
NR+GCS preferred to NR	55	77	79	74	79	77
NR+C preferred to NR	62	84	88	83	84	82
GCS+NR preferred to C+NR	47	52	53	53	49	52
NR+C+GCS preferred to NR	55	77	86	73	83	72

Figure S16: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See English translations in Figure S2; Question 29)




Figure S17: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements seen as important for supporting the GCS in a 4-Likert scale (in percent). (Question 32) [\(Back to Section 2.4.5\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
It would succeed in limiting climate change	78	85	85	86	86	83
It would hurt the [Country] economy	81	67	61	67	66	69
It would penalize my household	75	60	55	63	59	63
It would make people change their lifestyle	78	79	83	79	78	77
It would reduce poverty in low-income countries	77	85	88	85	86	81
It might be detrimental to some poor countries	79	72	79	67	78	70
It could foster global cooperation	82	81	81	82	85	80
It could fuel corruption in low-income countries	79	75	82	69	79	72
It could be subject to fraud	80	79	80	74	83	81
It would be technically difficult to put in place	77	71	74	62	79	71
Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences	89	82	89	68	91	88

Figure S18: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements found in the open-ended field on the GCS (manually recoded, in percent).

"When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to your mind?

Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme." (Question 31) (Back to Section 2.4.5)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
environment	26	31	37	26	43	24
unclassifiable	25	24	23	28	25	22
pro	22	23	21	22	33	20
con	22	17	12	18	20	16
cost	17	12	11	14	17	7
poorest humans	11	7	6	9	5	6
tax redistribution	10	7	11	8	4	9
support	8	6	3	5	6	8
oppose	7	3	2	3	1	4
don't know	6	8	10	8	7	10
empty	6	3	0	0	0	13
difficult agreement	5	10	7	12	8	8
difficult implement	3	5	5	6	4	6
misunderstands gcs	3	2	2	1	3	1
misunderstands question	2	2	1	3	3	3

Figure S19: Perceptions of the GCS. Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).

"When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to your mind?

Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme." (Question 31) [\(Back to Section 2.4.5\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
world: international world country global	28	22	23	19	22	23
environment: climat environment animal emission natur	26	21	17	28	21	17
poorest: poor low-income 700 poverty	16	8	8	9	4	10
pro: pro pros pros pros:	16	3	0	1	9	5
con: con con: cons cons:	15	4	0	1	8	6
cost: cost expensive higher price 85 inflation	13	7	5	9	7	6
tax: tax	8	3	4	3	2	2
redistribution: rich redistribu	8	4	5	4	3	5
implementation: implement enforce polic monitor	6	4	5	6	0	5
agreement: agree accept participat	3	4	5	6	2	3

Figure S20: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality (mean). (Question 34) [\(Back to Section 2.5.3\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Donation to own country	35	34	31	38	34	32
Donation to Africa	32	35	33	41	32	33

Figure S21: Support for a global wealth tax.

"Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-income countries?

Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education." (Question 35)




Figure S22: Support for a national wealth tax.

"Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: affordable housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and schools]?" (Question 36)




Figure S23: Preferred share of global wealth tax revenues that should be pooled to finance low-income countries. (Question 37)




Figure S24: Support for sharing half of global tax revenues with low-income countries, rather than each country retaining all the revenues it collects (in percent). (Question 38)




Figure S25: Perceived foreign aid. “From your best guess, what percentage of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?” (Question 39) (Back to Section 2.5.3)

Actual values: France: 0.8%; Germany: 1.3%; Spain: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%; U.S.: 0.4%.




Figure S26: Preferred foreign aid (without info on actual amount).

"If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?" (Question 40) (Back to Section 2.5.3)




Figure S27: Preferred foreign aid (after info on actual amount).

"Actually, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid.

If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?" (Question 40) (Back to Section 2.5.3)




Figure S28: Actual, perceived and preferred amount of foreign aid, with random info (or not) on actual amount. (*Mean* in percent of public spending, Questions 39, 40) (Back to Section 2.5.3)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Actual foreign aid (in % of public spending)	0.4	1.1	0.8	1.3	0.5	1.7
Belief about foreign aid	4.7	2.9	2.7	2.9	2.8	3.5
Preferred foreign aid (with info)	1.8	2.7	3.4	2.9	2.1	2.5
Preferred foreign aid (no info)	4	3.9	4.7	4.4	3.1	3.4

Figure S29: Preferred foreign aid (after info or after perception). (Questions 39 and 40)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as current	70	75	91	76	77	57
Preferred foreign aid is higher than current	47	59	75	58	63	43
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as perceived	57	74	83	79	77	58
Preferred foreign aid is higher than perceived	37	53	64	59	54	39

Figure S30: Preferences for funding increased foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]
 "How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent) (Question 41) (Back to Section 2.5.3)




Figure S31: Preferences of spending following reduced foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]
 "How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent)
 (Question 42) [\(Back to Section 2.5.3\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Higher spending on defense	19	23	11	21	17	31
Higher spending on retirement pensions	23	41	22	51	57	35
Higher spending on healthcare	40	57	31	42	80	70
Higher spending on welfare benefits	13	20	7	19	39	20
Higher spending on education	30	45	31	47	58	43
Higher spending on other programs	6	6	6	4	9	8
Lower taxes on the wealthiest	5	2	5	2	0	2
Lower corporate income tax rate	12	6	10	4	8	6
Lower personal income tax rates	48	29	26	27	37	30
Lower public deficit	32	24	21	13	41	21

Figure S32: Willingness to sign real-stake petition for the Global Climate Scheme or National Redistribution, compared to stated support in corresponding subsamples (e.g. support for the GCS in the branch where the petition was about the GCS). (Question 43)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Petition for the GCS	51	69	69	66	78	69
(Comparable) support for the GCS	53	76	81	74	81	74
Petition for NR	57	67	65	66	74	68
(Comparable) support for NR	58	72	76	65	78	75

Figure S33: Absolute support for various global policies (Percent of (*somewhat or strong*) support). (Questions 44 and 45. See Figure 3 for the relative support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	41	54	52	53	62	51
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	53	65	62	66	68	62
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	45	58	55	60	62	54
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	31	37	36	30	45	40
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	34	44	44	43	52	43
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	39	49	39	51	50	54
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	42	55	54	54	61	53
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	44	70	73	70	72	65
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	34	45	40	48	44	50
National tax on millionaires funding public services	62	76	70	79	79	77
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	58	71	69	72	78	71

Figure S34: Preferred approach of diplomats at international climate negotiations. In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend [own country] interests or global justice? (Question 49)




Figure S35: Percent of selected issues viewed as important.
 "To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem?" (Question 56)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Income inequality in [Country]	55	59	54	58	71	57
Climate change	59	66	66	63	73	63
Global poverty	50	57	50	58	75	49

Figure S36: Group defended when voting.
 "What group do you defend when you vote?" (Question 57)




Figure S37: Mean prioritization of policies.

Mean number of points allocated policies to express intensity of support (among six policies chosen at random). Blue color means that the policy has been awarded more points than the average policy.

"In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

How do you allocate the points among the following policies?" (Question 58)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	13	21	10	14	35	31
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	23	22	25	21	22	23
econ3	21	15	13	18	17	13
econ4	28	22	27	17	24	20
soc1	10	17	13	17	12	21
soc2	13	9	14	8	10	8
climate1	14	15	11	18	20	12
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	20	18	22	19	15	17
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030	11	9	8	8	9	11
tax1: National redistribution scheme	14	15	16	15	15	15
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	19	19	21	18	17	19
foreign1: Global climate scheme	15	20	20	23	16	17
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	21	20	20	23	19	20
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	15	15	15	17	14	13
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	9	11	13	14	9	8

Figure S38: Positive prioritization of policies.

Percent of people allocating a positive number of points to policies, expressing their support (among six policies chosen at random).

"In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

How do you allocate the points among the following policies?" (Question 58)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	64	78	61	67	96	95
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	83	86	85	84	87	89
econ3	81	69	50	78	80	68
econ4	88	86	91	79	89	85
soc1	57	75	69	74	74	78
soc2	58	58	72	53	64	48
climate1	70	76	65	79	89	75
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	79	83	86	84	78	80
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030	62	58	56	48	60	70
tax1: National redistribution scheme	67	79	79	76	82	79
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	80	79	76	78	83	85
foreign1: Global climate scheme	71	83	84	85	84	78
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	80	81	79	83	82	82
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	71	77	79	74	83	76
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	58	70	79	74	74	57

Figure S39: Charity donation.

"How much did you give to charities in 2022?" (Question 50)




Figure S40: Interest in politics.

"To what extent are you interested in politics?" (Question 51)




Figure S41: Desired involvement of government (from 1 to 5). (Question 52)




Figure S42: Political leaning on economics (from 1: Left to 5: Right). (Question 53)




Figure S43: Voted in last election. (Question 54)




Figure S44: Vote in last election (aggregated). PNR includes people who did not vote or prefer not to answer. (Question 55)




Figure S45: Perception that survey was biased.
“Do you feel that this survey was politically biased?” (Question 61)





Figure S46: Opinion on the fight against extreme poverty.

“According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme poverty in low-income countries?” (Question 62) [\(Back to Section 2.5.3\)](#)

(a) Elements found in the open-ended field on the question
(manually recoded, in percent)



(b) Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).




Figure S47: Main attitudes by vote (“Right” spans from Center-right to Far right).
 (Relative support in percent in Questions 20, 35, 45, 46, 49) (Back to Section 2.5.3)

	Europe Left	Europe PNR/Non-voter	Europe Right	U.S. Left	U.S. PNR/Non-voter	U.S. Right
Support for the GCS	85	72	71	74	53	26
Global tax on millionaires	94	83	76	85	71	40
Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries	61	52	45	55	67	41
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	73	65	52	62	49	23
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	93	79	74	87	70	38
[Country]’s foreign aid should be increased	93	83	72	92	81	48
Universalist	56	48	26	53	49	23

1273 C Questionnaire of the global survey (section on global
1274 policies)

1275 A. At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be
1276 put in place? (Multiple answers are possible) [Figures 2 and S11]
1277 Global; [Federal / European / ...]; [State / National]; Local

1278 B. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “[country] should take mea-
1279 sures to fight climate change.”

1280 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly
1281 agree*

1282 C. How should [country] climate policies depend on what other countries do?

- 1283 • If other countries do more, [country] should do...
1284 • If other countries do less, [country] should do...

