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− 342 removals	363 lines	+ 463 additions	473 lines

1	\title{International Attitudes Toward Global Policies %	1 \title{International Majorities Genuinely Support Global Redistributive and Climate Policies
2	}	2 }
3		3
4	\begin{abstract}	4 \begin{abstract}
5	%	5 %
6		6
7	We document majority support for policies entailing global redistribution and climate mitigation. Surveys on 40,680 respondents in 20 countries show strong stated support for an effective way to jointly combat climate change and poverty: a global carbon price funding a global basic income, called the ``Global Climate Scheme'' (GCS). Using complementary surveys on 8,000 respondents in the U.S., France, Germany, Spain, and the UK, we test several hypotheses that could reconcile strong stated support with a lack of salience in policy circles.	7 We document majority support for policies entailing global redistribution and climate mitigation. Surveys on 40,680 respondents in 20 countries show strong stated support for a global carbon price funding equal cash transfers, called the ``Global Climate Scheme'' (GCS). Through our main surveys on 8,000 respondents in the U.S., France, Germany, Spain, and the UK, we test several hypotheses that could reconcile strong stated support with scarce occurrences in public debates.
8	The GCS is supported by three quarters of Europeans and half of Americans, even as they understand the policy's cost to them. Using different experiments, we show that the support for the GCS is sincere and that electoral candidates could win votes by endorsing it. More generally, we document widespread support for other globally redistributive policies, such as a we	8 Three quarters of Europeans and half of Americans support the GCS, even as they understand the policy's cost to them. Using different experiments, we show that the support for the GCS is sincere and that electoral candidates could win votes by endorsing it. More generally, we document widespread support for other globally redistributive policies, such as increased fo

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alth tax funding low-income countries or increased foreign aid. In sum, we provide evidence that global policies are genuinely supported by majoritie s, even in wealthy nations that would bear the burden.
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reign aid or a wealth tax funding low -income countries. In sum, global pol icies are genuinely supported by majo rities, even in wealthy, contributing countries.
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\end{abstract}

\textbf{JEL codes:} P48, Q58, H23, Q5 4 %

\textbf{Keywords:} Climate change, gl obal policies, cap-and-trade, attitud es, survey.%

\tableofcontents

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\section{Introduction}%

Major sustainability objectives could be achieved by global approaches to m itigating climate change and poverty involving transfers from high- to low er-income countries \citep{budolfson_ climate_2021,franks_mobilizing_2018,d ennig_inequality_2015,soergel_combini ng_2021,bauer_quantification_2020,cra mton_global_2017}. For instance, a gl obal wealth tax could finance the Sus tainable Development Goals \citep{pik etty_brief_2022}. More specifically, if merely 35\% of the revenue were al located for this purpose, a global 2\ % tax on individual wealth in excess of \$5 million could significantly re duce poverty as it would mechanically increase low-income countries' nation al income by 50\% (as computed on the \href{https://wid.world/world-wealth- tax-simulator/}{WID wealth tax simula tor}). Besides, global carbon pricing is widely regarded by economists as t he benchmark climate policy, as it wo uld efficiently correct the carbon em issions externality. In an early anal ysis of global climate policy, \citet
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\end{abstract}

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\begin{bibunit}

\section{Introduction}%
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{grubb_greenhouse_1990} states: ``by far the best combination of long term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity, is obtained from a system based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions which are allocated on an adult per capita basis'', i.e., equally among human adults. Support for such solution, which we call the ``Global Climate Scheme'', has been renewed ever since \citep{hoel_carbon_1991,agarwal_global_1991,bertram_tradeable_1992,baer_equity_2000,jamieson_climate_2001,blanchard_major_2021,rajan_global_2021}.

While international negotiations have not yet led to ambitious globally redistributive policies, recent developments suggest that such a change might be underway. The International Maritime Organization is poised to adopt a global carbon levy on maritime fuel; the \citet{african_union_african_2023} calls for a global carbon taxation regime; the \citet{un_promotion_2023} is setting up a Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation; Brazil uses its presidency of the G20 in 2024 to propose a global wealth tax, %
\href{https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2023/03/14/taxation-mondiale-sur-les-ultrariches-ce-que-nous-avons-reussi-pour-les-multinationales-nous-devons-le-faire-pour-les-grandes-fortunes_6165354_3232.html}{backed} by 130 Members of the European Parliament; etc.

A key condition for implementing global policies has remained largely unaddressed: the support of citizens. Using a Global survey on 40,680 respondents from 20 high- and middle-income countries, we reveal substantial support for those policies, especially global climate policies and a global tax on the wealthiest aimed at financing low-income countries (other questions from these surveys are analyzed in a companion paper, \citealp{dechezlepre

tre_fighting_2022}). Interestingly, even in wealthy nations that would bear a significant burden, majorities of citizens express support for such globally redistributive policies. To better understand public support for global policies in high-income countries, we conduct Complementary surveys among 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, the U.S., and the UK.

By studying in depth the support for global policies, we are making an ambitious shift in the methodological approach of attitudinal surveys. In general, academic surveys focus on studying effect sizes of some treatment on political attitudes, or the socio-demographic factors that correlate with attitudes (e.g., \citealp{kuziemko_how_2015,douenne_yellow_2022}). The magnitude of support for a given proposal is often regarded as problematic to estimate satisfactorily. %

The measure of support is usually left to non-academic pollsters, who rarely apply all the academic best practices: transparency, representative sampling, neutral and precise wording of questions, comparison with existing literature, use of multiple questions and complementary methods to correctly interpret the results. Although it is challenging to estimate the extent of support, this question seems too important not to be addressed using scientific methods. Absent large scale measurements of public opinion like referenda, surveys remain the best method to assess support or opposition to given policies. In this paper, after a worldwide assessment in the Global survey, we use Complementary surveys to carefully measure the support for global policies in Western countries. We inquire the support for various policies, approach the question from diverse angles, and run a battery of pre-registered tests to check whether stated support estimates are reliable.

Major sustainability objectives could be achieved by global approaches to mitigating climate change and poverty involving transfers from high- to lower-income countries.\citep{budolfson_climate_2021,franks_mobilizing_2018,dennig_inequality_2015,soergel_combining_2021,bauer_quantification_2020,cramton_global_2017}

Especially, global carbon pricing is widely regarded by economists as the benchmark climate policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon emissions externality. A version of global carbon pricing as a system based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions is prominently discussed in environmental economics.\citep{grubb_greenhouse_1990,hoel_carbon_1991,agarwal_global_1991,bertram_tradeable_1992,baer_equity_2000,jamieson_climate_2001,blanchard_major_2021} It would work as follows: It implements a cap on carbon emissions to limit global warming below 2\textdegree{}C. The emission rights are auctioned each year to polluting firms and fund a global basic income, alleviating extreme poverty. The emission rights would be allocated

29

30 The focus of the Complementary surveys is a specific policy aimed at addressing both climate change and poverty, referred to as the ``Global Climate Scheme'' (GCS). It implements a cap on carbon emissions to limit global warming below 2\textdegree{}C. The emission rights are auctioned each year to polluting firms and fund a global basic income, alleviating extreme poverty.

31 This archetypal policy exposes respondents to the key trade-off between the benefits and costs of globally redistributive climate policies, as respondents are made aware of the cost tha

22 equally among human adults, yielding redistribution from richer to poorer countries. It would combine long-term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity.\citep{grubb_greenhouse_1990} We call this established approach to global carbon pricing the ``Global Climate Scheme'' (GCS).

23 While international negotiations have not yet led to ambitious globally redistributive policies, %

24 some recent prominent attempts are that the %

25 African Union \href{https://media.africaclimatesummit.org/NAIROBI+Declaration+FURTHER+edited+060923+EN+920AM.pdf}{calls for} a global carbon taxation regime, %

26 the UN \href{https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4032838}{is setting up} a Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation and %

27 Brazil is proposing

28 a global wealth tax at the G20. %

29

30 A key factor for implementing global policies has remained largely unaddressed: the support of citizens. Using a global survey on 40,680 respondents from 20 high- and middle-income countries, we reveal substantial support for global climate policies and, in addition, a global tax on the wealthiest aimed at financing low-income countries. Surprisingly, even in wealthy nations that would bear a significant burden, majorities of citizens express support for such globally redistributive policies. To better understand public support for global policies in high-income countries, the main analysis of this article is conducted with surveys among 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, the UK, and the U.S.

31 The focus of the main surveys is to study how respondents react to the key trade-off between the benefits and costs of globally redistributive climate policies. In our survey respondents are made aware of the cost that the G

t the GCS entails for their country's people.

CS entails for their country's peopl e, that is average Westerners would i ncur a net loss. Our main result is t hat the GCS is supported by three qua rters of Europeans and more than half of Americans.

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32

33 After checking that respondents have understood the policy and its cost, w e measure the support in a direct \te xtit{Yes}/\textit{No} question. The G CS is supported by three quarters of Europeans and more than half of Ameri cans. Then, we test for social desira bility bias using a list experiment. We find no evidence that people exagg erate their support in the direct que stion. To assess whether the support would diminish in a context with real stakes, we ask respondents whether th ey are willing to sign a petition in favor of the GCS, after informing the m that the question results will be c ommunicated to their head of state's office. The support is sustained in a n environment that approaches real st akes. We then carry out conjoint anal yses to neutralize experimenter deman d and investigate the priority given to global policies compared to other types of policies. Conjoint analyses reveal that a political platform is m ore likely to be preferred if it cont ains the GCS or a global tax on milli onaires, and that global policies ran k high in the prioritization of polic ies. Our randomized experiments also show that a candidate would not lose vote intentions by endorsing the GCS, and might even gain up to 11 points i n a country like France. An analysis of open-ended fields confirms that su pport for the GCS is real, and indica tes that appeal of the GCS comes from its international nature and its impa cts on climate, more than on global p overty. %

33 Furthermore, we test the robustness o f this conclusion by a wide variety o f methods. First, we control for soci al desirability bias using a list exp eriment. We find no evidence that peo ple exaggerate their support in the d irect question. Second, to assess whe ther the support would diminish in a context with real stakes, we ask resp ondents whether they are willing to s ign a petition in favor of the GCS, a fter informing them that the question results will be communicated to their head of state's office. The support i s sustained in an environment that ap proaches real stakes. Third, we carry out conjoint analyses to neutralize e xperimenter demand and investigate th e priority given to global policies c ompared to other types of policies. C onjoint analyses reveal that a politi cal platform is more likely to be pre ferred if it contains the GCS or a gl obal tax on millionaires, and that gl obal policies rank high in the priori tization of policies. Our randomized experiments also show that a candidat e would not lose vote intentions by e ndorsing the GCS, and might even gain up to 11 points in France. Fourth, an analysis of open-ended fields indicat es that the appeal of the GCS comes f rom its international nature and its impacts on climate, more than on glob al poverty. %

34 We also test other global policies an d universalistic attitudes. Support i s very strong for a global tax on mil lionaires, and the median respondent

34 To put our main finding in context, w e also test other global policies and universalistic attitudes. Support is very strong for a global tax on milli

prefers to allocate 30\% of the revenues of such a tax to low-income countries. Majorities are willing to increase foreign aid, but only if some conditions are respected, such as making sure the aid is well spent and other high-income countries also increase their contribution. Questions on universalistic values, including a donation experiment, confirm the congruence of underlying values with the support for specific policies. Our diverse approaches also help understand what drives the support. For instance, the evidence indicates that one key reason why increasing foreign aid is not as popular as global policies lies in its unilateral nature. We reckon that survey evidence is no panacea, as attitudes can be ambivalent and context-dependent. Nevertheless, we arguably employ the best available methods to address potential concerns, including an experiment assessing how support might be affected by a negative media campaign.

onaires, and the median respondent prefers to allocate 30\% of the revenues of such a tax to low-income countries. Majorities are willing to increase foreign aid, but only if some conditions are respected, such as making sure the aid is well spent and other high-income countries also increase their contribution. Questions on universalistic values, including a donation experiment, confirm the congruence of underlying values with the support for specific policies. Our diverse approaches also help understand what drives the support. For instance, the evidence indicates that one key reason why increasing foreign aid is not as popular as global policies lies in its unilateral nature.

Overall, our results %

point out to strong and genuine support for global climate and redistributive policies, as our experiments confirm the stated support found in direct questions. This suggests that carefully administered surveys can be used to measure the level of support for a given policy. Our results contribute to the literature on attitudes toward climate policy, confirming that climate policy is preferred at a global level \citep{issp_international_2010,beiser-mcgrath_could_2019,sivonen_attitudes_2022,meilland_international_2023}, where it is more effective and fair. Indeed, the Global Climate Scheme is largely supported, but a similar policy at the national level is opposed by a majority in many countries \citep{dechezlepretre_fighting_2022}, despite lower costs. Noting that only 13\% of French people declared supporting a national carbon tax with cash t

ransfers during the Yellow Vests movement \citep{douenne_yellow_2022}, surveys appear to accurately reflect the level of support. Therefore, unless support for global policies disappear once they enter the public debate, it seems unlikely that a policy such as the GCS would face major protests.	
38 In our discussion we offer potential explanations behind the lack of prominence of global policies in the public debate despite this strong support.	38 They contribute to a body of literature on attitudes toward climate policy, which confirms that climate policy is preferred at a global level,\citep{issp_international_2010,beiser-mcgrath_could_2019,sivonen_attitudes_2022,meilland_international_2023} where it is more effective and fair.
39 Finally, while our findings underscore majority support for global policies, converging results from independent surveys are needed to ascertain such novel evidence. %	39 While 3,354 economists supported a national carbon tax financing equal cash transfers in the \href{https://www.clcouncil.org/media/EconomistsStatement.pdf}{Wall Street Journal}, numerous surveys have shown that public support for such policy is mixed.\citep{douenne_yellow_2022,dechezlepretre_fighting_nodate,carattini_overcoming_2018,maestre-andres_perceived_2019,mildenberger_limited_2022,sommer_supporting_2022} Meanwhile, the GCS --- the global version of this policy --- is largely supported, despite higher costs in high-income countries.
	40 In the Discussion we offer potential explanations that could reconcile the strong support for global policies with their lack of prominence in the public debate. %
40 \paragraph{Literature}	41 \paragraph{Literature}
41	42
42 International surveys have shown widespread support for costly climate action \citep{dechezlepretre_fighting_2022,leiserowitz_international_2022}. For instance, using representative samples in 125 countries covering 96\% of the world's greenhouse gas emissions, \citet{andre_globally_2024} show that 69\% of the global population express willingness to contribute 1\% of their income to fight global warming. International surveys have also uncover near consensus that ``present econ	43 International surveys have shown widespread support for costly climate action.\citep{dechezlepretre_fighting_nodate,leiserowitz_international_2022} For instance, representative surveys in 125 countries covering 96\% of the world's greenhouse gas emissions show that 69\% of the global population express willingness to contribute 1\% of their income to fight global warming.\citet{andre_globally_2024} International surveys have also uncovered near consensus that ``present economic d

omic differences between rich and poo r countries are too large'' (overall, 78\% agree and 5\% disagree) in each of 29 countries \citep{issp_internati onal_2019}.

ifferences between rich and poor coun tries are too large'' (overall, 78\% agree and 5\% disagree) in each of 29 countries.\citep{issp_international_2 019}

Yet, few prior attitudinal surveys ha ve examined global redistributive pol icies.

