

1 International Majorities Genuinely Support Global
2 Redistributive and Climate Policies

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5

6 **Abstract**

7 We document majority support for policies entailing global redistribution and cli-
8 mate mitigation. Surveys on 40,680 respondents in 20 countries show strong stated
9 support for an effective way to jointly combat climate change and poverty: a global
10 carbon price funding a global basic income, called the “Global Climate Scheme” (GCS).
11 Through our main surveys on 8,000 respondents in the U.S., France, Germany, Spain,
12 and the UK, we test several hypotheses that could reconcile strong stated support
13 with a lack of salience in policy circles. The GCS is supported by three quarters of
14 Europeans and half of Americans, even as they understand the policy’s cost to them.
15 Using different experiments, we show that the support for the GCS is sincere and that
16 electoral candidates could win votes by endorsing it. More generally, we document
17 widespread support for other globally redistributive policies, such as a wealth tax
18 funding low-income countries or increased foreign aid. In sum, we provide evidence
19 that global policies are genuinely supported by majorities, even in wealthy nations
20 that would bear the burden.

21 **JEL codes:** P48, Q58, H23, Q54

22 **Keywords:** Climate change, global policies, cap-and-trade, attitudes, survey.

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71 **1 Introduction**

72 Major sustainability objectives could be achieved by global approaches to mitigating
 73 climate change and poverty involving transfers from high- to lower-income countries.^{1–6}
 74 For instance, a global wealth tax could finance the Sustainable Development Goals.⁷ More
 75 specifically, if merely 35% of the revenue were allocated for this purpose, a global 2% tax
 76 on individual wealth in excess of \$5 million could significantly reduce poverty as it would
 77 mechanically increase low-income countries' national income by 50% (as computed on
 78 the [WID wealth tax simulator](#)). Besides, global carbon pricing is widely regarded by
 79 economists as the benchmark climate policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon
 80 emissions externality. As early as 1990, Michael Grubb stated:⁸ "by far the best com-
 81 bination of long term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity, is obtained from a
 82 system based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions which are allocated on an adult
 83 per capita basis", i.e., equally among human adults. Support for such solution, which we
 84 call the "Global Climate Scheme", has been renewed ever since.^{9–15}

85 While international negotiations have not yet led to ambitious globally redistributive
86 policies, recent developments suggest that such a change might be underway. The In-
87 ternational Maritime Organization is poised to adopt a global carbon levy on maritime
88 fuel; the African Union calls for a global carbon taxation regime;¹⁶ the UN is setting up a
89 Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation;¹⁷ Brazil uses its presidency of
90 the G20 in 2024 to propose a global wealth tax, **backed** by 130 Members of the European
91 Parliament; etc.

92 A key condition for implementing global policies has remained largely unaddressed:
93 the support of citizens. Using a Global survey on 40,680 respondents from 20 high-
94 and middle-income countries, we reveal substantial support for those policies, especially
95 global climate policies and a global tax on the wealthiest aimed at financing low-income
96 countries (other questions from this survey are analyzed in a companion paper¹⁸). In-
97 terestingly, even in wealthy nations that would bear a significant burden, majorities of
98 citizens express support for such globally redistributive policies. To better understand
99 public support for global policies in high-income countries, we conduct our Main sur-
100 veys among 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, the U.S., and the UK.

101 By studying in depth the support for global policies, we are making an ambitious shift
102 in the methodological approach of attitudinal surveys. In general, academic surveys focus
103 on studying effect sizes of some treatment on political attitudes, or the socio-demographic
104 factors that correlate with attitudes.^{19;20} The magnitude of support for a given proposal is
105 often regarded as problematic to estimate satisfactorily. The measure of support is usually
106 left to non-academic pollsters, who rarely apply all the academic best practices: trans-
107 parency, representative sampling, neutral and precise wording of questions, comparison
108 with existing literature, use of multiple questions and complementary methods to cor-
109 rectly interpret the results. Although estimating the extent of support is challenging, this
110 question seems too important not to be addressed using scientific methods. Absent large
111 scale measurements of public opinion like referenda, surveys remain the best method to
112 assess support or opposition to given policies. In this paper, after a worldwide assessment
113 in the Global survey, we use our Main surveys to carefully measure the support for global
114 policies in Western countries. We inquire the support for various policies, approach the
115 question from diverse angles, and run a battery of pre-registered tests to check whether
116 stated support estimates are reliable.

117 The focus of the Main surveys is a specific policy aimed at addressing both climate
118 change and poverty, referred to as the “Global Climate Scheme” (GCS). It implements

¹¹⁹ a cap on carbon emissions to limit global warming below 2°C. The emission rights are
¹²⁰ auctioned each year to polluting firms and fund a global basic income, alleviating extreme
¹²¹ poverty. This archetypal policy exposes respondents to the key trade-off between the
¹²² benefits and costs of globally redistributive climate policies, as respondents are made
¹²³ aware of the cost that the GCS entails for their country's people.

¹²⁴ After checking that respondents have understood the policy and its cost, we measure
¹²⁵ the support in a direct Yes/No question. The GCS is supported by three quarters of Eu-
¹²⁶ ropeans and more than half of Americans. Then, we test for social desirability bias using
¹²⁷ a list experiment. We find no evidence that people exaggerate their support in the direct
¹²⁸ question. To assess whether the support would diminish in a context with real stakes,
¹²⁹ we ask respondents whether they are willing to sign a petition in favor of the GCS, after
¹³⁰ informing them that the question results will be communicated to their head of state's
¹³¹ office. The support is sustained in an environment that approaches real stakes. We then
¹³² carry out conjoint analyses to neutralize experimenter demand and investigate the prior-
¹³³ ity given to global policies compared to other types of policies. Conjoint analyses reveal
¹³⁴ that a political platform is more likely to be preferred if it contains the GCS or a global tax
¹³⁵ on millionaires, and that global policies rank high in the prioritization of policies. Our
¹³⁶ randomized experiments also show that a candidate would not lose vote intentions by
¹³⁷ endorsing the GCS, and might even gain up to 11 points in a country like France. An
¹³⁸ analysis of open-ended fields confirms that support for the GCS is real, and indicates that
¹³⁹ appeal of the GCS comes from its international nature and its impacts on climate, more
¹⁴⁰ than on global poverty. We also test other global policies and universalistic attitudes. Sup-
¹⁴¹ port is very strong for a global tax on millionaires, and the median respondent prefers to
¹⁴² allocate 30% of the revenues of such a tax to low-income countries. Majorities are willing
¹⁴³ to increase foreign aid, but only if some conditions are respected, such as making sure the
¹⁴⁴ aid is well spent and other high-income countries also increase their contribution. Ques-
¹⁴⁵ tions on universalistic values, including a donation experiment, confirm the congruence
¹⁴⁶ of underlying values with the support for specific policies. Our diverse approaches also
¹⁴⁷ help understand what drives the support. For instance, the evidence indicates that one
¹⁴⁸ key reason why increasing foreign aid is not as popular as global policies lies in its unilat-
¹⁴⁹ eral nature. We reckon that survey evidence is no panacea, as attitudes can be ambivalent
¹⁵⁰ and context-dependent. Nevertheless, we arguably employ the best available methods
¹⁵¹ to address potential concerns, including an experiment assessing how support might be
¹⁵² affected by a negative media campaign.

153 Overall, our results point out to strong and genuine support for global climate and re-
154 distributive policies, as our experiments confirm the stated support found in direct ques-
155 tions. This suggests that carefully administered surveys can be used to measure the level
156 of support for a given policy. Our results contribute to the literature on attitudes toward
157 climate policy, confirming that climate policy is preferred at a global level,^{21–24} where it
158 is more effective and fair. Indeed, the Global Climate Scheme is largely supported, but
159 a similar policy at the national level is opposed by a majority in many countries,¹⁸ de-
160 spite lower costs. Noting that only 13% of French people declared supporting a national
161 carbon tax with cash transfers during the Yellow Vests movement,²⁰ surveys appear to
162 accurately reflect the level of support. Therefore, unless support for global policies dis-
163 appear once they enter the public debate, it seems unlikely that a policy such as the GCS
164 would face major protests. In our discussion we offer potential explanations behind the
165 lack of prominence of global policies in the public debate despite this strong support.
166 Finally, while our findings underscore majority support for global policies, converging
167 results from independent surveys are needed to ascertain such novel evidence.

168 **Literature** International surveys have shown widespread support for costly climate ac-
169 tion.^{18;25} For instance, representative surveys in 125 countries covering 96% of the world's
170 greenhouse gas emissions show that 69% of the global population express willingness
171 to contribute 1% of their income to fight global warming.²⁶ International surveys have
172 also uncovered near consensus that "present economic differences between rich and poor
173 countries are too large" (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree) in each of 29 countries.²⁷

174 Yet, few prior attitudinal surveys have examined global redistributive policies. A no-
175 table exception tests the support for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples in five
176 countries, representative along gender and age.²⁸ For a given variant, the sample size is
177 about 167 respondents per country. They find over 80% support for any variant in India,
178 between 50% and 65% in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43% to 59% in the U.S.,
179 depending on the variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding an equal
180 cash transfer for each human is close to 50% in high-income countries (e.g., at 44% in the
181 U.S.). These figures are consistent with our results from the *Global* survey (see Figure 2),
182 where the support is lower for a tax that would "only" reduce CO₂ emissions than for
183 a quota that would unambiguously achieve the climate target. Relatedly, 66% of Ameri-
184 cans support providing "financial aid and technical support to developing countries that
185 agree to limit their greenhouse gas emissions";²⁹ and 90% of Germans want some degree

186 of global redistribution.³⁰ Besides, in surveys conducted in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the
187 UK and the U.S., support ranges from 55% to 74% for “a global democracy including both
188 a global government and a global parliament, directly elected by the world population,
189 to recommend and implement policies on global issues”.³¹ Through an experiment, this
190 paper also finds that, in countries where the government stems from a coalition, voting
191 shares would shift by 8 (Brazil) to 12 p.p. (Germany) from parties who are said to oppose
192 global democracy to parties that supposedly support it. For instance, when Germans re-
193 spondents were told that (only) the Greens and the Left support global democracy, these
194 parties gained respectively 9 and 3 p.p. in vote intentions, while the SPD and the CDU-
195 CSU each lost 6 p.p.

196 Appendix A contains a broader literature review including further attitudinal sur-
197 veys on global policies (A.1.1); prior work on attitudes toward climate burden sharing
198 (Appendix A.1.2), attitudes toward foreign aid (Appendix A.1.3); global carbon pricing
199 (Appendix A.2.1), global redistribution (Appendix A.2.3), basic income (Appendix A.2.4),
200 and global democracy (Appendix A.2.5).


201 2 Results

202 The presentation of results proceeds as follows: after briefly describing the survey
203 data, we first document broad international support for global approaches to climate pol-
204 icy that lead to global redistribution. We then present our Main surveys in the U.S. and
205 Europe. After studying the stated support for the Global Climate Scheme, we test the
206 sincerity of the support by means of a list experiment, petition, conjoint analyses, prioriti-
207 zation task, and by eliciting pros and cons. Subsequently, we present specific findings that
208 document support for wealth taxes, other global policies, and foreign aid. To understand
209 the gap between support for global policies and their appearance in public discussion, we
210 also test underlying universalistic values and beliefs about the support of others, reported
211 in two boxes.

212 2.1 Data

213 The study relies on two sets of surveys: the *Global* survey and the *Main* surveys.

Figure 1: Main surveys' structure. Cf. also Figure S48 for the treatment branches.



²¹⁴ **Global Survey** The *Global* survey, conducted in 2021, involved 40,680 respondents from
²¹⁵ 20 countries, representing approximately 72% of global CO₂ emissions. This survey serves
²¹⁶ as the basis for measuring stated support for various global policies worldwide. Detailed
²¹⁷ information about the data collection process, sample representativeness, and analysis of
²¹⁸ questions on national policies can be found in a companion paper.¹⁸

²¹⁹ **Main Surveys** To delve deeper into the sincerity and rationales behind support for the
²²⁰ GCS and attitudes towards global policies, global redistribution, and universalistic val-
²²¹ ues, we conducted the Main surveys in 2023. These surveys are based on a sample of
²²² 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, the UK, and the U.S. The European sur-
²²³vey (*Eu*) comprises 3,000 respondents, while the U.S. sample was collected in two sep-
²²⁴arate waves: *US1* with 3,000 respondents and *US2* with 2,000 respondents. The survey
²²⁵questions in both the European and U.S. surveys are identical (see Figure 1), except for an
²²⁶additional question in *US2* that uses results from *US1* to assess the bandwagon effect.

²²⁷ The Main surveys ensured representativeness along key dimensions: gender, income,
²²⁸ age, highest diploma, and degree of urbanization. The *Eu* survey is also representative

²²⁹ of its four countries in terms of population size, while the *US1* and *US2* surveys are rep-
²³⁰ resentative in terms of region and ethnicity. Tables S9-S10 detail how our samples match
²³¹ population frequencies. More detail on data collection is given in Section Methods. The
²³² questionnaires used in the surveys are provided in Appendices C and D.


²³³ 2.2 Global support

²³⁴ The Global survey shows strong support for climate policies enacted at the global
²³⁵ level (Figure 2). When asked “At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle
²³⁶ climate change need to be put in place?”, 70% (in the U.S.) to 94% (in Japan) choose the
²³⁷ global level. The next most popular choice is the federal or continental level, favored
²³⁸ by 52% of Americans and less than half of European respondents. Local policies receive
²³⁹ the least support. This preference for climate policies implemented at the global scale
²⁴⁰ is in line with the literature²² and consistent with individuals’ concerns for the fairness
²⁴¹ and effectiveness of such policies, which have been identified as two of the three key
²⁴² determinants of support, besides self-interest.^{32;20;18} It could also stem from conditional
²⁴³ cooperation, although previous studies indicate that the support for climate policies does
²⁴⁴ not depend on climate action abroad.^{33;34}

²⁴⁵ Among the four global climate policies examined in the *Global* survey, three policies
²⁴⁶ garner high support across all countries (Figure 2). These policies include a global demo-
²⁴⁷ cratic assembly on climate change, a global tax on millionaires to finance low-income
²⁴⁸ countries contingent on their climate action, and a global carbon budget of +2°C divided
²⁴⁹ among countries based on tradable shares (or “global quota”), with the allocation of coun-
²⁵⁰ try shares unspecified (see wording in Appendix C). The three policies garner a majority
²⁵¹ of absolute support (i.e., “somewhat” or “strong” support) in all countries (except in the
²⁵² U.S. for the global assembly, 48% absolute support). In high-income countries, the global
²⁵³ quota policy obtains 64% absolute support and 84% relative support (i.e., excluding “in-
²⁵⁴ different” answers).

²⁵⁵ Following the support for the global quota, respondents are asked about their pref-
²⁵⁶ erences for dividing the carbon budget among countries, as depicted in the third block
²⁵⁷ of Figure 2. Consistent with the existing literature (see Appendix A.1.2), an equal per
²⁵⁸ capita allocation of emission rights emerges as the preferred burden-sharing principle,
²⁵⁹ garnering absolute majority support in all countries and never below 84% relative sup-
²⁶⁰ port. Taking into account historical responsibilities or vulnerability to climate damages is
²⁶¹ also popular, albeit with less consensus, while grandfathering (i.e., allocation of emission

Figure 2: Relative support for global climate policies.



Note 1: The numbers represent the share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* among non-*indifferent* answers (in percent, $n = 40,680$). The color blue denotes a relative majority. See Figure S11 for the absolute support. (Questions A-I).

Note 2: *In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

shares in proportion to current emissions) receives the least support in all countries.

A global carbon tax that funds a global basic income should produce the same distributional outcomes as a global tradable quota with equal per capita emission rights, provided that each country returns equally to its citizens the revenues from emissions trading and to the extent that the carbon price is the same. The support for the global carbon tax is also tested and its redistributive effects – the average increase in expenditures along with the amount of the basic income – are specified to the respondents explicitly (see box below and Appendix D, p. 98). The support for the carbon tax is lower than for the quota, particularly in high-income countries, and there is no relative majority for the tax in Anglo-Saxon countries (consistently with the levels of support found in the only

²⁷² previous study that tested a global carbon tax²⁸). Two possible reasons for this lower
²⁷³ support are that distributive effects are made salient in the case of the tax, and that peo-
²⁷⁴ ple may prefer a quota, perhaps because they find it more effective than a tax to reduce
²⁷⁵ emissions. This interpretation is consistent with the level of support for the global quota
²⁷⁶ once we make the distributive effects salient, as we do in the Main surveys.

²⁷⁷ 2.3 Stated support for the Global Climate Scheme

²⁷⁸ The Main surveys (*US1, US2, Eu*) include a comprehensive exploration of citizens'
²⁷⁹ attitudes towards the GCS. We present to respondents a detailed description of the GCS
²⁸⁰ and explain its distributive effects, including specific amounts at stake (as specified in
²⁸¹ the box below). Furthermore, we assess respondents' understanding of the GCS with
²⁸² incentivized questions to test their comprehension of the expected financial outcome for
²⁸³ typical individuals in high-income countries (loss) and the poorest individuals globally
²⁸⁴ (gain), followed by the provision of correct answers (Figures S12-S13). The same approach
²⁸⁵ is applied to a National Redistribution scheme (NR) targeting top incomes with the aim
²⁸⁶ of financing cash transfers to all adults, calibrated to offset the monetary loss of the GCS
²⁸⁷ for the median emitter in their country. We evaluate respondents' understanding that the
²⁸⁸ richest would lose and the typical fellow citizens would gain from that policy. Subse-
²⁸⁹ quently, we summarize both schemes to enhance respondents' recall. Additionally, we
²⁹⁰ present a final incentivized comprehension question and provide the expected answer
²⁹¹ that the combined GCS and NR would result in no net gain or loss for a typical fellow
²⁹² citizen. Finally, respondents are directly asked to express their support for the GCS and
²⁹³ NR using a simple Yes/No question.

The Global Climate Scheme The GCS consists of global emissions trading with emission rights being auctioned each year to polluting firms, and of a global basic income, funded by the auction revenues. Using the price and emissions trajectories from the report by Stern & Stiglitz,³⁵ and in particular a carbon price of \$90/tCO₂ in 2030, we estimate that the basic income would amount to \$30 per month for every human adult (see details in Appendix E). We describe the GCS to the respondents as a “climate club” and we specify its redistributive effects: The 700 million people with less than \$2/day [in Purchasing Power Parity] would be lifted out of extreme poverty, and fossil fuel price increases would cost the typical person in their country a specified amount (see Appendix D for details). The monthly median net cost is \$85 in the U.S., €10 in France, €25 in Germany, €5 in Spain, £20 in the UK.

294

295 The stated support for the GCS is 54% in the U.S. and 76% in Europe, while the support
 296 for NR is very similar: 56% and 73% respectively (see Figure S1). Appendix F examines
 297 the sociodemographic determinants of support for the GCS as well as the beliefs corre-
 298 lated with the support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income. The
 299 strongest correlates are political leaning, trust in the government and perceptions that the
 300 policy is effective at reducing emissions or in one’s self-interest.

Figure S1: [For Supplementary Material, except first row to be included in Figure 3] Support for the GCS, NR and the combination of GCS, NR and C (Yes/No questions).
 (p. 98, Questions 20, 22, 35, 36, and 26).

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)	54	76	80	71	81	74
National redistribution scheme (NR)	56	73	77	66	79	75
National climate policy + GCS + NR	52	74	79	69	81	70

301 **2.4 Robustness and sincerity of support for the GCS**

302 We use several methods to assess the sincerity of the support for the GCS: a list ex-
303 periment, a real-stake petition, conjoint analyses, and the prioritization of policies. All
304 methods suggest that the support is either completely sincere, or the share of insincere
305 answers is limited.

306 **2.4.1 List experiment**

307 By asking *how many* policies within a list respondents support and varying the list
308 among respondents, a list experiment allows identifying the tacit support for a policy of
309 interest. The tacit support is estimated as the difference in the average number of policies
310 supported between two groups, whose list differ only by the inclusion of that policy.³⁶
311 For example, say a first subsample faces the list of policies A, B, and C, while a second
312 subsamples faces the list A, B, C, and GCS. We do not need to know which policies each
313 respondent support to estimate the average (tacit) support for the GCS, we simply need
314 to compute the difference in the average number of supported policies between the two
315 random subsamples. List experiments have been used to reveal social desirability bias,
316 silencing either racism in the Southern U.S.³⁷ or opposition to the invasion of Ukraine in
317 Russia.³⁸ In our case, as shown in Table 1, the tacit support for the GCS measured through
318 the list experiment is not significantly lower than the direct stated support. Hence, we do
319 not find a social desirability bias in our study.

320 **2.4.2 Petition**

321 We ask respondents whether they are willing to sign a petition in support of either
322 the GCS or NR policy. We inform them that the petition results will be sent to the head
323 of state's office, highlighting the proportion of fellow citizens endorsing the respective
324 scheme. Even when framed as a petition that might have real stakes, both policies con-
325 tinue to receive majority support. In the U.S., we find no significant difference between
326 the support in the petitions and the simple questions (GCS: $p = .30$; NR: $p = .76$). In Eu-
327 rope, the petition leads to a comparable lower support for both the GCS (7 p.p., $p = 10^{-5}$)
328 and NR (4 p.p., $p = .008$). While some European respondents are unwilling to sign a
329 petition for policies they are expected to support, this effect is not specific to the GCS, and
330 the overall willingness to sign a petition remains strong, with 69% expressing support for
331 the GCS and 67% for NR.

Table 1: Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list. The tacit support for the GCS is estimated by regressing the number of supported policies on the presence of the GCS in the list of policies. The social desirability is estimated as the difference between the tacit and stated support, and it is not significantly different from zero even at a 20% threshold (see [Methods](#)).

	Number of supported policies		
	All	U.S.	Europe
List contains: GCS	0.624*** (0.028)	0.524*** (0.041)	0.724*** (0.036)
<i>Support for GCS</i>	0.65	0.542	0.757
<i>Social desirability bias</i>	-0.025	-0.019	-0.033
<i>80% C.I. for the bias</i>	[-0.06; 0.01]	[-0.07; 0.04]	[-0.08; 0.01]
Constant	1.317	1.147	1.486
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000
R ²	0.089	0.065	0.125

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

332 2.4.3 Conjoint analyses

333 In order to assess the public support for the GCS in conjunction with other policies, we
 334 conduct a series of conjoint analyses. We ask respondents to make five choices between
 335 pairs of political platforms.

