

International Majorities Genuinely Support Global Redistributive and Climate Policies

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Abstract

We document majority support for policies entailing global redistribution and climate mitigation. Surveys on 40,680 respondents in 20 countries show strong stated support for a global carbon price funding equal cash transfers, called the “Global Climate Scheme” (GCS). Through our surveys on 8,000 respondents in the U.S., France, Germany, Spain, and the UK, we test hypotheses that could reconcile strong stated support with scarce occurrences in public debates. Three quarters of Europeans and half of Americans support the GCS, even as they understand the policy’s cost to them. Using different experiments, we show that the support for the GCS is sincere and that political programs that include it are preferred to programs that do not. We document widespread support for other globally redistributive policies, such as increased foreign aid or a wealth tax funding low-income countries. In sum, global policies are genuinely supported by majorities, even in wealthy, contributing countries.

Contents

| | | |
|----|--------------------|---|
| 20 | Contents | 1 |
| 21 | 1 Introduction | 3 |
| 22 | 2 Results | 6 |
| 23 | 2.1 Data | 6 |

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| | | |
|----|--|-----|
| 24 | 2.2 Global support | 7 |
| 25 | 2.3 Stated support for the Global Climate Scheme | 9 |
| 26 | 2.4 Robustness and sincerity of support for the GCS | 10 |
| 27 | 2.4.1 List experiment | 11 |
| 28 | 2.4.2 Petition | 11 |
| 29 | 2.4.3 Conjoint analyses | 11 |
| 30 | 2.4.4 Prioritization | 13 |
| 31 | 2.4.5 Pros and Cons | 13 |
| 32 | 2.5 Stated support for global redistribution | 15 |
| 33 | 2.5.1 International policies | 15 |
| 34 | 2.5.2 Foreign aid | 15 |
| 35 | 2.6 Universalistic values | 17 |
| 36 | 3 Discussion | 18 |
| 37 | Methods | 18 |
| 38 | Bibliography | 26 |
| 39 | A Literature review | 39 |
| 40 | A.1 Attitudes and perceptions | 39 |
| 41 | A.1.1 Population attitudes on global policies | 39 |
| 42 | A.1.2 Population attitudes on climate burden sharing | 40 |
| 43 | A.1.3 Population attitudes on foreign aid | 42 |
| 44 | A.1.4 Population attitudes on taxes on the rich | 44 |
| 45 | A.1.5 Population attitudes on ethical norms | 45 |
| 46 | A.1.6 Second-order beliefs | 46 |
| 47 | A.1.7 Elite attitudes | 47 |
| 48 | A.2 Proposals and analyses of global policy-making | 47 |
| 49 | A.2.1 Global carbon pricing | 47 |
| 50 | A.2.2 Climate burden sharing | 49 |
| 51 | A.2.3 Global redistribution | 54 |
| 52 | A.2.4 Basic income | 55 |
| 53 | A.2.5 Global democracy | 56 |
| 54 | B Raw results | 57 |
| 55 | C Questionnaire of the global survey (section on global policies) | 80 |
| 56 | D Questionnaire of the complementary surveys | 83 |
| 57 | E Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme | 106 |
| 58 | F Determinants of support | 110 |

| | | |
|----|--|-----|
| 59 | G Representativeness of the surveys | 113 |
| 60 | H Attrition analysis | 115 |
| 61 | I Balance analysis | 118 |
| 62 | J Placebo tests | 119 |
| 63 | K Main results on the extended sample | 119 |
| 64 | L Effect of questionnaire framing | 122 |
| 65 | Bibliography | 122 |
| 66 | List of Tables | 136 |
| 67 | List of Figures | 136 |

68 1 Introduction

69 Major sustainability objectives could be achieved by global approaches to mitigating
 70 climate change and poverty involving transfers from high- to lower-income countries.^{1–6}
 71 Especially, global carbon pricing is widely regarded by economists as the benchmark cli-
 72 mate policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon emissions externality. A version
 73 of global carbon pricing as a system based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions
 74 is prominently discussed in environmental economics.^{7–13} It would work as follows: It
 75 implements a cap on carbon emissions to limit global warming below 2°C. The emission
 76 rights are auctioned each year to polluting firms and fund a global basic income, alle-
 77 viating extreme poverty. The emission rights would be allocated equally among human
 78 adults, yielding redistribution from richer to poorer countries. It would combine long-
 79 term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity.⁷ We call this approach to global car-
 80 bon pricing the “Global Climate Scheme” (GCS).

81 While international negotiations have not yet led to ambitious globally redistributive
 82 policies, some recent prominent attempts are that the International Maritime Organiza-
 83 tion is poised to adopt a global carbon levy on maritime fuel; the African Union **calls**
 84 **for** a global carbon taxation regime, the UN **is setting up** a Framework Convention on
 85 International Tax Cooperation and Brazil is proposing a global wealth tax at the G20.

86 A key factor for implementing global policies has remained largely unaddressed: the

87 support of citizens. As a first piece of evidence, a global survey on 40,680 respondents
88 from 20 high- and middle-income countries reveals substantial support for global climate
89 policies and, in addition, a global tax on the wealthiest aimed at financing low-income
90 countries. Surprisingly, even in wealthy nations that would bear a significant burden,
91 majorities of citizens express support for such globally redistributive policies. To better
92 understand public support for global policies in high-income countries, the main analysis
93 of this article is conducted with surveys among 8,000 respondents from France, Germany,
94 Spain, the UK, and the U.S.

95 The focus of the Western surveys is to study how respondents react to the key trade-off
96 between the benefits and costs of globally redistributive climate policies. In our survey re-
97 spondents are made aware of the cost that the GCS entails for their country's people, that
98 is average Westerners would incur a net loss. Our main result is that the Global Climate
99 Scheme is supported by three quarters of Europeans and more than half of Americans.

100 Furthermore, we test the robustness of this conclusion by a wide variety of methods.
101 First, we control for social desirability bias using a list experiment. We find no evidence
102 that people exaggerate their support in the direct question. Second, to assess whether
103 the support would diminish in a context that approaches real stakes, we ask respondents
104 whether they are willing to sign a petition in favor of the GCS, after informing them that
105 the question results will be communicated to their head of state's office. The support is
106 sustained in an environment that approaches real stakes. Third, we carry out conjoint
107 analyses to neutralize experimenter demand and investigate the priority given to global
108 policies compared to other types of policies. Conjoint analyses reveal that a political plat-
109 form is more likely to be preferred if it contains the GCS or a global tax on millionaires,
110 and that global policies rank high in the prioritization of policies. Our randomized exper-
111 iments also show that a candidate would not lose vote intentions by endorsing the GCS,
112 and might even gain up to 11 points in France. Fourth, an analysis of open-ended fields
113 indicates that the appeal of the GCS comes from its international nature and its impacts
114 on climate, more than on global poverty. To put our main finding in context, we also test
115 other global policies and universalistic attitudes. Support is very strong for a global tax
116 on millionaires (69% in the U.S., 84% in Europe), and the median respondent prefers to
117 allocate 30% of the revenues of such a tax to low-income countries. Majorities are willing
118 to increase foreign aid, but only if some conditions are respected, such as making sure
119 the aid is well spent and other high-income countries also increase their contribution.
120 Questions on universalistic values, including a donation experiment, confirm the congru-

ence of underlying values with the support for specific policies. Our diverse approaches also help understand what drives the support. For instance, the evidence indicates that one key reason why increasing foreign aid is not as popular as global policies lies in its unilateral nature.

Overall, our results point out to strong and genuine support for global climate and redistributive policies, as our experiments confirm the stated support found in direct questions. They contribute to a body of literature on attitudes toward climate policy, which confirms that climate policy is preferred at a global level,^{14? -16} where it is more effective and fair. While 3,354 economists supported a national carbon tax financing equal cash transfers in the *Wall Street Journal*, numerous surveys have shown that public support for such policy is mixed.¹⁷⁻²² Meanwhile, the GCS — the global version of this policy — is largely supported, despite higher costs in high-income countries. In the Discussion we offer potential explanations that could reconcile the strong support for global policies with their lack of prominence in the public debate.

Literature International surveys have shown widespread support for costly climate action.^{18;23} For instance, representative surveys in 125 countries covering 96% of the world's greenhouse gas emissions show that 69% of the global population express willingness to contribute 1% of their income to fight global warming.²⁴ International surveys have also uncovered near consensus that "present economic differences between rich and poor countries are too large" (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree) in each of 29 countries.²⁵

Yet, few prior attitudinal surveys have examined global redistributive policies. A notable exception tests the support for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples in five countries, representative along gender and age.²⁶ For a given variant, the sample size is about 167 respondents per country. They find over 80% support for any variant in India, between 50% and 65% in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43% to 59% in the U.S., depending on the variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding an equal cash transfer for each human is close to 50% in high-income countries.

Further evidence of the popularity of global redistribution is provided by the finding that 66% of Americans support providing "financial aid and technical support to developing countries that agree to limit their greenhouse gas emissions";²⁷ and 90% of Germans want some degree of global redistribution.²⁸ Besides, in surveys conducted in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S., support ranges from 55% to 74% for "a global democracy including both a global government and a global parliament, directly elected by the

¹⁵⁴ world population, to recommend and implement policies on global issues”, and similar
¹⁵⁵ support is found in surveys over 17 countries.^{29,30}

¹⁵⁶ Appendix A contains a broader literature review including further attitudinal sur-
¹⁵⁷ veys on global policies (A.1.1); prior work on attitudes toward climate burden sharing
¹⁵⁸ (Appendix A.1.2), attitudes toward foreign aid (Appendix A.1.3), global carbon pricing
¹⁵⁹ (Appendix A.2.1), global redistribution (Appendix A.2.3), basic income (Appendix A.2.4),
¹⁶⁰ and global democracy (Appendix A.2.5).

¹⁶¹ 2 Results


¹⁶² 2.1 Data

¹⁶³ We use unanalysed questions from a global survey conducted in 2021 that involved
¹⁶⁴ 40,680 respondents from 20 countries, representing approximately 72% of global CO₂
¹⁶⁵ emissions. This survey (henceforth: global survey) serves as the basis for measuring
¹⁶⁶ stated support for various global policies worldwide. Detailed information about the
¹⁶⁷ data collection process, sample representativeness, and analysis of questions on national
¹⁶⁸ policies can be found in the companion paper.¹⁸

¹⁶⁹ To delve deeper into the sincerity and rationales behind support for the GCS and at-
¹⁷⁰ titudes towards global policies, global redistribution, and universalistic values, we con-
¹⁷¹ ducted further surveys in 2023 (henceforth: Western surveys). These surveys are based
¹⁷² on a sample of 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, the UK, and the U.S. The
¹⁷³ European survey (*Eu*) comprises 3,000 respondents, while the U.S. sample was collected
¹⁷⁴ in two separate waves: *US1* with 3,000 respondents and *US2* with 2,000 respondents. The
¹⁷⁵ survey questions in both the European and U.S. surveys are almost identical (see Fig-
¹⁷⁶ ure 1), except for an additional question in *US2* that uses results from *US1* to assess the
¹⁷⁷ bandwagon effect and variations in policy designs in some questions.

¹⁷⁸ The Western surveys ensured broad representativeness along key dimensions: gender,
¹⁷⁹ income, age, highest diploma, and degree of urbanization. The *Eu* survey is also repre-
¹⁸⁰ sentative of its four countries in terms of population size, while the *US1* and *US2* surveys
¹⁸¹ are representative in terms of region and ethnicity. Tables S9-S10 detail how our samples
¹⁸² match population frequencies. More detail on data collection is given in Section Methods.
¹⁸³ The questionnaires used in the surveys are provided in Appendices C and D.

Figure 1: Structure of Western survey, cf. also Figure S48 for the treatment branches.




¹⁸⁴ 2.2 Global support

¹⁸⁵ We find strong support for climate policies enacted at the global level when analysing
¹⁸⁶ the global survey (Figure 2). When asked “At which level(s) do you think public policies
¹⁸⁷ to tackle climate change need to be put in place?”, 70% (in the U.S.) to 94% (in Japan)
¹⁸⁸ choose the global level. The next most popular choice is the federal or continental level,
¹⁸⁹ favored by 52% of Americans and less than half of European respondents. Local policies
¹⁹⁰ receive the least support. This preference for climate policies implemented at the global
¹⁹¹ scale is in line with earlier contributions ^{15;31;16} and consistent with individuals’ concerns
¹⁹² for the fairness and effectiveness of such policies, which have been identified as two of
¹⁹³ the three key determinants of support, besides self-interest. ^{32;17;18} It could also stem from
¹⁹⁴ conditional cooperation, ³³ even if previous studies suggest that the support for climate
¹⁹⁵ policies does not depend on climate action abroad ^{34;35}.

¹⁹⁶ Among the four global climate policies examined, three policies garner high support
¹⁹⁷ across all countries (Figure 2). These policies include a global democratic assembly on
¹⁹⁸ climate change, a global tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries contingent

Figure 2: Relative Support for global climate policies.



Note 1: The numbers represent *relative support*, i.e. the share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* among non-*indifferent* answers (in percent, $n = 40,680$). Shares of indifferent answers range from 11% to 48%, with quartiles 20%, 27%, and 33%. The color blue denotes a relative majority. See Figure S11 for the absolute support. (Questions A-I).

Note 2: *In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

199 on their climate action, and a global carbon budget of +2°C divided among countries
 200 based on tradable shares (or “global quota”), with the allocation of country shares un-
 201 specified (see wording in Appendix C). The three policies garner a majority of absolute
 202 support (i.e., “somewhat” or “strong” support) in all countries (except in the U.S. for the
 203 global assembly, 48% absolute support). In high-income countries, the global quota pol-
 204 icy obtains 64% absolute support and 84% relative support (i.e., excluding “indifferent”
 205 answers).

206 Following the support for the global quota, respondents are asked about their pref-
 207 erences for dividing the carbon budget among countries, as depicted in the third block

208 of Figure 2. Consistent with the existing literature (see Appendix A.1.2), an equal per
209 capita allocation of emission rights emerges as the preferred burden-sharing principle,
210 garnering absolute majority support in all countries and never below 84% relative sup-
211 port. Taking into account historical responsibilities or vulnerability to climate damages is
212 also popular, albeit with less consensus, while grandfathering (i.e., allocation of emission
213 shares in proportion to current emissions) receives the least support in all countries.

214 A global carbon tax that funds a global basic income should produce the same dis-
215 tributional outcomes as a global tradable quota with equal per capita emission rights (to
216 the extent that the carbon price is the same and provided that each country returns the
217 revenues from emissions trading equally to its citizens). The support for the global car-
218 bon tax is also tested and its redistributive effects – the average increase in expenditures
219 along with the amount of the basic income – are specified to the respondents explicitly
220 (see box below and Appendix D, p.88). The support for the carbon tax is lower than for
221 the quota, particularly in high-income countries, and there is no relative majority for the
222 tax in Anglo-Saxon countries (consistently with the levels of support found in the only
223 previous study that tested a global carbon tax²⁶). Two possible reasons for this lower
224 support are that distributive effects are specified explicitly in the case of the tax, and that
225 people may prefer a quota, perhaps because they find it more effective than a tax to re-
226 duce emissions. The two reasons are consistent with the intermediate level of support for
227 the GCS in the Western survey, which is based on a global quota but where the question
228 specifies explicitly the distributive effects.

229 2.3 Stated support for the Global Climate Scheme

230 The Western surveys (*US1, US2, Eu*) include a comprehensive exploration of citizens'
231 attitudes towards the GCS. We present to respondents a detailed description of the GCS
232 and explain its distributive effects, including specific amounts at stake (as specified in
233 the box below). Furthermore, we assess respondents' understanding of the GCS with
234 incentivized questions to test their comprehension of the expected financial outcome for
235 typical individuals in high-income countries (loss) and the poorest individuals globally
236 (gain), followed by the provision of correct answers (Figures S12-S13).

237 For comparison, the same approach is applied to a National Redistribution scheme
238 (NR) targeting top incomes with the aim of financing cash transfers to all adults, cali-
239 brated to offset the monetary loss of the GCS for the median emitter in their country. We
240 evaluate respondents' understanding that the richest would lose and the typical fellow

²⁴¹ citizens would gain from that policy. Subsequently, we summarize both schemes to en-
²⁴² hance respondents' recall. Additionally, we present a final incentivized comprehension
²⁴³ question and provide the expected answer that the combined GCS and NR would result
²⁴⁴ in no net gain or loss for a typical fellow citizen. Finally, respondents are directly asked
²⁴⁵ to express their support for the GCS and NR using a simple Yes/No question.

The Global Climate Scheme The GCS consists of global emissions trading with emission rights being auctioned each year to polluting firms, and of a global basic income, funded by the auction revenues. Using the price and emissions trajectories from the report by Stern & Stiglitz,³⁶ and in particular a carbon price of \$90/tCO₂ in 2030, we estimate that the basic income would amount to \$30 per month for every human adult (see details in Appendix E). We describe the GCS to the respondents as a "climate club" and we specify its redistributive effects: The 700 million people with less than \$2/day [in Purchasing Power Parity] would be lifted out of extreme poverty, and fossil fuel price increases would cost the typical person in their country a specified amount (see Appendix D for details). The monthly median net cost is \$85 in the U.S., €10 in France, €25 in Germany, €5 in Spain, £20 in the UK.

²⁴⁶

²⁴⁷ Our main result is that stated support for the GCS is 54% in the U.S. and 76% in Eu-
²⁴⁸ rope, while the support for NR is very similar: 56% and 73% respectively (Figures 3, S1).
²⁴⁹ Appendix F examines the sociodemographic determinants of support for the GCS as well
²⁵⁰ as the beliefs correlated with the support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic
²⁵¹ income. The strongest correlates are political leaning, trust in the government and per-
²⁵² ceptions that climate policies are effective at reducing emissions or in one's self-interest.

²⁵³ Finding majority support for the GCS motivates the subsequent analysis of robustness
²⁵⁴ and sincerity, novel to attitudinal surveys on instrument choice for environmental policy.

²⁵⁵ 2.4 Robustness and sincerity of support for the GCS

²⁵⁶ We use several methods to assess the sincerity of the support for the GCS: a list ex-
²⁵⁷ periment, a real-stake petition, conjoint analyses, and the prioritization of policies. All
²⁵⁸ methods suggest that the support is either completely sincere, or the share of insincere
²⁵⁹ answers is limited.

260 **2.4.1 List experiment**

261 By asking *how many* policies within a list respondents support and varying the list
262 among respondents, a list experiment allows identifying the tacit support for a policy of
263 interest. For example, say a first subsample faces the list of policies A, B, and C, while a
264 second subsamples faces the list A, B, C, and GCS. We do not need to know which policies
265 each respondent support to estimate the average (tacit) support for the GCS, we simply
266 need to compute the difference in the average number of supported policies between
267 the two random subsamples.³⁷ In our case, as shown in Table 1, the tacit support for the
268 GCS measured through the list experiment is not significantly lower than the direct stated
269 support. Hence, we do not find a social desirability bias in our study.

270 **2.4.2 Petition**

271 We ask respondents whether they are willing to sign a petition in support of either
272 the GCS or NR policy. We inform them that the petition results will be sent to the head
273 of state's office, highlighting the proportion of fellow citizens endorsing the respective
274 scheme. Even when framed as a petition that might have real stakes, both policies con-
275 tinue to receive majority support. In the U.S., we find no significant difference between
276 the support in the petitions and the simple questions (GCS: $-.02$, $t(3,044)=1.0$, $p=.30$, 95%
277 CI=[-.05, .02]; NR: $-.01$, $t(2,952)=.3$, $p=.76$, 95% CI=[-.04, .03]). In Europe, the petition
278 leads to a comparable lower support for both the GCS (-7 p.p., $t(3,018)=4.4$, $p=10^{-5}$,
279 95% CI=[-.10, -.04]) and NR (-4 p.p., $t(2,953)=2.6$, $p=.008$, 95% CI=[-.08, -.01]). While
280 some European respondents are unwilling to sign a petition for policies they are expected
281 to support, this phenomenon is not specific to the GCS, and the overall willingness to sign
282 a petition remains strong, with 69% expressing support for the GCS and 67% for NR.

283 **2.4.3 Conjoint analyses**

284 In order to assess the public support for the GCS in conjunction with other policies, we
285 conduct a series of conjoint analyses. We ask respondents to make five choices between
286 pairs of political platforms. Each choice is meant at testing a different hypothesis on the
287 support for the GCS in relation to other policies or voting.

288 The first conjoint analysis suggests that the GCS is supported independently of being
289 complemented by the National Redistribution Scheme and a national climate policy (C).
290 The second analysis indicates majority support for the GCS and for C, which are seen as

291 neither complement nor substitute (see [Methods](#)). A minor share of respondents like a
292 national climate policy and dislike a global one, but as many people prefer a global rather
293 than a national policy; and there is no evidence that implementing NR would increase the
294 support for the GCS.

295 In the third analysis, we present two random branches of the sample with hypothetical
296 progressive and conservative platforms that differ only by the presence (or not) of the
297 GCS in the progressive platform. Table 2 shows that a progressive candidate would not
298 significantly lose voting share by endorsing the GCS in any country, and may even gain
299 11 p.p. ($p = .005$) in voting intention in France.

300 Our last two analyses make respondents choose between two random platforms. In
301 Europe, respondents are prompted to imagine that a left or center-left coalition will win
302 the next election and asked what platform they would prefer that coalition to have cam-
303 paigned on. In the U.S., the question is framed as a hypothetical duel in a Democratic
304 primary, and asked only to non-Republicans ($n = 2,218$), i.e. the respondents who declare
305 as political affiliation *Democrat*, *Independent*, *Non-Affiliated* or *Other*.

306 In the fourth analysis, a policy (or an absence of policy) is randomly drawn for each
307 platform in each of five categories: *economic issues*, *societal issues*, *climate policy*, *tax system*,
308 *foreign policy* (Figure S2, Table S3). In the UK, Germany, and France, a platform is about 9
309 to 13 p.p. more likely to be preferred if it includes the GCS rather than no foreign policy.
310 This effect is between 1 and 4 p.p. and no longer significant in the U.S. (among non-
311 Republicans) and in Spain. Moreover, a platform that includes a global tax on millionaires
312 rather than no foreign policy is 5 to 13 p.p. more likely to be preferred in all countries
313 (the effect is significant and at least 9 p.p. in all countries but Spain). Similarly, a global
314 democratic assembly on climate change has a significant effect of 8 to 12 p.p. in the U.S.
315 (among non-Republicans), Germany, and France. These effects are large, and not far from
316 the effects of the policies most influential on the platforms, which range between 15 and
317 18 p.p. in most countries (27 p.p. in Spain), and all relate to improved public services (in
318 particular healthcare, housing, and education).

319 The fifth analysis draws random platforms similarly, except that candidate A's plat-
320 form always contains the GCS while B's includes no foreign policy. In this case, A is
321 chosen by 60% of Europeans and 58% of non-Republican Americans (Figure S3).

322 Overall, taking the U.S. as an example, our conjoint analyses indicate that a candidate
323 at the Democratic primary would have more chances to obtain the nomination by en-
324 dorsing the GCS, and this endorsement would not penalize her or him at the presidential

³²⁵ election. This result relates to the finding that 12% of Germans shift their voting intention
³²⁶ from SPD and CDU/CSU to the Greens and the Left when they are told that the latter
³²⁷ parties support global democracy.²⁹

³²⁸ **2.4.4 Prioritization**

³²⁹ Towards the end of the survey, we ask respondents to allocate 100 points among six
³³⁰ randomly selected policies from the previous conjoint analyses, using sliders. The instruc-
³³¹ tion was to distribute the points based on their level of support, with a higher allocation
³³² indicating greater support for a policy. As a result, the average support across policies is
³³³ 16.67 points. In each country, the GCS ranks in the middle of all policies or above, with
³³⁴ an average number of points from 15.4 in the U.S. to 22.9 in Germany.

³³⁵ Interestingly, in Germany, the most prioritized policy is the global tax on millionaires,
³³⁶ while the GCS is the second most prioritized policy. The global tax on millionaires con-
³³⁷ sistently ranks no lower than fifth position (out of 15 or 17 policies) in every country,
³³⁸ garnering an average of 18.3 points in Spain to 22.9 points in Germany.

³³⁹ **2.4.5 Pros and Cons**

³⁴⁰ We survey respondents to gather their perspectives on the pros and cons of the GCS,
³⁴¹ randomly utilizing an open-ended or a closed question. In the closed question format,
³⁴² respondents tend to consider every argument as important in determining their support
³⁴³ or opposition to the GCS (see Figure S17).

³⁴⁴ The open-ended question provides more insights into what people associate with the
³⁴⁵ GCS when prompted to think about it. Analyzing keywords in the responses (automati-
³⁴⁶ cally translated into English), the most frequently mentioned topics are the international
³⁴⁷ aspect and the environment, each appearing in approximately one-quarter of the answers
³⁴⁸ (see Figure S19). This is followed by discussions on the effects of the GCS on poverty and
³⁴⁹ prices, each mentioned by about one-tenth of the respondents. We also manually clas-
³⁵⁰ sified each answer into different categories (see Figure S18). This exercise confirms the
³⁵¹ findings from the automatic search: the environmental benefit of the GCS is the most
³⁵² commonly discussed topic, while obstacles to implementation or agreement on the pro-
³⁵³ posal are relatively infrequently mentioned.

