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— **341 removals**   353 lines   + **313 additions**   319 lines

1 \title{International Attitudes Toward Global Policies %

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3
4 \begin{abstract}
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6

7   We document majority support for policies entailing global redistribution and climate mitigation. Surveys on 40,680 respondents in 20 countries show strong stated support for an effective way to jointly combat climate change and poverty: a global carbon price funding a global basic income, called the ``Global Climate Scheme'' (GCS). Using complementary surveys on 8,000 respondents in the U.S., France, Germany, Spain, and the UK, we test several hypotheses that could reconcile strong stated support with a lack of salience in policy circles.

8   The GCS is supported by three quarters of Europeans and half of Americans, even as they understand the policy's cost to them. Using different experiments, we show that the support for the GCS is sincere and that electoral candidates could win votes by endorsing it. More generally, we document widespread support for other globally redistributive policies, such as a wealth tax funding low-income countries or increased foreign aid. In sum, we provide evidence that global policies are genuinely supported by majorities, even in wealthy nations that would bear the burden.

9   %
10 \end{abstract}

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1 \title{International Majorities Genuinely Support Global Redistributive and Climate Policies

2 }
3
4 \begin{abstract}
5   %
6

7   We document majority support for policies entailing global redistribution and climate mitigation. Surveys on 40,680 respondents in 20 countries show strong stated support for a global carbon price funding equal cash transfers, called the ``Global Climate Scheme'' (GCS). Through our main surveys on 8,000 respondents in the U.S., France, Germany, Spain, and the UK, we test several hypotheses that could reconcile strong stated support with scarce occurrences in public debates.

8   Three quarters of Europeans and half of Americans support the GCS, even as they understand the policy's cost to them. Using different experiments, we show that the support for the GCS is sincere and that electoral candidates could win votes by endorsing it. More generally, we document widespread support for other globally redistributive policies, such as increased foreign aid or a wealth tax funding low-income countries. In sum, global policies are genuinely supported by majorities, even in wealthy, contributing countries.

9   %
10 \end{abstract}

11

12 \textbf{JEL codes:} P48, Q58, H23, Q54 %

13

14 \textbf{Keywords:} Climate change, global policies, cap-and-trade, attitudes, survey.%

15

16 \tableofcontents

17

18 \onehalfspacing %

19 \section{Introduction}%

20 Major sustainability objectives could be achieved by global approaches to mitigating climate change and poverty involving transfers from high- to lower-income countries \citep{budolfson_climate_2021,franks_mobilizing_2018,dennig_inequality_2015,soergel_combining_2021,bauer_quantification_2020,cramton_global_2017}. For instance, a global wealth tax could finance the Sustainable Development Goals \citep{piketty_brief_2022}. More specifically, if merely 35\% of the revenue were allocated for this purpose, a global 2\% tax on individual wealth in excess of \$5 million could significantly reduce poverty as it would mechanically increase low-income countries' national income by 50\% (as computed on the \href{https://wid.world/world-wealth-tax-simulator/}{WID wealth tax simulator}). Besides, global carbon pricing is widely regarded by economists as the benchmark climate policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon emissions externality. In an early analysis of global climate policy, \citet{grubb_greenhouse_1990} states: ``by far the best combination of long term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity, is obtained from a system based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions which are allocated on an adult per capita basis'', i.e., equally among human adults. Support f

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15
16 \begin{bibunit}
17

18 \section{Introduction}%

or such solution, which we call the ``Global Climate Scheme'', has been renewed ever since \citep{hoel_carbon_1991,agarwal_global_1991,bertram_tradeable_1992,baer_equity_2000,jamieson_climate_2001,blanchard_major_2021,rajan_global_2021}.

21

22 While international negotiations have not yet led to ambitious globally redistributive policies, recent developments suggest that such a change might be underway. The International Maritime Organization is poised to adopt a global carbon levy on maritime fuel; the \citet{african_union_african_2023} calls for a global carbon taxation regime; the \citet{un_promotion_2023} is setting up a Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation; Brazil uses its presidency of the G20 in 2024 to propose a global wealth tax, %

23 \href{https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2023/03/14/taxation-mondiale-sur-les-ultrariches-ce-que-nous-avons-reussi-pour-les-multinationales-nous-devons-le-faire-pour-les-grandes-fortunes_6165354_3232.html}{backed} by 130 Members of the European Parliament; etc.

24

25 A key condition for implementing global policies has remained largely unaddressed: the support of citizens. Using a Global survey on 40,680 respondents from 20 high- and middle-income countries, we reveal substantial support for those policies, especially global climate policies and a global tax on the wealthiest aimed at financing low-income countries (other questions from these surveys are analyzed in a companion paper, \citealp{dechezlepretre_fighting_2022}). Interestingly, even in wealthy nations that would bear a significant burden, majorities of citizens express support for such globally redistributive policies. To better understand public support for global policies in high-income countries, we conduct Complementary surveys a

mong 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, the U.S., and the UK.

26

27 By studying in depth the support for global policies, we are making an ambitious shift in the methodological approach of attitudinal surveys. In general, academic surveys focus on studying effect sizes of some treatment on political attitudes, or the socio-demographic factors that correlate with attitudes (e.g., \citealp{kuziemko_how_2015,douenne_yellow_2022}). The magnitude of support for a given proposal is often regarded as problematic to estimate satisfactorily. %

28 The measure of support is usually left to non-academic pollsters, who rarely apply all the academic best practices: transparency, representative sampling, neutral and precise wording of questions, comparison with existing literature, use of multiple questions and complementary methods to correctly interpret the results. Although it is challenging to estimate the extent of support, this question seems too important not to be addressed using scientific methods. Absent large scale measurements of public opinion like referenda, surveys remain the best method to assess support or opposition to given policies. In this paper, after a worldwide assessment in the Global survey, we use Complementary surveys to carefully measure the support for global policies in Western countries. We inquire the support for various policies, approach the question from diverse angles, and run a battery of pre-registered tests to check whether stated support estimates are reliable.

19

20 Major sustainability objectives could be achieved by global approaches to mitigating climate change and poverty involving transfers from high- to lower-income countries.\citep{budolfson_climate_2021,franks_mobilizing_2018,dennig_inequality_2015,soergel_combining_2021,bauer_quantification_2020,cramton_global_2017}

21 Especially, global carbon pricing is widely regarded by economists as the benchmark climate policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon emissions externality. A version of global carbon pricing as a system based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions is prominently discussed in environmental economics.\citep{grubb_greenhouse_1990,hoel_carbon_1991,agarwal_global_1991,bertram_tradeable_1992,baer_equity_2000,jamieson_climate_2001,blanchard_major_2021} It would work as follows: It implements a cap on carbon emissions to limit global warming below 2\textdegree{}C. The emission rights are auctioned each year to polluting firms and fund a global basic income, alleviating extreme poverty. The emission rights would be allocated

22 equally among human adults, yielding redistribution from richer to poorer countries. It would combine long-term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity.\citep{grubb_greenhouse_1990} We call this established approach to global carbon pricing the ``Global Climate Scheme'' (GCS).

23 While international negotiations have not yet led to ambitious globally redistributive policies, %
24 some recent prominent attempts are that the %
25 African Union \href{https://media.africaclimatesummit.org/NAIROBI+Declaration+FURTHER+edited+060923+EN+920AM.pdf}{calls for} a global carbon taxation regime, %
26 the UN \href{https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4032838}{is setting up} a Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation and %
27 Brazil is proposing
28 a global wealth tax at the G20. %
29

30 The focus of the Complementary surveys is a specific policy aimed at addressing both climate change and poverty, referred to as the ``Global Climate Scheme'' (GCS). It implements a cap on carbon emissions to limit global warming below 2\textdegree{}C. The emission rights are auctioned each year to polluting firms and fund a global basic income, alleviating extreme poverty.

30 A key factor for implementing global policies has remained largely unaddressed: the support of citizens. Using a global survey on 40,680 respondents from 20 high- and middle-income countries, we reveal substantial support for global climate policies and, in addition, a global tax on the wealthiest aimed at financing low-income countries. Surprisingly, even in wealthy nations that would bear a significant burden, majorities of citizens express support for such globally redistributive policies. To better understand public support for global policies in high-income countries, the main analysis of this article is conducted with surveys among 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, the UK, and the U.S.

31 This archetypal policy exposes respondents to the key trade-off between the benefits and costs of globally redistributive climate policies, as respondents are made aware of the cost that the GCS entails for their country's people.

31 The focus of the main surveys is to study how respondents react to the key trade-off between the benefits and costs of globally redistributive climate policies. In our survey respondents are made aware of the cost that the GCS entails for their country's people, that is average Westerners would incur a net loss. Our main result is that the GCS is supported by three quarters of Europeans and more than half of Americans.

32

33 After checking that respondents have understood the policy and its cost, we measure the support in a direct \textit{Yes}/\textit{No} question. The GCS is supported by three quarters of Europeans and more than half of Americans. Then, we test for social desirability bias using a list experiment. We find no evidence that people exaggerate their support in the direct question. To assess whether the support would diminish in a context with real stakes, we ask respondents whether they are willing to sign a petition in favor of the GCS, after informing them that the question results will be communicated to their head of state's office. The support is sustained in an environment that approaches real stakes. We then carry out conjoint analyses to neutralize experimenter demand and investigate the priority given to global policies compared to other types of policies. Conjoint analyses reveal that a political platform is more likely to be preferred if it contains the GCS or a global tax on millionaires, and that global policies rank high in the prioritization of policies. Our randomized experiments also show that a candidate would not lose vote intentions by endorsing the GCS, and might even gain up to 11 points in a country like France. An analysis of open-ended fields confirms that support for the GCS is real, and indicates that appeal of the GCS comes from its international nature and its impacts on climate, more than on global poverty. %

33 Furthermore, we test the robustness of this conclusion by a wide variety of methods. First, we control for social desirability bias using a list experiment. We find no evidence that people exaggerate their support in the direct question. Second, to assess whether the support would diminish in a context with real stakes, we ask respondents whether they are willing to sign a petition in favor of the GCS, after informing them that the question results will be communicated to their head of state's office. The support is sustained in an environment that approaches real stakes. Third, we carry out conjoint analyses to neutralize experimenter demand and investigate the priority given to global policies compared to other types of policies. Conjoint analyses reveal that a political platform is more likely to be preferred if it contains the GCS or a global tax on millionaires, and that global policies rank high in the prioritization of policies. Our randomized experiments also show that a candidate would not lose vote intentions by endorsing the GCS, and might even gain up to 11 points in France. Fourth, an analysis of open-ended fields indicates that the appeal of the GCS comes from its international nature and its impacts on climate, more than on global poverty. %

34 We also test other global policies and universalistic attitudes. Support is very strong for a global tax on millionaires, and the median respondent prefers to allocate 30\% of the revenues of such a tax to low-income countries. Majorities are willing to increase foreign aid, but only if some conditions are respected, such as making sure the aid is well spent and other high-income countries also increase their contribution. Questions on unive

34 To put our main finding in context, we also test other global policies and universalistic attitudes. Support is very strong for a global tax on millionaires, and the median respondent prefers to allocate 30\% of the revenues of such a tax to low-income countries. Majorities are willing to increase foreign aid, but only if some conditions are respected, such as making sure the aid is well spent and other high-income countries also increase th

rsalistic values, including a donation experiment, confirm the congruence of underlying values with the support for specific policies. Our diverse approaches also help understand what drives the support. For instance, the evidence indicates that one key reason why increasing foreign aid is not as popular as global policies lies in its unilateral nature. We reckon that survey evidence is no panacea, as attitudes can be ambivalent and context-dependent. Nevertheless, we arguably employ the best available methods to address potential concerns, including an experiment assessing how support might be affected by a negative media campaign.

eir contribution. Questions on universalistic values, including a donation experiment, confirm the congruence of underlying values with the support for specific policies. Our diverse approaches also help understand what drives the support. For instance, the evidence indicates that one key reason why increasing foreign aid is not as popular as global policies lies in its unilateral nature.

35

36 Overall, our results %

37 point out to strong and genuine support for global climate and redistributive policies, as our experiments confirm the stated support found in direct questions. This suggests that carefully administered surveys can be used to measure the level of support for a given policy. Our results contribute to the literature on attitudes toward climate policy, confirming that climate policy is preferred at a global level \citep{issp_international_2010,beiser-mcgrath_could_2019,sivonen_attitudes_2022,meilland_international_2023}, where it is more effective and fair. Indeed, the Global Climate Scheme is largely supported, but a similar policy at the national level is opposed by a majority in many countries \citep{dechezlepretre_fighting_2022}, despite lower costs. Noting that only 13\% of French people declared supporting a national carbon tax with cash transfers during the Yellow Vests movement \citep{douenne_yellow_2022}, surveys appear to accurately reflect the level of support. Therefore, unless support for global policies disappear once they enter the public debate, it seems unlikely that a policy such as the GCS would face major protests.

