

¹ **International Attitudes Toward Global Policies**

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⁴ **Abstract**

We document majority support for policies entailing global redistribution and climate mitigation. Surveys on 40,680 respondents in 20 countries show strong stated support for an effective way to jointly combat climate change and poverty: a global carbon price funding a global basic income, called the “Global Climate Scheme” (GCS). Using complementary surveys on 8,000 respondents in the U.S., France, Germany, Spain, and the UK, we test several hypotheses that could reconcile strong stated support with a lack of salience in policy circles. The GCS is supported by three quarters of Europeans and half of Americans, even as they understand the policy’s cost to them. Using different experiments, we show that the support for the GCS is sincere and that electoral candidates could win votes by endorsing it. More generally, we document widespread support for other globally redistributive policies, such as a wealth tax funding low-income countries or increased foreign aid. In sum, we provide evidence that global policies are genuinely supported by majorities, even in wealthy nations that would bear the burden.

²⁰ **JEL codes:** P48, Q58, H23, Q54

²¹ **Keywords:** Climate change, global policies, cap-and-trade, attitudes, survey.

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70 **1 Introduction**

71 Major sustainability objectives could be achieved by global approaches to mitigating
 72 climate change and poverty involving transfers from high- to lower-income countries
 73 (Bauer et al. 2020; Budolfson et al. 2021; Cramton et al. 2017; Dennig et al. 2015; Franks
 74 et al. 2018; Soergel et al. 2021). For instance, a global wealth tax could finance the Sustain-
 75 able Development Goals (Piketty 2022). More specifically, if merely 35% of the revenue
 76 were allocated for this purpose, a global 2% tax on individual wealth in excess of \$5
 77 million could significantly reduce poverty as it would mechanically increase low-income
 78 countries' national income by 50% (as computed on the **WID wealth tax simulator**). Be-
 79 sides, global carbon pricing is widely regarded by economists as the benchmark climate
 80 policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon emissions externality. In an early analysis
 81 of global climate policy, Grubb (1990) states: "by far the best combination of long term
 82 effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity, is obtained from a system based upon
 83 tradable permits for carbon emissions which are allocated on an adult per capita basis",
 84 i.e., equally among human adults. Support for such solution, which we call the "Global

85 Climate Scheme”, has been renewed ever since (Agarwal & Narain 1991; Baer et al. 2000;
86 Bertram 1992; Blanchard & Tirole 2021; Hoel 1991; Jamieson 2001; Rajan 2021).

87 While international negotiations have not yet led to ambitious globally redistributive
88 policies, recent developments suggest that such a change might be underway. The In-
89 ternational Maritime Organization is poised to adopt a global carbon levy on maritime
90 fuel; the African Union (2023) calls for a global carbon taxation regime; the UN (2023)
91 is setting up a Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation; Brazil uses its
92 presidency of the G20 in 2024 to propose a global wealth tax, backed by 130 Members of
93 the European Parliament; etc.

94 A key condition for implementing global policies has remained largely unaddressed:
95 the support of citizens. Using a Global survey on 40,680 respondents from 20 high-
96 and middle-income countries, we reveal substantial support for those policies, especially
97 global climate policies and a global tax on the wealthiest aimed at financing low-income
98 countries (other questions from these surveys are analyzed in a companion paper, Deche-
99 zleprêtre et al. 2022). Interestingly, even in wealthy nations that would bear a significant
100 burden, majorities of citizens express support for such globally redistributive policies. To
101 better understand public support for global policies in high-income countries, we con-
102 duct Complementary surveys among 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain,
103 the U.S., and the UK.

104 By studying in depth the support for global policies, we are making an ambitious shift
105 in the methodological approach of attitudinal surveys. In general, academic surveys focus
106 on studying effect sizes of some treatment on political attitudes, or the socio-demographic
107 factors that correlate with attitudes (e.g., Douenne & Fabre 2022; Kuziemko et al. 2015).
108 The magnitude of support for a given proposal is often regarded as problematic to esti-
109 mate satisfactorily. The measure of support is usually left to non-academic pollsters, who
110 rarely apply all the academic best practices: transparency, representative sampling, neu-
111 tral and precise wording of questions, comparison with existing literature, use of multiple
112 questions and complementary methods to correctly interpret the results. Although it is
113 challenging to estimate the extent of support, this question seems too important not to
114 be addressed using scientific methods. Absent large scale measurements of public opin-
115 ion like referenda, surveys remain the best method to assess support or opposition to
116 given policies. In this paper, after a worldwide assessment in the Global survey, we use
117 Complementary surveys to carefully measure the support for global policies in Western
118 countries. We inquire the support for various policies, approach the question from di-

¹¹⁹ verse angles, and run a battery of pre-registered tests to check whether stated support
¹²⁰ estimates are reliable.