336 The first conjoint analysis suggests that the GCS is supported independently of be-
 337 ing complemented by the National Redistribution Scheme and a national climate policy
 338 (“Coal exit” in the U.S., “Thermal insulation plan” in Europe, denoted C). For the second
 339 analysis, we split the sample into four random branches (see [Methods](#)). The outcome
 340 is that there is majority support for the GCS and for C, which are seen as neither com-
 341 plement nor substitute. A minor share of respondents like a national climate policy and
 342 dislike a global one, but as many people prefer a global rather than a national policy; and
 343 there is no evidence that implementing NR would increase the support for the GCS.

344 In the third analysis, we present two random branches of the sample with hypothetical
 345 progressive and conservative platforms that differ only by the presence (or not) of the
 346 GCS in the progressive platform. Table 2 shows that a progressive candidate would not
 347 significantly lose voting share by endorsing the GCS in any country, and may even gain

³⁴⁸ 11 p.p. ($p = .005$) in voting intention in France.

Table 2: Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. (Question 28)

	Prefers the Progressive platform					
	All	United States	France	Germany	UK	Spain
GCS in Progressive platform	0.028* (0.014)	0.029 (0.022)	0.112*** (0.041)	0.015 (0.033)	0.008 (0.040)	-0.015 (0.038)
Constant	0.623	0.604	0.55	0.7	0.551	0.775
Observations	5,202	2,619	605	813	661	504
R ²	0.001	0.001	0.013	0.0003	0.0001	0.0003

Note: Simple OLS model. The 14% of *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples.
GCS has no significant influence on them. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

³⁴⁹ Our last two analyses make respondents choose between two random platforms. In
³⁵⁰ Europe, respondents are prompted to imagine that a left or center-left coalition will win
³⁵¹ the next election and are asked what platform they would prefer that coalition to have
³⁵² campaigned on. In the U.S., the question is framed as a hypothetical duel in a Democratic
³⁵³ primary, and asked only to non-Republicans ($n = 2,218$), i.e. the respondents who declare
³⁵⁴ as political affiliation *Democrat*, *Independent*, *Non-Affiliated* or *Other*. In the fourth analysis,
³⁵⁵ a policy (or an absence of policy) is randomly drawn for each platform in each of five
³⁵⁶ categories: *economic issues*, *societal issues*, *climate policy*, *tax system*, *foreign policy* (Figure S2).


³⁵⁷ In the UK, Germany, and France, a platform is about 9 to 13 p.p. more likely to be
³⁵⁸ preferred if it includes the GCS rather than no foreign policy. This effect is between 1 and
³⁵⁹ 4 p.p. and no longer significant in the U.S. (among non-Republicans) and in Spain. More-
³⁶⁰ over, a platform that includes a global tax on millionaires rather than no foreign policy is 5
³⁶¹ to 13 p.p. more likely to be preferred in all countries (the effect is significant and at least 9
³⁶² p.p. in all countries but Spain). Similarly, a global democratic assembly on climate change
³⁶³ has a significant effect of 8 to 12 p.p. in the U.S. (among non-Republicans), Germany, and
³⁶⁴ France. These effects are large, and not far from the effects of the policies most influential
³⁶⁵ on the platforms, which range between 15 and 18 p.p. in most countries (and 27 p.p. in
³⁶⁶ Spain), and all relate to improved public services (in particular healthcare, housing, and
³⁶⁷ education).

Figure S2: [For Supplementary Material] Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See non-translated versions in Figure S16; Question 29)


(a) U.S. (Asked only to non-Republicans)




(b) France




(c) Germany



(d) Spain




(e) UK



³⁶⁸ The fifth analysis draws random platforms similarly, except that candidate A's platform
³⁶⁹ always contains the GCS while B's includes no foreign policy. In this case, A is chosen
³⁷⁰ by 60% of Europeans and 58% of non-Republican Americans (Figure S3). Overall, taking
³⁷¹ the U.S. as an example, our conjoint analyses indicate that a candidate at the Democratic
³⁷² primary would have more chances to obtain the nomination by endorsing the GCS, and
³⁷³ this endorsement would not penalize her or him at the presidential election. This re-
³⁷⁴ sult reminds the finding that 12% of Germans shift their voting intention from SPD and
³⁷⁵ CDU/CSU to the Greens and the Left when they are told that the latter parties support
³⁷⁶ global democracy.³¹

Figure S3: [For Supplementary Material] Influence of the GCS on preferred platform:
Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than
a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question 30; in the U.S., asked only to non-
Republicans.)



³⁷⁷ 2.4.4 Prioritization

³⁷⁸ Towards the end of the survey, we ask respondents to allocate 100 points among six
³⁷⁹ randomly selected policies from the previous conjoint analyses, using sliders. The instruc-
³⁸⁰ tion was to distribute the points based on their level of support, with a higher allocation
³⁸¹ indicating greater support for a policy. As a result, the average support across policies is
³⁸² 16.67 points. In each country, the GCS ranks in the middle of all policies or above, with
³⁸³ an average number of points from 15.4 in the U.S. to 22.9 in Germany.

³⁸⁴ Interestingly, in Germany, the most prioritized policy is the global tax on millionaires,
³⁸⁵ while the GCS is the second most prioritized policy. The global tax on millionaires con-
³⁸⁶ sistently ranks no lower than fifth position (out of 15 or 17 policies) in every country,
³⁸⁷ garnering an average of 18.3 points in Spain to 22.9 points in Germany.

³⁸⁸ This question sheds light on a potential discrepancy between the policy priorities of
³⁸⁹ the public and those enacted by legislators. For instance, while the European Union and
³⁹⁰ California have enacted plans to phase out new combustion-engine cars by 2035, the pro-

³⁹¹ posal to “ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030” emerged as one of the
³⁹² three least prioritized policies in each country, with an average allocation of 7.8 points in
³⁹³ France to 11.4 points in the UK.

³⁹⁴ **2.4.5 Pros and Cons**

³⁹⁵ We survey respondents to gather their perspectives on the pros and cons of the GCS,
³⁹⁶ randomly utilizing an open-ended or a closed question. In the closed question format,
³⁹⁷ respondents tend to consider every argument as important in determining their support
³⁹⁸ or opposition to the GCS (see Figure S17). Notably, the least important aspect was the
³⁹⁹ negative impact on their household, with 60% in Europe ($n=1,505$) and 75% in the U.S.
⁴⁰⁰ ($n=493$) finding it important. The most important elements differ between Europe and the
⁴⁰¹ U.S. In Europe, the key factors are the GCS’s potential to limit climate change and reduce
⁴⁰² poverty in low-income countries, both deemed important by 85% of respondents. In the
⁴⁰³ U.S., having sufficient information about the scheme ranks highest at 89%, followed by
⁴⁰⁴ its potential to foster global cooperation at 82%. However, due to the limited variation in
⁴⁰⁵ the ratings for each element, the closed question format is inconclusive (Figure S17).

⁴⁰⁶ The open-ended question provides more insights into what people associate with the
⁴⁰⁷ GCS when prompted to think about it. Analyzing keywords in the responses (automati-
⁴⁰⁸ cally translated into English), the most frequently mentioned topics are the international
⁴⁰⁹ aspect and the environment, each appearing in approximately one-quarter of the answers
⁴¹⁰ (see Figure S19). This is followed by discussions on the effects of the GCS on poverty and
⁴¹¹ prices, each mentioned by about one-tenth of the respondents. We also manually clas-
⁴¹² sified each answer into different categories (see Figure S18). This exercise confirms the
⁴¹³ findings from the automatic search: the environmental benefit of the GCS is the most
⁴¹⁴ commonly discussed topic, while obstacles to implementation or agreement on the pro-
⁴¹⁵ posal are relatively infrequently mentioned.

⁴¹⁶ In the US2 survey, we divided the sample into four random branches. Two branches
⁴¹⁷ were presented the pros and cons questions (either in open or closed format) *before* be-
⁴¹⁸ ing asked about their support for the GCS or NR. Another branch received information
⁴¹⁹ on the actual level of support for the GCS and NR (estimated in US1, see box p. 20),
⁴²⁰ and one control group received none of these treatments. The objective of the “pros and
⁴²¹ cons treatment” was to mimic a “campaign effect”, which refers to the shift in opinion
⁴²² resulting from media coverage of the proposal. To conservatively estimate the effect of
⁴²³ a (potentially negative) campaign, we intentionally included more cons (6) than pros (3).

⁴²⁴ Interestingly, the support for the GCS decreased by 11 p.p. after respondents viewed a list
⁴²⁵ of its pros and cons. Notably, the support also decreased by 7 p.p. after respondents were
⁴²⁶ asked to consider the pros and cons in an open-ended question. Despite some significant
⁴²⁷ effects of pondering the pros and cons, approximately half of the Americans express sup-
⁴²⁸ port for the GCS across all treatment branches (see Table S2). Although support remains
⁴²⁹ significant, these results suggest that the public success of the GCS would be sensitive to
⁴³⁰ the content of the debate about it, and subject to the discourse adopted by interest groups.

Second-order Beliefs To explain the strong support for the GCS despite its ab-
sence from political platforms and public debate, we hypothesized pluralistic igno-
rance, i.e. that the public and policymakers mistakenly perceive the GCS as unpop-
ular. As a result, individuals might conceal their support for such globally redis-
tributive policies, believing that advocating for them would be futile.

In the case of Americans, their beliefs about the level of support for the GCS are
relatively accurate (Figure S4). The mean perceived support is 52% (with quartiles
of 36%, 52%, and 68%), which closely aligns with the actual support of 53%. Euro-
peans, on the other hand, underestimate the support by 17 p.p. Nonetheless, 65% of
them correctly estimate that the GCS garners majority support, and the mean per-
ceived support is 59% (and quartiles of 43%, 61%, and 74%), compared to the actual
support of 76%. Second-order beliefs are equally accurate for NR in the U.S. and
similarly underestimated in Europe. Finally, consistent with Americans accurately
perceiving the levels of support for the GCS or NR, providing information on the
actual level had no significant effect on their support in the US2 survey.

⁴³¹

⁴³² 2.5 Stated support for global redistribution

⁴³³ 2.5.1 Global wealth tax

⁴³⁴ Consistent with the results of the Global survey, a “tax on millionaires of all countries
⁴³⁵ to finance low-income countries” garners relative support of over 69% in each country,
⁴³⁶ only 5 p.p. lower than a national millionaires tax overall (Figure 3). In random subsam-
⁴³⁷ ples, we inquire about respondents’ preferences regarding the redistribution of revenues
⁴³⁸ from a global tax on individual wealth exceeding \$5 million, after providing information
⁴³⁹ on the revenue raised by such a tax in their country compared to low-income countries.


Figure S4: [For Supplementary Material] Beliefs regarding the support for the GCS and NR. (Questions 21 and 23)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Belief about GCS	52	59	61	56	63	57
Support for the GCS	54	76	80	71	81	74
Belief about NR	55	58	60	53	62	59
Support for NR	56	73	77	66	79	75

Figure S5: [For Supplementary Material] Percent of global wealth tax that should finance low-income countries (*mean*).

"Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all countries around the world. (...)"

What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of retained in the country's national budget)??" (Question 37)



⁴⁴⁰ We ask certain respondents ($n = 1,283$) what percentage of global tax revenues should be
⁴⁴¹ pooled to finance low-income countries. In each country, at least 88% of respondents in-
⁴⁴² dicate a positive amount, with an average of one-third (Figure S5). To other respondents
⁴⁴³ ($n = 1,233$), we inquire whether they would prefer each country to retain all the revenues
⁴⁴⁴ it collects or that half of the revenues be pooled to finance low-income countries. Ap-
⁴⁴⁵ proximately half of the respondents opt to allocate half of the tax revenues to low-income
⁴⁴⁶ countries, consistently with the other variant of the question.

447 **2.5.2 Other global policies**

448 We also assess support for other global policies (Figure 3). Most policies garner rel-
449 ative majority support in each country, with two exceptions: the “cancellation of low-
450 income countries’ public debt” and “a maximum wealth limit” for each individual. The
451 latter policy obtains relative majority support in Europe but not in the U.S., despite the
452 cap being set at \$10 billion in the U.S. compared to €/£100 million in Europe. Notably,
453 climate-related policies enjoy significant popularity, with “high-income countries funding
454 renewable energy in low-income countries” receiving absolute majority support across all
455 surveyed countries. Additionally, relative support for loss and damages compensation, as
456 approved in principle at the international climate negotiations in 2022 (“COP27”), ranges
457 from 55% (U.S.) to 81% (Spain), with absolute support ranging from 41% to 62%.

458 **2.5.3 Foreign aid**

459 We provide respondents with information about the actual amount “spent on foreign
460 aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries” relative to their country’s government
461 spending and GDP. Less than 16% of respondents state that their country’s foreign aid
462 should be reduced, while 62% express support for increasing it, including 17% who sup-
463 port an unconditional increase (Figure S4). Among the 45% who think aid should be
464 increased under certain conditions, we subsequently ask them to specify the conditions
465 they deem necessary (Figure S5). The three most commonly selected conditions are: “we
466 can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted” (73% chose this con-
467 dition), “that recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights” (67%),
468 and “that other high-income countries also increase their foreign aid” (48%). On the other
469 hand, respondents who do not wish to increase their country’s foreign aid primarily jus-
470 tify their view by prioritizing the well-being of their fellow citizens or by perceiving each
471 country as responsible for its own fate (Figure S6). In response to an open-ended ques-
472 tion regarding measures high-income countries should take to fight extreme poverty, a
473 large majority of Americans expressed that more help is needed (Figure S46). The most
474 commonly suggested form of aid is financial support, closely followed by investments in
475 education.

476 We also inquire about the perceived amount of foreign aid. Consistent with prior re-
477 search (see Appendix A.1.3), most people overestimate the actual amount of foreign aid
478 (Figure S25). We then elicit respondents’ preferred amount of foreign aid, after randomly

Figure 3: Relative support for various global policies (percentage of *somewhat* or *strong support*, after excluding *indifferent* answers). (Questions 44 and 45; See Figure S33 for the absolute support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	55	71	72	70	79	70
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	68	82	82	82	85	81
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	60	76	77	79	79	71
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	46	53	53	43	62	61
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	58	71	69	69	78	72
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	62	73	58	73	80	83
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	63	80	80	78	81	83
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	62	87	90	86	91	87
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	46	62	58	62	65	67
National tax on millionaires funding public services	73	85	81	87	89	88
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	69	84	84	84	87	83

⁴⁷⁹ presenting them with either the actual amount or no information. Most of the respon-
⁴⁸⁰ dents who learn the actual amount choose a bracket at least as high as the actual one, and
⁴⁸¹ most of those without the information choose a bracket at least as high as the perceived
⁴⁸² one (Figures S28–S27). Finally, we ask a last question to the respondents who received
⁴⁸³ the information. To those who prefer an increase of foreign aid, we ask how they would
⁴⁸⁴ finance it: by far, the preferred source of funding is higher taxes on the wealthiest (Figure
⁴⁸⁵ S30). To those who prefer a reduction, we ask how they would use the funds becoming
⁴⁸⁶ available: In every country, more people choose higher spending on education or health-
⁴⁸⁷ care rather than lower taxes (Figure S31).

Universalistic values We also elicit underlying values, to test whether broad values are consistent with people's support for specific policies. When we ask respondents which group they defend when they vote, 20% choose "sentient beings (humans and animals)," 22% choose "humans," 33% select their "fellow citizens" (or "Europeans"), 15% choose "My family and myself," and the remaining 10% choose another group (mainly "My State or region" or "People sharing my culture or religion"). The first two categories, representing close to one out of two people, can be described as universalist in their vote. Notably, a majority of left-wing voters are universalist in their vote (see Figure S47).

When asked what their country's diplomats should defend in international climate negotiations, only 11% prefer their country's "interests, even if it goes against global justice." In contrast, 30% prefer global justice (with or without consideration of national interests), and the bulk of respondents (38%) prefer their country's "interests, to the extent it respects global justice."

Furthermore, when we ask respondents to assess the extent to which climate change, global poverty, and inequality in their country are issues, climate change is generally viewed as the most significant problem (with a mean score of 0.59 after recoding answers between -2 and 2). This is followed by global poverty (0.42) and national inequality (0.37).

Finally, we conduct a lottery experiment to elicit universalistic values. Respondents were automatically enrolled in a lottery with a \$100 prize and had to choose the proportion of the prize they would keep for themselves versus give to a person living in poverty. The charity donation is directed either to an African individual or a fellow citizen, depending on the respondent's random assignment. In Europe, we observe no significant variation in the willingness to donate based on the recipient's origin. In the U.S., the donations to Africans are 3 p.p. lower (with an average donation of 34%), but the slightly lower donations to Africans are entirely driven by Trump voters and non-voters (Table S3).

Overall, answers to these broad value questions are consistent with half of Americans and three quarters of Europeans supporting global policies like the GCS: people are almost as much willing to give to poor Africans than to poor fellow citizens, find that global issues are among the biggest problems, almost half of them are universalist when they vote, and most of them wish that their diplomats take into account global justice.

Figure S4: [For Supplementary Material] Attitudes regarding the evolution of [own country] foreign aid. (Question 46)





Figure S5: [For Supplementary Material] Conditions at which foreign aid should be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish an increase of foreign aid at some conditions.] (Question 47)



489 3 Discussion

490 Our point of departure are recent surveys conducted in 20 of the largest countries, as
 491 they reveal robust majority support for global redistributive and climate policies, even in
 492 high-income countries that would financially lose from them. The results from the Main
 493 surveys conducted in the U.S. and four European countries reinforce these findings. We

Figure S6: [For Supplementary Material] Reasons why foreign aid should not be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish a decrease or stability of foreign aid.] (Question 48)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Aid perpetuates poverty as it makes people feel less responsible for themselves	29	30	31	35	31	24
Aid is not effective as most of it is diverted	40	53	48	57	60	49
Aid is a pressure tactic for high-income countries that prevents low-income countries from developing freely	16	16	15	14	23	13
[Country] is not responsible for what happens in other countries	45	30	28	30	20	37
Charity begins at home: there is already a lot to do to support the [country] people in need	63	63	51	62	71	69

494 find strong support for global taxes on the wealthiest individuals, as well as majority sup-
 495 port for our main policy of interest – the Global Climate Scheme (GCS). The GCS encom-
 496 passes carbon pricing at a global level through an emissions trading system, accompanied
 497 by a global basic income funded by the scheme’s revenues. Additional experiments, such
 498 as a list experiment and a real-stake petition, demonstrate that the support for the GCS is
 499 real. Such genuine support is further substantiated by the prioritization of the GCS over
 500 prominent national climate policies and aligned with a significant portion of the popu-
 501 lation holding universalistic values rather than nationalistic or egoistic ones. Moreover,
 502 the conjoint analyses indicate that a progressive candidate would not lose voting shares
 503 by endorsing the GCS, and may even gain 11 p.p. in voting shares in France. Similarly,
 504 a candidate endorsing the GCS would gain votes in a U.S. Democratic primary, while in
 505 Europe, a progressive platform that includes the GCS would be preferred over one that
 506 does not.

507 Having ruled out insincerity as potential explanation for the scarcity of global policies
 508 in the public debate, we propose alternative explanations. The first two are variations of
 509 pluralistic ignorance, and the last three represent complementary explanations.

510 First, there may be pluralistic ignorance *among policymakers* regarding universalistic
 511 values, support for the GCS, or the electoral advantage of endorsing it. Second, people or
 512 policymakers may believe that globally redistributive policies are politically infeasible in

513 some key (potentially foreign) countries like the U.S. Third, political discourse centrally
514 happens at the national level, shaped by national media and institutions such as voting.
515 National framing by political voices may create biases and suppress universalistic values.
516 Fourth, many individuals, including policymakers, may perceive global redistributive
517 policies as ill-defined or technically infeasible, ultimately dismissing them as unrealistic.
518 In particular, policymakers may have insider information about the technical feasibility of
519 such policies. Alternatively, the perception of unrealism may stem from an unawareness
520 of specific proposals. Fifth, just as policy is disproportionately influenced by the economic
521 elites,^{39;40} public debate may be shaped by the wealthiest, who have vested interests in
522 preventing global redistribution.

523 Confirmation of any of these hypotheses would lead to a common conclusion: there
524 exists substantial support for global policies addressing climate change and global in-
525 equality, even in high-income countries, and the perceived boundaries of political realism
526 on this issue may soon shift. Uncovering evidence to support the above hypotheses could
527 draw attention to global policies in the public debate and contribute to their increased
528 prominence.

529 Methods

530 **Data collection.** The paper utilizes two sets of surveys: the *Global* survey and the *Main* sur-
531 veys. The *Main* surveys consist of two U.S. surveys, *US1* and *US2*, and one European survey, *Eu*.
532 The *Global* survey was conducted from March 2021 to March 2022 on 40,680 respondents from
533 20 countries (with 1,465 to 2,488 respondents per country). *US1* collected responses from 3,000
534 respondents between January and March 2023, while *US2* gathered data from 2,000 respondents
535 between March and April 2023. *Eu* included 3,000 respondents and was conducted from February
536 to March 2023. We used the survey companies *Dynata* and *Respondi*. To ensure representative
537 samples, we employed stratified quotas based on gender, age (5 brackets), income (4), region (4),
538 education level (3), and ethnicity (3) for the U.S. We also incorporated survey weights throughout
539 the analysis to account for any remaining imbalances. These weights were constructed using the
540 quota variables as well as the degree of urbanity, and trimmed between 0.25 and 4. Stratified quo-
541 tas followed by reweighting is the usual method to reduce selection bias from opt-in online panels,
542 when better sampling methods (such as compulsory participation of random dwellings) are un-
543 available.⁴¹ By applying weights, the results are fully representative of the respective countries
544 along the above mentioned dimensions. Results at the European level apply different weights
545 which ensure representativeness of the combined four European countries. Appendix G shows
546 how our samples compare to actual population frequencies. Our samples match well actual fre-

547 quencies, except for some imbalance on vote in the U.S. (which does not affect our results, as show
548 the results reweighted by vote in the below section *Support for the GCS*). Appendix I shows that
549 the treatment branches are balanced. Appendix J runs placebo tests of the effects of each treat-
550 ment on unrelated outcomes. We do not find effects of earlier treatments on unrelated outcomes
551 arriving later in the survey. Appendix K shows that our results are robust to including inattentive
552 respondents.

553 **Data quality.** The median duration is 28 minutes for the *Global* survey, 14 min for *US1*, 11 min
554 for *US2*, and 20 min for *Eu*. To ensure the best possible data quality, we exclude respondents
555 who fail an attention test or rush through the survey (i.e., answer in less than 11.5 minutes in
556 the *Global* survey, 4 minutes in *US1* or *US2*, 6 minutes in *Eu*). At the end of the survey, we ask
557 whether respondents thought that our survey was politically biased and provide some feedback.
558 67% of the respondents found the survey unbiased. 25% found it left-wing biased, and 8% found
559 it right-wing biased.

