

1 International Majorities Genuinely Support Global
2 Redistributive and Climate Policies

3 Adrien Fabre*, Thomas Douenne[†] and Linus Mattauch^{‡§}

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5

6 **Abstract**

7 We document majority support for policies entailing global redistribution and cli-
8 mate mitigation. Surveys on 40,680 respondents in 20 countries show strong stated
9 support for an effective way to jointly combat climate change and poverty: a global
10 carbon price funding a global basic income, called the “Global Climate Scheme” (GCS).
11 Through our main surveys on 8,000 respondents in the U.S., France, Germany, Spain,
12 and the UK, we test several hypotheses that could reconcile strong stated support
13 with a lack of salience in policy circles. The GCS is supported by three quarters of
14 Europeans and half of Americans, even as they understand the policy’s cost to them.
15 Using different experiments, we show that the support for the GCS is sincere and that
16 electoral candidates could win votes by endorsing it. More generally, we document
17 widespread support for other globally redistributive policies, such as a wealth tax
18 funding low-income countries or increased foreign aid. In sum, we provide evidence
19 that global policies are genuinely supported by majorities, even in wealthy nations
20 that would bear the burden.

21 **JEL codes:** P48, Q58, H23, Q54

22 **Keywords:** Climate change, global policies, cap-and-trade, attitudes, survey.

*CNRS, CIRED. E-mail: adrien.fabre@cnrs.fr (corresponding author).

[†]University of Amsterdam

[‡]Technical University Berlin, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research – Member of the Leibniz Association and University of Oxford

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71 **1 Introduction**

72 Major sustainability objectives could be achieved by global approaches to mitigating
 73 climate change and poverty involving transfers from high- to lower-income countries.^{1–6}
 74 For instance, a global wealth tax could finance the Sustainable Development Goals.⁷ More
 75 specifically, if merely 35% of the revenue were allocated for this purpose, a global 2% tax
 76 on individual wealth in excess of \$5 million could significantly reduce poverty as it would
 77 mechanically increase low-income countries' national income by 50% (as computed on
 78 the [WID wealth tax simulator](#)). Besides, global carbon pricing is widely regarded by
 79 economists as the benchmark climate policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon
 80 emissions externality. As early as 1990, Michael Grubb stated:⁸ "by far the best com-
 81 bination of long term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity, is obtained from a
 82 system based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions which are allocated on an adult
 83 per capita basis", i.e., equally among human adults. Support for such solution, which we
 84 call the "Global Climate Scheme", has been renewed ever since.^{9–15}

85 While international negotiations have not yet led to ambitious globally redistributive
86 policies, recent developments suggest that such a change might be underway. The African
87 Union calls for a global carbon taxation regime,¹⁶ the UN is setting up a Framework
88 Convention on International Tax Cooperation,¹⁷ the G20 is studying a global wealth tax,
89 etc.

90 A key condition for implementing global policies has remained largely unaddressed:
91 the support of citizens. Using a Global survey on 40,680 respondents from 20 high-
92 and middle-income countries, we reveal substantial support for those policies, especially
93 global climate policies and a global tax on the wealthiest aimed at financing low-income
94 countries (other questions from this survey are analyzed in a companion paper¹⁸). In-
95 terestingly, even in wealthy nations that would bear a significant burden, majorities of
96 citizens express support for such globally redistributive policies. To better understand
97 public support for global policies in high-income countries, we conduct our Main sur-
98 veys among 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, the UK, and the U.S.

99 The focus of the Main surveys is a specific policy aimed at addressing both climate
100 change and poverty, referred to as the “Global Climate Scheme” (GCS). It implements
101 a cap on carbon emissions to limit global warming below 2°C. The emission rights are
102 auctioned each year to polluting firms and fund a global basic income, alleviating extreme
103 poverty. This archetypal policy exposes respondents to the key trade-off between the
104 benefits and costs of globally redistributive climate policies, as respondents are made
105 aware of the cost that the GCS entails for their country’s people.

106 After checking that respondents have understood the policy and its cost, we measure
107 the support in a direct Yes/No question. The GCS is supported by three quarters of Eu-
108 ropeans and more than half of Americans. Then, we test for social desirability bias using
109 a list experiment. We find no evidence that people exaggerate their support in the direct
110 question. To assess whether the support would diminish in a context with real stakes,
111 we ask respondents whether they are willing to sign a petition in favor of the GCS, after
112 informing them that the question results will be communicated to their head of state’s
113 office. The support is sustained in an environment that approaches real stakes. We then
114 carry out conjoint analyses to neutralize experimenter demand and investigate the prior-
115 ity given to global policies compared to other types of policies. Conjoint analyses reveal
116 that a political platform is more likely to be preferred if it contains the GCS or a global tax
117 on millionaires, and that global policies rank high in the prioritization of policies. Our
118 randomized experiments also show that a candidate would not lose vote intentions by

¹¹⁹ endorsing the GCS, and might even gain up to 11 points in a country like France. An
¹²⁰ analysis of open-ended fields confirms that support for the GCS is real, and indicates that
¹²¹ appeal of the GCS comes from its international nature and its impacts on climate, more
¹²² than on global poverty. We also test other global policies and universalistic attitudes. Sup-
¹²³ port is very strong for a global tax on millionaires, and the median respondent prefers to
¹²⁴ allocate 30% of the revenues of such a tax to low-income countries. Majorities are willing
¹²⁵ to increase foreign aid, but only if some conditions are respected, such as making sure
¹²⁶ the aid is well spent and other high-income countries also increase their contribution.
¹²⁷ Questions on universalistic values, including a donation experiment, confirm the congru-
¹²⁸ ence of underlying values with the support for specific policies. Our diverse approaches
¹²⁹ also help understand what drives the support. For instance, the evidence indicates that
¹³⁰ one key reason why increasing foreign aid is not as popular as global policies lies in its
¹³¹ unilateral nature.

¹³² Overall, our results point out to strong and genuine support for global climate and re-
¹³³ distributive policies, as our experiments confirm the stated support found in direct ques-
¹³⁴ tions. Our results contribute to the literature on attitudes toward climate policy, confirm-
¹³⁵ ing that climate policy is preferred at a global level,^{19–22} where it is more effective and
¹³⁶ fair. Indeed, the Global Climate Scheme is largely supported, but a similar policy at the
¹³⁷ national level is opposed by a majority in many countries,¹⁸ despite lower costs. Noting
¹³⁸ that only 13% of French people declared supporting a national carbon tax with cash trans-
¹³⁹ fers during the Yellow Vests movement,²³ surveys appear to accurately reflect the level
¹⁴⁰ of support. Therefore, unless support for global policies disappear once they enter the
¹⁴¹ public debate, it seems unlikely that a policy such as the GCS would face major protests.
¹⁴² In our discussion we offer potential explanations behind the lack of prominence of global
¹⁴³ policies in the public debate despite this strong support.

¹⁴⁴ **Literature** International surveys have shown widespread support for costly climate ac-
¹⁴⁵ tion.^{18;24} For instance, representative surveys in 125 countries covering 96% of the world's
¹⁴⁶ greenhouse gas emissions show that 69% of the global population express willingness
¹⁴⁷ to contribute 1% of their income to fight global warming.²⁵ International surveys have
¹⁴⁸ also uncovered near consensus that “present economic differences between rich and poor
¹⁴⁹ countries are too large” (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree) in each of 29 countries.²⁶

¹⁵⁰ Yet, few prior attitudinal surveys have examined global redistributive policies. A no-
¹⁵¹ table exception tests the support for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples in five

¹⁵² countries, representative along gender and age.²⁷ For a given variant, the sample size is
¹⁵³ about 167 respondents per country. They find over 80% support for any variant in India,
¹⁵⁴ between 50% and 65% in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43% to 59% in the U.S.,
¹⁵⁵ depending on the variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding an equal
¹⁵⁶ cash transfer for each human is close to 50% in high-income countries (e.g., at 44% in the
¹⁵⁷ U.S.). These figures are consistent with our results from the *Global* survey (see Figure 2),
¹⁵⁸ where the support is lower for a tax that would “only” reduce CO₂ emissions than for
¹⁵⁹ a quota that would unambiguously achieve the climate target. Relatedly, 66% of Ameri-
¹⁶⁰ cans support providing “financial aid and technical support to developing countries that
¹⁶¹ agree to limit their greenhouse gas emissions”;²⁸ and 90% of Germans want some degree
¹⁶² of global redistribution.²⁹ Besides, in surveys conducted in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the
¹⁶³ UK and the U.S., support ranges from 55% to 74% for “a global democracy including both
¹⁶⁴ a global government and a global parliament, directly elected by the world population,
¹⁶⁵ to recommend and implement policies on global issues”.³⁰ Through an experiment, this
¹⁶⁶ paper also finds that, in countries where the government stems from a coalition, voting
¹⁶⁷ shares would shift by 8 (Brazil) to 12 p.p. (Germany) from parties who are said to oppose
¹⁶⁸ global democracy to parties that supposedly support it. For instance, when Germans re-
¹⁶⁹ spondents were told that (only) the Greens and the Left support global democracy, these
¹⁷⁰ parties gained respectively 9 and 3 p.p. in vote intentions.

¹⁷¹ Appendix A contains a broader literature review including further attitudinal sur-
¹⁷² veys on global policies (A.1.1); prior work on attitudes toward climate burden sharing
¹⁷³ (Appendix A.1.2), attitudes toward foreign aid (Appendix A.1.3); global carbon pricing
¹⁷⁴ (Appendix A.2.1), global redistribution (Appendix A.2.3), basic income (Appendix A.2.4),
¹⁷⁵ and global democracy (Appendix A.2.5).


¹⁷⁶ 2 Results

¹⁷⁷ 2.1 Data

¹⁷⁸ The study relies on two sets of surveys: the *Global* survey and the *Main* surveys.

¹⁷⁹ **Global Survey** The *Global* survey, conducted in 2021, involved 40,680 respondents from
¹⁸⁰ 20 countries, representing approximately 72% of global CO₂ emissions. This survey serves
¹⁸¹ as the basis for measuring stated support for various global policies worldwide. Detailed

Figure 1: Main surveys' structure. Cf. also Figure S48 for the treatment branches.



¹⁸² information about the data collection process, sample representativeness, and analysis of
¹⁸³ questions on national policies can be found in a companion paper.¹⁸

Main Surveys To delve deeper into the sincerity and rationales behind support for the GCS and attitudes towards global policies, global redistribution, and universalistic values, we conducted the Main surveys in 2023. These surveys are based on a sample of 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, the UK, and the U.S. The European survey (*Eu*) comprises 3,000 respondents, while the U.S. sample was collected in two separate waves: *US1* with 3,000 respondents and *US2* with 2,000 respondents. The survey questions in both the European and U.S. surveys are identical (see Figure 1), except for an additional question in *US2* that uses results from *US1* to assess the bandwagon effect.

The Main surveys ensured representativeness along key dimensions: gender, income, age, highest diploma, and degree of urbanization. The *Eu* survey is also representative of its four countries in terms of population size, while the *US1* and *US2* surveys are representative in terms of region and ethnicity. Tables [S9-S10](#) detail how our samples match population frequencies. More detail on data collection is given in Section [Methods](#). The

¹⁹⁷ questionnaires used in the surveys are provided in Appendices C and D.

¹⁹⁸ 2.2 Global support


¹⁹⁹ The Global survey shows strong support for climate policies enacted at the global
²⁰⁰ level (Figure 2). When asked “At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle
²⁰¹ climate change need to be put in place?”, 70% (in the U.S.) to 94% (in Japan) choose the
²⁰² global level. The next most popular choice is the federal or continental level, favored
²⁰³ by 52% of Americans and less than half of European respondents. Local policies receive
²⁰⁴ the least support. This preference for climate policies implemented at the global scale
²⁰⁵ is in line with the literature²⁰ and consistent with individuals’ concerns for the fairness
²⁰⁶ and effectiveness of such policies, which have been identified as two of the three key
²⁰⁷ determinants of support, besides self-interest.^{31;23;18} It could also stem from conditional
²⁰⁸ cooperation, although previous studies indicate that the support for climate policies does
²⁰⁹ not depend on climate action abroad.^{32;33}

²¹⁰ Among the four global climate policies examined in the *Global* survey, three policies
²¹¹ garner high support across all countries (Figure 2). These policies include a global demo-
²¹² cratic assembly on climate change, a global tax on millionaires to finance low-income
²¹³ countries contingent on their climate action, and a global carbon budget of +2°C divided
²¹⁴ among countries based on tradable shares (or “global quota”), with the allocation of coun-
²¹⁵ try shares unspecified (see wording in Appendix C). The three policies garner a majority
²¹⁶ of absolute support (i.e., “somewhat” or “strong” support) in all countries (except in the
²¹⁷ U.S. for the global assembly, 48% absolute support). In high-income countries, the global
²¹⁸ quota policy obtains 64% absolute support and 84% relative support (i.e., excluding “in-
²¹⁹ different” answers).

²²⁰ Following the support for the global quota, respondents are asked about their pref-
²²¹ erences for dividing the carbon budget among countries, as depicted in the third block
²²² of Figure 2. Consistent with the existing literature (see Appendix A.1.2), an equal per
²²³ capita allocation of emission rights emerges as the preferred burden-sharing principle,
²²⁴ garnering absolute majority support in all countries and never below 84% relative sup-
²²⁵ port. Taking into account historical responsibilities or vulnerability to climate damages is
²²⁶ also popular, albeit with less consensus, while grandfathering (i.e., allocation of emission
²²⁷ shares in proportion to current emissions) receives the least support in all countries.

²²⁸ A global carbon tax that funds a global basic income should produce the same dis-
²²⁹ tributional outcomes as a global tradable quota with equal per capita emission rights

Figure 2: Relative support for global climate policies.



Note 1: The numbers represent the share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* among non-*indifferent* answers (in percent, $n = 40,680$). The color blue denotes a relative majority. See Figure S11 for the absolute support. (Questions A-I).

Note 2: *In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

230 (provided that each country returns equally to its citizens the revenues from emissions
 231 trading and to the extent that the carbon price is the same). The support for the global car-
 232 bon tax is also tested and its redistributive effects – the average increase in expenditures
 233 along with the amount of the basic income – are specified to the respondents explicitly
 234 (see box below and Appendix D, p. 98). The support for the carbon tax is lower than for
 235 the quota, particularly in high-income countries, and there is no relative majority for the
 236 tax in Anglo-Saxon countries (consistently with the levels of support found in the only
 237 previous study that tested a global carbon tax²⁷). Two possible reasons for this lower
 238 support are that distributive effects are made salient in the case of the tax, and that peo-
 239 ple may prefer a quota, perhaps because they find it more effective than a tax to reduce

²⁴⁰ emissions. The combination of both reasons is consistent with the level of support for the
²⁴¹ global quota once we make the distributive effects salient, as we do in the Main surveys.

²⁴² 2.3 Stated support for the Global Climate Scheme

²⁴³ The Main surveys (*US1, US2, Eu*) include a comprehensive exploration of citizens'
²⁴⁴ attitudes towards the GCS. We present to respondents a detailed description of the GCS
²⁴⁵ and explain its distributive effects, including specific amounts at stake (as specified in
²⁴⁶ the box below). Furthermore, we assess respondents' understanding of the GCS with
²⁴⁷ incentivized questions to test their comprehension of the expected financial outcome for
²⁴⁸ typical individuals in high-income countries (loss) and the poorest individuals globally
²⁴⁹ (gain), followed by the provision of correct answers (Figures S12-S13). The same approach
²⁵⁰ is applied to a National Redistribution scheme (NR) targeting top incomes with the aim
²⁵¹ of financing cash transfers to all adults, calibrated to offset the monetary loss of the GCS
²⁵² for the median emitter in their country. We evaluate respondents' understanding that the
²⁵³ richest would lose and the typical fellow citizens would gain from that policy. Subse-
²⁵⁴ quently, we summarize both schemes to enhance respondents' recall. Additionally, we
²⁵⁵ present a final incentivized comprehension question and provide the expected answer
²⁵⁶ that the combined GCS and NR would result in no net gain or loss for a typical fellow
²⁵⁷ citizen. Finally, respondents are directly asked to express their support for the GCS and
²⁵⁸ NR using a simple Yes/No question.

The Global Climate Scheme The GCS consists of global emissions trading with emission rights being auctioned each year to polluting firms, and of a global basic income, funded by the auction revenues. Using the price and emissions trajectories from the report by Stern & Stiglitz,³⁴ and in particular a carbon price of \$90/tCO₂ in 2030, we estimate that the basic income would amount to \$30 per month for every human adult (see details in Appendix E). We describe the GCS to the respondents as a "climate club" and we specify its redistributive effects: The 700 million people with less than \$2/day [in Purchasing Power Parity] would be lifted out of extreme poverty, and fossil fuel price increases would cost the typical person in their country a specified amount (see Appendix D for details). The monthly median net cost is \$85 in the U.S., €10 in France, €25 in Germany, €5 in Spain, £20 in the UK.

²⁵⁹

²⁶⁰ The stated support for the GCS is 54% in the U.S. and 76% in Europe, while the support

for NR is very similar: 56% and 73% respectively (see Figure S1). Appendix F examines the sociodemographic determinants of support for the GCS as well as the beliefs correlated with the support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income. The strongest correlates are political leaning, trust in the government and perceptions that the policy is effective at reducing emissions or in one's self-interest.

Figure S1: [For Supplementary Material, except first row to be included in Figure 3] Support for the GCS, NR and the combination of GCS, NR and C (Yes/No questions). (p. 98, Questions 20, 22, 35, 36, and 26).

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)	54	76	80	71	81	74
National redistribution scheme (NR)	56	73	77	66	79	75
National climate policy + GCS + NR	52	74	79	69	81	70

2.4 Robustness and sincerity of support for the GCS

We use several methods to assess the sincerity of the support for the GCS: a list experiment, a real-stake petition, conjoint analyses, and the prioritization of policies. All methods suggest that the support is either completely sincere, or the share of insincere answers is limited.

2.4.1 List experiment

By asking *how many* policies within a list respondents support and varying the list among respondents, a list experiment allows identifying the tacit support for a policy of interest. For example, say a first subsample faces the list of policies A, B, and C, while a second subsamples faces the list A, B, C, and GCS. We do not need to know which policies each respondent support to estimate the average (tacit) support for the GCS, we simply need to compute the difference in the average number of supported policies between the two random subsamples.³⁵ In our case, as shown in Table 1, the tacit support for the

²⁷⁹ GCS measured through the list experiment is not significantly lower than the direct stated
²⁸⁰ support. Hence, we do not find a social desirability bias in our study.

Table 1: Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list. The tacit support for the GCS is estimated by regressing the number of supported policies on the presence of the GCS in the list of policies. The social desirability is estimated as the difference between the tacit and stated support, and it is not significantly different from zero even at a 20% threshold (see [Methods](#)).

	Number of supported policies		
	All	U.S.	Europe
List contains: GCS	0.624*** (0.028)	0.524*** (0.041)	0.724*** (0.036)
<i>Support for GCS</i>	0.65	0.542	0.757
<i>Social desirability bias</i>	-0.025	-0.019	-0.033
<i>80% C.I. for the bias</i>	[-0.06; 0.01]	[-0.07; 0.04]	[-0.08; 0.01]
Constant	1.317	1.147	1.486
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000
R ²	0.089	0.065	0.125

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

²⁸¹ 2.4.2 Petition

²⁸² We ask respondents whether they are willing to sign a petition in support of either
²⁸³ the GCS or NR policy. We inform them that the petition results will be sent to the head
²⁸⁴ of state's office, highlighting the proportion of fellow citizens endorsing the respective
²⁸⁵ scheme. Even when framed as a petition that might have real stakes, both policies con-
²⁸⁶ tinue to receive majority support. In the U.S., we find no significant difference between
²⁸⁷ the support in the petitions and the simple questions (GCS: $p = .30$; NR: $p = .76$). In Eu-
²⁸⁸ rope, the petition leads to a comparable lower support for both the GCS (7 p.p., $p = 10^{-5}$)
²⁸⁹ and NR (4 p.p., $p = .008$). While some European respondents are unwilling to sign a
²⁹⁰ petition for policies they are expected to support, this effect is not specific to the GCS, and
²⁹¹ the overall willingness to sign a petition remains strong, with 69% expressing support for
²⁹² the GCS and 67% for NR.

293 **2.4.3 Conjoint analyses**

294 In order to assess the public support for the GCS in conjunction with other policies, we
295 conduct a series of conjoint analyses. We ask respondents to make five choices between
296 pairs of political platforms.

297 The first conjoint analysis suggests that the GCS is supported independently of being
298 complemented by the National Redistribution Scheme and a national climate policy (C).
299 The second analysis indicates majority support for the GCS and for C, which are seen as
300 neither complement nor substitute (see [Methods](#)). A minor share of respondents like a
301 national climate policy and dislike a global one, but as many people prefer a global rather
302 than a national policy; and there is no evidence that implementing NR would increase the
303 support for the GCS.

304 In the third analysis, we present two random branches of the sample with hypothetical
305 progressive and conservative platforms that differ only by the presence (or not) of the
306 GCS in the progressive platform. Table 2 shows that a progressive candidate would not
307 significantly lose voting share by endorsing the GCS in any country, and may even gain
308 11 p.p. ($p = .005$) in voting intention in France.

Table 2: Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. (Question 28)

	Prefers the Progressive platform					
	All	United States	France	Germany	UK	Spain
GCS in Progressive platform	0.028*	0.029	0.112***	0.015	0.008	-0.015
	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.041)	(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.038)
Constant	0.623	0.604	0.55	0.7	0.551	0.775
Observations	5,202	2,619	605	813	661	504
R ²	0.001	0.001	0.013	0.0003	0.0001	0.0003

Note: Simple OLS model. The 14% of *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples.
GCS has no significant influence on them. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

309 Our last two analyses make respondents choose between two random platforms. In
310 Europe, respondents are prompted to imagine that a left or center-left coalition will win
311 the next election and asked what platform they would prefer that coalition to have cam-
312 paigned on. In the U.S., the question is framed as a hypothetical duel in a Democratic
313 primary, and asked only to non-Republicans ($n = 2,218$), i.e. the respondents who declare

³¹⁴ as political affiliation *Democrat*, *Independent*, *Non-Affiliated* or *Other*. In the fourth analy-
³¹⁵ sis, a policy (or an absence of policy) is randomly drawn for each platform in each of five
³¹⁶ categories: *economic issues*, *societal issues*, *climate policy*, *tax system*, *foreign policy* (Figure S2).