1285 *Much less; Less; About the same; More; Much more*

1286 D. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] All countries have signed the
1287 Paris agreement that aims to contain global warming “well below +2 °C’. To limit
1288 global warming to this level, there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we
1289 can emit globally, called the carbon budget. Each country could aim to emit less
1290 than a share of the carbon budget. To respect the global carbon budget, countries
1291 that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less
1292 than their share.

1293 Do you support such a policy? [Figures 2 and S11]

1294 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1295 support*

1296 E. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] Suppose the above policy is in
1297 place. How should the carbon budget be divided among countries? [Figures 2 and
1298 S11]

1299 *The emission share of a country should be proportional to its population, so that each human
1300 has an equal right to emit.; The emission share of a country should be proportional to its
1301 current emissions, so that those who already emit more have more rights to emit.; Countries
1302 that have emitted more over the past decades (from 1990 onwards) should receive a lower*

1303 *emission share, because they have already used some of their fair share.; Countries that will*
1304 *be hurt more by climate change should receive a higher emission share, to compensate them*
1305 *for the damages.*

1306 F. [In the U.S., Denmark, and France only] To achieve a given reduction of greenhouse
1307 gas emissions globally, costly investments are needed. Ideally, how should countries
1308 bear the costs of fighting climate change?

- 1309 • Countries should pay in proportion to their income
- 1310 • Countries should pay in proportion to their current emissions [Used as a sub-
1311 stitute to the equal right per capita in Figure 2]
- 1312 • Countries should pay in proportion to their past emissions (from 1990 on-
1313 wards) [Used as a substitute to historical responsibilities in Figure 2]
- 1314 • The richest countries should pay it all, so that the poorest countries do not have
1315 to pay anything
- 1316 • The richest countries should pay even more, to help vulnerable countries face
1317 adverse consequences: vulnerable countries would then receive money instead
1318 of paying [Used as a substitute to compensating vulnerable countries in Figures
1319 2 and S11]

1320 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly*
1321 *agree*

1322 G. Do you support or oppose establishing a global democratic assembly whose role
1323 would be to draft international treaties against climate change? Each adult across
1324 the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly. [Figures 2 and S11]
1325 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1326 *support*

1327 H. Imagine the following policy: a global tax on greenhouse gas emissions funding a
1328 global basic income. Such a policy would progressively raise the price of fossil fuels
1329 (for example, the price of gasoline would increase by [40 cents per gallon] in the
1330 first years). Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil
1331 fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Revenues from the tax would be used to
1332 finance a basic income of [\$30] per month to each human adult, thereby lifting the
1333 700 million people who earn less than \$2/day out of extreme poverty. The average

1334 [American] person would lose a bit from this policy as they would face [\$130] per
1335 month in price increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive.

1336 Do you support or oppose such a policy? [Figures 2 and S11]

1337 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1338 *support*


- 1339 I. Do you support or oppose a tax on all millionaires around the world to finance low-
1340 income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate ac-
1341 tion? This would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drink-
1342 ing water, healthcare, and education. [Figures 2 and S11]
1343 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1344 *support*

1345 **D Questionnaire of the complementary surveys**

1346 Below, we provide the generic questionnaire (based on the U.S. version), which roughly
1347 corresponds to the *Eu* questionnaire as well as the combination of the *US1* and *US2* ques-
1348 tionnaire. The main difference between Europe and the U.S. is that we split the *US2*
1349 sample into four random branches to include some treatments before the Section D on
1350 the GCS. Besides the control group, the treatments are: information regarding the sup-
1351 port of Americans for the GCS and NR, an open-ended field, and a closed question on the
1352 pros and cons of the GCS. The pros and cons of the GCS are also asked in *Eu* (likewise,
1353 either as an open-ended field or a question), but only in Section D, after the support.

1354 At each section or question, square brackets specify in which questionnaires it is present
1355 (*US1*, *US2* and/or *Eu*) as well as country specificities. Figure S48 displays the structure of
1356 each questionnaire. Each treatment randomization is independent. Qualtrics and Word
1357 versions of the questionnaires in each language are available on our [public repository](#),
1358 together with a spreadsheet that summarizes country specificities and our sources.

Figure S48: Main surveys' structure. Cf. Figure 1 for a simplified version.



1359 [Eu, US1, US2] Socio-demographic characteristics

1360 1. Welcome to this survey!

1361
1362 This survey is **anonymous** and is conducted for research purposes on a representa-
1363 tive sample of [1,000 British people].

1364
1365 It takes [US1, US2: 10 to 15 min; Eu: around 20 min] to complete.

1366
1367 The survey contains lotteries and awards for those who get the correct answer to
1368 some understanding questions.

1369 If you are attentive and lucky, you can win up to [US1, Eu: \$350; US2: \$150] in
1370 points. (See terms and conditions).

1371 Please answer every question carefully.

1372
1373 Do you agree to participate in the survey?

1374 Yes; No

1375 2. What is your gender?

1376 Woman; Man; Other

1377 3. How old are you?

1378 Below 18; 18 to 20; 21 to 24; 25 to 29; 30 to 34; 35 to 39; 40 to 44; 45 to 49; 50 to 54; 55 to
1379 59; 60 to 64; 65 to 69; 70 to 74; 75 to 79; 80 to 84; 85 to 89; 90 to 99; 100 or above

1380 4. [Eu] In which country do you live?

1381 France; Germany; Spain; United Kingdom; Other

1382 5. What is your ZIP code? [UK: What is your Outcode (the left part of your postcode,
1383 e.g. if your postcode is N7 8H7, just enter N7)?]

1384 6. Do you live with your partner (if you have one)?

1385 Yes; No

1386 7. How many people are in your household? The household includes: you, the mem-
1387 bers of your family who live with you, and your dependants.

1388 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more

- 1389 8. [Eu] How many children below 14 live with you?
- 1390 1; 2; 3; 4 or more
- 1391 9. [US1, US2] What race or ethnicity do you identify with? (Multiple answers are
- 1392 possible)
- 1393 White; Black or African American; Hispanic; Asian; American Indian or Alaskan Native;
- 1394 Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; Other: {open field}; Prefer not to say
- 1395 10. What is the [US1, US2: annual; Eu: monthly] gross income of your household (before
- 1396 withholding tax)? This includes all income: wages, self-employment earnings, So-
- 1397 cial Security benefits, pensions, investment income, welfare payments, and income
- 1398 from other sources.
- 1399 [US1, US2: Items based on household total income deciles and quartiles, namely:
- 1400 Less than \$20,000; between \$20,001 and \$35,000; between \$35,001 and \$42,000; between
- 1401 \$42,001 and \$50,000; between \$50,001 and \$65,000; between \$65,001 and \$82,000; between
- 1402 \$82,001 and \$103,000; between \$103,001 and \$130,000; between \$130,001 and \$145,000;
- 1403 between \$145,001 and \$165,000; between \$165,001 and \$250,000; More than \$250,000; I
- 1404 prefer not to answer;
- 1405 Eu: custom thresholds, taking into account household composition Questions 6-8,
- 1406 and corresponding to the country's deciles and quartiles of standard of living, cf.
- 1407 the sheet "Income" in [this spreadsheet](#)]
- 1408 11. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
- 1409 [Below upper secondary, Upper secondary, and Post secondary are coded as the first two,
- 1410 middle three, and last three items, respectively.
- 1411 US1, US2: Primary school or less; Eighth grade; Some high school; Regular high school
- 1412 diploma/GED or alternative credential; Some college, no degree; 2-year college degree or as-
- 1413 sociates degree (for example: AA, AS); Bachelor's degree (for example: BA, BS); Master's
- 1414 degree or above (MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA, MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD, PhD);
- 1415 FR: École primaire / Aucun; Brevet; CAP ou BEP; Baccalauréat professionnel ou tech-
- 1416 nologique; Baccalauréat général; Bac +2 (BTS, DUT, DEUG...); Bac +3 (licence...); Bac
- 1417 +5 ou plus (master, école d'ingénieur ou de commerce, doctorat, médecine, maîtrise, DEA,
- 1418 DESS...)
- 1419 DE: Keine abgeschlossene Schulbildung / Grundschule; Untere Sekundarstufe (z.B. Haupt-
- 1420 oder Realschulabschluss); Erstausbildung; Beruflicher Abschluss / Ausbildung; Abitur;
- 1421 Zweitausbildung; Bachelor oder Fachhochschulabschluss; Master-Abschluss oder höher

1422 ES: *Educación primaria / No he completado la enseñanza básica; Educación secundaria obligatoria (ESO); Formación profesional básica (FP); Formación profesional de grado medio; Bachillerato; Formación profesional de grado superior; Grado universitario; Máster/doctorado*
1423 UK: *Primary education or less; Some secondary school; GSCE; Vocational Upper secondary (Level 3 award, level 3 certificate, level 3 diploma, advanced apprenticeship, etc.); High school degree (A level); Higher vocational education (Level 4+ award, level 4+ certificate, level 4+ diploma, higher apprenticeship, etc.); Bachelor's Degree (BA, BSc, BEng, etc.); Postgraduate diploma or certificate, Master's Degree (MSc, MA, MBA, etc.) or Ph.D.]*

1430 12. What is your employment status?

1431 *Full-time employed; Part-time employed; Self-employed; Student; Retired; Unemployed*
1432 *(searching for a job); Inactive (not searching for a job)*

1433 13. Are you a homeowner or a tenant? (Multiple answers are possible)

1434 *Tenant; Owner; Landlord renting out property; Hosted free of charge*

1435 14. [If lives with partner: What is the estimated value of your household's assets (in
1436 U.S. dollars)?

1437 If does not live with partner: What is the estimated value of your assets (in U.S.
1438 dollars)?]

1439 Include here all your possessions (home, car, savings, etc.) net of debt. For example,
1440 if you own a house worth [\$]300,000 and you have [\$]100,000 left to repay on your
1441 mortgage, your assets are [\$]200,000.

1442 I estimate my [If lives with partner: household's] assets net of debt to be:

1443 [Items based on the following individual wealth quintiles, doubled if lives with
1444 partner. US1, US2: *Less than \$0 (I have a net debt); Close to \$0; Between \$4,000 and*
1445 *\$60,000; Between \$60,000 and \$190,000; More than \$190,000;* For Eu, the thresholds are:
1446 FR: €5/50/150/300k; DE: €0/35/130/280k; ES: €0/50/100/200k; UK: £3/45/115/270k]

1447 15. [US1, US2 (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the vote question)] What
1448 do you consider to be your political affiliation, as of today?