560 **Questionnaires and raw results.** The questionnaire and raw results of the *Global* survey can
561 be found in the Appendix of the companion paper.¹⁸ The raw results are reported in Appendix
562 B while the surveys' structures and questionnaires are given in Appendices C and D. Country-
563 specific raw results are also available as supplementary material files: US, EU, FR, DE, ES, UK.
564 The questionnaires are the same as the ones given *ex ante* in the registration plan (osf.io/fy6gd).

565 **Incentives.** To encourage accurate and truthful responses, several questions of the *US1* survey
566 use incentives. For each of the three comprehension questions that follow the policy descrip-
567 tions, we randomly select and reward three respondents who provide correct answers with a \$50
568 gift certificate. Similarly, for questions involving estimating support shares for the GCS and NR,
569 three respondents with the closest guesses to the actual values receive a \$50 gift certificate. In the
570 donation lottery question, we randomly select one respondent and split the \$100 prize between
571 the NGO GiveDirectly and the winner according to the winner's choice. In total, our incentives
572 scheme distributes gift certificates (and donations) for a value of \$850. Finally, respondents have
573 an incentive to answer truthfully to the petition question, as they are aware that the results for
574 that question (the share of respondents supporting the policy) will be transmitted to their head of
575 state's office.

576 **Absolute vs. relative support.** In most questions, support or opposition for a policy is asked
577 using a 5-Likert scale, with *Indifferent* as the middle option and compulsory response. We call
578 *absolute support* the share of *Somewhat* or *Strong support*. We generally favor the notion of *relative*

579 *support*, which reports the share of support after excluding *Indifferent* answers. Indeed, the *relative*
580 *support* is better suited to assess whether there is more people in favor vs. against a policy.

581 **Support for the GCS.** The 95% confidence intervals are [52.4%, 55.9%] in the U.S. and [74.2%, 77.2%]
582 in Europe. The average support is computed with survey weights, employing weights based on
583 quota variables, which exclude vote. Another method to reweigh the raw results involves running
584 a regression of the support for the GCS on sociodemographic characteristics (including vote) and
585 multiplying each coefficient by the population frequencies. This alternative approach yields sim-
586 ilar figures: 76% in Europe and 52% or 53% in the U.S. (depending on whether individuals who
587 did not disclose their vote are classified as non-voters or excluded). Notably, the average support
588 excluding non-voters is 54% in the U.S.

589 Though the level of support for the GCS is significantly lower in swing States (at 51%) that
590 are key to win U.S. elections, the electoral effect of endorsing the GCS remains non-significantly
591 different from zero (at +1.2 p.p.) in these States. Note that we define swing states as the 8 states
592 with less than 5 p.p. margin of victory in the 2020 election (MI, NV, PA, WI, AZ, GA, NC, FL). The
593 results are robust to using the 3 p.p. threshold (that excludes FL) instead.

594 **List experiment.** The question reads: “Beware, this question is quite unusual. Among the poli-
595 cies below, **how many** do you support?” The list of policies randomly varies across respondents,
596 and includes a subset of GCS, NR (National Redistribution scheme), C (“Coal exit” in the U.S.,
597 “Thermal insulation plan” in Europe) and O (“Marriage only for opposite-sex couples in the U.S.”,
598 “Death penalty for major crimes” in Europe). There are four branches: GCS/NR/C/O; GCS/C/O;
599 NR/C/O; C/O. To estimate the tacit average support for the GCS and NR, we regress the number
600 of supported policies on indicators that the list includes GCS and NR. We utilize the difference-in-
601 means estimator, and confidence intervals are computed using Monte Carlo simulation with the
602 R package *list*.⁴²

603 **Petition.** The respondent is randomly assigned a branch where the petition relates to the GCS or
604 the National Redistribution scheme. The question reads: “Would you be willing to sign a petition
605 for the [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme?

606 As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President’s office], in-
607 forming him what share of American people are willing to endorse the [Global climate / National
608 redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign, only your answer here is required and
609 remains anonymous.”).

610 Paired weighted *t*-tests are conducted to test the equality in support for a policy among re-
611 spondents who were questioned about the policy in the petition.

612 **Conjoint analyses.** In the first conjoint analysis, 54% of U.S. respondents and 74% of European
613 ones prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to the combination of C and NR alone, in-
614 dicating similar support for the GCS conditional on NR and C than for the GCS alone (Figure
615 S15).

616 In the second conjoint analysis, results from the first branch show that the support for the GCS
617 conditional on NR, at 55% in the U.S. ($n = 757$) and 77% in Europe ($n = 746$), is not significantly
618 different from the support for the GCS alone. This suggests that rejection of the GCS is not driven
619 by the cost of the policy on oneself. The second branch shows that the support for C conditional
620 on NR is somewhat higher, at 62% in the U.S. ($n = 751$) and 84% in Europe ($n = 747$). However,
621 the third one shows no significant preference for C compared to GCS (both conditional on NR),
622 neither in Europe, where GCS is preferred by 52% ($n = 741$) nor in the U.S., where C is preferred
623 by 53% ($n = 721$). The fourth branch shows that 55% in the U.S. ($n = 771$) and 77% in Europe ($n =$
624 766) prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to NR alone.

625 The effects reported in the fourth analysis are the Average Marginal Component Effects.³⁶ The
626 policies studied are progressive policies prominent in the country. Except for the category *foreign*
627 *policy*, which features the GCS 42% of the time, they are drawn uniformly.

628 **Prioritization.** The prioritization allows inferring individual-level preferences for one policy
629 over another. This slightly differs from a conjoint analysis, which only allows inferring individual-
630 level preferences for one platform over another or collective-level preferences for one policy over
631 another. Also, by comparing platforms, conjoint analyses may be subject to interaction effects
632 between policies of a platform (which can be seen as complementary, subsitute, or antagonistic)
633 while the prioritization frames the policies as independent.

634 **Open-ended question on the GCS.** Around one in four respondents explicitly cites pros or cons.
635 Few individuals explicitly express support or opposition, and misunderstandings are rare. Only
636 11% of the responses are empty or express a lack of opinion, though one-quarter are unclassifiable
637 due to the rarity, nonsensical nature, or irrelevance of the conveyed idea.

638 **Pros and cons.** Surprisingly, the support for National Redistribution also decreased by 7 p.p. fol-
639 lowing the closed question about the GCS. This suggests that some individuals may lack attention
640 and confuse the two policies, or that contemplating the pros and cons alters the mood of some
641 people, moving them away from their initial positive impression.

642 **Global wealth tax estimates.** A 2% tax on net wealth exceeding \$5 million would annually raise
643 \$816 billion, leaving unaffected 99.9% of the world population. More specifically, it would collect
644 €5 billion in Spain, €16 billion in France, £20 billion in the UK, €44 billion in Germany, \$430

645 billion in the U.S., and \$1 billion collectively in all low-income countries (28 countries, home to
646 700 million people). These Figures come from the WID wealth tax simulator.⁴³

647 **Design choices.** As Global survey results indicated strong support for global redistributive poli-
648 cies worldwide, we conducted our Main surveys to test the robustness of these results. Among
649 the eight largest high-income countries, we selected the five ones with a relatively low level of
650 support for global redistributive policies as observed in the Global survey. We also focus on the
651 GCS as its costs are less concentrated on the very rich, compared to other global redistributive
652 policies, so we expect lower (or less genuine) support. By selecting countries that would lose from
653 global redistribution, are less supportive than others, and focusing on less consensual policies, we
654 aimed at conservatively assessing the level of support of world citizens for global redistribution.

655 We split the U.S. survey into two waves to test the effect on the support of providing the
656 information on the actual support, and merged the *Eu* survey in one wave to get larger sample
657 sizes and more power in the analyses.

658 To select the policies tested, we spanned three key areas for global redistribution: climate
659 change, inequality, and global governance. We selected policies that are either on the agenda of
660 international negotiations (international transfers for mitigation; adaptation; or loss and damages;
661 cancellation of public debt; reform of voting rights at the UN or IMF; global wealth tax) or advo-
662 cated by prominent NGOs or scholars (global asset registry;⁴⁴ limits on wealth;^{45,7} democratic
663 climate governance;⁴⁶ global minimum wage;⁴⁷ fair trade;⁴⁸ carbon pricing;⁶ increased foreign
664 aid⁴⁹).

665 Data and code availability

666 All data and code of the *Main* surveys as well as figures of the paper are available on
667 github.com/bixiou/global_tax_attitudes. Data and code for the *Global* survey will be made public
668 upon publication.

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1211 **A Literature review**

1212 **A.1 Attitudes and perceptions**

1213 **A.1.1 Population attitudes on global policies**

1214 Using representative samples in 125 countries covering 96% of the world's greenhouse
1215 gas emissions, Andre et al.²⁶ show that 69% of the global population express willingness
1216 to contribute 1% of their income to fight global warming. Carattini et al.²⁸ test the sup-
1217 port for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples in five countries, representative
1218 along gender and age. For a given variant, the sample size is about 167 respondents per
1219 country. They find over 80% support for any variant in India, between 50% and 65% in
1220 Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43% to 59% in the U.S., depending on the variant.
1221 Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding an equal dividend for each human
1222 is close to 50% in high-income countries (e.g., at 44% in the U.S.), consistently with our
1223 results from the *Global* survey (see Figure 2). This is another piece of evidence that the
1224 support is lower for a tax that would "only" reduce CO₂ emissions than for a quota that
1225 would unambiguously achieve the climate target. Using a conjoint analysis in the U.S.
1226 and Germany, Beiser-McGrath and Bernauer²² find that the support for a carbon tax in-
1227 creases by up to 50% if it applies to all industrialized countries rather than exclusively to
1228 one's own country.

1229 In surveys conducted in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S., Ghassim³¹ finds
1230 support ranging from 55% to 74% for "a global democracy including both a global gov-
1231 ernment and a global parliament, directly elected by the world population, to recommend
1232 and implement policies on global issues". Through an experiment, he also finds that, in
1233 countries where the government stems from a coalition, voting shares would shift by 8
1234 (Brazil) to 12 p.p. (Germany) from parties who are said to oppose global democracy to
1235 parties that supposedly support it. For instance, when Germans respondents were told
1236 that (only) the Greens and the Left support global democracy, these parties gained re-
1237 spectively 9 and 3 p.p. in vote intentions, while the SPD and the CDU-CSU each lost
1238 6 p.p. Ghassim³¹ also presents survey results showing strong majorities in favor of the
1239 direct election of one's country's UN representative in all 18 surveyed countries. Simi-
1240 larly, in each of 10 countries, there are clear majorities in favor of "a new supranational
1241 entity [taking] enforceable global decisions in order to solve global risks"⁵⁰. Remarkably,
1242 already in 1946, 54% of Americans agreed (while 24% disagreed) that "the UN should be

1243 strengthened to make it a world government with the power to control the armed forces
1244 of all nations”⁵¹. Furthermore, in surveys conducted in Argentina, China, India, Russia,
1245 Spain, and the U.S., Ghassim et al.⁵² find majority support for UN reforms that would
1246 make United Nations’ decisions binding, give veto powers to a few other major countries
1247 at the Security Council, or complement the highest body of the UN with a chamber of
1248 directly elected representatives.

1249 Relatedly, Meilland et al.²⁴ find that both Americans and French people prefer an in-
1250 ternational settlement of climate justice, even if it encroaches on sovereignty. In a 2013
1251 survey conducted in China, Germany, and the U.S., Schleich et al.⁵³ show that over three-
1252 quarter of people think that international climate agreements reached so far are not suc-
1253 cessful and that future agreements are important. In Finland, Sivonen²³ finds that that
1254 support for a carbon tax is higher if implemented at the global level (54%) rather than at
1255 the national level (40%).

1256 The results from these specific questions are in line with the answers to more general
1257 questions. In each of 36 countries, ISSP²¹ find near consensus that “for environmental
1258 problems, there should be international agreements that [their country] and other coun-
1259 tries should be made to follow” (overall, 82% agree and 4% disagree). In each of 29 coun-
1260 tries, ISSP²⁷ uncover near consensus that “Present economic differences between rich and
1261 poor countries are too large” (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree).²⁹ reveal that 66% of
1262 Americans support providing “financial aid and technical support to developing coun-
1263 tries that agree to limit their greenhouse gas emissions.” Fehr et al.³⁰ find that 90% of
1264 Germans want some degree of global redistribution.

1265 A.1.2 Population attitudes on climate burden sharing

1266 Despite differences in the description of fairness principles, surveys on burden-sharing
1267 rules show consistent attitudes. Or at least, their seemingly contradictory results can be
1268 made compatible with the following interpretation: Concerning emissions reductions,
1269 most people want that every country engage in strong and collective decarbonization ef-
1270 forts, with a global quota converging to climate neutrality in the medium run. Concerning
1271 the financial effort, most people support high-emitting countries paying and low-income
1272 countries receiving funding. The most supported rules are those perceived as equitable,
1273 in particular an equal right to emit per person.

1274 This interpretation helps to understand the apparent differences between articles that
1275 approach burden sharing from different angles: cost sharing (in money terms), effort shar-

1276 ing (in terms of emissions reductions), or resource sharing (in terms of rights to emit).
1277 Existing papers adopt either the cost sharing or effort sharing approach, which preclude
1278 any country from being a net receiver of funds. Also, by focusing on *either* the financial
1279 or the decarbonization effort, these surveys miss the other half of the picture, which can
1280 explain why some papers find strong support for the ability-to-pay principle while others
1281 find strong support for grandfathering (defined as emissions reductions being the same
1282 in every country). The literature follows these approaches to align with the notions used
1283 by the UNFCCC. Yet, we argue that the resource sharing approach is preferable for un-
1284 covering attitudes, as it unambiguously describes the distributive implications of each
1285 rule while achieving an efficient geographical distribution of emissions reductions and
1286 explicitly allowing for monetary gains for some countries.

1287 Now, let us summarize the results of the different papers in the light of this clarifica-
1288 tion. Schleich et al.⁵³ find an identical ranking of support for burden-sharing principles
1289 in China, Germany, and the U.S.: polluter-pays followed by ability-to-pay, equal emis-
1290 sions per capita, and grandfathering. Note that the authors do not allow for emissions
1291 trading in their description of equal *emissions per capita*, which may explain its relatively
1292 low support. Yet, the relative support for egalitarianism also depends on how *the other*
1293 rules are described. Indeed, Carlsson et al.⁵⁴ find that Swedes prefer that “all countries
1294 are allowed to emit an equal amount per capita” rather than options where emissions are
1295 reduced based on current or historical emissions, for which it is explicitly stated that high-
1296 emitting countries “will continue to emit more than others”. Bechtel and Scheve⁵⁵ find
1297 agreement that rich countries should pay more and historical emissions should matter,
1298 but that efforts should not be solely borne by wealthy nations. More precisely, their con-
1299 joint analysis conducted in France, Germany, the UK, and the U.S. shows that a climate
1300 agreement is 15 p.p. more likely to be preferred (to a random alternative) if it includes 160
1301 countries rather than 20, and 5 p.p. less likely to be preferred if “only rich countries pay”
1302 compared to other burden-sharing rules: “rich countries pay more than poor”, “coun-
1303 tries pay proportional to current emissions” or “countries pay proportional to historical
1304 emissions”. In Germany and the U.S., Gampfer et al.⁵⁶ also find stronger support for
1305 funding climate action in low-income countries when cost is shared with other countries.
1306 Using a choice experiment, Carlsson et al.⁵⁷ find that the least preferred option in China
1307 and the U.S. is when low-emitting countries are exempted from any effort. Ability-to-
1308 pay is appreciated in both countries and is the preferred option in the U.S., though the
1309 preferred option in China is another one that accounts for historical responsibility. In

the U.S. and France, Meilland et al.²⁴ find that the most favored fairness principle is that “all countries commit to converge to the same average of total emissions per inhabitant, compatible with a controlled climate change”. Furthermore, in each country, 73% disagree with grandfathering defined as “countries which emitted a lot of carbon in the past have a right to continue emitting more than others in the future”. The study by Meilland et al.²⁴ contains many other results: for instance, majorities prefer to hold countries accountable for their consumption-based rather than territorial emissions, and the median choice regarding historical responsibility is to hold a country accountable for its post-1990 emissions (rather than post-1850 or just their current emissions). Finally, in each of 28 (among the largest) countries, Dabla-Norris et al.⁵⁸ find strong majority for “all countries” to the question “Which countries do you think should be paying to reduce carbon emissions?”. When asked to choose between a cost sharing based on *current* vs. *accumulated historic emissions*, a majority prefers *current emissions* in all countries but China and Saudi Arabia (where the two options are close to equally preferred). (Back to Section 2.2)

1324 A.1.3 Population attitudes on foreign aid

1325 There is an extensive literature on attitudes towards foreign aid in donor countries.
1326 The key findings indicate that most people overestimate the amount of foreign aid and
1327 that only a minority wants a cut in foreign aid compared to actual amounts, especially
1328 once they become aware of them.

1329 For instance, PIPA⁵⁹ shows that 83% of Americans support a multilateral effort to cut
1330 world hunger in half. PIPA⁶⁰ shows that in each of 20 countries, a majority thinks that
1331 developed countries “have a moral responsibility to work to reduce hunger and severe
1332 poverty in poor countries”, with an average agreement of 81%. In 7 OECD countries, the
1333 study finds that at least 75% of respondents are willing to pay for a program to cut hunger
1334 in half (at an estimated cost of, e.g., \$50 a year for each American).

1335 Kaufmann et al.⁶¹ find that perceived aid is overestimated in each of the 24 countries
1336 they study, on average by a factor of 7. In most countries, desired aid is larger than per-
1337 ceived aid.¹ They show that individuals in the top income quintile desire aid 0.13 p.p.
1338 lower than those in the bottom 40% – which is very close to what we find. By employing
1339 a theoretical model and examining correlations between lobbying and actual aid (control-
1340 ing for desired aid), they argue that the gap between actual and desired aid stems from

¹Kaufmann et al.⁶² offer the best results on desired aid because (as Hudson and van Heerde⁶³ criticize), other studies did not take into account misperceptions of actual aid.

1341 the political influence of the rich who defend their vested interests. In Kaufmann et al.⁶²,
1342 the U.S. is an outlier: desired aid is at the other countries' average (3% of GNI), but as mis-
1343 perceptions are enormous, perceived aid is twice as large as desired aid. Indeed, Gilens⁶⁴
1344 shows that even Americans with high political knowledge misperceive actual aid, and
1345 finds that 17% fewer of them want to cut aid when we provide them specific information
1346 about the amount of aid. Similarly, Nair⁶⁵ finds that the relatively low support for aid
1347 in the U.S. is driven by information on global distribution, as people underestimate their
1348 rank by 27 centiles on average and overestimate the global median income by a factor 10.

1349 Hudson and van Heerde⁶³ provide a critical review of the literature and show that the
1350 strong support for poverty alleviation largely stems from intrinsic altruism. They note
1351 that, according to DFID⁶⁶ and PIPA⁵⁹, 47% of British people find that the aid is wasted
1352 (mainly due to corruption), while Americans estimate that less than a quarter of the aid
1353 reaches those in need, with over half ending up in the hands of corrupt government of-
1354 ficials. Despite these perceptions, most people still support aid, suggesting the presence
1355 of nonutilitarian motives. Consistent with Henson et al.⁶⁷, Bauhr et al.⁶⁸ find that sup-
1356 port for aid is reduced by the perception of corruption in recipient countries. However,
1357 this effect is mitigated by the aid-corruption paradox: countries with higher levels of
1358 corruption often need more help. Bodenstein and Faust⁶⁹ further show that right-wing
1359 Europeans, as well as those who perceive strong corruption in their country, are more
1360 likely to agree that recipient countries should "follow certain rules regarding democracy,
1361 human rights and governance as a condition for receiving EU development aid." Using a
1362 2002 Gallup survey and the 2006 World Values Survey, and in line with Bayram⁷⁰, Paxton
1363 and Knack⁷¹ show that the main determinants for wanting more aid are trust, left-wing
1364 ideology, interest in politics, and being a woman (all positively associated). (Back to Sec-
1365 tion 2.5.3)

1366 A.1.4 Population attitudes on taxes on the rich

1367 We are not aware of any previous survey on a global wealth tax,² though surveys
1368 consistently show strong support for national wealth taxes. In a comprehensive survey
1369 conducted in the UK, Rowlingson et al.⁷² show that a wealth tax is the preferred option
1370 for raising revenues. Only 8% of respondents state that total net wealth should not be
1371 taxed (with little differences between Labour and Conservative voters). The study also

²We did not find any using the combination of "survey" or "attitudes" with "wealth tax" or "global wealth tax" in Google Scholar.

1372 finds that the preferred design would be a 1% or 3% tax on net wealth above £1 million.
1373 By asking how much taxes per year should a person with a certain income and wealth
1374 level pay, Fisman et al.⁷³ finds that the average American favors a 0.8% linear tax rate
1375 on unspecified wealth up to \$2 million (the highest wealth level tested), and a 3% linear
1376 rate on inherited wealth. Through a conjoint analysis conducted in three high-income
1377 countries, Schechtl and Tisch⁷⁴ find widespread support for a wealth tax (from 78% in
1378 the U.S. to 86% in Germany and the UK), with a preference for an exemption threshold
1379 set at \$/€1 million (rather than 500,000 or 2 million) with the tax rate and tax unit having
1380 little influence on the preferred design. In 21 OECD countries, the OECD⁷⁵ uncovers
1381 strong majority support for higher taxes on the rich to support the poor, with nearly 70%
1382 overall agreement and less than 20% disagreement. Isbell⁷⁶ finds similarly high level of
1383 support in 34 African countries. In the UK, Patriotic Millionaires⁷⁷ find 69% support (and
1384 7% opposition) for a 1.1% tax on wealth in excess of £10 million. In the U.S., Americans
1385 for Tax Fairness⁷⁸ find that 67% to 71% of the respondents support to “raise taxes for
1386 those earning more than \$400,000 a year”, “raise the income tax rate for those earning
1387 over \$1 million a year by 10 percentage points”, or “apply a 2% tax on an individual’s
1388 wealth above \$50 million each year, and 3% on wealth above \$1 billion”.

1389 A.1.5 Population attitudes on ethical norms

1390 As argued by Nyborg et al.⁷⁹, social norms can be the solution to the collective action
1391 problem. As such, universalistic values and free-riding attitudes are key.

