International Attitudes Toward Global Policies

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Motivation

- Two major global challenges: extreme poverty and climate change.

- Climate change: some worrying trends:
  - ➢ Without a strengthening of policies, global warming of 3.2°C projected by 2100 (IPCC, 2023).
  - ➢ At these temperatures (and even far below), major changes to ecosystems, and major impacts on humans.

- Extreme poverty: still a very bleak picture:
  - ➢ Around 700 million people live with less than $2/day.

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- Extreme poverty: still a very bleak picture:
    - ➢ Around 700 million people live with less than $2/day.

- Both issues are linked:
    - ➢ climate change expected to impact differently (typically more) people in extreme poverty;
    - ➢ deciding on climate policy requires to decide on burden sharing rules.

Research question

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- Rapid and effective action implies significant costs for high-income countries as 1) they cause more pollution and 2) have more resources to address these problems.

$\Rightarrow$ **Questions: Are citizens around the world willing to coordinate on these policies? Are citizens in high-income countries willing to make sacrifices to address climate change and extreme poverty?**

What we do

- We study attitudes towards global policies to combat climate change and extreme poverty;
  - ➢ we use survey data from 20 high- and middle-income countries and >40k respondents from Dechezleprêtre et al. (2022);
  - ➢ we run complementary surveys on 8k respondents in the US, UK, Germany, France, and Spain.

- We examine the sincerity of support for these policies;
  - ➢ We focus on a specific global redistributive climate policy: the "Global Climate Scheme".
  - ➢ We rely on diverse methods, e.g. list experiment, conjoint analysis, petition, prioritization exercise.

What we find

- We find strong support for global redistributive and climate policies all over the world, including:
  - ➤ a global carbon budget with tradable country shares;
  - ➤ a tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries;
  - ➤ a global democratic assembly on climate change;
  - ➤ etc.

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⇒ These results raise questions about the reasons behind lack of policy implementation. If not lack of demand, is there an issue with the supply?

Related work

- Prior literature uses surveys to study attitudes towards climate change and climate policies (see e.g., Whitmarsh & Capstick, 2018; Douenne & Fabre, 2020; Dechezleprêtre et al., 2022).

- Also large literature on preferences for (national) redistribution (see Mengel & Weidenholzer, 2022).

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- Literature using attitudinal surveys to study preferences for *global* redistribution is more scarce:
  - ➢ Carattini et al. (2019): study global carbon taxes with international per capita redistribution.
  - ➢ Fehr et al (2022): study people's perception of their rank in the global income distribution and their preferences to redistribute.
  - ➢ Ghassim et al. (2022): study support for global democracy.

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Our contribution: investigate large panel of global policies across many countries and respondentss, and test sincerity.

Survey data

Data collection: overview (1/2)

- Study based on two sets of online surveys:

Table: Summary of the surveys used in the analysis.

|	**Global survey**	**Complementary surveys**		
Name	*Global*	*US1*	*US2*	*Eu*
Region	20 high and middle-income countries	U.S.	U.S.	France, Germany, Spain, U.K.
Sample size	40,680	3,000	2,000	3,000
Main purpose	Stated support for global policies	Focus on GCS (sincerity, rationales, etc.) + Support for global redistribution + Universalistic values		

Data collection: overview (2/2)

Figure: Country coverage of the surveys

Table: Sample representativeness of the complementary surveys.