1449 *Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other; Non-Affiliated*

1452 [Eu, US1, US2] Global climate scheme

1453 In the following, we describe two policies, on which we will survey your opinion.
1454 To check that you have attentively read the descriptions, **we will ask some understanding questions afterwards: those who get correct answers can win up to \$150.**

1455 **Global climate scheme:** At the Paris agreement in 2015, all countries have agreed
1456 to contain global warming “well below +2 °C”. To limit global warming to this
1457 level, **there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally.**

1458 To meet the climate target, a limited number of permits to emit greenhouse gases
1459 can be created globally. Polluting firms would be required to buy permits to cover
1460 their emissions. Such a policy would **make fossil fuel companies pay** for their
1461 emissions and progressively raise the price of fossil fuels. **Higher prices would en-**
1462 **courage people and companies to use less fossil fuels, reducing greenhouse gas**
1463 **emissions.**

1464 In accordance with the principle that each human has an equal right to pollute, the
1465 revenues generated by the sale of permits could finance a global basic income. **Each**
1466 **adult in the world would receive [US1, US2: \$30/month; UK: \$30 (that is £25) per**
1467 **month; FR, DE, ES: €30/month], thereby lifting out of extreme poverty the 700 mil-**
1468 **lion people who earn less than \$2/day.**

1469 **The typical [American] would lose out financially [US1, US2: \$85, FR: €10, DE:**
1470 **€25, ES: €5, UK: £20] per month** (as he or she would face [\$115] per month in price
1471 increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive).

1472 The policy could be put in place as soon as countries totaling more than 60% of
1473 global emissions agree on it. Countries that would refuse to take part in the policy
1474 could face sanctions (like tariffs) from the rest of the World and would be excluded
1475 from the basic income.

(Back to Section 2.2)

1476 16. Who would win or lose financially in the Global climate scheme? [Figure S12]

1477 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1478 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

1479 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.;*

1480 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

1481 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would lose and*

1485 the 700 million poorest humans would win from the Global climate scheme. Now, here
1486 is the second policy:

1487

1488 **National redistribution scheme:**

1489 This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [US1, US2: 5%; Eu: 1%] and provide
1490 cash transfers to all adults. More precisely, **each [American] adult would receive**
1491 **[\$85] per month** (that is [\$1,000] per year). This would be financed by an increase
1492 of the federal income tax on household income in excess of [US1, US2: \$315,000 per
1493 year; FR: €15,000 per month; DE: €20,000 per month; ES: €10,000 per month; UK:
1494 £15,000 per month], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000]. [US1,
1495 US2: See more details.] ⁹

1496 17. Who would win or lose financially in the National redistribution? [Figure S12]

1497

1498 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1499 Typical [Americans] would win and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Ameri-
1500 cans] would win and the richest [Americans] would lose.; Typical [Americans] would lose
1501 and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Americans] would lose and the richest
1502 [Americans] would lose.

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would win and
1504 the richest [Americans] would lose* from the National redistribution scheme.

1505

1506 To help you with the next question, here is a reminder of the policies:

1507

1508 **Global Climate scheme:**

1509 To limit global warming and reach the international climate objective, the Global
1510 climate scheme would **impose a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can
1511 emit globally.**

⁹8% of U.S. respondents click. They then see the following text, based on taxjusticenow.org by Saez & Zucman (2019): *The marginal income tax rates would evolve as follows:*

Below \$315,000: unchanged

\$315,000 - \$400,000: current rate 32% => new rate 41%

\$400,000 - \$600,000: 35% => 50%

\$600,000 - \$2.5 million: 37% => 60%

\$2.5 - \$5 million: 37% => 65%

Above \$5 million: 37% => 70%

1512 It would **make polluters pay** for their emissions, which in turn would increase fos-
1513 sil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities.

1514 The revenues would finance a **global basic income** of [\$30] per month for all hu-
1515 mans, lifting out of extreme poverty the poorest billion people.

1516 Considering the basic income and the fuel price increases, **the typical [American]**
1517 **would lose out financially** [\$85] per month.

1518

1519 **National redistribution scheme:**

1520 This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [5%] and provide cash transfers to
1521 all adults. More precisely, **each [American] would receive** [\$85] per month. This
1522 would be financed by an increase of the federal income tax on household income in
1523 excess of [\$315,000 per year], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000
1524 per year].

1525 18. If both the Global climate scheme and the National redistribution scheme are imple-
1526 mented, how would a typical [American] be financially affected? [Figure S12]

1527 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1528 *A typical [American] would lose out financially.; A typical [American] would neither gain
1529 nor lose.; A typical [American] would gain financially.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was that *A typical [American] would nei-
1531 ther gain nor lose* from both schemes combined. [US1, Eu: Now, here are the last two
1532 policies:]

1533

1534 **[US1: Coal exit:**

1535 To reduce CO₂ emissions, this policy would require all U.S. coal power plants to be
1536 phased out by 2030. Coal would be replaced by renewable sources like wind and
1537 solar panels as well as stronger reliance on gas power plants.

1538 **Eu: Thermal insulation plan:**

1539 To reduce CO₂ emissions and energy insecurity, this policy would require that all
1540 buildings meet energy efficiency targets: at least rating E in 2030 and rating C in
1541 2040. The [UK] government would subsidise half the cost of insulation for all house-
1542 holds, and up to 90% for the poorest households. Insulation work would cost [FR,
1543 DE: €25; ES: €20; UK: £25] billion a year, but would deliver energy savings greater
1544 than this cost.]

1545

1546 [US1: **Marriage only for opposite-sex couples:**

1547

This policy is a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would legally define marriage as a union of one man and one woman.

1548

1549 [Eu: **Death penalty for major crimes:**

1550

This measure would reintroduce capital punishment for major crimes such as terrorism and mass shootings.]

1552

1553 Now, we will ask your opinion on the [US1, Eu: four] policies.

1554

Click here for the reminder of the [US1, Eu: first] two policies. [Clicking displays the previous summarized descriptions.]

1555

- 1556 19. [US2] [4 Random branches: control (*nothing*); Question 31 (*field*); Question 32 (*important*); or the following question (*info*).] For information, a recent survey has shown
1557 that:

1559

- 64% of Americans support the Global climate scheme.
- 72% of Americans support the National redistribution scheme.

1561

20. Do you support the Global climate scheme? [Figure S1]

1562

Yes; No

1563

21. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the previous question? [Figure S4]

1565

The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

1566

Percentage of [Americans] in favor of Global climate scheme [slider from 0 to 100]

1567

22. Do you support the National redistribution scheme? [Figure S1]

1568

Yes; No

1569

23. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the previous question? [Figure S4]

1571

The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

1572

Percentage of [Americans] in favor of National redistribution [slider from 0 to 100]

1573

24. [Eu, US1] Beware, this question is quite unusual. Among the policies below, how many do you support? [Figure S14, Table 1]

1575 [Four random branches. Branch GCS/NR/C/O]

- 1576
- 1577 • Global climate scheme
- 1578 • National redistribution scheme
- 1579 • [Coal exit]
- 1580 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

1581 0; 1; 2; 3; 4

1582

1583 [Branch GCS/C/O]

- 1584
- 1585 • Global climate scheme
- 1586 • [Coal exit]
- 1587 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

1588 0; 1; 2; 3

1589

1590 [Branch NR/C/O]

- 1591
- 1592 • National redistribution scheme
- 1593 • [Coal exit]
- 1594 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

1595 0; 1; 2; 3

1596 [Branch C/O]

- 1597
- 1598 • [Coal exit]
- 1599 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

1600 0; 1; 2

1601

1602 [Eu, US1] Conjoint analyses

- 1603 25. Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you prefer? [Figure
1604 S15]

1605 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the
1606 same time.

Bundle A	Bundle B
[Coal exit]	[Coal exit]
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme
Global climate scheme	

1608
1609 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 1610 26. Do you support Bundle A (combining [Coal exit], the National redistribution scheme,
1611 and the Global climate scheme)?[Figure S1]

1612 Yes; No

- 1613 27. [new page] Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you
1614 prefer? [Figure S15]

1615 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the
1616 same time.

1617 [Four random branches. Branch C + NR vs. GCS + NR]

Bundle A	Bundle B
[Coal exit]	Global climate scheme
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme

1620 [Branch NR vs. NR + C + GCS]

Bundle A	Bundle B
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme [Coal exit] Global climate scheme

1622
1623 [Branch NR + GCS vs. NR]

	Bundle A	Bundle B
1624	National redistribution scheme Global climate scheme	National redistribution scheme
1625		

1626 [Branch NR + C vs. NR]

	Bundle A	Bundle B
1627	National redistribution scheme [Coal exit]	National redistribution scheme
1628		

1629 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 1630 28. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and
 1631 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies
 1632 in their platforms.

1633 *Eu: Imagine if [DE, ES, UK: the two favorite candidates in your constituency in the
 1634 next general election; FR: the two candidates in the second round of the next pres-
 1635 idential election] campaigned with the following policies in their party's platforms.]*

1636 Which of these candidates would you vote for? [Table 2, Figure S15]

1637 [Table 2. Two random branches: with and without the final row. The US1 version of the poli-
 1638 cies is given below, see the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the European versions.]

	Democrat	Republican
	Increase corporate income tax rate from 21% to 28%	Decrease the payroll tax
	Coal exit	Permit completion of the Keystone pipeline
1640	Trillion dollar investment in childcare, healthcare, education and housing	Withdrawal of the Paris agreement
	\$15 minimum wage	Marriage only for opposite-sex couples
	National redistribution scheme	Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation
	[Global climate scheme / no row]	[/ no row]

1641

1642 [US1: Democrat; Republican; None of them; Eu: Candidate A; Candidate B; None of them]

- 1643 29. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and
1644 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies
1645 in their platforms.

1646 *Eu (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the Section "Values and politics"):* Imag-
1647 ine that [FR: the left or center-left; DE: a red-red-green coalition; ES: the PSOE; UK:
1648 the Labour Party] wins the next [general] elections. Here are two possible platforms
1649 on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a
1650 pool of credible [FR: left or center-left, DE: left-wing parties'; ES: PSOE; UK: Labour]
1651 policies).]

1652

1653 [US1: Which of these candidates do you prefer?

1654 *Eu: Even if you [FR: are not from the left or center-left; DE: do not support the left-
1655 wing parties; ES: do not support the PSOE; UK: do not support the Labour Party],
1656 which of these platforms do you prefer?]*

1657 [Figures S2, S16; see also the sheet "Policies" in *this spreadsheet* for the possible policies.]

	[Candidate A]	[Candidate B]	
1658	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]

1659 [US1: Candidate A; Candidate B; Eu: Platform A; Platform B]

- 1660 30. [new page] [Same wording and conditions as above. For brevity, only the UK version is
1661 given here.] Imagine that the Labour Party wins the next general elections. Here are
1662 two possible platforms on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are
1663 randomly drawn from a pool of credible Labour policies).