35

36 Overall, our results %

37 point out to strong and genuine support for global climate and redistributive policies, as our experiments confirm the stated support found in direct questions.

Left version:

38 In our discussion we offer potential explanations behind the lack of prominence of global policies in the public debate despite this strong support.

39 Finally, while our findings underscore majority support for global policies, converging results from independent surveys are needed to ascertain such novel evidence. %

40 \paragraph{Literature}

41

42 International surveys have shown widespread support for costly climate action \citep{dechezlepretre_fighting_2022,leiserowitz_international_2022}. For instance, using representative samples in 125 countries covering 96\% of the world's greenhouse gas emissions, \citet{andre_globally_2024} show that 69\% of the global population express willingness to contribute 1\% of their income to fight global warming. International surveys have also uncover near consensus that ``present economic differences between rich and poor countries are too large'' (overall, 78\% agree and 5\% disagree) in each of 29 countries \citep{issp_international_2019}.

43

44 Yet, few prior attitudinal surveys have examined global redistributive pol

Right version:

38 They contribute to a body of literature on attitudes toward climate policy, which confirms that climate policy is preferred at a global level,\citep{issp_international_2010,beiser-mcgrath_could_2019,sivonen_attitudes_2022,meilland_international_2023} where it is more effective and fair.

39 While 3,354 economists supported a national carbon tax financing equal cash transfers in the \href{https://www.clcouncil.org/media/EconomistsStatement.pdf}{Wall Street Journal}, numerous surveys have shown that public support for such policy is mixed.\citep{douenne_yellow_2022,dechezlepretre_fighting_nodate,carattini_overcoming_2018,maestre-andres_perceived_2019,mildenberger_limited_2022,sommer_supporting_2022} Meanwhile, the GCS --- the global version of this policy --- is largely supported, despite higher costs in high-income countries.

40 In the Discussion we offer potential explanations that could reconcile the strong support for global policies with their lack of prominence in the public debate. %

41 \paragraph{Literature}

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44

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icies.

45 A notable exception is \citet{carattini_how_2019}, who test the support for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples in five countries, representative along gender and age. For a given variant, the sample size is about 167 respondents per country. They find over 80\% support for any variant in India, between 50\% and 65\% in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43\% to 59\% in the U.S., depending on the variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding an equal cash transfer for each human is close to 50\% in high-income countries (e.g., at 44\% in the U.S.). These figures are consistent with our results from the \textit{Global} survey (see Figure \ref{fig:oecd}), where the support is lower for a tax that would ``only'' reduce CO$_\text{2}$ emissions than for a quota that would unambiguously achieve the climate target.

46 Relatedly, \cite{leiserowitz_public_2021} reveal that 66\% of Americans support providing ``financial aid and technical support to developing countries that agree to limit their greenhouse gas emissions''; and \citet{fehr_your_2022} find that 90\% of Germans want some degree of global redistribution.

47 Besides, in surveys conducted in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S., \citet{ghassim_who_2020} finds support ranging from 55\% to 74\% for ``a global democracy including both a global government and a global parliament, directly elected by the world population, to recommend and implement policies on global issues''. %

48 Through an experiment, he also finds that, in countries where the government stems from a coalition, voting shares would shift by 8 (Brazil) to 12 p.p. (Germany) from parties who are said to oppose global democracy to parties that supposedly support it. For instance, when Germans respondents were told that (only) the Greens and the Left support global democracy, thes

46 A notable exception tests the support for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples in five countries, representative along gender and age.\cite{carattini_how_2019} For a given variant, the sample size is about 167 respondents per country. They find over 80\% support for any variant in India, between 50\% and 65\% in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43\% to 59\% in the U.S., depending on the variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding an equal cash transfer for each human is close to 50\% in high-income countries. %

e parties gained respectively 9 and 3 p.p. in vote intentions, while the SPD and the CDU-CSU each lost 6 p.p.

49

50 Appendix \ref{sec:literature} contains a broader literature review including further attitudinal surveys on global policies (\ref{subsubsec:literature_attitudes_policies}); prior work on attitudes toward climate burden sharing (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_attitudes_burden_sharing}), attitudes toward foreign aid (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_foreign_aid}); global carbon pricing (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_pricing}), global redistribution (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_redistribution}), basic income (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_basic_income}), and global democracy (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_democracy}).

47

48 Further evidence of the popularity of global redistribution is provided by the finding that 66\% of Americans support providing ``financial aid and technical support to developing countries that agree to limit their greenhouse gas emissions'';\cite{leiserowitz_public_2021} and 90\% of Germans want some degree of global redistribution.\cite{fehr_your_2022}

49 Besides, in surveys conducted in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S., support ranges from 55\% to 74\% for ``a global democracy including both a global government and a global parliament, directly elected by the world population, to recommend and implement policies on global issues'', and similar support is found in surveys over 17 countries.\cite{ghassim_who_2020,ghassim_who_2024} %

50

51 Appendix \ref{sec:literature} contains a broader literature review including further attitudinal surveys on global policies (\ref{subsubsec:literature_attitudes_policies}); prior work on attitudes toward climate burden sharing (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_attitudes_burden_sharing}), attitudes toward foreign aid (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_foreign_aid}), global carbon pricing (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_pricing}), global redistribution (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_redistribution}), basic income (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_basic_income}), and global

democracy (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_democracy}).

\section{Results}

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The presentation of results proceeds as follows: after briefly describing the survey data (\ref{subsec:data}), we first document broad international support for global approaches to climate policy that lead to global redistribution (\ref{subsubsec:global_support}). Subsequently, we present specific findings from surveys in the U.S. and Europe that document support for the GCS, wealth taxes, and foreign aid in those countries (\ref{subsubsec:support_gcs}-\ref{subsubsec:support_foreign_aid}). We proceed to study the support for the Global Climate Scheme in more detail, by means of a list experiment, petition, conjoint analyses, prioritization task, and by eliciting pros and cons (\ref{subsec:robustness_sincerity}). To understand the gap between support for global policies and their appearance in public discussion, we conclude by reporting results on underlying universalistic values (\ref{subsec:universalistic}) and beliefs about the support of others (\ref{subsec:second_order_beliefs}).

\subsection{Data}\label{subsec:data}

\subsection{Data}\label{subsec:data}

The study relies on two sets of surveys: the \textit{Global} survey and the \textit{Complementary} surveys (see Table \ref{tab:survey_summary}).

We use unanalysed questions from a global survey conducted in 2021 by Dechezleprêtre et al. (forthcoming)\cite{dechezlepretre_fighting_nodate} that involved 40,680 respondents from 20 countries, representing approximately 72\% of global CO$_\text{2}$ emissions.

\renewcommand{\thetable}{S\arabic{table}}

This survey (henceforth: global survey) serves as the basis for measuring stated support for various global policies worldwide.

\begin{table}[h]

Detailed information about the data collection process, sample representativeness, and analysis of questions on national policies can be found in the

companion paper.\cite{dechezlepretre_fighting_nodate}

60   \caption[Surveys summary]{[For Supplementary Material] Summary of the surveys used in the analysis.}

60 To delve deeper into the sincerity and rationales behind support for the GCS and attitudes towards global policies, global redistribution, and universalistic values, we conducted further surveys in 2023 (henceforth: main surveys). These surveys are based on a sample of 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, the UK, and the U.S. The European survey (\textit{Eu}) comprises 3,000 respondents, while the U.S. sample was collected in two separate waves: \textit{US1} with 3,000 respondents and \textit{US2} with 2,000 respondents. The survey questions in both the European and U.S. surveys are identical (see Figure \ref{fig:flow_simple}), except for an additional question in \textit{US2} that uses results from \textit{US1} to assess the bandwagon effect.

61   %

61 \begin{figure}[h!]

62   \label{tab:survey_summary}

62   \caption[Main surveys' structure]{Structure of main survey, cf. also Figure \ref{fig:flow_combined} for the treatment branches.}\label{fig:flow_simple}

63   \centering

63   \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegraphics[width=.58\textwidth]{../questionnaire/survey_flow-simple.pdf}}

64 \begin{tabular}

64 \end{figure}

65   {@{\extracolsep{5pt}}lcccc}

65 The main surveys ensured representativeness along key dimensions: gender, income, age, highest diploma, and degree of urbanization. The \textit{Eu} survey is also representative of its four countries in terms of population size, while the \textit{US1} and \textit{US2} surveys are representative in terms of region and ethnicity.

66   \\[-1.8ex]\hline

66 Tables \ref{tab:representativeness_waves}-\ref{tab:representativeness_EU} detail how our samples match population frequencies.

67   \hline \\[-1.8ex]

67 More detail on data collection is given in Section \nameref{sec:methods}. The questionnaires used in the surveys are provided in Appendices \ref{app:questionnaire_oecd} and \ref{app:questionnaire}.

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68      & \textit{Global survey} & \multic
        olumn{3}{c}{\textit{Complementary sur
        veys}} \\
69      \\[-1.8ex] Survey & \textit{Global}
        & \textit{Eu} & \textit{US1} & \texti
        t{US2} \\
70      \hline \\[-1.8ex]
71      Country coverage & 20 countries & F
        R, DE, ES, UK & U.S. & U.S. \\
72      Sample size & 40,680 & 3,000 & 3,00
        0 & 2,000 \\
73      Main purpose & \makecell{Stated sup
        port \\for global policies} & \multic
        olumn{3}{c}{\makecell{Focus on GCS (s
        incerity, rationales, etc.) \\+ Suppo
        rt for global redistribution \\+ Univ
        ersalistic values}} \\
74      %
75      %
76      \hline
77      \hline \\[-1.8ex]
78  \end{tabular}
79  \end{table}
80  \setcounter{table}{0}
81  \renewcommand{\thetable}{\arabic{tabl
        e}}
82
83  \paragraph{Global Survey}
84
85  The \textit{Global} survey, conducted
    in 2021, involved 40,680 respondents
    from 20 countries, representing appro
    ximately 72\% of global CO$_\text{2}$
    emissions. This survey serves as the
    basis for measuring stated support fo
    r various global policies worldwide.
    Detailed information about the data c
    ollection process, sample representat
    iveness, and analysis of questions on
    national policies can be found in \ci
    tet{dechezlepretre_fighting_2022}.
86
87  \paragraph{Complementary Surveys}\lab
        el{par:surveys}
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89  To delve deeper into the sincerity an
    d rationales behind support for the G
    CS and attitudes towards global polic
    ies, global redistribution, and unive
    rsalistic values, complementary surve
    ys were conducted in 2023. These surv
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The complementary surveys ensured representativeness along key dimensions: gender, income, age, highest diploma, and degree of urbanization. The \textit{Eu} survey is also representative of its four countries in terms of population size, while the \textit{US1} and \textit{US2} surveys are representative in terms of region and ethnicity. Tables \ref{tab:representativeness_waves}-\ref{tab:representativeness_EU} confirm that our samples closely match population frequencies. More detail on data collection is given in Section \nameref{sec:methods}. The questionnaires used in the surveys are provided in Appendices \ref{app:questionnaire_oecd} and \ref{app:questionnaire}.

