A Fossil-Free Union

Adrien Fabre (CNRS, CIRED)

June 2024

Global survey: Global policies are strongly supported.

Share of support (somewhat or strongly) for the main global policies among non-*indifferent*. ▸ Absolute ▸ National



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   Provisions to accommodate subnational entities (like California) into the club.

   A carbon border adjustment would prevent carbon leakage.

Strong support for global climate and redistribution policies

Share of support (somewhat or strongly) for the main global policies among non-*indifferent*.



The proposed allocation of emissions allowances

Table 1: Carbon budget over 2030–2080 for a 1.8°C trajectory (in $GtCO_2$)

	Africa	China	Latin America	India	Europe	Other Asia	*Union*	*World*
Equal p.c.	144	134	62	135	49	128	*653*	*754*
Proposal	144	154	62	135	23	128	*647*	*748*



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Middle-income countries (India, Brazil, Indonesia) would get allowances in line with their needs, encouraging them to decarbonize with the guarantee that the rest of the world also decarbonizes.

Key characteristics of this Plan

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Guarantee decarbonization in union countries with a cap enforced directly on firms using an ETS.

Embrace the consensus on equal per capita shares to negotiate a common price or quantity target.

Break the deadlock of international negotiations by granting resources to low-income countries.

What do you think?

2-page policy note on: bit.ly/fossil_free_union

@adrien_fabre

Implementation

Need to monitor, report and verify emissions of industrial units.

- Challenging to avoid fraud in countries lacking institutional capacity, but same for any climate policy.
- The GCP would provide resources and assistance from experienced countries.

Distributing a global basic income is challenging: need to reach everyone and avoid fraud.

- Most countries maintain electoral lists and already have social programs for isolated people.
- Smartphones can provide biometric identification and means of transaction.
- Satellite internet access might soon become cheap and ubiquitous (Hanson 2016).

Details

Ideal timeline: negotiation, consultations up to 2030, phase-in between 2030 and 2035.

Scope: ideally, all CO_2. Initially, CO_2 from fossil fuels and cement production in large industrial units, including shipping and aviation.

Framework: defines the scope, use of revenues, rules of governance, and carbon budget (e.g. 500 $GtCO_2 \approx <+1.5°C$ with 50% chance).

Governance: the governing body would choose the yearly emissions quota, the market design, and possible sanctions against non-participating or non-complying entities.

Market design: Carbon offsets should not be allowed. Borrowing and banking emissions permits should be limited.

The distributive effects

Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan in 2030. ▸ More maps



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Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan throughout the century. ▸ More maps



Scenarios with non-universal participation

Table 2: Main features of different scenarios of climate union.

Union scenario	Emissions covered	Population covered	Basic income in 2040 (€/month)	EU loss in 2040 (share of its GDP)	Temperature increase in 2100 (in °C)
All countries	100%	100%	44	0.6%	1.8
All but OPEC	90%	97%	39	0.6%	1.9
Optimistic	74%	91%	28	0.8%	2.0
Central	67%	88%	23	0.9%	2.0
Prudent	63%	85%	20	0.9%	2.1
Africa EU	12%	23%	26	0.8%	2.5

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Optimistic scenario.
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

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Prudent scenario.
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

Appendix

Additional results

Conditions for increased foreign aid

Go back

[Info on actual amount]. Do you support [the U.S.] transferring more money to low-income countries?



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

[If *at some conditions*] What conditions should be required for [the U.S.] to increase its foreign aid?



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

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

People want to help people (not oligarchs) and to foster climate action and human rights.

National preference is the main reason behind not wanting increased foreign aid.

Preferences over public spending

Go back

Your previous answer shows that you would like to increase [UK] foreign aid.
How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers possible)



Your previous answer shows that you would like to reduce [UK] foreign aid.
How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible)



People want better public services and higher taxes on the wealthiest.

Support for increased foreign aid

Go back

Actual, perceived and preferred amount of foreign aid, with random info (or not) on actual amount. (*Mean*)



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

Support for increased foreign aid: from previous question, and directly asked (with info).



Actual foreign aid is overestimated.

Majorities support more foreign aid.

Perceptions of the Global Climate Scheme

Go back

When determining your support or opposition to the Global climate scheme, which points are important to you?



