

# <sup>1</sup> International Majorities Genuinely Support Global <sup>2</sup> Redistribution and Climate Policies

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## Abstract

We document majority support for policies entailing global redistribution and climate mitigation. Surveys on 40,680 respondents in 20 countries show strong stated support for a global carbon price funding equal cash transfers, called the “Global Climate Scheme” (GCS). Through our main surveys on 8,000 respondents in the U.S., France, Germany, Spain, and the UK, we test several hypotheses that could reconcile strong stated support with scarce occurrences in public debates. Three quarters of Europeans and half of Americans support the GCS, even as they understand the policy’s cost to them. Using different experiments, we show that the support for the GCS is sincere and that electoral candidates could win votes by endorsing it. More generally, we document widespread support for other globally redistributive policies, such as increased foreign aid or a wealth tax funding low-income countries. In sum, global policies are genuinely supported by majorities, even in wealthy, contributing countries.

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## 69 **1 Introduction**

70 Major sustainability objectives could be achieved by global approaches to mitigating  
 71 climate change and poverty involving transfers from high- to lower-income countries.<sup>1–6</sup>  
 72 For instance, a global wealth tax could finance the Sustainable Development Goals.<sup>7</sup> More  
 73 specifically, if merely 35% of the revenue were allocated for this purpose, a global 2% tax  
 74 on individual wealth in excess of \$5 million could significantly reduce poverty as it would  
 75 mechanically increase low-income countries' national income by 50% (as computed on  
 76 the [WID wealth tax simulator](#)). Besides, global carbon pricing is widely regarded by  
 77 economists as the benchmark climate policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon  
 78 emissions externality. As early as 1990, Michael Grubb stated:<sup>8</sup> "by far the best com-  
 79 bination of long term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity, is obtained from a  
 80 system based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions which are allocated on an adult  
 81 per capita basis", i.e., equally among human adults. Support for such solution, which we  
 82 call the "Global Climate Scheme", has been renewed ever since.<sup>9–14</sup>

83 While international negotiations have not yet led to ambitious globally redistributive  
 84 policies, recent developments suggest that such a change might be underway. The African  
 85 Union [calls for](#) a global carbon taxation regime, the UN [is setting up](#) a Framework Con-  
 86 vention on International Tax Cooperation, the G20 is studying a global wealth tax, etc.

87 A key condition for implementing global policies has remained largely unaddressed:  
88 the support of citizens. Using a Global survey on 40,680 respondents from 20 high-  
89 and middle-income countries, we reveal substantial support for those policies, especially  
90 global climate policies and a global tax on the wealthiest aimed at financing low-income  
91 countries (other questions from this survey are analyzed in a companion paper<sup>15</sup>). In-  
92 terestingly, even in wealthy nations that would bear a significant burden, majorities of  
93 citizens express support for such globally redistributive policies. To better understand  
94 public support for global policies in high-income countries, we conduct our Main sur-  
95 veys among 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, the UK, and the U.S.

96 The focus of the Main surveys is a specific policy aimed at addressing both climate  
97 change and poverty, referred to as the “Global Climate Scheme” (GCS). It implements  
98 a cap on carbon emissions to limit global warming below 2°C. The emission rights are  
99 auctioned each year to polluting firms and fund a global basic income, alleviating extreme  
100 poverty. This archetypal policy exposes respondents to the key trade-off between the  
101 benefits and costs of globally redistributive climate policies, as respondents are made  
102 aware of the cost that the GCS entails for their country’s people.

103 After checking that respondents have understood the policy and its cost, we measure  
104 the support in a direct Yes/No question. The GCS is supported by three quarters of Eu-  
105 ropeans and more than half of Americans. Then, we test for social desirability bias using  
106 a list experiment. We find no evidence that people exaggerate their support in the direct  
107 question. To assess whether the support would diminish in a context with real stakes,  
108 we ask respondents whether they are willing to sign a petition in favor of the GCS, after  
109 informing them that the question results will be communicated to their head of state’s  
110 office. The support is sustained in an environment that approaches real stakes. We then  
111 carry out conjoint analyses to neutralize experimenter demand and investigate the prior-  
112 ity given to global policies compared to other types of policies. Conjoint analyses reveal  
113 that a political platform is more likely to be preferred if it contains the GCS or a global tax  
114 on millionaires, and that global policies rank high in the prioritization of policies. Our  
115 randomized experiments also show that a candidate would not lose vote intentions by  
116 endorsing the GCS, and might even gain up to 11 points in a country like France. An  
117 analysis of open-ended fields confirms that support for the GCS is real, and indicates that  
118 appeal of the GCS comes from its international nature and its impacts on climate, more  
119 than on global poverty. We also test other global policies and universalistic attitudes. Sup-  
120 port is very strong for a global tax on millionaires, and the median respondent prefers to

<sup>121</sup> allocate 30% of the revenues of such a tax to low-income countries. Majorities are willing  
<sup>122</sup> to increase foreign aid, but only if some conditions are respected, such as making sure  
<sup>123</sup> the aid is well spent and other high-income countries also increase their contribution.  
<sup>124</sup> Questions on universalistic values, including a donation experiment, confirm the congru-  
<sup>125</sup> ence of underlying values with the support for specific policies. Our diverse approaches  
<sup>126</sup> also help understand what drives the support. For instance, the evidence indicates that  
<sup>127</sup> one key reason why increasing foreign aid is not as popular as global policies lies in its  
<sup>128</sup> unilateral nature.

<sup>129</sup> Overall, our results point out to strong and genuine support for global climate and  
<sup>130</sup> redistributive policies, as our experiments confirm the stated support found in direct  
<sup>131</sup> questions. Our results contribute to the literature on attitudes toward climate policy, con-  
<sup>132</sup> firming that climate policy is preferred at a global level,<sup>16–19</sup> where it is more effective  
<sup>133</sup> and fair. While 3,354 economists supported a national carbon tax financing equal cash  
<sup>134</sup> transfers in the *Wall Street Journal*, numerous surveys have shown that support for such  
<sup>135</sup> policy is mixed at best.<sup>20;15;21?</sup> Meanwhile, the GCS — the global version of this policy  
<sup>136</sup> — is largely supported, despite higher costs in high-income countries. In our discussion  
<sup>137</sup> we offer potential explanations behind the lack of prominence of global policies in the  
<sup>138</sup> public debate despite this strong support.

<sup>139</sup> **Literature** International surveys have shown widespread support for costly climate ac-  
<sup>140</sup> tion.<sup>15;22</sup> For instance, representative surveys in 125 countries covering 96% of the world's  
<sup>141</sup> greenhouse gas emissions show that 69% of the global population express willingness  
<sup>142</sup> to contribute 1% of their income to fight global warming.<sup>23</sup> International surveys have  
<sup>143</sup> also uncovered near consensus that “present economic differences between rich and poor  
<sup>144</sup> countries are too large” (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree) in each of 29 countries.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>145</sup> Yet, few prior attitudinal surveys have examined global redistributive policies. A no-  
<sup>146</sup> table exception tests the support for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples in five  
<sup>147</sup> countries, representative along gender and age.<sup>25</sup> For a given variant, the sample size is  
<sup>148</sup> about 167 respondents per country. They find over 80% support for any variant in India,  
<sup>149</sup> between 50% and 65% in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43% to 59% in the U.S.,  
<sup>150</sup> depending on the variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding an equal  
<sup>151</sup> cash transfer for each human is close to 50% in high-income countries (e.g., at 44% in the  
<sup>152</sup> U.S.). These figures are consistent with our results from the *Global survey* (see Figure 2),  
<sup>153</sup> where the support is lower for a tax that would “only” reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions than for

<sup>154</sup> a quota that would unambiguously achieve the climate target. Relatedly, 66% of Americans support providing “financial aid and technical support to developing countries that agree to limit their greenhouse gas emissions”,<sup>26</sup> and 90% of Germans want some degree of global redistribution.<sup>27</sup> Besides, in surveys conducted in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S., support ranges from 55% to 74% for “a global democracy including both a global government and a global parliament, directly elected by the world population, to recommend and implement policies on global issues”.<sup>28</sup> Through an experiment, this paper also finds that, in countries where the government stems from a coalition, voting shares would shift by 8 (Brazil) to 12 p.p. (Germany) from parties who are said to oppose global democracy to parties that supposedly support it. For instance, when Germans respondents were told that (only) the Greens and the Left support global democracy, these parties gained respectively 9 and 3 p.p. in vote intentions.

<sup>166</sup> Appendix A contains a broader literature review including further attitudinal surveys on global policies (A.1.1); prior work on attitudes toward climate burden sharing (Appendix A.1.2), attitudes toward foreign aid (Appendix A.1.3); global carbon pricing (Appendix A.2.1), global redistribution (Appendix A.2.3), basic income (Appendix A.2.4), and global democracy (Appendix A.2.5).

## <sup>171</sup> 2 Results


### <sup>172</sup> 2.1 Data

<sup>173</sup> The study relies on two sets of surveys: the *Global* survey and the *Main* surveys.

<sup>174</sup> **Global Survey** The *Global* survey, conducted in 2021 by Dechezleprêtre et al.,<sup>15</sup> involved 40,680 respondents from 20 countries, representing approximately 72% of global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. This survey serves as the basis for measuring stated support for various global policies worldwide. Detailed information about the data collection process, sample representativeness, and analysis of questions on national policies can be found in the companion paper.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>180</sup> **Main Surveys** To delve deeper into the sincerity and rationales behind support for the GCS and attitudes towards global policies, global redistribution, and universalistic values, we conducted the Main surveys in 2023. These surveys are based on a sample of

Figure 1: Main surveys' structure. Cf. also Figure S48 for the treatment branches.



<sup>183</sup> 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, the UK, and the U.S. The European survey (*Eu*) comprises 3,000 respondents, while the U.S. sample was collected in two separate waves: *US1* with 3,000 respondents and *US2* with 2,000 respondents. The survey questions in both the European and U.S. surveys are identical (see Figure 1), except for an additional question in *US2* that uses results from *US1* to assess the bandwagon effect.


<sup>188</sup> The Main surveys ensured representativeness along key dimensions: gender, income, age, highest diploma, and degree of urbanization. The *Eu* survey is also representative of its four countries in terms of population size, while the *US1* and *US2* surveys are representative in terms of region and ethnicity. Tables S8-S9 detail how our samples match population frequencies. More detail on data collection is given in Section **Methods**. The questionnaires used in the surveys are provided in Appendices **C** and **D**.

## <sup>194</sup> 2.2 Global support

<sup>195</sup> The Global survey shows strong support for climate policies enacted at the global level (Figure 2). When asked “At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle

197 climate change need to be put in place?", 70% (in the U.S.) to 94% (in Japan) choose the  
 198 global level. The next most popular choice is the federal or continental level, favored  
 199 by 52% of Americans and less than half of European respondents. Local policies receive  
 200 the least support. This preference for climate policies implemented at the global scale  
 201 is in line with the literature<sup>17</sup> and consistent with individuals' concerns for the fairness  
 202 and effectiveness of such policies, which have been identified as two of the three key  
 203 determinants of support, besides self-interest.<sup>29;20;15</sup> It could also stem from conditional  
 204 cooperation, although previous studies suggest that the support for climate policies does  
 205 not depend on climate action abroad.<sup>30;31</sup>

Figure 2: Support for global climate policies.



Note 1: The numbers represent *relative* support, i.e. the share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* among non-*indifferent* answers (in percent,  $n = 40,680$ ). The color blue denotes a relative majority. See Figure S11 for the absolute support. (Questions A-I).

Note 2: \*In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

206 Among the four global climate policies examined in the *Global* survey, three policies

<sup>207</sup> garner high support across all countries (Figure 2). These policies include a global democratic assembly on climate change, a global tax on millionaires to finance low-income  
<sup>208</sup> countries contingent on their climate action, and a global carbon budget of +2°C divided  
<sup>209</sup> among countries based on tradable shares (or “global quota”), with the allocation of coun-  
<sup>210</sup> try shares unspecified (see wording in Appendix C). The three policies garner a majority  
<sup>211</sup> of absolute support (i.e., “somewhat” or “strong” support) in all countries (except in the  
<sup>212</sup> U.S. for the global assembly, 48% absolute support). In high-income countries, the global  
<sup>213</sup> quota policy obtains 64% absolute support and 84% relative support (i.e., excluding “in-  
<sup>214</sup> different” answers).

<sup>215</sup> Following the support for the global quota, respondents are asked about their pref-  
<sup>216</sup> erences for dividing the carbon budget among countries, as depicted in the third block  
<sup>217</sup> of Figure 2. Consistent with the existing literature (see Appendix A.1.2), an equal per  
<sup>218</sup> capita allocation of emission rights emerges as the preferred burden-sharing principle,  
<sup>219</sup> garnering absolute majority support in all countries and never below 84% relative sup-  
<sup>220</sup> port. Taking into account historical responsibilities or vulnerability to climate damages is  
<sup>221</sup> also popular, albeit with less consensus, while grandfathering (i.e., allocation of emission  
<sup>222</sup> shares in proportion to current emissions) receives the least support in all countries.

<sup>223</sup> A global carbon tax that funds a global basic income should produce the same dis-  
<sup>224</sup> tributional outcomes as a global tradable quota with equal per capita emission rights  
<sup>225</sup> (provided that each country returns the revenues from emissions trading equally to its  
<sup>226</sup> citizens and to the extent that the carbon price is the same). The support for the global  
<sup>227</sup> carbon tax is also tested and its redistributive effects – the average increase in expendi-  
<sup>228</sup> tures along with the amount of the basic income – are specified to the respondents ex-  
<sup>229</sup> plicitly (see box below and Appendix D, p. 86). The support for the carbon tax is lower  
<sup>230</sup> than for the quota, particularly in high-income countries, and there is no relative majority  
<sup>231</sup> for the tax in Anglo-Saxon countries (consistently with the levels of support found in the  
<sup>232</sup> only previous study that tested a global carbon tax<sup>25</sup>). Two possible reasons for this lower  
<sup>233</sup> support are that distributive effects are made salient in the case of the tax, and that peo-  
<sup>234</sup> ple may prefer a quota, perhaps because they find it more effective than a tax to reduce  
<sup>235</sup> emissions. The combination of both reasons is consistent with the level of support for the  
<sup>236</sup> global quota once we make the distributive effects salient, as we do in the Main surveys.  
<sup>237</sup>

<sup>238</sup> **2.3 Stated support for the Global Climate Scheme**

<sup>239</sup> The Main surveys (*US1, US2, Eu*) include a comprehensive exploration of citizens'  
<sup>240</sup> attitudes towards the GCS. We present to respondents a detailed description of the GCS  
<sup>241</sup> and explain its distributive effects, including specific amounts at stake (as specified in  
<sup>242</sup> the box below). Furthermore, we assess respondents' understanding of the GCS with  
<sup>243</sup> incentivized questions to test their comprehension of the expected financial outcome for  
<sup>244</sup> typical individuals in high-income countries (loss) and the poorest individuals globally  
<sup>245</sup> (gain), followed by the provision of correct answers (Figures S12-S13). The same approach  
<sup>246</sup> is applied to a National Redistribution scheme (NR) targeting top incomes with the aim  
<sup>247</sup> of financing cash transfers to all adults, calibrated to offset the monetary loss of the GCS  
<sup>248</sup> for the median emitter in their country. We evaluate respondents' understanding that the  
<sup>249</sup> richest would lose and the typical fellow citizens would gain from that policy. Subse-  
<sup>250</sup> quently, we summarize both schemes to enhance respondents' recall. Additionally, we  
<sup>251</sup> present a final incentivized comprehension question and provide the expected answer  
<sup>252</sup> that the combined GCS and NR would result in no net gain or loss for a typical fellow  
<sup>253</sup> citizen. Finally, respondents are directly asked to express their support for the GCS and  
<sup>254</sup> NR using a simple Yes/No question.

**The Global Climate Scheme** The GCS consists of global emissions trading with emission rights being auctioned each year to polluting firms, and of a global basic income, funded by the auction revenues. Using the price and emissions trajectories from the report by Stern & Stiglitz,<sup>32</sup> and in particular a carbon price of \$90/tCO<sub>2</sub> in 2030, we estimate that the basic income would amount to \$30 per month for every human adult (see details in Appendix E). We describe the GCS to the respondents as a "climate club" and we specify its redistributive effects: The 700 million people with less than \$2/day [in Purchasing Power Parity] would be lifted out of extreme poverty, and fossil fuel price increases would cost the typical person in their country a specified amount (see Appendix D for details). The monthly median net cost is \$85 in the U.S., €10 in France, €25 in Germany, €5 in Spain, £20 in the UK.

<sup>255</sup>

<sup>256</sup> The stated support for the GCS is 54% in the U.S. and 76% in Europe, while the support  
<sup>257</sup> for NR is very similar: 56% and 73% respectively (see Figure S1). Appendix F examines  
<sup>258</sup> the sociodemographic determinants of support for the GCS as well as the beliefs corre-  
<sup>259</sup> lated with the support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income. The

<sup>260</sup> strongest correlates are political leaning, trust in the government and perceptions that the  
<sup>261</sup> policy is effective at reducing emissions or in one's self-interest.

## <sup>262</sup> 2.4 Robustness and sincerity of support for the GCS

<sup>263</sup> We use several methods to assess the sincerity of the support for the GCS: a list ex-  
<sup>264</sup> periment, a real-stake petition, conjoint analyses, and the prioritization of policies. All  
<sup>265</sup> methods suggest that the support is either completely sincere, or the share of insincere  
<sup>266</sup> answers is limited.

### <sup>267</sup> 2.4.1 List experiment

<sup>268</sup> By asking *how many* policies within a list respondents support and varying the list  
<sup>269</sup> among respondents, a list experiment allows identifying the tacit support for a policy of  
<sup>270</sup> interest. For example, say a first subsample faces the list of policies A, B, and C, while a  
<sup>271</sup> second subsamples faces the list A, B, C, and GCS. We do not need to know which policies  
<sup>272</sup> each respondent support to estimate the average (tacit) support for the GCS, we simply  
<sup>273</sup> need to compute the difference in the average number of supported policies between  
<sup>274</sup> the two random subsamples.<sup>33</sup> In our case, as shown in Table 1, the tacit support for the  
<sup>275</sup> GCS measured through the list experiment is not significantly lower than the direct stated  
<sup>276</sup> support. Hence, we do not find a social desirability bias in our study.

### <sup>277</sup> 2.4.2 Petition

<sup>278</sup> We ask respondents whether they are willing to sign a petition in support of either  
<sup>279</sup> the GCS or NR policy. We inform them that the petition results will be sent to the head  
<sup>280</sup> of state's office, highlighting the proportion of fellow citizens endorsing the respective  
<sup>281</sup> scheme. Even when framed as a petition that might have real stakes, both policies con-  
<sup>282</sup> tinue to receive majority support. In the U.S., we find no significant difference between  
<sup>283</sup> the support in the petitions and the simple questions (GCS:  $p = .30$ ; NR:  $p = .76$ ). In Eu-  
<sup>284</sup> rope, the petition leads to a comparable lower support for both the GCS ( $7$  p.p.,  $p = 10^{-5}$ )  
<sup>285</sup> and NR ( $4$  p.p.,  $p = .008$ ). While some European respondents are unwilling to sign a  
<sup>286</sup> petition for policies they are expected to support, this phenomenon is not specific to the  
<sup>287</sup> GCS, and the overall willingness to sign a petition remains strong, with  $69\%$  expressing  
<sup>288</sup> support for the GCS and  $67\%$  for NR.

289 **2.4.3 Conjoint analyses**

290 In order to assess the public support for the GCS in conjunction with other policies, we  
291 conduct a series of conjoint analyses. We ask respondents to make five choices between  
292 pairs of political platforms.

293 The first conjoint analysis suggests that the GCS is supported independently of being  
294 complemented by the National Redistribution Scheme and a national climate policy (C).  
295 The second analysis indicates majority support for the GCS and for C, which are seen as  
296 neither complement nor substitute (see [Methods](#)). A minor share of respondents like a  
297 national climate policy and dislike a global one, but as many people prefer a global rather  
298 than a national policy; and there is no evidence that implementing NR would increase the  
299 support for the GCS.

300 In the third analysis, we present two random branches of the sample with hypothetical  
301 progressive and conservative platforms that differ only by the presence (or not) of the  
302 GCS in the progressive platform. Table 2 shows that a progressive candidate would not  
303 significantly lose voting share by endorsing the GCS in any country, and may even gain  
304 11 p.p. ( $p = .005$ ) in voting intention in France.

305 Our last two analyses make respondents choose between two random platforms. In  
306 Europe, respondents are prompted to imagine that a left or center-left coalition will win  
307 the next election and asked what platform they would prefer that coalition to have cam-  
308 paigned on. In the U.S., the question is framed as a hypothetical duel in a Democratic  
309 primary, and asked only to non-Republicans ( $n = 2,218$ ), i.e. the respondents who declare  
310 as political affiliation *Democrat*, *Independent*, *Non-Affiliated* or *Other*. In the fourth analysis,  
311 a policy (or an absence of policy) is randomly drawn for each platform in each of five  
312 categories: *economic issues*, *societal issues*, *climate policy*, *tax system*, *foreign policy* (Figure  
313 [S2](#)).

314 In the UK, Germany, and France, a platform is about 9 to 13 p.p. more likely to be  
315 preferred if it includes the GCS rather than no foreign policy. This effect is between 1  
316 and 4 p.p. and no longer significant in the U.S. (among non-Republicans) and in Spain.  
317 Moreover, a platform that includes a global tax on millionaires rather than no foreign  
318 policy is 5 to 13 p.p. more likely to be preferred in all countries (the effect is significant  
319 and at least 9 p.p. in all countries but Spain). Similarly, a global democratic assembly on  
320 climate change has a significant effect of 8 to 12 p.p. in the U.S. (among non-Republicans),  
321 Germany, and France. These effects are large, and not far from the effects of the policies  
322 most influential on the platforms, which range between 15 and 18 p.p. in most countries

<sup>323</sup> (and 27 p.p. in Spain), and all relate to improved public services (in particular healthcare,  
<sup>324</sup> housing, and education).