\subsection{Stated support for global policies}\label{subsec:stated_support}
\subsubsection{Global support}\label{subsubsec:global_support}

The Global survey shows strong support for climate policies enacted at the global level (Figure \ref{fig:oecd}). %

When asked ``At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be put in place?'', 70\% (in the U.S.) to 94\% (in Japan) choose the global level. The next most popular choice is the federal or co

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\subsection{Global support}\label{subsubsec:global_support}

We find strong support for climate policies enacted at the global level when analysing the global survey (Figure \ref{fig:oecd}). %

When asked ``At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be put in place?'', 70\% (in the U.S.) to 94\% (in Japan) choose the global level. The next most popular choice is the federal or co

ntinental level, favored by 52\% of Americans and less than half of European respondents. Local policies receive the least support. This preference for climate policies implemented at the global scale is in line with earlier contributions \cite{beiser-mcgrath_could_2019,bechtel_mass_2013,sivonen_attitudes_2022} %

73 and consistent with individuals' concerns for the fairness and effectiveness of such policies, which have been identified as two of the three key determinants of support, besides self-interest.\citep{klenert_making_2018,douenne_yellow_2022,dechezlepretre_fighting_nodate} It could also stem from conditional cooperation,\citep{barrett_self-enforcing_1994} even if previous studies suggest that the support for climate policies does not depend on climate action abroad \citep{aklin_prisoners_2020,tingley_conditional_2014}. %

74 \begin{figure}[h!]
75   %
76   \caption[Relative support for global climate policies]{Support for global climate policies.}
77   \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegraphics[width=1.2\textwidth]
78   {../figures/OECD/Heatplot_global_tax_attitudes_share.pdf}}\label{fig:oecd} %
79   {\footnotesize \\ $\quad$ \\ Note 1: The numbers represent \textit{relative} support, i.e. the share of \textit{Somewhat} or \textit{Strongly support} among non-\textit{indifferent} answers (in percent, n = 40,680). The color blue denotes a relative majority. See Figure \ref{fig:oecd_absolute} for the absolute support. (Questi

Left column:

104). \\ Note 2: *In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question \ref{q:burden_sharing_asterisk}. }

105 \end{figure}

106

107 Among the four global climate policies examined in the \textit{Global} survey, three policies garner high support across all countries (Figure \ref{fig:oecd}). These policies include a global democratic assembly on climate change, a global tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries contingent on their climate action, and a global carbon budget of +2\textdegree{}C divided among countries based on tradable shares (or ``global quota''), with the allocation of country shares unspecified.\footnote{The policies were all described with further details to make sure people understood them. Specifically, the policies were presented as follows: an international emissions trading system where ``countries that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less than their share''; ``a tax on all millionaires in dollars around the world to finance low-income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate action [which] would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education''; ``a global democratic assembly whose role would be to draft international treaties against climate change [where] each adult across the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly''.} The three policies garner a majority of absolute support (i.e., ``somewhat'' or ``strong'' support) in all countries (except in the U.S. for the global assembly, 48\% absolute support). In high-income countries, the global quota policy obtains 64\% absolute suppo

Right column:

ons \ref{q:scale}-\ref{q:millionaire_tax}%

80). \\ Note 2: *In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question \ref{q:burden_sharing_asterisk}. }

81 \end{figure}

82

83 Among the four global climate policies examined, three policies garner high support across all countries (Figure \ref{fig:oecd}). These policies include a global democratic assembly on climate change, a global tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries contingent on their climate action, and a global carbon budget of +2\textdegree{}C divided among countries based on tradable shares (or ``global quota''), with the allocation of country shares unspecified (see wording in Appendix \ref{app:questionnaire_oecd}).

rt and 84\% relative support (i.e., e
xcluding ``indifferent'' answers). %

84 The three policies garner a majority
of absolute support (i.e., ``somewha
t'' or ``strong'' support) in all cou
ntries (except in the U.S. for the gl
obal assembly, 48\% absolute suppor
t). In high-income countries, the glo
bal quota policy obtains 64\% absolut
e support and 84\% relative support
(i.e., excluding ``indifferent'' answ
ers). %

108

85

109 Following the support for the global
quota, respondents are asked about th
eir preferences for dividing the carb
on budget among countries, as depicte
d in the third block of Figure \ref{f
ig:oecd}. Consistent with the existin
g literature (see Appendix \ref{subsu
bsec:literature_attitudes_burden_shar
ing}), an equal per capita allocation
of emission rights emerges as the pre
ferred burden-sharing principle, garn
ering absolute majority support in al
l countries and never below 84\% rela
tive support. Taking into account his
torical responsibilities or vulnerabi
lity to climate damages is also popul
ar, albeit with less consensus, while
grandfathering (i.e., allocation of e
mission shares in proportion to curre
nt emissions) receives the least supp
ort in all countries.

86 Following the support for the global
quota, respondents are asked about th
eir preferences for dividing the carb
on budget among countries, as depicte
d in the third block of Figure \ref{f
ig:oecd}. Consistent with the existin
g literature (see Appendix \ref{subsu
bsec:literature_attitudes_burden_shar
ing}), an equal per capita allocation
of emission rights emerges as the pre
ferred burden-sharing principle, garn
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l countries and never below 84\% rela
tive support. Taking into account his
torical responsibilities or vulnerabi
lity to climate damages is also popul
ar, albeit with less consensus, while
grandfathering (i.e., allocation of e
mission shares in proportion to curre
nt emissions) receives the least supp
ort in all countries.

110

87

111 A global quota with equal per capita
emission rights should produce the sa
me distributional outcomes as a globa
l carbon tax that funds a global basi
c income.\footnote{Similarly, a glob
al quota with grandfathering is equiv
alent to a global carbon tax where ea
ch country keeps the revenues it coll
ects.} The support for the global car
bon tax is also tested and its redist
ributive effects -- the average incr
ease in expenditures along with the a
mount of the basic income -- are spec
ified to the respondents explicitly
(see box below and Appendix \ref{app:

88 A global carbon tax that funds a glob
al basic income should produce the sa
me distributional outcomes as a globa
l tradable quota with equal per capit
a emission rights (to the extent that
the carbon price is the same and prov
ided that each country returns the re
venues from emissions trading equally
to its citizens). %

Left column:

questionnaire}, p. \pageref{subsec:questionnaire_GCS}). %

112 The support for the carbon tax is lower than for the quota, particularly in high-income countries, and there is no relative majority for the tax in Anglo-Saxon countries.\footnote{The levels of support are consistent with the findings of \citet{carattini_how_2019}, the only previous study that tested a global carbon tax.} Two possible reasons for this lower support are that distributive effects are made salient in the case of the tax, and that people may prefer a quota, perhaps because they find it more effective than a tax to reduce emissions. This interpretation is consistent with the level of support for the global quota once we make the distributive effects salient, as we do in the complementary surveys.

113 \subsubsection{Global Climate Scheme}\label{subsubsec:support_gcs}

114

115 The complementary surveys (\textit{US1}, \textit{US2}, \textit{Eu}) consist of a comprehensive exploration of citizens' attitudes towards the GCS. We present to respondents a detailed description of the GCS and explain its distributive effects, including speci

Right column:

89 The support for the global carbon tax is also tested and its redistributive effects -- the average increase in expenditures along with the amount of the basic income -- are specified to the respondents explicitly (see box below and Appendix \ref{app:questionnaire}, p.\pageref{subsec:questionnaire_GCS}). %

90 The support for the carbon tax is lower than for the quota, particularly in high-income countries, and there is no relative majority for the tax in Anglo-Saxon countries (consistently with the levels of support found in the only previous study that tested a global carbon tax\cite{carattini_how_2019}). %

91 Two possible reasons for this lower support are that distributive effects are specified explicitly in the case of the tax, and that people may prefer a quota, perhaps because they find it more effective than a tax to reduce emissions. The two reasons are consistent with the intermediate level of support for the GCS in the main survey, which is based on a global quota but where the question specifies explicitly the distributive effects. %

92

93 \subsection{Stated support for the Global Climate Scheme}\label{subsec:gcs_stated_support}

fic amounts at stake (as specified in the box below). Furthermore, we assess respondents' understanding of the GCS with incentivized questions to test their comprehension of the expected financial outcome for typical individuals in high-income countries (loss) and the poorest individuals globally (gain), followed by the provision of correct answers (Figures \ref{fig:understood_each}-\ref{fig:understood_score}). %

116 The same approach is applied to a National Redistribution scheme (NR) targeting the top 5\% (in the U.S.) or top 1\% (in Europe) with the aim of financing cash transfers to all adults,\footnote{The wider base in the U.S. was chosen because emissions are larger in the U.S. than in Europe, and it would hardly be feasible to offset the median American's loss by taxing only the top 1\%.} calibrated to offset the monetary loss of the GCS for the median emitter in their country. We evaluate respondents' understanding that the richest would lose and the typical fellow citizens would gain from that policy. %

94

95 The main surveys (\textit{US1}, \textit{US2}, \textit{Eu}) include a comprehensive exploration of citizens' attitudes towards the GCS. We present to respondents a detailed description of the GCS and explain its distributive effects, including specific amounts at stake (as specified in the box below). Furthermore, we assess respondents' understanding of the GCS with incentivized questions to test their comprehension of the expected financial outcome for typical individuals in high-income countries (loss) and the poorest individuals globally (gain), followed by the provision of correct answers (Figures \ref{fig:understood_each}-\ref{fig:understood_score}). %

96

97 For comparison, %

98 the same approach is applied to a National Redistribution scheme (NR) targeting top incomes %

99 with the aim of financing cash transfers to all adults, %

100 calibrated to offset the monetary loss of the GCS for the median emitter in their country. We evaluate respondents' understanding that the richest would lose and the typical fellow citizens would gain from that policy. %

117 Subsequently, we summarize both schemes to enhance respondents' recall. Additionally, we present a final incentivized comprehension question and provide the expected answer that the combined GCS and NR would result in no net gain or loss for a typical fellow citizen. Finally, respondents are directly asked to express their support for the GCS and NR using a simple \textit{Yes}/\textit{No} question.

101 Subsequently, we summarize both schemes to enhance respondents' recall. Additionally, we present a final incentivized comprehension question and provide the expected answer that the combined GCS and NR would result in no net gain or loss for a typical fellow citizen. Finally, respondents are directly asked to express their support for the GCS and NR using a simple \textit{Yes}/\textit{No} question.

118 The stated support for the GCS is 54\% in the U.S. and 76\% in Europe,\footnote{The 95\% confidence intervals are $[52.4\%, 55.9\%]$ in the U.S. and $[74.2\%, 77.2\%]$ in Europe. The average support is computed with survey weights, employing weights based on quota variables, which exclude vote. Another method to reweigh the raw results involves running a regression of the support for the GCS on sociodemographic characteristics (including vote) and multiplying each coefficient by the population frequencies. This alternative approach yields similar figures: 76\% in Europe and 52\% or 53\% in the U.S. (depending on whether individuals who did not disclose their vote are classified as non-voters or excluded). Notably, the average support excluding non-voters is 54\% in the U.S.} while the support for NR is very similar: 56\% and 73\% respectively (see Figure \ref{fig:support_binary}). Appendix \ref{app:determinants} examines the sociodemographic determinants of support for the GCS as well as the beliefs correlated with the support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income. The strongest correlates are political leaning, trust in the government and perceptio

102

ns that the policy is effective at re
ducing emissions or in one's self-int
erest. %

103 Our main result is that stated suppor
t for the GCS is 54\% in the U.S. and
76\% in Europe, while the support for
NR is very similar: 56\% and 73\% res
pectively (Figures \ref{fig:support},
\ref{fig:support_binary}).

104 Appendix \ref{app:determinants} exami
nes the sociodemographic determinants
of support for the GCS as well as the
beliefs correlated with the support f
or a global tax on GHG financing a gl
obal basic income. The strongest corr
elates are political leaning, trust i
n the government and perceptions that
climate policies are effective at red
ucing emissions or in one's self-inte
rest.

105

106 Finding majority support for the GCS
runs counter to the conventional skep
ticism about the feasibility of globa
l cooperation to mitigating climate c
hange. %

107 This motivates the subsequent analysi
s of robustness and sincerity, novel
to attitudinal surveys on instrument
choice for environmental policy. %

119   108

120 \begin{tcolorbox}\label{box:GCS}   109 \begin{tcolorbox}\label{box:GCS}

121 \paragraph{The Global Climate Schem
e} The GCS consists of global emissio
ns trading with emission rights being
auctioned each year to polluting firm
s, and of a global basic income, fund
ed by the auction revenues. Using the
price and emissions trajectories from
the report by \cite{stern_report_201
7}, and in particular a carbon price
of \$90/tCO$_\text{2}$ in 2030, we es
timate that the basic income would am
ount to \$30 per month for every huma
n over the age of 15 (see details in
Appendix \ref{app:gain_gcs}). %

110 \paragraph{The Global Climate Schem
e} The GCS consists of global emissio
ns trading with emission rights being
auctioned each year to polluting firm
s, and of a global basic income, fund
ed by the auction revenues. Using the
price and emissions trajectories from
the report by Stern \& Stiglitz,\cite
{stern_report_2017} and in particular
a carbon price of \$90/tCO$_\text{2}$
in 2030, we estimate that the basic i
ncome would amount to \$30 per month
for every human adult %

111 (see details in Appendix \ref{app:g
ain_gcs}). %

122 We describe the GCS to the responde
nts as a ``climate club'' and we spec
ify its redistributive effects: The 7

112 We describe the GCS to the responde
nts as a ``climate club'' and we spec
ify its redistributive effects: The 7

00 million people with less than \$2/
day [in Purchasing Power Parity] woul
d be lifted out of extreme poverty, a
nd fossil fuel price increases would
cost the typical person in their coun
try a specified amount (see Appendix
\ref{subsec:questionnaire_GCS} for de
tails). The monthly median net cost i
s \$85 in the U.S., \euro{}10 in Fran
ce, \euro{}25 in Germany, \euro{}5 in
Spain, £20 in the UK.