³¹⁷ In the UK, Germany, and France, a platform is about 9 to 13 p.p. more likely to be
³¹⁸ preferred if it includes the GCS rather than no foreign policy. This effect is between 1 and
³¹⁹ 4 p.p. and no longer significant in the U.S. (among non-Republicans) and in Spain. More-
³²⁰ over, a platform that includes a global tax on millionaires rather than no foreign policy is 5
³²¹ to 13 p.p. more likely to be preferred in all countries (the effect is significant and at least 9
³²² p.p. in all countries but Spain). Similarly, a global democratic assembly on climate change
³²³ has a significant effect of 8 to 12 p.p. in the U.S. (among non-Republicans), Germany, and
³²⁴ France. These effects are large, and not far from the effects of the policies most influential
³²⁵ on the platforms, which range between 15 and 18 p.p. in most countries (and 27 p.p. in
³²⁶ Spain), and all relate to improved public services (in particular healthcare, housing, and
³²⁷ education).

Figure S2: [For Supplementary Material] Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See non-translated versions in Figure S16; Question 29)


(a) U.S. (Asked only to non-Republicans)




(b) France




(c) Germany



(d) Spain




(e) UK



328 The fifth analysis draws random platforms similarly, except that candidate A's platform
329 always contains the GCS while B's includes no foreign policy. In this case, A is chosen
330 by 60% of Europeans and 58% of non-Republican Americans (Figure S3). Overall, taking
331 the U.S. as an example, our conjoint analyses indicate that a candidate at the Democratic
332 primary would have more chances to obtain the nomination by endorsing the GCS, and
333 this endorsement would not penalize her or him at the presidential election.

Figure S3: [For Supplementary Material] Influence of the GCS on preferred platform:
Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than
a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question 30; in the U.S., asked only to non-
Republicans.)



334 2.4.4 Prioritization

335 Towards the end of the survey, we ask respondents to allocate 100 points among six
336 randomly selected policies from the previous conjoint analyses, using sliders. The instruc-
337 tion was to distribute the points based on their level of support, with a higher allocation
338 indicating greater support for a policy. As a result, the average support across policies is
339 16.67 points. In each country, the GCS ranks in the middle of all policies or above, with
340 an average number of points from 15.4 in the U.S. to 22.9 in Germany.

341 Interestingly, in Germany, the most prioritized policy is the global tax on millionaires,
342 while the GCS is the second most prioritized policy. The global tax on millionaires con-
343 sistently ranks no lower than fifth position (out of 15 or 17 policies) in every country,
344 garnering an average of 18.3 points in Spain to 22.9 points in Germany.

345 2.4.5 Pros and Cons

346 We survey respondents to gather their perspectives on the pros and cons of the GCS,
347 randomly utilizing an open-ended or a closed question. In the closed question format,
348 respondents tend to consider every argument as important in determining their support
349 or opposition to the GCS (see Figure S17).

350 The open-ended question provides more insights into what people associate with the
351 GCS when prompted to think about it. Analyzing keywords in the responses (automati-
352 cally translated into English), the most frequently mentioned topics are the international
353 aspect and the environment, each appearing in approximately one-quarter of the answers
354 (see Figure S19). This is followed by discussions on the effects of the GCS on poverty and
355 prices, each mentioned by about one-tenth of the respondents. We also manually clas-
356 sified each answer into different categories (see Figure S18). This exercise confirms the
357 findings from the automatic search: the environmental benefit of the GCS is the most
358 commonly discussed topic, while obstacles to implementation or agreement on the pro-
359 posal are relatively infrequently mentioned.

360 In the US2 survey, we divided the sample into four random branches. Two branches
361 were presented the pros and cons questions (either in open or closed format) *before* be-
362 ing asked about their support for the GCS or NR. Another branch received information
363 on the actual level of support for the GCS and NR (estimated in US1, see box p. 19),
364 and one control group received none of these treatments. The objective of the “pros and
365 cons treatment” was to mimic a “campaign effect”, which refers to the shift in opinion
366 resulting from media coverage of the proposal. To conservatively estimate the effect of
367 a (potentially negative) campaign, we intentionally included more cons (6) than pros (3).
368 Interestingly, the support for the GCS decreased by 11 p.p. after respondents viewed a list
369 of its pros and cons. Notably, the support also decreased by 7 p.p. after respondents were
370 asked to consider the pros and cons in an open-ended question. Despite some significant
371 effects of pondering the pros and cons, approximately half of the Americans express sup-
372 port for the GCS across all treatment branches (see Table S2). Although support remains
373 significant, these results suggest that the public success of the GCS would be sensitive to
374 the content of the debate about it, and subject to the discourse adopted by interest groups.

Second-order Beliefs To explain the strong support for the GCS despite its absence from political platforms and public debate, we hypothesized pluralistic ignorance, i.e. that the public and policymakers mistakenly perceive the GCS as unpopular. As a result, individuals might conceal their support for such globally redistributive policies, believing that advocating for them would be futile.

In the case of Americans, their beliefs about the level of support for the GCS are relatively accurate (Figure S4). The mean perceived support is 52% (with quartiles of 36%, 52%, and 68%), which closely aligns with the actual support of 53%. Europeans, on the other hand, underestimate the support by 17 p.p. Nonetheless, 65% of them correctly estimate that the GCS garners majority support, and the mean perceived support is 59% (and quartiles of 43%, 61%, and 74%), compared to the actual support of 76%. Second-order beliefs are equally accurate for NR in the U.S. and similarly underestimated in Europe. Finally, consistent with Americans accurately perceiving the levels of support for the GCS or NR, providing information on the actual level had no significant effect on their support in the US2 survey.

375


Figure S4: [For Supplementary Material] Beliefs regarding the support for the GCS and NR. (Questions 21 and 23)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Belief about GCS	52	59	61	56	63	57
Support for the GCS	54	76	80	71	81	74
Belief about NR	55	58	60	53	62	59
Support for NR	56	73	77	66	79	75

Figure S5: [For Supplementary Material] Percent of global wealth tax that should finance low-income countries (*mean*).

"Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all countries around the world. (...)

What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of retained in the country's national budget)??" (Question 37)



³⁷⁶ 2.5 Stated support for global redistribution

³⁷⁷ 2.5.1 Global wealth tax

³⁷⁸ Consistent with the results of the Global survey, a "tax on millionaires of all countries
³⁷⁹ to finance low-income countries" garners relative support of over 69% in each country,
³⁸⁰ only 5 p.p. lower than a national millionaires tax overall (Figure 3). In random subsam-
³⁸¹ ples, we inquire about respondents' preferences regarding the redistribution of revenues
³⁸² from a global tax on individual wealth exceeding \$5 million, after providing information
³⁸³ on the revenue raised by such a tax in their country compared to low-income countries.
³⁸⁴ We ask certain respondents ($n = 1,283$) what percentage of global tax revenues should be
³⁸⁵ pooled to finance low-income countries. In each country, at least 88% of respondents in-
³⁸⁶ dicate a positive amount, with an average of one-third (Figure S5). To other respondents
³⁸⁷ ($n = 1,233$), we inquire whether they would prefer each country to retain all the revenues
³⁸⁸ it collects or that half of the revenues be pooled to finance low-income countries. Ap-
³⁸⁹ proximately half of the respondents opt to allocate half of the tax revenues to low-income
³⁹⁰ countries, consistently with the other variant of the question.

³⁹¹ 2.5.2 Other global policies

³⁹² We also assess support for other global policies (Figure 3). Most policies garner rel-
³⁹³ ative majority support in each country, with two exceptions: the "cancellation of low-
³⁹⁴ income countries' public debt" and "a maximum wealth limit" for each individual. The
³⁹⁵ latter policy obtains relative majority support in Europe but not in the U.S., despite the

Figure 3: Relative support for various global policies (percentage of *somewhat* or *strong support*, after excluding *indifferent* answers). (Questions 44 and 45; See Figure S33 for the absolute support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	55	71	72	70	79	70
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	68	82	82	82	85	81
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	60	76	77	79	79	71
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	46	53	53	43	62	61
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	58	71	69	69	78	72
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	62	73	58	73	80	83
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	63	80	80	78	81	83
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	62	87	90	86	91	87
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	46	62	58	62	65	67
National tax on millionaires funding public services	73	85	81	87	89	88
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	69	84	84	84	87	83

³⁹⁶ cap being set at \$10 billion in the U.S. compared to €/£100 million in Europe. Notably,
³⁹⁷ climate-related policies enjoy significant popularity, with “high-income countries funding
³⁹⁸ renewable energy in low-income countries” receiving absolute majority support across all
³⁹⁹ surveyed countries. Additionally, relative support for loss and damages compensation, as
⁴⁰⁰ approved in principle at the international climate negotiations in 2022 (“COP27”), ranges
⁴⁰¹ from 55% (U.S.) to 81% (Spain).

⁴⁰² 2.5.3 Foreign aid

⁴⁰³ We provide respondents with information about the actual amount “spent on foreign
⁴⁰⁴ aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries” relative to their country’s government

405 spending and GDP. Less than 16% of respondents state that their country's foreign aid
406 should be reduced, while 62% express support for increasing it, including 17% who sup-
407 port an unconditional increase (Figure S4). Among the 45% who think aid should be
408 increased under certain conditions, we subsequently ask them to specify the conditions
409 they deem necessary (Figure S5). The three most commonly selected conditions are: "we
410 can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted" (73% chose this con-
411 dition), "that recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights" (67%),
412 and "that other high-income countries also increase their foreign aid" (48%). On the other
413 hand, respondents who do not wish to increase their country's foreign aid primarily jus-
414 tify their view by prioritizing the well-being of their fellow citizens or by perceiving each
415 country as responsible for its own fate (Figure S6). In response to an open-ended ques-
416 tion regarding measures high-income countries should take to fight extreme poverty, a
417 large majority of Americans expressed that more help is needed (Figure S46). The most
418 commonly suggested form of aid is financial support, closely followed by investments in
419 education.

420 We also inquire about the perceived amount of foreign aid. Consistent with prior re-
421 search (see Appendix A.1.3), most people overestimate the actual amount of foreign aid
422 (Figure S25). We then elicit respondents' preferred amount of foreign aid, after randomly
423 presenting them with either the actual amount or no information. Most of the respon-
424 dents who learn the actual amount choose a bracket at least as high as the actual one, and
425 most of those without the information choose a bracket at least as high as the perceived
426 one (Figures S28–S27). Finally, we ask a last question to the respondents who received
427 the information. To those who prefer an increase of foreign aid, we ask how they would
428 finance it: by far, the preferred source of funding is higher taxes on the wealthiest (Figure
429 S30). To those who prefer a reduction, we ask how they would use the funds becoming
430 available: In every country, more people choose higher spending on education or health-
431 care rather than lower taxes (Figure S31).

Universalistic values We also elicit underlying values, to test whether broad values are consistent with people’s support for specific policies. When we ask respondents which group they defend when they vote, 20% choose “sentient beings (humans and animals),” 22% choose “humans,” 33% select their “fellow citizens” (or “Europeans”), 15% choose “My family and myself,” and the remaining 10% choose another group (mainly “My State or region” or “People sharing my culture or religion”). The first two categories, representing close to one out of two people, can be described as universalist in their vote. Notably, a majority of left-wing voters are universalist in their vote (see Figure S47).

When asked what their country’s diplomats should defend in international climate negotiations, only 11% prefer their country’s “interests, even if it goes against global justice.” In contrast, 30% prefer global justice (with or without consideration of national interests), and the bulk of respondents (38%) prefer their country’s “interests, to the extent it respects global justice.”

Furthermore, when we ask respondents to assess the extent to which climate change, global poverty, and inequality in their country are issues, climate change is generally viewed as the most significant problem (with a mean score of 0.59 after recoding answers between -2 and 2). This is followed by global poverty (0.42) and national inequality (0.37).

Finally, we conduct a lottery experiment to elicit universalistic values. Respondents were automatically enrolled in a lottery with a \$100 prize and had to choose the proportion of the prize they would keep for themselves versus give to a person living in poverty. The charity donation is directed either to an African individual or a fellow citizen, depending on the respondent’s random assignment. In Europe, we observe no significant variation in the willingness to donate based on the recipient’s origin. In the U.S., the donations to Africans are 3 p.p. lower (with an average donation of 34%), but the slightly lower donations to Africans are entirely driven by Trump voters and non-voters (Table S3).

432

433 3 Discussion

434 Our point of departure are recent surveys conducted in 20 of the largest countries, as
435 they reveal robust majority support for global redistributive and climate policies, even in

Figure S4: [For Supplementary Material] Attitudes regarding the evolution of [own country] foreign aid. (Question 46)





Figure S5: [For Supplementary Material] Conditions at which foreign aid should be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish an increase of foreign aid at some conditions.] (Question 47)



⁴³⁶ high-income countries that would financially lose from them. The results from the Main
⁴³⁷ surveys conducted in the U.S. and four European countries reinforce these findings. We
⁴³⁸ find strong support for global taxes on the wealthiest individuals, as well as majority sup-
⁴³⁹ port for our main policy of interest – the Global Climate Scheme (GCS). The GCS encom-
⁴⁴⁰ passes carbon pricing at a global level through an emissions trading system, accompanied
⁴⁴¹ by a global basic income funded by the scheme's revenues. Additional experiments, such
⁴⁴² as a list experiment and a real-stake petition, demonstrate that the support for the GCS is

Figure S6: [For Supplementary Material] Reasons why foreign aid should not be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish a decrease or stability of foreign aid.] (Question 48)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Aid perpetuates poverty as it makes people feel less responsible for themselves	29	30	31	35	31	24
Aid is not effective as most of it is diverted	40	53	48	57	60	49
Aid is a pressure tactic for high-income countries that prevents low-income countries from developing freely	16	16	15	14	23	13
[Country] is not responsible for what happens in other countries	45	30	28	30	20	37
Charity begins at home: there is already a lot to do to support the [country] people in need	63	63	51	62	71	69

443 real. Such genuine support is further substantiated by the prioritization of the GCS over
 444 prominent national climate policies and aligned with a significant portion of the popu-
 445 lation holding universalistic values rather than nationalistic or egoistic ones. Moreover,
 446 the conjoint analyses indicate that a progressive candidate would not lose voting shares
 447 by endorsing the GCS, and may even gain 11 p.p. in voting shares in France. Similarly,
 448 a candidate endorsing the GCS would gain votes in a U.S. Democratic primary, while in
 449 Europe, a progressive platform that includes the GCS would be preferred over one that
 450 does not.

451 Having ruled out insincerity as potential explanation for the scarcity of global policies
 452 in the public debate, we propose alternative explanations. The first two are variations of
 453 pluralistic ignorance, and the last three represent complementary explanations.

454 First, there may be pluralistic ignorance *among policymakers* regarding universalistic
 455 values, support for the GCS, or the electoral advantage of endorsing it. Second, people or
 456 policymakers may believe that globally redistributive policies are politically infeasible in
 457 some key (potentially foreign) countries like the U.S. Third, political discourse centrally
 458 happens at the national level, shaped by national media and institutions such as voting.
 459 National framing by political voices may create biases and suppress universalistic values.
 460 Fourth, many individuals, including policymakers, may perceive global redistributive
 461 policies as ill-defined or technically infeasible, ultimately dismissing them as unrealistic.

⁴⁶² In particular, policymakers may have insider information about the technical feasibility of
⁴⁶³ such policies. Alternatively, the perception of unrealism may stem from an unawareness
⁴⁶⁴ of specific proposals. Fifth, just as policy is disproportionately influenced by the economic
⁴⁶⁵ elites,^{36;37} public debate may be shaped by the wealthiest, who have vested interests in
⁴⁶⁶ preventing global redistribution.

⁴⁶⁷ Confirmation of any of these hypotheses would lead to a common conclusion: there
⁴⁶⁸ exists substantial support for global policies addressing climate change and global in-
⁴⁶⁹ equality, even in high-income countries, and the perceived boundaries of political realism
⁴⁷⁰ on this issue may soon shift. Uncovering evidence to support the above hypotheses could
⁴⁷¹ draw attention to global policies in the public debate and contribute to their increased
⁴⁷² prominence.

⁴⁷³ Methods

⁴⁷⁴ **Data collection.** The paper utilizes two sets of surveys: the *Global* survey and the *Main* sur-
⁴⁷⁵ veys. The *Main* surveys consist of two U.S. surveys, *US1* and *US2*, and one European survey, *Eu*.
⁴⁷⁶ The *Global* survey was conducted from March 2021 to March 2022 on 40,680 respondents from
⁴⁷⁷ 20 countries (with 1,465 to 2,488 respondents per country). *US1* collected responses from 3,000
⁴⁷⁸ respondents between January and March 2023, while *US2* gathered data from 2,000 respondents
⁴⁷⁹ between March and April 2023. *Eu* included 3,000 respondents and was conducted from February
⁴⁸⁰ to March 2023. We used the survey companies *Dynata* and *Respondi*. To ensure representative
⁴⁸¹ samples, we employed stratified quotas based on gender, age (5 brackets), income (4), region (4),
⁴⁸² education level (3), and ethnicity (3) for the U.S. We also incorporated survey weights throughout
⁴⁸³ the analysis to account for any remaining imbalances. These weights were constructed using the
⁴⁸⁴ quota variables as well as the degree of urbanity, and trimmed between 0.25 and 4. Stratified quo-
⁴⁸⁵ tas followed by reweighting is the usual method to reduce selection bias from opt-in online panels,
⁴⁸⁶ when better sampling methods (such as compulsory participation of random dwellings) are un-
⁴⁸⁷ available.³⁸ By applying weights, the results are fully representative of the respective countries
⁴⁸⁸ along the above mentioned dimensions. Results at the European level apply different weights
⁴⁸⁹ which ensure representativeness of the combined four European countries. Appendix G shows
⁴⁹⁰ how our samples compare to actual population frequencies. Our samples match well actual fre-
⁴⁹¹ quencies, except for some imbalance on vote in the U.S. (which does not affect our results, as show
⁴⁹² the results reweighted by vote in the below section *Support for the GCS*). Appendix I shows that
⁴⁹³ the treatment branches are balanced. Appendix J runs placebo tests of the effects of each treat-
⁴⁹⁴ ment on unrelated outcomes. We do not find effects of earlier treatments on unrelated outcomes
⁴⁹⁵ arriving later in the survey. Appendix K shows that our results are robust to including inattentive

496 respondents.

497 **Data quality.** The median duration is 28 minutes for the *Global* survey, 14 min for *US1*, 11 min
498 for *US2*, and 20 min for *Eu*. To ensure the best possible data quality, we exclude respondents
499 who fail an attention test or rush through the survey (i.e., answer in less than 11.5 minutes in
500 the *Global* survey, 4 minutes in *US1* or *US2*, 6 minutes in *Eu*). At the end of the survey, we ask
501 whether respondents thought that our survey was politically biased and provide some feedback.
502 67% of the respondents found the survey unbiased. 25% found it left-wing biased, and 8% found
503 it right-wing biased.

504 **Questionnaires and raw results.** The questionnaire and raw results of the *Global* survey can
505 be found in the Appendix of the companion paper.¹⁸ The raw results are reported in Appendix
506 B while the surveys' structures and questionnaires are given in Appendices C and D. Country-
507 specific raw results are also available as supplementary material files: US, EU, FR, DE, ES, UK.
508 The questionnaires are the same as the ones given *ex ante* in the registration plan (osf.io/fy6gd).

509 **Incentives.** To encourage accurate and truthful responses, several questions of the *US1* survey
510 use incentives. For each of the three comprehension questions that follow the policy descrip-
511 tions, we randomly select and reward three respondents who provide correct answers with a \$50
512 gift certificate. Similarly, for questions involving estimating support shares for the GCS and NR,
513 three respondents with the closest guesses to the actual values receive a \$50 gift certificate. In the
514 donation lottery question, we randomly select one respondent and split the \$100 prize between
515 the NGO GiveDirectly and the winner according to the winner's choice. In total, our incentives
516 scheme distributes gift certificates (and donations) for a value of \$850. Finally, respondents have
517 an incentive to answer truthfully to the petition question, as they are aware that the results for
518 that question (the share of respondents supporting the policy) will be transmitted to their head of
519 state's office.

520 **Absolute vs. relative support.** In most questions, support or opposition for a policy is asked
521 using a 5-Likert scale, with *Indifferent* as the middle option and compulsory response. We call
522 *absolute support* the share of *Somewhat* or *Strong support*. We generally favor the notion of *relative*
523 *support*, which reports the share of support after excluding *Indifferent* answers. Indeed, the *relative*
524 *support* is better suited to assess whether there is more people in favor vs. against a policy.

525 **Support for the GCS.** The 95% confidence intervals are [52.4%, 55.9%] in the U.S. and [74.2%, 77.2%]
526 in Europe. The average support is computed with survey weights, employing weights based on
527 quota variables, which exclude vote. Another method to reweigh the raw results involves running

528 a regression of the support for the GCS on sociodemographic characteristics (including vote) and
529 multiplying each coefficient by the population frequencies. This alternative approach yields sim-
530 ilar figures: 76% in Europe and 52% or 53% in the U.S. (depending on whether individuals who
531 did not disclose their vote are classified as non-voters or excluded). Notably, the average support
532 excluding non-voters is 54% in the U.S.

533 Though the level of support for the GCS is significantly lower in swing States (at 51%) that
534 are key to win U.S. elections, the electoral effect of endorsing the GCS remains non-significantly
535 different from zero (at +1.2 p.p.) in these States. Note that we define swing states as the 8 states
536 with less than 5 p.p. margin of victory in the 2020 election (MI, NV, PA, WI, AZ, GA, NC, FL). The
537 results are robust to using the 3 p.p. threshold (that excludes FL) instead.