1664

1665 Even if you do not support the Labour Party, which of these platforms do you pre-
1666 fer? [Figure S2]

		Platform A	Platform B
1667	[Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order]	[Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy]	[Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy]
1668	Foreign policy	Global climate scheme	-
	<i>Platform A; Platform B</i>		

1669 **[Eu, US2] Perceptions of the GCS**

1670 [Eu: two random branches. US2: four random branches and the question is asked (if asked)
1671 before Question 20]

1672 31. [Branch: field] When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to
1673 your mind?

1674 Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme. [Figures S18, S19]
1675 {Open field}

1676 32. [Branch: important] When determining your support or opposition to the Global
1677 climate scheme, which points are important to you? [Figure S17]

- 1678 • It would succeed in limiting climate change.
- 1679 • It would hurt the [U.S.] economy.
- 1680 • It would penalize my household.
- 1681 • It would make people change their lifestyle.
- 1682 • It would reduce poverty in low-income countries.
- 1683 • It might be detrimental to some poor countries.
- 1684 • It could foster global cooperation.
- 1685 • It could fuel corruption in low-income countries.
- 1686 • It could be subject to fraud.
- 1687 • It would be technically difficult to put in place.
- 1688 • Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences.

1689 *Not at all important; Not so important; Quite important; Very important*

1690 [Eu, US1] Donation lottery

1691 33. Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).

1692 *Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*

1693 34. [Two random branches] By taking this survey, you are automatically entered into a
1694 lottery to win [\$]100 in panel points. This lottery is unrelated to the previous ones
1695 that rewarded answers’ accuracy. In a few days you will know whether you have
1696 been selected in the lottery. The payment will be made to you in the same way as
1697 your compensation for this survey, so no further action is required on your part.

1698

1699 Should you be selected in the lottery, you can also donate a part of this additional
1700 compensation to [[American] / African] people living in poverty through [US1: the
1701 charity GiveDirectly. The charity GiveDirectly; Eu: a charity. We would channel this
1702 donation to a charity that] provides small amounts of cash to people in need in [[the
1703 U.S] / Africa].

1704

1705 **In case you are winner of the lottery, what share of the [\$]100 would you donate**
1706 **to [[American] / African] people living in poverty [US1: through GiveDirectly]?**
1707 *[Figure S20, Table S2]*

1708 *Amount donated to [[American] / African] people in need (in [\$]) [slider from 0 to 100]*

1709 [Eu, US2] Wealth tax

1710 [Four random branches: Question 35 then Question 36 (global first); Question 36 then Ques-
1711 tion 35 (national first); Question 37 (global share); Question 38 (sharing)]

1712 35. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-
1713 income countries?

1714 Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking
1715 water, healthcare, and education. *[Figures S1, S21]*

1716 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1717 *support*

1718 36. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: afford-
1719 able housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and
1720 schools]? *[Figures S1, S22]*

1721 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1722 *support*

- 1723 37. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all
1724 countries around the world. In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount
1725 to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE: €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2:
1726 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount
1727 to [\$]1 billion in all low-income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700
1728 million people, most of them in Africa).

1729 Each country would retain part of the revenues it collects, and the remaining part
1730 would be pooled at the global level to finance infrastructure and public services in
1731 low-income countries.

1732 What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of re-
1733 tained in the country's national budget)? [Figures S5, S23]

1734 *Percent of global wealth tax that should go to low-income countries [slider from 0 to 100]*

- 1736 38. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in
1737 all countries around the world.

1738 In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE:
1739 €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2: 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES:
1740 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount to [\$]1 billion in all low-
1741 income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700 million people, most of
1742 them in Africa).

1743 Which of the following options would you prefer? [Figure S24]

- 1744 • The whole wealth tax financing national budgets in each country. For ex-
1745 ample, in [US2: the U.S., it could finance affordable housing and universal
1746 childcare/pre-K.; Eu-UK: the UK, it could finance the National Health Service
1747 and state-funded schools].
- 1748 • Half of the wealth tax financing national budgets in each country, half of it
1749 financing low-income countries. For example, it could finance [US2: universal
1750 childcare/pre-K in the U.S.; Eu-UK: state-funded schools in the UK] and access
1751 to drinking water, healthcare, and education in Africa.

1752 [Eu, US2] Foreign aid

1753 US2 Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).

1754 Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal

- 1755 39. From your best guess, what percentage of [U.S.] government spending is allocated
1756 to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?

1757

1758 For your information, government spending totals [US2: 38%; FR: 55%; DE: 45%; ES:
1759 42%; UK: 41%] of [U.S.] GDP, it includes [US2: federal, State; Eu: national] and local
1760 government spending, and apart from foreign aid, it covers the following items: de-
1761 fense, social security (retirement pensions), health [US2: (including Medicare and
1762 Medicaid)], welfare benefits [US2: (including food stamps and EITC)], education,
1763 roads, justice, other programs [US2: and federal agencies (including in energy, sci-
1764 ence...)]. [Figure S25]

1765 Less than 0.1%; 0.1% to 0.2%; 0.3% to 0.5%; 0.6% to 1.0%; 1.1% to 1.7%; 1.8% to 2.6%;
1766 2.7% to 4%; 4.1% to 6%; 6.1% to 9%; 9.1% to 13%; 13.1% to 25%; More than 25%

- 1767 40. [Two random branches: with or without information on actual amount] [Info: Actually,
1768 [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [the U.S.] government spend-
1769 ing is allocated to foreign aid.]

1770

1771 If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate
1772 to foreign aid? [Figures S28, S29, S26 and S27]

- 1773 41. [Asked iff branch: Info and preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than actual for-
1774 eign aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to increase [U.S.] foreign
1775 aid.

1776

1777 How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers
1778 possible) [Figure S30]

1779 Lower spending on defense; Lower spending on retirement pensions; Lower spending on
1780 healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Lower spending on welfare benefits [US2: (like
1781 EITC or food stamps)]; Lower spending on education; Lower spending on other programs
1782 [US2: and federal agencies]; Higher taxes on the wealthiest; Higher corporate income tax
1783 rate; Higher personal income tax rates; Higher public deficit

1784 42. [Asked iff branch: *Info* and preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than actual foreign
1785 aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to reduce [U.S.] foreign aid.

1786

1787 How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible) [*Figure S31*]
1788

1789 *Higher spending on defense; Higher spending on retirement pensions; Higher spending on
1790 healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Higher spending on welfare benefits [US2:
1791 like EITC or food stamps)]; Higher spending on education; lower spending on other pro-
1792 grams [US2: and federal agencies]; Lower taxes on the wealthiest; Lower corporate income
1793 tax rate; Lower personal income tax rates; Lower public deficit*

1794 **[Eu, US1] Petition**

1795 43. [*Two random branches*] Would you be willing to sign a petition for the [Global cli-
1796 mate / National redistribution] scheme? [*Figure S32*]

1797

1798 As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President's
1799 office], informing him what share of American people are willing to endorse the
1800 [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign,
1801 only your answer here is required and remains anonymous.) Yes; No

1802 **[Eu, US1] Other policies**

1803 44. The following policies are discussed at international negotiations on how to deal
1804 with climate change. [*Figures 3 and S33*]

1805

1806 Do you support or oppose the following policies?

- 1807 • Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for
1808 climate damages
- 1809 • High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries
- 1810 • High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income
1811 countries adapt to climate change

1812 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1813 support*

1814 45. Do you support or oppose the following global policies? [Figures 3 and S33]

- 1815 • Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt
- 1816 • Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting
1817 right proportional to its population
- 1818 • Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries
- 1819 • A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage
- 1820 • Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of
1821 all assets
- 1822 • A maximum wealth limit of [US1: \$10 billion; Eu: [€]100 million] for each
1823 human

1824 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1825 support*

1826 46. Currently, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [U.S.] government
1827 spending (that is, [US1: 0.2%; FR: 0.4%; DE: 0.6%; ES: 0.2%; UK: 0.7%] of [U.S.] GDP)
1828 is spent on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries. [Figure S6]

1829
1830 Do you support [the U.S.] transferring more money to low-income countries?

1831 *Yes, [U.S.] foreign aid should be increased.; Yes, but only if some conditions are met.; No,
1832 [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.; No, [U.S.] foreign aid should be reduced.*

1833 47. [Asked only if *Yes, but only if some conditions are met.* is chosen] What conditions
1834 should be required for [the U.S.] to increase its foreign aid? (Multiple answers pos-
1835 sible) [Figures S7, S28]

1836 *That recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights.; That recipient
1837 countries cooperate to fight illegal migrations.; That other high-income countries also in-
1838 crease their foreign aid.; That this is financed by increased taxes on millionaires.; That we
1839 can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted.; Other: [open field]*

1840 48. [Asked only if *No, [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.* or *No, [U.S.] foreign aid
1841 should be reduced.* is chosen] Why do you oppose [the U.S.] increasing its foreign
1842 aid? (Multiple answers possible) [Figure S8]

1843 *Aid perpetuates poverty as it makes people feel less responsible for themselves.; Aid is not
1844 effective as most of it is diverted.; Aid is a pressure tactic for high-income countries that*

1845 prevents low-income countries from developing freely.; [The U.S.] is not responsible for what
1846 happens in other countries.; Charity begins at home: there is already a lot to do to support
1847 the American people in need.; Other: [open field]

1848 **[Eu, US1, US2] Values and politics**

- 1849 49. [Eu (where it is instead asked at the beginning of Section “Other Policies”), US1]
1850 In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend
1851 [U.S.] interests or global justice? [Figure S34]
1852 [U.S.] interests, even if it goes against global justice; [U.S.] interests, to the extent it re-
1853 spects global justice; Indifferent or don’t know; Global justice, to the extent it respects [U.S.]
1854 interests; Global justice, even if it goes against [U.S.] interests
- 1855 50. How much did you give to charities in 2022? [Figure S39]
1856 I did not make donations to charities last year.; Less than [\$]100.; Between [\$]101 and
1857 [\$]500.; Between [\$]501 and [\$]1,000.; Between [\$]1,001 and [\$]5,000.; More than [\$]5,000.
- 1858 51. To what extent are you interested in politics? [Figure S40]
1859 Not at all; A little; Moderately; A lot; A great deal
- 1860 52. Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means you think the
1861 government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic gov-
1862 ernment functions, and 5 means you think the government should take active steps
1863 in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens? [Figure S41]
1864 Desired involvement of government [slider from 1 to 5]
- 1865 53. **On economic policy matters**, where do you see yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where
1866 1 is Left (favoring equality and government interventions) and 5 is Right (favoring
1867 free competition and little government intervention)? [Figure S42]
1868 Left (1) to Right (5) on economic issues [slider from 1 to 5]
- 1869 54. Did you vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election? [Figure S43]
1870 Yes; No; I didn’t have the right to vote in the U.S.; Prefer not to say
- 1871 55. [If voted: Which candidate did you vote for in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election?
1872 If did not vote: Even if you did not vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election,
1873 please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who
1874 represents your views more closely.] [Figure S44]