123	\end{tcolorbox}
124	\setcounter{figure}{0}
125	\renewcommand{\thefigure}{S\arabic{figure}}
126	\begin{figure}[h!]
127	\caption[Support for the Global Climate Scheme]{[For Supplementary Material, except first row to be included in Figure \ref{fig:support}] Support for the GCS, NR and the combination of GCS, NR and C. \\(p. \pageref{subsec:questionnaire_GCS}, Questions \ref{q:gcs_support}, \ref{q:nr_support}, \ref{q:global_tax}, \ref{q:national_tax}, and \ref{q:crg_support}).%
128	}\label{fig:support_binary}
129	\makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegraphics[width=.9\textwidth]{../figures/country_comparison/support_binary_positive.pdf}}
130	\end{figure}
131	
132	\subsubsection{Other global policies}\label{subsubsec:support_other_global_policies} %
133	
134	We also assess support for other global policies (Figure \ref{fig:support}).
135	Most policies garner relative majority support in each country, with two exceptions: the ``cancellation of low-income countries' public debt'' and ``a maximum wealth limit'' for each individual.
136	The latter policy obtains relative majority support in Europe but not in the U.S., despite the cap being set at \$10 billion in the U.S. compared to \euro{}/£100 million in Europe. Notably, climate-related policies enjoy si

Right column:

00 million people with less than \$2/
day [in Purchasing Power Parity] woul
d be lifted out of extreme poverty, a
nd fossil fuel price increases would
cost the typical person in their coun
try a specified amount (see Appendix
\ref{subsec:questionnaire_GCS} for de
tails). The monthly median net cost i
s \$85 in the U.S., \euro{}10 in Fran
ce, \euro{}25 in Germany, \euro{}5 in
Spain, £20 in the UK.

113   \end{tcolorbox}

gnificant popularity, with ``high-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries'' receiving absolute majority support across all surveyed countries. Additionally, relative support for loss and damages compensation, as approved in principle at the international climate negotiations in 2022 (``COP27''), ranges from 55\% (U.S.) to 81\% (Spain), with absolute support ranging from 41\% to 62\%.

137

138 \subsubsection{Global wealth tax}\label{subsubsec:support_global_wealth_tax}

139

140 Consistent with the results of the global survey, a ``tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-income countries'' garners absolute majority support of over 67\% in each country, only 5 p.p. lower than a national millionaires tax overall (Figure \ref{fig:support}). In random subsamples, we inquire about respondents' preferences regarding the redistribution of revenues from a global tax on individual wealth exceeding \$5 million, after providing information on the revenue raised by such a tax in their country compared to low-income countries.\footnote{A 2\% tax on net wealth exceeding \$5 million would annually raise \$816 billion, leaving unaffected 99.9\% of the world population. More specifically, it would collect \euro{}5 billion in Spain, \euro{}16 billion in France, £20 billion in the UK, \euro{}44 billion in Germany, \$430 billion in the U.S., and \$1 billion collectively in all low-income countries (28 countries, home to 700 million people).%

141 } We ask certain respondents (n = 1,283) what percentage of global tax revenues should be pooled to finance low-income countries. In each country, at least 88\% of respondents indicate a positive amount, with an average ranging from 30\% (Germany) to 36\% (U.S., France) (Figure \ref{fig:globa

l_share_mean}). To other respondents (n = 1,233), we inquire whether they would prefer each country to retain all the revenues it collects or that half of the revenues be pooled to finance low-income countries. Approximately half of the respondents opt to allocate half of the tax revenues to low-income countries.

142 \begin{figure}

143   \centering

144   \caption[Preferred share of wealth tax for low-income countries]{[For Supplementary Material] Percent of global wealth tax that should finance low-income countries (\textit{mean}). (Question \ref{q:global_tax_global_share})} %

145   \includegraphics[width=1\textwidth]{../figures/country_comparison/global_tax_global_share_mean.pdf} \label{fig:global_share_mean}

146 \end{figure}

147   114

                                             115 \subsection{Stated support for global redistribution}\label{subsec:support_other}

                                             116 We also assess support for a range of other international policies (Figure \ref{fig:support}) as well as unilateral foreign aid. %

                                             117 \subsubsection{International policies}\label{subsubsec:support_other_global_policies} %

148   118

149 \setcounter{figure}{1}   119 Most policies garner relative majority support in each country, with two exceptions: the ``cancellation of low-income countries' public debt'' and ``a maximum wealth limit'' for each individual (Figure \ref{fig:support}). %

150 \renewcommand{\thefigure}{\arabic{figure}}   120 The latter policy garners relative majority support in Europe but not in the U.S., despite the cap being set at \$10 billion in the U.S. compared to \euro{}/£100 million in Europe. Notably, climate-related policies enjoy significant popularity, with ``high-income countries funding renewable energ

y in low-income countries'' receiving absolute majority support across all surveyed countries. Additionally, relative support for loss and damages compensation, as approved in principle at the international climate negotiations in 2022 (``COP27''), ranges from 55\% (U.S.) to 81\% (Spain). %

121 Consistent with the results of the global survey,

122 a ``tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-income countries'' garners relative support of over 69\% in each country, only 5 p.p. lower than a national millionaires tax overall. In random subsamples, we inquire about respondents' preferences regarding the redistribution of revenues from a global tax on individual wealth exceeding \$5 million, after providing information on the revenue raised by such a tax in their country compared to low-income countries.

123 We ask certain respondents (n = 1,283) what percentage of the global tax revenues should be pooled to finance low-income countries. In each country, at least 88\% of respondents indicate a positive amount, with an average of one-third %

124 (Figure \ref{fig:global_share_mean}). To other respondents (n = 1,233), we inquire whether they would prefer each country to retain all the revenues it collects or that half of the revenues be pooled to finance low-income countries. Approximately half of the respondents opt to allocate half of the tax revenues to low-income countries, consistently with the other variant of the question.

151 \begin{figure}
152   %
153   \caption[Relative support for further global policies]{Relative support for various global policies (percentage of \textit{somewhat} or \textit{strong support}, after excluding \textit{indifferent} answers). (Questions \ref{q:climate_policies} and \ref{q:other_policies}; See Figure \ref{fig:s

125 \begin{figure}
126   %
127   \caption[Relative support for other global policies]{Support for various global policies. (\textit{relative support}: percentage of \textit{somewhat} or \textit{strong support}, after excluding \textit{indifferent} answers; *except for GCS: percentage of \textit{Yes} in a \textit{Yes}/\textit{N

Left column:

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upport_likert_positive} for the absol
ute support.)%
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154 `        }`

155 `    \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegra`
`phics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/co`
`untry_comparison/support_likert_shar`
`e.pdf}}\label{fig:support}`

156 `\end{figure}`

157 `\renewcommand{\thefigure}{S\arabic{fi`
`gure}}`

158

159 `\subsubsection{Foreign aid}\label{sub`
`subsec:support_foreign_aid} %`

160

161 `We provide respondents with informati`
`on about the actual amount ``spent on`
`foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-`
`income countries'' relative to their`
`country's government spending and GD`
`P. Less than 16\% of respondents stat`
`e that their country's foreign aid sh`
`ould be reduced, while 62\% express s`
`upport for increasing it, including 1`
`7\% who support an unconditional incr`
`ease (Figure \ref{fig:foreign_aid_rai`
`se_support}). Among the 45\% who thin`
`k aid should be increased under certa`
`in conditions, we subsequently ask th`
`em to specify the conditions they dee`
`m necessary (Figure \ref{fig:foreign_`
`aid_condition}). The three most commo`
`nly selected conditions are: ``we can`
`be sure the aid reaches people in nee`
`d and money is not diverted'' (73\% c`
`hose this condition), ``that recipien`
`t countries comply with climate targe`
`ts and human rights'' (67\%), and ``t`
`hat other high-income countries also`
`increase their foreign aid'' (48\`
`%).\footnote{It is worth noting that`
`these conditions align closely with t`
`he principles of the GCS.}`

162 `On the other hand, respondents who do`
`not wish to increase their country's`
`foreign aid primarily justify their v`

Right column:

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o} question). (p. \pageref{subsec:que
stionnaire_GCS}, Questions \ref{q:gcs
_support}, \ref{q:climate_policies} a
nd \ref{q:other_policies}; See Figure
\ref{fig:support_likert_positive} for
the absolute support.)%
```

128 `        }`

129 `    \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegra`
`phics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/co`
`untry_comparison/support_likert_gcs_s`
`hare.pdf}}\label{fig:support}`

130 `\end{figure}`

131

132 `\subsubsection{Foreign aid}\label{sub`
`subsec:support_foreign_aid} %`

133

134 `In addition, we provide respondents w`
`ith information about the actual amou`
`nt ``spent on foreign aid to reduce p`
`overty in low-income countries'' rela`
`tive to their country's government sp`
`ending and GDP. Less than 16\% of res`
`pondents state that their country's f`
`oreign aid should be reduced, while 6`
`2\% express support for increasing i`
`t, including 17\% who support an unco`
`nditional increase (Figure \ref{fig:f`
`oreign_aid_raise_support}). Among the`
`45\% who think aid should be increase`
`d under certain conditions, we subseq`
`uently ask them to specify the condit`
`ions they deem necessary (Figure \ref`
`{fig:foreign_aid_condition}). The thr`
`ee most commonly selected conditions`
`are that: ``we can be sure the aid re`
`aches people in need and money is not`
`diverted'' (73\% chose this conditio`
`n), ``recipient countries comply with`
`climate targets and human rights'' (6`
`7\%), and ``other high-income countri`
`es also increase their foreign aid''`
`(48\%). %`

135 `On the other hand, respondents who do`
`not wish to increase their country's`
`foreign aid primarily justify their v`

iew by prioritizing the well-being of their fellow citizens or by perceiving each country as responsible for its own fate (Figure \ref{fig:foreign_aid_no}). In response to an open-ended question regarding measures high-income countries should take to fight extreme poverty, a large majority of Americans expressed that more help is needed (Figure \ref{fig:poverty_field}). The most commonly suggested form of aid is financial support, closely followed by investments in education.

We also inquire about the perceived amount of foreign aid. Consistent with prior research (see Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_foreign_aid}), most people overestimate the actual amount of foreign aid (Figure \ref{fig:foreign_aid_belief}). We then elicit respondents' preferred amount of foreign aid, after randomly presenting them with either the actual amount or no information. Most of the respondents who learn the actual amount choose a bracket at least as high as the actual one, and most of those without the information choose a bracket at least as high as the perceived one (Figures \ref{fig:foreign_aid_amount}--\ref{fig:foreign_aid_preferred_info}). Finally, we ask a last question to the respondents who received the information. To those who prefer an increase of foreign aid, we ask how they would finance it: by far, the preferred source of funding is higher taxes on the wealthiest (Figure \ref{fig:foreign_aid_raise_how}). To those who prefer a reduction, we ask how they would use the funds becoming available: %

In every country, more people choose higher spending on education or healthcare rather than lower taxes (Figure \ref{fig:foreign_aid_reduce_how}).

\begin{figure}[h!]
  \caption[Attitudes on the evolution of foreign aid]{[For Supplementary Material] Attitudes regarding the evolu

```
tion of [own country] foreign aid. (Q
uestion \ref{q:foreign_aid_raise_supp
ort})}\label{fig:foreign_aid_raise_su
pport}
168    \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegra
phics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/co
untry_comparison/foreign_aid_raise_su
pport.pdf}}
169 \end{figure}
170
171 \begin{figure}[h!]
172    \caption[Conditions at which foreig
n aid should be increased]{[For Suppl
ementary Material] Conditions at whic
h foreign aid should be increased (in
percent). [Asked to those who wish an
increase of foreign aid at some condi
tions.] (Question \ref{q:foreign_aid_
condition})}\label{fig:foreign_aid_co
ndition}
173    \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegra
phics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/co
untry_comparison/foreign_aid_conditio
n_positive.pdf}}
174 \end{figure}
175
176 \begin{figure}[h!]
177    \caption[Reasons why foreign aid sh
ould not be increased]{[For Supplemen
tary Material] Reasons why foreign ai
d should not be increased (in percen
t). [Asked to those who wish a decrea
se or stability of foreign aid.] (Que
stion \ref{q:foreign_aid_no})}\label
{fig:foreign_aid_no}
178    \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegra
phics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/co
untry_comparison/foreign_aid_no_posit
ive.pdf}}
179 \end{figure}
```

