

908    **A Literature review**

909    **A.1 Attitudes and perceptions**

910    **A.1.1 Population attitudes on global policies**

911    Using representative samples in 125 countries covering 96% of the world's greenhouse  
912    gas emissions, Andre et al. (2024) show that 69% of the global population express willingness  
913    to contribute 1% of their income to fight global warming. Carattini et al. (2019) test  
914    the support for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples in five countries, representative  
915    along gender and age. For a given variant, the sample size is about 167 respondents per country.  
916    They find over 80% support for any variant in India, between 50% and 65% in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43% to 59% in the U.S., depending on the  
917    variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding an equal dividend for each  
918    human is close to 50% in high-income countries (e.g., at 44% in the U.S.), consistently with  
919    our results from the *Global* survey (see Figure 1). This is another piece of evidence that the  
920    support is lower for a tax that would "only" reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions than for a quota that  
921    would unambiguously achieve the climate target. Using a conjoint analysis in the U.S.  
922    and Germany, Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019b) find that the support for a carbon tax  
923    increases by up to 50% if it applies to all industrialized countries rather than exclusively  
924    to one's own country.

925    In surveys conducted in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S., Ghassim (2020)  
926    finds support ranging from 55% to 74% for "a global democracy including both a global  
927    government and a global parliament, directly elected by the world population, to recom-  
928    mend and implement policies on global issues". Through an experiment, he also finds  
929    that, in countries where the government stems from a coalition, voting shares would shift  
930    by 8 (Brazil) to 12 p.p. (Germany) from parties who are said to oppose global democracy  
931    to parties that supposedly support it. For instance, when Germans respondents were told  
932    that (only) the Greens and the Left support global democracy, these parties gained re-  
933    spectively 9 and 3 p.p. in vote intentions, while the SPD and the CDU-CSU each lost 6  
934    p.p. Ghassim (2020) also presents survey results showing strong majorities in favor of the  
935    direct election of one's country's UN representative in all 18 surveyed countries. Simi-  
936    larly, in each of 10 countries, there are clear majorities in favor of "a new supranational  
937    entity [taking] enforceable global decisions in order to solve global risks" (Global Chal-  
938    lenges Foundation 2018). Remarkably, already in 1946, 54% of Americans agreed (while  
939

940 24% disagreed) that “the UN should be strengthened to make it a world government with  
941 the power to control the armed forces of all nations” ([Gallup 1946](#)). Furthermore, in sur-  
942 veys conducted in Argentina, China, India, Russia, Spain, and the U.S., [Ghassim et al.](#)  
943 ([2022](#)) find majority support for UN reforms that would make United Nations’ decisions  
944 binding, give veto powers to a few other major countries at the Security Council, or com-  
945 plement the highest body of the UN with a chamber of directly elected representatives.

946 Relatedly, [Meiland et al. \(2023\)](#) find that both Americans and French people prefer an  
947 international settlement of climate justice, even if it encroaches on sovereignty. In a 2013  
948 survey conducted in China, Germany, and the U.S., [Schleich et al. \(2016\)](#) show that over  
949 three-quarter of people think that international climate agreements reached so far are not  
950 successful and that future agreements are important. In Finland, [Sivonen \(2022\)](#) finds that  
951 that support for a carbon tax is higher if implemented at the global level (54%) rather than  
952 at the national level (40%).

953 The results from these specific questions are in line with the answers to more general  
954 questions. In each of 36 countries, [ISSP \(2010\)](#) find near consensus that “for environmental  
955 problems, there should be international agreements that [their country] and other coun-  
956 tries should be made to follow” (overall, 82% agree and 4% disagree). In each of 29 coun-  
957 tries, [ISSP \(2019\)](#) uncover near consensus that “Present economic differences between rich  
958 and poor countries are too large” (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree). [Leiserowitz et al.](#)  
959 ([2021](#)) reveal that 66% of Americans support providing “financial aid and technical sup-  
960 port to developing countries that agree to limit their greenhouse gas emissions.” [Fehr](#)  
961 [et al. \(2022\)](#) find that 90% of Germans want some degree of global redistribution.

### 962 A.1.2 Population attitudes on climate burden sharing

963 Despite differences in the description of fairness principles, surveys on burden-sharing  
964 rules show consistent attitudes. Or at least, their seemingly contradictory results can be  
965 made compatible with the following interpretation: Concerning emissions reductions,  
966 most people want that every country engage in strong and collective decarbonization ef-  
967 forts, with a global quota converging to climate neutrality in the medium run. Concerning  
968 the financial effort, most people support high-emitting countries paying and low-income  
969 countries receiving funding. The most supported rules are those perceived as equitable,  
970 in particular an equal right to emit per person.

971 This interpretation helps to understand the apparent differences between articles that  
972 approach burden sharing from different angles: cost sharing (in money terms), effort shar-

ing (in terms of emissions reductions), or resource sharing (in terms of rights to emit). Existing papers adopt either the cost sharing or effort sharing approach, which preclude any country from being a net receiver of funds. Also, by focusing on *either* the financial or the decarbonization effort, these surveys miss the other half of the picture, which can explain why some papers find strong support for the ability-to-pay principle while others find strong support for grandfathering (defined as emissions reductions being the same in every country). The literature follows these approaches to align with the notions used by the UNFCCC. Yet, we argue that the resource sharing approach is preferable for uncovering attitudes, as it unambiguously describes the distributive implications of each rule while achieving an efficient geographical distribution of emissions reductions and explicitly allowing for monetary gains for some countries.

Now, let us summarize the results of the different papers in the light of this clarification. Schleich et al. (2016) find an identical ranking of support for burden-sharing principles in China, Germany, and the U.S.: polluter-pays followed by ability-to-pay, equal emissions per capita, and grandfathering. Note that the authors do not allow for emissions trading in their description of equal *emissions per capita*, which may explain its relatively low support. Yet, the relative support for egalitarianism also depends on how the other rules are described. Indeed, Carlsson et al. (2011) find that Swedes prefer that “all countries are allowed to emit an equal amount per capita” rather than options where emissions are reduced based on current or historical emissions, for which it is explicitly stated that high-emitting countries “will continue to emit more than others”. Bechtel & Scheve (2013) find agreement that rich countries should pay more and historical emissions should matter, but that efforts should not be solely borne by wealthy nations. More precisely, their conjoint analysis conducted in France, Germany, the UK, and the U.S. shows that a climate agreement is 15 p.p. more likely to be preferred (to a random alternative) if it includes 160 countries rather than 20, and 5 p.p. less likely to be preferred if “only rich countries pay” compared to other burden-sharing rules: “rich countries pay more than poor”, “countries pay proportional to current emissions” or “countries pay proportional to historical emissions”. In Germany and the U.S., Gampfer et al. (2014) also find stronger support for funding climate action in low-income countries when cost is shared with other countries. Using a choice experiment, Carlsson et al. (2013) find that the least preferred option in China and the U.S. is when low-emitting countries are exempted from any effort. Ability-to-pay is appreciated in both countries and is the preferred option in the U.S., though the preferred option in China is another one that accounts for historical

1007 responsibility. In the U.S. and France, [Meilland et al. \(2023\)](#) find that the most favored  
1008 fairness principle is that “all countries commit to converge to the same average of total  
1009 emissions per inhabitant, compatible with a controlled climate change”. Furthermore, in  
1010 each country, 73% disagree with grandfathering defined as “countries which emitted a  
1011 lot of carbon in the past have a right to continue emitting more than others in the future”.  
1012 The study by [Meilland et al. \(2023\)](#) contains many other results: for instance, majorities  
1013 prefer to hold countries accountable for their consumption-based rather than territorial  
1014 emissions, and the median choice regarding historical responsibility is to hold a country  
1015 accountable for its post-1990 emissions (rather than post-1850 or just their current emis-  
1016 sions). Finally, in each of 28 (among the largest) countries, [Dabla-Norris et al. \(2023\)](#) find  
1017 strong majority for “all countries” to the question “Which countries do you think should  
1018 be paying to reduce carbon emissions?”. When asked to choose between a cost sharing  
1019 based on *current* vs. *accumulated historic emissions*, a majority prefers *current emissions* in  
1020 all countries but China and Saudi Arabia (where the two options are close to equally  
1021 preferred).

(Back to Section [2.2.1](#))

### 1022 **A.1.3 Population attitudes on foreign aid**

1023 There is an extensive literature on attitudes towards foreign aid in donor countries.  
1024 The key findings indicate that most people overestimate the amount of foreign aid and  
1025 that only a minority wants a cut in foreign aid compared to actual amounts, especially  
1026 once they become aware of them.

1027 For instance, [PIPA \(2001\)](#) shows that 83% of Americans support a multilateral effort  
1028 to cut world hunger in half. [PIPA \(2008\)](#) shows that in each of 20 countries, a majority  
1029 thinks that developed countries “have a moral responsibility to work to reduce hunger  
1030 and severe poverty in poor countries”, with an average agreement of 81%. In 7 OECD  
1031 countries, the study finds that at least 75% of respondents are willing to pay for a program  
1032 to cut hunger in half (at an estimated cost of, e.g., \$50 a year for each American).

1033 [Kaufmann et al. \(2012\)](#) find that perceived aid is overestimated in each of the 24 coun-  
1034 tries they study, on average by a factor of 7. In most countries, desired aid is larger than  
1035 perceived aid.<sup>20</sup> They show that individuals in the top income quintile desire aid 0.13  
1036 p.p. lower than those in the bottom 40% – which is very close to what we find. By em-  
1037 ploying a theoretical model and examining correlations between lobbying and actual aid

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<sup>20</sup>[Kaufmann et al. \(2012\)](#) offer the best results on desired aid because (as [Hudson & van Heerde \(2012\)](#) criticize), other studies did not take into account misperceptions of actual aid.

1038 (controlling for desired aid), they argue that the gap between actual and desired aid stems  
1039 from the political influence of the rich who defend their vested interests. In [Kaufmann](#)  
1040 [et al. \(2012\)](#), the U.S. is an outlier: desired aid is at the other countries' average (3% of  
1041 GNI), but as misperceptions are enormous, perceived aid is twice as large as desired aid.  
1042 Indeed, [Gilens \(2001\)](#) shows that even Americans with high political knowledge misper-  
1043 ceive actual aid, and finds that 17% fewer of them want to cut aid when we provide them  
1044 specific information about the amount of aid. Similarly, [Nair \(2018\)](#) finds that the rela-  
1045 tively low support for aid in the U.S. is driven by information on global distribution, as  
1046 people underestimate their rank by 27 centiles on average and overestimate the global  
1047 median income by a factor 10.

1048 [Hudson & van Heerde \(2012\)](#) provide a critical review of the literature and show that  
1049 the strong support for poverty alleviation largely stems from intrinsic altruism. They  
1050 note that, according to [DFID \(2009\)](#) and [PIPA \(2001\)](#), 47% of British people find that the  
1051 aid is wasted (mainly due to corruption), while Americans estimate that less than a quar-  
1052 ter of the aid reaches those in need, with over half ending up in the hands of corrupt  
1053 government officials. Despite these perceptions, most people still support aid, suggest-  
1054 ing the presence of nonutilitarian motives. Consistent with [Henson et al. \(2010\)](#), [Bauhr](#)  
1055 [et al. \(2013\)](#) find that support for aid is reduced by the perception of corruption in recipi-  
1056 ent countries. However, this effect is mitigated by the aid-corruption paradox: countries  
1057 with higher levels of corruption often need more help. [Bodenstein & Faust \(2017\)](#) fur-  
1058 ther show that right-wing Europeans, as well as those who perceive strong corruption  
1059 in their country, are more likely to agree that recipient countries should "follow certain  
1060 rules regarding democracy, human rights and governance as a condition for receiving EU  
1061 development aid." Using a 2002 Gallup survey and the 2006 World Values Survey, and  
1062 in line with [Bayram \(2017\)](#), [Paxton & Knack \(2012\)](#) show that the main determinants for  
1063 wanting more aid are trust, left-wing ideology, interest in politics, and being a woman (all  
1064 positively associated).

(Back to Section [2.2.5](#))

#### 1065 A.1.4 Population attitudes on taxes on the rich

1066 We are not aware of any previous survey on a global wealth tax,<sup>21</sup> though surveys  
1067 consistently show strong support for national wealth taxes. In a comprehensive survey  
1068 conducted in the UK, [Rowlingson et al. \(2021\)](#) show that a wealth tax is the preferred

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<sup>21</sup>We did not find any using the combination of "survey" or "attitudes" with "wealth tax" or "global wealth tax" in Google Scholar.

option for raising revenues. Only 8% of respondents state that total net wealth should not be taxed (with little differences between Labour and Conservative voters). The study also finds that the preferred design would be a 1% or 3% tax on net wealth above £1 million. By asking how much taxes per year should a person with a certain income and wealth level pay, *Fisman et al. (2017)* finds that the average American favors a 0.8% linear tax rate on unspecified wealth up to \$2 million (the highest wealth level tested), and a 3% linear rate on inherited wealth. Through a conjoint analysis conducted in three high-income countries, *Schechtl & Tisch (2023)* find widespread support for a wealth tax (from 78% in the U.S. to 86% in Germany and the UK), with a preference for an exemption threshold set at \$/€1 million (rather than 500,000 or 2 million) with the tax rate and tax unit having little influence on the preferred design. In 21 OECD countries, the *OECD (2019)* uncovers strong majority support for higher taxes on the rich to support the poor, with nearly 70% overall agreement and less than 20% disagreement. *Isbell (2022)* finds similarly high level of support in 34 African countries. In the UK, *Patriotic Millionaires (2022)* find 69% support (and 7% opposition) for a 1.1% tax on wealth in excess of £10 million. In the U.S., *Americans for Tax Fairness (2021)* find that 67% to 71% of the respondents support to “raise taxes for those earning more than \$400,000 a year”, “raise the income tax rate for those earning over \$1 million a year by 10 percentage points”, or “apply a 2% tax on an individual’s wealth above \$50 million each year, and 3% on wealth above \$1 billion”.

#### 1088 A.1.5 Population attitudes on ethical norms

1089 As argued by *Nyborg et al. (2016)*, social norms can be the solution to the collective  
1090 action problem. As such, universalistic values and free-riding attitudes are key.

1091 **Universalism** Various studies have examined the concept of global identity (see *Reysen  
1092 & Katzarska-Miller (2018)* for a review). In the 2005-2008 wave of the World Values Sur-  
1093 vey, *Bayram (2015)* notes that “78% of the participants in 57 countries see themselves as  
1094 citizens of the world”, though the *2017-2022 wave* reveals that more people feel close to  
1095 their town, region or country than to the world. *Enke et al. (2023a)* measure universal-  
1096 ism at the U.S. district level using donation data, and find that a district’s universalism  
1097 predicts electoral outcomes better than its income or education level. To measure uni-  
1098 versalism at the individual level, *Enke et al. (2023c)* ask American respondents to split  
1099 \$100 between a random stranger and a random person with the same income but closer  
1100 to them. They distinguish different facets of universalism, and define *foreign universalism*

as the inclination to give to a foreigner rather than a fellow citizen. They find a home bias for most people, which could partly be attributed to concerns about inequality, as the split involves two persons with the same income, with the foreigner most certainly living in a poorer country than the American and thus enjoying a higher social status. That being said, a home bias probably remains even after accounting for concerns about inequality, as 84% of Americans agree that “taking care of problems at home is more important than giving aid to foreign countries” (PIPA 2001). Enke et al. (2023b) also measure universalism and analyze its correlates in 7 countries, and Cappelen et al. (2022) deploy this method in 60 countries. In a lab experiment with students in the U.S., Cherry et al. (2017) show that a substantial share of people prefer policies detrimental to them due to their egalitarian worldview. Waytz et al. (2019) show that left-leaning people exhibit a wider “moral circle”. Jaeger & Wilks (2023) find that judgments of moral concern are equally well explained by characteristics of the judge and the evaluated target.