<sup>325</sup> The fifth analysis draws random platforms similarly, except that candidate A's plat-  
<sup>326</sup> form always contains the GCS while B's includes no foreign policy. In this case, A is  
<sup>327</sup> chosen by 60% of Europeans and 58% of non-Republican Americans (Figure S3). Over-  
<sup>328</sup> all, taking the U.S. as an example, our conjoint analyses indicate that a candidate at the  
<sup>329</sup> Democratic primary would have more chances to obtain the nomination by endorsing the  
<sup>330</sup> GCS, and this endorsement would not penalize her or him at the presidential election.

#### <sup>331</sup> 2.4.4 Prioritization

<sup>332</sup> Towards the end of the survey, we ask respondents to allocate 100 points among six  
<sup>333</sup> randomly selected policies from the previous conjoint analyses, using sliders. The instruc-  
<sup>334</sup> tion was to distribute the points based on their level of support, with a higher allocation  
<sup>335</sup> indicating greater support for a policy. As a result, the average support across policies is  
<sup>336</sup> 16.67 points. In each country, the GCS ranks in the middle of all policies or above, with  
<sup>337</sup> an average number of points from 15.4 in the U.S. to 22.9 in Germany.

<sup>338</sup> Interestingly, in Germany, the most prioritized policy is the global tax on millionaires,  
<sup>339</sup> while the GCS is the second most prioritized policy. The global tax on millionaires con-  
<sup>340</sup> sistently ranks no lower than fifth position (out of 15 or 17 policies) in every country,  
<sup>341</sup> garnering an average of 18.3 points in Spain to 22.9 points in Germany.

#### <sup>342</sup> 2.4.5 Pros and Cons

<sup>343</sup> We survey respondents to gather their perspectives on the pros and cons of the GCS,  
<sup>344</sup> randomly utilizing an open-ended or a closed question. In the closed question format,  
<sup>345</sup> respondents tend to consider every argument as important in determining their support  
<sup>346</sup> or opposition to the GCS (see Figure S17).

<sup>347</sup> The open-ended question provides more insights into what people associate with the  
<sup>348</sup> GCS when prompted to think about it. Analyzing keywords in the responses (automati-  
<sup>349</sup> cally translated into English), the most frequently mentioned topics are the international  
<sup>350</sup> aspect and the environment, each appearing in approximately one-quarter of the answers  
<sup>351</sup> (see Figure S19). This is followed by discussions on the effects of the GCS on poverty and  
<sup>352</sup> prices, each mentioned by about one-tenth of the respondents. We also manually clas-  
<sup>353</sup> sified each answer into different categories (see Figure S18). This exercise confirms the

<sup>354</sup> findings from the automatic search: the environmental benefit of the GCS is the most  
<sup>355</sup> commonly discussed topic, while obstacles to implementation or agreement on the pro-  
<sup>356</sup> posal are relatively infrequently mentioned.

<sup>357</sup> In the *US2* survey, we divided the sample into four random branches. Two branches  
<sup>358</sup> were presented the pros and cons questions (either in open or closed format) *before* be-  
<sup>359</sup> ing asked about their support for the GCS or NR. Another branch received information  
<sup>360</sup> on the actual level of support for the GCS and NR (estimated in *US1*, see box p. 14),  
<sup>361</sup> and one control group received none of these treatments. The objective of the “pros and  
<sup>362</sup> cons treatment” was to mimic a “campaign effect”, which refers to the shift in opinion  
<sup>363</sup> resulting from media coverage of the proposal. To conservatively estimate the effect of  
<sup>364</sup> a (potentially negative) campaign, we intentionally included more cons (6) than pros (3).  
<sup>365</sup> Interestingly, the support for the GCS decreased by 11 p.p. after respondents viewed a list  
<sup>366</sup> of its pros and cons. Notably, the support also decreased by 7 p.p. after respondents were  
<sup>367</sup> asked to consider the pros and cons in an open-ended question. Despite some significant  
<sup>368</sup> effects of pondering the pros and cons, approximately half of the Americans express sup-  
<sup>369</sup> port for the GCS across all treatment branches (see Table S1). Although support remains  
<sup>370</sup> significant, these results suggest that the public success of the GCS would be sensitive to  
<sup>371</sup> the content of the debate about it, and subject to the discourse adopted by interest groups.

**Second-order Beliefs** To explain the strong support for the GCS despite its ab-  
sence from political platforms and public debate, we hypothesized pluralistic igno-  
rance, i.e. that the public and policymakers mistakenly perceive the GCS as unpop-  
ular. As a result, individuals might conceal their support for such globally redis-  
tributive policies, believing that advocating for them would be futile.

In the case of Americans, their beliefs about the level of support for the GCS are  
relatively accurate (Figure S4). The mean perceived support is 52% (with quartiles  
of 36%, 52%, and 68%), which closely aligns with the actual support of 53%. Euro-  
peans, on the other hand, underestimate the support by 17 p.p. Nonetheless, 65% of  
them correctly estimate that the GCS garners majority support, and the mean per-  
ceived support is 59% (and quartiles of 43%, 61%, and 74%), compared to the actual  
support of 76%. Second-order beliefs are equally accurate for NR in the U.S. and  
similarly underestimated in Europe. Finally, consistent with Americans accurately  
perceiving the levels of support for the GCS or NR, providing information on the  
actual level had no significant effect on their support in the *US2* survey.

<sup>373</sup> **2.5 Stated support for global redistribution**

<sup>374</sup> **2.5.1 Global wealth tax**

<sup>375</sup> Consistent with the results of the Global survey, a “tax on millionaires of all countries  
<sup>376</sup> to finance low-income countries” garners relative support of over 69% in each country,  
<sup>377</sup> only 5 p.p. lower than a national millionaires tax overall (Figure 3). In random subsam-  
<sup>378</sup> ples, we inquire about respondents’ preferences regarding the redistribution of revenues  
<sup>379</sup> from a global tax on individual wealth exceeding \$5 million, after providing information  
<sup>380</sup> on the revenue raised by such a tax in their country compared to low-income countries.  
<sup>381</sup> We ask certain respondents ( $n = 1,283$ ) what percentage of global tax revenues should be  
<sup>382</sup> pooled to finance low-income countries. In each country, at least 88% of respondents in-  
<sup>383</sup> dicate a positive amount, with an average of one-third (Figure S5). To other respondents  
<sup>384</sup> ( $n = 1,233$ ), we inquire whether they would prefer each country to retain all the revenues  
<sup>385</sup> it collects or that half of the revenues be pooled to finance low-income countries. Ap-  
<sup>386</sup> proximately half of the respondents opt to allocate half of the tax revenues to low-income  
<sup>387</sup> countries, consistently with the other variant of the question.

<sup>388</sup> **2.5.2 Other global policies**

<sup>389</sup> We also assess support for other global policies (Figure 3). Most policies garner rel-  
<sup>390</sup> ative majority support in each country, with two exceptions: the “cancellation of low-  
<sup>391</sup> income countries’ public debt” and “a maximum wealth limit” for each individual. The  
<sup>392</sup> latter policy obtains relative majority support in Europe but not in the U.S., despite the  
<sup>393</sup> cap being set at \$10 billion in the U.S. compared to €/£100 million in Europe. Notably,  
<sup>394</sup> climate-related policies enjoy significant popularity, with “high-income countries funding  
<sup>395</sup> renewable energy in low-income countries” receiving absolute majority support across all  
<sup>396</sup> surveyed countries. Additionally, relative support for loss and damages compensation, as  
<sup>397</sup> approved in principle at the international climate negotiations in 2022 (“COP27”), ranges  
<sup>398</sup> from 55% (U.S.) to 81% (Spain).

<sup>399</sup> **2.5.3 Foreign aid**

<sup>400</sup> We provide respondents with information about the actual amount “spent on foreign  
<sup>401</sup> aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries” relative to their country’s government  
<sup>402</sup> spending and GDP. Less than 16% of respondents state that their country’s foreign aid

Figure 3: Support for various global policies (*relative support*: percentage of *somewhat* or *strong support*, after excluding *indifferent* answers; \*except for GCS: percentage of Yes in a Yes/No question). (p. 86, Questions 20, 44 and 45; See Figure S33 for the absolute support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)*	54	76	80	71	81	74
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	55	71	72	70	79	70
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	68	82	82	82	85	81
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	60	76	77	79	79	71
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	46	53	53	43	62	61
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	58	71	69	69	78	72
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	62	73	58	73	80	83
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	63	80	80	78	81	83
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	62	87	90	86	91	87
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	46	62	58	62	65	67
National tax on millionaires funding public services	73	85	81	87	89	88
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	69	84	84	84	87	83

403 should be reduced, while 62% express support for increasing it, including 17% who sup-  
 404 port an unconditional increase (Figure S6). Among the 45% who think aid should be  
 405 increased under certain conditions, we subsequently ask them to specify the conditions  
 406 they deem necessary (Figure S7). The three most commonly selected conditions are: "we  
 407 can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted" (73% chose this con-  
 408 dition), "that recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights" (67%),  
 409 and "that other high-income countries also increase their foreign aid" (48%). On the other  
 410 hand, respondents who do not wish to increase their country's foreign aid primarily jus-  
 411 tify their view by prioritizing the well-being of their fellow citizens or by perceiving each  
 412 country as responsible for its own fate (Figure S8). In response to an open-ended ques-

<sup>413</sup> tion regarding measures high-income countries should take to fight extreme poverty, a  
<sup>414</sup> large majority of Americans expressed that more help is needed (Figure S46). The most  
<sup>415</sup> commonly suggested form of aid is financial support, closely followed by investments in  
<sup>416</sup> education.

<sup>417</sup> We also inquire about the perceived amount of foreign aid. Consistent with prior re-  
<sup>418</sup> search (see Appendix A.1.3), most people overestimate the actual amount of foreign aid  
<sup>419</sup> (Figure S25). We then elicit respondents' preferred amount of foreign aid, after randomly  
<sup>420</sup> presenting them with either the actual amount or no information. Most of the respon-  
<sup>421</sup> dents who learn the actual amount choose a bracket at least as high as the actual one, and  
<sup>422</sup> most of those without the information choose a bracket at least as high as the perceived  
<sup>423</sup> one (Figures S28–S27). Finally, we ask a last question to the respondents who received  
<sup>424</sup> the information. To those who prefer an increase of foreign aid, we ask how they would  
<sup>425</sup> finance it: by far, the preferred source of funding is higher taxes on the wealthiest (Figure  
<sup>426</sup> S30). To those who prefer a reduction, we ask how they would use the funds becoming  
<sup>427</sup> available: In every country, more people choose higher spending on education or health-  
<sup>428</sup> care rather than lower taxes (Figure S31).

**Universalistic values** We elicit underlying values, to test whether broad values are consistent with people's support for specific policies. When we ask respondents which group they defend when they vote, 20% choose "sentient beings (humans and animals)," 22% choose "humans," 33% select their "fellow citizens" (or "Europeans"), 15% choose "My family and myself," and the remaining 10% choose another group (mainly "My State or region" or "People sharing my culture or religion"). Notably, a majority of left-wing voters choose *humans* or *sentient beings*.

When asked what their country's diplomats should defend in international climate negotiations, only 11% prefer their country's "interests, even if it goes against global justice." In contrast, 30% prefer global justice (with or without consideration of national interests), and the bulk of respondents (38%) prefer their country's "interests, to the extent it respects global justice."

Furthermore, when we ask respondents to assess the extent to which climate change, global poverty, and inequality in their country are issues, climate change is generally viewed as the most significant problem (with a mean score of 0.59 after recoding answers between -2 and 2). This is followed by global poverty (0.42) and national inequality (0.37).

Finally, we conduct a lottery experiment to elicit. Respondents were automatically enrolled in a lottery with a \$100 prize and had to choose the proportion of the prize they would keep for themselves versus give to a person living in poverty. The charity donation is directed either to an African individual or a fellow citizen, depending on the respondent's random assignment. In Europe, we observe no significant variation in the willingness to donate based on the recipient's origin. In the U.S., the donations to Africans are 3 p.p. lower, but the slightly lower donations to Africans are entirely driven by Trump voters and non-voters (Table S2).

429

### 430 3 Discussion

431 Our point of departure are recent surveys conducted in 20 of the largest countries, as  
432 they reveal strong majority support for global redistributive and climate policies, even in  
433 high-income countries that would financially lose from them. The results from the Main  
434 surveys conducted in the U.S. and four European countries reinforce these findings. We  
435 find strong support for global taxes on the wealthiest individuals, as well as majority sup-

<sup>436</sup> port for our main policy of interest – the Global Climate Scheme (GCS). The GCS encom-  
<sup>437</sup> passes carbon pricing at a global level through an emissions trading system, accompanied  
<sup>438</sup> by a global basic income funded by the scheme’s revenues. Additional experiments, such  
<sup>439</sup> as a list experiment and a real-stake petition, demonstrate that the support for the GCS is  
<sup>440</sup> real. Such genuine support is further substantiated by the prioritization of the GCS over  
<sup>441</sup> prominent national climate policies and aligned with a significant portion of the popu-  
<sup>442</sup> lation holding universalistic values rather than nationalistic or egoistic ones. Moreover,  
<sup>443</sup> the conjoint analyses indicate that a progressive candidate would not lose voting shares  
<sup>444</sup> by endorsing the GCS, and may even gain 11 p.p. in voting shares in France. Similarly,  
<sup>445</sup> a candidate endorsing the GCS would gain votes in a U.S. Democratic primary, while in  
<sup>446</sup> Europe, a progressive platform that includes the GCS would be preferred over one that  
<sup>447</sup> does not.

<sup>448</sup> Having ruled out insincerity as potential explanation for the scarcity of global policies  
<sup>449</sup> in the public debate, we propose alternative explanations. The first two are variations of  
<sup>450</sup> pluralistic ignorance, and the last three represent complementary explanations.

<sup>451</sup> First, there may be pluralistic ignorance *among policymakers* regarding universalistic  
<sup>452</sup> values, support for the GCS, or the electoral advantage of endorsing it. Second, people or  
<sup>453</sup> policymakers may believe that globally redistributive policies are politically infeasible in  
<sup>454</sup> some key (potentially foreign) countries like the U.S. Third, political discourse centrally  
<sup>455</sup> happens at the national level, shaped by national media and institutions such as voting.  
<sup>456</sup> National framing by political voices may create biases and suppress universalistic values.  
<sup>457</sup> Fourth, many individuals, including policymakers, may perceive global redistributive  
<sup>458</sup> policies as ill-defined or technically infeasible, ultimately dismissing them as unrealistic.  
<sup>459</sup> In particular, policymakers may have insider information about the technical feasibility of  
<sup>460</sup> such policies. Alternatively, the perception of unrealism may stem from an unawareness  
<sup>461</sup> of specific proposals. Fifth, just as policy is disproportionately influenced by the economic  
<sup>462</sup> elites,<sup>34;35</sup> public debate may be shaped by the wealthiest, who have vested interests in  
<sup>463</sup> preventing global redistribution.

<sup>464</sup> Confirmation of any of these hypotheses would lead to a common conclusion: there  
<sup>465</sup> exists substantial support for global policies addressing climate change and global in-  
<sup>466</sup> equality, even in high-income countries, and the perceived boundaries of political realism  
<sup>467</sup> on this issue may soon shift. Uncovering evidence to support the above hypotheses could  
<sup>468</sup> draw attention to global policies in the public debate and contribute to their increased  
<sup>469</sup> prominence.

470 **Methods**

471 **Pre-registration.** The project is approved by Economics & Business Ethics Committee (EBEC) at  
472 the University of Amsterdam (EB-1113) and was preregistered in the Open Science Foundation  
473 registry ([osf.io/fy6gd](https://osf.io/fy6gd)). The study did not deviate from the registration: the questionnaires and  
474 the hypotheses tests used are the same as the ones *given ex ante*. Informed consent was obtained  
475 from all respondents, randomized treatment branches were unknown to the respondents, and our  
476 research complies with all relevant ethical regulations. Respondents were compensated with gift  
477 certificates for a value of €1 per interview. No statistical methods were used to pre-determine  
478 sample sizes but our sample sizes are those reported in previous publications.<sup>15–18;20</sup>

479 **Data collection.** The paper utilizes two sets of surveys: the *Global* survey and the *Main* sur-  
480 veys. The *Main* surveys consist of two U.S. surveys, *US1* and *US2*, and one European survey, *Eu*.  
481 The *Global* survey was conducted from March 2021 to March 2022 on 40,680 respondents from  
482 20 countries (with 1,465 to 2,488 respondents per country). *US1* collected responses from 3,000  
483 respondents between January and March 2023, while *US2* gathered data from 2,000 respondents  
484 between March and April 2023. *Eu* included 3,000 respondents and was conducted from February  
485 to March 2023. We used the survey companies *Dynata* and *Respondi*. To ensure representative  
486 samples, we employed stratified quotas based on gender, age (5 brackets), income (4), region (4),  
487 education level (3), and ethnicity (3) for the U.S. We also incorporated survey weights throughout  
488 the analysis to account for any remaining imbalances. These weights were constructed using the  
489 quota variables as well as the degree of urbanity, and trimmed between 0.25 and 4. Stratified quo-  
490 tas followed by reweighting is the usual method to reduce selection bias from opt-in online panels,  
491 when better sampling methods (such as compulsory participation of random dwellings) are un-  
492 available.<sup>36</sup> By applying weights, the results are fully representative of the respective countries  
493 along the above mentioned dimensions. Results at the European level apply different weights  
494 which ensure representativeness of the combined four European countries. Appendix G shows  
495 how our samples compare to actual population frequencies. Our samples match well actual fre-  
496 quencies, except for some imbalance on vote in the U.S. (which does not affect our results, as show  
497 the results reweighted by vote in the below section *Support for the GCS*). Appendix I shows that the  
498 treatment branches are balanced. Appendix J runs placebo tests of the effects of each treatment on  
499 unrelated outcomes. We do not find effects of earlier treatments on unrelated outcomes arriving  
500 later in the survey. Appendix K shows that our results are unchanged when including inattentive  
501 respondents.

502 **Data quality.** The median duration is 28 minutes for the *Global* survey, 14 min for *US1*, 11 min  
503 for *US2*, and 20 min for *Eu*. To ensure the best possible data quality, we exclude respondents who

504 fail an attention test or rush through the survey (i.e., answer in less than 11.5 minutes in the *Global*  
505 survey, 4 minutes in *US1* or *US2*, 6 minutes in *Eu*). At the end of the survey, we ask whether  
506 respondents thought that our survey was politically biased and want to provide some feedback.  
507 67% of the respondents found the survey unbiased. 25% found it left-wing biased, and 8% found  
508 it right-wing biased.

509 **Questionnaires and raw results.** The questionnaire and raw results of the *Global* survey can  
510 be found in the Appendix of the companion paper.<sup>15</sup> The raw results are reported in Appendix  
511 **B** while the surveys' structures and questionnaires are given in Appendices **C** and **D**. Country-  
512 specific raw results are also available as supplementary material files: **US**, **EU**, **FR**, **DE**, **ES**, **UK**.

513 **Incentives.** To encourage accurate and truthful responses, several questions of the *US1* survey  
514 use incentives. For each of the three comprehension questions that follow the policy descrip-  
515 tions, we randomly select and reward three respondents who provide correct answers with a \$50  
516 gift certificate. Similarly, for questions involving estimating support shares for the GCS and NR,  
517 three respondents with the closest guesses to the actual values receive a \$50 gift certificate. In the  
518 donation lottery question, we randomly select one respondent and split the \$100 prize between  
519 the NGO GiveDirectly and the winner according to the winner's choice. In total, our incentives  
520 scheme distributes gift certificates (and donations) for a value of \$850. Finally, respondents have  
521 an incentive to answer truthfully to the petition question, as they are aware that the results for  
522 that question (the share of respondents supporting the policy) will be transmitted to their head of  
523 state's office.

524 **Absolute vs. relative support.** In most questions, support or opposition for a policy is asked  
525 using a 5-Likert scale, with *Indifferent* as the middle option and compulsory response. We call  
526 *absolute support* the share of *Somewhat* or *Strong support*. We generally favor the notion of *relative*  
527 *support*, which reports the share of support after excluding *Indifferent* answers. Indeed, the *relative*  
528 *support* is better suited to assess whether there are more people in favor vs. against a policy.

529 **Support for the GCS.** The 95% confidence intervals are [52.4%, 55.9%] in the U.S. and [74.2%, 77.2%]  
530 in Europe. The average support is computed with survey weights, employing weights based on  
531 quota variables, which exclude vote. Another method to reweigh the raw results involves running  
532 a regression of the support for the GCS on sociodemographic characteristics (including vote) and  
533 multiplying each coefficient by the population frequencies. This alternative approach yields sim-  
534 ilar figures: 76% in Europe and 52% or 53% in the U.S. (depending on whether individuals who  
535 did not disclose their vote are classified as non-voters or excluded). Notably, the average support  
536 excluding non-voters is 54% in the U.S.

537 Though the level of support for the GCS is significantly lower in swing States (at 51%) that  
538 are key to win U.S. elections, the electoral effect of endorsing the GCS remains non-significantly  
539 different from zero (at +1.2 p.p.) in these States. Note that we define swing states as the 8 states  
540 with less than 5 p.p. margin of victory in the 2020 election (MI, NV, PA, WI, AZ, GA, NC, FL). The  
541 results are unchanged if we use the 3 p.p. threshold (that excludes FL) instead.

542 **List experiment.** List experiments have been used to reveal social desirability bias, silencing ei-  
543 ther racism in the Southern U.S.<sup>37</sup> or opposition to the invasion of Ukraine in Russia.<sup>38</sup> In our case,  
544 the question reads: “Beware, this question is quite unusual. Among the policies below, **how many**  
545 do you support?” The list of policies randomly varies across respondents, and includes a subset of  
546 GCS, NR (National Redistribution scheme), C (“Coal exit” in the U.S., “Thermal insulation plan”  
547 in Europe) and O (“Marriage only for opposite-sex couples in the U.S.”, “Death penalty for major  
548 crimes” in Europe). There are four branches: GCS/NR/C/O; GCS/C/O; NR/C/O; C/O. To esti-  
549 mate the tacit average support for the GCS and NR, we regress the number of supported policies  
550 on indicators that the list includes GCS and NR. We utilize the difference-in-means estimator, and  
551 confidence intervals are computed using Monte Carlo simulation with the R package *list*.<sup>33</sup>

552 **Petition.** The respondent is randomly assigned a branch where the petition relates to the GCS or  
553 the National Redistribution scheme. The question reads: “Would you be willing to sign a petition  
554 for the [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme?