538 **List experiment.** List experiments have been used to reveal social desirability bias, silencing ei-
539 ther racism in the Southern U.S.³⁹ or opposition to the invasion of Ukraine in Russia.⁴⁰ In our case,
540 the question reads: “Beware, this question is quite unusual. Among the policies below, **how many**
541 do you support?” The list of policies randomly varies across respondents, and includes a subset of
542 GCS, NR (National Redistribution scheme), C (“Coal exit” in the U.S., “Thermal insulation plan”
543 in Europe) and O (“Marriage only for opposite-sex couples in the U.S.”, “Death penalty for major
544 crimes” in Europe). There are four branches: GCS/NR/C/O; GCS/C/O; NR/C/O; C/O. To esti-
545 mate the tacit average support for the GCS and NR, we regress the number of supported policies
546 on indicators that the list includes GCS and NR. We utilize the difference-in-means estimator, and
547 confidence intervals are computed using Monte Carlo simulation with the R package *list*.³⁵

548 **Petition.** The respondent is randomly assigned a branch where the petition relates to the GCS or
549 the National Redistribution scheme. The question reads: “Would you be willing to sign a petition
550 for the [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme?

551 As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President’s office], in-
552 forming him what share of American people are willing to endorse the [Global climate / National
553 redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign, only your answer here is required and
554 remains anonymous.)”.

555 Paired weighted *t*-tests are conducted to test the equality in support for a policy among re-
556 spondents who were questioned about the policy in the petition.

557 **Conjoint analyses.** The first conjoint analysis suggests that the GCS is supported independently
558 of being complemented by the National Redistribution Scheme and a national climate policy
559 (“Coal exit” in the U.S., “Thermal insulation plan” in Europe, denoted C). Indeed, 54% of U.S.
560 respondents and 74% of European ones prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to the com-
561 bination of C and NR alone, indicating similar support for the GCS conditional on NR and C than

562 for the GCS alone (Figure S15).

563 In the second conjoint analysis, results from the first branch show that the support for the GCS
564 conditional on NR, at 55% in the U.S. ($n = 757$) and 77% in Europe ($n = 746$), is not significantly
565 different from the support for the GCS alone. This suggests that rejection of the GCS is not driven
566 by the cost of the policy on oneself. The second branch shows that the support for C conditional
567 on NR is somewhat higher, at 62% in the U.S. ($n = 751$) and 84% in Europe ($n = 747$). However,
568 the third one shows no significant preference for C compared to GCS (both conditional on NR),
569 neither in Europe, where GCS is preferred by 52% ($n = 741$) nor in the U.S., where C is preferred
570 by 53% ($n = 721$). The fourth branch shows that 55% in the U.S. ($n = 771$) and 77% in Europe ($n =$
571 766) prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to NR alone.

572 The effects reported in the fourth analysis are the Average Marginal Component Effects.⁴¹ The
573 policies studied are progressive policies prominent in the country. Except for the category *foreign*
574 *policy*, which features the GCS 42% of the time, they are drawn uniformly.

575 **Prioritization.** The prioritization allows inferring individual-level preferences for one policy
576 over another. This slightly differs from a conjoint analysis, which only allows inferring individual-
577 level preferences for one platform over another or collective-level preferences for one policy over
578 another. Also, by comparing platforms, conjoint analyses may be subject to interaction effects
579 between policies of a platform (which can be seen as complementary, subsitute, or antagonistic)
580 while the prioritization frames the policies as independent.

581 This question sheds light on a potential discrepancy between the policy priorities of the public
582 and those enacted by legislators. For instance, while the European Union and California have
583 enacted plans to phase out new combustion-engine cars by 2035, the proposal to “ban the sale of
584 new combustion-engine cars by 2030” emerged as one of the three least prioritized policies in each
585 country, with an average allocation of 7.8 points in France to 11.4 points in the UK.

586 **Open-ended question on the GCS.** Around one in four respondents explicitly cites pros or cons.
587 Few individuals explicitly express support or opposition, and misunderstandings are rare. Only
588 11% of the responses are empty or express a lack of opinion, though one-quarter are unclassifiable
589 due to the rarity, nonsensical nature, or irrelevance of the conveyed idea.

590 **Pros and cons.** In the closed question, the least important aspect was the negative impact on
591 their household, with 60% in Europe ($n=1,505$) and 75% in the U.S. ($n=493$) finding it important.
592 The most important elements differ between Europe and the U.S. In Europe, the key factors are
593 the GCS’s potential to limit climate change and reduce poverty in low-income countries, both
594 deemed important by 85% of respondents. In the U.S., having sufficient information about the
595 scheme ranks highest at 89%, followed by its potential to foster global cooperation at 82%.

596 Surprisingly, the support for National Redistribution also decreased by 7 p.p. following the
597 closed question about the GCS. This suggests that some individuals may lack attention and con-
598 fuse the two policies, or that contemplating the pros and cons alters the mood of some people,
599 moving them away from their initial positive impression.

600 **Global wealth tax estimates.** A 2% tax on net wealth exceeding \$5 million would annually raise
601 \$816 billion, leaving unaffected 99.9% of the world population. More specifically, it would collect
602 €5 billion in Spain, €16 billion in France, £20 billion in the UK, €44 billion in Germany, \$430
603 billion in the U.S., and \$1 billion collectively in all low-income countries (28 countries, home to
604 700 million people). These Figures come from the [WID wealth tax simulator](#).⁴²

605 **Design choices.** As Global survey results indicated strong support for global redistributive poli-
606 cies worldwide, we conducted our Main surveys to test the robustness of these results. Among
607 the eight largest high-income countries, we selected the five ones with a relatively low level of
608 support for global redistributive policies as observed in the Global survey. We also focus on the
609 GCS as its costs are less concentrated on the very rich, compared to other global redistributive
610 policies, so we expect lower (or less genuine) support. By selecting countries that would lose from
611 global redistribution, are less supportive than others, and focusing on less consensual policies, we
612 aimed at conservatively assessing the level of support of world citizens for global redistribution.

613 We split the U.S. survey into two waves to test the effect on the support of providing the
614 information on the actual support, and merged the *Eu* survey in one wave to get larger sample
615 sizes and more power in the analyses.

616 To select the policies tested, we spanned three key areas for global redistribution: climate
617 change, inequality, and global governance. We selected policies that are either on the agenda of
618 international negotiations (international transfers for mitigation; adaptation; or loss and damages;
619 cancellation of public debt; reform of voting rights at the UN or IMF; global wealth tax) or advo-
620 cated by prominent NGOs or scholars (global asset registry;⁴³ limits on wealth;^{44;7} democratic
621 climate governance;⁴⁵ global minimum wage;⁴⁶ fair trade;⁴⁷ carbon pricing;⁶ increased foreign
622 aid⁴⁸).

623 Data and code availability

624 All data and code of the *Main* surveys as well as figures of the paper are available on
625 github.com/bixiou/global_tax_attitudes. Data and code for the *Global* survey will be made public
626 upon publication.

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1165 **A Literature review**

1166 **A.1 Attitudes and perceptions**

1167 **A.1.1 Population attitudes on global policies**

1168 Using representative samples in 125 countries covering 96% of the world's greenhouse
1169 gas emissions, Andre et al.²⁵ show that 69% of the global population express willingness
1170 to contribute 1% of their income to fight global warming. Carattini et al.²⁷ test the sup-
1171 port for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples in five countries, representative
1172 along gender and age. For a given variant, the sample size is about 167 respondents per
1173 country. They find over 80% support for any variant in India, between 50% and 65% in
1174 Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43% to 59% in the U.S., depending on the variant.
1175 Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding an equal dividend for each human
1176 is close to 50% in high-income countries (e.g., at 44% in the U.S.), consistently with our
1177 results from the *Global* survey (see Figure 2). This is another piece of evidence that the
1178 support is lower for a tax that would "only" reduce CO₂ emissions than for a quota that
1179 would unambiguously achieve the climate target. Using a conjoint analysis in the U.S.
1180 and Germany, Beiser-McGrath and Bernauer²⁰ find that the support for a carbon tax in-
1181 creases by up to 50% if it applies to all industrialized countries rather than exclusively to
1182 one's own country.

1183 In surveys conducted in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S., Ghassim³⁰ finds
1184 support ranging from 55% to 74% for "a global democracy including both a global gov-
1185 ernment and a global parliament, directly elected by the world population, to recommend
1186 and implement policies on global issues". Through an experiment, he also finds that, in
1187 countries where the government stems from a coalition, voting shares would shift by 8
1188 (Brazil) to 12 p.p. (Germany) from parties who are said to oppose global democracy to
1189 parties that supposedly support it. For instance, when Germans respondents were told
1190 that (only) the Greens and the Left support global democracy, these parties gained re-
1191 spectively 9 and 3 p.p. in vote intentions, while the SPD and the CDU-CSU each lost
1192 6 p.p. Ghassim³⁰ also presents survey results showing strong majorities in favor of the
1193 direct election of one's country's UN representative in all 18 surveyed countries. Simi-
1194 larly, in each of 10 countries, there are clear majorities in favor of "a new supranational
1195 entity [taking] enforceable global decisions in order to solve global risks"⁴⁹. Remarkably,
1196 already in 1946, 54% of Americans agreed (while 24% disagreed) that "the UN should be

1197 strengthened to make it a world government with the power to control the armed forces
1198 of all nations”⁵⁰. Furthermore, in surveys conducted in Argentina, China, India, Russia,
1199 Spain, and the U.S., Ghassim et al.⁵¹ find majority support for UN reforms that would
1200 make United Nations’ decisions binding, give veto powers to a few other major countries
1201 at the Security Council, or complement the highest body of the UN with a chamber of
1202 directly elected representatives.

1203 Relatedly, Meilland et al.²² find that both Americans and French people prefer an in-
1204 ternational settlement of climate justice, even if it encroaches on sovereignty. In a 2013
1205 survey conducted in China, Germany, and the U.S., Schleich et al.⁵² show that over three-
1206 quarter of people think that international climate agreements reached so far are not suc-
1207 cessful and that future agreements are important. In Finland, Sivonen²¹ finds that that
1208 support for a carbon tax is higher if implemented at the global level (54%) rather than at
1209 the national level (40%).

1210 The results from these specific questions are in line with the answers to more general
1211 questions. In each of 36 countries, ISSP¹⁹ find near consensus that “for environmental
1212 problems, there should be international agreements that [their country] and other coun-
1213 tries should be made to follow” (overall, 82% agree and 4% disagree). In each of 29 coun-
1214 tries, ISSP²⁶ uncover near consensus that “Present economic differences between rich and
1215 poor countries are too large” (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree).²⁸ reveal that 66% of
1216 Americans support providing “financial aid and technical support to developing coun-
1217 tries that agree to limit their greenhouse gas emissions.” Fehr et al.²⁹ find that 90% of
1218 Germans want some degree of global redistribution.

1219 A.1.2 Population attitudes on climate burden sharing

1220 Despite differences in the description of fairness principles, surveys on burden-sharing
1221 rules show consistent attitudes. Or at least, their seemingly contradictory results can be
1222 made compatible with the following interpretation: Concerning emissions reductions,
1223 most people want that every country engage in strong and collective decarbonization ef-
1224 forts, with a global quota converging to climate neutrality in the medium run. Concerning
1225 the financial effort, most people support high-emitting countries paying and low-income
1226 countries receiving funding. The most supported rules are those perceived as equitable,
1227 in particular an equal right to emit per person.

1228 This interpretation helps to understand the apparent differences between articles that
1229 approach burden sharing from different angles: cost sharing (in money terms), effort shar-

1230 ing (in terms of emissions reductions), or resource sharing (in terms of rights to emit).
1231 Existing papers adopt either the cost sharing or effort sharing approach, which preclude
1232 any country from being a net receiver of funds. Also, by focusing on *either* the financial
1233 or the decarbonization effort, these surveys miss the other half of the picture, which can
1234 explain why some papers find strong support for the ability-to-pay principle while others
1235 find strong support for grandfathering (defined as emissions reductions being the same
1236 in every country). The literature follows these approaches to align with the notions used
1237 by the UNFCCC. Yet, we argue that the resource sharing approach is preferable for un-
1238 covering attitudes, as it unambiguously describes the distributive implications of each
1239 rule while achieving an efficient geographical distribution of emissions reductions and
1240 explicitly allowing for monetary gains for some countries.

1241 Now, let us summarize the results of the different papers in the light of this clarifica-
1242 tion. Schleich et al.⁵² find an identical ranking of support for burden-sharing principles
1243 in China, Germany, and the U.S.: polluter-pays followed by ability-to-pay, equal emis-
1244 sions per capita, and grandfathering. Note that the authors do not allow for emissions
1245 trading in their description of equal *emissions per capita*, which may explain its relatively
1246 low support. Yet, the relative support for egalitarianism also depends on how *the other*
1247 rules are described. Indeed, Carlsson et al.⁵³ find that Swedes prefer that “all countries
1248 are allowed to emit an equal amount per capita” rather than options where emissions are
1249 reduced based on current or historical emissions, for which it is explicitly stated that high-
1250 emitting countries “will continue to emit more than others”. Bechtel and Scheve⁵⁴ find
1251 agreement that rich countries should pay more and historical emissions should matter,
1252 but that efforts should not be solely borne by wealthy nations. More precisely, their con-
1253 joint analysis conducted in France, Germany, the UK, and the U.S. shows that a climate
1254 agreement is 15 p.p. more likely to be preferred (to a random alternative) if it includes 160
1255 countries rather than 20, and 5 p.p. less likely to be preferred if “only rich countries pay”
1256 compared to other burden-sharing rules: “rich countries pay more than poor”, “coun-
1257 tries pay proportional to current emissions” or “countries pay proportional to historical
1258 emissions”. In Germany and the U.S., Gampfer et al.⁵⁵ also find stronger support for
1259 funding climate action in low-income countries when cost is shared with other countries.
1260 Using a choice experiment, Carlsson et al.⁵⁶ find that the least preferred option in China
1261 and the U.S. is when low-emitting countries are exempted from any effort. Ability-to-
1262 pay is appreciated in both countries and is the preferred option in the U.S., though the
1263 preferred option in China is another one that accounts for historical responsibility. In

the U.S. and France, Meilland et al.²² find that the most favored fairness principle is that “all countries commit to converge to the same average of total emissions per inhabitant, compatible with a controlled climate change”. Furthermore, in each country, 73% disagree with grandfathering defined as “countries which emitted a lot of carbon in the past have a right to continue emitting more than others in the future”. The study by Meilland et al.²² contains many other results: for instance, majorities prefer to hold countries accountable for their consumption-based rather than territorial emissions, and the median choice regarding historical responsibility is to hold a country accountable for its post-1990 emissions (rather than post-1850 or just their current emissions). Finally, in each of 28 (among the largest) countries, Dabla-Norris et al.⁵⁷ find strong majority for “all countries” to the question “Which countries do you think should be paying to reduce carbon emissions?”. When asked to choose between a cost sharing based on *current* vs. *accumulated historic emissions*, a majority prefers *current emissions* in all countries but China and Saudi Arabia (where the two options are close to equally preferred). (Back to Section 2.2)

A.1.3 Population attitudes on foreign aid

There is an extensive literature on attitudes towards foreign aid in donor countries. The key findings indicate that most people overestimate the amount of foreign aid and that only a minority wants a cut in foreign aid compared to actual amounts, especially once they become aware of them.

For instance, PIPA⁵⁸ shows that 83% of Americans support a multilateral effort to cut world hunger in half. PIPA⁵⁹ shows that in each of 20 countries, a majority thinks that developed countries “have a moral responsibility to work to reduce hunger and severe poverty in poor countries”, with an average agreement of 81%. In 7 OECD countries, the study finds that at least 75% of respondents are willing to pay for a program to cut hunger in half (at an estimated cost of, e.g., \$50 a year for each American).

Kaufmann et al.⁶⁰ find that perceived aid is overestimated in each of the 24 countries they study, on average by a factor of 7. In most countries, desired aid is larger than perceived aid.¹ They show that individuals in the top income quintile desire aid 0.13 p.p. lower than those in the bottom 40% – which is very close to what we find. By employing a theoretical model and examining correlations between lobbying and actual aid (controlling for desired aid), they argue that the gap between actual and desired aid stems from

¹Kaufmann et al.⁶¹ offer the best results on desired aid because (as Hudson and van Heerde⁶² criticize), other studies did not take into account misperceptions of actual aid.

1295 the political influence of the rich who defend their vested interests. In Kaufmann et al.⁶¹,
1296 the U.S. is an outlier: desired aid is at the other countries' average (3% of GNI), but as mis-
1297 perceptions are enormous, perceived aid is twice as large as desired aid. Indeed, Gilens⁶³
1298 shows that even Americans with high political knowledge misperceive actual aid, and
1299 finds that 17% fewer of them want to cut aid when we provide them specific information
1300 about the amount of aid. Similarly, Nair⁶⁴ finds that the relatively low support for aid
1301 in the U.S. is driven by information on global distribution, as people underestimate their
1302 rank by 27 centiles on average and overestimate the global median income by a factor 10.

1303 Hudson and van Heerde⁶² provide a critical review of the literature and show that the
1304 strong support for poverty alleviation largely stems from intrinsic altruism. They note
1305 that, according to DFID⁶⁵ and PIPA⁵⁸, 47% of British people find that the aid is wasted
1306 (mainly due to corruption), while Americans estimate that less than a quarter of the aid
1307 reaches those in need, with over half ending up in the hands of corrupt government of-
1308 ficials. Despite these perceptions, most people still support aid, suggesting the presence
1309 of nonutilitarian motives. Consistent with Henson et al.⁶⁶, Bauhr et al.⁶⁷ find that sup-
1310 port for aid is reduced by the perception of corruption in recipient countries. However,
1311 this effect is mitigated by the aid-corruption paradox: countries with higher levels of
1312 corruption often need more help. Bodenstein and Faust⁶⁸ further show that right-wing
1313 Europeans, as well as those who perceive strong corruption in their country, are more
1314 likely to agree that recipient countries should "follow certain rules regarding democracy,
1315 human rights and governance as a condition for receiving EU development aid." Using a
1316 2002 Gallup survey and the 2006 World Values Survey, and in line with Bayram⁶⁹, Paxton
1317 and Knack⁷⁰ show that the main determinants for wanting more aid are trust, left-wing
1318 ideology, interest in politics, and being a woman (all positively associated). (Back to Sec-
1319 tion 2.5.3)

1320 A.1.4 Population attitudes on taxes on the rich

1321 We are not aware of any previous survey on a global wealth tax,² though surveys
1322 consistently show strong support for national wealth taxes. In a comprehensive survey
1323 conducted in the UK, Rowlingson et al.⁷¹ show that a wealth tax is the preferred option
1324 for raising revenues. Only 8% of respondents state that total net wealth should not be
1325 taxed (with little differences between Labour and Conservative voters). The study also

²We did not find any using the combination of "survey" or "attitudes" with "wealth tax" or "global wealth tax" in Google Scholar.

1326 finds that the preferred design would be a 1% or 3% tax on net wealth above £1 million.
1327 By asking how much taxes per year should a person with a certain income and wealth
1328 level pay, Fisman et al.⁷² finds that the average American favors a 0.8% linear tax rate
1329 on unspecified wealth up to \$2 million (the highest wealth level tested), and a 3% linear
1330 rate on inherited wealth. Through a conjoint analysis conducted in three high-income
1331 countries, Schechtl and Tisch⁷³ find widespread support for a wealth tax (from 78% in
1332 the U.S. to 86% in Germany and the UK), with a preference for an exemption threshold
1333 set at \$/€1 million (rather than 500,000 or 2 million) with the tax rate and tax unit having
1334 little influence on the preferred design. In 21 OECD countries, the OECD⁷⁴ uncovers
1335 strong majority support for higher taxes on the rich to support the poor, with nearly 70%
1336 overall agreement and less than 20% disagreement. Isbell⁷⁵ finds similarly high level of
1337 support in 34 African countries. In the UK, Patriotic Millionaires⁷⁶ find 69% support (and
1338 7% opposition) for a 1.1% tax on wealth in excess of £10 million. In the U.S., Americans
1339 for Tax Fairness⁷⁷ find that 67% to 71% of the respondents support to “raise taxes for
1340 those earning more than \$400,000 a year”, “raise the income tax rate for those earning
1341 over \$1 million a year by 10 percentage points”, or “apply a 2% tax on an individual’s
1342 wealth above \$50 million each year, and 3% on wealth above \$1 billion”.

1343 A.1.5 Population attitudes on ethical norms

1344 As argued by Nyborg et al.⁷⁸, social norms can be the solution to the collective action
1345 problem. As such, universalistic values and free-riding attitudes are key.

1346 **Universalism** Various studies have examined the concept of global identity (see Reysen
1347 and Katzarska-Miller⁷⁹ for a review). In the 2005-2008 wave of the World Values Survey,
1348 Bayram⁸⁰ notes that “78% of the participants in 57 countries see themselves as citizens of
1349 the world”, though the 2017-2022 wave reveals that more people feel close to their town,
1350 region or country than to the world. Enke et al.⁸¹ measure universalism at the U.S. dis-
1351 trict level using donation data, and find that a district’s universalism predicts electoral
1352 outcomes better than its income or education level. To measure universalism at the in-
1353 dividual level, Enke et al.⁸² ask American respondents to split \$100 between a random
1354 stranger and a random person with the same income but closer to them. They distin-
1355 guish different facets of universalism, and define *foreign universalism* as the inclination
1356 to give to a foreigner rather than a fellow citizen. They find a home bias for most peo-
1357 ple, which could partly be attributed to concerns about inequality, as the split involves

1358 two persons with the same income, with the foreigner most certainly living in a poorer
1359 country than the American and thus enjoying a higher social status. That being said, a
1360 home bias probably remains even after accounting for concerns about inequality, as 84%
1361 of Americans agree that “taking care of problems at home is more important than giv-
1362 ing aid to foreign countries”⁵⁸. Enke et al.⁸³ also measure universalism and analyze its
1363 correlates in 7 countries, and Cappelen et al.⁸⁴ deploy this method in 60 countries. In
1364 a lab experiment with students in the U.S., Cherry et al.⁸⁵ show that a substantial share
1365 of people prefer policies detrimental to them due to their egalitarian worldview. Waytz
1366 et al.⁸⁶ show that left-leaning people exhibit a wider “moral circle”. Jaeger and Wilks⁸⁷
1367 find that judgments of moral concern are equally well explained by characteristics of the
1368 judge and the evaluated target.