**Free-riding** Despite the long-standing explanation of the lack of climate action as a result of free-riding, surveys consistently show that people support climate mitigation action in their own country, even in the absence of such action in other countries. Bernauer & Gampfer (2015) show this for Americans and Indians, who both overestimate their country’s emissions at one third of the global total. Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019a) show this in the U.S. and China using an experimental design. McEvoy & Cherry (2016) show that Americans mostly invoke leadership and morality to justify unilateral climate action. Using a range of methods, Aklin & Mildenberger (2020) show that the empirical evidence for free-riding is not compelling, and that climate inaction can be equally well explained by distributive conflicts. Finally, review of the literature by McGrath & Bernauer (2017) shows that climate attitudes are largely nonreciprocal, and primarily driven by values and perceptions of the policies, rather than by considerations of what other countries do.

### A.1.6 Second-order beliefs

Allport (1924) introduced the concept of pluralistic ignorance: a shared misperception concerning others’ beliefs. The concept became notorious when O’Gorman (1975) showed that, towards the end of the civil rights movement, 47% of Americans believed that a majority of white people supported segregation, while only 18% did so. PIPA (2001) has shown that while 75% of Americans are willing to contribute \$50 annually to halve world

1133 hunger (the cost of the program), only 32% believed that the majority would share this  
1134 willingness. Pluralistic ignorance regarding climate-friendly norms in the United States  
1135 has been documented by Andre et al. (2022), who further show that correcting the misper-  
1136 ceptions would be effective to enhance pro-climate behaviors. Relatedly, Sparkman et al.  
1137 (2022) show that Americans underestimate the support for climate policies by nearly half,  
1138 while Drews et al. (2022) document pluralistic ignorance of carbon tax support in Spain.  
1139 Additionally, Geiger & Swim (2016) show that pluralistic ignorance regarding concern for  
1140 climate change leads people to self-silence, resulting in reduced discussions on the topic.

### 1141 A.1.7 Elite attitudes

1142 In a survey of climate negotiators on their preferences in terms of burden-sharing,  
1143 Lange et al. (2007) uncovers a mix of self-serving bias and support for the egalitarian  
1144 principle. Dannenberg et al. (2010) elicit climate negotiators' equity preferences and find  
1145 that regional differences in addressing climate change are driven more by national inter-  
1146 ests than by different equity concerns. Hjerpe et al. (2011) indicate that voluntary con-  
1147 tribution, indicated as willingness to contribute, was the least preferred principle among  
1148 both negotiators and observers. Three of the four principles for allocating mitigation  
1149 commitments were recognized widely across the major geographical regions: historical  
1150 responsibilities, ability-to-pay, and equal per capita emissions. This result is confirmed  
1151 by Kesternich et al. (2021), who observe tendencies for a more harmonized view among  
1152 key groups towards the ability-to-pay rule in a setting of weighted burden sharing rules.  
1153 Mildenberger & Tingley (2019) survey elites (Congress staffers and international relations  
1154 scholars) as well as the population in U.S. and China. They document pluralistic igno-  
1155 rance of pro-climate attitudes, egocentric bias, and increasing support after beliefs are  
1156 updated.

## 1157 A.2 Proposals and analyses of global policy-making

### 1158 A.2.1 Global carbon pricing

1159 Global carbon pricing is widely regarded by economists as the benchmark climate  
1160 policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon emissions externality. For instance, Hoel  
1161 (1991) shows that an international carbon tax can be designed to simultaneously achieve  
1162 efficiency and accommodate any distributional objective. Concerning the distributional  
1163 objective, Grubb (1990), Agarwal & Narain (1991) and Bertram (1992) were the first to

advocate for an equal right to emit for each human. As [Grubb \(1990\)](#) states it: "by far the best combination of long term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity, is obtained from a system based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions which are allocated on an adult per capita basis".<sup>22</sup> Support for such solution has been renewed ever since ([Baer et al. 2000](#); [Blanchard & Tirole 2021](#); [Jamieson 2001](#); [Rajan 2021](#)).

While many endorse the egalitarian allocation of emissions permits, economists also considered this outcome as politically unfeasible. Thus, to preserve the current level of inequalities and to preclude transfers between countries, they adjusted their (integrated assessment) models by assigning more weight to the interest of rich countries ([Stanton 2011](#)).

[Gollier & Tirole \(2015\)](#) synthesize the distributional decision with a *generosity* parameter which would allocate emissions permit to countries in proportion to their population if set to one, in proportion to their emissions (on the start date of the policy) if set to zero, and as a mixture of the egalitarian and grandfathering rules if set in between. Using a similar formula in the context of a tax, [Cramton et al. \(2015\)](#) (summarized in [MacKay et al. 2015](#)) propose that countries with emissions per capita around the average fix the generosity parameter, so that it is strategically chosen to maximize the tax rate, and to fix the tax rate at the minimum price proposed by participating countries. Negotiations would exclude countries with low ambition beforehand; and the treaty would impose trade sanctions on non-participating countries. [van den Bergh et al. \(2020\)](#) propose a "dual-track transition to global carbon pricing": an expanding climate club that would integrate existing and new emissions trading systems, and a reorientation of UNFCCC negotiations towards a global carbon price and burden-sharing rules. The [IMF \(2019\)](#) also supports global carbon pricing or, as a first step, a carbon price floor. They propose either differentiated prices among countries or international transfers, and estimate that a price of \$75/tCO<sub>2</sub> in 2030 would be compatible with a 2°C trajectory.

Other authors have put forth more radical proposals. For instance, [Weitzman \(2017\)](#) envisions a World Climate Assembly with proportional representation at the global scale, so that the median (human) voter would choose the carbon price level. To finance an adaptation fund, [Chancel & Piketty \(2015\)](#) propose a global *progressive* carbon tax (or a progressive tax on air tickets as a first step), so that rich people (who are high emitters) contribute more to the public good. [Fleurbaey & Zuber \(2013\)](#) highlight that, given that current emitters are probably richer than future victims of climate change damages, cli-

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<sup>22</sup>By "adult per capita", [Grubb \(1990\)](#) means that permits would be allocated equally among adults.

1197 mate policies deserve a *negative* discount rate. In other words, we cannot dissociate the  
1198 climate issue from global inequalities, and an ethical response to this issue requires global  
1199 redistribution.

1200 **A.2.2 Climate burden sharing**

1201 The literature has discussed different burden-sharing principles (Ringius et al. 2002).  
1202 While there is no agreement on their definitions as different approaches are used (cost  
1203 sharing, effort sharing, or resource sharing, see Section A.1.2), we describe here the burden-  
1204 sharing principles consistently using the resource sharing approach (i.e., allocating emis-  
1205 sions rights). For other papers that define or compare different burden-sharing principles,  
1206 see Leimbach & Giannousakis (2019); Vaillancourt & Waaub (2004); Zhou & Wang (2016).

1207 **Equal per capita.** The simplest principle is perhaps to allocate each year's global carbon  
1208 quota based on an equal right to emit per capita, or an equal right to emit for each adult.  
1209 Implementing this principle would result in large transfers from high-emitting to low-  
1210 emitting countries.

1211 **Grandfathering.** In contrast, *grandfathering* entails allocating emissions rights in pro-  
1212 portion to current emissions. From the perspective of allocating carbon pricing revenues  
1213 between countries, grandfathering amounts to each country retaining the revenues it col-  
1214 lects. Given that nations are sovereign and have not agreed to share emissions rights,  
1215 this principle can be considered as the default option against which the other ones can be  
1216 compared in terms of distributive effects.

1217 **Historical responsibilities.** At the opposite end of the spectrum is the principle of *his-  
1218 torical responsibilities*, which assigns to each country a carbon budget proportional to its  
1219 population. Countries that have emitted more than the average have accumulated a car-  
1220 bon debt towards countries that have emitted less, which have a carbon credit.<sup>23</sup>

1221 To fully specify this rule, one needs to define a start date for the responsibilities on  
1222 past emissions and specify how to account for population size. 1990 is often chosen as  
1223 a start year as it is the date of the first IPCC assessment report, marking the widespread

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23It is not clear how these debts would be settled. Approaches could involve carbon removal from the atmosphere, or using a conventional social cost of carbon to monetize them, by crediting (positively or negatively) emissions rights to countries in an international carbon market.

1224 acknowledgment of climate change, though variants include 1972, 1960, 1950 or 1850.<sup>24</sup>  
1225 Several solutions have been proposed to account for evolving populations, none of which  
1226 is flawless. Matthews (2015) allocates emissions rights on a given year proportionally to  
1227 the countries' populations in that year. An alternative is to use fixed populations, such  
1228 as the populations at the chosen start year (Neumayer 2000), or at a future date such  
1229 as projected when the global total population will reach 9 billion (Raupach et al. 2014).  
1230 Fanning & Hickel (2023) convert the projected climate debt up to 2050 into monetary  
1231 terms in a 1.5°C scenario.

1232 The rationale for using fixed populations is to prevent countries from intentionally  
1233 increasing their population size to gain more emissions rights. However, this approach  
1234 treats countries with different demographic trajectories similarly, effectively penalizing  
1235 countries which grow more than others (if past populations are used) or grow more than  
1236 expected (if future populations are used). Using current populations like Matthews (2015)  
1237 also comes with its own problems. Consider two countries having contributed very little  
1238 to cumulative emissions, with the same emissions per capita but different demographic  
1239 patterns: country A's population has doubled in the last 30 years, while country B's pop-  
1240 ulation has remained stable. Despite the similar present situation, country B would ac-  
1241 cumulate more carbon credit than country A. Essentially, compensating country B more  
1242 due to its past population size amounts to compensating the dead although it is future  
1243 generations who will suffer. That being said, using current populations is likely a more  
1244 viable solution than relying on fixed populations since, in practice, countries with similar  
1245 emissions per capita tend to have relatively similar demographic trajectories.

1246 **Ability to pay.** Another prominent burden-sharing principle is the ability to pay whereby  
1247 richer countries should contribute more to mitigation efforts. To operationalize this prin-  
1248 ciple, Baer et al. (2008) define *capacity* as the share of global income above an exemption  
1249 threshold. They use the threshold of \$7,500 per year (in 2005 PPP), which corresponds to  
1250 the top 28% of the global income distribution. According to this principle, the effort of a  
1251 country should be proportional to the revenues it would raise with a linear income tax on  
1252 individual income above \$7,500.

1253 **Climate Equity Reference Framework** Baer et al. (2008) propose another effort-sharing  
1254 method, the *Climate Equity Reference Framework* (CERF), which blends the ability to pay

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<sup>24</sup>Climate equity monitor uses 1850 for example.

principle with their version of historical responsibilities. They define *responsibility* as follows: they determine the mitigation requirement as the emissions gap between the Business as Usual scenario from IEA (2007) and a 2°C (with 68-86% probability) scenario. The mitigation requirement is then allocated to countries proportionally to their cumulative emissions (starting in 1990). The emissions right of a country according to their *responsibility* are then determined by its Business as Usual emissions minus its mitigation requirement. A country's emissions right, dubbed its *greenhouse development right* (GDR), is defined using a combination of *capacity* (C) and *responsibility* (R) to allocate the mitigation requirement between countries. This allocation key is called the *Responsibility and Capacity Indicator* (RCI) and defined as  $RCI = R^a \cdot C^{1-a}$ , with  $a = .4$ .


This choice of parameter may seem somewhat arbitrary, but the **EcoEquity calculator** allows for a customization all CERF parameters (Holz et al. 2018, 2019). The Climate Action Network has adopted the CERF as its *fair share* framework, though the different national chapters of the organization could not agree on a choice of parameters (Athanasios et al. 2022).<sup>25</sup>

The CERF approach was adopted by a prominent network of climate NGOs because it operationalizes the principle of *common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities* recognized by the UNFCCC. However, this approach suffers from three drawbacks. First, its definition of historical responsibility as an effort sharing principle is inconsistent with the principle of an equal right of cumulative emissions per capita, which is a resource sharing principle. For instance, consider a fully decarbonized country that has exhausted *exactly* its cumulative carbon budget. According to the CERF notion of *responsibility*, this country would still be expected to contribute significantly to mitigation efforts due to its relatively high cumulative emissions. Yet, according to the usual definition of the historical responsibility based on an equal right of cumulative emissions p.c., this country would have no liability as it has not exceeded its carbon budget. Second, a country with moderate incomes<sup>26</sup> and low historical responsibility would be assigned a relatively low effort, even if its emissions per capita are high. In other words, the CERF

<sup>25</sup>The U.S. Climate Action Network and the think tank EcoEquity (funded by Tom Athanasiou and late Paul Baer) choose the following parameters: an equal weight for R and C ( $a = .5$ ), their own **business as usual projections** of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions based on trends of GDP growth and emissions intensity reduction, a 1.5°C (Low Energy Demand) pathway, 1950 as the start year for responsibility, a gradual inclusion of income to compute *capacity* (which adds complexity to the calculation) from a full exemption of the bottom 70% (\$7,500 per year) linearly to a full inclusion of the top 2% (\$72,211), the inclusion of non-CO<sub>2</sub> gases but not of emissions embodied in trade (i.e. imported emissions) nor LULUCF (land-use).

<sup>26</sup>Using the above parameters, moderate incomes means few incomes above the global 70th. percentile.

Figure S9: Net gains from the CERF burden-sharing rule in 2030.




Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO<sub>2</sub>.

approach favors countries that have experienced recent growth. Third, the poorest countries would be granted emissions rights close to the Business as Usual trajectory, as they would bear virtually none of the effort. But this trajectory carries the current (unfair) income distribution and amounts to grandfathering. For example, the baseline trajectory for emissions<sup>27</sup> in the DRC entail 0.8 tCO<sub>2</sub> p.c. in 2030, which is five times less than the world average emissions right per capita. In this framework, if the DRC were to grow faster than projected in the baseline, it would actually have to pay to the rest of the world for mitigation efforts. This is what is likely to happen to countries like Mexico or Senegal, from our simulation of the net gains of CERF compared to a situation without international transfers (see Figure S9). In contrast, a resource sharing approach based on equal per capita emissions would result in low-income countries receiving emissions rights exceeding their projected trajectories, leading to transfers from high-income countries. By construction, such transfers do not occur in an effort sharing approach like the CERF, implying lower transfers to low-income countries. Compared to an equal right to emit per capita, this method favors countries like China (whose emissions are allowed to re-

<sup>27</sup>The baseline trajectory is computed as the “product of the projected GDP and CO<sub>2</sub> emission intensity”.

Figure S10: Difference between net gains from Greenhouse Development Rights and equal rights per capita.



Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario ( $2^{\circ}\text{C}$  with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO<sub>2</sub>.

- 1298 main stable over 2020-2030 instead of a reduction of 35-40%) and penalizes regions like  
 1299 Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (see Figure S10).