Conjoint analyses: interaction with other policies

Go back

National climate policy (C) is as supported as the GCS, but no substitute for it.

Support for the GCS does not increase when complemented by National Redistribution.

$\Rightarrow$ Confirms that the monetary loss is not a primary concern for one's attitude toward the GCS.

Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you prefer?

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)	54	76	80	71	81	74
NR+GCS preferred to NR	55	77	79	74	79	77
C+NR+GCS preferred to C+NR	55	74	79	71	78	68
NR+C preferred to NR	62	84	88	83	84	82
GCS+NR preferred to C+NR	47	52	53	53	49	52

Conjoint analyses: influence on preferred platform (Eu) ▸ Go back

(...) Even if you do not support the Left, which of these platforms do you prefer?



Europeans prefer platforms that include the GCS and without the ban on thermal cars (a planned policy).

Conjoint analyses: influence on preferred platform (France)

Go back

France shows that there can be a mismatch between preferred policies (insulation plan, public services, global tax, GCS) and enacted policies (higher retirement age and ban on thermal cars: the least preferred).

Imaginez que la gauche ou le centre gauche gagne les prochaines élections en 2027. Voici deux programmes possibles sur lesquels elle pourrait faire campagne (...), lequel de ces programmes préférez-vous ?



Conjoint analyses: influence on preferred platform (U.S.)

Go back

Endorsing the GCS is not determinant to gain the Democratic primary.

[Only on non-Republican] Imagine that at the 2024 Democratic party presidential primaries, the two main candidates campaign with the following key policies in their platforms.

Which of these candidates do you prefer?

Climate policy:
- Ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030
- Coal exit
- Trillion dollar investment in clean transportation infrastructure and building insulation

Economic issues:
- $15 minimum wage
- Funding affordable housing
- Student loan forgiveness
- Universal childcare/pre-K

Foreign policy:
- Doubling foreign aid
- Global climate scheme
- Global democratic assembly on climate change
- Global tax on millionaires

Societal issues:
- Expanding the Supreme Court
- Handgun ban
- Making abortion a right at the federal level

Tax system:
- Increase corporate income tax rate from 21% to 28%
- National redistribution scheme
- Wealth tax



Conjoint analyses: influence on preferred platform (Germany)

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Endorsing the GCS is not determinant to gain the Democratic primary.

Imagine that a Rot-Rot-Grüne coalition wins the next elections. Here are two possible platforms on which the coalition may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a pool of credible left-wing policies).

(...) Even if you do not support the Left, which of these platforms do you prefer?



Conjoint analyses: influence on preferred platform (Spain)

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Imagine that the PSOE wins the next elections. Here are two possible platforms on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a pool of credible PSOE policies).

(...) Even if you do not support the PSOE, which of these platforms do you prefer?

Política climática:
- 100% de electricidad producida con energías renovables en 2040
- Plan de aislamiento térmico
- Prohibir la venta de coches nuevos con motor de combustión para 2030

Asuntos económicos:
- Más necesidades sanitarias dentro del sistema público (cuidado dental, gafas, salud mental)
- Ingreso Básico Garantizado de 600€ al mes
- Jornada laboral de 34 horas semanales
- Inversión en el sistema educativo y universalización de la educación preescolar

Política exterior:
- Plan climático global
- Impuesto mundial a los millonarios
- Asamblea democrática mundial sobre el cambio climático
- Duplicar la ayuda exterior a los países de renta baja

Asuntos sociales:
- Reformar la ley electoral para hacer el Senado más proporcional
- Abolición de la prostitución

Sistema fiscal:
- Plan de redistribución nacional
- Aumentar los impuestos sobre las rentas superiores a 100.000 euros anuales



"you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.
How do you allocate the points among the following policies?"
[6 policies taken at random]

GCS is as prioritized as the average policy, or even more in France and Germany.
It is more prioritized than some planned climate policies, like the ban on thermal cars.

The global tax on millionaires is among the most prioritized measures.
It as prioritized as a national wealth tax, if not more.