	US1			US2			Eu		
	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample
Sample size		3,000	3,000		2,000	2,000		3,000	3,000
Gender: Woman	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.45	0.50	0.51	0.49	0.51
Gender: Man	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.49	0.55	0.50	0.49	0.51	0.49
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.11	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.18	0.15	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.18	0.15	0.17	0.15
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.24	0.26
Age: 65+	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.25	0.23	0.25
Diploma_25_64: Below upper secondary	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.13	0.14	0.13
Diploma_25_64: Upper secondary	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.28	0.23	0.19	0.23
Diploma_25_64: Post secondary	0.34	0.40	0.34	0.34	0.33	0.34	0.29	0.33	0.29
Race: White only	0.60	0.67	0.61	0.60	0.62	0.61			
Race: Hispanic	0.18	0.15	0.19	0.18	0.19	0.19			
Race: Black	0.13	0.16	0.14	0.13	0.17	0.14			
Region: Northeast	0.17	0.20	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.17			
Region: Midwest	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.21			
Region: South	0.38	0.39	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38			
Region: West	0.24	0.20	0.24	0.24	0.20	0.24			
Urban: TRUE	0.73	0.78	0.74	0.73	0.75	0.73			
Employment_18_64: Inactive	0.20	0.16	0.16	0.20	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.15
Employment_18_64: Unemployed	0.02	0.07	0.08	0.02	0.09	0.08	0.03	0.06	0.05
Vote: Left	0.32	0.47	0.45	0.32	0.46	0.45	0.30	0.32	0.32
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.32	0.32
Vote: Far right							0.10	0.10	0.10
Country: FR							0.24	0.24	0.24
Country: DE							0.33	0.33	0.33
Country: ES							0.18	0.18	0.18
Country: UK							0.25	0.25	0.25
Urbanity: Cities							0.43	0.49	0.43
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs							0.33	0.32	0.33
Urbanity: Rural							0.25	0.20	0.25

Stated support

Stated support: global survey (1/3)

- Question: "At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be put in place?"

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Figure: Appropriate scale for climate policies.

➢ Very large majority favors the global level, more local approaches are less supported.

➢ Consistent with people caring about fairness and effectiveness of climate policies.

- We ask support for four climate policies: ▸ See wording

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Figure: Relative support for global climate policies.

| Global climate policies	High-income	Australia	Canada	Denmark	France	Germany	Italy	Japan	Poland	South Korea	Spain	United Kingdom	United States	Middle-income	Brazil	China	India	Indonesia	Mexico	South Africa	Turkey	Ukraine
Global carbon budget (+2°C) divided in tradable country shares	84	79	85			74	89	82	81	92	85	90		90	82	95	89	95	92	90	88	85
Global tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries	82	74	84	72	86	83	90	88	80	89	86	85	73	92	86	98	92	97	93	89	87	94
Global democratic assembly on climate change	81	74	80	77	82	76	90	88	85	85	88	77	71	91	84	97	88	96	94	89	87	93
Global tax on GHG financing a global basic income	49	41	44	57	51	52	55	53	47	53	50	40	49	79	76	92	88	91	83	54	60	77

➢ Three of them garner support in all countries, only the carbon tax does not receive majority support everywhere.

Stated support: global survey (3/3)

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
Figure: Preferred burden sharing rule.

Burden sharing preferences for the global carbon budget	High-income	Australia	Canada	Denmark	France	Germany	Italy	Japan	Poland	South Korea	Spain	United Kingdom	United States	Middle-income	Brazil	China	India	Indonesia	Mexico	South Africa	Turkey	Ukraine
Emission share should be in proportion to population*	88	87	87	90	90	85	91	84	89	91	89	88	87	91	84	96	91	94	92	93	90	85
Countries that have emitted more since 1990 should receive a lower share*	72	69	73	57	80	76	80	69	71	75	74	72	68	82	79	92	86	91	75	73	81	74
Countries that will be hurt more by CC should receive a higher share*	71	71	68	62	74	67	71	84	80	72	75	68	59	84	78	95	90	91	77	81	83	69
Emission share should be in proportion to current emissions	54	55	53			47	46	63	57	68	49	48		69	53	86	77	88	56	55	77	46

➢ equal per capita allocation is the preferred option, virtually consensual;

➢ taking into account historical responsibility or vulnerability to climate change also largely supported;

➢ grandfathering (i.e., prop. to current emissions) least supported.

Inconsistent support for carbon taxation?

Two contrasting results:

1. People are largely in favor of a carbon budget with tradable quotas, even more so if quotas are allocated on an equal per capita basis.

2. People are less in favor of a global carbon tax financing a basic income.

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Possible explanations:

➤ lower expected environmental effectiveness of the tax;

➤ distributional effects more salient with the tax;

➤ a form of tax aversion?

Stated support: complementary surveys

In the complementary surveys, we again enquire about support for many climate and redistributive policies:

- Multiple questions on wealth taxation;

- Multiple questions on foreign aid;

- Questions on global institutions, rules applying on trade tariffs, etc.

- In addition, specific focus on a "Global Climate Scheme" (GCS).

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- In addition, specific focus on a "Global Climate Scheme" (GCS).