1875 [US1, US2: Biden; Trump; Jorgensen; Hawkins; Prefer not to say
1876 FR: candidates at the 2022 presidential election
1877 DE: parties with more than 1% of votes at the 2021 federal election and *Other*
1878 ES: lists with more than 0.9% at the November 2019 general election and *Other*
1879 UK: parties with more than 0.5% of votes at the 2019 general election and *Other*]

1880 56. To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem? [Figure S35]

- 1881 • Income inequality in [the U.S.]
1882 • Climate change
1883 • Global poverty

1884 *Not an important issue for me; An issue but there are other priorities; An issue but we
1885 already do what we can; An important issue, we should do more; One of the most pressing
1886 issue of our time*

1887 57. What group do you defend when you vote? [Figure S36]

1888 *Sentient beings (humans and animals); Humans; [Eu: Europeans]; [Americans]; People
1889 sharing my culture or religion; [US1, US2: My State]; [US1, US2: My town; Eu: My
1890 country, region or town]; My relatives and/or colleagues; My family and myself*

1891 [Eu, US1] Prioritization

1892 58. In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The
1893 more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

1894 How do you allocate the points among the following policies? [Figures S37 and S38]

1895 You can adjust the number of points either using the slider or entering the num-
1896 ber of your choice on the right-hand-side. **The sum of points must equal exactly
1897 100.** By pushing the last slider to the right, the total will automatically adjust to 100.
1898 Please read the 6 options before making your choice.

1899 See the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the pool of policies in each country.
1900 [sliders from 0 to 100]

1903 [FR, DE, ES] ETS2

1904 59. Similar to the Global Climate Scheme, the European Climate Scheme would impose
1905 a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit across the EU in the buildings
1906 and transport sectors. It would make polluters pay for their emissions, which in turn
1907 would increase fossil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities. Several options
1908 are possible regarding the use of the scheme's revenues:

- 1909 • Provide an equal cash transfer of €105 per year to each European.
- 1910 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European, proportional to their
1911 country's emissions: people in countries with higher emissions per person (like
1912 Germany) would receive more than people in countries with lower emissions
1913 (like Romania). For information, people in [Germany] would receive €[FR:
1914 110; DE: 130; ES: 90]/year.
- 1915 • Finance low-carbon investments: thermal insulation of buildings, switch to
1916 clean sources of heating, public transportation, and charging stations for elec-
1917 tric vehicles.
- 1918 • Provide cash transfers to the most vulnerable half of Europeans and finance
1919 low-carbon investments.

1920 Do you support or oppose the European Climate Scheme in case the revenue is used
1921 to... ?

- 1922 • Provide an equal cash transfer to each European
- 1923 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European
- 1924 • Finance low-carbon investments
- 1925 • Provide cash transfers for the most vulnerable Europeans and low-carbon in-
1926 vestments

1927 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1928 support*

1929 60. [Asked iff none of the four variants of the European Climate Scheme is (somewhat or
1930 strongly) supported] Why do you not support a European Climate Scheme? (Mul-
1931 tiple answers possible)

1932 *I am opposed to climate policy being decided at the EU level, it should be decided at the na-*
1933 *tional level;*
1934 *I would prefer if the revenues were used in a different way (beyond the four suggestions*
1935 *above) than previously suggested;*
1936 *I would prefer if decreasing carbon emissions were regulated by other climate policies;*
1937 *I am generally opposed to additional, or more ambitious, climate policies;*
1938 *I do not fully understand how the European Climate Scheme is supposed to work;*
1939 *I don't know*

1940 **[Eu, US1, US2] Feedback**

- 1941 61. Do you feel that this survey was politically biased? [Figure S45]
1942 *Yes, left-wing biased; Yes, right-wing biased; No, I do not feel it was biased*
- 1943 62. [US2 Asked only to one random third of the respondents, instead of the feedback Ques-
1944 tion 63] According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme
1945 poverty in low-income countries? [Figure S46]
1946 *{Open field}*
- 1947 63. The survey is nearing completion. You can now enter any comments, thoughts or
1948 suggestions in the field below.
1949 *{Open field}*
- 1950 64. Lastly, are you interested to be interviewed by a researcher (through videoconfer-
1951 encing) for 30 min?
1952
1953 This is totally optional and will not be rewarded.
1954 *Yes; No*

1955 E Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme

1956 To specify the GCS, we use the IEA's 2DS scenario (IEA 2017), which is consistent
1957 with limiting the global average temperature increase to 2°C with a probability of at least
1958 50%. The paper by Hood (2017) contributing to the Report of the High-Level Commission
1959 on Carbon Prices (Stern & Stiglitz 2017) presents a price corridor compatible with this
1960 emissions scenario, from which we take the midpoint. The product of these two series
1961 provides an estimate of the revenues expected from a global carbon price. We then use
1962 the UN median scenario of future population aged over 15 years (*adults*, for short). We
1963 derive the basic income that could be paid to all adults by recycling the revenues from
1964 the global carbon price: evolving between \$20 and \$30 per month, with a peak in 2030.
1965 Accounting for the lower price levels in low-income countries, an additional income of
1966 \$30 per month would allow **670 million people** to escape extreme poverty, defined with
1967 the threshold of \$2.15 per day in purchasing power parity.¹⁰

1968 To estimate the increase in fossil fuel expenditures (or "cost") in each country by 2030,
1969 we make a key assumption concerning the evolution of the carbon footprints per adult:
1970 that they will decrease by the same proportion in each country. We use data from the
1971 Global Carbon Project (Peters et al. 2012). In 2030, the average carbon footprint of a
1972 country c , e_c , evolves from baseline year b proportionally to the evolution of its adult
1973 population $\Delta p_c = p_c^{2030} / p_c^b$. Thus, the global share of country c 's carbon footprint, s_c ,
1974 is proportional to $\sigma_c = e_c \Delta p_c$, and as countries' shares sum to 1, $s_c = \frac{\sigma_c}{\sum_k \sigma_k}$. Multiplying
1975 country c 's emission share with global revenues in 2030, R , and dividing by c 's adult pop-
1976 ulation in year y , yields its average cost per adult: $R \cdot s_c / p_c^y$. Using findings from Ivanova
1977 & Wood (2020) for Europe and Fremstad & Paul (2019) for the U.S., we approximate the
1978 median cost as 90% of the average cost. Finally, the net gain is given by the basic income
1979 (\$30 per month) minus the cost. We provided consistent estimates of net gains in all sur-
1980 veys (using $y = b = 2015$), though in the global survey we gave the average net gains
1981 vs. the median ones in the complementary surveys. The latter are shown in Figure S49.
1982 For the record, Table S3 also provides an estimate of *average* net gains (computed with

¹⁰The average carbon footprint of Sub-Saharan Africa is 0.75tCO₂ per capita (World Bank), and it is even lower for people living in extreme poverty, under one tenth of the world average of about 5tCO₂ per capita (Chancel & Piketty 2015). Under a GCS with a cash transfer of \$30 per person, if one's emission is one tenth of the world average, their net gain would be \$27 per month in nominal terms. In regions with extreme poverty like Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding high-income countries), the conversion factor from Market Exchange Rate to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is 2.4 (computed as the ratio of the World Bank series relating the GDP per capita of Sub-Saharan Africa in PPP and nominal). Therefore, the net gain for the extreme poor is \$65 per month (or \$2.13 a day) in PPP, enough to lift them out of extreme poverty.

1983 $b = 2019$ and $y = 2030$).¹¹

1984 Estimates of the net gains from the Global Climate Scheme are necessarily imprecise,
1985 given the uncertainties surrounding the carbon price required to achieve emissions re-
1986 ductions as well as each country's trajectory in terms of emissions and population. These
1987 values are highly dependent on future (non-price) climate policies, technical progress,
1988 and economic growth of each country, which are only partially known. Integrated As-
1989 sessment Models have been used to derive a Global Energy Assessment (Johansson et al.
1990 2012), a 100% renewable scenario (Greenpeace 2015) as well as Shared Socioeconomic
1991 Pathways (SSPs), which include consistent trajectories of population, emissions, and car-
1992 bon price (Riahi et al.; Bauer et al.; van Vuuren et al.; Fricko et al. 2017; 2017; 2017; 2017).
1993 Instead of using some of these modelling trajectories, we relied on a simple and trans-
1994 parent formula, for a number of reasons. First and foremost, those trajectories describe
1995 territorial emissions while we need consumption-based emissions to compute the inci-
1996 dence of the GCS. Second, the carbon price is relatively low in trajectories of SSPs that
1997 contain global warming below 2°C (less than \$35/tCO₂ in 2030), so we conservatively
1998 chose a method yielding a higher carbon price (\$90 in 2030). Third, modelling results are
1999 available only for a few macro regions, while we wanted country by country estimates.
2000 Finally, we have checked that the emissions per capita given by our method are broadly
2001 in line with alternative methods, even if it tends to overestimate net gains in countries
2002 which will decarbonize less rapidly than average.¹² For example, although countries' de-
2003 carbonization plans should realign with the GCS in place, India might still decarbonize
2004 less quickly than the European Union, so India's gain and the EU's loss might be over-
2005 estimated in our computations. For a more sophisticated version of the Global Climate
2006 Scheme which includes participation mechanisms preventing middle-income countries
2007 (like China) to lose from it and estimations of the Net Present Value by country, see Fabre
2008 (2023).

(Back to Section 2.3)

¹¹2015 was the last year of data available when the global questionnaire was conceived (OECD data was then used – it does not cover all countries but give identical rounded estimates than those recomputed from the Global Carbon Project data for our complementary surveys). 2030 was chosen as the reference year as it is the date at which global carbon price revenues are expected to peak (and the GCS redistributive effects would be largest), and the GCS could not realistically enter into force before that date. In the surveys, we chose $y = b = 2015$ rather than $b = 2019$ and $y = 2030$ to get more conservative estimates of the monthly cost in the U.S. (\$20 higher than the other option) and in Europe (€5 or £10 higher).

¹²Computations with alternative methods can be found on [our public repository](#).