Yet, few prior attitudinal surveys ha ve examined global redistributive pol icies.

A notable exception is \citet{caratti ni_how_2019}, who test the support fo r six variants of a global carbon tax on samples in five countries, represe ntative along gender and age. For a g iven variant, the sample size is abou t 167 respondents per country. They f ind over 80\% support for any variant in India, between 50\% and 65\% in Au stralia, the UK and South Africa, and 43\% to 59\% in the U.S., depending o n the variant. Notably, the support f or a global carbon tax funding an equ al cash transfer for each human is cl ose to 50\% in high-income countries (e.g., at 44\% in the U.S.). These fi gures are consistent with our results from the \textit{Global} survey (see Figure \ref{fig:oecd}), where the sup port is lower for a tax that would `` only'' reduce CO$_\text{2}$ emissions than for a quota that would unambiguo usly achieve the climate target.

A notable exception tests the support for six variants of a global carbon t ax on samples in five countries, repr esentative along gender and age.\cite {carattini_how_2019} For a given vari ant, the sample size is about 167 res pondents per country. They find over 80\% support for any variant in Indi a, between 50\% and 65\% in Australi a, the UK and South Africa, and 43\% to 59\% in the U.S., depending on the variant. Notably, the support for a g lobal carbon tax funding an equal cas h transfer for each human is close to 50\% in high-income countries. %

Relatedly, \cite{leiserowitz_public_2 021} reveal that 66\% of Americans su pport providing ``financial aid and t echnical support to developing countr ies that agree to limit their greenho use gas emissions''; and \citet{fehr_ your_2022} find that 90\% of Germans want some degree of global redistribu tion.

Besides, in surveys conducted in Braz il, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U. S., \citet{ghassim_who_2020} finds su pport ranging from 55\% to 74\% for ` `a global democracy including both a global government and a global parlia ment, directly elected by the world p opulation, to recommend and implement policies on global issues''. %

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48 Through an experiment, he also finds that, in countries where the governme
   nt stems from a coalition, voting sha
   res would shift by 8 (Brazil) to 12
   p.p. (Germany) from parties who are s
   aid to oppose global democracy to par
   ties that supposedly support it. For
   instance, when Germans respondents we
   re told that (only) the Greens and th
   e Left support global democracy, thes
   e parties gained respectively 9 and 3
   p.p. in vote intentions, while the SP
   D and the CDU-CSU each lost 6 p.p.
49
50 Appendix \ref{sec:literature} contain
   s a broader literature review includi
   ng further attitudinal surveys on glo
   bal policies (\ref{subsubsec:literatu
   re_attitudes_policies}); prior work o
   n attitudes toward climate burden sha
   ring (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literat
   ure_attitudes_burden_sharing}), attit
   udes toward foreign aid (Appendix \re
   f{subsubsec:literature_foreign_aid});
   global carbon pricing (Appendix \ref
   {subsubsec:literature_pricing}), glob
   al redistribution (Appendix \ref{subs
   ubsec:literature_redistribution}), ba
   sic income (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:l
   iterature_basic_income}), and global
   democracy (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:li
   terature_democracy}).
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47
48 Further evidence of the popularity of
   global redistribution is provided by
   the finding that 66\% of Americans su
   pport providing ``financial aid and t
   echnical support to developing countr
   ies that agree to limit their greenho
   use gas emissions'';\cite{leiserowitz
   _public_2021} and 90\% of Germans wan
   t some degree of global redistributio
   n.\cite{fehr_your_2022}
49 Besides, in surveys conducted in Braz
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   ement policies on global issues'', an
   d similar support is found in surveys
   over 17 countries.\cite{ghassim_who_2
   020,ghassim_who_2024} %
50
51 Appendix \ref{sec:literature} contain
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   ng further attitudinal surveys on glo
   bal policies (\ref{subsubsec:literatu
   re_attitudes_policies}); prior work o
   n attitudes toward climate burden sha
   ring (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literat
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51
52 \section{Results}
53 The presentation of results proceeds as follows: after briefly describing the survey data (\ref{subsec:data}), we first document broad international support for global approaches to climate policy that lead to global redistribution (\ref{subsubsec:global_support}). Subsequently, we present specific findings from surveys in the U.S. and Europe that document support for the GCS, wealth taxes, and foreign aid in those countries (\ref{subsubsec:support_gcs}-\ref{subsubsec:support_foreign_aid}). We proceed to study the support for the Global Climate Scheme in more detail, by means of a list experiment, petition, conjoint analyses, prioritization task, and by eliciting pros and cons (\ref{subsec:robustness_sincerity}). To understand the gap between support for global policies and their appearance in public discussion, we conclude by reporting results on underlying universalistic values (\ref{subsec:universalistic}) and beliefs about the support of others (\ref{subsec:second_order_beliefs}).
54
55 \subsection{Data}\label{subsec:data}
56
57 The study relies on two sets of surveys: the \textit{Global} survey and the \textit{Complementary} surveys (see Table \ref{tab:survey_summary}).
58 \renewcommand{\thetable}{S\arabic{table}}
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ure_attitudes_burden_sharing}), attitudes toward foreign aid (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_foreign_aid}), global carbon pricing (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_pricing}), global redistribution (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_redistribution}), basic income (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_basic_income}), and global democracy (Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_democracy}).
52
53 \section{Results}
54
55 \subsection{Data}\label{subsec:data}
56
57 We use unanalysed questions from a global survey conducted in 2021 that involved 40,680 respondents from 20 countries, representing approximately 72 \% of global CO$_\text{2}$ emissions.
58 This survey (henceforth: global survey) serves as the basis for measuring
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	Original		Changed
			stated support for various global policies worldwide.
59	\begin{table}[h]	59	Detailed information about the data collection process, sample representativeness, and analysis of questions on national policies can be found in the companion paper.\cite{dechezlepretre_fighting_nodate}
60	\caption[Surveys summary]{[For Supplementary Material] Summary of the surveys used in the analysis.}	60	To delve deeper into the sincerity and rationales behind support for the GCS and attitudes towards global policies, global redistribution, and universalistic values, we conducted further surveys in 2023 (henceforth: main surveys). These surveys are based on a sample of 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, the UK, and the U.S. The European survey (\textit{Eu}) comprises 3,000 respondents, while the U.S. sample was collected in two separate waves: \textit{US1} with 3,000 respondents and \textit{US2} with 2,000 respondents. The survey questions in both the European and U.S. surveys are identical (see Figure \ref{fig:flow_simple}), except for an additional question in \textit{US2} that uses results from \textit{US1} to assess the bandwagon effect.
61	%	61	\begin{figure}[h!]
62	\label{tab:survey_summary}	62	\caption[Main surveys' structure]{Structure of main survey, cf. also Figure \ref{fig:flow_combined} for the treatment branches.}\label{fig:flow_simple}
63	\centering	63	\makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegraphics[width=.58\textwidth]{../questionnaire/survey_flow-simple.pdf}}
64	\begin{tabular}	64	\end{figure}
65	{@{\extracolsep{5pt}}lcccc}	65	The main surveys ensured representativeness along key dimensions: gender, income, age, highest diploma, and degree of urbanization. The \textit{Eu} survey is also representative of its four countries in terms of population size, while the \textit{US1} and \textit{US2} surveys are representative in terms of region and ethnicity.
66	\\[-1.8ex]\hline	66	Tables \ref{tab:representativeness_waves}-\ref{tab:representativeness_EU} detail how our samples match population frequencies.

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  \hline \\[-1.8ex]
  & \textit{Global survey} & \multicolumn{3}{c}{\textit{Complementary surveys}} \\
  \\[-1.8ex] Survey & \textit{Global} & \textit{Eu} & \textit{US1} & \textit{US2} \\
  \hline \\[-1.8ex]
  Country coverage & 20 countries & FR, DE, ES, UK & U.S. & U.S. \\
  Sample size & 40,680 & 3,000 & 3,000 & 2,000 \\
  Main purpose & \makecell{Stated support \\for global policies} & \multicolumn{3}{c}{\makecell{Focus on GCS (sincerity, rationales, etc.) \\+ Support for global redistribution \\+ Universalistic values}} \\
  %
  %
  \hline
  \hline \\[-1.8ex]
\end{tabular}
\end{table}
\setcounter{table}{0}
\renewcommand{\thetable}{\arabic{table}}

\paragraph{Global Survey}

The \textit{Global} survey, conducted in 2021, involved 40,680 respondents from 20 countries, representing approximately 72\% of global CO$_\text{2}$ emissions. This survey serves as the basis for measuring stated support for various global policies worldwide. Detailed information about the data collection process, sample representativeness, and analysis of questions on national policies can be found in \cite{dechezlepretre_fighting_2022}.

\paragraph{Complementary Surveys}\label{par:surveys}

More detail on data collection is given in Section \nameref{sec:methods}. The questionnaires used in the surveys are provided in Appendices \ref{app:questionnaire_oecd} and \ref{app:questionnaire}.
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89 To delve deeper into the sincerity an
   d rationales behind support for the G
   CS and attitudes towards global polic
   ies, global redistribution, and unive
   rsalistic values, complementary surve
   ys were conducted in 2023. These surv
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   extit{US1} with 3,000 respondents and
   \textit{US2} with 2,000 respondents.
   The survey questions in both the Euro
   pean and U.S. surveys are identical,
   except for an additional question in
   \textit{US2} that uses results from
   \textit{US1} to assess the bandwagon
   effect.
90
91 The complementary surveys ensured rep
   resentativeness along key dimensions:
   gender, income, age, highest diploma,
   and degree of urbanization. The \text
   it{Eu} survey is also representative
   of its four countries in terms of pop
   ulation size, while the \textit{US1}
   and \textit{US2} surveys are represen
   tative in terms of region and ethnici
   ty. Tables \ref{tab:representativenes
   s_waves}-\ref{tab:representativeness_
   EU} confirm that our samples closely
   match population frequencies. More de
   tail on data collection is given in S
   ection \nameref{sec:methods}. The que
   stionnaires used in the surveys are p
   rovided in Appendices \ref{app:questi
   onnaire_oecd} and \ref{app:questionna
   ire}.
92
93 \subsection{Stated support for global
   policies}\label{subsec:stated_suppor
   t}
94 \subsubsection{Global support}\label
   {subsubsec:global_support}
95
96 The Global survey shows strong suppor
   t for climate policies enacted at the
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68
69 \subsection{Global support}\label{sub
   subsec:global_support}
70
71 We find strong support for climate po
   licies enacted at the global level wh
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global level (Figure \ref{fig:oecd}). %
When asked ``At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle clima te change need to be put in place?'', 70\% (in the U.S.) to 94\% (in Japan) choose the global level. The next mos t popular choice is the federal or co ntinental level, favored by 52\% of A mericans and less than half of Europe an respondents. Local policies receiv e the least support. This preference for climate policies implemented at t he global scale is in line with \cite t{beiser-mcgrath_could_2019} and cons istent with individuals' concerns for the fairness and effectiveness of suc h policies, which have been identifie d as two of the three key determinant s of support, besides self-interest \citep{klenert_making_2018,douenne_ye llow_2022,dechezlepretre_fighting_202 2}.
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```
en analysing the global survey (Figur e \ref{fig:oecd}). %
When asked ``At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle clima te change need to be put in place?'', 70\% (in the U.S.) to 94\% (in Japan) choose the global level. The next mos t popular choice is the federal or co ntinental level, favored by 52\% of A mericans and less than half of Europe an respondents. Local policies receiv e the least support. This preference for climate policies implemented at t he global scale is in line with earli er contributions \cite{beiser-mcgrath _could_2019,bechtel_mass_2013,sivonen _attitudes_2022} %
and consistent with individuals' conc erns for the fairness and effectivene ss of such policies, which have been identified as two of the three key de terminants of support, besides self-i nterest.\citep{klenert_making_2018,do uenne_yellow_2022,dechezlepretre_figh ting_nodate} It could also stem from conditional cooperation,\citep{barret t_self-enforcing_1994} even if previo us studies suggest that the support f or climate policies does not depend o n climate action abroad \citep{aklin_ prisoners_2020,tingley_conditional_20 14}. %
```

```
\begin{figure}[h!]
  %
  \caption[Relative support for globa l climate policies]{Relative support for global climate policies.}
  \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegra phics[width=1.2\textwidth]
  {../figures/OECD/Heatplot_global_ta x_attitudes_share.pdf}}\label{fig:oec d} %
  {\footnotesize \\ $\quad$ \\ Note 1: The numbers represent the share of
```

