

# **1** Contents

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## 32 Main text figures and tables

33 For each figure, the captions refer to the figure's filename and to the questionnaire's question.  
 34 The figures' folders are `figures/country_comparison` (for PDFs) and  
 35 `xlsx/country_comparison` (for data tables), except when the filename contains a folder  
 36 name (which then replaces `country_comparison`). The repository (for code, data, and  
 37 figures) is [github.com/bixiou/international\\_attitudes\\_toward\\_global\\_policies](https://github.com/bixiou/international_attitudes_toward_global_policies).

Figure 1: Structure of Western survey, cf. also Figure S41 for the treatment branches (questionnaire/survey\_flow-simple).





Figure 2: Relative Support for global climate policies  
(OECD/Heatplot\_global\_tax\_attitudes\_share).



Note 1: The numbers represent *relative* support, i.e. the share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* among non-*indifferent* answers (in percent,  $n = 40,680$ ). Shares of indifferent answers range from 11% to 48%, with quartiles 20%, 27%, and 33%. The color blue denotes a relative majority. See Figure S4 for the absolute support. (Questions A-I).

Note 2: \*In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

Table 1: Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list. The tacit support for the GCS is estimated by regressing the number of supported policies on the presence of the GCS in the list of policies. The social desirability is estimated as the difference between the tacit and stated support (see Methods), and it is not significantly different from zero even at a 20% threshold (as shown by the 80% Confidence Interval).

	Number of supported policies		
	All	U.S.	Europe
List contains: GCS	0.624*** (0.028)	0.524*** (0.041)	0.724*** (0.036)
<i>Support for GCS</i>	0.65	0.542	0.757
<i>Social desirability bias</i>	-0.026	-0.019	-0.033
<i>80% C.I. for the bias</i>	[-0.06; 0.01]	[-0.07; 0.04]	[-0.08; 0.01]
Constant	1.317	1.147	1.486
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000
R <sup>2</sup>	0.089	0.065	0.125

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 2: Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. (Question 28)

	Prefers the Progressive platform					
	All	United States	France	Germany	UK	Spain
GCS in Progressive platform	0.028*	0.029	0.112***	0.015	0.008	-0.015
P-value	0.057	0.185	0.007	0.647	0.844	0.698
t	1.90	1.33	2.73	0.46	0.20	-0.39
95% C.I.	[-.00; .06]	[-.01; .07]	[.03; .19]	[-.05; .08]	[-.07; .09]	[-.09; .06]
Constant	0.623	0.604	0.55	0.7	0.551	0.775
Observations	5,202	2,619	605	813	661	504
R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.001	0.013	0.0003	0.0001	0.0003

Note: Simple OLS model with robust standard errors (HC1). The 14% of *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples. GCS has no significant influence on them. \*p < 0.1; \*\*p < 0.05; \*\*\*p < 0.01.

Figure 3: Relative support for various global policies. (percentage of *somewhat* or *strong support*, after excluding *indifferent* answers; \*except for GCS: percentage of Yes in a Yes/No question, preferred share: percentage of answers  $\geq 30\%$ , and foreign aid: percentage of unconditional or conditional increase rather than decrease or stable aid). Shares of indifferent answers range from 10% to 40%, with quartiles 19%, 25%, and 32%. (support\_likert\_all\_share; p. 63, Questions 20, 36, 43, 44, and 45; See Figure S26 for the absolute support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)*	54	76	80	71	81	74
National tax on millionaires funding public services	73	85	81	87	89	88
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	69	84	84	84	87	83
Preferred share of global wealth tax for low-income countries: 30% or more*	50	54	53	50	57	54
[Country]'s foreign aid should be increased*	60	64	63	68	69	56
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	60	76	77	79	79	71
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	68	82	82	82	85	81
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	55	71	72	70	79	70
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	46	53	53	43	62	61
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	58	71	69	69	78	72
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	62	73	58	73	80	83
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	63	80	80	78	81	83
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	62	87	90	86	91	87
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	46	62	58	62	65	67

Table ED1: Effects on the support for the GCS of a question on its pros and cons (either in open-ended or closed format) and on information about the actual support, in the U.S. (See Section D in the US2 Questionnaire)

	Support			
	Global Climate Scheme		National Redistribution	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Control group mean	0.557	0.557	0.569	0.569
Treatment: Open-ended field on GCS pros & cons	-0.073** (0.035)	-0.073** (0.031)	-0.035 (0.035)	-0.031 (0.032)
Treatment: Closed questions on GCS pros & cons	-0.109*** (0.034)	-0.096*** (0.031)	-0.065* (0.034)	-0.062** (0.031)
Treatment: Info on actual support for GCS and NR	-0.021 (0.034)	-0.017 (0.031)	0.048 (0.033)	0.054* (0.031)
Includes controls		✓		✓
Observations	2,000	1,995	2,000	1,995
R <sup>2</sup>	0.007	0.169	0.007	0.153

Table ED2: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality. (Question 33)

	Donation to poor people (in %)			
	All	US	US	Eu
Poor is in own country	0.590 (0.799)	2.509** (1.152)	0.046 (1.691)	-1.349 (1.108)
Poor is in own country × Vote: <i>not</i> Biden			3.954* (2.279)	
Mean	34.034	33.658	33.658	34.41
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000	3,000
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0001	0.002	0.034	0.0005

Table ED3: Average Marginal Component Effects of global policies.


	Effect	Obs.	t	P-value	95% C.I.
FR; Global Climate Plan	0.13***	1456	3.5	$5 \cdot 10^{-4}$	[0.06; 0.21]
DE; Global Climate Plan	0.09**	1958	2.8	0.005	[0.03; 0.16]
ES; Global Climate Plan	0.04	1086	0.82	0.411	[-0.05; 0.12]
UK; Global Climate Plan	0.09*	1498	2.31	0.021	[0.01; 0.16]
US; Global Climate Plan	0.01	4436	0.61	0.539	[-0.03; 0.06]
FR; Global Millionaire Tax	0.11*	1456	2.49	0.013	[0.02; 0.2]
DE; Global Millionaire Tax	0.09*	1958	2.3	0.022	[0.01; 0.18]
ES; Global Millionaire Tax	0.05	1086	0.91	0.365	[-0.06; 0.16]
UK; Global Millionaire Tax	0.13**	1498	2.86	0.004	[0.04; 0.22]
US; Global Millionaire Tax	0.09**	4436	3.16	0.002	[0.03; 0.14]
FR; Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change	0.12*	1456	2.52	0.012	[0.03; 0.21]
DE; Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change	0.1*	1958	2.52	0.012	[0.02; 0.18]
ES; Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change	-0.01	1086	-0.22	0.829	[-0.12; 0.1]
UK; Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change	0.07	1498	1.56	0.12	[-0.02; 0.17]
US; Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change	0.08**	4436	2.93	0.003	[0.03; 0.13]

Figure ED1: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See non-translated versions in Figure S9; [country]/ca\_r; Question 29)


(a) U.S. (Asked only to non-Republicans)




(b) France



### (c) Germany



### (d) Spain



### (e) UK




Figure ED2: Influence of the GCS on preferred platform:  
 Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percent). (conjoint\_left\_ag\_b\_binary\_positive; Question 30; in the U.S., asked only to non-Republicans.)




Figure ED3: Beliefs regarding the support for the GCS and NR. (belief\_all\_mean; Questions 21 and 23)




Figure ED4: Percent of global wealth tax that should finance low-income countries (*mean*).  
 “Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all countries around the world. (...) What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of retained in the country’s national budget)?” (global\_tax\_global\_share\_mean; Question 36)




Figure ED5: Attitudes regarding the evolution of [own country] foreign aid.  
(foreign\_aid\_raise\_support; Question 45)




Figure ED6: Conditions at which foreign aid should be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish an increase of foreign aid at some conditions.]  
(foreign\_aid\_condition\_positive; Question 46)




Figure ED7: Reasons why foreign aid should not be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish a decrease or stability of foreign aid.] (foreign\_aid\_no\_positive; Question 47)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Aid perpetuates poverty as it makes people feel less responsible for themselves	29	30	31	35	31	24
Aid is not effective as most of it is diverted	40	53	48	57	60	49
Aid is a pressure tactic for high-income countries that prevents low-income countries from developing freely	16	16	15	14	23	13
[Country] is not responsible for what happens in other countries	45	30	28	30	20	37
Charity begins at home: there is already a lot to do to support the [country] people in need	63	63	51	62	71	69

38 **A Literature review**

39 **A.1 Attitudes and perceptions**

40 **A.1.1 Population attitudes on global policies**

41 Using representative samples in 125 countries covering 96% of the world's greenhouse  
42 gas emissions, Andre et al. (2024) show that 69% of the global population express willingness  
43 to contribute 1% of their income to fight global warming.<sup>1</sup> Carattini et al. (2019) test  
44 the support for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples in five countries, representative  
45 along gender and age. For a given variant, the sample size is about 167 respondents per country.  
46 They find over 80% support for any variant in India, between 50% and 65% in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43% to 59% in the U.S., depending on the  
47 variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding an equal dividend for each  
48 human is close to 50% in high-income countries (e.g., at 44% in the U.S.), consistently  
49 with our results from the *Global* survey (see Figure 2). This is another piece of evidence  
50 that the support is lower for a tax that would "only" reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions than for a  
51 quota that would unambiguously achieve the climate target. In a survey over 15 countries,  
52 Bloodworth & Callegari (2023) find 73% agreement to tax fossil fuel companies and  
53 finance climate action in poorer countries. Using a conjoint analysis in the U.S. and Germany,  
54 Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019) find that the support for a carbon tax increases  
55 by up to 50% if it applies to all industrialized countries rather than exclusively to one's  
56 own country.

58 In surveys conducted in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S., Ghassim (2020)  
59 finds support ranging from 55% to 74% for "a global democracy including both a global  
60 government and a global parliament, directly elected by the world population, to recom-  
61 mend and implement policies on global issues". Ghassim & Pauli (2024) also finds strong  
62 support for a democratic world government in surveys over 17 countries. Furthermore,  
63 through an experiment, Ghassim (2020) finds that, in countries where the government  
64 stems from a coalition, voting shares would shift by 8 (Brazil) to 12 p.p. (Germany) from  
65 parties who are said to oppose global democracy to parties that supposedly support it.  
66 For instance, when Germans respondents were told that (only) the Greens and the Left  
67 support global democracy, these parties gained respectively 9 and 3 p.p. in vote inten-  
68 tions, while the SPD and the CDU-CSU each lost 6 p.p. Ghassim (2020) also presents

---

<sup>1</sup>However, Ipsos (2023) find no majority support when the amount is not specified, despite strong agreement for own individual action.

69 survey results showing strong majorities in favor of the direct election of one's country's  
70 UN representative in all 18 surveyed countries. Similarly, in each of 10 countries, there  
71 are clear majorities in favor of "a new supranational entity [taking] enforceable global de-  
72 cisions in order to solve global risks" (Global Challenges Foundation 2018). Remarkably,  
73 already in 1946, 54% of Americans agreed (while 24% disagreed) that "the UN should be  
74 strengthened to make it a world government with the power to control the armed forces  
75 of all nations" (Gallup 1946). Furthermore, in surveys conducted in Argentina, China,  
76 India, Russia, Spain, and the U.S., Ghassim et al. (2022) find majority support for UN  
77 reforms that would make United Nations' decisions binding, give veto powers to a few  
78 other major countries at the Security Council, or complement the highest body of the UN  
79 with a chamber of directly elected representatives.

80 Relatedly, Meilland et al. (2024) find that both Americans and French people prefer  
81 an international settlement of climate justice, even if it encroaches on sovereignty. In a  
82 2013 survey conducted in China, Germany, and the U.S., Schleich et al. (2016) show that  
83 over three-quarter of people think that international climate agreements reached so far  
84 are not successful and that future agreements are important. In Finland, Sivonen (2022)  
85 finds that that support for a carbon tax is higher if implemented at the global level (54%)  
86 rather than at the national level (40%).

87 The results from these specific questions are in line with the answers to more gen-  
88 eral questions. In each of 36 countries, ISSP (2010) find near consensus that "for envi-  
89 ronmental problems, there should be international agreements that [their country] and  
90 other countries should be made to follow" (overall, 82% agree and 4% disagree). In each  
91 of 29 countries, ISSP (2019) uncover near consensus that "Present economic differences  
92 between rich and poor countries are too large" (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree).  
93 Leiserowitz et al. (2021) reveal that 66% of Americans support providing "financial aid  
94 and technical support to developing countries that agree to limit their greenhouse gas  
95 emissions." Fehr et al. (2022) find that 90% of Germans want some degree of global redis-  
96 tribution.

### 97 A.1.2 Population attitudes on climate burden sharing

98 Despite differences in the description of fairness principles, surveys on burden-  
99 sharing rules show consistent attitudes. Or at least, their seemingly contradictory re-  
100 sults can be made compatible with the following interpretation: Concerning emissions  
101 reductions, most people want that every country engage in strong and collective decar-

<sup>102</sup> bonization efforts, with a global quota converging to climate neutrality in the medium  
<sup>103</sup> run. Concerning the financial effort, most people support high-emitting countries pay-  
<sup>104</sup> ing and low-income countries receiving funding. The most supported rules are those  
<sup>105</sup> perceived as equitable, in particular an equal right to emit per person.

<sup>106</sup> This interpretation helps to understand the apparent differences between articles that  
<sup>107</sup> approach burden sharing from different angles: cost sharing (in money terms), effort shar-  
<sup>108</sup> ing (in terms of emissions reductions), or resource sharing (in terms of rights to emit).  
<sup>109</sup> Existing papers adopt either the cost sharing or effort sharing approach, which preclude  
<sup>110</sup> any country from being a net receiver of funds. Also, by focusing on *either* the financial  
<sup>111</sup> or the decarbonization effort, these surveys miss the other half of the picture, which can  
<sup>112</sup> explain why some papers find strong support for the ability-to-pay principle while others  
<sup>113</sup> find strong support for grandfathering (defined as emissions reductions being the same  
<sup>114</sup> in every country). The literature follows these approaches to align with the notions used  
<sup>115</sup> by the UNFCCC. Yet, we argue that the resource sharing approach is preferable for un-  
<sup>116</sup> covering attitudes, as it unambiguously describes the distributive implications of each  
<sup>117</sup> rule while achieving an efficient geographical distribution of emissions reductions and  
<sup>118</sup> explicitly allowing for monetary gains for some countries.

<sup>119</sup> Now, let us summarize the results of the different papers in the light of this clarifica-  
<sup>120</sup> tion. [Schleich et al. \(2016\)](#) find an identical ranking of support for burden-sharing prin-  
<sup>121</sup> ciples in China, Germany, and the U.S.: polluter-pays followed by ability-to-pay, equal  
<sup>122</sup> emissions per capita, and grandfathering. Note that the authors do not allow for emis-  
<sup>123</sup> sions trading in their description of equal *emissions per capita*, which may explain its rel-  
<sup>124</sup> atively low support. Yet, the relative support for egalitarianism also depends on how  
<sup>125</sup> *the other* rules are described. Indeed, [Carlsson et al. \(2011\)](#) find that Swedes prefer that  
<sup>126</sup> “all countries are allowed to emit an equal amount per capita” rather than options where  
<sup>127</sup> emissions are reduced based on current or historical emissions, for which it is explicitly  
<sup>128</sup> stated that high-emitting countries “will continue to emit more than others”. [Bechtel &](#)  
<sup>129</sup> [Scheve \(2013\)](#) find agreement that rich countries should pay more and historical emis-  
<sup>130</sup> sions should matter, but that efforts should not be solely borne by wealthy nations. More  
<sup>131</sup> precisely, their conjoint analysis conducted in France, Germany, the UK, and the U.S.  
<sup>132</sup> shows that a climate agreement is 15 p.p. more likely to be preferred (to a random alter-  
<sup>133</sup> native) if it includes 160 countries rather than 20, and 5 p.p. less likely to be preferred  
<sup>134</sup> if “only rich countries pay” compared to other burden-sharing rules: “rich countries pay  
<sup>135</sup> more than poor”, “countries pay proportional to current emissions” or “countries pay

<sup>136</sup> proportional to historical emissions". In Germany and the U.S., [Gampfer et al. \(2014\)](#) also  
<sup>137</sup> find stronger support for funding climate action in low-income countries when cost is  
<sup>138</sup> shared with other countries. Using a choice experiment, [Carlsson et al. \(2013\)](#) find that the  
<sup>139</sup> least preferred option in China and the U.S. is when low-emitting countries are exempted  
<sup>140</sup> from any effort. Ability-to-pay is appreciated in both countries and is the preferred op-  
<sup>141</sup> tion in the U.S., though the preferred option in China is another one that accounts for  
<sup>142</sup> historical responsibility. In the U.S. and France, [Meilland et al. \(2024\)](#) find that the most  
<sup>143</sup> favored fairness principle is that "all countries commit to converge to the same average  
<sup>144</sup> of total emissions per inhabitant, compatible with a controlled climate change". Further-  
<sup>145</sup> more, in each country, 73% disagree with grandfathering defined as "countries which  
<sup>146</sup> emitted a lot of carbon in the past have a right to continue emitting more than others in  
<sup>147</sup> the future". The study by [Meilland et al. \(2024\)](#) contains many other results: for instance,  
<sup>148</sup> majorities prefer to hold countries accountable for their consumption-based rather than  
<sup>149</sup> territorial emissions, and the median choice regarding historical responsibility is to hold  
<sup>150</sup> a country accountable for its post-1990 emissions (rather than post-1850 or just their cur-  
<sup>151</sup> rent emissions). Finally, in each of 28 (among the largest) countries, [Dabla-Norris et al.](#)  
<sup>152</sup> ([2023](#)) find strong majority for "all countries" to the question "Which countries do you  
<sup>153</sup> think should be paying to reduce carbon emissions?". When asked to choose between a  
<sup>154</sup> cost sharing based on *current* vs. *accumulated historic emissions*, a majority prefers *current*  
<sup>155</sup> *emissions* in all countries but China and Saudi Arabia (where the two options are close to  
<sup>156</sup> equally preferred).