³⁵⁴ In the US2 survey, we divided the sample into four random branches. Two branches
³⁵⁵ were presented the pros and cons questions (either in open or closed format) *before* be-

356 ing asked about their support for the GCS or NR. Another branch received information
357 on the actual level of support for the GCS and NR (estimated in *US1*, see box p. 14),
358 and one control group received none of these treatments. The objective of the “pros and
359 cons treatment” was to mimic a “campaign effect”, which refers to the shift in opinion
360 resulting from media coverage of the proposal.³⁸ To conservatively estimate the effect of
361 a (potentially negative) campaign, we intentionally included more cons (6) than pros (3).
362 Interestingly, the support for the GCS decreased by 11 p.p. ($t(1,996)=-3.5$, $p=5 \cdot 10^{-4}$,
363 95% CI=[-.17, -.05]) after respondents viewed a list of its pros and cons. Notably, the
364 support also decreased by 7 p.p. ($t(1,996)=-2.3$, $p=.02$, 95% CI=[-.13, -.01]) after respon-
365 dents were asked to consider the pros and cons in an open-ended question. Despite some
366 significant effects of pondering the pros and cons, approximately half of the Americans
367 express support for the GCS across all treatment branches (see Table S1). Although sup-
368 port remains significant, these results suggest that the public success of the GCS would
369 be sensitive to the content of the debate about it, and oriented by the discourse adopted
370 by interest groups.

Second-order Beliefs To explain the strong support for the GCS despite its ab-
sence from political platforms and public debate, we hypothesized pluralistic igno-
rance, i.e. that the public and policymakers mistakenly perceive the GCS as unpop-
ular. As a result, individuals might conceal their support for such globally redis-
tributive policy, believing that advocating for it would be futile.

In the case of Americans, their beliefs about the level of support for the GCS are
relatively accurate (Figure S4). The mean perceived support is 52% (with quartiles
of 36%, 52%, and 68%), which closely aligns with the actual support of 54%. Euro-
peans, on the other hand, underestimate the support by 17 p.p. Nonetheless, 65% of
them correctly estimate that the GCS garners majority support, and the mean per-
ceived support is 59% (and quartiles of 43%, 61%, and 74%), compared to the actual
support of 76%. Second-order beliefs are equally accurate for NR in the U.S. and
similarly underestimated in Europe. Finally, consistent with Americans accurately
perceiving the levels of support for the GCS or NR, providing information on the
actual level had no significant effect on their support in the *US2* survey (effect=.025,
 $t(1,998)=1.1$, $p=.26$, 95% CI=[-.02, .07]).

³⁷² **2.5 Stated support for global redistribution**

³⁷³ We also assess support for a range of other international policies (Figure 3) as well as
³⁷⁴ unilateral foreign aid.

³⁷⁵ **2.5.1 International policies**

³⁷⁶ Most policies garner relative majority support in each country, with two exceptions:
³⁷⁷ the “cancellation of low-income countries’ public debt” and “a maximum wealth limit”
³⁷⁸ for each individual (Figure 3). The latter policy garners relative majority support in Eu-
³⁷⁹ rope but not in the U.S., despite the cap being set at \$10 billion in the U.S. compared
³⁸⁰ to €/£100 million in Europe. Notably, climate-related policies enjoy significant popu-
³⁸¹ larity, with “high-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries”
³⁸² receiving absolute majority support across all surveyed countries. Additionally, relative
³⁸³ support for loss and damages compensation, as approved in principle at the international
³⁸⁴ climate negotiations in 2022 (“COP27”), ranges from 55% (U.S.) to 81% (Spain).

³⁸⁵ Consistent with the results of the global survey, a “tax on millionaires of all countries
³⁸⁶ to finance low-income countries” garners relative support of over 69% in each country,
³⁸⁷ only 5 p.p. lower than a national millionaires tax overall. In random subsamples, we
³⁸⁸ inquire about respondents’ preferences regarding the redistribution of revenues from a
³⁸⁹ global tax on individual wealth exceeding \$5 million, after providing information on the
³⁹⁰ revenue raised by such a tax in their country compared to low-income countries. We
³⁹¹ ask certain respondents ($n = 1,283$) what percentage of the global tax revenues should be
³⁹² pooled to finance low-income countries. In each country, at least 88% of respondents in-
³⁹³ dicate a positive amount, with an average of one-third (Figure S5). To other respondents
³⁹⁴ ($n = 1,233$), we inquire whether they would prefer each country to retain all the revenues
³⁹⁵ it collects or that half of the revenues be pooled to finance low-income countries. Ap-
³⁹⁶ proximately half of the respondents opt to allocate half of the tax revenues to low-income
³⁹⁷ countries, consistently with the other variant of the question.

³⁹⁸ **2.5.2 Foreign aid**

³⁹⁹ In addition, we provide respondents with information about the actual amount “spent
⁴⁰⁰ on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries” relative to their country’s gov-
⁴⁰¹ ernment spending and GDP. Less than 16% of respondents state that their country’s for-
⁴⁰² eign aid should be reduced, while 62% express support for increasing it, including 17%

Figure 3: Relative support for various global policies. (percentage of *somewhat* or *strong support*, after excluding *indifferent* answers; *except for GCS: percentage of Yes in a Yes/No question). Shares of indifferent answers range from 10% to 40%, with quartiles 19%, 25%, and 32%. (p. 88, Questions 20, 44 and 45; See Figure S33 for the absolute support.)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Global climate scheme (GCS)* | 54 | 76 | 80 | 71 | 81 | 74 |
| Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages | 55 | 71 | 72 | 70 | 79 | 70 |
| High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries | 68 | 82 | 82 | 82 | 85 | 81 |
| High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change | 60 | 76 | 77 | 79 | 79 | 71 |
| Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt | 46 | 53 | 53 | 43 | 62 | 61 |
| Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population | 58 | 71 | 69 | 69 | 78 | 72 |
| Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries | 62 | 73 | 58 | 73 | 80 | 83 |
| A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage | 63 | 80 | 80 | 78 | 81 | 83 |
| Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets | 62 | 87 | 90 | 86 | 91 | 87 |
| A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human | 46 | 62 | 58 | 62 | 65 | 67 |
| National tax on millionaires funding public services | 73 | 85 | 81 | 87 | 89 | 88 |
| Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries | 69 | 84 | 84 | 84 | 87 | 83 |

403 who support an unconditional increase (Figure S6). Among the 45% who think aid should
 404 be increased under certain conditions, we subsequently ask them to specify the conditions
 405 they deem necessary (Figure S7). The three most commonly selected conditions are that:
 406 “we can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted” (73% chose this
 407 condition), “recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights” (67%),
 408 and “other high-income countries also increase their foreign aid” (48%). On the other
 409 hand, respondents who do not wish to increase their country’s foreign aid primarily jus-
 410 tify their view by prioritizing the well-being of their fellow citizens or by perceiving each
 411 country as responsible for its own fate (Figure S8). In response to an open-ended ques-

⁴¹² tion regarding measures high-income countries should take to fight extreme poverty, a
⁴¹³ large majority of Americans expressed that more help is needed (Figure S46). The most
⁴¹⁴ commonly suggested form of aid is financial support, closely followed by investments in
⁴¹⁵ education.

⁴¹⁶ We also inquire about the perceived amount of foreign aid. Consistent with prior re-
⁴¹⁷ search (see Appendix A.1.3), most people overestimate the actual amount of foreign aid
⁴¹⁸ (Figure S25). We then elicit respondents' preferred amount of foreign aid, after randomly
⁴¹⁹ presenting them with either the actual amount or no information. Most of the respon-
⁴²⁰ dents who learn the actual amount choose a bracket at least as high as the actual one, and
⁴²¹ most of those without the information choose a bracket at least as high as the perceived
⁴²² one (Figures S28–S27). Finally, we ask a last question to the respondents who received
⁴²³ the information. To those who prefer an increase of foreign aid, we ask how they would
⁴²⁴ finance it: by far, the preferred source of funding is higher taxes on the wealthiest (Figure
⁴²⁵ S30). To those who prefer a reduction, we ask how they would use the funds becoming
⁴²⁶ available: In every country, more people choose higher spending on education or health-
⁴²⁷ care rather than lower taxes (Figure S31).

⁴²⁸ 2.6 Universalistic values

⁴²⁹ We ask broad questions on people's values to assess whether their core values are
⁴³⁰ consistent with support for specific policies. When we ask respondents which group they
⁴³¹ defend when they vote, 20% choose "sentient beings (humans and animals)," 22% choose
⁴³² "humans," 33% select their "fellow citizens" (or "Europeans"), 15% choose "My family
⁴³³ and myself," and the remaining 10% choose another group (mainly "My State or region"
⁴³⁴ or "People sharing my culture or religion"). Notably, a majority of left-wing voters choose
⁴³⁵ *humans or sentient beings*.

⁴³⁶ Answers to this and other broad value questions are consistent with half of Ameri-
⁴³⁷ cans and three quarters of Europeans supporting global policies like the GCS: people are
⁴³⁸ almost as much willing to make a donation to poor Africans than to poor fellow citizens
⁴³⁹ in a lottery experiment, most respondents find that global issues are among the biggest
⁴⁴⁰ problems, and most respondents wish that their diplomats take into account global justice
⁴⁴¹ (see [Methods](#) for details).

442 **3 Discussion**

443 In our analysis, we have uncovered strong and genuine support for global redistributive
444 policies.

445 We conclude by providing hypotheses to reconcile the scarcity of global policies in the
446 public debate with our findings that they would be widely accepted. The first two are
447 variations of pluralistic ignorance, and the last three represent complementary explana-
448 tions.

449 First, there may be pluralistic ignorance *among policymakers* regarding universalistic
450 values, support for the GCS, or the electoral advantage of endorsing it. Second, people or
451 policymakers may believe that globally redistributive policies are politically infeasible in
452 some key (potentially foreign) countries like the U.S. Third, political discourse centrally
453 happens at the national level, shaped by national media and institutions such as voting.
454 National framing by political voices may create biases and suppress universalistic values.
455 Fourth, many individuals, including policymakers, may be unaware of specific propos-
456 als or may perceive global redistributive policies as ill-defined or technically infeasible,
457 ultimately dismissing them as unrealistic. Fifth, just as policy is disproportionately influ-
458 enced by the economic elites,^{39;40} public debate may be shaped by the wealthiest, who
459 have vested interests in preventing global redistribution.

460 Confirmation of any of these hypotheses would lead to a common conclusion: there
461 exists substantial public support for global policies addressing climate change and global
462 inequality, even in high-income countries. Uncovering evidence to support the above
463 hypotheses could shift the perceived boundaries of political realism on this issue.

464 **Methods**

465 **Pre-registration.** The project is approved by Economics & Business Ethics Committee (EBEC) at
466 the University of Amsterdam (EB-1113) and was preregistered in the Open Science Foundation
467 registry (osf.io/fy6gd). The study did not deviate from the registration: the questionnaires and
468 the hypotheses tests used are the same as the ones *given ex ante*. Informed consent was obtained
469 from all respondents, randomized treatment branches were unknown to the respondents, and our
470 research complies with all relevant ethical regulations. Respondents were compensated with gift
471 certificates for a value of €1 per interview. No statistical methods were used to pre-determine
472 sample sizes but our sample sizes match those reported in similar publications.^{18;14-17}

473 **Data collection.** The paper utilizes two sets of surveys: the *global* survey and the *m* surveys. The
474 *main* surveys consist of two U.S. surveys, *US1* and *US2*, and one European survey, *Eu*. The *global*
475 survey was conducted from March 2021 to March 2022 on 40,680 respondents from 20 countries
476 (with 1,465 to 2,488 respondents per country). *US1* collected responses from 3,000 respondents be-
477 tween January and March 2023, while *US2* gathered data from 2,000 respondents between March
478 and April 2023. *Eu* included 3,000 respondents and was conducted from February to March 2023.
479 We used the survey companies *Dynata* and *Respondi*. To ensure representative samples, we em-
480 ployed stratified quotas based on gender, age (5 brackets), income (4), region (4), education level
481 (3), and ethnicity (3) for the U.S. We also incorporated survey weights throughout the analysis to
482 account for any remaining imbalances. These weights were constructed using the quota variables
483 as well as the degree of urbanity, and trimmed between 0.25 and 4. Stratified quotas followed by
484 reweighting is the usual method to reduce selection bias from opt-in online panels, when better
485 sampling methods (such as compulsory participation of random dwellings) are unavailable.⁴¹ By
486 applying weights, the results are fully representative of the respective countries along the above
487 mentioned dimensions. Results at the European level apply different weights which ensure rep-
488 resentativeness of the combined four European countries. Appendix G shows how our samples
489 compare to actual population frequencies. Our samples match the actual frequencies well, except
490 for some imbalances in specific quota demographics —such as gender in the UK (43% of women
491 instead of 50%) or urbanity in Spain (15% rural instead of 26%)— that are corrected through our
492 survey weights, and in the U.S. vote (which does not affect our results, as shown by the results
493 reweighted by vote in the *Support for the GCS* section below). Appendix I shows that the treat-
494 ment branches are balanced. Appendix J runs placebo tests of the effects of each treatment on
495 unrelated outcomes. We do not find effects of earlier treatments on unrelated outcomes arriving
496 later in the survey. Appendix K shows that our results are unchanged when including inattentive
497 respondents.

498 **Data quality.** The median duration is 28 minutes for the *global* survey, 14 min for *US1*, 11 min
499 for *US2*, and 20 min for *Eu*. To ensure the best possible data quality, we exclude respondents who
500 fail an attention test or rush through the survey (i.e., answer in less than 11.5 minutes in the *global*
501 survey, 4 minutes in *US1* or *US2*, 6 minutes in *Eu*). At the end of the survey, we ask whether
502 respondents thought that our survey was politically biased and offer to provide some feedback.
503 67% of the respondents found the survey unbiased. 25% found it left-wing biased, and 8% found
504 it right-wing biased.

505 **Questionnaires and raw results.** The raw results are reported in Appendix B while the surveys'
506 structures and questionnaires are given in Appendices C and D. Details on the *global* survey can be
507 found in the Appendix of the companion paper.¹⁸ Country-specific raw results are also available

508 as supplementary material files: [US](#), [EU](#), [FR](#), [DE](#), [ES](#), [UK](#).

509 **Incentives.** To encourage accurate and truthful responses, several questions of the Western sur-
510 veys use incentives. For each of the three comprehension questions that follow the policy descrip-
511 tions, we randomly select and reward three respondents who provide correct answers with a \$50
512 gift certificate. Similarly, for questions involving estimating support shares for the GCS and NR,
513 three respondents with the closest guesses to the actual values receive a \$50 gift certificate. In the
514 donation lottery question, we randomly select one respondent and split the \$100 prize between
515 the NGO GiveDirectly and the winner according to the winner's choice. In total, our incentives
516 scheme distributes gift certificates (and donations) for a value of \$850. Finally, respondents have
517 an incentive to answer truthfully to the petition question, as they are aware that the results for
518 that question (the share of respondents supporting the policy) will be transmitted to their head of
519 state's office.

520 **Absolute vs. relative support.** In most questions, support or opposition for a policy is asked
521 using a 5-Likert scale, with compulsory response and *Indifferent* as the middle option. We call
522 *absolute support* the share of *Somewhat* or *Strong support*. We generally favor the notion of *relative*
523 *support*, which reports the share of support after excluding *Indifferent* answers. Indeed, the *relative*
524 *support* is better suited to assess whether there are more people in favor vs. against a policy.

525 **Support for the GCS.** The 95% confidence intervals are [52.4%, 55.9%] in the U.S. and [74.2%, 77.2%]
526 in Europe. The average support is computed with survey weights, employing weights based on
527 quota variables, which exclude vote. Another method to reweigh the raw results involves running
528 a regression of the support for the GCS on sociodemographic characteristics (including vote) and
529 multiplying each coefficient by the population frequencies. This alternative approach yields sim-
530 ilar figures: 76% in Europe and 52% or 53% in the U.S. (depending on whether individuals who
531 did not disclose their vote are classified as non-voters or excluded). Notably, the average support
532 among voters is 54% in the U.S., with 74% support among Biden voters vs. 26% among Trump
533 voters (see Figure S47).

534 Though the level of support for the GCS is significantly lower in swing States (at 51%) that
535 are key to win U.S. elections, the electoral effect of endorsing the GCS remains non-significantly
536 different from zero (at +1.2 p.p.) in these States. Note that we define swing states as the 8 states
537 with less than 5 p.p. margin of victory in the 2020 election (MI, NV, PA, WI, AZ, GA, NC, FL). The
538 results are unchanged if we use the 3 p.p. threshold (that excludes FL) instead.

539 **List experiment.** List experiments have been used to reveal social desirability bias, silencing ei-
540 ther racism in the Southern U.S.⁴² or opposition to the invasion of Ukraine in Russia.⁴³ In our case,

541 the question reads: "Beware, this question is quite unusual. Among the policies below, **how many**
542 do you support?" The list of policies randomly varies across respondents, and includes a subset of
543 GCS, NR (National Redistribution scheme), C ("Coal exit" in the U.S., "Thermal insulation plan"
544 in Europe) and O ("Marriage only for opposite-sex couples in the U.S.", "Death penalty for major
545 crimes" in Europe). There are four branches: GCS/NR/C/O; GCS/C/O; NR/C/O; C/O. To esti-
546 mate the tacit average support for the GCS and NR, we regress the number of supported policies
547 on indicators that the list includes GCS and NR. We utilize the difference-in-means estimator, and
548 confidence intervals are computed using Monte Carlo simulation with the R package *list*.³⁷

549 **Petition.** The respondent is randomly assigned a branch where the petition relates to the GCS or
550 the National Redistribution scheme. The question reads: "Would you be willing to sign a petition
551 for the [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme?

552 As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President's office], inform-
553 ing him what share of [American] people are willing to endorse the [Global climate / National
554 redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign, only your answer here is required and
555 remains anonymous.)".

556 Paired weighted *t*-tests are conducted to test the equality in support for a policy among re-
557 spondents who were questioned about the policy in the petition.

558 **Conjoint analyses.** The first conjoint analysis suggests that the GCS is supported independently
559 of being complemented by the National Redistribution Scheme and a national climate policy
560 ("Coal exit" in the U.S., "Thermal insulation plan" in Europe, denoted C). Indeed, 54% of U.S.
561 respondents and 74% of European ones prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to the com-
562 bination of C and NR alone, indicating similar support for the GCS conditional on NR and C than
563 for the GCS alone (Figure S15).

564 In the second conjoint analysis, results from the first branch show that the support for the GCS
565 conditional on NR, at 55% in the U.S. ($n = 757$) and 77% in Europe ($n = 746$), is not significantly
566 different from the support for the GCS alone. This suggests that rejection of the GCS is not driven
567 by the cost of the policy on oneself. The second branch shows that the support for C conditional
568 on NR is somewhat higher, at 62% in the U.S. ($n = 751$) and 84% in Europe ($n = 747$). However,
569 the third one shows no significant preference for C compared to GCS (both conditional on NR),
570 neither in Europe, where GCS is preferred by 52% ($n = 741$) nor in the U.S., where C is preferred
571 by 53% ($n = 721$). The fourth branch shows that 55% in the U.S. ($n = 771$) and 77% in Europe ($n =$
572 766) prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to NR alone.

573 The effects reported in the fourth analysis are the Average Marginal Component Effects.⁴⁴ The
574 policies studied are progressive policies prominent in the country. Except for the category *foreign*
575 *policy*, which features the GCS 42% of the time, they are drawn uniformly.

576 **Prioritization.** The prioritization allows inferring individual-level preferences for one policy
577 over another, including in their intensity. This somewhat differs from a conjoint analysis, which
578 only allows inferring individual-level preferences for one platform over another or collective-level
579 preferences for one policy over another. Also, by comparing platforms, conjoint analyses may be
580 subject to interaction effects between policies of a platform (which can be seen as complementary,
581 substitute, or antagonistic) while the prioritization frames the policies as independent.

582 This question sheds light on a potential discrepancy between the policy priorities of the public
583 and those enacted by legislators. For instance, while the European Union and California have
584 enacted plans to phase out new combustion-engine cars by 2035, the proposal to “ban the sale of
585 new combustion-engine cars by 2030” emerged as one of the three least prioritized policies in each
586 country, with an average allocation of 7.8 points in France to 11.4 points in the UK.

587 **Open-ended question on the GCS.** Around one in four respondents explicitly cites pros or cons.
588 Few individuals explicitly express support or opposition, and misunderstandings are rare. Only
589 11% of the responses are empty or express a lack of opinion, though one-quarter are unclassifiable
590 due to the rarity, nonsensical nature, or irrelevance of the conveyed idea.

591 **Pros and cons.** In the closed question, the least important aspect was the negative impact on
592 their household, with 60% in Europe ($n=1,505$) and 75% in the U.S. ($n=493$) finding it important.
593 The most important elements differ between Europe and the U.S. In Europe, the key factors are
594 the GCS’s potential to limit climate change and reduce poverty in low-income countries, both
595 deemed important by 85% of respondents. In the U.S., having sufficient information about the
596 scheme ranks highest at 89%, followed by its potential to foster global cooperation at 82%.

597 Surprisingly, the support for National Redistribution also decreased by 7 p.p. following the
598 closed question about the GCS. This suggests that some individuals may lack attention and con-
599 fuse the two policies, or that contemplating the pros and cons alters the mood of some people,
600 moving them away from their initial positive impression.

601 **Universalistic values** When asked what their country’s diplomats should defend in interna-
602 tional climate negotiations, only 11% prefer their country’s “interests, even if it goes against global
603 justice.” In contrast, 30% prefer global justice (with or without consideration of national interests),
604 and the bulk of respondents (38%) prefer their country’s “interests, to the extent it respects global
605 justice.”

606 Furthermore, when we ask respondents to assess the extent to which climate change, global
607 poverty, and inequality in their country are issues, climate change is generally viewed as the most
608 significant problem (with a mean score of 0.59 after recoding answers between -2 and 2). This is
609 followed by global poverty (0.42) and national inequality (0.37).

610 Finally, we conduct a lottery experiment. Respondents were automatically enrolled in a lottery
611 with a \$100 prize and had to choose the proportion of the prize they would keep for themselves
612 versus give to a person living in poverty. The charity donation is directed either to an African
613 individual or a fellow citizen, depending on the respondent's random assignment. In Europe, we
614 observe no significant variation in the willingness to donate based on the recipient's origin. In the
615 U.S., the donations to Africans are 3 p.p. lower, but the slightly lower donations to Africans are
616 entirely driven by Trump voters and non-voters (Table S2).

617 **Global wealth tax estimates.** A 2% tax on net wealth exceeding \$5 million would annually raise
618 \$816 billion, leaving unaffected 99.9% of the world population. More specifically, it would collect
619 €5 billion in Spain, €16 billion in France, £20 billion in the UK, €44 billion in Germany, \$430
620 billion in the U.S., and \$1 billion collectively in all low-income countries (28 countries, home to
621 700 million people). These Figures come from the [WID wealth tax simulator](#).⁴⁵

622 **Design choices.** As global survey results indicated strong support for global redistributive poli-
623 cies worldwide, we conducted our Western surveys to further investigate the surprisingly high
624 support. Among the eight largest high-income countries, we selected the five ones with a rela-
625 tively low level of support for global redistributive policies as observed in the global survey. We
626 also focus on the GCS as its costs are less concentrated on the very rich, compared to other global
627 redistributive policies, so we expected lower (or less genuine) support. By selecting countries that
628 would lose from global redistribution, are less supportive than others, and focusing on less con-
629 sensual policies, we aimed at conservatively assessing the level of support of world citizens for
630 global redistribution.

631 We split the U.S. survey into two waves to test the effect on the support of providing the
632 information on the actual support, and merged the *Eu* survey in one wave to get larger sample
633 sizes and more power in the analyses.

634 To select the policies tested, we spanned three key areas for global redistribution: climate
635 change, inequality, and global governance. We selected policies that are either on the agenda
636 of international negotiations (international transfers for mitigation; adaptation; or loss and dam-
637 ages; cancellation of public debt; reform of voting rights at the UN or IMF; global wealth tax) or
638 advocated by prominent NGOs or scholars ([global asset registry](#); limits on wealth;^{46;47} democratic
639 climate governance;⁴⁸ global minimum wage;⁴⁹ fair trade;⁵⁰ carbon pricing;⁶ [increased foreign](#)
640 [aid](#)).

641 **Data and code availability**

642 All data and code of the *main* surveys as well as figures of the paper are available on [10.5281/zenodo.11202245](https://zenodo.11202245). Data and code for the *g* survey will be made public upon publication.

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649 **Author Contributions**

650 A.F. collected and analysed the data, and drafted the questionnaire and the paper. T.D. and
651 L.M. substantially revised the questionnaire and paper, and contributed to the conception and
652 redaction.