¹²¹ The focus of the Complementary surveys is a specific policy aimed at addressing both
¹²² climate change and poverty, referred to as the “Global Climate Scheme” (GCS). It imple-
¹²³ ments a cap on carbon emissions to limit global warming below 2°C. The emission rights
¹²⁴ are auctioned each year to polluting firms and fund a global basic income, alleviating ex-
¹²⁵ treme poverty. This archetypal policy exposes respondents to the key trade-off between
¹²⁶ the benefits and costs of globally redistributive climate policies, as respondents are made
¹²⁷ aware of the cost that the GCS entails for their country’s people.

¹²⁸ After checking that respondents have understood the policy and its cost, we measure
¹²⁹ the support in a direct Yes/No question. The GCS is supported by three quarters of Eu-
¹³⁰ ropeans and more than half of Americans. Then, we test for social desirability bias using
¹³¹ a list experiment. We find no evidence that people exaggerate their support in the direct
¹³² question. To assess whether the support would diminish in a context with real stakes,
¹³³ we ask respondents whether they are willing to sign a petition in favor of the GCS, after
¹³⁴ informing them that the question results will be communicated to their head of state’s
¹³⁵ office. The support is sustained in an environment that approaches real stakes. We then
¹³⁶ carry out conjoint analyses to neutralize experimenter demand and investigate the prior-
¹³⁷ ity given to global policies compared to other types of policies. Conjoint analyses reveal
¹³⁸ that a political platform is more likely to be preferred if it contains the GCS or a global tax
¹³⁹ on millionaires, and that global policies rank high in the prioritization of policies. Our
¹⁴⁰ randomized experiments also show that a candidate would not lose vote intentions by
¹⁴¹ endorsing the GCS, and might even gain up to 11 points in a country like France. An
¹⁴² analysis of open-ended fields confirms that support for the GCS is real, and indicates that
¹⁴³ appeal of the GCS comes from its international nature and its impacts on climate, more
¹⁴⁴ than on global poverty. We also test other global policies and universalistic attitudes. Sup-
¹⁴⁵ port is very strong for a global tax on millionaires, and the median respondent prefers to
¹⁴⁶ allocate 30% of the revenues of such a tax to low-income countries. Majorities are willing
¹⁴⁷ to increase foreign aid, but only if some conditions are respected, such as making sure the
¹⁴⁸ aid is well spent and other high-income countries also increase their contribution. Ques-
¹⁴⁹ tions on universalistic values, including a donation experiment, confirm the congruence
¹⁵⁰ of underlying values with the support for specific policies. Our diverse approaches also
¹⁵¹ help understand what drives the support. For instance, the evidence indicates that one
¹⁵² key reason why increasing foreign aid is not as popular as global policies lies in its unilat-

153 eral nature. We reckon that survey evidence is no panacea, as attitudes can be ambivalent
154 and context-dependent. Nevertheless, we arguably employ the best available methods
155 to address potential concerns, including an experiment assessing how support might be
156 affected by a negative media campaign.

157 Overall, our results point out to strong and genuine support for global climate and
158 redistributive policies, as our experiments confirm the stated support found in direct
159 questions. This suggests that carefully administered surveys can be used to measure the
160 level of support for a given policy. Our results contribute to the literature on attitudes
161 toward climate policy, confirming that climate policy is preferred at a global level (Beiser-
162 McGrath & Bernauer 2019b; ISSP 2010; Meilland et al. 2023; Sivonen 2022), where it is
163 more effective and fair. Indeed, the Global Climate Scheme is largely supported, but a
164 similar policy at the national level is opposed by a majority in many countries (Deche-
165 zleprêtre et al. 2022), despite lower costs. Noting that only 13% of French people declared
166 supporting a national carbon tax with cash transfers during the Yellow Vests movement
167 (Douenne & Fabre 2022), surveys appear to accurately reflect the level of support. There-
168 fore, unless support for global policies disappear once they enter the public debate, it
169 seems unlikely that a policy such as the GCS would face major protests. In our discussion
170 we offer potential explanations behind the lack of prominence of global policies in the
171 public debate despite this strong support. Finally, while our findings underscore major-
172 ity support for global policies, converging results from independent surveys are needed
173 to ascertain such novel evidence.