### <sup>157</sup> A.1.3 Population attitudes on foreign aid

<sup>158</sup> There is an extensive literature on attitudes towards foreign aid in donor countries.  
<sup>159</sup> The key findings indicate that most people overestimate the amount of foreign aid and  
<sup>160</sup> that only a minority wants a cut in foreign aid compared to actual amounts, especially  
<sup>161</sup> once they become aware of them.

<sup>162</sup> For instance, [PIPA \(2001\)](#) shows that 83% of Americans support a multilateral effort  
<sup>163</sup> to cut world hunger in half. [PIPA \(2008\)](#) shows that in each of 20 countries, a majority  
<sup>164</sup> thinks that developed countries "have a moral responsibility to work to reduce hunger  
<sup>165</sup> and severe poverty in poor countries", with an average agreement of 81%. In 7 OECD  
<sup>166</sup> countries, the study finds that at least 75% of respondents are willing to pay for a pro-  
<sup>167</sup> gram to cut hunger in half (at an estimated cost of, e.g., \$50 a year for each American).  
<sup>168</sup> Eurobarometer data shows majority support to comply with the promise to increase aid

169 (Cho 2024).

170 Kaufmann et al. (2019) find that perceived aid is overestimated in each of the 24 coun-  
171 tries they study, on average by a factor of 7. In most countries, desired aid is larger than  
172 perceived aid.<sup>2</sup> They show that individuals in the top income quintile desire aid 0.13  
173 p.p. lower than those in the bottom 40% – which is very close to what we find. By em-  
174 ploying a theoretical model and examining correlations between lobbying and actual aid  
175 (controling for desired aid), they argue that the gap between actual and desired aid stems  
176 from the political influence of the rich who defend their vested interests. In Kaufmann  
177 et al. (2012), the U.S. is an outlier: desired aid is at the other countries' average (3% of  
178 GNI), but as misperceptions are enormous, perceived aid is twice as large as desired aid.  
179 Indeed, Gilens (2001) shows that even Americans with high political knowledge misper-  
180 ceive actual aid, and finds that 17% fewer of them want to cut aid when we provide them  
181 specific information about the amount of aid. Similarly, Nair (2018) finds that the rela-  
182 tively low support for aid in the U.S. is driven by information on global distribution, as  
183 people underestimate their rank by 27 centiles on average and overestimate the global  
184 median income by a factor 10. This could explain why in the 2000–2004 waves of the GSS,  
185 over 60 percent of Americans state that the government is spending too much on foreign  
186 aid (Okten & Osili 2007).

187 Hudson & van Heerde (2012) provide a critical review of the literature and show that  
188 the strong support for poverty alleviation largely stems from intrinsic altruism. They note  
189 that, according to DFID (2009) and PIPA (2001), 47% of British people find that the aid  
190 is wasted (mainly due to corruption), while Americans estimate that less than a quarter  
191 of the aid reaches those in need, with over half ending up in the hands of corrupt gov-  
192 ernment officials. Despite these perceptions, most people still support aid, suggesting  
193 the presence of nonutilitarian motives. Consistent with Henson et al. (2010), Bauhr et al.  
194 (2013) find that support for aid is reduced by the perception of corruption in recipient  
195 countries. However, this effect is mitigated by the aid-corruption paradox: countries with  
196 higher levels of corruption often need more help. Bodenstein & Faust (2017) further show  
197 that right-wing Europeans, as well as those who perceive strong corruption in their coun-  
198 try, are more likely to agree that recipient countries should “follow certain rules regarding  
199 democracy, human rights and governance as a condition for receiving EU development  
200 aid.” Using a 2002 Gallup survey and the 2006 World Values Survey, and in line with

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<sup>2</sup>Kaufmann et al. (2012) offer the best results on desired aid because (as Hudson & van Heerde (2012) criticize), other studies did not take into account misperceptions of actual aid.

<sup>201</sup> Heinrich et al. (2018) in the U.S., Bayram (2017) and Paxton & Knack (2012) show that the  
<sup>202</sup> main determinants for wanting more aid are trust, left-wing ideology, interest in politics,  
<sup>203</sup> and being a woman (all positively associated).

<sup>204</sup> While foreign aid is generally unilateral, discretionary, and often used as a bargaining  
<sup>205</sup> chip, global redistribution is conceived as multilateral, rule-based, and with dedicated  
<sup>206</sup> funding. Our paper finds much stronger support for global redistributive policies than  
<sup>207</sup> for increased foreign aid. The difference in attitudes between unilateral foreign aid and  
<sup>208</sup> global policies is consistent with the literature on foreign aid. Indeed, it can be explained  
<sup>209</sup> by the observation that people prefer multilateral policies and often view foreign aid as  
<sup>210</sup> inefficient in reducing poverty. Therefore, we contribute to the theory of attitudes towards  
<sup>211</sup> global transfers by showing that when such transfers are multilateral and trusted to be  
<sup>212</sup> effective, they would be largely supported.

#### <sup>213</sup> A.1.4 Population attitudes on taxes on the rich

<sup>214</sup> We are not aware of any previous survey on a global wealth tax,<sup>3</sup> though surveys  
<sup>215</sup> consistently show strong support for national wealth taxes. In a comprehensive survey  
<sup>216</sup> conducted in the UK, Rowlingson et al. (2021) show that a wealth tax is the preferred  
<sup>217</sup> option for raising revenues. Only 8% of respondents state that total net wealth should not  
<sup>218</sup> be taxed (with little differences between Labour and Conservative voters). The study also  
<sup>219</sup> finds that the preferred design would be a 1% or 3% tax on net wealth above £1 million. By  
<sup>220</sup> asking how much taxes per year should a person with a certain income and wealth level  
<sup>221</sup> pay, Fisman et al. (2017) finds that the average American favors a 0.8% linear tax rate  
<sup>222</sup> on unspecified wealth up to \$2 million (the highest wealth level tested), and a 3% linear  
<sup>223</sup> rate on inherited wealth. Through a conjoint analysis conducted in three high-income  
<sup>224</sup> countries, Schechtl & Tisch (2023) find widespread support for a wealth tax (from 78% in  
<sup>225</sup> the U.S. to 86% in Germany and the UK), with a preference for an exemption threshold  
<sup>226</sup> set at \$/€1 million (rather than 500,000 or 2 million) with the tax rate and tax unit having  
<sup>227</sup> little influence on the preferred design. In 21 OECD countries, the OECD (2019) uncovers  
<sup>228</sup> strong majority support for higher taxes on the rich to support the poor, with nearly  
<sup>229</sup> 70% overall agreement and less than 20% disagreement. Isbell (2022) finds similarly high  
<sup>230</sup> level of support in 34 African countries. In the UK, Patriotic Millionaires (2022) find 69%  
<sup>231</sup> support (and 7% opposition) for a 1.1% tax on wealth in excess of £10 million. In the

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<sup>3</sup>We did not find any using the combination of “survey” or “attitudes” with “wealth tax” or “global wealth tax” in Google Scholar.

<sup>232</sup> U.S., [Americans for Tax Fairness \(2021\)](#) find that 67% to 71% of the respondents support  
<sup>233</sup> to “raise taxes for those earning more than \$400,000 a year”, “raise the income tax rate  
<sup>234</sup> for those earning over \$1 million a year by 10 percentage points”, or “apply a 2% tax on  
<sup>235</sup> an individual’s wealth above \$50 million each year, and 3% on wealth above \$1 billion”.  
<sup>236</sup> [Patriotic Millionaires \(2024\)](#) indicate that millionaires themselves agree to be taxed: out  
<sup>237</sup> of 2,385 millionaires contacted through wealth councillors, 74% support “increased tax on  
<sup>238</sup> very wealthy individuals” and 58% support a 2% wealth tax above \$10 million. Finally,  
<sup>239</sup> in surveys in Germany and the U.S., [Ferreira et al. \(2024\)](#) finds strong majority support  
<sup>240</sup> for a limit on income or wealth.

#### <sup>241</sup> A.1.5 Population attitudes on ethical norms

<sup>242</sup> As argued by [Nyborg et al. \(2016\)](#), social norms can be the solution to the collective  
<sup>243</sup> action problem. As such, universalistic values and free-riding attitudes are key.

<sup>244</sup> **Universalism** Various studies have examined the concept of global identity (see [Rey-](#)  
<sup>245</sup> [sen & Katzarska-Miller \(2018\)](#) for a review). In the 2005-2008 wave of the World Values  
<sup>246</sup> Survey, [Bayram \(2015\)](#) notes that “78% of the participants in 57 countries see themselves  
<sup>247</sup> as citizens of the world”, though the [2017-2022 wave](#) reveals that more people feel close  
<sup>248</sup> to their town, region or country than to the world. [Nation \(2024\)](#) finds large variation  
<sup>249</sup> across 21 countries, as 31% to 88% of respondents (excluding *indifferent* answers) consider  
<sup>250</sup> themselves “more a world citizen than a citizen of [their] country” (with similar shares  
<sup>251</sup> agreeing that “[their] taxes should go towards solving global problems”).

<sup>252</sup> [Enke et al. \(2023\)](#) measure universalism at the U.S. district level using donation data,  
<sup>253</sup> and find that a district’s universalism predicts electoral outcomes better than its income  
<sup>254</sup> or education level. To measure universalism at the individual level, [Enke et al. \(2023\)](#)  
<sup>255</sup> ask American respondents to split \$100 between a random stranger and a random person  
<sup>256</sup> with the same income but closer to them. They distinguish different facets of universal-  
<sup>257</sup> ism, and define *foreign universalism* as the inclination to give to a foreigner rather than a  
<sup>258</sup> fellow citizen. They find a home bias for most people, which could partly be attributed to  
<sup>259</sup> concerns about inequality, as the split involves two persons with the same income, with  
<sup>260</sup> the foreigner most certainly living in a poorer country than the American and thus en-  
<sup>261</sup> joying a higher social status. That being said, a home bias probably remains even after  
<sup>262</sup> accounting for concerns about inequality: [Prather \(2013\)](#) also finds a home bias in the  
<sup>263</sup> U.S., and 84% of Americans agree that “taking care of problems at home is more impor-

tant than giving aid to foreign countries" (PIPA 2001). Enke et al. (2023) also measure universalism and analyze its correlates in 7 countries, and Cappelen et al. (2022) deploy this method in 60 countries. In a lab experiment with students in the U.S., Cherry et al. (2017) show that a substantial share of people prefer policies detrimental to them due to their egalitarian worldview. Leiserowitz (2006) shows that 68% of Americans are most concerned about the impacts of climate change on "people all over the world" (50%) or "non-human nature" (18%) rather than themselves and their family (12%) or the U.S. (9%).<sup>4</sup> A 2017 survey by Focus 2030 shows that 40% of French people agree "fighting poverty in developing countries should be one of the priorities of the European Union" while only 19% disagree. Waytz et al. (2019) show that left-leaning people exhibit a wider "moral circle". Jaeger & Wilks (2023) find that judgments of moral concern are equally well explained by characteristics of the judge and the evaluated target.

**Free-riding** Despite the long-standing explanation of the lack of climate action as a result of free-riding, surveys consistently show that people support climate mitigation action in their own country, even in the absence of such action in other countries. Bernauer & Gampfer (2015) show this for Americans and Indians, who both overestimate their country's emissions at one third of the global total. Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019) show this in the U.S. and China using an experimental design. McEvoy & Cherry (2016) show that Americans mostly invoke leadership and morality to justify unilateral climate action. Using a range of methods, Aklin & Mildenberger (2020) show that the empirical evidence for free-riding is not compelling, and that climate inaction can be equally well explained by distributive conflicts. Finally, review of the literature by McGrath & Bernauer (2017) shows that climate attitudes are largely nonreciprocal, and primarily driven by values and perceptions of the policies, rather than by considerations of what other countries do.

#### A.1.6 Second-order beliefs

Allport (1924) introduced the concept of pluralistic ignorance: a shared misperception concerning others' beliefs. The concept became notorious when O'Gorman (1975) showed that, towards the end of the civil rights movement, 47% of Americans believed that a majority of white people supported segregation, while only 18% did so. PIPA (2001) has shown that while 75% of Americans are willing to contribute \$50 annually to halve

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<sup>4</sup>Unpublished survey results of Dechezleprêtre et al. (forthcoming) find similar figures in 2024.

295 world hunger (the cost of the program), only 32% believed that the majority would share  
296 this willingness. Pluralistic ignorance regarding climate-friendly norms in the United  
297 States has been documented by ? (?), who further show that correcting the mispercep-  
298 tions would be effective to enhance pro-climate behaviors. Relatedly, **Sparkman et al.**  
299 ([2022](#)) show that Americans underestimate the support for climate policies by nearly half,  
300 while **Drews et al. (2022)** document pluralistic ignorance of carbon tax support in Spain.  
301 Additionally, **Geiger & Swim (2016)** show that pluralistic ignorance regarding concern for  
302 climate change leads people to self-silence, resulting in reduced discussions on the topic.

### 303 A.1.7 Elite attitudes

304 In a survey of climate negotiators on their preferences in terms of burden-sharing,  
305 **Lange et al. (2007)** uncovers a mix of self-serving bias and support for the egalitarian  
306 principle. **Dannenberg et al. (2010)** elicit climate negotiators' equity preferences and find  
307 that regional differences in addressing climate change are driven more by national inter-  
308 ests than by different equity concerns. **Hjerpe et al. (2011)** indicate that voluntary con-  
309 tribution, indicated as willingness to contribute, was the least preferred principle among  
310 both negotiators and observers. Three of the four principles for allocating mitigation  
311 commitments were recognized widely across the major geographical regions: historical  
312 responsibilities, ability-to-pay, and equal per capita emissions. This result is confirmed  
313 by **Kesternich et al. (2021)**, who observe tendencies for a more harmonized view among  
314 key groups towards the ability-to-pay rule in a setting of weighted burden sharing rules.  
315 **Mildenberger & Tingley (2019)** survey elites (Congress staffers and international relations  
316 scholars) as well as the population in U.S. and China. They document pluralistic igno-  
317 rance of pro-climate attitudes, egocentric bias, and increasing support after beliefs are  
318 updated.

## 319 A.2 Proposals and analyses of global policy-making

### 320 A.2.1 Global carbon pricing

321 Global carbon pricing is widely regarded by economists as the benchmark climate  
322 policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon emissions externality. For instance, **Hoel**  
323 ([1991](#)) shows that an international carbon tax can be designed to simultaneously achieve  
324 efficiency and accommodate any distributional objective. Concerning the distributional  
325 objective, **Grubb (1990)**, **Agarwal & Narain (1991)** and **Bertram (1992)** were the first to

advocate for an equal right to emit for each human. As Grubb (1990) states it: "by far the best combination of long term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity, is obtained from a system based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions which are allocated on an adult per capita basis".<sup>5</sup> Support for such solution has been renewed ever since (Baer et al. 2000; Jamieson 2001; Blanchard & Tirole 2021; Rajan 2021).

While many endorse the egalitarian allocation of emissions permits, economists also considered this outcome as politically unfeasible. Thus, to preserve the current level of inequalities and to preclude transfers between countries, they adjusted their (integrated assessment) models by assigning more weight to the interest of rich countries (Stanton 2011).

Gollier & Tirole (2015) synthesize the distributional decision with a *generosity* parameter which would allocate emissions permit to countries in proportion to their population if set to one, in proportion to their emissions (on the start date of the policy) if set to zero, and as a mixture of the egalitarian and grandfathering rules if set in between. Using a similar formula in the context of a tax, Cramton et al. (2015) (summarized in MacKay et al. 2015) propose that countries with emissions per capita around the average fix the generosity parameter, so that it is strategically chosen to maximize the tax rate, and to fix the tax rate at the minimum price proposed by participating countries. Negotiations would exclude countries with low ambition beforehand; and the treaty would impose trade sanctions on non-participating countries. van den Bergh et al. (2020) propose a "dual-track transition to global carbon pricing": an expanding climate club that would integrate existing and new emissions trading systems, and a reorientation of UNFCCC negotiations towards a global carbon price and burden-sharing rules. The IMF (2019) also supports global carbon pricing or, as a first step, a carbon price floor. They propose either differentiated prices among countries or international transfers, and estimate that a price of \$75/tCO<sub>2</sub> in 2030 would be compatible with a 2°C trajectory.

Other authors have put forth more radical proposals. For instance, Weitzman (2017) envisions a World Climate Assembly with proportional representation at the global scale, so that the median (human) voter would choose the carbon price level. To finance an adaptation fund, Chancel & Piketty (2015) propose a global *progressive* carbon tax (or a progressive tax on air tickets as a first step), so that rich people (who are high emitters) contribute more to the public good. Fleurbaey & Zuber (2013) highlight that, given that current emitters are probably richer than future victims of climate change damages, cli-

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<sup>5</sup>By "adult per capita", Grubb (1990) means that permits would be allocated equally among adults.

<sup>359</sup> mate policies deserve a *negative* discount rate. In other words, we cannot dissociate the  
<sup>360</sup> climate issue from global inequalities, and an ethical response to this issue requires global  
<sup>361</sup> redistribution.

<sup>362</sup> **A.2.2 Climate burden sharing**

<sup>363</sup> The literature has discussed different burden-sharing principles (Ringius et al. 2002).  
<sup>364</sup> While there is no agreement on their definitions as different approaches are used (cost  
<sup>365</sup> sharing, effort sharing, or resource sharing, see Section A.1.2), we describe here the  
<sup>366</sup> burden-sharing principles consistently using the resource sharing approach (i.e., allocat-  
<sup>367</sup> ing emissions rights). For other papers that define or compare different burden-sharing  
<sup>368</sup> principles, see Vaillancourt & Waaub (2004), Zhou & Wang (2016), Leimbach & Gian-  
<sup>369</sup> nousakis (2019).