⇒ Again very high level of support for these policies.

GCS: presentation (1/3)

The Global Climate Scheme works as follows:

- Implements a cap on carbon emissions to limit global warming below 2°C.

- Emission rights are auctioned each year to polluting firms.

- Revenue is used to fund a global basic income, alleviating extreme poverty.

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⇒ Again, same distributional effects as a global carbon tax financing a global basic income, and same as tradable quotas allocated on a per capita basis.

Figure: Distributive effects of the Global Climate Scheme in 2030.

GCS: presentation (3/3)

- We present it to respondents as a club mechanism:
  - ➤ "The policy could be put in place as soon as countries totaling more than 60% of global emissions agree on it. Countries that would refuse to take part in the policy could face sanctions (like tariffs) from the rest of the World and would be excluded from the basic income."

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- We make distributional effects salient, e.g., in US surveys:
  - ➤ "Each adult in the world would receive \$30/month per month, thereby lifting out of extreme poverty the 700 million people who earn less than \$2/day."
  - ➤ "The typical American would lose out financially \$85 per month (as he or she would face \$115 per month in price increases, which is higher than the \$30 they would receive)."

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- To check understanding, we ask respondents whether fellow citizens or the poorest humans would win/lose, provide correct answers, and randomly reward good responses.

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- a National Redistribution Scheme (NR):
  - ➤ this policy would increase taxes on the top [5% in the US, 1% in Eu) and provide cash transfers to all adults;
  - ➤ for each country, policy calibrated so that cash transfer is equivalent to average net loss from the GCS;
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- a societal policy (used for the list experiment):
  - ➢ marriage only for opposite-sex couples in the US;
  - ➢ death penalty for major crimes in Europe.

Support for GCS and other policies

Figure: Support for the GCS, NR and the combination of GCS, NR and C.

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)	54	76	80	71	81	74
National redistribution scheme (NR)	56	73	77	66	79	75
National climate policy + GCS + NR	52	74	79	69	81	70

➢ Majority support for the GCS in all countries: 54% in US, 76% in European countries.

➢ Similar level of support for NR.

➢ Similar level of support for combinaition of GCS, NR, C.

Table: Determinants of support for the Global Climate Scheme.

				Supports the Global Climate Scheme			
	All	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Country: Germany	−0.157***		−0.144***				
	(0.022)		(0.022)				
Country: Spain	−0.044*		−0.026				
	(0.024)		(0.024)				
Country: United Kingdom	−0.079***		−0.104***				
	(0.024)		(0.023)				
Country: United States	−0.375***						
	(0.019)						
Income quartile: 2	0.037**	0.031	0.038	0.047	0.058	0.013	0.023
	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.043)	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.043)
Income quartile: 3	0.042**	0.033	0.049**	0.080**	0.059	0.074	−0.052
	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.040)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Income quartile: 4	0.056***	0.062**	0.010	0.018	−0.015	−0.001	−0.005
	(0.018)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.047)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.057)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.023*	0.032*	0.010	0.007	0.045	0.007	−0.010
	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Age: 25-34	−0.076***	−0.084***	−0.044	−0.031	−0.077	−0.050	−0.103
	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.057)	(0.083)	(0.066)	(0.091)
Age: 35-49	−0.101***	−0.109***	−0.069**	−0.094*	−0.009	−0.168**	−0.050
	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.055)	(0.077)	(0.070)	(0.090)
Age: 50-64	−0.137***	−0.165***	−0.038	−0.039	−0.020	−0.146**	−0.017
	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.056)	(0.082)	(0.067)	(0.087)
Age: 65+	−0.116***	−0.142***	−0.056	0.003	−0.045	−0.258***	0.011
	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.044)	(0.076)	(0.094)	(0.091)	(0.105)
Gender: Man	0.019*	0.022	−0.010	−0.014	−0.018	0.042	−0.005
	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.034)
Lives with partner	0.029**	0.023	0.058***	0.070**	0.082**	0.017	0.040
	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.039)
Employment status: Retired	−0.020	−0.046	0.056	0.087	0.096	0.040	0.001
	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.038)	(0.081)	(0.075)	(0.082)	(0.073)
Employment status: Student	0.045	0.062	0.101**	0.165*	0.192**	0.116	−0.021
	(0.033)	(0.048)	(0.044)	(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.074)	(0.107)
Employment status: Working	−0.016	−0.020	0.011	0.082	0.006	−0.050	0.036
	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.064)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.051)
Vote: Center-right or Right	−0.331***	−0.435***	−0.106***	−0.131***	−0.004	−0.114***	−0.081***
	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.035)	(0.044)	(0.038)	(0.041)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	−0.184***	−0.198***	−0.136***	−0.196***	−0.034	−0.116**	−0.108***
	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.039)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.040)
Vote: Far right	−0.396***		−0.308***	−0.493***	−0.168***	−0.130	−0.314***
	(0.032)		(0.033)	(0.064)	(0.051)	(0.102)	(0.080)
Urban	0.049***	0.072***	0.006	−0.002	0.019	−0.014	0.017
	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.033)
Race: White		−0.030					
		(0.019)					
Region: Northeast		0.010					
		(0.023)					
Region: South		0.006					
		(0.020)					
Region: West		0.010					
		(0.022)					
Swing State		−0.038**					
		(0.019)					
Constant	1.048	0.736	0.89	0.7	0.732	0.935	0.886
Observations	7.986	4.992	2.994	977	727	748	542
R²	0.160	0.181	0.064	0.116	0.067	0.043	0.063

