

# International Attitudes Toward Global Policies Supplementary Material

Adrien Fabre\*, Thomas Douenne<sup>†</sup> and Linus Mattauch<sup>‡</sup>

January 5, 2024

## Contents

7	<b>Contents</b>	1
8	<b>Main figures</b>	3
9	<b>A Literature review</b>	11
10	A.1 Attitudes and perceptions . . . . .	11
11	A.1.1 Population attitudes on global policies . . . . .	11
12	A.1.2 Population attitudes on climate burden sharing . . . . .	12
13	A.1.3 Population attitudes on foreign aid . . . . .	14
14	A.1.4 Population attitudes on rich tax . . . . .	15
15	A.1.5 Population attitudes on ethical norms . . . . .	16
16	A.1.6 Second-order beliefs . . . . .	17
17	A.2 Proposals and analyses of global policy-making . . . . .	18
18	A.2.1 Global carbon pricing . . . . .	18
19	A.2.2 Climate burden sharing . . . . .	19
20	A.2.3 Global redistribution . . . . .	24
21	A.2.4 Basic income . . . . .	25
22	A.2.5 Global democracy . . . . .	26
23	<b>B Raw results</b>	27

---

\*CNRS, CIRED. E-mail: adrien.fabre@cnrs.fr (corresponding author).


<sup>†</sup>University of Amsterdam

<sup>‡</sup>Technical University Berlin, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research – Member of the Leibniz Association and University of Oxford

24	<b>C Questionnaire of the global survey (section on global policies)</b>	50
25	<b>D Questionnaire of the complementary surveys</b>	53
26	<b>E Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme</b>	76
27	<b>F Determinants of support</b>	80
28	<b>G Representativeness of the surveys</b>	83
29	<b>H Attrition analysis</b>	85
30	<b>I Balance analysis</b>	88
31	<b>J Placebo tests</b>	89
32	<b>Bibliography</b>	90
33	<b>List of Tables</b>	101
34	<b>List of Figures</b>	101

## 35 Main figures

Figure 1: Relative support for global climate policies. (Reproduced from [Dechezleprêtre et al. \(2022\)](#), Figure A21.)



Note 1: The numbers represent the share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* among non-*indifferent* answers (in percent,  $n = 40,680$ ). The color blue denotes a relative majority. See Figure A3 for the absolute support. (Questions A-I).

Note 2: \*In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

Figure 2: Relative support for various global policies (percentage of *somewhat* or *strong support*, after excluding *indifferent* answers). (Questions 44 and 45; See Figure A25 for the absolute support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	55	71	72	70	79	70
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	68	82	82	82	85	81
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	60	76	77	79	79	71
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	46	53	53	43	62	61
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	58	71	69	69	78	72
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	62	73	58	73	80	83
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	63	80	80	78	81	83
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	62	87	90	86	91	87
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	46	62	58	62	65	67
National tax on millionaires funding public services	73	85	81	87	89	88
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	69	84	84	84	87	83

Figure 3: Support for the GCS, NR and the combination of GCS, NR and C. (Questions 35, 36, 20, 22 and 26).

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)	54	76	80	71	81	74
National redistribution scheme (NR)	56	73	77	66	79	75
National climate policy + GCS + NR	52	74	79	69	81	70

Table 1: Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list.

	Number of supported policies		
	All	U.S.	Europe
List contains: GCS	0.624*** (0.028)	0.524*** (0.041)	0.724*** (0.036)
<i>Support for GCS</i>	0.65	0.542	0.757
<i>Social desirability bias</i>	-0.025	-0.019	-0.033
<i>80% C.I. for the bias</i>	[-0.06; 0.01]	[-0.07; 0.04]	[-0.08; 0.01]
Constant	1.317	1.147	1.486
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000
R <sup>2</sup>	0.089	0.065	0.125

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 2: Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. (Question 28)

	Prefers the Progressive platform					
	All	United States	France	Germany	UK	Spain
GCS in Progressive platform	0.028* (0.014)	0.029 (0.022)	0.112*** (0.041)	0.015 (0.033)	0.008 (0.040)	-0.015 (0.038)
Constant	0.623	0.604	0.55	0.7	0.551	0.775
Observations	5,202	2,619	605	813	661	504
R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.001	0.013	0.0003	0.0001	0.0003

Note: The 14% of *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples. GCS has no significant influence on them. \*p < 0.1; \*\*p < 0.05; \*\*\*p < 0.01.

Figure 4: Percent of global wealth tax that should finance low-income countries (*mean*). (Question 37)




Figure 5: Attitudes regarding the evolution of [own country] foreign aid. (Question 46)




Figure 6: Conditions at which foreign aid should be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish an increase of foreign aid at some conditions.] (Question 47)




Figure 7: Reasons why foreign aid should not be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish a decrease or stability of foreign aid.] (Question 48)





Figure 8: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See English translations in Figure A8; Question 29)

(a) U.S. (Asked only to non-Republicans)



(b) France



### (c) Germany

**Klimaschutz:**

- Verpflichtende Solaranlagen auf allen geeigneten Dächern
- Plan zur Wärmedämmung
- Verbot des Verkaufs von Neuwagen mit Verbrennungsmotor bis 2030

**Wirtschaftspolitik:**

- Erhöhung des Regelsatzes des Bürgergelds auf bis zu 600€ pro Monat
- Bürgerversicherung als gerechtere Sozialversicherung
- Staatschuldenquote auf unter 60% reduzieren
- Investitionen für Gigabit-Netzwerke bereitstellen

**Außenpolitik:**

- Globales Klimaprogramm
- Globale Steuer auf Millionäre
- Globale demokratische Versammlung zum Klimawandel
- Verdoppelung der Mittel für die Entwicklungshilfe in einkommensschwachen Ländern


**Gesellschaft:**

- Volksscheid auf Bundesebene

- Cannabis-Legalisierung

**Steuerpolitik:**

- Nationales Umverteilungsprogramm
- Die Vermögenssteuer wieder in Kraft setzen



### (d) Spain

**Política climática:**

- 100% de electricidad producida con energías renovables en 2040
- Plan de aislamiento térmico
- Prohibir la venta de coches nuevos con motor de combustión para 2030

**Asuntos económicos:**

- Más necesidades sanitarias dentro del sistema público (cuidado dental, gafas, salud mental)
- Ingreso Básico Garantizado de 600€ al mes
- Jornada laboral de 34 horas semanales
- Inversión en el sistema educativo y universalización de la educación preescolar

**Política exterior:**


- Plan climático global
- Impuesto mundial a los millonarios
- Asamblea democrática mundial sobre el cambio climático
- Duplicar la ayuda exterior a los países de renta baja

**Asuntos sociales:**

- Reformar la ley electoral para hacer el Senado más proporcional
- Abolición de la prostitución

**Sistema fiscal:**

- Plan de redistribución nacional
- Aumentar los impuestos sobre las rentas superiores a 100.000 euros anuales



### (e) UK

**Climate policy:**

- Ban of most polluting vehicles in city centers (low-emission zones)
- Thermal insulation plan
- Ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030

**Economic issues:**

- £150 billion to upgrade schools, hospitals, care homes and council houses
- Real Living Wage of £11 per hour for all workers aged 16 and over
- Reduce the average full-time weekly working hours to 32
- Re-establish neighbourhood policing and recruit 2,000 more frontline officers

**Foreign policy:**

- Global climate scheme
- Global tax on millionaires
- Global democratic assembly on climate change
- Doubling foreign aid

**Societal issues:**

- Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation
- Legalization of cannabis

**Tax system:**

- National redistribution scheme
- Wealth tax




Figure 9: Influence of the GCS on preferred platform:

Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question 30; in the U.S., asked only to non-Republicans.)





Figure 10: Beliefs regarding the support for the GCS and NR. (Questions 21 and 23)



<sup>36</sup> **A Literature review**

<sup>37</sup> **A.1 Attitudes and perceptions**

<sup>38</sup> **A.1.1 Population attitudes on global policies**

<sup>39</sup> **Carattini et al. (2019)** test the support for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples  
<sup>40</sup> in five countries, representative along gender and age. For a given variant, the sample  
<sup>41</sup> size is about 167 respondents per country. They find over 80% support for any variant in  
<sup>42</sup> India, between 50% and 65% in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43% to 59% in  
<sup>43</sup> the U.S., depending on the variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding  
<sup>44</sup> an equal dividend for each human is close to 50% in high-income countries (e.g., at 44%  
<sup>45</sup> in the U.S.), consistently with our results from the *Global* survey (see Figure 1). This is  
<sup>46</sup> another piece of evidence that the support is lower for a tax that would “only” reduce CO<sub>2</sub>  
<sup>47</sup> emissions than for a quota that would unambiguously achieve the climate target. Using  
<sup>48</sup> a conjoint analysis in the U.S. and Germany, **Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019b)** find  
<sup>49</sup> that the support for a carbon tax increases by up to 50% if it applies to all industrialized  
<sup>50</sup> countries rather than exclusively to one’s own country.

<sup>51</sup> In surveys conducted in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S., **Ghassim (2020)**  
<sup>52</sup> finds support ranging from 55% to 74% for “a global democracy including both a global  
<sup>53</sup> government and a global parliament, directly elected by the world population, to recom-  
<sup>54</sup> mend and implement policies on global issues”. Through an experiment, he also finds  
<sup>55</sup> that, in countries where the government stems from a coalition, voting shares would shift  
<sup>56</sup> by 8 (Brazil) to 12 p.p. (Germany) from parties who are said to oppose global democracy  
<sup>57</sup> to parties that supposedly support it. For instance, when Germans respondents were told  
<sup>58</sup> that (only) the Greens and the Left support global democracy, these parties gained re-  
<sup>59</sup>spectively 9 and 3 p.p. in vote intentions, while the SPD and the CDU-CSU each lost 6  
<sup>60</sup> p.p. **Ghassim (2020)** also presents survey results showing strong majorities in favor of the  
<sup>61</sup> direct election of one’s country’s UN representative in all 18 surveyed countries. Simi-  
<sup>62</sup>larly, in each of 10 countries, there are clear majorities in favor of “a new supranational  
<sup>63</sup> entity [taking] enforceable global decisions in order to solve global risks” (**Global Chal-**  
<sup>64</sup>**lenges Foundation 2018**). Remarkably, already in 1946, 54% of Americans agreed (while  
<sup>65</sup> 24% disagreed) that “the UN should be strengthened to make it a world government with  
<sup>66</sup> the power to control the armed forces of all nations” (**Gallup 1946**). Furthermore, in sur-  
<sup>67</sup>veys conducted in Argentina, China, India, Russia, Spain, and the U.S., **Ghassim et al.**

68 (2022) find majority support for UN reforms that would make United Nations' decisions  
69 binding, give veto powers to a few other major countries at the Security Council, or com-  
70 plement the highest body of the UN with a chamber of directly elected representatives.

71 Relatedly, Meiland et al. (2023) find that both Americans and French people prefer an  
72 international settlement of climate justice, even if it encroaches on sovereignty. In a 2013  
73 survey conducted in China, Germany, and the U.S., Schleich et al. (2016) show that over  
74 three-quarter of people think that international climate agreements reached so far are not  
75 successful and that future agreements are important. In Finland, Sivonen (2022) finds that  
76 that support for a carbon tax is higher if implemented at the global level (54%) rather than  
77 at the national level (40%).

78 The results from these specific questions are in line with the answers to more general  
79 questions. In each of 36 countries, ISSP (2010) find near consensus that "for environ-  
80 mental problems, there should be international agreements that [their country] and other  
81 countries should be made to follow" (overall, 82% agree and 4% disagree). In each of  
82 29 countries, ISSP (2019) uncover near consensus that "Present economic differences be-  
83 tween rich and poor countries are too large" (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree). Fehr  
84 et al. (2022) find that 90% of Germans want some degree of global redistribution.

### 85 A.1.2 Population attitudes on climate burden sharing

86 Despite differences in the description of fairness principles, surveys on burden-sharing  
87 rules show consistent attitudes. Or at least, their seemingly contradictory results can be  
88 made compatible with the following interpretation: Concerning emissions reductions,  
89 most people want that every country engage in strong and collective decarbonization ef-  
90 forts, with a global quota converging to climate neutrality in the medium run. Concerning  
91 the financial effort, most people support high-emitting countries paying and low-income  
92 countries receiving funding. The most supported rules are those perceived as equitable,  
93 in particular an equal right to emit per person.

94 This interpretation helps to understand the apparent differences between articles that  
95 approach burden sharing from different angles: cost sharing (in money terms), effort shar-  
96 ing (in terms of emissions reductions), or resource sharing (in terms of rights to emit).  
97 Existing papers adopt either the cost sharing or effort sharing approach, which preclude  
98 any country from being a net receiver of funds. Also, by focusing on *either* the financial  
99 or the decarbonization effort, these surveys miss the other half of the picture, which can  
100 explain why some papers find strong support for the ability-to-pay principle while others

101 find strong support for grandfathering (defined as emissions reductions being the same  
102 in every country). The literature follows these approaches to align with the notions used  
103 by the UNFCCC. Yet, we argue that the resource sharing approach is preferable for un-  
104 covering attitudes, as it unambiguously describes the distributive implications of each  
105 rule while achieving an efficient geographical distribution of emissions reductions and  
106 explicitly allowing for monetary gains for some countries.

107 Now, let us summarize the results of the different papers in the light of this clarifica-  
108 tion. [Schleich et al. \(2016\)](#) find an identical ranking of support for burden-sharing prin-  
109 ciples in China, Germany, and the U.S.: polluter-pays followed by ability-to-pay, equal  
110 emissions per capita, and grandfathering. Note that the authors do not allow for emis-  
111 sions trading in their description of equal *emissions per capita*, which may explain its rel-  
112 atively low support. Yet, the relative support for egalitarianism also depends on how  
113 *the other* rules are described. Indeed, [Carlsson et al. \(2011\)](#) find that Swedes prefer that  
114 “all countries are allowed to emit an equal amount per capita” rather than options where  
115 emissions are reduced based on current or historical emissions, for which it is explicitly  
116 stated that high-emitting countries “will continue to emit more than others”. [Bechtel &](#)  
117 [Scheve \(2013\)](#) find agreement that rich countries should pay more and historical emissions  
118 should matter, but that efforts should not be solely borne by wealthy nations. More pre-  
119 cisely, their conjoint analysis conducted in France, Germany, the UK, and the U.S. shows  
120 that a climate agreement is 15 p.p. more likely to be preferred (to a random alternative) if  
121 it includes 160 countries rather than 20, and 5 p.p. less likely to be preferred if “only rich  
122 countries pay” compared to other burden-sharing rules: “rich countries pay more than  
123 poor”, “countries pay proportional to current emissions” or “countries pay proportional  
124 to historical emissions”. Using a choice experiment, [Carlsson et al. \(2013\)](#) find that the  
125 least preferred option in China and the U.S. is when low-emitting countries are exempted  
126 from any effort. Ability-to-pay is appreciated in both countries and is the preferred op-  
127 tion in the U.S., though the preferred option in China is another one that accounts for  
128 historical responsibility. In the U.S. and France, [Meiland et al. \(2023\)](#) find that the most  
129 favored fairness principle is that “all countries commit to converge to the same average  
130 of total emissions per inhabitant, compatible with a controlled climate change”. Further-  
131 more, in each country, 73% disagree with grandfathering defined as “countries which  
132 emitted a lot of carbon in the past have a right to continue emitting more than others in  
133 the future”. The study by [Meiland et al. \(2023\)](#) contains many other results: for instance,  
134 majorities prefer to hold countries accountable for their consumption-based rather than

<sup>135</sup> territorial emissions, and the median choice regarding historical responsibility is to hold  
<sup>136</sup> a country accountable for its post-1990 emissions (rather than post-1850 or just their cur-  
<sup>137</sup> rent emissions). Finally, in each of 28 (among the largest) countries, **Dabla-Norris et al.**  
<sup>138</sup> (2023) find strong majority for “all countries” to the question “Which countries do you  
<sup>139</sup> think should be paying to reduce carbon emissions?”. When asked to choose between a  
<sup>140</sup> cost sharing based on *current vs. accumulated historic emissions*, a majority prefers *current*  
<sup>141</sup> *emissions* in all countries but China and Saudi Arabia (where the two options are close to  
<sup>142</sup> equally preferred).

#### <sup>143</sup> A.1.3 Population attitudes on foreign aid

<sup>144</sup> There is an extensive literature on attitudes towards foreign aid in donor countries.  
<sup>145</sup> The key findings indicate that most people overestimate the amount of foreign aid and  
<sup>146</sup> that only a minority wants a cut in foreign aid compared to actual amounts, especially  
<sup>147</sup> once they become aware of them.

<sup>148</sup> For instance, **PIPA** (2001) shows that 83% of Americans support a multilateral effort  
<sup>149</sup> to cut world hunger in half. **PIPA** (2008) shows that in each of 20 countries, a majority  
<sup>150</sup> thinks that developed countries “have a moral responsibility to work to reduce hunger  
<sup>151</sup> and severe poverty in poor countries”, with an average agreement of 81%. In 7 OECD  
<sup>152</sup> countries, the study finds that at least 75% of respondents are willing to pay for a program  
<sup>153</sup> to cut hunger in half (at an estimated cost of, e.g., \$50 a year for each American).

<sup>154</sup> **Kaufmann et al.** (2012) find that perceived aid is overestimated in each of the 24 coun-  
<sup>155</sup> tries they study, on average by a factor of 7. In most countries, desired aid is larger than  
<sup>156</sup> perceived aid.<sup>1</sup> They show that individuals in the top income quintile desire aid 0.13  
<sup>157</sup> p.p. lower than those in the bottom 40% – which is very close to what we find. By em-  
<sup>158</sup> ploying a theoretical model and examining correlations between lobbying and actual aid  
<sup>159</sup> (controling for desired aid), they argue that the gap between actual and desired aid stems  
<sup>160</sup> from the political influence of the rich who defend their vested interests. In **Kaufmann**  
<sup>161</sup> **et al.** (2012), the U.S. is an outlier: desired aid is at the other countries’ average (3% of  
<sup>162</sup> GNI), but as misperceptions are enormous, perceived aid is twice as large as desired aid.  
<sup>163</sup> Indeed, **Gilens** (2001) shows that even Americans with high political knowledge misper-  
<sup>164</sup> ceive actual aid, and finds that 17% fewer of them want to cut aid when we provide them  
<sup>165</sup> specific information about the amount of aid. Similarly, **Nair** (2018) finds that the rela-

---

<sup>1</sup>**Kaufmann et al.** (2012) offer the best results on desired aid because (as **Hudson & van Heerde** (2012) criticize), other studies did not take into account misperceptions of actual aid.

<sup>166</sup> tively low support for aid in the U.S. is driven by information on global distribution, as  
<sup>167</sup> people underestimate their rank by 27 centiles on average and overestimate the global  
<sup>168</sup> median income by a factor 10.

<sup>169</sup> **Hudson & van Heerde (2012)** provide a critical review of the literature and show that  
<sup>170</sup> the strong support for poverty alleviation largely stems from intrinsic altruism. They  
<sup>171</sup> note that, according to **DFID (2009)** and **PIPA (2001)**, 47% of British people find that the  
<sup>172</sup> aid is wasted (mainly due to corruption), while Americans estimate that less than a quar-  
<sup>173</sup> ter of the aid reaches those in need, with over half ending up in the hands of corrupt  
<sup>174</sup> government officials. Despite these perceptions, most people still support aid, suggest-  
<sup>175</sup> ing the presence of nonutilitarian motives. Consistent with **Henson et al. (2010)**, **Bauhr**  
<sup>176</sup> **et al. (2013)** find that support for aid is reduced by the perception of corruption in recipi-  
<sup>177</sup> ent countries. However, this effect is mitigated by the aid-corruption paradox: countries  
<sup>178</sup> with higher levels of corruption often need more help. **Bodenstein & Faust (2017)** fur-  
<sup>179</sup> ther show that right-wing Europeans, as well as those who perceive strong corruption  
<sup>180</sup> in their country, are more likely to agree that recipient countries should “follow certain  
<sup>181</sup> rules regarding democracy, human rights and governance as a condition for receiving EU  
<sup>182</sup> development aid.” Using a 2002 Gallup survey and the 2006 World Values Survey, and  
<sup>183</sup> in line with **Bayram (2017)**, **Paxton & Knack (2012)** show that the main determinants for  
<sup>184</sup> wanting more aid are trust, left-wing ideology, interest in politics, and being a woman (all  
<sup>185</sup> positively associated).