1392 **Universalism** Various studies have examined the concept of global identity (see Reysen
1393 and Katzarska-Miller⁸⁰ for a review). In the 2005-2008 wave of the World Values Survey,
1394 Bayram⁸¹ notes that “78% of the participants in 57 countries see themselves as citizens of
1395 the world”, though the 2017-2022 wave reveals that more people feel close to their town,
1396 region or country than to the world. Enke et al.⁸² measure universalism at the U.S. dis-
1397 trict level using donation data, and find that a district’s universalism predicts electoral
1398 outcomes better than its income or education level. To measure universalism at the in-
1399 dividual level, Enke et al.⁸³ ask American respondents to split \$100 between a random
1400 stranger and a random person with the same income but closer to them. They distin-
1401 guish different facets of universalism, and define *foreign universalism* as the inclination
1402 to give to a foreigner rather than a fellow citizen. They find a home bias for most peo-
1403 ple, which could partly be attributed to concerns about inequality, as the split involves

1404 two persons with the same income, with the foreigner most certainly living in a poorer
1405 country than the American and thus enjoying a higher social status. That being said, a
1406 home bias probably remains even after accounting for concerns about inequality, as 84%
1407 of Americans agree that “taking care of problems at home is more important than giv-
1408 ing aid to foreign countries”⁵⁹. Enke et al.⁸⁴ also measure universalism and analyze its
1409 correlates in 7 countries, and Cappelen et al.⁸⁵ deploy this method in 60 countries. In
1410 a lab experiment with students in the U.S., Cherry et al.⁸⁶ show that a substantial share
1411 of people prefer policies detrimental to them due to their egalitarian worldview. Waytz
1412 et al.⁸⁷ show that left-leaning people exhibit a wider “moral circle”. Jaeger and Wilks⁸⁸
1413 find that judgments of moral concern are equally well explained by characteristics of the
1414 judge and the evaluated target.

1415 **Free-riding** Despite the long-standing explanation of the lack of climate action as a re-
1416 sult of free-riding, surveys consistently show that people support climate mitigation ac-
1417 tion in their own country, even in the absence of such action in other countries. Bernauer
1418 and Gampfer⁸⁹ show this for Americans and Indians, who both overestimate their coun-
1419 try’s emissions at one third of the global total. Beiser-McGrath and Bernauer⁹⁰ show this
1420 in the U.S. and China using an experimental design. McEvoy and Cherry⁹¹ show that
1421 Americans mostly invoke leadership and morality to justify unilateral climate action. Us-
1422 ing a range of methods, Aklin and Mildenberger³³ show that the empirical evidence for
1423 free-riding is not compelling, and that climate inaction can be equally well explained by
1424 distributive conflicts. Finally, review of the literature by McGrath and Bernauer⁹² shows
1425 that climate attitudes are largely nonreciprocal, and primarily driven by values and per-
1426 ceptions of the policies, rather than by considerations of what other countries do.

1427 A.1.6 Second-order beliefs

1428 Allport⁹³ introduced the concept of pluralistic ignorance: a shared misperception con-
1429 cerning others’ beliefs. The concept became notorious when O’Gorman⁹⁴ showed that,
1430 towards the end of the civil rights movement, 47% of Americans believed that a majority
1431 of white people supported segregation, while only 18% did so. PIPA⁵⁹ has shown that
1432 while 75% of Americans are willing to contribute \$50 annually to halve world hunger (the
1433 cost of the program), only 32% believed that the majority would share this willingness.
1434 Pluralistic ignorance regarding climate-friendly norms in the United States has been doc-
1435 umented by Andre et al.⁹⁵, who further show that correcting the misperceptions would be

¹⁴³⁶ effective to enhance pro-climate behaviors. Relatedly, Sparkman et al.⁹⁶ show that Amer-
¹⁴³⁷ icans underestimate the support for climate policies by nearly half, while Drews et al.⁹⁷
¹⁴³⁸ document pluralistic ignorance of carbon tax support in Spain. Additionally, Geiger and
¹⁴³⁹ Swim⁹⁸ show that pluralistic ignorance regarding concern for climate change leads peo-
¹⁴⁴⁰ ple to self-silence, resulting in reduced discussions on the topic.

¹⁴⁴¹ A.1.7 Elite attitudes

¹⁴⁴² In a survey of climate negotiators on their preferences in terms of burden-sharing,
¹⁴⁴³ Lange et al.⁹⁹ uncovers a mix of self-serving bias and support for the egalitarian prin-
¹⁴⁴⁴ ciple. Dannenberg et al.¹⁰⁰ elicit climate negotiators' equity preferences and find that
¹⁴⁴⁵ regional differences in addressing climate change are driven more by national interests
¹⁴⁴⁶ than by different equity concerns. Hjerpe et al.¹⁰¹ indicate that voluntary contribution,
¹⁴⁴⁷ indicated as willingness to contribute, was the least preferred principle among both nego-
¹⁴⁴⁸ tiators and observers. Three of the four principles for allocating mitigation commitments
¹⁴⁴⁹ were recognized widely across the major geographical regions: historical responsibili-
¹⁴⁵⁰ ties, ability-to-pay, and equal per capita emissions. This result is confirmed by Kesternich
¹⁴⁵¹ et al.¹⁰², who observe tendencies for a more harmonized view among key groups towards
¹⁴⁵² the ability-to-pay rule in a setting of weighted burden sharing rules. Mildenberger and
¹⁴⁵³ Tingley¹⁰³ survey elites (Congress staffers and international relations scholars) as well as
¹⁴⁵⁴ the population in U.S. and China. They document pluralistic ignorance of pro-climate
¹⁴⁵⁵ attitudes, egocentric bias, and increasing support after beliefs are updated.

¹⁴⁵⁶ A.2 Proposals and analyses of global policy-making

¹⁴⁵⁷ A.2.1 Global carbon pricing

¹⁴⁵⁸ Global carbon pricing is widely regarded by economists as the benchmark climate
¹⁴⁵⁹ policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon emissions externality. For instance, Hoel⁹
¹⁴⁶⁰ shows that an international carbon tax can be designed to simultaneously achieve effi-
¹⁴⁶¹ ciency and accommodate any distributional objective. Concerning the distributional ob-
¹⁴⁶² jective, Grubb⁸, Agarwal and Narain¹⁰ and Bertram¹¹ were the first to advocate for an
¹⁴⁶³ equal right to emit for each human. As Grubb⁸ states it: "by far the best combination
¹⁴⁶⁴ of long term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity, is obtained from a system
¹⁴⁶⁵ based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions which are allocated on an adult per

¹⁴⁶⁶ capita basis".³ Support for such solution has been renewed ever since^{12–15}.

¹⁴⁶⁷ While many endorse the egalitarian allocation of emissions permits, economists also
¹⁴⁶⁸ considered this outcome as politically unfeasible. Thus, to preserve the current level of
¹⁴⁶⁹ inequalities and to preclude transfers between countries, they adjusted their (integrated
¹⁴⁷⁰ assessment) models by assigning more weight to the interest of rich countries¹⁰⁴.

¹⁴⁷¹ Gollier and Tirole¹⁰⁵ synthesize the distributional decision with a *generosity* parame-
¹⁴⁷² ter which would allocate emissions permit to countries in proportion to their population
¹⁴⁷³ if set to one, in proportion to their emissions (on the start date of the policy) if set to
¹⁴⁷⁴ zero, and as a mixture of the egalitarian and grandfathering rules if set in between. Using
¹⁴⁷⁵ a similar formula in the context of a tax, Cramton et al.¹⁰⁶ (summarized in¹⁰⁷) propose
¹⁴⁷⁶ that countries with emissions per capita around the average fix the generosity parame-
¹⁴⁷⁷ ter, so that it is strategically chosen to maximize the tax rate, and to fix the tax rate at
¹⁴⁷⁸ the minimum price proposed by participating countries. Negotiations would exclude
¹⁴⁷⁹ countries with low ambition beforehand; and the treaty would impose trade sanctions on
¹⁴⁸⁰ non-participating countries. van den Bergh et al.¹⁰⁸ propose a "dual-track transition to
¹⁴⁸¹ global carbon pricing": an expanding climate club that would integrate existing and new
¹⁴⁸² emissions trading systems, and a reorientation of UNFCCC negotiations towards a global
¹⁴⁸³ carbon price and burden-sharing rules. The IMF¹⁰⁹ also supports global carbon pricing
¹⁴⁸⁴ or, as a first step, a carbon price floor. They propose either differentiated prices among
¹⁴⁸⁵ countries or international transfers, and estimate that a price of \$75/tCO₂ in 2030 would
¹⁴⁸⁶ be compatible with a 2°C trajectory.

¹⁴⁸⁷ Other authors have put forth more radical proposals. For instance, Weitzman¹¹⁰ en-
¹⁴⁸⁸ visions a World Climate Assembly with proportional representation at the global scale,
¹⁴⁸⁹ so that the median (human) voter would choose the carbon price level. To finance an
¹⁴⁹⁰ adaptation fund, Chancel and Piketty¹¹¹ propose a global *progressive* carbon tax (or a
¹⁴⁹¹ progressive tax on air tickets as a first step), so that rich people (who are high emitters)
¹⁴⁹² contribute more to the public good. Fleurbaey and Zuber¹¹² highlight that, given that
¹⁴⁹³ current emitters are probably richer than future victims of climate change damages, cli-
¹⁴⁹⁴ mate policies deserve a *negative* discount rate. In other words, we cannot dissociate the
¹⁴⁹⁵ climate issue from global inequalities, and an ethical response to this issue requires global
¹⁴⁹⁶ redistribution.

³By "adult per capita", Grubb⁸ means that permits would be allocated equally among adults.

1497 **A.2.2 Climate burden sharing**

1498 The literature has discussed different burden-sharing principles¹¹³. While there is no
1499 agreement on their definitions as different approaches are used (cost sharing, effort shar-
1500 ing, or resource sharing, see Section A.1.2), we describe here the burden-sharing princi-
1501 ples consistently using the resource sharing approach (i.e., allocating emissions rights).
1502 For other papers that define or compare different burden-sharing principles, see Leim-
1503 bach and Giannousakis¹¹⁴; Zhou and Wang¹¹⁵; Vaillancourt and Waaub¹¹⁶.

1504 **Equal per capita.** The simplest principle is perhaps to allocate each year's global carbon
1505 quota based on an equal right to emit per capita, or an equal right to emit for each adult.
1506 Implementing this principle would result in large transfers from high-emitting to low-
1507 emitting countries.

1508 **Grandfathering.** In contrast, *grandfathering* entails allocating emissions rights in pro-
1509 portion to current emissions. From the perspective of allocating carbon pricing revenues
1510 between countries, grandfathering amounts to each country retaining the revenues it col-
1511 lects. Given that nations are sovereign and have not agreed to share emissions rights,
1512 this principle can be considered as the default option against which the other ones can be
1513 compared in terms of distributive effects.

1514 **Historical responsibilities.** At the opposite end of the spectrum is the principle of *his-
1515 torical responsibilities*, which assigns to each country a carbon budget proportional to its
1516 population. Countries that have emitted more than the average have accumulated a car-
1517 bon debt towards countries that have emitted less, which have a carbon credit.⁴

1518 To fully specify this rule, one needs to define a start date for the responsibilities on
1519 past emissions and specify how to account for population size. 1990 is often chosen as
1520 a start year as it is the date of the first IPCC assessment report, marking the widespread
1521 acknowledgment of climate change, though variants include 1972, 1960, 1950 or 1850.⁵
1522 Several solutions have been proposed to account for evolving populations, none of which
1523 is flawless. Matthews¹¹⁷ allocates emissions rights on a given year proportionally to the
1524 countries' populations in that year. An alternative is to use fixed populations, such as

⁴It is not clear how these debts would be settled. Approaches could involve carbon removal from the atmosphere, or using a conventional social cost of carbon to monetize them, by crediting (positively or negatively) emissions rights to countries in an international carbon market.

⁵Climate equity monitor uses 1850 for example.

1525 the populations at the chosen start year¹¹⁸, or at a future date such as projected when
1526 the global total population will reach 9 billion¹¹⁹. Fanning and Hickel¹²⁰ convert the
1527 projected climate debt up to 2050 into monetary terms in a 1.5°C scenario.

1528 The rationale for using fixed populations is to prevent countries from intentionally
1529 increasing their population size to gain more emissions rights. However, this approach
1530 treats countries with different demographic trajectories similarly, effectively penalizing
1531 countries which grow more than others (if past populations are used) or grow more than
1532 expected (if future populations are used). Using current populations like Matthews¹¹⁷
1533 also comes with its own problems. Consider two countries having contributed very little
1534 to cumulative emissions, with the same emissions per capita but different demographic
1535 patterns: country A's population has doubled in the last 30 years, while country B's pop-
1536 ulation has remained stable. Despite the similar present situation, country B would ac-
1537 cumulate more carbon credit than country A. Essentially, compensating country B more
1538 due to its past population size amounts to compensating the dead although it is future
1539 generations who will suffer. That being said, using current populations is likely a more
1540 viable solution than relying on fixed populations since, in practice, countries with similar
1541 emissions per capita tend to have relatively similar demographic trajectories.


1542 **Ability to pay.** Another prominent burden-sharing principle is the ability to pay whereby
1543 richer countries should contribute more to mitigation efforts. To operationalize this prin-
1544 ciple, Baer et al.¹²¹ define *capacity* as the share of global income above an exemption
1545 threshold. They use the threshold of \$7,500 per year (in 2005 PPP), which corresponds to
1546 the top 28% of the global income distribution. According to this principle, the effort of a
1547 country should be proportional to the revenues it would raise with a linear income tax on
1548 individual income above \$7,500.

1549 **Climate Equity Reference Framework** Baer et al.¹²¹ propose another effort-sharing
1550 method, the *Climate Equity Reference Framework* (CERF), which blends the ability to pay
1551 principle with their version of historical responsibilities. They define *responsibility* as fol-
1552 lows: they determine the mitigation requirement as the emissions gap between the Busi-
1553 ness as Usual scenario from IEA¹²² and a 2°C (with 68-86% probability) scenario. The
1554 mitigation requirement is then allocated to countries proportionally to their cumulative
1555 emissions (starting in 1990). The emissions right of a country according to their *respon-
1556 sibility* are then determined by its Business as Usual emissions minus its mitigation re-

1557 quirement. A country's emissions right, dubbed its *greenhouse development right* (GDR),
 1558 is defined using a combination of *capacity* (C) and *responsibility* (R) to allocate the miti-
 1559 gation requirement between countries. This allocation key is called the *Responsibility and*
 1560 *Capacity Indicator* (RCI) and defined as $RCI = R^a \cdot C^{1-a}$, with $a = .4$.

1561 This choice of parameter may seem somewhat arbitrary, but the [EcoEquity calculator](#)
 1562 allows for a customization all CERF parameters^{123;124}. The Climate Action Network has
 1563 adopted the CERF as its *fair share* framework, though the different national chapters of
 1564 the organization could not agree on a choice of parameters^{125 6}.

Figure S9: Net gains from the CERF burden-sharing rule in 2030.




Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#)¹²⁵ using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment¹²⁶ and a price of \$144/tCO₂.

1565 The CERF approach was adopted by a prominent network of climate NGOs because
 1566 it operationalizes the principle of *common but differentiated responsibilities and respective ca-*
 1567 *pabilities* recognized by the UNFCCC. However, this approach suffers from three draw-

⁶The [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) and the think tank [EcoEquity](#) (funded by Tom Athanasiou and late Paul Baer) choose the following parameters: an equal weight for R and C ($a = .5$), their own [business as usual projections](#) of CO₂ emissions based on trends of GDP growth and emissions intensity reduction, a 1.5°C (Low Energy Demand) pathway, 1950 as the start year for responsibility, a gradual inclusion of income to compute *capacity* (which adds complexity to the calculation) from a full exemption of the bottom 70% (\$7,500 per year) linearly to a full inclusion of the top 2% (\$72,211), the inclusion of non-CO₂ gases but not of emissions embodied in trade (i.e. imported emissions) nor LULUCF (land-use).

Figure S10: Difference between net gains from Greenhouse Development Rights and equal rights per capita.



Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the U.S. Climate Action Network¹²⁵ using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with $>50\%$ chance) of the Global Energy Assessment¹²⁶ and a price of \$144/tCO₂.

backs. First, its definition of historical responsibility as an effort sharing principle is consistent with the principle of an equal right of cumulative emissions per capita, which is a resource sharing principle. For instance, consider a fully decarbonized country that has exhausted *exactly* its cumulative carbon budget. According to the CERF notion of responsibility, this country would still be expected to contribute significantly to mitigation efforts due to its relatively high cumulative emissions. Yet, according to the usual definition of the historical responsibility based on an equal right of cumulative emissions p.c., this country would have no liability as it has not exceeded its carbon budget. Second, a country with moderate incomes⁷ and low historical responsibility would be assigned a relatively low effort, even if its emissions per capita are high. In other words, the CERF approach favors countries that have experienced recent growth. Third, the poorest countries would be granted emissions rights close to the Business as Usual trajectory, as they would bear virtually none of the effort. But this trajectory carries the current (unfair) income distribution and amounts to grandfathering. For example, the baseline trajectory

⁷Using the above parameters, moderate incomes means few incomes above the global 70th. percentile.

1582 for emissions⁸ in the DRC entail 0.8 tCO₂ p.c. in 2030, which is five times less than the
1583 world average emissions right per capita. In this framework, if the DRC were to grow
1584 faster than projected in the baseline, it would actually have to pay to the rest of the world
1585 for mitigation efforts. This is what is likely to happen to countries like Mexico or Senegal,
1586 from our simulation of the net gains of CERF compared to a situation without interna-
1587 tional transfers (see Figure S9). In contrast, a resource sharing approach based on equal
1588 per capita emissions would result in low-income countries receiving emissions rights ex-
1589 ceeding their projected trajectories, leading to transfers from high-income countries. By
1590 construction, such transfers do not occur in an effort sharing approach like the CERF,
1591 implying lower transfers to low-income countries. Compared to an equal right to emit
1592 per capita, this method favors countries like China (whose emissions are allowed to re-
1593 main stable over 2020-2030 instead of a reduction of 35-40%) and penalizes regions like
1594 Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (see Figure S10).

1595 **Contraction and Convergence.** Meyer¹²⁷ defines a rule called *contraction and conver-*
1596 *gence* (C&C), which combines elements of grandfathering and equal per capita approaches.
1597 According to C&C, each country is granted (tradable) emissions rights, starting at their
1598 current emission level and converging linearly to an equal per capita level at some pre-
1599 specified date. The *contraction* part refers to the reduction of total emissions rights in line
1600 with the climate objective. When discussed around year 2000, the convergence date was
1601 specified between 2020 and 2050. This rule, advocated by the Global Commons Institute
1602 (a UK think tank), was on the agenda from COP2 to COP15 (i.e., until Copenhagen, and
1603 including in Kyoto), including at Kyoto, and was endorsed by the European Parliament
1604 in 1998. More recently, Gignac and Matthews¹²⁸ have shown how C&C can be made
1605 consistent with historical responsibilities by computing carbon debts and credits until the
1606 convergence date.

1607 **Assessments of the NDCs against burden-sharing principles.** The regime established
1608 by the 2015 Paris agreement to regulate climate change respects none of the burden-
1609 sharing principles and relies instead on voluntary contributions from each country, known
1610 as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). A body of literature (reviewed by¹²⁹)
1611 assesses the NDCs against the emissions reduction objective and different burden-sharing
1612 principles. To evaluate the NDCs, Gao et al.¹³⁰ examine their emissions projections for

⁸The baseline trajectory is computed as the “product of the projected GDP and CO₂ emission intensity”.

¹⁶¹³ 2030 and estimate the resulting increase in temperature. The most recent and comprehensive assessment of NDCs against burden-sharing principles is conducted by van den Berg et al.¹³¹ (see also ^{132;133;119}).

¹⁶¹⁶ **A.2.3 Global redistribution**

¹⁶¹⁷ Addressing global poverty, inequalities, and climate change are central to the universally agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). As highlighted by Bolch et al.¹³⁴,
¹⁶¹⁸ low-income countries often lack sufficient domestic resources to eradicate poverty in the
¹⁶¹⁹ short term, indicating the need for international transfers to rapidly end global poverty.
¹⁶²⁰ In *Beyond the Welfare State*, Gunnar Myrdal¹³⁵ called for a *welfare world*. In his Nobel
¹⁶²¹ lecture, he emphasized the necessity of increasing foreign aid to low-income countries,
¹⁶²² stating that “The type of marginal foreign aid we have provided, is clearly not enough to
¹⁶²³ meet their barest needs”¹³⁶.

¹⁶²⁵ Drawing on the labor theory of value, some economists have argued that global inequalities arise from unequal exchange in international trade¹³⁷. Indeed, the stark disparity in wages between countries implies that one unit of labor exported by an American commands five units of labor embodied in imported goods, whereas Ethiopians need to export 50 units of labor to obtain one unit through imports^{138;139}. Taking stock, Hickel⁴⁸
¹⁶²⁶ proposes to globally establish minimum wages at 50% of the local median wage. Hickel⁴⁸
¹⁶²⁷ also suggests other solutions against global inequality, which served as inspiration for our
¹⁶²⁸ questionnaire. These measures include the cancellation of low-income countries’ public
¹⁶²⁹ debt, fair trade practices (such as eliminating tariffs from high-income countries, reducing
¹⁶³⁰ patent protections, and reducing farming subsidies in rich countries), initiatives to
¹⁶³¹ combat tax evasion (e.g., implementing a global financial register), land reform, and a fair
¹⁶³² international climate policy.

¹⁶³⁷ Piketty¹⁴⁰ prominently advocates for a progressive wealth tax on a global scale, although he does not specify whether the resulting revenues should fund international transfers.

¹⁶⁴⁰ Kopczuk et al.¹⁴¹ compute the optimal linear income tax rates for all countries in two ways: globally centralized and decentralized (i.e., within each country and without international transfers). They show that the average decentralized rate is 41%. In contrast, the global rate is 62%, which would generate funds to finance a basic income of 250\$/month (higher than the GPD per capita of 73 countries). From a current global Gini index of 0.695, they show that decentralized optimal taxation would only marginally reduce global

¹⁶⁴⁶ inequality to 0.69, whereas global taxation would significantly decrease the Gini to 0.25.
¹⁶⁴⁷ The study also shows that the existing level of foreign aid can only be rationalized if the
¹⁶⁴⁸ U.S. attaches 2,000 less value to a citizen in the poorest countries than to an American
¹⁶⁴⁹ citizen (or 1,000 less if half of the transfers are diverted due to corruption).