1369 **Free-riding** Despite the long-standing explanation of the lack of climate action as a re-
1370 sult of free-riding, surveys consistently show that people support climate mitigation ac-
1371 tion in their own country, even in the absence of such action in other countries. Bernauer
1372 and Gampfer⁸⁸ show this for Americans and Indians, who both overestimate their coun-
1373 try’s emissions at one third of the global total. Beiser-McGrath and Bernauer⁸⁹ show this
1374 in the U.S. and China using an experimental design. McEvoy and Cherry⁹⁰ show that
1375 Americans mostly invoke leadership and morality to justify unilateral climate action. Us-
1376 ing a range of methods, Aklin and Mildenberger³² show that the empirical evidence for
1377 free-riding is not compelling, and that climate inaction can be equally well explained by
1378 distributive conflicts. Finally, review of the literature by McGrath and Bernauer⁹¹ shows
1379 that climate attitudes are largely nonreciprocal, and primarily driven by values and per-
1380 ceptions of the policies, rather than by considerations of what other countries do.

1381 A.1.6 Second-order beliefs

1382 Allport⁹² introduced the concept of pluralistic ignorance: a shared misperception con-
1383 cerning others’ beliefs. The concept became notorious when O’Gorman⁹³ showed that,
1384 towards the end of the civil rights movement, 47% of Americans believed that a majority
1385 of white people supported segregation, while only 18% did so. PIPA⁵⁸ has shown that
1386 while 75% of Americans are willing to contribute \$50 annually to halve world hunger (the
1387 cost of the program), only 32% believed that the majority would share this willingness.
1388 Pluralistic ignorance regarding climate-friendly norms in the United States has been doc-
1389 umented by Andre et al.⁹⁴, who further show that correcting the misperceptions would be

1390 effective to enhance pro-climate behaviors. Relatedly, Sparkman et al.⁹⁵ show that Amer-
1391 icans underestimate the support for climate policies by nearly half, while Drews et al.⁹⁶
1392 document pluralistic ignorance of carbon tax support in Spain. Additionally, Geiger and
1393 Swim⁹⁷ show that pluralistic ignorance regarding concern for climate change leads peo-
1394 ple to self-silence, resulting in reduced discussions on the topic.

1395 **A.1.7 Elite attitudes**

1396 In a survey of climate negotiators on their preferences in terms of burden-sharing,
1397 Lange et al.⁹⁸ uncovers a mix of self-serving bias and support for the egalitarian prin-
1398 ciple. Dannenberg et al.⁹⁹ elicit climate negotiators' equity preferences and find that
1399 regional differences in addressing climate change are driven more by national interests
1400 than by different equity concerns. Hjerpe et al.¹⁰⁰ indicate that voluntary contribution,
1401 indicated as willingness to contribute, was the least preferred principle among both nego-
1402 tiators and observers. Three of the four principles for allocating mitigation commitments
1403 were recognized widely across the major geographical regions: historical responsibili-
1404 ties, ability-to-pay, and equal per capita emissions. This result is confirmed by Kesternich
1405 et al.¹⁰¹, who observe tendencies for a more harmonized view among key groups towards
1406 the ability-to-pay rule in a setting of weighted burden sharing rules. Mildenberger and
1407 Tingley¹⁰² survey elites (Congress staffers and international relations scholars) as well as
1408 the population in U.S. and China. They document pluralistic ignorance of pro-climate
1409 attitudes, egocentric bias, and increasing support after beliefs are updated.

1410 **A.2 Proposals and analyses of global policy-making**

1411 **A.2.1 Global carbon pricing**

1412 Global carbon pricing is widely regarded by economists as the benchmark climate
1413 policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon emissions externality. For instance, Hoel⁹
1414 shows that an international carbon tax can be designed to simultaneously achieve effi-
1415 ciency and accommodate any distributional objective. Concerning the distributional ob-
1416 jective, Grubb⁸, Agarwal and Narain¹⁰ and Bertram¹¹ were the first to advocate for an
1417 equal right to emit for each human. As Grubb⁸ states it: "by far the best combination
1418 of long term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity, is obtained from a system
1419 based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions which are allocated on an adult per

1420 capita basis".³ Support for such solution has been renewed ever since^{12–15}.

1421 While many endorse the egalitarian allocation of emissions permits, economists also
1422 considered this outcome as politically unfeasible. Thus, to preserve the current level of
1423 inequalities and to preclude transfers between countries, they adjusted their (integrated
1424 assessment) models by assigning more weight to the interest of rich countries¹⁰³.

1425 Gollier and Tirole¹⁰⁴ synthesize the distributional decision with a *generosity* parame-
1426 ter which would allocate emissions permit to countries in proportion to their population
1427 if set to one, in proportion to their emissions (on the start date of the policy) if set to
1428 zero, and as a mixture of the egalitarian and grandfathering rules if set in between. Using
1429 a similar formula in the context of a tax, Cramton et al.¹⁰⁵ (summarized in¹⁰⁶) propose
1430 that countries with emissions per capita around the average fix the generosity parame-
1431 ter, so that it is strategically chosen to maximize the tax rate, and to fix the tax rate at
1432 the minimum price proposed by participating countries. Negotiations would exclude
1433 countries with low ambition beforehand; and the treaty would impose trade sanctions on
1434 non-participating countries. van den Bergh et al.¹⁰⁷ propose a "dual-track transition to
1435 global carbon pricing": an expanding climate club that would integrate existing and new
1436 emissions trading systems, and a reorientation of UNFCCC negotiations towards a global
1437 carbon price and burden-sharing rules. The IMF¹⁰⁸ also supports global carbon pricing
1438 or, as a first step, a carbon price floor. They propose either differentiated prices among
1439 countries or international transfers, and estimate that a price of \$75/tCO₂ in 2030 would
1440 be compatible with a 2°C trajectory.

1441 Other authors have put forth more radical proposals. For instance, Weitzman¹⁰⁹ en-
1442 visions a World Climate Assembly with proportional representation at the global scale,
1443 so that the median (human) voter would choose the carbon price level. To finance an
1444 adaptation fund, Chancel and Piketty¹¹⁰ propose a global *progressive* carbon tax (or a
1445 progressive tax on air tickets as a first step), so that rich people (who are high emitters)
1446 contribute more to the public good. Fleurbaey and Zuber¹¹¹ highlight that, given that
1447 current emitters are probably richer than future victims of climate change damages, cli-
1448 mate policies deserve a *negative* discount rate. In other words, we cannot dissociate the
1449 climate issue from global inequalities, and an ethical response to this issue requires global
1450 redistribution.

³By "adult per capita", Grubb⁸ means that permits would be allocated equally among adults.

1451 **A.2.2 Climate burden sharing**

1452 The literature has discussed different burden-sharing principles¹¹². While there is no
1453 agreement on their definitions as different approaches are used (cost sharing, effort shar-
1454 ing, or resource sharing, see Section A.1.2), we describe here the burden-sharing princi-
1455 ples consistently using the resource sharing approach (i.e., allocating emissions rights).
1456 For other papers that define or compare different burden-sharing principles, see Leim-
1457 bach and Giannousakis¹¹³; Zhou and Wang¹¹⁴; Vaillancourt and Waub¹¹⁵.

1458 **Equal per capita.** The simplest principle is perhaps to allocate each year's global carbon
1459 quota based on an equal right to emit per capita, or an equal right to emit for each adult.
1460 Implementing this principle would result in large transfers from high-emitting to low-
1461 emitting countries.

1462 **Grandfathering.** In contrast, *grandfathering* entails allocating emissions rights in pro-
1463 portion to current emissions. From the perspective of allocating carbon pricing revenues
1464 between countries, grandfathering amounts to each country retaining the revenues it col-
1465 lects. Given that nations are sovereign and have not agreed to share emissions rights,
1466 this principle can be considered as the default option against which the other ones can be
1467 compared in terms of distributive effects.

1468 **Historical responsibilities.** At the opposite end of the spectrum is the principle of *his-
1469 torical responsibilities*, which assigns to each country a carbon budget proportional to its
1470 population. Countries that have emitted more than the average have accumulated a car-
1471 bon debt towards countries that have emitted less, which have a carbon credit.⁴

1472 To fully specify this rule, one needs to define a start date for the responsibilities on
1473 past emissions and specify how to account for population size. 1990 is often chosen as
1474 a start year as it is the date of the first IPCC assessment report, marking the widespread
1475 acknowledgment of climate change, though variants include 1972, 1960, 1950 or 1850.⁵
1476 Several solutions have been proposed to account for evolving populations, none of which
1477 is flawless. Matthews¹¹⁶ allocates emissions rights on a given year proportionally to the
1478 countries' populations in that year. An alternative is to use fixed populations, such as

⁴It is not clear how these debts would be settled. Approaches could involve carbon removal from the atmosphere, or using a conventional social cost of carbon to monetize them, by crediting (positively or negatively) emissions rights to countries in an international carbon market.

⁵Climate equity monitor uses 1850 for example.

¹⁴⁷⁹ the populations at the chosen start year¹¹⁷, or at a future date such as projected when
¹⁴⁸⁰ the global total population will reach 9 billion¹¹⁸. Fanning and Hickel¹¹⁹ convert the
¹⁴⁸¹ projected climate debt up to 2050 into monetary terms in a 1.5°C scenario.

¹⁴⁸² The rationale for using fixed populations is to prevent countries from intentionally
¹⁴⁸³ increasing their population size to gain more emissions rights. However, this approach
¹⁴⁸⁴ treats countries with different demographic trajectories similarly, effectively penalizing
¹⁴⁸⁵ countries which grow more than others (if past populations are used) or grow more than
¹⁴⁸⁶ expected (if future populations are used). Using current populations like Matthews¹¹⁶
¹⁴⁸⁷ also comes with its own problems. Consider two countries having contributed very little
¹⁴⁸⁸ to cumulative emissions, with the same emissions per capita but different demographic
¹⁴⁸⁹ patterns: country A's population has doubled in the last 30 years, while country B's pop-
¹⁴⁹⁰ulation has remained stable. Despite the similar present situation, country B would ac-
¹⁴⁹¹cumulate more carbon credit than country A. Essentially, compensating country B more
¹⁴⁹² due to its past population size amounts to compensating the dead although it is future
¹⁴⁹³generations who will suffer. That being said, using current populations is likely a more
¹⁴⁹⁴viable solution than relying on fixed populations since, in practice, countries with similar
¹⁴⁹⁵emissions per capita tend to have relatively similar demographic trajectories.


¹⁴⁹⁶ **Ability to pay.** Another prominent burden-sharing principle is the ability to pay whereby
¹⁴⁹⁷ richer countries should contribute more to mitigation efforts. To operationalize this prin-
¹⁴⁹⁸ciple, Baer et al.¹²⁰ define *capacity* as the share of global income above an exemption
¹⁴⁹⁹threshold. They use the threshold of \$7,500 per year (in 2005 PPP), which corresponds to
¹⁵⁰⁰the top 28% of the global income distribution. According to this principle, the effort of a
¹⁵⁰¹country should be proportional to the revenues it would raise with a linear income tax on
¹⁵⁰²individual income above \$7,500.

¹⁵⁰³ **Climate Equity Reference Framework** Baer et al.¹²⁰ propose another effort-sharing
¹⁵⁰⁴method, the *Climate Equity Reference Framework* (CERF), which blends the ability to pay
¹⁵⁰⁵principle with their version of historical responsibilities. They define *responsibility* as fol-
¹⁵⁰⁶lows: they determine the mitigation requirement as the emissions gap between the Busi-
¹⁵⁰⁷ness as Usual scenario from IEA¹²¹ and a 2°C (with 68-86% probability) scenario. The
¹⁵⁰⁸mitigation requirement is then allocated to countries proportionally to their cumulative
¹⁵⁰⁹emissions (starting in 1990). The emissions right of a country according to their *respon-
1510*sibility are then determined by its Business as Usual emissions minus its mitigation re-

1511 quirement. A country's emissions right, dubbed its *greenhouse development right* (GDR),
 1512 is defined using a combination of *capacity* (C) and *responsibility* (R) to allocate the miti-
 1513 gation requirement between countries. This allocation key is called the *Responsibility and*
 1514 *Capacity Indicator* (RCI) and defined as $RCI = R^a \cdot C^{1-a}$, with $a = .4$.

1515 This choice of parameter may seem somewhat arbitrary, but the [EcoEquity calculator](#)
 1516 allows for a customization all CERF parameters^{122;123}. The Climate Action Network has
 1517 adopted the CERF as its *fair share* framework, though the different national chapters of
 1518 the organization could not agree on a choice of parameters¹²⁴.⁶

Figure S9: Net gains from the CERF burden-sharing rule in 2030.




Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#)¹²⁴ using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment¹²⁵ and a price of \$144/tCO₂.

1519 The CERF approach was adopted by a prominent network of climate NGOs because
 1520 it operationalizes the principle of *common but differentiated responsibilities and respective ca-*
 1521 *pabilities* recognized by the UNFCCC. However, this approach suffers from three draw-

⁶The [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) and the think tank [EcoEquity](#) (funded by Tom Athanasiou and late Paul Baer) choose the following parameters: an equal weight for R and C ($a = .5$), their own [business as usual projections](#) of CO₂ emissions based on trends of GDP growth and emissions intensity reduction, a 1.5°C (Low Energy Demand) pathway, 1950 as the start year for responsibility, a gradual inclusion of income to compute *capacity* (which adds complexity to the calculation) from a full exemption of the bottom 70% (\$7,500 per year) linearly to a full inclusion of the top 2% (\$72,211), the inclusion of non-CO₂ gases but not of emissions embodied in trade (i.e. imported emissions) nor LULUCF (land-use).

Figure S10: Difference between net gains from Greenhouse Development Rights and equal rights per capita.



Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the U.S. Climate Action Network¹²⁴ using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with $>50\%$ chance) of the Global Energy Assessment¹²⁵ and a price of \$144/tCO₂.

backs. First, its definition of historical responsibility as an effort sharing principle is consistent with the principle of an equal right of cumulative emissions per capita, which is a resource sharing principle. For instance, consider a fully decarbonized country that has exhausted *exactly* its cumulative carbon budget. According to the CERF notion of *responsibility*, this country would still be expected to contribute significantly to mitigation efforts due to its relatively high cumulative emissions. Yet, according to the usual definition of the historical responsibility based on an equal right of cumulative emissions p.c., this country would have no liability as it has not exceeded its carbon budget. Second, a country with moderate incomes⁷ and low historical responsibility would be assigned a relatively low effort, even if its emissions per capita are high. In other words, the CERF approach favors countries that have experienced recent growth. Third, the poorest countries would be granted emissions rights close to the Business as Usual trajectory, as they would bear virtually none of the effort. But this trajectory carries the current (unfair) income distribution and amounts to grandfathering. For example, the baseline trajectory

⁷Using the above parameters, moderate incomes means few incomes above the global 70th. percentile.

1536 for emissions⁸ in the DRC entail 0.8 tCO₂ p.c. in 2030, which is five times less than the
1537 world average emissions right per capita. In this framework, if the DRC were to grow
1538 faster than projected in the baseline, it would actually have to pay to the rest of the world
1539 for mitigation efforts. This is what is likely to happen to countries like Mexico or Senegal,
1540 from our simulation of the net gains of CERF compared to a situation without interna-
1541 tional transfers (see Figure S9). In contrast, a resource sharing approach based on equal
1542 per capita emissions would result in low-income countries receiving emissions rights ex-
1543 ceeding their projected trajectories, leading to transfers from high-income countries. By
1544 construction, such transfers do not occur in an effort sharing approach like the CERF,
1545 implying lower transfers to low-income countries. Compared to an equal right to emit
1546 per capita, this method favors countries like China (whose emissions are allowed to re-
1547 main stable over 2020-2030 instead of a reduction of 35-40%) and penalizes regions like
1548 Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (see Figure S10).

1549 **Contraction and Convergence.** Meyer¹²⁶ defines a rule called *contraction and conver-*
1550 *gence* (C&C), which combines elements of grandfathering and equal per capita approaches.
1551 According to C&C, each country is granted (tradable) emissions rights, starting at their
1552 current emission level and converging linearly to an equal per capita level at some pre-
1553 specified date. The *contraction* part refers to the reduction of total emissions rights in line
1554 with the climate objective. When discussed around year 2000, the convergence date was
1555 specified between 2020 and 2050. This rule, advocated by the Global Commons Institute
1556 (a UK think tank), was on the agenda from COP2 to COP15 (i.e., until Copenhagen, and
1557 including in Kyoto), including at Kyoto, and was endorsed by the European Parliament
1558 in 1998. More recently, Gignac and Matthews¹²⁷ have shown how C&C can be made
1559 consistent with historical responsibilities by computing carbon debts and credits until the
1560 convergence date.

1561 **Assessments of the NDCs against burden-sharing principles.** The regime established
1562 by the 2015 Paris agreement to regulate climate change respects none of the burden-
1563 sharing principles and relies instead on voluntary contributions from each country, known
1564 as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). A body of literature (reviewed by¹²⁸)
1565 assesses the NDCs against the emissions reduction objective and different burden-sharing
1566 principles. To evaluate the NDCs, Gao et al.¹²⁹ examine their emissions projections for

⁸The baseline trajectory is computed as the “product of the projected GDP and CO₂ emission intensity”.

1567 2030 and estimate the resulting increase in temperature. The most recent and comprehensive
1568 assessment of NDCs against burden-sharing principles is conducted by van den Berg et al.¹³⁰ (see also^{131;132;118}).
1569

1570 **A.2.3 Global redistribution**

1571 Addressing global poverty, inequalities, and climate change are central to the universally
1572 agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). As highlighted by Bolch et al.¹³³,
1573 low-income countries often lack sufficient domestic resources to eradicate poverty in the
1574 short term, indicating the need for international transfers to rapidly end global poverty.
1575 In *Beyond the Welfare State*, Gunnar Myrdal¹³⁴ called for a *welfare world*. In his Nobel
1576 lecture, he emphasized the necessity of increasing foreign aid to low-income countries,
1577 stating that “The type of marginal foreign aid we have provided, is clearly not enough to
1578 meet their barest needs”¹³⁵.

1579 Drawing on the labor theory of value, some economists have argued that global in-
1580 equalities arise from unequal exchange in international trade¹³⁶. Indeed, the stark dispari-
1581 ty in wages between countries implies that one unit of labor exported by an American
1582 commands five units of labor embodied in imported goods, whereas Ethiopians need to
1583 export 50 units of labor to obtain one unit through imports^{137;138}. Taking stock, Hickel⁴⁷
1584 proposes to globally establish minimum wages at 50% of the local median wage. Hickel⁴⁷
1585 also suggests other solutions against global inequality, which served as inspiration for our
1586 questionnaire. These measures include the cancellation of low-income countries’ public
1587 debt, fair trade practices (such as eliminating tariffs from high-income countries, reduc-
1588 ing patent protections, and reducing farming subsidies in rich countries), initiatives to
1589 combat tax evasion (e.g., implementing a global financial register), land reform, and a fair
1590 international climate policy.

1591 Piketty¹³⁹ prominently advocates for a progressive wealth tax on a global scale, al-
1592 though he does not specify whether the resulting revenues should fund international
1593 transfers.

1594 Kopczuk et al.¹⁴⁰ compute the optimal linear income tax rates for all countries in two
1595 ways: globally centralized and decentralized (i.e., within each country and without inter-
1596 national transfers). They show that the average decentralized rate is 41%. In contrast, the
1597 global rate is 62%, which would generate funds to finance a basic income of 250\$/month
1598 (higher than the GPD per capita of 73 countries). From a current global Gini index of
1599 0.695, they show that decentralized optimal taxation would only marginally reduce global

1600 inequality to 0.69, whereas global taxation would significantly decrease the Gini to 0.25.
1601 The study also shows that the existing level of foreign aid can only be rationalized if the
1602 U.S. attaches 2,000 less value to a citizen in the poorest countries than to an American
1603 citizen (or 1,000 less if half of the transfers are diverted due to corruption).

1604 A.2.4 Basic income

1605 Unconditional cash transfers (UCT) are increasingly seen as an effective way to end
1606 extreme poverty. A growing body of evidence from randomized control trials supports
1607 this notion: Gangopadhyay et al.¹⁴¹ find that UCT outperform a food subsidy; Haushofer
1608 and Shapiro¹⁴² find significant impacts on health, economic outcomes, and psychological
1609 well-being; Egger et al.¹⁴³ find large positive spillovers on non-recipient people, and
1610 minimal inflation. Reviews of existing research further confirm the positive outcomes of
1611 UCT^{144;145}.

1612 While the delivery of cash to remote areas and the prevention of fraud is challenging in
1613 regions without a proper civil register, the use of mobile phones as banking and biometric
1614 identification tools could provide viable solutions¹⁴⁶. Although many places still lack
1615 internet access, satellite internet technology shows promising progress, with some experts
1616 suggesting that it could soon become affordable and universally accessible¹⁴⁷.