174 **Literature** International surveys have shown widespread support for costly climate ac-
175 tion (Dechezleprêtre et al. 2022; Leiserowitz et al. 2022). For instance, using representative
176 samples in 125 countries covering 96% of the world's greenhouse gas emissions, Andre
177 et al. (2024) show that 69% of the global population express willingness to contribute 1%
178 of their income to fight global warming. International surveys have also uncover near
179 consensus that "present economic differences between rich and poor countries are too
180 large" (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree) in each of 29 countries (ISSP 2019).

181 Yet, few prior attitudinal surveys have examined global redistributive policies. A no-
182 table exception is Carattini et al. (2019), who test the support for six variants of a global
183 carbon tax on samples in five countries, representative along gender and age. For a given
184 variant, the sample size is about 167 respondents per country. They find over 80% support
185 for any variant in India, between 50% and 65% in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and

43% to 59% in the U.S., depending on the variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding an equal cash transfer for each human is close to 50% in high-income countries (e.g., at 44% in the U.S.). These figures are consistent with our results from the *Global survey* (see Figure 1), where the support is lower for a tax that would “only” reduce CO₂ emissions than for a quota that would unambiguously achieve the climate target. Relatively, Leiserowitz et al. (2021) reveal that 66% of Americans support providing “financial aid and technical support to developing countries that agree to limit their greenhouse gas emissions”; and Fehr et al. (2022) find that 90% of Germans want some degree of global redistribution. Besides, in surveys conducted in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S., Ghassim (2020) finds support ranging from 55% to 74% for “a global democracy including both a global government and a global parliament, directly elected by the world population, to recommend and implement policies on global issues”. Through an experiment, he also finds that, in countries where the government stems from a coalition, voting shares would shift by 8 (Brazil) to 12 p.p. (Germany) from parties who are said to oppose global democracy to parties that supposedly support it. For instance, when Germans respondents were told that (only) the Greens and the Left support global democracy, these parties gained respectively 9 and 3 p.p. in vote intentions, while the SPD and the CDU-CSU each lost 6 p.p.

Appendix A contains a broader literature review including further attitudinal surveys on global policies (A.1.1); prior work on attitudes toward climate burden sharing (Appendix A.1.2), attitudes toward foreign aid (Appendix A.1.3); global carbon pricing (Appendix A.2.1), global redistribution (Appendix A.2.3), basic income (Appendix A.2.4), and global democracy (Appendix A.2.5).

2 Results

The presentation of results proceeds as follows: after briefly describing the survey data (2.1), we first document broad international support for global approaches to climate policy that lead to global redistribution (2.2.1). Subsequently, we present specific findings from surveys in the U.S. and Europe that document support for the GCS, wealth taxes, and foreign aid in those countries (2.2.2-2.2.5). We proceed to study the support for the Global Climate Scheme in more detail, by means of a list experiment, petition, conjoint analyses, prioritization task, and by eliciting pros and cons (2.3). To understand the gap between support for global policies and their appearance in public discussion, we

²¹⁸ conclude by reporting results on underlying universalistic values (2.4) and beliefs about
²¹⁹ the support of others (2.5).

²²⁰ 2.1 Data

²²¹ The study relies on two sets of surveys: the *Global* survey and the *Complementary* sur-
²²² veys (see Table S1).

Table S1: [For Supplementary Material] Summary of the surveys used in the analysis.

Survey	<i>Global survey</i>	<i>Complementary surveys</i>		
	<i>Global</i>	<i>Eu</i>	<i>US1</i>	<i>US2</i>
Country coverage	20 countries	FR, DE, ES, UK	U.S.	U.S.
Sample size	40,680	3,000	3,000	2,000
Main purpose	Stated support for global policies	Focus on GCS (sincerity, rationales, etc.) + Support for global redistribution + Universalistic values		

²²³ **Global Survey** The *Global* survey, conducted in 2021, involved 40,680 respondents from
²²⁴ 20 countries, representing approximately 72% of global CO₂ emissions. This survey serves
²²⁵ as the basis for measuring stated support for various global policies worldwide. Detailed
²²⁶ information about the data collection process, sample representativeness, and analysis of
²²⁷ questions on national policies can be found in Dechezleprêtre et al. (2022).