1300 **Contraction and Convergence.** [Meyer \(2004\)](#) defines a rule called *contraction and con-*  
 1301 *vergence* (C&C), which combines elements of grandfathering and equal per capita ap-  
 1302 proaches. According to C&C, each country is granted (tradable) emissions rights, starting  
 1303 at their current emission level and converging linearly to an equal per capita level at some  
 1304 pre-specified date. The *contraction* part refers to the reduction of total emissions rights in  
 1305 line with the climate objective. When discussed around year 2000, the convergence date  
 1306 was specified between 2020 and 2050. This rule, advocated by the Global Commons Insti-  
 1307 tute (a UK think tank), was on the agenda from COP2 to COP15 (i.e., until Copenhagen,  
 1308 and including in Kyoto), including at Kyoto, and was endorsed by the European Parlia-  
 1309 ment in 1998. More recently, [Gignac & Matthews \(2015\)](#) have shown how C&C can be  
 1310 made consistent with historical responsibilities by computing carbon debts and credits  
 1311 until the convergence date.

1312 **Assessments of the NDCs against burden-sharing principles.** The regime established  
1313 by the 2015 Paris agreement to regulate climate change respects none of the burden-  
1314 sharing principles and relies instead on voluntary contributions from each country, known  
1315 as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). A body of literature (reviewed by Höhne  
1316 et al. 2014) assesses the NDCs against the emissions reduction objective and different  
1317 burden-sharing principles. To evaluate the NDCs, Gao et al. (2019) examine their emis-  
1318 sions projections for 2030 and estimate the resulting increase in temperature. The most  
1319 recent and comprehensive assessment of NDCs against burden-sharing principles is con-  
1320 ducted by van den Berg et al. (2020) (see also Raupach et al. 2014; Robiou du Pont et al.  
1321 2016, 2017).

1322 **A.2.3 Global redistribution**

1323 Addressing global poverty, inequalities, and climate change are central to the univer-  
1324 sally agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). As highlighted by Bolch et al. (2022),  
1325 low-income countries often lack sufficient domestic resources to eradicate poverty in the  
1326 short term, indicating the need for international transfers to rapidly end global poverty.  
1327 In *Beyond the Welfare State*, Gunnar Myrdal (1960) called for a *welfare world*. In his Nobel  
1328 lecture, he emphasized the necessity of increasing foreign aid to low-income countries,  
1329 stating that “The type of marginal foreign aid we have provided, is clearly not enough to  
1330 meet their barest needs” (Myrdal 1975).

1331 Drawing on the labor theory of value, some economists have argued that global in-  
1332 equalities arise from unequal exchange in international trade (Arghiri 1972). Indeed, the  
1333 stark disparity in wages between countries implies that one unit of labor exported by an  
1334 American commands five units of labor embodied in imported goods, whereas Ethiopi-  
1335 ans need to export 50 units of labor to obtain one unit through imports (Alsamawi et al.  
1336 2014; Reyes et al. 2017). Taking stock, Hickel (2017) proposes to globally establish mini-  
1337 mum wages at 50% of the local median wage. Hickel (2017) also suggests other solutions  
1338 against global inequality, which served as inspiration for our questionnaire. These mea-  
1339 sures include the cancellation of low-income countries’ public debt, fair trade practices  
1340 (such as eliminating tariffs from high-income countries, reducing patent protections, and  
1341 reducing farming subsidies in rich countries), initiatives to combat tax evasion (e.g., im-  
1342 plementing a global financial register), land reform, and a fair international climate policy.

1343 Piketty (2014) prominently advocates for a progressive wealth tax on a global scale,  
1344 although he does not specify whether the resulting revenues should fund international

1345 transfers.

1346 Kopczuk et al. (2005) compute the optimal linear income tax rates for all countries in  
1347 two ways: globally centralized and decentralized (i.e., within each country and without  
1348 international transfers). They show that the average decentralized rate is 41%. In con-  
1349 trast, the global rate is 62%, which would generate funds to finance a basic income of  
1350 250\$/month (higher than the GPD per capita of 73 countries). From a current global Gini  
1351 index of 0.695, they show that decentralized optimal taxation would only marginally re-  
1352 duce global inequality to 0.69, whereas global taxation would significantly decrease the  
1353 Gini to 0.25. The study also shows that the existing level of foreign aid can only be ratio-  
1354 nalized if the U.S. attaches 2,000 less value to a citizen in the poorest countries than to an  
1355 American citizen (or 1,000 less if half of the transfers are diverted due to corruption).

#### 1356 A.2.4 Basic income

1357 Unconditional cash transfers (UCT) are increasingly seen as an effective way to end ex-  
1358 treme poverty. A growing body of evidence from randomized control trials supports this  
1359 notion: Gangopadhyay et al. (2015) find that UCT outperform a food subsidy; Haushofer  
1360 & Shapiro (2016) find significant impacts on health, economic outcomes, and psycholog-  
1361 ical well-being; Egger et al. (2022) find large positive spillovers on non-recipient people,  
1362 and minimal inflation. Reviews of existing research further confirm the positive outcomes  
1363 of UCT (Bastagli et al. 2016; Standing 2014).

1364 While the delivery of cash to remote areas and the prevention of fraud is challenging  
1365 in regions without a proper civil register, the use of mobile phones as banking and bio-  
1366 metric identification tools could provide viable solutions (Harnett 2017). Although many  
1367 places still lack internet access, satellite internet technology shows promising progress,  
1368 with some experts suggesting that it could soon become affordable and universally ac-  
1369 cessible (Hanson 2016).

#### 1370 A.2.5 Global democracy

1371 The idea of world federalism has a long-standing history, dating back at least to Kant  
1372 (1795), who argued that a world federation was essential for achieving perpetual peace.  
1373 International organizations were eventually created to foster peace, though the League  
1374 of Nations and its successor, the United Nations, never succeeded in avoiding military  
1375 conflicts. Many have argued that we need stronger and more democratic global institu-


1376 tions, competent to address global challenges such as extreme poverty, climate change,  
1377 wars, pandemics, or financial stability. Before World War II, feminist and pacifist **Maver-**  
1378 **ick Lloyd & Schwimmer (1937)** founded the *Campaign for World Government*, advocating  
1379 for direct representation at the global scale. **Einstein (1947)** called for the subordination of  
1380 the UN Security Council to the General Assembly and the direct election of UN delegates.  
1381 Since 2007, there has been widespread support for a United Nations Parliamentary As-  
1382 sembly (UNPA) from individuals and institutions in over 150 countries, including 1,800  
1383 member of parliament, heads of state, as well the European Parliament, the Pan-African  
1384 Parliament, and the Latin-American Parliament. The UNPA campaign calls for a gradual  
1385 implementation of a democratic assembly, starting with a consultative assembly com-  
1386 posed of members of national parliaments, allowing for the direct election of its members  
1387 in voluntary countries, and progressing towards a world parliament with binding legisla-  
1388 tive powers once all members are directly elected (**Leinen & Bummel 2018**). Besides the  
1389 UNPA, various scholars have put forward different models of global democracy, ranging  
1390 from deliberative spaces to a world federation (**Archibugi et al. 2011**). While the most rad-  
1391 ical proposals may still be on the horizon, an assembly of random citizens representative  
1392 of the world population has already been convened. It has produced a joint statement at  
1393 the COP26 (**Global Assembly 2022**), and a similar *World Citizens' Assembly* should soon  
1394 follow.

1395 **B Raw results**

1396 Country-specific raw results are also available as supplementary material files: **US**,  
 1397 **EU, FR, DE, ES, UK**.

Figure S11: Absolute support for global climate policies.

Share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* (in percent,  $n = 40,680$ ). The color blue denotes an absolute majority. See Figure 1 for the relative support. (Questions A-I of the global survey.)



\*In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

Figure S12: Correct answers to comprehension questions (in percent). (Questions 16-18)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
With NR, typical [country] people win and richest lose	68	73	76	73	73	70
With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win	60	68	62	72	67	67
With GCS+NR, typical [country] people neither win nor lose	54	60	63	59	57	61

Figure S13: Number of correct answers to comprehension questions (mean). (Section 2.2.2, Questions 16-18)




Figure S14: List experiment: mean number of supported policies. (Section 2.3.1, Question 24)




Figure S15: Conjoint analyses 1 and 2. (Questions 25-27, Back to Section 2.3.3)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)	54	76	80	71	81	74
C+NR+GCS preferred to C+NR	55	74	79	71	78	68
NR+GCS preferred to NR	55	77	79	74	79	77
NR+C preferred to NR	62	84	88	83	84	82
GCS+NR preferred to C+NR	47	52	53	53	49	52
NR+C+GCS preferred to NR	55	77	86	73	83	72

Table S2: Effects on the support for the GCS of a question on its pros and cons and on information about the actual support, in the U.S. (See Section D in the US2 Questionnaire) (Back to Section 2.3.5)

	Support			
	Global Climate Scheme		National Redistribution	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Control group mean	0.557	0.557	0.569	0.569
Treatment: Open-ended field on GCS pros & cons	-0.073** (0.035)	-0.071** (0.031)	-0.035 (0.035)	-0.030 (0.032)
Treatment: Closed questions on GCS pros & cons	-0.109*** (0.034)	-0.096*** (0.031)	-0.065* (0.034)	-0.062** (0.031)
Treatment: Info on actual support for GCS and NR	-0.021 (0.034)	-0.015 (0.031)	0.048 (0.033)	0.056* (0.031)
Includes controls		✓		✓
Observations	2,000	1,995	2,000	1,995
R <sup>2</sup>	0.007	0.170	0.007	0.154

Figure S16: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See original translations in Figure S6; Question 29)




Figure S17: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements seen as important for supporting the GCS in a 4-Likert scale (in percent). (Question 32) [\(Back to Section 2.3.5\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
It would succeed in limiting climate change	78	85	85	86	86	83
It would hurt the [Country] economy	81	67	61	67	66	69
It would penalize my household	75	60	55	63	59	63
It would make people change their lifestyle	78	79	83	79	78	77
It would reduce poverty in low-income countries	77	85	88	85	86	81
It might be detrimental to some poor countries	79	72	79	67	78	70
It could foster global cooperation	82	81	81	82	85	80
It could fuel corruption in low-income countries	79	75	82	69	79	72
It could be subject to fraud	80	79	80	74	83	81
It would be technically difficult to put in place	77	71	74	62	79	71
Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences	89	82	89	68	91	88

Figure S18: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements found in the open-ended field on the GCS (manually recoded, in percent). (Question 31) [\(Back to Section 2.3.5\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
environment	26	31	37	26	43	24
unclassifiable	25	24	23	28	25	22
pro	22	23	21	22	33	20
con	22	17	12	18	20	16
cost	17	12	11	14	17	7
poorest humans	11	7	6	9	5	6
tax redistribution	10	7	11	8	4	9
support	8	6	3	5	6	8
oppose	7	3	2	3	1	4
don't know	6	8	10	8	7	10
empty	6	3	0	0	0	13
difficult agreement	5	10	7	12	8	8
difficult implement	3	5	5	6	4	6
misunderstands gcs	3	2	2	1	3	1
misunderstands question	2	2	1	3	3	3

Figure S19: Perceptions of the GCS. Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent). (Question 31) [\(Back to Section 2.3.5\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
world: international world country global	28	22	23	19	22	23
environment: climate environment animal emission nature	26	21	17	28	21	17
poorest: poor low-income 700 poverty	16	8	8	9	4	10
pro: pro  pros  pros:	16	3	0	1	9	5
con: con  con:  cons  cons:	15	4	0	1	8	6
cost: cost expensive higher price 85 inflation	13	7	5	9	7	6
tax: tax	8	3	4	3	2	2
redistribution: rich redistribution	8	4	5	4	3	5
implementation: implement enforce policy monitor	6	4	5	6	0	5
agreement: agree accept participate	3	4	5	6	2	3

Figure S20: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality (mean). (Question 34) [\(Back to Section 2.4\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Donation to own country	35	34	31	38	34	32
Donation to Africa	32	35	33	41	32	33

Table S3: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality. (Question 34) [\(Back to Section 2.4\)](#)

	Donation to poor people (in %)			
	All	US	US	Eu
Poor is in own country	0.590 (0.799)	2.509** (1.152)	0.046 (1.691)	-1.349 (1.108)
Poor is in own country × Vote: <i>not</i> Biden			3.954* (2.279)	
Mean	34.034	33.658	33.658	34.41
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000	3,000
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0001	0.002	0.034	0.0005

Figure S21: Support for a global wealth tax.

"Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-income countries?

Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education." (Question 35)




Figure S22: Support for a national wealth tax financing public services like healthcare, education, and social housing. (Question 36)




Figure S23: Preferred share of global wealth tax revenues that should be pooled to finance low-income countries. (Question 37)




Figure S24: Support for sharing half of global tax revenues with low-income countries, rather than each country retaining all the revenues it collects (in percent). (Question 38)



Figure S25: Actual, perceived and preferred amount of foreign aid, with random info (or not) on actual amount. (Mean, Questions 39, 40) [\(Back to Section 2.2.5\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Actual foreign aid (in % of public spending)	0.4	1.1	0.8	1.3	0.5	1.7
Belief about foreign aid	4.7	2.9	2.7	2.9	2.8	3.5
Preferred foreign aid (with info)	1.8	2.7	3.4	2.9	2.1	2.5
Preferred foreign aid (no info)	4	3.9	4.7	4.4	3.1	3.4

Figure S26: Preferred foreign aid (after info or after perception). (Questions 39 and 40)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as current	70	75	91	76	77	57
Preferred foreign aid is higher than current	47	59	75	58	63	43
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as perceived	57	74	83	79	77	58
Preferred foreign aid is higher than perceived	37	53	64	59	54	39

Figure S27: Perceived foreign aid. “From your best guess, what percentage of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?” (Question 39) (Back to Section 2.2.5)

Actual values: France: 0.8%; Germany: 1.3%; Spain: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%; U.S.: 0.4%.




Figure S28: Preferred foreign aid (without info on actual amount).

“If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?” (Question 40) (Back to Section 2.2.5)




Figure S29: Preferred foreign aid (after info on actual amount).

"Actually, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid.

If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?" (Question 40) [\(Back to Section 2.2.5\)](#)




Figure S30: Preferences for funding increased foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]  
 "How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent) (Question 41) (Back to Section 2.2.5)




Figure S31: Preferences of spending following reduced foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]  
 "How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent)  
 (Question 42) [\(Back to Section 2.2.5\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Higher spending on defense	19	23	11	21	17	31
Higher spending on retirement pensions	23	41	22	51	57	35
Higher spending on healthcare	40	57	31	42	80	70
Higher spending on welfare benefits	13	20	7	19	39	20
Higher spending on education	30	45	31	47	58	43
Higher spending on other programs	6	6	6	4	9	8
Lower taxes on the wealthiest	5	2	5	2	0	2
Lower corporate income tax rate	12	6	10	4	8	6
Lower personal income tax rates	48	29	26	27	37	30
Lower public deficit	32	24	21	13	41	21

Figure S32: Willingness to sign real-stake petition for the Global Climate Scheme or National Redistribution, compared to stated support in corresponding subsamples (e.g. support for the GCS in the branch where the petition was about the GCS). (Question 43)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Petition for the GCS	51	69	69	66	78	69
(Comparable) support for the GCS	53	76	81	74	81	74
Petition for NR	57	67	65	66	74	68
(Comparable) support for NR	58	72	76	65	78	75

Figure S33: Absolute support for various global policies (Percent of (*somewhat or strong*) support). (Questions 44 and 45. See Figure 2 for the relative support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	41	54	52	53	62	51
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	53	65	62	66	68	62
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	45	58	55	60	62	54
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	31	37	36	30	45	40
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	34	44	44	43	52	43
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	39	49	39	51	50	54
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	42	55	54	54	61	53
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	44	70	73	70	72	65
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	34	45	40	48	44	50
National tax on millionaires funding public services	62	76	70	79	79	77
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	58	71	69	72	78	71

Figure S34: Preferred approach of diplomats at international climate negotiations. In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend [own country] interests or global justice? (Question 49)




Figure S35: Percent of selected issues viewed as important.  
 “To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem?” (Question 56)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Income inequality in [Country]	55	59	54	58	71	57
Climate change	59	66	66	63	73	63
Global poverty	50	57	50	58	75	49

Figure S36: Group defended when voting.  
 “What group do you defend when you vote?” (Question 57)




Figure S37: Mean prioritization of policies.