555 As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President’s office], in-  
556 forming him what share of American people are willing to endorse the [Global climate / National  
557 redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign, only your answer here is required and  
558 remains anonymous.”).

559 Paired weighted *t*-tests are conducted to test the equality in support for a policy among re-  
560 spondents who were questioned about the policy in the petition.

561 **Conjoint analyses.** The first conjoint analysis suggests that the GCS is supported independently  
562 of being complemented by the National Redistribution Scheme and a national climate policy  
563 (“Coal exit” in the U.S., “Thermal insulation plan” in Europe, denoted C). Indeed, 54% of U.S.  
564 respondents and 74% of European ones prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to the com-  
565 bination of C and NR alone, indicating similar support for the GCS conditional on NR and C than  
566 for the GCS alone (Figure S15).

567 In the second conjoint analysis, results from the first branch show that the support for the GCS  
568 conditional on NR, at 55% in the U.S. ( $n = 757$ ) and 77% in Europe ( $n = 746$ ), is not significantly  
569 different from the support for the GCS alone. This suggests that rejection of the GCS is not driven  
570 by the cost of the policy on oneself. The second branch shows that the support for C conditional

571 on NR is somewhat higher, at 62% in the U.S. ( $n = 751$ ) and 84% in Europe ( $n = 747$ ). However,  
572 the third one shows no significant preference for C compared to GCS (both conditional on NR),  
573 neither in Europe, where GCS is preferred by 52% ( $n = 741$ ) nor in the U.S., where C is preferred  
574 by 53% ( $n = 721$ ). The fourth branch shows that 55% in the U.S. ( $n = 771$ ) and 77% in Europe ( $n =$   
575 766) prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to NR alone.

576 The effects reported in the fourth analysis are the Average Marginal Component Effects.<sup>39</sup> The  
577 policies studied are progressive policies prominent in the country. Except for the category *foreign*  
578 *policy*, which features the GCS 42% of the time, they are drawn uniformly.

579 **Prioritization.** The prioritization allows inferring individual-level preferences for one policy  
580 over another, including in their intensity. This somewhat differs from a conjoint analysis, which  
581 only allows inferring individual-level preferences for one platform over another or collective-level  
582 preferences for one policy over another. Also, by comparing platforms, conjoint analyses may be  
583 subject to interaction effects between policies of a platform (which can be seen as complementary,  
584 substitute, or antagonistic) while the prioritization frames the policies as independent.

585 This question sheds light on a potential discrepancy between the policy priorities of the public  
586 and those enacted by legislators. For instance, while the European Union and California have  
587 enacted plans to phase out new combustion-engine cars by 2035, the proposal to “ban the sale of  
588 new combustion-engine cars by 2030” emerged as one of the three least prioritized policies in each  
589 country, with an average allocation of 7.8 points in France to 11.4 points in the UK.

590 **Open-ended question on the GCS.** Around one in four respondents explicitly cites pros or cons.  
591 Few individuals explicitly express support or opposition, and misunderstandings are rare. Only  
592 11% of the responses are empty or express a lack of opinion, though one-quarter are unclassifiable  
593 due to the rarity, nonsensical nature, or irrelevance of the conveyed idea.

594 **Pros and cons.** In the closed question, the least important aspect was the negative impact on  
595 their household, with 60% in Europe ( $n=1,505$ ) and 75% in the U.S. ( $n=493$ ) finding it important.  
596 The most important elements differ between Europe and the U.S. In Europe, the key factors are  
597 the GCS’s potential to limit climate change and reduce poverty in low-income countries, both  
598 deemed important by 85% of respondents. In the U.S., having sufficient information about the  
599 scheme ranks highest at 89%, followed by its potential to foster global cooperation at 82%.

600 Surprisingly, the support for National Redistribution also decreased by 7 p.p. following the  
601 closed question about the GCS. This suggests that some individuals may lack attention and con-  
602 fuse the two policies, or that contemplating the pros and cons alters the mood of some people,  
603 moving them away from their initial positive impression.

604 **Global wealth tax estimates.** A 2% tax on net wealth exceeding \$5 million would annually raise  
605 \$816 billion, leaving unaffected 99.9% of the world population. More specifically, it would collect  
606 €5 billion in Spain, €16 billion in France, £20 billion in the UK, €44 billion in Germany, \$430  
607 billion in the U.S., and \$1 billion collectively in all low-income countries (28 countries, home to  
608 700 million people). These Figures come from the WID wealth tax simulator.<sup>40</sup>

609 **Design choices.** As Global survey results indicated strong support for global redistributive poli-  
610 cies worldwide, we conducted our Main surveys to test the robustness of these results. Among  
611 the eight largest high-income countries, we selected the five ones with a relatively low level of  
612 support for global redistributive policies as observed in the Global survey. We also focus on the  
613 GCS as its costs are less concentrated on the very rich, compared to other global redistributive  
614 policies, so we expect lower (or less genuine) support. By selecting countries that would lose from  
615 global redistribution, are less supportive than others, and focusing on less consensual policies, we  
616 aimed at conservatively assessing the level of support of world citizens for global redistribution.

617 We split the U.S. survey into two waves to test the effect on the support of providing the  
618 information on the actual support, and merged the *Eu* survey in one wave to get larger sample  
619 sizes and more power in the analyses.

620 To select the policies tested, we spanned three key areas for global redistribution: climate  
621 change, inequality, and global governance. We selected policies that are either on the agenda  
622 of international negotiations (international transfers for mitigation; adaptation; or loss and dam-  
623 ages; cancellation of public debt; reform of voting rights at the UN or IMF; global wealth tax) or  
624 advocated by prominent NGOs or scholars ([global asset registry](#); limits on wealth;<sup>41,7</sup> democratic  
625 climate governance;<sup>42</sup> global minimum wage;<sup>43</sup> fair trade;<sup>44</sup> carbon pricing;<sup>6</sup> [increased foreign  
626 aid](#)).

## 627 Data and code availability

628 All data and code of the *Main* surveys as well as figures of the paper are available on [10.5281/zen-](#)  
629 [odo.11202245](#) Data and code for the *Global* survey will be made public upon publication.

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634 the project. We thank Auriane Meiland for feedback.

635 **Author Contributions**

636 A.F. collected and analysed the data, and drafted the questionnaire and the paper. T.D. and  
637 L.M. substantially revised the questionnaire and paper, and contributed to the conception and  
638 redaction.

639 **Competing interests**

640 Fabre declares that he also serves as president of Global Redistribution Advocates.

Table 1: Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list. The tacit support for the GCS is estimated by regressing the number of supported policies on the presence of the GCS in the list of policies. The social desirability is estimated as the difference between the tacit and stated support, and it is not significantly different from zero even at a 20% threshold (see [Methods](#)).

	Number of supported policies		
	All	U.S.	Europe
List contains: GCS	0.624*** (0.028)	0.524*** (0.041)	0.724*** (0.036)
<i>Support for GCS</i>	0.65	0.542	0.757
<i>Social desirability bias</i>	-0.025	-0.019	-0.033
<i>80% C.I. for the bias</i>	[-0.06; 0.01]	[-0.07; 0.04]	[-0.08; 0.01]
Constant	1.317	1.147	1.486
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000
R <sup>2</sup>	0.089	0.065	0.125

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

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645 mate action with revenue recycling has benefits for poverty, inequality and well-  
646 being. *Nature Climate Change*, 11(12):1111–1116, December 2021. ISSN 1758-6798.  
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Table 2: Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. (Question 28)

	Prefers the Progressive platform					
	All	United States	France	Germany	UK	Spain
GCS in Progressive platform	0.028* (0.014)	0.029 (0.022)	0.112*** (0.041)	0.015 (0.033)	0.008 (0.040)	-0.015 (0.038)
Constant	0.623	0.604	0.55	0.7	0.551	0.775
Observations	5,202	2,619	605	813	661	504
R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.001	0.013	0.0003	0.0001	0.0003

Note: Simple OLS model. The 14% of *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples.  
GCS has no significant influence on them. \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

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<sup>781</sup> **Extended data**

Table S1: Effects on the support for the GCS of a question on its pros and cons (either in open-ended or closed format) and on information about the actual support, in the U.S. (See Section D in the US2 Questionnaire) (Back to Section 2.4.5)

	Support			
	Global Climate Scheme		National Redistribution	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Control group mean	0.557	0.557	0.569	0.569
Treatment: Open-ended field on GCS pros & cons	-0.073** (0.035)	-0.071** (0.031)	-0.035 (0.035)	-0.030 (0.032)
Treatment: Closed questions on GCS pros & cons	-0.109*** (0.034)	-0.096*** (0.031)	-0.065* (0.034)	-0.062** (0.031)
Treatment: Info on actual support for GCS and NR	-0.021 (0.034)	-0.015 (0.031)	0.048 (0.033)	0.056* (0.031)
Includes controls		✓		✓
Observations	2,000	1,995	2,000	1,995
R <sup>2</sup>	0.007	0.170	0.007	0.154

Figure S1: [For Supplementary Material] Support for the GCS, NR and the combination of GCS, NR and C (Yes/No questions).  
(p. 86, Questions 20, 22, 35, 36, and 26).





Table S2: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality. (Question 34) [\(Back to Section 2.5.3\)](#)


	Donation to poor people (in %)			
	All	US	US	Eu
Poor is in own country	0.590 (0.799)	2.509** (1.152)	0.046 (1.691)	-1.349 (1.108)
Poor is in own country $\times$ Vote: <i>not</i> Biden			3.954* (2.279)	
Mean	34.034	33.658	33.658	34.41
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000	3,000
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0001	0.002	0.034	0.0005

Figure S2: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See non-translated versions in Figure S16; Question 29)


(a) U.S. (Asked only to non-Republicans)




(b) France



### (c) Germany



### (d) Spain



### (e) UK




Figure S3: Influence of the GCS on preferred platform:

Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question 30; in the U.S., asked only to non-Republicans.)




Figure S4: Beliefs regarding the support for the GCS and NR. (Questions 21 and 23)




Figure S5: Percent of global wealth tax that should finance low-income countries (*mean*). “Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all countries around the world. (...)

What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of retained in the country’s national budget)?” (Question 37)




Figure S6: Attitudes regarding the evolution of [own country] foreign aid. (Question 46)




Figure S7: Conditions at which foreign aid should be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish an increase of foreign aid at some conditions.] (Question 47)





Figure S8: Reasons why foreign aid should not be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish a decrease or stability of foreign aid.] (Question 48)



782 **A Literature review**

783 **A.1 Attitudes and perceptions**

784 **A.1.1 Population attitudes on global policies**

785 Using representative samples in 125 countries covering 96% of the world's greenhouse  
786 gas emissions, Andre et al. (2024) show that 69% of the global population express willingness  
787 to contribute 1% of their income to fight global warming. Carattini et al. (2019) test  
788 the support for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples in five countries, representative  
789 along gender and age. For a given variant, the sample size is about 167 respondents per country.  
790 They find over 80% support for any variant in India, between 50% and 65% in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43% to 59% in the U.S., depending on the  
791 variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding an equal dividend for each  
792 human is close to 50% in high-income countries (e.g., at 44% in the U.S.), consistently with  
793 our results from the *Global* survey (see Figure 2). This is another piece of evidence that the  
794 support is lower for a tax that would "only" reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions than for a quota that  
795 would unambiguously achieve the climate target. Using a conjoint analysis in the U.S.  
796 and Germany, Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019) find that the support for a carbon tax  
797 increases by up to 50% if it applies to all industrialized countries rather than exclusively  
798 to one's own country.

800 In surveys conducted in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S., Ghassim (2020)  
801 finds support ranging from 55% to 74% for "a global democracy including both a global  
802 government and a global parliament, directly elected by the world population, to recom-  
803 mend and implement policies on global issues". Through an experiment, he also finds  
804 that, in countries where the government stems from a coalition, voting shares would shift  
805 by 8 (Brazil) to 12 p.p. (Germany) from parties who are said to oppose global democracy  
806 to parties that supposedly support it. For instance, when Germans respondents were  
807 told that (only) the Greens and the Left support global democracy, these parties gained  
808 respectively 9 and 3 p.p. in vote intentions, while the SPD and the CDU-CSU each lost  
809 6 p.p. Ghassim (2020) also presents survey results showing strong majorities in favor of  
810 the direct election of one's country's UN representative in all 18 surveyed countries. Sim-  
811ilarly, in each of 10 countries, there are clear majorities in favor of "a new supranational  
812 entity [taking] enforceable global decisions in order to solve global risks" (Global Chal-  
813 lenges Foundation 2018). Remarkably, already in 1946, 54% of Americans agreed (while

814 24% disagreed) that “the UN should be strengthened to make it a world government with  
815 the power to control the armed forces of all nations” (Gallup 1946). Furthermore, in sur-  
816 veys conducted in Argentina, China, India, Russia, Spain, and the U.S., Ghassim et al.  
817 (2022) find majority support for UN reforms that would make United Nations’ decisions  
818 binding, give veto powers to a few other major countries at the Security Council, or com-  
819 plement the highest body of the UN with a chamber of directly elected representatives.

820 Relatedly, Meilland et al. (2023) find that both Americans and French people prefer  
821 an international settlement of climate justice, even if it encroaches on sovereignty. In a  
822 2013 survey conducted in China, Germany, and the U.S., Schleich et al. (2016) show that  
823 over three-quarter of people think that international climate agreements reached so far  
824 are not successful and that future agreements are important. In Finland, Sivonen (2022)  
825 finds that that support for a carbon tax is higher if implemented at the global level (54%)  
826 rather than at the national level (40%).

827 The results from these specific questions are in line with the answers to more gen-  
828 eral questions. In each of 36 countries, ISSP (2010) find near consensus that “for envi-  
829 ronmental problems, there should be international agreements that [their country] and  
830 other countries should be made to follow” (overall, 82% agree and 4% disagree). In each  
831 of 29 countries, ISSP (2019) uncover near consensus that “Present economic differences  
832 between rich and poor countries are too large” (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree).  
833 Leiserowitz et al. (2021) reveal that 66% of Americans support providing “financial aid  
834 and technical support to developing countries that agree to limit their greenhouse gas  
835 emissions.” Fehr et al. (2022) find that 90% of Germans want some degree of global redis-  
836 tribution.

### 837 A.1.2 Population attitudes on climate burden sharing

838 Despite differences in the description of fairness principles, surveys on burden-sharing  
839 rules show consistent attitudes. Or at least, their seemingly contradictory results can be  
840 made compatible with the following interpretation: Concerning emissions reductions,  
841 most people want that every country engage in strong and collective decarbonization ef-  
842 forts, with a global quota converging to climate neutrality in the medium run. Concerning  
843 the financial effort, most people support high-emitting countries paying and low-income  
844 countries receiving funding. The most supported rules are those perceived as equitable,  
845 in particular an equal right to emit per person.

846 This interpretation helps to understand the apparent differences between articles that

847 approach burden sharing from different angles: cost sharing (in money terms), effort shar-  
848 ing (in terms of emissions reductions), or resource sharing (in terms of rights to emit).  
849 Existing papers adopt either the cost sharing or effort sharing approach, which preclude  
850 any country from being a net receiver of funds. Also, by focusing on *either* the financial  
851 or the decarbonization effort, these surveys miss the other half of the picture, which can  
852 explain why some papers find strong support for the ability-to-pay principle while others  
853 find strong support for grandfathering (defined as emissions reductions being the same  
854 in every country). The literature follows these approaches to align with the notions used  
855 by the UNFCCC. Yet, we argue that the resource sharing approach is preferable for un-  
856 covering attitudes, as it unambiguously describes the distributive implications of each  
857 rule while achieving an efficient geographical distribution of emissions reductions and  
858 explicitly allowing for monetary gains for some countries.

859 Now, let us summarize the results of the different papers in the light of this clarifica-  
860 tion. Schleich et al. (2016) find an identical ranking of support for burden-sharing prin-  
861 ciples in China, Germany, and the U.S.: polluter-pays followed by ability-to-pay, equal  
862 emissions per capita, and grandfathering. Note that the authors do not allow for emis-  
863 sions trading in their description of equal *emissions per capita*, which may explain its rel-  
864 atively low support. Yet, the relative support for egalitarianism also depends on how  
865 *the other* rules are described. Indeed, Carlsson et al. (2011) find that Swedes prefer that  
866 “all countries are allowed to emit an equal amount per capita” rather than options where  
867 emissions are reduced based on current or historical emissions, for which it is explicitly  
868 stated that high-emitting countries “will continue to emit more than others”. Bechtel &  
869 Scheve (2013) find agreement that rich countries should pay more and historical emis-  
870 sions should matter, but that efforts should not be solely borne by wealthy nations. More  
871 precisely, their conjoint analysis conducted in France, Germany, the UK, and the U.S.  
872 shows that a climate agreement is 15 p.p. more likely to be preferred (to a random alter-  
873 native) if it includes 160 countries rather than 20, and 5 p.p. less likely to be preferred  
874 if “only rich countries pay” compared to other burden-sharing rules: “rich countries pay  
875 more than poor”, “countries pay proportional to current emissions” or “countries pay  
876 proportional to historical emissions”. In Germany and the U.S., Gampfer et al. (2014) also  
877 find stronger support for funding climate action in low-income countries when cost is  
878 shared with other countries. Using a choice experiment, Carlsson et al. (2013) find that the  
879 least preferred option in China and the U.S. is when low-emitting countries are exempted  
880 from any effort. Ability-to-pay is appreciated in both countries and is the preferred op-

tion in the U.S., though the preferred option in China is another one that accounts for historical responsibility. In the U.S. and France, [Meilland et al. \(2023\)](#) find that the most favored fairness principle is that “all countries commit to converge to the same average of total emissions per inhabitant, compatible with a controlled climate change”. Furthermore, in each country, 73% disagree with grandfathering defined as “countries which emitted a lot of carbon in the past have a right to continue emitting more than others in the future”. The study by [Meilland et al. \(2023\)](#) contains many other results: for instance, majorities prefer to hold countries accountable for their consumption-based rather than territorial emissions, and the median choice regarding historical responsibility is to hold a country accountable for its post-1990 emissions (rather than post-1850 or just their current emissions). Finally, in each of 28 (among the largest) countries, [Dabla-Norris et al. \(2023\)](#) find strong majority for “all countries” to the question “Which countries do you think should be paying to reduce carbon emissions?”. When asked to choose between a cost sharing based on *current* vs. *accumulated historic emissions*, a majority prefers *current emissions* in all countries but China and Saudi Arabia (where the two options are close to equally preferred).

[\(Back to Section 2.2\)](#)

### 897 A.1.3 Population attitudes on foreign aid

898 There is an extensive literature on attitudes towards foreign aid in donor countries.  
899 The key findings indicate that most people overestimate the amount of foreign aid and  
900 that only a minority wants a cut in foreign aid compared to actual amounts, especially  
901 once they become aware of them.

902 For instance, [PIPA \(2001\)](#) shows that 83% of Americans support a multilateral effort  
903 to cut world hunger in half. [PIPA \(2008\)](#) shows that in each of 20 countries, a majority  
904 thinks that developed countries “have a moral responsibility to work to reduce hunger  
905 and severe poverty in poor countries”, with an average agreement of 81%. In 7 OECD  
906 countries, the study finds that at least 75% of respondents are willing to pay for a program  
907 to cut hunger in half (at an estimated cost of, e.g., \$50 a year for each American).

908 [Kaufmann et al. \(2019\)](#) find that perceived aid is overestimated in each of the 24 coun-  
909 tries they study, on average by a factor of 7. In most countries, desired aid is larger than  
910 perceived aid.<sup>1</sup> They show that individuals in the top income quintile desire aid 0.13  
911 p.p. lower than those in the bottom 40% – which is very close to what we find. By em-

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<sup>1</sup>[Kaufmann et al. \(2012\)](#) offer the best results on desired aid because (as [Hudson & van Heerde \(2012\)](#) criticize), other studies did not take into account misperceptions of actual aid.

ploying a theoretical model and examining correlations between lobbying and actual aid (controling for desired aid), they argue that the gap between actual and desired aid stems from the political influence of the rich who defend their vested interests. In [Kaufmann et al. \(2012\)](#), the U.S. is an outlier: desired aid is at the other countries' average (3% of GNI), but as misperceptions are enormous, perceived aid is twice as large as desired aid. Indeed, [Gilens \(2001\)](#) shows that even Americans with high political knowledge misperceive actual aid, and finds that 17% fewer of them want to cut aid when we provide them specific information about the amount of aid. Similarly, [Nair \(2018\)](#) finds that the relatively low support for aid in the U.S. is driven by information on global distribution, as people underestimate their rank by 27 centiles on average and overestimate the global median income by a factor 10.

[Hudson & van Heerde \(2012\)](#) provide a critical review of the literature and show that the strong support for poverty alleviation largely stems from intrinsic altruism. They note that, according to [DFID \(2009\)](#) and [PIPA \(2001\)](#), 47% of British people find that the aid is wasted (mainly due to corruption), while Americans estimate that less than a quarter of the aid reaches those in need, with over half ending up in the hands of corrupt government officials. Despite these perceptions, most people still support aid, suggesting the presence of nonutilitarian motives. Consistent with [Henson et al. \(2010\)](#), [Bauhr et al. \(2013\)](#) find that support for aid is reduced by the perception of corruption in recipient countries. However, this effect is mitigated by the aid-corruption paradox: countries with higher levels of corruption often need more help. [Bodenstein & Faust \(2017\)](#) further show that right-wing Europeans, as well as those who perceive strong corruption in their country, are more likely to agree that recipient countries should "follow certain rules regarding democracy, human rights and governance as a condition for receiving EU development aid." Using a 2002 Gallup survey and the 2006 World Values Survey, and in line with [Bayram \(2017\)](#), [Paxton & Knack \(2012\)](#) show that the main determinants for wanting more aid are trust, left-wing ideology, interest in politics, and being a woman (all positively associated).