²²⁸ **Complementary Surveys** To delve deeper into the sincerity and rationales behind sup-
²²⁹ port for the GCS and attitudes towards global policies, global redistribution, and univer-
²³⁰ salistic values, complementary surveys were conducted in 2023. These surveys are based
²³¹ on a sample of 8,000 respondents from France, Germany, Spain, the UK, and the U.S. The
²³² European survey (*Eu*) comprises 3,000 respondents, while the U.S. sample was collected
²³³ in two separate waves: *US1* with 3,000 respondents and *US2* with 2,000 respondents.
²³⁴ The survey questions in both the European and U.S. surveys are identical, except for an
²³⁵ additional question in *US2* that uses results from *US1* to assess the bandwagon effect.

²³⁶ The complementary surveys ensured representativeness along key dimensions: gen-
²³⁷ der, income, age, highest diploma, and degree of urbanization. The *Eu* survey is also
²³⁸ representative of its four countries in terms of population size, while the *US1* and *US2*

²³⁹ surveys are representative in terms of region and ethnicity. Tables S9-S10 confirm that our
²⁴⁰ samples closely match population frequencies. More detail on data collection is given in
²⁴¹ Section Methods. The questionnaires used in the surveys are provided in Appendices C
²⁴² and D.

²⁴³ 2.2 Stated support for global policies

²⁴⁴ 2.2.1 Global support


²⁴⁵ The Global survey shows strong support for climate policies enacted at the global
²⁴⁶ level (Figure 1). When asked “At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle
²⁴⁷ climate change need to be put in place?”, 70% (in the U.S.) to 94% (in Japan) choose the
²⁴⁸ global level. The next most popular choice is the federal or continental level, favored by
²⁴⁹ 52% of Americans and less than half of European respondents. Local policies receive the
²⁵⁰ least support. This preference for climate policies implemented at the global scale is in
²⁵¹ line with Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019b) and consistent with individuals’ concerns
²⁵² for the fairness and effectiveness of such policies, which have been identified as two of
²⁵³ the three key determinants of support, besides self-interest (Dechezleprêtre et al. 2022;
²⁵⁴ Douenne & Fabre 2022; Klenert et al. 2018).

²⁵⁵ Among the four global climate policies examined in the *Global* survey, three policies
²⁵⁶ garner high support across all countries (Figure 1). These policies include a global demo-
²⁵⁷ cratic assembly on climate change, a global tax on millionaires to finance low-income
²⁵⁸ countries contingent on their climate action, and a global carbon budget of +2°C divided
²⁵⁹ among countries based on tradable shares (or “global quota”), with the allocation of coun-
²⁶⁰ try shares unspecified.¹ The three policies garner a majority of absolute support (i.e.,
²⁶¹ “somewhat” or “strong” support) in all countries (except in the U.S. for the global assem-
²⁶² bly, 48% absolute support). In high-income countries, the global quota policy obtains 64%
²⁶³ absolute support and 84% relative support (i.e., excluding “indifferent” answers).

²⁶⁴ Following the support for the global quota, respondents are asked about their pref-

¹The policies were all described with further details to make sure people understood them. Specifically, the policies were presented as follows: an international emissions trading system where “countries that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less than their share”; “a tax on all millionaires in dollars around the world to finance low-income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate action [which] would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education”; “a global democratic assembly whose role would be to draft international treaties against climate change [where] each adult across the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly”.

Figure 1: Relative support for global climate policies.



Note 1: The numbers represent the share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* among non-*indifferent* answers (in percent, $n = 40,680$). The color blue denotes a relative majority. See Figure S11 for the absolute support. (Questions A-I).

Note 2: *In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

ferences for dividing the carbon budget among countries, as depicted in the third block of Figure 1. Consistent with the existing literature (see Appendix A.1.2), an equal per capita allocation of emission rights emerges as the preferred burden-sharing principle, garnering absolute majority support in all countries and never below 84% relative support. Taking into account historical responsibilities or vulnerability to climate damages is also popular, albeit with less consensus, while grandfathering (i.e., allocation of emission shares in proportion to current emissions) receives the least support in all countries.