Figure S49: Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme.




Table S3: Estimated net gain from the GCS in 2030 and carbon footprint by country.

	Mean net gain from the GCS (\$/month)	CO ₂ footprint per adult in 2019 (tCO ₂ /y)			
			Mexico	2	5.6
			Ukraine	2	5.6
			Uzbekistan*	4	5.1
			Argentina	5	4.9
			Thailand	6	4.6
			Egypt	12	3.6
			Indonesia	13	3.3
			Colombia	15	3.0
Saudi Arabia	-93	24.0	Brazil	15	2.9
United States	-77	21.0	Vietnam	15	2.9
Australia	-60	17.6	Peru	16	2.8
Canada	-56	16.7	Morocco	16	2.7
South Korea	-50	15.6	North Korea*	17	2.5
Germany	-30	11.7	India	18	2.4
Russia	-29	11.5	Philippines	18	2.3
Japan	-28	11.3	Pakistan	22	1.6
Malaysia	-21	10.0	Bangladesh	24	1.1
Iran	-19	9.5	Nigeria	25	1.0
Poland	-19	9.5	Kenya	25	0.9
United Kingdom	-18	9.4	Myanmar*	26	0.9
China	-14	8.6	Sudan*	26	0.9
Italy	-13	8.4	Tanzania	27	0.5
South Africa	-11	8.0	Afghanistan*	27	0.5
France	-10	7.8	Uganda	28	0.4
Iraq*	-8	7.4	Ethiopia	28	0.3
Spain	-6	7.0	Venezuela	29	0.3
Turkey	-2	6.2	DRC*	30	0.1
Algeria*	-1	6.0			

²⁰⁰⁹ Note: Asterisks denote countries where footprint is missing and territorial emissions is used instead.

²⁰¹⁰ Values differ from Figure S49 as this table present estimates of *mean* net gain per adult in 2030, not at the

²⁰¹¹ present. Only the countries with more than 20 million adults (covering 87% of the global total) are shown.

F Determinants of support

Table S4: Determinants of support for the Global Climate Scheme. (Back to [2.3](#))

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme						
	All	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Country: Germany	-0.157*** (0.022)		-0.144*** (0.022)				
Country: Spain	-0.044* (0.024)		-0.026 (0.024)				
Country: United Kingdom	-0.079*** (0.024)		-0.104*** (0.023)				
Country: United States	-0.375*** (0.019)						
Income quartile: 2	0.037** (0.017)	0.031 (0.022)	0.038 (0.023)	0.047 (0.043)	0.058 (0.049)	0.013 (0.053)	0.023 (0.043)
Income quartile: 3	0.042** (0.017)	0.033 (0.024)	0.049** (0.024)	0.080** (0.040)	0.059 (0.052)	0.074 (0.056)	-0.052 (0.052)
Income quartile: 4	0.056*** (0.018)	0.062** (0.026)	0.010 (0.026)	0.018 (0.047)	-0.015 (0.055)	-0.001 (0.056)	-0.005 (0.057)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.023* (0.012)	0.032* (0.017)	0.010 (0.018)	0.007 (0.029)	0.045 (0.039)	0.007 (0.039)	-0.010 (0.039)
Age: 25-34	-0.076*** (0.025)	-0.084*** (0.031)	-0.044 (0.035)	-0.031 (0.057)	-0.077 (0.083)	-0.050 (0.066)	-0.103 (0.091)
Age: 35-49	-0.101*** (0.024)	-0.109*** (0.030)	-0.069* (0.034)	-0.094* (0.055)	-0.009 (0.077)	-0.168** (0.070)	-0.050 (0.090)
Age: 50-64	-0.137*** (0.024)	-0.165*** (0.030)	-0.038 (0.035)	-0.039 (0.056)	-0.020 (0.082)	-0.146** (0.067)	-0.017 (0.087)
Age: 65+	-0.116*** (0.028)	-0.142*** (0.034)	-0.056 (0.044)	0.003 (0.076)	-0.045 (0.094)	-0.258*** (0.091)	0.011 (0.105)
Gender: Man	0.019* (0.011)	0.022 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.029)	-0.018 (0.033)	0.042 (0.038)	-0.005 (0.034)
Lives with partner	0.029** (0.013)	0.023 (0.017)	0.058*** (0.018)	0.070** (0.033)	0.082** (0.038)	0.017 (0.038)	0.040 (0.039)
Employment status: Retired	-0.020 (0.024)	-0.046 (0.030)	0.056 (0.038)	0.087 (0.081)	0.096 (0.075)	0.040 (0.082)	0.001 (0.073)
Employment status: Student	0.045 (0.033)	0.062 (0.048)	0.101** (0.044)	0.165* (0.085)	0.192** (0.087)	0.116 (0.074)	-0.021 (0.107)
Employment status: Working	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.020 (0.024)	0.011 (0.028)	0.082 (0.064)	0.006 (0.056)	-0.050 (0.056)	0.036 (0.051)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.331*** (0.013)	-0.435*** (0.017)	-0.106*** (0.019)	-0.131*** (0.035)	-0.004 (0.044)	-0.114*** (0.038)	-0.081* (0.041)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	-0.184*** (0.016)	-0.198*** (0.022)	-0.136*** (0.021)	-0.196*** (0.039)	-0.034 (0.043)	-0.116** (0.046)	-0.108*** (0.040)
Vote: Far right	-0.396*** (0.032)		-0.309*** (0.033)	-0.493*** (0.064)	-0.168*** (0.051)	-0.130 (0.102)	-0.314*** (0.080)
Urban	0.049*** (0.012)	0.072*** (0.018)	0.006 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.029)	0.019 (0.032)	-0.014 (0.036)	0.017 (0.033)
Race: White		-0.030 (0.019)					
Region: Northeast		0.010 (0.023)					
Region: South		0.006 (0.020)					
Region: West		0.010 (0.022)					
Swing State		-0.038** (0.019)					
Constant	1.048	0.736	0.89	0.7	0.732	0.935	0.886
Observations	7,986	4,992	2,994	977	727	748	542
R ²	0.160	0.181	0.064	0.116	0.067	0.043	0.063

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table S5: Support for the GCS regressed on comprehension of its financial effects.

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme					
	All	United States	France	Germany	United Kingdom	Spain
With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win	0.029** (0.012)	-0.004 (0.016)	0.043 (0.033)	0.051 (0.033)	0.040 (0.036)	0.038 (0.037)
Constant	0.596	0.53	0.764	0.677	0.707	0.796
Observations	8,000	5,000	729	979	749	543
R ²	0.001	0.00001	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.002

Table S6: Correlation between (*Somewhat or Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in high-income countries.

	Support for a global GHG tax and dividend											
	USA (1)	DNK (2)	FRA (3)	DEU (4)	ITA (5)	ESP (6)	GBR (7)	JPN (8)	POL (9)	AUS (10)	CAN (11)	KOR (12)
Control group mean	0.34	0.409	0.34	0.361	0.341	0.421	0.288	0.317	0.309	0.294	0.316	0.334
Trusts the government	0.040*** (0.013)	0.0005 (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.051*** (0.011)	0.061*** (0.012)	0.046*** (0.011)	0.050*** (0.012)	0.039*** (0.013)	0.023** (0.011)	0.041*** (0.013)	0.019 (0.012)	0.079*** (0.013)
Believes inequality is an important problem	0.038*** (0.014)	0.051*** (0.012)	0.045*** (0.013)	0.040*** (0.011)	0.023** (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.052*** (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)	0.009 (0.010)	0.005 (0.013)	0.031*** (0.012)	0.024** (0.012)
Worries about CC	0.006 (0.018)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.005 (0.016)	0.048*** (0.014)	0.023* (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.044*** (0.015)	0.014 (0.014)	0.018 (0.013)	0.036** (0.017)	0.004 (0.014)	0.015 (0.013)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	0.009 (0.015)	0.007 (0.012)	0.018 (0.014)	0.015 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.012)	0.032** (0.011)	0.027** (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.024** (0.015)	0.018 (0.014)	0.014 (0.014)	0.001 (0.013)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.059*** (0.015)	0.019 (0.013)	0.008 (0.014)	0.032** (0.013)	0.012 (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.006 (0.014)	0.037** (0.014)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.033** (0.016)	0.026* (0.014)	0.033** (0.013)
Understands emission across activities/regions	-0.018 (0.011)	0.009 (0.013)	0.003 (0.012)	0.023* (0.012)	0.007 (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.007 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.026** (0.012)	-0.002 (0.013)	0.003 (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	0.007 (0.012)	0.008 (0.014)	0.023 (0.014)	0.011 (0.012)	-0.0005 (0.012)	0.031*** (0.012)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.014 (0.011)	0.025* (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.024* (0.012)
Knows which gases cause CC	0.005 (0.011)	0.021* (0.012)	0.010 (0.013)	0.001 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.010)	0.020* (0.010)	0.015 (0.010)	0.017 (0.011)	0.011 (0.011)	-0.0003 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.013)
Understands impacts of CC	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.029*** (0.011)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.022* (0.012)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.024* (0.012)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	-0.005 (0.013)	0.007 (0.012)	0.021 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.014)	0.011 (0.014)	0.010 (0.013)	0.014 (0.013)	0.008 (0.013)	0.015 (0.013)	0.036** (0.016)	0.004 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.013)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	-0.013 (0.021)	0.037 (0.023)	0.043* (0.022)	-0.014 (0.020)	-0.038** (0.019)	0.029 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.017 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.006 (0.022)	0.021 (0.020)	-0.020 (0.019)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.086*** (0.024)	0.066*** (0.023)	0.075*** (0.023)	0.094*** (0.022)	0.105*** (0.020)	0.074*** (0.023)	0.091*** (0.021)	0.154*** (0.019)	0.089*** (0.020)	0.070*** (0.024)	0.053** (0.023)	0.112*** (0.020)
Believes own household would lose	-0.071*** (0.021)	-0.057*** (0.015)	-0.026 (0.020)	-0.087*** (0.017)	-0.066*** (0.017)	-0.053*** (0.017)	-0.073*** (0.017)	-0.008 (0.017)	-0.079*** (0.017)	-0.052*** (0.016)	-0.060*** (0.019)	-0.083*** (0.017)
Believes low-income earners will lose	-0.034* (0.019)	-0.020 (0.016)	-0.056*** (0.018)	-0.022 (0.017)	-0.021 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.016)	-0.015 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.056*** (0.017)	-0.025 (0.016)	-0.030 (0.020)	-0.056*** (0.018)
Believes high-income earners will lose	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.012)	0.013 (0.013)	0.003 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.007 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.025** (0.012)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.0004 (0.013)
Observations	2,218	2,013	2,006	2,006	2,088	2,268	2,025	1,990	2,053	1,978	2,022	1,932
R ²	0.329	0.241	0.237	0.295	0.211	0.216	0.272	0.222	0.214	0.272	0.254	0.228

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 of Dechezleprêtre et al. (2022) for variable definitions.