<sup>370</sup> **Equal per capita.** The simplest principle is perhaps to allocate each year's global carbon  
<sup>371</sup> quota based on an equal right to emit per capita, or an equal right to emit for each adult.  
<sup>372</sup> Implementing this principle would result in large transfers from high-emitting to low-  
<sup>373</sup> emitting countries (Young-Brun et al. 2023).

<sup>374</sup> **Grandfathering.** In contrast, *grandfathering* entails allocating emissions rights in pro-  
<sup>375</sup> portion to current emissions. From the perspective of allocating carbon pricing revenues  
<sup>376</sup> between countries, grandfathering amounts to each country retaining the revenues it col-  
<sup>377</sup> lects. Given that nations are sovereign and have not agreed to share emissions rights,  
<sup>378</sup> this principle can be considered as the default option against which the other ones can be  
<sup>379</sup> compared in terms of distributive effects.

<sup>380</sup> **Historical responsibilities.** At the opposite end of the spectrum is the principle of *his-  
381 torical responsibilities*, which assigns to each country a carbon budget proportional to its  
<sup>382</sup> population. Countries that have emitted more than the average have accumulated a car-  
<sup>383</sup> bon debt towards countries that have emitted less, which have a carbon credit.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>384</sup> To fully specify this rule, one needs to define a start date for the responsibilities on  
<sup>385</sup> past emissions and specify how to account for population size. 1990 is often chosen as

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<sup>6</sup>It is not clear how these debts would be settled. Approaches could involve carbon removal from the atmosphere, or using a conventional social cost of carbon to monetize them, by crediting (positively or negatively) emissions rights to countries in an international carbon market.

<sup>386</sup> a start year as it is the date of the first IPCC assessment report, marking the widespread  
<sup>387</sup> acknowledgment of climate change, though variants include 1972, 1960, 1950 or 1850.<sup>7</sup>  
<sup>388</sup> Several solutions have been proposed to account for evolving populations, none of which  
<sup>389</sup> is flawless. Matthews (2015) allocates emissions rights on a given year proportionally to  
<sup>390</sup> the countries' populations in that year. An alternative is to use fixed populations, such  
<sup>391</sup> as the populations at the chosen start year (Neumayer 2000), or at a future date such  
<sup>392</sup> as projected when the global total population will reach 9 billion (Raupach et al. 2014).  
<sup>393</sup> Fanning & Hickel (2023) convert the projected climate debt up to 2050 into monetary  
<sup>394</sup> terms in a 1.5°C scenario.

<sup>395</sup> The rationale for using fixed populations is to prevent countries from intentionally  
<sup>396</sup> increasing their population size to gain more emissions rights. However, this approach  
<sup>397</sup> treats countries with different demographic trajectories similarly, effectively penalizing  
<sup>398</sup> countries which grow more than others (if past populations are used) or grow more than  
<sup>399</sup> expected (if future populations are used). Using current populations like Matthews (2015)  
<sup>400</sup> also comes with its own problems. Consider two countries having contributed very little  
<sup>401</sup> to cumulative emissions, with the same emissions per capita but different demographic  
<sup>402</sup> patterns: country A's population has doubled in the last 30 years, while country B's pop-  
<sup>403</sup>ulation has remained stable. Despite the similar present situation, country B would ac-  
<sup>404</sup>cumulate more carbon credit than country A. Essentially, compensating country B more  
<sup>405</sup> due to its past population size amounts to compensating the dead although it is future  
<sup>406</sup> generations who will suffer. That being said, using current populations is likely a more  
<sup>407</sup>viable solution than relying on fixed populations since, in practice, countries with similar  
<sup>408</sup>emissions per capita tend to have relatively similar demographic trajectories.

<sup>409</sup> **Ability to pay.** Another prominent burden-sharing principle is the ability to pay  
<sup>410</sup> whereby richer countries should contribute more to mitigation efforts. To operational-  
<sup>411</sup>ize this principle, Baer et al. (2008) define *capacity* as the share of global income above  
<sup>412</sup>an exemption threshold. They use the threshold of \$7,500 per year (in 2005 PPP), which  
<sup>413</sup>corresponds to the top 28% of the global income distribution. According to this principle,  
<sup>414</sup>the effort of a country should be proportional to the revenues it would raise with a linear  
<sup>415</sup>income tax on individual income above \$7,500.

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<sup>7</sup>Climate equity monitor uses 1850 for example.

416    **Climate Equity Reference Framework** Baer et al. (2008) propose another effort-sharing  
417    method, the *Climate Equity Reference Framework* (CERF), which blends the ability to pay  
418    principle with their version of historical responsibilities. They define *responsibility* as fol-  
419    lows: they determine the mitigation requirement as the emissions gap between the Busi-  
420    ness as Usual scenario from IEA (2007) and a 2°C (with 68-86% probability) scenario.  
421    The mitigation requirement is then allocated to countries proportionally to their cumu-  
422    lative emissions (starting in 1990). The emissions right of a country according to their  
423    *responsibility* are then determined by its Business as Usual emissions minus its mitigation  
424    requirement. A country's emissions right, dubbed its *greenhouse development right* (GDR),  
425    is defined using a combination of *capacity* (C) and *responsibility* (R) to allocate the miti-  
426    gation requirement between countries. This allocation key is called the *Responsibility and*  
427    *Capacity Indicator* (RCI) and defined as  $RCI = R^a \cdot C^{1-a}$ , with  $a = .4$ .

428    This choice of parameter may seem somewhat arbitrary, but the [EcoEquity calculator](#)  
429    allows for a customization all CERF parameters (Holz et al. 2018; Holz et al. 2019). The  
430    Climate Action Network has adopted the CERF as its *fair share* framework, though the  
431    different national chapters of the organization could not agree on a choice of parameters  
432    (Athanasou et al. 2022).<sup>8</sup>

433    The CERF approach was adopted by a prominent network of climate NGOs because  
434    it operationalizes the principle of *common but differentiated responsibilities and respective ca-*  
435    *pabilities* recognized by the UNFCCC. However, this approach suffers from three draw-  
436    backs. First, its definition of historical responsibility as an effort sharing principle is in-  
437    consistent with the principle of an equal right of cumulative emissions per capita, which  
438    is a resource sharing principle. For instance, consider a fully decarbonized country that  
439    has exhausted *exactly* its cumulative carbon budget. According to the CERF notion of *re-*  
440    *sponsibility*, this country would still be expected to contribute significantly to mitigation  
441    efforts due to its relatively high cumulative emissions. Yet, according to the usual defini-  
442    tion of the historical responsibility based on an equal right of cumulative emissions p.c.,  
443    this country would have no liability as it has not exceeded its carbon budget. Second, a

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<sup>8</sup>The U.S. Climate Action Network and the think tank EcoEquity (funded by Tom Athanasiou and late Paul Baer) choose the following parameters: an equal weight for R and C ( $a = .5$ ), their own business as usual projections of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions based on trends of GDP growth and emissions intensity reduction, a 1.5°C (Low Energy Demand) pathway, 1950 as the start year for responsibility, a gradual inclusion of income to compute capacity (which adds complexity to the calculation) from a full exemption of the bottom 70% (\$7,500 per year) linearly to a full inclusion of the top 2% (\$72,211), the inclusion of non-CO<sub>2</sub> gases but not of emissions embodied in trade (i.e. imported emissions) nor LULUCF (land-use).


country with moderate incomes<sup>9</sup> and low historical responsibility would be assigned a relatively low effort, even if its emissions per capita are high. In other words, the CERF approach favors countries that have experienced recent growth. Third, the poorest countries would be granted emissions rights close to the Business as Usual trajectory, as they would bear virtually none of the effort. But this trajectory carries the current (unfair) income distribution and amounts to grandfathering. For example, the baseline trajectory for emissions<sup>10</sup> in the DRC entail 0.8 tCO<sub>2</sub> p.c. in 2030, which is five times less than the world average emissions right per capita. In this framework, if the DRC were to grow faster than projected in the baseline, it would actually have to pay to the rest of the world for mitigation efforts. This is what is likely to happen to countries like Mexico or Senegal, from our simulation of the net gains of CERF compared to a situation without international transfers (see Figure S1). In contrast, a resource sharing approach based on equal per capita emissions would result in low-income countries receiving emissions rights exceeding their projected trajectories, leading to transfers from high-income countries. By construction, such transfers do not occur in an effort sharing approach like the CERF, implying lower transfers to low-income countries. Compared to an equal right to emit per capita, this method favors countries like China (whose emissions are allowed to remain stable over 2020-2030 instead of a reduction of 35-40%) and penalizes regions like Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (see Figure S2).

**Contraction and Convergence.** Meyer (2004) defines a rule called *contraction and convergence* (C&C), which combines elements of grandfathering and equal per capita approaches. According to C&C, each country is granted (tradable) emissions rights, starting at their current emission level and converging linearly to an equal per capita level at some pre-specified date. The *contraction* part refers to the reduction of total emissions rights in line with the climate objective. When discussed around year 2000, the convergence date was specified between 2020 and 2050. This rule, advocated by the Global Commons Institute (a UK think tank), was on the agenda from COP2 to COP15 (i.e., until Copenhagen, and including in Kyoto), including at Kyoto, and was endorsed by the European Parliament in 1998. More recently, Gignac & Matthews (2015) have shown how C&C can be made consistent with historical responsibilities by computing carbon debts and credits until the convergence date.

<sup>9</sup>Using the above parameters, moderate incomes means few incomes above the global 70th. percentile.

<sup>10</sup>The baseline trajectory is computed as the “product of the projected GDP and CO<sub>2</sub> emission intensity”.

Figure S1: Net gains from the CERF burden-sharing rule in 2030.




Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO<sub>2</sub>.

475 **Assessments of the NDCs against burden-sharing principles.** The regime established  
 476 by the 2015 Paris agreement to regulate climate change respects none of the burden-  
 477 sharing principles and relies instead on voluntary contributions from each country,  
 478 known as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). A body of literature (reviewed  
 479 by [Höhne et al. 2014](#)) assesses the NDCs against the emissions reduction objective and  
 480 different burden-sharing principles. To evaluate the NDCs, [Gao et al. \(2019\)](#) examine  
 481 their emissions projections for 2030 and estimate the resulting increase in temperature.  
 482 The most recent and comprehensive assessment of NDCs against burden-sharing princi-  
 483 ples is conducted by [van den Berg et al. \(2020\)](#) (see also [Raupach et al. 2014](#); [Robiou du](#)  
 484 [Pont et al. 2016](#); [Robiou du Pont et al. 2017](#)).

#### 485 **A.2.3 Global redistribution**

486 **Lack of cooperation vs. lack of redistribution.** Major social science scholarship from  
 487 Realism in International Relations to game theory of international environmental agree-  
 488 ments in economics has pointed to lack of cooperation as the major obstacle to global  
 489 sustainability ([Waltz 1979](#); [Snidal 1991](#); [Barrett 1994](#); [Nordhaus 2015](#)). Another body of

Figure S2: Difference between net gains from Greenhouse Development Rights and equal rights per capita.



Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO<sub>2</sub>.

490 literature on international climate cooperation emphasises redistribution from North to  
 491 South as a key condition for making global climate policy work, noting the historical  
 492 responsibility of major emitters in the Global North ([Parks & Roberts 2008](#); [Friman &](#)  
 493 [Strandberg 2014](#); [Bou-Habib 2019](#); [Aklin & Mildenberger 2020](#)). Taking the second per-  
 494 spective, making progress on international climate policy also requires a decision on how  
 495 the burden of climate change mitigation can be shared fairly. This raises the question of  
 496 whether citizens around the world support such global redistribution policies or, more  
 497 specifically, whether citizens in high-income countries are willing to make sacrifices to  
 498 combat climate change and extreme poverty.

499 While we cannot test conditional cooperation as part of the present analysis, our em-  
 500 pirical results document that if the North-South redistribution would be implemented as  
 501 part of global climate policies, they would receive strong public support.

502 **Studies on global redistribution** Addressing global poverty, inequalities, and climate  
 503 change are central to the universally agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). As

504 highlighted by Bolch et al. (2022) and Fabre (2024), low-income countries often lack suf-  
505 ficient domestic resources to eradicate poverty in the short term, indicating the need for  
506 international transfers to rapidly end global poverty. In *Beyond the Welfare State*, Gunnar  
507 Myrdal (1960) called for a *welfare world*. In his Nobel lecture, he emphasized the neces-  
508 sity of increasing foreign aid to low-income countries, stating that “The type of marginal  
509 foreign aid we have provided, is clearly not enough to meet their barest needs” (Myrdal  
510 1975).

511 Drawing on the labor theory of value, some economists have argued that global in-  
512 equalities arise from unequal exchange in international trade (Arghiri 1972). Indeed, the  
513 stark disparity in wages between countries implies that one unit of labor exported by an  
514 American commands five units of labor embodied in imported goods, whereas Ethiopi-  
515 ans need to export 50 units of labor to obtain one unit through imports (Alsamawi et al.  
516 2014; Reyes et al. 2017). Taking stock, Hickel (2017) proposes to globally establish mini-  
517 mum wages at 50% of the local median wage. Hickel (2017) also suggests other solutions  
518 against global inequality, which served as inspiration for our questionnaire. These mea-  
519 sures include the cancellation of low-income countries’ public debt, fair trade practices  
520 (such as eliminating tariffs from high-income countries, reducing patent protections, and  
521 reducing farming subsidies in rich countries), initiatives to combat tax evasion (e.g., im-  
522 plementing a global financial register), land reform, and a fair international climate policy.

523 Piketty (2014) prominently advocates for a progressive wealth tax on a global scale,  
524 and Piketty (2022) suggests to allocate its revenues to countries in proportion to their  
525 population.

526 Kopczuk et al. (2005) compute the optimal linear income tax rates for all countries in  
527 two ways: globally centralized and decentralized (i.e., within each country and without  
528 international transfers). They show that the average decentralized rate is 41%. In con-  
529 trast, the global rate is 62%, which would generate funds to finance a basic income of  
530 250\$/month (higher than the GPD per capita of 73 countries). From a current global Gini  
531 index of 0.695, they show that decentralized optimal taxation would only marginally re-  
532 duce global inequality to 0.69, whereas global taxation would significantly decrease the  
533 Gini to 0.25. The study also shows that the existing level of foreign aid can only be ratio-  
534 nalized if the U.S. attaches 2,000 less value to a citizen in the poorest countries than to an  
535 American citizen (or 1,000 less if half of the transfers are diverted due to corruption).

536 **A.2.4 Basic income**

537 Unconditional cash transfers (UCT) are increasingly seen as an effective way to end ex-  
538 treme poverty. A growing body of evidence from randomized control trials supports this  
539 notion: [Gangopadhyay et al. \(2015\)](#) find that UCT outperform a food subsidy; [Haushofer & Shapiro \(2016\)](#) find significant impacts on health, economic outcomes, and psychological well-being; [Egger et al. \(2022\)](#) find large positive spillovers on non-recipient people, and minimal inflation. Reviews of existing research further confirm the positive outcomes of UCT ([Standing 2014](#); [Bastagli et al. 2016](#)).

544 While the delivery of cash to remote areas and the prevention of fraud is challenging  
545 in regions without a proper civil register, the use of mobile phones as banking and bio-  
546 metric identification tools could provide viable solutions ([Harnett 2017](#)). Although many  
547 places still lack internet access, satellite internet technology shows promising progress,  
548 with some experts suggesting that it could soon become affordable and universally ac-  
549 cessible ([Hanson 2016](#)).

550 **A.2.5 Global democracy**

551 The idea of world federalism has a long-standing history, dating back at least to [Kant \(1795\)](#), who argued that a world federation was essential for achieving perpetual peace.  
552 International organizations were eventually created to foster peace, though the League  
553 of Nations and its successor, the United Nations, never succeeded in avoiding military  
554 conflicts. Many have argued that we need stronger and more democratic global institu-  
555 tions, competent to address global challenges such as extreme poverty, climate change,  
556 wars, pandemics, or financial stability. Before World War II, feminist and pacifist [Maver-  
557 ick Lloyd & Schwimmer \(1937\)](#) founded the *Campaign for World Government*, advocating  
558 for direct representation at the global scale. [Einstein \(1947\)](#) called for the subordination of  
559 the UN Security Council to the General Assembly and the direct election of UN delegates.  
560 Since 2007, there has been widespread support for a United Nations Parliamentary As-  
561 sembly (UNPA) from individuals and institutions in over 150 countries, including 1,800  
562 member of parliament, heads of state, as well the European Parliament, the Pan-African  
563 Parliament, and the Latin-American Parliament. The UNPA campaign calls for a gradual  
564 implementation of a democratic assembly, starting with a consultative assembly com-  
565 posed of members of national parliaments, allowing for the direct election of its members  
566 in voluntary countries, and progressing towards a world parliament with binding legisla-

568 tive powers once all members are directly elected (Leinen & Bummel 2018). Besides the  
569 UNPA, various scholars have put forward different models of global democracy, ranging  
570 from deliberative spaces to a world federation (Archibugi et al. 2011). While the most  
571 radical proposals may still be on the horizon, an assembly of random citizens represen-  
572 tative of the world population has already been convened. It has produced a joint state-  
573 ment at the COP26 (Global Assembly 2022), and a similar *World Citizens' Assembly* should  
574 soon follow. Using surveys covering 86% of global population, Hale & Koenig-Archibugi  
575 (2019) find that the world as a whole is less polarized than some countries and argue  
576 against the fear people's views would be too diverse for a functioning global democracy.

577 **B Raw results**


578 For each figure, the captions refer to the figure's filename and to the question-  
579 naire's question. The figures' folders are `figures/country_comparison` (for PDFs) and  
580 `xlsx/country_comparison` (for data tables), except when the filename contains a folder  
581 name (which then replaces `country_comparison`). Country-specific raw results are also  
582 available as supplementary material files: [US](#), [EU](#), [FR](#), [DE](#), [ES](#), [UK](#).