(Back to Section [2.5.3](#))

#### 940 A.1.4 Population attitudes on taxes on the rich

941 We are not aware of any previous survey on a global wealth tax,<sup>2</sup> though surveys  
942 consistently show strong support for national wealth taxes. In a comprehensive survey

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<sup>2</sup>We did not find any using the combination of "survey" or "attitudes" with "wealth tax" or "global wealth tax" in Google Scholar.

conducted in the UK, [Rowlingson et al. \(2021\)](#) show that a wealth tax is the preferred option for raising revenues. Only 8% of respondents state that total net wealth should not be taxed (with little differences between Labour and Conservative voters). The study also finds that the preferred design would be a 1% or 3% tax on net wealth above £1 million. By asking how much taxes per year should a person with a certain income and wealth level pay, [Fisman et al. \(2017\)](#) finds that the average American favors a 0.8% linear tax rate on unspecified wealth up to \$2 million (the highest wealth level tested), and a 3% linear rate on inherited wealth. Through a conjoint analysis conducted in three high-income countries, [Schechtl & Tisch \(2023\)](#) find widespread support for a wealth tax (from 78% in the U.S. to 86% in Germany and the UK), with a preference for an exemption threshold set at \$/€1 million (rather than 500,000 or 2 million) with the tax rate and tax unit having little influence on the preferred design. In 21 OECD countries, the [OECD \(2019\)](#) uncovers strong majority support for higher taxes on the rich to support the poor, with nearly 70% overall agreement and less than 20% disagreement. [Isbell \(2022\)](#) finds similarly high level of support in 34 African countries. In the UK, [Patriotic Millionaires \(2022\)](#) find 69% support (and 7% opposition) for a 1.1% tax on wealth in excess of £10 million. In the U.S., [Americans for Tax Fairness \(2021\)](#) find that 67% to 71% of the respondents support to “raise taxes for those earning more than \$400,000 a year”, “raise the income tax rate for those earning over \$1 million a year by 10 percentage points”, or “apply a 2% tax on an individual’s wealth above \$50 million each year, and 3% on wealth above \$1 billion”.

### 963 A.1.5 Population attitudes on ethical norms

964 As argued by [Nyborg et al. \(2016\)](#), social norms can be the solution to the collective  
965 action problem. As such, universalistic values and free-riding attitudes are key.

966 **Universalism** Various studies have examined the concept of global identity (see [Rey-  
967 sen & Katzarska-Miller \(2018\)](#) for a review). In the 2005-2008 wave of the World Values  
968 Survey, [Bayram \(2015\)](#) notes that “78% of the participants in 57 countries see themselves  
969 as citizens of the world”, though the [2017-2022 wave](#) reveals that more people feel close  
970 to their town, region or country than to the world. [Enke et al. \(2023\)](#) measure universal-  
971 ism at the U.S. district level using donation data, and find that a district’s universalism  
972 predicts electoral outcomes better than its income or education level. To measure univer-  
973 salism at the individual level, [Enke et al. \(2023\)](#) ask American respondents to split \$100  
974 between a random stranger and a random person with the same income but closer to

them. They distinguish different facets of universalism, and define *foreign universalism* as the inclination to give to a foreigner rather than a fellow citizen. They find a home bias for most people, which could partly be attributed to concerns about inequality, as the split involves two persons with the same income, with the foreigner most certainly living in a poorer country than the American and thus enjoying a higher social status. That being said, a home bias probably remains even after accounting for concerns about inequality, as 84% of Americans agree that “taking care of problems at home is more important than giving aid to foreign countries” (PIPA 2001). Enke et al. (2023) also measure universalism and analyze its correlates in 7 countries, and Cappelen et al. (2022) deploy this method in 60 countries. In a lab experiment with students in the U.S., Cherry et al. (2017) show that a substantial share of people prefer policies detrimental to them due to their egalitarian worldview. Waytz et al. (2019) show that left-leaning people exhibit a wider “moral circle”. Jaeger & Wilks (2023) find that judgments of moral concern are equally well explained by characteristics of the judge and the evaluated target.

**Free-riding** Despite the long-standing explanation of the lack of climate action as a result of free-riding, surveys consistently show that people support climate mitigation action in their own country, even in the absence of such action in other countries. Bernauer & Gampfer (2015) show this for Americans and Indians, who both overestimate their country’s emissions at one third of the global total. Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019) show this in the U.S. and China using an experimental design. McEvoy & Cherry (2016) show that Americans mostly invoke leadership and morality to justify unilateral climate action. Using a range of methods, Aklin & Mildenberger (2020) show that the empirical evidence for free-riding is not compelling, and that climate inaction can be equally well explained by distributive conflicts. Finally, review of the literature by McGrath & Bernauer (2017) shows that climate attitudes are largely nonreciprocal, and primarily driven by values and perceptions of the policies, rather than by considerations of what other countries do.

### A.1.6 Second-order beliefs

Allport (1924) introduced the concept of pluralistic ignorance: a shared misperception concerning others’ beliefs. The concept became notorious when O’Gorman (1975) showed that, towards the end of the civil rights movement, 47% of Americans believed that a majority of white people supported segregation, while only 18% did so. PIPA (2001)

1007 has shown that while 75% of Americans are willing to contribute \$50 annually to halve  
1008 world hunger (the cost of the program), only 32% believed that the majority would share  
1009 this willingness. Pluralistic ignorance regarding climate-friendly norms in the United  
1010 States has been documented by Andre et al. (2022), who further show that correcting the  
1011 misperceptions would be effective to enhance pro-climate behaviors. Relatedly, Spark-  
1012 man et al. (2022) show that Americans underestimate the support for climate policies  
1013 by nearly half, while Drews et al. (2022) document pluralistic ignorance of carbon tax  
1014 support in Spain. Additionally, Geiger & Swim (2016) show that pluralistic ignorance  
1015 regarding concern for climate change leads people to self-silence, resulting in reduced  
1016 discussions on the topic.

1017 **A.1.7 Elite attitudes**

1018 In a survey of climate negotiators on their preferences in terms of burden-sharing,  
1019 Lange et al. (2007) uncovers a mix of self-serving bias and support for the egalitarian  
1020 principle. Dannenberg et al. (2010) elicit climate negotiators' equity preferences and find  
1021 that regional differences in addressing climate change are driven more by national inter-  
1022 ests than by different equity concerns. Hjerpe et al. (2011) indicate that voluntary con-  
1023 tribution, indicated as willingness to contribute, was the least preferred principle among  
1024 both negotiators and observers. Three of the four principles for allocating mitigation  
1025 commitments were recognized widely across the major geographical regions: historical  
1026 responsibilities, ability-to-pay, and equal per capita emissions. This result is confirmed  
1027 by Kesternich et al. (2021), who observe tendencies for a more harmonized view among  
1028 key groups towards the ability-to-pay rule in a setting of weighted burden sharing rules.  
1029 Mildenberger & Tingley (2019) survey elites (Congress staffers and international relations  
1030 scholars) as well as the population in U.S. and China. They document pluralistic igno-  
1031 rance of pro-climate attitudes, egocentric bias, and increasing support after beliefs are  
1032 updated.

1033 **A.2 Proposals and analyses of global policy-making**

1034 **A.2.1 Global carbon pricing**

1035 Global carbon pricing is widely regarded by economists as the benchmark climate  
1036 policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon emissions externality. For instance, Hoel  
1037 (1991) shows that an international carbon tax can be designed to simultaneously achieve

efficiency and accommodate any distributional objective. Concerning the distributional objective, Grubb (1990), Agarwal & Narain (1991) and Bertram (1992) were the first to advocate for an equal right to emit for each human. As Grubb (1990) states it: "by far the best combination of long term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity, is obtained from a system based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions which are allocated on an adult per capita basis".<sup>3</sup> Support for such solution has been renewed ever since (Baer et al.; Jamieson; Blanchard & Tirole; Rajan 2000; 2001; 2021; 2021).

While many endorse the egalitarian allocation of emissions permits, economists also considered this outcome as politically unfeasible. Thus, to preserve the current level of inequalities and to preclude transfers between countries, they adjusted their (integrated assessment) models by assigning more weight to the interest of rich countries (Stanton 2011).

Gollier & Tirole (2015) synthesize the distributional decision with a *generosity* parameter which would allocate emissions permit to countries in proportion to their population if set to one, in proportion to their emissions (on the start date of the policy) if set to zero, and as a mixture of the egalitarian and grandfathering rules if set in between. Using a similar formula in the context of a tax, Cramton et al. (2015) (summarized in MacKay et al. 2015) propose that countries with emissions per capita around the average fix the generosity parameter, so that it is strategically chosen to maximize the tax rate, and to fix the tax rate at the minimum price proposed by participating countries. Negotiations would exclude countries with low ambition beforehand; and the treaty would impose trade sanctions on non-participating countries. van den Bergh et al. (2020) propose a "dual-track transition to global carbon pricing": an expanding climate club that would integrate existing and new emissions trading systems, and a reorientation of UNFCCC negotiations towards a global carbon price and burden-sharing rules. The IMF (2019) also supports global carbon pricing or, as a first step, a carbon price floor. They propose either differentiated prices among countries or international transfers, and estimate that a price of \$75/tCO<sub>2</sub> in 2030 would be compatible with a 2°C trajectory.

Other authors have put forth more radical proposals. For instance, Weitzman (2017) envisions a World Climate Assembly with proportional representation at the global scale, so that the median (human) voter would choose the carbon price level. To finance an adaptation fund, Chancel & Piketty (2015) propose a global *progressive* carbon tax (or a progressive tax on air tickets as a first step), so that rich people (who are high emitters)

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<sup>3</sup>By "adult per capita", Grubb (1990) means that permits would be allocated equally among adults.

contribute more to the public good. [Fleurbaeay & Zuber \(2013\)](#) highlight that, given that current emitters are probably richer than future victims of climate change damages, climate policies deserve a *negative* discount rate. In other words, we cannot dissociate the climate issue from global inequalities, and an ethical response to this issue requires global redistribution.

### 1076 A.2.2 Climate burden sharing

1077 The literature has discussed different burden-sharing principles ([Ringius et al. 2002](#)).  
1078 While there is no agreement on their definitions as different approaches are used (cost  
1079 sharing, effort sharing, or resource sharing, see Section [A.1.2](#)), we describe here the burden-  
1080 sharing principles consistently using the resource sharing approach (i.e., allocating emis-  
1081 sions rights). For other papers that define or compare different burden-sharing principles,  
1082 see [Leimbach & Giannousakis; Zhou & Wang; Vaillancourt & Waaub \(2019; 2016; 2004\)](#).

1083 **Equal per capita.** The simplest principle is perhaps to allocate each year's global carbon  
1084 quota based on an equal right to emit per capita, or an equal right to emit for each adult.  
1085 Implementing this principle would result in large transfers from high-emitting to low-  
1086 emitting countries.

1087 **Grandfathering.** In contrast, *grandfathering* entails allocating emissions rights in pro-  
1088 portion to current emissions. From the perspective of allocating carbon pricing revenues  
1089 between countries, grandfathering amounts to each country retaining the revenues it col-  
1090 lects. Given that nations are sovereign and have not agreed to share emissions rights,  
1091 this principle can be considered as the default option against which the other ones can be  
1092 compared in terms of distributive effects.

1093 **Historical responsibilities.** At the opposite end of the spectrum is the principle of *his-  
1094 torical responsibilities*, which assigns to each country a carbon budget proportional to its  
1095 population. Countries that have emitted more than the average have accumulated a car-  
1096 bon debt towards countries that have emitted less, which have a carbon credit.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>It is not clear how these debts would be settled. Approaches could involve carbon removal from the atmosphere, or using a conventional social cost of carbon to monetize them, by crediting (positively or negatively) emissions rights to countries in an international carbon market.

1097 To fully specify this rule, one needs to define a start date for the responsibilities on  
1098 past emissions and specify how to account for population size. 1990 is often chosen as  
1099 a start year as it is the date of the first IPCC assessment report, marking the widespread  
1100 acknowledgment of climate change, though variants include 1972, 1960, 1950 or 1850.<sup>5</sup>  
1101 Several solutions have been proposed to account for evolving populations, none of which  
1102 is flawless. Matthews (2015) allocates emissions rights on a given year proportionally to  
1103 the countries' populations in that year. An alternative is to use fixed populations, such  
1104 as the populations at the chosen start year (Neumayer 2000), or at a future date such  
1105 as projected when the global total population will reach 9 billion (Raupach et al. 2014).  
1106 Fanning & Hickel (2023) convert the projected climate debt up to 2050 into monetary  
1107 terms in a 1.5°C scenario.

1108 The rationale for using fixed populations is to prevent countries from intentionally  
1109 increasing their population size to gain more emissions rights. However, this approach  
1110 treats countries with different demographic trajectories similarly, effectively penalizing  
1111 countries which grow more than others (if past populations are used) or grow more than  
1112 expected (if future populations are used). Using current populations like Matthews (2015)  
1113 also comes with its own problems. Consider two countries having contributed very little  
1114 to cumulative emissions, with the same emissions per capita but different demographic  
1115 patterns: country A's population has doubled in the last 30 years, while country B's pop-  
1116 ulation has remained stable. Despite the similar present situation, country B would ac-  
1117 cumulate more carbon credit than country A. Essentially, compensating country B more  
1118 due to its past population size amounts to compensating the dead although it is future  
1119 generations who will suffer. That being said, using current populations is likely a more  
1120 viable solution than relying on fixed populations since, in practice, countries with similar  
1121 emissions per capita tend to have relatively similar demographic trajectories.

1122 **Ability to pay.** Another prominent burden-sharing principle is the ability to pay whereby  
1123 richer countries should contribute more to mitigation efforts. To operationalize this prin-  
1124 ciple, Baer et al. (2008) define *capacity* as the share of global income above an exemption  
1125 threshold. They use the threshold of \$7,500 per year (in 2005 PPP), which corresponds to  
1126 the top 28% of the global income distribution. According to this principle, the effort of a  
1127 country should be proportional to the revenues it would raise with a linear income tax on  
1128 individual income above \$7,500.

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<sup>5</sup>Climate equity monitor uses 1850 for example.

1129 **Climate Equity Reference Framework** Baer et al. (2008) propose another effort-sharing  
1130 method, the *Climate Equity Reference Framework* (CERF), which blends the ability to pay  
1131 principle with their version of historical responsibilities. They define *responsibility* as fol-  
1132 lows: they determine the mitigation requirement as the emissions gap between the Busi-  
1133 ness as Usual scenario from IEA (2007) and a 2°C (with 68-86% probability) scenario.  
1134 The mitigation requirement is then allocated to countries proportionally to their cumu-  
1135 lative emissions (starting in 1990). The emissions right of a country according to their  
1136 *responsibility* are then determined by its Business as Usual emissions minus its mitigation  
1137 requirement. A country's emissions right, dubbed its *greenhouse development right* (GDR),  
1138 is defined using a combination of *capacity* (C) and *responsibility* (R) to allocate the miti-  
1139 gation requirement between countries. This allocation key is called the *Responsibility and*  
1140 *Capacity Indicator* (RCI) and defined as  $RCI = R^a \cdot C^{1-a}$ , with  $a = .4$ .


1141 This choice of parameter may seem somewhat arbitrary, but the [EcoEquity calculator](#)  
1142 allows for a customization all CERF parameters (Holz et al.; Holz et al. 2018; 2019). The  
1143 Climate Action Network has adopted the CERF as its *fair share* framework, though the  
1144 different national chapters of the organization could not agree on a choice of parameters  
1145 (Athanasou et al. 2022).<sup>6</sup>

1146 The CERF approach was adopted by a prominent network of climate NGOs because  
1147 it operationalizes the principle of *common but differentiated responsibilities and respective ca-*  
1148 *pabilities* recognized by the UNFCCC. However, this approach suffers from three draw-  
1149 backs. First, its definition of historical responsibility as an effort sharing principle is in-  
1150 consistent with the principle of an equal right of cumulative emissions per capita, which  
1151 is a resource sharing principle. For instance, consider a fully decarbonized country that  
1152 has exhausted *exactly* its cumulative carbon budget. According to the CERF notion of *re-*  
1153 *sponsibility*, this country would still be expected to contribute significantly to mitigation  
1154 efforts due to its relatively high cumulative emissions. Yet, according to the usual defini-  
1155 tion of the historical responsibility based on an equal right of cumulative emissions p.c.,  
1156 this country would have no liability as it has not exceeded its carbon budget. Second, a

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<sup>6</sup>The U.S. Climate Action Network and the think tank EcoEquity (funded by Tom Athanasiou and late Paul Baer) choose the following parameters: an equal weight for R and C ( $a = .5$ ), their own **business as usual projections** of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions based on trends of GDP growth and emissions intensity reduction, a 1.5°C (Low Energy Demand) pathway, 1950 as the start year for responsibility, a gradual inclusion of income to compute *capacity* (which adds complexity to the calculation) from a full exemption of the bottom 70% (\$7,500 per year) linearly to a full inclusion of the top 2% (\$72,211), the inclusion of non-CO<sub>2</sub> gases but not of emissions embodied in trade (i.e. imported emissions) nor LULUCF (land-use).

Figure S9: Net gains from the CERF burden-sharing rule in 2030.




Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO<sub>2</sub>.

country with moderate incomes<sup>7</sup> and low historical responsibility would be assigned a relatively low effort, even if its emissions per capita are high. In other words, the CERF approach favors countries that have experienced recent growth. Third, the poorest countries would be granted emissions rights close to the Business as Usual trajectory, as they would bear virtually none of the effort. But this trajectory carries the current (unfair) income distribution and amounts to grandfathering. For example, the baseline trajectory for emissions<sup>8</sup> in the DRC entail 0.8 tCO<sub>2</sub> p.c. in 2030, which is five times less than the world average emissions right per capita. In this framework, if the DRC were to grow faster than projected in the baseline, it would actually have to pay to the rest of the world for mitigation efforts. This is what is likely to happen to countries like Mexico or Senegal, from our simulation of the net gains of CERF compared to a situation without international transfers (see Figure S9). In contrast, a resource sharing approach based on equal per capita emissions would result in low-income countries receiving emissions rights exceeding their projected trajectories, leading to transfers from high-income countries. By

<sup>7</sup>Using the above parameters, moderate incomes means few incomes above the global 70th. percentile.

<sup>8</sup>The baseline trajectory is computed as the “product of the projected GDP and CO<sub>2</sub> emission intensity”.

Figure S10: Difference between net gains from Greenhouse Development Rights and equal rights per capita.



Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario ( $2^{\circ}\text{C}$  with  $>50\%$  chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO<sub>2</sub>.

construction, such transfers do not occur in an effort sharing approach like the CERF, implying lower transfers to low-income countries. Compared to an equal right to emit per capita, this method favors countries like China (whose emissions are allowed to remain stable over 2020-2030 instead of a reduction of 35-40%) and penalizes regions like Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (see Figure S10).

**Contraction and Convergence.** Meyer (2004) defines a rule called *contraction and convergence* (C&C), which combines elements of grandfathering and equal per capita approaches. According to C&C, each country is granted (tradable) emissions rights, starting at their current emission level and converging linearly to an equal per capita level at some pre-specified date. The *contraction* part refers to the reduction of total emissions rights in line with the climate objective. When discussed around year 2000, the convergence date was specified between 2020 and 2050. This rule, advocated by the Global Commons Institute (a UK think tank), was on the agenda from COP2 to COP15 (i.e., until Copenhagen, and including in Kyoto), including at Kyoto, and was endorsed by the European Parlia-

1185 ment in 1998. More recently, Gignac & Matthews (2015) have shown how C&C can be  
1186 made consistent with historical responsibilities by computing carbon debts and credits  
1187 until the convergence date.

1188 **Assessments of the NDCs against burden-sharing principles.** The regime established  
1189 by the 2015 Paris agreement to regulate climate change respects none of the burden-  
1190 sharing principles and relies instead on voluntary contributions from each country, known  
1191 as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). A body of literature (reviewed by Höhne  
1192 et al. 2014) assesses the NDCs against the emissions reduction objective and different  
1193 burden-sharing principles. To evaluate the NDCs, Gao et al. (2019) examine their emis-  
1194 sions projections for 2030 and estimate the resulting increase in temperature. The most  
1195 recent and comprehensive assessment of NDCs against burden-sharing principles is con-  
1196 ducted by van den Berg et al. (2020) (see also Robiou du Pont et al.; Robiou du Pont  
1197 et al.; Raupach et al. 2016; 2017; 2014).

### 1198 A.2.3 Global redistribution

1199 Addressing global poverty, inequalities, and climate change are central to the univer-  
1200 sally agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). As highlighted by Bolch et al. (2022),  
1201 low-income countries often lack sufficient domestic resources to eradicate poverty in the  
1202 short term, indicating the need for international transfers to rapidly end global poverty.  
1203 In *Beyond the Welfare State*, Gunnar Myrdal (1960) called for a *welfare world*. In his Nobel  
1204 lecture, he emphasized the necessity of increasing foreign aid to low-income countries,  
1205 stating that “The type of marginal foreign aid we have provided, is clearly not enough to  
1206 meet their barest needs” (Myrdal 1975).

1207 Drawing on the labor theory of value, some economists have argued that global in-  
1208 equalities arise from unequal exchange in international trade (Arghiri 1972). Indeed,  
1209 the stark disparity in wages between countries implies that one unit of labor exported  
1210 by an American commands five units of labor embodied in imported goods, whereas  
1211 Ethiopians need to export 50 units of labor to obtain one unit through imports (Alsamawi  
1212 et al.; Reyes et al. 2014; 2017). Taking stock, Hickel (2017) proposes to globally establish  
1213 minimum wages at 50% of the local median wage. Hickel (2017) also suggests other solu-  
1214 tions against global inequality, which served as inspiration for our questionnaire. These  
1215 measures include the cancellation of low-income countries’ public debt, fair trade prac-  
1216 tices (such as eliminating tariffs from high-income countries, reducing patent protections,

1217 and reducing farming subsidies in rich countries), initiatives to combat tax evasion (e.g.,  
1218 implementing a global financial register), land reform, and a fair international climate  
1219 policy.

1220 [Piketty \(2014\)](#) prominently advocates for a progressive wealth tax on a global scale,  
1221 although he does not specify whether the resulting revenues should fund international  
1222 transfers.

1223 [Kopczuk et al. \(2005\)](#) compute the optimal linear income tax rates for all countries in  
1224 two ways: globally centralized and decentralized (i.e., within each country and without  
1225 international transfers). They show that the average decentralized rate is 41%. In con-  
1226 trast, the global rate is 62%, which would generate funds to finance a basic income of  
1227 250\$/month (higher than the GPD per capita of 73 countries). From a current global Gini  
1228 index of 0.695, they show that decentralized optimal taxation would only marginally re-  
1229 duce global inequality to 0.69, whereas global taxation would significantly decrease the  
1230 Gini to 0.25. The study also shows that the existing level of foreign aid can only be ratio-  
1231 nalized if the U.S. attaches 2,000 less value to a citizen in the poorest countries than to an  
1232 American citizen (or 1,000 less if half of the transfers are diverted due to corruption).