¹⁶⁵⁰ A.2.4 Basic income

¹⁶⁵¹ Unconditional cash transfers (UCT) are increasingly seen as an effective way to end
¹⁶⁵² extreme poverty. A growing body of evidence from randomized control trials supports
¹⁶⁵³ this notion: Gangopadhyay et al. ¹⁴² find that UCT outperform a food subsidy; Haushofer
¹⁶⁵⁴ and Shapiro ¹⁴³ find significant impacts on health, economic outcomes, and psychologi-
¹⁶⁵⁵ cal well-being; Egger et al. ¹⁴⁴ find large positive spillovers on non-recipient people, and
¹⁶⁵⁶ minimal inflation. Reviews of existing research further confirm the positive outcomes of
¹⁶⁵⁷ UCT ^{145;146}.

¹⁶⁵⁸ While the delivery of cash to remote areas and the prevention of fraud is challenging in
¹⁶⁵⁹ regions without a proper civil register, the use of mobile phones as banking and biometric
¹⁶⁶⁰ identification tools could provide viable solutions ¹⁴⁷. Although many places still lack
¹⁶⁶¹ internet access, satellite internet technology shows promising progress, with some experts
¹⁶⁶² suggesting that it could soon become affordable and universally accessible ¹⁴⁸.

¹⁶⁶³ A.2.5 Global democracy

¹⁶⁶⁴ The idea of world federalism has a long-standing history, dating back at least to Kant ¹⁴⁹,
¹⁶⁶⁵ who argued that a world federation was essential for achieving perpetual peace. Inter-
¹⁶⁶⁶ national organizations were eventually created to foster peace, though the League of Na-
¹⁶⁶⁷ tions and its successor, the United Nations, never succeeded in avoiding military conflicts.
¹⁶⁶⁸ Many have argued that we need stronger and more democratic global institutions, com-
¹⁶⁶⁹ petent to address global challenges such as extreme poverty, climate change, wars, pan-
¹⁶⁷⁰ demics, or financial stability. Before World War II, feminist and pacifist Maverick Lloyd
¹⁶⁷¹ and Schwimmer ¹⁵⁰ founded the *Campaign for World Government*, advocating for direct
¹⁶⁷² representation at the global scale. Einstein ¹⁵¹ called for the subordination of the UN Se-
¹⁶⁷³ curity Council to the General Assembly and the direct election of UN delegates. Since
¹⁶⁷⁴ 2007, there has been widespread support for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly
¹⁶⁷⁵ (UNPA) from individuals and institutions in over 150 countries, including 1,800 member
¹⁶⁷⁶ of parliament, heads of state, as well the European Parliament, the Pan-African Parlia-


¹⁶⁷⁷ ment, and the Latin-American Parliament. The UNPA campaign calls for a gradual im-
¹⁶⁷⁸ plementation of a democratic assembly, starting with a consultative assembly composed
¹⁶⁷⁹ of members of national parliaments, allowing for the direct election of its members in
¹⁶⁸⁰ voluntary countries, and progressing towards a world parliament with binding legisla-
¹⁶⁸¹ tive powers once all members are directly elected ¹⁵². Besides the UNPA, various scholars
¹⁶⁸² have put forward different models of global democracy, ranging from deliberative spaces
¹⁶⁸³ to a world federation ¹⁵³. While the most radical proposals may still be on the horizon,
¹⁶⁸⁴ an assembly of random citizens representative of the world population has already been
¹⁶⁸⁵ convened. It has produced a joint statement at the COP26 ¹⁵⁴, and a similar *World Citizens'*
¹⁶⁸⁶ *Assembly* should soon follow.

1687 **B Raw results**

1688 Country-specific raw results are also available as supplementary material files: **US**,
 1689 **EU, FR, DE, ES, UK**.

Figure S11: Absolute support for global climate policies.

Share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* (in percent, $n = 40,680$). The color blue denotes an absolute majority. See Figure 2 for the relative support. (Questions A-I of the global survey.)



*In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

Figure S12: Correct answers to comprehension questions (in percent). (Questions 16-18)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
With NR, typical [country] people win and richest lose	68	73	76	73	73	70
With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win	60	68	62	72	67	67
With GCS+NR, typical [country] people neither win nor lose	54	60	63	59	57	61

Figure S13: Number of correct answers to comprehension questions (mean). (Section 2.3, Questions 16-18)




Figure S14: List experiment: mean number of supported policies. (Section 2.4.1, Question 24)




Figure S15: Conjoint analyses 1 and 2. (Questions 25-27, Back to Section 2.4.3)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)	54	76	80	71	81	74
C+NR+GCS preferred to C+NR	55	74	79	71	78	68
NR+GCS preferred to NR	55	77	79	74	79	77
NR+C preferred to NR	62	84	88	83	84	82
GCS+NR preferred to C+NR	47	52	53	53	49	52
NR+C+GCS preferred to NR	55	77	86	73	83	72

Table S2: Effects on the support for the GCS of a question on its pros and cons (either in open-ended or closed format) and on information about the actual support, in the U.S. (See Section D in the US2 Questionnaire) (Back to Section 2.4.5)

	Support			
	Global Climate Scheme		National Redistribution	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Control group mean	0.557	0.557	0.569	0.569
Treatment: Open-ended field on GCS pros & cons	-0.073** (0.035)	-0.071** (0.031)	-0.035 (0.035)	-0.030 (0.032)
Treatment: Closed questions on GCS pros & cons	-0.109*** (0.034)	-0.096*** (0.031)	-0.065* (0.034)	-0.062** (0.031)
Treatment: Info on actual support for GCS and NR	-0.021 (0.034)	-0.015 (0.031)	0.048 (0.033)	0.056* (0.031)
Includes controls		✓		✓
Observations	2,000	1,995	2,000	1,995
R ²	0.007	0.170	0.007	0.154

Figure S16: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See English translations in Figure S2; Question 29)




Figure S17: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements seen as important for supporting the GCS in a 4-Likert scale (in percent). (Question 32) [\(Back to Section 2.4.5\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
It would succeed in limiting climate change	78	85	85	86	86	83
It would hurt the [Country] economy	81	67	61	67	66	69
It would penalize my household	75	60	55	63	59	63
It would make people change their lifestyle	78	79	83	79	78	77
It would reduce poverty in low-income countries	77	85	88	85	86	81
It might be detrimental to some poor countries	79	72	79	67	78	70
It could foster global cooperation	82	81	81	82	85	80
It could fuel corruption in low-income countries	79	75	82	69	79	72
It could be subject to fraud	80	79	80	74	83	81
It would be technically difficult to put in place	77	71	74	62	79	71
Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences	89	82	89	68	91	88

Figure S18: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements found in the open-ended field on the GCS (manually recoded, in percent).

"When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to your mind?

Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme." (Question 31) (Back to Section 2.4.5)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
environment	26	31	37	26	43	24
unclassifiable	25	24	23	28	25	22
pro	22	23	21	22	33	20
con	22	17	12	18	20	16
cost	17	12	11	14	17	7
poorest humans	11	7	6	9	5	6
tax redistribution	10	7	11	8	4	9
support	8	6	3	5	6	8
oppose	7	3	2	3	1	4
don't know	6	8	10	8	7	10
empty	6	3	0	0	0	13
difficult agreement	5	10	7	12	8	8
difficult implement	3	5	5	6	4	6
misunderstands gcs	3	2	2	1	3	1
misunderstands question	2	2	1	3	3	3

Figure S19: Perceptions of the GCS. Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).

"When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to your mind?

Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme." (Question 31) [\(Back to Section 2.4.5\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
world: international world country global	28	22	23	19	22	23
environment: climat environment animal emission natur	26	21	17	28	21	17
poorest: poor low-income 700 poverty	16	8	8	9	4	10
pro: pro pros pros pro:	16	3	0	1	9	5
con: con con: cons cons:	15	4	0	1	8	6
cost: cost expensive higher price 85 inflation	13	7	5	9	7	6
tax: tax	8	3	4	3	2	2
redistribution: rich redistribu	8	4	5	4	3	5
implementation: implement enforce polic monitor	6	4	5	6	0	5
agreement: agree accept participat	3	4	5	6	2	3

Figure S20: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality (mean). (Question 34) [\(Back to Section 2.5.3\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Donation to own country	35	34	31	38	34	32
Donation to Africa	32	35	33	41	32	33

Table S3: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality. (Question 34)
 (Back to Section 2.5.3)

	Donation to poor people (in %)			
	All	US	US	Eu
Poor is in own country	0.590 (0.799)	2.509** (1.152)	0.046 (1.691)	-1.349 (1.108)
Poor is in own country × Vote: <i>not</i> Biden			3.954* (2.279)	
Mean	34.034	33.658	33.658	34.41
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000	3,000
R ²	0.0001	0.002	0.034	0.0005

Figure S21: Support for a global wealth tax.

"Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-income countries?

Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education." (Question 35)




Figure S22: Support for a national wealth tax.

"Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: affordable housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and schools]?" (Question 36)




Figure S23: Preferred share of global wealth tax revenues that should be pooled to finance low-income countries. (Question 37)




Figure S24: Support for sharing half of global tax revenues with low-income countries, rather than each country retaining all the revenues it collects (in percent). (Question 38)



Figure S25: Perceived foreign aid. “From your best guess, what percentage of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?” (Question 39) (Back to Section 2.5.3)

Actual values: France: 0.8%; Germany: 1.3%; Spain: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%; U.S.: 0.4%.




Figure S26: Preferred foreign aid (without info on actual amount).

“If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?” (Question 40) (Back to Section 2.5.3)




Figure S27: Preferred foreign aid (after info on actual amount).

"Actually, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid.

If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?" (Question 40) [\(Back to Section 2.5.3\)](#)




Figure S28: Actual, perceived and preferred amount of foreign aid, with random info (or not) on actual amount. (Mean in percent of public spending, Questions 39, 40) [\(Back to Section 2.5.3\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Actual foreign aid (in % of public spending)	0.4	1.1	0.8	1.3	0.5	1.7
Belief about foreign aid	4.7	2.9	2.7	2.9	2.8	3.5
Preferred foreign aid (with info)	1.8	2.7	3.4	2.9	2.1	2.5
Preferred foreign aid (no info)	4	3.9	4.7	4.4	3.1	3.4

Figure S29: Preferred foreign aid (after info or after perception). (Questions 39 and 40)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as current	70	75	91	76	77	57
Preferred foreign aid is higher than current	47	59	75	58	63	43
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as perceived	57	74	83	79	77	58
Preferred foreign aid is higher than perceived	37	53	64	59	54	39

Figure S30: Preferences for funding increased foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]

"How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent) (Question 41) (Back to Section 2.5.3)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Lower spending on defense	30	21	16	30	17	22
Lower spending on retirement pensions	5	3	4	2	1	5
Lower spending on healthcare	10	3	4	3	2	4
Lower spending on welfare benefits	14	12	19	11	3	12
Lower spending on education	8	2	2	1	3	5
Lower spending on other programs	19	24	22	37	11	12
Higher taxes on the wealthiest	68	64	55	82	35	85
Higher corporate income tax rate	51	27	21	27	15	53
Higher personal income tax rates	10	7	3	8	2	18
Higher public deficit	4	6	5	9	2	7

Figure S31: Preferences of spending following reduced foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]
 "How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent)
 (Question 42) [\(Back to Section 2.5.3\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Higher spending on defense	19	23	11	21	17	31
Higher spending on retirement pensions	23	41	22	51	57	35
Higher spending on healthcare	40	57	31	42	80	70
Higher spending on welfare benefits	13	20	7	19	39	20
Higher spending on education	30	45	31	47	58	43
Higher spending on other programs	6	6	6	4	9	8
Lower taxes on the wealthiest	5	2	5	2	0	2
Lower corporate income tax rate	12	6	10	4	8	6
Lower personal income tax rates	48	29	26	27	37	30
Lower public deficit	32	24	21	13	41	21

Figure S32: Willingness to sign real-stake petition for the Global Climate Scheme or National Redistribution, compared to stated support in corresponding subsamples (e.g. support for the GCS in the branch where the petition was about the GCS). (Question 43)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Petition for the GCS	51	69	69	66	78	69
(Comparable) support for the GCS	53	76	81	74	81	74
Petition for NR	57	67	65	66	74	68
(Comparable) support for NR	58	72	76	65	78	75

Figure S33: Absolute support for various global policies (Percent of (*somewhat or strong*) support). (Questions 44 and 45. See Figure 3 for the relative support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	41	54	52	53	62	51
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	53	65	62	66	68	62
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	45	58	55	60	62	54
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	31	37	36	30	45	40
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	34	44	44	43	52	43
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	39	49	39	51	50	54
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	42	55	54	54	61	53
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	44	70	73	70	72	65
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	34	45	40	48	44	50
National tax on millionaires funding public services	62	76	70	79	79	77
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	58	71	69	72	78	71

Figure S34: Preferred approach of diplomats at international climate negotiations. In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend [own country] interests or global justice? (Question 49)




Figure S35: Percent of selected issues viewed as important.
 "To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem?" (Question 56)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Income inequality in [Country]	55	59	54	58	71	57
Climate change	59	66	66	63	73	63
Global poverty	50	57	50	58	75	49

Figure S36: Group defended when voting.
 "What group do you defend when you vote?" (Question 57)




Figure S37: Mean prioritization of policies.

Mean number of points allocated policies to express intensity of support (among six policies chosen at random). Blue color means that the policy has been awarded more points than the average policy.

"In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

How do you allocate the points among the following policies?" (Question 58)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	13	21	10	14	35	31
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	23	22	25	21	22	23
econ3	21	15	13	18	17	13
econ4	28	22	27	17	24	20
soc1	10	17	13	17	12	21
soc2	13	9	14	8	10	8
climate1	14	15	11	18	20	12
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	20	18	22	19	15	17
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030	11	9	8	8	9	11
tax1: National redistribution scheme	14	15	16	15	15	15
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	19	19	21	18	17	19
foreign1: Global climate scheme	15	20	20	23	16	17
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	21	20	20	23	19	20
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	15	15	15	17	14	13
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	9	11	13	14	9	8

Figure S38: Positive prioritization of policies.

Percent of people allocating a positive number of points to policies, expressing their support (among six policies chosen at random).

"In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

How do you allocate the points among the following policies?" (Question 58)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	64	78	61	67	96	95
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	83	86	85	84	87	89
econ3	81	69	50	78	80	68
econ4	88	86	91	79	89	85
soc1	57	75	69	74	74	78
soc2	58	58	72	53	64	48
climate1	70	76	65	79	89	75
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	79	83	86	84	78	80
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030	62	58	56	48	60	70
tax1: National redistribution scheme	67	79	79	76	82	79
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	80	79	76	78	83	85
foreign1: Global climate scheme	71	83	84	85	84	78
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	80	81	79	83	82	82
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	71	77	79	74	83	76
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	58	70	79	74	74	57

Figure S39: Charity donation.

"How much did you give to charities in 2022?" (Question 50)




Figure S40: Interest in politics.

"To what extent are you interested in politics?" (Question 51)




Figure S41: Desired involvement of government (from 1 to 5). (Question 52)




Figure S42: Political leaning on economics (from 1: Left to 5: Right). (Question 53)




Figure S43: Voted in last election. (Question 54)




Figure S44: Vote in last election (aggregated). PNR includes people who did not vote or prefer not to answer. (Question 55)




Figure S45: Perception that survey was biased.
“Do you feel that this survey was politically biased?” (Question 61)




Figure S46: Opinion on the fight against extreme poverty.

“According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme poverty in low-income countries?” (Question 62) [\(Back to Section 2.5.3\)](#)

(a) Elements found in the open-ended field on the question
(manually recoded, in percent)



(b) Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).




Figure S47: Main attitudes by vote (“Right” spans from Center-right to Far right).
 (Relative support in percent in Questions 20, 35, 45, 46, 49) (Back to Section 2.5.3)

	Europe Left	Europe PNR/Non-voter	Europe Right	U.S. Left	U.S. PNR/Non-voter	U.S. Right
Support for the GCS	85	72	71	74	53	26
Global tax on millionaires	94	83	76	85	71	40
Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries	61	52	45	55	67	41
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	73	65	52	62	49	23
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	93	79	74	87	70	38
[Country]’s foreign aid should be increased	93	83	72	92	81	48
Universalist	56	48	26	53	49	23

1690 C Questionnaire of the global survey (section on global
1691 policies)

1692 A. At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be
1693 put in place? (Multiple answers are possible) [Figures 2 and S11]
1694 Global; [Federal / European / ...]; [State / National]; Local

1695 B. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “[country] should take mea-
1696 sures to fight climate change.”

1697 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly
1698 agree*

1699 C. How should [country] climate policies depend on what other countries do?

- 1700 • If other countries do more, [country] should do...
1701 • If other countries do less, [country] should do...

1702 *Much less; Less; About the same; More; Much more*

1703 D. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] All countries have signed the
1704 Paris agreement that aims to contain global warming “well below +2 °C’. To limit
1705 global warming to this level, there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we
1706 can emit globally, called the carbon budget. Each country could aim to emit less
1707 than a share of the carbon budget. To respect the global carbon budget, countries
1708 that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less
1709 than their share.

1710 Do you support such a policy? [Figures 2 and S11]

1711 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1712 support*

1713 E. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] Suppose the above policy is in
1714 place. How should the carbon budget be divided among countries? [Figures 2 and
1715 S11]

1716 *The emission share of a country should be proportional to its population, so that each human
1717 has an equal right to emit.; The emission share of a country should be proportional to its
1718 current emissions, so that those who already emit more have more rights to emit.; Countries
1719 that have emitted more over the past decades (from 1990 onwards) should receive a lower*

1720 *emission share, because they have already used some of their fair share.; Countries that will*
1721 *be hurt more by climate change should receive a higher emission share, to compensate them*
1722 *for the damages.*

1723 F. [In the U.S., Denmark, and France only] To achieve a given reduction of greenhouse
1724 gas emissions globally, costly investments are needed. Ideally, how should countries
1725 bear the costs of fighting climate change?

- 1726 • Countries should pay in proportion to their income
- 1727 • Countries should pay in proportion to their current emissions [Used as a sub-
1728 stitute to the equal right per capita in Figure 2]
- 1729 • Countries should pay in proportion to their past emissions (from 1990 on-
1730 wards) [Used as a substitute to historical responsibilities in Figure 2]
- 1731 • The richest countries should pay it all, so that the poorest countries do not have
1732 to pay anything
- 1733 • The richest countries should pay even more, to help vulnerable countries face
1734 adverse consequences: vulnerable countries would then receive money instead
1735 of paying [Used as a substitute to compensating vulnerable countries in Figures
1736 2 and S11]

1737 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly*
1738 *agree*

1739 G. Do you support or oppose establishing a global democratic assembly whose role
1740 would be to draft international treaties against climate change? Each adult across
1741 the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly. [Figures 2 and S11]
1742 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1743 *support*

1744 H. Imagine the following policy: a global tax on greenhouse gas emissions funding a
1745 global basic income. Such a policy would progressively raise the price of fossil fuels
1746 (for example, the price of gasoline would increase by [40 cents per gallon] in the
1747 first years). Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil
1748 fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Revenues from the tax would be used to
1749 finance a basic income of [\$30] per month to each human adult, thereby lifting the
1750 700 million people who earn less than \$2/day out of extreme poverty. The average

1751 [American] person would lose a bit from this policy as they would face [\$130] per
1752 month in price increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive.

1753 Do you support or oppose such a policy? [Figures 2 and S11]

1754 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1755 *support*


- 1756 I. Do you support or oppose a tax on all millionaires around the world to finance low-
1757 income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate ac-
1758 tion? This would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drink-
1759 ing water, healthcare, and education. [Figures 2 and S11]
1760 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1761 *support*

1762 D Questionnaire of the complementary surveys

1763 Below, we provide the generic questionnaire (based on the U.S. version), which roughly
1764 corresponds to the *Eu* questionnaire as well as the combination of the *US1* and *US2* ques-
1765 tionnaire. The main difference between Europe and the U.S. is that we split the *US2*
1766 sample into four random branches to include some treatments before the Section D on
1767 the GCS. Besides the control group, the treatments are: information regarding the sup-
1768 port of Americans for the GCS and NR, an open-ended field, and a closed question on the
1769 pros and cons of the GCS. The pros and cons of the GCS are also asked in *Eu* (likewise,
1770 either as an open-ended field or a question), but only in Section D, after the support.

1771 At each section or question, square brackets specify in which questionnaires it is present
1772 (*US1*, *US2* and/or *Eu*) as well as country specificities. Figure S48 displays the structure of
1773 each questionnaire. Each treatment randomization is independent. Qualtrics and Word
1774 versions of the questionnaires in each language are available on our [public repository](#),
1775 together with a spreadsheet that summarizes country specificities and our sources.

Figure S48: Main surveys' structure. Cf. Figure 1 for a simplified version.



1776 [Eu, US1, US2] Socio-demographic characteristics

1777 1. Welcome to this survey!

1778
1779 This survey is **anonymous** and is conducted for research purposes on a representa-
1780 tive sample of [1,000 British people].

1781
1782 It takes [US1, US2: 10 to 15 min; Eu: around 20 min] to complete.

1783
1784 The survey contains lotteries and awards for those who get the correct answer to
1785 some understanding questions.

1786 If you are attentive and lucky, you can win up to [US1, Eu: \$350; US2: \$150] in
1787 points. (See terms and conditions).

1788 Please answer every question carefully.

1789
1790 Do you agree to participate in the survey?

1791 Yes; No

1792 2. What is your gender?

1793 Woman; Man; Other

1794 3. How old are you?

1795 Below 18; 18 to 20; 21 to 24; 25 to 29; 30 to 34; 35 to 39; 40 to 44; 45 to 49; 50 to 54; 55 to
1796 59; 60 to 64; 65 to 69; 70 to 74; 75 to 79; 80 to 84; 85 to 89; 90 to 99; 100 or above

1797 4. [Eu] In which country do you live?

1798 France; Germany; Spain; United Kingdom; Other

1799 5. What is your ZIP code? [UK: What is your Outcode (the left part of your postcode,
1800 e.g. if your postcode is N7 8H7, just enter N7)?]

1801 6. Do you live with your partner (if you have one)?

1802 Yes; No

1803 7. How many people are in your household? The household includes: you, the mem-
1804 bers of your family who live with you, and your dependants.

1805 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more

1806 8. [Eu] How many children below 14 live with you?