<sup>186</sup> **A.1.4 Population attitudes on rich tax**

<sup>187</sup> We are not aware of any previous survey on a global wealth tax,<sup>2</sup> though surveys  
<sup>188</sup> consistently show strong support for national wealth taxes. In a comprehensive survey  
<sup>189</sup> conducted in the UK, **Rowlingson et al. (2021)** show that a wealth tax is the preferred  
<sup>190</sup> option for raising revenues. Only 8% of respondents state that total net wealth should not  
<sup>191</sup> be taxed (with little differences between Labour and Conservative voters). The study also  
<sup>192</sup> finds that the preferred design would be a 1% or 3% tax on net wealth above £1 million. By  
<sup>193</sup> asking how much taxes per year should a person with a certain income and wealth level  
<sup>194</sup> pay, **Fisman et al. (2017)** finds that the average American favors a 0.8% linear tax rate  
<sup>195</sup> on unspecified wealth up to \$2 million (the highest wealth level tested), and a 3% linear  
<sup>196</sup> rate on inherited wealth. Through a conjoint analysis conducted in three high-income

---

<sup>2</sup>We did not find any using the combination of “survey” or “attitudes” with “wealth tax” or “global wealth tax” in Google Scholar.

<sup>197</sup> countries, Schecht & Tisch (2023) find widespread support for a wealth tax (from 78% in  
<sup>198</sup> the U.S. to 86% in Germany and the UK), with a preference for an exemption threshold  
<sup>199</sup> set at \$/€1 million (rather than 500,000 or 2 million) with the tax rate and tax unit having  
<sup>200</sup> little influence on the preferred design. In 21 OECD countries, the OECD (2019) uncovers  
<sup>201</sup> strong majority support for higher taxes on the rich to support the poor, with nearly  
<sup>202</sup> 70% overall agreement and less than 20% disagreement. Isbell (2022) finds similarly high  
<sup>203</sup> level of support in 34 African countries. In the UK, Patriotic Millionaires (2022) find 69%  
<sup>204</sup> support (and 7% opposition) for a 1.1% tax on wealth in excess of £10 million. In the U.S.,  
<sup>205</sup> Americans for Tax Fairness (2021) find that 67% to 71% of the respondents support to  
<sup>206</sup> “raise taxes for those earning more than \$400,000 a year”, “raise the income tax rate for  
<sup>207</sup> those earning over \$1 million a year by 10 percentage points”, or “apply a 2% tax on an  
<sup>208</sup> individual’s wealth above \$50 million each year, and 3% on wealth above \$1 billion”.

#### <sup>209</sup> A.1.5 Population attitudes on ethical norms

<sup>210</sup> **Universalism** Various studies have examined the concept of global identity (see Reysen  
<sup>211</sup> & Katzarska-Miller (2018) for a review). In the 2005-2008 wave of the World Values Sur-  
<sup>212</sup>vey, Bayram (2015) notes that “78% of the participants in 57 countries see themselves as  
<sup>213</sup> citizens of the world”, though the 2017-2022 wave reveals that more people feel close to  
<sup>214</sup> their town, region or country than to the world. Enke et al. (2023a) measure universal-  
<sup>215</sup>ism at the U.S. district level using donation data, and find that a district’s universalism  
<sup>216</sup> predicts electoral outcomes better than its income or education level. To measure uni-  
<sup>217</sup>versalism at the individual level, Enke et al. (2023c) ask American respondents to split  
<sup>218</sup> \$100 between a random stranger and a random person with the same income but closer  
<sup>219</sup> to them. They distinguish different facets of universalism, and define *foreign universalism*  
<sup>220</sup> as the inclination to give to a foreigner rather than a fellow citizen. They find a home bias  
<sup>221</sup> for most people, which could partly be attributed to concerns about inequality, as the split  
<sup>222</sup> involves two persons with the same income, with the foreigner most certainly living in  
<sup>223</sup> a poorer country than the American and thus enjoying a higher social status. That being  
<sup>224</sup> said, a home bias probably remains even after accounting for concerns about inequality,  
<sup>225</sup> as 84% of Americans agree that “taking care of problems at home is more important than  
<sup>226</sup> giving aid to foreign countries” (PIPA 2001). Enke et al. (2023b) also measure univer-  
<sup>227</sup>salism and analyze its correlates in 7 countries, and Cappelen et al. (2022) deploy this  
<sup>228</sup> method in 60 countries. In a lab experiment with students in the U.S., Cherry et al. (2017)  
<sup>229</sup> show that a substantial share of people prefer policies detrimental to them due to their

<sup>230</sup> egalitarian worldview. Waytz et al. (2019) show that left-leaning people exhibit a wider  
<sup>231</sup> “moral circle”. Jaeger & Wilks (2023) find that judgments of moral concern are equally  
<sup>232</sup> well explained by characteristics of the judge and the evaluated target.

<sup>233</sup> **Free-riding** Despite the long-standing explanation of the lack of climate action as a re-  
<sup>234</sup> sult of free-riding, surveys consistently show that people support climate mitigation ac-  
<sup>235</sup> tion in their own country, even in the absence of such action in other countries. Bernauer  
<sup>236</sup> & Gampfer (2015) show this for Americans and Indians, who both overestimate their  
<sup>237</sup> country’s emissions at one third of the global total. Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019a)  
<sup>238</sup> show this in the U.S. and China using an experimental design. McEvoy & Cherry (2016)  
<sup>239</sup> show that Americans mostly invoke leadership and morality to justify unilateral climate  
<sup>240</sup> action. Using a range of methods, Aklin & Mildenberger (2020) show that the empiri-  
<sup>241</sup> cal evidence for free-riding is not compelling, and that climate inaction can be equally  
<sup>242</sup> well explained by distributive conflicts. Finally, review of the literature by McGrath &  
<sup>243</sup> Bernauer (2017) shows that climate attitudes are largely nonreciprocal, and primarily  
<sup>244</sup> driven by values and perceptions of the policies, rather than by considerations of what  
<sup>245</sup> other countries do.

#### <sup>246</sup> A.1.6 Second-order beliefs

<sup>247</sup> Allport (1924) introduced the concept of pluralistic ignorance: a shared misperception  
<sup>248</sup> concerning others’ beliefs. The concept became notorious when O’Gorman (1975) showed  
<sup>249</sup> that, towards the end of the civil rights movement, 47% of Americans believed that a ma-  
<sup>250</sup> jority of white people supported segregation, while only 18% did so. PIPA (2001) has  
<sup>251</sup> shown that while 75% of Americans are willing to contribute \$50 annually to halve world  
<sup>252</sup> hunger (the cost of the program), only 32% believed that the majority would share this  
<sup>253</sup> willingness. Pluralistic ignorance regarding climate-friendly norms in the United States  
<sup>254</sup> has been documented by Andre et al. (2022), who further show that correcting the misper-  
<sup>255</sup> ceptions would be effective to enhance pro-climate behaviors. Relatedly, Sparkman et al.  
<sup>256</sup> (2022) show that Americans underestimate the support for climate policies by nearly half,  
<sup>257</sup> while Drews et al. (2022) document pluralistic ignorance of carbon tax support in Spain.  
<sup>258</sup> Additionally, Geiger & Swim (2016) show that pluralistic ignorance regarding concern for  
<sup>259</sup> climate change leads people to self-silence, resulting in reduced discussions on the topic.

260 **A.2 Proposals and analyses of global policy-making**

261 **A.2.1 Global carbon pricing**

262 Global carbon pricing is widely regarded by economists as the benchmark climate  
263 policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon emissions externality. For instance, Hoel  
264 (1991) shows that an international carbon tax can be designed to simultaneously achieve  
265 efficiency and accommodate any distributional objective. Concerning the distributional  
266 objective, Grubb (1990), Agarwal & Narain (1991) and Bertram (1992) were the first to  
267 advocate for an equal right to emit for each human. As Grubb (1990) states it: "by far the  
268 best combination of long term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity, is obtained  
269 from a system based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions which are allocated on  
270 an adult per capita basis".<sup>3</sup> Support for such solution has been renewed ever since (Baer  
271 et al. 2000; Blanchard & Tirole 2021; Jamieson 2001; Rajan 2021).

272 While many endorse the egalitarian allocation of emissions permits, economists also  
273 considered this outcome as politically unfeasible. Thus, to preserve the current level of  
274 inequalities and to preclude transfers between countries, they adjusted their (integrated  
275 assessment) models by assigning more weight to the interest of rich countries (Stanton  
276 2011).

277 Gollier & Tirole (2015) synthesize the distributional decision with a *generosity* parame-  
278 ter which would allocate emissions permit to countries in proportion to their population  
279 if set to one, in proportion to their emissions (on the start date of the policy) if set to zero,  
280 and as a mixture of the egalitarian and grandfathering rules if set in between. Using a  
281 similar formula in the context of a tax, Cramton et al. (2015) (summarized in MacKay  
282 et al. 2015) propose that countries with emissions per capita around the average fix the  
283 generosity parameter, so that it is strategically chosen to maximize the tax rate, and to  
284 fix the tax rate at the minimum price proposed by participating countries. Negotiations  
285 would exclude countries with low ambition beforehand; and the treaty would impose  
286 trade sanctions on non-participating countries. van den Bergh et al. (2020) propose a  
287 "dual-track transition to global carbon pricing": an expanding climate club that would  
288 integrate existing and new emissions trading systems, and a reorientation of UNFCCC  
289 negotiations towards a global carbon price and burden-sharing rules. The ? also sup-  
290 ports global carbon pricing or, as a first step, a carbon price floor. They propose either  
291 differentiated prices among countries or international transfers, and estimate that a price

---

<sup>3</sup>By "adult per capita", Grubb (1990) means that permits would be allocated equally among adults.

292 of \$75/tCO<sub>2</sub> in 2030 would be compatible with a 2°C trajectory.

293 Other authors have put forth more radical proposals. For instance, Weitzman (2017)  
294 envisions a World Climate Assembly with proportional representation at the global scale,  
295 so that the median (human) voter would choose the carbon price level. To finance an  
296 adaptation fund, Chancel & Piketty (2015) propose a global *progressive* carbon tax (or a  
297 progressive tax on air tickets as a first step), so that rich people (who are high emitters)  
298 contribute more to the public good. Fleurbaey & Zuber (2013) highlight that, given that  
299 current emitters are probably richer than future victims of climate change damages, cli-  
300 mate policies deserve a *negative* discount rate. In other words, we cannot dissociate the  
301 climate issue from global inequalities, and an ethical response to this issue requires global  
302 redistribution.

### 303 A.2.2 Climate burden sharing

304 The literature has discussed different burden-sharing principles. While there is no  
305 agreement on their definitions as different approaches are used (cost sharing, effort shar-  
306 ing, or resource sharing, see Section A.1.2), we describe here the burden-sharing princi-  
307 ples consistently using the resource sharing approach (i.e., allocating emissions rights).  
308 For other papers that define or compare different burden-sharing principles, see Leim-  
309 bach & Giannousakis (2019); Vaillancourt & Waaub (2004); Zhou & Wang (2016).

310 **Equal per capita.** The simplest principle is perhaps to allocate each year's global carbon  
311 quota based on an equal right to emit per capita, or an equal right to emit for each adult.  
312 Implementing this principle would result in large transfers from high-emitting to low-  
313 emitting countries.

314 **Grandfathering.** In contrast, *grandfathering* entails allocating emissions rights in pro-  
315 portion to current emissions. From the perspective of allocating carbon pricing revenues  
316 between countries, grandfathering amounts to each country retaining the revenues it col-  
317 lects. Given that nations are sovereign and have not agreed to share emissions rights,  
318 this principle can be considered as the default option against which the other ones can be  
319 compared in terms of distributive effects.

320 **Historical responsibilities.** At the opposite end of the spectrum is the principle of *his-  
321 torical responsibilities*, which assigns to each country a carbon budget proportional to its

<sup>322</sup> population. Countries that have emitted more than the average have accumulated a carbon debt towards countries that have emitted less, which have a carbon credit.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>324</sup> To fully specify this rule, one needs to define a start date for the responsibilities on past emissions and specify how to account for population size. 1990 is often chosen as a start year as it is the date of the first IPCC assessment report, marking the widespread acknowledgment of climate change, though variants include 1972, 1960, 1950 or 1850.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>326</sup> Several solutions have been proposed to account for evolving populations, none of which is flawless. Matthews (2015) allocates emissions rights on a given year proportionally to the countries' populations in that year. An alternative is to use fixed populations, such as the populations at the chosen start year (Neumayer 2000), or at a future date such as projected when the global total population will reach 9 billion (Raupach et al. 2014). Fanning & Hickel (2023) convert the projected climate debt up to 2050 into monetary terms in a 1.5°C scenario.

<sup>335</sup> The rationale for using fixed populations is to prevent countries from intentionally increasing their population size to gain more emissions rights. However, this approach treats countries with different demographic trajectories similarly, effectively penalizing countries which grow more than others (if past populations are used) or grow more than expected (if future populations are used). Using current populations like Matthews (2015) also comes with its own problems. Consider two countries having contributed very little to cumulative emissions, with the same emissions per capita but different demographic patterns: country A's population has doubled in the last 30 years, while country B's population has remained stable. Despite the similar present situation, country B would accumulate more carbon credit than country A. Essentially, compensating country B more due to its past population size amounts to compensating the dead although it is future generations who will suffer. That being said, using current populations is likely a more viable solution than relying on fixed populations since, in practice, countries with similar emissions per capita tend to have relatively similar demographic trajectories.

<sup>349</sup> **Ability to pay.** Another prominent burden-sharing principle is the ability to pay whereby richer countries should contribute more to mitigation efforts. To operationalize this principle, Baer et al. (2008) define *capacity* as the share of global income above an exemption

---

<sup>4</sup>It is not clear how these debts would be settled. Approaches could involve carbon removal from the atmosphere, or using a conventional social cost of carbon to monetize them, by crediting (positively or negatively) emissions rights to countries in an international carbon market.

<sup>5</sup>Climate equity monitor uses 1850 for example.

352 threshold. They use the threshold of \$7,500 per year (in 2005 PPP), which corresponds to  
353 the top 28% of the global income distribution. According to this principle, the effort of a  
354 country should be proportional to the revenues it would raise with a linear income tax on  
355 individual income above \$7,500.

356 **Climate Equity Reference Framework** Baer et al. (2008) propose another effort-sharing  
357 method, the *Climate Equity Reference Framework* (CERF), which blends the ability to pay  
358 principle with their version of historical responsibilities. They define *responsibility* as fol-  
359 lows: they determine the mitigation requirement as the emissions gap between the Busi-  
360 ness as Usual scenario from IEA (2007) and a 2°C (with 68-86% probability) scenario.  
361 The mitigation requirement is then allocated to countries proportionally to their cumu-  
362 lative emissions (starting in 1990). The emissions right of a country according to their  
363 *responsibility* are then determined by its Business as Usual emissions minus its mitigation  
364 requirement. A country's emissions right, dubbed its *greenhouse development right* (GDR),  
365 is defined using a combination of *capacity* (C) and *responsibility* (R) to allocate the miti-  
366 gation requirement between countries. This allocation key is called the *Responsibility and*  
367 *Capacity Indicator* (RCI) and defined as  $RCI = R^a \cdot C^{1-a}$ , with  $a = .4$ .


368 This choice of parameter may seem somewhat arbitrary, but the **EcoEquity calculator**  
369 allows for a customization all CERF parameters (Holz et al. 2019). The Climate Action  
370 Network has adopted the CERF as its *fair share* framework, though the different national  
371 chapters of the organization could not agree on a choice of parameters (Athanasou et al.  
372 2022).<sup>6</sup>

373 The CERF approach was adopted by a prominent network of climate NGOs because  
374 it operationalizes the principle of *common but differentiated responsibilities and respective ca-*  
375 *pabilities* recognized by the UNFCCC. However, this approach suffers from three draw-  
376 backs. First, its definition of historical responsibility as an effort sharing principle is in-  
377 consistent with the principle of an equal right of cumulative emissions per capita, which  
378 is a resource sharing principle. For instance, consider a fully decarbonized country that  
379 has exhausted *exactly* its cumulative carbon budget. According to the CERF notion of *re-*

---

<sup>6</sup>The U.S. Climate Action Network and the think tank EcoEquity (funded by Tom Athanasiou and late Paul Baer) choose the following parameters: an equal weight for R and C ( $a = .5$ ), their own business as usual projections of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions based on trends of GDP growth and emissions intensity reduction, a 1.5°C (Low Energy Demand) pathway, 1950 as the start year for responsibility, a gradual inclusion of income to compute capacity (which adds complexity to the calculation) from a full exemption of the bottom 70% (\$7,500 per year) linearly to a full inclusion of the top 2% (\$72,211), the inclusion of non-CO<sub>2</sub> gases but not of emissions embodied in trade (i.e. imported emissions) nor LULUCF (land-use).

Figure A1: Net gains from the CERF burden-sharing rule in 2030.




Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO<sub>2</sub>.

<sup>380</sup> *sponsibility*, this country would still be expected to contribute significantly to mitigation  
<sup>381</sup> efforts due to its relatively high cumulative emissions. Yet, according to the usual defini-  
<sup>382</sup> tion of the historical responsibility based on an equal right of cumulative emissions p.c.,  
<sup>383</sup> this country would have no liability as it has not exceeded its carbon budget. Second, a  
<sup>384</sup> country with moderate incomes<sup>7</sup> and low historical responsibility would be assigned a  
<sup>385</sup> relatively low effort, even if its emissions per capita are high. In other words, the CERF  
<sup>386</sup> approach favors countries that have experienced recent growth. Third, the poorest coun-  
<sup>387</sup> tries would be granted emissions rights close to the Business as Usual trajectory, as they  
<sup>388</sup> would bear virtually none of the effort. But this trajectory carries the current (unfair) in-  
<sup>389</sup> come distribution and amounts to grandfathering. For example, the baseline trajectory  
<sup>390</sup> for emissions<sup>8</sup> in the DRC entail 0.8 tCO<sub>2</sub> p.c. in 2030, which is five times less than the  
<sup>391</sup> world average emissions right per capita. In this framework, if the DRC were to grow  
<sup>392</sup> faster than projected in the baseline, it would actually have to pay to the rest of the world  
<sup>393</sup> for mitigation efforts. This is what is likely to happen to countries like Mexico or Senegal,

<sup>7</sup>Using the above parameters, moderate incomes means few incomes above the global 70th. percentile.

<sup>8</sup>The baseline trajectory is computed as the “product of the projected GDP and CO<sub>2</sub> emission intensity”.

Figure A2: Difference between net gains from Greenhouse Development Rights and equal rights per capita.



*Note:* GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario ( $2^{\circ}\text{C}$  with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO<sub>2</sub>.

394 from our simulation of the net gains of CERF compared to a situation without interna-  
 395 tional transfers (see Figure A1). In contrast, a resource sharing approach based on equal  
 396 per capita emissions would result in low-income countries receiving emissions rights ex-  
 397 ceeding their projected trajectories, leading to transfers from high-income countries. By  
 398 construction, such transfers do not occur in an effort sharing approach like the CERF,  
 399 implying lower transfers to low-income countries. Compared to an equal right to emit  
 400 per capita, this method favors countries like China (whose emissions are allowed to re-  
 401 main stable over 2020-2030 instead of a reduction of 35-40%) and penalizes regions like  
 402 Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (see Figure A2).

403 **Contraction and Convergence.** Meyer (2004) defines a rule called *contraction and con-*  
 404 *vergence* (C&C), which combines elements of grandfathering and equal per capita ap-  
 405 proaches. According to C&C, each country is granted (tradable) emissions rights, starting  
 406 at their current emission level and converging linearly to an equal per capita level at some  
 407 pre-specified date. The *contraction* part refers to the reduction of total emissions rights in

408 line with the climate objective. When discussed around year 2000, the convergence date  
409 was specified between 2020 and 2050. This rule, advocated by the Global Commons Insti-  
410 tute (a UK think tank), was on the agenda from COP2 to COP15 (i.e., until Copenhagen,  
411 and including in Kyoto), including at Kyoto, and was endorsed by the European Parlia-  
412 ment in 1998. More recently, Gignac & Matthews (2015) have shown how C&C can be  
413 made consistent with historical responsibilities by computing carbon debts and credits  
414 until the convergence date.