1617 A.2.5 Global democracy

1618 The idea of world federalism has a long-standing history, dating back at least to Kant¹⁴⁸,
1619 who argued that a world federation was essential for achieving perpetual peace. Interna-
1620 tional organizations were eventually created to foster peace, though the League of Na-
1621 tions and its successor, the United Nations, never succeeded in avoiding military conflicts.
1622 Many have argued that we need stronger and more democratic global institutions, com-
1623 petent to address global challenges such as extreme poverty, climate change, wars, pan-
1624 demics, or financial stability. Before World War II, feminist and pacifist Maverick Lloyd
1625 and Schwimmer¹⁴⁹ founded the *Campaign for World Government*, advocating for direct
1626 representation at the global scale. Einstein¹⁵⁰ called for the subordination of the UN Se-
1627 curity Council to the General Assembly and the direct election of UN delegates. Since
1628 2007, there has been widespread support for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly
1629 (UNPA) from individuals and institutions in over 150 countries, including 1,800 member
1630 of parliament, heads of state, as well the European Parliament, the Pan-African Parlia-


¹⁶³¹ ment, and the Latin-American Parliament. The UNPA campaign calls for a gradual im-
¹⁶³² plementation of a democratic assembly, starting with a consultative assembly composed
¹⁶³³ of members of national parliaments, allowing for the direct election of its members in
¹⁶³⁴ voluntary countries, and progressing towards a world parliament with binding legisla-
¹⁶³⁵ tive powers once all members are directly elected ¹⁵¹. Besides the UNPA, various scholars
¹⁶³⁶ have put forward different models of global democracy, ranging from deliberative spaces
¹⁶³⁷ to a world federation ¹⁵². While the most radical proposals may still be on the horizon,
¹⁶³⁸ an assembly of random citizens representative of the world population has already been
¹⁶³⁹ convened. It has produced a joint statement at the COP26 ¹⁵³, and a similar *World Citizens'*
¹⁶⁴⁰ *Assembly* should soon follow.

1641 B Raw results

1642 Country-specific raw results are also available as supplementary material files: [US](#),
 1643 [EU](#), [FR](#), [DE](#), [ES](#), [UK](#).

Figure S11: Absolute support for global climate policies.

Share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* (in percent, $n = 40,680$). The color blue denotes an absolute majority. See Figure 2 for the relative support. (Questions A-I of the global survey.)



*In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

Figure S12: Correct answers to comprehension questions (in percent). (Questions 16-18)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
With NR, typical [country] people win and richest lose	68	73	76	73	73	70
With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win	60	68	62	72	67	67
With GCS+NR, typical [country] people neither win nor lose	54	60	63	59	57	61

Figure S13: Number of correct answers to comprehension questions (mean). (Section 2.3, Questions 16-18)




Figure S14: List experiment: mean number of supported policies. (Section 2.4.1, Question 24)




Figure S15: Conjoint analyses 1 and 2. (Questions 25-27, Back to Section 2.4.3)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)	54	76	80	71	81	74
C+NR+GCS preferred to C+NR	55	74	79	71	78	68
NR+GCS preferred to NR	55	77	79	74	79	77
NR+C preferred to NR	62	84	88	83	84	82
GCS+NR preferred to C+NR	47	52	53	53	49	52
NR+C+GCS preferred to NR	55	77	86	73	83	72

Table S2: Effects on the support for the GCS of a question on its pros and cons (either in open-ended or closed format) and on information about the actual support, in the U.S. (See Section D in the US2 Questionnaire) (Back to Section 2.4.5)

	Support			
	Global Climate Scheme		National Redistribution	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Control group mean	0.557	0.557	0.569	0.569
Treatment: Open-ended field on GCS pros & cons	-0.073** (0.035)	-0.071** (0.031)	-0.035 (0.035)	-0.030 (0.032)
Treatment: Closed questions on GCS pros & cons	-0.109*** (0.034)	-0.096*** (0.031)	-0.065* (0.034)	-0.062** (0.031)
Treatment: Info on actual support for GCS and NR	-0.021 (0.034)	-0.015 (0.031)	0.048 (0.033)	0.056* (0.031)
Includes controls		✓		✓
Observations	2,000	1,995	2,000	1,995
R ²	0.007	0.170	0.007	0.154

Figure S16: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See English translations in Figure S2; Question 29)




Figure S17: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements seen as important for supporting the GCS in a 4-Likert scale (in percent). (Question 32) [\(Back to Section 2.4.5\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
It would succeed in limiting climate change	78	85	85	86	86	83
It would hurt the [Country] economy	81	67	61	67	66	69
It would penalize my household	75	60	55	63	59	63
It would make people change their lifestyle	78	79	83	79	78	77
It would reduce poverty in low-income countries	77	85	88	85	86	81
It might be detrimental to some poor countries	79	72	79	67	78	70
It could foster global cooperation	82	81	81	82	85	80
It could fuel corruption in low-income countries	79	75	82	69	79	72
It could be subject to fraud	80	79	80	74	83	81
It would be technically difficult to put in place	77	71	74	62	79	71
Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences	89	82	89	68	91	88

Figure S18: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements found in the open-ended field on the GCS (manually recoded, in percent).

"When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to your mind?

Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme." (Question 31) (Back to Section 2.4.5)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
environment	26	31	37	26	43	24
unclassifiable	25	24	23	28	25	22
pro	22	23	21	22	33	20
con	22	17	12	18	20	16
cost	17	12	11	14	17	7
poorest humans	11	7	6	9	5	6
tax redistribution	10	7	11	8	4	9
support	8	6	3	5	6	8
oppose	7	3	2	3	1	4
don't know	6	8	10	8	7	10
empty	6	3	0	0	0	13
difficult agreement	5	10	7	12	8	8
difficult implement	3	5	5	6	4	6
misunderstands gcs	3	2	2	1	3	1
misunderstands question	2	2	1	3	3	3

Figure S19: Perceptions of the GCS. Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).

"When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to your mind?

Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme." (Question 31) [\(Back to Section 2.4.5\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
world: international world country global	28	22	23	19	22	23
environment: climat environment animal emission natur	26	21	17	28	21	17
poorest: poor low-income 700 poverty	16	8	8	9	4	10
pro: pro pros pros pro:	16	3	0	1	9	5
con: con con: cons cons:	15	4	0	1	8	6
cost: cost expensive higher price 85 inflation	13	7	5	9	7	6
tax: tax	8	3	4	3	2	2
redistribution: rich redistribu	8	4	5	4	3	5
implementation: implement enforce polic monitor	6	4	5	6	0	5
agreement: agree accept participat	3	4	5	6	2	3

Figure S20: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality (mean). (Question 34) [\(Back to Section 2.5.3\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Donation to own country	35	34	31	38	34	32
Donation to Africa	32	35	33	41	32	33

Table S3: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality. (Question 34)
 (Back to Section 2.5.3)

	Donation to poor people (in %)			
	All	US	US	Eu
Poor is in own country	0.590 (0.799)	2.509** (1.152)	0.046 (1.691)	-1.349 (1.108)
Poor is in own country × Vote: <i>not</i> Biden			3.954* (2.279)	
Mean	34.034	33.658	33.658	34.41
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000	3,000
R ²	0.0001	0.002	0.034	0.0005

Figure S21: Support for a global wealth tax.

"Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-income countries?

Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education." (Question 35)




Figure S22: Support for a national wealth tax.

"Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: affordable housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and schools]?" (Question 36)




Figure S23: Preferred share of global wealth tax revenues that should be pooled to finance low-income countries. (Question 37)




Figure S24: Support for sharing half of global tax revenues with low-income countries, rather than each country retaining all the revenues it collects (in percent). (Question 38)



Figure S25: Perceived foreign aid. “From your best guess, what percentage of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?” (Question 39) (Back to Section 2.5.3)

Actual values: France: 0.8%; Germany: 1.3%; Spain: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%; U.S.: 0.4%.




Figure S26: Preferred foreign aid (without info on actual amount).

“If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?” (Question 40) (Back to Section 2.5.3)




Figure S27: Preferred foreign aid (after info on actual amount).

"Actually, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid.

If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?" (Question 40) [\(Back to Section 2.5.3\)](#)




Figure S28: Actual, perceived and preferred amount of foreign aid, with random info (or not) on actual amount. (Mean in percent of public spending, Questions 39, 40) [\(Back to Section 2.5.3\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Actual foreign aid (in % of public spending)	0.4	1.1	0.8	1.3	0.5	1.7
Belief about foreign aid	4.7	2.9	2.7	2.9	2.8	3.5
Preferred foreign aid (with info)	1.8	2.7	3.4	2.9	2.1	2.5
Preferred foreign aid (no info)	4	3.9	4.7	4.4	3.1	3.4

Figure S29: Preferred foreign aid (after info or after perception). (Questions 39 and 40)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as current	70	75	91	76	77	57
Preferred foreign aid is higher than current	47	59	75	58	63	43
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as perceived	57	74	83	79	77	58
Preferred foreign aid is higher than perceived	37	53	64	59	54	39

Figure S30: Preferences for funding increased foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]

"How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent) (Question 41) (Back to Section 2.5.3)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Lower spending on defense	30	21	16	30	17	22
Lower spending on retirement pensions	5	3	4	2	1	5
Lower spending on healthcare	10	3	4	3	2	4
Lower spending on welfare benefits	14	12	19	11	3	12
Lower spending on education	8	2	2	1	3	5
Lower spending on other programs	19	24	22	37	11	12
Higher taxes on the wealthiest	68	64	55	82	35	85
Higher corporate income tax rate	51	27	21	27	15	53
Higher personal income tax rates	10	7	3	8	2	18
Higher public deficit	4	6	5	9	2	7

Figure S31: Preferences of spending following reduced foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]
 "How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent)
 (Question 42) [\(Back to Section 2.5.3\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Higher spending on defense	19	23	11	21	17	31
Higher spending on retirement pensions	23	41	22	51	57	35
Higher spending on healthcare	40	57	31	42	80	70
Higher spending on welfare benefits	13	20	7	19	39	20
Higher spending on education	30	45	31	47	58	43
Higher spending on other programs	6	6	6	4	9	8
Lower taxes on the wealthiest	5	2	5	2	0	2
Lower corporate income tax rate	12	6	10	4	8	6
Lower personal income tax rates	48	29	26	27	37	30
Lower public deficit	32	24	21	13	41	21

Figure S32: Willingness to sign real-stake petition for the Global Climate Scheme or National Redistribution, compared to stated support in corresponding subsamples (e.g. support for the GCS in the branch where the petition was about the GCS). (Question 43)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Petition for the GCS	51	69	69	66	78	69
(Comparable) support for the GCS	53	76	81	74	81	74
Petition for NR	57	67	65	66	74	68
(Comparable) support for NR	58	72	76	65	78	75

Figure S33: Absolute support for various global policies (Percent of (*somewhat or strong*) support). (Questions 44 and 45. See Figure 3 for the relative support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	41	54	52	53	62	51
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	53	65	62	66	68	62
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	45	58	55	60	62	54
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	31	37	36	30	45	40
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	34	44	44	43	52	43
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	39	49	39	51	50	54
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	42	55	54	54	61	53
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	44	70	73	70	72	65
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	34	45	40	48	44	50
National tax on millionaires funding public services	62	76	70	79	79	77
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	58	71	69	72	78	71

Figure S34: Preferred approach of diplomats at international climate negotiations. In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend [own country] interests or global justice? (Question 49)




Figure S35: Percent of selected issues viewed as important.
 "To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem?" (Question 56)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Income inequality in [Country]	55	59	54	58	71	57
Climate change	59	66	66	63	73	63
Global poverty	50	57	50	58	75	49

Figure S36: Group defended when voting.
 "What group do you defend when you vote?" (Question 57)




Figure S37: Mean prioritization of policies.

Mean number of points allocated policies to express intensity of support (among six policies chosen at random). Blue color means that the policy has been awarded more points than the average policy.

"In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

How do you allocate the points among the following policies?" (Question 58)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	13	21	10	14	35	31
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	23	22	25	21	22	23
econ3	21	15	13	18	17	13
econ4	28	22	27	17	24	20
soc1	10	17	13	17	12	21
soc2	13	9	14	8	10	8
climate1	14	15	11	18	20	12
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	20	18	22	19	15	17
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030	11	9	8	8	9	11
tax1: National redistribution scheme	14	15	16	15	15	15
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	19	19	21	18	17	19
foreign1: Global climate scheme	15	20	20	23	16	17
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	21	20	20	23	19	20
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	15	15	15	17	14	13
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	9	11	13	14	9	8

Figure S38: Positive prioritization of policies.

Percent of people allocating a positive number of points to policies, expressing their support (among six policies chosen at random).

"In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

How do you allocate the points among the following policies?" (Question 58)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	64	78	61	67	96	95
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	83	86	85	84	87	89
econ3	81	69	50	78	80	68
econ4	88	86	91	79	89	85
soc1	57	75	69	74	74	78
soc2	58	58	72	53	64	48
climate1	70	76	65	79	89	75
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	79	83	86	84	78	80
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030	62	58	56	48	60	70
tax1: National redistribution scheme	67	79	79	76	82	79
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	80	79	76	78	83	85
foreign1: Global climate scheme	71	83	84	85	84	78
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	80	81	79	83	82	82
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	71	77	79	74	83	76
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	58	70	79	74	74	57

Figure S39: Charity donation.

"How much did you give to charities in 2022?" (Question 50)




Figure S40: Interest in politics.

"To what extent are you interested in politics?" (Question 51)




Figure S41: Desired involvement of government (from 1 to 5). (Question 52)




Figure S42: Political leaning on economics (from 1: Left to 5: Right). (Question 53)




Figure S43: Voted in last election. (Question 54)




Figure S44: Vote in last election (aggregated). PNR includes people who did not vote or prefer not to answer. (Question 55)




Figure S45: Perception that survey was biased.
“Do you feel that this survey was politically biased?” (Question 61)




Figure S46: Opinion on the fight against extreme poverty.

“According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme poverty in low-income countries?” (Question 62) [\(Back to Section 2.5.3\)](#)

(a) Elements found in the open-ended field on the question
(manually recoded, in percent)



(b) Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).




Figure S47: Main attitudes by vote (“Right” spans from Center-right to Far right).
 (Relative support in percent in Questions 20, 35, 45, 46, 49) (Back to Section 2.5.3)

	Europe Left	Europe PNR/Non-voter	Europe Right	U.S. Left	U.S. PNR/Non-voter	U.S. Right
Support for the GCS	85	72	71	74	53	26
Global tax on millionaires	94	83	76	85	71	40
Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries	61	52	45	55	67	41
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	73	65	52	62	49	23
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	93	79	74	87	70	38
[Country]’s foreign aid should be increased	93	83	72	92	81	48
Universalist	56	48	26	53	49	23

1644 C Questionnaire of the global survey (section on global
1645 policies)

1646 A. At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be
1647 put in place? (Multiple answers are possible) [Figures 2 and S11]
1648 Global; [Federal / European / ...]; [State / National]; Local

1649 B. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “[country] should take mea-
1650 sures to fight climate change.”

1651 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly
1652 agree*

1653 C. How should [country] climate policies depend on what other countries do?

- 1654 • If other countries do more, [country] should do...
1655 • If other countries do less, [country] should do...

1656 *Much less; Less; About the same; More; Much more*

1657 D. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] All countries have signed the
1658 Paris agreement that aims to contain global warming “well below +2 °C’. To limit
1659 global warming to this level, there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we
1660 can emit globally, called the carbon budget. Each country could aim to emit less
1661 than a share of the carbon budget. To respect the global carbon budget, countries
1662 that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less
1663 than their share.

1664 Do you support such a policy? [Figures 2 and S11]

1665 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1666 support*

1667 E. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] Suppose the above policy is in
1668 place. How should the carbon budget be divided among countries? [Figures 2 and
1669 S11]

1670 *The emission share of a country should be proportional to its population, so that each human
1671 has an equal right to emit.; The emission share of a country should be proportional to its
1672 current emissions, so that those who already emit more have more rights to emit.; Countries
1673 that have emitted more over the past decades (from 1990 onwards) should receive a lower*

1674 *emission share, because they have already used some of their fair share.; Countries that will*
1675 *be hurt more by climate change should receive a higher emission share, to compensate them*
1676 *for the damages.*

1677 F. [In the U.S., Denmark, and France only] To achieve a given reduction of greenhouse
1678 gas emissions globally, costly investments are needed. Ideally, how should countries
1679 bear the costs of fighting climate change?

- 1680 • Countries should pay in proportion to their income
- 1681 • Countries should pay in proportion to their current emissions [Used as a sub-
1682 stitute to the equal right per capita in Figure 2]
- 1683 • Countries should pay in proportion to their past emissions (from 1990 on-
1684 wards) [Used as a substitute to historical responsibilities in Figure 2]
- 1685 • The richest countries should pay it all, so that the poorest countries do not have
1686 to pay anything
- 1687 • The richest countries should pay even more, to help vulnerable countries face
1688 adverse consequences: vulnerable countries would then receive money instead
1689 of paying [Used as a substitute to compensating vulnerable countries in Figures
1690 2 and S11]

1691 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly*
1692 *agree*

1693 G. Do you support or oppose establishing a global democratic assembly whose role
1694 would be to draft international treaties against climate change? Each adult across
1695 the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly. [Figures 2 and S11]
1696 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1697 *support*

1698 H. Imagine the following policy: a global tax on greenhouse gas emissions funding a
1699 global basic income. Such a policy would progressively raise the price of fossil fuels
1700 (for example, the price of gasoline would increase by [40 cents per gallon] in the
1701 first years). Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil
1702 fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Revenues from the tax would be used to
1703 finance a basic income of [\$30] per month to each human adult, thereby lifting the
1704 700 million people who earn less than \$2/day out of extreme poverty. The average

1705 [American] person would lose a bit from this policy as they would face [\$130] per
1706 month in price increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive.

1707 Do you support or oppose such a policy? [Figures 2 and S11]

1708 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1709 *support*


- 1710 I. Do you support or oppose a tax on all millionaires around the world to finance low-
1711 income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate ac-
1712 tion? This would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drink-
1713 ing water, healthcare, and education. [Figures 2 and S11]
1714 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1715 *support*

¹⁷¹⁶ D Questionnaire of the complementary surveys

¹⁷¹⁷ Below, we provide the generic questionnaire (based on the U.S. version), which roughly
¹⁷¹⁸ corresponds to the *Eu* questionnaire as well as the combination of the *US1* and *US2* ques-
¹⁷¹⁹ tionnaire. The main difference between Europe and the U.S. is that we split the *US2*
¹⁷²⁰ sample into four random branches to include some treatments before the Section D on
¹⁷²¹ the GCS. Besides the control group, the treatments are: information regarding the sup-
¹⁷²² port of Americans for the GCS and NR, an open-ended field, and a closed question on the
¹⁷²³ pros and cons of the GCS. The pros and cons of the GCS are also asked in *Eu* (likewise,
¹⁷²⁴ either as an open-ended field or a question), but only in Section D, after the support.

¹⁷²⁵ At each section or question, square brackets specify in which questionnaires it is present
¹⁷²⁶ (*US1*, *US2* and/or *Eu*) as well as country specificities. Figure S48 displays the structure of
¹⁷²⁷ each questionnaire. Each treatment randomization is independent. Qualtrics and Word
¹⁷²⁸ versions of the questionnaires in each language are available on our [public repository](#),
¹⁷²⁹ together with a spreadsheet that summarizes country specificities and our sources.

Figure S48: Main surveys' structure. Cf. Figure 1 for a simplified version.



1730 [Eu, US1, US2] Socio-demographic characteristics

1731 1. Welcome to this survey!

1732
1733 This survey is **anonymous** and is conducted for research purposes on a representa-
1734 tive sample of [1,000 British people].

1735
1736 It takes [US1, US2: 10 to 15 min; Eu: around 20 min] to complete.

1737
1738 The survey contains lotteries and awards for those who get the correct answer to
1739 some understanding questions.

1740 If you are attentive and lucky, you can win up to [US1, Eu: \$350; US2: \$150] in
1741 points. (See terms and conditions).

1742 Please answer every question carefully.

1743
1744 Do you agree to participate in the survey?

1745 Yes; No

1746 2. What is your gender?

1747 Woman; Man; Other

1748 3. How old are you?

1749 Below 18; 18 to 20; 21 to 24; 25 to 29; 30 to 34; 35 to 39; 40 to 44; 45 to 49; 50 to 54; 55 to
1750 59; 60 to 64; 65 to 69; 70 to 74; 75 to 79; 80 to 84; 85 to 89; 90 to 99; 100 or above

1751 4. [Eu] In which country do you live?

1752 France; Germany; Spain; United Kingdom; Other

1753 5. What is your ZIP code? [UK: What is your Outcode (the left part of your postcode,
1754 e.g. if your postcode is N7 8H7, just enter N7)?]

1755 6. Do you live with your partner (if you have one)?

1756 Yes; No

1757 7. How many people are in your household? The household includes: you, the mem-
1758 bers of your family who live with you, and your dependants.

1759 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more

- 1760 8. [Eu] How many children below 14 live with you?
- 1761 1; 2; 3; 4 or more
- 1762 9. [US1, US2] What race or ethnicity do you identify with? (Multiple answers are possible)
- 1763 *White; Black or African American; Hispanic; Asian; American Indian or Alaskan Native; Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; Other: {open field}; Prefer not to say*
- 1764
- 1765
- 1766 10. What is the [US1, US2: annual; Eu: monthly] gross income of your household (before withholding tax)? This includes all income: wages, self-employment earnings, Social Security benefits, pensions, investment income, welfare payments, and income from other sources.
- 1767 [US1, US2: Items based on household total income deciles and quartiles, namely:
- 1768 *Less than \$20,000; between \$20,001 and \$35,000; between \$35,001 and \$42,000; between \$42,001 and \$50,000; between \$50,001 and \$65,000; between \$65,001 and \$82,000; between \$82,001 and \$103,000; between \$103,001 and \$130,000; between \$130,001 and \$145,000; between \$145,001 and \$165,000; between \$165,001 and \$250,000; More than \$250,000; I prefer not to answer;*
- 1769
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- 1790
- 1791
- 1792
- Eu: custom thresholds, taking into account household composition Questions 6-8, and corresponding to the country's deciles and quartiles of standard of living, cf. the sheet "Income" in [this spreadsheet](#)]
11. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
- [Below upper secondary, Upper secondary, and Post secondary are coded as the first two, middle three, and last three items, respectively.
- US1, US2: Primary school or less; Eighth grade; Some high school; Regular high school diploma/GED or alternative credential; Some college, no degree; 2-year college degree or associates degree (for example: AA, AS); Bachelor's degree (for example: BA, BS); Master's degree or above (MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA, MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD, PhD); FR: École primaire / Aucun; Brevet; CAP ou BEP; Baccalauréat professionnel ou technologique; Baccalauréat général; Bac +2 (BTS, DUT, DEUG...); Bac +3 (licence...); Bac +5 ou plus (master, école d'ingénieur ou de commerce, doctorat, médecine, maîtrise, DEA, DESS...)
- DE: Keine abgeschlossene Schulbildung / Grundschule; Untere Sekundarstufe (z.B. Haupt- oder Realschulabschluss); Erstausbildung; Beruflicher Abschluss / Ausbildung; Abitur; Zweitausbildung; Bachelor oder Fachhochschulabschluss; Master-Abschluss oder höher

1793 ES: *Educación primaria / No he completado la enseñanza básica; Educación secundaria obligatoria (ESO); Formación profesional básica (FP); Formación profesional de grado medio; Bachillerato; Formación profesional de grado superior; Grado universitario; Máster/doctorado*
1794 UK: *Primary education or less; Some secondary school; GSCE; Vocational Upper secondary (Level 3 award, level 3 certificate, level 3 diploma, advanced apprenticeship, etc.); High school degree (A level); Higher vocational education (Level 4+ award, level 4+ certificate, level 4+ diploma, higher apprenticeship, etc.); Bachelor's Degree (BA, BSc, BEng, etc.); Postgraduate diploma or certificate, Master's Degree (MSc, MA, MBA, etc.) or Ph.D.]*

1801 12. What is your employment status?