653 **Competing interests**

654 Fabre declares that he also serves as president of Global Redistribution Advocates.

Table 1: Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list. The tacit support for the GCS is estimated by regressing the number of supported policies on the presence of the GCS in the list of policies. The social desirability is estimated as the difference between the tacit and stated support, and it is not significantly different from zero even at a 20% threshold (see [Methods](#)).

| | Number of supported policies | | |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | All | U.S. | Europe |
| List contains: GCS | 0.624*** (0.028) | 0.524*** (0.041) | 0.724*** (0.036) |
| <i>Support for GCS</i> | 0.65 | 0.542 | 0.757 |
| <i>Social desirability bias</i> | -0.025 | -0.019 | -0.034 |
| <i>80% C.I. for the bias</i> | [-0.06; 0.01] | [-0.07; 0.03] | [-0.08; 0.01] |
| Constant | 1.317 | 1.147 | 1.486 |
| Observations | 6,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 |
| R ² | 0.089 | 0.065 | 0.125 |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 2: Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. ([Question 28](#))

| | Prefers the Progressive platform | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | All | United States | France | Germany | UK | Spain |
| GCS in Progressive platform | 0.028** | 0.029 | 0.112*** | 0.015 | 0.008 | -0.015 |
| P-value | 0.039 | 0.132 | 0.005 | 0.639 | 0.839 | 0.696 |
| t | 2.07 | 1.51 | 2.83 | 0.47 | 0.20 | -0.39 |
| 95% C.I. | [.00; .05] | [-.01; .07] | [.03; .19] | [-.05; .08] | [-.07; .08] | [-.09; .06] |
| Constant | 0.623 | 0.604 | 0.55 | 0.7 | 0.551 | 0.775 |
| Observations | 5,202 | 2,619 | 605 | 813 | 661 | 504 |
| R ² | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.013 | 0.0003 | 0.0001 | 0.0003 |

Note: Simple OLS model. The 14% of *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples. GCS has no significant influence on them. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

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Extended data

Table S1: Effects on the support for the GCS of a question on its pros and cons (either in open-ended or closed format) and on information about the actual support, in the U.S. (See Section D in the US2 Questionnaire) (Back to Section 2.4.5)

| | Support | | | |
|--|-----------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|
| | Global Climate Scheme | | National Redistribution | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Control group mean | 0.557 | 0.557 | 0.569 | 0.569 |
| Treatment: Open-ended field on GCS pros & cons | -0.073** (0.035) | -0.071** (0.031) | -0.035 (0.035) | -0.030 (0.032) |
| Treatment: Closed questions on GCS pros & cons | -0.109*** (0.034) | -0.096*** (0.031) | -0.065* (0.034) | -0.062** (0.031) |
| Treatment: Info on actual support for GCS and NR | -0.021 (0.034) | -0.015 (0.031) | 0.048 (0.033) | 0.056* (0.031) |
| Includes controls | | ✓ | | ✓ |
| Observations | 2,000 | 1,995 | 2,000 | 1,995 |
| R ² | 0.007 | 0.170 | 0.007 | 0.154 |

Figure S1: [For Supplementary Material] Support for the GCS, NR and the combination of GCS, NR and C (Yes/No questions).
(p. 88, Questions 20, 22, 35, 36, and 26).




Table S2: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality. (Question 34) [\(Back to Section 2.6\)](#)


| | Donation to poor people (in %) | | | |
|--|--------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | All | US | US | Eu |
| Poor is in own country | 0.590 (0.799) | 2.509** (1.152) | 0.046 (1.691) | -1.349 (1.108) |
| Poor is in own country \times Vote: <i>not</i> Biden | | | 3.954* (2.279) | |
| Mean | 34.034 | 33.658 | 33.658 | 34.41 |
| Observations | 6,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 |
| R ² | 0.0001 | 0.002 | 0.034 | 0.0005 |

Table S3: Average Marginal Component Effects of global policies.


| | Effect | Obs. | t | P-value | 95% C.I. |
|--|---------|------|-------|-------------------|---------------|
| FR; Global Climate Plan | 0.13*** | 1456 | 3.5 | $5 \cdot 10^{-4}$ | [0.06; 0.21] |
| DE; Global Climate Plan | 0.09** | 1958 | 2.8 | 0.005 | [0.03; 0.16] |
| ES; Global Climate Plan | 0.04 | 1086 | 0.82 | 0.411 | [-0.05; 0.12] |
| UK; Global Climate Plan | 0.09* | 1498 | 2.31 | 0.021 | [0.01; 0.16] |
| US; Global Climate Plan | 0.01 | 4436 | 0.61 | 0.539 | [-0.03; 0.06] |
| FR; Global Millionaire Tax | 0.11* | 1456 | 2.49 | 0.013 | [0.02; 0.2] |
| DE; Global Millionaire Tax | 0.09* | 1958 | 2.3 | 0.022 | [0.01; 0.18] |
| ES; Global Millionaire Tax | 0.05 | 1086 | 0.91 | 0.365 | [-0.06; 0.16] |
| UK; Global Millionaire Tax | 0.13** | 1498 | 2.86 | 0.004 | [0.04; 0.22] |
| US; Global Millionaire Tax | 0.09** | 4436 | 3.16 | 0.002 | [0.03; 0.14] |
| FR; Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change | 0.12* | 1456 | 2.52 | 0.012 | [0.03; 0.21] |
| DE; Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change | 0.1* | 1958 | 2.52 | 0.012 | [0.02; 0.18] |
| ES; Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change | -0.01 | 1086 | -0.22 | 0.829 | [-0.12; 0.1] |
| UK; Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change | 0.07 | 1498 | 1.56 | 0.12 | [-0.02; 0.17] |
| US; Global Democratic Assembly on Climate Change | 0.08** | 4436 | 2.93 | 0.003 | [0.03; 0.13] |

Figure S2: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See non-translated versions in Figure S16; Question 29)


(a) U.S. (Asked only to non-Republicans)




(b) France



(c) Germany



(d) Spain



(e) UK




Figure S3: Influence of the GCS on preferred platform:

Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question 30; in the U.S., asked only to non-Republicans.)




Figure S4: Beliefs regarding the support for the GCS and NR. (Questions 21 and 23)




Figure S5: Percent of global wealth tax that should finance low-income countries (*mean*). “Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all countries around the world. (...)

What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of retained in the country’s national budget)?” (Question 37)




Figure S6: Attitudes regarding the evolution of [own country] foreign aid. (Question 46)




Figure S7: Conditions at which foreign aid should be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish an increase of foreign aid at some conditions.] (Question 47)





Figure S8: Reasons why foreign aid should not be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish a decrease or stability of foreign aid.] (Question 48)



817 **A Literature review**

818 **A.1 Attitudes and perceptions**

819 **A.1.1 Population attitudes on global policies**

820 Using representative samples in 125 countries covering 96% of the world's greenhouse
821 gas emissions, Andre et al. (2024) show that 69% of the global population express willingness
822 to contribute 1% of their income to fight global warming.¹ Carattini et al. (2019) test
823 the support for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples in five countries, representative
824 along gender and age. For a given variant, the sample size is about 167 respondents per country.
825 They find over 80% support for any variant in India, between 50% and 65% in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43% to 59% in the U.S., depending on the
826 variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding an equal dividend for each
827 human is close to 50% in high-income countries (e.g., at 44% in the U.S.), consistently
828 with our results from the *Global* survey (see Figure 2). This is another piece of evidence
829 that the support is lower for a tax that would "only" reduce CO₂ emissions than for a
830 quota that would unambiguously achieve the climate target. In a survey over 15 countries,
831 Bloodworth & Callegari (2023) find 73% agreement to tax fossil fuel companies and
832 finance climate action in poorer countries. Using a conjoint analysis in the U.S. and Germany,
833 Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019) find that the support for a carbon tax increases
834 by up to 50% if it applies to all industrialized countries rather than exclusively to one's
835 own country.

837 In surveys conducted in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S., Ghassim (2020)
838 finds support ranging from 55% to 74% for "a global democracy including both a global
839 government and a global parliament, directly elected by the world population, to recom-
840 mend and implement policies on global issues". Ghassim & Pauli (2024) also finds strong
841 support for a democratic world government in surveys over 17 countries. Furthermore,
842 through an experiment, Ghassim (2020) finds that, in countries where the government
843 stems from a coalition, voting shares would shift by 8 (Brazil) to 12 p.p. (Germany) from
844 parties who are said to oppose global democracy to parties that supposedly support it.
845 For instance, when Germans respondents were told that (only) the Greens and the Left
846 support global democracy, these parties gained respectively 9 and 3 p.p. in vote inten-
847 tions, while the SPD and the CDU-CSU each lost 6 p.p. Ghassim (2020) also presents

¹However, Ipsos (2023) find no majority support when the amount is not specified, despite strong agreement for own individual action.

848 survey results showing strong majorities in favor of the direct election of one's country's
849 UN representative in all 18 surveyed countries. Similarly, in each of 10 countries, there
850 are clear majorities in favor of "a new supranational entity [taking] enforceable global de-
851 cisions in order to solve global risks" (Global Challenges Foundation 2018). Remarkably,
852 already in 1946, 54% of Americans agreed (while 24% disagreed) that "the UN should be
853 strengthened to make it a world government with the power to control the armed forces
854 of all nations" (Gallup 1946). Furthermore, in surveys conducted in Argentina, China,
855 India, Russia, Spain, and the U.S., Ghassim et al. (2022) find majority support for UN
856 reforms that would make United Nations' decisions binding, give veto powers to a few
857 other major countries at the Security Council, or complement the highest body of the UN
858 with a chamber of directly elected representatives.

859 Relatedly, ? (?) find that both Americans and French people prefer an international set-
860 tlement of climate justice, even if it encroaches on sovereignty. In a 2013 survey conducted
861 in China, Germany, and the U.S., Schleich et al. (2016) show that over three-quarter of peo-
862 ple think that international climate agreements reached so far are not successful and that
863 future agreements are important. In Finland, Sivonen (2022) finds that that support for a
864 carbon tax is higher if implemented at the global level (54%) rather than at the national
865 level (40%).

866 The results from these specific questions are in line with the answers to more gen-
867 eral questions. In each of 36 countries, ISSP (2010) find near consensus that "for envi-
868 ronmental problems, there should be international agreements that [their country] and
869 other countries should be made to follow" (overall, 82% agree and 4% disagree). In each
870 of 29 countries, ISSP (2019) uncover near consensus that "Present economic differences
871 between rich and poor countries are too large" (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree).
872 Leiserowitz et al. (2021) reveal that 66% of Americans support providing "financial aid
873 and technical support to developing countries that agree to limit their greenhouse gas
874 emissions." Fehr et al. (2022) find that 90% of Germans want some degree of global redis-
875 tribution.

876 A.1.2 Population attitudes on climate burden sharing

877 Despite differences in the description of fairness principles, surveys on burden-sharing
878 rules show consistent attitudes. Or at least, their seemingly contradictory results can be
879 made compatible with the following interpretation: Concerning emissions reductions,
880 most people want that every country engage in strong and collective decarbonization ef-

881 forts, with a global quota converging to climate neutrality in the medium run. Concerning
882 the financial effort, most people support high-emitting countries paying and low-income
883 countries receiving funding. The most supported rules are those perceived as equitable,
884 in particular an equal right to emit per person.

885 This interpretation helps to understand the apparent differences between articles that
886 approach burden sharing from different angles: cost sharing (in money terms), effort shar-
887 ing (in terms of emissions reductions), or resource sharing (in terms of rights to emit).
888 Existing papers adopt either the cost sharing or effort sharing approach, which preclude
889 any country from being a net receiver of funds. Also, by focusing on *either* the financial
890 or the decarbonization effort, these surveys miss the other half of the picture, which can
891 explain why some papers find strong support for the ability-to-pay principle while others
892 find strong support for grandfathering (defined as emissions reductions being the same
893 in every country). The literature follows these approaches to align with the notions used
894 by the UNFCCC. Yet, we argue that the resource sharing approach is preferable for un-
895 covering attitudes, as it unambiguously describes the distributive implications of each
896 rule while achieving an efficient geographical distribution of emissions reductions and
897 explicitly allowing for monetary gains for some countries.

898 Now, let us summarize the results of the different papers in the light of this clarifica-
899 tion. [Schleich et al. \(2016\)](#) find an identical ranking of support for burden-sharing prin-
900 ciples in China, Germany, and the U.S.: polluter-pays followed by ability-to-pay, equal
901 emissions per capita, and grandfathering. Note that the authors do not allow for emis-
902 sions trading in their description of equal *emissions per capita*, which may explain its rel-
903 atively low support. Yet, the relative support for egalitarianism also depends on how
904 *the other* rules are described. Indeed, [Carlsson et al. \(2011\)](#) find that Swedes prefer that
905 “all countries are allowed to emit an equal amount per capita” rather than options where
906 emissions are reduced based on current or historical emissions, for which it is explicitly
907 stated that high-emitting countries “will continue to emit more than others”. [Bechtel &](#)
908 [Scheve \(2013\)](#) find agreement that rich countries should pay more and historical emis-
909 sions should matter, but that efforts should not be solely borne by wealthy nations. More
910 precisely, their conjoint analysis conducted in France, Germany, the UK, and the U.S.
911 shows that a climate agreement is 15 p.p. more likely to be preferred (to a random alter-
912 native) if it includes 160 countries rather than 20, and 5 p.p. less likely to be preferred
913 if “only rich countries pay” compared to other burden-sharing rules: “rich countries pay
914 more than poor”, “countries pay proportional to current emissions” or “countries pay

proportional to historical emissions". In Germany and the U.S., Gampfer et al. (2014) also find stronger support for funding climate action in low-income countries when cost is shared with other countries. Using a choice experiment, Carlsson et al. (2013) find that the least preferred option in China and the U.S. is when low-emitting countries are exempted from any effort. Ability-to-pay is appreciated in both countries and is the preferred option in the U.S., though the preferred option in China is another one that accounts for historical responsibility. In the U.S. and France, ? (?) find that the most favored fairness principle is that "all countries commit to converge to the same average of total emissions per inhabitant, compatible with a controlled climate change". Furthermore, in each country, 73% disagree with grandfathering defined as "countries which emitted a lot of carbon in the past have a right to continue emitting more than others in the future". The study by ? (?) contains many other results: for instance, majorities prefer to hold countries accountable for their consumption-based rather than territorial emissions, and the median choice regarding historical responsibility is to hold a country accountable for its post-1990 emissions (rather than post-1850 or just their current emissions). Finally, in each of 28 (among the largest) countries, Dabla-Norris et al. (2023) find strong majority for "all countries" to the question "Which countries do you think should be paying to reduce carbon emissions?". When asked to choose between a cost sharing based on *current* vs. *accumulated historic emissions*, a majority prefers *current emissions* in all countries but China and Saudi Arabia (where the two options are close to equally preferred).

(Back to Section 2.2)

A.1.3 Population attitudes on foreign aid

There is an extensive literature on attitudes towards foreign aid in donor countries. The key findings indicate that most people overestimate the amount of foreign aid and that only a minority wants a cut in foreign aid compared to actual amounts, especially once they become aware of them.

For instance, PIPA (2001) shows that 83% of Americans support a multilateral effort to cut world hunger in half. PIPA (2008) shows that in each of 20 countries, a majority thinks that developed countries "have a moral responsibility to work to reduce hunger and severe poverty in poor countries", with an average agreement of 81%. In 7 OECD countries, the study finds that at least 75% of respondents are willing to pay for a program to cut hunger in half (at an estimated cost of, e.g., \$50 a year for each American).

Kaufmann et al. (2019) find that perceived aid is overestimated in each of the 24 countries they study, on average by a factor of 7. In most countries, desired aid is larger than

perceived aid.² They show that individuals in the top income quintile desire aid 0.13 p.p. lower than those in the bottom 40% – which is very close to what we find. By employing a theoretical model and examining correlations between lobbying and actual aid (controlling for desired aid), they argue that the gap between actual and desired aid stems from the political influence of the rich who defend their vested interests. In Kaufmann et al. (2012), the U.S. is an outlier: desired aid is at the other countries' average (3% of GNI), but as misperceptions are enormous, perceived aid is twice as large as desired aid. Indeed, Gilens (2001) shows that even Americans with high political knowledge misperceive actual aid, and finds that 17% fewer of them want to cut aid when we provide them specific information about the amount of aid. Similarly, Nair (2018) finds that the relatively low support for aid in the U.S. is driven by information on global distribution, as people underestimate their rank by 27 centiles on average and overestimate the global median income by a factor 10.

Hudson & van Heerde (2012) provide a critical review of the literature and show that the strong support for poverty alleviation largely stems from intrinsic altruism. They note that, according to DFID (2009) and PIPA (2001), 47% of British people find that the aid is wasted (mainly due to corruption), while Americans estimate that less than a quarter of the aid reaches those in need, with over half ending up in the hands of corrupt government officials. Despite these perceptions, most people still support aid, suggesting the presence of nonutilitarian motives. Consistent with Henson et al. (2010), Bauhr et al. (2013) find that support for aid is reduced by the perception of corruption in recipient countries. However, this effect is mitigated by the aid-corruption paradox: countries with higher levels of corruption often need more help. Bodenstein & Faust (2017) further show that right-wing Europeans, as well as those who perceive strong corruption in their country, are more likely to agree that recipient countries should “follow certain rules regarding democracy, human rights and governance as a condition for receiving EU development aid.” Using a 2002 Gallup survey and the 2006 World Values Survey, and in line with Bayram (2017), Paxton & Knack (2012) show that the main determinants for wanting more aid are trust, left-wing ideology, interest in politics, and being a woman (all positively associated).

While foreign aid is generally unilateral, discretionary, and often used as a bargaining chip, global redistribution is conceived as multilateral, rule-based, and with dedicated

²Kaufmann et al. (2012) offer the best results on desired aid because (as Hudson & van Heerde (2012) criticize), other studies did not take into account misperceptions of actual aid.

980 funding. Our paper finds much stronger support for global redistributive policies than
981 for increased foreign aid. The difference in attitudes between unilateral foreign aid and
982 global policies is consistent with the literature on foreign aid. Indeed, it can be explained
983 by the observation that people prefer multilateral policies and often view foreign aid as
984 inefficient in reducing poverty. Therefore, we contribute to the theory of attitudes towards
985 global transfers by showing that when such transfers are multilateral and trusted to be
986 effective, they would be largely supported.

(Back to Section 2.5.2)

987 A.1.4 Population attitudes on taxes on the rich

988 We are not aware of any previous survey on a global wealth tax,³ though surveys
989 consistently show strong support for national wealth taxes. In a comprehensive survey
990 conducted in the UK, [Rowlingson et al. \(2021\)](#) show that a wealth tax is the preferred
991 option for raising revenues. Only 8% of respondents state that total net wealth should not
992 be taxed (with little differences between Labour and Conservative voters). The study also
993 finds that the preferred design would be a 1% or 3% tax on net wealth above £1 million. By
994 asking how much taxes per year should a person with a certain income and wealth level
995 pay, [Fisman et al. \(2017\)](#) finds that the average American favors a 0.8% linear tax rate
996 on unspecified wealth up to \$2 million (the highest wealth level tested), and a 3% linear
997 rate on inherited wealth. Through a conjoint analysis conducted in three high-income
998 countries, [Schechtl & Tisch \(2023\)](#) find widespread support for a wealth tax (from 78% in
999 the U.S. to 86% in Germany and the UK), with a preference for an exemption threshold
1000 set at \$/€1 million (rather than 500,000 or 2 million) with the tax rate and tax unit having
1001 little influence on the preferred design. In 21 OECD countries, the [OECD \(2019\)](#) uncovers
1002 strong majority support for higher taxes on the rich to support the poor, with nearly
1003 70% overall agreement and less than 20% disagreement. [Isbell \(2022\)](#) finds similarly high
1004 level of support in 34 African countries. In the UK, [Patriotic Millionaires \(2022\)](#) find 69%
1005 support (and 7% opposition) for a 1.1% tax on wealth in excess of £10 million. In the
1006 U.S., [Americans for Tax Fairness \(2021\)](#) find that 67% to 71% of the respondents support
1007 to “raise taxes for those earning more than \$400,000 a year”, “raise the income tax rate
1008 for those earning over \$1 million a year by 10 percentage points”, or “apply a 2% tax on
1009 an individual’s wealth above \$50 million each year, and 3% on wealth above \$1 billion”.
1010 [Patriotic Millionaires \(2024\)](#) indicate that millionaires themselves agree to be taxed: out

³We did not find any using the combination of “survey” or “attitudes” with “wealth tax” or “global wealth tax” in Google Scholar.

1011 of 2,385 millionaires contacted through wealth councillors, 74% support “increased tax on
1012 very wealthy individuals” and 58% support a 2% wealth tax above \$10 million. Finally,
1013 in surveys in Germany and the U.S., Ferreira et al. (2024) finds strong majority support
1014 for a limit on income or wealth.

1015 **A.1.5 Population attitudes on ethical norms**

1016 As argued by Nyborg et al. (2016), social norms can be the solution to the collective
1017 action problem. As such, universalistic values and free-riding attitudes are key.

1018 **Universalism** Various studies have examined the concept of global identity (see Rey-
1019 sen & Katzarska-Miller (2018) for a review). In the 2005-2008 wave of the World Values
1020 Survey, Bayram (2015) notes that “78% of the participants in 57 countries see themselves
1021 as citizens of the world”, though the 2017-2022 wave reveals that more people feel close
1022 to their town, region or country than to the world. Enke et al. (2023) measure universal-
1023 ism at the U.S. district level using donation data, and find that a district’s universalism
1024 predicts electoral outcomes better than its income or education level. To measure univer-
1025 salism at the individual level, Enke et al. (2023) ask American respondents to split \$100
1026 between a random stranger and a random person with the same income but closer to
1027 them. They distinguish different facets of universalism, and define *foreign universalism* as
1028 the inclination to give to a foreigner rather than a fellow citizen. They find a home bias for
1029 most people, which could partly be attributed to concerns about inequality, as the split
1030 involves two persons with the same income, with the foreigner most certainly living in
1031 a poorer country than the American and thus enjoying a higher social status. That being
1032 said, a home bias probably remains even after accounting for concerns about inequality,
1033 as 84% of Americans agree that “taking care of problems at home is more important than
1034 giving aid to foreign countries” (PIPA 2001). Enke et al. (2023) also measure universalism
1035 and analyze its correlates in 7 countries, and Cappelen et al. (2022) deploy this method
1036 in 60 countries. In a lab experiment with students in the U.S., Cherry et al. (2017) show
1037 that a substantial share of people prefer policies detrimental to them due to their egali-
1038 tarian worldview. Leiserowitz (2006) shows that 68% of Americans are most concerned
1039 about the impacts of climate change on “people all over the world” (50%) or “non-human
1040 nature” (18%) rather than themselves and their family (12%) or the U.S. (9%).⁴ A 2017

⁴Unpublished survey results of Dechezleprêtre et al. (forthcoming) find similar figures in 2024.

1041 survey by Focus 2030 shows that 40% of French people agree “fighting poverty in devel-
1042 oping countries should be one of the priorities of the European Union” while only 19%
1043 disagree. Waytz et al. (2019) show that left-leaning people exhibit a wider “moral circle”.
1044 Jaeger & Wilks (2023) find that judgments of moral concern are equally well explained by
1045 characteristics of the judge and the evaluated target.

1046 **Free-riding** Despite the long-standing explanation of the lack of climate action as a re-
1047 sult of free-riding, surveys consistently show that people support climate mitigation ac-
1048 tion in their own country, even in the absence of such action in other countries. Bernauer
1049 & Gampfer (2015) show this for Americans and Indians, who both overestimate their
1050 country’s emissions at one third of the global total. Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019)
1051 show this in the U.S. and China using an experimental design. McEvoy & Cherry (2016)
1052 show that Americans mostly invoke leadership and morality to justify unilateral climate
1053 action. Using a range of methods, Aklin & Mildenberger (2020) show that the empiri-
1054 cal evidence for free-riding is not compelling, and that climate inaction can be equally
1055 well explained by distributive conflicts. Finally, review of the literature by McGrath &
1056 Bernauer (2017) shows that climate attitudes are largely nonreciprocal, and primarily
1057 driven by values and perceptions of the policies, rather than by considerations of what
1058 other countries do.

1059 A.1.6 Second-order beliefs

1060 Allport (1924) introduced the concept of pluralistic ignorance: a shared mispercep-
1061 tion concerning others’ beliefs. The concept became notorious when O’Gorman (1975)
1062 showed that, towards the end of the civil rights movement, 47% of Americans believed
1063 that a majority of white people supported segregation, while only 18% did so. PIPA (2001)
1064 has shown that while 75% of Americans are willing to contribute \$50 annually to halve
1065 world hunger (the cost of the program), only 32% believed that the majority would share
1066 this willingness. Pluralistic ignorance regarding climate-friendly norms in the United
1067 States has been documented by Andre et al. (2022), who further show that correcting the
1068 misperceptions would be effective to enhance pro-climate behaviors. Relatedly, Spark-
1069 man et al. (2022) show that Americans underestimate the support for climate policies
1070 by nearly half, while Drews et al. (2022) document pluralistic ignorance of carbon tax
1071 support in Spain. Additionally, Geiger & Swim (2016) show that pluralistic ignorance
1072 regarding concern for climate change leads people to self-silence, resulting in reduced

1073 discussions on the topic.

1074 A.1.7 Elite attitudes

1075 In a survey of climate negotiators on their preferences in terms of burden-sharing,
1076 Lange et al. (2007) uncovers a mix of self-serving bias and support for the egalitarian
1077 principle. Dannenberg et al. (2010) elicit climate negotiators' equity preferences and find
1078 that regional differences in addressing climate change are driven more by national inter-
1079 ests than by different equity concerns. Hjerpe et al. (2011) indicate that voluntary con-
1080 tribution, indicated as willingness to contribute, was the least preferred principle among
1081 both negotiators and observers. Three of the four principles for allocating mitigation
1082 commitments were recognized widely across the major geographical regions: historical
1083 responsibilities, ability-to-pay, and equal per capita emissions. This result is confirmed
1084 by Kesternich et al. (2021), who observe tendencies for a more harmonized view among
1085 key groups towards the ability-to-pay rule in a setting of weighted burden sharing rules.
1086 Mildenberger & Tingley (2019) survey elites (Congress staffers and international relations
1087 scholars) as well as the population in U.S. and China. They document pluralistic igno-
1088 rance of pro-climate attitudes, egocentric bias, and increasing support after beliefs are
1089 updated.

1090 A.2 Proposals and analyses of global policy-making

1091 A.2.1 Global carbon pricing

1092 Global carbon pricing is widely regarded by economists as the benchmark climate
1093 policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon emissions externality. For instance, Hoel
1094 (1991) shows that an international carbon tax can be designed to simultaneously achieve
1095 efficiency and accommodate any distributional objective. Concerning the distributional
1096 objective, Grubb (1990), Agarwal & Narain (1991) and Bertram (1992) were the first to
1097 advocate for an equal right to emit for each human. As Grubb (1990) states it: "by far the
1098 best combination of long term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity, is obtained
1099 from a system based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions which are allocated on
1100 an adult per capita basis".⁵ Support for such solution has been renewed ever since (Baer
1101 et al. 2000; Jamieson 2001; Blanchard & Tirole 2021; Rajan 2021).