1807 1; 2; 3; 4 or more

1808 9. [US1, US2] What race or ethnicity do you identify with? (Multiple answers are
1809 possible)

1810 White; Black or African American; Hispanic; Asian; American Indian or Alaskan Native;
1811 Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; Other: {open field}; Prefer not to say

1812 10. What is the [US1, US2: annual; Eu: monthly] gross income of your household (before
1813 withholding tax)? This includes all income: wages, self-employment earnings, So-
1814 cial Security benefits, pensions, investment income, welfare payments, and income
1815 from other sources.

1816 [US1, US2: Items based on household total income deciles and quartiles, namely:
1817 Less than \$20,000; between \$20,001 and \$35,000; between \$35,001 and \$42,000; between
1818 \$42,001 and \$50,000; between \$50,001 and \$65,000; between \$65,001 and \$82,000; between
1819 \$82,001 and \$103,000; between \$103,001 and \$130,000; between \$130,001 and \$145,000;
1820 between \$145,001 and \$165,000; between \$165,001 and \$250,000; More than \$250,000; I
1821 prefer not to answer;

1822 Eu: custom thresholds, taking into account household composition Questions 6-8,
1823 and corresponding to the country's deciles and quartiles of standard of living, cf.
1824 the sheet "Income" in [this spreadsheet](#)]

1825 11. What is the highest level of education you have completed?

1826 [Below upper secondary, Upper secondary, and Post secondary are coded as the first two,
1827 middle three, and last three items, respectively.

1828 US1, US2: Primary school or less; Eighth grade; Some high school; Regular high school
1829 diploma/GED or alternative credential; Some college, no degree; 2-year college degree or as-
1830 sociates degree (for example: AA, AS); Bachelor's degree (for example: BA, BS); Master's
1831 degree or above (MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA, MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD, PhD);
1832 FR: École primaire / Aucun; Brevet; CAP ou BEP; Baccalauréat professionnel ou tech-
1833 nologique; Baccalauréat général; Bac +2 (BTS, DUT, DEUG...); Bac +3 (licence...); Bac
1834 +5 ou plus (master, école d'ingénieur ou de commerce, doctorat, médecine, maîtrise, DEA,
1835 DESS...)

1836 DE: Keine abgeschlossene Schulbildung / Grundschule; Untere Sekundarstufe (z.B. Haupt-
1837 oder Realschulabschluss); Erstausbildung; Beruflicher Abschluss / Ausbildung; Abitur;
1838 Zweitausbildung; Bachelor oder Fachhochschulabschluss; Master-Abschluss oder höher

1839 ES: *Educación primaria / No he completado la enseñanza básica; Educación secundaria obligatoria (ESO); Formación profesional básica (FP); Formación profesional de grado medio; Bachillerato; Formación profesional de grado superior; Grado universitario; Máster/doctorado*
1840 UK: *Primary education or less; Some secondary school; GSCE; Vocational Upper secondary (Level 3 award, level 3 certificate, level 3 diploma, advanced apprenticeship, etc.); High school degree (A level); Higher vocational education (Level 4+ award, level 4+ certificate, level 4+ diploma, higher apprenticeship, etc.); Bachelor's Degree (BA, BSc, BEng, etc.); Postgraduate diploma or certificate, Master's Degree (MSc, MA, MBA, etc.) or Ph.D.]*

1847 12. What is your employment status?

1848 *Full-time employed; Part-time employed; Self-employed; Student; Retired; Unemployed*
1849 *(searching for a job); Inactive (not searching for a job)*

1850 13. Are you a homeowner or a tenant? (Multiple answers are possible)

1851 *Tenant; Owner; Landlord renting out property; Hosted free of charge*

1852 14. [If lives with partner: What is the estimated value of your household's assets (in
1853 U.S. dollars)?

1854 If does not live with partner: What is the estimated value of your assets (in U.S.
1855 dollars)?]

1856 Include here all your possessions (home, car, savings, etc.) net of debt. For example,
1857 if you own a house worth [\$]300,000 and you have [\$]100,000 left to repay on your
1858 mortgage, your assets are [\$]200,000.

1860 I estimate my [If lives with partner: household's] assets net of debt to be:

1861
1862 [Items based on the following individual wealth quintiles, doubled if lives with
1863 partner. US1, US2: *Less than \$0 (I have a net debt); Close to \$0; Between \$4,000 and*
1864 *\$60,000; Between \$60,000 and \$190,000; More than \$190,000;* For Eu, the thresholds are:
1865 FR: €5/50/150/300k; DE: €0/35/130/280k; ES: €0/50/100/200k; UK: £3/45/115/270k]

1866 15. [US1, US2 (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the vote question)] What
1867 do you consider to be your political affiliation, as of today?

1868 *Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other; Non-Affiliated*

1869 [Eu, US1, US2] Global climate scheme

1870 In the following, we describe two policies, on which we will survey your opinion.
1871 To check that you have attentively read the descriptions, **we will ask some understanding questions afterwards: those who get correct answers can win up to \$150.**

1873 **Global climate scheme:** At the Paris agreement in 2015, all countries have agreed
1874 to contain global warming “well below +2 °C”. To limit global warming to this
1875 level, **there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally.**

1876 To meet the climate target, a limited number of permits to emit greenhouse gases
1877 can be created globally. Polluting firms would be required to buy permits to cover
1878 their emissions. Such a policy would **make fossil fuel companies pay** for their
1879 emissions and progressively raise the price of fossil fuels. **Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil fuels, reducing greenhouse gas**
1880 **emissions.**

1882 In accordance with the principle that each human has an equal right to pollute, the
1883 revenues generated by the sale of permits could finance a global basic income. **Each**
1884 **adult in the world would receive [US1, US2: \$30/month; UK: \$30 (that is £25) per**
1885 **month; FR, DE, ES: €30/month], thereby lifting out of extreme poverty the 700 mil-**
1886 **lion people who earn less than \$2/day.**

1887 **The typical [American] would lose out financially [US1, US2: \$85, FR: €10, DE:**
1888 **€25, ES: €5, UK: £20] per month** (as he or she would face [\$115] per month in price
1889 increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive).

1890 The policy could be put in place as soon as countries totaling more than 60% of
1891 global emissions agree on it. Countries that would refuse to take part in the policy
1892 could face sanctions (like tariffs) from the rest of the World and would be excluded
1893 from the basic income.

(Back to Section 2.2)

1894 16. Who would win or lose financially in the Global climate scheme? [Figure S12]

1895
1896 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1897 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

1898 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.;*

1899 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

1900 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would lose and*

1902 *the 700 million poorest humans would win* from the Global climate scheme. Now, here
1903 is the second policy:

1904

1905 **National redistribution scheme:**

1906 This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [US1, US2: 5%; Eu: 1%] and provide
1907 cash transfers to all adults. More precisely, **each [American] adult would receive**
1908 **[\$85] per month** (that is [\$1,000] per year). This would be financed by an increase
1909 of the federal income tax on household income in excess of [US1, US2: \$315,000 per
1910 year; FR: €15,000 per month; DE: €20,000 per month; ES: €10,000 per month; UK:
1911 £15,000 per month], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000]. [US1,
1912 US2: See more details.] ⁹

1913 17. Who would win or lose financially in the National redistribution? [Figure S12]

1914

1915 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1916 Typical [Americans] would win and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Ameri-
1917 cans] would win and the richest [Americans] would lose.; Typical [Americans] would lose
1918 and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Americans] would lose and the richest
1919 [Americans] would lose.

1920 [new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would win and*
1921 *the richest [Americans] would lose* from the National redistribution scheme.

1922

1923 To help you with the next question, here is a reminder of the policies:

1924

1925 **Global Climate scheme:**

1926 To limit global warming and reach the international climate objective, the Global
1927 climate scheme would **impose a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can
1928 emit globally.**

⁹8% of U.S. respondents click. They then see the following text, based on [taxjusticenow.org](#) by Saez and Zucman ¹⁵⁵: *The marginal income tax rates would evolve as follows:*

Below \$315,000: unchanged

\$315,000 - \$400,000: current rate 32% => new rate 41%

\$400,000 - \$600,000: 35% => 50%

\$600,000 - \$2.5 million: 37% => 60%

\$2.5 - \$5 million: 37% => 65%

Above \$5 million: 37% => 70%

1929 It would **make polluters pay** for their emissions, which in turn would increase fossil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities.
1930

1931 The revenues would finance a **global basic income** of [\$30] per month for all humans, lifting out of extreme poverty the poorest billion people.
1932

1933 Considering the basic income and the fuel price increases, **the typical [American]**
1934 **would lose out financially** [\$85] per month.
1935

1936 **National redistribution scheme:**

1937 This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [5%] and provide cash transfers to
1938 all adults. More precisely, **each [American] would receive** [\$85] per month. This
1939 would be financed by an increase of the federal income tax on household income in
1940 excess of [\$315,000 per year], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000
1941 per year].

- 1942 18. If both the Global climate scheme and the National redistribution scheme are implemented,
1943 how would a typical [American] be financially affected? [Figure S12]

1944 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1945 *A typical [American] would lose out financially.; A typical [American] would neither gain
1946 nor lose.; A typical [American] would gain financially.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was that *A typical [American] would neither gain nor lose* from both schemes combined. [US1, Eu: Now, here are the last two policies:]
1948
1949

1950
1951 **[US1: Coal exit:**

1952 To reduce CO₂ emissions, this policy would require all U.S. coal power plants to be
1953 phased out by 2030. Coal would be replaced by renewable sources like wind and
1954 solar panels as well as stronger reliance on gas power plants.

1955 **Eu: Thermal insulation plan:**

1956 To reduce CO₂ emissions and energy insecurity, this policy would require that all
1957 buildings meet energy efficiency targets: at least rating E in 2030 and rating C in
1958 2040. The [UK] government would subsidise half the cost of insulation for all households,
1959 and up to 90% for the poorest households. Insulation work would cost [FR,
1960 DE: €25; ES: €20; UK: £25] billion a year, but would deliver energy savings greater
1961 than this cost.]

1962

1963 [US1: **Marriage only for opposite-sex couples:**

1964

This policy is a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would legally define marriage as a union of one man and one woman.

1965

1966 [Eu: **Death penalty for major crimes:**

1967

This measure would reintroduce capital punishment for major crimes such as terrorism and mass shootings.]

1969

1970 Now, we will ask your opinion on the [US1, Eu: four] policies.

1971

1972 [Click here for the reminder of the \[US1, Eu: first\] two policies.](#) [Clicking displays the previous summarized descriptions.]

1973

- 1974 19. [US2] [4 Random branches: control (*nothing*); Question 31 (*field*); Question 32 (*important*); or the following question (*info*).] For information, a recent survey has shown that:

1976

- 64% of Americans support the Global climate scheme.
- 72% of Americans support the National redistribution scheme.

1978

20. Do you support the Global climate scheme? [Figure S1]

1979

Yes; No

1980

- 1981 21. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the previous question? [Figure S4]

1982

The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

1983

Percentage of [Americans] in favor of Global climate scheme [slider from 0 to 100]

1984

22. Do you support the National redistribution scheme? [Figure S1]

1985

Yes; No

1986

- 1987 23. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the previous question? [Figure S4]

1988

The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

1989

Percentage of [Americans] in favor of National redistribution [slider from 0 to 100]

1990

- 1991 24. [Eu, US1] Beware, this question is quite unusual. Among the policies below, **how many** do you support? [Figure S14, Table 1]

- 1992 [Four random branches. Branch GCS/NR/C/O]
- 1993
- 1994
 - Global climate scheme
- 1995
 - National redistribution scheme
- 1996
 - [Coal exit]
- 1997
 - [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]
- 1998 0; 1; 2; 3; 4
- 1999
- 2000 [Branch GCS/C/O]
- 2001
- 2002
 - Global climate scheme
- 2003
 - [Coal exit]
- 2004
 - [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]
- 2005 0; 1; 2; 3
- 2006
- 2007 [Branch NR/C/O]
- 2008
- 2009
 - National redistribution scheme
- 2010
 - [Coal exit]
- 2011
 - [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]
- 2012 0; 1; 2; 3
- 2013 [Branch C/O]
- 2014
- 2015
 - [Coal exit]
- 2016
 - [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]
- 2017 0; 1; 2
- 2018

2019 [Eu, US1] Conjoint analyses

- 2020 25. Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you prefer? [Figure
2021 S15]

2022 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the
2023 same time.

	Bundle A	Bundle B
	[Coal exit] National redistribution scheme Global climate scheme	[Coal exit] National redistribution scheme

2026 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 2027 26. Do you support Bundle A (combining [Coal exit], the National redistribution scheme,
2028 and the Global climate scheme)?[Figure S1]

2029 Yes; No

- 2030 27. [new page] Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you
2031 prefer? [Figure S15]

2032 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the
2033 same time.

2034 [Four random branches. Branch C + NR vs. GCS + NR]

	Bundle A	Bundle B
	[Coal exit] National redistribution scheme	Global climate scheme National redistribution scheme

2037 [Branch NR vs. NR + C + GCS]

	Bundle A	Bundle B
	National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme [Coal exit] Global climate scheme

2040 [Branch NR + GCS vs. NR]

	Bundle A	Bundle B
2041	National redistribution scheme Global climate scheme	National redistribution scheme
2042		

2043 [Branch NR + C vs. NR]

	Bundle A	Bundle B
2044	National redistribution scheme [Coal exit]	National redistribution scheme
2045		

2046 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 2047 28. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and
2048 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies
2049 in their platforms.

2050 *Eu: Imagine if [DE, ES, UK: the two favorite candidates in your constituency in the
2051 next general election; FR: the two candidates in the second round of the next pres-
2052 idential election] campaigned with the following policies in their party's platforms.]*

2053 2054 Which of these candidates would you vote for? [Table 2, Figure S15]

2055 [Table 2. Two random branches: with and without the final row. The US1 version of the poli-
2056 cies is given below, see the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the European versions.]

	Democrat	Republican
2057	Increase corporate income tax rate from 21% to 28% Coal exit Trillion dollar investment in childcare, healthcare, education and housing \$15 minimum wage National redistribution scheme [Global climate scheme / no row]	Decrease the payroll tax Permit completion of the Keystone pipeline Withdrawal of the Paris agreement Marriage only for opposite-sex couples Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation [/ no row]

2058

2059 [US1: Democrat; Republican; None of them; Eu: Candidate A; Candidate B; None of them]

- 2060 29. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and
2061 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies
2062 in their platforms.

2063 *Eu (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the Section "Values and politics"):* Imag-
2064 ine that [FR: the left or center-left; DE: a red-red-green coalition; ES: the PSOE; UK:
2065 the Labour Party] wins the next [general] elections. Here are two possible platforms
2066 on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a
2067 pool of credible [FR: left or center-left, DE: left-wing parties'; ES: PSOE; UK: Labour]
2068 policies).]

2069

2070 [US1: Which of these candidates do you prefer?

2071 *Eu: Even if you [FR: are not from the left or center-left; DE: do not support the left-
2072 wing parties; ES: do not support the PSOE; UK: do not support the Labour Party],
2073 which of these platforms do you prefer?]*

2074 [Figures S2, S16; see also the sheet "Policies" in *this spreadsheet* for the possible policies.]

	[Candidate A]	[Candidate B]	
2075	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]

2076 [US1: Candidate A; Candidate B; Eu: Platform A; Platform B]

- 2077 30. [new page] [Same wording and conditions as above. For brevity, only the UK version is
2078 given here.] Imagine that the Labour Party wins the next general elections. Here are
2079 two possible platforms on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are
2080 randomly drawn from a pool of credible Labour policies).

2081

2082 Even if you do not support the Labour Party, which of these platforms do you pre-
2083 fer? [Figure S2]

		Platform A	Platform B
2084	[Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order] [Policy field in random order]	[Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy]	[Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy] [Random policy]
	Foreign policy	Global climate scheme	-
2085	<i>Platform A; Platform B</i>		

2086 **[Eu, US2] Perceptions of the GCS**

2087 [Eu: two random branches. US2: four random branches and the question is asked (if asked)
2088 before Question 20]

2089 31. [Branch: field] When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to
2090 your mind?

2091 Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme. [Figures S18, S19]
2092 {Open field}

2093 32. [Branch: important] When determining your support or opposition to the Global
2094 climate scheme, which points are important to you? [Figure S17]

- 2095 • It would succeed in limiting climate change.
2096 • It would hurt the [U.S.] economy.
2097 • It would penalize my household.
2098 • It would make people change their lifestyle.
2099 • It would reduce poverty in low-income countries.
2100 • It might be detrimental to some poor countries.
2101 • It could foster global cooperation.
2102 • It could fuel corruption in low-income countries.
2103 • It could be subject to fraud.
2104 • It would be technically difficult to put in place.
2105 • Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences.

2106 *Not at all important; Not so important; Quite important; Very important*

2107 [Eu, US1] Donation lottery

2108 33. Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).

2109 *Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*

2110 34. [Two random branches] By taking this survey, you are automatically entered into a
2111 lottery to win [\$]100 in panel points. This lottery is unrelated to the previous ones
2112 that rewarded answers’ accuracy. In a few days you will know whether you have
2113 been selected in the lottery. The payment will be made to you in the same way as
2114 your compensation for this survey, so no further action is required on your part.

2115

2116 Should you be selected in the lottery, you can also donate a part of this additional
2117 compensation to [[American] / African] people living in poverty through [US1: the
2118 charity GiveDirectly. The charity GiveDirectly; Eu: a charity. We would channel this
2119 donation to a charity that] provides small amounts of cash to people in need in [[the
2120 U.S] / Africa].

2121

2122 **In case you are winner of the lottery, what share of the [\$]100 would you donate**
2123 **to [[American] / African] people living in poverty [US1: through GiveDirectly]?**
2124 *[Figure S20, Table S3]*

2125 *Amount donated to [[American] / African] people in need (in [\$]) [slider from 0 to 100]*

2126 [Eu, US2] Wealth tax

2127 [Four random branches: Question 35 then Question 36 (global first); Question 36 then Ques-
2128 tion 35 (national first); Question 37 (global share); Question 38 (sharing)]

2129 35. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-
2130 income countries?

2131 Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking
2132 water, healthcare, and education. *[Figures S1, S21]*

2133 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
2134 *support*

2135 36. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: afford-
2136 able housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and
2137 schools]? *[Figures S1, S22]*

2138 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
2139 *support*

2140 37. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all
2141 countries around the world. In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount
2142 to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE: €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2:
2143 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount
2144 to [\$]1 billion in all low-income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700
2145 million people, most of them in Africa).

2146 Each country would retain part of the revenues it collects, and the remaining part
2147 would be pooled at the global level to finance infrastructure and public services in
2148 low-income countries.

2149
2150 What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of re-
2151 tained in the country's national budget)? [Figures S5, S23]

2152 *Percent of global wealth tax that should go to low-income countries* [slider from 0 to 100]

2153 38. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in
2154 all countries around the world.

2155 In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE:
2156 €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2: 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES:
2157 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount to [\$]1 billion in all low-
2158 income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700 million people, most of
2159 them in Africa).

2160 Which of the following options would you prefer? [Figure S24]

- 2161 • The whole wealth tax financing national budgets in each country. For ex-
2162 ample, in [US2: the U.S., it could finance affordable housing and universal
2163 childcare/pre-K.; Eu-UK: the UK, it could finance the National Health Service
2164 and state-funded schools].
- 2165 • Half of the wealth tax financing national budgets in each country, half of it
2166 financing low-income countries. For example, it could finance [US2: universal
2167 childcare/pre-K in the U.S.; Eu-UK: state-funded schools in the UK] and access
2168 to drinking water, healthcare, and education in Africa.

2169 [Eu, US2] Foreign aid

2170 US2 Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).

2171 *Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*

- 2172 39. From your best guess, what percentage of [U.S.] government spending is allocated
2173 to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?

2174

2175 For your information, government spending totals [US2: 38%; FR: 55%; DE: 45%; ES:
2176 42%; UK: 41%] of [U.S.] GDP, it includes [US2: federal, State; Eu: national] and local
2177 government spending, and apart from foreign aid, it covers the following items: de-
2178 fense, social security (retirement pensions), health [US2: (including Medicare and
2179 Medicaid)], welfare benefits [US2: (including food stamps and EITC)], education,
2180 roads, justice, other programs [US2: and federal agencies (including in energy, sci-
2181 ence...)]. [Figure S25]

2182 *Less than 0.1%; 0.1% to 0.2%; 0.3% to 0.5%; 0.6% to 1.0%; 1.1% to 1.7%; 1.8% to 2.6%;
2183 2.7% to 4%; 4.1% to 6%; 6.1% to 9%; 9.1% to 13%; 13.1% to 25%; More than 25%*

- 2184 40. [Two random branches: with or without information on actual amount] [Info: Actually,
2185 [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [the U.S.] government spend-
2186 ing is allocated to foreign aid.]

2187

2188 If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate
2189 to foreign aid? [Figures S28, S29, S26 and S27]

- 2190 41. [Asked iff branch: Info and preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than actual for-
2191 eign aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to increase [U.S.] foreign
2192 aid.

2193

2194 How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers
2195 possible) [Figure S30]

2196 *Lower spending on defense; Lower spending on retirement pensions; Lower spending on
2197 healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Lower spending on welfare benefits [US2: (like
2198 EITC or food stamps)]; Lower spending on education; Lower spending on other programs
2199 [US2: and federal agencies]; Higher taxes on the wealthiest; Higher corporate income tax
2200 rate; Higher personal income tax rates; Higher public deficit*

2201 42. [Asked iff branch: *Info* and preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than actual foreign
2202 aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to reduce [U.S.] foreign aid.