1802 *Full-time employed; Part-time employed; Self-employed; Student; Retired; Unemployed*
1803 *(searching for a job); Inactive (not searching for a job)*

1804 13. Are you a homeowner or a tenant? (Multiple answers are possible)

1805 *Tenant; Owner; Landlord renting out property; Hosted free of charge*

1806 14. [If lives with partner: What is the estimated value of your household's assets (in
1807 U.S. dollars)?]

1808 If does not live with partner: What is the estimated value of your assets (in U.S.
1809 dollars)?]

1810 Include here all your possessions (home, car, savings, etc.) net of debt. For example,
1811 if you own a house worth [\$]300,000 and you have [\$]100,000 left to repay on your
1812 mortgage, your assets are [\$]200,000.

1813 I estimate my [If lives with partner: household's] assets net of debt to be:

1814 [Items based on the following individual wealth quintiles, doubled if lives with
1815 partner. US1, US2: *Less than \$0 (I have a net debt); Close to \$0; Between \$4,000 and*
1816 *\$60,000; Between \$60,000 and \$190,000; More than \$190,000;* For Eu, the thresholds are:
1817 FR: €5/50/150/300k; DE: €0/35/130/280k; ES: €0/50/100/200k; UK: £3/45/115/270k]

1818 15. [US1, US2 (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the vote question)] What
1819 do you consider to be your political affiliation, as of today?

1820 *Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other; Non-Affiliated*

1823 [Eu, US1, US2] Global climate scheme

1824 In the following, we describe two policies, on which we will survey your opinion.
1825 To check that you have attentively read the descriptions, **we will ask some under-**
1826 **standing questions afterwards: those who get correct answers can win up to \$150.**

1827 **Global climate scheme:** At the Paris agreement in 2015, all countries have agreed
1828 to contain global warming “well below +2 °C”. To limit global warming to this
1829 level, **there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally.**

1830 To meet the climate target, a limited number of permits to emit greenhouse gases
1831 can be created globally. Polluting firms would be required to buy permits to cover
1832 their emissions. Such a policy would **make fossil fuel companies pay** for their
1833 emissions and progressively raise the price of fossil fuels. **Higher prices would en-**
1834 **courage people and companies to use less fossil fuels, reducing greenhouse gas**
1835 **emissions.**

1836 In accordance with the principle that each human has an equal right to pollute, the
1837 revenues generated by the sale of permits could finance a global basic income. **Each**
1838 **adult in the world would receive [US1, US2: \$30/month; UK: \$30 (that is £25) per**
1839 **month; FR, DE, ES: €30/month], thereby lifting out of extreme poverty the 700 mil-**
1840 **lion people who earn less than \$2/day.**

1841 **The typical [American] would lose out financially [US1, US2: \$85, FR: €10, DE:**
1842 **€25, ES: €5, UK: £20] per month** (as he or she would face [\$115] per month in price
1843 increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive).

1844 The policy could be put in place as soon as countries totaling more than 60% of
1845 global emissions agree on it. Countries that would refuse to take part in the policy
1846 could face sanctions (like tariffs) from the rest of the World and would be excluded
1847 from the basic income.

(Back to Section 2.2)

1848 16. Who would win or lose financially in the Global climate scheme? [Figure S12]

1849 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1850 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

1851 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.;*

1852 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

1853 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would lose and*

1856 *the 700 million poorest humans would win* from the Global climate scheme. Now, here
1857 is the second policy:

1858

1859 **National redistribution scheme:**

1860 This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [US1, US2: 5%; Eu: 1%] and provide
1861 cash transfers to all adults. More precisely, **each [American] adult would receive**
1862 **[\$85] per month** (that is [\$1,000] per year). This would be financed by an increase
1863 of the federal income tax on household income in excess of [US1, US2: \$315,000 per
1864 year; FR: €15,000 per month; DE: €20,000 per month; ES: €10,000 per month; UK:
1865 £15,000 per month], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000]. [US1,
1866 US2: See more details.] ⁹

1867 17. Who would win or lose financially in the National redistribution? [Figure S12]

1868

1869 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1870 Typical [Americans] would win and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Ameri-
1871 cans] would win and the richest [Americans] would lose.; Typical [Americans] would lose
1872 and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Americans] would lose and the richest
1873 [Americans] would lose.

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would win and
1875 the richest [Americans] would lose* from the National redistribution scheme.

1876

1877 To help you with the next question, here is a reminder of the policies:

1878

1879 **Global Climate scheme:**

1880 To limit global warming and reach the international climate objective, the Global
1881 climate scheme would **impose a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can
1882 emit globally.**

⁹8% of U.S. respondents click. They then see the following text, based on taxjusticenow.org by Saez and Zucman ¹⁵⁴: *The marginal income tax rates would evolve as follows:*

Below \$315,000: unchanged

\$315,000 - \$400,000: current rate 32% => new rate 41%

\$400,000 - \$600,000: 35% => 50%

\$600,000 - \$2.5 million: 37% => 60%

\$2.5 - \$5 million: 37% => 65%

Above \$5 million: 37% => 70%

1883 It would **make polluters pay** for their emissions, which in turn would increase fos-
1884 sil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities.

1885 The revenues would finance a **global basic income** of [\$30] per month for all hu-
1886 mans, lifting out of extreme poverty the poorest billion people.

1887 Considering the basic income and the fuel price increases, **the typical [American]**
1888 **would lose out financially** [\$85] per month.

1889

1890 **National redistribution scheme:**

1891 This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [5%] and provide cash transfers to
1892 all adults. More precisely, **each [American] would receive** [\$85] per month. This
1893 would be financed by an increase of the federal income tax on household income in
1894 excess of [\$315,000 per year], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000
1895 per year].

- 1896 18. If both the Global climate scheme and the National redistribution scheme are imple-
1897 mented, how would a typical [American] be financially affected? [Figure S12]

1898 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1899 *A typical [American] would lose out financially.; A typical [American] would neither gain
1900 nor lose.; A typical [American] would gain financially.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was that *A typical [American] would nei-
1902 ther gain nor lose* from both schemes combined. [US1, Eu: Now, here are the last two
1903 policies:]

1904

1905 **[US1: Coal exit:**

1906 To reduce CO₂ emissions, this policy would require all U.S. coal power plants to be
1907 phased out by 2030. Coal would be replaced by renewable sources like wind and
1908 solar panels as well as stronger reliance on gas power plants.

1909 **Eu: Thermal insulation plan:**

1910 To reduce CO₂ emissions and energy insecurity, this policy would require that all
1911 buildings meet energy efficiency targets: at least rating E in 2030 and rating C in
1912 2040. The [UK] government would subsidise half the cost of insulation for all house-
1913 holds, and up to 90% for the poorest households. Insulation work would cost [FR,
1914 DE: €25; ES: €20; UK: £25] billion a year, but would deliver energy savings greater
1915 than this cost.]

1916

1917 [US1: **Marriage only for opposite-sex couples:**

1918

This policy is a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would legally define marriage as a union of one man and one woman.

1919

1920 **Eu: Death penalty for major crimes:**

1921

This measure would reintroduce capital punishment for major crimes such as terrorism and mass shootings.]

1922

1923 Now, we will ask your opinion on the [US1, Eu: four] policies.

1924

1925 [Click here for the reminder of the \[US1, Eu: first\] two policies.](#) [Clicking displays the
1926 previous summarized descriptions.]

1927

- 1928 19. [US2] [4 Random branches: control (*nothing*); Question 31 (*field*); Question 32 (*important*); or the following question (*info*).] For information, a recent survey has shown
1929 that:

1930

- 64% of Americans support the Global climate scheme.
- 72% of Americans support the National redistribution scheme.

1932

20. Do you support the Global climate scheme? [Figure S1]

1933

Yes; No

1934

21. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the
1935 previous question? [Figure S4]

1936

The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

1937

Percentage of [Americans] in favor of Global climate scheme [slider from 0 to 100]

1938

22. Do you support the National redistribution scheme? [Figure S1]

1939

Yes; No

1940

23. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the
1941 previous question? [Figure S4]

1942

The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

1943

Percentage of [Americans] in favor of National redistribution [slider from 0 to 100]

1944

24. [Eu, US1] Beware, this question is quite unusual. Among the policies below, **how many** do you support? [Figure S14, Table 1]

- 1946 [Four random branches. Branch GCS/NR/C/O]
- 1947
- 1948 • Global climate scheme
- 1949 • National redistribution scheme
- 1950 • [Coal exit]
- 1951 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]
- 1952 0; 1; 2; 3; 4
- 1953
- 1954 [Branch GCS/C/O]
- 1955
- 1956 • Global climate scheme
- 1957 • [Coal exit]
- 1958 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]
- 1959 0; 1; 2; 3
- 1960
- 1961 [Branch NR/C/O]
- 1962
- 1963 • National redistribution scheme
- 1964 • [Coal exit]
- 1965 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]
- 1966 0; 1; 2; 3
- 1967 [Branch C/O]
- 1968
- 1969 • [Coal exit]
- 1970 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]
- 1971 0; 1; 2
- 1972

1973 [Eu, US1] Conjoint analyses

- 1974 25. Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you prefer? [Figure
1975 [S15](#)]

1976 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the
1977 same time.

Bundle A	Bundle B
[Coal exit]	[Coal exit]
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme
Global climate scheme	

1979 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 1980 26. Do you support Bundle A (combining [Coal exit], the National redistribution scheme,
1981 and the Global climate scheme)?[Figure [S1](#)]

1982 Yes; No

- 1983 27. [new page] Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you
1984 prefer? [Figure [S15](#)]

1985 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the
1986 same time.

1987 *[Four random branches. Branch C + NR vs. GCS + NR]*

Bundle A	Bundle B
[Coal exit]	Global climate scheme
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme

1991 *[Branch NR vs. NR + C + GCS]*

Bundle A	Bundle B
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme [Coal exit] Global climate scheme

1994 *[Branch NR + GCS vs. NR]*

	Bundle A	Bundle B	
1995	National redistribution scheme Global climate scheme	National redistribution scheme	
1996			
1997	[Branch NR + C vs. NR]		
	Bundle A	Bundle B	
1998	National redistribution scheme [Coal exit]	National redistribution scheme	
1999			
2000	<i>Bundle A; Bundle B</i>		
2001	28. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies in their platforms.		
2002			
2003			
2004	Eu: Imagine if [DE, ES, UK: the two favorite candidates in your constituency in the next general election; FR: the two candidates in the second round of the next presidential election] campaigned with the following policies in their party's platforms.]		
2005			
2006			
2007			
2008	Which of these candidates would you vote for? [Table 2, Figure S15]		
2009			
2010	[Table 2. Two random branches: with and without the final row. The US1 version of the policies is given below, see the sheet "Policies" in this spreadsheet for the European versions.]		
	Democrat	Republican	
2011	Increase corporate income tax rate from 21% to 28% Coal exit Trillion dollar investment in childcare, healthcare, education and housing \$15 minimum wage National redistribution scheme [Global climate scheme / no row]	Decrease the payroll tax Permit completion of the Keystone pipeline Withdrawal of the Paris agreement Marriage only for opposite-sex couples Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation [/ no row]	

2012

2013

[US1: Democrat; Republican; None of them; Eu: Candidate A; Candidate B; None of them]

2014

2015

2016

29. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies in their platforms.

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Eu (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the Section “Values and politics”): Imagine that [FR: the left or center-left; DE: a red-red-green coalition; ES: the PSOE; UK: the Labour Party] wins the next [general] elections. Here are two possible platforms on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a pool of credible [FR: left or center-left, DE: left-wing parties’; ES: PSOE; UK: Labour] policies).]

2023

2024

[US1: Which of these candidates do you prefer?

2025

2026

2027

2028

Eu: Even if you [FR: are not from the left or center-left; DE: do not support the left-wing parties; ES: do not support the PSOE; UK: do not support the Labour Party], which of these platforms do you prefer?]

[Figures S2, S16; see also the sheet “Policies” in *this spreadsheet* for the possible policies.]

	[Candidate A]	[Candidate B]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
2029	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]

2030

[US1: Candidate A; Candidate B; Eu: Platform A; Platform B]

2031

2032

2033

2034

30. [new page] [Same wording and conditions as above. For brevity, only the UK version is given here.] Imagine that the Labour Party wins the next general elections. Here are two possible platforms on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a pool of credible Labour policies).

2035

2036

2037

Even if you do not support the Labour Party, which of these platforms do you prefer? [Figure S2]

		Platform A	Platform B
2038	[Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order]	[Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy]	[Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy]
	Foreign policy	Global climate scheme	-
2039	<i>Platform A; Platform B</i>		

2040 **[Eu, US2] Perceptions of the GCS**

2041 [Eu: two random branches. US2: four random branches and the question is asked (if asked)
2042 before Question 20]

2043 31. [Branch: field] When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to
2044 your mind?

2045 Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme. [Figures S18, S19]
2046 {Open field}

2047 32. [Branch: important] When determining your support or opposition to the Global
2048 climate scheme, which points are important to you? [Figure S17]

- 2049 • It would succeed in limiting climate change.
- 2050 • It would hurt the [U.S.] economy.
- 2051 • It would penalize my household.
- 2052 • It would make people change their lifestyle.
- 2053 • It would reduce poverty in low-income countries.
- 2054 • It might be detrimental to some poor countries.
- 2055 • It could foster global cooperation.
- 2056 • It could fuel corruption in low-income countries.
- 2057 • It could be subject to fraud.
- 2058 • It would be technically difficult to put in place.
- 2059 • Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences.

2060 *Not at all important; Not so important; Quite important; Very important*

2061 [Eu, US1] Donation lottery

2062 33. Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).

2063 *Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*

2064 34. [Two random branches] By taking this survey, you are automatically entered into a
2065 lottery to win [\$]100 in panel points. This lottery is unrelated to the previous ones
2066 that rewarded answers’ accuracy. In a few days you will know whether you have
2067 been selected in the lottery. The payment will be made to you in the same way as
2068 your compensation for this survey, so no further action is required on your part.

2069
2070 Should you be selected in the lottery, you can also donate a part of this additional
2071 compensation to [[American] / African] people living in poverty through [US1: the
2072 charity GiveDirectly. The charity GiveDirectly; Eu: a charity. We would channel this
2073 donation to a charity that] provides small amounts of cash to people in need in [[the
2074 U.S] / Africa].

2075
2076 **In case you are winner of the lottery, what share of the [\$]100 would you donate
2077 to [[American] / African] people living in poverty [US1: through GiveDirectly]?**
2078 [Figure S20, Table S3]

2079 *Amount donated to [[American] / African] people in need (in [\$]) [slider from 0 to 100]*

2080 [Eu, US2] Wealth tax

2081 [Four random branches: Question 35 then Question 36 (global first); Question 36 then Ques-
2082 tion 35 (national first); Question 37 (global share); Question 38 (sharing)]

2083 35. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-
2084 income countries?

2085 Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking
2086 water, healthcare, and education. [Figures S1, S21]

2087 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
2088 support*

2089 36. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: afford-
2090 able housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and
2091 schools]? [Figures S1, S22]

2092 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
2093 *support*

2094 37. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all
2095 countries around the world. In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount
2096 to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE: €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2:
2097 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount
2098 to [\$]1 billion in all low-income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700
2099 million people, most of them in Africa).

2100 Each country would retain part of the revenues it collects, and the remaining part
2101 would be pooled at the global level to finance infrastructure and public services in
2102 low-income countries.

2103
2104 What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of re-
2105 tained in the country's national budget)? [Figures S5, S23]

2106 *Percent of global wealth tax that should go to low-income countries* [slider from 0 to 100]

2107 38. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in
2108 all countries around the world.

2109 In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE:
2110 €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2: 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES:
2111 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount to [\$]1 billion in all low-
2112 income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700 million people, most of
2113 them in Africa).

2114 Which of the following options would you prefer? [Figure S24]

- 2115 • The whole wealth tax financing national budgets in each country. For ex-
2116 ample, in [US2: the U.S., it could finance affordable housing and universal
2117 childcare/pre-K.; Eu-UK: the UK, it could finance the National Health Service
2118 and state-funded schools].
- 2119 • Half of the wealth tax financing national budgets in each country, half of it
2120 financing low-income countries. For example, it could finance [US2: universal
2121 childcare/pre-K in the U.S.; Eu-UK: state-funded schools in the UK] and access
2122 to drinking water, healthcare, and education in Africa.

2123 [Eu, US2] Foreign aid

2124 US2 Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).

2125 Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal

- 2126 39. From your best guess, what percentage of [U.S.] government spending is allocated
2127 to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?

2128

2129 For your information, government spending totals [US2: 38%; FR: 55%; DE: 45%; ES:
2130 42%; UK: 41%] of [U.S.] GDP, it includes [US2: federal, State; Eu: national] and local
2131 government spending, and apart from foreign aid, it covers the following items: de-
2132 fense, social security (retirement pensions), health [US2: (including Medicare and
2133 Medicaid)], welfare benefits [US2: (including food stamps and EITC)], education,
2134 roads, justice, other programs [US2: and federal agencies (including in energy, sci-
2135 ence...)]. [Figure S25]

2136 Less than 0.1%; 0.1% to 0.2%; 0.3% to 0.5%; 0.6% to 1.0%; 1.1% to 1.7%; 1.8% to 2.6%;
2137 2.7% to 4%; 4.1% to 6%; 6.1% to 9%; 9.1% to 13%; 13.1% to 25%; More than 25%

- 2138 40. [Two random branches: with or without information on actual amount] [Info: Actually,
2139 [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [the U.S.] government spend-
2140 ing is allocated to foreign aid.]

2141

2142 If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate
2143 to foreign aid? [Figures S28, S29, S26 and S27]

- 2144 41. [Asked iff branch: Info and preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than actual for-
2145 eign aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to increase [U.S.] foreign
2146 aid.

2147

2148 How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers
2149 possible) [Figure S30]

2150 Lower spending on defense; Lower spending on retirement pensions; Lower spending on
2151 healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Lower spending on welfare benefits [US2: (like
2152 EITC or food stamps)]; Lower spending on education; Lower spending on other programs
2153 [US2: and federal agencies]; Higher taxes on the wealthiest; Higher corporate income tax
2154 rate; Higher personal income tax rates; Higher public deficit

2155 42. [Asked iff branch: *Info* and preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than actual foreign
2156 aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to reduce [U.S.] foreign aid.

2157

2158 How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible) [*Figure S31*]
2159

2160 *Higher spending on defense; Higher spending on retirement pensions; Higher spending on
2161 healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Higher spending on welfare benefits [US2:
2162 like EITC or food stamps)]; Higher spending on education; lower spending on other pro-
2163 grams [US2: and federal agencies]; Lower taxes on the wealthiest; Lower corporate income
2164 tax rate; Lower personal income tax rates; Lower public deficit*

2165 **[Eu, US1] Petition**

2166 43. [*Two random branches*] Would you be willing to sign a petition for the [Global cli-
2167 mate / National redistribution] scheme? [*Figure S32*]

2168

2169 As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President's
2170 office], informing him what share of American people are willing to endorse the
2171 [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign,
2172 only your answer here is required and remains anonymous.) Yes; No

2173 **[Eu, US1] Other policies**

2174 44. The following policies are discussed at international negotiations on how to deal
2175 with climate change. [*Figures 3 and S33*]

2176

2177 Do you support or oppose the following policies?

- 2178 • Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for
2179 climate damages
- 2180 • High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries
- 2181 • High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income
2182 countries adapt to climate change

2183 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
2184 support*

2185 45. Do you support or oppose the following global policies? [Figures 3 and S33]

- 2186 • Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt
- 2187 • Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting
right proportional to its population
- 2188 • Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries
- 2189 • A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage
- 2190 • Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of
all assets
- 2191 • A maximum wealth limit of [US1: \$10 billion; Eu: [€]100 million] for each
2192 human

2193 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
2194 support*

2195 46. Currently, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [U.S.] government
2196 spending (that is, [US1: 0.2%; FR: 0.4%; DE: 0.6%; ES: 0.2%; UK: 0.7%] of [U.S.] GDP)
2197 is spent on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries. [Figure S4]

2200
2201 Do you support [the U.S.] transferring more money to low-income countries?

2202 Yes, [U.S.] foreign aid should be increased.; Yes, but only if some conditions are met.; No,
2203 [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.; No, [U.S.] foreign aid should be reduced.