```
\begin{figure}[h!]
  %
  \caption[Relative support for globa l climate policies]{Support for globa l climate policies.}
  \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegra phics[width=1.2\textwidth]
  {../figures/OECD/Heatplot_global_ta x_attitudes_share.pdf}}\label{fig:oec d} %
  {\footnotesize \\ $\quad$ \\ Note 1: The numbers represent \textit{rela
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```
\textit{Somewhat} or \textit{Strongly support} among non-\textit{indifferent} answers (in percent, $n$ = 40,680). The color blue denotes a relative majority. See Figure \ref{fig:oecd_absolute} for the absolute support. (Questions \ref{q:scale}-\ref{q:millionaire_tax}%
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tive} support, i.e. the share of \textit{Somewhat} or \textit{Strongly support} among non-\textit{indifferent} answers (in percent, $n$ = 40,680). The color blue denotes a relative majority. See Figure \ref{fig:oecd_absolute} for the absolute support. (Questions \ref{q:scale}-\ref{q:millionaire_tax}%
```

```
). \\ Note 2: *In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question \ref{q:burden_sharing_asterisk}.
}
\end{figure}

Among the four global climate policies examined in the \textit{Global} survey, three policies garner high support across all countries (Figure \ref{fig:oecd}). These policies include a global democratic assembly on climate change, a global tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries contingent on their climate action, and a global carbon budget of +2\textdegree{}C divided among countries based on tradable shares (or ``global quota''), with the allocation of country shares unspecified.\footnote{The policies were all described with further details to make sure people understood them. Specifically, the policies were presented as follows: an international emissions trading system where ``countries that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less than their share''; ``a tax on all millionaires in dollars around the world to finance low-income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate action [which] would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education''; ``a global democratic assembly whose role would be to draft international treaties against climate change [where] each adult across the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly''.} The
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). \\ Note 2: *In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question \ref{q:burden_sharing_asterisk}.
}
\end{figure}

Among the four global climate policies examined, three policies garner high support across all countries (Figure \ref{fig:oecd}). These policies include a global democratic assembly on climate change, a global tax on millionaires to finance low-income countries contingent on their climate action, and a global carbon budget of +2\textdegree{}C divided among countries based on tradable shares (or ``global quota''), with the allocation of country shares unspecified (see wording in Appendix \ref{app:questionnaire_oecd}).
```

three policies garner a majority of absolute support (i.e., ``somewhat'' or ``strong'' support) in all countries (except in the U.S. for the global assembly, 48\% absolute support). In high-income countries, the global quota policy obtains 64\% absolute support and 84\% relative support (i.e., excluding ``indifferent'' answers). %

84 The three policies garner a majority of absolute support (i.e., ``somewhat'' or ``strong'' support) in all countries (except in the U.S. for the global assembly, 48\% absolute support). In high-income countries, the global quota policy obtains 64\% absolute support and 84\% relative support (i.e., excluding ``indifferent'' answers). %

108

109 Following the support for the global quota, respondents are asked about their preferences for dividing the carbon budget among countries, as depicted in the third block of Figure \ref{fig:oecd}. Consistent with the existing literature (see Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_attitudes_burden_sharing}), an equal per capita allocation of emission rights emerges as the preferred burden-sharing principle, garnering absolute majority support in all countries and never below 84\% relative support. Taking into account historical responsibilities or vulnerability to climate damages is also popular, albeit with less consensus, while grandfathering (i.e., allocation of emission shares in proportion to current emissions) receives the least support in all countries.

85

86 Following the support for the global quota, respondents are asked about their preferences for dividing the carbon budget among countries, as depicted in the third block of Figure \ref{fig:oecd}. Consistent with the existing literature (see Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_attitudes_burden_sharing}), an equal per capita allocation of emission rights emerges as the preferred burden-sharing principle, garnering absolute majority support in all countries and never below 84\% relative support. Taking into account historical responsibilities or vulnerability to climate damages is also popular, albeit with less consensus, while grandfathering (i.e., allocation of emission shares in proportion to current emissions) receives the least support in all countries.

110

111 A global quota with equal per capita emission rights should produce the same distributional outcomes as a global carbon tax that funds a global basic income.\footnote{Similarly, a global quota with grandfathering is equivalent to a global carbon tax where each country keeps the revenues it collects.} The support for the global car

87

88 A global carbon tax that funds a global basic income should produce the same distributional outcomes as a global tradable quota with equal per capita emission rights (to the extent that the carbon price is the same and provided that each country returns the revenues from emissions trading equally to its citizens). %

bon tax is also tested and its redist ributive effects -- the average incr ease in expenditures along with the a mount of the basic income -- are spec ified to the respondents explicitly (see box below and Appendix \ref{app: questionnaire}, p. \pageref{subsec:qu estionnaire_GCS}). %	
112 The support for the carbon tax is low er than for the quota, particularly i n high-income countries, and there is no relative majority for the tax in A nglo-Saxon countries.\footnote{The le vels of support are consistent with t he findings of \citet{carattini_how_2 019}, the only previous study that te sted a global carbon tax.} Two possib le reasons for this lower support are that distributive effects are made sa lient in the case of the tax, and tha t people may prefer a quota, perhaps because they find it more effective t han a tax to reduce emissions. This i nterpretation is consistent with the level of support for the global quota once we make the distributive effects salient, as we do in the complementar y surveys.	89 The support for the global carbon tax is also tested and its redistributive effects -- the average increase in e xpenditures along with the amount of the basic income -- are specified to the respondents explicitly (see box below and Appendix \ref{app:questionn aire}, p.\pageref{subsec:questionnair e_GCS}). %
113 \subsubsection{Global Climate Scheme} \label{subsubsec:support_gcs}	90 The support for the carbon tax is low er than for the quota, particularly i n high-income countries, and there is no relative majority for the tax in A nglo-Saxon countries (consistently wi th the levels of support found in the only previous study that tested a glo bal carbon tax\cite{carattini_how_201 9}). %
	91 Two possible reasons for this lower s upport are that distributive effects are specified explicitly in the case of the tax, and that people may prefe r a quota, perhaps because they find it more effective than a tax to reduc e emissions. The two reasons are cons istent with the intermediate level of support for the GCS in the main surve y, which is based on a global quota b ut where the question specifies expli citly the distributive effects. %
114	92

115 The complementary surveys (\textit{US 1}, \textit{US2}, \textit{Eu}) consis t of a comprehensive exploration of c itizens' attitudes towards the GCS. W e present to respondents a detailed d escription of the GCS and explain its distributive effects, including speci fic amounts at stake (as specified in the box below). Furthermore, we asses s respondents' understanding of the G CS with incentivized questions to tes t their comprehension of the expected financial outcome for typical individ uals in high-income countries (loss) and the poorest individuals globally (gain), followed by the provision of correct answers (Figures \ref{fig:und erstood_each}-\ref{fig:understood_sco re}). %	93 \subsection{Stated support for the Gl obal Climate Scheme}\label{subsec:gcs _stated_support}
116 The same approach is applied to a Nat ional Redistribution scheme (NR) targ eting the top 5\% (in the U.S.) or to p 1\% (in Europe) with the aim of fin ancing cash transfers to all adult s,\footnote{The wider base in the U. S. was chosen because emissions are l arger in the U.S. than in Europe, and it would hardly be feasible to offset the median American's loss by taxing only the top 1\%.} calibrated to offs et the monetary loss of the GCS for t he median emitter in their country. W e evaluate respondents' understanding that the richest would lose and the t ypical fellow citizens would gain fro m that policy. %	94
	95 The main surveys (\textit{US1}, \text it{US2}, \textit{Eu}) include a compr ehensive exploration of citizens' att itudes towards the GCS. We present to respondents a detailed description of the GCS and explain its distributive effects, including specific amounts a t stake (as specified in the box belo w). Furthermore, we assess respondent s' understanding of the GCS with ince ntivized questions to test their comp rehension of the expected financial o utcome for typical individuals in hig h-income countries (loss) and the poo rest individuals globally (gain), fol lowed by the provision of correct ans

117 Subsequently, we summarize both schemes to enhance respondents' recall. Additionally, we present a final incentivized comprehension question and provide the expected answer that the combined GCS and NR would result in no net gain or loss for a typical fellow citizen. Finally, respondents are directly asked to express their support for the GCS and NR using a simple \textit{Yes}/\textit{No} question.

118 The stated support for the GCS is 54\% in the U.S. and 76\% in Europe,\footnote{The 95\% confidence intervals are $[52.4\%, 55.9\%]$ in the U.S. and $[74.2\%, 77.2\%]$ in Europe. The average support is computed with survey weights, employing weights based on quota variables, which exclude vote. Another method to reweigh the raw results involves running a regression of the support for the GCS on sociodemographic characteristics (including vote) and multiplying each coefficient by the population frequencies. This alternative approach yields similar figures: 76\% in Europe and 52\% or 53\% in the U.S. (depending on whether individuals who did not disclose their vote are classified as non-voters or excluded). Notably, the average support excluding non-voters is 54\% in the U.S.} while the support for NR is very similar: 56\% and 73\% respectively (see Figure \ref{fig:support_binary}). Appendix \ref{app:determinants}

wers (Figures \ref{fig:understood_each}-\ref{fig:understood_score}). %

96

97 For comparison, %

98 the same approach is applied to a National Redistribution scheme (NR) targeting top incomes %

99 with the aim of financing cash transfers to all adults, %

100 calibrated to offset the monetary loss of the GCS for the median emitter in their country. We evaluate respondents' understanding that the richest would lose and the typical fellow citizens would gain from that policy. %

101 Subsequently, we summarize both schemes to enhance respondents' recall. Additionally, we present a final incentivized comprehension question and provide the expected answer that the combined GCS and NR would result in no net gain or loss for a typical fellow citizen. Finally, respondents are directly asked to express their support for the GCS and NR using a simple \textit{Yes}/\textit{No} question.

102

examines the sociodemographic determinants of support for the GCS as well as the beliefs correlated with the support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income. The strongest correlates are political leaning, trust in the government and perceptions that the policy is effective at reducing emissions or in one's self-interest. %

Our main result is that stated support for the GCS is 54\% in the U.S. and 76\% in Europe, while the support for NR is very similar: 56\% and 73\% respectively (Figures \ref{fig:support}, \ref{fig:support_binary}).

Appendix \ref{app:determinants} examines the sociodemographic determinants of support for the GCS as well as the beliefs correlated with the support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income. The strongest correlates are political leaning, trust in the government and perceptions that climate policies are effective at reducing emissions or in one's self-interest.

Finding majority support for the GCS runs counter to the conventional skepticism about the feasibility of global solidarity to addressing climate change. %

This motivates the subsequent analysis of robustness and sincerity, novel to attitudinal surveys on instrument choice for environmental policy. %

\begin{tcolorbox}\label{box:GCS}

\paragraph{The Global Climate Scheme} The GCS consists of global emissions trading with emission rights being auctioned each year to polluting firms, and of a global basic income, funded by the auction revenues. Using the price and emissions trajectories from the report by \cite{stern_report_2017}, and in particular a carbon price of \$90/tCO$_\text{2}$ in 2030, we estimate that the basic income would amount to \$30 per month for every huma

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n over the age of 15 (see details in Appendix \ref{app:gain_gcs}). %
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ncome would amount to \$30 per month for every human adult %
 (see details in Appendix \ref{app:gain_gcs}). %
```

```
  We describe the GCS to the respondents as a ``climate club'' and we specify its redistributive effects: The 700 million people with less than \$2/day [in Purchasing Power Parity] would be lifted out of extreme poverty, and fossil fuel price increases would cost the typical person in their country a specified amount (see Appendix \ref{subsec:questionnaire_GCS} for details). The monthly median net cost is \$85 in the U.S., \euro{}10 in France, \euro{}25 in Germany, \euro{}5 in Spain, £20 in the UK.
\end{tcolorbox}
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```
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\end{tcolorbox}
```

```
\setcounter{figure}{0}
\renewcommand{\thefigure}{S\arabic{figure}}
\begin{figure}[h!]
    \caption[Support for the Global Climate Scheme]{[For Supplementary Material, except first row to be included in Figure \ref{fig:support}] Support for the GCS, NR and the combination of GCS, NR and C. \\(p. \pageref{subsec:questionnaire_GCS}, Questions \ref{q:gcs_support}, \ref{q:nr_support}, \ref{q:global_tax}, \ref{q:national_tax}, and \ref{q:crg_support}).%
```

Text moved to lines 394-396

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    }\label{fig:support_binary}
    \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegraphics[width=.9\textwidth]{../figures/country_comparison/support_binary_positive.pdf}}
\end{figure}
```

```

\subsection{Robustness and sincerity of support for the GCS}\label{subsec:robustness_sincerity}
We use several methods to assess the sincerity of the support for the GCS: a list experiment, a real-stake petition, conjoint analyses, and the prioritization of policies. All methods suggest that the support is either comp
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```

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letely sincere, or the share of insin
cere answers is limited.

\subsubsection{List experiment}\label
{subsubsec:list_exp} %

By asking \textit{how many} policies
within a list respondents support and
varying the list among respondents, a
list experiment allows identifying th
e tacit support for a policy of inter
est. The tacit support is estimated a
s the difference in the average numbe
r of policies supported between two g
roups, whose list differ only by the
inclusion of that policy \citep{hainm
ueller_causal_2014}. %
For example, say a first subsample fa
ces the list of policies A, B, and C,
while a second subsamples faces the l
ist A, B, C, and GCS. We do not need
to know which policies each responden
t support to estimate the average (ta
cit) support for the GCS, we simply n
eed to compute the difference in the
average number of supported policies
between the two random subsamples.

List experiments have been used to re
veal social desirability bias, silenc
ing either racism in the Southern U.
S. \citep{kuklinski_racial_1997} or o
pposition to the invasion of Ukraine
in Russia \citep{chapkovski_solid_202
2}. %
In our case, as shown in Table \ref{t
ab:list_exp}, the tacit support for t
he GCS measured through the list expe
riment is not significantly lower tha
n the direct stated support.\footnote
{We utilize the difference-in-means e
stimator, and confidence intervals ar
e computed using Monte Carlo simulati
on with the R package \textit{list}
\citep{imai_multivariate_2011}.} Henc
e, we do not find a social desirabili
ty bias in our study.