415 **Assessments of the NDCs against burden-sharing principles.** The regime established  
416 by the 2015 Paris agreement to regulate climate change respects none of the burden-  
417 sharing principles and relies instead on voluntary contributions from each country, known  
418 as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). A body of literature (reviewed by Höhne  
419 et al. 2014) assesses the NDCs against the emissions reduction objective and different  
420 burden-sharing principles. To evaluate the NDCs, Gao et al. (2019) examine their emis-  
421 sions projections for 2030 and estimate the resulting increase in temperature. The most  
422 recent and comprehensive assessment of NDCs against burden-sharing principles is con-  
423 ducted by van den Berg et al. (2020) (see also Raupach et al. 2014; Robiou du Pont et al.  
424 2016, 2017).

#### 425 A.2.3 Global redistribution

426 Addressing global poverty, inequalities, and climate change are central to the univer-  
427 sally agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). As highlighted by Bolch et al. (2022),  
428 low-income countries often lack sufficient domestic resources to eradicate poverty in the  
429 short term, indicating the need for international transfers to rapidly end global poverty.  
430 In *Beyond the Welfare State*, Gunnar Myrdal (1960) called for a *welfare world*. In his Nobel  
431 lecture, he emphasized the necessity of increasing foreign aid to low-income countries,  
432 stating that “The type of marginal foreign aid we have provided, is clearly not enough to  
433 meet their barest needs” (Myrdal 1975).

434 Drawing on the labor theory of value, some economists have argued that global in-  
435 equalities arise from unequal exchange in international trade (Arghiri 1972). Indeed, the  
436 stark disparity in wages between countries implies that one unit of labor exported by an  
437 American commands five units of labor embodied in imported goods, whereas Ethiopi-  
438 ans need to export 50 units of labor to obtain one unit through imports (Alsamawi et al.  
439 2014; Reyes et al. 2017). Taking stock, Hickel (2017) proposes to globally establish mini-

440 mum wages at 50% of the local median wage. [Hickel \(2017\)](#) also suggests other solutions  
441 against global inequality, which served as inspiration for our questionnaire. These mea-  
442 sures include the cancellation of low-income countries' public debt, fair trade practices  
443 (such as eliminating tariffs from high-income countries, reducing patent protections, and  
444 reducing farming subsidies in rich countries), initiatives to combat tax evasion (e.g., im-  
445 plementing a global financial register), land reform, and a fair international climate policy.

446 [Piketty \(2014\)](#) prominently advocates for a progressive wealth tax on a global scale,  
447 although he does not specify whether the resulting revenues should fund international  
448 transfers.

449 [Kopczuk et al. \(2005\)](#) compute the optimal linear income tax rates for all countries in  
450 two ways: globally centralized and decentralized (i.e., within each country and without  
451 international transfers). They show that the average decentralized rate is 41%. In con-  
452 trast, the global rate is 62%, which would generate funds to finance a basic income of  
453 250\$/month (higher than the GPD per capita of 73 countries). From a current global Gini  
454 index of 0.695, they show that decentralized optimal taxation would only marginally re-  
455 duce global inequality to 0.69, whereas global taxation would significantly decrease the  
456 Gini to 0.25. The study also shows that the existing level of foreign aid can only be ratio-  
457 nalized if the U.S. attaches 2,000 less value to a citizen in the poorest countries than to an  
458 American citizen (or 1,000 less if half of the transfers are diverted due to corruption).

#### 459 A.2.4 Basic income

460 Unconditional cash transfers (UCT) are increasingly seen as an effective way to end ex-  
461 treme poverty. A growing body of evidence from randomized control trials supports this  
462 notion: [Gangopadhyay et al. \(2015\)](#) find that UCT outperform a food subsidy; [Haushofer & Shapiro \(2016\)](#) find significant impacts on health, economic outcomes, and psycholog-  
463 ical well-being; [Egger et al. \(2022\)](#) find large positive spillovers on non-recipient people,  
464 and minimal inflation. Reviews of existing research further confirm the positive outcomes  
465 of UCT ([Bastagli et al. 2016; Standing 2014](#)).

466 While the delivery of cash to remote areas and the prevention of fraud is challenging  
467 in regions without a proper civil register, the use of mobile phones as banking and bio-  
468 metric identification tools could provide viable solutions ([Harnett 2017](#)). Although many  
469 places still lack internet access, satellite internet technology shows promising progress,  
470 with some experts suggesting that it could soon become affordable and universally ac-  
471 cessible ([Hanson 2016](#)).

473 **A.2.5 Global democracy**


474 The idea of world federalism has a long-standing history, dating back at least to Kant  
475 (1795), who argued that a world federation was essential for achieving perpetual peace.  
476 International organizations were eventually created to foster peace, though the League  
477 of Nations and its successor, the United Nations, never succeeded in avoiding military  
478 conflicts. Many have argued that we need stronger and more democratic global institu-  
479 tions, competent to address global challenges such as extreme poverty, climate change,  
480 wars, pandemics, or financial stability. Before World War II, feminist and pacifist Maver-  
481 ick Lloyd & Schwimmer (1937) founded the *Campaign for World Government*, advocating  
482 for direct representation at the global scale. Einstein (1947) called for the subordination of  
483 the UN Security Council to the General Assembly and the direct election of UN delegates.  
484 Since 2007, there has been widespread support for a United Nations Parliamentary As-  
485 sembly (UNPA) from individuals and institutions in over 150 countries, including 1,800  
486 member of parliament, heads of state, as well the European Parliament, the Pan-African  
487 Parliament, and the Latin-American Parliament. The UNPA campaign calls for a gradual  
488 implementation of a democratic assembly, starting with a consultative assembly com-  
489 posed of members of national parliaments, allowing for the direct election of its members  
490 in voluntary countries, and progressing towards a world parliament with binding legisla-  
491 tive powers once all members are directly elected (Leinen & Bummel 2018). Besides the  
492 UNPA, various scholars have put forward different models of global democracy, ranging  
493 from deliberative spaces to a world federation (Archibugi et al. 2011). While the most rad-  
494 ical proposals may still be on the horizon, an assembly of random citizens representative  
495 of the world population has already been convened. It has produced a joint statement at  
496 the COP26 (Global Assembly 2022), and a similar *World Citizens' Assembly* should soon  
497 follow.

## 498 B Raw results

499 Country-specific raw results are also available as supplementary material files: **US**,  
500 **EU, FR, DE, ES, UK**.

Figure A3: Absolute support for global climate policies (Reproduced from *Dechezleprêtre et al. 2022*, Figure A20.).

Share of *Somewhat or Strongly support* (in percent,  $n = 40,680$ ). The color blue denotes an absolute majority. See Figure 1 for the relative support. (Questions A-I of the global survey.)



\*In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

Figure A4: Correct answers to comprehension questions (in percent). (Questions 16-18)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
With NR, typical [country] people win and richest lose	68	73	76	73	73	70
With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win	60	68	62	72	67	67
With GCS+NR, typical [country] people neither win nor lose	54	60	63	59	57	61

Figure A5: Number of correct answers to comprehension questions (mean). (Questions 16-18)




Figure A6: List experiment: mean number of supported policies. (Question 24)




Figure A7: Conjoint analyses 1 and 2. (Questions 25-27)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)	54	76	80	71	81	74
C+NR+GCS preferred to C+NR	55	74	79	71	78	68
NR+GCS preferred to NR	55	77	79	74	79	77
NR+C preferred to NR	62	84	88	83	84	82
GCS+NR preferred to C+NR	47	52	53	53	49	52
NR+C+GCS preferred to NR	55	77	86	73	83	72

Table A1: Effects on the support for the GCS of a question on its pros and cons and on information about the actual support, in the U.S. (See Section D in the US2 Questionnaire)

	Support			
	Global Climate Scheme		National Redistribution	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Control group mean	0.557	0.557	0.569	0.569
Treatment: Open-ended field on GCS pros & cons	-0.073** (0.035)	-0.071** (0.031)	-0.035 (0.035)	-0.030 (0.032)
Treatment: Closed questions on GCS pros & cons	-0.109*** (0.034)	-0.096*** (0.031)	-0.065* (0.034)	-0.062** (0.031)
Treatment: Info on actual support for GCS and NR	-0.021 (0.034)	-0.015 (0.031)	0.048 (0.033)	0.056* (0.031)
Includes controls		✓		✓
Observations	2,000	1,995	2,000	1,995
R <sup>2</sup>	0.007	0.170	0.007	0.154

Figure A8: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See original translations in Figure 8; Question 29)




Figure A9: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements seen as important for supporting the GCS in a 4-Likert scale (in percent). (Question 32)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
It would succeed in limiting climate change	78	85	85	86	86	83
It would hurt the [Country] economy	81	67	61	67	66	69
It would penalize my household	75	60	55	63	59	63
It would make people change their lifestyle	78	79	83	79	78	77
It would reduce poverty in low-income countries	77	85	88	85	86	81
It might be detrimental to some poor countries	79	72	79	67	78	70
It could foster global cooperation	82	81	81	82	85	80
It could fuel corruption in low-income countries	79	75	82	69	79	72
It could be subject to fraud	80	79	80	74	83	81
It would be technically difficult to put in place	77	71	74	62	79	71
Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences	89	82	89	68	91	88

Figure A10: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements found in the open-ended field on the GCS (manually recoded, in percent). (Question 31)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
environment	26	31	37	26	43	24
unclassifiable	25	24	23	28	25	22
pro	22	23	21	22	33	20
con	22	17	12	18	20	16
cost	17	12	11	14	17	7
poorest humans	11	7	6	9	5	6
tax redistribution	10	7	11	8	4	9
support	8	6	3	5	6	8
oppose	7	3	2	3	1	4
don't know	6	8	10	8	7	10
empty	6	3	0	0	0	13
difficult agreement	5	10	7	12	8	8
difficult implement	3	5	5	6	4	6
misunderstands gcs	3	2	2	1	3	1
misunderstands question	2	2	1	3	3	3

Figure A11: Perceptions of the GCS. Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent). (Question 31)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
world: international world country global	28	22	23	19	22	23
environment: climate environment animal emission nature	26	21	17	28	21	17
poorest: poor low-income 700 poverty	16	8	8	9	4	10
pro: pro  pros pros pros:	16	3	0	1	9	5
con: con  con:  cons  cons:	15	4	0	1	8	6
cost: cost expensive higher price 85 inflation	13	7	5	9	7	6
tax: tax	8	3	4	3	2	2
redistribution: rich redistribution	8	4	5	4	3	5
implementation: implement enforce policy monitor	6	4	5	6	0	5
agreement: agree accept participate	3	4	5	6	2	3

Figure A12: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality (mean). (Question 34)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Donation to own country	35	34	31	38	34	32
Donation to Africa	32	35	33	41	32	33

Table A2: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality. (Question 34)

	Donation to poor people (in %)			
	All	US	US	Eu
Poor is in own country	0.590 (0.799)	2.509** (1.152)	0.046 (1.691)	-1.349 (1.108)
Poor is in own country × Vote: <i>not</i> Biden			3.954* (2.279)	
Mean	34.034	33.658	33.658	34.41
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000	3,000
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0001	0.002	0.034	0.0005

Figure A13: Support for a global wealth tax.

"Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-income countries?

Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education." (Question 35)




Figure A14: Support for a national wealth tax financing public services like healthcare, education, and social housing. (Question 36)




Figure A15: Preferred share of global wealth tax revenues that should be pooled to finance low-income countries. (Question 37)




Figure A16: Support for sharing half of global tax revenues with low-income countries, rather than each country retaining all the revenues it collects (in percent). (Question 38)



Figure A17: Actual, perceived and preferred amount of foreign aid, with random info (or not) on actual amount. (Mean, Questions 39, 40)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Actual foreign aid (in % of public spending)	0.4	1.1	0.8	1.3	0.5	1.7
Belief about foreign aid	4.7	2.9	2.7	2.9	2.8	3.5
Preferred foreign aid (with info)	1.8	2.7	3.4	2.9	2.1	2.5
Preferred foreign aid (no info)	4	3.9	4.7	4.4	3.1	3.4

Figure A18: Preferred foreign aid (after info or after perception). (Questions 39 and 40)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as current	70	75	91	76	77	57
Preferred foreign aid is higher than current	47	59	75	58	63	43
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as perceived	57	74	83	79	77	58
Preferred foreign aid is higher than perceived	37	53	64	59	54	39

Figure A19: Perceived foreign aid. “From your best guess, what percentage of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?” (Question 39)

Actual values: France: 0.8%; Germany: 1.3%; Spain: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%; U.S.: 0.4%.




Figure A20: Preferred foreign aid (without info on actual amount).

“If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?” (Question 40)




Figure A21: Preferred foreign aid (after info on actual amount).

"Actually, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid.

If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?" (Question 40)




Figure A22: Preferences for funding increased foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]  
 "How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent) (Question 41)




Figure A23: Preferences of spending following reduced foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]  
 "How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent) (Question 42)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Higher spending on defense	19	23	11	21	17	31
Higher spending on retirement pensions	23	41	22	51	57	35
Higher spending on healthcare	40	57	31	42	80	70
Higher spending on welfare benefits	13	20	7	19	39	20
Higher spending on education	30	45	31	47	58	43
Higher spending on other programs	6	6	6	4	9	8
Lower taxes on the wealthiest	5	2	5	2	0	2
Lower corporate income tax rate	12	6	10	4	8	6
Lower personal income tax rates	48	29	26	27	37	30
Lower public deficit	32	24	21	13	41	21

Figure A24: Willingness to sign real-stake petition for the Global Climate Scheme or National Redistribution, compared to stated support in corresponding subsamples (e.g. support for the GCS in the branch where the petition was about the GCS). (Question 43)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Petition for the GCS	51	69	69	66	78	69
(Comparable) support for the GCS	53	76	81	74	81	74
Petition for NR	57	67	65	66	74	68
(Comparable) support for NR	58	72	76	65	78	75

Figure A25: Absolute support for various global policies (Percent of (*somewhat or strong*) support). (Questions 44 and 45. See Figure 2 for the relative support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	41	54	52	53	62	51
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	53	65	62	66	68	62
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	45	58	55	60	62	54
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	31	37	36	30	45	40
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	34	44	44	43	52	43
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	39	49	39	51	50	54
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	42	55	54	54	61	53
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	44	70	73	70	72	65
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	34	45	40	48	44	50
National tax on millionaires funding public services	62	76	70	79	79	77
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	58	71	69	72	78	71

Figure A26: Preferred approach of diplomats at international climate negotiations.  
In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend [own country] interests or global justice? (Question 49)




Figure A27: Percent of selected issues viewed as important.  
 “To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem?” (Question 56)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Income inequality in [Country]	55	59	54	58	71	57
Climate change	59	66	66	63	73	63
Global poverty	50	57	50	58	75	49

Figure A28: Group defended when voting.  
 “What group do you defend when you vote?” (Question 57)




Figure A29: Mean prioritization of policies.

Mean number of points allocated policies to express intensity of support (among six policies chosen at random). Blue color means that the policy has been awarded more points than the average policy. (Question 58)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	13	21	10	14	35	31
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	23	22	25	21	22	23
econ3	21	15	13	18	17	13
econ4	28	22	27	17	24	20
soc1	10	17	13	17	12	21
soc2	13	9	14	8	10	8
climate1	14	15	11	18	20	12
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	20	18	22	19	15	17
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030	11	9	8	8	9	11
tax1: National redistribution scheme	14	15	16	15	15	15
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	19	19	21	18	17	19
foreign1: Global climate scheme	15	20	20	23	16	17
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	21	20	20	23	19	20
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	15	15	15	17	14	13
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	9	11	13	14	9	8

Figure A30: Positive prioritization of policies.

Percent of people allocating a positive number of points to policies, expressing their support (among six policies chosen at random). (Question 58)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	64	78	61	67	96	95
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	83	86	85	84	87	89
econ3	81	69	50	78	80	68
econ4	88	86	91	79	89	85
soc1	57	75	69	74	74	78
soc2	58	58	72	53	64	48
climate1	70	76	65	79	89	75
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	79	83	86	84	78	80
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030	62	58	56	48	60	70
tax1: National redistribution scheme	67	79	79	76	82	79
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	80	79	76	78	83	85
foreign1: Global climate scheme	71	83	84	85	84	78
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	80	81	79	83	82	82
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	71	77	79	74	83	76
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	58	70	79	74	74	57

Figure A31: Charity donation.

"How much did you give to charities in 2022?" (Question 50)




Figure A32: Interest in politics.

"To what extent are you interested in politics?" (Question 51)




Figure A33: Desired involvement of government (from 1 to 5). (Question 52)




Figure A34: Political leaning on economics (from 1: Left to 5: Right). (Question 53)




Figure A35: Voted in last election. (Question 54)




Figure A36: Vote in last election (aggregated). PNR includes people who did not vote or prefer not to answer. (Question 55)




Figure A37: Perception that survey was biased.  
“Do you feel that this survey was politically biased?” (Question 61)





Figure A38: Opinion on the fight against extreme poverty.

“According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme poverty in low-income countries?” (Question 62)

(a) Elements found in the open-ended field on the question  
 (manually recoded, in percent)



(b) Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).




Figure A39: Main attitudes by vote (“Right” spans from Center-right to Far right).  
 (Relative support in percent in Questions 20, 35, 45, 46, 49)

	Europe Left	Europe PNR/Non-voter	Europe Right	U.S. Left	U.S. PNR/Non-voter	U.S. Right
Support for the GCS	85	72	71	74	53	26
Global tax on millionaires	94	83	76	85	71	40
Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries	61	52	45	55	67	41
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	73	65	52	62	49	23
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	93	79	74	87	70	38
[Country]'s foreign aid should be increased	93	83	72	92	81	48
Universalist	56	48	26	53	49	23

501 C Questionnaire of the global survey (section on global  
502 policies)

503 A. At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be  
504 put in place? (Multiple answers are possible) [Figures 1 and A3]  
505 *Global; [Federal / European / ...]; [State / National]; Local*

506 B. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “[country] should take mea-  
507 sures to fight climate change.”  
508 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly  
509 agree*

510 C. How should [country] climate policies depend on what other countries do?  
511     • If other countries do more, [country] should do...  
512     • If other countries do less, [country] should do...

513 *Much less; Less; About the same; More; Much more*

514 D. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] All countries have signed the  
515 Paris agreement that aims to contain global warming “well below +2 °C”. To limit  
516 global warming to this level, there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we  
517 can emit globally, called the carbon budget. Each country could aim to emit less  
518 than a share of the carbon budget. To respect the global carbon budget, countries  
519 that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less  
520 than their share.

521 Do you support such a policy? [Figures 1 and A3]

522 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly  
523 support*

524 E. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] Suppose the above policy is in  
525 place. How should the carbon budget be divided among countries? [Figures 1 and  
526 A3]  
527 *The emission share of a country should be proportional to its population, so that each human  
528 has an equal right to emit.; The emission share of a country should be proportional to its  
529 current emissions, so that those who already emit more have more rights to emit.; Countries  
530 that have emitted more over the past decades (from 1990 onwards) should receive a lower*

531        *emission share, because they have already used some of their fair share.; Countries that will*  
532        *be hurt more by climate change should receive a higher emission share, to compensate them*  
533        *for the damages.*

534        F. [In the U.S., Denmark, and France only] To achieve a given reduction of greenhouse  
535        gas emissions globally, costly investments are needed. Ideally, how should countries  
536        bear the costs of fighting climate change?

- 537            • Countries should pay in proportion to their income
- 538            • Countries should pay in proportion to their current emissions [Used as a sub-  
539            stitute to the equal right per capita in Figure 1]
- 540            • Countries should pay in proportion to their past emissions (from 1990 on-  
541            wards) [Used as a substitute to historical responsibilities in Figure 1]
- 542            • The richest countries should pay it all, so that the poorest countries do not have  
543            to pay anything
- 544            • The richest countries should pay even more, to help vulnerable countries face  
545            adverse consequences: vulnerable countries would then receive money instead  
546            of paying [Used as a substitute to compensating vulnerable countries in Figures  
547            1 and A3]

548        *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly*  
549        *agree*

550        G. Do you support or oppose establishing a global democratic assembly whose role  
551        would be to draft international treaties against climate change? Each adult across  
552        the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly. [Figures 1 and A3]  
553        *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*  
554        *support*

555        H. Imagine the following policy: a global tax on greenhouse gas emissions funding a  
556        global basic income. Such a policy would progressively raise the price of fossil fuels  
557        (for example, the price of gasoline would increase by [40 cents per gallon] in the  
558        first years). Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil  
559        fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Revenues from the tax would be used to  
560        finance a basic income of [\$30] per month to each human adult, thereby lifting the  
561        700 million people who earn less than \$2/day out of extreme poverty. The average

562 [American] person would lose a bit from this policy as they would face [\$130] per  
563 month in price increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive.