Figure S3: Support for the GCS, NR and the combination of GCS, NR and C (Yes/No questions).

(support\_binary\_positive; p. 63, Questions 20, 22, 35, 34, and 26).

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)	54	76	80	71	81	74
National redistribution scheme (NR)	56	73	77	66	79	75
National climate policy + GCS + NR	52	74	79	69	81	70

Figure S4: Absolute support for global climate policies.  
Share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* (in percent,  $n = 40,680$ ). The color blue denotes an absolute majority. See Figure 2 for the relative support.  
(OECD/Heatplot\_global\_tax\_attitudes\_positive; Questions A-I of the global survey.)



\*In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

Figure S5: Correct answers to comprehension questions (in percent).  
(understood\_each\_positive; Questions 16-18)




Figure S6: Number of correct answers to comprehension questions (mean). (understood\_score\_mean; Questions 16-18)




Figure S7: List experiment: mean number of supported policies. (list\_exp\_mean; Question 24)




Figure S8: Conjoint analyses 1 and 2. (conjoint\_ab\_all\_positive; Questions 25-27)






Figure S9: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. Points represent Average Marginal Component Effects and bars 95% C.I. ([country]/ca\_r; See English translations in Figure ED1; Question 29)

(a) Germany



(b) France



(c) Spain




Figure S10: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements seen as important for supporting the GCS in a 4-Likert scale (in percent). (gcs\_important\_positive; Question 32)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
It would succeed in limiting climate change	78	85	85	86	86	83
It would hurt the [Country] economy	81	67	61	67	66	69
It would penalize my household	75	60	55	63	59	63
It would make people change their lifestyle	78	79	83	79	78	77
It would reduce poverty in low-income countries	77	85	88	85	86	81
It might be detrimental to some poor countries	79	72	79	67	78	70
It could foster global cooperation	82	81	81	82	85	80
It could fuel corruption in low-income countries	79	75	82	69	79	72
It could be subject to fraud	80	79	80	74	83	81
It would be technically difficult to put in place	77	71	74	62	79	71
Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences	89	82	89	68	91	88

Figure S11: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements found in the open-ended field on the GCS (manually recoded, in percent).

"When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to your mind?

Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme." (gcs\_field\_positive; Question 31)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
environment	26	31	37	26	43	24
unclassifiable	25	24	23	28	25	22
pro	22	23	21	22	33	20
con	22	17	12	18	20	16
cost	17	12	11	14	17	7
poorest humans	11	7	6	9	5	6
tax redistribution	10	7	11	8	4	9
support	8	6	3	5	6	8
oppose	7	3	2	3	1	4
don't know	6	8	10	8	7	10
empty	6	3	0	0	0	13
difficult agreement	5	10	7	12	8	8
difficult implement	3	5	5	6	4	6
misunderstands gcs	3	2	2	1	3	1
misunderstands question	2	2	1	3	3	3

Figure S12: Perceptions of the GCS. Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).

"When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to your mind?

Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme." (gcs\_field\_contains\_positive; Question 31)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
world: international world country global	28	22	23	19	22	23
environment: climat environment animal emission natur	26	21	17	28	21	17
poorest: poor low-income 700 poverty	16	8	8	9	4	10
pro: pro  pros pros pro:	16	3	0	1	9	5
con: con  con:  cons cons:	15	4	0	1	8	6
cost: cost expensive higher price 85 inflation	13	7	5	9	7	6
tax: tax	8	3	4	3	2	2
redistribution: rich redistribu	8	4	5	4	3	5
implementation: implement enforce polic monitor	6	4	5	6	0	5
agreement: agree accept participat	3	4	5	6	2	3

Figure S13: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality (mean). (donation\_mean; Question 33)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Donation to own country	35	34	31	38	34	32
Donation to Africa	32	35	33	41	32	33

Figure S14: Support for a national wealth tax.

"Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: affordable housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and schools]?" (national\_tax\_support; Question 34)




Figure S15: Support for a global wealth tax.

"Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-income countries?

Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education." (global\_tax\_support; Question 35)




Figure S16: Preferred share of global wealth tax revenues that should be pooled to finance low-income countries. (global\_tax\_global\_share; Question 36)




Figure S17: Support for sharing half of global tax revenues with low-income countries, rather than each country retaining all the revenues it collects (in percent). (global\_tax\_sharing\_positive; Question 37)



Figure S18: Perceived foreign aid. "From your best guess, what percentage of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?" (foreign\_aid\_belief\_agg; Question 38)

Actual values: France: 0.8%; Germany: 1.3%; Spain: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%; U.S.: 0.4%.




Figure S19: Preferred foreign aid (without info on actual amount).

"If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?" (foreign\_aid\_preferred\_no\_info\_agg; Question 39)




Figure S20: Preferred foreign aid (after info on actual amount).

"Actually, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid.

If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?" (foreign\_aid\_preferred\_info\_agg; Question 39)




Figure S21: Actual, perceived and preferred amount of foreign aid, with random info (or not) on actual amount. (Mean in percent of public spending; foreign\_aid\_amount\_mean; Questions 38, 39)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Actual foreign aid (in % of public spending)	0.4	1.1	0.8	1.3	0.5	1.7
Belief about foreign aid	4.7	2.9	2.7	2.9	2.8	3.5
Preferred foreign aid (with info)	1.8	2.7	3.4	2.9	2.1	2.5
Preferred foreign aid (no info)	4	3.9	4.7	4.4	3.1	3.4

Figure S22: Preferred foreign aid (after info or after perception). (foreign\_aid\_no\_less\_all\_positive; Questions 38 and 39)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as current	70	75	91	76	77	57
Preferred foreign aid is higher than current	47	59	75	58	63	43
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as perceived	57	74	83	79	77	58
Preferred foreign aid is higher than perceived	37	53	64	59	54	39

Figure S23: Preferences for funding increased foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]

"How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent) (foreign\_aid\_raise\_positive; Question 40)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Lower spending on defense	30	21	16	30	17	22
Lower spending on retirement pensions	5	3	4	2	1	5
Lower spending on healthcare	10	3	4	3	2	4
Lower spending on welfare benefits	14	12	19	11	3	12
Lower spending on education	8	2	2	1	3	5
Lower spending on other programs	19	24	22	37	11	12
Higher taxes on the wealthiest	68	64	55	82	35	85
Higher corporate income tax rate	51	27	21	27	15	53
Higher personal income tax rates	10	7	3	8	2	18
Higher public deficit	4	6	5	9	2	7

Figure S24: Preferences of spending following reduced foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]  
 "How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent)  
 (foreign\_aid\_reduce\_positive; Question 41)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Higher spending on defense	19	23	11	21	17	31
Higher spending on retirement pensions	23	41	22	51	57	35
Higher spending on healthcare	40	57	31	42	80	70
Higher spending on welfare benefits	13	20	7	19	39	20
Higher spending on education	30	45	31	47	58	43
Higher spending on other programs	6	6	6	4	9	8
Lower taxes on the wealthiest	5	2	5	2	0	2
Lower corporate income tax rate	12	6	10	4	8	6
Lower personal income tax rates	48	29	26	27	37	30
Lower public deficit	32	24	21	13	41	21

Figure S25: Willingness to sign real-stake petition for the Global Climate Scheme or National Redistribution, compared to stated support in corresponding subsamples (e.g. support for the GCS in the branch where the petition was about the GCS). (petition\_comparable\_positive; Question 42)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Petition for the GCS	51	69	69	66	78	69
(Comparable) support for the GCS	53	76	81	74	81	74
Petition for NR	57	67	65	66	74	68
(Comparable) support for NR	58	72	76	65	78	75

Figure S26: Absolute support for various global policies (Percent of (*somewhat or strong*) support). (support\_likert\_positive; Questions 43 and 44. See Figure 3 for the relative support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	41	54	52	53	62	51
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	53	65	62	66	68	62
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	45	58	55	60	62	54
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	31	37	36	30	45	40
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	34	44	44	43	52	43
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	39	49	39	51	50	54
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	42	55	54	54	61	53
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	44	70	73	70	72	65
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	34	45	40	48	44	50
National tax on millionaires funding public services	62	76	70	79	79	77
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	58	71	69	72	78	71

Figure S27: Preferred approach of diplomats at international climate negotiations. In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend [own country] interests or global justice? (negotiation; Question 48)




Figure S28: Percent of selected issues viewed as important.

"To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem?" (problem\_positive; Question 55)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Income inequality in [Country]	55	59	54	58	71	57
Climate change	59	66	66	63	73	63
Global poverty	50	57	50	58	75	49

Figure S29: Group defended when voting.

"What group do you defend when you vote?" (group\_defended\_agg2; Question 56)




Figure S30: Mean prioritization of policies.

Mean number of points allocated policies to express intensity of support (among six policies chosen at random). Blue color means that the policy has been awarded more points than the average policy.

"In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

How do you allocate the points among the following policies?" (points\_mean; Question 57)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	13	21	10	14	35	31
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	23	22	25	21	22	23
econ3	21	15	13	18	17	13
econ4	28	22	27	17	24	20
soc1	10	17	13	17	12	21
soc2	13	9	14	8	10	8
climate1	14	15	11	18	20	12
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	20	18	22	19	15	17
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030	11	9	8	8	9	11
tax1: National redistribution scheme	14	15	16	15	15	15
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	19	19	21	18	17	19
foreign1: Global climate scheme	15	20	20	23	16	17
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	21	20	20	23	19	20
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	15	15	15	17	14	13
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	9	11	13	14	9	8

Figure S31: Positive prioritization of policies.

Percent of people allocating a positive number of points to policies, expressing their support (among six policies chosen at random).

"In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it."

How do you allocate the points among the following policies?" (points\_positive; Question 57)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	64	78	61	67	96	95
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	83	86	85	84	87	89
econ3	81	69	50	78	80	68
econ4	88	86	91	79	89	85
soc1	57	75	69	74	74	78
soc2	58	58	72	53	64	48
climate1	70	76	65	79	89	75
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	79	83	86	84	78	80
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030	62	58	56	48	60	70
tax1: National redistribution scheme	67	79	79	76	82	79
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	80	79	76	78	83	85
foreign1: Global climate scheme	71	83	84	85	84	78
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	80	81	79	83	82	82
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	71	77	79	74	83	76
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	58	70	79	74	74	57

Figure S32: Charity donation.

"How much did you give to charities in 2022?" (donation\_charities; Question 49)




Figure S33: Interest in politics.

"To what extent are you interested in politics?" (interested\_politics; Question 50)




Figure S34: Desired involvement of government (from 1 to 5). (involvement\_govt; Question 51)




Figure S35: Political leaning on economics (from 1: Left to 5: Right). (left\_right; Question 52)




Figure S36: Voted in last election. (vote\_participation; Question 53)




Figure S37: Vote in last election (aggregated). PNR includes people who did not vote or prefer not to answer. (vote; Question 54)




Figure S38: Perception that survey was biased.

"Do you feel that this survey was politically biased?" (survey\_bias; Question 60)




Figure S39: Opinion on the fight against extreme poverty.

“According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme poverty in low-income countries?” (poverty\_field; Question 61)

(a) Elements found in the open-ended field on the question  
(manually recoded, in percent)



(b) Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).




Figure S40: Main attitudes by vote (“Right” spans from Center-right to Far right).  
 (main\_all\_by\_vote\_share; Relative support in percent in Questions 20, 35, 44, 45, 48)

	Europe Left	Europe PNR/Non-voter	Europe Right	U.S. Left	U.S. PNR/Non-voter	U.S. Right
Support for the GCS	85	72	71	74	53	26
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	94	83	76	85	71	40
Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries*	61	52	45	55	67	41
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	73	65	52	62	49	23
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	93	79	74	87	70	38
[Country]'s foreign aid should be increased	78	62	54	75	64	34
Universalist*	56	48	26	53	49	23

583 C Questionnaire of the global survey (section on global  
584 policies)

585 A. At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be  
586 put in place? (Multiple answers are possible) [Figures 2 and S4]  
587 *Global; [Federal / European / ...]; [State / National]; Local*

588 B. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “[country] should take mea-  
589 sures to fight climate change.”

590 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree;*  
591 *Strongly agree*

592 C. How should [country] climate policies depend on what other countries do?

- 593 • If other countries do more, [country] should do...  
594 • If other countries do less, [country] should do...

595 *Much less; Less; About the same; More; Much more*

596 D. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] All countries have signed the  
597 Paris agreement that aims to contain global warming “well below +2 °C’. To limit  
598 global warming to this level, there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we  
599 can emit globally, called the carbon budget. Each country could aim to emit less  
600 than a share of the carbon budget. To respect the global carbon budget, countries  
601 that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less  
602 than their share.

603 Do you support such a policy? [Figures 2 and S4]

604 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support;*  
605 *Strongly support*

606 E. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] Suppose the above policy is in  
607 place. How should the carbon budget be divided among countries? [Figures 2 and  
608 S4]

609 *The emission share of a country should be proportional to its population, so that each human*  
610 *has an equal right to emit.; The emission share of a country should be proportional to its*  
611 *current emissions, so that those who already emit more have more rights to emit.; Countries*  
612 *that have emitted more over the past decades (from 1990 onwards) should receive a lower*

613        *emission share, because they have already used some of their fair share.; Countries that will*  
614        *be hurt more by climate change should receive a higher emission share, to compensate them*  
615        *for the damages.*

616        F. [In the U.S., Denmark, and France only] To achieve a given reduction of greenhouse  
617        gas emissions globally, costly investments are needed. Ideally, how should countries  
618        bear the costs of fighting climate change?

- 619            • Countries should pay in proportion to their income
- 620            • Countries should pay in proportion to their current emissions [Used as a sub-  
621            stitute to the equal right per capita in Figure 2]
- 622            • Countries should pay in proportion to their past emissions (from 1990 on-  
623            wards) [Used as a substitute to historical responsibilities in Figure 2]
- 624            • The richest countries should pay it all, so that the poorest countries do not have  
625            to pay anything
- 626            • The richest countries should pay even more, to help vulnerable countries face  
627            adverse consequences: vulnerable countries would then receive money instead  
628            of paying [Used as a substitute to compensating vulnerable countries in Figures  
629            2 and S4]

630        *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree;*  
631        *Strongly agree*

632        G. Do you support or oppose establishing a global democratic assembly whose role  
633        would be to draft international treaties against climate change? Each adult across  
634        the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly. [Figures 2 and S4]  
635        *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support;*  
636        *Strongly support*

637        H. Imagine the following policy: a global tax on greenhouse gas emissions funding a  
638        global basic income. Such a policy would progressively raise the price of fossil fuels  
639        (for example, the price of gasoline would increase by [40 cents per gallon] in the  
640        first years). Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil  
641        fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Revenues from the tax would be used to  
642        finance a basic income of [\$30] per month to each human adult, thereby lifting the  
643        700 million people who earn less than \$2/day out of extreme poverty. The average

644 [American] person would lose a bit from this policy as they would face [\$130] per  
645 month in price increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive.

646 Do you support or oppose such a policy? [Figures 2 and S4]

647 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support;*  
648 *Strongly support*


- 649 I. Do you support or oppose a tax on all millionaires around the world to finance low-  
650 income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate ac-  
651 tion? This would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drink-  
652 ing water, healthcare, and education. [Figures 2 and S4]  
653 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support;*  
654 *Strongly support*

655     D Questionnaire of the Western surveys

656     Below, we provide the generic questionnaire (based on the U.S. version), which  
657     roughly corresponds to the *Eu* questionnaire as well as the combination of the *US1* and  
658     *US2* questionnaire. The main difference between Europe and the U.S. is that we split the  
659     *US2* sample into four random branches to include some treatments before the Section D  
660     on the GCS. Besides the control group, the treatments are: information regarding the sup-  
661     port of Americans for the GCS and NR, an open-ended field, and a closed question on the  
662     pros and cons of the GCS. The pros and cons of the GCS are also asked in *Eu* (likewise,  
663     either as an open-ended field or a question), but only in Section D, after the support.

664     At each section or question, square brackets specify in which questionnaires it is  
665     present (*US1*, *US2* and/or *Eu*) as well as country specificities. Figure S41 displays the  
666     structure of each questionnaire. Each treatment randomization is independent. Qualtrics  
667     and Word versions of the questionnaires in each language are available on our [public](#)  
668     [repository](#), together with a spreadsheet that summarizes country specificities and our  
669     sources.

Figure S41: Western surveys' structure. Cf. Figure 1 for a simplified version.



670 [Eu, US1, US2] Socio-demographic characteristics

671 1. Welcome to this survey!

672  
673 This survey is **anonymous** and is conducted **for research** purposes on a rep-  
674 resentative sample of [1,000 British people].

675  
676 It takes [US1, US2: 10 to 15 min; Eu: around **20 min**] to complete.

677  
678 The survey contains lotteries and awards for those who get the correct an-  
679 swer to some understanding questions.

680 If you are attentive and lucky, **you can win up to** [US1, Eu: \$350; US2: \$150] in  
681 points. ([See terms and conditions](#)).

682 Please answer every question carefully.

683  
684 **Do you agree to participate in the survey?**

685 Yes; No

686 2. What is your gender? [gender]

687 Woman; Man; Other

688 3. How old are you? [age]

689 Below 18; 18 to 20; 21 to 24; 25 to 29; 30 to 34; 35 to 39; 40 to 44; 45 to 49; 50 to 54; 55 to  
690 59; 60 to 64; 65 to 69; 70 to 74; 75 to 79; 80 to 84; 85 to 89; 90 to 99; 100 or above

691 4. [Eu] In which country do you live? [country]

692 France; Germany; Spain; United Kingdom; Other

693 5. What is your ZIP code? [zipcode UK: What is your Outcode (the left part of your  
694 postcode, e.g. if your postcode is N7 8H7, just enter N7)?]