\subsubsection{Petition}\label{subsub
sec:petition} %
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letely sincere, or the share of insin
cere answers is limited.

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{subsubsec:list_exp} %

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cit) support for the GCS, we simply n
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average number of supported policies
between the two random subsamples.\ci
tep{imai_multivariate_2011}
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he GCS measured through the list expe
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n the direct stated support. %
Hence, we do not find a social desira
bility bias in our study.


\subsubsection{Petition}\label{subsub
sec:petition} %
```

144

145 We ask respondents whether they are willing to sign a petition in support of either the GCS or NR policy. We inform them that the petition results will be sent to the head of state's office, highlighting the proportion of fellow citizens endorsing the respective scheme. Even when framed as a real-stake petition, both policies continue to receive majority support. In the U.S., we find no significant difference between the support in the real-stake petitions and the simple questions (GCS: $p=.30$; NR: $p=.76$).\footnote{Paired weighted \textit{t}-tests are conducted to test the equality in support for a policy among respondents who were questioned about the policy in the petition.} In Europe, the petition leads to a comparable lower support for both the GCS (7 p.p., $p=10^{-5}$) and NR (4 p.p., $p = .008$). While some European respondents are unwilling to sign a petition for policies they are expected to support, this effect is not specific to the GCS, and the overall willingness to sign a real-stake petition remains strong, with 69\% expressing support for the GCS and 67\% for NR.

146

127

128 We ask respondents whether they are willing to sign a petition in support of either the GCS or NR policy. We inform them that the petition results will be sent to the head of state's office, highlighting the proportion of fellow citizens endorsing the respective scheme. Even when framed as a petition that might have real stakes, both policies continue to receive majority support. In the U.S., we find no significant difference between the support in the %

129 petitions and the simple questions (GCS: $-$.02, t(3,044)=1.0, p=.30, 95\% CI=[$-$.05, .02]; NR: $-$.01, t(2,952)=.3, p=.76, 95\% CI=[$-$.04, .03]).

130 In Europe, the petition leads to a comparable lower support for both the GCS ($-$7 p.p., t(3,018)=4.4, p=10^{-5}, 95\% CI=[$-$.10, $-$.04]) and NR ($-$4 p.p., t(2,953)=2.6, p=.008, 95\% CI=[$-$.08, $-$.01]).

131 While some European respondents are unwilling to sign a petition for policies they are expected to support, this phenomenon is not specific to the GCS, and the overall willingness to sign a %

132 petition remains strong, with 69\% expressing support for the GCS and 67\% for NR.

133

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147 \subsubsection{Conjoint analyses}\lab
    el{subsubsec:conjoint} %
148
149 In order to assess the public support
    for the GCS in conjunction with other
    policies, we conduct a series of conj
    oint analyses. We ask respondents to
    make five choices between pairs of po
    litical platforms.
150
151 The first conjoint analysis suggests
    that the GCS is supported independent
    ly of being complemented by the Natio
    nal Redistribution Scheme and a natio
    nal climate policy (``Coal exit'' in
    the U.S., ``Thermal insulation plan''
    in Europe, denoted C).\footnote{Indee
    d, 54\% of %
152 U.S. respondents and 74\% of %
153 European ones prefer the combination
    of C, NR and the GCS to the combinati
    on of C and NR alone, indicating simi
    lar support for the GCS conditional o
    n NR and C than for the GCS alone (Fi
    gure \ref{fig:conjoint}).} %
154 For the second analysis, we split the
    sample into four random branches.\foo
    tnote{Results from the first branch s
    how that the support for the GCS cond
    itional on NR, at 55\% in the U.S.
    ($n$ = 757) and 77\% in Europe ($n$ =
    746), is not significantly different
    from the support for the GCS alone. T
    his suggests that rejection of the GC
    S is not driven by the cost of the po
    licy on oneself. The second branch sh
    ows that the support for C conditiona
    l on NR is somewhat higher, at 62\% i
```

```
134 \subsubsection{Conjoint analyses}\lab
    el{subsubsec:conjoint} %
135
136 In order to assess the public support
    for the GCS in conjunction with other
    policies, we conduct a series of conj
    oint analyses. We ask respondents to
    make five choices between pairs of po
    litical platforms. Each choice is mea
    nt at testing a different hypothesis
    on the support for the GCS in relatio
    n to other policies or voting.
137
138 The first conjoint analysis suggests
    that the GCS is supported independent
    ly of being complemented by the Natio
    nal Redistribution Scheme and a natio
    nal climate policy (C). %
139 The second analysis indicates majorit
    y support for the GCS and for C, whic
    h are seen as neither complement nor
    substitute (see \nameref{sec:method
    s}). A minor share of respondents lik
    e a national climate policy and disli
    ke a global one, but as many people p
    refer a global rather than a national
    policy; and there is no evidence that
    implementing NR would increase the su
    pport for the GCS.
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n the U.S. (n = 751) and 84\% in Europe (n = 747). However, the third one shows no significant preference for C compared to GCS (both conditional on NR), neither in Europe, where GCS is preferred by 52\% (n = 741) nor in the U.S., where C is preferred by 53\% (n = 721). The fourth branch shows that 55\% in the U.S. (n = 771) and 77\% in Europe (n = 766) prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to NR alone.} The outcome is that there is majority support for the GCS and for C, which are seen as neither complement nor substitute. A minor share of respondents like a national climate policy and dislike a global one, but as many people prefer a global rather than a national policy; and there is no evidence that implementing NR would increase the support for the GCS.

155 In the third analysis, we present two random branches of the sample with hypothetical progressive and conservative platforms that differ only by the presence (or not) of the GCS in the progressive platform. Table \ref{tab:conjoint_c} shows that a progressive candidate would not significantly lose voting share by endorsing the GCS in any country, and may even gain 11 p.p. ($p = .005$) in voting intention in France. %

156 Though the level of support for the GCS is significantly lower in swing States (at 51\%) that are key to win U.S. elections, the electoral effect of endorsing the GCS remains non-significantly different from zero (at +1.2 p.p.) in these States.\footnote{We define swing states as the 8 states with less than 5 p.p. margin of victory in the 2020 election (MI, NV, PA, WI, AZ, GA, NC, FL). The results are robust to using the 3 p.p. threshold (that excludes FL) instead.}

Text moved with changes to lines 347-352 (99.5% similarity)

140 In the third analysis, we present two random branches of the sample with hypothetical progressive and conservative platforms that differ only by the presence (or not) of the GCS in the progressive platform. Table \ref{tab:conjoint_c} shows that a progressive candidate would not significantly lose voting share by endorsing the GCS in any country, and may even gain 11 p.p. ($p = .005$) in voting intention in France. %

141 Our last two analyses make respondents choose between two random platforms. In Europe, respondents are prompted to imagine that a left or center-left coalition will win the next election and asked what platform they would prefer that coalition to have campaigned on. In the U.S., the question is framed as a hypothetical duel in a Democratic primary, and asked only to non-Republicans (n = 2,218), i.e. the respondents who declare as political affiliation \textit{Democrat}, \textit{Independent}, \textit{Non-Affiliated} or \textit{Other}.

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\begin{table}[h]
  %
  \caption[Influence of the GCS on electoral prospects]{Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. (Question \ref{q:conjoint_c})
  %
} %
  \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\input{../tables/country_comparison/conjoint_c_wo_none.tex}}\label{tab:conjoint_c}
  {\footnotesize \textit{Note:} Simple OLS model. The 14\% of \textit{None of them} answers have been excluded from the regression samples. GCS has no significant influence on them. $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**} p<0.05$; $^{***} p<0.01$.
  }
\end{table}
\begin{stretchpars}
Our last two analyses make respondents choose between two random platforms. In Europe, respondents are prompted to imagine that a left or center-left coalition will win the next election and are asked what platform they would prefer that coalition to have campaigned on. In the U.S., the question is framed as a hypothetical duel in a Democratic primary, and asked only to non-Republicans ($n$ = 2,218), i.e. the respondents who declare as political affiliation \textit{Democrat}, \textit{Independent}, \textit{Non-Affiliated} or \textit{Other}. In the fourth analysis, a policy (or an absence of policy) is randomly drawn for each platform in each of five categories: \textit{economic issues}, \textit{societal issues}, \textit{climate policy}, \textit{tax system}, \textit{foreign policy} (Figure \ref{fig:car}).

Except for the category \textit{foreign policy}, which features the GCS 42 \% of the time, the policies are prominent progressive policies and they are drawn uniformly. %
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In the fourth analysis, a policy (or an absence of policy) is randomly drawn for each platform in each of five categories: \textit{economic issues}, \textit{societal issues}, \textit{cli
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			mate policy}, \textit{tax system}, \t extit{foreign policy} (Figure \ref{fi g:ca_r}, Table \ref{tab:amce}).
170	In the UK, Germany, and France, a pla tform is about 9 to 13 p.p. more like ly to be preferred if it includes the GCS rather than no foreign policy.\fo otnote{This is the Average Marginal C omponent Effect computed following \c itet{hainmueller_causal_2014}.} This effect is between 1 and 4 p.p. and no longer significant in the U.S. and in Spain. Moreover, a platform that incl udes a global tax on millionaires rat her than no foreign policy is 5 to 13 percentage points (p.p.) more likely to be preferred in all countries (the effect is significant and at least 9 p.p. in all countries but Spain).	144	In the UK, Germany, and France, a pla tform is about 9 to 13 p.p. more like ly to be preferred if it includes the GCS rather than no foreign policy. %
171	Similarly, a global democratic assemb ly on climate change has a significan t effect of 8 to 12 p.p. in the U.S., Germany, and France.	145	This effect is between 1 and 4 p.p. a nd no longer significant in the U.S. (among non-Republicans) and in Spain. Moreover, a platform that includes a global tax on millionaires rather tha n no foreign policy is 5 to 13 p.p. m ore likely to be preferred in all cou ntries (the effect is significant and at least 9 p.p. in all countries but Spain).
172	These effects are large, and not far from the effects of the policies most influential on the platforms, which r ange between 15 and 18 p.p. in most c ountries (and 27 p.p. in Spain), and all relate to improved public service s (in particular healthcare, housing, and education).	146	Similarly, a global democratic assemb ly on climate change has a significan t effect of 8 to 12 p.p. in the U.S. (among non-Republicans), Germany, and France.
173	\end{stretchpars}	147	These effects are large, and not far from the effects of the policies most influential on the platforms, which r ange between 15 and 18 p.p. in most c ountries (27 p.p. in Spain), and all relate to improved public services (i n particular healthcare, housing, and education).
174		148	
175	\begin{figure}[h]	149	The fifth analysis draws random platf orms similarly, except that candidate A's platform always contains the GCS while B's includes no foreign policy.

```
                                                                    In this case, A is chosen by 60\% of Europeans %
176   \caption[Preferences for various policies in political platforms]{[For Supplementary Material] Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See English translations in Figure \ref{fig:ca_r_en}; Question \ref{q:conjoint_r}%
                                                                150 and 58\% of non-Republican Americans (Figure \ref{fig:conjoint_left_ag_b}). %
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Text moved with changes to lines 401-426 (99.7% similarity)

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177   )}\label{fig:ca_r}                                        151
178   \begin{subfigure}{\textwidth}                             152 Overall, taking the U.S. as an example, our conjoint analyses indicate that a candidate at the Democratic primary would have more chances to obtain the nomination by endorsing the GCS, and this endorsement would not penalize her or him at the presidential election.
179     \subcaption{U.S. (Asked only to non-Republicans)}       153 This result relates to the finding that 12\% of Germans shift their voting intention from SPD and CDU/CSU to the Greens and the Left when they are told that the latter parties support global democracy.\citep{ghassim_who_2020}
180     \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/US1/ca_r.png}
181   \end{subfigure}
182   \begin{subfigure}{\textwidth}
183     \subcaption{France}
184     \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/FR/ca_r.png}
185   \end{subfigure}
186 \end{figure}%
187 \clearpage
188 \begin{figure}[h!]\ContinuedFloat %
189   \begin{subfigure}{\textwidth}
190     \subcaption{Germany}
191     \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/DE/ca_r.png}
192   \end{subfigure}
193   \begin{subfigure}{\textwidth}
194     \subcaption{Spain}
195     \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/ES/ca_r.png}
196   \end{subfigure}
197   \begin{subfigure}{\textwidth}
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    \subcaption{UK}
    \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/UK/ca_r.png}
  \end{subfigure}
  %
\end{figure}
\clearpage
\noindent
The fifth analysis draws random platforms similarly, except that candidate A's platform always contains the GCS while B's includes no foreign policy. In this case, A is chosen by 60\% in Europe %
and 58\% in the U.S. (Figure \ref{fig:conjoint_left_ag_b}). %
Overall, taking the U.S. as an example, our conjoint analyses indicate that a candidate at the Democratic primary would have more chances to obtain the nomination by endorsing the GCS, and this endorsement would not penalize her or him at the presidential election. This result reminds the finding that 12\% of Germans shift their voting intention from SPD and CDU/CSU to the Greens and the Left when they are told that the latter parties support global democracy \citep{ghassim_who_2020}.
\begin{figure}[h!]
    \caption[Influence of the GCS on preferred platform]{[For Supplementary Material] Influence of the GCS on preferred platform:\\ Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question \ref{q:conjoint_d}; in the U.S., asked only to non-Republicans.)}\label{fig:conjoint_left_ag_b}
    \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/country_comparison/conjoint_left_ag_b_binary_positive.pdf}}
\end{figure}
\subsubsection{Prioritization}\label{subsubsec:prioritization} %

Towards the end of the survey, we ask respondents to allocate 100 points am
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ong six randomly selected policies fr
om the previous conjoint analyses, us
ing sliders. The instruction was to d
istribute the points based on their l
evel of support, with a higher alloca
tion indicating greater support for a
policy. %
As a result, the average support acro
ss policies is 16.67 points. %
In each country, the GCS ranks in the
middle of all policies or above, with
an average number of points from 15.4
in the U.S. to 22.9 in Germany.%

Interestingly, in Germany, the most p
rioritized policy is the global tax o
n millionaires, while the GCS is the
second most prioritized policy. The g
lobal tax on millionaires consistentl
y ranks no lower than fifth position
(out of 15 or 17 policies) in every c
ountry, garnering an average of 18.3
points in Spain to 22.9 points in Ger
many.