564 Do you support or oppose such a policy? [Figures 1 and A3]

565 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*  
566 *support*

- 567 I. Do you support or oppose a tax on all millionaires around the world to finance low-  
568 income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate ac-  
569 tion? This would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drink-  
570 ing water, healthcare, and education. [Figures 1 and A3]  
571 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*  
572 *support*

## 573 D Questionnaire of the complementary surveys

574 Below, we provide the generic questionnaire (based on the U.S. version), which roughly  
 575 corresponds to the *Eu* questionnaire as well as the combination of the *US1* and *US2* ques-  
 576 tionnaire. The main difference between Europe and the U.S. is that we split the *US2*  
 577 sample into four random branches to include some treatments before the Section D on  
 578 the GCS. Besides the control group, the treatments are: information regarding the sup-  
 579 port of Americans for the GCS and NR, an open-ended field, and a closed question on the  
 580 pros and cons of the GCS. The pros and cons of the GCS are also asked in *Eu* (likewise,  
 581 either as an open-ended field or a question), but only in Section D, after the support.

582 At each section or question, square brackets specify in which questionnaires it is present  
 583 (*US1*, *US2* and/or *Eu*) as well as country specificities. Figures A40-A42 displays the struc-  
 584 ture of each questionnaire. Each treatment randomization is independent. Qualtrics and  
 585 Word versions of the questionnaires in each language are available on our [public reposi-](#)  
 586 [tory](#), together with a spreadsheet that summarizes country specificities and our sources.

Figure A40: *Eu* survey structure




Figure A41: US1 survey structure





Figure A42: US2 survey structure



587 [Eu, US1, US2] Socio-demographic characteristics

588 1. Welcome to this survey!

589  
590 This survey is **anonymous** and is conducted for research purposes on a representa-  
591 tive sample of [1,000 British people].

592  
593 It takes [US1, US2: 10 to 15 min; Eu: around 20 min] to complete.

594  
595 The survey contains lotteries and awards for those who get the correct answer to  
596 some understanding questions.

597 If you are attentive and lucky, you can win up to [US1, Eu: \$350; US2: \$150] in  
598 points. (See terms and conditions).

599 Please answer every question carefully.

600  
601 **Do you agree to participate in the survey?**

602 Yes; No

603 2. What is your gender?

604 Woman; Man; Other

605 3. How old are you?

606 Below 18; 18 to 20; 21 to 24; 25 to 29; 30 to 34; 35 to 39; 40 to 44; 45 to 49; 50 to 54; 55 to  
607 59; 60 to 64; 65 to 69; 70 to 74; 75 to 79; 80 to 84; 85 to 89; 90 to 99; 100 or above

608 4. [Eu] In which country do you live?

609 France; Germany; Spain; United Kingdom; Other

610 5. What is your ZIP code? [UK: What is your Outcode (the left part of your postcode,  
611 e.g. if your postcode is N7 8H7, just enter N7)?]

612 6. Do you live with your partner (if you have one)?

613 Yes; No

614 7. How many people are in your household? The household includes: you, the mem-  
615 bers of your family who live with you, and your dependants.

616 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more

- 617 8. [Eu] How many children below 14 live with you?
- 618 1; 2; 3; 4 or more
- 619 9. [US1, US2] What race or ethnicity do you identify with? (Multiple answers are
- 620 possible)
- 621 *White; Black or African American; Hispanic; Asian; American Indian or Alaskan Native;*
- 622 *Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; Other: {open field}; Prefer not to say*
- 623 10. What is the [US1, US2: annual; Eu: monthly] gross income of your household (before
- 624 withholding tax)? This includes all income: wages, self-employment earnings, So-
- 625 cial Security benefits, pensions, investment income, welfare payments, and income
- 626 from other sources.
- 627 [US1, US2: Items based on household total income deciles and quartiles, namely:
- 628 *Less than \$20,000; between \$20,001 and \$35,000; between \$35,001 and \$42,000; between*
- 629 *\$42,001 and \$50,000; between \$50,001 and \$65,000; between \$65,001 and \$82,000; between*
- 630 *\$82,001 and \$103,000; between \$103,001 and \$130,000; between \$130,001 and \$145,000;*
- 631 *between \$145,001 and \$165,000; between \$165,001 and \$250,000; More than \$250,000; I*
- 632 *prefer not to answer;*
- 633 Eu: custom thresholds, taking into account household composition Questions 6-8,
- 634 and corresponding to the country's deciles and quartiles of standard of living, cf.
- 635 the sheet "Income" in [this spreadsheet](#)]
- 636 11. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
- 637 [Below upper secondary, Upper secondary, and Post secondary are coded as the first two,
- 638 middle three, and last three items, respectively.
- 639 US1, US2: Primary school or less; Eighth grade; Some high school; Regular high school
- 640 diploma/GED or alternative credential; Some college, no degree; 2-year college degree or as-
- 641 sociates degree (for example: AA, AS); Bachelor's degree (for example: BA, BS); Master's
- 642 degree or above (MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA, MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD, PhD);
- 643 FR: École primaire / Aucun; Brevet; CAP ou BEP; Baccalauréat professionnel ou tech-
- 644 nologique; Baccalauréat général; Bac +2 (BTS, DUT, DEUG...); Bac +3 (licence...); Bac
- 645 +5 ou plus (master, école d'ingénieur ou de commerce, doctorat, médecine, maîtrise, DEA,
- 646 DESS...)
- 647 DE: Keine abgeschlossene Schulbildung / Grundschule; Untere Sekundarstufe (z.B. Haupt-
- 648 oder Realschulabschluss); Erstausbildung; Beruflicher Abschluss / Ausbildung; Abitur;
- 649 Zweitausbildung; Bachelor oder Fachhochschulabschluss; Master-Abschluss oder höher

650 ES: *Educación primaria / No he completado la enseñanza básica; Educación secundaria obligatoria (ESO); Formación profesional básica (FP); Formación profesional de grado medio; Bachillerato; Formación profesional de grado superior; Grado universitario; Máster/doctorado*  
651 UK: *Primary education or less; Some secondary school; GSCE; Vocational Upper secondary (Level 3 award, level 3 certificate, level 3 diploma, advanced apprenticeship, etc.); High school degree (A level); Higher vocational education (Level 4+ award, level 4+ certificate, level 4+ diploma, higher apprenticeship, etc.); Bachelor's Degree (BA, BSc, BEng, etc.); Postgraduate diploma or certificate, Master's Degree (MSc, MA, MBA, etc.) or Ph.D.]*

658 12. What is your employment status?

659 *Full-time employed; Part-time employed; Self-employed; Student; Retired; Unemployed*  
660 *(searching for a job); Inactive (not searching for a job)*

661 13. Are you a homeowner or a tenant? (Multiple answers are possible)

662 *Tenant; Owner; Landlord renting out property; Hosted free of charge*

663 14. [If lives with partner: What is the estimated value of your household's assets (in  
664 U.S. dollars)?]

665 If does not live with partner: What is the estimated value of your assets (in U.S.  
666 dollars)?]

667 Include here all your possessions (home, car, savings, etc.) net of debt. For example,  
668 if you own a house worth [\$]300,000 and you have [\$]100,000 left to repay on your  
669 mortgage, your assets are [\$]200,000.

670 I estimate my [If lives with partner: household's] assets net of debt to be:

671 [Items based on the following individual wealth quintiles, doubled if lives with  
672 partner. US1, US2: *Less than \$0 (I have a net debt); Close to \$0; Between \$4,000 and*  
673 *\$60,000; Between \$60,000 and \$190,000; More than \$190,000;* For Eu, the thresholds are:  
674 FR: €5/50/150/300k; DE: €0/35/130/280k; ES: €0/50/100/200k; UK: £3/45/115/270k]

677 15. [US1, US2 (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the vote question)] What  
678 do you consider to be your political affiliation, as of today?

679 *Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other; Non-Affiliated*

680 [Eu, US1, US2] Global climate scheme

681 In the following, we describe two policies, on which we will survey your opinion.  
682 To check that you have attentively read the descriptions, **we will ask some understanding questions afterwards: those who get correct answers can win up to \$150.**

683  
684 **Global climate scheme:** At the Paris agreement in 2015, all countries have agreed  
685 to contain global warming “well below +2 °C”. To limit global warming to this  
686 level, **there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally.**

687 To meet the climate target, a limited number of permits to emit greenhouse gases  
688 can be created globally. Polluting firms would be required to buy permits to cover  
689 their emissions. Such a policy would **make fossil fuel companies pay** for their  
690 emissions and progressively raise the price of fossil fuels. **Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions.**

691  
692 In accordance with the principle that each human has an equal right to pollute, the  
693 revenues generated by the sale of permits could finance a global basic income. **Each adult in the world would receive [US1, US2: \$30/month; UK: \$30 (that is £25) per month; FR, DE, ES: €30/month],** thereby lifting out of extreme poverty the 700 million people who earn less than \$2/day.

694  
695 **The typical [American] would lose out financially [US1, US2: \$85, FR: €10, DE: €25, ES: €5, UK: £20] per month** (as he or she would face [\$115] per month in price  
696 increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive).

700  
701 The policy could be put in place as soon as countries totaling more than 60% of  
702 global emissions agree on it. Countries that would refuse to take part in the policy  
703 could face sanctions (like tariffs) from the rest of the World and would be excluded  
704 from the basic income.)

705 16. Who would win or lose financially in the Global climate scheme? [Figure A4]

706  
707 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

708 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

709 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.;*

710 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

711 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would lose and*

713       *the 700 million poorest humans would win* from the Global climate scheme. Now, here  
714       is the second policy:

715

716       **National redistribution scheme:**

717       This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [US1, US2: 5%; Eu: 1%] and provide  
718       cash transfers to all adults. More precisely, **each [American] adult would receive**  
719       **[\$85] per month** (that is [\$1,000] per year). This would be financed by an increase  
720       of the federal income tax on household income in excess of [US1, US2: \$315,000 per  
721       year; FR: €15,000 per month; DE: €20,000 per month; ES: €10,000 per month; UK:  
722       £15,000 per month], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000]. [US1,  
723       US2: See more details.] <sup>9</sup>

- 724       17. Who would win or lose financially in the National redistribution? [Figure A4]

725

726       Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

727       Typical [Americans] would win and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Ameri-  
728       cans] would win and the richest [Americans] would lose.; Typical [Americans] would lose  
729       and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Americans] would lose and the richest  
730       [Americans] would lose.

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would win and  
732       the richest [Americans] would lose* from the National redistribution scheme.

733

734       To help you with the next question, here is a reminder of the policies:

735

736       **Global Climate scheme:**

737       To limit global warming and reach the international climate objective, the Global  
738       climate scheme would **impose a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can  
739       emit globally.**

---

<sup>9</sup>8% of U.S. respondents click. They then see the following text, based on [taxjusticenow.org](http://taxjusticenow.org) by Saez & Zucman (2019): *The marginal income tax rates would evolve as follows:*

*Below \$315,000: unchanged*

*\$315,000 - \$400,000: current rate 32% => new rate 41%*

*\$400,000 - \$600,000: 35% => 50%*

*\$600,000 - \$2.5 million: 37% => 60%*

*\$2.5 - \$5 million: 37% => 65%*

*Above \$5 million: 37% => 70%*

740 It would **make polluters pay** for their emissions, which in turn would increase fos-  
741 sil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities.

742 The revenues would finance a **global basic income** of [\$30] per month for all hu-  
743 mans, lifting out of extreme poverty the poorest billion people.

744 Considering the basic income and the fuel price increases, **the typical [American]**  
745 **would lose out financially** [\$85] per month.

746

747 **National redistribution scheme:**

748 This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [5%] and provide cash transfers to  
749 all adults. More precisely, **each [American] would receive** [\$85] per month. This  
750 would be financed by an increase of the federal income tax on household income in  
751 excess of [\$315,000 per year], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000  
752 per year].

- 753 18. If both the Global climate scheme and the National redistribution scheme are imple-  
754 mented, how would a typical [American] be financially affected? [Figure A4]

755 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

756 *A typical [American] would lose out financially.; A typical [American] would neither gain  
757 nor lose.; A typical [American] would gain financially.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was that *A typical [American] would nei-  
759 ther gain nor lose* from both schemes combined. [US1, Eu: Now, here are the last two  
760 policies:]

761

762 **[US1: Coal exit:**

763 To reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, this policy would require all U.S. coal power plants to be  
764 phased out by 2030. Coal would be replaced by renewable sources like wind and  
765 solar panels as well as stronger reliance on gas power plants.

766 **Eu: Thermal insulation plan:**

767 To reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and energy insecurity, this policy would require that all  
768 buildings meet energy efficiency targets: at least rating E in 2030 and rating C in  
769 2040. The [UK] government would subsidise half the cost of insulation for all house-  
770 holds, and up to 90% for the poorest households. Insulation work would cost [FR,  
771 DE: €25; ES: €20; UK: £25] billion a year, but would deliver energy savings greater  
772 than this cost. ]

773  
774 [US1: **Marriage only for opposite-sex couples:**

775 This policy is a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would legally  
776 define marriage as a union of one man and one woman.

777 **Eu: Death penalty for major crimes:**

778 This measure would reintroduce capital punishment for major crimes such as ter-  
779 rrorism and mass shootings.]

780  
781 Now, we will ask your opinion on the [US1, Eu: four] policies.

782 [Click here for the reminder of the \[US1, Eu: first\] two policies.](#) [Clicking displays the  
783 previous summarized descriptions.]

784 19. [US2] [4 Random branches: control (*nothing*); Question 31 (*field*); Question 32 (*impor-  
785 tant*); or the following question (*info*).] For information, a recent survey has shown  
786 that:

- 787 • 64% of Americans support the Global climate scheme.  
788 • 72% of Americans support the National redistribution scheme.

789 20. Do you support the Global climate scheme? [Figure 3]

790 Yes; No

791 21. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the  
792 previous question? [Figure 10]

793 The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

794 Percentage of [Americans] in favor of Global climate scheme [slider from 0 to 100]

795 22. Do you support the National redistribution scheme? [Figure 3]

796 Yes; No

797 23. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the  
798 previous question? [Figure 10]

799 The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

800 Percentage of [Americans] in favor of National redistribution [slider from 0 to 100]

801 24. [Eu, US1] Beware, this question is quite unusual. Among the policies below, **how  
802 many** do you support? [Figure A6, Table 1]

803 [Four random branches. Branch GCS/NR/C/O]

- 804
- 805 • Global climate scheme
- 806 • National redistribution scheme
- 807 • [Coal exit]
- 808 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

809 0; 1; 2; 3; 4

810

811 [Branch GCS/C/O]

- 812
- 813 • Global climate scheme
- 814 • [Coal exit]
- 815 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

816 0; 1; 2; 3

817

818 [Branch NR/C/O]

- 819
- 820 • National redistribution scheme
- 821 • [Coal exit]
- 822 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

823 0; 1; 2; 3

824 [Branch C/O]

- 825
- 826 • [Coal exit]
- 827 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

828 0; 1; 2

829

830 [Eu, US1] Conjoint analyses

- 831 25. Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you prefer? [Figure  
832 A7]

833 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the  
834 same time.

Bundle A	Bundle B
[Coal exit]	[Coal exit]
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme
Global climate scheme	

835  
836  
837 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 838 26. Do you support Bundle A (combining [Coal exit], the National redistribution scheme,  
839 and the Global climate scheme)?[Figure 3]

840 Yes; No

- 841 27. [new page] Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you  
842 prefer? [Figure A7]

843 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the  
844 same time.

845 [Four random branches. Branch C + NR vs. GCS + NR]

Bundle A	Bundle B
[Coal exit]	Global climate scheme
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme

846  
847  
848 [Branch NR vs. NR + C + GCS]

Bundle A	Bundle B
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme [Coal exit] Global climate scheme

849  
850  
851 [Branch NR + GCS vs. NR]

<b>Bundle A</b>	<b>Bundle B</b>
National redistribution scheme Global climate scheme	National redistribution scheme

852            [Branch NR + C vs. NR]

<b>Bundle A</b>	<b>Bundle B</b>
National redistribution scheme [Coal exit]	National redistribution scheme

853            *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 854            28. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and  
855            Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies  
856            in their platforms.

857            *[Eu: Imagine if [DE, ES, UK: the two favorite candidates in your constituency in the  
858            next general election; FR: the two candidates in the second round of the next pres-  
859            idential election] campaigned with the following policies in their party's platforms.]*

860            Which of these candidates would you vote for? [Table 2, Figure A7]

861            *[Table 2. Two random branches: with and without the final row. The US1 version of the poli-  
862            cies is given below, see the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the European versions.]*

<b>Democrat</b>	<b>Republican</b>
Increase corporate income tax rate from 21% to 28%	Decrease the payroll tax
Coal exit	Permit completion of the Keystone pipeline
Trillion dollar investment in childcare, healthcare, education and housing	Withdrawal of the Paris agreement
\$15 minimum wage	Marriage only for opposite-sex couples
National redistribution scheme	Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation
[Global climate scheme / no row]	[ / no row]

869

870 [US1: Democrat; Republican; None of them; Eu: Candidate A; Candidate B; None of them]

- 871 29. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and  
872 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies  
873 in their platforms.

874 *Eu (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the Section “Values and politics”): Imagine*  
875 *that [FR: the left or center-left; DE: a red-red-green coalition; ES: the PSOE; UK:*  
876 *the Labour Party] wins the next [general] elections. Here are two possible platforms*  
877 *on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a*  
878 *pool of credible [FR: left or center-left, DE: left-wing parties’; ES: PSOE; UK: Labour]*  
879 *policies).]*

880

881 [US1: Which of these candidates do you prefer?

882 *Eu: Even if you [FR: are not from the left or center-left; DE: do not support the left-*  
883 *wing parties; ES: do not support the PSOE; UK: do not support the Labour Party],*  
884 *which of these platforms do you prefer?]*

885 [Figures 8, A8; see also the sheet “Policies” in *this spreadsheet* for the possible policies.]

	[Candidate A]	[Candidate B]
[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]

886 887 [US1: Candidate A; Candidate B; Eu: Platform A; Platform B]

- 888 30. [new page] [Same wording and conditions as above. For brevity, only the UK version is  
889 given here.] Imagine that the Labour Party wins the next general elections. Here are  
890 two possible platforms on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are  
891 randomly drawn from a pool of credible Labour policies).

892

893 Even if you do not support the Labour Party, which of these platforms do you pre-  
894 fer? [Figure 8]

		<b>Platform A</b>	<b>Platform B</b>
895	[Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order]	[Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy]	[Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy]
896	<b>Foreign policy</b>	Global climate scheme	-
	<i>Platform A; Platform B</i>		

## 897 [Eu, US2] Perceptions of the GCS

898 [Eu: two random branches. US2: four random branches and the question is asked (if asked)  
 899 before Question 20]

900 31. [Branch: field] When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to  
 901 your mind?

902 Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme. [Figures A10, A11]  
 903 {Open field}

904 32. [Branch: important] When determining your support or opposition to the Global  
 905 climate scheme, which points are important to you? [Figure A9]

- 906 • It would succeed in limiting climate change.
- 907 • It would hurt the [U.S.] economy.
- 908 • It would penalize my household.
- 909 • It would make people change their lifestyle.
- 910 • It would reduce poverty in low-income countries.
- 911 • It might be detrimental to some poor countries.
- 912 • It could foster global cooperation.
- 913 • It could fuel corruption in low-income countries.
- 914 • It could be subject to fraud.
- 915 • It would be technically difficult to put in place.
- 916 • Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences.

917 *Not at all important; Not so important; Quite important; Very important*

918 [Eu, US1] Donation lottery

919 33. Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).