Mean number of points allocated policies to express intensity of support (among six policies chosen at random). Blue color means that the policy has been awarded more points than the average policy. (Question 58)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	13	21	10	14	35	31
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	23	22	25	21	22	23
econ3	21	15	13	18	17	13
econ4	28	22	27	17	24	20
soc1	10	17	13	17	12	21
soc2	13	9	14	8	10	8
climate1	14	15	11	18	20	12
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	20	18	22	19	15	17
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030	11	9	8	8	9	11
tax1: National redistribution scheme	14	15	16	15	15	15
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	19	19	21	18	17	19
foreign1: Global climate scheme	15	20	20	23	16	17
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	21	20	20	23	19	20
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	15	15	15	17	14	13
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	9	11	13	14	9	8

Figure S38: Positive prioritization of policies.

Percent of people allocating a positive number of points to policies, expressing their support (among six policies chosen at random). (Question 58)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	64	78	61	67	96	95
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	83	86	85	84	87	89
econ3	81	69	50	78	80	68
econ4	88	86	91	79	89	85
soc1	57	75	69	74	74	78
soc2	58	58	72	53	64	48
climate1	70	76	65	79	89	75
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	79	83	86	84	78	80
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030	62	58	56	48	60	70
tax1: National redistribution scheme	67	79	79	76	82	79
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	80	79	76	78	83	85
foreign1: Global climate scheme	71	83	84	85	84	78
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	80	81	79	83	82	82
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	71	77	79	74	83	76
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	58	70	79	74	74	57

Figure S39: Charity donation.

"How much did you give to charities in 2022?" (Question 50)




Figure S40: Interest in politics.

"To what extent are you interested in politics?" (Question 51)




Figure S41: Desired involvement of government (from 1 to 5). (Question 52)




Figure S42: Political leaning on economics (from 1: Left to 5: Right). (Question 53)




Figure S43: Voted in last election. (Question 54)




Figure S44: Vote in last election (aggregated). PNR includes people who did not vote or prefer not to answer. (Question 55)




Figure S45: Perception that survey was biased.  
“Do you feel that this survey was politically biased?” (Question 61)





Figure S46: Opinion on the fight against extreme poverty.

“According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme poverty in low-income countries?” (Question 62) [\(Back to Section 2.2.5\)](#)

(a) Elements found in the open-ended field on the question  
(manually recoded, in percent)



(b) Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).




Figure S47: Main attitudes by vote (“Right” spans from Center-right to Far right).  
 (Relative support in percent in Questions 20, 35, 45, 46, 49) (Back to Section 2.4)

	Europe Left	Europe PNR/Non-voter	Europe Right	U.S. Left	U.S. PNR/Non-voter	U.S. Right
Support for the GCS	85	72	71	74	53	26
Global tax on millionaires	94	83	76	85	71	40
Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries	61	52	45	55	67	41
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	73	65	52	62	49	23
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	93	79	74	87	70	38
[Country]'s foreign aid should be increased	93	83	72	92	81	48
Universalist	56	48	26	53	49	23

1398 C Questionnaire of the global survey (section on global  
1399 policies)

1400 A. At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be  
1401 put in place? (Multiple answers are possible) [Figures 1 and S11]  
1402 *Global; [Federal / European / ...]; [State / National]; Local*

1403 B. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “[country] should take mea-  
1404 sures to fight climate change.”

1405 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly  
1406 agree*

1407 C. How should [country] climate policies depend on what other countries do?

- 1408 • If other countries do more, [country] should do...  
1409 • If other countries do less, [country] should do...

1410 *Much less; Less; About the same; More; Much more*

1411 D. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] All countries have signed the  
1412 Paris agreement that aims to contain global warming “well below +2 °C’. To limit  
1413 global warming to this level, there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we  
1414 can emit globally, called the carbon budget. Each country could aim to emit less  
1415 than a share of the carbon budget. To respect the global carbon budget, countries  
1416 that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less  
1417 than their share.

1418 Do you support such a policy? [Figures 1 and S11]

1419 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly  
1420 support*

1421 E. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] Suppose the above policy is in  
1422 place. How should the carbon budget be divided among countries? [Figures 1 and  
1423 S11]

1424 *The emission share of a country should be proportional to its population, so that each human  
1425 has an equal right to emit.; The emission share of a country should be proportional to its  
1426 current emissions, so that those who already emit more have more rights to emit.; Countries  
1427 that have emitted more over the past decades (from 1990 onwards) should receive a lower*

1428 *emission share, because they have already used some of their fair share.; Countries that will*  
1429 *be hurt more by climate change should receive a higher emission share, to compensate them*  
1430 *for the damages.*

1431 F. [In the U.S., Denmark, and France only] To achieve a given reduction of greenhouse  
1432 gas emissions globally, costly investments are needed. Ideally, how should countries  
1433 bear the costs of fighting climate change?

- 1434 • Countries should pay in proportion to their income
- 1435 • Countries should pay in proportion to their current emissions [Used as a sub-  
1436 stitute to the equal right per capita in Figure 1]
- 1437 • Countries should pay in proportion to their past emissions (from 1990 on-  
1438 wards) [Used as a substitute to historical responsibilities in Figure 1]
- 1439 • The richest countries should pay it all, so that the poorest countries do not have  
1440 to pay anything
- 1441 • The richest countries should pay even more, to help vulnerable countries face  
1442 adverse consequences: vulnerable countries would then receive money instead  
1443 of paying [Used as a substitute to compensating vulnerable countries in Figures  
1444 1 and S11]

1445 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly*  
1446 *agree*

1447 G. Do you support or oppose establishing a global democratic assembly whose role  
1448 would be to draft international treaties against climate change? Each adult across  
1449 the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly. [Figures 1 and S11]  
1450 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*  
1451 *support*

1452 H. Imagine the following policy: a global tax on greenhouse gas emissions funding a  
1453 global basic income. Such a policy would progressively raise the price of fossil fuels  
1454 (for example, the price of gasoline would increase by [40 cents per gallon] in the  
1455 first years). Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil  
1456 fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Revenues from the tax would be used to  
1457 finance a basic income of [\$30] per month to each human adult, thereby lifting the  
1458 700 million people who earn less than \$2/day out of extreme poverty. The average

1459 [American] person would lose a bit from this policy as they would face [\$130] per  
1460 month in price increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive.

1461 Do you support or oppose such a policy? [Figures 1 and S11]

1462 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*  
1463 *support*

- 1464 I. Do you support or oppose a tax on all millionaires around the world to finance low-  
1465 income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate ac-  
1466 tion? This would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drink-  
1467 ing water, healthcare, and education. [Figures 1 and S11]  
1468 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*  
1469 *support*

## 1470 D Questionnaire of the complementary surveys

1471 Below, we provide the generic questionnaire (based on the U.S. version), which roughly  
 1472 corresponds to the *Eu* questionnaire as well as the combination of the *US1* and *US2* ques-  
 1473 tionnaire. The main difference between Europe and the U.S. is that we split the *US2*  
 1474 sample into four random branches to include some treatments before the Section D on  
 1475 the GCS. Besides the control group, the treatments are: information regarding the sup-  
 1476 port of Americans for the GCS and NR, an open-ended field, and a closed question on the  
 1477 pros and cons of the GCS. The pros and cons of the GCS are also asked in *Eu* (likewise,  
 1478 either as an open-ended field or a question), but only in Section D, after the support.

1479 At each section or question, square brackets specify in which questionnaires it is present  
 1480 (*US1*, *US2* and/or *Eu*) as well as country specificities. Figures S48-S50 display the struc-  
 1481 ture of each questionnaire. Each treatment randomization is independent. Qualtrics and  
 1482 Word versions of the questionnaires in each language are available on our [public reposi-](#)  
 1483 [tory](#), together with a spreadsheet that summarizes country specificities and our sources.

Figure S48: *Eu* survey structure




Figure S49: US1 survey structure





Figure S50: US2 survey structure



1484 [Eu, US1, US2] Socio-demographic characteristics

1485 1. Welcome to this survey!

1486  
1487 This survey is **anonymous** and is conducted for research purposes on a representa-  
1488 tive sample of [1,000 British people].

1489  
1490 It takes [US1, US2: 10 to 15 min; Eu: around 20 min] to complete.

1491  
1492 The survey contains lotteries and awards for those who get the correct answer to  
1493 some understanding questions.

1494 If you are attentive and lucky, you can win up to [US1, Eu: \$350; US2: \$150] in  
1495 points. (See terms and conditions).

1496 Please answer every question carefully.

1497  
1498 Do you agree to participate in the survey?

1499 Yes; No

1500 2. What is your gender?

1501 Woman; Man; Other

1502 3. How old are you?

1503 Below 18; 18 to 20; 21 to 24; 25 to 29; 30 to 34; 35 to 39; 40 to 44; 45 to 49; 50 to 54; 55 to  
1504 59; 60 to 64; 65 to 69; 70 to 74; 75 to 79; 80 to 84; 85 to 89; 90 to 99; 100 or above

1505 4. [Eu] In which country do you live?

1506 France; Germany; Spain; United Kingdom; Other

1507 5. What is your ZIP code? [UK: What is your Outcode (the left part of your postcode,  
1508 e.g. if your postcode is N7 8H7, just enter N7)?]

1509 6. Do you live with your partner (if you have one)?

1510 Yes; No

1511 7. How many people are in your household? The household includes: you, the mem-  
1512 bers of your family who live with you, and your dependants.

1513 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more

- 1514 8. [Eu] How many children below 14 live with you?
- 1515 1; 2; 3; 4 or more
- 1516 9. [US1, US2] What race or ethnicity do you identify with? (Multiple answers are
- 1517 possible)
- 1518 White; Black or African American; Hispanic; Asian; American Indian or Alaskan Native;
- 1519 Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; Other: {open field}; Prefer not to say
- 1520 10. What is the [US1, US2: annual; Eu: monthly] gross income of your household (before
- 1521 withholding tax)? This includes all income: wages, self-employment earnings, So-
- 1522 cial Security benefits, pensions, investment income, welfare payments, and income
- 1523 from other sources.
- 1524 [US1, US2: Items based on household total income deciles and quartiles, namely:
- 1525 Less than \$20,000; between \$20,001 and \$35,000; between \$35,001 and \$42,000; between
- 1526 \$42,001 and \$50,000; between \$50,001 and \$65,000; between \$65,001 and \$82,000; between
- 1527 \$82,001 and \$103,000; between \$103,001 and \$130,000; between \$130,001 and \$145,000;
- 1528 between \$145,001 and \$165,000; between \$165,001 and \$250,000; More than \$250,000; I
- 1529 prefer not to answer;
- 1530 Eu: custom thresholds, taking into account household composition Questions 6-8,
- 1531 and corresponding to the country's deciles and quartiles of standard of living, cf.
- 1532 the sheet "Income" in [this spreadsheet](#)]
- 1533 11. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
- 1534 [Below upper secondary, Upper secondary, and Post secondary are coded as the first two,
- 1535 middle three, and last three items, respectively.
- 1536 US1, US2: Primary school or less; Eighth grade; Some high school; Regular high school
- 1537 diploma/GED or alternative credential; Some college, no degree; 2-year college degree or as-
- 1538 sociates degree (for example: AA, AS); Bachelor's degree (for example: BA, BS); Master's
- 1539 degree or above (MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA, MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD, PhD);
- 1540 FR: École primaire / Aucun; Brevet; CAP ou BEP; Baccalauréat professionnel ou tech-
- 1541 nologique; Baccalauréat général; Bac +2 (BTS, DUT, DEUG...); Bac +3 (licence...); Bac
- 1542 +5 ou plus (master, école d'ingénieur ou de commerce, doctorat, médecine, maîtrise, DEA,
- 1543 DESS...)
- 1544 DE: Keine abgeschlossene Schulbildung / Grundschule; Untere Sekundarstufe (z.B. Haupt-
- 1545 oder Realschulabschluss); Erstausbildung; Beruflicher Abschluss / Ausbildung; Abitur;
- 1546 Zweitausbildung; Bachelor oder Fachhochschulabschluss; Master-Abschluss oder höher

1547 ES: *Educación primaria / No he completado la enseñanza básica; Educación secundaria obligatoria (ESO); Formación profesional básica (FP); Formación profesional de grado medio; Bachillerato; Formación profesional de grado superior; Grado universitario; Máster/doctorado*  
1548 UK: *Primary education or less; Some secondary school; GSCE; Vocational Upper secondary (Level 3 award, level 3 certificate, level 3 diploma, advanced apprenticeship, etc.); High school degree (A level); Higher vocational education (Level 4+ award, level 4+ certificate, level 4+ diploma, higher apprenticeship, etc.); Bachelor's Degree (BA, BSc, BEng, etc.); Postgraduate diploma or certificate, Master's Degree (MSc, MA, MBA, etc.) or Ph.D.]*

1555 12. What is your employment status?

1556 *Full-time employed; Part-time employed; Self-employed; Student; Retired; Unemployed*  
1557 *(searching for a job); Inactive (not searching for a job)*

1558 13. Are you a homeowner or a tenant? (Multiple answers are possible)

1559 *Tenant; Owner; Landlord renting out property; Hosted free of charge*

1560 14. [If lives with partner: What is the estimated value of your household's assets (in  
1561 U.S. dollars)?

1562 If does not live with partner: What is the estimated value of your assets (in U.S.  
1563 dollars)?]

1564 Include here all your possessions (home, car, savings, etc.) net of debt. For example,  
1565 if you own a house worth [\$]300,000 and you have [\$]100,000 left to repay on your  
1566 mortgage, your assets are [\$]200,000.

1567 I estimate my [If lives with partner: household's] assets net of debt to be:

1569  
1570 [Items based on the following individual wealth quintiles, doubled if lives with  
1571 partner. US1, US2: *Less than \$0 (I have a net debt); Close to \$0; Between \$4,000 and*  
1572 *\$60,000; Between \$60,000 and \$190,000; More than \$190,000;* For Eu, the thresholds are:  
1573 FR: €5/50/150/300k; DE: €0/35/130/280k; ES: €0/50/100/200k; UK: £3/45/115/270k]

1574 15. [US1, US2 (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the vote question)] What  
1575 do you consider to be your political affiliation, as of today?