This question sheds light on a potent
ial discrepancy between the policy pr
iorities of the public and those enac
ted by legislators. For instance, whi
le the European Union and California
have enacted plans to phase out new c
ombustion-engine cars by 2035, the pr
oposal to ``ban the sale of new combu
stion-engine cars by 2030'' emerged a
s one of the three least prioritized
policies in each country, with an ave
rage allocation of 7.8 points in Fran
ce to 11.4 points in the UK.

\subsubsection{Pros and Cons}\label{s
ubsubsec:pros_cons}

We survey respondents to gather their
perspectives on the pros and cons of
the GCS, utilizing either an open-end
ed or a closed question. In the close
d question format, respondents tend t
o consider every argument as importan
t in determining their support or opp
osition to the GCS (see Figure \ref{f

ong six randomly selected policies fr
om the previous conjoint analyses, us
ing sliders. The instruction was to d
istribute the points based on their l
evel of support, with a higher alloca
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to consider every argument as importa
nt in determining their support or op

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ig:gcs_important}). Notably, the leas
t important aspect was the negative i
mpact on their household, with 60\% i
n Europe ($n$=1,505) and 75\% in the
U.S. ($n$=493) finding it important.
The most important elements differ be
tween Europe and the U.S. In Europe,
the key factors are the GCS's potenti
al to limit climate change and reduce
poverty in low-income countries, both
deemed important by 85\% of responden
ts. In the U.S., having sufficient in
formation about the scheme ranks high
est at 89\%, followed by its potentia
l to foster global cooperation at 82\
%. However, due to the limited variat
ion in the ratings for each element,
the closed question format is inconcl
usive (Figure \ref{fig:gcs_importan
t}). %
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position to the GCS (see Figure \ref
{fig:gcs_important}).
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226
227 The open-ended question provides more
insights into what people associate w
ith the GCS when prompted to think ab
out it. %
228 Analyzing keywords in the responses
(automatically translated into Englis
h), the most frequently mentioned top
ics are the international aspect and
the environment, each appearing in ap
proximately one-quarter of the answer
s (see Figure \ref{fig:gcs_field_cont
ains}). This is followed by discussio
ns on the effects of the GCS on pover
ty and prices, each mentioned by abou
t one-tenth of the respondents. We al
so manually classified each answer in
to different categories (see Figure
\ref{fig:gcs_field}). This exercise c
onfirms the findings from the automat
ic search: the environmental benefit
of the GCS is the most commonly discu
ssed topic, while obstacles to implem
entation or agreement on the proposal
are relatively infrequently mentione
d.%
229 \footnote{Moreover, around one in fou
r respondents explicitly cites pros o
r cons. Few individuals explicitly ex
press support or opposition, and misu
nderstandings are rare. Only 11\% of
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166
167 The open-ended question provides more
insights into what people associate w
ith the GCS when prompted to think ab
out it. %
168 Analyzing keywords in the responses
(automatically translated into Englis
h), the most frequently mentioned top
ics are the international aspect and
the environment, each appearing in ap
proximately one-quarter of the answer
s (see Figure \ref{fig:gcs_field_cont
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onfirms the findings from the automat
ic search: the environmental benefit
of the GCS is the most commonly discu
ssed topic, while obstacles to implem
entation or agreement on the proposal
are relatively infrequently mentione
d.%
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the responses are empty or express a lack of opinion, though one-quarter are unclassifiable due to the rarity, nonsensical nature, or irrelevance of the conveyed idea.}%

In the \textit{US2} survey, we divided the sample into four random branches.

Two branches were presented the pros and cons questions (either in open or closed format) \textit{before} being asked about their support for the GCS or NR. Another branch received information on the actual level of support for the GCS and NR (estimated in \textit{US1}, see Section \ref{subsec:second_order_beliefs}), and one control group received none of these treatments. %
The objective of this ``pros and cons treatment'' was to simulate a ``campaign effect'', which refers to the shift in opinion resulting from media coverage of the proposal. To conservatively estimate the effect of a (potentially negative) campaign, we intentionally included more cons (6) than pros (3). Interestingly, the support for the GCS decreased by 11 p.p. after respondents viewed a list of its pros and cons.\footnote{Surprisingly, the support for National Redistribution also decreased by 7 p.p. following the closed question about the GCS. This suggests that some individuals may lack attention and confuse the two policies, or that contemplating the pros and cons alters the mood of some people, moving them away from their initial positive impression.} Notably, the support also decreased by 7 p.p. after respondents were asked to consider the pros and cons in an open-ended question. Although support remains significant,%
\footnote{Despite some significant effects of pondering the pros and cons, approximately half of the Americans express support for the GCS across all
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Two branches were presented the pros and cons questions (either in open or closed format) \textit{before} being asked about their support for the GCS or NR. Another branch received information on the actual level of support for the GCS and NR (estimated in \textit{US1}, see box p. \pageref{subsec:second_order_beliefs}), %
and one control group received none of these treatments. %
The objective of the ``pros and cons treatment'' was to mimic a ``campaign effect'', which refers to the shift in opinion resulting from media coverage of the proposal.\citep{anderson_ca
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treatment branches (see Table \ref{tab:branch_gcs}).}
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n_2023} To conservatively estimate the effect of a (potentially negative) campaign, we intentionally included more cons (6) than pros (3). Interestingly, the support for the GCS decreased by 11 p.p. (t(1,996)=$-$3.5, p=$5 \cdot 10^{-4}$, 95\% CI=[$-$.17, $-$.05]) after respondents viewed a list of its pros and cons. %
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these results suggest that the public success of the GCS would be sensitive to the content of the debate about it, and subject to the discourse adopted by interest groups. %
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Notably, the support also decreased by 7 p.p. (t(1,996)=$-$2.3, p=.02, 95\% CI=[$-$.13, $-$.01]) after respondents were asked to consider the pros and cons in an open-ended question. Despite some significant effects of pondering the pros and cons, approximately half of the Americans express support for the GCS across all treatment branches (see Table \ref{tab:branch_gcs}). Although support remains significant, %
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these results suggest that the public success of the GCS would be sensitive to the content of the debate about it, and oriented by the discourse adopted by interest groups. %
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\subsection{Second-order Beliefs}\label{subsec:second_order_beliefs}
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\begin{tcolorbox}\label{subsec:second_order_beliefs}
  \paragraph{Second-order Beliefs}
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To explain the strong support for the GCS despite its absence from political platforms and public debate,
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we hypothesized pluralistic ignorance, i.e. that the public and policymakers mistakenly perceive the GCS as unpopular. As a result, individuals might conceal their support for such globally redistributive policies, believing that advocating for them would be futile.
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However, the evidence for pluralistic ignorance is limited based on an incentivized question about perceived support (Figure \ref{fig:belief}).
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In the case of Americans,
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In the case of Americans,
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their beliefs about the level of support for the GCS are relatively accurate. The mean perceived support is 52\
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their beliefs about the level of support for the GCS are relatively accurate (Figure \ref{fig:belief}). The mea
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% (with quartiles of 36\%, 52\%, and 68\%), which closely aligns with the actual support of 53\%. Europeans, on the other hand, underestimate the support by 17 p.p. Nonetheless, 65\% of them correctly estimate that the GCS garners majority support, and the mean perceived support is 59\% (and quartiles of 43\%, 61\%, and 74\%), compared to the actual support of 76\%.	n perceived support is 52\% (with quartiles of 36\%, 52\%, and 68\%), which closely aligns with the actual support of 54\%. Europeans, on the other hand, underestimate the support by 17 p.p. Nonetheless, 65\% of them correctly estimate that the GCS garners majority support, and the mean perceived support is 59\% (and quartiles of 43\%, 61\%, and 74\%), compared to the actual support of 76\%. %
Second-order beliefs are equally accurate for NR in the U.S. and similarly underestimated in Europe. %	Second-order beliefs are equally accurate for NR in the U.S. and similarly underestimated in Europe. %
Finally, consistent with Americans accurately perceiving the levels of support for the GCS or NR, providing information on the actual level had no significant effect on their support in the \textit{US2} survey. %	Finally, consistent with Americans accurately perceiving the levels of support for the GCS or NR, providing information on the actual level had no significant effect on their support in the \textit{US2} survey (effect=.025, t(1,998)=1.1, p=.26, 95\% CI=[$-$.02, .07]). %
	\end{tcolorbox}
\begin{figure}[h!]	
\caption[Beliefs about support for the GCS and NR]{[For Supplementary Material] Beliefs regarding the support for the GCS and NR. (Questions \ref{q:gcs_belief} and \ref{q:nr_belief})}\label{fig:belief}	
\makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegraphics[width=.7\textwidth]{../figures/country_comparison/belief_all_mean.pdf}}	
\end{figure}	
\subsubsection{Other global policies}\label{subsubsec:support_other_global_policies} %	\subsection{Stated support for global redistribution}\label{subsec:support_other}
	We also assess support for a range of other international policies (Figure \ref{fig:support}) as well as unilateral foreign aid. %
	\subsubsection{International policies}\label{subsubsec:support_other_global_policies} %

254 We also assess support for other glob al policies (Figure \ref{fig:suppor t}).	
255 Most policies garner relative majorit y support in each country, with two e xceptions:	192 Most policies garner relative majorit y support in each country, with two e xceptions:
256 the ``cancellation of low-income coun tries' public debt'' and ``a maximum wealth limit'' for each individual.	193 the ``cancellation of low-income coun tries' public debt'' and ``a maximum wealth limit'' for each individual (F igure \ref{fig:support}). %
257 The latter policy obtains relative ma jority support in Europe but not in t he U.S., despite the cap being set at \$10 billion in the U.S. compared to \euro{}/£100 million in Europe. Notab ly, climate-related policies enjoy si gnificant popularity, with ``high-inc ome countries funding renewable energ y in low-income countries'' receiving absolute majority support across all surveyed countries. Additionally, rel ative support for loss and damages co mpensation, as approved in principle at the international climate negotiat ions in 2022 (``COP27''), ranges from 55\% (U.S.) to 81\% (Spain), with abs olute support ranging from 41\% to 62 \%.	194 The latter policy garners relative ma jority support in Europe but not in t he U.S., despite the cap being set at \$10 billion in the U.S. compared to \euro{}/£100 million in Europe. Notab ly, climate-related policies enjoy si gnificant popularity, with ``high-inc ome countries funding renewable energ y in low-income countries'' receiving absolute majority support across all surveyed countries. Additionally, rel ative support for loss and damages co mpensation, as approved in principle at the international climate negotiat ions in 2022 (``COP27''), ranges from 55\% (U.S.) to 81\% (Spain). %
258	195 Consistent with the results of the gl obal survey,
259 \subsubsection{Global wealth tax}\lab el{subsubsec:support_global_wealth_ta x}	196 a ``tax on millionaires of all countr ies to finance low-income countries'' garners relative support of over 69\% in each country, only 5 p.p. lower th an a national millionaires tax overal l. In random subsamples, we inquire a bout respondents' preferences regardi ng the redistribution of revenues fro m a global tax on individual wealth e xceeding \$5 million, after providing information on the revenue raised by such a tax in their country compared to low-income countries.
260	197 We ask certain respondents (n = 1,2 83) what percentage of the global tax revenues should be pooled to finance low-income countries. In each countr y, at least 88\% of respondents indic ate a positive amount, with an averag e of one-third %

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Consistent with the results of the global survey, a ``tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-income countries'' garners absolute majority support of over 67\% in each country, only 5 p.p. lower than a national millionaires tax overall (Figure \ref{fig:support}). In random subsamples, we inquire about respondents' preferences regarding the redistribution of revenues from a global tax on individual wealth exceeding \$5 million, after providing information on the revenue raised by such a tax in their country compared to low-income countries.\footnote{A 2\% tax on net wealth exceeding \$5 million would annually raise \$816 billion, leaving unaffected 99.9\% of the world population. More specifically, it would collect \euro{}5 billion in Spain, \euro{}16 billion in France, £20 billion in the UK, \euro{}44 billion in Germany, \$430 billion in the U.S., and \$1 billion collectively in all low-income countries (28 countries, home to 700 million people).%
} We ask certain respondents ($n$ = 1,283) what percentage of global tax revenues should be pooled to finance low-income countries. In each country, at least 88\% of respondents indicate a positive amount, with an average ranging from 30\% (Germany) to 36\% (U.S., France) (Figure \ref{fig:global_share_mean}). To other respondents ($n$ = 1,233), we inquire whether they would prefer each country to retain all the revenues it collects or that half of the revenues be pooled to finance low-income countries. Approximately half of the respondents opt to allocate half of the tax revenues to low-income countries.
\begin{figure}
    \centering
    \caption[Preferred share of wealth tax for low-income countries]{[For Supplementary Material] Percent of global wealth tax that should finance low-income countries (\textit{mean}).
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(Figure \ref{fig:global_share_mean}). To other respondents ($n$ = 1,233), we inquire whether they would prefer each country to retain all the revenues it collects or that half of the revenues be pooled to finance low-income countries. Approximately half of the respondents opt to allocate half of the tax revenues to low-income countries, consistently with the other variant of the question.
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(Question \ref{q:global_tax_global_share})} %
    \includegraphics[width=1\textwidth]{../figures/country_comparison/global_tax_global_share_mean.pdf} \label{fig:global_share_mean}
\end{figure}


\setcounter{figure}{1}
\renewcommand{\thefigure}{\arabic{figure}}
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\begin{figure}
  %
  \caption[Relative support for further global policies]{Relative support for various global policies (percentage of \textit{somewhat} or \textit{strong support}, after excluding \textit{indifferent} answers). (Questions \ref{q:climate_policies} and \ref{q:other_policies}; See Figure \ref{fig:support_likert_positive} for the absolute support.)%
  }
  \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/country_comparison/support_likert_share.pdf}}\label{fig:support}
\end{figure}
\renewcommand{\thefigure}{S\arabic{figure}}