2204 47. [Asked only if Yes, but only if some conditions are met. is chosen] What conditions
2205 should be required for [the U.S.] to increase its foreign aid? (Multiple answers pos-
2206 sible) [Figures S5, S28]

2207 *That recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights.; That recipient
2208 countries cooperate to fight illegal migrations.; That other high-income countries also in-
2209 crease their foreign aid.; That this is financed by increased taxes on millionaires.; That we
2210 can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted.; Other: [open field]*

2211 48. [Asked only if No, [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable. or No, [U.S.] foreign aid
2212 should be reduced. is chosen] Why do you oppose [the U.S.] increasing its foreign
2213 aid? (Multiple answers possible) [Figure S6]

2214 *Aid perpetuates poverty as it makes people feel less responsible for themselves.; Aid is not
2215 effective as most of it is diverted.; Aid is a pressure tactic for high-income countries that*

2216 prevents low-income countries from developing freely.; [The U.S.] is not responsible for what
2217 happens in other countries.; Charity begins at home: there is already a lot to do to support
2218 the American people in need.; Other: [open field]

2219 **[Eu, US1, US2] Values and politics**

- 2220 49. [Eu (where it is instead asked at the beginning of Section “Other Policies”), US1]
2221 In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend
2222 [U.S.] interests or global justice? [Figure S34]
2223 [U.S.] interests, even if it goes against global justice; [U.S.] interests, to the extent it re-
2224 spects global justice; Indifferent or don’t know; Global justice, to the extent it respects [U.S.]
2225 interests; Global justice, even if it goes against [U.S.] interests
- 2226 50. How much did you give to charities in 2022? [Figure S39]
2227 I did not make donations to charities last year.; Less than [\$]100.; Between [\$]101 and
2228 [\$]500.; Between [\$]501 and [\$]1,000.; Between [\$]1,001 and [\$]5,000.; More than [\$]5,000.
- 2229 51. To what extent are you interested in politics? [Figure S40]
2230 Not at all; A little; Moderately; A lot; A great deal
- 2231 52. Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means you think the
2232 government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic gov-
2233 ernment functions, and 5 means you think the government should take active steps
2234 in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens? [Figure S41]
2235 Desired involvement of government [slider from 1 to 5]
- 2236 53. **On economic policy matters**, where do you see yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where
2237 1 is Left (favoring equality and government interventions) and 5 is Right (favoring
2238 free competition and little government intervention)? [Figure S42]
2239 Left (1) to Right (5) on economic issues [slider from 1 to 5]
- 2240 54. Did you vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election? [Figure S43]
2241 Yes; No; I didn’t have the right to vote in the U.S.; Prefer not to say
- 2242 55. [If voted: Which candidate did you vote for in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election?
2243 If did not vote: Even if you did not vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election,
2244 please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who
2245 represents your views more closely.] [Figure S44]

2246 [US1, US2: Biden; Trump; Jorgensen; Hawkins; Prefer not to say
2247 FR: candidates at the 2022 presidential election
2248 DE: parties with more than 1% of votes at the 2021 federal election and *Other*
2249 ES: lists with more than 0.9% at the November 2019 general election and *Other*
2250 UK: parties with more than 0.5% of votes at the 2019 general election and *Other*]

2251 56. To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem? [Figure S35]

- 2252 • Income inequality in [the U.S.]
2253 • Climate change
2254 • Global poverty

2255 *Not an important issue for me; An issue but there are other priorities; An issue but we
2256 already do what we can; An important issue, we should do more; One of the most pressing
2257 issue of our time*

2258 57. What group do you defend when you vote? [Figure S36]

2259 *Sentient beings (humans and animals); Humans; [Eu: Europeans]; [Americans]; People
2260 sharing my culture or religion; [US1, US2: My State]; [US1, US2: My town; Eu: My
2261 country, region or town]; My relatives and/or colleagues; My family and myself*

2262 [Eu, US1] Prioritization

2263 58. In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The
2264 more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

2265 How do you allocate the points among the following policies? [Figures S37 and S38]

2266 You can adjust the number of points either using the slider or entering the num-
2267 ber of your choice on the right-hand-side. **The sum of points must equal exactly
2268 100.** By pushing the last slider to the right, the total will automatically adjust to 100.
2269 Please read the 6 options before making your choice.

2270 See the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the pool of policies in each country.

2271 [sliders from 0 to 100]

2274 [FR, DE, ES] ETS2

2275 59. Similar to the Global Climate Scheme, the European Climate Scheme would impose
2276 a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit across the EU in the buildings
2277 and transport sectors. It would make polluters pay for their emissions, which in turn
2278 would increase fossil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities. Several options
2279 are possible regarding the use of the scheme's revenues:

- 2280 • Provide an equal cash transfer of €105 per year to each European.
2281 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European, proportional to their
2282 country's emissions: people in countries with higher emissions per person (like
2283 Germany) would receive more than people in countries with lower emissions
2284 (like Romania). For information, people in [Germany] would receive €[FR:
2285 110; DE: 130; ES: 90]/year.
2286 • Finance low-carbon investments: thermal insulation of buildings, switch to
2287 clean sources of heating, public transportation, and charging stations for elec-
2288 tric vehicles.
2289 • Provide cash transfers to the most vulnerable half of Europeans and finance
2290 low-carbon investments.

2291 Do you support or oppose the European Climate Scheme in case the revenue is used
2292 to... ?

- 2293 • Provide an equal cash transfer to each European
2294 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European
2295 • Finance low-carbon investments
2296 • Provide cash transfers for the most vulnerable Europeans and low-carbon in-
2297 vestments

2298 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
2299 support*

2300 60. [Asked iff none of the four variants of the European Climate Scheme is (somewhat or
2301 strongly) supported] Why do you not support a European Climate Scheme? (Mul-
2302 tiple answers possible)

2303 *I am opposed to climate policy being decided at the EU level, it should be decided at the na-*
2304 *tional level;*
2305 *I would prefer if the revenues were used in a different way (beyond the four suggestions*
2306 *above) than previously suggested;*
2307 *I would prefer if decreasing carbon emissions were regulated by other climate policies;*
2308 *I am generally opposed to additional, or more ambitious, climate policies;*
2309 *I do not fully understand how the European Climate Scheme is supposed to work;*
2310 *I don't know*

2311 **[Eu, US1, US2] Feedback**

- 2312 61. Do you feel that this survey was politically biased? [Figure S45]
2313 *Yes, left-wing biased; Yes, right-wing biased; No, I do not feel it was biased*
- 2314 62. [US2 Asked only to one random third of the respondents, instead of the feedback Ques-
2315 tion 63] According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme
2316 poverty in low-income countries? [Figure S46]
2317 *{Open field}*
- 2318 63. The survey is nearing completion. You can now enter any comments, thoughts or
2319 suggestions in the field below.
2320 *{Open field}*
- 2321 64. Lastly, are you interested to be interviewed by a researcher (through videoconfer-
2322 encing) for 30 min?
2323
2324 This is totally optional and will not be rewarded.
2325 *Yes; No*

2326 E Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme

2327 To specify the GCS, we use the IEA's 2DS scenario¹⁵⁵, which is consistent with limiting
2328 the global average temperature increase to 2°C with a probability of at least 50%. The
2329 paper by Hood¹⁵⁶ contributing to the Report of the High-Level Commission on Carbon
2330 Prices³⁴ presents a price corridor compatible with this emissions scenario, from which we
2331 take the midpoint. The product of these two series provides an estimate of the revenues
2332 expected from a global carbon price. We then use the UN median scenario of future
2333 population aged over 15 years (*adults*, for short). We derive the basic income that could
2334 be paid to all adults by recycling the revenues from the global carbon price: evolving
2335 between \$20 and \$30 per month, with a peak in 2030. Accounting for the lower price
2336 levels in low-income countries, an additional income of \$30 per month would allow **670**
2337 **million people** to escape extreme poverty, defined with the threshold of \$2.15 per day in
2338 purchasing power parity.¹⁰

2339 To estimate the increase in fossil fuel expenditures (or “cost”) in each country by
2340 2030, we make a key assumption concerning the evolution of the carbon footprints per
2341 adult: that they will decrease by the same proportion in each country. We use data
2342 from the Global Carbon Project¹⁵⁷. In 2030, the average carbon footprint of a country
2343 c , e_c , evolves from baseline year b proportionally to the evolution of its adult population
2344 $\Delta p_c = p_c^{2030} / p_c^b$. Thus, the global share of country c 's carbon footprint, s_c , is propor-
2345 tional to $\sigma_c = e_c \Delta p_c$, and as countries' shares sum to 1, $s_c = \frac{\sigma_c}{\sum_k \sigma_k}$. Multiplying country
2346 c 's emission share with global revenues in 2030, R , and dividing by c 's adult population
2347 in year y , yields its average cost per adult: $R \cdot s_c / p_c^y$. Using findings from Ivanova and
2348 Wood¹⁵⁸ for Europe and Fremstad and Paul¹⁵⁹ for the U.S., we approximate the median
2349 cost as 90% of the average cost. Finally, the net gain is given by the basic income (\$30
2350 per month) minus the cost. We provided consistent estimates of net gains in all surveys
2351 (using $y = b = 2015$), though in the global survey we gave the average net gains vs. the
2352 median ones in the complementary surveys. The latter are shown in Figure S49. For the
2353 record, Table S4 also provides an estimate of *average* net gains (computed with $b = 2019$)

¹⁰The average carbon footprint of Sub-Saharan Africa is 0.75tCO₂ per capita ([World Bank](#)), and it is even lower for people living in extreme poverty, under one tenth of the world average of about 5tCO₂ per capita¹¹⁰. Under a GCS with a cash transfer of \$30 per person, if one's emission is one tenth of the world average, their net gain would be \$27 per month in nominal terms. In regions with extreme poverty like Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding high-income countries), the conversion factor from Market Exchange Rate to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is 2.4 (computed as the [ratio](#) of the World Bank series relating the GDP per capita of Sub-Saharan Africa in [PPP](#) and [nominal](#)). Therefore, the net gain for the extreme poor is \$65 per month (or \$2.13 a day) in PPP, enough to lift them out of extreme poverty.

²³⁵⁴ and $y = 2030$).¹¹

²³⁵⁵ Estimates of the net gains from the Global Climate Scheme are necessarily imprecise,
²³⁵⁶ given the uncertainties surrounding the carbon price required to achieve emissions
²³⁵⁷ reductions as well as each country's trajectory in terms of emissions and population. These
²³⁵⁸ values are highly dependent on future (non-price) climate policies, technical progress,
²³⁵⁹ and economic growth of each country, which are only partially known. Integrated Assess-
²³⁶⁰ ment Models have been used to derive a Global Energy Assessment¹²⁵, a 100% renewable
²³⁶¹ scenario¹⁶⁰ as well as Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs), which include consistent
²³⁶² trajectories of population, emissions, and carbon price^{161–164}. Instead of using some of
²³⁶³ these modelling trajectories, we relied on a simple and transparent formula, for a num-
²³⁶⁴ ber of reasons. First and foremost, those trajectories describe territorial emissions while
²³⁶⁵ we need consumption-based emissions to compute the incidence of the GCS. Second, the
²³⁶⁶ carbon price is relatively low in trajectories of SSPs that contain global warming below
²³⁶⁷ 2°C (less than \$35/tCO₂ in 2030), so we conservatively chose a method yielding a higher
²³⁶⁸ carbon price (\$90 in 2030). Third, modelling results are available only for a few macro re-
²³⁶⁹ gions, while we wanted country by country estimates. Finally, we have checked that the
²³⁷⁰ emissions per capita given by our method are broadly in line with alternative methods,
²³⁷¹ even if it tends to overestimate net gains in countries which will decarbonize less rapidly
²³⁷² than average.¹² For example, although countries' decarbonization plans should realign
²³⁷³ with the GCS in place, India might still decarbonize less quickly than the European Union,
²³⁷⁴ so India's gain and the EU's loss might be overestimated in our computations. For a more
²³⁷⁵ sophisticated version of the Global Climate Scheme which includes participation mecha-
²³⁷⁶ nisms preventing middle-income countries (like China) to lose from it and estimations of
²³⁷⁷ the Net Present Value by country, see Fabre¹⁶⁵.

(Back to Section 2.3)

¹¹2015 was the last year of data available when the global questionnaire was conceived (OECD data was then used – it does not cover all countries but give identical rounded estimates than those recomputed from the Global Carbon Project data for our complementary surveys). 2030 was chosen as the reference year as it is the date at which global carbon price revenues are expected to peak (and the GCS redistributive effects would be largest), and the GCS could not realistically enter into force before that date. In the surveys, we chose $y = b = 2015$ rather than $b = 2019$ and $y = 2030$ to get more conservative estimates of the monthly cost in the U.S. (\$20 higher than the other option) and in Europe (€5 or £10 higher).

¹²Computations with alternative methods can be found on [our public repository](#).

Figure S49: Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme.




Table S4: Estimated net gain from the GCS in 2030 and carbon footprint by country.

	Mean net gain from the GCS (\$/month)	CO ₂ footprint per adult in 2019 (tCO ₂ /y)			
			Mexico	2	5.6
			Ukraine	2	5.6
			Uzbekistan*	4	5.1
			Argentina	5	4.9
			Thailand	6	4.6
			Egypt	12	3.6
			Indonesia	13	3.3
			Colombia	15	3.0
Saudi Arabia	-93	24.0	Brazil	15	2.9
United States	-77	21.0	Vietnam	15	2.9
Australia	-60	17.6	Peru	16	2.8
Canada	-56	16.7	Morocco	16	2.7
South Korea	-50	15.6	North Korea*	17	2.5
Germany	-30	11.7	India	18	2.4
Russia	-29	11.5	Philippines	18	2.3
Japan	-28	11.3	Pakistan	22	1.6
Malaysia	-21	10.0	Bangladesh	24	1.1
Iran	-19	9.5	Nigeria	25	1.0
Poland	-19	9.5	Kenya	25	0.9
United Kingdom	-18	9.4	Myanmar*	26	0.9
China	-14	8.6	Sudan*	26	0.9
Italy	-13	8.4	Tanzania	27	0.5
South Africa	-11	8.0	Afghanistan*	27	0.5
France	-10	7.8	Uganda	28	0.4
Iraq*	-8	7.4	Ethiopia	28	0.3
Spain	-6	7.0	Venezuela	29	0.3
Turkey	-2	6.2	DRC*	30	0.1
Algeria*	-1	6.0			

²³⁷⁸ Note: Asterisks denote countries where footprint is missing and territorial emissions is used instead.

²³⁷⁹ Values differ from Figure S49 as this table present estimates of *mean* net gain per adult in 2030, not at the

²³⁸⁰ present. Only the countries with more than 20 million adults (covering 87% of the global total) are shown.

2381 F Determinants of support

Table S5: Determinants of support for the Global Climate Scheme. (Back to [2.3](#))

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme						
	All	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Country: Germany	-0.157*** (0.022)		-0.144*** (0.022)				
Country: Spain	-0.044* (0.024)		-0.026 (0.024)				
Country: United Kingdom	-0.079*** (0.024)		-0.104*** (0.023)				
Country: United States	-0.375*** (0.019)						
Income quartile: 2	0.037** (0.017)	0.031 (0.022)	0.038 (0.023)	0.047 (0.043)	0.058 (0.049)	0.013 (0.053)	0.023 (0.043)
Income quartile: 3	0.042** (0.017)	0.033 (0.024)	0.049** (0.024)	0.080** (0.040)	0.059 (0.052)	0.074 (0.056)	-0.052 (0.052)
Income quartile: 4	0.056*** (0.018)	0.062** (0.026)	0.010 (0.026)	0.018 (0.047)	-0.015 (0.055)	-0.001 (0.056)	-0.005 (0.057)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.023* (0.012)	0.032* (0.017)	0.010 (0.018)	0.007 (0.029)	0.045 (0.039)	0.007 (0.039)	-0.010 (0.039)
Age: 25-34	-0.076*** (0.025)	-0.084*** (0.031)	-0.044 (0.035)	-0.031 (0.057)	-0.077 (0.083)	-0.050 (0.066)	-0.103 (0.091)
Age: 35-49	-0.101*** (0.024)	-0.109*** (0.030)	-0.069* (0.034)	-0.094* (0.055)	-0.009 (0.077)	-0.168** (0.070)	-0.050 (0.090)
Age: 50-64	-0.137*** (0.024)	-0.165*** (0.030)	-0.038 (0.035)	-0.039 (0.056)	-0.020 (0.082)	-0.146** (0.067)	-0.017 (0.087)
Age: 65+	-0.116*** (0.028)	-0.142*** (0.034)	-0.056 (0.044)	0.003 (0.076)	-0.045 (0.094)	-0.258*** (0.091)	0.011 (0.105)
Gender: Man	0.019* (0.011)	0.022 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.029)	-0.018 (0.033)	0.042 (0.038)	-0.005 (0.034)
Lives with partner	0.029** (0.013)	0.023 (0.017)	0.058*** (0.018)	0.070** (0.033)	0.082** (0.038)	0.017 (0.038)	0.040 (0.039)
Employment status: Retired	-0.020 (0.024)	-0.046 (0.030)	0.056 (0.038)	0.087 (0.081)	0.096 (0.075)	0.040 (0.082)	0.001 (0.073)
Employment status: Student	0.045 (0.033)	0.062 (0.048)	0.101** (0.044)	0.165* (0.085)	0.192** (0.087)	0.116 (0.074)	-0.021 (0.107)
Employment status: Working	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.020 (0.024)	0.011 (0.028)	0.082 (0.064)	0.006 (0.056)	-0.050 (0.056)	0.036 (0.051)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.331*** (0.013)	-0.435*** (0.017)	-0.106*** (0.019)	-0.131*** (0.035)	-0.004 (0.044)	-0.114*** (0.038)	-0.081* (0.041)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	-0.184*** (0.016)	-0.198*** (0.022)	-0.136*** (0.021)	-0.196*** (0.039)	-0.034 (0.043)	-0.116** (0.046)	-0.108*** (0.040)
Vote: Far right	-0.396*** (0.032)		-0.309*** (0.033)	-0.493*** (0.064)	-0.168*** (0.051)	-0.130 (0.102)	-0.314*** (0.080)
Urban	0.049*** (0.012)	0.072*** (0.018)	0.006 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.029)	0.019 (0.032)	-0.014 (0.036)	0.017 (0.033)
Race: White		-0.030 (0.019)					
Region: Northeast		0.010 (0.023)					
Region: South		0.006 (0.020)					
Region: West		0.010 (0.022)					
Swing State		-0.038** (0.019)					
Constant	1.048	0.736	0.89	0.7	0.732	0.935	0.886
Observations	7,986	4,992	2,994	977	727	748	542
R ²	0.160	0.181	0.064	0.116	0.067	0.043	0.063

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table S6: Support for the GCS regressed on comprehension of its financial effects.

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme					
	All	United States	France	Germany	United Kingdom	Spain
With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win	0.029** (0.012)	-0.004 (0.016)	0.043 (0.033)	0.051 (0.033)	0.040 (0.036)	0.038 (0.037)
Constant	0.596	0.53	0.764	0.677	0.707	0.796
Observations	8,000	5,000	729	979	749	543
R ²	0.001	0.00001	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.002

Table S7: Correlation between (*Somewhat or Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in high-income countries.

	Support for a global GHG tax and dividend											
	USA (1)	DNK (2)	FRA (3)	DEU (4)	ITA (5)	ESP (6)	GBR (7)	JPN (8)	POL (9)	AUS (10)	CAN (11)	KOR (12)
Control group mean	0.34	0.409	0.34	0.361	0.341	0.421	0.288	0.317	0.309	0.294	0.316	0.334
Trusts the government	0.040*** (0.013)	0.0005 (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.051*** (0.011)	0.061*** (0.012)	0.046*** (0.011)	0.050*** (0.012)	0.039*** (0.013)	0.023** (0.011)	0.041*** (0.013)	0.019 (0.013)	0.079*** (0.013)
Believes inequality is an important problem	0.038*** (0.014)	0.051*** (0.012)	0.045*** (0.013)	0.040*** (0.011)	0.023** (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.052*** (0.011)	0.015 (0.012)	0.009 (0.012)	0.005 (0.010)	0.031*** (0.013)	0.024** (0.012)
Worries about CC	0.006 (0.018)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.005 (0.016)	0.048*** (0.014)	0.023* (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.044*** (0.015)	0.014 (0.014)	0.018 (0.013)	0.036** (0.017)	0.004 (0.014)	0.015 (0.013)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	0.009 (0.015)	0.007 (0.012)	0.018 (0.014)	0.015 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.012)	0.032** (0.011)	0.027** (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.024** (0.012)	0.018 (0.015)	0.014 (0.014)	0.001 (0.013)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.059*** (0.015)	0.019 (0.013)	0.008 (0.014)	0.032** (0.013)	0.012 (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.006 (0.014)	0.006 (0.014)	0.037** (0.014)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.033** (0.016)	0.026* (0.014)
Understands emission across activities/regions	-0.018 (0.011)	0.009 (0.013)	0.003 (0.012)	0.023* (0.012)	0.007 (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.007 (0.011)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.026** (0.013)	-0.002 (0.013)	0.003 (0.012)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	0.007 (0.012)	0.008 (0.014)	0.023 (0.014)	0.011 (0.012)	-0.0005 (0.012)	0.031*** (0.012)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.014 (0.011)	0.025* (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.024* (0.012)
Knows which gases cause CC	0.005 (0.011)	0.021* (0.012)	0.010 (0.013)	0.001 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.010)	0.020* (0.010)	0.015 (0.010)	0.017 (0.011)	0.011 (0.010)	-0.0003 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.013)
Understands impacts of CC	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.029*** (0.011)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.022* (0.011)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.024** (0.012)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	-0.005 (0.013)	0.007 (0.012)	0.021 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.014)	0.011 (0.014)	0.010 (0.013)	0.014 (0.013)	0.008 (0.013)	0.015 (0.013)	0.036** (0.016)	0.004 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.013)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	-0.013 (0.021)	0.037 (0.023)	0.043* (0.022)	-0.014 (0.020)	-0.038** (0.019)	0.029 (0.020)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.017 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.006 (0.022)	0.021 (0.020)	-0.020 (0.019)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.086*** (0.024)	0.066*** (0.023)	0.075*** (0.023)	0.094*** (0.022)	0.105*** (0.020)	0.074*** (0.023)	0.091*** (0.023)	0.154*** (0.021)	0.089*** (0.020)	0.070*** (0.024)	0.053** (0.023)	0.112*** (0.020)
Believes own household would lose	-0.071*** (0.021)	-0.057*** (0.015)	-0.026 (0.020)	-0.087*** (0.017)	-0.066*** (0.017)	-0.053*** (0.017)	-0.073*** (0.017)	-0.008 (0.017)	-0.079*** (0.017)	-0.052*** (0.016)	-0.060*** (0.020)	-0.083*** (0.017)
Believes low-income earners will lose	-0.034* (0.019)	-0.020 (0.016)	-0.056*** (0.018)	-0.022 (0.017)	-0.021 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.016)	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.056*** (0.017)	-0.025 (0.016)	-0.030 (0.020)	-0.056*** (0.018)	0.002 (0.016)
Believes high-income earners will lose	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.012)	0.013 (0.013)	0.003 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.007 (0.011)	-0.0003 (0.012)	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.025** (0.012)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.0004 (0.013)
Observations	2,218	2,013	2,006	2,006	2,088	2,268	2,025	1,990	2,053	1,978	2,022	1,932
R ²	0.329	0.241	0.237	0.295	0.211	0.216	0.272	0.222	0.214	0.272	0.254	0.228

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 of ¹⁸ for variable definitions.