```
180 \subsection{Robustness and sincerity    140 \subsection{Robustness and sincerity
    of support for the GCS}\label{subsec:        of support for the GCS}\label{subsec:
    robustness_sincerity}                        robustness_sincerity}
181 We use several methods to assess the     141 We use several methods to assess the
    sincerity of the support for the GCS:        sincerity of the support for the GCS:
    a list experiment, a real-stake petit        a list experiment, a real-stake petit
    ion, conjoint analyses, and the prior        ion, conjoint analyses, and the prior
    itization of policies. All methods su        itization of policies. All methods su
    ggest that the support is either comp        ggest that the support is either comp
    letely sincere, or the share of insin        letely sincere, or the share of insin
    cere answers is limited.                      cere answers is limited.
182                                          142
```

183 \subsubsection{List experiment}\label
{subsubsec:list_exp} %

184

185 By asking \textit{how many} policies
within a list respondents support and
varying the list among respondents, a
list experiment allows identifying th
e tacit support for a policy of inter
est. The tacit support is estimated a
s the difference in the average numbe
r of policies supported between two g
roups, whose list differ only by the
inclusion of that policy \citep{hainm
ueller_causal_2014}. %

186 For example, say a first subsample fa
ces the list of policies A, B, and C,
while a second subsamples faces the l
ist A, B, C, and GCS. We do not need
to know which policies each responden
t support to estimate the average (ta
cit) support for the GCS, we simply n
eed to compute the difference in the
average number of supported policies
between the two random subsamples.

187 List experiments have been used to re
veal social desirability bias, silenc
ing either racism in the Southern U.
S. \citep{kuklinski_racial_1997} or o
pposition to the invasion of Ukraine
in Russia \citep{chapkovski_solid_202
2}. %

188 In our case, as shown in Table \ref{t
ab:list_exp}, the tacit support for t
he GCS measured through the list expe
riment is not significantly lower tha
n the direct stated support.\footnote
{We utilize the difference-in-means e
stimator, and confidence intervals ar
e computed using Monte Carlo simulati
on with the R package \textit{list}
\citep{imai_multivariate_2011}.} Henc
e, we do not find a social desirabili
ty bias in our study.

189 \begin{table}[h]

190   %

191   %

192   \caption[List experiment: tacit sup
port for the GCS]{Number of supported
policies in the list experiment depen
ding on the presence of the Global Cl
imate Scheme (GCS) in the list. %

---

143 \subsubsection{List experiment}\label
{subsubsec:list_exp} %

144

145 By asking \textit{how many} policies
within a list respondents support and
varying the list among respondents, a
list experiment allows identifying th
e tacit support for a policy of inter
est.

146 For example, say a first subsample fa
ces the list of policies A, B, and C,
while a second subsamples faces the l
ist A, B, C, and GCS. We do not need
to know which policies each responden
t support to estimate the average (ta
cit) support for the GCS, we simply n
eed to compute the difference in the
average number of supported policies
between the two random subsamples.\ci
tep{imai_multivariate_2011}

147 In our case, as shown in Table \ref{t
ab:list_exp}, the tacit support for t
he GCS measured through the list expe
riment is not significantly lower tha
n the direct stated support. %

148 Hence, we do not find a social desira
bility bias in our study.

193   The tacit support for the GCS is estimated by regressing the number of supported policies on the presence of the GCS in the list of policies. The social desirability is estimated as the difference between the tacit and stated support, and it is not significantly different from zero even at a 20\% threshold (see \nameref{sec:methods}).

194   }\label{tab:list_exp}

195   \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\input{../tables/continents/reg_list_exp_g.tex}

196   }

197   %

198 \end{table}

199

200 \subsubsection{Petition}\label{subsubsec:petition} %

201

202 We ask respondents whether they are willing to sign a petition in support of either the GCS or NR policy. We inform them that the petition results will be sent to the head of state's office, highlighting the proportion of fellow citizens endorsing the respective scheme. Even when framed as a real-stake petition, both policies continue to receive majority support. In the U.S., we find no significant difference between the support in the real-stake petitions and the simple questions (GCS: $p=.30$; NR: $p=.76$).\footnote{Paired weighted \textit{t}-tests are conducted to test the equality in support for a policy among respondents who were questioned about the policy in the petition.} In Europe, the petition leads to a comparable lower support for both the GCS (7 p.p., $p=10^{-5}$) and NR (4 p.p., $p = .008$). While some European respondents are unwilling to sign a petition for policies they are expected to support, this effect is not specific to the GCS, and the overall willingness to sign a real-stake petition remains strong, with 69\% expressing support for the GCS and 67\% for NR.

149

150 \subsubsection{Petition}\label{subsubsec:petition} %

151

152 We ask respondents whether they are willing to sign a petition in support of either the GCS or NR policy. We inform them that the petition results will be sent to the head of state's office, highlighting the proportion of fellow citizens endorsing the respective scheme. Even when framed as a petition that might have real stakes, both policies continue to receive majority support. In the U.S., we find no significant difference between the support in the %

153 petitions and the simple questions (G
CS: $p=.30$; NR: $p=.76$). %

154 In Europe, the petition leads to a co
mparable lower support for both the G
CS (7 p.p., $p=10^{-5}$) and NR (4 p.
p., $p = .008$). While some European
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etition for policies they are expecte
d to support, this phenomenon is not
specific to the GCS, and the overall
willingness to sign a %

155 petition remains strong, with 69\% ex
pressing support for the GCS and 67\%
for NR.

156

157 \subsubsection{Conjoint analyses}\lab
el{subsubsec:conjoint} %

158

159 In order to assess the public support
for the GCS in conjunction with other
policies, we conduct a series of conj
oint analyses. We ask respondents to
make five choices between pairs of po
litical platforms. Each choice is mea
nt at testing a different hypothesis
on the support for the GCS in relatio
n to other policies or voting.

160

161 The first conjoint analysis suggests
that the GCS is supported independent
ly of being complemented by the Natio
nal Redistribution Scheme and a natio
nal climate policy (C). %

162 The second analysis indicates majorit
y support for the GCS and for C, whic
h are seen as neither complement nor
substitute (see \nameref{sec:method
s}). A minor share of respondents lik
e a national climate policy and disli
ke a global one, but as many people p
refer a global rather than a national
policy; and there is no evidence that
implementing NR would increase the su
pport for the GCS.

203

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el{subsubsec:conjoint} %

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for the GCS in conjunction with other
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make five choices between pairs of po
litical platforms.

207

208 The first conjoint analysis suggests
that the GCS is supported independent
ly of being complemented by the Natio
nal Redistribution Scheme and a natio
nal climate policy (``Coal exit'' in
the U.S., ``Thermal insulation plan''
in Europe, denoted C).\footnote{Indee
d, 54\% of %

209 U.S. respondents and 74\% of %

210 European ones prefer the combination
of C, NR and the GCS to the combinati
on of C and NR alone, indicating simi

lar support for the GCS conditional on NR and C than for the GCS alone (Figure \ref{fig:conjoint}).} %

211 For the second analysis, we split the sample into four random branches.\footnote{Results from the first branch show that the support for the GCS conditional on NR, at 55\% in the U.S. (n = 757) and 77\% in Europe (n = 746), is not significantly different from the support for the GCS alone. This suggests that rejection of the GCS is not driven by the cost of the policy on oneself. The second branch shows that the support for C conditional on NR is somewhat higher, at 62\% in the U.S. (n = 751) and 84\% in Europe (n = 747). However, the third one shows no significant preference for C compared to GCS (both conditional on NR), neither in Europe, where GCS is preferred by 52\% (n = 741) nor in the U.S., where C is preferred by 53\% (n = 721). The fourth branch shows that 55\% in the U.S. (n = 771) and 77\% in Europe (n = 766) prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to NR alone.} The outcome is that there is majority support for the GCS and for C, which are seen as neither complement nor substitute. A minor share of respondents like a national climate policy and dislike a global one, but as many people prefer a global rather than a national policy; and there is no evidence that implementing NR would increase the support for the GCS.

212 In the third analysis, we present two random branches of the sample with hypothetical progressive and conservative platforms that differ only by the presence (or not) of the GCS in the progressive platform. Table \ref{tab:conjoint_c} shows that a progressive candidate would not significantly lose voting share by endorsing the GCS in any country, and may even gain 11 p.p. (p = .005$) in voting intention in France. %

163 In the third analysis, we present two random branches of the sample with hypothetical progressive and conservative platforms that differ only by the presence (or not) of the GCS in the progressive platform. Table \ref{tab:conjoint_c} shows that a progressive candidate would not significantly lose voting share by endorsing the GCS in any country, and may even gain 11 p.p. (p = .005$) in voting intention in France. %

213 Though the level of support for the GCS is significantly lower in swing States (at 51\%) that are key to win U.S. elections, the electoral effect of endorsing the GCS remains non-significantly different from zero (at +1.2 p.p.) in these States.\footnote{We define swing states as the 8 states with less than 5 p.p. margin of victory in the 2020 election (MI, NV, PA, WI, AZ, GA, NC, FL). The results are robust to using the 3 p.p. threshold (that excludes FL) instead.}

214 \begin{table}[h]
215   %
216   \caption[Influence of the GCS on electoral prospects]{Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. (Question \ref{q:conjoint_c})
217   %
218 } %
219   \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\input{../tables/country_comparison/conjoint_c_wo_none.tex}}\label{tab:conjoint_c}
220   {\footnotesize \textit{Note:} Simple OLS model. The 14\% of \textit{None of them} answers have been excluded from the regression samples. GCS has no significant influence on them. $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**} p<0.05$; $^{***} p<0.01$.
221   }
222 \end{table}
223 \begin{stretchpars}
224 Our last two analyses make respondents choose between two random platforms. In Europe, respondents are prompted to imagine that a left or center-left coalition will win the next election and are asked what platform they would prefer that coalition to have campaigned on. In the U.S., the question is framed as a hypothetical duel in a Democratic primary, and asked only to non-Republicans (n = 2,218), i.e. the respondents who declare as political affiliation \textit{Democrat}, \textit{Independent}, \textit{Non-Affiliated} or \textit{Other}. In the fo

164 Our last two analyses make respondents choose between two random platforms. In Europe, respondents are prompted to imagine that a left or center-left coalition will win the next election and asked what platform they would prefer that coalition to have campaigned on. In the U.S., the question is framed as a hypothetical duel in a Democratic primary, and asked only to non-Republicans (n = 2,218), i.e. the respondents who declare as political affiliation \textit{Democrat}, \textit{Independent}, \textit{Non-Affiliated} or \textit{Other}.

urth analysis, a policy (or an absence of policy) is randomly drawn for each platform in each of five categories: \textit{economic issues}, \textit{societal issues}, \textit{climate policy}, \textit{tax system}, \textit{foreign policy} (Figure \ref{fig:ca_r}).

225

226 Except for the category \textit{foreign policy}, which features the GCS 42 \% of the time, the policies are prominent progressive policies and they are drawn uniformly. %

165

166 In the fourth analysis, a policy (or an absence of policy) is randomly drawn for each platform in each of five categories: \textit{economic issues}, \textit{societal issues}, \textit{climate policy}, \textit{tax system}, \textit{foreign policy} (Figure \ref{fig:ca_r}).

227 In the UK, Germany, and France, a platform is about 9 to 13 p.p. more likely to be preferred if it includes the GCS rather than no foreign policy.\footnote{This is the Average Marginal Component Effect computed following \citet{hainmueller_causal_2014}.} This effect is between 1 and 4 p.p. and no longer significant in the U.S. and in Spain. Moreover, a platform that includes a global tax on millionaires rather than no foreign policy is 5 to 13 percentage points (p.p.) more likely to be preferred in all countries (the effect is significant and at least 9 p.p. in all countries but Spain).

167 In the UK, Germany, and France, a platform is about 9 to 13 p.p. more likely to be preferred if it includes the GCS rather than no foreign policy. %

228 Similarly, a global democratic assembly on climate change has a significant effect of 8 to 12 p.p. in the U.S., Germany, and France.

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229 These effects are large, and not far from the effects of the policies most influential on the platforms, which range between 15 and 18 p.p. in most countries (and 27 p.p. in Spain), and all relate to improved public services (in particular healthcare, housing, and education).

169 Similarly, a global democratic assembly on climate change has a significant effect of 8 to 12 p.p. in the U.S. (among non-Republicans), Germany, and France.

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231

171

232 \begin{figure}[h]

172 The fifth analysis draws random platforms similarly, except that candidate A's platform always contains the GCS while B's includes no foreign policy. In this case, A is chosen by 60\% of Europeans %

233   \caption[Preferences for various policies in political platforms]{[For Supplementary Material] Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See English translations in Figure \ref{fig:ca_r_en}; Question \ref{q:conjoint_r}%

173 and 58\% of non-Republican Americans (Figure \ref{fig:conjoint_left_ag_b}). %

234   )}\label{fig:ca_r}

174

235   \begin{subfigure}{\textwidth}

175 Overall, taking the U.S. as an example, our conjoint analyses indicate that a candidate at the Democratic primary would have more chances to obtain the nomination by endorsing the GCS, and this endorsement would not penalize her or him at the presidential election.

236   \subcaption{U.S. (Asked only to non-Republicans)}

176 This result relates to the finding that 12\% of Germans shift their voting intention from SPD and CDU/CSU to the Greens and the Left when they are told that the latter parties support global democracy.\citep{ghassim_who_2020}

237   \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/US1/ca_r.png}

238   \end{subfigure}

239   \begin{subfigure}{\textwidth}

240   \subcaption{France}

241   \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/FR/ca_r.png}

242   \end{subfigure}

243 \end{figure}%

244 \clearpage