\subsubsection{Foreign aid}\label{subsubsec:support_foreign_aid} %

We provide respondents with information about the actual amount ``spent on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries'' relative to their country's government spending and GDP. Less than 16\% of respondents state that their country's foreign aid should be reduced, while 62\% express support for increasing it, including 1
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\begin{figure}
  %
  \caption[Relative support for other global policies]{Support for various global policies. (\textit{relative support}: percentage of \textit{somewhat} or \textit{strong support}, after excluding \textit{indifferent} answers; *except for GCS: percentage of \textit{Yes} in a \textit{Yes}/\textit{No} question). (p. \pageref{subsec:questionnaire_GCS}, Questions \ref{q:gcs_support}, \ref{q:climate_policies} and \ref{q:other_policies}; See Figure \ref{fig:support_likert_positive} for the absolute support.)%
  }
  \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/country_comparison/support_likert_gcs_share.pdf}}\label{fig:support}
\end{figure}


\subsubsection{Foreign aid}\label{subsubsec:support_foreign_aid} %

In addition, we provide respondents with information about the actual amount ``spent on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries'' relative to their country's government spending and GDP. Less than 16\% of respondents state that their country's foreign aid should be reduced, while 62\% express support for increasing i
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7\% who support an unconditional incr
ease (Figure \ref{fig:foreign_aid_rai
se_support}). Among the 45\% who thin
k aid should be increased under certa
in conditions, we subsequently ask th
em to specify the conditions they dee
m necessary (Figure \ref{fig:foreign_
aid_condition}). The three most commo
nly selected conditions are: ``we can
be sure the aid reaches people in nee
d and money is not diverted'' (73\% c
hose this condition), ``that recipien
t countries comply with climate targe
ts and human rights'' (67\%), and ``t
hat other high-income countries also
increase their foreign aid'' (48\
%).\footnote{It is worth noting that
these conditions align closely with t
he principles of the GCS.}
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t, including 17\% who support an unco
nditional increase (Figure \ref{fig:f
oreign_aid_raise_support}). Among the
45\% who think aid should be increase
d under certain conditions, we subseq
uently ask them to specify the condit
ions they deem necessary (Figure \ref
{fig:foreign_aid_condition}). The thr
ee most commonly selected conditions
are that: ``we can be sure the aid re
aches people in need and money is not
diverted'' (73\% chose this conditio
n), ``recipient countries comply with
climate targets and human rights'' (6
7\%), and ``other high-income countri
es also increase their foreign aid''
(48\%). %
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283 On the other hand, respondents who do not wish to increase their country's foreign aid primarily justify their view by prioritizing the well-being of their fellow citizens or by perceiving each country as responsible for its own fate (Figure \ref{fig:foreign_aid_no}). In response to an open-ended question regarding measures high-income countries should take to fight extreme poverty, a large majority of Americans expressed that more help is needed (Figure \ref{fig:poverty_field}). The most commonly suggested form of aid is financial support, closely followed by investments in education.

209 On the other hand, respondents who do not wish to increase their country's foreign aid primarily justify their view by prioritizing the well-being of their fellow citizens or by perceiving each country as responsible for its own fate (Figure \ref{fig:foreign_aid_no}). In response to an open-ended question regarding measures high-income countries should take to fight extreme poverty, a large majority of Americans expressed that more help is needed (Figure \ref{fig:poverty_field}). The most commonly suggested form of aid is financial support, closely followed by investments in education.

210

284 We also inquire about the perceived amount of foreign aid. Consistent with prior research (see Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_foreign_aid}), most people overestimate the actual amount of foreign aid (Figure \ref{fig:foreign_aid_belief}). We then elicit respondents' preferred amount of foreign aid, after randomly presenting them with either the actual amount or no information. Most of the respondents who learn the actual amount choose a bracket at least as high as the actual one, and most of those without the information choose a bracket at least as

211 We also inquire about the perceived amount of foreign aid. Consistent with prior research (see Appendix \ref{subsubsec:literature_foreign_aid}), most people overestimate the actual amount of foreign aid (Figure \ref{fig:foreign_aid_belief}). We then elicit respondents' preferred amount of foreign aid, after randomly presenting them with either the actual amount or no information. Most of the respondents who learn the actual amount choose a bracket at least as high as the actual one, and most of those without the information choose a bracket at least as

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high as the perceived one (Figures \r
ef{fig:foreign_aid_amount}--\ref{fig:
foreign_aid_preferred_info}). Finall
y, we ask a last question to the resp
ondents who received the information.
To those who prefer an increase of fo
reign aid, we ask how they would fina
nce it: by far, the preferred source
of funding is higher taxes on the wea
lthiest (Figure \ref{fig:foreign_aid_
raise_how}). To those who prefer a re
duction, we ask how they would use th
e funds becoming available: %
In every country, more people choose
higher spending on education or healt
hcare rather than lower taxes (Figure
\ref{fig:foreign_aid_reduce_how}).
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high as the perceived one (Figures \r
ef{fig:foreign_aid_amount}--\ref{fig:
foreign_aid_preferred_info}). Finall
y, we ask a last question to the resp
ondents who received the information.
To those who prefer an increase of fo
reign aid, we ask how they would fina
nce it: by far, the preferred source
of funding is higher taxes on the wea
lthiest (Figure \ref{fig:foreign_aid_
raise_how}). To those who prefer a re
duction, we ask how they would use th
e funds becoming available: %
In every country, more people choose
higher spending on education or healt
hcare rather than lower taxes (Figure
\ref{fig:foreign_aid_reduce_how}).
```

```

\begin{figure}[h!]
  \caption[Attitudes on the evolution
of foreign aid]{[For Supplementary Ma
terial] Attitudes regarding the evolu
tion of [own country] foreign aid. (Q
uestion \ref{q:foreign_aid_raise_supp
ort})}\label{fig:foreign_aid_raise_su
pport}
```

Text moved to lines 448-451

```
  \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegra
phics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/co
untry_comparison/foreign_aid_raise_su
pport.pdf}}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[h!]
  \caption[Conditions at which foreig
n aid should be increased]{[For Suppl
ementary Material] Conditions at whic
h foreign aid should be increased (in
percent). [Asked to those who wish an
increase of foreign aid at some condi
tions.] (Question \ref{q:foreign_aid_
condition})}\label{fig:foreign_aid_co
ndition}
```

Text moved to lines 453-456

```
  \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegra
phics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/co
untry_comparison/foreign_aid_conditio
n_positive.pdf}}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[h!]
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```
298   \caption[Reasons why foreign aid should not be increased]{[For Supplementary Material] Reasons why foreign aid should not be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish a decrease or stability of foreign aid.] (Question \ref{q:foreign_aid_no})}\label{fig:foreign_aid_no}
```

Text moved to lines 458-460

```
299   \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/country_comparison/foreign_aid_no_positive.pdf}}
300 \end{figure}
301
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302 \subsection{Universalistic values}\label{subsec:universalistic}
303
304 We also elicit underlying values, to test whether broad values are consistent with people's support for specific policies. %
305 When we ask respondents which group they defend when they vote, %
306 20\% choose ``sentient beings (humans and animals),'' 22\% choose ``humans,'' 33\% select their ``fellow citizens'' (or ``Europeans''), 15\% choose ``My family and myself,'' and the remaining 10\% choose another group (mainly ``My State or region'' or ``People sharing my culture or religion''). The first two categories, representing close to one out of two people, can be described as universalist in their vote. Notably, a majority of left-wing voters can even be considered universalist voters (see Figure \ref{fig:main_by_vote} for main attitudes by vote).%
307
308 When asked what their country's diplomats should defend in international climate negotiations, only 11\% prefer their country's ``interests, even if it goes against global justice.'' In contrast, 30\% prefer global justice (with or without consideration of nat
```

```
213 \subsection{Universalistic values}\label{subsec:universalistic}
214
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216 When we ask respondents which group they defend when they vote, %
217 20\% choose ``sentient beings (humans and animals),'' 22\% choose ``humans,'' 33\% select their ``fellow citizens'' (or ``Europeans''), 15\% choose ``My family and myself,'' and the remaining 10\% choose another group (mainly ``My State or region'' or ``People sharing my culture or religion'').
218 Notably, a majority of left-wing voters choose \textit{humans} or \textit{sentient beings}.
```

```
ional interests), and the bulk of res
pondents (38\%) prefer their countr
y's ``interests, to the extent it res
pects global justice.''

Furthermore, when we ask respondents
to assess the extent to which climate
change, global poverty, and inequalit
y in their country are issues, climat
e change is generally viewed as the m
ost significant problem (with a mean
score of 0.59 after recoding answers
between -2 and 2). This is followed b
y global poverty (0.42) and national
inequality (0.37). %

Finally, we conduct a lottery experim
ent to elicit universalistic values.
Respondents were automatically enroll
ed in a lottery with a \$100 prize an
d had to choose the proportion of the
prize they would keep for themselves
versus give to a person living in pov
erty. The charity donation is directe
d either to an African individual or
a fellow citizen, depending on the re
spondent's random assignment. In Euro
pe, we observe no significant variati
on in the willingness to donate based
on the recipient's origin. In the U.
S., the donations to Africans are 3
p.p. lower (with an average donation
of 34\%), but the slightly lower dona
tions to Africans are entirely driven
by Trump voters and non-voters (Table
\ref{tab:donation}).

Overall, answers to these broad value
questions are consistent with half of
Americans and three quarters of Europ
eans supporting global policies like
the GCS: people are almost as much wi
lling to give to poor Africans than t
o poor fellow citizens, find that glo
bal issues are among the biggest prob
lems, almost half of them are univers
alist when they vote, and most of the
m wish that their diplomats take into
account global justice.
```

220 Answers to this and other broad value questions are consistent with half of Americans and three quarters of Europeans supporting global policies like the GCS: people are almost as much willing to make a donation to poor Africans than to poor fellow citizens in a lottery experiment, most respondents find that global issues are among the biggest problems, and most respondents wish that their diplomats take into account global justice (see \nameref{sec:methods} for details).

316 \section{Discussion} %

221 \section{Discussion} %

317 Our point of departure are recent surveys conducted %

318 in 20 of the largest countries%

319 , as they reveal robust majority support for global redistributive and climate policies, even in high-income countries that would financially lose from them. The results from complementary surveys conducted in the U.S. and four European countries %

320 reinforce these findings. We find strong support for global taxes on the wealthiest individuals, as well as majority support for our main policy of interest -- the Global Climate Scheme (GCS). The GCS encompasses carbon pricing at a global level through an emissions trading system, accompanied by a global basic income funded by the scheme's revenues. Additional experiments, such as a list experiment and a real-stake petition, demonstrate that the support for the GCS is real.

321 Such genuine support is further substantiated by the prioritization of the GCS over prominent national climate policies and aligned with a significant portion of the population holding universalistic values rather than nationalistic or egoistic ones. Moreover, the conjoint analyses indicate that a progressive candidate would not lose voting shares by endorsing the GCS, and may even gain 11 p.p. in voting shares in France. Similarly, a candidate endorsing the GCS would gain votes in a U.S. Democratic primary, while i

n Europe, a progressive platform that includes the GCS would be preferred o ver one that does not.

Having ruled out insincerity and unde restimation of fellow citizens' suppo rt as potential explanations for the scarcity of global policies in the pu blic debate, we propose alternative e xplanations. %

In our analysis, we have uncovered st rong and genuine support for global r edistributive policies. One limitatio n to this finding, inherent to any in quiry into hypothetical policies, is that the support might change once gl obal policies are discussed in the pu blic debate (as explored in the parag raph on \textit{Pros and Cons}).

We conclude by providing hypotheses t o reconcile the scarcity of global po licies in the public debate with our findings that they would be widely ac cepted. %

The first two are variations of plura listic ignorance, and the last three represent complementary explanations.

The first two are variations of plura listic ignorance, and the last three represent complementary explanations.

First, there may be pluralistic ignor ance \textit{among policymakers} rega rding universalistic values, support for the GCS, or the electoral advanta ge of endorsing it. Second, people or policymakers may believe that globall y redistributive policies are politic ally infeasible in some key (potentia lly foreign) countries like the U.S. %

First, there may be pluralistic ignor ance \textit{among policymakers} rega rding universalistic values, support for the GCS, or the electoral advanta ge of endorsing it.

Second, people or policymakers may be lieve that globally redistributive po licies are politically infeasible in some key (potentially foreign) countr ies like the U.S. %

Third, political discourse centrally happens at the national level, shaped by national media and institutions su ch as voting.

National framing by political voices may create biases and suppress univer salistic values. %

Fourth, many individuals, including p olicymakers, may perceive global redi stributive policies as ill-defined or technically infeasible, ultimately di smissing them as unrealistic. In part

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National framing by political voices may create biases and suppress univer salistic values. %

Fourth, many individuals, including p olicymakers, may perceive global redi stributive policies as ill-defined or technically infeasible, ultimately di smissing them as unrealistic. In part

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icular, policymakers may have insider information about the technical feasi
bility of such policies. Alternativel
y, the perception of unrealism may st
em from an unawareness of specific pr
oposals. %
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Fifth, just as policy is disproportio
nately influenced by the economic eli
tes \citep{gilens_testing_2014,persso
n_rich_2023}, public debate may be sh
aped by the wealthiest, who have vest
ed interests in preventing global red
istribution.
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Confirmation of any of these hypothes
es would lead to a common conclusion:
there exists substantial support for
global policies addressing climate ch
ange and global inequality, even in h
igh-income countries, and the perceiv
ed boundaries of political realism on
this issue may soon shift. %
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```
Uncovering evidence to support the ab
ove hypotheses could %
draw attention to global policies in
the public debate and contribute to t
heir increased prominence. %
  \begin{small} %
\section*{\normalsize Methods}\label
{sec:methods} %
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bility of such policies. Alternativel
y, the perception of unrealism may st
em from an unawareness of specific pr
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en in high-income countries. %
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heir increased prominence. %
  \begin{small} %
\section*{\normalsize Methods}\label
{sec:methods} %
\addcontentsline{toc}{section}{\namer
ef{sec:methods}}
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\paragraph{\small Pre-registration.}
The project is approved by Economics
\& Business Ethics Committee (EBEC) a
t the University of Amsterdam (EB-111
3) and %
was preregistered in the Open Science
Foundation registry (\href{https://os
f.io/fy6gd}{osf.io/fy6gd}). The study
did not deviate from the registratio
n: the questionnaires and the hypothe
ses tests used are the same as the on
es \href{https://osf.io/2b6vq}{given
\textit{ex ante}}. Informed consent w
as obtained from all respondents, ran
domized treatment branches were unkow
n to the respondents, and our researc
h complies with all relevant ethical
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regulations. Respondents were compens
ated with gift certificates for a val
ue of \euro{}1 per interview. No stat
istical methods were used to pre-dete
rmine sample sizes but our sample siz
es match those reported in similar pu
blications.\citep{dechezlepretre_figh
ting_nodate,issp_international_2010,b
eiser-mcgrath_could_2019,sivonen_atti
tudes_2022,douenne_yellow_2022}
```