Table S8: Correlation between (*Somewhat* or *Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in middle-income countries.

	Support for a global GHG tax and dividend							
	IDN (1)	ZAF (2)	MEX (3)	TUR (4)	IND (5)	BRA (6)	CHN (7)	UKR (8)
Control group mean	0.697	0.396	0.681	0.44	0.719	0.539	0.737	0.622
Trusts the government	0.051*** (0.012)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.040*** (0.014)	0.066*** (0.017)	0.065*** (0.015)	0.038** (0.015)	-0.011 (0.015)	0.061*** (0.014)
Believes inequality is an important problem	0.048** (0.011)	0.002 (0.014)	0.057*** (0.015)	0.028 (0.017)	0.092*** (0.016)	0.055*** (0.015)	-0.001 (0.015)	0.027 (0.018)
Worries about CC	0.003 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.016)	0.013 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.017)	-0.0002 (0.016)	0.032* (0.017)	-0.0002 (0.016)	0.046*** (0.016)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	0.020 (0.014)	0.026 (0.017)	0.004 (0.014)	0.039** (0.017)	0.022 (0.016)	0.019 (0.016)	0.034** (0.016)	0.018 (0.016)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.020* (0.011)	0.038** (0.016)	0.032* (0.017)	-0.002 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.015)	-0.017 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.018 (0.016)
Understands emission across activities/regions	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.013)	0.003 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.010)	0.039** (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.00004 (0.013)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	-0.006 (0.009)	0.011 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.016)	0.0002 (0.012)	0.003 (0.014)	-0.052*** (0.016)	0.022 (0.014)
Knows which gases cause CC	-0.026*** (0.009)	0.019 (0.015)	0.035** (0.014)	0.015 (0.015)	0.020 (0.013)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.023* (0.012)	0.023 (0.015)
Understands impacts of CC	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.0005 (0.015)	0.009 (0.017)	0.043*** (0.014)	-0.023 (0.015)	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.014 (0.014)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	-0.010 (0.007)	0.009 (0.016)	0.015 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.013)	0.002 (0.011)	-0.016 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.010)	0.035* (0.015)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	0.023 (0.015)	0.002 (0.021)	0.019 (0.022)	0.044 (0.029)	0.021 (0.020)	0.032 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.018)	-0.023 (0.025)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.111*** (0.019)	0.073*** (0.022)	0.088*** (0.024)	0.078** (0.031)	0.034 (0.025)	0.129*** (0.022)	0.060*** (0.022)	0.138*** (0.025)
Believes own household would lose	-0.027 (0.021)	-0.044** (0.020)	-0.071*** (0.019)	-0.054** (0.024)	-0.012 (0.019)	-0.067*** (0.023)	-0.119*** (0.022)	-0.045** (0.021)
Believes low-income earners will lose	-0.059*** (0.020)	-0.016 (0.019)	0.003 (0.017)	-0.053** (0.023)	-0.055*** (0.019)	-0.013 (0.020)	0.001 (0.018)	0.004 (0.020)
Believes high-income earners will lose	0.026** (0.011)	-0.020 (0.015)	0.010 (0.013)	0.010 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.014)	0.003 (0.014)	-0.047*** (0.016)	-0.007 (0.013)
Observations	2,488	2,003	2,045	1,932	2,472	1,860	1,717	1,564
R ²	0.366	0.175	0.242	0.248	0.370	0.272	0.280	0.255

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 of ¹⁸ for variable definitions.

G Representativeness of the surveys

Table S9: Sample representativeness of the complementary surveys. (Back to [2.1](#))

	US1			US2			Eu		
	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample
Sample size		3,000	3,000		2,000	2,000		3,000	3,000
Gender: Woman	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.45	0.50	0.51	0.49	0.51
Gender: Man	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.49	0.55	0.50	0.49	0.51	0.49
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.11	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.18	0.15	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.18	0.15	0.17	0.15
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.24	0.26
Age: 65+	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.25	0.23	0.25
Diploma_25_64: Below upper secondary	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.13	0.14	0.13
Diploma_25_64: Upper secondary	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.28	0.23	0.19	0.23
Diploma_25_64: Post secondary	0.34	0.40	0.34	0.34	0.33	0.34	0.29	0.33	0.29
Race: White only	0.60	0.67	0.61	0.60	0.62	0.61			
Race: Hispanic	0.18	0.15	0.19	0.18	0.19	0.19			
Race: Black	0.13	0.16	0.14	0.13	0.17	0.14			
Region: Northeast	0.17	0.20	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.17			
Region: Midwest	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.21			
Region: South	0.38	0.39	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38			
Region: West	0.24	0.20	0.24	0.24	0.20	0.24			
Urban: TRUE	0.73	0.78	0.74	0.73	0.75	0.73			
Employment_18_64: Inactive	0.20	0.16	0.16	0.20	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.15
Employment_18_64: Unemployed	0.02	0.07	0.08	0.02	0.09	0.08	0.03	0.06	0.05
Vote: Left	0.32	0.47	0.45	0.32	0.46	0.45	0.30	0.32	0.32
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.32	0.32
Vote: Far right							0.10	0.10	0.10
Country: FR							0.24	0.24	0.24
Country: DE							0.33	0.33	0.33
Country: ES							0.18	0.18	0.18
Country: UK							0.25	0.25	0.25
Urbanity: Cities							0.43	0.49	0.43
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs							0.33	0.32	0.33
Urbanity: Rural							0.25	0.20	0.25

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

Table S10: Sample representativeness for each European country. (Back to [2.1](#))

	FR			DE			ES			UK		
	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.									
Sample size		729	729		979	979		543	543		749	749
Gender: Woman	0.52	0.50	0.52	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.53	0.51	0.50	0.43	0.50
Gender: Man	0.48	0.50	0.48	0.49	0.48	0.49	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.50	0.57	0.50
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.29	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.19	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.19	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.33	0.25	0.25	0.18	0.25	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.14	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.07	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.12	0.16	0.12	0.17	0.20	0.17
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.31	0.24	0.22	0.26	0.22	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.24	0.18	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.24	0.19	0.24	0.28	0.23	0.28	0.27	0.28	0.27	0.25	0.30	0.25
Age: 65+	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.26	0.21	0.26	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.24
Diploma_25-64: Below upper secondary	0.11	0.19	0.11	0.10	0.14	0.10	0.24	0.16	0.25	0.12	0.09	0.12
Diploma_25-64: Upper secondary	0.26	0.16	0.26	0.27	0.20	0.27	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.21	0.23	0.21
Diploma_25-64: Post secondary	0.26	0.30	0.26	0.29	0.31	0.29	0.28	0.38	0.27	0.33	0.36	0.33
Urbanity: Cities	0.47	0.52	0.47	0.37	0.47	0.37	0.52	0.58	0.52	0.40	0.41	0.40
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.40	0.35	0.40	0.22	0.27	0.22	0.42	0.43	0.42
Urbanity: Rural	0.34	0.29	0.34	0.23	0.18	0.23	0.26	0.15	0.26	0.18	0.16	0.18
Employment_18-64: Inactive	0.20	0.19	0.18	0.15	0.14	0.11	0.20	0.13	0.12	0.16	0.16	0.17
Employment_18-64: Unemployed	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.11	0.12	0.02	0.03	0.04
Vote: Left	0.23	0.19	0.21	0.37	0.44	0.44	0.33	0.37	0.38	0.25	0.28	0.29
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.26	0.30	0.29	0.28	0.27	0.29	0.18	0.24	0.24	0.36	0.44	0.41
Vote: Far right	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.01	0.03	0.03

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. In this Table, weights are defined at the country level. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

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Similar tables for the global surveys can be found in Dechezleprêtre et al. ¹⁸.

H Attrition analysis

Table S11: Attrition analysis for the US1 survey.

	Dropped out	Dropped out after socio-eco	Failed attention test	Duration (in min)	Duration below 4 min
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mean	0.08	0.059	0.082	21.198	0.016
Income quartile: 2	0.025*** (0.010)	0.025*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.740 (3.064)	-0.009 (0.006)
Income quartile: 3	0.062*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.754 (2.813)	-0.004 (0.007)
Income quartile: 4	0.035*** (0.011)	0.035*** (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-3.917 (2.798)	-0.003 (0.007)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.039*** (0.009)	0.039*** (0.009)	-0.000*** (0.000)	1.544 (2.665)	0.006 (0.006)
Age: 25-34	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.597 (2.604)	-0.031** (0.013)
Age: 35-49	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.824 (3.176)	-0.032** (0.013)
Age: 50-64	-0.060*** (0.015)	-0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	5.723** (2.763)	-0.039*** (0.012)
Age: 65+	0.048*** (0.017)	0.048*** (0.017)	0.000** (0.000)	8.952** (4.267)	-0.047*** (0.012)
Gender: Man	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.451 (2.210)	-0.0001 (0.005)
Urban	0.006 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.888** (2.443)	-0.004 (0.006)
Race: Black	0.020** (0.010)	0.020** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	8.554*** (2.600)	0.004 (0.007)
Race: Hispanic	0.021** (0.010)	0.021** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.119* (2.293)	-0.002 (0.007)
Region: Northeast	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-4.862 (4.782)	-0.004 (0.007)
Region: South	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-1.151 (4.710)	-0.004 (0.006)
Region: West	0.006 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-4.000 (4.305)	-0.003 (0.007)
Vote: Biden	-0.048*** (0.008)	-0.048*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-2.901 (2.379)	-0.009 (0.007)
Vote: Trump	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.145 (2.878)	-0.005 (0.008)
Observations	5,719	5,719	3,252	3,044	3,044
R ²	0.127	0.127	1.000	0.006	0.017

Table S12: Attrition analysis for the US2 survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 4 min (5)
Mean	0.095	0.074	0.092	16.338	0.052
Income quartile: 2	0.023* (0.013)	0.023* (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	1.352 (1.601)	-0.029** (0.014)
Income quartile: 3	0.054*** (0.014)	0.054*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	8.502 (9.649)	-0.009 (0.016)
Income quartile: 4	0.060*** (0.016)	0.060*** (0.016)	-0.000 (0.000)	5.254 (3.376)	0.0003 (0.017)
Diploma: Post secondary	-0.033*** (0.011)	-0.033*** (0.011)	0.000 (0.000)	1.601 (2.630)	0.012 (0.011)
Age: 25-34	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.929 (1.535)	-0.032 (0.024)
Age: 35-49	0.012 (0.014)	0.012 (0.014)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.076 (6.651)	-0.047** (0.022)
Age: 50-64	0.040*** (0.014)	0.040*** (0.014)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.364 (1.565)	-0.079*** (0.022)
Age: 65+	0.115*** (0.017)	0.115*** (0.017)	-0.000*** (0.000)	2.619 (3.150)	-0.095*** (0.022)
Gender: Man	-0.073*** (0.009)	-0.073*** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	4.707 (6.037)	0.010 (0.010)
Urban	0.019* (0.011)	0.019* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	1.766 (1.135)	0.005 (0.012)
Race: Black	0.060*** (0.015)	0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.673 (13.328)	-0.010 (0.015)
Race: Hispanic	0.079*** (0.014)	0.079*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	2.930 (1.813)	-0.027** (0.012)
Region: Northeast	-0.026* (0.014)	-0.026* (0.014)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.837 (2.855)	-0.011 (0.015)
Region: South	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.000 (0.000)	3.220 (5.002)	0.009 (0.014)
Region: West	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.000 (0.000)	-1.759 (1.942)	-0.009 (0.015)
Vote: Biden	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	3.230 (2.731)	-0.006 (0.014)
Vote: Trump	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.554 (1.272)	0.007 (0.016)
Observations	2,973	2,973	2,280	2,103	2,103
R ²	0.241	0.241	1.000	0.010	0.031

Table S13: Attrition analysis for the *Eu* survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 6 min (5)
Mean	0.067	0.044	0.151	54.602	0.039
Country: Germany	0.023** (0.010)	0.019** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.533 (18.906)	0.019* (0.010)
Country: Spain	-0.102*** (0.011)	-0.098*** (0.011)	0.000* (0.000)	-29.136* (15.948)	0.010 (0.010)
Country: United Kingdom	0.042*** (0.011)	0.043*** (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-7.458 (18.046)	0.010 (0.010)
Income quartile: 2	0.032*** (0.010)	0.029*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	32.749* (19.771)	-0.015 (0.010)
Income quartile: 3	0.049*** (0.010)	0.047*** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	6.130 (11.734)	-0.021** (0.010)
Income quartile: 4	0.024** (0.011)	0.021* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.659 (19.955)	-0.018* (0.011)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.035*** (0.008)	0.034*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	10.647 (12.959)	-0.007 (0.007)
Age: 25-34	0.028** (0.013)	0.025* (0.013)	-0.000*** (0.000)	36.132 (22.285)	-0.005 (0.018)
Age: 35-49	0.064*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	-0.000*** (0.000)	37.159** (17.190)	-0.013 (0.016)
Age: 50-64	0.085*** (0.013)	0.083*** (0.013)	-0.000 (0.000)	48.363** (22.526)	-0.063*** (0.015)
Age: 65+	0.117*** (0.014)	0.115*** (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	36.351** (14.226)	-0.061*** (0.015)
Gender: Man	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-22.980 (14.093)	0.009 (0.007)
Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs	0.006 (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-16.736 (17.256)	0.004 (0.008)
Degree of urbanization: Rural	0.023** (0.009)	0.023** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	-14.593 (19.733)	-0.001 (0.009)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.025*** (0.005)	-0.025*** (0.005)	0.000*** (0.000)	-17.558 (13.143)	0.019** (0.008)
Vote: Far right	0.005 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.000*** (0.000)	15.838 (32.281)	0.029** (0.014)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	0.023*** (0.006)	0.022*** (0.005)	0.000 (0.000)	24.631 (19.824)	0.030*** (0.010)
Observations	3,963	3,963	3,326	3,115	3,115
R ²	0.406	0.395	1.000	0.006	0.028

I Balance analysis

Table S14: Balance analysis.

	List contains: G (1)	Branch petition: NR (2)	Branch donation: Own nation (3)	Branch conjoint 3: with GCS (4)
Mean	0.496	0.493	0.5	0.499
Country: Germany	-0.026 (0.026)	0.017 (0.026)	0.020 (0.026)	0.005 (0.026)
Country: Spain	0.025 (0.030)	0.026 (0.030)	0.026 (0.030)	0.043 (0.030)
Country: United Kingdom	0.002 (0.028)	0.018 (0.028)	0.037 (0.028)	0.063** (0.028)
Country: United States	-0.001 (0.024)	0.019 (0.024)	0.007 (0.024)	0.023 (0.024)
Income quartile: 2	-0.013 (0.021)	-0.024 (0.021)	0.012 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.021)
Income quartile: 3	0.021 (0.022)	-0.005 (0.022)	0.011 (0.022)	-0.004 (0.022)
Income quartile: 4	-0.001 (0.023)	-0.017 (0.023)	-0.013 (0.023)	0.0001 (0.023)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.008 (0.016)	0.014 (0.016)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.016)
Age: 25-34	0.023 (0.031)	-0.049 (0.031)	-0.003 (0.031)	-0.009 (0.031)
Age: 35-49	0.032 (0.030)	-0.002 (0.030)	-0.014 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.030)
Age: 50-64	0.030 (0.030)	-0.005 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.030)	-0.020 (0.030)
Age: 65+	0.029 (0.037)	-0.037 (0.037)	-0.015 (0.037)	-0.012 (0.037)
Gender: Man	0.024 (0.015)	0.012 (0.015)	0.002 (0.015)	-0.016 (0.015)
Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.0005 (0.017)	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.011 (0.017)
Degree of urbanization: Rural	0.013 (0.024)	0.017 (0.024)	-0.004 (0.024)	0.027 (0.024)
Employment status: Retired	-0.005 (0.032)	-0.031 (0.032)	-0.034 (0.032)	-0.016 (0.032)
Employment status: Student	0.005 (0.044)	-0.023 (0.044)	-0.033 (0.044)	-0.025 (0.044)
Employment status: Working	0.010 (0.024)	-0.027 (0.024)	-0.033 (0.024)	-0.012 (0.024)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.004 (0.017)	0.003 (0.017)	0.010 (0.017)	0.002 (0.017)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	0.001 (0.019)	0.014 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.019)	-0.012 (0.019)
Vote: Far right	0.009 (0.034)	0.030 (0.034)	0.023 (0.035)	0.038 (0.034)
Observations	5,991	5,991	5,991	5,991
R ²	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.003

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

²³⁸⁶ **J Placebo tests**

Table S15: Placebo tests.

	G+R+C preferred to R+C (1)	Supports G+R+C (2)	Signs petition (3)	Share of policies supported (4)	Conjoint 5 A+CGS preferred to B (5)
Mean	0.645	0.633	0.611	0.535	0.596
Branch of list experiment: 1	-0.013 (0.019)	-0.024 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.018 (0.021)
Branch of list experiment: rgl	0.005 (0.019)	0.006 (0.019)	-0.002 (0.019)	0.001 (0.012)	0.010 (0.021)
Branch of list experiment: rl	-0.009 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.019)	0.022 (0.019)	0.007 (0.012)	0.007 (0.021)
Branch of petition: nr	0.011 (0.014)	0.006 (0.014)	0.022 (0.014)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.015)
Poor is in own country	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.014)	0.015 (0.014)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.020 (0.015)
Observations	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	5,218
R ²	0.0004	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

²³⁸⁷ **K Main results on the extended sample**

²³⁸⁸ As a robustness check, we reproduce our main results on the extended sample that
²³⁸⁹ includes the 14% respondents who failed the attention check ($n = 9,318$). These results
²³⁹⁰ are non-weighted. They closely match the results in our main specification. For example,
²³⁹¹ the support for the GCS is 54% in the U.S. and 75% in Europe, while the same coefficients
²³⁹² are significant for the list experiment.

Figure S50: [Extended sample] Main attitudes by vote (“Right” spans from Center-right to Far right).

(Relative support in percent in Questions 20, 35, 45, 46, 49)

(Back to Section 2.5.3)

	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom	United States
Support for the GCS	75	78	70	81	75	54
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	83	81	84	87	81	68
Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries*	52	45	60	59	44	52
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	62	57	62	65	65	47
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	82	80	82	86	80	69
[Country]'s foreign aid should be increased	83	87	87	89	69	77
Universalist*	41	35	49	44	36	43

Figure S51: [Extended sample] Influence of the GCS on preferred platform: Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question 30; in the U.S., asked only to non-Republicans.)

	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom	United States
Random programs: A+GCS preferred to B	60	61	59	64	58	59

Table S16: [Extended sample] Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list. The tacit support for the GCS is estimated by regressing the number of supported policies on the presence of the GCS in the list of policies. The social desirability is estimated as the difference between the tacit and stated support, and it is not significantly different from zero even at a 20% threshold (see [Methods](#)).

	Number of supported policies		
	All	U.S.	Europe
List contains: GCS	0.624*** (0.028)	0.524*** (0.041)	0.724*** (0.036)
<i>Support for GCS</i>	NA	0.554	0.754
<i>Social desirability bias</i>	-0.025	-0.017	-0.033
<i>80% C.I. for the bias</i>	[-0.06; 0.01]	[-0.07; 0.04]	[-0.08; 0.01]
Constant	1.317	1.147	1.486
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000
R ²	0.089	0.065	0.125

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table S17: [Extended sample] Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. ([Question 28](#))

	Prefers the Progressive platform					
	All	United States	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
GCS in Progressive platform	0.022* (0.013)	0.015 (0.018)	0.116*** (0.037)	-0.007 (0.032)	0.028 (0.038)	0.012 (0.037)
Constant	0.628	0.629	0.55	0.682	0.721	0.553
Observations	5,638	2,797	671	883	550	737
R ²	0.001	0.0002	0.014	0.0001	0.001	0.0001

Note: Simple OLS model. *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples. *p < 0.1;
p < 0.05; *p < 0.01.

2393 **L Effect of questionnaire framing**

2394 When comparing the samples *US1* and *US2*, we observe no effect of questionnaire
2395 framing (or block sequence) on the question “What group do you defend when you
2396 vote?”, common to all waves and placed close to the end of the questionnaire (Table S18).

Table S18: Effect of the wave (*US1* vs. *US2*) on the group defend when voting.
“What group do you defend when you vote?” (Question 57)

	Group defended when voting		
	Humans or Sentient beings	Fellow citizens	Family and self
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Wave: <i>US2</i>	−0.009 (0.014)	0.009 (0.014)	0.010 (0.011)
Mean	0.432	0.335	0.156
Observations	5,000	5,000	5,000
R ²	0.0001	0.0001	0.0002

Note: Simple OLS model. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

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