1576 *Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other; Non-Affiliated*

1577 [Eu, US1, US2] Global climate scheme

1578 In the following, we describe two policies, on which we will survey your opinion.  
1579 To check that you have attentively read the descriptions, **we will ask some under-**  
1580 **standing questions afterwards: those who get correct answers can win up to \$150.**

1581 **Global climate scheme:** At the Paris agreement in 2015, all countries have agreed  
1582 to contain global warming “well below +2 °C”. To limit global warming to this  
1583 level, **there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally.**

1584 To meet the climate target, a limited number of permits to emit greenhouse gases  
1585 can be created globally. Polluting firms would be required to buy permits to cover  
1586 their emissions. Such a policy would **make fossil fuel companies pay** for their  
1587 emissions and progressively raise the price of fossil fuels. **Higher prices would en-**  
1588 **courage people and companies to use less fossil fuels, reducing greenhouse gas**  
1589 **emissions.**

1590 In accordance with the principle that each human has an equal right to pollute, the  
1591 revenues generated by the sale of permits could finance a global basic income. **Each**  
1592 **adult in the world would receive [US1, US2: \$30/month; UK: \$30 (that is £25) per**  
1593 **month; FR, DE, ES: €30/month], thereby lifting out of extreme poverty the 700 mil-**  
1594 **lion people who earn less than \$2/day.**

1595 **The typical [American] would lose out financially [US1, US2: \$85, FR: €10, DE:**  
1596 **€25, ES: €5, UK: £20] per month** (as he or she would face [\$115] per month in price  
1597 increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive).

1598 The policy could be put in place as soon as countries totaling more than 60% of  
1599 global emissions agree on it. Countries that would refuse to take part in the policy  
1600 could face sanctions (like tariffs) from the rest of the World and would be excluded  
1601 from the basic income.

(Back to Section [2.2.1](#))

1602 16. Who would win or lose financially in the Global climate scheme? [[Figure S12](#)]

1603  
1604 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1605 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

1606 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.;*

1607 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

1608 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would lose and*

1610       the 700 million poorest humans would win from the Global climate scheme. Now, here  
1611       is the second policy:

1612

1613       **National redistribution scheme:**

1614       This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [US1, US2: 5%; Eu: 1%] and provide  
1615       cash transfers to all adults. More precisely, **each [American] adult would receive**  
1616       **[\$85] per month** (that is [\$1,000] per year). This would be financed by an increase  
1617       of the federal income tax on household income in excess of [US1, US2: \$315,000 per  
1618       year; FR: €15,000 per month; DE: €20,000 per month; ES: €10,000 per month; UK:  
1619       £15,000 per month], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000]. [US1,  
1620       US2: See more details.] <sup>28</sup>

1621       17. Who would win or lose financially in the National redistribution? [Figure S12]

1622

1623       Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1624       Typical [Americans] would win and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Ameri-  
1625       cans] would win and the richest [Americans] would lose.; Typical [Americans] would lose  
1626       and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Americans] would lose and the richest  
1627       [Americans] would lose.

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would win and  
1629       the richest [Americans] would lose* from the National redistribution scheme.

1630

1631       To help you with the next question, here is a reminder of the policies:

1632

1633       **Global Climate scheme:**

1634       To limit global warming and reach the international climate objective, the Global  
1635       climate scheme would **impose a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can  
1636       emit globally.**

---

<sup>28</sup>8% of U.S. respondents click. They then see the following text, based on [taxjusticenow.org](http://taxjusticenow.org) by Saez & Zucman (2019): *The marginal income tax rates would evolve as follows:*

*Below \$315,000: unchanged*

*\$315,000 - \$400,000: current rate 32% => new rate 41%*

*\$400,000 - \$600,000: 35% => 50%*

*\$600,000 - \$2.5 million: 37% => 60%*

*\$2.5 - \$5 million: 37% => 65%*

*Above \$5 million: 37% => 70%*

1637 It would **make polluters pay** for their emissions, which in turn would increase fos-  
1638 sil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities.

1639 The revenues would finance a **global basic income** of [\$30] per month for all hu-  
1640 mans, lifting out of extreme poverty the poorest billion people.

1641 Considering the basic income and the fuel price increases, **the typical [American]**  
1642 **would lose out financially** [\$85] per month.

1643

1644 **National redistribution scheme:**

1645 This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [5%] and provide cash transfers to  
1646 all adults. More precisely, **each [American] would receive** [\$85] per month. This  
1647 would be financed by an increase of the federal income tax on household income in  
1648 excess of [\$315,000 per year], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000  
1649 per year].

- 1650 18. If both the Global climate scheme and the National redistribution scheme are imple-  
1651 mented, how would a typical [American] be financially affected? [Figure S12]

1652 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1653 *A typical [American] would lose out financially.; A typical [American] would neither gain  
1654 nor lose.; A typical [American] would gain financially.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was that *A typical [American] would nei-  
1656 ther gain nor lose* from both schemes combined. [US1, Eu: Now, here are the last two  
1657 policies:]

1658

1659 **[US1: Coal exit:**

1660 To reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, this policy would require all U.S. coal power plants to be  
1661 phased out by 2030. Coal would be replaced by renewable sources like wind and  
1662 solar panels as well as stronger reliance on gas power plants.

1663 **Eu: Thermal insulation plan:**

1664 To reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and energy insecurity, this policy would require that all  
1665 buildings meet energy efficiency targets: at least rating E in 2030 and rating C in  
1666 2040. The [UK] government would subsidise half the cost of insulation for all house-  
1667 holds, and up to 90% for the poorest households. Insulation work would cost [FR,  
1668 DE: €25; ES: €20; UK: £25] billion a year, but would deliver energy savings greater  
1669 than this cost. ]

1670

1671 [US1: **Marriage only for opposite-sex couples:**

1672

This policy is a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would legally define marriage as a union of one man and one woman.

1673

1674 **Eu: Death penalty for major crimes:**

1675

This measure would reintroduce capital punishment for major crimes such as terrorism and mass shootings.]

1677

1678 Now, we will ask your opinion on the [US1, Eu: four] policies.

1679

Click here for the reminder of the [US1, Eu: first] two policies. [Clicking displays the previous summarized descriptions.]

1680

1681

- 1682 19. [US2] [4 Random branches: control (*nothing*); Question 31 (*field*); Question 32 (*important*); or the following question (*info*).] For information, a recent survey has shown that:

1683

- 1684 • 64% of Americans support the Global climate scheme.
- 1685 • 72% of Americans support the National redistribution scheme.

1686

20. Do you support the Global climate scheme? [Figure S1]

1687

Yes; No

1688

21. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the previous question? [Figure S8]

1689

The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

1690

*Percentage of [Americans] in favor of Global climate scheme* [slider from 0 to 100]

1691

22. Do you support the National redistribution scheme? [Figure S1]

1692

Yes; No

1693

23. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the previous question? [Figure S8]

1694

The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

1695

*Percentage of [Americans] in favor of National redistribution* [slider from 0 to 100]

1696

24. [Eu, US1] Beware, this question is quite unusual. Among the policies below, **how many** do you support? [Figure S14, Table 1]

1700 [Four random branches. Branch GCS/NR/C/O]

- 1701
- 1702 • Global climate scheme
- 1703 • National redistribution scheme
- 1704 • [Coal exit]
- 1705 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

1706 0; 1; 2; 3; 4

1707

1708 [Branch GCS/C/O]

- 1709
- 1710 • Global climate scheme
- 1711 • [Coal exit]
- 1712 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

1713 0; 1; 2; 3

1714

1715 [Branch NR/C/O]

- 1716
- 1717 • National redistribution scheme
- 1718 • [Coal exit]
- 1719 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

1720 0; 1; 2; 3

1721 [Branch C/O]

- 1722
- 1723 • [Coal exit]
- 1724 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

1725 0; 1; 2

1726

1727 [Eu, US1] Conjoint analyses

- 1728 25. Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you prefer? [Figure  
1729 S15]

1730 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the  
1731 same time.

Bundle A	Bundle B
[Coal exit]	[Coal exit]
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme
Global climate scheme	

1732 1733 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 1734 26. Do you support Bundle A (combining [Coal exit], the National redistribution scheme,  
1735 and the Global climate scheme)?[Figure S1]

1736 Yes; No

- 1737 27. [new page] Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you  
1738 prefer? [Figure S15]

1739 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the  
1740 same time.

1741 1742 [Four random branches. Branch C + NR vs. GCS + NR]

Bundle A	Bundle B
[Coal exit]	Global climate scheme
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme

1743 1744 [Branch NR vs. NR + C + GCS]

Bundle A	Bundle B
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme [Coal exit] Global climate scheme

1745 1746 1747 [Branch NR + GCS vs. NR]

	<b>Bundle A</b>	<b>Bundle B</b>
1749	National redistribution scheme Global climate scheme	National redistribution scheme
1750		

1751 [Branch NR + C vs. NR]

	<b>Bundle A</b>	<b>Bundle B</b>
1752	National redistribution scheme [Coal exit]	National redistribution scheme
1753		

1754 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 1755 28. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and  
 1756 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies  
 1757 in their platforms.  
 1758 *Eu: Imagine if [DE, ES, UK: the two favorite candidates in your constituency in the  
 1759 next general election; FR: the two candidates in the second round of the next pres-  
 1760 idential election] campaigned with the following policies in their party's platforms.]*

1761 Which of these candidates would you vote for? [Table 2, Figure S15]

1762 [Table 2. Two random branches: with and without the final row. The US1 version of the poli-  
 1763 cies is given below, see the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the European versions.]

	<b>Democrat</b>	<b>Republican</b>
	Increase corporate income tax rate from 21% to 28%	Decrease the payroll tax
	Coal exit	Permit completion of the Keystone pipeline
	Trillion dollar investment in childcare, healthcare, education and housing	Withdrawal of the Paris agreement
	\$15 minimum wage	Marriage only for opposite-sex couples
	National redistribution scheme	Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation
1765	[Global climate scheme / no row]	[ / no row]

1766

1767 [US1: Democrat; Republican; None of them; Eu: Candidate A; Candidate B; None of them]

- 1768 29. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and  
1769 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies  
1770 in their platforms.

1771 *Eu (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the Section "Values and politics"):* Imag-  
1772 ine that [FR: the left or center-left; DE: a red-red-green coalition; ES: the PSOE; UK:  
1773 the Labour Party] wins the next [general] elections. Here are two possible platforms  
1774 on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a  
1775 pool of credible [FR: left or center-left, DE: left-wing parties'; ES: PSOE; UK: Labour]  
1776 policies).]

1777

1778 [US1: Which of these candidates do you prefer?

1779 *Eu: Even if you [FR: are not from the left or center-left; DE: do not support the left-*  
1780 *wing parties; ES: do not support the PSOE; UK: do not support the Labour Party],*  
1781 *which of these platforms do you prefer?]*

1782 [Figures S6, S16; see also the sheet "Policies" in *this spreadsheet* for the possible policies.]

	[Candidate A]	[Candidate B]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
1783	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
1784	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]

[US1: Candidate A; Candidate B; Eu: Platform A; Platform B]

- 1785 30. [new page] [Same wording and conditions as above. For brevity, only the UK version is  
1786 given here.] Imagine that the Labour Party wins the next general elections. Here are  
1787 two possible platforms on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are  
1788 randomly drawn from a pool of credible Labour policies).

1789

1790 Even if you do not support the Labour Party, which of these platforms do you pre-  
1791 fer? [Figure S6]

		<b>Platform A</b>	<b>Platform B</b>
1792	[Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order]	[Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy]	[Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy]
1793	<b>Foreign policy</b>	Global climate scheme	-
	<i>Platform A; Platform B</i>		

#### **1794 [Eu, US2] Perceptions of the GCS**

*1795 [Eu: two random branches. US2: four random branches and the question is asked (if asked)  
1796 before Question 20]*

*1797 31. [Branch: field] When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to  
1798 your mind?*

*1799 Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme. [Figures S18, S19]  
1800 {Open field}*

*1801 32. [Branch: important] When determining your support or opposition to the Global  
1802 climate scheme, which points are important to you? [Figure S17]*

- 1803 • It would succeed in limiting climate change.*
- 1804 • It would hurt the [U.S.] economy.*
- 1805 • It would penalize my household.*
- 1806 • It would make people change their lifestyle.*
- 1807 • It would reduce poverty in low-income countries.*
- 1808 • It might be detrimental to some poor countries.*
- 1809 • It could foster global cooperation.*
- 1810 • It could fuel corruption in low-income countries.*
- 1811 • It could be subject to fraud.*
- 1812 • It would be technically difficult to put in place.*
- 1813 • Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences.*

*1814 Not at all important; Not so important; Quite important; Very important*

1815 [Eu, US1] Donation lottery

1816 33. Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).

1817 *Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*

1818 34. [Two random branches] By taking this survey, you are automatically entered into a  
1819 lottery to win [\$]100 in panel points. This lottery is unrelated to the previous ones  
1820 that rewarded answers’ accuracy. In a few days you will know whether you have  
1821 been selected in the lottery. The payment will be made to you in the same way as  
1822 your compensation for this survey, so no further action is required on your part.

1823  
1824 Should you be selected in the lottery, you can also donate a part of this additional  
1825 compensation to [[American] / African] people living in poverty through [US1: the  
1826 charity GiveDirectly. The charity GiveDirectly; Eu: a charity. We would channel this  
1827 donation to a charity that] provides small amounts of cash to people in need in [[the  
1828 U.S] / Africa].

1829  
1830 **In case you are winner of the lottery, what share of the [\$]100 would you donate  
1831 to [[American] / African] people living in poverty [US1: through GiveDirectly]?**

1832 [Figure S20, Table S3]

1833 *Amount donated to [[American] / African] people in need (in [\$]) [slider from 0 to 100]*

1834 [Eu, US2] Wealth tax

1835 [Four random branches: Question 35 then Question 36 (global first); Question 36 then Ques-  
1836 tion 35 (national first); Question 37 (global share); Question 38 (sharing)]

1837 35. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-  
1838 income countries?

1839 Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking  
1840 water, healthcare, and education. [Figures S1, S21]

1841 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly  
1842 support*

1843 36. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: afford-  
1844 able housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and  
1845 schools]? [Figures S1, S22]

1846      *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*  
1847      *support*

1848    37. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all  
1849    countries around the world. In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount  
1850    to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE: €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2:  
1851    2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount  
1852    to [\$]1 billion in all low-income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700  
1853    million people, most of them in Africa).

1854    Each country would retain part of the revenues it collects, and the remaining part  
1855    would be pooled at the global level to finance infrastructure and public services in  
1856    low-income countries.

1857    What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of re-  
1858    tained in the country's national budget)? [Figure S23]

1859    *Percent of global wealth tax that should go to low-income countries [slider from 0 to 100]*

1861    38. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in  
1862    all countries around the world.

1863    In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE:  
1864    €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2: 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES:  
1865    0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount to [\$]1 billion in all low-  
1866    income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700 million people, most of  
1867    them in Africa).

1868    Which of the following options would you prefer? [Figure S24]

- 1869    • The whole wealth tax financing national budgets in each country. For ex-  
1870    ample, in [US2: the U.S., it could finance affordable housing and universal  
1871    childcare/pre-K.; Eu-UK: the UK, it could finance the National Health Service  
1872    and state-funded schools].
- 1873    • Half of the wealth tax financing national budgets in each country, half of it  
1874    financing low-income countries. For example, it could finance [US2: universal  
1875    childcare/pre-K in the U.S.; Eu-UK: state-funded schools in the UK] and access  
1876    to drinking water, healthcare, and education in Africa.

1877 [Eu, US2] Foreign aid

1878 US2 Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).

1879 *Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*

- 1880 39. From your best guess, what percentage of [U.S.] government spending is allocated  
1881 to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?