920 *Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*

921 34. [Two random branches] By taking this survey, you are automatically entered into a  
922 lottery to win [\$]100 in panel points. This lottery is unrelated to the previous ones  
923 that rewarded answers’ accuracy. In a few days you will know whether you have  
924 been selected in the lottery. The payment will be made to you in the same way as  
925 your compensation for this survey, so no further action is required on your part.

926  
927 Should you be selected in the lottery, you can also donate a part of this additional  
928 compensation to [[American] / African] people living in poverty through [US1: the  
929 charity GiveDirectly. The charity GiveDirectly; Eu: a charity. We would channel this  
930 donation to a charity that] provides small amounts of cash to people in need in [[the  
931 U.S] / Africa].

932  
933 **In case you are winner of the lottery, what share of the [\$]100 would you donate  
934 to [[American] / African] people living in poverty [US1: through GiveDirectly]?  
935 [Figure A12, Table A2]**

936 *Amount donated to [[American] / African] people in need (in [\$]) [slider from 0 to 100]*

937 [Eu, US2] Wealth tax

938 [Four random branches: Question 35 then Question 36 (global first); Question 36 then Ques-  
939 tion 35 (national first); Question 37 (global share); Question 38 (sharing)]

940 35. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-  
941 income countries?

942 Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking  
943 water, healthcare, and education. [Figures 3, A13]

944 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly  
945 support*

946 36. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: afford-  
947 able housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and  
948 schools]? [Figures 3, A14]

949           *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*  
950           *support*

- 951       37. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all  
952           countries around the world. In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount  
953           to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE: €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2:  
954           2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount  
955           to [\$]1 billion in all low-income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700  
956           million people, most of them in Africa).

957           Each country would retain part of the revenues it collects, and the remaining part  
958           would be pooled at the global level to finance infrastructure and public services in  
959           low-income countries.

960  
961           What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of re-  
962           tained in the country's national budget)? [\[Figure A15\]](#)

963           Percent of global wealth tax that should go to low-income countries [slider from 0 to 100]

- 964       38. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in  
965           all countries around the world.

966           In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE:  
967           €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2: 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES:  
968           0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount to [\$]1 billion in all low-  
969           income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700 million people, most of  
970           them in Africa).

971           Which of the following options would you prefer? [\[Figure A16\]](#)

- 972           • The whole wealth tax financing national budgets in each country. For ex-  
973           ample, in [US2: the U.S., it could finance affordable housing and universal  
974           childcare/pre-K.; Eu-UK: the UK, it could finance the National Health Service  
975           and state-funded schools].
- 976           • Half of the wealth tax financing national budgets in each country, half of it  
977           financing low-income countries. For example, it could finance [US2: universal  
978           childcare/pre-K in the U.S.; Eu-UK: state-funded schools in the UK] and access  
979           to drinking water, healthcare, and education in Africa.

980 [Eu, US2] Foreign aid

981 US2 Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).

982 Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal

- 983 39. From your best guess, what percentage of [U.S.] government spending is allocated  
984 to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?

985

986 For your information, government spending totals [US2: 38%; FR: 55%; DE: 45%; ES:  
987 42%; UK: 41%] of [U.S.] GDP, it includes [US2: federal, State; Eu: national] and local  
988 government spending, and apart from foreign aid, it covers the following items: de-  
989 fense, social security (retirement pensions), health [US2: (including Medicare and  
990 Medicaid)], welfare benefits [US2: (including food stamps and EITC)], education,  
991 roads, justice, other programs [US2: and federal agencies (including in energy, sci-  
992 ence...)]. [Figure A19]

993 Less than 0.1%; 0.1% to 0.2%; 0.3% to 0.5%; 0.6% to 1.0%; 1.1% to 1.7%; 1.8% to 2.6%;  
994 2.7% to 4%; 4.1% to 6%; 6.1% to 9%; 9.1% to 13%; 13.1% to 25%; More than 25%

- 995 40. [Two random branches: with or without information on actual amount] [Info: Actually,  
996 [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [the U.S.] government spend-  
997 ing is allocated to foreign aid.]

998

999 If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate  
1000 to foreign aid? [Figures A17, A18, A20 and A21]

- 1001 41. [Asked iff branch: Info and preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than actual for-  
1002 eign aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to increase [U.S.] foreign  
1003 aid.

1004

1005 How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers  
1006 possible) [Figure A22]

1007 Lower spending on defense; Lower spending on retirement pensions; Lower spending on  
1008 healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Lower spending on welfare benefits [US2: (like  
1009 EITC or food stamps)]; Lower spending on education; Lower spending on other programs  
1010 [US2: and federal agencies]; Higher taxes on the wealthiest; Higher corporate income tax  
1011 rate; Higher personal income tax rates; Higher public deficit

1012    42. [Asked iff branch: *Info* and preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than actual foreign  
1013    aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to reduce [U.S.] foreign aid.

1014

1015    How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible) [*Figure A23*]  
1016

1017    *Higher spending on defense; Higher spending on retirement pensions; Higher spending on*  
1018    *healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Higher spending on welfare benefits [US2:*  
1019    *(like EITC or food stamps)]; Higher spending on education; lower spending on other pro-*  
1020    *grams [US2: and federal agencies]; Lower taxes on the wealthiest; Lower corporate income*  
1021    *tax rate; Lower personal income tax rates; Lower public deficit*

1022    **[Eu, US1] Petition**

1023    43. [*Two random branches*] Would you be willing to sign a petition for the [Global cli-  
1024    mate / National redistribution] scheme? [*Figure A24*]

1025

1026    As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President's  
1027    office], informing him what share of American people are willing to endorse the  
1028    [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign,  
1029    only your answer here is required and remains anonymous.) Yes; No

1030    **[Eu, US1] Other policies**

1031    44. The following policies are discussed at international negotiations on how to deal  
1032    with climate change. [*Figures 2 and A25*]

1033

1034    Do you support or oppose the following policies?

- 1035    • Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for  
1036       climate damages
- 1037    • High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries
- 1038    • High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income  
1039       countries adapt to climate change

1040    *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*  
1041    *support*

1042 45. Do you support or oppose the following global policies? [Figures 2 and A25]

- 1043 • Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt
- 1044 • Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting  
right proportional to its population
- 1045 • Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries
- 1046 • A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage
- 1047 • Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of  
all assets
- 1048 • A maximum wealth limit of [US1: \$10 billion; Eu: [€]100 million] for each  
1049 human
- 1050
- 1051

1052 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly  
1053 support*

1054 46. Currently, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [U.S.] government  
1055 spending (that is, [US1: 0.2%; FR: 0.4%; DE: 0.6%; ES: 0.2%; UK: 0.7%] of [U.S.] GDP)  
1056 is spent on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries. [Figure 5]

1057  
1058 Do you support [the U.S.] transferring more money to low-income countries?

1059 *Yes, [U.S.] foreign aid should be increased.; Yes, but only if some conditions are met.; No,  
1060 [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.; No, [U.S.] foreign aid should be reduced.*

1061 47. [Asked only if *Yes, but only if some conditions are met.* is chosen] What conditions  
1062 should be required for [the U.S.] to increase its foreign aid? (Multiple answers pos-  
1063 sible) [Figures 6, A17]

1064 *That recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights.; That recipient  
1065 countries cooperate to fight illegal migrations.; That other high-income countries also in-  
1066 crease their foreign aid.; That this is financed by increased taxes on millionaires.; That we  
1067 can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted.; Other: [open field]*

1068 48. [Asked only if *No, [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.* or *No, [U.S.] foreign aid  
1069 should be reduced.* is chosen] Why do you oppose [the U.S.] increasing its foreign  
1070 aid? (Multiple answers possible) [Figure 7]

1071 *Aid perpetuates poverty as it makes people feel less responsible for themselves.; Aid is not  
1072 effective as most of it is diverted.; Aid is a pressure tactic for high-income countries that*

1073        *prevents low-income countries from developing freely.; [The U.S.] is not responsible for what*  
1074        *happens in other countries.; Charity begins at home: there is already a lot to do to support*  
1075        *the American people in need.; Other: [open field]*

1076        **[Eu, US1, US2] Values and politics**

- 1077        49. [Eu (where it is instead asked at the beginning of Section “Other Policies”), US1]  
1078        In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend  
1079        [U.S.] interests or global justice? [Figure A26]  
1080        *[U.S.] interests, even if it goes against global justice; [U.S.] interests, to the extent it re-*  
1081        *spects global justice; ndifferent or don’t know; Global justice, to the extent it respects [U.S.]*  
1082        *interests; Global justice, even if it goes against [U.S.] interests*
- 1083        50. How much did you give to charities in 2022? [Figure A31]  
1084        *I did not make donations to charities last year.; Less than [\$]100.; Between [\$]101 and*  
1085        *[\$]500.; Between [\$]501 and [\$]1,000.; Between [\$]1,001 and [\$]5,000.; More than [\$]5,000.*
- 1086        51. To what extent are you interested in politics? [Figure A32]  
1087        *Not at all; A little; Moderately; A lot; A great deal*
- 1088        52. Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means you think the  
1089        government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic gov-  
1090        ernment functions, and 5 means you think the government should take active steps  
1091        in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens? [Figure A33]  
1092        *Desired involvement of government [slider from 1 to 5]*
- 1093        53. **On economic policy matters**, where do you see yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where  
1094        1 is Left (favoring equality and government interventions) and 5 is Right (favoring  
1095        free competition and little government intervention)? [Figure A34]  
1096        *Left (1) to Right (5) on economic issues [slider from 1 to 5]*
- 1097        54. Did you vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election? [Figure A35]  
1098        *Yes; No: I didn’t have the right to vote in the U.S.; Prefer not to say*
- 1099        55. [If voted: Which candidate did you vote for in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election?  
1100        If did not vote: Even if you did not vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election,  
1101        please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who  
1102        represents your views more closely.] [Figure A36]

1103 [US1, US2: Biden; Trump; Jorgensen; Hawkins; Prefer not to say  
1104 FR: candidates at the 2022 presidential election  
1105 DE: parties with more than 1% of votes at the 2021 federal election and *Other*  
1106 ES: lists with more than 0.9% at the November 2019 general election and *Other*  
1107 UK: parties with more than 0.5% of votes at the 2019 general election and *Other*]

1108 56. To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem? [Figure A27]

- 1109 • Income inequality in [the U.S.]
- 1110 • Climate change
- 1111 • Global poverty

1112 *Not an important issue for me; An issue but there are other priorities; An issue but we*  
1113 *already do what we can; An important issue, we should do more; One of the most pressing*  
1114 *issue of our time*

1115 57. What group do you defend when you vote? [Figure A28]

1116 *Sentient beings (humans and animals); Humans; [Eu: Europeans]; [Americans]; People*  
1117 *sharing my culture or religion; [US1, US2: My State]; [US1, US2: My town; Eu: My*  
1118 *country, region or town]; My relatives and/or colleagues; My family and myself*

## 1119 **[Eu, US1] Prioritization**

1120 58. In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The  
1121 more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

1122 How do you allocate the points among the following policies? [Figures A29 and A30]

1123 You can adjust the number of points either using the slider or entering the num-  
1124 ber of your choice on the right-hand-side. **The sum of points must equal exactly**  
1125 **100**. By pushing the last slider to the right, the total will automatically adjust to 100.  
1126 Please read the 6 options before making your choice.

1127 See the sheet “Policies” in *this spreadsheet* for the pool of policies in each country.

1128 [sliders from 0 to 100]

1131 [FR, DE, ES] ETS2

1132 59. Similar to the Global Climate Scheme, the European Climate Scheme would impose  
1133 a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit across the EU in the buildings  
1134 and transport sectors. It would make polluters pay for their emissions, which in turn  
1135 would increase fossil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities. Several options  
1136 are possible regarding the use of the scheme's revenues:

- 1137 • Provide an equal cash transfer of €105 per year to each European.
- 1138 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European, proportional to their  
1139 country's emissions: people in countries with higher emissions per person (like  
1140 Germany) would receive more than people in countries with lower emissions  
1141 (like Romania). For information, people in [Germany] would receive €[FR:  
1142 110; DE: 130; ES: 90]/year.
- 1143 • Finance low-carbon investments: thermal insulation of buildings, switch to  
1144 clean sources of heating, public transportation, and charging stations for elec-  
1145 tric vehicles.
- 1146 • Provide cash transfers to the most vulnerable half of Europeans and finance  
1147 low-carbon investments.

1148 Do you support or oppose the European Climate Scheme in case the revenue is used  
1149 to... ?

- 1150 • Provide an equal cash transfer to each European
- 1151 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European
- 1152 • Finance low-carbon investments
- 1153 • Provide cash transfers for the most vulnerable Europeans and low-carbon in-  
1154 vestments

1155 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly  
1156 support*

1157 60. [Asked iff none of the four variants of the European Climate Scheme is (somewhat or  
1158 strongly) supported] Why do you not support a European Climate Scheme? (Mul-  
1159 tiple answers possible)

1160      *I am opposed to climate policy being decided at the EU level, it should be decided at the na-*  
1161      *tional level;*  
1162      *I would prefer if the revenues were used in a different way (beyond the four suggestions*  
1163      *above) than previously suggested;*  
1164      *I would prefer if decreasing carbon emissions were regulated by other climate policies;*  
1165      *I am generally opposed to additional, or more ambitious, climate policies;*  
1166      *I do not fully understand how the European Climate Scheme is supposed to work;*  
1167      *I don't know*

1168    **[Eu, US1, US2] Feedback**

- 1169    61. Do you feel that this survey was politically biased? [Figure A37]  
1170      *Yes, left-wing biased; Yes, right-wing biased; No, I do not feel it was biased*
- 1171    62. [US2 Asked only to one random third of the respondents, instead of the feedback Ques-  
1172      tion 63] According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme  
1173      poverty in low-income countries? [Figure A38]  
1174      *{Open field}*
- 1175    63. The survey is nearing completion. You can now enter any comments, thoughts or  
1176      suggestions in the field below.  
1177      *{Open field}*
- 1178    64. Lastly, are you interested to be interviewed by a researcher (through videoconfer-  
1179      encing) for 30 min?  
1180  
1181      This is totally optional and will not be rewarded.  
1182      *Yes; No*

## 1183 E Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme

1184 To specify the GCS, we use the IEA's 2DS scenario (IEA 2017), which is consistent  
1185 with limiting the global average temperature increase to 2°C with a probability of at least  
1186 50%. The paper by Hood (2017) contributing to the Report of the High-Level Commission  
1187 on Carbon Prices (Stern & Stiglitz 2017) presents a price corridor compatible with this  
1188 emissions scenario, from which we take the midpoint. The product of these two series  
1189 provides an estimate of the revenues expected from a global carbon price. We then use  
1190 the UN median scenario of future population aged over 15 years (*adults*, for short). We  
1191 derive the basic income that could be paid to all adults by recycling the revenues from  
1192 the global carbon price: evolving between \$20 and \$30 per month, with a peak in 2030.  
1193 Accounting for the lower price levels in low-income countries, an additional income of  
1194 \$30 per month would allow **670 million people** to escape extreme poverty, defined with  
1195 the threshold of \$2.15 per day in purchasing power parity.<sup>10</sup>

1196 To estimate the increase in fossil fuel expenditures (or "cost") in each country by 2030,  
1197 we make a key assumption concerning the evolution of the carbon footprints per adult:  
1198 that they will decrease by the same proportion in each country. We use data from the  
1199 Global Carbon Project (Peters et al. 2012). In 2030, the average carbon footprint of a  
1200 country  $c$ ,  $e_c$ , evolves from baseline year  $b$  proportionally to the evolution of its adult  
1201 population  $\Delta p_c = p_c^{2030} / p_c^b$ . Thus, the global share of country  $c$ 's carbon footprint,  $s_c$ ,  
1202 is proportional to  $\sigma_c = e_c \Delta p_c$ , and as countries' shares sum to 1,  $s_c = \frac{\sigma_c}{\sum_k \sigma_k}$ . Multiplying  
1203 country  $c$ 's emission share with global revenues in 2030,  $R$ , and dividing by  $c$ 's adult pop-  
1204 ulation in year  $y$ , yields its average cost per adult:  $R \cdot s_c / p_c^y$ . Using findings from Ivanova  
1205 & Wood (2020) for Europe and Fremstad & Paul (2019) for the U.S., we approximate the  
1206 median cost as 90% of the average cost. Finally, the net gain is given by the basic income  
1207 (\$30 per month) minus the cost. We provided consistent estimates of net gains in all sur-  
1208 veys (using  $y = b = 2015$ ), though in the global survey we gave the average net gains  
1209 vs. the median ones in the complementary surveys. The latter are shown in Figure A43.  
1210 For the record, Table A3 also provides an estimate of *average* net gains (computed with

---

<sup>10</sup>The average carbon footprint of Sub-Saharan Africa is 0.75tCO<sub>2</sub> per capita (World Bank), and it is even lower for people living in extreme poverty, under one tenth of the world average of about 5tCO<sub>2</sub> per capita (Chancel & Piketty 2015). Under a GCS with a cash transfer of \$30 per person, if one's emission is one tenth of the world average, their net gain would be \$27 per month in nominal terms. In regions with extreme poverty like Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding high-income countries), the conversion factor from Market Exchange Rate to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is 2.4 (computed as the ratio of the World Bank series relating the GDP per capita of Sub-Saharan Africa in PPP and nominal). Therefore, the net gain for the extreme poor is \$65 per month (or \$2.13 a day) in PPP, enough to lift them out of extreme poverty.

1211  $b = 2019$  and  $y = 2030$ ).<sup>11</sup>

1212 Estimates of the net gains from the Global Climate Scheme are necessarily imprecise,  
1213 given the uncertainties surrounding the carbon price required to achieve emissions  
1214 reductions as well as each country's trajectory in terms of emissions and population. These  
1215 values are highly dependent on future (non-price) climate policies, technical progress,  
1216 and economic growth of each country, which are only partially known. Integrated As-  
1217 sessment Models have been used to derive a Global Energy Assessment (Johansson et al.  
1218 2012), a 100% renewable scenario (Greenpeace 2015) as well as Shared Socioeconomic  
1219 Pathways (SSPs), which include consistent trajectories of population, emissions, and car-  
1220 bon price (Bauer et al. 2017; Fricko et al. 2017; Riahi et al. 2017; van Vuuren et al. 2017).  
1221 Instead of using some of these modelling trajectories, we relied on a simple and trans-  
1222 parent formula, for a number of reasons. First and foremost, those trajectories describe  
1223 territorial emissions while we need consumption-based emissions to compute the inci-  
1224 dence of the GCS. Second, the carbon price is relatively low in trajectories of SSPs that  
1225 contain global warming below 2°C (less than \$35/tCO<sub>2</sub> in 2030), so we conservatively  
1226 chose a method yielding a higher carbon price (\$90 in 2030). Third, modelling results are  
1227 available only for a few macro regions, while we wanted country by country estimates.  
1228 Finally, we have checked that the emissions per capita given by our method are broadly  
1229 in line with alternative methods, even if it tends to overestimate net gains in countries  
1230 which will decarbonize less rapidly than average.<sup>12</sup> For example, although countries' de-  
1231 carbonization plans should realign with the GCS in place, India might still decarbonize  
1232 less quickly than the European Union, so India's gain and the EU's loss might be over-  
1233 estimated in our computations. For a more sophisticated version of the Global Climate  
1234 Scheme which includes participation mechanisms preventing middle-income countries  
1235 (like China) to lose from it and estimations of the Net Present Value by country, see Fabre  
1236 (2023).

---

<sup>11</sup>2015 was the last year of data available when the global questionnaire was conceived (OECD data was then used – it does not cover all countries but give identical rounded estimates than those recomputed from the Global Carbon Project data for our complementary surveys). 2030 was chosen as the reference year as it is the date at which global carbon price revenues are expected to peak (and the GCS redistributive effects would be largest), and the GCS could not realistically enter into force before that date. In the surveys, we chose  $y = b = 2015$  rather than  $b = 2019$  and  $y = 2030$  to get more conservative estimates of the monthly cost in the U.S. (\$20 higher than the other option) and in Europe (€5 or £10 higher).

<sup>12</sup>Computations with alternative methods can be found on [our public repository](#).

Figure A43: Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme.




Table A3: Estimated net gain from the GCS in 2030 and carbon footprint by country.