#### 1233 A.2.4 Basic income

1234 Unconditional cash transfers (UCT) are increasingly seen as an effective way to end ex-  
1235 treme poverty. A growing body of evidence from randomized control trials supports this  
1236 notion: [Gangopadhyay et al. \(2015\)](#) find that UCT outperform a food subsidy; [Haushofer](#)  
1237 & [Shapiro \(2016\)](#) find significant impacts on health, economic outcomes, and psycholog-  
1238 ical well-being; [Egger et al. \(2022\)](#) find large positive spillovers on non-recipient people,  
1239 and minimal inflation. Reviews of existing research further confirm the positive outcomes  
1240 of UCT ([Standing; Bastagli et al. 2014; 2016](#)).

1241 While the delivery of cash to remote areas and the prevention of fraud is challenging  
1242 in regions without a proper civil register, the use of mobile phones as banking and bio-  
1243 metric identification tools could provide viable solutions ([Harnett 2017](#)). Although many  
1244 places still lack internet access, satellite internet technology shows promising progress,  
1245 with some experts suggesting that it could soon become affordable and universally ac-  
1246 cessible ([Hanson 2016](#)).

1247 **A.2.5 Global democracy**


1248 The idea of world federalism has a long-standing history, dating back at least to Kant  
1249 (1795), who argued that a world federation was essential for achieving perpetual peace.  
1250 International organizations were eventually created to foster peace, though the League  
1251 of Nations and its successor, the United Nations, never succeeded in avoiding military  
1252 conflicts. Many have argued that we need stronger and more democratic global institu-  
1253 tions, competent to address global challenges such as extreme poverty, climate change,  
1254 wars, pandemics, or financial stability. Before World War II, feminist and pacifist Maver-  
1255 ick Lloyd & Schwimmer (1937) founded the *Campaign for World Government*, advocating  
1256 for direct representation at the global scale. Einstein (1947) called for the subordination of  
1257 the UN Security Council to the General Assembly and the direct election of UN delegates.  
1258 Since 2007, there has been widespread support for a United Nations Parliamentary As-  
1259 sembly (UNPA) from individuals and institutions in over 150 countries, including 1,800  
1260 member of parliament, heads of state, as well the European Parliament, the Pan-African  
1261 Parliament, and the Latin-American Parliament. The UNPA campaign calls for a gradual  
1262 implementation of a democratic assembly, starting with a consultative assembly com-  
1263 posed of members of national parliaments, allowing for the direct election of its members  
1264 in voluntary countries, and progressing towards a world parliament with binding legisla-  
1265 tive powers once all members are directly elected (Leinen & Bummel 2018). Besides the  
1266 UNPA, various scholars have put forward different models of global democracy, ranging  
1267 from deliberative spaces to a world federation (Archibugi et al. 2011). While the most  
1268 radical proposals may still be on the horizon, an assembly of random citizens representa-  
1269 tive of the world population has already been convened. It has produced a joint statement  
1270 at the COP26 (Global Assembly 2022), and a similar *World Citizens' Assembly* should soon  
1271 follow.

## 1272 B Raw results

1273 Country-specific raw results are also available as supplementary material files: **US**,  
 1274 **EU, FR, DE, ES, UK**.

Figure S11: Absolute support for global climate policies.

Share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* (in percent,  $n = 40,680$ ). The color blue denotes an absolute majority. See Figure 2 for the relative support. (Questions A-I of the global survey.)



\*In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

Figure S12: Correct answers to comprehension questions (in percent). (Questions 16-18)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
With NR, typical [country] people win and richest lose	68	73	76	73	73	70
With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win	60	68	62	72	67	67
With GCS+NR, typical [country] people neither win nor lose	54	60	63	59	57	61

Figure S13: Number of correct answers to comprehension questions (mean). (Section 2.3, Questions 16-18)




Figure S14: List experiment: mean number of supported policies. (Section 2.4.1, Question 24)




Figure S15: Conjoint analyses 1 and 2. (Questions 25-27, Back to Section 2.4.3)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)	54	76	80	71	81	74
C+NR+GCS preferred to C+NR	55	74	79	71	78	68
NR+GCS preferred to NR	55	77	79	74	79	77
NR+C preferred to NR	62	84	88	83	84	82
GCS+NR preferred to C+NR	47	52	53	53	49	52
NR+C+GCS preferred to NR	55	77	86	73	83	72

Figure S16: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See English translations in Figure S2; Question 29)




Figure S17: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements seen as important for supporting the GCS in a 4-Likert scale (in percent). (Question 32) [\(Back to Section 2.4.5\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
It would succeed in limiting climate change	78	85	85	86	86	83
It would hurt the [Country] economy	81	67	61	67	66	69
It would penalize my household	75	60	55	63	59	63
It would make people change their lifestyle	78	79	83	79	78	77
It would reduce poverty in low-income countries	77	85	88	85	86	81
It might be detrimental to some poor countries	79	72	79	67	78	70
It could foster global cooperation	82	81	81	82	85	80
It could fuel corruption in low-income countries	79	75	82	69	79	72
It could be subject to fraud	80	79	80	74	83	81
It would be technically difficult to put in place	77	71	74	62	79	71
Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences	89	82	89	68	91	88

Figure S18: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements found in the open-ended field on the GCS (manually recoded, in percent).

"When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to your mind?

Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme." (Question 31) (Back to Section 2.4.5)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
environment	26	31	37	26	43	24
unclassifiable	25	24	23	28	25	22
pro	22	23	21	22	33	20
con	22	17	12	18	20	16
cost	17	12	11	14	17	7
poorest humans	11	7	6	9	5	6
tax redistribution	10	7	11	8	4	9
support	8	6	3	5	6	8
oppose	7	3	2	3	1	4
don't know	6	8	10	8	7	10
empty	6	3	0	0	0	13
difficult agreement	5	10	7	12	8	8
difficult implement	3	5	5	6	4	6
misunderstands gcs	3	2	2	1	3	1
misunderstands question	2	2	1	3	3	3

Figure S19: Perceptions of the GCS. Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).

"When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to your mind?

Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme." (Question 31) [\(Back to Section 2.4.5\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
world: international world countr global	28	22	23	19	22	23
environment: climat environment animal emission natur	26	21	17	28	21	17
poorest: poor low-income 700 poverty	16	8	8	9	4	10
pro: pro  pro: pros  pros:	16	3	0	1	9	5
con: con  con:  cons  cons:	15	4	0	1	8	6
cost: cost expensive higher price 85 inflation	13	7	5	9	7	6
tax: tax	8	3	4	3	2	2
redistribution: rich redistribu	8	4	5	4	3	5
implementation: implement enforce polic monitor	6	4	5	6	0	5
agreement: agree accept participat	3	4	5	6	2	3

Figure S20: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality (mean). (Question 34) [\(Back to Section 2.5.3\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Donation to own country	35	34	31	38	34	32
Donation to Africa	32	35	33	41	32	33

Figure S21: Support for a global wealth tax.

"Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-income countries?

Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education." (Question 35)




Figure S22: Support for a national wealth tax.

"Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: affordable housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and schools]?" (Question 36)




Figure S23: Preferred share of global wealth tax revenues that should be pooled to finance low-income countries. (Question 37)




Figure S24: Support for sharing half of global tax revenues with low-income countries, rather than each country retaining all the revenues it collects (in percent). (Question 38)




Figure S25: Perceived foreign aid. “From your best guess, what percentage of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?” (Question 39) (Back to Section 2.5.3)

Actual values: France: 0.8%; Germany: 1.3%; Spain: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%; U.S.: 0.4%.




Figure S26: Preferred foreign aid (without info on actual amount).

"If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?" (Question 40) (Back to Section 2.5.3)




Figure S27: Preferred foreign aid (after info on actual amount).

"Actually, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid.

If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?" (Question 40) (Back to Section 2.5.3)




Figure S28: Actual, perceived and preferred amount of foreign aid, with random info (or not) on actual amount. (*Mean* in percent of public spending, Questions 39, 40) (Back to Section 2.5.3)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Actual foreign aid (in % of public spending)	0.4	1.1	0.8	1.3	0.5	1.7
Belief about foreign aid	4.7	2.9	2.7	2.9	2.8	3.5
Preferred foreign aid (with info)	1.8	2.7	3.4	2.9	2.1	2.5
Preferred foreign aid (no info)	4	3.9	4.7	4.4	3.1	3.4

Figure S29: Preferred foreign aid (after info or after perception). (Questions 39 and 40)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as current	70	75	91	76	77	57
Preferred foreign aid is higher than current	47	59	75	58	63	43
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as perceived	57	74	83	79	77	58
Preferred foreign aid is higher than perceived	37	53	64	59	54	39

Figure S30: Preferences for funding increased foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]  
 "How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent) (Question 41) (Back to Section 2.5.3)




Figure S31: Preferences of spending following reduced foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]  
 "How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent)  
 (Question 42) [\(Back to Section 2.5.3\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Higher spending on defense	19	23	11	21	17	31
Higher spending on retirement pensions	23	41	22	51	57	35
Higher spending on healthcare	40	57	31	42	80	70
Higher spending on welfare benefits	13	20	7	19	39	20
Higher spending on education	30	45	31	47	58	43
Higher spending on other programs	6	6	6	4	9	8
Lower taxes on the wealthiest	5	2	5	2	0	2
Lower corporate income tax rate	12	6	10	4	8	6
Lower personal income tax rates	48	29	26	27	37	30
Lower public deficit	32	24	21	13	41	21

Figure S32: Willingness to sign real-stake petition for the Global Climate Scheme or National Redistribution, compared to stated support in corresponding subsamples (e.g. support for the GCS in the branch where the petition was about the GCS). (Question 43)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Petition for the GCS	51	69	69	66	78	69
(Comparable) support for the GCS	53	76	81	74	81	74
Petition for NR	57	67	65	66	74	68
(Comparable) support for NR	58	72	76	65	78	75

Figure S33: Absolute support for various global policies (Percent of (*somewhat or strong*) support). (Questions 44 and 45. See Figure 3 for the relative support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	41	54	52	53	62	51
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	53	65	62	66	68	62
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	45	58	55	60	62	54
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	31	37	36	30	45	40
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	34	44	44	43	52	43
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	39	49	39	51	50	54
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	42	55	54	54	61	53
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	44	70	73	70	72	65
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	34	45	40	48	44	50
National tax on millionaires funding public services	62	76	70	79	79	77
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	58	71	69	72	78	71

Figure S34: Preferred approach of diplomats at international climate negotiations. In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend [own country] interests or global justice? (Question 49)




Figure S35: Percent of selected issues viewed as important.  
 "To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem?" (Question 56)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Income inequality in [Country]	55	59	54	58	71	57
Climate change	59	66	66	63	73	63
Global poverty	50	57	50	58	75	49

Figure S36: Group defended when voting.  
 "What group do you defend when you vote?" (Question 57)




Figure S37: Mean prioritization of policies.

Mean number of points allocated policies to express intensity of support (among six policies chosen at random). Blue color means that the policy has been awarded more points than the average policy.

"In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

How do you allocate the points among the following policies?" (Question 58)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	13	21	10	14	35	31
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	23	22	25	21	22	23
econ3	21	15	13	18	17	13
econ4	28	22	27	17	24	20
soc1	10	17	13	17	12	21
soc2	13	9	14	8	10	8
climate1	14	15	11	18	20	12
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	20	18	22	19	15	17
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030	11	9	8	8	9	11
tax1: National redistribution scheme	14	15	16	15	15	15
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	19	19	21	18	17	19
foreign1: Global climate scheme	15	20	20	23	16	17
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	21	20	20	23	19	20
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	15	15	15	17	14	13
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	9	11	13	14	9	8

Figure S38: Positive prioritization of policies.

Percent of people allocating a positive number of points to policies, expressing their support (among six policies chosen at random).

"In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

How do you allocate the points among the following policies?" (Question 58)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	64	78	61	67	96	95
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	83	86	85	84	87	89
econ3	81	69	50	78	80	68
econ4	88	86	91	79	89	85
soc1	57	75	69	74	74	78
soc2	58	58	72	53	64	48
climate1	70	76	65	79	89	75
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	79	83	86	84	78	80
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030	62	58	56	48	60	70
tax1: National redistribution scheme	67	79	79	76	82	79
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	80	79	76	78	83	85
foreign1: Global climate scheme	71	83	84	85	84	78
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	80	81	79	83	82	82
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	71	77	79	74	83	76
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	58	70	79	74	74	57

Figure S39: Charity donation.

"How much did you give to charities in 2022?" (Question 50)




Figure S40: Interest in politics.

"To what extent are you interested in politics?" (Question 51)




Figure S41: Desired involvement of government (from 1 to 5). (Question 52)




Figure S42: Political leaning on economics (from 1: Left to 5: Right). (Question 53)




Figure S43: Voted in last election. (Question 54)




Figure S44: Vote in last election (aggregated). PNR includes people who did not vote or prefer not to answer. (Question 55)




Figure S45: Perception that survey was biased.  
“Do you feel that this survey was politically biased?” (Question 61)





Figure S46: Opinion on the fight against extreme poverty.

“According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme poverty in low-income countries?” (Question 62) [\(Back to Section 2.5.3\)](#)

(a) Elements found in the open-ended field on the question  
(manually recoded, in percent)



(b) Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).




Figure S47: Main attitudes by vote (“Right” spans from Center-right to Far right).  
 (Relative support in percent in Questions 20, 35, 45, 46, 49) (Back to Section 2.5.3)

	Europe Left	Europe PNR/Non-voter	Europe Right	U.S. Left	U.S. PNR/Non-voter	U.S. Right
Support for the GCS	85	72	71	74	53	26
Global tax on millionaires	94	83	76	85	71	40
Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries	61	52	45	55	67	41
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	73	65	52	62	49	23
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	93	79	74	87	70	38
[Country]’s foreign aid should be increased	93	83	72	92	81	48
Universalist	56	48	26	53	49	23

1275 C Questionnaire of the global survey (section on global  
1276 policies)

1277 A. At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be  
1278 put in place? (Multiple answers are possible) [Figures 2 and S11]  
1279 Global; [Federal / European / ...]; [State / National]; Local

1280 B. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “[country] should take mea-  
1281 sures to fight climate change.”

1282 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly  
1283 agree*

1284 C. How should [country] climate policies depend on what other countries do?

- 1285 • If other countries do more, [country] should do...  
1286 • If other countries do less, [country] should do...

1287 *Much less; Less; About the same; More; Much more*

1288 D. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] All countries have signed the  
1289 Paris agreement that aims to contain global warming “well below +2 °C’. To limit  
1290 global warming to this level, there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we  
1291 can emit globally, called the carbon budget. Each country could aim to emit less  
1292 than a share of the carbon budget. To respect the global carbon budget, countries  
1293 that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less  
1294 than their share.

1295 Do you support such a policy? [Figures 2 and S11]

1296 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly  
1297 support*

1298 E. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] Suppose the above policy is in  
1299 place. How should the carbon budget be divided among countries? [Figures 2 and  
1300 S11]

1301 *The emission share of a country should be proportional to its population, so that each human  
1302 has an equal right to emit.; The emission share of a country should be proportional to its  
1303 current emissions, so that those who already emit more have more rights to emit.; Countries  
1304 that have emitted more over the past decades (from 1990 onwards) should receive a lower*

1305 *emission share, because they have already used some of their fair share.; Countries that will*  
1306 *be hurt more by climate change should receive a higher emission share, to compensate them*  
1307 *for the damages.*

1308 F. [In the U.S., Denmark, and France only] To achieve a given reduction of greenhouse  
1309 gas emissions globally, costly investments are needed. Ideally, how should countries  
1310 bear the costs of fighting climate change?

- 1311 • Countries should pay in proportion to their income
- 1312 • Countries should pay in proportion to their current emissions [Used as a sub-  
1313 stitute to the equal right per capita in Figure 2]
- 1314 • Countries should pay in proportion to their past emissions (from 1990 on-  
1315 wards) [Used as a substitute to historical responsibilities in Figure 2]
- 1316 • The richest countries should pay it all, so that the poorest countries do not have  
1317 to pay anything
- 1318 • The richest countries should pay even more, to help vulnerable countries face  
1319 adverse consequences: vulnerable countries would then receive money instead  
1320 of paying [Used as a substitute to compensating vulnerable countries in Figures  
1321 2 and S11]

1322 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly*  
1323 *agree*

1324 G. Do you support or oppose establishing a global democratic assembly whose role  
1325 would be to draft international treaties against climate change? Each adult across  
1326 the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly. [Figures 2 and S11]  
1327 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*  
1328 *support*

1329 H. Imagine the following policy: a global tax on greenhouse gas emissions funding a  
1330 global basic income. Such a policy would progressively raise the price of fossil fuels  
1331 (for example, the price of gasoline would increase by [40 cents per gallon] in the  
1332 first years). Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil  
1333 fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Revenues from the tax would be used to  
1334 finance a basic income of [\$30] per month to each human adult, thereby lifting the  
1335 700 million people who earn less than \$2/day out of extreme poverty. The average

1336 [American] person would lose a bit from this policy as they would face [\$130] per  
1337 month in price increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive.

1338 Do you support or oppose such a policy? [Figures 2 and S11]

1339 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*  
1340 *support*


- 1341 I. Do you support or oppose a tax on all millionaires around the world to finance low-  
1342 income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate ac-  
1343 tion? This would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drink-  
1344 ing water, healthcare, and education. [Figures 2 and S11]  
1345 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*  
1346 *support*

1347 **D Questionnaire of the complementary surveys**

1348 Below, we provide the generic questionnaire (based on the U.S. version), which roughly  
1349 corresponds to the *Eu* questionnaire as well as the combination of the *US1* and *US2* ques-  
1350 tionnaire. The main difference between Europe and the U.S. is that we split the *US2*  
1351 sample into four random branches to include some treatments before the Section D on  
1352 the GCS. Besides the control group, the treatments are: information regarding the sup-  
1353 port of Americans for the GCS and NR, an open-ended field, and a closed question on the  
1354 pros and cons of the GCS. The pros and cons of the GCS are also asked in *Eu* (likewise,  
1355 either as an open-ended field or a question), but only in Section D, after the support.

1356 At each section or question, square brackets specify in which questionnaires it is present  
1357 (*US1*, *US2* and/or *Eu*) as well as country specificities. Figure S48 displays the structure of  
1358 each questionnaire. Each treatment randomization is independent. Qualtrics and Word  
1359 versions of the questionnaires in each language are available on our [public repository](#),  
1360 together with a spreadsheet that summarizes country specificities and our sources.

Figure S48: Main surveys' structure. Cf. Figure 1 for a simplified version.



1361 [Eu, US1, US2] Socio-demographic characteristics

1362 1. Welcome to this survey!

1363  
1364 This survey is **anonymous** and is conducted for research purposes on a representa-  
1365 tive sample of [1,000 British people].

1366  
1367 It takes [US1, US2: 10 to 15 min; Eu: around 20 min] to complete.

1368  
1369 The survey contains lotteries and awards for those who get the correct answer to  
1370 some understanding questions.

1371 If you are attentive and lucky, you can win up to [US1, Eu: \$350; US2: \$150] in  
1372 points. (See terms and conditions).

1373 Please answer every question carefully.

1374  
1375 Do you agree to participate in the survey?

1376 Yes; No

1377 2. What is your gender?

1378 Woman; Man; Other

1379 3. How old are you?

1380 Below 18; 18 to 20; 21 to 24; 25 to 29; 30 to 34; 35 to 39; 40 to 44; 45 to 49; 50 to 54; 55 to  
1381 59; 60 to 64; 65 to 69; 70 to 74; 75 to 79; 80 to 84; 85 to 89; 90 to 99; 100 or above

1382 4. [Eu] In which country do you live?

1383 France; Germany; Spain; United Kingdom; Other

1384 5. What is your ZIP code? [UK: What is your Outcode (the left part of your postcode,  
1385 e.g. if your postcode is N7 8H7, just enter N7)?]

1386 6. Do you live with your partner (if you have one)?

1387 Yes; No

1388 7. How many people are in your household? The household includes: you, the mem-  
1389 bers of your family who live with you, and your dependants.

1390 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more

- 1391 8. [Eu] How many children below 14 live with you?
- 1392     1; 2; 3; 4 or more
- 1393 9. [US1, US2] What race or ethnicity do you identify with? (Multiple answers are
- 1394 possible)
- 1395     *White; Black or African American; Hispanic; Asian; American Indian or Alaskan Native;*
- 1396     *Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; Other: {open field}; Prefer not to say*
- 1397 10. What is the [US1, US2: annual; Eu: monthly] gross income of your household (before
- 1398 withholding tax)? This includes all income: wages, self-employment earnings, So-
- 1399 cial Security benefits, pensions, investment income, welfare payments, and income
- 1400 from other sources.
- 1401     [US1, US2: Items based on household total income deciles and quartiles, namely:
- 1402       *Less than \$20,000; between \$20,001 and \$35,000; between \$35,001 and \$42,000; between*
- 1403       *\$42,001 and \$50,000; between \$50,001 and \$65,000; between \$65,001 and \$82,000; between*
- 1404       *\$82,001 and \$103,000; between \$103,001 and \$130,000; between \$130,001 and \$145,000;*
- 1405       *between \$145,001 and \$165,000; between \$165,001 and \$250,000; More than \$250,000; I*
- 1406       *prefer not to answer;*
- 1407     *Eu: custom thresholds, taking into account household composition Questions 6-8,*
- 1408     *and corresponding to the country's deciles and quartiles of standard of living, cf.*
- 1409     *the sheet "Income" in [this spreadsheet](#)]*
- 1410 11. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
- 1411     [*Below upper secondary, Upper secondary, and Post secondary* are coded as the first two,
- 1412 middle three, and last three items, respectively.
- 1413     *US1, US2: Primary school or less; Eighth grade; Some high school; Regular high school*
- 1414     *diploma/GED or alternative credential; Some college, no degree; 2-year college degree or as-*
- 1415     *sociates degree (for example: AA, AS); Bachelor's degree (for example: BA, BS); Master's*
- 1416     *degree or above (MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA, MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD, PhD);*
- 1417     *FR: École primaire / Aucun; Brevet; CAP ou BEP; Baccalauréat professionnel ou tech-*
- 1418     *nologique; Baccalauréat général; Bac +2 (BTS, DUT, DEUG...); Bac +3 (licence...); Bac*
- 1419     *+5 ou plus (master, école d'ingénieur ou de commerce, doctorat, médecine, maîtrise, DEA,*
- 1420     *DESS...)*
- 1421     *DE: Keine abgeschlossene Schulbildung / Grundschule; Untere Sekundarstufe (z.B. Haupt-*
- 1422     *oder Realschulabschluss); Erstausbildung; Beruflicher Abschluss / Ausbildung; Abitur;*
- 1423     *Zweitausbildung; Bachelor oder Fachhochschulabschluss; Master-Abschluss oder höher*

1424 ES: *Educación primaria / No he completado la enseñanza básica; Educación secundaria obligatoria (ESO); Formación profesional básica (FP); Formación profesional de grado medio; Bachillerato; Formación profesional de grado superior; Grado universitario; Máster/doctorado*  
1425 UK: *Primary education or less; Some secondary school; GSCE; Vocational Upper secondary (Level 3 award, level 3 certificate, level 3 diploma, advanced apprenticeship, etc.); High school degree (A level); Higher vocational education (Level 4+ award, level 4+ certificate, level 4+ diploma, higher apprenticeship, etc.); Bachelor's Degree (BA, BSc, BEng, etc.); Postgraduate diploma or certificate, Master's Degree (MSc, MA, MBA, etc.) or Ph.D.]*

1432 12. What is your employment status?