```
245  \begin{figure}[h!]\ContinuedFloat %
246    \begin{subfigure}{\textwidth}
247      \subcaption{Germany}
248      \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/DE/ca_r.png}
249    \end{subfigure}
250    \begin{subfigure}{\textwidth}
251      \subcaption{Spain}
252      \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/ES/ca_r.png}
253    \end{subfigure}
254    \begin{subfigure}{\textwidth}
255      \subcaption{UK}
256      \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/UK/ca_r.png}
257    \end{subfigure}
258    %
259  \end{figure}
260  \clearpage
261  \noindent
```

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264 Overall, taking the U.S. as an example, our conjoint analyses indicate that a candidate at the Democratic primary would have more chances to obtain the nomination by endorsing the GCS, and this endorsement would not penalize her or him at the presidential election. This result reminds the finding that 12\% of Germans shift their voting intention from SPD and CDU/CSU to the Greens and the Left when they are told that the latter parties support global democracy \citep{ghassim_who_2020}.

```
265  \begin{figure}[h!]
266      \caption[Influence of the GCS on preferred platform]{[For Supplementary Material] Influence of the GCS on preferred platform:\\ Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question \ref{q:conjoint_d}; in the
```

U.S., asked only to non-Republican s.)}\label{fig:conjoint_left_ag_b}

267   \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includeg raphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/ country_comparison/conjoint_left_ag_b _binary_positive.pdf}}

268 \end{figure}

269 \subsubsection{Prioritization}\label {subsubsec:prioritization} %

270

271 Towards the end of the survey, we ask respondents to allocate 100 points am ong six randomly selected policies fr om the previous conjoint analyses, us ing sliders. The instruction was to d istribute the points based on their l evel of support, with a higher alloca tion indicating greater support for a policy. %

272 As a result, the average support acro ss policies is 16.67 points. %

273 In each country, the GCS ranks in the middle of all policies or above, with an average number of points from 15.4 in the U.S. to 22.9 in Germany.%

274

275 Interestingly, in Germany, the most p rioritized policy is the global tax o n millionaires, while the GCS is the second most prioritized policy. The g lobal tax on millionaires consistentl y ranks no lower than fifth position (out of 15 or 17 policies) in every c ountry, garnering an average of 18.3 points in Spain to 22.9 points in Ger many.

276

277 This question sheds light on a potent ial discrepancy between the policy pr iorities of the public and those enac ted by legislators. For instance, whi le the European Union and California have enacted plans to phase out new c ombustion-engine cars by 2035, the pr oposal to ``ban the sale of new combu stion-engine cars by 2030'' emerged a s one of the three least prioritized policies in each country, with an ave rage allocation of 7.8 points in Fran ce to 11.4 points in the UK.

278

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184

279

280 \subsubsection{Pros and Cons}\label{subsubsec:pros_cons}

281

282 We survey respondents to gather their perspectives on the pros and cons of the GCS, utilizing either an open-ended or a closed question. In the closed question format, respondents tend to consider every argument as important in determining their support or opposition to the GCS (see Figure \ref{fig:gcs_important}). Notably, the least important aspect was the negative impact on their household, with 60\% in Europe (n=1,505) and 75\% in the U.S. (n=493) finding it important. The most important elements differ between Europe and the U.S. In Europe, the key factors are the GCS's potential to limit climate change and reduce poverty in low-income countries, both deemed important by 85\% of respondents. In the U.S., having sufficient information about the scheme ranks highest at 89\%, followed by its potential to foster global cooperation at 82\%. However, due to the limited variation in the ratings for each element, the closed question format is inconclusive (Figure \ref{fig:gcs_important}). %

283

284 The open-ended question provides more insights into what people associate with the GCS when prompted to think about it. %

285 Analyzing keywords in the responses (automatically translated into English), the most frequently mentioned topics are the international aspect and the environment, each appearing in approximately one-quarter of the answers (see Figure \ref{fig:gcs_field_contains}). This is followed by discussions on the effects of the GCS on poverty and prices, each mentioned by about one-tenth of the respondents. We also manually classified each answer into different categories (see Figure \ref{fig:gcs_field}). This exercise c

---

185

186 \subsubsection{Pros and Cons}\label{subsubsec:pros_cons}

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onfirms the findings from the automat
ic search: the environmental benefit
of the GCS is the most commonly discu
ssed topic, while obstacles to implem
entation or agreement on the proposal
are relatively infrequently mentione
d.%

286 \footnote{Moreover, around one in fou
r respondents explicitly cites pros o
r cons. Few individuals explicitly ex
press support or opposition, and misu
nderstandings are rare. Only 11\% of
the responses are empty or express a
lack of opinion, though one-quarter a
re unclassifiable due to the rarity,
nonsensical nature, or irrelevance of
the conveyed idea.}%

287

288 In the \textit{US2} survey, we divide
d the sample into four random branche
s. Two branches were presented the pr
os and cons questions (either in open
or closed format) \textit{before} bei
ng asked about their support for the
GCS or NR. Another branch received in
formation on the actual level of supp
ort for the GCS and NR (estimated in
\textit{US1}, see Section \ref{subse
c:second_order_beliefs}), and one con
trol group received none of these tre
atments. %

289 The objective of this ``pros and cons
treatment'' was to simulate a ``campa
ign effect'', which refers to the shi
ft in opinion resulting from media co
verage of the proposal. To conservati
vely estimate the effect of a (potent
ially negative) campaign, we intentio
nally included more cons (6) than pro
s (3). Interestingly, the support for
the GCS decreased by 11 p.p. after re
spondents viewed a list of its pros a
nd cons.\footnote{Surprisingly, the s
upport for National Redistribution al
so decreased by 7 p.p. following the
closed question about the GCS. This s
uggests that some individuals may lac
k attention and confuse the two polic
ies, or that contemplating the pros a
nd cons alters the mood of some peopl
e, moving them away from their initia

192

193 In the \textit{US2} survey, we divide
d the sample into four random branche
s. Two branches were presented the pr
os and cons questions (either in open
or closed format) \textit{before} bei
ng asked about their support for the
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formation on the actual level of supp
ort for the GCS and NR (estimated in
\textit{US1}, see box p. \pageref{sub
sec:second_order_beliefs}), %

194 and one control group received none o
f these treatments. %

l positive impression.} Notably, the support also decreased by 7 p.p. after respondents were asked to consider the pros and cons in an open-ended question. Although support remains significant,%

290 \footnote{Despite some significant effects of pondering the pros and cons, approximately half of the Americans express support for the GCS across all treatment branches (see Table \ref{tab:branch_gcs}).} these results suggest that the public success of the GCS would be sensitive to the content of the debate about it, and subject to the discourse adopted by interest groups. %

195 The objective of the ``pros and cons treatment'' was to mimic a ``campaign effect'', which refers to the shift in opinion resulting from media coverage of the proposal.\citep{anderson_can_2023} To conservatively estimate the effect of a (potentially negative) campaign, we intentionally included more cons (6) than pros (3). Interestingly, the support for the GCS decreased by 11 p.p. after respondents viewed a list of its pros and cons. %

196 Notably, the support also decreased by 7 p.p. after respondents were asked to consider the pros and cons in an open-ended question. Despite some significant effects of pondering the pros and cons, approximately half of the Americans express support for the GCS across all treatment branches (see Table \ref{tab:branch_gcs}). Although support remains significant, %

197 these results suggest that the public success of the GCS would be sensitive to the content of the debate about it, and oriented by the discourse adopted by interest groups. %

198 \begin{tcolorbox}\label{subsec:second_order_beliefs}

199   \paragraph{Second-order Beliefs}

200 To explain the strong support for the GCS despite its absence from political platforms and public debate, we hypothesized pluralistic ignorance, i.e. that the public and policymakers mistakenly perceive the GCS as unpopular. As a result, individuals might conceal their support for such globally redistributive policy, believing that advocating for it would be futile.

201

202 In the case of Americans, their beliefs about the level of support for the GCS are relatively accurate (Figure \ref{fig:belief}). The mean perceived support is 52\% (with quartiles of 36

\%, 52\%, and 68\%), which closely aligns with the actual support of 54\%. Europeans, on the other hand, underestimate the support by 17 p.p. Nonetheless, 65\% of them correctly estimate that the GCS garners majority support, and the mean perceived support is 59\% (and quartiles of 43\%, 61\%, and 74\%), compared to the actual support of 76\%. %

Second-order beliefs are equally accurate for NR in the U.S. and similarly underestimated in Europe. %

Finally, consistent with Americans accurately perceiving the levels of support for the GCS or NR, providing information on the actual level had no significant effect on their support in the \textit{US2} survey. %

\end{tcolorbox}

\subsection{Universalistic values}\label{subsec:universalistic}

We elicit underlying values, to test whether broad values are consistent with people's support for specific policies. %

When we ask respondents which group they defend when they vote, %

20\% choose ``sentient beings (humans and animals),'' 22\% choose ``humans,'' 33\% select their ``fellow citizens'' (or ``Europeans''), 15\% choose ``My family and myself,'' and the remaining 10\% choose another group (mainly ``My State or region'' or ``People sharing my culture or religion'').

Notably, a majority of left-wing voters choose \textit{humans} or \textit{sentient beings}.

298 When asked what their country's diplomats should defend in international climate negotiations, only 11\% prefer their country's ``interests, even if it goes against global justice.'' In contrast, 30\% prefer global justice (with or without consideration of national interests), and the bulk of respondents (38\%) prefer their country's ``interests, to the extent it respects global justice.''

299

300 Furthermore, when we ask respondents to assess the extent to which climate change, global poverty, and inequality in their country are issues, climate change is generally viewed as the most significant problem (with a mean score of 0.59 after recoding answers between -2 and 2). This is followed by global poverty (0.42) and national inequality (0.37). %

301

302 Finally, we conduct a lottery experiment to elicit universalistic values. Respondents were automatically enrolled in a lottery with a \$100 prize and had to choose the proportion of the prize they would keep for themselves versus give to a person living in poverty. The charity donation is directed either to an African individual or a fellow citizen, depending on the respondent's random assignment. In Europe, we observe no significant variation in the willingness to donate based on the recipient's origin. In the U.S., the donations to Africans are 3 p.p. lower (with an average donation of 34\%), but the slightly lower donations to Africans are entirely driven by Trump voters and non-voters (Table \ref{tab:donation}).

303

304 Overall, answers to these broad value questions are consistent with half of Americans and three quarters of Europeans supporting global policies like the GCS: people are almost as much willing to give to poor Africans than to poor fellow citizens, find that global issues are among the biggest prob

lems, almost half of them are universalist when they vote, and most of them wish that their diplomats take into account global justice.

305

306　\subsection{Second-order Beliefs}\label{subsec:second_order_beliefs}

307　To explain the strong support for the GCS despite its absence from political platforms and public debate, we hypothesized pluralistic ignorance, i.e. that the public and policymakers mistakenly perceive the GCS as unpopular. As a result, individuals might conceal their support for such globally redistributive policies, believing that advocating for them would be futile. However, the evidence for pluralistic ignorance is limited based on an incentivized question about perceived support (Figure \ref{fig:belief}).

308

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310　Finally, consistent with Americans accurately perceiving the levels of support for the GCS or NR, providing information on the actual level had no significant effect on their support in the \textit{US2} survey. %

311　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　213

312　\begin{figure}[h!]　　　　　　214　Answers to this and other broad value questions are consistent with half of Americans and three quarters of Europeans supporting global policies like the GCS: people are almost as much wi

lling to make a donation to poor Africans than to poor fellow citizens in a lottery experiment, most respondents find that global issues are among the biggest problems, and most respondents wish that their diplomats take into account global justice (see \nameref{sec:methods} for details).