Prioritization

Go back

Mean number of points

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	13	21	10	14	35	31
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	23	22	25	21	22	23
econ3	21	15	13	18	17	13
econ4	28	22	27	17	24	20
soc1	10	17	13	17	12	21
soc2	13	9	14	8	10	8
climate1	14	15	11	18	20	12
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	20	18	22	19	15	17
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion−engine cars by 2030	11	9	8	8	9	11
tax1: National redistribution scheme	14	15	16	15	15	15
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	19	19	21	18	17	19
foreign1: Global climate scheme	15	20	20	23	16	17
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	21	20	20	23	19	20

International climate negotiations

Go back

In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend [U.S.] interests or global justice?



The typical answer is to defend one's country's "interests, to the extent it respects global justice."

Only one eigth wants to defend one's country's "interests, even if it goes against global justice."

Group defended

Go back



The most defended group is one's fellow citizens.

40% are universalist, i.e. defend all humans or sentient beings.

Biggest issues

Go back

To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem? *5-Likert scale*
(Mean of answers recoded in [-2, +2])



People rank these the importance of these 3 issures as follows:

1. Climate change
2. Global poverty
3. Income inequality in their country

Eu questionnaire

Go back



Descriptive statistics

Main attitudes by vote

Go back

Main attitudes by vote (“Right” spans from Center-right to Far right). (Relative support in percent)



Main attitudes by vote

Go back



Main attitudes by vote

Go back

Main attitudes by vote in Germany



Main attitudes by vote

Go back



Main attitudes by vote

Go back

Main attitudes by vote in the UK



Comprehension of the policies

Correct answers to comprehension questions (in percent). Go back



Comprehension of the policies

Number of correct answers to comprehension questions (mean). Go back



Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan

Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan

Go back

Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan in 2030.



Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan

Go back

Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan in 2040.



Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan

Go back

Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan in 2050.



Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan

Go back

Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan in 2060.



Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan

Go back

Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan in 2070.



Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan

Go back

Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan in 2080.

Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan

Go back

Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan in 2030.



Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan

Go back

Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan in 2040.



Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan

Go back

Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan in 2050.



Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan

Go back

Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan in 2060.



Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan

Go back

Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan in 2070.

Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan

Go back

Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan in 2080.

Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan

Go back

Distributive effects of the Global Climate *Scheme*.



Distributive effects of the Global Climate Plan

Go back

Distributive effects of the Global Climate *Plan*.



OECD

Relative support for national policies

Go back



Support in high-income countries: Global tax and dividend $\lesssim$ National tax and dividend $<$ Global cuota and dividend

Absolute support for global policies

Go back

Share of support (somewhat or strongly) for the main global policies among non-*indifferent*.



Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “[country] should take measures to fight climate change.” ▸ Go back



At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be put in place? (Multiple answers are possible) ‣ Go back



How should [country] climate policies depend on what other countries do?
If other countries do more, [country] should do... ▸ Go back



How should [country] climate policies depend on what other countries do?
If other countries do less, [country] should do... ▸ Go back



[Question non posée aux U.S., au Danemark et en France] All countries have signed the Paris agreement that aims to contain global warming “well below +2 °C”. To limit global warming to this level, there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally, called the carbon budget. Each country could aim to emit less than a share of the carbon budget. To respect the global carbon budget, countries that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less than their share.

Do you support such a policy? ‣ Go back



[*Question not asked in the U.S., Denmark and France, answers to a similar question are displayed]
Suppose the above policy is in place. How should the carbon budget be divided among countries?
The emission share of a country should be proportional to its population, so that each human has an equal right to emit.; The emission share of a country should be proportional to its current emissions, so that those who already emit more have more rights to emit.; Countries that have emitted more over the past decades (from 1990 onwards) should receive a lower emission share, because they have already used some of their fair share.; Countries that will be hurt more by climate change should receive a higher emission share, to compensate them for the damages.
Percentage of support (somewhat or strong) among: *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support*

Go back



Do you support or oppose establishing a global democratic assembly whose role would be to draft international treaties against climate change? Each adult across the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly.

Go back



Imagine the following policy: a global tax on greenhouse gas emissions funding a global basic income. Such a policy would progressively raise the price of fossil fuels (for example, the price of gasoline would increase by [40 cents per gallon] in the first years). Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Revenues from the tax would be used to finance a basic income of [$30] per month to each human adult, thereby lifting the 700 million people who earn less than $2/day out of extreme poverty. The average British person would lose a bit from this policy as they would face [$130] per month in price increases, which is higher than the [$30] they would receive.