Table S7: Correlation between (*Somewhat* or *Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in middle-income countries.

	Support for a global GHG tax and dividend							
	IDN (1)	ZAF (2)	MEX (3)	TUR (4)	IND (5)	BRA (6)	CHN (7)	UKR (8)
Control group mean	0.697	0.396	0.681	0.44	0.719	0.539	0.737	0.622
Trusts the government	0.051*** (0.012)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.040*** (0.014)	0.066*** (0.017)	0.065*** (0.015)	0.038** (0.015)	-0.011 (0.015)	0.061*** (0.014)
Believes inequality is an important problem	0.048** (0.011)	0.002 (0.014)	0.057*** (0.015)	0.028 (0.017)	0.092*** (0.016)	0.055*** (0.015)	-0.001 (0.015)	0.027 (0.018)
Worries about CC	0.003 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.016)	0.013 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.017)	-0.0002 (0.016)	0.032* (0.017)	-0.0002 (0.016)	0.046*** (0.016)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	0.020 (0.014)	0.026 (0.017)	0.004 (0.014)	0.039** (0.017)	0.022 (0.016)	0.019 (0.015)	0.034** (0.016)	0.018 (0.016)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.020* (0.011)	0.038** (0.016)	0.032* (0.017)	-0.002 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.015)	-0.017 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.018 (0.016)
Understands emission across activities/regions	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.013)	0.003 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.010)	0.039*** (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.00004 (0.013)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	-0.006 (0.009)	0.011 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.016)	0.0002 (0.012)	0.003 (0.014)	-0.052*** (0.016)	0.022 (0.014)
Knows which gases cause CC	-0.026*** (0.009)	0.019 (0.015)	0.035** (0.014)	0.015 (0.015)	0.020 (0.013)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.023* (0.012)	0.023 (0.015)
Understands impacts of CC	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.0005 (0.015)	0.009 (0.017)	0.043*** (0.014)	-0.023 (0.015)	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.014 (0.014)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	-0.010 (0.007)	0.009 (0.016)	0.015 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.013)	0.002 (0.011)	-0.016 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.010)	0.035** (0.015)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	0.023 (0.015)	0.002 (0.021)	0.019 (0.022)	0.044 (0.029)	0.021 (0.020)	0.032 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.018)	-0.023 (0.025)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.111*** (0.019)	0.073*** (0.022)	0.088*** (0.024)	0.078** (0.031)	0.034 (0.025)	0.129*** (0.022)	0.060*** (0.022)	0.138*** (0.025)
Believes own household would lose	-0.027 (0.021)	-0.044** (0.020)	-0.071*** (0.019)	-0.054** (0.024)	-0.012 (0.019)	-0.067*** (0.023)	-0.119*** (0.022)	-0.045** (0.021)
Believes low-income earners will lose	-0.059*** (0.020)	-0.016 (0.019)	0.003 (0.017)	-0.053** (0.023)	-0.055*** (0.019)	-0.013 (0.020)	0.001 (0.018)	0.004 (0.020)
Believes high-income earners will lose	0.026** (0.011)	-0.020 (0.015)	0.010 (0.013)	0.010 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.014)	0.003 (0.016)	-0.047*** (0.014)	-0.007 (0.013)
Observations	2,488	2,003	2,045	1,932	2,472	1,860	1,717	1,564
R ²	0.366	0.175	0.242	0.248	0.370	0.272	0.280	0.255

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 of Dechezleprêtre et al. (2022) for variable definitions.

G Representativeness of the surveys

Table S8: Sample representativeness of the complementary surveys. (Back to [2.1](#))

	US1			US2			Eu		
	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample
Sample size		3,000	3,000		2,000	2,000		3,000	3,000
Gender: Woman	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.45	0.50	0.51	0.49	0.51
Gender: Man	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.49	0.55	0.50	0.49	0.51	0.49
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.11	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.18	0.15	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.18	0.15	0.17	0.15
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.24	0.26
Age: 65+	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.25	0.23	0.25
Diploma_25_64: Below upper secondary	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.13	0.14	0.13
Diploma_25_64: Upper secondary	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.28	0.23	0.19	0.23
Diploma_25_64: Post secondary	0.34	0.40	0.34	0.34	0.33	0.34	0.29	0.33	0.29
Race: White only	0.60	0.67	0.61	0.60	0.62	0.61			
Race: Hispanic	0.18	0.15	0.19	0.18	0.19	0.19			
Race: Black	0.13	0.16	0.14	0.13	0.17	0.14			
Region: Northeast	0.17	0.20	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.17			
Region: Midwest	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.21			
Region: South	0.38	0.39	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38			
Region: West	0.24	0.20	0.24	0.24	0.20	0.24			
Urban: TRUE	0.73	0.78	0.74	0.73	0.75	0.73			
Employment_18_64: Inactive	0.20	0.16	0.16	0.20	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.15
Employment_18_64: Unemployed	0.02	0.07	0.08	0.02	0.09	0.08	0.03	0.06	0.05
Vote: Left	0.32	0.47	0.45	0.32	0.46	0.45	0.30	0.32	0.32
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.32	0.32
Vote: Far right							0.10	0.10	0.10
Country: FR							0.24	0.24	0.24
Country: DE							0.33	0.33	0.33
Country: ES							0.18	0.18	0.18
Country: UK							0.25	0.25	0.25
Urbanity: Cities							0.43	0.49	0.43
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs							0.33	0.32	0.33
Urbanity: Rural							0.25	0.20	0.25

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

Table S9: Sample representativeness for each European country. (Back to [2.1](#))

	FR			DE			ES			UK		
	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.									
Sample size		729	729		979	979		543	543		749	749
Gender: Woman	0.52	0.50	0.52	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.53	0.51	0.50	0.43	0.50
Gender: Man	0.48	0.50	0.48	0.49	0.48	0.49	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.50	0.57	0.50
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.29	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.19	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.19	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.33	0.25	0.25	0.18	0.25	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.14	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.07	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.12	0.16	0.12	0.17	0.20	0.17
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.31	0.24	0.22	0.26	0.22	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.24	0.18	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.24	0.19	0.24	0.28	0.23	0.28	0.27	0.28	0.27	0.25	0.30	0.25
Age: 65+	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.26	0.21	0.26	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.24
Diploma_25_64: Below upper secondary	0.11	0.19	0.11	0.10	0.14	0.10	0.24	0.16	0.25	0.12	0.09	0.12
Diploma_25_64: Upper secondary	0.26	0.16	0.26	0.27	0.20	0.27	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.21	0.23	0.21
Diploma_25_64: Post secondary	0.26	0.30	0.26	0.29	0.31	0.29	0.28	0.38	0.27	0.33	0.36	0.33
Urbanity: Cities	0.47	0.52	0.47	0.37	0.47	0.37	0.52	0.58	0.52	0.40	0.41	0.40
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.40	0.35	0.40	0.22	0.27	0.22	0.42	0.43	0.42
Urbanity: Rural	0.34	0.29	0.34	0.23	0.18	0.23	0.26	0.15	0.26	0.18	0.16	0.18
Employment_18_64: Inactive	0.20	0.19	0.18	0.15	0.14	0.11	0.20	0.13	0.12	0.16	0.16	0.17
Employment_18_64: Unemployed	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.11	0.12	0.02	0.03	0.04
Vote: Left	0.23	0.19	0.21	0.37	0.44	0.44	0.33	0.37	0.38	0.25	0.28	0.29
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.26	0.30	0.29	0.28	0.27	0.29	0.18	0.24	0.24	0.36	0.44	0.41
Vote: Far right	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.01	0.03	0.03

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. In this Table, weights are defined at the country level. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

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Similar tables for the global surveys can be found in [Dechezleprêtre et al. \(2022\)](#).

H Attrition analysis

Table S10: Attrition analysis for the US1 survey.

	Dropped out	Dropped out after socio-eco	Failed attention test	Duration (in min)	Duration below 4 min
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mean	0.08	0.059	0.082	21.198	0.016
Income quartile: 2	0.025*** (0.010)	0.025*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.740 (3.064)	-0.009 (0.006)
Income quartile: 3	0.062*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.754 (2.813)	-0.004 (0.007)
Income quartile: 4	0.035*** (0.011)	0.035*** (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-3.917 (2.798)	-0.003 (0.007)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.039*** (0.009)	0.039*** (0.009)	-0.000*** (0.000)	1.544 (2.665)	0.006 (0.006)
Age: 25-34	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.597 (2.604)	-0.031** (0.013)
Age: 35-49	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.824 (3.176)	-0.032** (0.013)
Age: 50-64	-0.060*** (0.015)	-0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	5.723** (2.763)	-0.039*** (0.012)
Age: 65+	0.048*** (0.017)	0.048*** (0.017)	0.000** (0.000)	8.952** (4.267)	-0.047*** (0.012)
Gender: Man	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.451 (2.210)	-0.0001 (0.005)
Urban	0.006 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.888** (2.443)	-0.004 (0.006)
Race: Black	0.020** (0.010)	0.020** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	8.554*** (2.600)	0.004 (0.007)
Race: Hispanic	0.021** (0.010)	0.021** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.119* (2.293)	-0.002 (0.007)
Region: Northeast	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-4.862 (4.782)	-0.004 (0.007)
Region: South	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-1.151 (4.710)	-0.004 (0.006)
Region: West	0.006 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-4.000 (4.305)	-0.003 (0.007)
Vote: Biden	-0.048*** (0.008)	-0.048*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-2.901 (2.379)	-0.009 (0.007)
Vote: Trump	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.145 (2.878)	-0.005 (0.008)
Observations	5,719	5,719	3,252	3,044	3,044
R ²	0.127	0.127	1.000	0.006	0.017