	Mean net gain from the GCS (\$/month)	CO <sub>2</sub> footprint per adult in 2019 (tCO <sub>2</sub> /y)			
Saudi Arabia	-92	24.0	Algeria*	-1	6.0
United States	-76	21.0	Mexico	2	5.6
Australia	-59	17.6	Ukraine	2	5.6
Canada	-55	16.7	Uzbekistan*	4	5.1
South Korea	-49	15.6	Argentina	5	4.9
Taiwan	-41	14.0	Thailand	7	4.6
Germany	-30	11.7	Egypt	12	3.6
Russia	-28	11.5	Indonesia	13	3.3
Japan	-27	11.3	Colombia	15	3.0
Malaysia	-21	10.0	Brazil	15	2.9
Iran	-19	9.5	Vietnam	16	2.9
Poland	-18	9.5	Peru	16	2.8
United Kingdom	-18	9.4	Morocco	16	2.7
China	-14	8.6	North Korea*	17	2.5
Italy	-12	8.4	India	18	2.4
South Africa	-11	8.0	Philippines	18	2.3
France	-10	7.8	Pakistan	22	1.6
Iraq*	-7	7.4	Bangladesh	24	1.1
Spain	-6	7.0	Nigeria	25	1.0
Turkey	-2	6.2	Kenya	25	0.9
			Myanmar*	26	0.9
			Sudan*	26	0.9
			Tanzania	27	0.5
			Afghanistan*	27	0.5
			Uganda	28	0.4
			Ethiopia	28	0.3
			Venezuela	29	0.3
			DRC*	30	0.1

<sup>1237</sup> Note: Asterisks denote countries where footprint is missing and territorial emissions is used instead.

<sup>1238</sup> Values differ from Figure A43 as this table present estimates of *mean* net gain per adult in 2030, not at the present. Only the countries with more than 20 million adults (covering 87% of the global total) are shown.

## F Determinants of support

Table A4: Determinants of support for the Global Climate Scheme.

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme						
	All	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Country: Germany	-0.157*** (0.022)		-0.144*** (0.022)				
Country: Spain	-0.044* (0.024)		-0.026 (0.024)				
Country: United Kingdom	-0.079*** (0.024)		-0.104*** (0.023)				
Country: United States	-0.375*** (0.019)						
Income quartile: 2	0.037** (0.017)	0.031 (0.022)	0.038 (0.023)	0.047 (0.043)	0.058 (0.049)	0.013 (0.053)	0.023 (0.043)
Income quartile: 3	0.042** (0.017)	0.033 (0.024)	0.049** (0.024)	0.080** (0.040)	0.059 (0.052)	0.074 (0.056)	-0.052 (0.052)
Income quartile: 4	0.056*** (0.018)	0.062** (0.026)	0.010 (0.026)	0.018 (0.047)	-0.015 (0.055)	-0.001 (0.056)	-0.005 (0.057)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.023* (0.012)	0.032* (0.017)	0.010 (0.018)	0.007 (0.029)	0.045 (0.039)	0.007 (0.039)	-0.010 (0.039)
Age: 25-34	-0.076*** (0.025)	-0.084*** (0.031)	-0.044 (0.035)	-0.031 (0.057)	-0.077 (0.083)	-0.050 (0.066)	-0.103 (0.091)
Age: 35-49	-0.101*** (0.024)	-0.109*** (0.030)	-0.069* (0.034)	-0.094* (0.055)	-0.009 (0.077)	-0.168** (0.070)	-0.050 (0.090)
Age: 50-64	-0.137*** (0.024)	-0.165*** (0.030)	-0.038 (0.035)	-0.039 (0.056)	-0.020 (0.082)	-0.146** (0.067)	-0.017 (0.087)
Age: 65+	-0.116*** (0.028)	-0.142*** (0.034)	-0.056 (0.044)	0.003 (0.076)	-0.045 (0.094)	-0.258*** (0.091)	0.011 (0.105)
Gender: Man	0.019* (0.011)	0.022 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.029)	-0.018 (0.033)	0.042 (0.038)	-0.005 (0.034)
Lives with partner	0.029** (0.013)	0.023 (0.017)	0.058*** (0.018)	0.070** (0.033)	0.082** (0.038)	0.017 (0.038)	0.040 (0.039)
Employment status: Retired	-0.020 (0.024)	-0.046 (0.030)	0.056 (0.038)	0.087 (0.081)	0.096 (0.075)	0.040 (0.082)	0.001 (0.073)
Employment status: Student	0.045 (0.033)	0.062 (0.048)	0.101** (0.044)	0.165* (0.085)	0.192** (0.087)	0.116 (0.074)	-0.021 (0.107)
Employment status: Working	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.020 (0.024)	0.011 (0.028)	0.082 (0.064)	0.006 (0.056)	-0.050 (0.056)	0.036 (0.051)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.331*** (0.013)	-0.435*** (0.017)	-0.106*** (0.019)	-0.131*** (0.035)	-0.004 (0.044)	-0.114*** (0.038)	-0.081* (0.041)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	-0.184*** (0.016)	-0.198*** (0.022)	-0.136*** (0.021)	-0.196*** (0.039)	-0.034 (0.043)	-0.116** (0.046)	-0.108*** (0.040)
Vote: Far right	-0.396*** (0.032)		-0.309*** (0.033)	-0.493*** (0.064)	-0.168*** (0.051)	-0.130 (0.102)	-0.314*** (0.080)
Urban	0.049*** (0.012)	0.072*** (0.018)	0.006 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.029)	0.019 (0.032)	-0.014 (0.036)	0.017 (0.033)
Race: White		-0.030 (0.019)					
Region: Northeast		0.010 (0.023)					
Region: South		0.006 (0.020)					
Region: West		0.010 (0.022)					
Swing State		-0.038** (0.019)					
Constant	1.048	0.736	0.89	0.7	0.732	0.935	0.886
Observations	7,986	4,992	2,994	977	727	748	542
R <sup>2</sup>	0.160	0.181	0.064	0.116	0.067	0.043	0.063

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A5: Correlation between (*Somewhat* or *Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in high-income countries.

	Support for a global GHG tax and dividend											
	USA (1)	DNK (2)	FRA (3)	DEU (4)	ITA (5)	ESP (6)	GBR (7)	JPN (8)	POL (9)	AUS (10)	CAN (11)	KOR (12)
Control group mean	0.34	0.409	0.34	0.361	0.341	0.421	0.288	0.317	0.309	0.294	0.316	0.334
Trusts the government	0.040*** (0.013)	0.0005 (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.051*** (0.011)	0.061*** (0.012)	0.046*** (0.011)	0.050*** (0.012)	0.039*** (0.013)	0.023** (0.011)	0.041*** (0.013)	0.019 (0.012)	0.079*** (0.013)
Believes inequality is an important problem	0.038*** (0.014)	0.051*** (0.012)	0.045*** (0.013)	0.040*** (0.011)	0.023** (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.052*** (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)	0.009 (0.010)	0.005 (0.013)	0.031*** (0.012)	0.024** (0.012)
Worries about CC	0.006 (0.018)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.005 (0.016)	0.045*** (0.014)	0.023* (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.044*** (0.015)	0.014 (0.014)	0.018 (0.013)	0.036** (0.017)	0.004 (0.014)	0.015 (0.013)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	0.009 (0.015)	0.007 (0.012)	0.018 (0.014)	0.015 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.032*** (0.012)	0.027** (0.011)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.024** (0.012)	0.018 (0.015)	0.014 (0.014)	0.001 (0.013)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.059*** (0.015)	0.019 (0.013)	0.008 (0.014)	0.032** (0.013)	0.012 (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.006 (0.014)	0.037*** (0.014)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.033** (0.016)	0.026* (0.016)	0.033** (0.014)
Understands emission across activities/regions	-0.018 (0.011)	0.009 (0.013)	0.003 (0.012)	0.023* (0.012)	0.007 (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.007 (0.011)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.026** (0.011)	-0.002 (0.013)	0.003 (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	0.007 (0.012)	0.008 (0.014)	0.023 (0.014)	0.011 (0.014)	-0.0005 (0.012)	0.031*** (0.012)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.014 (0.011)	0.025* (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.024* (0.012)
Knows which gases cause CC	0.005 (0.011)	0.021* (0.012)	0.010 (0.013)	0.001 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.010)	0.020* (0.010)	0.015 (0.011)	0.017 (0.011)	0.011 (0.010)	-0.0003 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.013)
Understands impacts of CC	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.029*** (0.011)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.022* (0.012)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.024** (0.012)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	-0.005 (0.013)	0.007 (0.012)	0.021 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.014)	0.011 (0.014)	0.010 (0.013)	0.014 (0.013)	0.008 (0.013)	0.015 (0.013)	0.036** (0.013)	0.004 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.013)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	-0.013 (0.021)	0.037 (0.023)	0.043* (0.022)	-0.014 (0.020)	-0.038** (0.019)	0.029 (0.020)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.017 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.006 (0.022)	0.021 (0.020)	-0.020 (0.019)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.086*** (0.024)	0.066*** (0.023)	0.075*** (0.023)	0.094*** (0.022)	0.105*** (0.020)	0.074*** (0.023)	0.091*** (0.021)	0.154** (0.019)	0.089*** (0.020)	0.070*** (0.024)	0.053** (0.023)	0.112*** (0.020)
Believes own household would lose	-0.071*** (0.021)	-0.057*** (0.015)	-0.026 (0.020)	-0.087*** (0.017)	-0.066*** (0.017)	-0.053*** (0.017)	-0.073*** (0.017)	-0.008 (0.017)	-0.079*** (0.017)	-0.052*** (0.016)	-0.060*** (0.019)	-0.083*** (0.017)
Believes low-income earners will lose	-0.034* (0.019)	-0.020 (0.016)	-0.056*** (0.018)	-0.022 (0.017)	-0.021 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.016)	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.056*** (0.017)	-0.025 (0.016)	-0.030 (0.020)	-0.056*** (0.018)	0.002 (0.016)
Believes high-income earners will lose	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.012)	0.013 (0.013)	0.003 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.007 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.025** (0.012)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.0004 (0.013)
Observations	2,218	2,013	2,006	2,006	2,088	2,268	2,025	1,990	2,053	1,978	2,022	1,932
R <sup>2</sup>	0.329	0.241	0.237	0.295	0.211	0.216	0.272	0.222	0.214	0.272	0.254	0.228

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; \* $p<0.1$ ; \*\* $p<0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p<0.01$ . See Appendix A-1 of Dechezleprêtre et al. (2022) for variable definitions.

Table A6: Correlation between (*Somewhat* or *Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in middle-income countries.

	Support for a global GHG tax and dividend							
	IDN (1)	ZAF (2)	MEX (3)	TUR (4)	IND (5)	BRA (6)	CHN (7)	UKR (8)
Control group mean	0.697	0.396	0.681	0.44	0.719	0.539	0.737	0.622
Trusts the government	0.051*** (0.012)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.040*** (0.014)	0.066*** (0.017)	0.065*** (0.015)	0.038** (0.015)	-0.011 (0.015)	0.061*** (0.014)
Believes inequality is an important problem	0.048** (0.011)	0.002 (0.014)	0.057*** (0.015)	0.028 (0.017)	0.092*** (0.016)	0.055*** (0.015)	-0.001 (0.015)	0.027 (0.018)
Worries about CC	0.003 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.016)	0.013 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.017)	-0.0002 (0.016)	0.032* (0.017)	-0.0002 (0.016)	0.046*** (0.016)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	0.020 (0.014)	0.026 (0.017)	0.004 (0.014)	0.039** (0.017)	0.022 (0.016)	0.019 (0.015)	0.034** (0.016)	0.018 (0.016)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.020* (0.011)	0.038** (0.016)	0.032* (0.017)	-0.002 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.015)	-0.017 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.018 (0.016)
Understands emission across activities/regions	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.013)	0.003 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.010)	0.039*** (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.00004 (0.013)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	-0.006 (0.009)	0.011 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.016)	0.0002 (0.012)	0.003 (0.014)	-0.052*** (0.016)	0.022 (0.014)
Knows which gases cause CC	-0.026*** (0.009)	0.019 (0.015)	0.035** (0.014)	0.015 (0.015)	0.020 (0.013)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.023* (0.012)	0.023 (0.015)
Understands impacts of CC	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.0005 (0.015)	0.009 (0.017)	0.043*** (0.014)	-0.023 (0.015)	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.014 (0.014)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	-0.010 (0.007)	0.009 (0.016)	0.015 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.013)	0.002 (0.013)	-0.016 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.010)	0.035** (0.015)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	0.023 (0.015)	0.002 (0.021)	0.019 (0.022)	0.044 (0.029)	0.021 (0.020)	0.032 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.018)	-0.023 (0.025)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.111*** (0.019)	0.073*** (0.022)	0.088*** (0.024)	0.078** (0.031)	0.034 (0.025)	0.129*** (0.022)	0.060*** (0.022)	0.138*** (0.025)
Believes own household would lose	-0.027 (0.021)	-0.044** (0.020)	-0.071*** (0.019)	-0.054** (0.024)	-0.012 (0.019)	-0.067*** (0.023)	-0.119*** (0.022)	-0.045** (0.021)
Believes low-income earners will lose	-0.059*** (0.020)	-0.016 (0.019)	0.003 (0.017)	-0.053** (0.023)	-0.055*** (0.019)	-0.013 (0.020)	0.001 (0.018)	0.004 (0.020)
Believes high-income earners will lose	0.026** (0.011)	-0.020 (0.015)	0.010 (0.013)	0.010 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.014)	0.003 (0.016)	-0.047*** (0.014)	-0.007 (0.013)
Observations	2,488	2,003	2,045	1,932	2,472	1,860	1,717	1,564
R <sup>2</sup>	0.366	0.175	0.242	0.248	0.370	0.272	0.280	0.255

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; \* $p<0.1$ ; \*\* $p<0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p<0.01$ . See Appendix A-1 of Dechezleprêtre et al. (2022) for variable definitions.

<sup>1241</sup> **G Representativeness of the surveys**

Table A7: Sample representativeness of the complementary surveys.

	US1			US2			Eu		
	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample
Sample size		3,000	3,000		2,000	2,000		3,000	3,000
Gender: Woman	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.45	0.50	0.51	0.49	0.51
Gender: Man	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.49	0.55	0.50	0.49	0.51	0.49
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.11	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.18	0.15	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.18	0.15	0.17	0.15
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.24	0.26
Age: 65+	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.25	0.23	0.25
Diploma_25_64: Below upper secondary	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.13	0.14	0.13
Diploma_25_64: Upper secondary	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.28	0.23	0.19	0.23
Diploma_25_64: Post secondary	0.34	0.40	0.34	0.34	0.33	0.34	0.29	0.33	0.29
Race: White only	0.60	0.67	0.61	0.60	0.62	0.61			
Race: Hispanic	0.18	0.15	0.19	0.18	0.19	0.19			
Race: Black	0.13	0.16	0.14	0.13	0.17	0.14			
Region: Northeast	0.17	0.20	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.17			
Region: Midwest	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.21			
Region: South	0.38	0.39	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38			
Region: West	0.24	0.20	0.24	0.24	0.20	0.24			
Urban: TRUE	0.73	0.78	0.74	0.73	0.75	0.73			
Employment_18_64: Inactive	0.20	0.16	0.16	0.20	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.15
Employment_18_64: Unemployed	0.02	0.07	0.08	0.02	0.09	0.08	0.03	0.06	0.05
Vote: Left	0.32	0.47	0.45	0.32	0.46	0.45	0.30	0.32	0.32
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.32	0.32
Vote: Far right							0.10	0.10	0.10
Country: FR							0.24	0.24	0.24
Country: DE							0.33	0.33	0.33
Country: ES							0.18	0.18	0.18
Country: UK							0.25	0.25	0.25
Urbanity: Cities							0.43	0.49	0.43
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs							0.33	0.32	0.33
Urbanity: Rural							0.25	0.20	0.25

*Note:* This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

Table A8: Sample representativeness for each European country.

	FR			DE			ES			UK		
	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.									
Sample size		729	729		979	979		543	543		749	749
Gender: Woman	0.52	0.50	0.52	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.53	0.51	0.50	0.43	0.50
Gender: Man	0.48	0.50	0.48	0.49	0.48	0.49	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.50	0.57	0.50
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.29	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.19	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.19	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.33	0.25	0.25	0.18	0.25	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.14	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.07	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.12	0.16	0.12	0.17	0.20	0.17
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.31	0.24	0.22	0.26	0.22	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.24	0.18	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.24	0.19	0.24	0.28	0.23	0.28	0.27	0.28	0.27	0.25	0.30	0.25
Age: 65+	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.26	0.21	0.26	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.24
Diploma_25-64: Below upper secondary	0.11	0.19	0.11	0.10	0.14	0.10	0.24	0.16	0.25	0.12	0.09	0.12
Diploma_25-64: Upper secondary	0.26	0.16	0.26	0.27	0.20	0.27	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.21	0.23	0.21
Diploma_25-64: Post secondary	0.26	0.30	0.26	0.29	0.31	0.29	0.28	0.38	0.27	0.33	0.36	0.33
Urbanity: Cities	0.47	0.52	0.47	0.37	0.47	0.37	0.52	0.58	0.52	0.40	0.41	0.40
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.40	0.35	0.40	0.22	0.27	0.22	0.42	0.43	0.42
Urbanity: Rural	0.34	0.29	0.34	0.23	0.18	0.23	0.26	0.15	0.26	0.18	0.16	0.18
Employment_18-64: Inactive	0.20	0.19	0.18	0.15	0.14	0.11	0.20	0.13	0.12	0.16	0.16	0.17
Employment_18-64: Unemployed	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.11	0.12	0.02	0.03	0.04
Vote: Left	0.23	0.19	0.21	0.37	0.44	0.44	0.33	0.37	0.38	0.25	0.28	0.29
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.26	0.30	0.29	0.28	0.27	0.29	0.18	0.24	0.24	0.36	0.44	0.41
Vote: Far right	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.01	0.03	0.03

*Note:* This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. In this Table, weights are defined at the country level. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

<sup>1242</sup> Similar tables for the global surveys can be found in [Dechezleprêtre et al. \(2022\)](#).

## H Attrition analysis

Table A9: Attrition analysis for the US1 survey.