695 6. Do you live with your partner (if you have one)? [couple]

696 Yes; No

697 7. How many people are in your household? The household includes: you, the mem-  
698 bers of your family who live with you, and your dependants. [hh\_size]  
699 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more

700 8. [Eu] How many children below 14 live with you? [Nb\_children\_14]

701 1; 2; 3; 4 or more

702 9. [US1, US2] What race or ethnicity do you identify with? (Multiple answers are  
703 possible) [race]

704 White; Black or African American; Hispanic; Asian; American Indian or Alaskan Native;  
705 Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; Other: {open field}; Prefer not to say

706 10. What is the [US1, US2: annual; Eu: monthly] gross income of your household (before  
707 withholding tax)? This includes all income: wages, self-employment earnings, So-  
708 cial Security benefits, pensions, investment income, welfare payments, and income  
709 from other sources. [income]

710 [US1, US2: Items based on household total income deciles and quartiles, namely:  
711 Less than \$20,000; between \$20,001 and \$35,000; between \$35,001 and \$42,000; between  
712 \$42,001 and \$50,000; between \$50,001 and \$65,000; between \$65,001 and \$82,000; between  
713 \$82,001 and \$103,000; between \$103,001 and \$130,000; between \$130,001 and \$145,000;  
714 between \$145,001 and \$165,000; between \$165,001 and \$250,000; More than \$250,000; I  
715 prefer not to answer;

716 Eu: custom thresholds, taking into account household composition Questions 6-8,  
717 and corresponding to the country's deciles and quartiles of standard of living, cf.  
718 the sheet "Income" in [this spreadsheet](#)]

719 11. What is the highest level of education you have completed?  
720 [education, post\_secondary]

721 [Below upper secondary, Upper secondary, and Post secondary are coded as the first  
722 two, middle three, and last three items, respectively.

723 US1, US2: Primary school or less; Eighth grade; Some high school; Regular high school  
724 diploma/GED or alternative credential; Some college, no degree; 2-year college degree or  
725 associates degree (for example: AA, AS); Bachelor's degree (for example: BA, BS); Master's  
726 degree or above (MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA, MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD, PhD);  
727 FR: École primaire / Aucun; Brevet; CAP ou BEP; Baccalauréat professionnel ou tech-  
728 nologique; Baccalauréat général; Bac +2 (BTS, DUT, DEUG...); Bac +3 (licence...); Bac  
729 +5 ou plus (master, école d'ingénieur ou de commerce, doctorat, médecine, maîtrise, DEA,  
730 DESS...)

731 DE: Keine abgeschlossene Schulbildung / Grundschule; Untere Sekundarstufe (z.B. Haupt-  
732 oder Realschulabschluss); Erstausbildung; Beruflicher Abschluss / Ausbildung; Abitur;

733 Zweitausbildung; Bachelor oder Fachhochschulabschluss; Master-Abschluss oder höher  
734 ES: Educación primaria / No he completado la enseñanza básica; Educación secundaria  
735 obligatoria (ESO); Formación profesional básica (FP); Formación profesional de grado  
736 medio; Bachillerato; Formación profesional de grado superior; Grado universitario;  
737 Máster/doctorado  
738 UK: Primary education or less; Some secondary school; GSCE; Vocational Upper secondary  
739 (Level 3 award, level 3 certificate, level 3 diploma, advanced apprenticeship, etc.); High  
740 school degree (A level); Higher vocational education (Level 4+ award, level 4+ certificate,  
741 level 4+ diploma, higher apprenticeship, etc.); Bachelor's Degree (BA, BSc, BEng, etc.);  
742 Postgraduate diploma or certificate, Master's Degree (MSc, MA, MBA, etc.) or Ph.D.]

743 12. What is your employment status? [employment\_agg]

744 Full-time employed; Part-time employed; Self-employed; Student; Retired; Unemployed  
745 (searching for a job); Inactive (not searching for a job)

746 13. Are you a homeowner or a tenant? (Multiple answers are possible) [home\_...]

747 Tenant; Owner; Landlord renting out property; Hosted free of charge

748 14. [If lives with partner: What is the estimated value of your household's assets (in  
749 U.S. dollars)? [wealth]]

750 If does not live with partner: What is the estimated value of your assets (in U.S.  
751 dollars)?]

752 Include here all your possessions (home, car, savings, etc.) net of debt. For example,  
753 if you own a house worth [\$]300,000 and you have [\$]100,000 left to repay on your  
754 mortgage, your assets are [\$]200,000.

755 I estimate my [If lives with partner: household's] assets net of debt to be:

756 [Items based on the following individual wealth quintiles, doubled if lives  
757 with partner. US1, US2: Less than \$0 (I have a net debt); Close to \$0; Between \$4,000  
758 and \$60,000; Between \$60,000 and \$190,000; More than \$190,000; For Eu, the thresh-  
759 olds are: FR: €5/50/150/300k; DE: €0/35/130/280k; ES: €0/50/100/200k; UK:  
760 £3/45/115/270k]

761 15. [US1, US2 (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the vote ques-  
762 tion)] What do you consider to be your political affiliation, as of today?

765 [political\_affiliation]  
766 Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other; Non-Affiliated

767 **[Eu, US1, US2] Global climate scheme**

768 In the following, we describe two policies, on which we will survey your opinion.  
769 To check that you have attentively read the descriptions, **we will ask some understanding questions afterwards: those who get correct answers can win up to \$150.**

770 **Global climate scheme:** At the Paris agreement in 2015, all countries have agreed  
771 to contain global warming “well below +2 °C”. To limit global warming to this  
772 level, **there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally.**

773 To meet the climate target, a limited number of permits to emit greenhouse gases  
774 can be created globally. Polluting firms would be required to buy permits to cover  
775 their emissions. Such a policy would **make fossil fuel companies pay** for their  
776 emissions and progressively raise the price of fossil fuels. **Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil fuels, reducing greenhouse gas**  
777 **emissions.**

778 In accordance with the principle that each human has an equal right to pollute, the  
779 revenues generated by the sale of permits could finance a global basic income. **Each**  
780 **adult in the world would receive** [US1, US2: \$30/month; UK: \$30 (that is £25) per  
781 month; FR, DE, ES: €30/month], thereby lifting out of extreme poverty the 700 million  
782 people who earn less than \$2/day.

783 **The typical [American] would lose out financially** [US1, US2: \$85, FR: €10, DE:  
784 €25, ES: €5, UK: £20] **per month** (as he or she would face [\$115] per month in price  
785 increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive).

786 The policy could be put in place as soon as countries totaling more than 60% of  
787 global emissions agree on it. Countries that would refuse to take part in the policy  
788 could face sanctions (like tariffs) from the rest of the World and would be excluded  
789 from the basic income.

- 790 16. Who would win or lose financially in the Global climate scheme? [Figure S5;  
791 gcs\_win\_lose]

792 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

793 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

797       Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.;  
798       Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;  
799       Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would win* from the Global climate scheme. Now, here  
801       is the second policy:  
802

803

804       **National redistribution scheme:**

805       This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [US1, US2: 5%; Eu: 1%]<sup>11</sup> and provide  
806       cash transfers to all adults. More precisely, **each [American] adult would receive**  
807       [\$85] **per month** (that is [\$1,000] per year). This would be financed by an increase  
808       of the federal income tax on household income in excess of [US1, US2: \$315,000 per  
809       year; FR: €15,000 per month; DE: €20,000 per month; ES: €10,000 per month; UK:  
810       £15,000 per month], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000]. [US1,  
811       US2: See more details.]<sup>12</sup>

812       17. Who would win or lose financially in the National redistribution? [Figure S5;  
813       nr\_win\_lose]

814

815       Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

816       Typical [Americans] would win and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Ameri-  
817       cans] would win and the richest [Americans] would lose.; Typical [Americans] would lose  
818       and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Americans] would lose and the richest  
819       [Americans] would lose.

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would win and the richest [Americans] would lose* from the National redistribution scheme.

822

---

<sup>11</sup>The wider base in the U.S. was chosen because emissions are larger in the U.S. than in Europe, and it would hardly be feasible to offset the median American's loss from the GCS by taxing only the top 1%.

<sup>12</sup>8% of U.S. respondents click. They then see the following text, based on [taxjusticenow.org](http://taxjusticenow.org) by Saez & Zucman (2019): *The marginal income tax rates would evolve as follows:*

*Below \$315,000: unchanged*

*\$315,000 - \$400,000: current rate 32% => new rate 41%*

*\$400,000 - \$600,000: 35% => 50%*

*\$600,000 - \$2.5 million: 37% => 60%*

*\$2.5 - \$5 million: 37% => 65%*

*Above \$5 million: 37% => 70%*

823 To help you with the next question, here is a reminder of the policies:

824

825 **Global Climate scheme:**

826 To limit global warming and reach the international climate objective, the Global  
827 climate scheme would **impose a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can  
828 emit globally.**

829 It would **make polluters pay** for their emissions, which in turn would increase  
830 fossil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities.

831 The revenues would finance a **global basic income** of [\$30] per month for all  
832 humans, lifting out of extreme poverty the poorest billion people.

833 Considering the basic income and the fuel price increases, **the typical [American]**  
834 **would lose out financially [\$85] per month.**

835

836 **National redistribution scheme:**

837 This policy would **increase taxes on the top [5%]** and provide cash transfers to  
838 all adults. More precisely, **each [American] would receive [\$85] per month.** This  
839 would be financed by an increase of the federal income tax on household income in  
840 excess of [\$315,000 per year], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000  
841 per year].

- 842 18. If both the Global climate scheme and the National redistribution scheme are im-  
843 plemented, how would a typical [American] be financially affected? [Figure S5;  
844 both\_win Lose]

845 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

846 *A typical [American] would lose out financially.; A typical [American] would neither gain  
847 nor lose.; A typical [American] would gain financially.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was that *A typical [American] would  
849 neither gain nor lose from both schemes combined. [US1, Eu: Now, here are the last  
850 two policies:]*

851

852 **[US1: Coal exit:**

853 To reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, this policy would require all U.S. coal power plants to be  
854 phased out by 2030. Coal would be replaced by renewable sources like wind and  
855 solar panels as well as stronger reliance on gas power plants.

856           *Eu: Thermal insulation plan:*

857           To reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and energy insecurity, this policy would require that  
858           all buildings meet energy efficiency targets: at least rating E in 2030 and rating C  
859           in 2040. The [UK] government would subsidise half the cost of insulation for all  
860           households, and up to 90% for the poorest households. Insulation work would cost  
861           [FR, DE: €25; ES: €20; UK: £25] billion a year, but would deliver energy savings  
862           greater than this cost. ]

863

864           *[US1: Marriage only for opposite-sex couples:*

865           This policy is a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would legally  
866           define marriage as a union of one man and one woman.

867

868           *Eu: Death penalty for major crimes:*

869           This measure would reintroduce capital punishment for major crimes such as  
870           terrorism and mass shootings.]

871

872           Now, we will ask your opinion on the [US1, Eu: four] policies.

873

874           [Click here for the reminder of the \[US1, Eu: first\] two policies.](#) [Clicking displays the  
875           previous summarized descriptions.]

876

19. [US2] [4 Random branches: control (*nothing*); Question 31 (*field*); Question 32 (*important*); or the following question (*info*).] For information, a recent survey has shown  
that: [branch\_gcs\_..., info\_support]

877

- 64% of Americans support the Global climate scheme.
- 72% of Americans support the National redistribution scheme.

878

20. Do you support the Global climate scheme? [Figure S3; gcs\_support]

879           Yes; No

880

21. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the  
previous question? [Figure ED3; gcs\_belief]

881           The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

882

883           Percentage of [Americans] in favor of Global climate scheme [slider from 0 to 100]

884

22. Do you support the National redistribution scheme? [Figure S3; nr\_support]

885

886           Yes; No

887 23. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the  
888 previous question? [Figure ED3; nr\_belief]

889 The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

890 *Percentage of [Americans] in favor of National redistribution* [slider from 0 to 100]

891 24. [Eu, US1] Beware, this question is quite unusual. Among the policies below, **how**  
892 **many** do you support? [Figure S7, Table 1; list\_exp]

893 [Four random branches. Branch GCS/NR/C/O; branch\_list\_exp ]

- 894
- 895 • Global climate scheme
- 896 • National redistribution scheme
- 897 • [Coal exit]
- 898 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

899 0; 1; 2; 3; 4

900 [Branch GCS/C/O]

- 901
- 902 • Global climate scheme
- 903 • [Coal exit]
- 904 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

905 0; 1; 2; 3

906 [Branch NR/C/O]

- 907
- 908
- 909 • National redistribution scheme
- 910 • [Coal exit]
- 911 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

912 0; 1; 2; 3

913 [Branch C/O]

- 914
- 915
- 916 • [Coal exit]
- 917 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

918 0; 1; 2

919

920 **[Eu, US1] Conjoint analyses**

- 921 25. Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you prefer? [Figure  
922 [S8](#); conjoint\_crg\_cr]

923 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the  
924 same time.

Bundle A	Bundle B
[Coal exit] National redistribution scheme Global climate scheme	[Coal exit] National redistribution scheme

927 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 928 26. Do you support Bundle A (combining [Coal exit], the National redistribution  
929 scheme, and the Global climate scheme)?[[Figure S3](#); cgr\_support]

930 Yes; No

- 931 27. [new page] Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you  
932 prefer? [[Figure S8](#); conjoint\_b, branch\_conjoint\_b]

933 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the  
934 same time.

935 *[Four random branches. Branch C + NR vs. GCS + NR; conjoint\_cr\_gr]*

Bundle A	Bundle B
[Coal exit] National redistribution scheme	Global climate scheme National redistribution scheme

938 *[Branch NR vs. NR + C + GCS; conjoint\_r\_rcg]*

Bundle A	Bundle B
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme [Coal exit] Global climate scheme

941 [Branch NR + GCS vs. NR; conjoint\_rg\_r]

Bundle A	Bundle B
National redistribution scheme Global climate scheme	National redistribution scheme

942 [Branch NR + C vs. NR; conjoint\_rc\_r]

Bundle A	Bundle B
National redistribution scheme [Coal exit]	National redistribution scheme

943 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 944 28. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and  
945 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies  
946 in their platforms.

947 *Eu: Imagine if [DE, ES, UK: the two favorite candidates in your constituency in the  
948 next general election; FR: the two candidates in the second round of the next pres-  
949 idential election] campaigned with the following policies in their party's platforms.]*

950 Which of these candidates would you vote for? [Table 2, Figure S8;  
951 conjoint\_c, branch\_conjoint\_c]

952 [Table 2. Two random branches: with and without the final row. The US1 version of  
953 the policies is given below, see the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the European  
954 versions.]

<b>Democrat</b>	<b>Republican</b>
Increase corporate income tax rate from 21% to 28%	Decrease the payroll tax
Coal exit	Permit completion of the Keystone pipeline
Trillion dollar investment in childcare, healthcare, education and housing	Withdrawal of the Paris agreement
\$15 minimum wage	Marriage only for opposite-sex couples
National redistribution scheme	Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation
[Global climate scheme / <i>no row</i> ]	[ / <i>no row</i> ]

960 [US1: *Democrat; Republican; None of them; Eu: Candidate A; Candidate B; None of them*]

- 961  
962 29. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and  
963 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies  
964 in their platforms.

965 *Eu (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the Section "Values and politics"):*  
966 Imagine that [FR: the left or center-left; DE: a red-red-green coalition; ES: the PSOE;  
967 UK: the Labour Party] wins the next [general] elections. Here are two possible  
968 platforms on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly  
969 drawn from a pool of credible [FR: left or center-left, DE: left-wing parties'; ES:  
970 PSOE; UK: Labour] policies).]

971  
972 [US1: Which of these candidates do you prefer?  
973  
974 *Eu: Even if you [FR: are not from the left or center-left; DE: do not support the  
975 left-wing parties; ES: do not support the PSOE; UK: do not support the Labour  
976 Party], which of these platforms do you prefer?]*

977 [Figures ED1, S9; see also the sheet "Policies" in *this spreadsheet* for the possible policies.;  
978 conjoint\_left\_a\_b]

	[Candidate A]	[Candidate B]	
980	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]

981 [US1: Candidate A; Candidate B; Eu: Platform A; Platform B]

- 982 30. [new page] [Same wording and conditions as above. For brevity, only the UK version  
 983 is given here.; conjoint\_left\_ag\_b] Imagine that the Labour Party wins the next  
 984 general elections. Here are two possible platforms on which it may campaign  
 985 (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a pool of credible Labour  
 986 policies).

987  
 988 Even if you do not support the Labour Party, which of these platforms do  
 989 you prefer? [Figure ED1]

	Platform A	Platform B	
990	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	<b>Foreign policy</b>	Global climate scheme	-

991 Platform A; Platform B

## 992 [Eu, US2] Perceptions of the GCS

993 [Eu: two random branches. US2: four random branches and the question is asked (if asked)  
 994 before Question 20; branch\_gcs ]

- 995 31. [Branch: field] When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to  
 996 your mind?

997 Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme. [Figures S11, S12; gcs\_field]  
 998 {Open field}

- 999     32. [Branch: important] When determining your support or opposition to the Global  
1000    climate scheme, which points are important to you? [Figure S10; important\_...]  
  
1001    • It would succeed in limiting climate change.  
1002    • It would hurt the [U.S.] economy.  
1003    • It would penalize my household.  
1004    • It would make people change their lifestyle.  
1005    • It would reduce poverty in low-income countries.  
1006    • It might be detrimental to some poor countries.  
1007    • It could foster global cooperation.  
1008    • It could fuel corruption in low-income countries.  
1009    • It could be subject to fraud.  
1010    • It would be technically difficult to put in place.  
1011    • Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences.

1012    *Not at all important; Not so important; Quite important; Very important*

1013    **[Eu, US1] Donation lottery**

1014    US1 Please select "A little" (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).  
1015    [attention\_test]

1016    *Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*

1017    33. [*Two random branches*] By taking this survey, you are automatically entered into a  
1018    lottery to win [\$]100 in panel points. This lottery is unrelated to the previous ones  
1019    that rewarded answers' accuracy. In a few days you will know whether you have  
1020    been selected in the lottery. The payment will be made to you in the same way as  
1021    your compensation for this survey, so no further action is required on your part.