1882

1883 For your information, government spending totals [US2: 38%; FR: 55%; DE: 45%; ES:  
1884 42%; UK: 41%] of [U.S.] GDP, it includes [US2: federal, State; Eu: national] and local  
1885 government spending, and apart from foreign aid, it covers the following items: de-  
1886 fense, social security (retirement pensions), health [US2: (including Medicare and  
1887 Medicaid)], welfare benefits [US2: (including food stamps and EITC)], education,  
1888 roads, justice, other programs [US2: and federal agencies (including in energy, sci-  
1889 ence...)]. [Figure S27]

1890 *Less than 0.1%; 0.1% to 0.2%; 0.3% to 0.5%; 0.6% to 1.0%; 1.1% to 1.7%; 1.8% to 2.6%;  
1891 2.7% to 4%; 4.1% to 6%; 6.1% to 9%; 9.1% to 13%; 13.1% to 25%; More than 25%*

- 1892 40. [Two random branches: with or without information on actual amount] [Info: Actually,  
1893 [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [the U.S.] government spend-  
1894 ing is allocated to foreign aid.]

1895

1896 If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate  
1897 to foreign aid? [Figures S25, S26, S28 and S29]

- 1898 41. [Asked iff branch: Info and preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than actual for-  
1899 eign aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to increase [U.S.] foreign  
1900 aid.

1901

1902 How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers  
1903 possible) [Figure S30]

1904 *Lower spending on defense; Lower spending on retirement pensions; Lower spending on  
1905 healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Lower spending on welfare benefits [US2: (like  
1906 EITC or food stamps)]; Lower spending on education; Lower spending on other programs  
1907 [US2: and federal agencies]; Higher taxes on the wealthiest; Higher corporate income tax  
1908 rate; Higher personal income tax rates; Higher public deficit*

1909     42. [Asked iff branch: *Info* and preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than actual foreign  
1910       aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to reduce [U.S.] foreign aid.

1911

1912       How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible) [*Figure S31*]  
1913

1914       *Higher spending on defense; Higher spending on retirement pensions; Higher spending on*  
1915       *healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Higher spending on welfare benefits [US2:*  
1916       *(like EITC or food stamps)]; Higher spending on education; lower spending on other pro-*  
1917       *grams [US2: and federal agencies]; Lower taxes on the wealthiest; Lower corporate income*  
1918       *tax rate; Lower personal income tax rates; Lower public deficit*

1919     **[Eu, US1] Petition**

1920     43. [*Two random branches*] Would you be willing to sign a petition for the [Global cli-  
1921       mate / National redistribution] scheme? [*Figure S32*]

1922

1923       As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President's  
1924       office], informing him what share of American people are willing to endorse the  
1925       [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign,  
1926       only your answer here is required and remains anonymous.) Yes; No

1927     **[Eu, US1] Other policies**

1928     44. The following policies are discussed at international negotiations on how to deal  
1929       with climate change. [*Figures 2 and S33*]

1930

1931       Do you support or oppose the following policies?

- 1932       • Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for  
1933       climate damages
- 1934       • High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries
- 1935       • High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income  
1936       countries adapt to climate change

1937       *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*  
1938       *support*

1939 45. Do you support or oppose the following global policies? [Figures 2 and S33]

- 1940 • Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt
- 1941 • Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting  
1942 right proportional to its population
- 1943 • Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries
- 1944 • A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage
- 1945 • Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of  
1946 all assets
- 1947 • A maximum wealth limit of [US1: \$10 billion; Eu: [€]100 million] for each  
1948 human

1949 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly  
1950 support*

1951 46. Currently, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [U.S.] government  
1952 spending (that is, [US1: 0.2%; FR: 0.4%; DE: 0.6%; ES: 0.2%; UK: 0.7%] of [U.S.] GDP)  
1953 is spent on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries. [Figure S3]

1954 Do you support [the U.S.] transferring more money to low-income countries?

1955 Yes, [U.S.] foreign aid should be increased.; Yes, but only if some conditions are met.; No,  
1956 [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.; No, [U.S.] foreign aid should be reduced.

1958 47. [Asked only if Yes, but only if some conditions are met. is chosen] What conditions  
1959 should be required for [the U.S.] to increase its foreign aid? (Multiple answers pos-  
1960 sible) [Figures S4, S25]

1961 *That recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights.; That recipient  
1962 countries cooperate to fight illegal migrations.; That other high-income countries also in-  
1963 crease their foreign aid.; That this is financed by increased taxes on millionaires.; That we  
1964 can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted.; Other: [open field]*

1965 48. [Asked only if No, [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable. or No, [U.S.] foreign aid  
1966 should be reduced. is chosen] Why do you oppose [the U.S.] increasing its foreign  
1967 aid? (Multiple answers possible) [Figure S5]

1968 *Aid perpetuates poverty as it makes people feel less responsible for themselves.; Aid is not  
1969 effective as most of it is diverted.; Aid is a pressure tactic for high-income countries that*

1970      *prevents low-income countries from developing freely.; [The U.S.] is not responsible for what*  
1971      *happens in other countries.; Charity begins at home: there is already a lot to do to support*  
1972      *the American people in need.; Other: [open field]*

1973    **[Eu, US1, US2] Values and politics**

- 1974    49. [Eu (where it is instead asked at the beginning of Section “Other Policies”), US1]  
1975      In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend  
1976      [U.S.] interests or global justice? [Figure S34]  
1977      *[U.S.] interests, even if it goes against global justice; [U.S.] interests, to the extent it re-*  
1978      *spects global justice; ndifferent or don’t know; Global justice, to the extent it respects [U.S.]*  
1979      *interests; Global justice, even if it goes against [U.S.] interests*
- 1980    50. How much did you give to charities in 2022? [Figure S39]  
1981      *I did not make donations to charities last year.; Less than [\$]100.; Between [\$]101 and*  
1982      *[\$]500.; Between [\$]501 and [\$]1,000.; Between [\$]1,001 and [\$]5,000.; More than [\$]5,000.*
- 1983    51. To what extent are you interested in politics? [Figure S40]  
1984      *Not at all; A little; Moderately; A lot; A great deal*
- 1985    52. Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means you think the  
1986      government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic gov-  
1987      ernment functions, and 5 means you think the government should take active steps  
1988      in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens? [Figure S41]  
1989      *Desired involvement of government [slider from 1 to 5]*
- 1990    53. **On economic policy matters**, where do you see yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where  
1991      1 is Left (favoring equality and government interventions) and 5 is Right (favoring  
1992      free competition and little government intervention)? [Figure S42]  
1993      *Left (1) to Right (5) on economic issues [slider from 1 to 5]*
- 1994    54. Did you vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election? [Figure S43]  
1995      *Yes; No: I didn’t have the right to vote in the U.S.; Prefer not to say*
- 1996    55. [If voted: Which candidate did you vote for in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election?  
1997      If did not vote: Even if you did not vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election,  
1998      please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who  
1999      represents your views more closely.] [Figure S44]

2000 [US1, US2: Biden; Trump; Jorgensen; Hawkins; Prefer not to say  
2001 FR: candidates at the 2022 presidential election  
2002 DE: parties with more than 1% of votes at the 2021 federal election and *Other*  
2003 ES: lists with more than 0.9% at the November 2019 general election and *Other*  
2004 UK: parties with more than 0.5% of votes at the 2019 general election and *Other*]

2005 56. To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem? [Figure S35]

- 2006 • Income inequality in [the U.S.]
- 2007 • Climate change
- 2008 • Global poverty

2009 *Not an important issue for me; An issue but there are other priorities; An issue but we already do what we can; An important issue, we should do more; One of the most pressing issue of our time*  
2010  
2011

2012 57. What group do you defend when you vote? [Figure S36]

2013 *Sentient beings (humans and animals); Humans; [Eu: Europeans]; [Americans]; People sharing my culture or religion; [US1, US2: My State]; [US1, US2: My town; Eu: My country, region or town]; My relatives and/or colleagues; My family and myself*  
2014  
2015

## 2016 [Eu, US1] Prioritization

2017 58. In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The  
2018 more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

2019  
2020 How do you allocate the points among the following policies? [Figures S37 and S38]  
2021

2022 You can adjust the number of points either using the slider or entering the num-  
2023 ber of your choice on the right-hand-side. **The sum of points must equal exactly**  
2024 **100**. By pushing the last slider to the right, the total will automatically adjust to 100.  
2025 Please read the 6 options before making your choice.

2026 See the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the pool of policies in each country.  
2027 [sliders from 0 to 100]

2028 [FR, DE, ES] ETS2

2029 59. Similar to the Global Climate Scheme, the European Climate Scheme would impose  
2030 a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit across the EU in the buildings  
2031 and transport sectors. It would make polluters pay for their emissions, which in turn  
2032 would increase fossil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities. Several options  
2033 are possible regarding the use of the scheme's revenues:

- 2034 • Provide an equal cash transfer of €105 per year to each European.  
2035 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European, proportional to their  
2036 country's emissions: people in countries with higher emissions per person (like  
2037 Germany) would receive more than people in countries with lower emissions  
2038 (like Romania). For information, people in [Germany] would receive €[FR:  
2039 110; DE: 130; ES: 90]/year.
- 2040 • Finance low-carbon investments: thermal insulation of buildings, switch to  
2041 clean sources of heating, public transportation, and charging stations for elec-  
2042 tric vehicles.
- 2043 • Provide cash transfers to the most vulnerable half of Europeans and finance  
2044 low-carbon investments.

2045 Do you support or oppose the European Climate Scheme in case the revenue is used  
2046 to... ?

- 2047 • Provide an equal cash transfer to each European  
2048 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European  
2049 • Finance low-carbon investments  
2050 • Provide cash transfers for the most vulnerable Europeans and low-carbon in-  
2051 vestments

2052 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly  
2053 support*

2054 60. [Asked iff none of the four variants of the European Climate Scheme is (somewhat or  
2055 strongly) supported] Why do you not support a European Climate Scheme? (Mul-  
2056 tiple answers possible)

2057     *I am opposed to climate policy being decided at the EU level, it should be decided at the na-*  
2058     *tional level;*  
2059     *I would prefer if the revenues were used in a different way (beyond the four suggestions*  
2060     *above) than previously suggested;*  
2061     *I would prefer if decreasing carbon emissions were regulated by other climate policies;*  
2062     *I am generally opposed to additional, or more ambitious, climate policies;*  
2063     *I do not fully understand how the European Climate Scheme is supposed to work;*  
2064     *I don't know*

2065     **[Eu, US1, US2] Feedback**

- 2066     61. Do you feel that this survey was politically biased? [Figure S45]  
2067         *Yes, left-wing biased; Yes, right-wing biased; No, I do not feel it was biased*
- 2068     62. [US2 Asked only to one random third of the respondents, instead of the feedback Ques-  
2069         tion 63] According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme  
2070         poverty in low-income countries? [Figure S46]  
2071         *{Open field}*
- 2072     63. The survey is nearing completion. You can now enter any comments, thoughts or  
2073         suggestions in the field below.  
2074         *{Open field}*
- 2075     64. Lastly, are you interested to be interviewed by a researcher (through videoconfer-  
2076         encing) for 30 min?  
2077  
2078         This is totally optional and will not be rewarded.  
2079         *Yes; No*

## 2080 E Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme

2081 To specify the GCS, we use the IEA's 2DS scenario (IEA 2017), which is consistent  
2082 with limiting the global average temperature increase to 2°C with a probability of at least  
2083 50%. The paper by Hood (2017) contributing to the Report of the High-Level Commission  
2084 on Carbon Prices (Stern & Stiglitz 2017) presents a price corridor compatible with this  
2085 emissions scenario, from which we take the midpoint. The product of these two series  
2086 provides an estimate of the revenues expected from a global carbon price. We then use  
2087 the UN median scenario of future population aged over 15 years (*adults*, for short). We  
2088 derive the basic income that could be paid to all adults by recycling the revenues from  
2089 the global carbon price: evolving between \$20 and \$30 per month, with a peak in 2030.  
2090 Accounting for the lower price levels in low-income countries, an additional income of  
2091 \$30 per month would allow **670 million people** to escape extreme poverty, defined with  
2092 the threshold of \$2.15 per day in purchasing power parity.<sup>29</sup>

2093 To estimate the increase in fossil fuel expenditures (or “cost”) in each country by 2030,  
2094 we make a key assumption concerning the evolution of the carbon footprints per adult:  
2095 that they will decrease by the same proportion in each country. We use data from the  
2096 Global Carbon Project (Peters et al. 2012). In 2030, the average carbon footprint of a  
2097 country  $c$ ,  $e_c$ , evolves from baseline year  $b$  proportionally to the evolution of its adult  
2098 population  $\Delta p_c = p_c^{2030} / p_c^b$ . Thus, the global share of country  $c$ 's carbon footprint,  $s_c$ ,  
2099 is proportional to  $\sigma_c = e_c \Delta p_c$ , and as countries' shares sum to 1,  $s_c = \frac{\sigma_c}{\sum_k \sigma_k}$ . Multiplying  
2100 country  $c$ 's emission share with global revenues in 2030,  $R$ , and dividing by  $c$ 's adult pop-  
2101 ulation in year  $y$ , yields its average cost per adult:  $R \cdot s_c / p_c^y$ . Using findings from Ivanova  
2102 & Wood (2020) for Europe and Fremstad & Paul (2019) for the U.S., we approximate the  
2103 median cost as 90% of the average cost. Finally, the net gain is given by the basic income  
2104 (\$30 per month) minus the cost. We provided consistent estimates of net gains in all sur-  
2105 veys (using  $y = b = 2015$ ), though in the global survey we gave the average net gains  
2106 vs. the median ones in the complementary surveys. The latter are shown in Figure S51.  
2107 For the record, Table S4 also provides an estimate of *average* net gains (computed with

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<sup>29</sup>The average carbon footprint of Sub-Saharan Africa is 0.75tCO<sub>2</sub> per capita (World Bank), and it is even lower for people living in extreme poverty, under one tenth of the world average of about 5tCO<sub>2</sub> per capita (Chancel & Piketty 2015). Under a GCS with a cash transfer of \$30 per person, if one's emission is one tenth of the world average, their net gain would be \$27 per month in nominal terms. In regions with extreme poverty like Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding high-income countries), the conversion factor from Market Exchange Rate to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is 2.4 (computed as the ratio of the World Bank series relating the GDP per capita of Sub-Saharan Africa in PPP and nominal). Therefore, the net gain for the extreme poor is \$65 per month (or \$2.13 a day) in PPP, enough to lift them out of extreme poverty.