⁵By "adult per capita", Grubb (1990) means that permits would be allocated equally among adults.

1102 While many endorse the egalitarian allocation of emissions permits, economists also
1103 considered this outcome as politically unfeasible. Thus, to preserve the current level of
1104 inequalities and to preclude transfers between countries, they adjusted their (integrated
1105 assessment) models by assigning more weight to the interest of rich countries (Stanton
1106 2011).

1107 [Gollier & Tirole \(2015\)](#) synthesize the distributional decision with a *generosity* parame-
1108 ter which would allocate emissions permit to countries in proportion to their population
1109 if set to one, in proportion to their emissions (on the start date of the policy) if set to zero,
1110 and as a mixture of the egalitarian and grandfathering rules if set in between. Using a
1111 similar formula in the context of a tax, [Cramton et al. \(2015\)](#) (summarized in [MacKay
et al. 2015](#)) propose that countries with emissions per capita around the average fix the
1113 generosity parameter, so that it is strategically chosen to maximize the tax rate, and to
1114 fix the tax rate at the minimum price proposed by participating countries. Negotiations
1115 would exclude countries with low ambition beforehand; and the treaty would impose
1116 trade sanctions on non-participating countries. [van den Bergh et al. \(2020\)](#) propose a
1117 “dual-track transition to global carbon pricing”: an expanding climate club that would
1118 integrate existing and new emissions trading systems, and a reorientation of UNFCCC
1119 negotiations towards a global carbon price and burden-sharing rules. The [IMF \(2019\)](#)
1120 also supports global carbon pricing or, as a first step, a carbon price floor. They propose
1121 either differentiated prices among countries or international transfers, and estimate that
1122 a price of \$75/tCO₂ in 2030 would be compatible with a 2°C trajectory.

1123 Other authors have put forth more radical proposals. For instance, [Weitzman \(2017\)](#)
1124 envisions a World Climate Assembly with proportional representation at the global scale,
1125 so that the median (human) voter would choose the carbon price level. To finance an
1126 adaptation fund, [Chancel & Piketty \(2015\)](#) propose a global *progressive* carbon tax (or a
1127 progressive tax on air tickets as a first step), so that rich people (who are high emitters)
1128 contribute more to the public good. [Fleurbaey & Zuber \(2013\)](#) highlight that, given that
1129 current emitters are probably richer than future victims of climate change damages, cli-
1130 mate policies deserve a *negative* discount rate. In other words, we cannot dissociate the
1131 climate issue from global inequalities, and an ethical response to this issue requires global
1132 redistribution.

1133 **A.2.2 Climate burden sharing**

1134 The literature has discussed different burden-sharing principles (Ringius et al. 2002).
1135 While there is no agreement on their definitions as different approaches are used (cost
1136 sharing, effort sharing, or resource sharing, see Section A.1.2), we describe here the burden-
1137 sharing principles consistently using the resource sharing approach (i.e., allocating emis-
1138 sions rights). For other papers that define or compare different burden-sharing principles,
1139 see Vaillancourt & Waaub (2004), Zhou & Wang (2016), Leimbach & Giannousakis (2019).

1140 **Equal per capita.** The simplest principle is perhaps to allocate each year's global carbon
1141 quota based on an equal right to emit per capita, or an equal right to emit for each adult.
1142 Implementing this principle would result in large transfers from high-emitting to low-
1143 emitting countries (Young-Brun et al. 2023).

1144 **Grandfathering.** In contrast, *grandfathering* entails allocating emissions rights in pro-
1145 portion to current emissions. From the perspective of allocating carbon pricing revenues
1146 between countries, grandfathering amounts to each country retaining the revenues it col-
1147 lects. Given that nations are sovereign and have not agreed to share emissions rights,
1148 this principle can be considered as the default option against which the other ones can be
1149 compared in terms of distributive effects.

1150 **Historical responsibilities.** At the opposite end of the spectrum is the principle of *his-
1151 torical responsibilities*, which assigns to each country a carbon budget proportional to its
1152 population. Countries that have emitted more than the average have accumulated a car-
1153 bon debt towards countries that have emitted less, which have a carbon credit.⁶

1154 To fully specify this rule, one needs to define a start date for the responsibilities on
1155 past emissions and specify how to account for population size. 1990 is often chosen as
1156 a start year as it is the date of the first IPCC assessment report, marking the widespread
1157 acknowledgment of climate change, though variants include 1972, 1960, 1950 or 1850.⁷
1158 Several solutions have been proposed to account for evolving populations, none of which
1159 is flawless. Matthews (2015) allocates emissions rights on a given year proportionally to
1160 the countries' populations in that year. An alternative is to use fixed populations, such

⁶It is not clear how these debts would be settled. Approaches could involve carbon removal from the atmosphere, or using a conventional social cost of carbon to monetize them, by crediting (positively or negatively) emissions rights to countries in an international carbon market.

⁷Climate equity monitor uses 1850 for example.

as the populations at the chosen start year (Neumayer 2000), or at a future date such as projected when the global total population will reach 9 billion (Raupach et al. 2014). Fanning & Hickel (2023) convert the projected climate debt up to 2050 into monetary terms in a 1.5°C scenario.

The rationale for using fixed populations is to prevent countries from intentionally increasing their population size to gain more emissions rights. However, this approach treats countries with different demographic trajectories similarly, effectively penalizing countries which grow more than others (if past populations are used) or grow more than expected (if future populations are used). Using current populations like Matthews (2015) also comes with its own problems. Consider two countries having contributed very little to cumulative emissions, with the same emissions per capita but different demographic patterns: country A's population has doubled in the last 30 years, while country B's population has remained stable. Despite the similar present situation, country B would accumulate more carbon credit than country A. Essentially, compensating country B more due to its past population size amounts to compensating the dead although it is future generations who will suffer. That being said, using current populations is likely a more viable solution than relying on fixed populations since, in practice, countries with similar emissions per capita tend to have relatively similar demographic trajectories.

Ability to pay. Another prominent burden-sharing principle is the ability to pay whereby richer countries should contribute more to mitigation efforts. To operationalize this principle, Baer et al. (2008) define *capacity* as the share of global income above an exemption threshold. They use the threshold of \$7,500 per year (in 2005 PPP), which corresponds to the top 28% of the global income distribution. According to this principle, the effort of a country should be proportional to the revenues it would raise with a linear income tax on individual income above \$7,500.

Climate Equity Reference Framework Baer et al. (2008) propose another effort-sharing method, the *Climate Equity Reference Framework* (CERF), which blends the ability to pay principle with their version of historical responsibilities. They define *responsibility* as follows: they determine the mitigation requirement as the emissions gap between the Business as Usual scenario from IEA (2007) and a 2°C (with 68-86% probability) scenario. The mitigation requirement is then allocated to countries proportionally to their cumulative emissions (starting in 1990). The emissions right of a country according to their

1193 responsibility are then determined by its Business as Usual emissions minus its mitigation
1194 requirement. A country's emissions right, dubbed its *greenhouse development right* (GDR),
1195 is defined using a combination of *capacity* (C) and *responsibility* (R) to allocate the miti-
1196 gation requirement between countries. This allocation key is called the *Responsibility and*
1197 *Capacity Indicator* (RCI) and defined as $RCI = R^a \cdot C^{1-a}$, with $a = .4$.

1198 This choice of parameter may seem somewhat arbitrary, but the [EcoEquity calculator](#)
1199 allows for a customization all CERF parameters ([Holz et al. 2018](#); [Holz et al. 2019](#)). The
1200 Climate Action Network has adopted the CERF as its *fair share* framework, though the
1201 different national chapters of the organization could not agree on a choice of parameters
1202 ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)).⁸

1203 The CERF approach was adopted by a prominent network of climate NGOs because
1204 it operationalizes the principle of *common but differentiated responsibilities and respective ca-*
1205 *pabilities* recognized by the UNFCCC. However, this approach suffers from three draw-
1206 backs. First, its definition of historical responsibility as an effort sharing principle is in-
1207 consistent with the principle of an equal right of cumulative emissions per capita, which
1208 is a resource sharing principle. For instance, consider a fully decarbonized country that
1209 has exhausted *exactly* its cumulative carbon budget. According to the CERF notion of *re-*
1210 *sponsibility*, this country would still be expected to contribute significantly to mitigation
1211 efforts due to its relatively high cumulative emissions. Yet, according to the usual defini-
1212 tion of the historical responsibility based on an equal right of cumulative emissions p.c.,
1213 this country would have no liability as it has not exceeded its carbon budget. Second, a
1214 country with moderate incomes⁹ and low historical responsibility would be assigned a
1215 relatively low effort, even if its emissions per capita are high. In other words, the CERF
1216 approach favors countries that have experienced recent growth. Third, the poorest coun-
1217 tries would be granted emissions rights close to the Business as Usual trajectory, as they
1218 would bear virtually none of the effort. But this trajectory carries the current (unfair) in-
1219 come distribution and amounts to grandfathering. For example, the baseline trajectory
1220 for emissions¹⁰ in the DRC entail 0.8 tCO₂ p.c. in 2030, which is five times less than the


⁸The [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) and the think tank [EcoEquity](#) (funded by Tom Athanasiou and late Paul Baer) choose the following parameters: an equal weight for R and C ($a = .5$), their own [business as usual projections](#) of CO₂ emissions based on trends of GDP growth and emissions intensity reduction, a 1.5°C (Low Energy Demand) pathway, 1950 as the start year for responsibility, a gradual inclusion of income to compute *capacity* (which adds complexity to the calculation) from a full exemption of the bottom 70% (\$7,500 per year) linearly to a full inclusion of the top 2% (\$72,211), the inclusion of non-CO₂ gases but not of emissions embodied in trade (i.e. imported emissions) nor LULUCF (land-use).

⁹Using the above parameters, moderate incomes means few incomes above the global 70th. percentile.

¹⁰The baseline trajectory is computed as the “product of the projected GDP and CO₂ emission intensity”.

1221 world average emissions right per capita. In this framework, if the DRC were to grow
 1222 faster than projected in the baseline, it would actually have to pay to the rest of the world
 1223 for mitigation efforts. This is what is likely to happen to countries like Mexico or Senegal,
 1224 from our simulation of the net gains of CERF compared to a situation without interna-
 1225 tional transfers (see Figure S9). In contrast, a resource sharing approach based on equal
 1226 per capita emissions would result in low-income countries receiving emissions rights ex-
 1227 ceeding their projected trajectories, leading to transfers from high-income countries. By
 1228 construction, such transfers do not occur in an effort sharing approach like the CERF,
 1229 implying lower transfers to low-income countries. Compared to an equal right to emit
 1230 per capita, this method favors countries like China (whose emissions are allowed to re-
 1231 main stable over 2020-2030 instead of a reduction of 35-40%) and penalizes regions like
 1232 Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (see Figure S10).


Figure S9: Net gains from the CERF burden-sharing rule in 2030.



Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO₂.

1233 **Contraction and Convergence.** Meyer (2004) defines a rule called *contraction and con-*
 1234 *vergence* (C&C), which combines elements of grandfathering and equal per capita ap-
 1235 proaches. According to C&C, each country is granted (tradable) emissions rights, starting

Figure S10: Difference between net gains from Greenhouse Development Rights and equal rights per capita.



Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO₂.

at their current emission level and converging linearly to an equal per capita level at some pre-specified date. The *contraction* part refers to the reduction of total emissions rights in line with the climate objective. When discussed around year 2000, the convergence date was specified between 2020 and 2050. This rule, advocated by the Global Commons Institute (a UK think tank), was on the agenda from COP2 to COP15 (i.e., until Copenhagen, and including in Kyoto), including at Kyoto, and was endorsed by the European Parliament in 1998. More recently, [Gignac & Matthews \(2015\)](#) have shown how C&C can be made consistent with historical responsibilities by computing carbon debts and credits until the convergence date.

Assessments of the NDCs against burden-sharing principles. The regime established by the 2015 Paris agreement to regulate climate change respects none of the burden-sharing principles and relies instead on voluntary contributions from each country, known as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). A body of literature (reviewed by [Höhne et al. 2014](#)) assesses the NDCs against the emissions reduction objective and different

burden-sharing principles. To evaluate the NDCs, Gao et al. (2019) examine their emissions projections for 2030 and estimate the resulting increase in temperature. The most recent and comprehensive assessment of NDCs against burden-sharing principles is conducted by van den Berg et al. (2020) (see also Raupach et al. 2014; Robiou du Pont et al. 2016; Robiou du Pont et al. 2017).

A.2.3 Global redistribution

Lack of cooperation vs. lack of redistribution. Major social science scholarship from Realism in International Relations to game theory of international environmental agreements in economics has pointed to lack of cooperation as the major obstacle to global sustainability (Waltz 1979; Snidal 1991; Barrett 1994; Nordhaus 2015). Another body of literature on international climate cooperation emphasises redistribution from North to South as a key condition for making global climate policy work, noting the historical responsibility of major emitters in the Global North (Parks & Roberts 2008; Friman & Strandberg 2014; Bou-Habib 2019; Aklin & Mildenberger 2020). Taking the second perspective, making progress on international climate policy also requires a decision on how the burden of climate change mitigation can be shared fairly. This raises the question of whether citizens around the world support such global redistribution policies or, more specifically, whether citizens in high-income countries are willing to make sacrifices to combat climate change and extreme poverty.

While we cannot test conditional cooperation as part of the present analysis, our empirical results document that if the North-South redistribution would be implemented as part of global climate policies, they would receive strong public support.

Studies on global redistribution Addressing global poverty, inequalities, and climate change are central to the universally agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). As highlighted by Bolch et al. (2022) and Fabre (2024), low-income countries often lack sufficient domestic resources to eradicate poverty in the short term, indicating the need for international transfers to rapidly end global poverty. In *Beyond the Welfare State*, Gunnar Myrdal (1960) called for a *welfare world*. In his Nobel lecture, he emphasized the necessity of increasing foreign aid to low-income countries, stating that “The type of marginal foreign aid we have provided, is clearly not enough to meet their barest needs” (Myrdal 1975).

Drawing on the labor theory of value, some economists have argued that global in-

1282 equalities arise from unequal exchange in international trade (Arghiri 1972). Indeed, the
1283 stark disparity in wages between countries implies that one unit of labor exported by an
1284 American commands five units of labor embodied in imported goods, whereas Ethiopi-
1285 ans need to export 50 units of labor to obtain one unit through imports (Alsamawi et al.
1286 2014; Reyes et al. 2017). Taking stock, Hickel (2017) proposes to globally establish mini-
1287 mum wages at 50% of the local median wage. Hickel (2017) also suggests other solutions
1288 against global inequality, which served as inspiration for our questionnaire. These mea-
1289 sures include the cancellation of low-income countries' public debt, fair trade practices
1290 (such as eliminating tariffs from high-income countries, reducing patent protections, and
1291 reducing farming subsidies in rich countries), initiatives to combat tax evasion (e.g., im-
1292 plementing a global financial register), land reform, and a fair international climate policy.

1293 Piketty (2014) prominently advocates for a progressive wealth tax on a global scale,
1294 and Piketty (2022) suggests to allocate its revenues to countries in proportion to their
1295 population.

1296 Kopczuk et al. (2005) compute the optimal linear income tax rates for all countries in
1297 two ways: globally centralized and decentralized (i.e., within each country and without
1298 international transfers). They show that the average decentralized rate is 41%. In con-
1299 trast, the global rate is 62%, which would generate funds to finance a basic income of
1300 250\$/month (higher than the GPD per capita of 73 countries). From a current global Gini
1301 index of 0.695, they show that decentralized optimal taxation would only marginally re-
1302 duce global inequality to 0.69, whereas global taxation would significantly decrease the
1303 Gini to 0.25. The study also shows that the existing level of foreign aid can only be ratio-
1304 nalized if the U.S. attaches 2,000 less value to a citizen in the poorest countries than to an
1305 American citizen (or 1,000 less if half of the transfers are diverted due to corruption).

1306 A.2.4 Basic income

1307 Unconditional cash transfers (UCT) are increasingly seen as an effective way to end ex-
1308 treme poverty. A growing body of evidence from randomized control trials supports this
1309 notion: Gangopadhyay et al. (2015) find that UCT outperform a food subsidy; Haushofer
1310 & Shapiro (2016) find significant impacts on health, economic outcomes, and psycholog-
1311 ical well-being; Egger et al. (2022) find large positive spillovers on non-recipient people,
1312 and minimal inflation. Reviews of existing research further confirm the positive outcomes
1313 of UCT (Standing 2014; Bastagli et al. 2016).

1314 While the delivery of cash to remote areas and the prevention of fraud is challenging

1315 in regions without a proper civil register, the use of mobile phones as banking and bio-
1316 metric identification tools could provide viable solutions (Harnett 2017). Although many
1317 places still lack internet access, satellite internet technology shows promising progress,
1318 with some experts suggesting that it could soon become affordable and universally ac-
1319 cessible (Hanson 2016).

1320 **A.2.5 Global democracy**


1321 The idea of world federalism has a long-standing history, dating back at least to Kant
1322 (1795), who argued that a world federation was essential for achieving perpetual peace.
1323 International organizations were eventually created to foster peace, though the League
1324 of Nations and its successor, the United Nations, never succeeded in avoiding military
1325 conflicts. Many have argued that we need stronger and more democratic global institu-
1326 tions, competent to address global challenges such as extreme poverty, climate change,
1327 wars, pandemics, or financial stability. Before World War II, feminist and pacifist Maver-
1328 ick Lloyd & Schwimmer (1937) founded the *Campaign for World Government*, advocating
1329 for direct representation at the global scale. Einstein (1947) called for the subordination of
1330 the UN Security Council to the General Assembly and the direct election of UN delegates.
1331 Since 2007, there has been widespread support for a United Nations Parliamentary As-
1332 sembly (UNPA) from individuals and institutions in over 150 countries, including 1,800
1333 member of parliament, heads of state, as well the European Parliament, the Pan-African
1334 Parliament, and the Latin-American Parliament. The UNPA campaign calls for a gradual
1335 implementation of a democratic assembly, starting with a consultative assembly com-
1336 posed of members of national parliaments, allowing for the direct election of its members
1337 in voluntary countries, and progressing towards a world parliament with binding legisla-
1338 tive powers once all members are directly elected (Leinen & Bummel 2018). Besides the
1339 UNPA, various scholars have put forward different models of global democracy, ranging
1340 from deliberative spaces to a world federation (Archibugi et al. 2011). While the most
1341 radical proposals may still be on the horizon, an assembly of random citizens representa-
1342 tive of the world population has already been convened. It has produced a joint statement
1343 at the COP26 (Global Assembly 2022), and a similar *World Citizens' Assembly* should soon
1344 follow.

¹³⁴⁵ **B Raw results**

¹³⁴⁶ Country-specific raw results are also available as supplementary material files: **US**,
¹³⁴⁷ **EU, FR, DE, ES, UK**.

Figure S11: Absolute support for global climate policies.

Share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* (in percent, $n = 40,680$). The color blue denotes an absolute majority. See Figure 2 for the relative support. (Questions A-I of the global survey.)



*In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

Figure S12: Correct answers to comprehension questions (in percent). (Questions 16-18)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| With NR, typical [country] people win and richest lose | 68 | 73 | 76 | 73 | 73 | 70 |
| With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win | 60 | 68 | 62 | 72 | 67 | 67 |
| With GCS+NR, typical [country] people neither win nor lose | 54 | 60 | 63 | 59 | 57 | 61 |

Figure S13: Number of correct answers to comprehension questions (mean). (Section 2.3, Questions 16-18)




Figure S14: List experiment: mean number of supported policies. (Section 2.4.1, Question 24)




Figure S15: Conjoint analyses 1 and 2. (Questions 25-27, Back to Section 2.4.3)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|-----------------------------|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Global climate scheme (GCS) | 54 | 76 | 80 | 71 | 81 | 74 |
| C+NR+GCS preferred to C+NR | 55 | 74 | 79 | 71 | 78 | 68 |
| NR+GCS preferred to NR | 55 | 77 | 79 | 74 | 79 | 77 |
| NR+C preferred to NR | 62 | 84 | 88 | 83 | 84 | 82 |
| GCS+NR preferred to C+NR | 47 | 52 | 53 | 53 | 49 | 52 |
| NR+C+GCS preferred to NR | 55 | 77 | 86 | 73 | 83 | 72 |

Figure S16: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See English translations in Figure S2; Question 29)




Figure S17: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements seen as important for supporting the GCS in a 4-Likert scale (in percent). (Question 32) [\(Back to Section 2.4.5\)](#)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|---|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| It would succeed in limiting climate change | 78 | 85 | 85 | 86 | 86 | 83 |
| It would hurt the [Country] economy | 81 | 67 | 61 | 67 | 66 | 69 |
| It would penalize my household | 75 | 60 | 55 | 63 | 59 | 63 |
| It would make people change their lifestyle | 78 | 79 | 83 | 79 | 78 | 77 |
| It would reduce poverty in low-income countries | 77 | 85 | 88 | 85 | 86 | 81 |
| It might be detrimental to some poor countries | 79 | 72 | 79 | 67 | 78 | 70 |
| It could foster global cooperation | 82 | 81 | 81 | 82 | 85 | 80 |
| It could fuel corruption in low-income countries | 79 | 75 | 82 | 69 | 79 | 72 |
| It could be subject to fraud | 80 | 79 | 80 | 74 | 83 | 81 |
| It would be technically difficult to put in place | 77 | 71 | 74 | 62 | 79 | 71 |
| Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences | 89 | 82 | 89 | 68 | 91 | 88 |

Figure S18: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements found in the open-ended field on the GCS (manually recoded, in percent).

"When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to your mind?

Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme." (Question 31) (Back to Section 2.4.5)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|-------------------------|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| environment | 26 | 31 | 37 | 26 | 43 | 24 |
| unclassifiable | 25 | 24 | 23 | 28 | 25 | 22 |
| pro | 22 | 23 | 21 | 22 | 33 | 20 |
| con | 22 | 17 | 12 | 18 | 20 | 16 |
| cost | 17 | 12 | 11 | 14 | 17 | 7 |
| poorest humans | 11 | 7 | 6 | 9 | 5 | 6 |
| tax redistribution | 10 | 7 | 11 | 8 | 4 | 9 |
| support | 8 | 6 | 3 | 5 | 6 | 8 |
| oppose | 7 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 4 |
| don't know | 6 | 8 | 10 | 8 | 7 | 10 |
| empty | 6 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13 |
| difficult agreement | 5 | 10 | 7 | 12 | 8 | 8 |
| difficult implement | 3 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 4 | 6 |
| misunderstands gcs | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 |
| misunderstands question | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 |

Figure S19: Perceptions of the GCS. Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).

"When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to your mind?

Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme." (Question 31) [\(Back to Section 2.4.5\)](#)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|---|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| world: international world country global | 28 | 22 | 23 | 19 | 22 | 23 |
| environment: climat environment animal emission natur | 26 | 21 | 17 | 28 | 21 | 17 |
| poorest: poor low-income 700 poverty | 16 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 4 | 10 |
| pro: pro pros pros pro: | 16 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 5 |
| con: con con: cons cons: | 15 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 6 |
| cost: cost expensive higher price 85 inflation | 13 | 7 | 5 | 9 | 7 | 6 |
| tax: tax | 8 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| redistribution: rich redistribu | 8 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 5 |
| implementation: implement enforce polic monitor | 6 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 5 |
| agreement: agree accept participat | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 2 | 3 |

Figure S20: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality (mean). (Question 34) [\(Back to Section 2.6\)](#)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|-------------------------|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Donation to own country | 35 | 34 | 31 | 38 | 34 | 32 |
| Donation to Africa | 32 | 35 | 33 | 41 | 32 | 33 |

Figure S21: Support for a global wealth tax.

"Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-income countries?

Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education." (Question 35)




Figure S22: Support for a national wealth tax.

"Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: affordable housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and schools]?" (Question 36)




Figure S23: Preferred share of global wealth tax revenues that should be pooled to finance low-income countries. (Question 37)




Figure S24: Support for sharing half of global tax revenues with low-income countries, rather than each country retaining all the revenues it collects (in percent). (Question 38)




Figure S25: Perceived foreign aid. “From your best guess, what percentage of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?” (Question 39) (Back to Section 2.5.2)

Actual values: France: 0.8%; Germany: 1.3%; Spain: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%; U.S.: 0.4%.




Figure S26: Preferred foreign aid (without info on actual amount).

"If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?" (Question 40) (Back to Section 2.5.2)




Figure S27: Preferred foreign aid (after info on actual amount).

"Actually, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid.