2203

2204 How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible) [*Figure S31*]
2205

2206 *Higher spending on defense; Higher spending on retirement pensions; Higher spending on
2207 healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Higher spending on welfare benefits [US2:
2208 like EITC or food stamps)]; Higher spending on education; lower spending on other pro-
2209 grams [US2: and federal agencies]; Lower taxes on the wealthiest; Lower corporate income
2210 tax rate; Lower personal income tax rates; Lower public deficit*

2211 **[Eu, US1] Petition**

2212 43. [*Two random branches*] Would you be willing to sign a petition for the [Global cli-
2213 mate / National redistribution] scheme? [*Figure S32*]

2214

2215 As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President's
2216 office], informing him what share of American people are willing to endorse the
2217 [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign,
2218 only your answer here is required and remains anonymous.) Yes; No

2219 **[Eu, US1] Other policies**

2220 44. The following policies are discussed at international negotiations on how to deal
2221 with climate change. [*Figures 3 and S33*]

2222

2223 Do you support or oppose the following policies?

- 2224
- 2225 • Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for
2226 climate damages
 - 2227 • High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries
 - 2228 • High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income
2229 countries adapt to climate change

2229 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
2230 support*

2231 45. Do you support or oppose the following global policies? [Figures 3 and S33]

- 2232 • Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt
- 2233 • Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting
right proportional to its population
- 2234 • Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries
- 2235 • A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage
- 2236 • Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of
all assets
- 2237 • A maximum wealth limit of [US1: \$10 billion; Eu: [€]100 million] for each
2238 human

2241 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
2242 support*

2243 46. Currently, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [U.S.] government
2244 spending (that is, [US1: 0.2%; FR: 0.4%; DE: 0.6%; ES: 0.2%; UK: 0.7%] of [U.S.] GDP)
2245 is spent on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries. [Figure S4]

2246 Do you support [the U.S.] transferring more money to low-income countries?

2247 *Yes, [U.S.] foreign aid should be increased.; Yes, but only if some conditions are met.; No,
2248 [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.; No, [U.S.] foreign aid should be reduced.*

2249 47. [Asked only if *Yes, but only if some conditions are met.* is chosen] What conditions
2250 should be required for [the U.S.] to increase its foreign aid? (Multiple answers pos-
2251 sible) [Figures S5, S28]

2252 *That recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights.; That recipient
2253 countries cooperate to fight illegal migrations.; That other high-income countries also in-
2254 crease their foreign aid.; That this is financed by increased taxes on millionaires.; That we
2255 can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted.; Other: [open field]*

2256 48. [Asked only if *No, [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.* or *No, [U.S.] foreign aid
2257 should be reduced.* is chosen] Why do you oppose [the U.S.] increasing its foreign
2258 aid? (Multiple answers possible) [Figure S6]

2259 *Aid perpetuates poverty as it makes people feel less responsible for themselves.; Aid is not
2260 effective as most of it is diverted.; Aid is a pressure tactic for high-income countries that*

2262 *prevents low-income countries from developing freely.; [The U.S.] is not responsible for what*
2263 *happens in other countries.; Charity begins at home: there is already a lot to do to support*
2264 *the American people in need.; Other: [open field]*

2265 **[Eu, US1, US2] Values and politics**

- 2266 49. [Eu (where it is instead asked at the beginning of Section “Other Policies”), US1]
2267 In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend
2268 [U.S.] interests or global justice? *[Figure S34]*
2269 *[U.S.] interests, even if it goes against global justice; [U.S.] interests, to the extent it re-*
2270 *spects global justice; Indifferent or don't know; Global justice, to the extent it respects [U.S.]*
2271 *interests; Global justice, even if it goes against [U.S.] interests*
- 2272 50. How much did you give to charities in 2022? *[Figure S39]*
2273 *I did not make donations to charities last year.; Less than [\$]100.; Between [\$]101 and*
2274 *[\$]500.; Between [\$]501 and [\$]1,000.; Between [\$]1,001 and [\$]5,000.; More than [\$]5,000.*
- 2275 51. To what extent are you interested in politics? *[Figure S40]*
2276 *Not at all; A little; Moderately; A lot; A great deal*
- 2277 52. Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means you think the
2278 government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic gov-
2279 ernment functions, and 5 means you think the government should take active steps
2280 in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens? *[Figure S41]*
2281 *Desired involvement of government [slider from 1 to 5]*
- 2282 53. **On economic policy matters**, where do you see yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where
2283 1 is Left (favoring equality and government interventions) and 5 is Right (favoring
2284 free competition and little government intervention)? *[Figure S42]*
2285 *Left (1) to Right (5) on economic issues [slider from 1 to 5]*
- 2286 54. Did you vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election? *[Figure S43]*
2287 *Yes; No: I didn't have the right to vote in the U.S.; Prefer not to say*
- 2288 55. [If voted: Which candidate did you vote for in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election?
2289 If did not vote: Even if you did not vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election,
2290 please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who
2291 represents your views more closely.] *[Figure S44]*

[2292] [US1, US2: Biden; Trump; Jorgensen; Hawkins; Prefer not to say]
[2293] FR: candidates at the 2022 presidential election
[2294] DE: parties with more than 1% of votes at the 2021 federal election and *Other*
[2295] ES: lists with more than 0.9% at the November 2019 general election and *Other*
[2296] UK: parties with more than 0.5% of votes at the 2019 general election and *Other*]

[2297] 56. To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem? [Figure S35]

- [2298] • Income inequality in [the U.S.]
[2299] • Climate change
[2300] • Global poverty

[2301] *Not an important issue for me; An issue but there are other priorities; An issue but we*
[2302] *already do what we can; An important issue, we should do more; One of the most pressing*
[2303] *issue of our time*

[2304] 57. What group do you defend when you vote? [Figure S36]

[2305] *Sentient beings (humans and animals); Humans; [Eu: Europeans]; [Americans]; People*
[2306] *sharing my culture or religion; [US1, US2: My State]; [US1, US2: My town; Eu: My*
[2307] *country, region or town]; My relatives and/or colleagues; My family and myself*

[2308] [Eu, US1] Prioritization

[2309] 58. In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The
[2310] more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

[2311] How do you allocate the points among the following policies? [Figures S37 and S38]

[2312] You can adjust the number of points either using the slider or entering the num-
[2313] ber of your choice on the right-hand-side. **The sum of points must equal exactly**
[2314] **100**. By pushing the last slider to the right, the total will automatically adjust to 100.
[2315] Please read the 6 options before making your choice.

[2316] See the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the pool of policies in each country.

[2317] [sliders from 0 to 100]

2320 [FR, DE, ES] ETS2

2321 59. Similar to the Global Climate Scheme, the European Climate Scheme would impose
2322 a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit across the EU in the buildings
2323 and transport sectors. It would make polluters pay for their emissions, which in turn
2324 would increase fossil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities. Several options
2325 are possible regarding the use of the scheme's revenues:

- 2326 • Provide an equal cash transfer of €105 per year to each European.
- 2327 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European, proportional to their
2328 country's emissions: people in countries with higher emissions per person (like
2329 Germany) would receive more than people in countries with lower emissions
2330 (like Romania). For information, people in [Germany] would receive €[FR:
2331 110; DE: 130; ES: 90]/year.
- 2332 • Finance low-carbon investments: thermal insulation of buildings, switch to
2333 clean sources of heating, public transportation, and charging stations for elec-
2334 tric vehicles.
- 2335 • Provide cash transfers to the most vulnerable half of Europeans and finance
2336 low-carbon investments.

2337 Do you support or oppose the European Climate Scheme in case the revenue is used
2338 to... ?

- 2339 • Provide an equal cash transfer to each European
- 2340 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European
- 2341 • Finance low-carbon investments
- 2342 • Provide cash transfers for the most vulnerable Europeans and low-carbon in-
2343 vestments

2344 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
2345 support*

2346 60. [Asked iff none of the four variants of the European Climate Scheme is (somewhat or
2347 strongly) supported] Why do you not support a European Climate Scheme? (Mul-
2348 tiple answers possible)

2349 *I am opposed to climate policy being decided at the EU level, it should be decided at the na-*
2350 *tional level;*
2351 *I would prefer if the revenues were used in a different way (beyond the four suggestions*
2352 *above) than previously suggested;*
2353 *I would prefer if decreasing carbon emissions were regulated by other climate policies;*
2354 *I am generally opposed to additional, or more ambitious, climate policies;*
2355 *I do not fully understand how the European Climate Scheme is supposed to work;*
2356 *I don't know*

2357 **[Eu, US1, US2] Feedback**

- 2358 61. Do you feel that this survey was politically biased? [Figure S45]
2359 *Yes, left-wing biased; Yes, right-wing biased; No, I do not feel it was biased*
- 2360 62. [US2 Asked only to one random third of the respondents, instead of the feedback Ques-
2361 tion 63] According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme
2362 poverty in low-income countries? [Figure S46]
2363 *{Open field}*
- 2364 63. The survey is nearing completion. You can now enter any comments, thoughts or
2365 suggestions in the field below.
2366 *{Open field}*
- 2367 64. Lastly, are you interested to be interviewed by a researcher (through videoconfer-
2368 encing) for 30 min?
2369
2370 This is totally optional and will not be rewarded.
2371 *Yes; No*

2372 E Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme

2373 To specify the GCS, we use the IEA's 2DS scenario¹⁵⁶, which is consistent with limiting
2374 the global average temperature increase to 2°C with a probability of at least 50%. The
2375 paper by Hood¹⁵⁷ contributing to the Report of the High-Level Commission on Carbon
2376 Prices³⁵ presents a price corridor compatible with this emissions scenario, from which we
2377 take the midpoint. The product of these two series provides an estimate of the revenues
2378 expected from a global carbon price. We then use the UN median scenario of future
2379 population aged over 15 years (*adults*, for short). We derive the basic income that could
2380 be paid to all adults by recycling the revenues from the global carbon price: evolving
2381 between \$20 and \$30 per month, with a peak in 2030. Accounting for the lower price
2382 levels in low-income countries, an additional income of \$30 per month would allow 670
2383 million people to escape extreme poverty, defined with the threshold of \$2.15 per day in
2384 purchasing power parity.¹⁰

2385 To estimate the increase in fossil fuel expenditures (or “cost”) in each country by
2386 2030, we make a key assumption concerning the evolution of the carbon footprints per
2387 adult: that they will decrease by the same proportion in each country. We use data
2388 from the Global Carbon Project¹⁵⁸. In 2030, the average carbon footprint of a country
2389 c , e_c , evolves from baseline year b proportionally to the evolution of its adult population
2390 $\Delta p_c = p_c^{2030} / p_c^b$. Thus, the global share of country c 's carbon footprint, s_c , is propor-
2391 tional to $\sigma_c = e_c \Delta p_c$, and as countries' shares sum to 1, $s_c = \frac{\sigma_c}{\sum_k \sigma_k}$. Multiplying country
2392 c 's emission share with global revenues in 2030, R , and dividing by c 's adult population
2393 in year y , yields its average cost per adult: $R \cdot s_c / p_c^y$. Using findings from Ivanova and
2394 Wood¹⁵⁹ for Europe and Fremstad and Paul¹⁶⁰ for the U.S., we approximate the median
2395 cost as 90% of the average cost. Finally, the net gain is given by the basic income (\$30
2396 per month) minus the cost. We provided consistent estimates of net gains in all surveys
2397 (using $y = b = 2015$), though in the global survey we gave the average net gains vs. the
2398 median ones in the complementary surveys. The latter are shown in Figure S49. For the
2399 record, Table S4 also provides an estimate of *average* net gains (computed with $b = 2019$)

¹⁰The average carbon footprint of Sub-Saharan Africa is 0.75tCO₂ per capita (World Bank), and it is even lower for people living in extreme poverty, under one tenth of the world average of about 5tCO₂ per capita¹¹¹. Under a GCS with a cash transfer of \$30 per person, if one's emission is one tenth of the world average, their net gain would be \$27 per month in nominal terms. In regions with extreme poverty like Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding high-income countries), the conversion factor from Market Exchange Rate to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is 2.4 (computed as the ratio of the World Bank series relating the GDP per capita of Sub-Saharan Africa in PPP and nominal). Therefore, the net gain for the extreme poor is \$65 per month (or \$2.13 a day) in PPP, enough to lift them out of extreme poverty.

2400 and $y = 2030$).¹¹

2401 Estimates of the net gains from the Global Climate Scheme are necessarily imprecise,
2402 given the uncertainties surrounding the carbon price required to achieve emissions
2403 reductions as well as each country's trajectory in terms of emissions and population. These
2404 values are highly dependent on future (non-price) climate policies, technical progress,
2405 and economic growth of each country, which are only partially known. Integrated Assess-
2406 ment Models have been used to derive a Global Energy Assessment¹²⁶, a 100% renewable
2407 scenario¹⁶¹ as well as Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs), which include consistent
2408 trajectories of population, emissions, and carbon price^{162–165}. Instead of using some of
2409 these modelling trajectories, we relied on a simple and transparent formula, for a num-
2410 ber of reasons. First and foremost, those trajectories describe territorial emissions while
2411 we need consumption-based emissions to compute the incidence of the GCS. Second, the
2412 carbon price is relatively low in trajectories of SSPs that contain global warming below
2413 2°C (less than \$35/tCO₂ in 2030), so we conservatively chose a method yielding a higher
2414 carbon price (\$90 in 2030). Third, modelling results are available only for a few macro re-
2415 gions, while we wanted country by country estimates. Finally, we have checked that the
2416 emissions per capita given by our method are broadly in line with alternative methods,
2417 even if it tends to overestimate net gains in countries which will decarbonize less rapidly
2418 than average.¹² For example, although countries' decarbonization plans should realign
2419 with the GCS in place, India might still decarbonize less quickly than the European Union,
2420 so India's gain and the EU's loss might be overestimated in our computations. For a more
2421 sophisticated version of the Global Climate Scheme which includes participation mecha-
2422 nisms preventing middle-income countries (like China) to lose from it and estimations of
2423 the Net Present Value by country, see Fabre¹⁶⁶.

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¹¹2015 was the last year of data available when the global questionnaire was conceived (OECD data was then used – it does not cover all countries but give identical rounded estimates than those recomputed from the Global Carbon Project data for our complementary surveys). 2030 was chosen as the reference year as it is the date at which global carbon price revenues are expected to peak (and the GCS redistributive effects would be largest), and the GCS could not realistically enter into force before that date. In the surveys, we chose $y = b = 2015$ rather than $b = 2019$ and $y = 2030$ to get more conservative estimates of the monthly cost in the U.S. (\$20 higher than the other option) and in Europe (€5 or £10 higher).

¹²Computations with alternative methods can be found on [our public repository](#).

Figure S49: Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme.




Table S4: Estimated net gain from the GCS in 2030 and carbon footprint by country.

	Mean net gain from the GCS (\$/month)	CO ₂ footprint per adult in 2019 (tCO ₂ /y)			
			Mexico	2	5.6
			Ukraine	2	5.6
			Uzbekistan*	4	5.1
			Argentina	5	4.9
			Thailand	6	4.6
			Egypt	12	3.6
			Indonesia	13	3.3
			Colombia	15	3.0
Saudi Arabia	-93	24.0	Brazil	15	2.9
United States	-77	21.0	Vietnam	15	2.9
Australia	-60	17.6	Peru	16	2.8
Canada	-56	16.7	Morocco	16	2.7
South Korea	-50	15.6	North Korea*	17	2.5
Germany	-30	11.7	India	18	2.4
Russia	-29	11.5	Philippines	18	2.3
Japan	-28	11.3	Pakistan	22	1.6
Malaysia	-21	10.0	Bangladesh	24	1.1
Iran	-19	9.5	Nigeria	25	1.0
Poland	-19	9.5	Kenya	25	0.9
United Kingdom	-18	9.4	Myanmar*	26	0.9
China	-14	8.6	Sudan*	26	0.9
Italy	-13	8.4	Tanzania	27	0.5
South Africa	-11	8.0	Afghanistan*	27	0.5
France	-10	7.8	Uganda	28	0.4
Iraq*	-8	7.4	Ethiopia	28	0.3
Spain	-6	7.0	Venezuela	29	0.3
Turkey	-2	6.2	DRC*	30	0.1
Algeria*	-1	6.0			

²⁴²⁴ Note: Asterisks denote countries where footprint is missing and territorial emissions is used instead.

²⁴²⁵ Values differ from Figure S49 as this table present estimates of *mean* net gain per adult in 2030, not at the

²⁴²⁶ present. Only the countries with more than 20 million adults (covering 87% of the global total) are shown.

F Determinants of support

Table S5: Determinants of support for the Global Climate Scheme. (Back to [2.3](#))

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme						
	All	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Country: Germany	-0.157*** (0.022)		-0.144*** (0.022)				
Country: Spain	-0.044* (0.024)		-0.026 (0.024)				
Country: United Kingdom	-0.079*** (0.024)		-0.104*** (0.023)				
Country: United States	-0.375*** (0.019)						
Income quartile: 2	0.037** (0.017)	0.031 (0.022)	0.038 (0.023)	0.047 (0.043)	0.058 (0.049)	0.013 (0.053)	0.023 (0.043)
Income quartile: 3	0.042** (0.017)	0.033 (0.024)	0.049** (0.024)	0.080** (0.040)	0.059 (0.052)	0.074 (0.056)	-0.052 (0.052)
Income quartile: 4	0.056*** (0.018)	0.062** (0.026)	0.010 (0.026)	0.018 (0.047)	-0.015 (0.055)	-0.001 (0.056)	-0.005 (0.057)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.023* (0.012)	0.032* (0.017)	0.010 (0.018)	0.007 (0.029)	0.045 (0.039)	0.007 (0.039)	-0.010 (0.039)
Age: 25-34	-0.076*** (0.025)	-0.084*** (0.031)	-0.044 (0.035)	-0.031 (0.057)	-0.077 (0.083)	-0.050 (0.066)	-0.103 (0.091)
Age: 35-49	-0.101*** (0.024)	-0.109*** (0.030)	-0.069* (0.034)	-0.094* (0.055)	-0.009 (0.077)	-0.168** (0.070)	-0.050 (0.090)
Age: 50-64	-0.137*** (0.024)	-0.165*** (0.030)	-0.038 (0.035)	-0.039 (0.056)	-0.020 (0.082)	-0.146** (0.067)	-0.017 (0.087)
Age: 65+	-0.116*** (0.028)	-0.142*** (0.034)	-0.056 (0.044)	0.003 (0.076)	-0.045 (0.094)	-0.258*** (0.091)	0.011 (0.105)
Gender: Man	0.019* (0.011)	0.022 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.029)	-0.018 (0.033)	0.042 (0.038)	-0.005 (0.034)
Lives with partner	0.029** (0.013)	0.023 (0.017)	0.058*** (0.018)	0.070** (0.033)	0.082** (0.038)	0.017 (0.038)	0.040 (0.039)
Employment status: Retired	-0.020 (0.024)	-0.046 (0.030)	0.056 (0.038)	0.087 (0.081)	0.096 (0.075)	0.040 (0.082)	0.001 (0.073)
Employment status: Student	0.045 (0.033)	0.062 (0.048)	0.101** (0.044)	0.165* (0.085)	0.192** (0.087)	0.116 (0.074)	-0.021 (0.107)
Employment status: Working	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.020 (0.024)	0.011 (0.028)	0.082 (0.064)	0.006 (0.056)	-0.050 (0.056)	0.036 (0.051)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.331*** (0.013)	-0.435*** (0.017)	-0.106*** (0.019)	-0.131*** (0.035)	-0.004 (0.044)	-0.114*** (0.038)	-0.081* (0.041)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	-0.184*** (0.016)	-0.198*** (0.022)	-0.136*** (0.021)	-0.196*** (0.039)	-0.034 (0.043)	-0.116** (0.046)	-0.108*** (0.040)
Vote: Far right	-0.396*** (0.032)		-0.309*** (0.033)	-0.493*** (0.064)	-0.168*** (0.051)	-0.130 (0.102)	-0.314*** (0.080)
Urban	0.049*** (0.012)	0.072*** (0.018)	0.006 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.029)	0.019 (0.032)	-0.014 (0.036)	0.017 (0.033)
Race: White		-0.030 (0.019)					
Region: Northeast		0.010 (0.023)					
Region: South		0.006 (0.020)					
Region: West		0.010 (0.022)					
Swing State		-0.038** (0.019)					
Constant	1.048	0.736	0.89	0.7	0.732	0.935	0.886
Observations	7,986	4,992	2,994	977	727	748	542
R ²	0.160	0.181	0.064	0.116	0.067	0.043	0.063

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table S6: Support for the GCS regressed on comprehension of its financial effects.

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme					
	All	United States	France	Germany	United Kingdom	Spain
With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win	0.029** (0.012)	-0.004 (0.016)	0.043 (0.033)	0.051 (0.033)	0.040 (0.036)	0.038 (0.037)
Constant	0.596	0.53	0.764	0.677	0.707	0.796
Observations	8,000	5,000	729	979	749	543
R ²	0.001	0.00001	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.002

Table S7: Correlation between (*Somewhat or Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in high-income countries.

	Support for a global GHG tax and dividend											
	USA (1)	DNK (2)	FRA (3)	DEU (4)	ITA (5)	ESP (6)	GBR (7)	JPN (8)	POL (9)	AUS (10)	CAN (11)	KOR (12)
Control group mean	0.34	0.409	0.34	0.361	0.341	0.421	0.288	0.317	0.309	0.294	0.316	0.334
Trusts the government	0.040*** (0.013)	0.0005 (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.051*** (0.011)	0.061*** (0.012)	0.046*** (0.011)	0.050*** (0.012)	0.039*** (0.013)	0.023** (0.011)	0.041*** (0.013)	0.019 (0.013)	0.079*** (0.013)
Believes inequality is an important problem	0.038*** (0.014)	0.051*** (0.012)	0.045*** (0.013)	0.040*** (0.011)	0.023** (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.052*** (0.011)	0.015 (0.012)	0.009 (0.012)	0.005 (0.010)	0.031*** (0.013)	0.024** (0.012)
Worries about CC	0.006 (0.018)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.005 (0.016)	0.048*** (0.014)	0.023* (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.044*** (0.015)	0.014 (0.014)	0.018 (0.013)	0.036** (0.017)	0.004 (0.014)	0.015 (0.013)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	0.009 (0.015)	0.007 (0.012)	0.018 (0.014)	0.015 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.012)	0.032** (0.011)	0.027** (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.024** (0.012)	0.018 (0.015)	0.014 (0.014)	0.001 (0.013)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.059*** (0.015)	0.019 (0.013)	0.008 (0.014)	0.032** (0.013)	0.012 (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.006 (0.014)	0.006 (0.014)	0.037** (0.014)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.033** (0.016)	0.026* (0.014)
Understands emission across activities/regions	-0.018 (0.011)	0.009 (0.013)	0.003 (0.012)	0.023* (0.012)	0.007 (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.007 (0.011)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.026** (0.013)	-0.002 (0.013)	0.003 (0.012)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	0.007 (0.012)	0.008 (0.014)	0.023 (0.014)	0.011 (0.012)	-0.0005 (0.012)	0.031*** (0.012)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.014 (0.011)	0.025* (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.024* (0.012)
Knows which gases cause CC	0.005 (0.011)	0.021* (0.012)	0.010 (0.013)	0.001 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.010)	0.020* (0.010)	0.015 (0.010)	0.017 (0.011)	0.011 (0.010)	-0.0003 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.013)
Understands impacts of CC	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.029*** (0.011)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.022* (0.011)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.024** (0.012)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	-0.005 (0.013)	0.007 (0.012)	0.021 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.014)	0.011 (0.014)	0.010 (0.013)	0.014 (0.013)	0.008 (0.013)	0.015 (0.013)	0.036** (0.016)	0.004 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.013)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	-0.013 (0.021)	0.037 (0.023)	0.043* (0.022)	-0.014 (0.020)	-0.038** (0.019)	0.029 (0.020)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.017 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.006 (0.022)	0.021 (0.020)	-0.020 (0.019)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.086*** (0.024)	0.066*** (0.023)	0.075*** (0.023)	0.094*** (0.022)	0.105*** (0.020)	0.074*** (0.023)	0.091*** (0.023)	0.154*** (0.021)	0.089*** (0.020)	0.070*** (0.024)	0.053** (0.023)	0.112*** (0.020)
Believes own household would lose	-0.071*** (0.021)	-0.057*** (0.015)	-0.026 (0.020)	-0.087*** (0.017)	-0.066*** (0.017)	-0.053*** (0.017)	-0.073*** (0.017)	-0.008 (0.017)	-0.079*** (0.017)	-0.052*** (0.016)	-0.060*** (0.020)	-0.083*** (0.017)
Believes low-income earners will lose	-0.034* (0.019)	-0.020 (0.016)	-0.056*** (0.018)	-0.022 (0.017)	-0.021 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.016)	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.056*** (0.017)	-0.025 (0.016)	-0.030 (0.020)	-0.056*** (0.018)	0.002 (0.016)
Believes high-income earners will lose	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.012)	0.013 (0.013)	0.003 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.007 (0.011)	-0.0003 (0.012)	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.025** (0.012)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.0004 (0.013)
Observations	2,218	2,013	2,006	2,006	2,088	2,268	2,025	1,990	2,053	1,978	2,022	1,932
R ²	0.329	0.241	0.237	0.295	0.211	0.216	0.272	0.222	0.214	0.272	0.254	0.228

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 of ¹⁸ for variable definitions.