313   \caption[Beliefs about support for the GCS and NR]{[For Supplementary Material] Beliefs regarding the support for the GCS and NR. (Questions \ref{q:gcs_belief} and \ref{q:nr_belief})}\label{fig:belief}

314   \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegraphics[width=.7\textwidth]{../figures/country_comparison/belief_all_mean.pdf}}

315 \end{figure}

316 \section{Discussion} %   215 \section{Discussion} %

317 Our point of departure are recent surveys conducted %

318 in 20 of the largest countries%

319 , as they reveal robust majority support for global redistributive and climate policies, even in high-income countries that would financially lose from them. The results from complementary surveys conducted in the U.S. and four European countries %

320 reinforce these findings. We find strong support for global taxes on the wealthiest individuals, as well as majority support for our main policy of interest -- the Global Climate Scheme (GCS). The GCS encompasses carbon pricing at a global level through an emissions trading system, accompanied by a global basic income funded by the scheme's revenues. Additional experiments, such as a list experiment and a real-stake petition, demonstrate that the support for the GCS is real.

321 Such genuine support is further substantiated by the prioritization of the GCS over prominent national climate policies and aligned with a significant portion of the population holding universalistic values rather than nationalistic or egoistic ones. Moreover, the conjoint analyses indicate that a

progressive candidate would not lose voting shares by endorsing the GCS, and may even gain 11 p.p. in voting shares in France. Similarly, a candidate endorsing the GCS would gain votes in a U.S. Democratic primary, while in Europe, a progressive platform that includes the GCS would be preferred over one that does not.

322

323 Having ruled out insincerity and underestimation of fellow citizens' support as potential explanations for the scarcity of global policies in the public debate, we propose alternative explanations. %

217 In our analysis, we have uncovered strong and genuine support for global redistributive policies. One limitation to this finding, inherent to any inquiry into hypothetical policies, is that the support might change once global policies are discussed in the public debate (as explored in the paragraph on \textit{Pros and Cons}).

218

219 We conclude by providing hypotheses to reconcile the scarcity of global policies in the public debate with our findings that they would be widely accepted. %

324 The first two are variations of pluralistic ignorance, and the last three represent complementary explanations.

325

326 First, there may be pluralistic ignorance \textit{among policymakers} regarding universalistic values, support for the GCS, or the electoral advantage of endorsing it. Second, people or policymakers may believe that globally redistributive policies are politically infeasible in some key (potentially foreign) countries like the U.S. %

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Left column:

329 Fourth, many individuals, including p olicymakers, may perceive global redi stributive policies as ill-defined or technically infeasible, ultimately di smissing them as unrealistic. In part icular, policymakers may have insider information about the technical feasi bility of such policies. Alternativel y, the perception of unrealism may st em from an unawareness of specific pr oposals. %

330 Fifth, just as policy is disproportio nately influenced by the economic eli tes \citep{gilens_testing_2014,persso n_rich_2023}, public debate may be sh aped by the wealthiest, who have vest ed interests in preventing global red istribution.

331

332 Confirmation of any of these hypothes es would lead to a common conclusion: there exists substantial support for global policies addressing climate ch ange and global inequality, even in h igh-income countries, and the perceiv ed boundaries of political realism on this issue may soon shift. %

333 Uncovering evidence to support the ab ove hypotheses could %

334 draw attention to global policies in the public debate and contribute to t heir increased prominence. %

335   \begin{small} %

336 \section*{\normalsize Methods}\label {sec:methods} %

337 \addcontentsline{toc}{section}{\namer ef{sec:methods}}

Right column:

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232   \begin{small} %

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234 \addcontentsline{toc}{section}{\namer ef{sec:methods}}

235

236 \paragraph{\small Pre-registration.}

237 The project is approved by Economics \& Business Ethics Committee (EBEC) a t the University of Amsterdam (EB-111 3) and %

238 was preregistered in the Open Science Foundation registry (\href{https://os f.io/fy6gd}{osf.io/fy6gd}). The study did not deviate from the registratio n: the questionnaires and the hypothe ses tests used are the same as the on

Right column (top):

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es \href{https://osf.io/2b6vq}{given
\textit{ex ante}}. Informed consent w
as obtained from all respondents, ran
domized treatment branches were unkow
n to the respondents, and our researc
h complies with all relevant ethical
regulations. Respondents were compens
ated with gift certificates for a val
ue of \euro{}1 per interview. No stat
istical methods were used to pre-dete
rmine sample sizes but our sample siz
es match those reported in similar pu
blications.\citep{dechezlepretre_figh
ting_nodate,issp_international_2010,b
eiser-mcgrath_could_2019,sivonen_atti
tudes_2022,douenne_yellow_2022}
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239

Left column:

338 \paragraph{\small Data collection.} %

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The paper utilizes two sets of survey
s: the \textit{Global} survey and the
\textit{Complementary} surveys. The
\textit{Complementary} surveys consis
t of two U.S. surveys, \textit{US1} a
nd \textit{US2}, and one European sur
vey, \textit{Eu}. The \textit{Global}
survey was conducted from March 2021
to March 2022 on 40,680 respondents f
rom 20 countries (with 1,465 to 2,488
respondents per country). \textit{US
1} collected responses from January and March 20
23, while \textit{US2} gathered data
from 2,000 respondents between March
and April 2023. \textit{Eu} included
3,000 respondents and was conducted f
rom February to March 2023. We used t
he survey companies \emph{Dynata} and
\emph{Respondi}. To ensure representa
tive samples, we employed stratified
quotas based on gender, age (5 bracke
ts), income (4), region (4), educatio
n level (3), and ethnicity (3) for th
e U.S. We also incorporated survey we
ights throughout the analysis to acco
unt for any remaining imbalances. The
se weights were constructed using the
quota variables as well as the degree
of urbanity, and trimmed between 0.25
and 4. By applying weights, the resul
ts are fully representative of the re
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240 \paragraph{\small Data collection.} %

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242
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The paper utilizes two sets of survey
s: the \textit{global} survey and the
\textit{m} surveys. The \textit{main}
surveys consist of two U.S. surveys,
\textit{US1} and \textit{US2}, and on
e European survey, \textit{Eu}. The
\textit{global} survey was conducted
from March 2021 to March 2022 on 40,6
80 respondents from 20 countries (wit
h 1,465 to 2,488 respondents per coun
try). \textit{US1} collected response
s from 3,000 respondents between Janu
ary and March 2023, while \textit{US
2} gathered data from 2,000 responden
ts between March and April 2023. \tex
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loyed stratified quotas based on gend
er, age (5 brackets), income (4), reg
ion (4), education level (3), and eth
nicity (3) for the U.S. We also incor
porated survey weights throughout the
analysis to account for any remaining
imbalances. These weights were constr
ucted using the quota variables as we
ll as the degree of urbanity, and tri
mmed between 0.25 and 4. Stratified q
uotas followed by reweighting is the
usual method to reduce selection bias
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spective countries. Results at the European level apply different weights which ensure representativeness of the combined four European countries. Appendix \ref{app:representativeness} confirms that our samples are representative of the population. %

341 Appendix \ref{app:balance} shows that the treatment branches are balanced. Appendix \ref{app:placebo} runs placebo tests of the effects of each treatment on unrelated outcomes. We do not find effects of earlier treatments on unrelated outcomes arriving later in the survey.

342 \paragraph{\small Data quality.} %

343 The median duration is 28 minutes for the \textit{Global} survey, 14 min for \textit{US1}, 11 min for \textit{US2}, and 20 min for \textit{Eu}. To ensure the best possible data quality, we exclude respondents who fail an attention test or rush through the survey (i.e., answer in less than 11.5 minutes in the \textit{Global} survey, 4 minutes in \textit{US1} or \textit{US2}, 6 minutes in \textit{Eu}). %

Right column:

from opt-in online panels, when better sampling methods (such as compulsory participation of random dwellings) are unavailable.\cite{scherpenzeel_how_2010} By applying weights, the results are fully representative of the respective countries along the above mentioned dimensions. %

243 Results at the European level apply different weights which ensure representativeness of the combined four European countries. Appendix \ref{app:representativeness} shows how our samples compare to actual population frequencies. Our samples match the actual frequencies well, except for some imbalance in the U.S. vote (which does not affect our results, as shown by the results reweighted by vote in the \textit{Support for the GCS} section below).

244 Appendix \ref{app:balance} shows that the treatment branches are balanced. Appendix \ref{app:placebo} runs placebo tests of the effects of each treatment on unrelated outcomes. We do not find effects of earlier treatments on unrelated outcomes arriving later in the survey. Appendix \ref{app:extended} shows that our results are unchanged when including inattentive respondents.

245 \paragraph{\small Data quality.} %

246 The median duration is 28 minutes for the \textit{global} survey, 14 min for \textit{US1}, 11 min for \textit{US2}, and 20 min for \textit{Eu}. To ensure the best possible data quality, we exclude respondents who fail an attention test or rush through the survey (i.e., answer in less than 11.5 minutes in the \textit{global} survey, 4 minutes in \textit{US1} or \textit{US2}, 6 minutes in \textit{Eu}). %

247 At the end of the survey, we ask whether respondents thought that our survey was politically biased and offer to provide some feedback. 67\% of the respondents found the survey unbiased. 25\% found it left-wing biased, and 8\% found it right-wing biased.

344

345 \paragraph{\small Questionnaires and raw results.} %

346 The questionnaire and raw results of the \textit{Global} survey can be found in the Appendix of the companion paper \citep{dechezlepretre_fighting_2022}. %

347 The raw results are reported in Appendix \ref{app:raw_results}\footnote{Country-specific raw results are also available as supplementary material files: \href{https://github.com/bixiou/international_attitudes_toward_global_policies/raw/main/paper/app_desc_stats_US.pdf}{US}, \href{https://github.com/bixiou/international_attitudes_toward_global_policies/raw/main/paper/app_desc_stats_EU.pdf}{EU}, \href{https://github.com/bixiou/international_attitudes_toward_global_policies/raw/main/paper/app_desc_stats_FR.pdf}{FR}, \href{https://github.com/bixiou/international_attitudes_toward_global_policies/raw/main/paper/app_desc_stats_DE.pdf}{DE}, \href{https://github.c

248

249 \paragraph{\small Questionnaires and raw results.} %

250 The raw results are reported in Appendix \ref{app:raw_results} while the surveys' structures and questionnaires are given in Appendices \ref{app:questionnaire_oecd} and \ref{app:questionnaire}. Details on the \textit{global} survey can be found in the Appendix of the companion paper.\citep{dechezlepretre_fighting_nodate} Country-specific raw results are also available as supplementary material files: \href{https://github.com/bixiou/international_attitudes_toward_global_policies/raw/main/paper/app_desc_stats_US.pdf}{US}, \href{https://github.com/bixiou/international_attitudes_toward_global_policies/raw/main/paper/app_desc_stats_EU.pdf}{EU}, \href{https://github.com/bixiou/international_attitudes_toward_global_policies/raw/main/paper/app_desc_stats_FR.pdf}{FR}, \href{https://github.com/bixiou/international_attitudes_toward_global_policies/raw/main/paper/app_desc_stats_DE.pdf}{DE}, \href{https://github.com/bixiou/international_attitudes_toward_global_policies/raw/main/paper/app_desc_stats_ES.pdf}{ES}, \href{https://github.com/bixiou/international_attitudes_toward_global_policies/raw/main/paper/app_desc_stats_UK.pdf}{UK}. %

om/bixiou/international_attitudes_toward_global_policies/raw/main/paper/app_desc_stats_ES.pdf}{ES}, \href{https://github.com/bixiou/international_attitudes_toward_global_policies/raw/main/paper/app_desc_stats_UK.pdf}{UK}.} while the surveys' structures and questionnaires are given in Appendices \ref{app:questionnaire_oecd} and \ref{app:questionnaire}. The questionnaires are the same as the ones given \textit{ex ante} in the registration plan (\href{https://osf.io/fy6gd}{osf.io/fy6gd}).

348 \paragraph{\small Incentives.} %

349 To encourage accurate and truthful responses, several questions of the \textit{US1} survey use incentives. For each of the three comprehension questions that follow the policy descriptions, we randomly select and reward three respondents who provide correct answers with a \$50 gift certificate. Similarly, for questions involving estimating support shares for the GCS and NR, three respondents with the closest guesses to the actual values receive a \$50 gift certificate. In the donation lottery question, we randomly select one respondent and split the \$100 prize between the NGO GiveDirectly and the winner according to the winner's choice. In total, our incentives scheme distributes gift certificates (and donations) for a value of \$850. Finally, respondents have an incentive to answer truthfully to the petition question, as they are aware that the results for that question (the share of respondents supporting the policy) will be transmitted to the U.S. President's office.