If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?" (Question 40) (Back to Section 2.5.2)




Figure S28: Actual, perceived and preferred amount of foreign aid, with random info (or not) on actual amount. (*Mean* in percent of public spending, Questions 39, 40) (Back to Section 2.5.2)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Actual foreign aid (in % of public spending) | 0.4 | 1.1 | 0.8 | 1.3 | 0.5 | 1.7 |
| Belief about foreign aid | 4.7 | 2.9 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 3.5 |
| Preferred foreign aid (with info) | 1.8 | 2.7 | 3.4 | 2.9 | 2.1 | 2.5 |
| Preferred foreign aid (no info) | 4 | 3.9 | 4.7 | 4.4 | 3.1 | 3.4 |

Figure S29: Preferred foreign aid (after info or after perception). (Questions 39 and 40)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as current | 70 | 75 | 91 | 76 | 77 | 57 |
| Preferred foreign aid is higher than current | 47 | 59 | 75 | 58 | 63 | 43 |
| Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as perceived | 57 | 74 | 83 | 79 | 77 | 58 |
| Preferred foreign aid is higher than perceived | 37 | 53 | 64 | 59 | 54 | 39 |

Figure S30: Preferences for funding increased foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]
 "How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent) (Question 41) (Back to Section 2.5.2)




Figure S31: Preferences of spending following reduced foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]
 "How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent)
 (Question 42) [\(Back to Section 2.5.2\)](#)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Higher spending on defense | 19 | 23 | 11 | 21 | 17 | 31 |
| Higher spending on retirement pensions | 23 | 41 | 22 | 51 | 57 | 35 |
| Higher spending on healthcare | 40 | 57 | 31 | 42 | 80 | 70 |
| Higher spending on welfare benefits | 13 | 20 | 7 | 19 | 39 | 20 |
| Higher spending on education | 30 | 45 | 31 | 47 | 58 | 43 |
| Higher spending on other programs | 6 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 9 | 8 |
| Lower taxes on the wealthiest | 5 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| Lower corporate income tax rate | 12 | 6 | 10 | 4 | 8 | 6 |
| Lower personal income tax rates | 48 | 29 | 26 | 27 | 37 | 30 |
| Lower public deficit | 32 | 24 | 21 | 13 | 41 | 21 |

Figure S32: Willingness to sign real-stake petition for the Global Climate Scheme or National Redistribution, compared to stated support in corresponding subsamples (e.g. support for the GCS in the branch where the petition was about the GCS). (Question 43)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|----------------------------------|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Petition for the GCS | 51 | 69 | 69 | 66 | 78 | 69 |
| (Comparable) support for the GCS | 53 | 76 | 81 | 74 | 81 | 74 |
| Petition for NR | 57 | 67 | 65 | 66 | 74 | 68 |
| (Comparable) support for NR | 58 | 72 | 76 | 65 | 78 | 75 |

Figure S33: Absolute support for various global policies (Percent of (*somewhat or strong*) support). (Questions 44 and 45. See Figure 3 for the relative support.)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages | 41 | 54 | 52 | 53 | 62 | 51 |
| High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries | 53 | 65 | 62 | 66 | 68 | 62 |
| High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change | 45 | 58 | 55 | 60 | 62 | 54 |
| Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt | 31 | 37 | 36 | 30 | 45 | 40 |
| Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population | 34 | 44 | 44 | 43 | 52 | 43 |
| Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries | 39 | 49 | 39 | 51 | 50 | 54 |
| A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage | 42 | 55 | 54 | 54 | 61 | 53 |
| Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets | 44 | 70 | 73 | 70 | 72 | 65 |
| A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human | 34 | 45 | 40 | 48 | 44 | 50 |
| National tax on millionaires funding public services | 62 | 76 | 70 | 79 | 79 | 77 |
| Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries | 58 | 71 | 69 | 72 | 78 | 71 |

Figure S34: Preferred approach of diplomats at international climate negotiations. In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend [own country] interests or global justice? (Question 49)




Figure S35: Percent of selected issues viewed as important.
 “To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem?” (Question 56)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--------------------------------|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| Income inequality in [Country] | 55 | 59 | 54 | 58 | 71 | 57 |
| Climate change | 59 | 66 | 66 | 63 | 73 | 63 |
| Global poverty | 50 | 57 | 50 | 58 | 75 | 49 |

Figure S36: Group defended when voting.
 “What group do you defend when you vote?” (Question 57)




Figure S37: Mean prioritization of policies.

Mean number of points allocated policies to express intensity of support (among six policies chosen at random). Blue color means that the policy has been awarded more points than the average policy.

"In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

How do you allocate the points among the following policies?" (Question 58)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| econ1 | 13 | 21 | 10 | 14 | 35 | 31 |
| econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung) | 23 | 22 | 25 | 21 | 22 | 23 |
| econ3 | 21 | 15 | 13 | 18 | 17 | 13 |
| econ4 | 28 | 22 | 27 | 17 | 24 | 20 |
| soc1 | 10 | 17 | 13 | 17 | 12 | 21 |
| soc2 | 13 | 9 | 14 | 8 | 10 | 8 |
| climate1 | 14 | 15 | 11 | 18 | 20 | 12 |
| climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport) | 20 | 18 | 22 | 19 | 15 | 17 |
| climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030 | 11 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 11 |
| tax1: National redistribution scheme | 14 | 15 | 16 | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes) | 19 | 19 | 21 | 18 | 17 | 19 |
| foreign1: Global climate scheme | 15 | 20 | 20 | 23 | 16 | 17 |
| foreign2: Global tax on millionaires | 21 | 20 | 20 | 23 | 19 | 20 |
| foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change | 15 | 15 | 15 | 17 | 14 | 13 |
| foreign4: Doubling foreign aid | 9 | 11 | 13 | 14 | 9 | 8 |

Figure S38: Positive prioritization of policies.

Percent of people allocating a positive number of points to policies, expressing their support (among six policies chosen at random).

"In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

How do you allocate the points among the following policies?" (Question 58)

| | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
|--|---------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|
| econ1 | 64 | 78 | 61 | 67 | 96 | 95 |
| econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung) | 83 | 86 | 85 | 84 | 87 | 89 |
| econ3 | 81 | 69 | 50 | 78 | 80 | 68 |
| econ4 | 88 | 86 | 91 | 79 | 89 | 85 |
| soc1 | 57 | 75 | 69 | 74 | 74 | 78 |
| soc2 | 58 | 58 | 72 | 53 | 64 | 48 |
| climate1 | 70 | 76 | 65 | 79 | 89 | 75 |
| climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport) | 79 | 83 | 86 | 84 | 78 | 80 |
| climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030 | 62 | 58 | 56 | 48 | 60 | 70 |
| tax1: National redistribution scheme | 67 | 79 | 79 | 76 | 82 | 79 |
| tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes) | 80 | 79 | 76 | 78 | 83 | 85 |
| foreign1: Global climate scheme | 71 | 83 | 84 | 85 | 84 | 78 |
| foreign2: Global tax on millionaires | 80 | 81 | 79 | 83 | 82 | 82 |
| foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change | 71 | 77 | 79 | 74 | 83 | 76 |
| foreign4: Doubling foreign aid | 58 | 70 | 79 | 74 | 74 | 57 |

Figure S39: Charity donation.

"How much did you give to charities in 2022?" (Question 50)




Figure S40: Interest in politics.

"To what extent are you interested in politics?" (Question 51)




Figure S41: Desired involvement of government (from 1 to 5). (Question 52)




Figure S42: Political leaning on economics (from 1: Left to 5: Right). (Question 53)




Figure S43: Voted in last election. (Question 54)




Figure S44: Vote in last election (aggregated). PNR includes people who did not vote or prefer not to answer. (Question 55)




Figure S45: Perception that survey was biased.
“Do you feel that this survey was politically biased?” (Question 61)





Figure S46: Opinion on the fight against extreme poverty.

“According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme poverty in low-income countries?” (Question 62) [\(Back to Section 2.5.2\)](#)

(a) Elements found in the open-ended field on the question
(manually recoded, in percent)



(b) Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).




Figure S47: Main attitudes by vote (“Right” spans from Center-right to Far right).
 (Relative support in percent in Questions 20, 35, 45, 46, 49) (Back to Section 2.6)

| | Europe Left | Europe PNR/Non-voter | Europe Right | U.S. Left | U.S. PNR/Non-voter | U.S. Right |
|---|-------------|----------------------|--------------|-----------|--------------------|------------|
| Support for the GCS | 85 | 72 | 71 | 74 | 53 | 26 |
| Global tax on millionaires | 94 | 83 | 76 | 85 | 71 | 40 |
| Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries | 61 | 52 | 45 | 55 | 67 | 41 |
| A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human | 73 | 65 | 52 | 62 | 49 | 23 |
| High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries | 93 | 79 | 74 | 87 | 70 | 38 |
| [Country]'s foreign aid should be increased | 93 | 83 | 72 | 92 | 81 | 48 |
| Universalist | 56 | 48 | 26 | 53 | 49 | 23 |

1348 C Questionnaire of the global survey (section on global
1349 policies)

1350 A. At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be
1351 put in place? (Multiple answers are possible) [Figures 2 and S11]
1352 *Global; [Federal / European / ...]; [State / National]; Local*

1353 B. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “[country] should take mea-
1354 sures to fight climate change.”

1355 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly
1356 agree*

1357 C. How should [country] climate policies depend on what other countries do?

- 1358 • If other countries do more, [country] should do...
1359 • If other countries do less, [country] should do...

1360 *Much less; Less; About the same; More; Much more*

1361 D. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] All countries have signed the
1362 Paris agreement that aims to contain global warming “well below +2 °C’. To limit
1363 global warming to this level, there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we
1364 can emit globally, called the carbon budget. Each country could aim to emit less
1365 than a share of the carbon budget. To respect the global carbon budget, countries
1366 that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less
1367 than their share.

1368 Do you support such a policy? [Figures 2 and S11]

1369 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1370 support*

1371 E. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] Suppose the above policy is in
1372 place. How should the carbon budget be divided among countries? [Figures 2 and
1373 S11]

1374 *The emission share of a country should be proportional to its population, so that each human
1375 has an equal right to emit.; The emission share of a country should be proportional to its
1376 current emissions, so that those who already emit more have more rights to emit.; Countries
1377 that have emitted more over the past decades (from 1990 onwards) should receive a lower*

1378 *emission share, because they have already used some of their fair share.; Countries that will*
1379 *be hurt more by climate change should receive a higher emission share, to compensate them*
1380 *for the damages.*

1381 F. [In the U.S., Denmark, and France only] To achieve a given reduction of greenhouse
1382 gas emissions globally, costly investments are needed. Ideally, how should countries
1383 bear the costs of fighting climate change?

- 1384 • Countries should pay in proportion to their income
- 1385 • Countries should pay in proportion to their current emissions [Used as a sub-
1386 stitute to the equal right per capita in Figure 2]
- 1387 • Countries should pay in proportion to their past emissions (from 1990 on-
1388 wards) [Used as a substitute to historical responsibilities in Figure 2]
- 1389 • The richest countries should pay it all, so that the poorest countries do not have
1390 to pay anything
- 1391 • The richest countries should pay even more, to help vulnerable countries face
1392 adverse consequences: vulnerable countries would then receive money instead
1393 of paying [Used as a substitute to compensating vulnerable countries in Figures
1394 2 and S11]

1395 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly*
1396 *agree*

1397 G. Do you support or oppose establishing a global democratic assembly whose role
1398 would be to draft international treaties against climate change? Each adult across
1399 the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly. [Figures 2 and S11]
1400 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1401 *support*

1402 H. Imagine the following policy: a global tax on greenhouse gas emissions funding a
1403 global basic income. Such a policy would progressively raise the price of fossil fuels
1404 (for example, the price of gasoline would increase by [40 cents per gallon] in the
1405 first years). Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil
1406 fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Revenues from the tax would be used to
1407 finance a basic income of [\$30] per month to each human adult, thereby lifting the
1408 700 million people who earn less than \$2/day out of extreme poverty. The average

1409 [American] person would lose a bit from this policy as they would face [\$130] per
1410 month in price increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive.

1411 Do you support or oppose such a policy? [Figures 2 and S11]

1412 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1413 *support*


- 1414 I. Do you support or oppose a tax on all millionaires around the world to finance low-
1415 income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate ac-
1416 tion? This would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drink-
1417 ing water, healthcare, and education. [Figures 2 and S11]
1418 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1419 *support*

¹⁴²⁰ D Questionnaire of the complementary surveys

¹⁴²¹ Below, we provide the generic questionnaire (based on the U.S. version), which roughly
¹⁴²² corresponds to the *Eu* questionnaire as well as the combination of the *US1* and *US2* ques-
¹⁴²³ tionnaire. The main difference between Europe and the U.S. is that we split the *US2*
¹⁴²⁴ sample into four random branches to include some treatments before the Section D on
¹⁴²⁵ the GCS. Besides the control group, the treatments are: information regarding the sup-
¹⁴²⁶ port of Americans for the GCS and NR, an open-ended field, and a closed question on the
¹⁴²⁷ pros and cons of the GCS. The pros and cons of the GCS are also asked in *Eu* (likewise,
¹⁴²⁸ either as an open-ended field or a question), but only in Section D, after the support.

¹⁴²⁹ At each section or question, square brackets specify in which questionnaires it is present
¹⁴³⁰ (*US1*, *US2* and/or *Eu*) as well as country specificities. Figure S48 displays the structure of
¹⁴³¹ each questionnaire. Each treatment randomization is independent. Qualtrics and Word
¹⁴³² versions of the questionnaires in each language are available on our [public repository](#),
¹⁴³³ together with a spreadsheet that summarizes country specificities and our sources.

Figure S48: Western surveys' structure. Cf. Figure 1 for a simplified version.



1434 [Eu, US1, US2] Socio-demographic characteristics

1435 1. Welcome to this survey!

1436
1437 This survey is **anonymous** and is conducted for research purposes on a representa-
1438 tive sample of [1,000 British people].

1439
1440 It takes [US1, US2: 10 to 15 min; Eu: around 20 min] to complete.

1441
1442 The survey contains lotteries and awards for those who get the correct answer to
1443 some understanding questions.

1444 If you are attentive and lucky, you can win up to [US1, Eu: \$350; US2: \$150] in
1445 points. (See terms and conditions).

1446 Please answer every question carefully.

1447
1448 Do you agree to participate in the survey?

1449 Yes; No

1450 2. What is your gender?

1451 Woman; Man; Other

1452 3. How old are you?

1453 Below 18; 18 to 20; 21 to 24; 25 to 29; 30 to 34; 35 to 39; 40 to 44; 45 to 49; 50 to 54; 55 to
1454 59; 60 to 64; 65 to 69; 70 to 74; 75 to 79; 80 to 84; 85 to 89; 90 to 99; 100 or above

1455 4. [Eu] In which country do you live?

1456 France; Germany; Spain; United Kingdom; Other

1457 5. What is your ZIP code? [UK: What is your Outcode (the left part of your postcode,
1458 e.g. if your postcode is N7 8H7, just enter N7)?]

1459 6. Do you live with your partner (if you have one)?

1460 Yes; No

1461 7. How many people are in your household? The household includes: you, the mem-
1462 bers of your family who live with you, and your dependants.

1463 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more

1464 8. [Eu] How many children below 14 live with you?

1465 1; 2; 3; 4 or more

1466 9. [US1, US2] What race or ethnicity do you identify with? (Multiple answers are
1467 possible)

1468 White; Black or African American; Hispanic; Asian; American Indian or Alaskan Native;
1469 Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; Other: {open field}; Prefer not to say

1470 10. What is the [US1, US2: annual; Eu: monthly] gross income of your household (before
1471 withholding tax)? This includes all income: wages, self-employment earnings, So-
1472 cial Security benefits, pensions, investment income, welfare payments, and income
1473 from other sources.

1474 [US1, US2: Items based on household total income deciles and quartiles, namely:
1475 Less than \$20,000; between \$20,001 and \$35,000; between \$35,001 and \$42,000; between
1476 \$42,001 and \$50,000; between \$50,001 and \$65,000; between \$65,001 and \$82,000; between
1477 \$82,001 and \$103,000; between \$103,001 and \$130,000; between \$130,001 and \$145,000;
1478 between \$145,001 and \$165,000; between \$165,001 and \$250,000; More than \$250,000; I
1479 prefer not to answer;

1480 Eu: custom thresholds, taking into account household composition Questions 6-8,
1481 and corresponding to the country's deciles and quartiles of standard of living, cf.
1482 the sheet "Income" in [this spreadsheet](#)]

1483 11. What is the highest level of education you have completed?

1484 [Below upper secondary, Upper secondary, and Post secondary are coded as the first two,
1485 middle three, and last three items, respectively.

1486 US1, US2: Primary school or less; Eighth grade; Some high school; Regular high school
1487 diploma/GED or alternative credential; Some college, no degree; 2-year college degree or as-
1488 sociates degree (for example: AA, AS); Bachelor's degree (for example: BA, BS); Master's
1489 degree or above (MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA, MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD, PhD);
1490 FR: École primaire / Aucun; Brevet; CAP ou BEP; Baccalauréat professionnel ou tech-
1491 nologique; Baccalauréat général; Bac +2 (BTS, DUT, DEUG...); Bac +3 (licence...); Bac
1492 +5 ou plus (master, école d'ingénieur ou de commerce, doctorat, médecine, maîtrise, DEA,
1493 DESS...)

1494 DE: Keine abgeschlossene Schulbildung / Grundschule; Untere Sekundarstufe (z.B. Haupt-
1495 oder Realschulabschluss); Erstausbildung; Beruflicher Abschluss / Ausbildung; Abitur;
1496 Zweitausbildung; Bachelor oder Fachhochschulabschluss; Master-Abschluss oder höher

1497 ES: *Educación primaria / No he completado la enseñanza básica; Educación secundaria obli-*
1498 *gatoria (ESO); Formación profesional básica (FP); Formación profesional de grado medio;*
1499 *Bachillerato; Formación profesional de grado superior; Grado universitario; Máster/doctrado*
1500 *UK: Primary education or less; Some secondary school; GSCE; Vocational Upper secondary*
1501 *(Level 3 award, level 3 certificate, level 3 diploma, advanced apprenticeship, etc.); High*
1502 *school degree (A level); Higher vocational education (Level 4+ award, level 4+ certificate,*
1503 *level 4+ diploma, higher apprenticeship, etc.); Bachelor's Degree (BA, BSc, BEng, etc.);*
1504 *Postgraduate diploma or certificate, Master's Degree (MSc, MA, MBA, etc.) or Ph.D.]*

1505 12. What is your employment status?

1506 *Full-time employed; Part-time employed; Self-employed; Student; Retired; Unemployed*
1507 *(searching for a job); Inactive (not searching for a job)*

1508 13. Are you a homeowner or a tenant? (Multiple answers are possible)

1509 *Tenant; Owner; Landlord renting out property; Hosted free of charge*

1510 14. [If lives with partner: What is the estimated value of your household's assets (in
1511 U.S. dollars)?]

1512 If does not live with partner: What is the estimated value of your assets (in U.S.
1513 dollars)?]

1514 Include here all your possessions (home, car, savings, etc.) net of debt. For example,
1515 if you own a house worth [\$]300,000 and you have [\$]100,000 left to repay on your
1516 mortgage, your assets are [\$]200,000.

1517 I estimate my [If lives with partner: household's] assets net of debt to be:

1519
1520 [Items based on the following individual wealth quintiles, doubled if lives with
1521 partner. US1, US2: *Less than \$0 (I have a net debt); Close to \$0; Between \$4,000 and*
1522 *\$60,000; Between \$60,000 and \$190,000; More than \$190,000; For Eu, the thresholds are:*
1523 *FR: €5/50/150/300k; DE: €0/35/130/280k; ES: €0/50/100/200k; UK: £3/45/115/270k]*

1524 15. [US1, US2 (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the vote question)] What
1525 do you consider to be your political affiliation, as of today?

1526 *Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other; Non-Affiliated*

1527 [Eu, US1, US2] Global climate scheme

1528 In the following, we describe two policies, on which we will survey your opinion.
1529 To check that you have attentively read the descriptions, **we will ask some under-**
1530 **standing questions afterwards: those who get correct answers can win up to \$150.**

1531 **Global climate scheme:** At the Paris agreement in 2015, all countries have agreed
1532 to contain global warming “well below +2 °C”. To limit global warming to this
1533 level, **there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally.**

1534 To meet the climate target, a limited number of permits to emit greenhouse gases
1535 can be created globally. Polluting firms would be required to buy permits to cover
1536 their emissions. Such a policy would **make fossil fuel companies pay** for their
1537 emissions and progressively raise the price of fossil fuels. **Higher prices would en-**
1538 **courage people and companies to use less fossil fuels, reducing greenhouse gas**
1539 **emissions.**

1540 In accordance with the principle that each human has an equal right to pollute, the
1541 revenues generated by the sale of permits could finance a global basic income. **Each**
1542 **adult in the world would receive [US1, US2: \$30/month; UK: \$30 (that is £25) per**
1543 **month; FR, DE, ES: €30/month], thereby lifting out of extreme poverty the 700 mil-**
1544 **lion people who earn less than \$2/day.**

1545 **The typical [American] would lose out financially [US1, US2: \$85, FR: €10, DE:**
1546 **€25, ES: €5, UK: £20] per month** (as he or she would face [\$115] per month in price
1547 increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive).

1548 The policy could be put in place as soon as countries totaling more than 60% of
1549 global emissions agree on it. Countries that would refuse to take part in the policy
1550 could face sanctions (like tariffs) from the rest of the World and would be excluded
1551 from the basic income.

(Back to Section 2.2)

1552 16. Who would win or lose financially in the Global climate scheme? [Figure S12]

1553
1554 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1555 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

1556 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.;*

1557 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

1558 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would lose and*

1560 *the 700 million poorest humans would win* from the Global climate scheme. Now, here
1561 is the second policy:

1562

1563 **National redistribution scheme:**

1564 This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [US1, US2: 5%; Eu: 1%]¹¹ and provide
1565 cash transfers to all adults. More precisely, **each [American] adult would receive**
1566 **[\$85] per month** (that is [\$1,000] per year). This would be financed by an increase
1567 of the federal income tax on household income in excess of [US1, US2: \$315,000 per
1568 year; FR: €15,000 per month; DE: €20,000 per month; ES: €10,000 per month; UK:
1569 £15,000 per month], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000]. [US1,
1570 US2: See more details.]¹²

1571 17. Who would win or lose financially in the National redistribution? [Figure S12]

1572

1573 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1574 Typical [Americans] would win and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Ameri-
1575 cans] would win and the richest [Americans] would lose.; Typical [Americans] would lose
1576 and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Americans] would lose and the richest
1577 [Americans] would lose.

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would win and
1579 the richest [Americans] would lose* from the National redistribution scheme.

1580

1581 To help you with the next question, here is a reminder of the policies:

1582

1583 **Global Climate scheme:**

1584 To limit global warming and reach the international climate objective, the Global
1585 climate scheme would **impose a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can**

¹¹The wider base in the U.S. was chosen because emissions are larger in the U.S. than in Europe, and it would hardly be feasible to offset the median American's loss from the GCS by taxing only the top 1%.

¹²8% of U.S. respondents click. They then see the following text, based on taxjusticenow.org by Saez & Zucman (2019): *The marginal income tax rates would evolve as follows:*

Below \$315,000: unchanged

\$315,000 - \$400,000: current rate 32% => new rate 41%

\$400,000 - \$600,000: 35% => 50%

\$600,000 - \$2.5 million: 37% => 60%

\$2.5 - \$5 million: 37% => 65%

Above \$5 million: 37% => 70%

1586 **emit globally.**

1587 It would **make polluters pay** for their emissions, which in turn would increase fos-
1588 sil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities.

1589 The revenues would finance a **global basic income** of [\$30] per month for all hu-
1590 mans, lifting out of extreme poverty the poorest billion people.

1591 Considering the basic income and the fuel price increases, **the typical [American]**
1592 **would lose out financially [\$85] per month.**

1593
1594 **National redistribution scheme:**

1595 This policy would **increase taxes on the top [5%]** and provide cash transfers to
1596 all adults. More precisely, **each [American] would receive [\$85] per month.** This
1597 would be financed by an increase of the federal income tax on household income in
1598 excess of [\$315,000 per year], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000
1599 per year].

- 1600 18. If both the Global climate scheme and the National redistribution scheme are imple-
1601 mented, how would a typical [American] be financially affected? [*Figure S12*]
1602 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.
1603 *A typical [American] would lose out financially.; A typical [American] would neither gain
1604 nor lose.; A typical [American] would gain financially.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was that *A typical [American] would nei-
1606 ther gain nor lose* from both schemes combined. [*US1, Eu:* Now, here are the last two
1607 policies:]

1608
1609 **[US1: Coal exit:**

1610 To reduce CO₂ emissions, this policy would require all U.S. coal power plants to be
1611 phased out by 2030. Coal would be replaced by renewable sources like wind and
1612 solar panels as well as stronger reliance on gas power plants.

1613 **Eu: Thermal insulation plan:**

1614 To reduce CO₂ emissions and energy insecurity, this policy would require that all
1615 buildings meet energy efficiency targets: at least rating E in 2030 and rating C in
1616 2040. The [UK] government would subsidise half the cost of insulation for all house-
1617 holds, and up to 90% for the poorest households. Insulation work would cost [FR,
1618 DE: €25; ES: €20; UK: £25] billion a year, but would deliver energy savings greater

1619 than this cost.]

1620

1621 **[US1: Marriage only for opposite-sex couples:**

1622 This policy is a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would legally
1623 define marriage as a union of one man and one woman.

1624 ***Eu: Death penalty for major crimes:***

1625 This measure would reintroduce capital punishment for major crimes such as ter-
1626 rrorism and mass shootings.]

1627

1628 Now, we will ask your opinion on the [US1, Eu: four] policies.

1629 [Click here for the reminder of the \[US1, Eu: first\] two policies.](#) [Clicking displays the
1630 previous summarized descriptions.]

- 1631 19. [US2] [4 Random branches: control (*nothing*); Question 31 (*field*); Question 32 (*impor-*
1632 *tant*); or the following question (*info*).] For information, a recent survey has shown
1633 that:

- 1634 • 64% of Americans support the Global climate scheme.
1635 • 72% of Americans support the National redistribution scheme.