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\paragraph{\small Data collection.} %
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\paragraph{\small Data collection.} %
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The paper utilizes two sets of survey
s: the \textit{Global} survey and the
\textit{Complementary} surveys. The
\textit{Complementary} surveys consis
t of two U.S. surveys, \textit{US1} a
nd \textit{US2}, and one European sur
vey, \textit{Eu}. The \textit{Global}
survey was conducted from March 2021
to March 2022 on 40,680 respondents f
rom 20 countries (with 1,465 to 2,488
respondents per country). \textit{US
1} collected responses from 3,000 res
pondents between January and March 20
23, while \textit{US2} gathered data
from 2,000 respondents between March
and April 2023. \textit{Eu} included
3,000 respondents and was conducted f
rom February to March 2023. We used t
he survey companies \emph{Dynata} and
\emph{Respondi}. To ensure representa
tive samples, we employed stratified
quotas based on gender, age (5 bracke
ts), income (4), region (4), educatio
n level (3), and ethnicity (3) for th
e U.S. We also incorporated survey we
ights throughout the analysis to acco
unt for any remaining imbalances. The
se weights were constructed using the
quota variables as well as the degree
of urbanity, and trimmed between 0.25
and 4. By applying weights, the resul
ts are fully representative of the re
spective countries. Results at the Eu
ropean level apply different weights
which ensure  representativeness of t
he combined four European countries.
Appendix \ref{app:representativeness}
```

```
The paper utilizes two sets of survey
s: the \textit{global} survey and the
\textit{m} surveys. The \textit{main}
surveys consist of two U.S. surveys,
\textit{US1} and \textit{US2}, and on
e European survey, \textit{Eu}. The
\textit{global} survey was conducted
from March 2021 to March 2022 on 40,6
80 respondents from 20 countries (wit
h 1,465 to 2,488 respondents per coun
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s from 3,000 respondents between Janu
ary and March 2023, while \textit{US
2} gathered data from 2,000 responden
ts between March and April 2023. \tex
tit{Eu} included 3,000 respondents an
d was conducted from February to Marc
h 2023. We used the survey companies
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ensure representative samples, we emp
loyed stratified quotas based on gend
er, age (5 brackets), income (4), reg
ion (4), education level (3), and eth
nicity (3) for the U.S. We also incor
porated survey weights throughout the
analysis to account for any remaining
imbalances. These weights were constr
ucted using the quota variables as we
ll as the degree of urbanity, and tri
mmed between 0.25 and 4. Stratified q
uotas followed by reweighting is the
usual method to reduce selection bias
from opt-in online panels, when bette
r sampling methods (such as compulsor
y participation of random dwellings)
are unavailable.\cite{scherpenzeel_ho
w_2010} By applying weights, the resu
lts are fully representative of the r
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confirms that our samples are representative of the population. %	espective countries along the above mentioned dimensions. %
341 Appendix \ref{app:balance} shows that the treatment branches are balanced. Appendix \ref{app:placebo} runs placebo tests of the effects of each treatment on unrelated outcomes. We do not find effects of earlier treatments on unrelated outcomes arriving later in the survey.	249 Results at the European level apply different weights which ensure representativeness of the combined four European countries. Appendix \ref{app:representativeness} shows how our samples compare to actual population frequencies. Our samples match the actual frequencies well, except for some imbalance in the U.S. vote (which does not affect our results, as shown by the results reweighted by vote in the \textit{Support for the GCS} section below).
	250 Appendix \ref{app:balance} shows that the treatment branches are balanced. Appendix \ref{app:placebo} runs placebo tests of the effects of each treatment on unrelated outcomes. We do not find effects of earlier treatments on unrelated outcomes arriving later in the survey. Appendix \ref{app:extended} shows that our results are unchanged when including inattentive respondents.
342 \paragraph{\small Data quality.} %	251 \paragraph{\small Data quality.} %
343 The median duration is 28 minutes for the \textit{Global} survey, 14 min for \textit{US1}, 11 min for \textit{US2}, and 20 min for \textit{Eu}. To ensure the best possible data quality, we exclude respondents who fail an attention test or rush through the survey (i.e., answer in less than 11.5 minutes in the \textit{Global} survey, 4 minutes in \textit{US1} or \textit{US2}, 6 minutes in \textit{Eu}). %	252 The median duration is 28 minutes for the \textit{global} survey, 14 min for \textit{US1}, 11 min for \textit{US2}, and 20 min for \textit{Eu}. To ensure the best possible data quality, we exclude respondents who fail an attention test or rush through the survey (i.e., answer in less than 11.5 minutes in the \textit{global} survey, 4 minutes in \textit{US1} or \textit{US2}, 6 minutes in \textit{Eu}). %
	253 At the end of the survey, we ask whether respondents thought that our survey was politically biased and offer to provide some feedback. 67\% of the respondents found the survey unbiased. 25\% found it left-wing biased, and 8\% found it right-wing biased.
344	254
345 \paragraph{\small Questionnaires and raw results.} %	255 \paragraph{\small Questionnaires and raw results.} %
346 The questionnaire and raw results of the \textit{Global} survey can be fou	256 The raw results are reported in Appendix \ref{app:raw_results} while the s

nd in the Appendix of the companion paper \citep{dechezlepretre_fighting_2022}. %

347 The raw results are reported in Appendix \ref{app:raw_results}\footnote{Country-specific raw results are also available as supplementary material files: \href{https://github.com/bixiou/international_attitudes_toward_global_policies/raw/main/paper/app_desc_stats_US.pdf}{US}, \href{https://github.com/bixiou/international_attitudes_toward_global_policies/raw/main/paper/app_desc_stats_EU.pdf}{EU}, \href{https://github.com/bixiou/international_attitudes_toward_global_policies/raw/main/paper/app_desc_stats_FR.pdf}{FR}, \href{https://github.com/bixiou/international_attitudes_toward_global_policies/raw/main/paper/app_desc_stats_DE.pdf}{DE}, \href{https://github.com/bixiou/international_attitudes_toward_global_policies/raw/main/paper/app_desc_stats_ES.pdf}{ES}, \href{https://github.com/bixiou/international_attitudes_toward_global_policies/raw/m

urveys' structures and questionnaires are given in Appendices \ref{app:questionnaire_oecd} and \ref{app:questionnaire}. Details on the \textit{global} survey can be found in the Appendix of the companion paper.\citep{dechezlepretre_fighting_nodate} Country-specific raw results are also available as supplementary material files: \href{https://github.com/bixiou/international_attitudes_toward_global_policies/raw/main/paper/app_desc_stats_US.pdf}{US}, \href{https://github.com/bixiou/international_attitudes_toward_global_policies/raw/main/paper/app_desc_stats_EU.pdf}{EU}, \href{https://github.com/bixiou/international_attitudes_toward_global_policies/raw/main/paper/app_desc_stats_FR.pdf}{FR}, \href{https://github.com/bixiou/international_attitudes_toward_global_policies/raw/main/paper/app_desc_stats_DE.pdf}{DE}, \href{https://github.com/bixiou/international_attitudes_toward_global_policies/raw/main/paper/app_desc_stats_ES.pdf}{ES}, \href{https://github.com/bixiou/international_attitudes_toward_global_policies/raw/main/paper/app_desc_stats_UK.pdf}{UK}. %

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ain/paper/app_desc_stats_UK.pdf}{U
K}.} while the surveys' structures an
d questionnaires are given in Appendi
ces \ref{app:questionnaire_oecd} and
\ref{app:questionnaire}. The question
naires are the same as the ones given
\textit{ex ante} in the registration
plan (\href{https://osf.io/fy6gd}{os
f.io/fy6gd}).
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\paragraph{\small Incentives.} %
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```
To encourage accurate and truthful re
sponses, several questions of the \te
xtit{US1} survey use incentives. For
each of the three comprehension quest
ions that follow the policy descripti
ons, we randomly select and reward th
ree respondents who provide correct a
nswers with a \$50 gift certificate.
Similarly, for questions involving es
timating support shares for the GCS a
nd NR, three respondents with the clo
sest guesses to the actual values rec
eive a \$50 gift certificate. In the
donation lottery question, we randoml
y select one respondent and split the
\$100 prize between the NGO GiveDirec
tly and the winner according to the w
inner's choice. In total, our incenti
ves scheme distributes gift certifica
tes (and donations) for a value of
\$850. Finally, respondents have an i
ncentive to answer truthfully to the
petition question, as they are aware
that the results for that question (t
he share of respondents supporting th
e policy) will be transmitted to the
U.S. President's office.
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\paragraph{\small Incentives.} %
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To encourage accurate and truthful re
sponses, several questions of the mai
n surveys use incentives. For each of
the three comprehension questions tha
t follow the policy descriptions, we
randomly select and reward three resp
ondents who provide correct answers w
ith a \$50 gift certificate. Similarl
y, for questions involving estimating
support shares for the GCS and NR, th
ree respondents with the closest gues
ses to the actual values receive a
\$50 gift certificate. In the donatio
n lottery question, we randomly selec
t one respondent and split the \$100
prize between the NGO GiveDirectly an
d the winner according to the winne
r's choice. In total, our incentives
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(and donations) for a value of \$850.
Finally, respondents have an incentiv
e to answer truthfully to the petitio
n question, as they are aware that th
e results for that question (the shar
e of respondents supporting the polic
y) will be transmitted to their head
of state's office.
\paragraph{\small Absolute vs. relati
ve support.}
In most questions, support or opposit
ion for a policy is asked using a 5-L
ikert scale, with compulsory response
and \textit{Indifferent} as the middl
e option. We call \textit{absolute su
pport} the share of \textit{Somewhat}
or \textit{Strong support}. We genera
lly favor the notion of \textit{relat
ive support}, which reports the share
of support after excluding \textit{In
different} answers. Indeed, the \text
it{relative support} is better suited
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to assess whether there are more people in favor vs. against a policy.

\paragraph{\small Support for the GCS.}
The 95\% confidence intervals are $[52.4\%, 55.9\%]$ in the U.S. and $[74.2\%, 77.2\%]$ in Europe. The average support is computed with survey weights, employing weights based on quota variables, which exclude vote. Another method to reweigh the raw results involves running a regression of the support for the GCS on sociodemographic characteristics (including vote) and multiplying each coefficient by the population frequencies. This alternative approach yields similar figures: 76\% in Europe and 52\% or 53\% in the U.S. (depending on whether individuals who did not disclose their vote are classified as non-voters or excluded). Notably, the average support among voters is 54\% in the U.S., with 74\% support among Biden voters vs. 26\% among Trump voters (see Figure \ref{fig:main_by_vote}).

Though the level of support for the GCS is significantly lower in swing States (at 51\%) that are key to win U.S. elections, the electoral effect of endorsing the GCS remains non-significantly different from zero (at +1.2 p.p.) in these States. Note that we define swing states as the 8 states with less than 5 p.p. margin of victory in the 2020 election (MI, NV, PA, WI, AZ, GA, NC, FL). The results are unchanged if we use the 3 p.p. threshold (that excludes FL) instead.

\paragraph{\small List experiment.} %
List experiments have been used to reveal social desirability bias, silencing either racism in the Southern U.S.\citep{kuklinski_racial_1997} or opposition to the invasion of Ukraine in Russia.\citep{chapkovski_solid_2022} %
In our case, the question reads: ``Beware, this question is quite unusual.

Among the policies below, \textbf{how many} do you support?'' The list of policies randomly varies across respondents, and includes a subset of GCS, NR (National Redistribution scheme), C (``Coal exit'' in the U.S., ``Thermal insulation plan'' in Europe) and O (``Marriage only for opposite-sex couples in the U.S.'', ``Death penalty for major crimes'' in Europe). There are four branches: GCS/NR/C/O; GCS/C/O; NR/C/O; C/O. To estimate the tacit average support for the GCS and NR, we regress the number of supported policies on indicators that the list includes GCS and NR.

We utilize the difference-in-means estimator, and confidence intervals are computed using Monte Carlo simulation with the R package \textit{list}.\citep{imai_multivariate_2011}

\paragraph{\small Petition.}
The respondent is randomly assigned a branch where the petition relates to the GCS or the National Redistribution scheme. The question reads: ``Would you be willing to sign a petition for the [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme? \\ As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President's office], informing him what share of [American] people are willing to endorse the [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign, only your answer here is required and remains anonymous.)''.

Paired weighted \textit{t}-tests are conducted to test the equality in support for a policy among respondents who were questioned about the policy in the petition.

\paragraph{\small Conjoint analyses.}
The first conjoint analysis suggests that the GCS is supported independently of being complemented by the National Redistribution Scheme and a national climate policy (``Coal exit'' in the U.S., ``Thermal insulation plan''

in Europe, denoted C). Indeed, 54\% of %
U.S. respondents and 74\% of %
European ones prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to the combination of C and NR alone, indicating similar support for the GCS conditional on NR and C than for the GCS alone (Figure \ref{fig:conjoint}).