1433 *Full-time employed; Part-time employed; Self-employed; Student; Retired; Unemployed*  
1434 *(searching for a job); Inactive (not searching for a job)*

1435 13. Are you a homeowner or a tenant? (Multiple answers are possible)

1436 *Tenant; Owner; Landlord renting out property; Hosted free of charge*

1437 14. [If lives with partner: What is the estimated value of your household's assets (in  
1438 U.S. dollars)?

1439 If does not live with partner: What is the estimated value of your assets (in U.S.  
1440 dollars)?]

1441 Include here all your possessions (home, car, savings, etc.) net of debt. For example,  
1442 if you own a house worth [\$]300,000 and you have [\$]100,000 left to repay on your  
1443 mortgage, your assets are [\$]200,000.

1444

1445 I estimate my [If lives with partner: household's] assets net of debt to be:

1446

1447 [Items based on the following individual wealth quintiles, doubled if lives with  
1448 partner. US1, US2: *Less than \$0 (I have a net debt); Close to \$0; Between \$4,000 and*  
1449 *\$60,000; Between \$60,000 and \$190,000; More than \$190,000;* For Eu, the thresholds are:  
1450 FR: €5/50/150/300k; DE: €0/35/130/280k; ES: €0/50/100/200k; UK: £3/45/115/270k]

1451 15. [US1, US2 (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the vote question)] What  
1452 do you consider to be your political affiliation, as of today?

1453 *Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other; Non-Affiliated*

1454 [Eu, US1, US2] Global climate scheme

1455 In the following, we describe two policies, on which we will survey your opinion.  
1456 To check that you have attentively read the descriptions, **we will ask some understanding questions afterwards: those who get correct answers can win up to \$150.**

1458 **Global climate scheme:** At the Paris agreement in 2015, all countries have agreed  
1459 to contain global warming “well below +2 °C”. To limit global warming to this  
1460 level, **there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally.**

1461 To meet the climate target, a limited number of permits to emit greenhouse gases  
1462 can be created globally. Polluting firms would be required to buy permits to cover  
1463 their emissions. Such a policy would **make fossil fuel companies pay** for their  
1464 emissions and progressively raise the price of fossil fuels. **Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions.**

1467 In accordance with the principle that each human has an equal right to pollute, the  
1468 revenues generated by the sale of permits could finance a global basic income. **Each adult in the world would receive [US1, US2: \$30/month; UK: \$30 (that is £25) per month; FR, DE, ES: €30/month],** thereby lifting out of extreme poverty the 700 million people who earn less than \$2/day.

1472 **The typical [American] would lose out financially [US1, US2: \$85, FR: €10, DE: €25, ES: €5, UK: £20] per month** (as he or she would face [\$115] per month in price increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive).

1475 The policy could be put in place as soon as countries totaling more than 60% of  
1476 global emissions agree on it. Countries that would refuse to take part in the policy  
1477 could face sanctions (like tariffs) from the rest of the World and would be excluded  
1478 from the basic income.

(Back to Section 2.2)

1479 16. Who would win or lose financially in the Global climate scheme? [Figure S12]

1480  
1481 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1482 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

1483 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.;*

1484 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

1485 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would lose and*

1487       *the 700 million poorest humans would win* from the Global climate scheme. Now, here  
1488       is the second policy:

1489

1490       **National redistribution scheme:**

1491       This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [US1, US2: 5%; Eu: 1%]<sup>9</sup> and provide  
1492       cash transfers to all adults. More precisely, **each [American] adult would receive**  
1493       **[\$85] per month** (that is [\$1,000] per year). This would be financed by an increase  
1494       of the federal income tax on household income in excess of [US1, US2: \$315,000 per  
1495       year; FR: €15,000 per month; DE: €20,000 per month; ES: €10,000 per month; UK:  
1496       £15,000 per month], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000]. [US1,  
1497       US2: See more details.]<sup>10</sup>

1498       17. Who would win or lose financially in the National redistribution? [Figure S12]

1499

1500       Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1501       Typical [Americans] would win and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Ameri-  
1502       cans] would win and the richest [Americans] would lose.; Typical [Americans] would lose  
1503       and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Americans] would lose and the richest  
1504       [Americans] would lose.

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would win and  
1506       the richest [Americans] would lose* from the National redistribution scheme.

1507

1508       To help you with the next question, here is a reminder of the policies:

1509

1510       **Global Climate scheme:**

1511       To limit global warming and reach the international climate objective, the Global  
1512       climate scheme would **impose a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can**

---

<sup>9</sup>The wider base in the U.S. was chosen because emissions are larger in the U.S. than in Europe, and it would hardly be feasible to offset the median American's loss from the GCS by taxing only the top 1%.

<sup>10</sup>8% of U.S. respondents click. They then see the following text, based on [taxjusticenow.org](http://taxjusticenow.org) by Saez & Zucman (2019): *The marginal income tax rates would evolve as follows:*

*Below \$315,000: unchanged*

*\$315,000 - \$400,000: current rate 32% => new rate 41%*

*\$400,000 - \$600,000: 35% => 50%*

*\$600,000 - \$2.5 million: 37% => 60%*

*\$2.5 - \$5 million: 37% => 65%*

*Above \$5 million: 37% => 70%*

1513 emit globally.

1514 It would **make polluters pay** for their emissions, which in turn would increase fos-  
1515 sil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities.

1516 The revenues would finance a **global basic income** of [\$30] per month for all hu-  
1517 mans, lifting out of extreme poverty the poorest billion people.

1518 Considering the basic income and the fuel price increases, **the typical [American]**  
1519 **would lose out financially [\$85] per month.**

1520

1521 **National redistribution scheme:**

1522 This policy would **increase taxes on the top [5%]** and provide cash transfers to  
1523 all adults. More precisely, **each [American] would receive [\$85] per month.** This  
1524 would be financed by an increase of the federal income tax on household income in  
1525 excess of [\$315,000 per year], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000  
1526 per year].

- 1527 18. If both the Global climate scheme and the National redistribution scheme are imple-  
1528 mented, how would a typical [American] be financially affected? [Figure S12]  
1529 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.  
1530 *A typical [American] would lose out financially.; A typical [American] would neither gain  
1531 nor lose.; A typical [American] would gain financially.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was that *A typical [American] would nei-  
1533 ther gain nor lose from both schemes combined. [US1, Eu: Now, here are the last two  
1534 policies:]*

1535

1536 **[US1: Coal exit:**

1537 To reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, this policy would require all U.S. coal power plants to be  
1538 phased out by 2030. Coal would be replaced by renewable sources like wind and  
1539 solar panels as well as stronger reliance on gas power plants.

1540 **Eu: Thermal insulation plan:**

1541 To reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and energy insecurity, this policy would require that all  
1542 buildings meet energy efficiency targets: at least rating E in 2030 and rating C in  
1543 2040. The [UK] government would subsidise half the cost of insulation for all house-  
1544 holds, and up to 90% for the poorest households. Insulation work would cost [FR,  
1545 DE: €25; ES: €20; UK: £25] billion a year, but would deliver energy savings greater

1546 than this cost. ]

1547

1548 **[US1: Marriage only for opposite-sex couples:**

1549 This policy is a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would legally  
1550 define marriage as a union of one man and one woman.

1551 ***Eu: Death penalty for major crimes:***

1552 This measure would reintroduce capital punishment for major crimes such as ter-  
1553 rrorism and mass shootings.]

1554

1555 Now, we will ask your opinion on the [US1, Eu: four] policies.

1556 [Click here for the reminder of the \[US1, Eu: first\] two policies.](#) [Clicking displays the  
1557 previous summarized descriptions.]

- 1558 19. [US2] [4 Random branches: control (*nothing*); Question 31 (*field*); Question 32 (*impor-*  
1559 *tant*); or the following question (*info*).] For information, a recent survey has shown  
1560 that:

- 1561 • 64% of Americans support the Global climate scheme.  
1562 • 72% of Americans support the National redistribution scheme.

- 1563 20. Do you support the Global climate scheme? [Figure S1]

1564 Yes; No

- 1565 21. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the  
1566 previous question? [Figure S4]

1567 The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

1568 Percentage of [Americans] in favor of Global climate scheme [slider from 0 to 100]

- 1569 22. Do you support the National redistribution scheme? [Figure S1]

1570 Yes; No

- 1571 23. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the  
1572 previous question? [Figure S4]

1573 The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

1574 Percentage of [Americans] in favor of National redistribution [slider from 0 to 100]

- 1575 24. [Eu, US1] Beware, this question is quite unusual. Among the policies below, **how**  
1576 **many** do you support? [Figure S14, Table 1]

1577 [Four random branches. Branch GCS/NR/C/O]

- 1578
- 1579 • Global climate scheme
  - 1580 • National redistribution scheme
  - 1581 • [Coal exit]
  - 1582 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

1583 0; 1; 2; 3; 4

1584

1585 [Branch GCS/C/O]

- 1586
- 1587 • Global climate scheme
- 1588 • [Coal exit]
- 1589 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

1590 0; 1; 2; 3

1591

1592 [Branch NR/C/O]

- 1593
- 1594 • National redistribution scheme
- 1595 • [Coal exit]
- 1596 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

1597 0; 1; 2; 3

1598 [Branch C/O]

- 1599
- 1600 • [Coal exit]
- 1601 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

1602 0; 1; 2

1603

1604 [Eu, US1] Conjoint analyses

- 1605 25. Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you prefer? [Figure  
1606 S15]

1607 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the  
1608 same time.

Bundle A	Bundle B
[Coal exit]	[Coal exit]
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme
Global climate scheme	

1610  
1611 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 1612 26. Do you support Bundle A (combining [Coal exit], the National redistribution scheme,  
1613 and the Global climate scheme)?[Figure S1]

1614 Yes; No

- 1615 27. [new page] Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you  
1616 prefer? [Figure S15]

1617 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the  
1618 same time.

1619 [Four random branches. Branch C + NR vs. GCS + NR]

Bundle A	Bundle B
[Coal exit]	Global climate scheme
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme

1620  
1622 [Branch NR vs. NR + C + GCS]

Bundle A	Bundle B
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme [Coal exit] Global climate scheme

1623  
1625 [Branch NR + GCS vs. NR]

	<b>Bundle A</b>	<b>Bundle B</b>
1626	National redistribution scheme Global climate scheme	National redistribution scheme
1627		

1628 [Branch NR + C vs. NR]

	<b>Bundle A</b>	<b>Bundle B</b>
1629	National redistribution scheme [Coal exit]	National redistribution scheme
1630		

1631 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 1632 28. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and  
 1633 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies  
 1634 in their platforms.

1635 *Eu: Imagine if [DE, ES, UK: the two favorite candidates in your constituency in the  
 1636 next general election; FR: the two candidates in the second round of the next pres-  
 1637 idential election] campaigned with the following policies in their party's platforms.]*

1639 Which of these candidates would you vote for? [Table 2, Figure S15]

1640 [Table 2. Two random branches: with and without the final row. The US1 version of the poli-  
 1641 cies is given below, see the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the European versions.]

	<b>Democrat</b>	<b>Republican</b>
	Increase corporate income tax rate from 21% to 28%	Decrease the payroll tax
	Coal exit	Permit completion of the Keystone pipeline
	Trillion dollar investment in childcare, healthcare, education and housing	Withdrawal of the Paris agreement
	\$15 minimum wage	Marriage only for opposite-sex couples
	National redistribution scheme	Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation
1642	[Global climate scheme / no row]	[ / no row]

1643

1644

[US1: Democrat; Republican; None of them; Eu: Candidate A; Candidate B; None of them]

1645

1646

1647

29. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies in their platforms.

1648

1649

1650

1651

1652

1653

*Eu (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the Section "Values and politics"):* Imagine that [FR: the left or center-left; DE: a red-red-green coalition; ES: the PSOE; UK: the Labour Party] wins the next [general] elections. Here are two possible platforms on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a pool of credible [FR: left or center-left, DE: left-wing parties'; ES: PSOE; UK: Labour] policies).]

1654

1655

[US1: Which of these candidates do you prefer?

1656

1657

1658

1659

*Eu: Even if you [FR: are not from the left or center-left; DE: do not support the left-wing parties; ES: do not support the PSOE; UK: do not support the Labour Party], which of these platforms do you prefer?]*

[Figures S2, S16; see also the sheet "Policies" in *this spreadsheet* for the possible policies.]

	[Candidate A]	[Candidate B]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
1660	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]

1661

[US1: Candidate A; Candidate B; Eu: Platform A; Platform B]

1662

1663

1664

1665

30. [new page] [Same wording and conditions as above. For brevity, only the UK version is given here.] Imagine that the Labour Party wins the next general elections. Here are two possible platforms on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a pool of credible Labour policies).

1666

1667

1668

Even if you do not support the Labour Party, which of these platforms do you prefer? [Figure S2]

		<b>Platform A</b>	<b>Platform B</b>
1669	[Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order]	[Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy]	[Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy]
1670	<b>Foreign policy</b>	Global climate scheme	-
	<i>Platform A; Platform B</i>		

1671 **[Eu, US2] Perceptions of the GCS**

1672 [Eu: two random branches. US2: four random branches and the question is asked (if asked)  
1673 before Question 20]

1674 31. [Branch: field] When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to  
1675 your mind?

1676 Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme. [Figures S18, S19]  
1677 {Open field}

1678 32. [Branch: important] When determining your support or opposition to the Global  
1679 climate scheme, which points are important to you? [Figure S17]

- 1680 • It would succeed in limiting climate change.
- 1681 • It would hurt the [U.S.] economy.
- 1682 • It would penalize my household.
- 1683 • It would make people change their lifestyle.
- 1684 • It would reduce poverty in low-income countries.
- 1685 • It might be detrimental to some poor countries.
- 1686 • It could foster global cooperation.
- 1687 • It could fuel corruption in low-income countries.
- 1688 • It could be subject to fraud.
- 1689 • It would be technically difficult to put in place.
- 1690 • Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences.

1691 *Not at all important; Not so important; Quite important; Very important*

1692 [Eu, US1] Donation lottery

1693 33. Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).

1694 *Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*

1695 34. [Two random branches] By taking this survey, you are automatically entered into a  
1696 lottery to win [\$]100 in panel points. This lottery is unrelated to the previous ones  
1697 that rewarded answers’ accuracy. In a few days you will know whether you have  
1698 been selected in the lottery. The payment will be made to you in the same way as  
1699 your compensation for this survey, so no further action is required on your part.

1700

1701 Should you be selected in the lottery, you can also donate a part of this additional  
1702 compensation to [[American] / African] people living in poverty through [US1: the  
1703 charity GiveDirectly. The charity GiveDirectly; Eu: a charity. We would channel this  
1704 donation to a charity that] provides small amounts of cash to people in need in [[the  
1705 U.S] / Africa].

1706

1707 **In case you are winner of the lottery, what share of the [\$]100 would you donate  
1708 to [[American] / African] people living in poverty [US1: through GiveDirectly]?  
1709 [Figure S20, Table S2]**

1710 *Amount donated to [[American] / African] people in need (in [\$]) [slider from 0 to 100]*

1711 [Eu, US2] Wealth tax

1712 [Four random branches: Question 35 then Question 36 (global first); Question 36 then Ques-  
1713 tion 35 (national first); Question 37 (global share); Question 38 (sharing)]

1714 35. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-  
1715 income countries?

1716 Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking  
1717 water, healthcare, and education. [Figures S1, S21]

1718 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly  
1719 support*

1720 36. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: afford-  
1721 able housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and  
1722 schools]? [Figures S1, S22]

1723        *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*  
1724        *support*

1725        37. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all  
1726        countries around the world. In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount  
1727        to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE: €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2:  
1728        2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount  
1729        to [\$]1 billion in all low-income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700  
1730        million people, most of them in Africa).

1731        Each country would retain part of the revenues it collects, and the remaining part  
1732        would be pooled at the global level to finance infrastructure and public services in  
1733        low-income countries.

1734  
1735        What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of re-  
1736        tained in the country's national budget)? [Figures S5, S23]

1737        *Percent of global wealth tax that should go to low-income countries [slider from 0 to 100]*

1738        38. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in  
1739        all countries around the world.

1740        In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE:  
1741        €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2: 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES:  
1742        0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount to [\$]1 billion in all low-  
1743        income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700 million people, most of  
1744        them in Africa).

1745        Which of the following options would you prefer? [Figure S24]

- 1746        • The whole wealth tax financing national budgets in each country. For ex-  
1747        ample, in [US2: the U.S., it could finance affordable housing and universal  
1748        childcare/pre-K.; Eu-UK: the UK, it could finance the National Health Service  
1749        and state-funded schools].
- 1750        • Half of the wealth tax financing national budgets in each country, half of it  
1751        financing low-income countries. For example, it could finance [US2: universal  
1752        childcare/pre-K in the U.S.; Eu-UK: state-funded schools in the UK] and access  
1753        to drinking water, healthcare, and education in Africa.

1754 [Eu, US2] Foreign aid

1755 US2 Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).

1756 Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal

- 1757 39. From your best guess, what percentage of [U.S.] government spending is allocated  
1758 to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?

1759

1760 For your information, government spending totals [US2: 38%; FR: 55%; DE: 45%; ES:  
1761 42%; UK: 41%] of [U.S.] GDP, it includes [US2: federal, State; Eu: national] and local  
1762 government spending, and apart from foreign aid, it covers the following items: de-  
1763 fense, social security (retirement pensions), health [US2: (including Medicare and  
1764 Medicaid)], welfare benefits [US2: (including food stamps and EITC)], education,  
1765 roads, justice, other programs [US2: and federal agencies (including in energy, sci-  
1766 ence...)]. [Figure S25]

1767 Less than 0.1%; 0.1% to 0.2%; 0.3% to 0.5%; 0.6% to 1.0%; 1.1% to 1.7%; 1.8% to 2.6%;  
1768 2.7% to 4%; 4.1% to 6%; 6.1% to 9%; 9.1% to 13%; 13.1% to 25%; More than 25%

- 1769 40. [Two random branches: with or without information on actual amount] [Info: Actually,  
1770 [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [the U.S.] government spend-  
1771 ing is allocated to foreign aid.]

1772

1773 If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate  
1774 to foreign aid? [Figures S28, S29, S26 and S27]

- 1775 41. [Asked iff branch: Info and preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than actual for-  
1776 eign aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to increase [U.S.] foreign  
1777 aid.

1778

1779 How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers  
1780 possible) [Figure S30]

1781 Lower spending on defense; Lower spending on retirement pensions; Lower spending on  
1782 healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Lower spending on welfare benefits [US2: (like  
1783 EITC or food stamps)]; Lower spending on education; Lower spending on other programs  
1784 [US2: and federal agencies]; Higher taxes on the wealthiest; Higher corporate income tax  
1785 rate; Higher personal income tax rates; Higher public deficit

1786     42. [Asked iff branch: *Info* and preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than actual foreign  
1787       aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to reduce [U.S.] foreign aid.

1788

1789     How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible) [*Figure S31*]  
1790

1791     *Higher spending on defense; Higher spending on retirement pensions; Higher spending on  
1792       healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Higher spending on welfare benefits [US2:  
1793       like EITC or food stamps)]; Higher spending on education; lower spending on other pro-  
1794       grams [US2: and federal agencies]; Lower taxes on the wealthiest; Lower corporate income  
1795       tax rate; Lower personal income tax rates; Lower public deficit*

### 1796     **[Eu, US1] Petition**

1797     43. [*Two random branches*] Would you be willing to sign a petition for the [Global cli-  
1798       mate / National redistribution] scheme? [*Figure S32*]

1799

1800     As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President's  
1801       office], informing him what share of American people are willing to endorse the  
1802       [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign,  
1803       only your answer here is required and remains anonymous.) Yes; No

### 1804     **[Eu, US1] Other policies**

1805     44. The following policies are discussed at international negotiations on how to deal  
1806       with climate change. [*Figures 3 and S33*]

1807

1808     Do you support or oppose the following policies?

- 1809       • Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for  
1810       climate damages
- 1811       • High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries
- 1812       • High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income  
1813       countries adapt to climate change

1814     *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly  
1815       support*

1816 45. Do you support or oppose the following global policies? [Figures 3 and S33]

- 1817 • Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt
- 1818 • Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting  
1819 right proportional to its population
- 1820 • Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries
- 1821 • A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage
- 1822 • Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of  
1823 all assets
- 1824 • A maximum wealth limit of [US1: \$10 billion; Eu: [€]100 million] for each  
1825 human

1826 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly  
1827 support*

1828 46. Currently, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [U.S.] government  
1829 spending (that is, [US1: 0.2%; FR: 0.4%; DE: 0.6%; ES: 0.2%; UK: 0.7%] of [U.S.] GDP)  
1830 is spent on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries. [Figure S6]

1831  
1832 Do you support [the U.S.] transferring more money to low-income countries?