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Attitudes towards other climate and redistributive policies

Among other results, we find that:

- most climate or redistributive policies we suggest are supported;
  ▸ Results

- high support for global tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries;

- majorities wish to devote significant part of the proceeds of a tax on top wealth (above 5m$) to finance low-income countries; ▸ Results

- people over-estimate foreign aid, but still want to increase it.
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⇒ Overall, large stated support for global redistributive climate policies. **Is it sincere?**

Robustness and sincerity of support

Petition

Figure: Would you be willing to sign a petition for the [GCS / NR]?
As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to the [head of state]
(...) *Yes/No*

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	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Petition for the GCS	51	69	69	66	78	69
(Comparable) support for the GCS	53	76	81	74	81	74
Petition for NR	57	67	65	66	74	68
(Comparable) support for NR	58	72	76	65	78	75

⇒ Willingness to sign a real-stake petition is generally 1 to 7 p.p. lower
than stated support. But not specific to GCS, and majorities are still willing
to sign the petition.

List experiment: design

Basic idea:

- provide a list of policies;

- ask respondents *how many* they support, without specifying which ones;

- randomly vary the content of the list across respondents;

- tacit support for a given policy is estimated as the effect of including that policy in a list on the number of policies supported.

Popular technique to reveal social desirability bias or silencing (e.g., on racism in the Southern U.S. (Kuklinski et al., 1997) or opposition to the invasion of Ukraine in Russia (Chapkovski & Schaub, 2022)).

In our case: list may include GCS, NR, C, and our societal policy.

List experiment: results

Table: Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list.

	Number of supported policies		
	All	US	Eu
List contains: GCS	0.624^{***}	0.524^{***}	0.724^{***}
	(0.028)	(0.041)	(0.036)
Support for GCS	0.617	0.542	0.757
Social desirability bias	-0.026	-0.018	-0.033
80% C.I. for the bias	$[-0.06; 0.01]$	$[-0.07; 0.01]$	$[-0.08; 0.01]$
Constant	1.317	1.147	1.486
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000
R^2	0.089	0.065	0.125

Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

$\Rightarrow$ Consistent with stated support, no evidence of social desirability bias.

Conjoint analysis: design (1/2)

- We run several conjoint analyses: people must choose between two alternative political platforms.

- We are interested in two main things:

  ➢ How would campaining for the GCS affect a progressive candidate relative to a conservative candidate?

  ➢ How would campaining for the GCS affect a progressive candidate relative to another progressive candidate?

⇒ We can use the conjoint analysis to implicitly reveal support for the GCS (and other policies), as well as how it interacts with other aspects of the political agenda.

Conjoint analysis: design (2/2)

Figure: Choice between a conservative platform and a progressive platform with/without the GCS.

Imagine if the two favorite candidates in your constituency in the next general election campaigned with the following policies in their party's platforms.

Which of these candidates would you vote for?