1022  
1023    Should you be selected in the lottery, you can also donate a part of this additional  
1024    compensation to [[American] / African] people living in poverty through  
1025    [US1: the charity GiveDirectly. The charity GiveDirectly; Eu: a charity. We would  
1026    channel this donation to a charity that] provides small amounts of cash to people in  
1027    need in [[the U.S] / Africa].

1028

1029 In case you are winner of the lottery, what share of the [\$]100 would you  
1030 donate to [[American] / African] people living in poverty [US1: through GiveDi-  
1031 rectly]? [Figure S13, Table ED2; donation, branch\_donation]

1032 Amount donated to [[American] / African] people in need (in [\$]) [slider from 0 to 100]

1033 **[Eu, US2] Wealth tax**

1034 [Four random branches: Question 35 then Question 34 (global\_first); Question 34 then Ques-  
1035 tion 35 (national\_first); Question 36 (global\_share); Question 37 (sharing); branch\_global\_tax]

1036 34. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: afford-  
1037 able housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and  
1038 schools]? [Figures S3, S14; national\_tax\_support]

1039 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support;  
1040 Strongly support*

1041 35. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-  
1042 income countries?

1043 Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking  
1044 water, healthcare, and education. [Figures S3, S15; global\_tax\_support]

1045 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support;  
1046 Strongly support*

1047 36. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted  
1048 in all countries around the world. In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would  
1049 amount to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE: €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is,  
1050 [US2: 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would  
1051 amount to [\$]1 billion in all low-income countries taken together (28 countries,  
1052 home to 700 million people, most of them in Africa).

1053 Each country would retain part of the revenues it collects, and the remaining part  
1054 would be pooled at the global level to finance infrastructure and public services in  
1055 low-income countries.

1056  
1057 What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (in-  
1058 stead of retained in the country's national budget)? [Figures ED4, S16;

1059       global\_tax\_global\_share]  
1060       Percent of global wealth tax that should go to low-income countries [slider from 0 to 100]

1061     37. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in  
1062       all countries around the world.

1063       In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount to [US2: \$430; FR: €16;  
1064       DE: €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2: 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%;  
1065       ES: 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount to [\$]1 billion in all  
1066       low-income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700 million people,  
1067       most of them in Africa).

1068       Which of the following options would you prefer?       [Figure S17;  
1069       global\_tax\_sharing]

- 1070       • The whole wealth tax financing national budgets in each country. For ex-  
1071       ample, in [US2: the U.S., it could finance affordable housing and universal  
1072       childcare/pre-K.; Eu-UK: the UK, it could finance the National Health Service  
1073       and state-funded schools].
- 1074       • Half of the wealth tax financing national budgets in each country, half of it  
1075       financing low-income countries. For example, it could finance [US2: universal  
1076       childcare/pre-K in the U.S.; Eu-UK: state-funded schools in the UK] and access  
1077       to drinking water, healthcare, and education in Africa.

1078     **[Eu, US2] Foreign aid**

1079     US2 Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).  
1080       [attention\_test]  
1081       *Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*

1082     38. From your best guess, what percentage of [U.S.] government spending is allocated  
1083       to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?

1084  
1085       For your information, government spending totals [US2: 38%; FR: 55%; DE:  
1086       45%; ES: 42%; UK: 41%] of [U.S.] GDP, it includes [US2: federal, State; Eu: national]  
1087       and local government spending, and apart from foreign aid, it covers the following  
1088       items: defense, social security (retirement pensions), health [US2: (including Medi-  
1089       care and Medicaid)], welfare benefits [US2: (including food stamps and EITC)],

1090 education, roads, justice, other programs [US2: and federal agencies (including in  
1091 energy, science...)]. [Figure S18; foreign\_aid\_belief]

1092 Less than 0.1%; 0.1% to 0.2%; 0.3% to 0.5%; 0.6% to 1.0%; 1.1% to 1.7%; 1.8% to 2.6%;  
1093 2.7% to 4%; 4.1% to 6%; 6.1% to 9%; 9.1% to 13%; 13.1% to 25%; More than 25%

- 1094 39. [Two random branches: with or without information on actual amount] [Info: Actually,  
1095 [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [the U.S.] government  
1096 spending is allocated to foreign aid.]

1097  
1098 If you could choose the government spending, what percentage  
1099 would you allocate to foreign aid? [Figures S21, S22, S19 and S20;  
1100 foreign\_aid\_preferred, branch\_foreign\_aid\_preferred]

- 1101 40. [Asked iff branch: Info and preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than actual  
1102 foreign aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to increase [U.S.]  
1103 foreign aid.

1104  
1105 How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple an-  
1106 swers possible) [Figure S23; foreign\_aid\_raise\_how\_...]

1107 Lower spending on defense; Lower spending on retirement pensions; Lower spending on  
1108 healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Lower spending on welfare benefits [US2: (like  
1109 EITC or food stamps)]; Lower spending on education; Lower spending on other programs  
1110 [US2: and federal agencies]; Higher taxes on the wealthiest; Higher corporate income tax  
1111 rate; Higher personal income tax rates; Higher public deficit

- 1112 41. [Asked iff branch: Info and preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than actual foreign  
1113 aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to reduce [U.S.] foreign aid.

1114  
1115 How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible)  
1116 [Figure S24; foreign\_aid\_reduce\_how\_...]

1117 Higher spending on defense; Higher spending on retirement pensions; Higher spending  
1118 on healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Higher spending on welfare benefits  
1119 [US2: (like EITC or food stamps)]; Higher spending on education; ower spending on other  
1120 programs [US2: and federal agencies]; Lower taxes on the wealthiest; Lower corporate  
1121 income tax rate; Lower personal income tax rates; Lower public deficit

1122 [Eu, US1] Petition

1123 42. [Two random branches] Would you be willing to sign a petition for  
1124 the [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme? [Figure S25;  
1125 branch\_petition, petition, petition\_gcs]

1126

1127 As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. Presi-  
1128 dent's office], informing him what share of American people are willing to endorse  
1129 the [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to  
1130 sign, only your answer here is required and remains anonymous.) Yes; No

1131 [Eu, US1] Other policies

1132 43. The following policies are discussed at international negotiations on how to deal  
1133 with climate change. [Figures 3 and S26; variables\_climate\_policies]

1134

1135 Do you support or oppose the following policies?

- 1136 • Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for  
1137 climate damages [climate\_compensation\_support]
- 1138 • High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries  
1139 [climate\_mitigation\_support]
- 1140 • High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income  
1141 countries adapt to climate change [climate\_adaptation\_support]

1142 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support;*  
1143 *Strongly support*

1144 44. Do you support or oppose the following global policies? [Figures 3 and S26;  
1145 variables\_global\_policies]

- 1146 • Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt  
1147 [debt\_cancellation\_support]
- 1148 • Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting  
1149 right proportional to its population [democratise\_un\_imf\_support]
- 1150 • Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries  
1151 [remove\_tariffs\_support]

- A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage [global\_min\_wage\_support]
- Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets [global\_register\_support]
- A maximum wealth limit of [US1: \$10 billion; Eu: [€]100 million] for each human [cap\_wealth\_support]

*Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support*

45. Currently, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [U.S.] government spending (that is, [US1: 0.2%; FR: 0.4%; DE: 0.6%; ES: 0.2%; UK: 0.7%] of [U.S.] GDP) is spent on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries. [Figure ED5; foreign\_aid\_raise\_support]

*Do you support [the U.S.] transferring more money to low-income countries?*

*Yes, [U.S.] foreign aid should be increased.; Yes, but only if some conditions are met.; No, [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.; No, [U.S.] foreign aid should be reduced.*

46. [Asked only if *Yes, but only if some conditions are met.* is chosen] What conditions should be required for [the U.S.] to increase its foreign aid? (Multiple answers possible) [Figures ED6, S21; foreign\_aid\_condition\_...]

*That recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights.; That recipient countries cooperate to fight illegal migrations.; That other high-income countries also increase their foreign aid.; That this is financed by increased taxes on millionaires.; That we can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted.; Other: [open field]*

47. [Asked only if *No, [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.* or *No, [U.S.] foreign aid should be reduced.* is chosen] Why do you oppose [the U.S.] increasing its foreign aid? (Multiple answers possible) [Figure ED7; foreign\_aid\_no\_]

*Aid perpetuates poverty as it makes people feel less responsible for themselves.; Aid is not effective as most of it is diverted.; Aid is a pressure tactic for high-income countries that prevents low-income countries from developing freely.; [The U.S.] is not responsible for what happens in other countries.; Charity begins at home: there is already a lot to do to support the American people in need.; Other: [open field]*

1183 [Eu, US1, US2] Values and politics

- 1184 48. [Eu (where it is instead asked at the beginning of Section “Other Policies”), US1]  
1185 In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend  
1186 [U.S.] interests or global justice? [Figure S27; negotiation]  
1187 [U.S.] interests, even if it goes against global justice; [U.S.] interests, to the extent it re-  
1188 spects global justice; Indifferent or don’t know; Global justice, to the extent it respects [U.S.]  
1189 interests; Global justice, even if it goes against [U.S.] interests
- 1190 49. How much did you give to charities in 2022? [Figure S32; donation\_charities]  
1191 I did not make donations to charities last year.; Less than [\$]100.; Between [\$]101 and  
1192 [\$]500.; Between [\$]501 and [\$]1,000.; Between [\$]1,001 and [\$]5,000.; More than [\$]5,000.
- 1193 50. To what extent are you interested in politics? [Figure S33; interested\_politics]  
1194 Not at all; A little; Moderately; A lot; A great deal
- 1195 51. Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means you think  
1196 the government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic  
1197 government functions, and 5 means you think the government should take active  
1198 steps in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens? [Figure S34;  
1199 involvement\_govt]  
1200 Desired involvement of government [slider from 1 to 5]
- 1201 52. **On economic policy matters**, where do you see yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where  
1202 1 is Left (favoring equality and government interventions) and 5 is Right (favoring  
1203 free competition and little government intervention)? [Figure S35; left\_right]  
1204 Left (1) to Right (5) on economic issues [slider from 1 to 5]
- 1205 53. Did you vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election? [Figure S36;  
1206 vote\_participation]  
1207 Yes; No; I didn’t have the right to vote in the U.S.; Prefer not to say
- 1208 54. [If voted: Which candidate did you vote for in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election?  
1209 If did not vote: Even if you did not vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election,  
1210 please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who  
1211 represents your views more closely.] [Figure S37; vote\_factor, voted]  
1212 [US1, US2: Biden; Trump; Jorgensen; Hawkins; Prefer not to say]  
1213 FR: candidates at the 2022 presidential election

1214 DE: parties with more than 1% of votes at the 2021 federal election and *Other*  
1215 ES: lists with more than 0.9% at the November 2019 general election and *Other*  
1216 UK: parties with more than 0.5% of votes at the 2019 general election and *Other*]

1217 55. To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem? [Figure S28;  
1218 variables\_problem]

- 1219 • Income inequality in [the U.S.] [problem\_inequality]  
1220 • Climate change [problem\_climate]  
1221 • Global poverty [problem\_poverty]

1222 *Not an important issue for me; An issue but there are other priorities; An issue but we  
1223 already do what we can; An important issue, we should do more; One of the most pressing  
1224 issue of our time*

1225 56. What group do you defend when you vote? [Figure S29; group\_defended]  
1226 *Sentient beings (humans and animals); Humans; [Eu: Europeans]; [Americans]; People  
1227 sharing my culture or religion; [US1, US2: My State]; [US1, US2: My town; Eu: My  
1228 country, region or town]; My relatives and/or colleagues; My family and myself*

## 1229 **[Eu, US1] Prioritization**

1230 57. In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The  
1231 more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

1232  
1233 How do you allocate the points among the following policies? [Figures S30  
1234 and S31; points\_foreign1\_gcs, points\_...]

1235  
1236 You can adjust the number of points either using the slider or entering the  
1237 number of your choice on the right-hand-side. **The sum of points must equal  
1238 exactly 100.** By pushing the last slider to the right, the total will automatically  
1239 adjust to 100. Please read the 6 options before making your choice.

1240 See the sheet “Policies” in *this spreadsheet* for the pool of policies in each country.  
1241 [sliders from 0 to 100]

1242 [FR, DE, ES] ETS2

1243 58. Similar to the Global Climate Scheme, the European Climate Scheme would impose  
1244 a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit across the EU in the buildings  
1245 and transport sectors. It would make polluters pay for their emissions, which in turn  
1246 would increase fossil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities. Several options  
1247 are possible regarding the use of the scheme's revenues:

- 1248 • Provide an equal cash transfer of €105 per year to each European.
- 1249 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European, proportional to their  
1250 country's emissions: people in countries with higher emissions per person (like  
1251 Germany) would receive more than people in countries with lower emissions  
1252 (like Romania). For information, people in [Germany] would receive €[FR:  
1253 110; DE: 130; ES: 90]/year.
- 1254 • Finance low-carbon investments: thermal insulation of buildings, switch to  
1255 clean sources of heating, public transportation, and charging stations for elec-  
1256 tric vehicles.
- 1257 • Provide cash transfers to the most vulnerable half of Europeans and finance  
1258 low-carbon investments.

1259 Do you support or oppose the European Climate Scheme in case the revenue is used  
1260 to...? [Fig. 1 in [Funke et al. \(2024\)](#); variables\_ets2\_support]

- 1261 • Provide an equal cash transfer to each European [ets2\_equal\_cash\_support]
- 1262 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European  
1263 [ets2\_country\_cash\_support]
- 1264 • Finance low-carbon investments [ets2\_investments\_support]
- 1265 • Provide cash transfers for the most vulnerable Europeans and low-carbon in-  
1266 vestments [ets2\_vulnerable\_investments\_support]

1267 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support;*  
1268 *Strongly support*

1269 59. [Asked iff none of the four variants of the European Climate Scheme is (somewhat or  
1270 strongly) supported] Why do you not support a European Climate Scheme? (Mul-  
1271 tiple answers possible) [ets2\_no\_...]

1272     *I am opposed to climate policy being decided at the EU level, it should be decided at the na-*  
1273     *tional level;*  
1274     *I would prefer if the revenues were used in a different way (beyond the four suggestions*  
1275     *above) than previously suggested;*  
1276     *I would prefer if decreasing carbon emissions were regulated by other climate policies;*  
1277     *I am generally opposed to additional, or more ambitious, climate policies;*  
1278     *I do not fully understand how the European Climate Scheme is supposed to work;*  
1279     *I don't know*

1280   **[Eu, US1, US2] Feedback**

- 1281   60. Do you feel that this survey was politically biased? [Figure S38; survey\_biased]  
1282     *Yes, left-wing biased; Yes, right-wing biased; No, I do not feel it was biased*
- 1283   61. [US2 Asked only to one random third of the respondents, instead of the  
1284     feedback Question 62] According to you, what should high-income coun-  
1285     tries do to fight extreme poverty in low-income countries? [Figure S39;  
1286     poverty\_field, branch\_poverty\_field]  
1287     *{Open field}*
- 1288   62. The survey is nearing completion. You can now enter any comments, thoughts or  
1289     suggestions in the field below. [comment\_field]  
1290     *{Open field}*
- 1291   63. Lastly, are you interested to be interviewed by a researcher (through videoconfer-  
1292     encing) for 30 min?  
1293  
1294     This is totally optional and will not be rewarded. [interview]  
1295     *Yes; No*

1296 **E Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme**

1297 To specify the GCS, we use the IEA's 2DS scenario (IEA 2017), which is consistent  
1298 with limiting the global average temperature increase to 2°C with a probability of at least  
1299 50%. The paper by Hood (2017) contributing to the Report of the High-Level Commission  
1300 on Carbon Prices (Stern & Stiglitz 2017) presents a price corridor compatible with this  
1301 emissions scenario, from which we take the midpoint. The product of these two series  
1302 provides an estimate of the revenues expected from a global carbon price. We then use  
1303 the UN median scenario of future population aged over 15 years (*adults*, for short). We  
1304 derive the basic income that could be paid to all adults by recycling the revenues from  
1305 the global carbon price: evolving between \$20 and \$30 per month, with a peak in 2030.  
1306 Accounting for the lower price levels in low-income countries, an additional income of  
1307 \$30 per month would allow **670 million people** to escape extreme poverty, defined with  
1308 the threshold of \$2.15 per day in purchasing power parity.<sup>13</sup>

1309 To estimate the increase in fossil fuel expenditures (or “cost”) in each country by 2030,  
1310 we make a key assumption concerning the evolution of the carbon footprints per adult:  
1311 that they will decrease by the same proportion in each country. We use data from the  
1312 Global Carbon Project (Peters et al. 2012). In 2030, the average carbon footprint of a  
1313 country  $c$ ,  $e_c$ , evolves from baseline year  $b$  proportionally to the evolution of its adult  
1314 population  $\Delta p_c = p_c^{2030} / p_c^b$ . Thus, the global share of country  $c$ 's carbon footprint,  $s_c$ ,  
1315 is proportional to  $\sigma_c = e_c \Delta p_c$ , and as countries' shares sum to 1,  $s_c = \frac{\sigma_c}{\sum_k \sigma_k}$ . Multiplying  
1316 country  $c$ 's emission share with global revenues in 2030,  $R$ , and dividing by  $c$ 's adult pop-  
1317 ulation in year  $y$ , yields its average cost per adult:  $R \cdot s_c / p_c^y$ . Using findings from Ivanova  
1318 & Wood (2020) for Europe and Fremstad & Paul (2019) for the U.S., we approximate the  
1319 median cost as 90% of the average cost. Finally, the net gain is given by the basic income  
1320 (\$30 per month) minus the cost. We provided consistent estimates of net gains in all sur-  
1321 veys (using  $y = b = 2015$ ), though in the global survey we gave the average net gains  
1322 vs. the median ones in the Western surveys. The latter are shown in Figure S42. For the  
1323 record, Table S1 also provides an estimate of *average* net gains (computed with  $b = 2019$ )

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<sup>13</sup>The average carbon footprint of Sub-Saharan Africa is 0.75tCO<sub>2</sub> per capita (World Bank), and it is even lower for people living in extreme poverty, under one tenth of the world average of about 5tCO<sub>2</sub> per capita (Chancel & Piketty 2015). Under a GCS with a cash transfer of \$30 per person, if one's emission is one tenth of the world average, their net gain would be \$27 per month in nominal terms. In regions with extreme poverty like Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding high-income countries), the conversion factor from Market Exchange Rate to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is 2.4 (computed as the ratio of the World Bank series relating the GDP per capita of Sub-Saharan Africa in PPP and nominal). Therefore, the net gain for the extreme poor is \$65 per month (or \$2.13 a day) in PPP, enough to lift them out of extreme poverty.