Table S8: Correlation between (*Somewhat* or *Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in middle-income countries.

	Support for a global GHG tax and dividend							
	IDN (1)	ZAF (2)	MEX (3)	TUR (4)	IND (5)	BRA (6)	CHN (7)	UKR (8)
Control group mean	0.697	0.396	0.681	0.44	0.719	0.539	0.737	0.622
Trusts the government	0.051*** (0.012)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.040*** (0.014)	0.066*** (0.017)	0.065*** (0.015)	0.038** (0.015)	-0.011 (0.015)	0.061*** (0.014)
Believes inequality is an important problem	0.048** (0.011)	0.002 (0.014)	0.057*** (0.015)	0.028 (0.017)	0.092*** (0.016)	0.055*** (0.015)	-0.001 (0.015)	0.027 (0.018)
Worries about CC	0.003 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.016)	0.013 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.017)	-0.0002 (0.016)	0.032* (0.017)	-0.0002 (0.016)	0.046*** (0.016)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	0.020 (0.014)	0.026 (0.017)	0.004 (0.014)	0.039** (0.017)	0.022 (0.016)	0.019 (0.016)	0.034** (0.016)	0.018 (0.016)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.020* (0.011)	0.038** (0.016)	0.032* (0.017)	-0.002 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.015)	-0.017 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.018 (0.016)
Understands emission across activities/regions	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.013)	0.003 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.010)	0.039** (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.00004 (0.013)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	-0.006 (0.009)	0.011 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.016)	0.0002 (0.012)	0.003 (0.014)	-0.052*** (0.016)	0.022 (0.014)
Knows which gases cause CC	-0.026*** (0.009)	0.019 (0.015)	0.035** (0.014)	0.015 (0.015)	0.020 (0.013)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.023* (0.012)	0.023 (0.015)
Understands impacts of CC	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.0005 (0.015)	0.009 (0.017)	0.043*** (0.014)	-0.023 (0.015)	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.014 (0.014)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	-0.010 (0.007)	0.009 (0.016)	0.015 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.013)	0.002 (0.011)	-0.016 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.010)	0.035* (0.015)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	0.023 (0.015)	0.002 (0.021)	0.019 (0.022)	0.044 (0.029)	0.021 (0.020)	0.032 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.018)	-0.023 (0.025)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.111*** (0.019)	0.073*** (0.022)	0.088*** (0.024)	0.078** (0.031)	0.034 (0.025)	0.129*** (0.022)	0.060*** (0.022)	0.138*** (0.025)
Believes own household would lose	-0.027 (0.021)	-0.044** (0.020)	-0.071*** (0.019)	-0.054** (0.024)	-0.012 (0.019)	-0.067*** (0.023)	-0.119*** (0.022)	-0.045** (0.021)
Believes low-income earners will lose	-0.059*** (0.020)	-0.016 (0.019)	0.003 (0.017)	-0.053** (0.023)	-0.055*** (0.019)	-0.013 (0.020)	0.001 (0.018)	0.004 (0.020)
Believes high-income earners will lose	0.026** (0.011)	-0.020 (0.015)	0.010 (0.013)	0.010 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.014)	0.003 (0.014)	-0.047*** (0.016)	-0.007 (0.013)
Observations	2,488	2,003	2,045	1,932	2,472	1,860	1,717	1,564
R ²	0.366	0.175	0.242	0.248	0.370	0.272	0.280	0.255

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 of ¹⁸ for variable definitions.

G Representativeness of the surveys

Table S9: Sample representativeness of the complementary surveys. (Back to [2.1](#))

	US1			US2			Eu		
	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample
Sample size		3,000	3,000		2,000	2,000		3,000	3,000
Gender: Woman	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.45	0.50	0.51	0.49	0.51
Gender: Man	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.49	0.55	0.50	0.49	0.51	0.49
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.11	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.18	0.15	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.18	0.15	0.17	0.15
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.24	0.26
Age: 65+	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.25	0.23	0.25
Diploma_25_64: Below upper secondary	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.13	0.14	0.13
Diploma_25_64: Upper secondary	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.28	0.23	0.19	0.23
Diploma_25_64: Post secondary	0.34	0.40	0.34	0.34	0.33	0.34	0.29	0.33	0.29
Race: White only	0.60	0.67	0.61	0.60	0.62	0.61			
Race: Hispanic	0.18	0.15	0.19	0.18	0.19	0.19			
Race: Black	0.13	0.16	0.14	0.13	0.17	0.14			
Region: Northeast	0.17	0.20	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.17			
Region: Midwest	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.21			
Region: South	0.38	0.39	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38			
Region: West	0.24	0.20	0.24	0.24	0.20	0.24			
Urban: TRUE	0.73	0.78	0.74	0.73	0.75	0.73			
Employment_18_64: Inactive	0.20	0.16	0.16	0.20	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.15
Employment_18_64: Unemployed	0.02	0.07	0.08	0.02	0.09	0.08	0.03	0.06	0.05
Vote: Left	0.32	0.47	0.45	0.32	0.46	0.45	0.30	0.32	0.32
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.32	0.32
Vote: Far right							0.10	0.10	0.10
Country: FR							0.24	0.24	0.24
Country: DE							0.33	0.33	0.33
Country: ES							0.18	0.18	0.18
Country: UK							0.25	0.25	0.25
Urbanity: Cities							0.43	0.49	0.43
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs							0.33	0.32	0.33
Urbanity: Rural							0.25	0.20	0.25

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

Table S10: Sample representativeness for each European country. (Back to [2.1](#))

	FR			DE			ES			UK		
	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.									
Sample size		729	729		979	979		543	543		749	749
Gender: Woman	0.52	0.50	0.52	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.53	0.51	0.50	0.43	0.50
Gender: Man	0.48	0.50	0.48	0.49	0.48	0.49	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.50	0.57	0.50
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.29	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.19	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.19	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.33	0.25	0.25	0.18	0.25	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.14	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.07	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.12	0.16	0.12	0.17	0.20	0.17
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.31	0.24	0.22	0.26	0.22	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.24	0.18	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.24	0.19	0.24	0.28	0.23	0.28	0.27	0.28	0.27	0.25	0.30	0.25
Age: 65+	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.26	0.21	0.26	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.24
Diploma_25-64: Below upper secondary	0.11	0.19	0.11	0.10	0.14	0.10	0.24	0.16	0.25	0.12	0.09	0.12
Diploma_25-64: Upper secondary	0.26	0.16	0.26	0.27	0.20	0.27	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.21	0.23	0.21
Diploma_25-64: Post secondary	0.26	0.30	0.26	0.29	0.31	0.29	0.28	0.38	0.27	0.33	0.36	0.33
Urbanity: Cities	0.47	0.52	0.47	0.37	0.47	0.37	0.52	0.58	0.52	0.40	0.41	0.40
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.40	0.35	0.40	0.22	0.27	0.22	0.42	0.43	0.42
Urbanity: Rural	0.34	0.29	0.34	0.23	0.18	0.23	0.26	0.15	0.26	0.18	0.16	0.18
Employment_18-64: Inactive	0.20	0.19	0.18	0.15	0.14	0.11	0.20	0.13	0.12	0.16	0.16	0.17
Employment_18-64: Unemployed	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.11	0.12	0.02	0.03	0.04
Vote: Left	0.23	0.19	0.21	0.37	0.44	0.44	0.33	0.37	0.38	0.25	0.28	0.29
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.26	0.30	0.29	0.28	0.27	0.29	0.18	0.24	0.24	0.36	0.44	0.41
Vote: Far right	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.01	0.03	0.03

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. In this Table, weights are defined at the country level. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

²⁴²⁹ Similar tables for the global surveys can be found in Dechezleprêtre et al. ¹⁸.

H Attrition analysis

Table S11: Attrition analysis for the US1 survey.

	Dropped out	Dropped out after socio-eco	Failed attention test	Duration (in min)	Duration below 4 min
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mean	0.08	0.059	0.082	21.198	0.016
Income quartile: 2	0.025*** (0.010)	0.025*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.740 (3.064)	-0.009 (0.006)
Income quartile: 3	0.062*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.754 (2.813)	-0.004 (0.007)
Income quartile: 4	0.035*** (0.011)	0.035*** (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-3.917 (2.798)	-0.003 (0.007)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.039*** (0.009)	0.039*** (0.009)	-0.000*** (0.000)	1.544 (2.665)	0.006 (0.006)
Age: 25-34	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.597 (2.604)	-0.031** (0.013)
Age: 35-49	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.824 (3.176)	-0.032** (0.013)
Age: 50-64	-0.060*** (0.015)	-0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	5.723** (2.763)	-0.039*** (0.012)
Age: 65+	0.048*** (0.017)	0.048*** (0.017)	0.000** (0.000)	8.952** (4.267)	-0.047*** (0.012)
Gender: Man	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.451 (2.210)	-0.0001 (0.005)
Urban	0.006 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.888** (2.443)	-0.004 (0.006)
Race: Black	0.020** (0.010)	0.020** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	8.554*** (2.600)	0.004 (0.007)
Race: Hispanic	0.021** (0.010)	0.021** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.119* (2.293)	-0.002 (0.007)
Region: Northeast	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-4.862 (4.782)	-0.004 (0.007)
Region: South	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-1.151 (4.710)	-0.004 (0.006)
Region: West	0.006 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-4.000 (4.305)	-0.003 (0.007)
Vote: Biden	-0.048*** (0.008)	-0.048*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-2.901 (2.379)	-0.009 (0.007)
Vote: Trump	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.145 (2.878)	-0.005 (0.008)
Observations	5,719	5,719	3,252	3,044	3,044
R ²	0.127	0.127	1.000	0.006	0.017

Table S12: Attrition analysis for the US2 survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 4 min (5)
Mean	0.095	0.074	0.092	16.338	0.052
Income quartile: 2	0.023* (0.013)	0.023* (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	1.352 (1.601)	-0.029** (0.014)
Income quartile: 3	0.054*** (0.014)	0.054*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	8.502 (9.649)	-0.009 (0.016)
Income quartile: 4	0.060*** (0.016)	0.060*** (0.016)	-0.000 (0.000)	5.254 (3.376)	0.0003 (0.017)
Diploma: Post secondary	-0.033*** (0.011)	-0.033*** (0.011)	0.000 (0.000)	1.601 (2.630)	0.012 (0.011)
Age: 25-34	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.929 (1.535)	-0.032 (0.024)
Age: 35-49	0.012 (0.014)	0.012 (0.014)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.076 (6.651)	-0.047** (0.022)
Age: 50-64	0.040*** (0.014)	0.040*** (0.014)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.364 (1.565)	-0.079*** (0.022)
Age: 65+	0.115*** (0.017)	0.115*** (0.017)	-0.000*** (0.000)	2.619 (3.150)	-0.095*** (0.022)
Gender: Man	-0.073*** (0.009)	-0.073*** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	4.707 (6.037)	0.010 (0.010)
Urban	0.019* (0.011)	0.019* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	1.766 (1.135)	0.005 (0.012)
Race: Black	0.060*** (0.015)	0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.673 (13.328)	-0.010 (0.015)
Race: Hispanic	0.079*** (0.014)	0.079*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	2.930 (1.813)	-0.027** (0.012)
Region: Northeast	-0.026* (0.014)	-0.026* (0.014)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.837 (2.855)	-0.011 (0.015)
Region: South	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.000 (0.000)	3.220 (5.002)	0.009 (0.014)
Region: West	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.000 (0.000)	-1.759 (1.942)	-0.009 (0.015)
Vote: Biden	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	3.230 (2.731)	-0.006 (0.014)
Vote: Trump	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.554 (1.272)	0.007 (0.016)
Observations	2,973	2,973	2,280	2,103	2,103
R ²	0.241	0.241	1.000	0.010	0.031

Table S13: Attrition analysis for the *Eu* survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 6 min (5)
Mean	0.067	0.044	0.151	54.602	0.039
Country: Germany	0.023** (0.010)	0.019** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.533 (18.906)	0.019* (0.010)
Country: Spain	-0.102*** (0.011)	-0.098*** (0.011)	0.000* (0.000)	-29.136* (15.948)	0.010 (0.010)
Country: United Kingdom	0.042*** (0.011)	0.043*** (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-7.458 (18.046)	0.010 (0.010)
Income quartile: 2	0.032*** (0.010)	0.029*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	32.749* (19.771)	-0.015 (0.010)
Income quartile: 3	0.049*** (0.010)	0.047*** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	6.130 (11.734)	-0.021** (0.010)
Income quartile: 4	0.024** (0.011)	0.021* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.659 (19.955)	-0.018* (0.011)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.035*** (0.008)	0.034*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	10.647 (12.959)	-0.007 (0.007)
Age: 25-34	0.028** (0.013)	0.025* (0.013)	-0.000*** (0.000)	36.132 (22.285)	-0.005 (0.018)
Age: 35-49	0.064*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	-0.000*** (0.000)	37.159** (17.190)	-0.013 (0.016)
Age: 50-64	0.085*** (0.013)	0.083*** (0.013)	-0.000 (0.000)	48.363** (22.526)	-0.063*** (0.015)
Age: 65+	0.117*** (0.014)	0.115*** (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	36.351** (14.226)	-0.061*** (0.015)
Gender: Man	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-22.980 (14.093)	0.009 (0.007)
Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs	0.006 (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-16.736 (17.256)	0.004 (0.008)
Degree of urbanization: Rural	0.023** (0.009)	0.023** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	-14.593 (19.733)	-0.001 (0.009)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.025*** (0.005)	-0.025*** (0.005)	0.000*** (0.000)	-17.558 (13.143)	0.019** (0.008)
Vote: Far right	0.005 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.000*** (0.000)	15.838 (32.281)	0.029** (0.014)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	0.023*** (0.006)	0.022*** (0.005)	0.000 (0.000)	24.631 (19.824)	0.030*** (0.010)
Observations	3,963	3,963	3,326	3,115	3,115
R ²	0.406	0.395	1.000	0.006	0.028

²⁴³¹ I Balance analysis

Table S14: Balance analysis.

	List contains: G (1)	Branch petition: NR (2)	Branch donation: Own nation (3)	Branch conjoint 3: with GCS (4)
Mean	0.496	0.493	0.5	0.499
Country: Germany	-0.026 (0.026)	0.017 (0.026)	0.020 (0.026)	0.005 (0.026)
Country: Spain	0.025 (0.030)	0.026 (0.030)	0.026 (0.030)	0.043 (0.030)
Country: United Kingdom	0.002 (0.028)	0.018 (0.028)	0.037 (0.028)	0.063** (0.028)
Country: United States	-0.001 (0.024)	0.019 (0.024)	0.007 (0.024)	0.023 (0.024)
Income quartile: 2	-0.013 (0.021)	-0.024 (0.021)	0.012 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.021)
Income quartile: 3	0.021 (0.022)	-0.005 (0.022)	0.011 (0.022)	-0.004 (0.022)
Income quartile: 4	-0.001 (0.023)	-0.017 (0.023)	-0.013 (0.023)	0.0001 (0.023)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.008 (0.016)	0.014 (0.016)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.016)
Age: 25-34	0.023 (0.031)	-0.049 (0.031)	-0.003 (0.031)	-0.009 (0.031)
Age: 35-49	0.032 (0.030)	-0.002 (0.030)	-0.014 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.030)
Age: 50-64	0.030 (0.030)	-0.005 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.030)	-0.020 (0.030)
Age: 65+	0.029 (0.037)	-0.037 (0.037)	-0.015 (0.037)	-0.012 (0.037)
Gender: Man	0.024 (0.015)	0.012 (0.015)	0.002 (0.015)	-0.016 (0.015)
Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.0005 (0.017)	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.011 (0.017)
Degree of urbanization: Rural	0.013 (0.024)	0.017 (0.024)	-0.004 (0.024)	0.027 (0.024)
Employment status: Retired	-0.005 (0.032)	-0.031 (0.032)	-0.034 (0.032)	-0.016 (0.032)
Employment status: Student	0.005 (0.044)	-0.023 (0.044)	-0.033 (0.044)	-0.025 (0.044)
Employment status: Working	0.010 (0.024)	-0.027 (0.024)	-0.033 (0.024)	-0.012 (0.024)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.004 (0.017)	0.003 (0.017)	0.010 (0.017)	0.002 (0.017)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	0.001 (0.019)	0.014 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.019)	-0.012 (0.019)
Vote: Far right	0.009 (0.034)	0.030 (0.034)	0.023 (0.035)	0.038 (0.034)
Observations	5,991	5,991	5,991	5,991
R ²	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.003

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

²⁴³² **J Placebo tests**

Table S15: Placebo tests.

	G+R+C preferred to R+C (1)	Supports G+R+C (2)	Signs petition (3)	Share of policies supported (4)	Conjoint 5 A+CGS preferred to B (5)
Mean	0.645	0.633	0.611	0.535	0.596
Branch of list experiment: 1	-0.013 (0.019)	-0.024 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.018 (0.021)
Branch of list experiment: rgl	0.005 (0.019)	0.006 (0.019)	-0.002 (0.019)	0.001 (0.012)	0.010 (0.021)
Branch of list experiment: rl	-0.009 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.019)	0.022 (0.019)	0.007 (0.012)	0.007 (0.021)
Branch of petition: nr	0.011 (0.014)	0.006 (0.014)	0.022 (0.014)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.015)
Poor is in own country	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.014)	0.015 (0.014)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.020 (0.015)
Observations	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	5,218
R ²	0.0004	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001

Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

²⁴³³ **K Main results on the extended sample**

²⁴³⁴ As a robustness check, we reproduce our main results on the extended sample that
²⁴³⁵ includes the 14% respondents who failed the attention check ($n = 9,318$). These results
²⁴³⁶ are non-weighted. They closely match the results in our main specification. For example,
²⁴³⁷ the support for the GCS is 54% in the U.S. and 75% in Europe, while the same coefficients
²⁴³⁸ are significant for the list experiment.

Figure S50: [Extended sample] Main attitudes by vote (“Right” spans from Center-right to Far right).

(Relative support in percent in Questions 20, 35, 45, 46, 49)

(Back to Section 2.5.3)

	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom	United States
Support for the GCS	75	78	70	81	75	54
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	83	81	84	87	81	68
Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries*	52	45	60	59	44	52
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	62	57	62	65	65	47
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	82	80	82	86	80	69
[Country]'s foreign aid should be increased	83	87	87	89	69	77
Universalist*	41	35	49	44	36	43

Figure S51: [Extended sample] Influence of the GCS on preferred platform: Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question 30; in the U.S., asked only to non-Republicans.)

	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom	United States
Random programs: A+GCS preferred to B	60	61	59	64	58	59

Table S16: [Extended sample] Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list. The tacit support for the GCS is estimated by regressing the number of supported policies on the presence of the GCS in the list of policies. The social desirability is estimated as the difference between the tacit and stated support, and it is not significantly different from zero even at a 20% threshold (see [Methods](#)).

	Number of supported policies		
	All	U.S.	Europe
List contains: GCS	0.624*** (0.028)	0.524*** (0.041)	0.724*** (0.036)
<i>Support for GCS</i>	NA	0.554	0.754
<i>Social desirability bias</i>	-0.025	-0.017	-0.033
<i>80% C.I. for the bias</i>	[-0.06; 0.01]	[-0.07; 0.04]	[-0.08; 0.01]
Constant	1.317	1.147	1.486
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000
R ²	0.089	0.065	0.125

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table S17: [Extended sample] Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. ([Question 28](#))

	Prefers the Progressive platform					
	All	United States	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
GCS in Progressive platform	0.022* (0.013)	0.015 (0.018)	0.116*** (0.037)	-0.007 (0.032)	0.028 (0.038)	0.012 (0.037)
Constant	0.628	0.629	0.55	0.682	0.721	0.553
Observations	5,638	2,797	671	883	550	737
R ²	0.001	0.0002	0.014	0.0001	0.001	0.0001

Note: Simple OLS model. *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples. *p < 0.1;
p < 0.05; *p < 0.01.

²⁴³⁹ **L Effect of questionnaire framing**

²⁴⁴⁰ When comparing the samples *US1* and *US2*, we observe no effect of questionnaire
²⁴⁴¹ framing (or block sequence) on the question “What group do you defend when you
²⁴⁴² vote?”, common to all waves and placed close to the end of the questionnaire (Table S18).

Table S18: Effect of the wave (*US1* vs. *US2*) on the group defend when voting.
“What group do you defend when you vote?” (Question 57)

	Group defended when voting		
	Humans or Sentient beings	Fellow citizens	Family and self
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Wave: <i>US2</i>	−0.009 (0.014)	0.009 (0.014)	0.010 (0.011)
Mean	0.432	0.335	0.156
Observations	5,000	5,000	5,000
R ²	0.0001	0.0001	0.0002

Note: Simple OLS model. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

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