Candidate A	Candidate B
Windfall tax on oil companies	Cut the burden of tax on business
Ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030	£100 billion for infrastructures like road and rail
£150 billion to upgrade schools, hospitals, care homes and council houses	Tougher sentencing for the worst offenders and 10,000 more prison places
National redistribution scheme	Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation
Global climate scheme	

Candidate A	Candidate B	None of them
○	○	○

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Candidate A	Candidate B	None of them
○	○	○

Conjoint analysis: results (1/2)

Table: Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not.

	Prefers the Progressive platform					
	All	United States	France	Germany	UK	Spain
GCS in Progressive platform	0.028*	0.029	0.112***	0.015	0.008	−0.015
	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.041)	(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.038)
Constant	0.623	0.604	0.55	0.7	0.551	0.775
Observations	5,202	2,619	605	813	661	504
R^2	0.001	0.001	0.013	0.0003	0.0001	0.0003

Note: Simple OLS model. The 14% of *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples. GCS has no significant influence on them. $^*p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$.

$\Rightarrow$ A progressive candidate would not lose votes by endorsing the GCS, and could even gain 11 p.p.*** in France.

Conjoint analysis: results (2/2)

- "Imagine that a [Left or Center-left coalition wins the next elections]. Here are two possible platforms on which [the coalition] may campaign" (...) "Even if you do not support the [Left or Center-left], which of these platforms do you prefer?"

- Policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a pool of credible left/center-left policies.

- For each country, we refer to specific parties. For the US, framed as a vote at the primary elections, not asked to republicans.

Figure: Influence of the GCS on preferred platform:
Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percent).

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Random programs: A+GCS preferred to B	58	60	61	59	65	58

Policy prioritization

We also implement a prioritization task:

- respondents have 100 points to allocate to 6 policies;
- they are told that "The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.";
- six policies are randomly drawn from a larger list;
- on average, policies get 16.7 pts when they are included.

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- six policies are randomly drawn from a larger list;
- on average, policies get 16.7 pts when they are included.

Results:

- In each country, the GCS ranks in the middle of all policies or above, from 15.4 pts in the U.S. to 22.9 pts in Germany (2nd most prioritized after tax on millionaires).
- Global tax on millionaires consistently ranks near the top.
- Contrasts with "ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030", one of the least preferred (from 7.8 pts in France to 11.4 in the UK).

Additional results

Campaign effect

- The campaign effect (cf. Anderson et al, 2023) refers to the drop in support policies may experience after entering the public debate.

- To simulate this effect, we expose a sub-sample of the US survey to a list of pros and cons about the GCS *before* asking for their approval.

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- To simulate this effect, we expose a sub-sample of the US survey to a list of pros and cons about the GCS *before* asking for their approval.

- We observe a decrease in support by 11 p.p.:
  - ➢ some items may cast doubt about the feasibility/desirability of the policy (e.g., "It could be subject to fraud", "It could fuel corruption in low−income countries").

$\Rightarrow$ Public support for the GCS (and other global policies) could be sensitive to campaigns against it!

Second-order beliefs

Question: "According to you, what percentage of [country-fellow] answer Yes to the previous question? The three people who are closest to the true value get $50. Mean answer:

Figure: Beliefs regarding the support for the GCS and NR.

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Belief about GCS	52	59	61	56	63	57
Support for the GCS	53	76	80	71	81	74
Belief about NR	55	58	60	53	62	59
Support for NR	56	73	77	66	79	75

⇒ No evidence of pluralistic ignorance in the US, some under-estimation in Europe but still, people expect majority support.

Donation: design

Do we observe universalistic values in behaviors?

- We ask questions about perceived importance of global issues, whose interests diplomats should defend in climate negotiations, etc.

- In addition, we design an incentivized donation:
  - ➢ Respondents might win a \$100 (/€/£) lottery prize, they have to decide which share to donate if they win.

  - ➢ Donation is to people in need, either in Africa or in their own country (random treatment).

Donation: results

Table: (...) In case you are winner of the lottery, what share of the [$]100 would you donate to [African / [own country]] people living in poverty through GiveDirectly?