<sup>2108</sup>  $b = 2019$  and  $y = 2030$ ).<sup>30</sup>

<sup>2109</sup> Estimates of the net gains from the Global Climate Scheme are necessarily imprecise,  
<sup>2110</sup> given the uncertainties surrounding the carbon price required to achieve emissions  
<sup>2111</sup> reductions as well as each country's trajectory in terms of emissions and population. These  
<sup>2112</sup> values are highly dependent on future (non-price) climate policies, technical progress,  
<sup>2113</sup> and economic growth of each country, which are only partially known. Integrated As-  
<sup>2114</sup> sessment Models have been used to derive a Global Energy Assessment (Johansson et al.  
<sup>2115</sup> 2012), a 100% renewable scenario (Greenpeace 2015) as well as Shared Socioeconomic  
<sup>2116</sup> Pathways (SSPs), which include consistent trajectories of population, emissions, and car-  
<sup>2117</sup> bon price (Bauer et al. 2017; Fricko et al. 2017; Riahi et al. 2017; van Vuuren et al. 2017).  
<sup>2118</sup> Instead of using some of these modelling trajectories, we relied on a simple and trans-  
<sup>2119</sup> parent formula, for a number of reasons. First and foremost, those trajectories describe  
<sup>2120</sup> territorial emissions while we need consumption-based emissions to compute the inci-  
<sup>2121</sup> dence of the GCS. Second, the carbon price is relatively low in trajectories of SSPs that  
<sup>2122</sup> contain global warming below 2°C (less than \$35/tCO<sub>2</sub> in 2030), so we conservatively  
<sup>2123</sup> chose a method yielding a higher carbon price (\$90 in 2030). Third, modelling results are  
<sup>2124</sup> available only for a few macro regions, while we wanted country by country estimates.  
<sup>2125</sup> Finally, we have checked that the emissions per capita given by our method are broadly  
<sup>2126</sup> in line with alternative methods, even if it tends to overestimate net gains in countries  
<sup>2127</sup> which will decarbonize less rapidly than average.<sup>31</sup> For example, although countries' de-  
<sup>2128</sup> carbonization plans should realign with the GCS in place, India might still decarbonize  
<sup>2129</sup> less quickly than the European Union, so India's gain and the EU's loss might be over-  
<sup>2130</sup> estimated in our computations. For a more sophisticated version of the Global Climate  
<sup>2131</sup> Scheme which includes participation mechanisms preventing middle-income countries  
<sup>2132</sup> (like China) to lose from it and estimations of the Net Present Value by country, see Fabre  
<sup>2133</sup> (2023).

(Back to Section 2.2.2)

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<sup>30</sup>2015 was the last year of data available when the global questionnaire was conceived (OECD data was then used – it does not cover all countries but give identical rounded estimates than those recomputed from the Global Carbon Project data for our complementary surveys). 2030 was chosen as the reference year as it is the date at which global carbon price revenues are expected to peak (and the GCS redistributive effects would be largest), and the GCS could not realistically enter into force before that date. In the surveys, we chose  $y = b = 2015$  rather than  $b = 2019$  and  $y = 2030$  to get more conservative estimates of the monthly cost in the U.S. (\$20 higher than the other option) and in Europe (€5 or £10 higher).

<sup>31</sup>Computations with alternative methods can be found on [our public repository](#).

Figure S51: Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme.




Table S4: Estimated net gain from the GCS in 2030 and carbon footprint by country.

	Mean net gain from the GCS (\$/month)	CO <sub>2</sub> footprint per adult in 2019 (tCO <sub>2</sub> /y)			
Saudi Arabia	-92	24.0	Algeria*	-1	6.0
United States	-76	21.0	Mexico	2	5.6
Australia	-59	17.6	Ukraine	2	5.6
Canada	-55	16.7	Uzbekistan*	4	5.1
South Korea	-49	15.6	Argentina	5	4.9
Taiwan	-41	14.0	Thailand	7	4.6
Germany	-30	11.7	Egypt	12	3.6
Russia	-28	11.5	Indonesia	13	3.3
Japan	-27	11.3	Colombia	15	3.0
Malaysia	-21	10.0	Brazil	15	2.9
Iran	-19	9.5	Vietnam	16	2.9
Poland	-18	9.5	Peru	16	2.8
United Kingdom	-18	9.4	Morocco	16	2.7
China	-14	8.6	North Korea*	17	2.5
Italy	-12	8.4	India	18	2.4
South Africa	-11	8.0	Philippines	18	2.3
France	-10	7.8	Pakistan	22	1.6
Iraq*	-7	7.4	Bangladesh	24	1.1
Spain	-6	7.0	Nigeria	25	1.0
Turkey	-2	6.2	Kenya	25	0.9
			Myanmar*	26	0.9
			Sudan*	26	0.9
			Tanzania	27	0.5
			Afghanistan*	27	0.5
			Uganda	28	0.4
			Ethiopia	28	0.3
			Venezuela	29	0.3
			DRC*	30	0.1

<sup>2134</sup> Note: Asterisks denote countries where footprint is missing and territorial emissions is used instead.

<sup>2135</sup> Values differ from Figure S51 as this table present estimates of *mean* net gain per adult in 2030, not at the

<sup>2136</sup> present. Only the countries with more than 20 million adults (covering 87% of the global total) are shown.

<sup>2137</sup> F Determinants of support

Table S5: Determinants of support for the Global Climate Scheme. (Back to [2.2.2](#))

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme						
	All	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Country: Germany	-0.157*** (0.022)		-0.144*** (0.022)				
Country: Spain	-0.044* (0.024)		-0.026 (0.024)				
Country: United Kingdom	-0.079*** (0.024)		-0.104*** (0.023)				
Country: United States	-0.375*** (0.019)						
Income quartile: 2	0.037** (0.017)	0.031 (0.022)	0.038 (0.023)	0.047 (0.043)	0.058 (0.049)	0.013 (0.053)	0.023 (0.043)
Income quartile: 3	0.042** (0.017)	0.033 (0.024)	0.049** (0.024)	0.080** (0.040)	0.059 (0.052)	0.074 (0.056)	-0.052 (0.052)
Income quartile: 4	0.056*** (0.018)	0.062** (0.026)	0.010 (0.026)	0.018 (0.047)	-0.015 (0.055)	-0.001 (0.056)	-0.005 (0.057)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.023* (0.012)	0.032* (0.017)	0.010 (0.018)	0.007 (0.029)	0.045 (0.039)	0.007 (0.039)	-0.010 (0.039)
Age: 25-34	-0.076*** (0.025)	-0.084*** (0.031)	-0.044 (0.035)	-0.031 (0.057)	-0.077 (0.083)	-0.050 (0.066)	-0.103 (0.091)
Age: 35-49	-0.101*** (0.024)	-0.109*** (0.030)	-0.069* (0.034)	-0.094* (0.055)	-0.009 (0.077)	-0.168** (0.070)	-0.050 (0.090)
Age: 50-64	-0.137*** (0.024)	-0.165*** (0.030)	-0.038 (0.035)	-0.039 (0.056)	-0.020 (0.082)	-0.146** (0.067)	-0.017 (0.087)
Age: 65+	-0.116*** (0.028)	-0.142*** (0.034)	-0.056 (0.044)	0.003 (0.076)	-0.045 (0.094)	-0.258*** (0.091)	0.011 (0.105)
Gender: Man	0.019* (0.011)	0.022 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.029)	-0.018 (0.033)	0.042 (0.038)	-0.005 (0.034)
Lives with partner	0.029** (0.013)	0.023 (0.017)	0.058*** (0.018)	0.070** (0.033)	0.082** (0.038)	0.017 (0.038)	0.040 (0.039)
Employment status: Retired	-0.020 (0.024)	-0.046 (0.030)	0.056 (0.038)	0.087 (0.081)	0.096 (0.075)	0.040 (0.082)	0.001 (0.073)
Employment status: Student	0.045 (0.033)	0.062 (0.048)	0.101** (0.044)	0.165* (0.085)	0.192** (0.087)	0.116 (0.074)	-0.021 (0.107)
Employment status: Working	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.020 (0.024)	0.011 (0.028)	0.082 (0.064)	0.006 (0.056)	-0.050 (0.056)	0.036 (0.051)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.331*** (0.013)	-0.435*** (0.017)	-0.106*** (0.019)	-0.131*** (0.035)	-0.004 (0.044)	-0.114*** (0.038)	-0.081** (0.041)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	-0.184*** (0.016)	-0.198*** (0.022)	-0.136*** (0.021)	-0.196*** (0.039)	-0.034 (0.043)	-0.116** (0.046)	-0.108*** (0.040)
Vote: Far right	-0.396*** (0.032)		-0.309*** (0.033)	-0.493*** (0.064)	-0.168*** (0.051)	-0.130 (0.102)	-0.314*** (0.080)
Urban	0.049*** (0.012)	0.072*** (0.018)	0.006 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.029)	0.019 (0.032)	-0.014 (0.036)	0.017 (0.033)
Race: White		-0.030 (0.019)					
Region: Northeast		0.010 (0.023)					
Region: South		0.006 (0.020)					
Region: West		0.010 (0.022)					
Swing State		-0.038** (0.019)					
Constant	1.048	0.736	0.89	0.7	0.732	0.935	0.886
Observations	7,986	4,992	2,994	977	727	748	542
R <sup>2</sup>	0.160	0.181	0.064	0.116	0.067	0.043	0.063

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table S6: Support for the GCS regressed on comprehension of its financial effects.

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme					
	All	United States	France	Germany	United Kingdom	Spain
With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win	0.029** (0.012)	-0.004 (0.016)	0.043 (0.033)	0.051 (0.033)	0.040 (0.036)	0.038 (0.037)
Constant	0.596	0.53	0.764	0.677	0.707	0.796
Observations	8,000	5,000	729	979	749	543
R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.00001	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.002

Table S7: Correlation between (*Somewhat or Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in high-income countries.

	Support for a global GHG tax and dividend											
	USA (1)	DNK (2)	FRA (3)	DEU (4)	ITA (5)	ESP (6)	GBR (7)	JPN (8)	POL (9)	AUS (10)	CAN (11)	KOR (12)
Control group mean	0.34	0.409	0.34	0.361	0.341	0.421	0.288	0.317	0.309	0.294	0.316	0.334
Trusts the government	0.040*** (0.013)	0.0005 (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.051*** (0.011)	0.061*** (0.012)	0.046*** (0.011)	0.050*** (0.012)	0.039*** (0.013)	0.023** (0.011)	0.041*** (0.013)	0.019 (0.012)	0.079*** (0.013)
Believes inequality is an important problem	0.038*** (0.014)	0.051*** (0.012)	0.045*** (0.013)	0.040*** (0.011)	0.023** (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.052*** (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)	0.009 (0.010)	0.005 (0.013)	0.031*** (0.012)	0.024** (0.012)
Worries about CC	0.006 (0.018)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.005 (0.016)	0.048*** (0.014)	0.023* (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.044*** (0.015)	0.014 (0.014)	0.018 (0.013)	0.036** (0.017)	0.004 (0.014)	0.015 (0.013)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	0.009 (0.015)	0.007 (0.012)	0.018 (0.014)	0.015 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.012)	0.032** (0.011)	0.027** (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.024** (0.014)	0.018 (0.015)	0.014 (0.014)	0.001 (0.013)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.059*** (0.015)	0.019 (0.013)	0.008 (0.014)	0.032** (0.013)	0.012 (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.006 (0.014)	0.037** (0.014)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.033** (0.016)	0.026* (0.014)	0.033** (0.013)
Understands emission across activities/regions	-0.018 (0.011)	0.009 (0.013)	0.003 (0.012)	0.023* (0.012)	0.007 (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.007 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.026** (0.011)	-0.002 (0.013)	0.003 (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	0.007 (0.012)	0.008 (0.014)	0.023 (0.014)	0.011 (0.012)	-0.0005 (0.012)	0.031*** (0.012)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.014 (0.011)	0.025* (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.024* (0.012)
Knows which gases cause CC	0.005 (0.011)	0.021* (0.012)	0.010 (0.013)	0.001 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.010)	0.020* (0.010)	0.015 (0.010)	0.017 (0.011)	0.011 (0.011)	-0.0003 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.013)
Understands impacts of CC	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.029*** (0.011)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.022* (0.012)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.024* (0.012)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	-0.005 (0.013)	0.007 (0.012)	0.021 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.014)	0.011 (0.014)	0.010 (0.013)	0.014 (0.013)	0.008 (0.013)	0.015 (0.013)	0.036** (0.016)	0.004 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.013)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	-0.013 (0.021)	0.037 (0.023)	0.043* (0.022)	-0.014 (0.020)	-0.038** (0.019)	0.029 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.017 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.006 (0.022)	0.021 (0.020)	-0.020 (0.019)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.086*** (0.024)	0.066*** (0.023)	0.075*** (0.023)	0.094*** (0.022)	0.105*** (0.020)	0.074*** (0.023)	0.091*** (0.021)	0.154*** (0.019)	0.089*** (0.020)	0.070*** (0.024)	0.053** (0.023)	0.112*** (0.020)
Believes own household would lose	-0.071*** (0.021)	-0.057*** (0.015)	-0.026 (0.020)	-0.087*** (0.017)	-0.066*** (0.017)	-0.053*** (0.017)	-0.073*** (0.017)	-0.008 (0.017)	-0.079*** (0.017)	-0.052*** (0.016)	-0.060*** (0.019)	-0.083*** (0.017)
Believes low-income earners will lose	-0.034* (0.019)	-0.020 (0.016)	-0.056*** (0.018)	-0.022 (0.017)	-0.021 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.016)	-0.015 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.056*** (0.017)	-0.025 (0.016)	-0.030 (0.020)	-0.056*** (0.018)
Believes high-income earners will lose	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.012)	0.013 (0.013)	0.003 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.007 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.025** (0.012)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.0004 (0.013)
Observations	2,218	2,013	2,006	2,006	2,088	2,268	2,025	1,990	2,053	1,978	2,022	1,932
R <sup>2</sup>	0.329	0.241	0.237	0.295	0.211	0.216	0.272	0.222	0.214	0.272	0.254	0.228

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 of Dechezleprêtre et al. (2022) for variable definitions.

Table S8: Correlation between (*Somewhat* or *Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in middle-income countries.

	Support for a global GHG tax and dividend							
	IDN (1)	ZAF (2)	MEX (3)	TUR (4)	IND (5)	BRA (6)	CHN (7)	UKR (8)
Control group mean	0.697	0.396	0.681	0.44	0.719	0.539	0.737	0.622
Trusts the government	0.051*** (0.012)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.040*** (0.014)	0.066*** (0.017)	0.065*** (0.015)	0.038** (0.015)	-0.011 (0.015)	0.061*** (0.014)
Believes inequality is an important problem	0.048** (0.011)	0.002 (0.014)	0.057*** (0.015)	0.028 (0.017)	0.092*** (0.016)	0.055*** (0.015)	-0.001 (0.015)	0.027 (0.018)
Worries about CC	0.003 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.016)	0.013 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.017)	-0.0002 (0.016)	0.032* (0.017)	-0.0002 (0.016)	0.046*** (0.016)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	0.020 (0.014)	0.026 (0.017)	0.004 (0.014)	0.039** (0.017)	0.022 (0.016)	0.019 (0.015)	0.034** (0.016)	0.018 (0.016)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.020* (0.011)	0.038** (0.016)	0.032* (0.017)	-0.002 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.015)	-0.017 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.018 (0.016)
Understands emission across activities/regions	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.013)	0.003 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.010)	0.039*** (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.00004 (0.013)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	-0.006 (0.009)	0.011 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.016)	0.0002 (0.012)	0.003 (0.014)	-0.052*** (0.016)	0.022 (0.014)
Knows which gases cause CC	-0.026*** (0.009)	0.019 (0.015)	0.035** (0.014)	0.015 (0.015)	0.020 (0.013)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.023* (0.012)	0.023 (0.015)
Understands impacts of CC	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.0005 (0.015)	0.009 (0.017)	0.043*** (0.014)	-0.023 (0.015)	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.014 (0.014)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	-0.010 (0.007)	0.009 (0.016)	0.015 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.013)	0.002 (0.011)	-0.016 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.010)	0.035** (0.015)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	0.023 (0.015)	0.002 (0.021)	0.019 (0.022)	0.044 (0.029)	0.021 (0.020)	0.032 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.018)	-0.023 (0.025)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.111*** (0.019)	0.073*** (0.022)	0.088*** (0.024)	0.078** (0.031)	0.034 (0.025)	0.129*** (0.022)	0.060*** (0.022)	0.138*** (0.025)
Believes own household would lose	-0.027 (0.021)	-0.044** (0.020)	-0.071*** (0.019)	-0.054** (0.024)	-0.012 (0.019)	-0.067*** (0.023)	-0.119*** (0.022)	-0.045** (0.021)
Believes low-income earners will lose	-0.059*** (0.020)	-0.016 (0.019)	0.003 (0.017)	-0.053** (0.023)	-0.055*** (0.019)	-0.013 (0.020)	0.001 (0.018)	0.004 (0.020)
Believes high-income earners will lose	0.026** (0.011)	-0.020 (0.015)	0.010 (0.013)	0.010 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.014)	0.003 (0.016)	-0.047*** (0.014)	-0.007 (0.013)
Observations	2,488	2,003	2,045	1,932	2,472	1,860	1,717	1,564
R <sup>2</sup>	0.366	0.175	0.242	0.248	0.370	0.272	0.280	0.255

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 of Dechezleprêtre et al. (2022) for variable definitions.