	Dropped out	Dropped out after socio-eco	Failed attention test	Duration (in min)	Duration below 4 min
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mean	0.08	0.059	0.082	21.198	0.016
Income quartile: 2	0.025*** (0.010)	0.025*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.740 (3.064)	-0.009 (0.006)
Income quartile: 3	0.062*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.754 (2.813)	-0.004 (0.007)
Income quartile: 4	0.035*** (0.011)	0.035*** (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-3.917 (2.798)	-0.003 (0.007)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.039*** (0.009)	0.039*** (0.009)	-0.000*** (0.000)	1.544 (2.665)	0.006 (0.006)
Age: 25-34	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.597 (2.604)	-0.031** (0.013)
Age: 35-49	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.824 (3.176)	-0.032** (0.013)
Age: 50-64	-0.060*** (0.015)	-0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	5.723** (2.763)	-0.039*** (0.012)
Age: 65+	0.048*** (0.017)	0.048*** (0.017)	0.000** (0.000)	8.952** (4.267)	-0.047*** (0.012)
Gender: Man	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.451 (2.210)	-0.0001 (0.005)
Urban	0.006 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.888** (2.443)	-0.004 (0.006)
Race: Black	0.020** (0.010)	0.020** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	8.554*** (2.600)	0.004 (0.007)
Race: Hispanic	0.021** (0.010)	0.021** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.119* (2.293)	-0.002 (0.007)
Region: Northeast	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-4.862 (4.782)	-0.004 (0.007)
Region: South	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-1.151 (4.710)	-0.004 (0.006)
Region: West	0.006 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-4.000 (4.305)	-0.003 (0.007)
Vote: Biden	-0.048*** (0.008)	-0.048*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-2.901 (2.379)	-0.009 (0.007)
Vote: Trump	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.145 (2.878)	-0.005 (0.008)
Observations	5,719	5,719	3,252	3,044	3,044
R <sup>2</sup>	0.127	0.127	1.000	0.006	0.017

Table A10: Attrition analysis for the US2 survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 4 min (5)
Mean	0.095	0.074	0.092	16.338	0.052
Income quartile: 2	0.023* (0.013)	0.023* (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	1.352 (1.601)	-0.029** (0.014)
Income quartile: 3	0.054*** (0.014)	0.054*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	8.502 (9.649)	-0.009 (0.016)
Income quartile: 4	0.060*** (0.016)	0.060*** (0.016)	-0.000 (0.000)	5.254 (3.376)	0.0003 (0.017)
Diploma: Post secondary	-0.033*** (0.011)	-0.033*** (0.011)	0.000 (0.000)	1.601 (2.630)	0.012 (0.011)
Age: 25-34	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.929 (1.535)	-0.032 (0.024)
Age: 35-49	0.012 (0.014)	0.012 (0.014)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.076 (6.651)	-0.047** (0.022)
Age: 50-64	0.040*** (0.014)	0.040*** (0.014)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.364 (1.565)	-0.079*** (0.022)
Age: 65+	0.115*** (0.017)	0.115*** (0.017)	-0.000*** (0.000)	2.619 (3.150)	-0.095*** (0.022)
Gender: Man	-0.073*** (0.009)	-0.073*** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	4.707 (6.037)	0.010 (0.010)
Urban	0.019* (0.011)	0.019* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	1.766 (1.135)	0.005 (0.012)
Race: Black	0.060*** (0.015)	0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.673 (13.328)	-0.010 (0.015)
Race: Hispanic	0.079*** (0.014)	0.079*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	2.930 (1.813)	-0.027** (0.012)
Region: Northeast	-0.026* (0.014)	-0.026* (0.014)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.837 (2.855)	-0.011 (0.015)
Region: South	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.000 (0.000)	3.220 (5.002)	0.009 (0.014)
Region: West	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.000 (0.000)	-1.759 (1.942)	-0.009 (0.015)
Vote: Biden	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	3.230 (2.731)	-0.006 (0.014)
Vote: Trump	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.554 (1.272)	0.007 (0.016)
Observations	2,973	2,973	2,280	2,103	2,103
R <sup>2</sup>	0.241	0.241	1.000	0.010	0.031

Table A11: Attrition analysis for the Eu survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 6 min (5)
Mean	0.067	0.044	0.151	54.602	0.039
Country: Germany	0.023** (0.010)	0.019** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.533 (18.906)	0.019* (0.010)
Country: Spain	-0.102*** (0.011)	-0.098*** (0.011)	0.000* (0.000)	-29.136* (15.948)	0.010 (0.010)
Country: United Kingdom	0.042*** (0.011)	0.043*** (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-7.458 (18.046)	0.010 (0.010)
Income quartile: 2	0.032*** (0.010)	0.029*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	32.749* (19.771)	-0.015 (0.010)
Income quartile: 3	0.049*** (0.010)	0.047*** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	6.130 (11.734)	-0.021** (0.010)
Income quartile: 4	0.024** (0.011)	0.021* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.659 (19.955)	-0.018* (0.011)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.035*** (0.008)	0.034*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	10.647 (12.959)	-0.007 (0.007)
Age: 25-34	0.028** (0.013)	0.025* (0.013)	-0.000*** (0.000)	36.132 (22.285)	-0.005 (0.018)
Age: 35-49	0.064*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	-0.000*** (0.000)	37.159** (17.190)	-0.013 (0.016)
Age: 50-64	0.085*** (0.013)	0.083*** (0.013)	-0.000 (0.000)	48.363** (22.526)	-0.063*** (0.015)
Age: 65+	0.117*** (0.014)	0.115*** (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	36.351** (14.226)	-0.061*** (0.015)
Gender: Man	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-22.980 (14.093)	0.009 (0.007)
Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs	0.006 (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-16.736 (17.256)	0.004 (0.008)
Degree of urbanization: Rural	0.023** (0.009)	0.023** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	-14.593 (19.733)	-0.001 (0.009)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.025*** (0.005)	-0.025*** (0.005)	0.000*** (0.000)	-17.558 (13.143)	0.019** (0.008)
Vote: Far right	0.005 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.000*** (0.000)	15.838 (32.281)	0.029** (0.014)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	0.023*** (0.006)	0.022*** (0.005)	0.000 (0.000)	24.631 (19.824)	0.030*** (0.010)
Observations	3,963	3,963	3,326	3,115	3,115
R <sup>2</sup>	0.406	0.395	1.000	0.006	0.028

<sup>1244</sup> I Balance analysis

Table A12: Balance analysis.

	List contains: G (1)	Branch petition: NR (2)	Branch donation: Own nation (3)	Branch conjoint 3: with GCS (4)
Mean	0.496	0.493	0.5	0.499
Country: Germany	-0.026 (0.026)	0.017 (0.026)	0.020 (0.026)	0.005 (0.026)
Country: Spain	0.025 (0.030)	0.026 (0.030)	0.026 (0.030)	0.043 (0.030)
Country: United Kingdom	0.002 (0.028)	0.018 (0.028)	0.037 (0.028)	0.063** (0.028)
Country: United States	-0.001 (0.024)	0.019 (0.024)	0.007 (0.024)	0.023 (0.024)
Income quartile: 2	-0.013 (0.021)	-0.024 (0.021)	0.012 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.021)
Income quartile: 3	0.021 (0.022)	-0.005 (0.022)	0.011 (0.022)	-0.004 (0.022)
Income quartile: 4	-0.001 (0.023)	-0.017 (0.023)	-0.013 (0.023)	0.0001 (0.023)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.008 (0.016)	0.014 (0.016)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.016)
Age: 25-34	0.023 (0.031)	-0.049 (0.031)	-0.003 (0.031)	-0.009 (0.031)
Age: 35-49	0.032 (0.030)	-0.002 (0.030)	-0.014 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.030)
Age: 50-64	0.030 (0.030)	-0.005 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.030)	-0.020 (0.030)
Age: 65+	0.029 (0.037)	-0.037 (0.037)	-0.015 (0.037)	-0.012 (0.037)
Gender: Man	0.024 (0.015)	0.012 (0.015)	0.002 (0.015)	-0.016 (0.015)
Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.0005 (0.017)	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.011 (0.017)
Degree of urbanization: Rural	0.013 (0.024)	0.017 (0.024)	-0.004 (0.024)	0.027 (0.024)
Employment status: Retired	-0.005 (0.032)	-0.031 (0.032)	-0.034 (0.032)	-0.016 (0.032)
Employment status: Student	0.005 (0.044)	-0.023 (0.044)	-0.033 (0.044)	-0.025 (0.044)
Employment status: Working	0.010 (0.024)	-0.027 (0.024)	-0.033 (0.024)	-0.012 (0.024)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.004 (0.017)	0.003 (0.017)	0.010 (0.017)	0.002 (0.017)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	0.001 (0.019)	0.014 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.019)	-0.012 (0.019)
Vote: Far right	0.009 (0.034)	0.030 (0.034)	0.023 (0.035)	0.038 (0.034)
Observations	5,991	5,991	5,991	5,991
R <sup>2</sup>	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.003

<sup>1245</sup> J Placebo tests

Table A13: Placebo tests.

	G+R+C preferred to R+C (1)	Supports G+R+C (2)	Signs petition (3)	Share of policies supported (4)	Conjoint 5 A+CGS preferred to B (5)
Mean	0.645	0.633	0.611	0.535	0.596
Branch of list experiment: l	-0.013 (0.019)	-0.024 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.018 (0.021)
Branch of list experiment: rgl	0.005 (0.019)	0.006 (0.019)	-0.002 (0.019)	0.001 (0.012)	0.010 (0.021)
Branch of list experiment: rl	-0.009 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.019)	0.022 (0.019)	0.007 (0.012)	0.007 (0.021)
Branch of petition: nr	0.011 (0.014)	0.006 (0.014)	0.022 (0.014)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.015)
Poor is in own country	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.014)	0.015 (0.014)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.020 (0.015)
Observations	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	5,218
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0004	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001

1246 **Bibliography**

- 1247 1248 1249 A. Agarwal & S. Narain. Global Warming in an Unequal World: A Case of Environmental Colonialism. Technical report, India Centre for Science and Environment, 1991. [Link](#). 18
- 1250 1251 1252 M. Aklin & M. Mildenberger. Prisoners of the Wrong Dilemma: Why Distributive Conflict, Not Collective Action, Characterizes the Politics of Climate Change. *Global Environmental Politics*, 2020. [Link](#). 17
- 1253 F. H. Allport. *Social Psychology*. Journal of Philosophy Inc, 1924. 17
- 1254 1255 A. Alsamawi, J. Murray, & M. Lenzen. The Employment Footprints of Nations. *Journal of Industrial Ecology*, 2014. [Link](#). 24
- 1256 1257 Americans for Tax Fairness. Support for Biden's Tax and Economic Plans. Technical report, 2021. [Link](#). 16
- 1258 1259 P. Andre, T. Boneva, F. Chopra, & A. Falk. Misperceived Social Norms and Willingness to Act Against Climate Change. 2022. 17
- 1260 1261 D. Archibugi, M. Koenig-Archibugi, & R. Marchetti. *Global Democracy: Normative and Empirical Perspectives*. Cambridge University Press, 2011. [Link](#). 26
- 1262 E. Arghiri. *Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism in Trade*. 1972. 24
- 1263 1264 T. Athanasiou, C. Holz, & S. Kartha. Fair Shares – Lessons from Practice, Thoughts on Strategy. 2022. 21, 22, 23
- 1265 1266 1267 P. Baer, J. Harte, B. Haya, A. V. Herzog, J. Holdren, N. E. Hultman, D. M. Kammen, R. B. Norgaard, & L. Raymond. Equity and Greenhouse Gas Responsibility. *Science*, 2000. [Link](#). 18
- 1268 1269 1270 P. Baer, G. Fieldman, T. Athanasiou, & S. Kartha. Greenhouse Development Rights: Towards an equitable framework for global climate policy. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 2008. [Link](#). 20, 21
- 1271 1272 F. Bastagli, J. Hagen-Zanker, L. Harman, V. Barca, G. Sturge, & T. Schmidt. Cash transfers: What does the evidence say? Technical report, ODI, 2016. 25

- 1273 N. Bauer, K. Calvin, J. Emmerling, O. Fricko, S. Fujimori, J. Hilaire, J. Eom, V. Krey,  
1274 E. Kriegler, I. Mouratiadou, H. Sytze de Boer, M. van den Berg, S. Carrara, V. Daioglou,  
1275 L. Drouet, J. E. Edmonds, D. Gernaat, P. Havlik, N. Johnson, D. Klein, P. Kyle,  
1276 G. Marangoni, T. Masui, R. C. Pietzcker, M. Strubegger, M. Wise, K. Riahi, & D. P.  
1277 van Vuuren. Shared Socio-Economic Pathways of the Energy Sector – Quantifying the  
1278 Narratives. *Global Environmental Change*, 2017. [Link](#). 77
- 1279 M. Bauhr, N. Charron, & N. Nasiritousi. Does Corruption Cause Aid Fatigue? Public  
1280 Opinion and the Aid-Corruption Paradox. *International Studies Quarterly*, 2013. [Link](#).  
1281 15
- 1282 A. B. Bayram. What drives modern Diogenes? Individual values and cosmopolitan alle-  
1283 giance. *European Journal of International Relations*, 2015. [Link](#). 16
- 1284 A. B. Bayram. Aiding Strangers: Generalized Trust and the Moral Basis of Public Support  
1285 for Foreign Development Aid. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2017. [Link](#). 15
- 1286 M. M. Bechtel & K. F. Scheve. Mass support for global climate agreements depends on  
1287 institutional design. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 2013. [Link](#). 13
- 1288 L. F. Beiser-McGrath & T. Bernauer. Commitment failures are unlikely to undermine  
1289 public support for the Paris agreement. *Nature Climate Change*, 2019. [Link](#). 17
- 1290 L. F. Beiser-McGrath & T. Bernauer. Could revenue recycling make effective carbon tax-  
1291 ation politically feasible? *Science Advances*, 2019. [Link](#). 11
- 1292 T. Bernauer & R. Gampfer. How robust is public support for unilateral climate policy?  
1293 *Environmental Science & Policy*, 2015. [Link](#). 17
- 1294 G. Bertram. Tradeable emission permits and the control of greenhouse gases. *The Journal  
1295 of Development Studies*, 1992. [Link](#). 18
- 1296 O. Blanchard & J. Tirole. Major Future Economic Challenges. 2021. [Link](#). 18
- 1297 T. Bodenstein & J. Faust. Who Cares? European Public Opinion on Foreign Aid and  
1298 Political Conditionality. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2017. [Link](#). 15
- 1299 K. B. Bolch, L. Ceriani, & L. F. López-Calva. The arithmetics and politics of domestic  
1300 resource mobilization for poverty eradication. *World Development*, 2022. [Link](#). 24

- 1301 A. W. Cappelen, B. Enke, & B. Tungodden. Universalism: Global Evidence, 2022. [Link](#).  
1302 16
- 1303 S. Carattini, S. Kallbekken, & A. Orlov. How to win public support for a global carbon  
1304 tax. *Nature*, 2019. [Link](#). 11
- 1305 F. Carlsson, M. Kataria, E. Lampi, Å. Löfgren, & T. Sterner. Is fairness blind?—The effect  
1306 of framing on preferences for effort-sharing rules. *Ecological Economics*, 2011. [Link](#). 13
- 1307 F. Carlsson, M. Kataria, A. Krupnick, E. Lampi, Å. Löfgren, P. Qin, & T. Sterner. A fair  
1308 share: Burden-sharing preferences in the United States and China. *Resource and Energy  
1309 Economics*, 2013. [Link](#). 13
- 1310 L. Chancel & T. Piketty. Carbon and inequality: From Kyoto to Paris. 2015. 19, 76
- 1311 T. L. Cherry, S. Kallbekken, & S. Kroll. Accepting market failure: Cultural worldviews and  
1312 the opposition to corrective environmental policies. *Journal of Environmental Economics  
1313 and Management*, 2017. [Link](#). 16
- 1314 P. Cramton, A. Ockenfels, & S. Stoft. An International Carbon-Price Commitment Pro-  
1315 motes Cooperation. *Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy*, 2015. [Link](#). 18
- 1316 E. Dabla-Norris, T. Helbling, S. Khalid, H. Khan, G. Magistretti, A. Sollaci, & K. Sri-  
1317 nivasan. Public Perceptions of Climate Mitigation Policies: Evidence from Cross-Country  
1318 Surveys. *IMF Staff Papers*, 2023. [Link](#). 14
- 1319 A. Dechezleprêtre, A. Fabre, T. Kruse, B. Planterose, A. Sanchez Chico, & S. Stantcheva.  
1320 Fighting climate change: International attitudes toward climate policies. *NBER Working  
1321 Paper*, 2022. [Link](#). 3, 27, 81, 82, 84
- 1322 D. f. I. D. DFID. *Aid under Pressure: Support for Development Assistance in a Global Economic  
1323 Downturn, Fourth Report of Session 2008-09, Vol. 1: Report, Together with Formal Minutes*.  
1324 The Stationery Office, 2009. ISBN 978-0-215-53050-9. 15
- 1325 S. Drews, I. Savin, & J. C. J. M. van den Bergh. Biased perceptions of other people's  
1326 attitudes to carbon taxation. *Energy Policy*, 2022. [Link](#). 17
- 1327 D. Egger, J. Haushofer, E. Miguel, P. Niehaus, & M. Walker. General Equilibrium Effects  
1328 of Cash Transfers: Experimental Evidence From Kenya. *Econometrica*, 2022. [Link](#). 25

- <sup>1329</sup> A. Einstein. To the General Assembly of the United Nations, 1947. [26](#)
- <sup>1330</sup> B. Enke, R. Fisman, L. Mota Freitas, & S. Sun. Universalism and Political Representation:  
<sup>1331</sup> Evidence from the Field, 2023. [Link](#). [16](#)
- <sup>1332</sup> B. Enke, R. Rodríguez-Padilla, & F. Zimmermann. Moral universalism and the structure  
<sup>1333</sup> of ideology. *Review of Economic Studies*, 2023. [16](#)
- <sup>1334</sup> B. Enke, R. Rodríguez-Padilla, & F. Zimmermann. Moral Universalism: Measurement  
<sup>1335</sup> and Economic Relevance. *Management Science*, 2023. [16](#)
- <sup>1336</sup> A. Fabre. The Global Climate Plan – Policy Brief. Technical report, Global Redistribution  
<sup>1337</sup> Advocates, 2023. [Link](#). [77](#)
- <sup>1338</sup> A. L. Fanning & J. Hickel. Compensation for atmospheric appropriation. *Nature Sustainability*,  
<sup>1339</sup> 2023. [Link](#). [20](#)
- <sup>1340</sup> D. Fehr, J. Mollerstrom, & R. Perez-Truglia. Your Place in the World: Relative Income and  
<sup>1341</sup> Global Inequality. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 2022. [Link](#). [12](#)
- <sup>1342</sup> R. Fisman, K. Gladstone, I. Kuziemko, & S. Naidu. Do Americans Want to Tax Capital?  
<sup>1343</sup> Evidence from Online Surveys. Working Paper 23907, National Bureau of Economic  
<sup>1344</sup> Research, 2017. [Link](#). [15](#)
- <sup>1345</sup> M. Fleurbaey & S. Zuber. Climate Policies Deserve a Negative Discount Rate. *Chicago*  
<sup>1346</sup> *Journal of International Law*, 2013. [Link](#). [19](#)
- <sup>1347</sup> A. Fremstad & M. Paul. The Impact of a Carbon Tax on Inequality. *Ecological Economics*,  
<sup>1348</sup> 2019. [Link](#). [76](#)
- <sup>1349</sup> O. Fricko, P. Havlik, J. Rogelj, Z. Klimont, M. Gusti, N. Johnson, P. Kolp, M. Strubegger,  
<sup>1350</sup> H. Valin, M. Amann, T. Ermolieva, N. Forsell, M. Herrero, C. Heyes, G. Kindermann,  
<sup>1351</sup> V. Krey, D. L. McCollum, M. Obersteiner, S. Pachauri, S. Rao, E. Schmid, W. Schoepp, &  
<sup>1352</sup> K. Riahi. The marker quantification of the Shared Socioeconomic Pathway 2: A middle-  
<sup>1353</sup> of-the-road scenario for the 21st century. *Global Environmental Change*, 2017. [Link](#). [77](#)
- <sup>1354</sup> I. Gallup. Seventy Years of U.S. Public Opinion on the United Nations, 1946. [Link](#). [11](#)
- <sup>1355</sup> S. Gangopadhyay, R. Lensink, & B. Yadav. Cash or In-kind Transfers? Evidence from a  
<sup>1356</sup> Randomised Controlled Trial in Delhi, India. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 2015.  
<sup>1357</sup> [Link](#). [25](#)

- 1358 G. Gao, M. Chen, J. Wang, K. Yang, Y. Xian, X. Shi, & K. Wang. Sufficient or insufficient: Assessment of the intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) of the  
1359 world's major greenhouse gas emitters. *Frontiers of Engineering Management*, 2019. [Link](#).  
1360  
1361 24
- 1362 N. Geiger & J. K. Swim. Climate of silence: Pluralistic ignorance as a barrier to climate  
1363 change discussion. *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 2016. [Link](#). 17
- 1364 F. Ghassim. *Who on Earth Wants Global Democracy – and Why (Not)? A Theoretical and*  
1365 *Experimental Study of International Public Opinion*. PhD thesis, University of Oxford,  
1366 2020. [Link](#). 11
- 1367 F. Ghassim, M. Koenig-Archibugi, & L. Cabrera. Public Opinion on Institutional Designs  
1368 for the United Nations: An International Survey Experiment. *International Studies Quarterly*,  
1369 2022. [Link](#). 11
- 1370 R. Gignac & H. D. Matthews. Allocating a 2 °C cumulative carbon budget to countries.  
1371 *Environmental Research Letters*, 2015. [Link](#). 24
- 1372 M. Gilens. Political Ignorance and Collective Policy Preferences. *American Political Science*  
1373 *Review*, 2001. [Link](#). 14
- 1374 . Global Assembly. Report of the 2021 Global Assembly on the Climate and Ecological  
1375 Crisis. Technical report, 2022. [Link](#). 26
- 1376 . Global Challenges Foundation. Attitudes to global risk and governance survey 2018.  
1377 Technical report, 2018. [Link](#). 11
- 1378 C. Gollier & J. Tirole. Negotiating Effective Institutions Against Climate Change. *Eco-*  
1379 *nomics of Energy & Environmental Policy*, 2015. [Link](#). 18
- 1380 Greenpeace. Energy [r]evolution - a sustainable world energy outlook 2015, 2015. [Link](#).  
1381 77
- 1382 M. Grubb. The Greenhouse Effect: Negotiating Targets. *International Affairs (Royal Institute*  
1383 *of International Affairs 1944-)*, 1990. [Link](#). 18
- 1384 W. A. Hanson. Satellite Internet in the Mobile Age. *New Space*, 2016. [Link](#). 25