1833 Yes, [U.S.] foreign aid should be increased.; Yes, but only if some conditions are met.; No,  
1834 [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.; No, [U.S.] foreign aid should be reduced.

1835 47. [Asked only if Yes, but only if some conditions are met. is chosen] What conditions  
1836 should be required for [the U.S.] to increase its foreign aid? (Multiple answers pos-  
1837 sible) [Figures S7, S28]

1838 *That recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights.; That recipient  
1839 countries cooperate to fight illegal migrations.; That other high-income countries also in-  
1840 crease their foreign aid.; That this is financed by increased taxes on millionaires.; That we  
1841 can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted.; Other: [open field]*

1842 48. [Asked only if No, [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable. or No, [U.S.] foreign aid  
1843 should be reduced. is chosen] Why do you oppose [the U.S.] increasing its foreign  
1844 aid? (Multiple answers possible) [Figure S8]

1845 *Aid perpetuates poverty as it makes people feel less responsible for themselves.; Aid is not  
1846 effective as most of it is diverted.; Aid is a pressure tactic for high-income countries that*

1847 prevents low-income countries from developing freely.; [The U.S.] is not responsible for what  
1848 happens in other countries.; Charity begins at home: there is already a lot to do to support  
1849 the American people in need.; Other: [open field]

1850 **[Eu, US1, US2] Values and politics**

- 1851 49. [Eu (where it is instead asked at the beginning of Section “Other Policies”), US1]  
1852 In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend  
1853 [U.S.] interests or global justice? [Figure S34]  
1854 [U.S.] interests, even if it goes against global justice; [U.S.] interests, to the extent it re-  
1855 spects global justice; Indifferent or don’t know; Global justice, to the extent it respects [U.S.]  
1856 interests; Global justice, even if it goes against [U.S.] interests
- 1857 50. How much did you give to charities in 2022? [Figure S39]  
1858 I did not make donations to charities last year.; Less than [\$]100.; Between [\$]101 and  
1859 [\$]500.; Between [\$]501 and [\$]1,000.; Between [\$]1,001 and [\$]5,000.; More than [\$]5,000.
- 1860 51. To what extent are you interested in politics? [Figure S40]  
1861 Not at all; A little; Moderately; A lot; A great deal
- 1862 52. Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means you think the  
1863 government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic gov-  
1864 ernment functions, and 5 means you think the government should take active steps  
1865 in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens? [Figure S41]  
1866 Desired involvement of government [slider from 1 to 5]
- 1867 53. **On economic policy matters**, where do you see yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where  
1868 1 is Left (favoring equality and government interventions) and 5 is Right (favoring  
1869 free competition and little government intervention)? [Figure S42]  
1870 Left (1) to Right (5) on economic issues [slider from 1 to 5]
- 1871 54. Did you vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election? [Figure S43]  
1872 Yes; No; I didn’t have the right to vote in the U.S.; Prefer not to say
- 1873 55. [If voted: Which candidate did you vote for in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election?  
1874 If did not vote: Even if you did not vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election,  
1875 please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who  
1876 represents your views more closely.] [Figure S44]

[US1, US2: Biden; Trump; Jorgensen; Hawkins; Prefer not to say  
FR: candidates at the 2022 presidential election  
DE: parties with more than 1% of votes at the 2021 federal election and *Other*  
ES: lists with more than 0.9% at the November 2019 general election and *Other*  
UK: parties with more than 0.5% of votes at the 2019 general election and *Other*]

56. To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem? [Figure S35]

- Income inequality in [the U.S.]
- Climate change
- Global poverty

*Not an important issue for me; An issue but there are other priorities; An issue but we already do what we can; An important issue, we should do more; One of the most pressing issue of our time*

57. What group do you defend when you vote? [Figure S36]

*Sentient beings (humans and animals); Humans; [Eu: Europeans]; [Americans]; People sharing my culture or religion; [US1, US2: My State]; [US1, US2: My town; Eu: My country, region or town]; My relatives and/or colleagues; My family and myself*

## [Eu, US1] Prioritization

58. In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

How do you allocate the points among the following policies? [Figures S37 and S38]

You can adjust the number of points either using the slider or entering the number of your choice on the right-hand-side. **The sum of points must equal exactly 100.** By pushing the last slider to the right, the total will automatically adjust to 100. Please read the 6 options before making your choice.

*See the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the pool of policies in each country.*

*[sliders from 0 to 100]*

1905 [FR, DE, ES] ETS2

1906 59. Similar to the Global Climate Scheme, the European Climate Scheme would impose  
1907 a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit across the EU in the buildings  
1908 and transport sectors. It would make polluters pay for their emissions, which in turn  
1909 would increase fossil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities. Several options  
1910 are possible regarding the use of the scheme's revenues:

- 1911 • Provide an equal cash transfer of €105 per year to each European.
- 1912 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European, proportional to their  
1913 country's emissions: people in countries with higher emissions per person (like  
1914 Germany) would receive more than people in countries with lower emissions  
1915 (like Romania). For information, people in [Germany] would receive €[FR:  
1916 110; DE: 130; ES: 90]/year.
- 1917 • Finance low-carbon investments: thermal insulation of buildings, switch to  
1918 clean sources of heating, public transportation, and charging stations for elec-  
1919 tric vehicles.
- 1920 • Provide cash transfers to the most vulnerable half of Europeans and finance  
1921 low-carbon investments.

1922 Do you support or oppose the European Climate Scheme in case the revenue is used  
1923 to... ?

- 1924 • Provide an equal cash transfer to each European
- 1925 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European
- 1926 • Finance low-carbon investments
- 1927 • Provide cash transfers for the most vulnerable Europeans and low-carbon in-  
1928 vestments

1929 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly  
1930 support*

1931 60. [Asked iff none of the four variants of the European Climate Scheme is (somewhat or  
1932 strongly) supported] Why do you not support a European Climate Scheme? (Mul-  
1933 tiple answers possible)

1934     *I am opposed to climate policy being decided at the EU level, it should be decided at the na-*  
1935     *tional level;*  
1936     *I would prefer if the revenues were used in a different way (beyond the four suggestions*  
1937     *above) than previously suggested;*  
1938     *I would prefer if decreasing carbon emissions were regulated by other climate policies;*  
1939     *I am generally opposed to additional, or more ambitious, climate policies;*  
1940     *I do not fully understand how the European Climate Scheme is supposed to work;*  
1941     *I don't know*

1942     **[Eu, US1, US2] Feedback**

- 1943     61. Do you feel that this survey was politically biased? [Figure S45]  
1944         *Yes, left-wing biased; Yes, right-wing biased; No, I do not feel it was biased*
- 1945     62. [US2 Asked only to one random third of the respondents, instead of the feedback Ques-  
1946         tion 63] According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme  
1947         poverty in low-income countries? [Figure S46]  
1948         *{Open field}*
- 1949     63. The survey is nearing completion. You can now enter any comments, thoughts or  
1950         suggestions in the field below.  
1951         *{Open field}*
- 1952     64. Lastly, are you interested to be interviewed by a researcher (through videoconfer-  
1953         encing) for 30 min?  
1954  
1955         This is totally optional and will not be rewarded.  
1956         *Yes; No*

## 1957 E Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme

1958 To specify the GCS, we use the IEA's 2DS scenario (IEA 2017), which is consistent  
1959 with limiting the global average temperature increase to 2°C with a probability of at least  
1960 50%. The paper by Hood (2017) contributing to the Report of the High-Level Commission  
1961 on Carbon Prices (Stern & Stiglitz 2017) presents a price corridor compatible with this  
1962 emissions scenario, from which we take the midpoint. The product of these two series  
1963 provides an estimate of the revenues expected from a global carbon price. We then use  
1964 the UN median scenario of future population aged over 15 years (*adults*, for short). We  
1965 derive the basic income that could be paid to all adults by recycling the revenues from  
1966 the global carbon price: evolving between \$20 and \$30 per month, with a peak in 2030.  
1967 Accounting for the lower price levels in low-income countries, an additional income of  
1968 \$30 per month would allow **670 million people** to escape extreme poverty, defined with  
1969 the threshold of \$2.15 per day in purchasing power parity.<sup>11</sup>

1970 To estimate the increase in fossil fuel expenditures (or "cost") in each country by 2030,  
1971 we make a key assumption concerning the evolution of the carbon footprints per adult:  
1972 that they will decrease by the same proportion in each country. We use data from the  
1973 Global Carbon Project (Peters et al. 2012). In 2030, the average carbon footprint of a  
1974 country  $c$ ,  $e_c$ , evolves from baseline year  $b$  proportionally to the evolution of its adult  
1975 population  $\Delta p_c = p_c^{2030} / p_c^b$ . Thus, the global share of country  $c$ 's carbon footprint,  $s_c$ ,  
1976 is proportional to  $\sigma_c = e_c \Delta p_c$ , and as countries' shares sum to 1,  $s_c = \frac{\sigma_c}{\sum_k \sigma_k}$ . Multiplying  
1977 country  $c$ 's emission share with global revenues in 2030,  $R$ , and dividing by  $c$ 's adult pop-  
1978 ulation in year  $y$ , yields its average cost per adult:  $R \cdot s_c / p_c^y$ . Using findings from Ivanova  
1979 & Wood (2020) for Europe and Fremstad & Paul (2019) for the U.S., we approximate the  
1980 median cost as 90% of the average cost. Finally, the net gain is given by the basic income  
1981 (\$30 per month) minus the cost. We provided consistent estimates of net gains in all sur-  
1982 veys (using  $y = b = 2015$ ), though in the global survey we gave the average net gains  
1983 vs. the median ones in the complementary surveys. The latter are shown in Figure S49.  
1984 For the record, Table S3 also provides an estimate of *average* net gains (computed with

---

<sup>11</sup>The average carbon footprint of Sub-Saharan Africa is 0.75tCO<sub>2</sub> per capita (World Bank), and it is even lower for people living in extreme poverty, under one tenth of the world average of about 5tCO<sub>2</sub> per capita (Chancel & Piketty 2015). Under a GCS with a cash transfer of \$30 per person, if one's emission is one tenth of the world average, their net gain would be \$27 per month in nominal terms. In regions with extreme poverty like Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding high-income countries), the conversion factor from Market Exchange Rate to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is 2.4 (computed as the ratio of the World Bank series relating the GDP per capita of Sub-Saharan Africa in PPP and nominal). Therefore, the net gain for the extreme poor is \$65 per month (or \$2.13 a day) in PPP, enough to lift them out of extreme poverty.

1985  $b = 2019$  and  $y = 2030$ ).<sup>12</sup>

1986 Estimates of the net gains from the Global Climate Scheme are necessarily imprecise,  
1987 given the uncertainties surrounding the carbon price required to achieve emissions  
1988 reductions as well as each country's trajectory in terms of emissions and population. These  
1989 values are highly dependent on future (non-price) climate policies, technical progress,  
1990 and economic growth of each country, which are only partially known. Integrated As-  
1991 sessment Models have been used to derive a Global Energy Assessment (Johansson et al.  
1992 2012), a 100% renewable scenario (Greenpeace 2015) as well as Shared Socioeconomic  
1993 Pathways (SSPs), which include consistent trajectories of population, emissions, and car-  
1994 bon price (Riahi et al.; Bauer et al.; van Vuuren et al.; Fricko et al. 2017; 2017; 2017; 2017).  
1995 Instead of using some of these modelling trajectories, we relied on a simple and trans-  
1996 parent formula, for a number of reasons. First and foremost, those trajectories describe  
1997 territorial emissions while we need consumption-based emissions to compute the inci-  
1998 dence of the GCS. Second, the carbon price is relatively low in trajectories of SSPs that  
1999 contain global warming below 2°C (less than \$35/tCO<sub>2</sub> in 2030), so we conservatively  
2000 chose a method yielding a higher carbon price (\$90 in 2030). Third, modelling results are  
2001 available only for a few macro regions, while we wanted country by country estimates.  
2002 Finally, we have checked that the emissions per capita given by our method are broadly  
2003 in line with alternative methods, even if it tends to overestimate net gains in countries  
2004 which will decarbonize less rapidly than average.<sup>13</sup> For example, although countries' de-  
2005 carbonization plans should realign with the GCS in place, India might still decarbonize  
2006 less quickly than the European Union, so India's gain and the EU's loss might be over-  
2007 estimated in our computations. For a more sophisticated version of the Global Climate  
2008 Scheme which includes participation mechanisms preventing middle-income countries  
2009 (like China) to lose from it and estimations of the Net Present Value by country, see Fabre  
2010 (2023).

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<sup>12</sup>2015 was the last year of data available when the global questionnaire was conceived (OECD data was then used – it does not cover all countries but give identical rounded estimates than those recomputed from the Global Carbon Project data for our complementary surveys). 2030 was chosen as the reference year as it is the date at which global carbon price revenues are expected to peak (and the GCS redistributive effects would be largest), and the GCS could not realistically enter into force before that date. In the surveys, we chose  $y = b = 2015$  rather than  $b = 2019$  and  $y = 2030$  to get more conservative estimates of the monthly cost in the U.S. (\$20 higher than the other option) and in Europe (€5 or £10 higher).

<sup>13</sup>Computations with alternative methods can be found on [our public repository](#).

Figure S49: Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme.




Table S3: Estimated net gain from the GCS in 2030 and carbon footprint by country.

	Mean net gain from the GCS (\$/month)	CO <sub>2</sub> footprint per adult in 2019 (tCO <sub>2</sub> /y)			
			Mexico	2	5.6
			Ukraine	2	5.6
			Uzbekistan*	4	5.1
			Argentina	5	4.9
			Thailand	6	4.6
			Egypt	12	3.6
			Indonesia	13	3.3
			Colombia	15	3.0
Saudi Arabia	-93	24.0	Brazil	15	2.9
United States	-77	21.0	Vietnam	15	2.9
Australia	-60	17.6	Peru	16	2.8
Canada	-56	16.7	Morocco	16	2.7
South Korea	-50	15.6	North Korea*	17	2.5
Germany	-30	11.7	India	18	2.4
Russia	-29	11.5	Philippines	18	2.3
Japan	-28	11.3	Pakistan	22	1.6
Malaysia	-21	10.0	Bangladesh	24	1.1
Iran	-19	9.5	Nigeria	25	1.0
Poland	-19	9.5	Kenya	25	0.9
United Kingdom	-18	9.4	Myanmar*	26	0.9
China	-14	8.6	Sudan*	26	0.9
Italy	-13	8.4	Tanzania	27	0.5
South Africa	-11	8.0	Afghanistan*	27	0.5
France	-10	7.8	Uganda	28	0.4
Iraq*	-8	7.4	Ethiopia	28	0.3
Spain	-6	7.0	Venezuela	29	0.3
Turkey	-2	6.2	DRC*	30	0.1
Algeria*	-1	6.0			

<sup>2011</sup> Note: Asterisks denote countries where footprint is missing and territorial emissions is used instead.

<sup>2012</sup> Values differ from Figure S49 as this table present estimates of *mean* net gain per adult in 2030, not at the

<sup>2013</sup> present. Only the countries with more than 20 million adults (covering 87% of the global total) are shown.

## F Determinants of support

Table S4: Determinants of support for the Global Climate Scheme. (Back to [2.3](#))

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme						
	All	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Country: Germany	-0.157*** (0.022)		-0.144*** (0.022)				
Country: Spain	-0.044* (0.024)		-0.026 (0.024)				
Country: United Kingdom	-0.079*** (0.024)		-0.104*** (0.023)				
Country: United States	-0.375*** (0.019)						
Income quartile: 2	0.037** (0.017)	0.031 (0.022)	0.038 (0.023)	0.047 (0.043)	0.058 (0.049)	0.013 (0.053)	0.023 (0.043)
Income quartile: 3	0.042** (0.017)	0.033 (0.024)	0.049** (0.024)	0.080** (0.040)	0.059 (0.052)	0.074 (0.056)	-0.052 (0.052)
Income quartile: 4	0.056*** (0.018)	0.062** (0.026)	0.010 (0.026)	0.018 (0.047)	-0.015 (0.055)	-0.001 (0.056)	-0.005 (0.057)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.023* (0.012)	0.032* (0.017)	0.010 (0.018)	0.007 (0.029)	0.045 (0.039)	0.007 (0.039)	-0.010 (0.039)
Age: 25-34	-0.076*** (0.025)	-0.084*** (0.031)	-0.044 (0.035)	-0.031 (0.057)	-0.077 (0.083)	-0.050 (0.066)	-0.103 (0.091)
Age: 35-49	-0.101*** (0.024)	-0.109*** (0.030)	-0.069* (0.034)	-0.094* (0.055)	-0.009 (0.077)	-0.168** (0.070)	-0.050 (0.090)
Age: 50-64	-0.137*** (0.024)	-0.165*** (0.030)	-0.038 (0.035)	-0.039 (0.056)	-0.020 (0.082)	-0.146** (0.067)	-0.017 (0.087)
Age: 65+	-0.116*** (0.028)	-0.142*** (0.034)	-0.056 (0.044)	0.003 (0.076)	-0.045 (0.094)	-0.258*** (0.091)	0.011 (0.105)
Gender: Man	0.019* (0.011)	0.022 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.029)	-0.018 (0.033)	0.042 (0.038)	-0.005 (0.034)
Lives with partner	0.029** (0.013)	0.023 (0.017)	0.058*** (0.018)	0.070** (0.033)	0.082** (0.038)	0.017 (0.038)	0.040 (0.039)
Employment status: Retired	-0.020 (0.024)	-0.046 (0.030)	0.056 (0.038)	0.087 (0.081)	0.096 (0.075)	0.040 (0.082)	0.001 (0.073)
Employment status: Student	0.045 (0.033)	0.062 (0.048)	0.101** (0.044)	0.165* (0.085)	0.192** (0.087)	0.116 (0.074)	-0.021 (0.107)
Employment status: Working	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.020 (0.024)	0.011 (0.028)	0.082 (0.064)	0.006 (0.056)	-0.050 (0.056)	0.036 (0.051)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.331*** (0.013)	-0.435*** (0.017)	-0.106*** (0.019)	-0.131*** (0.035)	-0.004 (0.044)	-0.114*** (0.038)	-0.081* (0.041)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	-0.184*** (0.016)	-0.198*** (0.022)	-0.136*** (0.021)	-0.196*** (0.039)	-0.034 (0.043)	-0.116** (0.046)	-0.108*** (0.040)
Vote: Far right	-0.396*** (0.032)		-0.309*** (0.033)	-0.493*** (0.064)	-0.168*** (0.051)	-0.130 (0.102)	-0.314*** (0.080)
Urban	0.049*** (0.012)	0.072*** (0.018)	0.006 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.029)	0.019 (0.032)	-0.014 (0.036)	0.017 (0.033)
Race: White		-0.030 (0.019)					
Region: Northeast		0.010 (0.023)					
Region: South		0.006 (0.020)					
Region: West		0.010 (0.022)					
Swing State		-0.038** (0.019)					
Constant	1.048	0.736	0.89	0.7	0.732	0.935	0.886
Observations	7,986	4,992	2,994	977	727	748	542
R <sup>2</sup>	0.160	0.181	0.064	0.116	0.067	0.043	0.063

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table S5: Support for the GCS regressed on comprehension of its financial effects.

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme					
	All	United States	France	Germany	United Kingdom	Spain
With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win	0.029** (0.012)	-0.004 (0.016)	0.043 (0.033)	0.051 (0.033)	0.040 (0.036)	0.038 (0.037)
Constant	0.596	0.53	0.764	0.677	0.707	0.796
Observations	8,000	5,000	729	979	749	543
R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.00001	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.002

Table S6: Correlation between (*Somewhat or Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in high-income countries.

	Support for a global GHG tax and dividend											
	USA (1)	DNK (2)	FRA (3)	DEU (4)	ITA (5)	ESP (6)	GBR (7)	JPN (8)	POL (9)	AUS (10)	CAN (11)	KOR (12)
Control group mean	0.34	0.409	0.34	0.361	0.341	0.421	0.288	0.317	0.309	0.294	0.316	0.334
Trusts the government	0.040*** (0.013)	0.0005 (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.051*** (0.011)	0.061*** (0.012)	0.046*** (0.011)	0.050*** (0.012)	0.039*** (0.013)	0.023** (0.011)	0.041*** (0.013)	0.019 (0.012)	0.079*** (0.013)
Believes inequality is an important problem	0.038*** (0.014)	0.051*** (0.012)	0.045*** (0.013)	0.040*** (0.011)	0.023** (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.052*** (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)	0.009 (0.010)	0.005 (0.013)	0.031*** (0.012)	0.024** (0.012)
Worries about CC	0.006 (0.018)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.005 (0.016)	0.048*** (0.014)	0.023* (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.044*** (0.015)	0.014 (0.014)	0.018 (0.013)	0.036** (0.017)	0.004 (0.014)	0.015 (0.013)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	0.009 (0.015)	0.007 (0.012)	0.018 (0.014)	0.015 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.032** (0.011)	0.027** (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.024** (0.015)	0.018 (0.014)	0.014 (0.014)	0.001 (0.013)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.059*** (0.015)	0.019 (0.013)	0.008 (0.014)	0.032** (0.013)	0.012 (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.006 (0.014)	0.037** (0.014)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.033** (0.016)	0.026* (0.014)	0.033** (0.013)
Understands emission across activities/regions	-0.018 (0.011)	0.009 (0.013)	0.003 (0.012)	0.023* (0.012)	0.007 (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.007 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.026** (0.012)	-0.002 (0.013)	0.003 (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	0.007 (0.012)	0.008 (0.014)	0.023 (0.014)	0.011 (0.012)	-0.0005 (0.012)	0.031*** (0.012)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.014 (0.011)	0.025* (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.024* (0.012)
Knows which gases cause CC	0.005 (0.011)	0.021* (0.012)	0.010 (0.013)	0.001 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.010)	0.020* (0.010)	0.015 (0.010)	0.017 (0.011)	0.011 (0.011)	-0.0003 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.013)
Understands impacts of CC	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.029*** (0.011)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.022* (0.012)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.024* (0.012)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	-0.005 (0.013)	0.007 (0.012)	0.021 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.014)	0.011 (0.014)	0.010 (0.013)	0.014 (0.013)	0.008 (0.013)	0.015 (0.013)	0.036** (0.016)	0.004 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.013)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	-0.013 (0.021)	0.037 (0.023)	0.043* (0.022)	-0.014 (0.020)	-0.038** (0.019)	0.029 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.017 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.006 (0.022)	0.021 (0.020)	-0.020 (0.019)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.086*** (0.024)	0.066*** (0.023)	0.075*** (0.023)	0.094*** (0.022)	0.105*** (0.020)	0.074*** (0.023)	0.091*** (0.021)	0.154*** (0.019)	0.089*** (0.020)	0.070*** (0.024)	0.053** (0.023)	0.112*** (0.020)
Believes own household would lose	-0.071*** (0.021)	-0.057*** (0.015)	-0.026 (0.020)	-0.087*** (0.017)	-0.066*** (0.017)	-0.053*** (0.017)	-0.073*** (0.017)	-0.008 (0.017)	-0.079*** (0.017)	-0.052*** (0.016)	-0.060*** (0.019)	-0.083*** (0.017)
Believes low-income earners will lose	-0.034* (0.019)	-0.020 (0.016)	-0.056*** (0.018)	-0.022 (0.017)	-0.021 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.016)	-0.015 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.056*** (0.017)	-0.025 (0.016)	-0.030 (0.020)	-0.056*** (0.018)
Believes high-income earners will lose	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.012)	0.013 (0.013)	0.003 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.007 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.025** (0.012)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.0004 (0.013)
Observations	2,218	2,013	2,006	2,006	2,088	2,268	2,025	1,990	2,053	1,978	2,022	1,932
R <sup>2</sup>	0.329	0.241	0.237	0.295	0.211	0.216	0.272	0.222	0.214	0.272	0.254	0.228

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 of Dechezleprêtre et al. (forthcoming) for variable definitions.