<sup>1324</sup> and  $y = 2030$ ).<sup>14</sup>

<sup>1325</sup> Estimates of the net gains from the Global Climate Scheme are necessarily imprecise,  
<sup>1326</sup> given the uncertainties surrounding the carbon price required to achieve emissions  
<sup>1327</sup> reductions as well as each country's trajectory in terms of emissions and population. These  
<sup>1328</sup> values are highly dependent on future (non-price) climate policies, technical progress,  
<sup>1329</sup> and economic growth of each country, which are only partially known. Integrated As-  
<sup>1330</sup> sessment Models have been used to derive a Global Energy Assessment (Johansson et al.  
<sup>1331</sup> 2012), a 100% renewable scenario (Greenpeace 2015) as well as Shared Socioeconomic  
<sup>1332</sup> Pathways (SSPs), which include consistent trajectories of population, emissions, and car-  
<sup>1333</sup> bon price Bauer et al. (2017), Fricko et al. (2017), Riahi et al. (2017), van Vuuren et al.  
<sup>1334</sup> (2017). Instead of using some of these modelling trajectories, we relied on a simple and  
<sup>1335</sup> transparent formula, for a number of reasons. First and foremost, those trajectories de-  
<sup>1336</sup> scribe territorial emissions while we need consumption-based emissions to compute the  
<sup>1337</sup> incidence of the GCS. Second, the carbon price is relatively low in trajectories of SSPs that  
<sup>1338</sup> contain global warming below 2°C (less than \$35/tCO<sub>2</sub> in 2030), so we conservatively  
<sup>1339</sup> chose a method yielding a higher carbon price (\$90 in 2030). Third, modelling results are  
<sup>1340</sup> available only for a few macro regions, while we wanted country by country estimates.  
<sup>1341</sup> Finally, we have checked that the emissions per capita given by our method are broadly  
<sup>1342</sup> in line with alternative methods, even if it tends to overestimate net gains in countries  
<sup>1343</sup> which will decarbonize less rapidly than average.<sup>15</sup> For example, although countries' de-  
<sup>1344</sup> carbonization plans should realign with the GCS in place, India might still decarbonize  
<sup>1345</sup> less quickly than the European Union, so India's gain and the EU's loss might be over-  
<sup>1346</sup> estimated in our computations. For a more sophisticated version of the Global Climate  
<sup>1347</sup> Scheme which includes participation mechanisms preventing middle-income countries  
<sup>1348</sup> (like China) to lose from it and estimations of the Net Present Value by country, see Fabre  
<sup>1349</sup> (2023).

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<sup>14</sup>2015 was the last year of data available when the global questionnaire was conceived (OECD data was then used – it does not cover all countries but give identical rounded estimates than those recomputed from the Global Carbon Project data for our Western surveys). 2030 was chosen as the reference year as it is the date at which global carbon price revenues are expected to peak (and the GCS redistributive effects would be largest), and the GCS could not realistically enter into force before that date. In the surveys, we chose  $y = b = 2015$  rather than  $b = 2019$  and  $y = 2030$  to get more conservative estimates of the monthly cost in the U.S. (\$20 higher than the other option) and in Europe (€5 or £10 higher).

<sup>15</sup>Computations with alternative methods can be found on [our public repository](#).

Figure S42: Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme (maps/median\_gain\_2015).




Table S1: Estimated net gain from the GCS in 2030 and carbon footprint by country.

	Mean net gain from the GCS (\$/month)	CO <sub>2</sub> footprint per adult in 2019 (tCO <sub>2</sub> /y)			
Saudi Arabia	-93	24.0	Brazil	15	2.9
United States	-77	21.0	Vietnam	15	2.9
Australia	-60	17.6	Peru	16	2.8
Canada	-56	16.7	Morocco	16	2.7
South Korea	-50	15.6	North Korea*	17	2.5
Germany	-30	11.7	India	18	2.4
Russia	-29	11.5	Philippines	18	2.3
Japan	-28	11.3	Pakistan	22	1.6
Malaysia	-21	10.0	Bangladesh	24	1.1
Iran	-19	9.5	Nigeria	25	1.0
Poland	-19	9.5	Kenya	25	0.9
United Kingdom	-18	9.4	Myanmar*	26	0.9
China	-14	8.6	Sudan*	26	0.9
Italy	-13	8.4	Tanzania	27	0.5
South Africa	-11	8.0	Afghanistan*	27	0.5
France	-10	7.8	Uganda	28	0.4
Iraq*	-8	7.4	Ethiopia	28	0.3
Spain	-6	7.0	Venezuela	29	0.3
Turkey	-2	6.2	DRC*	30	0.1
Algeria*	-1	6.0			

<sup>1350</sup> Note: Asterisks denote countries where footprint is missing and territorial emissions is used instead.

<sup>1351</sup> Values differ from Figure S42 as this table present estimates of *mean* net gain per adult in 2030, not at the

<sup>1352</sup> present. Only the countries with more than 20 million adults (covering 87% of the global total) are shown.

## F Determinants of support

Table S2: Determinants of support for the Global Climate Scheme.

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme						
	All	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Country: Germany	-0.157*** (0.022)		-0.144*** (0.022)				
Country: Spain	-0.044* (0.024)		-0.026 (0.024)				
Country: United Kingdom	-0.079*** (0.024)		-0.104*** (0.023)				
Country: United States	-0.375*** (0.019)						
Income quartile: 2	0.037** (0.017)	0.031 (0.022)	0.038 (0.023)	0.047 (0.043)	0.058 (0.049)	0.013 (0.053)	0.023 (0.043)
Income quartile: 3	0.042** (0.017)	0.033 (0.024)	0.049** (0.024)	0.080** (0.040)	0.059 (0.052)	0.074 (0.056)	-0.052 (0.052)
Income quartile: 4	0.056*** (0.018)	0.063** (0.026)	0.010 (0.026)	0.018 (0.047)	-0.015 (0.055)	-0.001 (0.056)	-0.005 (0.057)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.023* (0.012)	0.033* (0.017)	0.010 (0.018)	0.007 (0.029)	0.045 (0.039)	0.007 (0.039)	-0.010 (0.039)
Age: 25-34	-0.076*** (0.025)	-0.083*** (0.031)	-0.044 (0.035)	-0.031 (0.057)	-0.077 (0.083)	-0.050 (0.066)	-0.103 (0.091)
Age: 35-49	-0.101*** (0.024)	-0.108*** (0.030)	-0.069* (0.034)	-0.094* (0.055)	-0.009 (0.077)	-0.168** (0.070)	-0.050 (0.090)
Age: 50-64	-0.137*** (0.024)	-0.164*** (0.030)	-0.038 (0.035)	-0.039 (0.056)	-0.020 (0.082)	-0.146** (0.067)	-0.017 (0.087)
Age: 65+	-0.116*** (0.028)	-0.140*** (0.034)	-0.056 (0.044)	0.003 (0.076)	-0.045 (0.094)	-0.258*** (0.091)	0.011 (0.105)
Gender: Man	0.019* (0.011)	0.023 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.029)	-0.018 (0.033)	0.042 (0.038)	-0.005 (0.034)
Lives with partner	0.029** (0.013)	0.022 (0.017)	0.058*** (0.018)	0.070** (0.033)	0.082** (0.038)	0.017 (0.038)	0.040 (0.039)
Employment status: Retired	-0.020 (0.024)	-0.047 (0.030)	0.056 (0.038)	0.087 (0.081)	0.096 (0.075)	0.040 (0.082)	0.001 (0.073)
Employment status: Student	0.045 (0.033)	0.063 (0.048)	0.101** (0.044)	0.165* (0.085)	0.192** (0.087)	0.116 (0.074)	-0.021 (0.107)
Employment status: Working	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.021 (0.024)	0.011 (0.028)	0.082 (0.064)	0.006 (0.056)	-0.050 (0.056)	0.036 (0.051)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.331*** (0.013)	-0.435*** (0.017)	-0.106*** (0.019)	-0.131*** (0.035)	-0.004 (0.044)	-0.114*** (0.038)	-0.081** (0.041)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	-0.184*** (0.016)	-0.198*** (0.022)	-0.136*** (0.021)	-0.196*** (0.039)	-0.034 (0.043)	-0.116** (0.046)	-0.108*** (0.040)
Vote: Far right	-0.396*** (0.032)		-0.309*** (0.033)	-0.493*** (0.064)	-0.168*** (0.051)	-0.130 (0.102)	-0.314*** (0.080)
Urban	0.049*** (0.012)	0.074*** (0.018)	0.006 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.029)	0.019 (0.032)	-0.014 (0.036)	0.017 (0.033)
Race: White		-0.030 (0.019)					
Region: Northeast		0.009 (0.023)					
Region: South		0.011 (0.020)					
Region: West		0.011 (0.022)					
Swing State		-0.019 (0.017)					
Constant	1.048	0.729	0.89	0.7	0.732	0.935	0.886
Observations	7,986	4,992	2,994	977	727	748	542
R <sup>2</sup>	0.160	0.180	0.064	0.116	0.067	0.043	0.063

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table S3: Support for the GCS regressed on comprehension of its financial effects.

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme					
	All	United States	France	Germany	United Kingdom	Spain
With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win	0.029** (0.012)	-0.004 (0.016)	0.043 (0.033)	0.051 (0.033)	0.040 (0.036)	0.038 (0.037)
Constant	0.596	0.53	0.764	0.677	0.707	0.796
Observations	8,000	5,000	729	979	749	543
R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.00001	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.002

Table S4: Correlation between (*Somewhat or Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in high-income countries.

	Support for a global GHG tax and dividend											
	USA (1)	DNK (2)	FRA (3)	DEU (4)	ITA (5)	ESP (6)	GBR (7)	JPN (8)	POL (9)	AUS (10)	CAN (11)	KOR (12)
Control group mean	0.34	0.409	0.34	0.361	0.341	0.421	0.288	0.317	0.309	0.294	0.316	0.334
Trusts the government	0.040*** (0.013)	0.0005 (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.051*** (0.011)	0.061*** (0.012)	0.046*** (0.011)	0.050*** (0.012)	0.039*** (0.013)	0.023** (0.011)	0.041*** (0.013)	0.019 (0.012)	0.079*** (0.013)
Believes inequality is an important problem	0.038*** (0.014)	0.051*** (0.012)	0.045*** (0.013)	0.040*** (0.011)	0.023** (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.052*** (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)	0.009 (0.010)	0.005 (0.013)	0.031*** (0.012)	0.024** (0.012)
Worries about CC	0.006 (0.018)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.005 (0.016)	0.048*** (0.014)	0.023* (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.044*** (0.015)	0.014 (0.014)	0.018 (0.013)	0.036** (0.017)	0.004 (0.014)	0.015 (0.013)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	0.009 (0.015)	0.007 (0.012)	0.018 (0.014)	0.015 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.032** (0.011)	0.027** (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.024** (0.015)	0.018 (0.014)	0.014 (0.014)	0.001 (0.013)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.059*** (0.015)	0.019 (0.013)	0.008 (0.014)	0.032** (0.013)	0.012 (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.006 (0.014)	0.037** (0.014)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.033** (0.016)	0.026* (0.014)	0.033** (0.013)
Understands emission across activities/regions	-0.018 (0.011)	0.009 (0.013)	0.003 (0.012)	0.023* (0.012)	0.007 (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.007 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.026** (0.011)	-0.002 (0.013)	0.003 (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	0.007 (0.012)	0.008 (0.014)	0.023 (0.014)	0.011 (0.012)	-0.0005 (0.012)	0.031*** (0.012)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.014 (0.011)	0.025* (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.024* (0.012)
Knows which gases cause CC	0.005 (0.011)	0.021* (0.012)	0.010 (0.013)	0.001 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.010)	0.020* (0.010)	0.015 (0.010)	0.017 (0.011)	0.011 (0.011)	-0.0003 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.013)
Understands impacts of CC	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.029*** (0.011)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.022* (0.012)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.024* (0.012)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	-0.005 (0.013)	0.007 (0.012)	0.021 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.014)	0.011 (0.014)	0.010 (0.013)	0.014 (0.013)	0.008 (0.013)	0.015 (0.013)	0.036** (0.016)	0.004 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.013)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	-0.013 (0.021)	0.037 (0.023)	0.043* (0.022)	-0.014 (0.020)	-0.038** (0.019)	0.029 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.017 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.006 (0.022)	0.021 (0.020)	-0.020 (0.019)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.086*** (0.024)	0.066*** (0.023)	0.075*** (0.023)	0.094*** (0.022)	0.105*** (0.020)	0.074*** (0.023)	0.091*** (0.021)	0.154*** (0.019)	0.089*** (0.020)	0.070*** (0.024)	0.053** (0.023)	0.112*** (0.020)
Believes own household would lose	-0.071*** (0.021)	-0.057*** (0.015)	-0.026 (0.020)	-0.087*** (0.017)	-0.066*** (0.017)	-0.053*** (0.017)	-0.073*** (0.017)	-0.008 (0.017)	-0.079*** (0.017)	-0.052*** (0.016)	-0.060*** (0.019)	-0.083*** (0.017)
Believes low-income earners will lose	-0.034* (0.019)	-0.020 (0.016)	-0.056*** (0.018)	-0.022 (0.017)	-0.021 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.016)	-0.015 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.056*** (0.017)	-0.025 (0.016)	-0.030 (0.020)	-0.056*** (0.018)
Believes high-income earners will lose	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.012)	0.013 (0.013)	0.003 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.007 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.025** (0.012)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.0004 (0.013)
Observations	2,218	2,013	2,006	2,006	2,088	2,268	2,025	1,990	2,053	1,978	2,022	1,932
R <sup>2</sup>	0.329	0.241	0.237	0.295	0.211	0.216	0.272	0.222	0.214	0.272	0.254	0.228

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 of Dechezleprêtre et al. (forthcoming) for variable definitions.

Table S5: Correlation between (*Somewhat* or *Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in middle-income countries.

	Support for a global GHG tax and dividend							
	IDN (1)	ZAF (2)	MEX (3)	TUR (4)	IND (5)	BRA (6)	CHN (7)	UKR (8)
Control group mean	0.697	0.396	0.681	0.44	0.719	0.539	0.737	0.622
Trusts the government	0.051*** (0.012)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.040*** (0.014)	0.066*** (0.017)	0.065*** (0.015)	0.038** (0.015)	-0.011 (0.015)	0.061*** (0.014)
Believes inequality is an important problem	0.048** (0.011)	0.002 (0.014)	0.057*** (0.014)	0.028 (0.017)	0.092*** (0.016)	0.055*** (0.015)	-0.001 (0.015)	0.027 (0.018)
Worries about CC	0.003 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.016)	0.013 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.017)	-0.0002 (0.016)	0.032* (0.017)	-0.0002 (0.016)	0.046*** (0.016)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	0.020 (0.014)	0.026 (0.017)	0.004 (0.014)	0.039** (0.017)	0.022 (0.016)	0.019 (0.015)	0.034** (0.016)	0.018 (0.016)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.020* (0.011)	0.038** (0.016)	0.032* (0.017)	-0.002 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.015)	-0.017 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.018 (0.016)
Understands emission across activities/regions	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.013)	0.003 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.010)	0.039*** (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.00004 (0.013)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	-0.006 (0.009)	0.011 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.016)	0.0002 (0.012)	0.003 (0.014)	-0.052*** (0.016)	0.022 (0.014)
Knows which gases cause CC	-0.026*** (0.009)	0.019 (0.015)	0.035** (0.014)	0.015 (0.015)	0.020 (0.013)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.023* (0.012)	0.023 (0.015)
Understands impacts of CC	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.0005 (0.015)	0.009 (0.017)	0.043*** (0.014)	-0.023 (0.015)	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.014 (0.014)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	-0.010 (0.007)	0.009 (0.016)	0.015 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.013)	0.002 (0.011)	-0.016 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.010)	0.035** (0.015)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	0.023 (0.015)	0.002 (0.021)	0.019 (0.022)	0.044 (0.029)	0.021 (0.020)	0.032 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.018)	-0.023 (0.025)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.111*** (0.019)	0.073*** (0.022)	0.088*** (0.024)	0.078** (0.031)	0.034 (0.025)	0.129*** (0.022)	0.060*** (0.022)	0.138*** (0.025)
Believes own household would lose	-0.027 (0.021)	-0.044** (0.020)	-0.071*** (0.019)	-0.054** (0.024)	-0.012 (0.019)	-0.067*** (0.023)	-0.119*** (0.022)	-0.045** (0.021)
Believes low-income earners will lose	-0.059*** (0.020)	-0.016 (0.019)	0.003 (0.017)	-0.053** (0.023)	-0.055*** (0.019)	-0.013 (0.020)	0.001 (0.018)	0.004 (0.020)
Believes high-income earners will lose	0.026** (0.011)	-0.020 (0.015)	0.010 (0.013)	0.010 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.014)	0.003 (0.016)	-0.047*** (0.014)	-0.007 (0.013)
Observations	2,488	2,003	2,045	1,932	2,472	1,860	1,717	1,564
R <sup>2</sup>	0.366	0.175	0.242	0.248	0.370	0.272	0.280	0.255

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 of Dechezleprêtre et al. (forthcoming) for variable definitions.