<sup>2138</sup> **G Representativeness of the surveys**

Table S9: Sample representativeness of the complementary surveys. (Back to [2.1](#))

	US1			US2			Eu		
	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample
Sample size		3,000	3,000		2,000	2,000		3,000	3,000
Gender: Woman	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.45	0.50	0.51	0.49	0.51
Gender: Man	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.49	0.55	0.50	0.49	0.51	0.49
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.11	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.18	0.15	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.18	0.15	0.17	0.15
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.24	0.26
Age: 65+	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.25	0.23	0.25
Diploma_25_64: Below upper secondary	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.13	0.14	0.13
Diploma_25_64: Upper secondary	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.28	0.23	0.19	0.23
Diploma_25_64: Post secondary	0.34	0.40	0.34	0.34	0.33	0.34	0.29	0.33	0.29
Race: White only	0.60	0.67	0.61	0.60	0.62	0.61			
Race: Hispanic	0.18	0.15	0.19	0.18	0.19	0.19			
Race: Black	0.13	0.16	0.14	0.13	0.17	0.14			
Region: Northeast	0.17	0.20	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.17			
Region: Midwest	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.21			
Region: South	0.38	0.39	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38			
Region: West	0.24	0.20	0.24	0.24	0.20	0.24			
Urban: TRUE	0.73	0.78	0.74	0.73	0.75	0.73			
Employment_18_64: Inactive	0.20	0.16	0.16	0.20	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.15
Employment_18_64: Unemployed	0.02	0.07	0.08	0.02	0.09	0.08	0.03	0.06	0.05
Vote: Left	0.32	0.47	0.45	0.32	0.46	0.45	0.30	0.32	0.32
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.32	0.32
Vote: Far right							0.10	0.10	0.10
Country: FR							0.24	0.24	0.24
Country: DE							0.33	0.33	0.33
Country: ES							0.18	0.18	0.18
Country: UK							0.25	0.25	0.25
Urbanity: Cities							0.43	0.49	0.43
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs							0.33	0.32	0.33
Urbanity: Rural							0.25	0.20	0.25

*Note:* This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

Table S10: Sample representativeness for each European country. (Back to [2.1](#))

	FR			DE			ES			UK		
	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.									
Sample size		729	729		979	979		543	543		749	749
Gender: Woman	0.52	0.50	0.52	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.53	0.51	0.50	0.43	0.50
Gender: Man	0.48	0.50	0.48	0.49	0.48	0.49	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.50	0.57	0.50
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.29	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.19	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.19	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.33	0.25	0.25	0.18	0.25	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.14	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.07	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.12	0.16	0.12	0.17	0.20	0.17
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.31	0.24	0.22	0.26	0.22	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.24	0.18	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.24	0.19	0.24	0.28	0.23	0.28	0.27	0.28	0.27	0.25	0.30	0.25
Age: 65+	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.26	0.21	0.26	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.24
Diploma_25-64: Below upper secondary	0.11	0.19	0.11	0.10	0.14	0.10	0.24	0.16	0.25	0.12	0.09	0.12
Diploma_25-64: Upper secondary	0.26	0.16	0.26	0.27	0.20	0.27	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.21	0.23	0.21
Diploma_25-64: Post secondary	0.26	0.30	0.26	0.29	0.31	0.29	0.28	0.38	0.27	0.33	0.36	0.33
Urbanity: Cities	0.47	0.52	0.47	0.37	0.47	0.37	0.52	0.58	0.52	0.40	0.41	0.40
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.40	0.35	0.40	0.22	0.27	0.22	0.42	0.43	0.42
Urbanity: Rural	0.34	0.29	0.34	0.23	0.18	0.23	0.26	0.15	0.26	0.18	0.16	0.18
Employment_18-64: Inactive	0.20	0.19	0.18	0.15	0.14	0.11	0.20	0.13	0.12	0.16	0.16	0.17
Employment_18-64: Unemployed	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.11	0.12	0.02	0.03	0.04
Vote: Left	0.23	0.19	0.21	0.37	0.44	0.44	0.33	0.37	0.38	0.25	0.28	0.29
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.26	0.30	0.29	0.28	0.27	0.29	0.18	0.24	0.24	0.36	0.44	0.41
Vote: Far right	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.01	0.03	0.03

*Note:* This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. In this Table, weights are defined at the country level. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

<sup>2139</sup> Similar tables for the global surveys can be found in [Dechezleprêtre et al. \(2022\)](#).

<sup>2140</sup> H Attrition analysis

Table S11: Attrition analysis for the US1 survey.

	Dropped out	Dropped out after socio-eco	Failed attention test	Duration (in min)	Duration below 4 min
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mean	0.08	0.059	0.082	21.198	0.016
Income quartile: 2	0.025*** (0.010)	0.025*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.740 (3.064)	-0.009 (0.006)
Income quartile: 3	0.062*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.754 (2.813)	-0.004 (0.007)
Income quartile: 4	0.035*** (0.011)	0.035*** (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-3.917 (2.798)	-0.003 (0.007)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.039*** (0.009)	0.039*** (0.009)	-0.000*** (0.000)	1.544 (2.665)	0.006 (0.006)
Age: 25-34	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.597 (2.604)	-0.031** (0.013)
Age: 35-49	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.824 (3.176)	-0.032** (0.013)
Age: 50-64	-0.060*** (0.015)	-0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	5.723** (2.763)	-0.039*** (0.012)
Age: 65+	0.048*** (0.017)	0.048*** (0.017)	0.000** (0.000)	8.952** (4.267)	-0.047*** (0.012)
Gender: Man	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.451 (2.210)	-0.0001 (0.005)
Urban	0.006 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.888** (2.443)	-0.004 (0.006)
Race: Black	0.020** (0.010)	0.020** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	8.554*** (2.600)	0.004 (0.007)
Race: Hispanic	0.021** (0.010)	0.021** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.119* (2.293)	-0.002 (0.007)
Region: Northeast	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-4.862 (4.782)	-0.004 (0.007)
Region: South	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-1.151 (4.710)	-0.004 (0.006)
Region: West	0.006 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-4.000 (4.305)	-0.003 (0.007)
Vote: Biden	-0.048*** (0.008)	-0.048*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-2.901 (2.379)	-0.009 (0.007)
Vote: Trump	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.145 (2.878)	-0.005 (0.008)
Observations	5,719	5,719	3,252	3,044	3,044
R <sup>2</sup>	0.127	0.127	1.000	0.006	0.017

Table S12: Attrition analysis for the US2 survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 4 min (5)
Mean	0.095	0.074	0.092	16.338	0.052
Income quartile: 2	0.023* (0.013)	0.023* (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	1.352 (1.601)	-0.029** (0.014)
Income quartile: 3	0.054*** (0.014)	0.054*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	8.502 (9.649)	-0.009 (0.016)
Income quartile: 4	0.060*** (0.016)	0.060*** (0.016)	-0.000 (0.000)	5.254 (3.376)	0.0003 (0.017)
Diploma: Post secondary	-0.033*** (0.011)	-0.033*** (0.011)	0.000 (0.000)	1.601 (2.630)	0.012 (0.011)
Age: 25-34	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.929 (1.535)	-0.032 (0.024)
Age: 35-49	0.012 (0.014)	0.012 (0.014)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.076 (6.651)	-0.047** (0.022)
Age: 50-64	0.040*** (0.014)	0.040*** (0.014)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.364 (1.565)	-0.079*** (0.022)
Age: 65+	0.115*** (0.017)	0.115*** (0.017)	-0.000*** (0.000)	2.619 (3.150)	-0.095*** (0.022)
Gender: Man	-0.073*** (0.009)	-0.073*** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	4.707 (6.037)	0.010 (0.010)
Urban	0.019* (0.011)	0.019* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	1.766 (1.135)	0.005 (0.012)
Race: Black	0.060*** (0.015)	0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.673 (13.328)	-0.010 (0.015)
Race: Hispanic	0.079*** (0.014)	0.079*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	2.930 (1.813)	-0.027** (0.012)
Region: Northeast	-0.026* (0.014)	-0.026* (0.014)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.837 (2.855)	-0.011 (0.015)
Region: South	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.000 (0.000)	3.220 (5.002)	0.009 (0.014)
Region: West	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.000 (0.000)	-1.759 (1.942)	-0.009 (0.015)
Vote: Biden	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	3.230 (2.731)	-0.006 (0.014)
Vote: Trump	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.554 (1.272)	0.007 (0.016)
Observations	2,973	2,973	2,280	2,103	2,103
R <sup>2</sup>	0.241	0.241	1.000	0.010	0.031

Table S13: Attrition analysis for the *Eu* survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 6 min (5)
Mean	0.067	0.044	0.151	54.602	0.039
Country: Germany	0.023** (0.010)	0.019** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.533 (18.906)	0.019* (0.010)
Country: Spain	-0.102*** (0.011)	-0.098*** (0.011)	0.000* (0.000)	-29.136* (15.948)	0.010 (0.010)
Country: United Kingdom	0.042*** (0.011)	0.043*** (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-7.458 (18.046)	0.010 (0.010)
Income quartile: 2	0.032*** (0.010)	0.029*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	32.749* (19.771)	-0.015 (0.010)
Income quartile: 3	0.049*** (0.010)	0.047*** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	6.130 (11.734)	-0.021** (0.010)
Income quartile: 4	0.024** (0.011)	0.021* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.659 (19.955)	-0.018* (0.011)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.035*** (0.008)	0.034*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	10.647 (12.959)	-0.007 (0.007)
Age: 25-34	0.028** (0.013)	0.025* (0.013)	-0.000*** (0.000)	36.132 (22.285)	-0.005 (0.018)
Age: 35-49	0.064*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	-0.000*** (0.000)	37.159** (17.190)	-0.013 (0.016)
Age: 50-64	0.085*** (0.013)	0.083*** (0.013)	-0.000 (0.000)	48.363** (22.526)	-0.063*** (0.015)
Age: 65+	0.117*** (0.014)	0.115*** (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	36.351** (14.226)	-0.061*** (0.015)
Gender: Man	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-22.980 (14.093)	0.009 (0.007)
Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs	0.006 (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-16.736 (17.256)	0.004 (0.008)
Degree of urbanization: Rural	0.023** (0.009)	0.023** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	-14.593 (19.733)	-0.001 (0.009)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.025*** (0.005)	-0.025*** (0.005)	0.000*** (0.000)	-17.558 (13.143)	0.019** (0.008)
Vote: Far right	0.005 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.000*** (0.000)	15.838 (32.281)	0.029** (0.014)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	0.023*** (0.006)	0.022*** (0.005)	0.000 (0.000)	24.631 (19.824)	0.030*** (0.010)
Observations	3,963	3,963	3,326	3,115	3,115
R <sup>2</sup>	0.406	0.395	1.000	0.006	0.028

<sup>2141</sup> I Balance analysis

Table S14: Balance analysis.

	List contains: G (1)	Branch petition: NR (2)	Branch donation: Own nation (3)	Branch conjoint 3: with GCS (4)
Mean	0.496	0.493	0.5	0.499
Country: Germany	-0.026 (0.026)	0.017 (0.026)	0.020 (0.026)	0.005 (0.026)
Country: Spain	0.025 (0.030)	0.026 (0.030)	0.026 (0.030)	0.043 (0.030)
Country: United Kingdom	0.002 (0.028)	0.018 (0.028)	0.037 (0.028)	0.063** (0.028)
Country: United States	-0.001 (0.024)	0.019 (0.024)	0.007 (0.024)	0.023 (0.024)
Income quartile: 2	-0.013 (0.021)	-0.024 (0.021)	0.012 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.021)
Income quartile: 3	0.021 (0.022)	-0.005 (0.022)	0.011 (0.022)	-0.004 (0.022)
Income quartile: 4	-0.001 (0.023)	-0.017 (0.023)	-0.013 (0.023)	0.0001 (0.023)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.008 (0.016)	0.014 (0.016)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.016)
Age: 25-34	0.023 (0.031)	-0.049 (0.031)	-0.003 (0.031)	-0.009 (0.031)
Age: 35-49	0.032 (0.030)	-0.002 (0.030)	-0.014 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.030)
Age: 50-64	0.030 (0.030)	-0.005 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.030)	-0.020 (0.030)
Age: 65+	0.029 (0.037)	-0.037 (0.037)	-0.015 (0.037)	-0.012 (0.037)
Gender: Man	0.024 (0.015)	0.012 (0.015)	0.002 (0.015)	-0.016 (0.015)
Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.0005 (0.017)	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.011 (0.017)
Degree of urbanization: Rural	0.013 (0.024)	0.017 (0.024)	-0.004 (0.024)	0.027 (0.024)
Employment status: Retired	-0.005 (0.032)	-0.031 (0.032)	-0.034 (0.032)	-0.016 (0.032)
Employment status: Student	0.005 (0.044)	-0.023 (0.044)	-0.033 (0.044)	-0.025 (0.044)
Employment status: Working	0.010 (0.024)	-0.027 (0.024)	-0.033 (0.024)	-0.012 (0.024)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.004 (0.017)	0.003 (0.017)	0.010 (0.017)	0.002 (0.017)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	0.001 (0.019)	0.014 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.019)	-0.012 (0.019)
Vote: Far right	0.009 (0.034)	0.030 (0.034)	0.023 (0.035)	0.038 (0.034)
Observations	5,991	5,991	5,991	5,991
R <sup>2</sup>	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.003

<sup>2142</sup> J Placebo tests

Table S15: Placebo tests.

	G+R+C preferred to R+C (1)	Supports G+R+C (2)	Signs petition (3)	Share of policies supported (4)	Conjoint 5 A+CGS preferred to B (5)
Mean	0.645	0.633	0.611	0.535	0.596
Branch of list experiment: l	-0.013 (0.019)	-0.024 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.018 (0.021)
Branch of list experiment: rgl	0.005 (0.019)	0.006 (0.019)	-0.002 (0.019)	0.001 (0.012)	0.010 (0.021)
Branch of list experiment: rl	-0.009 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.019)	0.022 (0.019)	0.007 (0.012)	0.007 (0.021)
Branch of petition: nr	0.011 (0.014)	0.006 (0.014)	0.022 (0.014)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.015)
Poor is in own country	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.014)	0.015 (0.014)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.020 (0.015)
Observations	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	5,218
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0004	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001

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