Table S7: Correlation between (*Somewhat* or *Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in middle-income countries.

	Support for a global GHG tax and dividend							
	IDN (1)	ZAF (2)	MEX (3)	TUR (4)	IND (5)	BRA (6)	CHN (7)	UKR (8)
Control group mean	0.697	0.396	0.681	0.44	0.719	0.539	0.737	0.622
Trusts the government	0.051*** (0.012)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.040*** (0.014)	0.066*** (0.017)	0.065*** (0.015)	0.038** (0.015)	-0.011 (0.015)	0.061*** (0.014)
Believes inequality is an important problem	0.048** (0.011)	0.002 (0.014)	0.057*** (0.014)	0.028 (0.017)	0.092*** (0.016)	0.055*** (0.015)	-0.001 (0.015)	0.027 (0.018)
Worries about CC	0.003 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.016)	0.013 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.017)	-0.0002 (0.016)	0.032* (0.017)	-0.0002 (0.016)	0.046*** (0.016)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	0.020 (0.014)	0.026 (0.017)	0.004 (0.014)	0.039** (0.017)	0.022 (0.016)	0.019 (0.015)	0.034** (0.016)	0.018 (0.016)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.020* (0.011)	0.038** (0.016)	0.032* (0.017)	-0.002 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.015)	-0.017 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.018 (0.016)
Understands emission across activities/regions	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.013)	0.003 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.010)	0.039*** (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.00004 (0.013)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	-0.006 (0.009)	0.011 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.016)	0.0002 (0.012)	0.003 (0.014)	-0.052*** (0.016)	0.022 (0.014)
Knows which gases cause CC	-0.026*** (0.009)	0.019 (0.015)	0.035** (0.014)	0.015 (0.015)	0.020 (0.013)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.023* (0.012)	0.023 (0.015)
Understands impacts of CC	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.0005 (0.015)	0.009 (0.017)	0.043*** (0.014)	-0.023 (0.015)	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.014 (0.014)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	-0.010 (0.007)	0.009 (0.016)	0.015 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.013)	0.002 (0.011)	-0.016 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.010)	0.035** (0.015)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	0.023 (0.015)	0.002 (0.021)	0.019 (0.022)	0.044 (0.029)	0.021 (0.020)	0.032 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.018)	-0.023 (0.025)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.111*** (0.019)	0.073*** (0.022)	0.088*** (0.024)	0.078** (0.031)	0.034 (0.025)	0.129*** (0.022)	0.060*** (0.022)	0.138*** (0.025)
Believes own household would lose	-0.027 (0.021)	-0.044** (0.020)	-0.071*** (0.019)	-0.054** (0.024)	-0.012 (0.019)	-0.067*** (0.023)	-0.119*** (0.022)	-0.045** (0.021)
Believes low-income earners will lose	-0.059*** (0.020)	-0.016 (0.019)	0.003 (0.017)	-0.053** (0.023)	-0.055*** (0.019)	-0.013 (0.020)	0.001 (0.018)	0.004 (0.020)
Believes high-income earners will lose	0.026** (0.011)	-0.020 (0.015)	0.010 (0.013)	0.010 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.014)	0.003 (0.016)	-0.047*** (0.014)	-0.007 (0.013)
Observations	2,488	2,003	2,045	1,932	2,472	1,860	1,717	1,564
R <sup>2</sup>	0.366	0.175	0.242	0.248	0.370	0.272	0.280	0.255

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 of Dechezleprêtre et al. (forthcoming) for variable definitions.

## G Representativeness of the surveys

Table S8: Sample representativeness of the complementary surveys. (Back to [2.1](#))

	US1			US2			Eu		
	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample
Sample size		3,000	3,000		2,000	2,000		3,000	3,000
Gender: Woman	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.45	0.50	0.51	0.49	0.51
Gender: Man	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.49	0.55	0.50	0.49	0.51	0.49
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.11	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.18	0.15	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.18	0.15	0.17	0.15
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.24	0.26
Age: 65+	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.25	0.23	0.25
Diploma_25_64: Below upper secondary	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.13	0.14	0.13
Diploma_25_64: Upper secondary	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.28	0.23	0.19	0.23
Diploma_25_64: Post secondary	0.34	0.40	0.34	0.34	0.33	0.34	0.29	0.33	0.29
Race: White only	0.60	0.67	0.61	0.60	0.62	0.61			
Race: Hispanic	0.18	0.15	0.19	0.18	0.19	0.19			
Race: Black	0.13	0.16	0.14	0.13	0.17	0.14			
Region: Northeast	0.17	0.20	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.17			
Region: Midwest	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.21			
Region: South	0.38	0.39	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38			
Region: West	0.24	0.20	0.24	0.24	0.20	0.24			
Urban: TRUE	0.73	0.78	0.74	0.73	0.75	0.73			
Employment_18_64: Inactive	0.20	0.16	0.16	0.20	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.15
Employment_18_64: Unemployed	0.02	0.07	0.08	0.02	0.09	0.08	0.03	0.06	0.05
Vote: Left	0.32	0.47	0.45	0.32	0.46	0.45	0.30	0.32	0.32
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.32	0.32
Vote: Far right							0.10	0.10	0.10
Country: FR							0.24	0.24	0.24
Country: DE							0.33	0.33	0.33
Country: ES							0.18	0.18	0.18
Country: UK							0.25	0.25	0.25
Urbanity: Cities							0.43	0.49	0.43
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs							0.33	0.32	0.33
Urbanity: Rural							0.25	0.20	0.25

*Note:* This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

Table S9: Sample representativeness for each European country. (Back to [2.1](#))

	FR			DE			ES			UK		
	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.									
Sample size		729	729		979	979		543	543		749	749
Gender: Woman	0.52	0.50	0.52	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.53	0.51	0.50	0.43	0.50
Gender: Man	0.48	0.50	0.48	0.49	0.48	0.49	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.50	0.57	0.50
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.29	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.19	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.19	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.33	0.25	0.25	0.18	0.25	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.14	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.07	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.12	0.16	0.12	0.17	0.20	0.17
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.31	0.24	0.22	0.26	0.22	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.24	0.18	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.24	0.19	0.24	0.28	0.23	0.28	0.27	0.28	0.27	0.25	0.30	0.25
Age: 65+	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.26	0.21	0.26	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.24
Diploma_25_64: Below upper secondary	0.11	0.19	0.11	0.10	0.14	0.10	0.24	0.16	0.25	0.12	0.09	0.12
Diploma_25_64: Upper secondary	0.26	0.16	0.26	0.27	0.20	0.27	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.21	0.23	0.21
Diploma_25_64: Post secondary	0.26	0.30	0.26	0.29	0.31	0.29	0.28	0.38	0.27	0.33	0.36	0.33
Urbanity: Cities	0.47	0.52	0.47	0.37	0.47	0.37	0.52	0.58	0.52	0.40	0.41	0.40
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.40	0.35	0.40	0.22	0.27	0.22	0.42	0.43	0.42
Urbanity: Rural	0.34	0.29	0.34	0.23	0.18	0.23	0.26	0.15	0.26	0.18	0.16	0.18
Employment_18_64: Inactive	0.20	0.19	0.18	0.15	0.14	0.11	0.20	0.13	0.12	0.16	0.16	0.17
Employment_18_64: Unemployed	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.11	0.12	0.02	0.03	0.04
Vote: Left	0.23	0.19	0.21	0.37	0.44	0.44	0.33	0.37	0.38	0.25	0.28	0.29
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.26	0.30	0.29	0.28	0.27	0.29	0.18	0.24	0.24	0.36	0.44	0.41
Vote: Far right	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.01	0.03	0.03

*Note:* This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. In this Table, weights are defined at the country level. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

<sup>2016</sup> Similar tables for the global surveys can be found in [Dechezleprêtre et al. \(forthcoming\)](#).  
<sup>2017</sup> [ing](#).

## H Attrition analysis

Table S10: Attrition analysis for the US1 survey.

	Dropped out	Dropped out after socio-eco	Failed attention test	Duration (in min)	Duration below 4 min
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mean	0.08	0.059	0.082	21.198	0.016
Income quartile: 2	0.025*** (0.010)	0.025*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.740 (3.064)	-0.009 (0.006)
Income quartile: 3	0.062*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.754 (2.813)	-0.004 (0.007)
Income quartile: 4	0.035*** (0.011)	0.035*** (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-3.917 (2.798)	-0.003 (0.007)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.039*** (0.009)	0.039*** (0.009)	-0.000*** (0.000)	1.544 (2.665)	0.006 (0.006)
Age: 25-34	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.597 (2.604)	-0.031** (0.013)
Age: 35-49	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.824 (3.176)	-0.032** (0.013)
Age: 50-64	-0.060*** (0.015)	-0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	5.723** (2.763)	-0.039*** (0.012)
Age: 65+	0.048*** (0.017)	0.048*** (0.017)	0.000** (0.000)	8.952** (4.267)	-0.047*** (0.012)
Gender: Man	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.451 (2.210)	-0.0001 (0.005)
Urban	0.006 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.888** (2.443)	-0.004 (0.006)
Race: Black	0.020** (0.010)	0.020** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	8.554*** (2.600)	0.004 (0.007)
Race: Hispanic	0.021** (0.010)	0.021** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.119* (2.293)	-0.002 (0.007)
Region: Northeast	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-4.862 (4.782)	-0.004 (0.007)
Region: South	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-1.151 (4.710)	-0.004 (0.006)
Region: West	0.006 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-4.000 (4.305)	-0.003 (0.007)
Vote: Biden	-0.048*** (0.008)	-0.048*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-2.901 (2.379)	-0.009 (0.007)
Vote: Trump	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.145 (2.878)	-0.005 (0.008)
Observations	5,719	5,719	3,252	3,044	3,044
R <sup>2</sup>	0.127	0.127	1.000	0.006	0.017

Table S11: Attrition analysis for the US2 survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 4 min (5)
Mean	0.095	0.074	0.092	16.338	0.052
Income quartile: 2	0.023* (0.013)	0.023* (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	1.352 (1.601)	-0.029** (0.014)
Income quartile: 3	0.054*** (0.014)	0.054*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	8.502 (9.649)	-0.009 (0.016)
Income quartile: 4	0.060*** (0.016)	0.060*** (0.016)	-0.000 (0.000)	5.254 (3.376)	0.0003 (0.017)
Diploma: Post secondary	-0.033*** (0.011)	-0.033*** (0.011)	0.000 (0.000)	1.601 (2.630)	0.012 (0.011)
Age: 25-34	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.929 (1.535)	-0.032 (0.024)
Age: 35-49	0.012 (0.014)	0.012 (0.014)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.076 (6.651)	-0.047** (0.022)
Age: 50-64	0.040*** (0.014)	0.040*** (0.014)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.364 (1.565)	-0.079*** (0.022)
Age: 65+	0.115*** (0.017)	0.115*** (0.017)	-0.000*** (0.000)	2.619 (3.150)	-0.095*** (0.022)
Gender: Man	-0.073*** (0.009)	-0.073*** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	4.707 (6.037)	0.010 (0.010)
Urban	0.019* (0.011)	0.019* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	1.766 (1.135)	0.005 (0.012)
Race: Black	0.060*** (0.015)	0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.673 (13.328)	-0.010 (0.015)
Race: Hispanic	0.079*** (0.014)	0.079*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	2.930 (1.813)	-0.027** (0.012)
Region: Northeast	-0.026* (0.014)	-0.026* (0.014)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.837 (2.855)	-0.011 (0.015)
Region: South	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.000 (0.000)	3.220 (5.002)	0.009 (0.014)
Region: West	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.000 (0.000)	-1.759 (1.942)	-0.009 (0.015)
Vote: Biden	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	3.230 (2.731)	-0.006 (0.014)
Vote: Trump	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.554 (1.272)	0.007 (0.016)
Observations	2,973	2,973	2,280	2,103	2,103
R <sup>2</sup>	0.241	0.241	1.000	0.010	0.031

Table S12: Attrition analysis for the *Eu* survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 6 min (5)
Mean	0.067	0.044	0.151	54.602	0.039
Country: Germany	0.023** (0.010)	0.019** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.533 (18.906)	0.019* (0.010)
Country: Spain	-0.102*** (0.011)	-0.098*** (0.011)	0.000* (0.000)	-29.136* (15.948)	0.010 (0.010)
Country: United Kingdom	0.042*** (0.011)	0.043*** (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-7.458 (18.046)	0.010 (0.010)
Income quartile: 2	0.032*** (0.010)	0.029*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	32.749* (19.771)	-0.015 (0.010)
Income quartile: 3	0.049*** (0.010)	0.047*** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	6.130 (11.734)	-0.021** (0.010)
Income quartile: 4	0.024** (0.011)	0.021* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.659 (19.955)	-0.018* (0.011)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.035*** (0.008)	0.034*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	10.647 (12.959)	-0.007 (0.007)
Age: 25-34	0.028** (0.013)	0.025* (0.013)	-0.000*** (0.000)	36.132 (22.285)	-0.005 (0.018)
Age: 35-49	0.064*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	-0.000*** (0.000)	37.159** (17.190)	-0.013 (0.016)
Age: 50-64	0.085*** (0.013)	0.083*** (0.013)	-0.000 (0.000)	48.363** (22.526)	-0.063*** (0.015)
Age: 65+	0.117*** (0.014)	0.115*** (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	36.351** (14.226)	-0.061*** (0.015)
Gender: Man	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-22.980 (14.093)	0.009 (0.007)
Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs	0.006 (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-16.736 (17.256)	0.004 (0.008)
Degree of urbanization: Rural	0.023** (0.009)	0.023** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	-14.593 (19.733)	-0.001 (0.009)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.025*** (0.005)	-0.025*** (0.005)	0.000*** (0.000)	-17.558 (13.143)	0.019** (0.008)
Vote: Far right	0.005 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.000*** (0.000)	15.838 (32.281)	0.029** (0.014)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	0.023*** (0.006)	0.022*** (0.005)	0.000 (0.000)	24.631 (19.824)	0.030*** (0.010)
Observations	3,963	3,963	3,326	3,115	3,115
R <sup>2</sup>	0.406	0.395	1.000	0.006	0.028

# I Balance analysis

Table S13: Balance analysis.

	List contains: G (1)	Branch petition: NR (2)	Branch donation: Own nation (3)	Branch conjoint 3: with GCS (4)
Mean	0.496	0.493	0.5	0.499
Country: Germany	-0.026 (0.026)	0.017 (0.026)	0.020 (0.026)	0.005 (0.026)
Country: Spain	0.025 (0.030)	0.026 (0.030)	0.026 (0.030)	0.043 (0.030)
Country: United Kingdom	0.002 (0.028)	0.018 (0.028)	0.037 (0.028)	0.063** (0.028)
Country: United States	-0.001 (0.024)	0.019 (0.024)	0.007 (0.024)	0.023 (0.024)
Income quartile: 2	-0.013 (0.021)	-0.024 (0.021)	0.012 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.021)
Income quartile: 3	0.021 (0.022)	-0.005 (0.022)	0.011 (0.022)	-0.004 (0.022)
Income quartile: 4	-0.001 (0.023)	-0.017 (0.023)	-0.013 (0.023)	0.0001 (0.023)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.008 (0.016)	0.014 (0.016)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.016)
Age: 25-34	0.023 (0.031)	-0.049 (0.031)	-0.003 (0.031)	-0.009 (0.031)
Age: 35-49	0.032 (0.030)	-0.002 (0.030)	-0.014 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.030)
Age: 50-64	0.030 (0.030)	-0.005 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.030)	-0.020 (0.030)
Age: 65+	0.029 (0.037)	-0.037 (0.037)	-0.015 (0.037)	-0.012 (0.037)
Gender: Man	0.024 (0.015)	0.012 (0.015)	0.002 (0.015)	-0.016 (0.015)
Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.0005 (0.017)	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.011 (0.017)
Degree of urbanization: Rural	0.013 (0.024)	0.017 (0.024)	-0.004 (0.024)	0.027 (0.024)
Employment status: Retired	-0.005 (0.032)	-0.031 (0.032)	-0.034 (0.032)	-0.016 (0.032)
Employment status: Student	0.005 (0.044)	-0.023 (0.044)	-0.033 (0.044)	-0.025 (0.044)
Employment status: Working	0.010 (0.024)	-0.027 (0.024)	-0.033 (0.024)	-0.012 (0.024)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.004 (0.017)	0.003 (0.017)	0.010 (0.017)	0.002 (0.017)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	0.001 (0.019)	0.014 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.019)	-0.012 (0.019)
Vote: Far right	0.009 (0.034)	0.030 (0.034)	0.023 (0.035)	0.038 (0.034)
Observations	5,991	5,991	5,991	5,991
R <sup>2</sup>	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.003

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

2020 **J Placebo tests**

Table S14: Placebo tests.

	G+R+C preferred to R+C (1)	Supports G+R+C (2)	Signs petition (3)	Share of policies supported (4)	Conjoint 5 A+CGS preferred to B (5)
Mean	0.645	0.633	0.611	0.535	0.596
Branch of list experiment: l	-0.013 (0.019)	-0.024 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.018 (0.021)
Branch of list experiment: rgl	0.005 (0.019)	0.006 (0.019)	-0.002 (0.019)	0.001 (0.012)	0.010 (0.021)
Branch of list experiment: rl	-0.009 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.019)	0.022 (0.019)	0.007 (0.012)	0.007 (0.021)
Branch of petition: nr	0.011 (0.014)	0.006 (0.014)	0.022 (0.014)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.015)
Poor is in own country	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.014)	0.015 (0.014)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.020 (0.015)
Observations	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	5,218
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0004	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

2021 **K Main results on the extended sample**

2022 As a robustness check, we reproduce our main results on the extended sample that  
 2023 includes the 14% respondents who failed the attention check ( $n = 9,318$ ). These results  
 2024 are non-weighted. They closely match the results in our main specification. For example,  
 2025 the support for the GCS is 54% in the U.S. and 75% in Europe, while the same coefficients  
 2026 are significant for the list experiment.

Figure S50: [Extended sample] Main attitudes by vote (“Right” spans from Center-right to Far right).

(Relative support in percent in Questions 20, 35, 45, 46, 49)

(Back to Section 2.5.3)

	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom	United States
Support for the GCS	75	78	70	81	75	54
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	83	81	84	87	81	68
Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries*	52	45	60	59	44	52
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	62	57	62	65	65	47
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	82	80	82	86	80	69
[Country]'s foreign aid should be increased	83	87	87	89	69	77
Universalist*	41	35	49	44	36	43

Figure S51: [Extended sample] Influence of the GCS on preferred platform: Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question 30; in the U.S., asked only to non-Republicans.)

	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom	United States
Random programs: A+GCS preferred to B	60	61	59	64	58	59

Table S15: [Extended sample] Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list. The tacit support for the GCS is estimated by regressing the number of supported policies on the presence of the GCS in the list of policies. The social desirability is estimated as the difference between the tacit and stated support, and it is not significantly different from zero even at a 20% threshold (see [Methods](#)).

	Number of supported policies		
	All	U.S.	Europe
List contains: GCS	0.624*** (0.028)	0.524*** (0.041)	0.724*** (0.036)
<i>Support for GCS</i>	NA	0.554	0.754
<i>Social desirability bias</i>	-0.025	-0.017	-0.033
<i>80% C.I. for the bias</i>	[-0.06; 0.01]	[-0.07; 0.04]	[-0.08; 0.01]
Constant	1.317	1.147	1.486
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000
R <sup>2</sup>	0.089	0.065	0.125

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table S16: [Extended sample] Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. ([Question 28](#))

	Prefers the Progressive platform					
	All	United States	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
GCS in Progressive platform	0.022* (0.013)	0.015 (0.018)	0.116*** (0.037)	-0.007 (0.032)	0.028 (0.038)	0.012 (0.037)
Constant	0.628	0.629	0.55	0.682	0.721	0.553
Observations	5,638	2,797	671	883	550	737
R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.0002	0.014	0.0001	0.001	0.0001

Note: Simple OLS model. *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples. \*p < 0.1;  
\*\*p < 0.05; \*\*\*p < 0.01.

2027 **L Effect of questionnaire framing**

2028 When comparing the samples *US1* and *US2*, we observe no effect of questionnaire  
2029 framing (or block sequence) on the question “What group do you defend when you  
2030 vote?”, common to all waves and placed close to the end of the questionnaire (Table S17).

Table S17: Effect of the wave (*US1* vs. *US2*) on the group defend when voting.  
“What group do you defend when you vote?” (Question 57)

	Group defended when voting		
	Humans or Sentient beings	Fellow citizens	Family and self
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Wave: <i>US2</i>	−0.009 (0.014)	0.009 (0.014)	0.010 (0.011)
Mean	0.432	0.335	0.156
Observations	5,000	5,000	5,000
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0001	0.0001	0.0002

Note: Simple OLS model. \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

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