## G Representativeness of the surveys

Table S6: Sample representativeness of the Western surveys.

	US1			US2			Eu		
	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample
Sample size		3,000	3,000		2,000	2,000		3,000	3,000
Gender: Woman	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.45	0.50	0.51	0.49	0.51
Gender: Man	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.49	0.55	0.50	0.49	0.51	0.49
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.11	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.18	0.15	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.18	0.15	0.17	0.15
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.24	0.26
Age: 65+	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.25	0.23	0.25
Diploma_25_64: Below upper secondary	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.13	0.14	0.13
Diploma_25_64: Upper secondary	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.28	0.23	0.19	0.23
Diploma_25_64: Post secondary	0.34	0.40	0.34	0.34	0.33	0.34	0.29	0.33	0.29
Race: White only	0.60	0.67	0.61	0.60	0.62	0.61			
Race: Hispanic	0.18	0.15	0.19	0.18	0.19	0.19			
Race: Black	0.13	0.16	0.14	0.13	0.17	0.14			
Region: Northeast	0.17	0.20	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.17			
Region: Midwest	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.21			
Region: South	0.38	0.39	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38			
Region: West	0.24	0.20	0.24	0.24	0.20	0.24			
Urban: TRUE	0.73	0.78	0.74	0.73	0.75	0.73			
Employment_18_64: Inactive	0.20	0.16	0.16	0.20	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.15
Employment_18_64: Unemployed	0.02	0.07	0.08	0.02	0.09	0.08	0.03	0.06	0.05
Vote: Left	0.32	0.47	0.45	0.32	0.46	0.45	0.30	0.32	0.32
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.32	0.32
Vote: Far right							0.10	0.10	0.10
Country: FR							0.24	0.24	0.24
Country: DE							0.33	0.33	0.33
Country: ES							0.18	0.18	0.18
Country: UK							0.25	0.25	0.25
Urbanity: Cities							0.43	0.49	0.43
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs							0.33	0.32	0.33
Urbanity: Rural							0.25	0.20	0.25

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

Table S7: Sample representativeness for each European country.

	FR			DE			ES			UK		
	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.									
Sample size		729	729		979	979		543	543		749	749
Gender: Woman	0.52	0.50	0.52	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.53	0.51	0.50	0.43	0.50
Gender: Man	0.48	0.50	0.48	0.49	0.48	0.49	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.50	0.57	0.50
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.29	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.19	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.19	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.33	0.25	0.25	0.18	0.25	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.14	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.07	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.12	0.16	0.12	0.17	0.20	0.17
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.31	0.24	0.22	0.26	0.22	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.24	0.18	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.24	0.19	0.24	0.28	0.23	0.28	0.27	0.28	0.27	0.25	0.30	0.25
Age: 65+	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.26	0.21	0.26	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.24
Diploma_25-64: Below upper secondary	0.11	0.19	0.11	0.10	0.14	0.10	0.24	0.16	0.25	0.12	0.09	0.12
Diploma_25-64: Upper secondary	0.26	0.16	0.26	0.27	0.20	0.27	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.21	0.23	0.21
Diploma_25-64: Post secondary	0.26	0.30	0.26	0.29	0.31	0.29	0.28	0.38	0.27	0.33	0.36	0.33
Urbanity: Cities	0.47	0.52	0.47	0.37	0.47	0.37	0.52	0.58	0.52	0.40	0.41	0.40
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.40	0.35	0.40	0.22	0.27	0.22	0.42	0.43	0.42
Urbanity: Rural	0.34	0.29	0.34	0.23	0.18	0.23	0.26	0.15	0.26	0.18	0.16	0.18
Employment_18-64: Inactive	0.20	0.19	0.18	0.15	0.14	0.11	0.20	0.13	0.12	0.16	0.16	0.17
Employment_18-64: Unemployed	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.11	0.12	0.02	0.03	0.04
Vote: Left	0.23	0.19	0.21	0.37	0.44	0.44	0.33	0.37	0.38	0.25	0.28	0.29
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.26	0.30	0.29	0.28	0.27	0.29	0.18	0.24	0.24	0.36	0.44	0.41
Vote: Far right	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.01	0.03	0.03

*Note:* This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. In this Table, weights are defined at the country level. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

<sup>1355</sup> Similar tables for the global surveys can be found in Dechezleprêtre et al. (forthcoming).

<sup>1356</sup> [ing](#).

## H Attrition analysis

Table S8: Attrition analysis for the US1 survey.

	Dropped out	Dropped out after socio-eco	Failed attention test	Duration (in min)	Duration below 4 min
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mean	0.08	0.059	0.082	21.198	0.016
Income quartile: 2	0.025*** (0.010)	0.025*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.740 (3.064)	-0.009 (0.006)
Income quartile: 3	0.062*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.754 (2.813)	-0.004 (0.007)
Income quartile: 4	0.035*** (0.011)	0.035*** (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-3.917 (2.798)	-0.003 (0.007)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.039*** (0.009)	0.039*** (0.009)	-0.000*** (0.000)	1.544 (2.665)	0.006 (0.006)
Age: 25-34	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.597 (2.604)	-0.031** (0.013)
Age: 35-49	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.824 (3.176)	-0.032** (0.013)
Age: 50-64	-0.060*** (0.015)	-0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	5.723** (2.763)	-0.039*** (0.012)
Age: 65+	0.048*** (0.017)	0.048*** (0.017)	0.000** (0.000)	8.952** (4.267)	-0.047*** (0.012)
Gender: Man	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.451 (2.210)	-0.0001 (0.005)
Urban	0.006 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.888** (2.443)	-0.004 (0.006)
Race: Black	0.020** (0.010)	0.020** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	8.554*** (2.600)	0.004 (0.007)
Race: Hispanic	0.021** (0.010)	0.021** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.119* (2.293)	-0.002 (0.007)
Region: Northeast	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-4.862 (4.782)	-0.004 (0.007)
Region: South	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-1.151 (4.710)	-0.004 (0.006)
Region: West	0.006 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-4.000 (4.305)	-0.003 (0.007)
Vote: Biden	-0.048*** (0.008)	-0.048*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-2.901 (2.379)	-0.009 (0.007)
Vote: Trump	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.145 (2.878)	-0.005 (0.008)
Observations	5,719	5,719	3,252	3,044	3,044
R <sup>2</sup>	0.127	0.127	1.000	0.006	0.017

Table S9: Attrition analysis for the US2 survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 4 min (5)
Mean	0.095	0.074	0.092	16.338	0.052
Income quartile: 2	0.023* (0.013)	0.023* (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	1.352 (1.601)	-0.029** (0.014)
Income quartile: 3	0.054*** (0.014)	0.054*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	8.502 (9.649)	-0.009 (0.016)
Income quartile: 4	0.060*** (0.016)	0.060*** (0.016)	-0.000 (0.000)	5.254 (3.376)	0.0003 (0.017)
Diploma: Post secondary	-0.033*** (0.011)	-0.033*** (0.011)	0.000 (0.000)	1.601 (2.630)	0.012 (0.011)
Age: 25-34	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.929 (1.535)	-0.032 (0.024)
Age: 35-49	0.012 (0.014)	0.012 (0.014)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.076 (6.651)	-0.047** (0.022)
Age: 50-64	0.040*** (0.014)	0.040*** (0.014)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.364 (1.565)	-0.079*** (0.022)
Age: 65+	0.115*** (0.017)	0.115*** (0.017)	-0.000*** (0.000)	2.619 (3.150)	-0.095*** (0.022)
Gender: Man	-0.073*** (0.009)	-0.073*** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	4.707 (6.037)	0.010 (0.010)
Urban	0.019* (0.011)	0.019* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	1.766 (1.135)	0.005 (0.012)
Race: Black	0.060*** (0.015)	0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.673 (13.328)	-0.010 (0.015)
Race: Hispanic	0.079*** (0.014)	0.079*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	2.930 (1.813)	-0.027** (0.012)
Region: Northeast	-0.026* (0.014)	-0.026* (0.014)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.837 (2.855)	-0.011 (0.015)
Region: South	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.000 (0.000)	3.220 (5.002)	0.009 (0.014)
Region: West	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.000 (0.000)	-1.759 (1.942)	-0.009 (0.015)
Vote: Biden	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	3.230 (2.731)	-0.006 (0.014)
Vote: Trump	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.554 (1.272)	0.007 (0.016)
Observations	2,973	2,973	2,280	2,103	2,103
R <sup>2</sup>	0.241	0.241	1.000	0.010	0.031

Table S10: Attrition analysis for the *Eu* survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 6 min (5)
Mean	0.067	0.044	0.151	54.602	0.039
Country: Germany	0.023** (0.010)	0.019** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.533 (18.906)	0.019* (0.010)
Country: Spain	-0.102*** (0.011)	-0.098*** (0.011)	0.000* (0.000)	-29.136* (15.948)	0.010 (0.010)
Country: United Kingdom	0.042*** (0.011)	0.043*** (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-7.458 (18.046)	0.010 (0.010)
Income quartile: 2	0.032*** (0.010)	0.029*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	32.749* (19.771)	-0.015 (0.010)
Income quartile: 3	0.049*** (0.010)	0.047*** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	6.130 (11.734)	-0.021** (0.010)
Income quartile: 4	0.024** (0.011)	0.021* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.659 (19.955)	-0.018* (0.011)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.035*** (0.008)	0.034*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	10.647 (12.959)	-0.007 (0.007)
Age: 25-34	0.028** (0.013)	0.025* (0.013)	-0.000*** (0.000)	36.132 (22.285)	-0.005 (0.018)
Age: 35-49	0.064*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	-0.000*** (0.000)	37.159** (17.190)	-0.013 (0.016)
Age: 50-64	0.085*** (0.013)	0.083*** (0.013)	-0.000 (0.000)	48.363** (22.526)	-0.063*** (0.015)
Age: 65+	0.117*** (0.014)	0.115*** (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	36.351** (14.226)	-0.061*** (0.015)
Gender: Man	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-22.980 (14.093)	0.009 (0.007)
Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs	0.006 (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-16.736 (17.256)	0.004 (0.008)
Degree of urbanization: Rural	0.023** (0.009)	0.023** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	-14.593 (19.733)	-0.001 (0.009)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.025*** (0.005)	-0.025*** (0.005)	0.000*** (0.000)	-17.558 (13.143)	0.019** (0.008)
Vote: Far right	0.005 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.000*** (0.000)	15.838 (32.281)	0.029** (0.014)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	0.023*** (0.006)	0.022*** (0.005)	0.000 (0.000)	24.631 (19.824)	0.030*** (0.010)
Observations	3,963	3,963	3,326	3,115	3,115
R <sup>2</sup>	0.406	0.395	1.000	0.006	0.028

# I Balance analysis

Table S11: Balance analysis.

	List contains: G (1)	Branch petition: NR (2)	Branch donation: Own nation (3)	Branch conjoint 3: with GCS (4)
Mean	0.493	0.492	0.5	0.497
Country: Germany	-0.026 (0.026)	0.017 (0.026)	0.020 (0.026)	0.005 (0.026)
Country: Spain	0.025 (0.030)	0.026 (0.030)	0.026 (0.030)	0.043 (0.030)
Country: United Kingdom	0.002 (0.028)	0.018 (0.028)	0.037 (0.028)	0.063** (0.028)
Country: United States	-0.001 (0.024)	0.019 (0.024)	0.007 (0.024)	0.023 (0.024)
Income quartile: 2	-0.013 (0.021)	-0.024 (0.021)	0.012 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.021)
Income quartile: 3	0.021 (0.022)	-0.005 (0.022)	0.011 (0.022)	-0.004 (0.022)
Income quartile: 4	-0.001 (0.023)	-0.017 (0.023)	-0.013 (0.023)	0.0001 (0.023)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.008 (0.016)	0.014 (0.016)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.016)
Age: 25-34	0.023 (0.031)	-0.049 (0.031)	-0.003 (0.031)	-0.009 (0.031)
Age: 35-49	0.032 (0.030)	-0.002 (0.030)	-0.014 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.030)
Age: 50-64	0.030 (0.030)	-0.005 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.030)	-0.020 (0.030)
Age: 65+	0.029 (0.037)	-0.037 (0.037)	-0.015 (0.037)	-0.012 (0.037)
Gender: Man	0.024 (0.015)	0.012 (0.015)	0.002 (0.015)	-0.016 (0.015)
Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.0005 (0.017)	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.011 (0.017)
Degree of urbanization: Rural	0.013 (0.024)	0.017 (0.024)	-0.004 (0.024)	0.027 (0.024)
Employment status: Retired	-0.005 (0.032)	-0.031 (0.032)	-0.034 (0.032)	-0.016 (0.032)
Employment status: Student	0.005 (0.044)	-0.023 (0.044)	-0.033 (0.044)	-0.025 (0.044)
Employment status: Working	0.010 (0.024)	-0.027 (0.024)	-0.033 (0.024)	-0.012 (0.024)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.004 (0.017)	0.003 (0.017)	0.010 (0.017)	0.002 (0.017)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	0.001 (0.019)	0.014 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.019)	-0.012 (0.019)
Vote: Far right	0.009 (0.034)	0.030 (0.034)	0.023 (0.035)	0.038 (0.034)
Observations	5,991	5,991	5,991	5,991
R <sup>2</sup>	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.003

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

<sup>1359</sup> **J Placebo tests**

Table S12: Placebo tests.

	G+R+C preferred to R+C (1)	Supports G+R+C (2)	Signs petition (3)	Share of policies supported (4)	Conjoint 5 A+CGS preferred to B (5)
Mean	0.642	0.63	0.612	0.532	0.591
Branch of list experiment: 1	-0.013 (0.019)	-0.024 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.018 (0.021)
Branch of list experiment: rgl	0.005 (0.019)	0.006 (0.019)	-0.002 (0.019)	0.001 (0.012)	0.010 (0.021)
Branch of list experiment: rl	-0.009 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.019)	0.022 (0.019)	0.007 (0.012)	0.007 (0.021)
Branch of petition: nr	0.011 (0.014)	0.006 (0.014)	0.022 (0.014)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.015)
Poor is in own country	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.014)	0.015 (0.014)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.020 (0.015)
Observations	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	5,218
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0004	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001

*Note:* Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

<sup>1360</sup> **K Main results on the extended sample**

<sup>1361</sup> As a robustness check, we reproduce our main results on the extended sample that in-  
<sup>1362</sup> cludes the 14% respondents who failed the attention check or rushed through the survey  
<sup>1363</sup> ( $n = 9,318$ ). These results are non-weighted. They closely match the results in our main  
<sup>1364</sup> specification. For example, the support for the GCS is 54% in the U.S. and 75% in Europe,  
<sup>1365</sup> while the same coefficients are significant for the list experiment.

Figure S43: [Extended sample] Main attitudes.  
 (main\_alla\_share; Relative support —unless \*— in percent in Questions 20, 35, 44, 45, 48)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Support for the GCS	54	75	78	70	81	75
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	68	83	81	84	87	81
Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries*	52	52	45	60	59	44
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	47	62	57	62	65	65
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	69	82	80	82	86	80
[Country]'s foreign aid should be increased	32	55	53	61	59	45
Universalist*	43	41	35	49	44	36

Figure S44: [Extended sample] Influence of the GCS on preferred platform:  
 Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than  
 a platform B that does not (in percent). (conjoint\_left\_ag\_b\_binary\_alla\_positive;  
 Question 30; in the U.S., asked only to non-Republicans.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Random programs: A+GCS preferred to B	59	60	61	59	64	58

Table S13: [Extended sample] Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list. The tacit support for the GCS is estimated by regressing the number of supported policies on the presence of the GCS in the list of policies. The social desirability is estimated as the difference between the tacit and stated support, and it is not significantly different from zero even at a 20% threshold.

	Number of supported policies		
	All	U.S.	Europe
List contains: GCS	0.624*** (0.028)	0.524*** (0.041)	0.724*** (0.036)
<i>Support for GCS</i>	0.655	0.554	0.754
<i>Social desirability bias</i>	-0.026	-0.018	-0.034
<i>80% C.I. for the bias</i>	[-0.06; 0.01]	[-0.07; 0.04]	[-0.08; 0.01]
Constant	1.317	1.147	1.486
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000
R <sup>2</sup>	0.089	0.065	0.125

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table S14: [Extended sample] Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. (Question 28)

	Prefers the Progressive platform					
	All	United States	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
GCS in Progressive platform	0.022* (0.013)	0.015 (0.018)	0.116*** (0.037)	-0.007 (0.032)	0.028 (0.038)	0.012 (0.037)
Constant	0.628	0.629	0.55	0.682	0.721	0.553
Observations	5,638	2,797	671	883	550	737
R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.0002	0.014	0.0001	0.001	0.0001

Note: Simple OLS model. *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples. \*p < 0.1;  
\*\*p < 0.05; \*\*\*p < 0.01.

1366 **L Effect of questionnaire framing**

1367 When comparing the samples *US1* and *US2*, we observe no effect of questionnaire  
1368 framing (or block sequence) on the question “What group do you defend when you  
1369 vote?”, common to all waves and placed close to the end of the questionnaire (Table S15).

Table S15: Effect of the wave (*US1* vs. *US2*) on the group defend when voting.  
“What group do you defend when you vote?” (Question 56)

	Group defended when voting		
	Humans or Sentient beings	Fellow citizens	Family and self
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Wave: <i>US2</i>	−0.009 (0.014)	0.009 (0.014)	0.010 (0.011)
Mean	0.432	0.335	0.156
Observations	5,000	5,000	5,000
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0001	0.0001	0.0002

Note: Simple OLS model. \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

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