251 \paragraph{\small Incentives.} %

252 To encourage accurate and truthful responses, several questions of the main surveys use incentives. For each of the three comprehension questions that follow the policy descriptions, we randomly select and reward three respondents who provide correct answers with a \$50 gift certificate. Similarly, for questions involving estimating support shares for the GCS and NR, three respondents with the closest guesses to the actual values receive a \$50 gift certificate. In the donation lottery question, we randomly select one respondent and split the \$100 prize between the NGO GiveDirectly and the winner according to the winner's choice. In total, our incentives scheme distributes gift certificates (and donations) for a value of \$850. Finally, respondents have an incentive to answer truthfully to the petition question, as they are aware that the results for that question (the share of respondents supporting the policy) will be transmitted to their head of state's office.

253 \paragraph{\small Absolute vs. relative support.}

254 In most questions, support or opposition for a policy is asked using a 5-Likert scale, with compulsory response and \textit{Indifferent} as the middle option. We call \textit{absolute support} the share of \textit{Somewhat} or \textit{Strong support}. We genera

lly favor the notion of \textit{relative support}, which reports the share of support after excluding \textit{Indifferent} answers. Indeed, the \textit{relative support} is better suited to assess whether there are more people in favor vs. against a policy.

255

256 \paragraph{\small Support for the GCS.}

257 The 95\% confidence intervals are $[52.4\%, 55.9\%]$ in the U.S. and $[74.2\%, 77.2\%]$ in Europe. The average support is computed with survey weights, employing weights based on quota variables, which exclude vote. Another method to reweigh the raw results involves running a regression of the support for the GCS on sociodemographic characteristics (including vote) and multiplying each coefficient by the population frequencies. This alternative approach yields similar figures: 76\% in Europe and 52\% or 53\% in the U.S. (depending on whether individuals who did not disclose their vote are classified as non-voters or excluded). Notably, the average support among voters is 54\% in the U.S., with 74\% support among Biden voters vs. 26\% among Trump voters (see Figure \ref{fig:main_by_vote}).

258

259 Though the level of support for the GCS is significantly lower in swing States (at 51\%) that are key to win U.S. elections, the electoral effect of endorsing the GCS remains non-significantly different from zero (at +1.2 p.p.) in these States. Note that we define swing states as the 8 states with less than 5 p.p. margin of victory in the 2020 election (MI, NV, PA, WI, AZ, GA, NC, FL). The results are unchanged if we use the 3 p.p. threshold (that excludes FL) instead.

260

261 \paragraph{\small List experiment.} %

262 List experiments have been used to reveal social desirability bias, silencing either racism in the Southern U.S.\citep{kuklinski_racial_1997} or op

position to the invasion of Ukraine in Russia.\citep{chapkovski_solid_2022} %

263 In our case, the question reads: ``Beware, this question is quite unusual. Among the policies below, \textbf{how many} do you support?'' The list of policies randomly varies across respondents, and includes a subset of GCS, NR (National Redistribution scheme), C (``Coal exit'' in the U.S., ``Thermal insulation plan'' in Europe) and O (``Marriage only for opposite-sex couples in the U.S.'', ``Death penalty for major crimes'' in Europe). There are four branches: GCS/NR/C/O; GCS/C/O; NR/C/O; C/O. To estimate the tacit average support for the GCS and NR, we regress the number of supported policies on indicators that the list includes GCS and NR.

264 We utilize the difference-in-means estimator, and confidence intervals are computed using Monte Carlo simulation with the R package \textit{list}.\citep{imai_multivariate_2011}

265

266 \paragraph{\small Petition.}

267 The respondent is randomly assigned a branch where the petition relates to the GCS or the National Redistribution scheme. The question reads: ``Would you be willing to sign a petition for the [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme? \\ As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President's office], informing him what share of [American] people are willing to endorse the [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign, only your answer here is required and remains anonymous.)''.

268

269 Paired weighted \textit{t}-tests are conducted to test the equality in support for a policy among respondents who were questioned about the policy in the petition.

270

271 \paragraph{\small Conjoint analyses.}

272 The first conjoint analysis suggests that the GCS is supported independently of being complemented by the National Redistribution Scheme and a national climate policy (``Coal exit'' in the U.S., ``Thermal insulation plan'' in Europe, denoted C). Indeed, 54\% of %

273 U.S. respondents and 74\% of %

274 European ones prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to the combination of C and NR alone, indicating similar support for the GCS conditional on NR and C than for the GCS alone (Figure \ref{fig:conjoint}).

275

276 In the second conjoint analysis, results from the first branch show that the support for the GCS conditional on NR, at 55\% in the U.S. (n = 757) and 77\% in Europe (n = 746), is not significantly different from the support for the GCS alone. This suggests that rejection of the GCS is not driven by the cost of the policy on oneself. The second branch shows that the support for C conditional on NR is somewhat higher, at 62\% in the U.S. (n = 751) and 84\% in Europe (n = 747). However, the third one shows no significant preference for C compared to GCS (both conditional on NR), neither in Europe, where GCS is preferred by 52\% (n = 741) nor in the U.S., where C is preferred by 53\% (n = 721). The fourth branch shows that 55\% in the U.S. (n = 771) and 77\% in Europe (n = 766) prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to NR alone.

277

278 The effects reported in the fourth analysis are the Average Marginal Component Effects.\cite{hainmueller_causal_2014} The policies studied are progressive policies prominent in the country. Except for the category \textit{foreign policy}, which features the GCS 42\% of the time, they are drawn uniformly.

279

280 \paragraph{\small Prioritization.}

281 The prioritization allows inferring individual-level preferences for one policy over another, including in their intensity. This somewhat differs from a conjoint analysis, which only allows inferring individual-level preferences for one platform over another or collective-level preferences for one policy over another. Also, by comparing platforms, conjoint analyses may be subject to interaction effects between policies of a platform (which can be seen as complementary, substitute, or antagonistic) while the prioritization frames the policies as independent.

282

283 This question sheds light on a potential discrepancy between the policy priorities of the public and those enacted by legislators. For instance, while the European Union and California have enacted plans to phase out new combustion-engine cars by 2035, the proposal to ``ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030'' emerged as one of the three least prioritized policies in each country, with an average allocation of 7.8 points in France to 11.4 points in the UK.

284

285 \paragraph{\small Open-ended question on the GCS.}

286 Around one in four respondents explicitly cites pros or cons. Few individuals explicitly express support or opposition, and misunderstandings are rare. Only 11\% of the responses are empty or express a lack of opinion, though one-quarter are unclassifiable due to the rarity, nonsensical nature, or irrelevance of the conveyed idea.

287

288 \paragraph{\small Pros and cons.}

289 In the closed question, the least important aspect was the negative impact on their household, with 60\% in Europe (n=1,505) and 75\% in the U.S. (n=493) finding it important. The most important elements differ between Europe and the U.S. In Europe, the key factors are the GCS's potential to

limit climate change and reduce poverty in low-income countries, both deemed important by 85\% of respondents. In the U.S., having sufficient information about the scheme ranks highest at 89\%, followed by its potential to foster global cooperation at 82\%.

290

291 Surprisingly, the support for National Redistribution also decreased by 7 p.p. following the closed question about the GCS. This suggests that some individuals may lack attention and confuse the two policies, or that contemplating the pros and cons alters the mood of some people, moving them away from their initial positive impression.

292

293 \paragraph{\small Universalistic values}

294 When asked what their country's diplomats should defend in international climate negotiations, only 11\% prefer their country's ``interests, even if it goes against global justice.'' In contrast, 30\% prefer global justice (with or without consideration of national interests), and the bulk of respondents (38\%) prefer their country's ``interests, to the extent it respects global justice.''

295

296 Furthermore, when we ask respondents to assess the extent to which climate change, global poverty, and inequality in their country are issues, climate change is generally viewed as the most significant problem %

297 (with a mean score of 0.59 after recoding answers between -2 and 2). This is followed by global poverty (0.42) and national inequality (0.37). %

298

299 Finally, we conduct a lottery experiment. %

300 Respondents were automatically enrolled in a lottery with a \$100 prize and had to choose the proportion of the prize they would keep for themselves versus give to a person living in poverty. The %

301 charity donation is directed either to an African individual or a fellow citizen, depending on the respondent's random assignment. In Europe, we observe no significant variation in the willingness to donate based on the recipient's origin. In the U.S., the donations to Africans are 3 p.p. lower, %

302 but the slightly lower donations to Africans are entirely driven by Trump voters and non-voters (Table \ref{tab:donation}).

303

304 \paragraph{\small Global wealth tax estimates.}

305 A 2\% tax on net wealth exceeding \$5 million would annually raise \$816 billion, leaving unaffected 99.9\% of the world population. More specifically, it would collect \euro{}5 billion in Spain, \euro{}16 billion in France, £20 billion in the UK, \euro{}44 billion in Germany, \$430 billion in the U.S., and \$1 billion collectively in all low-income countries (28 countries, home to 700 million people). These Figures come from the \href{https://wid.world/world-wealth-tax-simulator/}{WID wealth tax simulator}.\cite{chancel_world_2022}

306 \paragraph{\small Design choices.}

307

308 As global survey results indicated strong support for global redistributive policies worldwide, we conducted our main surveys to further investigate the surprisingly high support. %

309 Among the eight largest high-income countries, we selected the five ones with a relatively low level of support for global redistributive policies as observed in the global survey. We also focus on the GCS as its costs are less concentrated on the very rich, compared to other global redistributive policies, so we expected lower (or less genuine) support. By selecting countries that would lose from global redistribution, are less supportive than others, and focusing on less consensual policies, we aimed at conservati

vely assessing the level of support of world citizens for global redistribution.

310

311 We split the U.S. survey into two waves to test the effect on the support of providing the information on the actual support, and merged the \textit{Eu} survey in one wave to get larger sample sizes and more power in the analyses.

312

313 To select the policies tested, we spanned three key areas for global redistribution: climate change, inequality, and global governance. We selected policies that are either on the agenda of international negotiations (international transfers for mitigation; adaptation; or loss and damages; cancellation of public debt; reform of voting rights at the UN or IMF; global wealth tax) or advocated by prominent NGOs or scholars (\href{https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5a0c602bf43b5594845abb81/t/5c988368eef1a1538c2ae7eb/1553498989927/GAR.pdf}{global asset registry}; limits on wealth;\citep{robeyns_limitarianism_2024,piketty_brief_2022} democratic climate governance;\citep{dryzek_global_2011} global minimum wage;\citep{palley_financial_2013} fair trade;\citep{hickel_divide_2017} carbon pricing;\citep{cramton_global_2017} \href{https://concordeurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/CONCORD_AidWatch_Report_2019_web.pdf}{increased foreign aid}).

314

315 \section*{\normalsize Data and code availability}

316

317 All data and code of the \textit{main} surveys as well as figures of the paper are available on \href{https://zenodo.org/doi/10.5281/zenodo.11202245}{10.5281/zenodo.11202245}. %

350 \section*{\normalsize Data and code availability}

351

352 All data and code of the \textit{Complementary} surveys as well as figures of the paper are available on \href{https://github.com/bixiou/international_attitudes_toward_global_policies}{github.com/bixiou/global_tax_attitudes}. Data and code for the \textit{Global} survey will be made public upon publication. %

318 Data and code for the \textit{g} survey will be made public upon publication. %

353

319