Table S11: Attrition analysis for the US2 survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 4 min (5)
Mean	0.095	0.074	0.092	16.338	0.052
Income quartile: 2	0.023* (0.013)	0.023* (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	1.352 (1.601)	-0.029** (0.014)
Income quartile: 3	0.054*** (0.014)	0.054*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	8.502 (9.649)	-0.009 (0.016)
Income quartile: 4	0.060*** (0.016)	0.060*** (0.016)	-0.000 (0.000)	5.254 (3.376)	0.0003 (0.017)
Diploma: Post secondary	-0.033*** (0.011)	-0.033*** (0.011)	0.000 (0.000)	1.601 (2.630)	0.012 (0.011)
Age: 25-34	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.929 (1.535)	-0.032 (0.024)
Age: 35-49	0.012 (0.014)	0.012 (0.014)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.076 (6.651)	-0.047** (0.022)
Age: 50-64	0.040*** (0.014)	0.040*** (0.014)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.364 (1.565)	-0.079*** (0.022)
Age: 65+	0.115*** (0.017)	0.115*** (0.017)	-0.000*** (0.000)	2.619 (3.150)	-0.095*** (0.022)
Gender: Man	-0.073*** (0.009)	-0.073*** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	4.707 (6.037)	0.010 (0.010)
Urban	0.019* (0.011)	0.019* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	1.766 (1.135)	0.005 (0.012)
Race: Black	0.060*** (0.015)	0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.673 (13.328)	-0.010 (0.015)
Race: Hispanic	0.079*** (0.014)	0.079*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	2.930 (1.813)	-0.027** (0.012)
Region: Northeast	-0.026* (0.014)	-0.026* (0.014)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.837 (2.855)	-0.011 (0.015)
Region: South	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.000 (0.000)	3.220 (5.002)	0.009 (0.014)
Region: West	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.000 (0.000)	-1.759 (1.942)	-0.009 (0.015)
Vote: Biden	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	3.230 (2.731)	-0.006 (0.014)
Vote: Trump	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.554 (1.272)	0.007 (0.016)
Observations	2,973	2,973	2,280	2,103	2,103
R ²	0.241	0.241	1.000	0.010	0.031

Table S12: Attrition analysis for the *Eu* survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 6 min (5)
Mean	0.067	0.044	0.151	54.602	0.039
Country: Germany	0.023** (0.010)	0.019** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.533 (18.906)	0.019* (0.010)
Country: Spain	-0.102*** (0.011)	-0.098*** (0.011)	0.000* (0.000)	-29.136* (15.948)	0.010 (0.010)
Country: United Kingdom	0.042*** (0.011)	0.043*** (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-7.458 (18.046)	0.010 (0.010)
Income quartile: 2	0.032*** (0.010)	0.029*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	32.749* (19.771)	-0.015 (0.010)
Income quartile: 3	0.049*** (0.010)	0.047*** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	6.130 (11.734)	-0.021** (0.010)
Income quartile: 4	0.024** (0.011)	0.021* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.659 (19.955)	-0.018* (0.011)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.035*** (0.008)	0.034*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	10.647 (12.959)	-0.007 (0.007)
Age: 25-34	0.028** (0.013)	0.025* (0.013)	-0.000*** (0.000)	36.132 (22.285)	-0.005 (0.018)
Age: 35-49	0.064*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	-0.000*** (0.000)	37.159** (17.190)	-0.013 (0.016)
Age: 50-64	0.085*** (0.013)	0.083*** (0.013)	-0.000 (0.000)	48.363** (22.526)	-0.063*** (0.015)
Age: 65+	0.117*** (0.014)	0.115*** (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	36.351** (14.226)	-0.061*** (0.015)
Gender: Man	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-22.980 (14.093)	0.009 (0.007)
Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs	0.006 (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-16.736 (17.256)	0.004 (0.008)
Degree of urbanization: Rural	0.023** (0.009)	0.023** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	-14.593 (19.733)	-0.001 (0.009)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.025*** (0.005)	-0.025*** (0.005)	0.000*** (0.000)	-17.558 (13.143)	0.019** (0.008)
Vote: Far right	0.005 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.000*** (0.000)	15.838 (32.281)	0.029** (0.014)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	0.023*** (0.006)	0.022*** (0.005)	0.000 (0.000)	24.631 (19.824)	0.030*** (0.010)
Observations	3,963	3,963	3,326	3,115	3,115
R ²	0.406	0.395	1.000	0.006	0.028

2016 I Balance analysis

Table S13: Balance analysis.

	List contains: G (1)	Branch petition: NR (2)	Branch donation: Own nation (3)	Branch conjoint 3: with GCS (4)
Mean	0.496	0.493	0.5	0.499
Country: Germany	-0.026 (0.026)	0.017 (0.026)	0.020 (0.026)	0.005 (0.026)
Country: Spain	0.025 (0.030)	0.026 (0.030)	0.026 (0.030)	0.043 (0.030)
Country: United Kingdom	0.002 (0.028)	0.018 (0.028)	0.037 (0.028)	0.063** (0.028)
Country: United States	-0.001 (0.024)	0.019 (0.024)	0.007 (0.024)	0.023 (0.024)
Income quartile: 2	-0.013 (0.021)	-0.024 (0.021)	0.012 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.021)
Income quartile: 3	0.021 (0.022)	-0.005 (0.022)	0.011 (0.022)	-0.004 (0.022)
Income quartile: 4	-0.001 (0.023)	-0.017 (0.023)	-0.013 (0.023)	0.0001 (0.023)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.008 (0.016)	0.014 (0.016)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.016)
Age: 25-34	0.023 (0.031)	-0.049 (0.031)	-0.003 (0.031)	-0.009 (0.031)
Age: 35-49	0.032 (0.030)	-0.002 (0.030)	-0.014 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.030)
Age: 50-64	0.030 (0.030)	-0.005 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.030)	-0.020 (0.030)
Age: 65+	0.029 (0.037)	-0.037 (0.037)	-0.015 (0.037)	-0.012 (0.037)
Gender: Man	0.024 (0.015)	0.012 (0.015)	0.002 (0.015)	-0.016 (0.015)
Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.0005 (0.017)	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.011 (0.017)
Degree of urbanization: Rural	0.013 (0.024)	0.017 (0.024)	-0.004 (0.024)	0.027 (0.024)
Employment status: Retired	-0.005 (0.032)	-0.031 (0.032)	-0.034 (0.032)	-0.016 (0.032)
Employment status: Student	0.005 (0.044)	-0.023 (0.044)	-0.033 (0.044)	-0.025 (0.044)
Employment status: Working	0.010 (0.024)	-0.027 (0.024)	-0.033 (0.024)	-0.012 (0.024)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.004 (0.017)	0.003 (0.017)	0.010 (0.017)	0.002 (0.017)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	0.001 (0.019)	0.014 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.019)	-0.012 (0.019)
Vote: Far right	0.009 (0.034)	0.030 (0.034)	0.023 (0.035)	0.038 (0.034)
Observations	5,991	5,991	5,991	5,991
R ²	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.003

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

2017 **J Placebo tests**

Table S14: Placebo tests.

	G+R+C preferred to R+C (1)	Supports G+R+C (2)	Signs petition (3)	Share of policies supported (4)	Conjoint 5 A+CGS preferred to B (5)
Mean	0.645	0.633	0.611	0.535	0.596
Branch of list experiment: l	-0.013 (0.019)	-0.024 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.018 (0.021)
Branch of list experiment: rgl	0.005 (0.019)	0.006 (0.019)	-0.002 (0.019)	0.001 (0.012)	0.010 (0.021)
Branch of list experiment: rl	-0.009 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.019)	0.022 (0.019)	0.007 (0.012)	0.007 (0.021)
Branch of petition: nr	0.011 (0.014)	0.006 (0.014)	0.022 (0.014)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.015)
Poor is in own country	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.014)	0.015 (0.014)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.020 (0.015)
Observations	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	5,218
R ²	0.0004	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

2018 **K Main results on the extended sample**

2019 As a robustness check, we reproduce our main results on the extended sample that
2020 includes the 14% respondents who failed the attention check ($n = 9,318$). These results
2021 are non-weighted. They closely match the results in our main specification. For example,
2022 the support for the GCS is 54% in the U.S. and 75% in Europe, while the same coefficients
2023 are significant for the list experiment.

Figure S50: [Extended sample] Main attitudes by vote (“Right” spans from Center-right to Far right).

(Relative support in percent in Questions 20, 35, 45, 46, 49)

(Back to Section 2.5.3)

	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom	United States
Support for the GCS	75	78	70	81	75	54
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	83	81	84	87	81	68
Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries*	52	45	60	59	44	52
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	62	57	62	65	65	47
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	82	80	82	86	80	69
[Country]'s foreign aid should be increased	83	87	87	89	69	77
Universalist*	41	35	49	44	36	43

Figure S51: [Extended sample] Influence of the GCS on preferred platform: Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question 30; in the U.S., asked only to non-Republicans.)

	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom	United States
Random programs: A+GCS preferred to B	60	61	59	64	58	59

Table S15: [Extended sample] Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list. The tacit support for the GCS is estimated by regressing the number of supported policies on the presence of the GCS in the list of policies. The social desirability is estimated as the difference between the tacit and stated support, and it is not significantly different from zero even at a 20% threshold (see [Methods](#)).

	Number of supported policies		
	All	U.S.	Europe
List contains: GCS	0.624*** (0.028)	0.524*** (0.041)	0.724*** (0.036)
<i>Support for GCS</i>	NA	0.554	0.754
<i>Social desirability bias</i>	-0.025	-0.017	-0.033
<i>80% C.I. for the bias</i>	[-0.06; 0.01]	[-0.07; 0.04]	[-0.08; 0.01]
Constant	1.317	1.147	1.486
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000
R ²	0.089	0.065	0.125

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table S16: [Extended sample] Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. ([Question 28](#))

	Prefers the Progressive platform					
	All	United States	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
GCS in Progressive platform	0.022* (0.013)	0.015 (0.018)	0.116*** (0.037)	-0.007 (0.032)	0.028 (0.038)	0.012 (0.037)
Constant	0.628	0.629	0.55	0.682	0.721	0.553
Observations	5,638	2,797	671	883	550	737
R ²	0.001	0.0002	0.014	0.0001	0.001	0.0001

Note: Simple OLS model. *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples. *p < 0.1;
p < 0.05; *p < 0.01.

2024 L Effect of questionnaire framing

2025 When comparing the samples *US1* and *US2*, we observe no effect of questionnaire
2026 framing (or block sequence) on the question “What group do you defend when you
2027 vote?”, common to all waves and placed close to the end of the questionnaire (Table S17).

Table S17: Effect of the wave (*US1* vs. *US2*) on the group defend when voting.
“What group do you defend when you vote?” (Question 57)

	Group defended when voting		
	Humans or Sentient beings	Fellow citizens	Family and self
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Wave: <i>US2</i>	−0.009 (0.014)	0.009 (0.014)	0.010 (0.011)
Mean	0.432	0.335	0.156
Observations	5,000	5,000	5,000
R ²	0.0001	0.0001	0.0002

Note: Simple OLS model. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

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