- <sup>1385</sup> P. Harnett. Taking Tax to the Global Level Combining Southern Initiatives to Create a  
<sup>1386</sup> World Basic Income. Technical report, World Basic Income, 2017. [Link](#). 25
- <sup>1387</sup> J. Haushofer & J. Shapiro. The Short-term Impact of Unconditional Cash Transfers to  
<sup>1388</sup> the Poor: Experimental Evidence from Kenya. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2016.  
<sup>1389</sup> [Link](#). 25
- <sup>1390</sup> S. Henson, J. Lindstrom, L. Haddad, & R. Mulmi. Public Perceptions of International  
<sup>1391</sup> Development and Support for Aid in the UK: Results of a Qualitative Enquiry. *IDS*  
<sup>1392</sup> *Working Papers*, 2010. [Link](#). 15
- <sup>1393</sup> J. Hickel. *The Divide: A Brief Guide to Global Inequality and Its Solutions*. Heinemann, 2017.  
<sup>1394</sup> ISBN 978-1-78515-112-5. [Link](#). 24, 25
- <sup>1395</sup> M. Hoel. Carbon taxes: An international tax or harmonized domestic taxes. *CICERO*  
<sup>1396</sup> *Working Paper*, 1991. [Link](#). 18
- <sup>1397</sup> N. Höhne, M. den Elzen, & D. Escalante. Regional GHG reduction targets based on effort  
<sup>1398</sup> sharing: A comparison of studies. *Climate Policy*, 2014. [Link](#). 24
- <sup>1399</sup> C. Holz, E. Kemp-Benedict, T. Athanasiou, & S. Kartha. The Climate Equity Reference  
<sup>1400</sup> Calculator. *Journal of Open Source Software*, 2019. [Link](#). 21
- <sup>1401</sup> C. Hood. Input to the High-level Economic Commission on Carbon Prices, 2017. [Link](#). 76
- <sup>1402</sup> D. Hudson & J. van Heerde. 'A Mile Wide and an Inch Deep': Surveys of Public Attitudes  
<sup>1403</sup> towards Development Aid. *International Journal of Development Education and Global*  
<sup>1404</sup> *Learning*, 2012. [Link](#). 14, 15
- <sup>1405</sup> . IEA. World Energy Outlook. Technical report, 2007. [Link](#). 21
- <sup>1406</sup> IEA. *Energy Technology Perspectives 2017*. 2017. [Link](#). 76
- <sup>1407</sup> T. Isbell. Footing the bill? Technical report, Afrobarometer, 2022. [Link](#). 16
- <sup>1408</sup> ISSP. International Social Survey Programme: Environment III. 2010. [Link](#). 12
- <sup>1409</sup> ISSP. International Social Survey Programme ISSP 2019 - Social Inequality V. 2019. [Link](#).
- <sup>1410</sup> 12

- <sup>1411</sup> D. Ivanova & R. Wood. The unequal distribution of household carbon footprints in Europe and its link to sustainability. *Global Sustainability*, 2020. [Link](#). 76
- <sup>1412</sup>
- <sup>1413</sup> B. Jaeger & M. Wilks. The Relative Importance of Target and Judge Characteristics in Shaping the Moral Circle. *Cognitive Science*, 2023. [Link](#). 17
- <sup>1414</sup>
- <sup>1415</sup> D. Jamieson. Climate Change and Global Environmental Justice. 2001. [Link](#). 18
- <sup>1416</sup>
- <sup>1417</sup> T. B. Johansson, A. Patwardhan, N. Nakićenović, L. Gomez-Echeverri, & International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, editors. *Global Energy Assessment (GEA)*. Cambridge University Press ; International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Cambridge : Laxenburg, Austria, 2012. ISBN 978-1-107-00519-8 978-0-521-18293-5. 22, 23,
- <sup>1418</sup>
- <sup>1419</sup>
- <sup>1420</sup> 77
- <sup>1421</sup> I. Kant. *Zum ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer Entwurf*. 1795. ISBN 978-1-4840-4926-6. 26
- <sup>1422</sup>
- <sup>1423</sup> D. Kaufmann, E. F. McGuirk, & P. C. Vicente. Foreign Aid Preferences and Perceptions in Donor Countries. 2012. 14
- <sup>1424</sup>
- <sup>1425</sup> W. Kopczuk, J. Slemrod, & S. Yitzhaki. The limitations of decentralized world redistribution: An optimal taxation approach. *European Economic Review*, 2005. [Link](#). 25
- <sup>1426</sup>
- <sup>1427</sup> M. Leimbach & A. Giannousakis. Burden sharing of climate change mitigation: Global and regional challenges under shared socio-economic pathways. *Climatic Change*, 2019.
- <sup>1428</sup> [Link](#). 19
- <sup>1429</sup>
- <sup>1430</sup> J. Leinen & A. Bummel. *A World Parliament: Governance and Democracy in the 21st Century*. Democracy Without Borders, Berlin, 2018. ISBN 978-3-942282-13-0. 26
- <sup>1431</sup>
- <sup>1432</sup> D. J. C. MacKay, P. Cramton, A. Ockenfels, & S. Stoft. Price carbon - I will if you will. *Nature*, 2015. 18
- <sup>1433</sup>
- <sup>1434</sup> H. D. Matthews. Quantifying historical carbon and climate debts among nations. *Nature Climate Change*, 2015. [Link](#). 20
- <sup>1435</sup>
- <sup>1436</sup> L. Maverick Lloyd & R. Schwimmer. Chaos, War, and a New World Order. Technical report, 1937. [Link](#). 26
- <sup>1437</sup>
- <sup>1438</sup> D. M. McEvoy & T. L. Cherry. The prospects for Paris: Behavioral insights into unconditional cooperation on climate change. *Palgrave Communications*, 2016. [Link](#). 17

- <sup>1439</sup> L. F. McGrath & T. Bernauer. How strong is public support for unilateral climate policy  
<sup>1440</sup> and what drives it? *WIREs Climate Change*, 2017. [Link](#). 17
- <sup>1441</sup> A. Meiland, Y. Kervinio, & A. Méjean. International climate justice: What the people  
<sup>1442</sup> think. 2023. [Link](#). 12, 13
- <sup>1443</sup> A. Meyer. Briefing: Contraction and convergence. *Proceedings of the Institution of Civil  
Engineers - Engineering Sustainability*, 2004. [Link](#). 23
- <sup>1445</sup> G. Myrdal. *Beyond the Welfare State: Economic Planning and its International Implications*.  
<sup>1446</sup> Praeger, yale university press edition, 1960. ISBN 978-0-313-23697-6. 24
- <sup>1447</sup> G. Myrdal. The Equality Issue in World Development. *The Swedish Journal of Economics*,  
<sup>1448</sup> 1975. [Link](#). 24
- <sup>1449</sup> G. Nair. Misperceptions of Relative Affluence and Support for International Redistribution.  
<sup>1450</sup> *The Journal of Politics*, 2018. [Link](#). 14
- <sup>1451</sup> E. Neumayer. In defence of historical accountability for greenhouse gas emissions. *Eco-  
logical Economics*, 2000. [Link](#). 20
- <sup>1453</sup> OECD. *Main Findings from the 2018 Risks That Matter Survey*. OECD, 2019. ISBN 978-92-  
<sup>1454</sup> 64-35751-8. [Link](#). 16
- <sup>1455</sup> H. J. O'Gorman. Pluralistic ignorance and white estimates of white support for racial  
<sup>1456</sup> segregation. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1975. [Link](#). 17
- <sup>1457</sup> . Patriotic Millionaires. Patriotic Millionaires Survey. Technical report, 2022. [Link](#). 16
- <sup>1458</sup> P. Paxton & S. Knack. Individual and country-level factors affecting support for foreign  
<sup>1459</sup> aid. *International Political Science Review*, 2012. [Link](#). 15
- <sup>1460</sup> G. P. Peters, S. J. Davis, & R. Andrew. A synthesis of carbon in international trade. *Biogeosciences*, 2012. [Link](#). 76
- <sup>1462</sup> T. Piketty. *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2014.  
<sup>1463</sup> ISBN 978-0-674-43000-6. 25
- <sup>1464</sup> P. o. I. P. A. PIPA. Americans on Foreign Aid and World Hunger A Study of U.S. Public  
<sup>1465</sup> Attitudes. Technical report, PIPA, 2001. [Link](#). 14, 15, 16, 17

- <sup>1466</sup> P. o. I. P. A. PIPA. Publics in Developed Countries Ready to Contribute Funds Necessary  
<sup>1467</sup> to Cut Hunger in Half By 2015. Technical report, 2008. [Link](#). 14
- <sup>1468</sup> R. G. Rajan. A Global Incentive to Reduce Emissions, 2021. [Link](#). 18
- <sup>1469</sup> M. R. Raupach, S. J. Davis, G. P. Peters, R. M. Andrew, J. G. Canadell, P. Ciais, P. Friedling-  
<sup>1470</sup> stein, F. Jotzo, D. P. van Vuuren, & C. Le Quéré. Sharing a quota on cumulative carbon  
<sup>1471</sup> emissions. *Nature Climate Change*, 2014. [Link](#). 20, 24
- <sup>1472</sup> R. Reyes, M. Lenzen, & J. Murray. Better Global Assessment of Worker Inequality: Com-  
<sup>1473</sup> ment on “The Employment Footprints of Nations”. *Journal of Industrial Ecology*, 2017.  
<sup>1474</sup> [Link](#). 24
- <sup>1475</sup> S. Reysen & I. Katzarska-Miller. *The Psychology of Global Citizenship: A Review of Theory*  
<sup>1476</sup> and Research. Lexington Books, Lanham, 2018. ISBN 978-1-4985-7029-9. 16
- <sup>1477</sup> K. Riahi, D. P. van Vuuren, E. Kriegler, J. Edmonds, B. C. O'Neill, S. Fujimori, N. Bauer,  
<sup>1478</sup> K. Calvin, R. Dellink, O. Fricko, W. Lutz, A. Popp, J. C. Cuaresma, S. Kc, M. Leimbach,  
<sup>1479</sup> L. Jiang, T. Kram, S. Rao, J. Emmerling, K. Ebi, T. Hasegawa, P. Havlik, F. Humpenöder,  
<sup>1480</sup> L. A. Da Silva, S. Smith, E. Stehfest, V. Bosetti, J. Eom, D. Gernaat, T. Masui, J. Rogelj,  
<sup>1481</sup> J. Strefler, L. Drouet, V. Krey, G. Luderer, M. Harmsen, K. Takahashi, L. Baumstark, J. C.  
<sup>1482</sup> Doelman, M. Kainuma, Z. Klimont, G. Marangoni, H. Lotze-Campen, M. Obersteiner,  
<sup>1483</sup> A. Tabeau, & M. Tavoni. The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways and their energy, land  
<sup>1484</sup> use, and greenhouse gas emissions implications: An overview. *Global Environmental*  
<sup>1485</sup> *Change*, 2017. [Link](#). 77
- <sup>1486</sup> Y. Robiou du Pont, M. L. Jeffery, J. Gütschow, P. Christoff, & M. Meinshausen. National  
<sup>1487</sup> contributions for decarbonizing the world economy in line with the G7 agreement. *En-*  
<sup>1488</sup> *vironmental Research Letters*, 2016. [Link](#). 24
- <sup>1489</sup> Y. Robiou du Pont, M. L. Jeffery, J. Gütschow, J. Rogelj, P. Christoff, & M. Meinshausen.  
<sup>1490</sup> Equitable mitigation to achieve the Paris Agreement goals. *Nature Climate Change*, 2017.  
<sup>1491</sup> [Link](#). 24
- <sup>1492</sup> K. Rowlingson, A. Sood, & T. Tu. Public attitudes to a wealth tax: The importance of  
<sup>1493</sup> ‘capacity to pay’. *Fiscal Studies*, 2021. [Link](#). 15

- <sup>1494</sup> E. Saez & G. Zucman. *The Triumph of Injustice: How the Rich Dodge Taxes and How to Make Them Pay*. W. W. Norton & Company, New York, NY, first edition edition, 2019. ISBN 978-1-324-00272-7. [59](#)
- <sup>1497</sup> M. Schecht & D. Tisch. Tax principles, policy feedback and self-interest: Cross-national experimental evidence on wealth tax preferences. *Socio-Economic Review*, 2023. [Link](#). [16](#)
- <sup>1499</sup> J. Schleich, E. Dütschke, C. Schwirplies, & A. Ziegler. Citizens' perceptions of justice in international climate policy: An empirical analysis. *Climate Policy*, 2016. [Link](#). [12](#), [13](#)
- <sup>1501</sup> J. Sivonen. Attitudes toward global and national climate policies in Finland – The significance of climate change risk perception and urban/rural-domicile. *GeoJournal*, 2022. [Link](#). [12](#)
- <sup>1504</sup> G. Sparkman, N. Geiger, & E. U. Weber. Americans experience a false social reality by underestimating popular climate policy support by nearly half. *Nature Communications*, 2022. [Link](#). [17](#)
- <sup>1507</sup> G. Standing. A little more, how much it is...: Piloting basic income transfers in madhya pradesh, india. Technical report. Technical report, UNICEF, 2014. [Link](#). [25](#)
- <sup>1509</sup> E. A. Stanton. Negishi welfare weights in integrated assessment models: The mathematics of global inequality. *Climatic Change*, 2011. [Link](#). [18](#)
- <sup>1511</sup> N. Stern & J. E. Stiglitz. Report of the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices. Technical report, Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, 2017. [Link](#). [76](#)
- <sup>1513</sup> K. Vaillancourt & J.-P. Waaub. Equity in international greenhouse gases abatement scenarios: A multicriteria approach. *European Journal of Operational Research*, 2004. [Link](#). [19](#)
- <sup>1516</sup> N. J. van den Berg, H. L. van Soest, A. F. Hof, M. G. J. den Elzen, D. P. van Vuuren, W. Chen, L. Drouet, J. Emmerling, S. Fujimori, N. Höhne, A. C. Köberle, D. McCollum, R. Schaeffer, S. Shekhar, S. S. Vishwanathan, Z. Vrontisi, & K. Blok. Implications of various effort-sharing approaches for national carbon budgets and emission pathways. *Climatic Change*, 2020. [Link](#). [24](#)
- <sup>1521</sup> J. C. J. M. van den Bergh, A. Angelsen, A. Baranzini, W. J. W. Botzen, S. Carattini, S. Drews, T. Dunlop, E. Galbraith, E. Gsottbauer, R. B. Howarth, E. Padilla, J. Roca, & R. C. Schmidt. A dual-track transition to global carbon pricing. *Climate Policy*, 2020. [Link](#). [18](#)

- 1524 D. P. van Vuuren, E. Stehfest, D. E. H. J. Gernaat, J. C. Doelman, M. van den Berg,  
1525 M. Harmsen, H. S. de Boer, L. F. Bouwman, V. Daioglou, O. Y. Edelenbosch, B. Girod,  
1526 T. Kram, L. Lassaletta, P. L. Lucas, H. van Meijl, C. Müller, B. J. van Ruijven, S. van der  
1527 Sluis, & A. Tabeau. Energy, land-use and greenhouse gas emissions trajectories under  
1528 a green growth paradigm. *Global Environmental Change*, 2017. [Link](#). 77
- 1529 A. Waytz, R. Iyer, L. Young, J. Haidt, & J. Graham. Ideological differences in the expanse  
1530 of the moral circle. *Nature Communications*, 2019. [Link](#). 17
- 1531 M. L. Weitzman. On a World Climate Assembly and the Social Cost of Carbon. *Economica*,  
1532 2017. [Link](#). 19
- 1533 P. Zhou & M. Wang. Carbon dioxide emissions allocation: A review. *Ecological Economics*,  
1534 2016. [Link](#). 19

1535 **List of Tables**

1536    1	List experiment: tacit support for the GCS . . . . .	5
1537    2	Influence of the GCS on electoral prospects . . . . .	5
1538    A1	Campaign and bandwagon effects on the support for the GCS. . . . .	29
1539    A2	Donation to Africa vs. own country . . . . .	34
1540    A3	Estimated net gain from the GCS in 2030 and carbon footprint by country. .	79
1541    A4	Determinants of support for the GCS . . . . .	80
1542    A5	Beliefs correlated with support for a global GHG tax and dividend (HICs) .	81
1543    A6	Beliefs correlated with support for a global GHG tax and dividend (MICs) .	82
1544    A7	Sample representativeness of US1, US2, Eu . . . . .	83
1545    A8	Sample representativeness of each European country . . . . .	84
1546    A9	Attrition analysis: US1 . . . . .	85
1547    A10	Attrition analysis: US2 . . . . .	86
1548    A11	Attrition analysis: Eu . . . . .	87
1549    A12	Balance analysis . . . . .	88
1550    A13	Placebo tests . . . . .	89

1551 **List of Figures**

1552    1	Relative support for global climate policies . . . . .	3
1553    2	Relative support for further global policies . . . . .	4
1554    3	Support for the Global Climate Scheme . . . . .	4
1555    4	Preferred share of wealth tax for low-income countries . . . . .	5
1556    5	Attitudes on the evolution of foreign aid . . . . .	6
1557    6	Conditions at which foreign aid should be increased . . . . .	6
1558    7	Reasons why foreign aid should not be increased . . . . .	7
1559    8	Preferences for various policies in political platforms . . . . .	8
1560    9	Influence of the GCS on preferred platform . . . . .	10
1561    10	Beliefs about support for the GCS and NR . . . . .	10
1562    A1	Net gains with the CERF burden-sharing rule. . . . .	22
1563    A2	Comparison between GDR and equal per capita burden-sharing rules. . . .	23
1564    A3	Absolute support for global climate policies . . . . .	27
1565    A4	Comprehension . . . . .	28
1566    A5	Comprehension score . . . . .	28

1567	A6 List experiment . . . . .	28
1568	A7 Conjoint analyses 1 and 2 . . . . .	29
1569	A8 Preferences for various policies in political platforms (English) . . . . .	30
1570	A9 Perceptions of the GCS . . . . .	31
1571	A10 Classification of open-ended field on the GCS . . . . .	32
1572	A11 Topics of open-ended field on the GCS . . . . .	33
1573	A12 Donation to Africa vs. own country . . . . .	33
1574	A13 Support for a global wealth tax . . . . .	34
1575	A14 Support for a national wealth tax . . . . .	35
1576	A15 Preferred share of global tax for low-income countries . . . . .	35
1577	A16 Support for sharing half of global tax revenues with low-income countries . .	35
1578	A17 Actual, perceived and preferred amount of foreign aid (mean) . . . . .	36
1579	A18 Preferred foreign aid (summary) . . . . .	36
1580	A19 Perceived foreign aid . . . . .	37
1581	A20 Preferred foreign aid (without info on actual amount) . . . . .	37
1582	A21 Preferred foreign aid (after info on actual amount) . . . . .	38
1583	A22 Preferences for funding increased foreign aid . . . . .	39
1584	A23 Preferences of spending following reduced foreign aid . . . . .	40
1585	A24 Willingness to sign a real-stake petition . . . . .	40
1586	A25 Absolute support for various global policies . . . . .	41
1587	A26 Preferred approach for international climate negotiations . . . . .	41
1588	A27 Importance of selected issues . . . . .	42
1589	A28 Group defended when voting . . . . .	42
1590	A29 Mean prioritization of policies . . . . .	43
1591	A30 Positive prioritization of policies . . . . .	44
1592	A31 Charity donation . . . . .	44
1593	A32 Interest in politics . . . . .	45
1594	A33 Desired involvement of government . . . . .	45
1595	A34 Political leaning . . . . .	46
1596	A35 Voted in last election . . . . .	46
1597	A36 Vote in last election . . . . .	47
1598	A37 Perception that survey was biased . . . . .	47
1599	A38 Classification of open-ended field on extreme poverty . . . . .	48
1600	A39 Main attitudes by vote . . . . .	49

1601	A40 <i>Eu survey structure</i>	53
1602	A41 <i>US1 survey structure</i>	54
1603	A42 <i>US2 survey structure</i>	54
1604	A43 Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme.	78