- 1636 20. Do you support the Global climate scheme? [[Figure S1](#)]

1637 Yes; No

- 1638 21. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the
1639 previous question? [[Figure S4](#)]

1640 The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

1641 *Percentage of [Americans] in favor of Global climate scheme* [slider from 0 to 100]

- 1642 22. Do you support the National redistribution scheme? [[Figure S1](#)]

1643 Yes; No

- 1644 23. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the
1645 previous question? [[Figure S4](#)]

1646 The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

1647 *Percentage of [Americans] in favor of National redistribution* [slider from 0 to 100]

- 1648 24. [Eu, US1] Beware, this question is quite unusual. Among the policies below, **how**
1649 **many** do you support? [[Figure S14](#), [Table 1](#)]

1650 [Four random branches. Branch GCS/NR/C/O]

- 1651
- 1652 • Global climate scheme
- 1653 • National redistribution scheme
- 1654 • [Coal exit]
- 1655 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

1656 0; 1; 2; 3; 4

1657

1658 [Branch GCS/C/O]

- 1659
- 1660 • Global climate scheme
- 1661 • [Coal exit]
- 1662 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

1663 0; 1; 2; 3

1664

1665 [Branch NR/C/O]

- 1666
- 1667 • National redistribution scheme
- 1668 • [Coal exit]
- 1669 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

1670 0; 1; 2; 3

1671 [Branch C/O]

- 1672
- 1673 • [Coal exit]
- 1674 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

1675 0; 1; 2

1676

1677 [Eu, US1] Conjoint analyses

- 1678 25. Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you prefer? [Figure
1679 S15]

1680 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the
1681 same time.

| Bundle A | Bundle B |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| [Coal exit] | [Coal exit] |
| National redistribution scheme | National redistribution scheme |
| Global climate scheme | |

1682
1683 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 1684 26. Do you support Bundle A (combining [Coal exit], the National redistribution scheme,
1685 and the Global climate scheme)?[Figure S1]

1686 Yes; No

- 1687 27. [new page] Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you
1688 prefer? [Figure S15]

1689 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the
1690 same time.

1691
1692 [Four random branches. Branch C + NR vs. GCS + NR]

| Bundle A | Bundle B |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| [Coal exit] | Global climate scheme |
| National redistribution scheme | National redistribution scheme |

1693
1694 [Branch NR vs. NR + C + GCS]

| Bundle A | Bundle B |
|--------------------------------|--|
| National redistribution scheme | National redistribution scheme [Coal exit] Global climate scheme |

1695
1696 [Branch NR + GCS vs. NR]

| | Bundle A | Bundle B |
|------|---|--------------------------------|
| 1699 | National redistribution scheme Global climate scheme | National redistribution scheme |
| 1700 | | |

1701 [Branch NR + C vs. NR]

| | Bundle A | Bundle B |
|------|---|--------------------------------|
| 1702 | National redistribution scheme [Coal exit] | National redistribution scheme |
| 1703 | | |

1704 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 1705 28. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and
 1706 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies
 1707 in their platforms.

1708 *Eu: Imagine if [DE, ES, UK: the two favorite candidates in your constituency in the
 1709 next general election; FR: the two candidates in the second round of the next pres-
 1710 idential election] campaigned with the following policies in their party's platforms.]*

1711 Which of these candidates would you vote for? [Table 2, Figure S15]

1712 [Table 2. Two random branches: with and without the final row. The US1 version of the poli-
 1713 cies is given below, see the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the European versions.]

| | Democrat | Republican |
|------|--|---|
| | Increase corporate income tax rate from 21% to 28% | Decrease the payroll tax |
| | Coal exit | Permit completion of the Keystone pipeline |
| 1715 | Trillion dollar investment in childcare, healthcare, education and housing | Withdrawal of the Paris agreement |
| | \$15 minimum wage | Marriage only for opposite-sex couples |
| | National redistribution scheme | Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation |
| | [Global climate scheme / no row] | [/ no row] |

1716

1717 [US1: Democrat; Republican; None of them; Eu: Candidate A; Candidate B; None of them]

- 1718 29. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and
1719 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies
1720 in their platforms.

1721 *Eu (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the Section "Values and politics"):* Imag-
1722 ine that [FR: the left or center-left; DE: a red-red-green coalition; ES: the PSOE; UK:
1723 the Labour Party] wins the next [general] elections. Here are two possible platforms
1724 on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a
1725 pool of credible [FR: left or center-left, DE: left-wing parties'; ES: PSOE; UK: Labour]
1726 policies).]

1727

1728 [US1: Which of these candidates do you prefer?

1729 *Eu: Even if you [FR: are not from the left or center-left; DE: do not support the left-*
1730 *wing parties; ES: do not support the PSOE; UK: do not support the Labour Party],*
1731 *which of these platforms do you prefer?]*

1732 [Figures S2, S16; see also the sheet "Policies" in *this spreadsheet* for the possible policies.]

| | [Candidate A] | [Candidate B] |
|------|--------------------------------|-----------------|
| | [Policy field in random order] | [Random policy] |
| 1733 | [Policy field in random order] | [Random policy] |
| | [Policy field in random order] | [Random policy] |
| | [Policy field in random order] | [Random policy] |
| | [Policy field in random order] | [Random policy] |

1734 [US1: Candidate A; Candidate B; Eu: Platform A; Platform B]

- 1735 30. [new page] [Same wording and conditions as above. For brevity, only the UK version is
1736 given here.] Imagine that the Labour Party wins the next general elections. Here are
1737 two possible platforms on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are
1738 randomly drawn from a pool of credible Labour policies).

1739

1740 Even if you do not support the Labour Party, which of these platforms do you pre-
1741 fer? [Figure S2]

| | | Platform A | Platform B |
|------|--|--|--|
| 1742 | [Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order] | [Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy] | [Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy] |
| | Foreign policy | Global climate scheme | - |
| 1743 | <i>Platform A; Platform B</i> | | |

1744 **[Eu, US2] Perceptions of the GCS**

1745 [Eu: two random branches. US2: four random branches and the question is asked (if asked)
1746 before Question 20]

1747 31. [Branch: field] When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to
1748 your mind?

1749 Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme. [Figures S18, S19]
1750 {Open field}

1751 32. [Branch: important] When determining your support or opposition to the Global
1752 climate scheme, which points are important to you? [Figure S17]

- 1753 • It would succeed in limiting climate change.
- 1754 • It would hurt the [U.S.] economy.
- 1755 • It would penalize my household.
- 1756 • It would make people change their lifestyle.
- 1757 • It would reduce poverty in low-income countries.
- 1758 • It might be detrimental to some poor countries.
- 1759 • It could foster global cooperation.
- 1760 • It could fuel corruption in low-income countries.
- 1761 • It could be subject to fraud.
- 1762 • It would be technically difficult to put in place.
- 1763 • Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences.

1764 *Not at all important; Not so important; Quite important; Very important*

1765 [Eu, US1] Donation lottery

1766 33. Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).

1767 *Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*

1768 34. [Two random branches] By taking this survey, you are automatically entered into a
1769 lottery to win [\$]100 in panel points. This lottery is unrelated to the previous ones
1770 that rewarded answers’ accuracy. In a few days you will know whether you have
1771 been selected in the lottery. The payment will be made to you in the same way as
1772 your compensation for this survey, so no further action is required on your part.

1773

1774 Should you be selected in the lottery, you can also donate a part of this additional
1775 compensation to [[American] / African] people living in poverty through [US1: the
1776 charity GiveDirectly. The charity GiveDirectly; Eu: a charity. We would channel this
1777 donation to a charity that] provides small amounts of cash to people in need in [[the
1778 U.S] / Africa].

1779

1780 **In case you are winner of the lottery, what share of the [\$]100 would you donate**
1781 **to [[American] / African] people living in poverty [US1: through GiveDirectly]?**
1782 *[Figure S20, Table S2]*

1783 *Amount donated to [[American] / African] people in need (in [\$]) [slider from 0 to 100]*

1784 [Eu, US2] Wealth tax

1785 [Four random branches: Question 35 then Question 36 (global first); Question 36 then Ques-
1786 tion 35 (national first); Question 37 (global share); Question 38 (sharing)]

1787 35. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-
1788 income countries?

1789 Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking
1790 water, healthcare, and education. *[Figures S1, S21]*

1791 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1792 *support*

1793 36. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: afford-
1794 able housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and
1795 schools]? *[Figures S1, S22]*

1796 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1797 *support*

1798 37. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all
1799 countries around the world. In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount
1800 to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE: €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2:
1801 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount
1802 to [\$]1 billion in all low-income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700
1803 million people, most of them in Africa).

1804 Each country would retain part of the revenues it collects, and the remaining part
1805 would be pooled at the global level to finance infrastructure and public services in
1806 low-income countries.

1807 What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of re-
1808 tained in the country's national budget)? [Figures S5, S23]

1809 *Percent of global wealth tax that should go to low-income countries [slider from 0 to 100]*

1811 38. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in
1812 all countries around the world.

1813 In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE:
1814 €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2: 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES:
1815 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount to [\$]1 billion in all low-
1816 income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700 million people, most of
1817 them in Africa).

1818 Which of the following options would you prefer? [Figure S24]

- 1819 • The whole wealth tax financing national budgets in each country. For ex-
1820 ample, in [US2: the U.S., it could finance affordable housing and universal
1821 childcare/pre-K.; Eu-UK: the UK, it could finance the National Health Service
1822 and state-funded schools].
- 1823 • Half of the wealth tax financing national budgets in each country, half of it
1824 financing low-income countries. For example, it could finance [US2: universal
1825 childcare/pre-K in the U.S.; Eu-UK: state-funded schools in the UK] and access
1826 to drinking water, healthcare, and education in Africa.

1827 [Eu, US2] Foreign aid

1828 US2 Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).

1829 *Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*

- 1830 39. From your best guess, what percentage of [U.S.] government spending is allocated
1831 to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?

1832

1833 For your information, government spending totals [US2: 38%; FR: 55%; DE: 45%; ES:
1834 42%; UK: 41%] of [U.S.] GDP, it includes [US2: federal, State; Eu: national] and local
1835 government spending, and apart from foreign aid, it covers the following items: de-
1836 fense, social security (retirement pensions), health [US2: (including Medicare and
1837 Medicaid)], welfare benefits [US2: (including food stamps and EITC)], education,
1838 roads, justice, other programs [US2: and federal agencies (including in energy, sci-
1839 ence...)]. [Figure S25]

1840 *Less than 0.1%; 0.1% to 0.2%; 0.3% to 0.5%; 0.6% to 1.0%; 1.1% to 1.7%; 1.8% to 2.6%;
1841 2.7% to 4%; 4.1% to 6%; 6.1% to 9%; 9.1% to 13%; 13.1% to 25%; More than 25%*

- 1842 40. [Two random branches: with or without information on actual amount] [Info: Actually,
1843 [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [the U.S.] government spend-
1844 ing is allocated to foreign aid.]

1845

1846 If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate
1847 to foreign aid? [Figures S28, S29, S26 and S27]

- 1848 41. [Asked iff branch: Info and preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than actual for-
1849 eign aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to increase [U.S.] foreign
1850 aid.

1851

1852 How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers
1853 possible) [Figure S30]

1854 *Lower spending on defense; Lower spending on retirement pensions; Lower spending on
1855 healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Lower spending on welfare benefits [US2: (like
1856 EITC or food stamps)]; Lower spending on education; Lower spending on other programs
1857 [US2: and federal agencies]; Higher taxes on the wealthiest; Higher corporate income tax
1858 rate; Higher personal income tax rates; Higher public deficit*

1859 42. [Asked iff branch: *Info* and preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than actual foreign
1860 aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to reduce [U.S.] foreign aid.

1861

1862 How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible) [*Figure S31*]
1863

1864 *Higher spending on defense; Higher spending on retirement pensions; Higher spending on
1865 healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Higher spending on welfare benefits [US2:
1866 like EITC or food stamps)]; Higher spending on education; lower spending on other pro-
1867 grams [US2: and federal agencies]; Lower taxes on the wealthiest; Lower corporate income
1868 tax rate; Lower personal income tax rates; Lower public deficit*

1869 **[Eu, US1] Petition**

1870 43. [*Two random branches*] Would you be willing to sign a petition for the [Global cli-
1871 mate / National redistribution] scheme? [*Figure S32*]

1872

1873 As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President's
1874 office], informing him what share of American people are willing to endorse the
1875 [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign,
1876 only your answer here is required and remains anonymous.) Yes; No

1877 **[Eu, US1] Other policies**

1878 44. The following policies are discussed at international negotiations on how to deal
1879 with climate change. [*Figures 3 and S33*]

1880

1881 Do you support or oppose the following policies?

- 1882 • Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for
1883 climate damages
- 1884 • High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries
- 1885 • High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income
1886 countries adapt to climate change

1887 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1888 support*

1889 45. Do you support or oppose the following global policies? [Figures 3 and S33]

- 1890 • Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt
- 1891 • Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting
1892 right proportional to its population
- 1893 • Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries
- 1894 • A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage
- 1895 • Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of
1896 all assets
- 1897 • A maximum wealth limit of [US1: \$10 billion; Eu: [€]100 million] for each
1898 human

1899 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1900 support*

1901 46. Currently, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [U.S.] government
1902 spending (that is, [US1: 0.2%; FR: 0.4%; DE: 0.6%; ES: 0.2%; UK: 0.7%] of [U.S.] GDP)
1903 is spent on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries. [Figure S6]

1904
1905 Do you support [the U.S.] transferring more money to low-income countries?

1906 *Yes, [U.S.] foreign aid should be increased.; Yes, but only if some conditions are met.; No,
1907 [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.; No, [U.S.] foreign aid should be reduced.*

1908 47. [Asked only if *Yes, but only if some conditions are met.* is chosen] What conditions
1909 should be required for [the U.S.] to increase its foreign aid? (Multiple answers pos-
1910 sible) [Figures S7, S28]

1911 *That recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights.; That recipient
1912 countries cooperate to fight illegal migrations.; That other high-income countries also in-
1913 crease their foreign aid.; That this is financed by increased taxes on millionaires.; That we
1914 can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted.; Other: [open field]*

1915 48. [Asked only if *No, [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.* or *No, [U.S.] foreign aid
1916 should be reduced.* is chosen] Why do you oppose [the U.S.] increasing its foreign
1917 aid? (Multiple answers possible) [Figure S8]

1918 *Aid perpetuates poverty as it makes people feel less responsible for themselves.; Aid is not
1919 effective as most of it is diverted.; Aid is a pressure tactic for high-income countries that*

1920 *prevents low-income countries from developing freely.; [The U.S.] is not responsible for what*
1921 *happens in other countries.; Charity begins at home: there is already a lot to do to support*
1922 *the American people in need.; Other: [open field]*

1923 **[Eu, US1, US2] Values and politics**

- 1924 49. [Eu (where it is instead asked at the beginning of Section “Other Policies”), US1]
1925 In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend
1926 [U.S.] interests or global justice? [Figure S34]
1927 *[U.S.] interests, even if it goes against global justice; [U.S.] interests, to the extent it re-*
1928 *spects global justice; Indifferent or don't know; Global justice, to the extent it respects [U.S.]*
1929 *interests; Global justice, even if it goes against [U.S.] interests*
- 1930 50. How much did you give to charities in 2022? [Figure S39]
1931 *I did not make donations to charities last year.; Less than [\$]100.; Between [\$]101 and*
1932 *[\$]500.; Between [\$]501 and [\$]1,000.; Between [\$]1,001 and [\$]5,000.; More than [\$]5,000.*
- 1933 51. To what extent are you interested in politics? [Figure S40]
1934 *Not at all; A little; Moderately; A lot; A great deal*
- 1935 52. Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means you think the
1936 government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic gov-
1937 ernment functions, and 5 means you think the government should take active steps
1938 in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens? [Figure S41]
1939 *Desired involvement of government [slider from 1 to 5]*
- 1940 53. **On economic policy matters**, where do you see yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where
1941 1 is Left (favoring equality and government interventions) and 5 is Right (favoring
1942 free competition and little government intervention)? [Figure S42]
1943 *Left (1) to Right (5) on economic issues [slider from 1 to 5]*
- 1944 54. Did you vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election? [Figure S43]
1945 *Yes; No: I didn't have the right to vote in the U.S.; Prefer not to say*
- 1946 55. [If voted: Which candidate did you vote for in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election?
1947 If did not vote: Even if you did not vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election,
1948 please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who
1949 represents your views more closely.] [Figure S44]

1950 [US1, US2: Biden; Trump; Jorgensen; Hawkins; Prefer not to say
1951 FR: candidates at the 2022 presidential election
1952 DE: parties with more than 1% of votes at the 2021 federal election and *Other*
1953 ES: lists with more than 0.9% at the November 2019 general election and *Other*
1954 UK: parties with more than 0.5% of votes at the 2019 general election and *Other*]

1955 56. To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem? [Figure S35]

- 1956 • Income inequality in [the U.S.]
1957 • Climate change
1958 • Global poverty

1959 *Not an important issue for me; An issue but there are other priorities; An issue but we
1960 already do what we can; An important issue, we should do more; One of the most pressing
1961 issue of our time*

1962 57. What group do you defend when you vote? [Figure S36]

1963 *Sentient beings (humans and animals); Humans; [Eu: Europeans]; [Americans]; People
1964 sharing my culture or religion; [US1, US2: My State]; [US1, US2: My town; Eu: My
1965 country, region or town]; My relatives and/or colleagues; My family and myself*

1966 [Eu, US1] Prioritization

1967 58. In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The
1968 more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

1969 How do you allocate the points among the following policies? [Figures S37 and S38]

1970 You can adjust the number of points either using the slider or entering the num-
1971 ber of your choice on the right-hand-side. **The sum of points must equal exactly
1972 100.** By pushing the last slider to the right, the total will automatically adjust to 100.
1973 Please read the 6 options before making your choice.

1974 See the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the pool of policies in each country.
1975 [sliders from 0 to 100]

1978 [FR, DE, ES] ETS2

1979 59. Similar to the Global Climate Scheme, the European Climate Scheme would impose
1980 a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit across the EU in the buildings
1981 and transport sectors. It would make polluters pay for their emissions, which in turn
1982 would increase fossil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities. Several options
1983 are possible regarding the use of the scheme's revenues:

- 1984 • Provide an equal cash transfer of €105 per year to each European.
- 1985 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European, proportional to their
1986 country's emissions: people in countries with higher emissions per person (like
1987 Germany) would receive more than people in countries with lower emissions
1988 (like Romania). For information, people in [Germany] would receive €[FR:
1989 110; DE: 130; ES: 90]/year.
- 1990 • Finance low-carbon investments: thermal insulation of buildings, switch to
1991 clean sources of heating, public transportation, and charging stations for elec-
1992 tric vehicles.
- 1993 • Provide cash transfers to the most vulnerable half of Europeans and finance
1994 low-carbon investments.

1995 Do you support or oppose the European Climate Scheme in case the revenue is used
1996 to... ?

- 1997 • Provide an equal cash transfer to each European
- 1998 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European
- 1999 • Finance low-carbon investments
- 2000 • Provide cash transfers for the most vulnerable Europeans and low-carbon in-
2001 vestments

2002 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
2003 support*

2004 60. [Asked iff none of the four variants of the European Climate Scheme is (somewhat or
2005 strongly) supported] Why do you not support a European Climate Scheme? (Mul-
2006 tiple answers possible)

2007 *I am opposed to climate policy being decided at the EU level, it should be decided at the national level;*
2008
2009 *I would prefer if the revenues were used in a different way (beyond the four suggestions above) than previously suggested;*
2010
2011 *I would prefer if decreasing carbon emissions were regulated by other climate policies;*
2012 *I am generally opposed to additional, or more ambitious, climate policies;*
2013 *I do not fully understand how the European Climate Scheme is supposed to work;*
2014 *I don't know*

2015 **[Eu, US1, US2] Feedback**

- 2016 61. Do you feel that this survey was politically biased? [Figure S45]
2017 *Yes, left-wing biased; Yes, right-wing biased; No, I do not feel it was biased*
- 2018 62. [US2 Asked only to one random third of the respondents, instead of the feedback Question 63] According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme poverty in low-income countries? [Figure S46]
2019
2020 *{Open field}*
- 2021
2022 63. The survey is nearing completion. You can now enter any comments, thoughts or suggestions in the field below.
2023 *{Open field}*
- 2024
2025 64. Lastly, are you interested to be interviewed by a researcher (through videoconferencing) for 30 min?
2026
- 2027
2028 This is totally optional and will not be rewarded.
2029 *Yes; No*

2030 E Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme

2031 To specify the GCS, we use the IEA's 2DS scenario (IEA 2017), which is consistent
2032 with limiting the global average temperature increase to 2°C with a probability of at least
2033 50%. The paper by Hood (2017) contributing to the Report of the High-Level Commission
2034 on Carbon Prices (Stern & Stiglitz 2017) presents a price corridor compatible with this
2035 emissions scenario, from which we take the midpoint. The product of these two series
2036 provides an estimate of the revenues expected from a global carbon price. We then use
2037 the UN median scenario of future population aged over 15 years (*adults*, for short). We
2038 derive the basic income that could be paid to all adults by recycling the revenues from
2039 the global carbon price: evolving between \$20 and \$30 per month, with a peak in 2030.
2040 Accounting for the lower price levels in low-income countries, an additional income of
2041 \$30 per month would allow **670 million people** to escape extreme poverty, defined with
2042 the threshold of \$2.15 per day in purchasing power parity.¹³

2043 To estimate the increase in fossil fuel expenditures (or “cost”) in each country by 2030,
2044 we make a key assumption concerning the evolution of the carbon footprints per adult:
2045 that they will decrease by the same proportion in each country. We use data from the
2046 Global Carbon Project (Peters et al. 2012). In 2030, the average carbon footprint of a
2047 country c , e_c , evolves from baseline year b proportionally to the evolution of its adult
2048 population $\Delta p_c = p_c^{2030} / p_c^b$. Thus, the global share of country c 's carbon footprint, s_c ,
2049 is proportional to $\sigma_c = e_c \Delta p_c$, and as countries' shares sum to 1, $s_c = \frac{\sigma_c}{\sum_k \sigma_k}$. Multiplying
2050 country c 's emission share with global revenues in 2030, R , and dividing by c 's adult pop-
2051 ulation in year y , yields its average cost per adult: $R \cdot s_c / p_c^y$. Using findings from Ivanova
2052 & Wood (2020) for Europe and Fremstad & Paul (2019) for the U.S., we approximate the
2053 median cost as 90% of the average cost. Finally, the net gain is given by the basic income
2054 (\$30 per month) minus the cost. We provided consistent estimates of net gains in all sur-
2055 veys (using $y = b = 2015$), though in the global survey we gave the average net gains
2056 vs. the median ones in the complementary surveys. The latter are shown in Figure S49.
2057 For the record, Table S4 also provides an estimate of *average* net gains (computed with

¹³The average carbon footprint of Sub-Saharan Africa is 0.75tCO₂ per capita (World Bank), and it is even lower for people living in extreme poverty, under one tenth of the world average of about 5tCO₂ per capita (Chancel & Piketty 2015). Under a GCS with a cash transfer of \$30 per person, if one's emission is one tenth of the world average, their net gain would be \$27 per month in nominal terms. In regions with extreme poverty like Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding high-income countries), the conversion factor from Market Exchange Rate to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is 2.4 (computed as the ratio of the World Bank series relating the GDP per capita of Sub-Saharan Africa in PPP and nominal). Therefore, the net gain for the extreme poor is \$65 per month (or \$2.13 a day) in PPP, enough to lift them out of extreme poverty.

2058 $b = 2019$ and $y = 2030$).¹⁴

2059 Estimates of the net gains from the Global Climate Scheme are necessarily imprecise,
2060 given the uncertainties surrounding the carbon price required to achieve emissions
2061 reductions as well as each country's trajectory in terms of emissions and population. These
2062 values are highly dependent on future (non-price) climate policies, technical progress,
2063 and economic growth of each country, which are only partially known. Integrated As-
2064 sessment Models have been used to derive a Global Energy Assessment (Johansson et al.
2065 2012), a 100% renewable scenario (Greenpeace 2015) as well as Shared Socioeconomic
2066 Pathways (SSPs), which include consistent trajectories of population, emissions, and car-
2067 bon price Bauer et al. (2017), Fricko et al. (2017), (Riahi et al. 2017), van Vuuren et al.
2068 (2017). Instead of using some of these modelling trajectories, we relied on a simple and
2069 transparent formula, for a number of reasons. First and foremost, those trajectories de-
2070 scribe territorial emissions while we need consumption-based emissions to compute the
2071 incidence of the GCS. Second, the carbon price is relatively low in trajectories of SSPs that
2072 contain global warming below 2°C (less than \$35/tCO₂ in 2030), so we conservatively
2073 chose a method yielding a higher carbon price (\$90 in 2030). Third, modelling results are
2074 available only for a few macro regions, while we wanted country by country estimates.
2075 Finally, we have checked that the emissions per capita given by our method are broadly
2076 in line with alternative methods, even if it tends to overestimate net gains in countries
2077 which will decarbonize less rapidly than average.¹⁵ For example, although countries' de-
2078 carbonization plans should realign with the GCS in place, India might still decarbonize
2079 less quickly than the European Union, so India's gain and the EU's loss might be over-
2080 estimated in our computations. For a more sophisticated version of the Global Climate
2081 Scheme which includes participation mechanisms preventing middle-income countries
2082 (like China) to lose from it and estimations of the Net Present Value by country, see Fabre
2083 (2023).

(Back to Section 2.3)

¹⁴2015 was the last year of data available when the global questionnaire was conceived (OECD data was then used – it does not cover all countries but give identical rounded estimates than those recomputed from the Global Carbon Project data for our complementary surveys). 2030 was chosen as the reference year as it is the date at which global carbon price revenues are expected to peak (and the GCS redistributive effects would be largest), and the GCS could not realistically enter into force before that date. In the surveys, we chose $y = b = 2015$ rather than $b = 2019$ and $y = 2030$ to get more conservative estimates of the monthly cost in the U.S. (\$20 higher than the other option) and in Europe (€5 or £10 higher).