	Donation to poor people (in %)			
	All	US	US	Eu
Poor is in own country	0.590	2.509**	0.046	−1.349
	(0.799)	(1.152)	(1.691)	(1.108)
Poor is in own country			3.954*	
× Vote: *not* Biden			(2.279)	
Mean	34.034	33.658	33.658	34.41
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000	3,000
R^2	0.0001	0.002	0.034	0.0005

⇒ U.S. non-voters and Trump voters donate 4 p.p. more to fellow citizens, others give the same amount.

Conclusion

Takeaways

- High support for global climate and redistributive policies across the world:
  - ➣ high international support for global carbon budget;
  - ➣ consensus on the "per capita" allocation rule;
  - ➣ majorities support global climate policies, including with transfers detrimental to their countries;
  - ➣ most people favorable to increasing foreign aid, despite overestimating current levels.

- This support appears mostly sincere:
  - ➣ evidence from real-stake petitions, list experiment, prioritization task, and conjoint analysis suggest support for the GCS is not cheap talk;
  - ➣ no evidence that a progressive candidate would lose vote shares by endorsing the GCS.

Discussion

If people are sincere about the support for global climate and redistributive policies, how come are they not more prominent in the public debate?

Potential reasons:

- National bias in power structures (elections, media) and mental structures (hymns, sport teams)?

- Pluralistic ignorance of the elites?

- Ideas whose time has come, and just lack some advocacy?

⇒ More research needed on the topic!

# Appendix

Wording policy questions

- "All countries have signed the Paris agreement that aims to contain global warming "well below $+2°C$". To limit global warming to this level, there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally, called the carbon budget. Each country could aim to emit less than a share of the carbon budget. To respect the global carbon budget, countries that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less than their share. Do you support such a policy?"

- "Do you support or oppose establishing a global democratic assembly whose role would be to draft international treaties against climate change? Each adult across the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly."

- "Do you support or oppose a tax on all millionaires around the world to finance lowincome countries that comply with international standards regarding climate action? This would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education."

Wealth tax

Figure: Percent of global wealth tax that should finance low-income countries (*mean*).

Preferred share of global tax for low–income (in %)

| United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
34	33	36	30	33	34

◂ Back

Support: other global policies

Figure: Relative support for various global policies (percentage of *somewhat* or *strong support*, after excluding *indifferent* answers).

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Payments from high–income countries to compensate low–income countries for climate damages	55	71	72	70	79	70
High–income countries funding renewable energy in low–income countries	68	82	82	82	85	81
High–income countries contributing $100 billion per year to help low–income countries adapt to climate change	60	76	77	79	79	71
Cancellation of low–income countries' public debt	46	53	53	43	62	61
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	58	71	69	69	78	72
Removing tariffs on imports from low–income countries	62	73	58	73	80	83
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	63	80	80	78	81	83
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	62	87	90	86	91	87
A maximum wealth limit of $10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	46	62	58	62	65	67
National tax on millionaires	73	85	81	87	89	88
Global tax on millionaires	69	84	84	84	87	83

Foreign aid (1/3)

Figure: Attitudes regarding the evolution of [own country] foreign aid.

Should [Country]'s foreign aid increase?

Country	No, should be reduced	No, should remain stable	Yes, but at some conditions	Yes, should be increased
France	11%	53%	26%	10%
Germany	25%	19%	39%	17%
Spain	10%	20%	50%	19%
United Kingdom	11%	22%	49%	19%
United States	8%	30%	51%	12%

◀ Back

Figure: Conditions at which foreign aid should be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish an increase of foreign aid at some conditions.]

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
That recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights	61	72	76	70	74	66
That recipient countries cooperate to fight illegal migrations	36	49	46	53	56	39
That other high–income countries also increase their foreign aid	45	51	52	51	49	49
That this is financed by increased taxes on millionaires	36	38	33	41	35	41
That we can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted	68	77	79	80	72	76

Foreign aid (3/3)

Figure: Reasons why foreign aid should not be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish a decrease or stability of foreign aid.]

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Aid perpetuates poverty as it makes people feel less responsible for themselves	11	30	31	35	31	24
Aid is not effective as most of it is diverted	15	53	48	57	60	49
Aid is a pressure tactic for high–income countries that prevents low–income countries from developing freely	6	16	15	14	23	13
[Country] is not responsible for what happens in other countries	17	30	28	30	20	37
Charity begins at home: there is already a lot to do to support the [country] people in need	24	63	51	62	71	69