Do you support or oppose such a policy? ‣ Go back



Do you support or oppose a tax on all millionaires around the world to finance low-income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate action? This would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education.

Go back



Synthèse : Pourcentage de réponses positive (e.g. Plutôt/Très favorable).

Go back

	High−income	Australia	Canada	Denmark*	France*	Germany	Italy	Japan	Poland	South Korea	Spain	United Kingdom	United States*	Middle−income	Brazil	China	India	Indonesia	Mexico	South Africa	Turkey	Ukraine
Level of climate policies needed: global	85	78	87	81	85	88	92	94	88	86	88	88	70	85	88	87	78	86	88	90	82	76
Level of climate policies needed: federal/continental	46	67	58	48	37	48	30	NA	40	NA	40	47	52	48	48	61	67	50	41	42	41	24
Level of climate policies needed: state/national	44	54	50	45	27	45	28	50	38	65	34	53	41	42	36	32	59	35	26	53	58	35
Level of climate policies needed: local	36	48	45	33	26	37	24	35	37	41	30	43	35	35	35	29	50	24	28	42	41	27
If other do more, [country] should do more	46	50	53	40	37	42	52	59	36	35	44	49	55	63	65	67	73	71	57	60	71	32
If other do less, [country] should do more	56	55	57	54	47	51	74	62	57	44	64	53	58	76	74	69	75	82	80	78	79	60
Global carbon budget (+2°C) divided in tradable country shares	62	57	64	NA	NA	52	69	50	59	71	71	66	NA	74	69	78	78	77	76	71	68	76
Emission share should be in proportion to population*	63	62	59	55	71	55	68	53	65	66	66	62	67	72	65	76	75	73	71	75	71	63
Emission share should be in proportion to current emissions	35	35	35	NA	NA	29	33	39	37	42	35	30	NA	50	41	65	60	62	40	38	55	31
Countries that have emitted more since 1990 should receive a lower share*	44	42	45	28	54	45	51	42	44	48	48	42	41	58	56	65	67	63	47	53	58	52
Countries that will be hurt more by CC should receive a higher share*	44	42	39	41	51	37	42	51	53	43	48	38	41	63	58	74	72	70	54	61	60	47
Global democratic assembly on climate change	57	52	54	51	55	56	68	61	63	57	68	53	48	75	64	86	77	78	76	70	72	73
Global tax on GHG financing a global basic income	34	29	32	41	34	36	34	32	31	33	42	29	34	61	54	74	72	70	68	40	44	62
Global tax on millionaires to finance low−income countries	64	58	67	55	65	65	72	64	62	65	75	65	53	78	73	86	80	83	78	71	73	83

Synthèse : Pourcentage de réponses positive (e.g. *Plutôt/Très favorable*) parmi les non *indifférents*.

Go back



Principales des attitudes sur les politiques mondiales

Pourcentage de réponses positive (e.g. Plutôt/Très favorable). ‣ Go back

	High−income	Australia	Canada	Denmark*	France*	Germany	Italy	Japan	Poland	South Korea	Spain	United Kingdom	United States*	Middle−income	Brazil	China	India	Indonesia	Mexico	South Africa	Turkey	Ukraine
Level of climate policies needed: global	85	78	87	81	85	88	92	94	88	86	88	88	70	85	88	87	78	86	88	90	82	76
Global carbon budget (+2°C) divided in tradable country shares	62	57	64	NA	NA	52	69	50	59	71	71	66	NA	74	69	78	78	77	76	71	68	76
Emission share should be in proportion to population*	63	62	59	55	71	55	68	53	65	66	66	62	67	72	65	76	75	73	71	75	71	63
Global democratic assembly on climate change	57	52	54	51	55	56	68	61	63	57	68	53	48	75	64	86	77	78	76	70	72	73
Global tax on millionaires to finance low−income countries	64	58	67	55	65	65	72	64	62	65	75	65	53	78	73	86	80	83	78	71	73	83

Principales attitudes sur les politiques mondiales

Pourcentage de réponses positive (e.g. *Plutôt/Très favorable*) parmi les non *indifférents*. Go back



Principales attitudes sur les politiques mondiales

Moyennes des réponses, recodées en [−2; +2]. Go back