¹⁵Computations with alternative methods can be found on [our public repository](#).

Figure S49: Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme.




Table S4: Estimated net gain from the GCS in 2030 and carbon footprint by country.

| | Mean net gain from the GCS (\$/month) | CO ₂ footprint per adult in 2019 (tCO ₂ /y) | | | |
|----------------|---|---|--------------|----|-----|
| | | | Mexico | 2 | 5.6 |
| | | | Ukraine | 2 | 5.6 |
| | | | Uzbekistan* | 4 | 5.1 |
| | | | Argentina | 5 | 4.9 |
| | | | Thailand | 6 | 4.6 |
| | | | Egypt | 12 | 3.6 |
| | | | Indonesia | 13 | 3.3 |
| | | | Colombia | 15 | 3.0 |
| Saudi Arabia | -93 | 24.0 | Brazil | 15 | 2.9 |
| United States | -77 | 21.0 | Vietnam | 15 | 2.9 |
| Australia | -60 | 17.6 | Peru | 16 | 2.8 |
| Canada | -56 | 16.7 | Morocco | 16 | 2.7 |
| South Korea | -50 | 15.6 | North Korea* | 17 | 2.5 |
| Germany | -30 | 11.7 | India | 18 | 2.4 |
| Russia | -29 | 11.5 | Philippines | 18 | 2.3 |
| Japan | -28 | 11.3 | Pakistan | 22 | 1.6 |
| Malaysia | -21 | 10.0 | Bangladesh | 24 | 1.1 |
| Iran | -19 | 9.5 | Nigeria | 25 | 1.0 |
| Poland | -19 | 9.5 | Kenya | 25 | 0.9 |
| United Kingdom | -18 | 9.4 | Myanmar* | 26 | 0.9 |
| China | -14 | 8.6 | Sudan* | 26 | 0.9 |
| Italy | -13 | 8.4 | Tanzania | 27 | 0.5 |
| South Africa | -11 | 8.0 | Afghanistan* | 27 | 0.5 |
| France | -10 | 7.8 | Uganda | 28 | 0.4 |
| Iraq* | -8 | 7.4 | Ethiopia | 28 | 0.3 |
| Spain | -6 | 7.0 | Venezuela | 29 | 0.3 |
| Turkey | -2 | 6.2 | DRC* | 30 | 0.1 |
| Algeria* | -1 | 6.0 | | | |

²⁰⁸⁴ Note: Asterisks denote countries where footprint is missing and territorial emissions is used instead.

²⁰⁸⁵ Values differ from Figure S49 as this table present estimates of *mean* net gain per adult in 2030, not at the

²⁰⁸⁶ present. Only the countries with more than 20 million adults (covering 87% of the global total) are shown.

F Determinants of support

Table S5: Determinants of support for the Global Climate Scheme. (Back to [2.3](#))

| | Supports the Global Climate Scheme | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | All | United States | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
| Country: Germany | -0.157*** (0.022) | | -0.144*** (0.022) | | | | |
| Country: Spain | -0.044* (0.024) | | -0.026 (0.024) | | | | |
| Country: United Kingdom | -0.079*** (0.024) | | -0.104*** (0.023) | | | | |
| Country: United States | -0.375*** (0.019) | | | | | | |
| Income quartile: 2 | 0.037** (0.017) | 0.031 (0.022) | 0.038 (0.023) | 0.047 (0.043) | 0.058 (0.049) | 0.013 (0.053) | 0.023 (0.043) |
| Income quartile: 3 | 0.042** (0.017) | 0.033 (0.024) | 0.049** (0.024) | 0.080** (0.040) | 0.059 (0.052) | 0.074 (0.056) | -0.052 (0.052) |
| Income quartile: 4 | 0.056*** (0.018) | 0.062** (0.026) | 0.010 (0.026) | 0.018 (0.047) | -0.015 (0.055) | -0.001 (0.056) | -0.005 (0.057) |
| Diploma: Post secondary | 0.023* (0.012) | 0.032* (0.017) | 0.010 (0.018) | 0.007 (0.029) | 0.045 (0.039) | 0.007 (0.039) | -0.010 (0.039) |
| Age: 25-34 | -0.076*** (0.025) | -0.084*** (0.031) | -0.044 (0.035) | -0.031 (0.057) | -0.077 (0.083) | -0.050 (0.066) | -0.103 (0.091) |
| Age: 35-49 | -0.101*** (0.024) | -0.109*** (0.030) | -0.069* (0.034) | -0.094* (0.055) | -0.009 (0.077) | -0.168** (0.070) | -0.050 (0.090) |
| Age: 50-64 | -0.137*** (0.024) | -0.165*** (0.030) | -0.038 (0.035) | -0.039 (0.056) | -0.020 (0.082) | -0.146** (0.067) | -0.017 (0.087) |
| Age: 65+ | -0.116*** (0.028) | -0.142*** (0.034) | -0.056 (0.044) | 0.003 (0.076) | -0.045 (0.094) | -0.258*** (0.091) | 0.011 (0.105) |
| Gender: Man | 0.019* (0.011) | 0.022 (0.015) | -0.010 (0.016) | -0.014 (0.029) | -0.018 (0.033) | 0.042 (0.038) | -0.005 (0.034) |
| Lives with partner | 0.029** (0.013) | 0.023 (0.017) | 0.058*** (0.018) | 0.070** (0.033) | 0.082** (0.038) | 0.017 (0.038) | 0.040 (0.039) |
| Employment status: Retired | -0.020 (0.024) | -0.046 (0.030) | 0.056 (0.038) | 0.087 (0.081) | 0.096 (0.075) | 0.040 (0.082) | 0.001 (0.073) |
| Employment status: Student | 0.045 (0.033) | 0.062 (0.048) | 0.101** (0.044) | 0.165* (0.085) | 0.192** (0.087) | 0.116 (0.074) | -0.021 (0.107) |
| Employment status: Working | -0.016 (0.019) | -0.020 (0.024) | 0.011 (0.028) | 0.082 (0.064) | 0.006 (0.056) | -0.050 (0.056) | 0.036 (0.051) |
| Vote: Center-right or Right | -0.331*** (0.013) | -0.435*** (0.017) | -0.106*** (0.019) | -0.131*** (0.035) | -0.004 (0.044) | -0.114*** (0.038) | -0.081* (0.041) |
| Vote: PNR/Non-voter | -0.184*** (0.016) | -0.198*** (0.022) | -0.136*** (0.021) | -0.196*** (0.039) | -0.034 (0.043) | -0.116** (0.046) | -0.108*** (0.040) |
| Vote: Far right | -0.396*** (0.032) | | -0.309*** (0.033) | -0.493*** (0.064) | -0.168*** (0.051) | -0.130 (0.102) | -0.314*** (0.080) |
| Urban | 0.049*** (0.012) | 0.072*** (0.018) | 0.006 (0.016) | -0.002 (0.029) | 0.019 (0.032) | -0.014 (0.036) | 0.017 (0.033) |
| Race: White | | -0.030 (0.019) | | | | | |
| Region: Northeast | | 0.010 (0.023) | | | | | |
| Region: South | | 0.006 (0.020) | | | | | |
| Region: West | | 0.010 (0.022) | | | | | |
| Swing State | | -0.038** (0.019) | | | | | |
| Constant | 1.048 | 0.736 | 0.89 | 0.7 | 0.732 | 0.935 | 0.886 |
| Observations | 7,986 | 4,992 | 2,994 | 977 | 727 | 748 | 542 |
| R ² | 0.160 | 0.181 | 0.064 | 0.116 | 0.067 | 0.043 | 0.063 |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table S6: Support for the GCS regressed on comprehension of its financial effects.

| | Supports the Global Climate Scheme | | | | | |
|--|------------------------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | All | United States | France | Germany | United Kingdom | Spain |
| With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win | 0.029** (0.012) | -0.004 (0.016) | 0.043 (0.033) | 0.051 (0.033) | 0.040 (0.036) | 0.038 (0.037) |
| Constant | 0.596 | 0.53 | 0.764 | 0.677 | 0.707 | 0.796 |
| Observations | 8,000 | 5,000 | 729 | 979 | 749 | 543 |
| R ² | 0.001 | 0.00001 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.002 | 0.002 |

Table S7: Correlation between (*Somewhat or Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in high-income countries.

| | Support for a global GHG tax and dividend | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | USA (1) | DNK (2) | FRA (3) | DEU (4) | ITA (5) | ESP (6) | GBR (7) | JPN (8) | POL (9) | AUS (10) | CAN (11) | KOR (12) |
| Control group mean | 0.34 | 0.409 | 0.34 | 0.361 | 0.341 | 0.421 | 0.288 | 0.317 | 0.309 | 0.294 | 0.316 | 0.334 |
| Trusts the government | 0.040*** (0.013) | 0.0005 (0.013) | 0.036*** (0.013) | 0.051*** (0.011) | 0.061*** (0.012) | 0.046*** (0.011) | 0.050*** (0.012) | 0.039*** (0.013) | 0.023** (0.011) | 0.041*** (0.013) | 0.019 (0.012) | 0.079*** (0.013) |
| Believes inequality is an important problem | 0.038*** (0.014) | 0.051*** (0.012) | 0.045*** (0.013) | 0.040*** (0.011) | 0.023** (0.011) | 0.012 (0.011) | 0.052*** (0.012) | 0.015 (0.012) | 0.009 (0.010) | 0.005 (0.013) | 0.031*** (0.012) | 0.024** (0.012) |
| Worries about CC | 0.006 (0.018) | 0.058*** (0.015) | 0.005 (0.016) | 0.048*** (0.014) | 0.023* (0.013) | 0.036*** (0.013) | 0.044*** (0.015) | 0.014 (0.014) | 0.018 (0.013) | 0.036** (0.017) | 0.004 (0.014) | 0.015 (0.013) |
| Believes net-zero is technically feasible | 0.009 (0.015) | 0.007 (0.012) | 0.018 (0.014) | 0.015 (0.012) | -0.004 (0.011) | 0.032** (0.011) | 0.027** (0.013) | -0.004 (0.013) | 0.024** (0.015) | 0.018 (0.014) | 0.014 (0.014) | 0.001 (0.013) |
| Believes will suffer from climate change | 0.059*** (0.015) | 0.019 (0.013) | 0.008 (0.014) | 0.032** (0.013) | 0.012 (0.013) | 0.006 (0.012) | 0.006 (0.014) | 0.037** (0.014) | 0.036*** (0.013) | 0.033** (0.016) | 0.026* (0.014) | 0.033** (0.013) |
| Understands emission across activities/regions | -0.018 (0.011) | 0.009 (0.013) | 0.003 (0.012) | 0.023* (0.012) | 0.007 (0.011) | 0.012 (0.011) | 0.007 (0.012) | -0.007 (0.011) | -0.026** (0.012) | -0.002 (0.013) | 0.003 (0.012) | 0.015 (0.012) |
| Knows CC is real & caused by human | 0.007 (0.012) | 0.008 (0.014) | 0.023 (0.014) | 0.011 (0.012) | -0.0005 (0.012) | 0.031*** (0.012) | -0.007 (0.012) | -0.010 (0.013) | 0.014 (0.011) | 0.025* (0.013) | 0.006 (0.012) | 0.024* (0.012) |
| Knows which gases cause CC | 0.005 (0.011) | 0.021* (0.012) | 0.010 (0.013) | 0.001 (0.011) | -0.008 (0.010) | 0.020* (0.010) | 0.015 (0.010) | 0.017 (0.011) | 0.011 (0.011) | -0.0003 (0.010) | -0.003 (0.011) | -0.008 (0.013) |
| Understands impacts of CC | -0.014 (0.012) | -0.010 (0.013) | 0.007 (0.014) | -0.009 (0.012) | -0.010 (0.011) | -0.029*** (0.011) | -0.008 (0.011) | -0.011 (0.011) | -0.009 (0.012) | -0.022* (0.011) | -0.008 (0.012) | -0.024* (0.012) |
| Believes policies entail positive econ. effects | -0.005 (0.013) | 0.007 (0.012) | 0.021 (0.014) | -0.005 (0.014) | 0.011 (0.014) | 0.010 (0.013) | 0.014 (0.013) | 0.008 (0.013) | 0.015 (0.013) | 0.036** (0.016) | 0.004 (0.014) | -0.007 (0.013) |
| Believes policies would reduce pollution | -0.013 (0.021) | 0.037 (0.023) | 0.043* (0.022) | -0.014 (0.020) | -0.038** (0.019) | 0.029 (0.019) | -0.019 (0.018) | -0.017 (0.018) | -0.021 (0.019) | -0.006 (0.022) | 0.021 (0.020) | -0.020 (0.019) |
| Believes policies would reduce emissions | 0.086*** (0.024) | 0.066*** (0.023) | 0.075*** (0.023) | 0.094*** (0.022) | 0.105*** (0.020) | 0.074*** (0.023) | 0.091*** (0.021) | 0.154*** (0.019) | 0.089*** (0.020) | 0.070*** (0.024) | 0.053** (0.023) | 0.112*** (0.020) |
| Believes own household would lose | -0.071*** (0.021) | -0.057*** (0.015) | -0.026 (0.020) | -0.087*** (0.017) | -0.066*** (0.017) | -0.053*** (0.017) | -0.073*** (0.017) | -0.008 (0.017) | -0.079*** (0.017) | -0.052*** (0.016) | -0.060*** (0.019) | -0.083*** (0.017) |
| Believes low-income earners will lose | -0.034* (0.019) | -0.020 (0.016) | -0.056*** (0.018) | -0.022 (0.017) | -0.021 (0.018) | -0.015 (0.016) | -0.015 (0.017) | -0.009 (0.017) | -0.056*** (0.017) | -0.025 (0.016) | -0.030 (0.020) | -0.056*** (0.018) |
| Believes high-income earners will lose | -0.001 (0.012) | -0.001 (0.012) | 0.013 (0.013) | 0.003 (0.011) | -0.004 (0.011) | 0.007 (0.010) | -0.003 (0.012) | -0.016 (0.013) | -0.011 (0.010) | -0.025** (0.012) | -0.008 (0.012) | -0.0004 (0.013) |
| Observations | 2,218 | 2,013 | 2,006 | 2,006 | 2,088 | 2,268 | 2,025 | 1,990 | 2,053 | 1,978 | 2,022 | 1,932 |
| R ² | 0.329 | 0.241 | 0.237 | 0.295 | 0.211 | 0.216 | 0.272 | 0.222 | 0.214 | 0.272 | 0.254 | 0.228 |

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 of Dechezleprêtre et al. (forthcoming) for variable definitions.

Table S8: Correlation between (*Somewhat* or *Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in middle-income countries.

| | Support for a global GHG tax and dividend | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | IDN (1) | ZAF (2) | MEX (3) | TUR (4) | IND (5) | BRA (6) | CHN (7) | UKR (8) |
| Control group mean | 0.697 | 0.396 | 0.681 | 0.44 | 0.719 | 0.539 | 0.737 | 0.622 |
| Trusts the government | 0.051*** (0.012) | 0.058*** (0.015) | 0.040*** (0.014) | 0.066*** (0.017) | 0.065*** (0.015) | 0.038** (0.015) | -0.011 (0.015) | 0.061*** (0.014) |
| Believes inequality is an important problem | 0.048** (0.011) | 0.002 (0.014) | 0.057*** (0.015) | 0.028 (0.017) | 0.092*** (0.016) | 0.055*** (0.015) | -0.001 (0.015) | 0.027 (0.018) |
| Worries about CC | 0.003 (0.014) | -0.005 (0.016) | 0.013 (0.016) | -0.006 (0.017) | -0.0002 (0.016) | 0.032* (0.017) | -0.0002 (0.016) | 0.046*** (0.016) |
| Believes net-zero is technically feasible | 0.020 (0.014) | 0.026 (0.017) | 0.004 (0.014) | 0.039** (0.017) | 0.022 (0.016) | 0.019 (0.015) | 0.034** (0.016) | 0.018 (0.016) |
| Believes will suffer from climate change | 0.020* (0.011) | 0.038** (0.016) | 0.032* (0.017) | -0.002 (0.020) | -0.014 (0.015) | -0.017 (0.016) | -0.004 (0.015) | 0.018 (0.016) |
| Understands emission across activities/regions | -0.007 (0.009) | -0.012 (0.014) | -0.006 (0.013) | 0.003 (0.015) | -0.006 (0.010) | 0.039*** (0.013) | -0.004 (0.013) | 0.00004 (0.013) |
| Knows CC is real & caused by human | -0.006 (0.009) | 0.011 (0.016) | -0.004 (0.015) | -0.006 (0.016) | 0.0002 (0.012) | 0.003 (0.014) | -0.052*** (0.016) | 0.022 (0.014) |
| Knows which gases cause CC | -0.026*** (0.009) | 0.019 (0.015) | 0.035** (0.014) | 0.015 (0.015) | 0.020 (0.013) | 0.007 (0.014) | -0.023* (0.012) | 0.023 (0.015) |
| Understands impacts of CC | -0.002 (0.010) | -0.015 (0.014) | -0.0005 (0.015) | 0.009 (0.017) | 0.043*** (0.014) | -0.023 (0.015) | -0.008 (0.014) | -0.014 (0.014) |
| Believes policies entail positive econ. effects | -0.010 (0.007) | 0.009 (0.016) | 0.015 (0.013) | -0.007 (0.013) | 0.002 (0.011) | -0.016 (0.014) | -0.013 (0.010) | 0.035** (0.015) |
| Believes policies would reduce pollution | 0.023 (0.015) | 0.002 (0.021) | 0.019 (0.022) | 0.044 (0.029) | 0.021 (0.020) | 0.032 (0.021) | -0.001 (0.018) | -0.023 (0.025) |
| Believes policies would reduce emissions | 0.111*** (0.019) | 0.073*** (0.022) | 0.088*** (0.024) | 0.078** (0.031) | 0.034 (0.025) | 0.129*** (0.022) | 0.060*** (0.022) | 0.138*** (0.025) |
| Believes own household would lose | -0.027 (0.021) | -0.044** (0.020) | -0.071*** (0.019) | -0.054** (0.024) | -0.012 (0.019) | -0.067*** (0.023) | -0.119*** (0.022) | -0.045** (0.021) |
| Believes low-income earners will lose | -0.059*** (0.020) | -0.016 (0.019) | 0.003 (0.017) | -0.053** (0.023) | -0.055*** (0.019) | -0.013 (0.020) | 0.001 (0.018) | 0.004 (0.020) |
| Believes high-income earners will lose | 0.026** (0.011) | -0.020 (0.015) | 0.010 (0.013) | 0.010 (0.016) | -0.004 (0.014) | 0.003 (0.016) | -0.047*** (0.014) | -0.007 (0.013) |
| Observations | 2,488 | 2,003 | 2,045 | 1,932 | 2,472 | 1,860 | 1,717 | 1,564 |
| R ² | 0.366 | 0.175 | 0.242 | 0.248 | 0.370 | 0.272 | 0.280 | 0.255 |

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 of Dechezleprêtre et al. (forthcoming) for variable definitions.

G Representativeness of the surveys

Table S9: Sample representativeness of the complementary surveys. (Back to [2.1](#))

| | US1 | | | US2 | | | Eu | | |
|--------------------------------------|------|--------|-----------------|------|--------|-----------------|------|--------|-----------------|
| | Pop. | Sample | Weighted sample | Pop. | Sample | Weighted sample | Pop. | Sample | Weighted sample |
| Sample size | | 3,000 | 3,000 | | 2,000 | 2,000 | | 3,000 | 3,000 |
| Gender: Woman | 0.51 | 0.52 | 0.51 | 0.51 | 0.45 | 0.50 | 0.51 | 0.49 | 0.51 |
| Gender: Man | 0.49 | 0.47 | 0.49 | 0.49 | 0.55 | 0.50 | 0.49 | 0.51 | 0.49 |
| Income_quartile: 1 | 0.25 | 0.27 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.28 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.28 | 0.25 |
| Income_quartile: 2 | 0.25 | 0.24 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.23 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.23 | 0.25 |
| Income_quartile: 3 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.26 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 |
| Income_quartile: 4 | 0.25 | 0.23 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.22 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.24 | 0.25 |
| Age: 18-24 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.10 |
| Age: 25-34 | 0.18 | 0.15 | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.16 | 0.18 | 0.15 | 0.17 | 0.15 |
| Age: 35-49 | 0.24 | 0.25 | 0.24 | 0.24 | 0.25 | 0.24 | 0.24 | 0.25 | 0.24 |
| Age: 50-64 | 0.25 | 0.27 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.26 | 0.24 | 0.26 |
| Age: 65+ | 0.21 | 0.21 | 0.21 | 0.21 | 0.22 | 0.21 | 0.25 | 0.23 | 0.25 |
| Diploma_25_64: Below upper secondary | 0.06 | 0.02 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.13 | 0.14 | 0.13 |
| Diploma_25_64: Upper secondary | 0.28 | 0.25 | 0.28 | 0.28 | 0.29 | 0.28 | 0.23 | 0.19 | 0.23 |
| Diploma_25_64: Post secondary | 0.34 | 0.40 | 0.34 | 0.34 | 0.33 | 0.34 | 0.29 | 0.33 | 0.29 |
| Race: White only | 0.60 | 0.67 | 0.61 | 0.60 | 0.62 | 0.61 | | | |
| Race: Hispanic | 0.18 | 0.15 | 0.19 | 0.18 | 0.19 | 0.19 | | | |
| Race: Black | 0.13 | 0.16 | 0.14 | 0.13 | 0.17 | 0.14 | | | |
| Region: Northeast | 0.17 | 0.20 | 0.17 | 0.17 | 0.19 | 0.17 | | | |
| Region: Midwest | 0.21 | 0.22 | 0.21 | 0.21 | 0.23 | 0.21 | | | |
| Region: South | 0.38 | 0.39 | 0.38 | 0.38 | 0.38 | 0.38 | | | |
| Region: West | 0.24 | 0.20 | 0.24 | 0.24 | 0.20 | 0.24 | | | |
| Urban: TRUE | 0.73 | 0.78 | 0.74 | 0.73 | 0.75 | 0.73 | | | |
| Employment_18_64: Inactive | 0.20 | 0.16 | 0.16 | 0.20 | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.17 | 0.15 | 0.15 |
| Employment_18_64: Unemployed | 0.02 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.03 | 0.06 | 0.05 |
| Vote: Left | 0.32 | 0.47 | 0.45 | 0.32 | 0.46 | 0.45 | 0.30 | 0.32 | 0.32 |
| Vote: Center-right or Right | 0.30 | 0.31 | 0.31 | 0.30 | 0.29 | 0.29 | 0.28 | 0.32 | 0.32 |
| Vote: Far right | | | | | | | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.10 |
| Country: FR | | | | | | | 0.24 | 0.24 | 0.24 |
| Country: DE | | | | | | | 0.33 | 0.33 | 0.33 |
| Country: ES | | | | | | | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.18 |
| Country: UK | | | | | | | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 |
| Urbanity: Cities | | | | | | | 0.43 | 0.49 | 0.43 |
| Urbanity: Towns and suburbs | | | | | | | 0.33 | 0.32 | 0.33 |
| Urbanity: Rural | | | | | | | 0.25 | 0.20 | 0.25 |

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

Table S10: Sample representativeness for each European country. (Back to [2.1](#))

| | FR | | | DE | | | ES | | | UK | | |
|--------------------------------------|------|------|---------------|------|------|---------------|------|------|---------------|------|------|---------------|
| | Pop. | Sam. | Wght. sam. |
| Sample size | | 729 | 729 | | 979 | 979 | | 543 | 543 | | 749 | 749 |
| Gender: Woman | 0.52 | 0.50 | 0.52 | 0.51 | 0.52 | 0.51 | 0.51 | 0.53 | 0.51 | 0.50 | 0.43 | 0.50 |
| Gender: Man | 0.48 | 0.50 | 0.48 | 0.49 | 0.48 | 0.49 | 0.49 | 0.47 | 0.49 | 0.50 | 0.57 | 0.50 |
| Income_quartile: 1 | 0.25 | 0.31 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.29 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.27 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.26 | 0.25 |
| Income_quartile: 2 | 0.25 | 0.17 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.31 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.19 | 0.25 |
| Income_quartile: 3 | 0.25 | 0.19 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.28 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.26 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.26 | 0.25 |
| Income_quartile: 4 | 0.25 | 0.33 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.18 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.17 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.28 | 0.25 |
| Age: 18-24 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.09 | 0.14 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.10 | 0.07 | 0.10 |
| Age: 25-34 | 0.15 | 0.14 | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.17 | 0.15 | 0.12 | 0.16 | 0.12 | 0.17 | 0.20 | 0.17 |
| Age: 35-49 | 0.24 | 0.31 | 0.24 | 0.22 | 0.26 | 0.22 | 0.28 | 0.25 | 0.28 | 0.24 | 0.18 | 0.24 |
| Age: 50-64 | 0.24 | 0.19 | 0.24 | 0.28 | 0.23 | 0.28 | 0.27 | 0.28 | 0.27 | 0.25 | 0.30 | 0.25 |
| Age: 65+ | 0.25 | 0.24 | 0.25 | 0.26 | 0.21 | 0.26 | 0.25 | 0.22 | 0.25 | 0.24 | 0.25 | 0.24 |
| Diploma_25_64: Below upper secondary | 0.11 | 0.19 | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.14 | 0.10 | 0.24 | 0.16 | 0.25 | 0.12 | 0.09 | 0.12 |
| Diploma_25_64: Upper secondary | 0.26 | 0.16 | 0.26 | 0.27 | 0.20 | 0.27 | 0.16 | 0.15 | 0.16 | 0.21 | 0.23 | 0.21 |
| Diploma_25_64: Post secondary | 0.26 | 0.30 | 0.26 | 0.29 | 0.31 | 0.29 | 0.28 | 0.38 | 0.27 | 0.33 | 0.36 | 0.33 |
| Urbanity: Cities | 0.47 | 0.52 | 0.47 | 0.37 | 0.47 | 0.37 | 0.52 | 0.58 | 0.52 | 0.40 | 0.41 | 0.40 |
| Urbanity: Towns and suburbs | 0.19 | 0.19 | 0.19 | 0.40 | 0.35 | 0.40 | 0.22 | 0.27 | 0.22 | 0.42 | 0.43 | 0.42 |
| Urbanity: Rural | 0.34 | 0.29 | 0.34 | 0.23 | 0.18 | 0.23 | 0.26 | 0.15 | 0.26 | 0.18 | 0.16 | 0.18 |
| Employment_18_64: Inactive | 0.20 | 0.19 | 0.18 | 0.15 | 0.14 | 0.11 | 0.20 | 0.13 | 0.12 | 0.16 | 0.16 | 0.17 |
| Employment_18_64: Unemployed | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.07 | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.04 |
| Vote: Left | 0.23 | 0.19 | 0.21 | 0.37 | 0.44 | 0.44 | 0.33 | 0.37 | 0.38 | 0.25 | 0.28 | 0.29 |
| Vote: Center-right or Right | 0.26 | 0.30 | 0.29 | 0.28 | 0.27 | 0.29 | 0.18 | 0.24 | 0.24 | 0.36 | 0.44 | 0.41 |
| Vote: Far right | 0.23 | 0.22 | 0.22 | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.03 |

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. In this Table, weights are defined at the country level. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

²⁰⁸⁹ Similar tables for the global surveys can be found in [Dechezleprêtre et al. \(forthcoming\)](#).
²⁰⁹⁰ [ing](#).