In the second conjoint analysis, results from the first branch show that the support for the GCS conditional on NR, at 55\% in the U.S. (n = 757) and 77\% in Europe (n = 746), is not significantly different from the support for the GCS alone. This suggests that rejection of the GCS is not driven by the cost of the policy on oneself. The second branch shows that the support for C conditional on NR is somewhat higher, at 62\% in the U.S. (n = 751) and 84\% in Europe (n = 747). However, the third one shows no significant preference for C compared to GCS (both conditional on NR), neither in Europe, where GCS is preferred by 52\% (n = 741) nor in the U.S., where C is preferred by 53\% (n = 721). The fourth branch shows that 55\% in the U.S. (n = 771) and 77\% in Europe (n = 766) prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to NR alone.

The effects reported in the fourth analysis are the Average Marginal Component Effects.\cite{hainmueller_causal_2014} The policies studied are progressive policies prominent in the country. Except for the category \textit{foreign policy}, which features the GCS 42\% of the time, they are drawn uniformly.

\paragraph{\small Prioritization.}
The prioritization allows inferring individual-level preferences for one policy over another, including in their intensity. This somewhat differs from a conjoint analysis, which only allows inferring individual-level prefe

rences for one platform over another or collective-level preferences for one policy over another. Also, by comparing platforms, conjoint analyses may be subject to interaction effects between policies of a platform (which can be seen as complementary, substitute, or antagonistic) while the prioritization frames the policies as independent.

288

289 This question sheds light on a potential discrepancy between the policy priorities of the public and those enacted by legislators. For instance, while the European Union and California have enacted plans to phase out new combustion-engine cars by 2035, the proposal to ``ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030'' emerged as one of the three least prioritized policies in each country, with an average allocation of 7.8 points in France to 11.4 points in the UK.

290

291 \paragraph{\small Open-ended question on the GCS.}

292 Around one in four respondents explicitly cites pros or cons. Few individuals explicitly express support or opposition, and misunderstandings are rare. Only 11\% of the responses are empty or express a lack of opinion, though one-quarter are unclassifiable due to the rarity, nonsensical nature, or irrelevance of the conveyed idea.

293

294 \paragraph{\small Pros and cons.}

295 In the closed question, the least important aspect was the negative impact on their household, with 60\% in Europe (n=1,505) and 75\% in the U.S. (n=493) finding it important. The most important elements differ between Europe and the U.S. In Europe, the key factors are the GCS's potential to limit climate change and reduce poverty in low-income countries, both deemed important by 85\% of respondents. In the U.S., having sufficient information about the scheme ranks highest

at 89\%, followed by its potential to foster global cooperation at 82\%.

Surprisingly, the support for National Redistribution also decreased by 7 p.p. following the closed question about the GCS. This suggests that some individuals may lack attention and confuse the two policies, or that contemplating the pros and cons alters the mood of some people, moving them away from their initial positive impression.

\paragraph{\small Universalistic values}

When asked what their country's diplomats should defend in international climate negotiations, only 11\% prefer their country's ``interests, even if it goes against global justice.'' In contrast, 30\% prefer global justice (with or without consideration of national interests), and the bulk of respondents (38\%) prefer their country's ``interests, to the extent it respects global justice.''

Furthermore, when we ask respondents to assess the extent to which climate change, global poverty, and inequality in their country are issues, climate change is generally viewed as the most significant problem %

(with a mean score of 0.59 after recoding answers between -2 and 2). This is followed by global poverty (0.42) and national inequality (0.37). %

Finally, we conduct a lottery experiment. %

Respondents were automatically enrolled in a lottery with a \$100 prize and had to choose the proportion of the prize they would keep for themselves versus give to a person living in poverty. The %

charity donation is directed either to an African individual or a fellow citizen, depending on the respondent's random assignment. In Europe, we observe no significant variation in the w

illingness to donate based on the rec ipient's origin. In the U.S., the don ations to Africans are 3 p.p. lower, %

but the slightly lower donations to A fricans are entirely driven by Trump voters and non-voters (Table \ref{ta b:donation}).

\paragraph{\small Global wealth tax e stimates.}

A 2\% tax on net wealth exceeding \$5 million would annually raise \$816 bi llion, leaving unaffected 99.9\% of t he world population. More specificall y, it would collect \euro{}5 billion in Spain, \euro{}16 billion in Franc e, £20 billion in the UK, \euro{}44 b illion in Germany, \$430 billion in t he U.S., and \$1 billion collectively in all low-income countries (28 count ries, home to 700 million people). Th ese Figures come from the \href{http s://wid.world/world-wealth-tax-simula tor/}{WID wealth tax simulator}.\cite {chancel_world_2022}

\paragraph{\small Design choices.}

As global survey results indicated st rong support for global redistributiv e policies worldwide, we conducted ou r main surveys to further investigate the surprisingly high support. %

Among the eight largest high-income c ountries, we selected the five ones w ith a relatively low level of support for global redistributive policies as observed in the global survey. We als o focus on the GCS as its costs are l ess concentrated on the very rich, co mpared to other global redistributive policies, so we expected lower (or le ss genuine) support. By selecting cou ntries that would lose from global re distribution, are less supportive tha n others, and focusing on less consen sual policies, we aimed at conservati vely assessing the level of support o f world citizens for global redistrib ution.

We split the U.S. survey into two waves to test the effect on the support of providing the information on the actual support, and merged the \textit{Eu} survey in one wave to get larger sample sizes and more power in the analyses.

To select the policies tested, we spanned three key areas for global redistribution: climate change, inequality, and global governance. We selected policies that are either on the agenda of international negotiations (international transfers for mitigation; adaptation; or loss and damages; cancellation of public debt; reform of voting rights at the UN or IMF; global wealth tax) or advocated by prominent NGOs or scholars (\href{https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5a0c602bf43b5594845abb81/t/5c988368eef1a1538c2ae7eb/1553498989927/GAR.pdf}{global asset registry}; limits on wealth;\citep{robeyns_limitarianism_2024,piketty_brief_2022} democratic climate governance;\citep{dryzek_global_2011} global minimum wage;\citep{palley_financial_2013} fair trade;\citep{hickel_divide_2017} carbon pricing;\citep{cramton_global_2017} \href{https://concordeurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/CONCORD_AidWatch_Report_2019_web.pdf}{increased foreign aid}).

\section*{\normalsize Data and code availability}

\section*{\normalsize Data and code availability}

All data and code of the \textit{Complementary} surveys as well as figures of the paper are available on \href{https://github.com/bixiou/international_attitudes_toward_global_policies}{github.com/bixiou/global_tax_attitudes}. Data and code for the \textit{Global} survey will be made public upon publication. %

All data and code of the \textit{main} surveys as well as figures of the paper are available on \href{https://zenodo.org/doi/10.5281/zenodo.11202245}{10.5281/zenodo.11202245}. %

Data and code for the \textit{g} survey will be made public upon publication. %

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\begin{table}[h]
  %
  %
  \caption[List experiment: tacit support for the GCS]{Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list. %
   The tacit support for the GCS is estimated by regressing the number of supported policies on the presence of the GCS in the list of policies. The social desirability is estimated as the difference between the tacit and stated support, and it is not significantly different from zero even at a 20\% threshold (see \nameref{sec:methods}).
  }\label{tab:list_exp}
  \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\input{../tables/continents/reg_list_exp_g.tex}
  }
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\section*{\normalsize Acknowledgements}

We are grateful for financial support from A Sustainable Future (ASF) at the University of Amsterdam, and TU Berlin. Mattauch also thanks the Robert Bosch Foundation. %
We thank Antoine Dechezleprêtre, Tobias Kruse, Bluebery Planterose, Ana Sanchez Chico, and Stefanie Stantcheva for their invaluable inputs for the project. We thank Auriane Meilland for feedback. %

\section*{\normalsize Author Contributions} A.F. collected and analysed the data, and drafted the questionnaire and the paper. T.D. and L.M. substantially revised the questionnaire and paper, and contributed to the conception and redaction.

\section*{\normalsize Competing interests} Fabre declares that he also serves as president of Global Redistribution Advocates. %
\end{small}  %

\begin{table}[h]
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  %
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  }\label{tab:list_exp}
  \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\input{../tables/continents/reg_list_exp_g.tex}
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363 \end{table}
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345 \end{table}
346
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Text moved with changes from lines 157-162 (99.5% similarity)

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347 \begin{table}[h]
348   %
349   \caption[Influence of the GCS on electoral prospects]{Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. (Question \ref{q:conjoint_c})
350   %
351 } %
352   \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\input{../tables/country_comparison/conjoint_c_wo_none_stats.tex}}\label{tab:conjoint_c}
353   {\footnotesize \textit{Note:} Simple OLS model. %
354   The 14\% of \textit{None of them} answers have been excluded from the regression samples. GCS has no significant influence on them. $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**} p<0.05$; $^{***} p<0.01$.
355   }
356 \end{table}
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358 \renewcommand{\url}[1]{\href{#1}{Link}} %
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360 \clearpage
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365 \begin{bibunit}[plainnaturl_clean]
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367 \appendix %
368 \renewcommand{\thetable}{S\arabic{table}}
369 \renewcommand{\thefigure}{S\arabic{figure}}
370 \setcounter{figure}{0}
371 \setcounter{table}{0}
372
373 \clearpage
374 \section*{Extended data}
375
376 \begin{table}[h]
377   \caption[Campaign and bandwagon effects on the support for the GCS.]{Eff
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ects on the support for the GCS of a question on its pros and cons (either in open-ended of closed format) and on information about the actual support, in the U.S. (See Section \ref{subsec:questionnaire_perceptions} in the \textit{US2} Questionnaire)  \hfill (Back~to~Section~\ref{subsubsec:pros_cons})} \label{tab:branch_gcs}
  \makebox[\textwidth][c]{
      \input{../tables/US2/branch_gcs.tex}
  }
  {\footnotesize %
  }
\end{table}

\begin{table}[h]
  \caption[Donation to Africa vs. own country]{Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality. (Question \ref{q:donation})\hfill (Back~to~Section~\ref{subsec:universalistic})} \label{tab:donation}
  \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\input{../tables/continents/donation_interaction.tex}}
\end{table}

\input{../tables/amce.tex}

\begin{figure}[h!]
    \caption[Support for the Global Climate Scheme]{[For Supplementary Material] Support for the GCS, NR and the combination of GCS, NR and C (\textit{Yes}/\textit{No} questions). \\(p. \pageref{subsec:questionnaire_GCS}, Questions \ref{q:gcs_support}, \ref{q:nr_support}, \ref{q:global_tax}, \ref{q:national_tax}, and \ref{q:crg_support}).%
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Text moved from lines 128-130

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    }\label{fig:support_binary}
    \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegraphics[width=.9\textwidth]{../figures/country_comparison/support_binary_positive.pdf}}
\end{figure}
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\begin{figure}[h]
  \caption[Preferences for various policies in political platforms]{Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See non-translated versions in Figure \ref{fig:ca_r_en}; Question \ref{q:conjoint_r}%
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  )}\label{fig:ca_r}
  \begin{subfigure}{\textwidth}
    \subcaption{U.S. (Asked only to non-Republicans)}
    \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/US1/ca_r.png}
  \end{subfigure}
  \begin{subfigure}{\textwidth}
    \subcaption{France}
    \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/FR/ca_r_en.png}
  \end{subfigure}
\end{figure}%
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\begin{figure}[h!]\ContinuedFloat %
  \begin{subfigure}{\textwidth}
    \subcaption{Germany}
    \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/DE/ca_r_en.png}
  \end{subfigure}
  \begin{subfigure}{\textwidth}
    \subcaption{Spain}
    \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/ES/ca_r_en.png}
  \end{subfigure}
  \begin{subfigure}{\textwidth}
    \subcaption{UK}
    \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/UK/ca_r.png}
  \end{subfigure}
  %
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[h!]
  \caption[Influence of the GCS on preferred platform]{Influence of the GCS on preferred platform:\\ Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percen
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t). (Question \ref{q:conjoint_d}; in the U.S., asked only to non-Republicans.)}\label{fig:conjoint_left_ag_b}
  \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/country_comparison/conjoint_left_ag_b_binary_positive.pdf}}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[h!]
  \caption[Beliefs about support for the GCS and NR]{Beliefs regarding the support for the GCS and NR. (Questions \ref{q:gcs_belief} and \ref{q:nr_belief})}\label{fig:belief}
  \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegraphics[width=.7\textwidth]{../figures/country_comparison/belief_all_mean.pdf}}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}
  \centering
  \caption[Preferred share of wealth tax for low-income countries]{Percent of global wealth tax that should finance low-income countries (\textit{mean}). \\ ``Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all countries around the world.
  (\dots)  \\
  What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of retained in the country's national budget)?'' (Question \ref{q:global_tax_global_share})} %
  \includegraphics[width=1\textwidth]{../figures/country_comparison/global_tax_global_share_mean.pdf} \label{fig:global_share_mean}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[h!]
  \caption[Attitudes on the evolution of foreign aid]{Attitudes regarding the evolution of [own country] foreign aid. (Question \ref{q:foreign_aid_raise_support})}\label{fig:foreign_aid_raise_support}
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Text moved from lines 289-292

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  \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/country_comparison/foreign_aid_raise_support.pdf}}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[h!]
  \caption[Conditions at which foreign aid should be increased]{Conditions at which foreign aid should be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish an increase of foreign aid at some conditions.] (Question \ref{q:foreign_aid_condition})}\label{fig:foreign_aid_condition}
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Text moved from lines 294-297

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  \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/country_comparison/foreign_aid_condition_positive.pdf}}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[h!]
  \caption[Reasons why foreign aid should not be increased]{Reasons why foreign aid should not be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish a decrease or stability of foreign aid.] (Question \ref{q:foreign_aid_no})}\label{fig:foreign_aid_no}
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  \makebox[\textwidth][c]{\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../figures/country_comparison/foreign_aid_no_positive.pdf}}
\end{figure}

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473 % Concluding paragraph in universalistic values?