2091 **H Attrition analysis**

Table S11: Attrition analysis for the US1 survey.

| | Dropped out | Dropped out after socio-eco | Failed attention test | Duration (in min) | Duration below 4 min |
|-------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Mean | 0.08 | 0.059 | 0.082 | 21.198 | 0.016 |
| Income quartile: 2 | 0.025*** (0.010) | 0.025*** (0.010) | 0.000 (0.000) | -0.740 (3.064) | -0.009 (0.006) |
| Income quartile: 3 | 0.062*** (0.012) | 0.062*** (0.012) | 0.000*** (0.000) | 0.754 (2.813) | -0.004 (0.007) |
| Income quartile: 4 | 0.035*** (0.011) | 0.035*** (0.011) | -0.000*** (0.000) | -3.917 (2.798) | -0.003 (0.007) |
| Diploma: Post secondary | 0.039*** (0.009) | 0.039*** (0.009) | -0.000*** (0.000) | 1.544 (2.665) | 0.006 (0.006) |
| Age: 25-34 | -0.094*** (0.015) | -0.094*** (0.015) | -0.000*** (0.000) | -0.597 (2.604) | -0.031** (0.013) |
| Age: 35-49 | -0.100*** (0.015) | -0.100*** (0.015) | -0.000*** (0.000) | 4.824 (3.176) | -0.032** (0.013) |
| Age: 50-64 | -0.060*** (0.015) | -0.060*** (0.015) | 0.000*** (0.000) | 5.723** (2.763) | -0.039*** (0.012) |
| Age: 65+ | 0.048*** (0.017) | 0.048*** (0.017) | 0.000** (0.000) | 8.952** (4.267) | -0.047*** (0.012) |
| Gender: Man | -0.039*** (0.007) | -0.039*** (0.007) | -0.000* (0.000) | -0.451 (2.210) | -0.0001 (0.005) |
| Urban | 0.006 (0.008) | 0.006 (0.008) | -0.000*** (0.000) | 4.888** (2.443) | -0.004 (0.006) |
| Race: Black | 0.020** (0.010) | 0.020** (0.010) | -0.000*** (0.000) | 8.554*** (2.600) | 0.004 (0.007) |
| Race: Hispanic | 0.021** (0.010) | 0.021** (0.010) | -0.000*** (0.000) | 4.119* (2.293) | -0.002 (0.007) |
| Region: Northeast | -0.005 (0.011) | -0.005 (0.011) | -0.000*** (0.000) | -4.862 (4.782) | -0.004 (0.007) |
| Region: South | -0.009 (0.009) | -0.009 (0.009) | -0.000 (0.000) | -1.151 (4.710) | -0.004 (0.006) |
| Region: West | 0.006 (0.011) | 0.006 (0.011) | 0.000*** (0.000) | -4.000 (4.305) | -0.003 (0.007) |
| Vote: Biden | -0.048*** (0.008) | -0.048*** (0.008) | 0.000*** (0.000) | -2.901 (2.379) | -0.009 (0.007) |
| Vote: Trump | -0.043*** (0.009) | -0.043*** (0.009) | -0.000 (0.000) | 0.145 (2.878) | -0.005 (0.008) |
| Observations | 5,719 | 5,719 | 3,252 | 3,044 | 3,044 |
| R ² | 0.127 | 0.127 | 1.000 | 0.006 | 0.017 |

Table S12: Attrition analysis for the US2 survey.

| | Dropped out (1) | Dropped out after socio-eco (2) | Failed attention test (3) | Duration (in min) (4) | Duration below 4 min (5) |
|-------------------------|----------------------|--|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Mean | 0.095 | 0.074 | 0.092 | 16.338 | 0.052 |
| Income quartile: 2 | 0.023* (0.013) | 0.023* (0.013) | -0.000** (0.000) | 1.352 (1.601) | -0.029** (0.014) |
| Income quartile: 3 | 0.054*** (0.014) | 0.054*** (0.014) | -0.000 (0.000) | 8.502 (9.649) | -0.009 (0.016) |
| Income quartile: 4 | 0.060*** (0.016) | 0.060*** (0.016) | -0.000 (0.000) | 5.254 (3.376) | 0.0003 (0.017) |
| Diploma: Post secondary | -0.033*** (0.011) | -0.033*** (0.011) | 0.000 (0.000) | 1.601 (2.630) | 0.012 (0.011) |
| Age: 25-34 | -0.004 (0.015) | -0.004 (0.015) | 0.000 (0.000) | -0.929 (1.535) | -0.032 (0.024) |
| Age: 35-49 | 0.012 (0.014) | 0.012 (0.014) | 0.000*** (0.000) | 9.076 (6.651) | -0.047** (0.022) |
| Age: 50-64 | 0.040*** (0.014) | 0.040*** (0.014) | -0.000*** (0.000) | 0.364 (1.565) | -0.079*** (0.022) |
| Age: 65+ | 0.115*** (0.017) | 0.115*** (0.017) | -0.000*** (0.000) | 2.619 (3.150) | -0.095*** (0.022) |
| Gender: Man | -0.073*** (0.009) | -0.073*** (0.009) | 0.000 (0.000) | 4.707 (6.037) | 0.010 (0.010) |
| Urban | 0.019* (0.011) | 0.019* (0.011) | 0.000*** (0.000) | 1.766 (1.135) | 0.005 (0.012) |
| Race: Black | 0.060*** (0.015) | 0.060*** (0.015) | 0.000*** (0.000) | 18.673 (13.328) | -0.010 (0.015) |
| Race: Hispanic | 0.079*** (0.014) | 0.079*** (0.014) | -0.000 (0.000) | 2.930 (1.813) | -0.027** (0.012) |
| Region: Northeast | -0.026* (0.014) | -0.026* (0.014) | 0.000 (0.000) | -0.837 (2.855) | -0.011 (0.015) |
| Region: South | -0.006 (0.012) | -0.006 (0.012) | -0.000 (0.000) | 3.220 (5.002) | 0.009 (0.014) |
| Region: West | -0.010 (0.013) | -0.010 (0.013) | 0.000 (0.000) | -1.759 (1.942) | -0.009 (0.015) |
| Vote: Biden | -0.049*** (0.008) | -0.049*** (0.008) | -0.000*** (0.000) | 3.230 (2.731) | -0.006 (0.014) |
| Vote: Trump | -0.026*** (0.009) | -0.026*** (0.009) | -0.000 (0.000) | -0.554 (1.272) | 0.007 (0.016) |
| Observations | 2,973 | 2,973 | 2,280 | 2,103 | 2,103 |
| R ² | 0.241 | 0.241 | 1.000 | 0.010 | 0.031 |

Table S13: Attrition analysis for the *Eu* survey.

| | Dropped out (1) | Dropped out after socio-eco (2) | Failed attention test (3) | Duration (in min) (4) | Duration below 6 min (5) |
|---|----------------------|--|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Mean | 0.067 | 0.044 | 0.151 | 54.602 | 0.039 |
| Country: Germany | 0.023** (0.010) | 0.019** (0.010) | 0.000*** (0.000) | 9.533 (18.906) | 0.019* (0.010) |
| Country: Spain | -0.102*** (0.011) | -0.098*** (0.011) | 0.000* (0.000) | -29.136* (15.948) | 0.010 (0.010) |
| Country: United Kingdom | 0.042*** (0.011) | 0.043*** (0.011) | 0.000*** (0.000) | -7.458 (18.046) | 0.010 (0.010) |
| Income quartile: 2 | 0.032*** (0.010) | 0.029*** (0.010) | 0.000 (0.000) | 32.749* (19.771) | -0.015 (0.010) |
| Income quartile: 3 | 0.049*** (0.010) | 0.047*** (0.010) | 0.000*** (0.000) | 6.130 (11.734) | -0.021** (0.010) |
| Income quartile: 4 | 0.024** (0.011) | 0.021* (0.011) | 0.000*** (0.000) | 18.659 (19.955) | -0.018* (0.011) |
| Diploma: Post secondary | 0.035*** (0.008) | 0.034*** (0.008) | 0.000*** (0.000) | 10.647 (12.959) | -0.007 (0.007) |
| Age: 25-34 | 0.028** (0.013) | 0.025* (0.013) | -0.000*** (0.000) | 36.132 (22.285) | -0.005 (0.018) |
| Age: 35-49 | 0.064*** (0.012) | 0.062*** (0.012) | -0.000*** (0.000) | 37.159** (17.190) | -0.013 (0.016) |
| Age: 50-64 | 0.085*** (0.013) | 0.083*** (0.013) | -0.000 (0.000) | 48.363** (22.526) | -0.063*** (0.015) |
| Age: 65+ | 0.117*** (0.014) | 0.115*** (0.013) | -0.000** (0.000) | 36.351** (14.226) | -0.061*** (0.015) |
| Gender: Man | -0.027*** (0.007) | -0.027*** (0.007) | -0.000* (0.000) | -22.980 (14.093) | 0.009 (0.007) |
| Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs | 0.006 (0.008) | 0.004 (0.008) | 0.000*** (0.000) | -16.736 (17.256) | 0.004 (0.008) |
| Degree of urbanization: Rural | 0.023** (0.009) | 0.023** (0.009) | 0.000 (0.000) | -14.593 (19.733) | -0.001 (0.009) |
| Vote: Center-right or Right | -0.025*** (0.005) | -0.025*** (0.005) | 0.000*** (0.000) | -17.558 (13.143) | 0.019** (0.008) |
| Vote: Far right | 0.005 (0.007) | 0.005 (0.007) | 0.000*** (0.000) | 15.838 (32.281) | 0.029** (0.014) |
| Vote: PNR/Non-voter | 0.023*** (0.006) | 0.022*** (0.005) | 0.000 (0.000) | 24.631 (19.824) | 0.030*** (0.010) |
| Observations | 3,963 | 3,963 | 3,326 | 3,115 | 3,115 |
| R ² | 0.406 | 0.395 | 1.000 | 0.006 | 0.028 |

2092 I Balance analysis

Table S14: Balance analysis.

| | List contains: G (1) | Branch petition: NR (2) | Branch donation: Own nation (3) | Branch conjoint 3: with GCS (4) |
|---|-------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Mean | 0.496 | 0.493 | 0.5 | 0.499 |
| Country: Germany | -0.026 (0.026) | 0.017 (0.026) | 0.020 (0.026) | 0.005 (0.026) |
| Country: Spain | 0.025 (0.030) | 0.026 (0.030) | 0.026 (0.030) | 0.043 (0.030) |
| Country: United Kingdom | 0.002 (0.028) | 0.018 (0.028) | 0.037 (0.028) | 0.063** (0.028) |
| Country: United States | -0.001 (0.024) | 0.019 (0.024) | 0.007 (0.024) | 0.023 (0.024) |
| Income quartile: 2 | -0.013 (0.021) | -0.024 (0.021) | 0.012 (0.021) | -0.010 (0.021) |
| Income quartile: 3 | 0.021 (0.022) | -0.005 (0.022) | 0.011 (0.022) | -0.004 (0.022) |
| Income quartile: 4 | -0.001 (0.023) | -0.017 (0.023) | -0.013 (0.023) | 0.0001 (0.023) |
| Diploma: Post secondary | 0.008 (0.016) | 0.014 (0.016) | -0.010 (0.016) | -0.001 (0.016) |
| Age: 25-34 | 0.023 (0.031) | -0.049 (0.031) | -0.003 (0.031) | -0.009 (0.031) |
| Age: 35-49 | 0.032 (0.030) | -0.002 (0.030) | -0.014 (0.030) | -0.016 (0.030) |
| Age: 50-64 | 0.030 (0.030) | -0.005 (0.030) | -0.016 (0.030) | -0.020 (0.030) |
| Age: 65+ | 0.029 (0.037) | -0.037 (0.037) | -0.015 (0.037) | -0.012 (0.037) |
| Gender: Man | 0.024 (0.015) | 0.012 (0.015) | 0.002 (0.015) | -0.016 (0.015) |
| Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs | -0.010 (0.017) | -0.0005 (0.017) | -0.010 (0.017) | -0.011 (0.017) |
| Degree of urbanization: Rural | 0.013 (0.024) | 0.017 (0.024) | -0.004 (0.024) | 0.027 (0.024) |
| Employment status: Retired | -0.005 (0.032) | -0.031 (0.032) | -0.034 (0.032) | -0.016 (0.032) |
| Employment status: Student | 0.005 (0.044) | -0.023 (0.044) | -0.033 (0.044) | -0.025 (0.044) |
| Employment status: Working | 0.010 (0.024) | -0.027 (0.024) | -0.033 (0.024) | -0.012 (0.024) |
| Vote: Center-right or Right | -0.004 (0.017) | 0.003 (0.017) | 0.010 (0.017) | 0.002 (0.017) |
| Vote: PNR/Non-voter | 0.001 (0.019) | 0.014 (0.019) | -0.005 (0.019) | -0.012 (0.019) |
| Vote: Far right | 0.009 (0.034) | 0.030 (0.034) | 0.023 (0.035) | 0.038 (0.034) |
| Observations | 5,991 | 5,991 | 5,991 | 5,991 |
| R ² | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.002 | 0.003 |

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

²⁰⁹³ **J Placebo tests**

Table S15: Placebo tests.

| | G+R+C preferred to R+C (1) | Supports G+R+C (2) | Signs petition (3) | Share of policies supported (4) | Conjoint 5 A+CGS preferred to B (5) |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--|--|
| Mean | 0.645 | 0.633 | 0.611 | 0.535 | 0.596 |
| Branch of list experiment: 1 | -0.013 (0.019) | -0.024 (0.019) | -0.019 (0.019) | -0.013 (0.012) | -0.018 (0.021) |
| Branch of list experiment: rgl | 0.005 (0.019) | 0.006 (0.019) | -0.002 (0.019) | 0.001 (0.012) | 0.010 (0.021) |
| Branch of list experiment: rl | -0.009 (0.019) | -0.005 (0.019) | 0.022 (0.019) | 0.007 (0.012) | 0.007 (0.021) |
| Branch of petition: nr | 0.011 (0.014) | 0.006 (0.014) | 0.022 (0.014) | 0.003 (0.009) | -0.006 (0.015) |
| Poor is in own country | -0.002 (0.014) | -0.003 (0.014) | 0.015 (0.014) | 0.003 (0.009) | -0.020 (0.015) |
| Observations | 6,000 | 6,000 | 6,000 | 6,000 | 5,218 |
| R ² | 0.0004 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.001 |

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

²⁰⁹⁴ **K Main results on the extended sample**

²⁰⁹⁵ As a robustness check, we reproduce our main results on the extended sample that
²⁰⁹⁶ includes the 14% respondents who failed the attention check ($n = 9,318$). These results
²⁰⁹⁷ are non-weighted. They closely match the results in our main specification. For example,
²⁰⁹⁸ the support for the GCS is 54% in the U.S. and 75% in Europe, while the same coefficients
²⁰⁹⁹ are significant for the list experiment.

Figure S50: [Extended sample] Main attitudes by vote (“Right” spans from Center-right to Far right).

(Relative support in percent in Questions 20, 35, 45, 46, 49)

[\(Back to Section 2.6\)](#)

| | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom | United States |
|--|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|---------------|
| Support for the GCS | 75 | 78 | 70 | 81 | 75 | 54 |
| Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries | 83 | 81 | 84 | 87 | 81 | 68 |
| Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries* | 52 | 45 | 60 | 59 | 44 | 52 |
| A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human | 62 | 57 | 62 | 65 | 65 | 47 |
| High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries | 82 | 80 | 82 | 86 | 80 | 69 |
| [Country]'s foreign aid should be increased | 83 | 87 | 87 | 89 | 69 | 77 |
| Universalist* | 41 | 35 | 49 | 44 | 36 | 43 |

Figure S51: [Extended sample] Influence of the GCS on preferred platform: Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question 30; in the U.S., asked only to non-Republicans.)

| | Europe | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom | United States |
|---------------------------------------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------------|---------------|
| Random programs: A+GCS preferred to B | 60 | 61 | 59 | 64 | 58 | 59 |

Table S16: [Extended sample] Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list. The tacit support for the GCS is estimated by regressing the number of supported policies on the presence of the GCS in the list of policies. The social desirability is estimated as the difference between the tacit and stated support, and it is not significantly different from zero even at a 20% threshold (see [Methods](#)).

| | Number of supported policies | | |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | All | U.S. | Europe |
| List contains: GCS | 0.624*** (0.028) | 0.524*** (0.041) | 0.724*** (0.036) |
| <i>Support for GCS</i> | NA | 0.554 | 0.754 |
| <i>Social desirability bias</i> | -0.025 | -0.017 | -0.033 |
| <i>80% C.I. for the bias</i> | [-0.06; 0.01] | [-0.07; 0.04] | [-0.08; 0.01] |
| Constant | 1.317 | 1.147 | 1.486 |
| Observations | 6,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 |
| R ² | 0.089 | 0.065 | 0.125 |

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table S17: [Extended sample] Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. ([Question 28](#))

| | Prefers the Progressive platform | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------|---------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | All | United States | France | Germany | Spain | United Kingdom |
| GCS in Progressive platform | 0.022* (0.013) | 0.015 (0.018) | 0.116*** (0.037) | -0.007 (0.032) | 0.028 (0.038) | 0.012 (0.037) |
| Constant | 0.628 | 0.629 | 0.55 | 0.682 | 0.721 | 0.553 |
| Observations | 5,638 | 2,797 | 671 | 883 | 550 | 737 |
| R ² | 0.001 | 0.0002 | 0.014 | 0.0001 | 0.001 | 0.0001 |

Note: Simple OLS model. *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples. *p < 0.1;
p < 0.05; *p < 0.01.

2100 **L Effect of questionnaire framing**

2101 When comparing the samples *US1* and *US2*, we observe no effect of questionnaire
2102 framing (or block sequence) on the question “What group do you defend when you
2103 vote?”, common to all waves and placed close to the end of the questionnaire (Table S18).

Table S18: Effect of the wave (*US1* vs. *US2*) on the group defend when voting.
“What group do you defend when you vote?” (Question 57)

| | Group defended when voting | | |
|------------------|----------------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | Humans or Sentient beings | Fellow citizens | Family and self |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Wave: <i>US2</i> | −0.009 (0.014) | 0.009 (0.014) | 0.010 (0.011) |
| Mean | 0.432 | 0.335 | 0.156 |
| Observations | 5,000 | 5,000 | 5,000 |
| R ² | 0.0001 | 0.0001 | 0.0002 |

Note: Simple OLS model. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

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List of Tables

| | | |
|-------------|--|-----|
| 2478 1 | List experiment: tacit support for the GCS | 25 |
| 2479 2 | Influence of the GCS on electoral prospects | 25 |
| 2480 S1 | Campaign and bandwagon effects on the support for the GCS. | 32 |
| 2481 S2 | Donation to Africa vs. own country | 33 |
| 2482 S3 | Average Marginal Component Effects of global policies. | 33 |
| 2483 S4 | Estimated net gain from the GCS in 2030 and carbon footprint by country. . | 109 |
| 2484 S5 | Determinants of support for the GCS | 110 |
| 2485 S6 | Support for the GCS regressed on comprehension | 111 |
| 2486 S7 | Beliefs correlated with support for a global GHG tax and dividend (HICs) . | 111 |
| 2487 S8 | Beliefs correlated with support for a global GHG tax and dividend (MICs) . | 112 |
| 2488 S9 | Sample representativeness of <i>US1</i> , <i>US2</i> , <i>Eu</i> | 113 |
| 2489 S10 | Sample representativeness of each European country | 114 |
| 2490 S11 | Attrition analysis: <i>US1</i> | 115 |
| 2491 S12 | Attrition analysis: <i>US2</i> | 116 |
| 2492 S13 | Attrition analysis: <i>Eu</i> | 117 |
| 2493 S14 | Balance analysis | 118 |
| 2494 S15 | Placebo tests | 119 |
| 2495 S16 | (Extended sample) List experiment: tacit support for the GCS | 121 |
| 2496 S17 | (Extended sample) Influence of the GCS on electoral prospects | 121 |
| 2497 S18 | Effect of the wave on group defend when voting | 122 |

List of Figures

| | | |
|------------|---|----|
| 2499 1 | Western surveys' structure | 7 |
| 2500 2 | Relative support for global climate policies | 8 |
| 2501 3 | Relative support for other global policies | 16 |
| 2502 S1 | Support for the Global Climate Scheme | 32 |
| 2503 S2 | Preferences for various policies in political platforms | 34 |
| 2504 S3 | Influence of the GCS on preferred platform | 36 |
| 2505 S4 | Beliefs about support for the GCS and NR | 36 |
| 2506 S5 | Preferred share of wealth tax for low-income countries | 36 |
| 2507 S6 | Attitudes on the evolution of foreign aid | 37 |
| 2508 S7 | Conditions at which foreign aid should be increased | 37 |

| | | |
|------|---|----|
| 2509 | S8 Reasons why foreign aid should not be increased | 38 |
| 2510 | S9 Net gains with the CERF burden-sharing rule. | 52 |
| 2511 | S10 Comparison between GDR and equal per capita burden-sharing rules. | 53 |
| 2512 | S11 Absolute support for global climate policies | 57 |
| 2513 | S12 Comprehension | 58 |
| 2514 | S13 Comprehension score | 58 |
| 2515 | S14 List experiment | 58 |
| 2516 | S15 Conjoint analyses 1 and 2 | 59 |
| 2517 | S16 Preferences for various policies in political platforms (original) | 60 |
| 2518 | S17 Perceptions of the GCS | 61 |
| 2519 | S18 Classification of open-ended field on the GCS | 62 |
| 2520 | S19 Topics of open-ended field on the GCS | 63 |
| 2521 | S20 Donation to Africa vs. own country | 63 |
| 2522 | S21 Support for a global wealth tax | 64 |
| 2523 | S22 Support for a national wealth tax | 64 |
| 2524 | S23 Preferred share of global tax for low-income countries | 65 |
| 2525 | S24 Support for sharing half of global tax revenues with low-income countries | 65 |
| 2526 | S25 Perceived foreign aid | 65 |
| 2527 | S26 Preferred foreign aid (without info on actual amount) | 66 |
| 2528 | S27 Preferred foreign aid (after info on actual amount) | 66 |
| 2529 | S28 Actual, perceived and preferred amount of foreign aid (mean) | 67 |
| 2530 | S29 Preferred foreign aid (summary) | 67 |
| 2531 | S30 Preferences for funding increased foreign aid | 68 |
| 2532 | S31 Preferences of spending following reduced foreign aid | 69 |
| 2533 | S32 Willingness to sign a real-stake petition | 69 |
| 2534 | S33 Absolute support for various global policies | 70 |
| 2535 | S34 Preferred approach for international climate negotiations | 70 |
| 2536 | S35 Importance of selected issues | 71 |
| 2537 | S36 Group defended when voting | 71 |
| 2538 | S37 Mean prioritization of policies | 72 |
| 2539 | S38 Positive prioritization of policies | 73 |
| 2540 | S39 Charity donation | 74 |
| 2541 | S40 Interest in politics | 74 |
| 2542 | S41 Desired involvement of government | 75 |

| | | |
|------|--|-----|
| 2543 | S42 Political leaning | 75 |
| 2544 | S43 Voted in last election | 76 |
| 2545 | S44 Vote in last election | 76 |
| 2546 | S45 Perception that survey was biased | 77 |
| 2547 | S46 Classification of open-ended field on extreme poverty | 78 |
| 2548 | S47 Main attitudes by vote | 79 |
| 2549 | S48 Western surveys' structure | 84 |
| 2550 | S49 Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme. | 108 |
| 2551 | S50 (Extended sample) Main attitudes by vote | 120 |
| 2552 | S51 (Extended sample) Influence of the GCS on preferred platform | 120 |