A global quota with equal per capita emission rights should produce the same distributional outcomes as a global carbon tax that funds a global basic income.² The support

²Similarly, a global quota with grandfathering is equivalent to a global carbon tax where each country

for the global carbon tax is also tested and its redistributive effects – the average increase in expenditures along with the amount of the basic income – are specified to the respondents explicitly (see box below and Appendix D, p. 92). The support for the carbon tax is lower than for the quota, particularly in high-income countries, and there is no relative majority for the tax in Anglo-Saxon countries.³ Two possible reasons for this lower support are that distributive effects are made salient in the case of the tax, and that people may prefer a quota, perhaps because they find it more effective than a tax to reduce emissions. This interpretation is consistent with the level of support for the global quota once we make the distributive effects salient, as we do in the complementary surveys.

2.2.2 Global Climate Scheme

The complementary surveys (*US1, US2, Eu*) consist of a comprehensive exploration of citizens' attitudes towards the GCS. We present to respondents a detailed description of the GCS and explain its distributive effects, including specific amounts at stake (as specified in the box below). Furthermore, we assess respondents' understanding of the GCS with incentivized questions to test their comprehension of the expected financial outcome for typical individuals in high-income countries (loss) and the poorest individuals globally (gain), followed by the provision of correct answers (Figures S12-S13). The same approach is applied to a National Redistribution scheme (NR) targeting the top 5% (in the U.S.) or top 1% (in Europe) with the aim of financing cash transfers to all adults,⁴ calibrated to offset the monetary loss of the GCS for the median emitter in their country. We evaluate respondents' understanding that the richest would lose and the typical fellow citizens would gain from that policy. Subsequently, we summarize both schemes to enhance respondents' recall. Additionally, we present a final incentivized comprehension question and provide the expected answer that the combined GCS and NR would result in no net gain or loss for a typical fellow citizen. Finally, respondents are directly asked to express their support for the GCS and NR using a simple Yes/No question.

The stated support for the GCS is 54% in the U.S. and 76% in Europe,⁵ while the

keeps the revenues it collects.

³The levels of support are consistent with the findings of Carattini et al. (2019), the only previous study that tested a global carbon tax.

⁴The wider base in the U.S. was chosen because emissions are larger in the U.S. than in Europe, and it would hardly be feasible to offset the median American's loss by taxing only the top 1%.

⁵The 95% confidence intervals are [52.4%, 55.9%] in the U.S. and [74.2%, 77.2%] in Europe. The average support is computed with survey weights, employing weights based on quota variables, which exclude vote. Another method to reweigh the raw results involves running a regression of the support for the GCS

301 support for NR is very similar: 56% and 73% respectively (see Figure S1). Appendix F
302 examines the sociodemographic determinants of support for the GCS as well as the beliefs
303 correlated with the support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income. The
304 strongest correlates are political leaning, trust in the government and perceptions that the
305 policy is effective at reducing emissions or in one's self-interest.

The Global Climate Scheme The GCS consists of global emissions trading with emission rights being auctioned each year to polluting firms, and of a global basic income, funded by the auction revenues. Using the price and emissions trajectories from the report by Stern & Stiglitz (2017), and in particular a carbon price of \$90/tCO₂ in 2030, we estimate that the basic income would amount to \$30 per month for every human over the age of 15 (see details in Appendix E). We describe the GCS to the respondents as a "climate club" and we specify its redistributive effects: The 700 million people with less than \$2/day [in Purchasing Power Parity] would be lifted out of extreme poverty, and fossil fuel price increases would cost the typical person in their country a specified amount (see Appendix D for details). The monthly median net cost is \$85 in the U.S., €10 in France, €25 in Germany, €5 in Spain, £20 in the UK.

306

307 2.2.3 Global wealth tax

308 Consistent with the results of the global survey, a "tax on millionaires of all countries
309 to finance low-income countries" garners absolute majority support of over 67% in each
310 country, only 5 p.p. lower than a national millionaires tax overall (Figure 2). In random
311 subsamples, we inquire about respondents' preferences regarding the redistribution of
312 revenues from a global tax on individual wealth exceeding \$5 million, after providing in-
313 formation on the revenue raised by such a tax in their country compared to low-income
314 countries.⁶ We ask certain respondents ($n = 1,283$) what percentage of global tax revenues


on sociodemographic characteristics (including vote) and multiplying each coefficient by the population frequencies. This alternative approach yields similar figures: 76% in Europe and 52% or 53% in the U.S. (depending on whether individuals who did not disclose their vote are classified as non-voters or excluded). Notably, the average support excluding non-voters is 54% in the U.S.

⁶A 2% tax on net wealth exceeding \$5 million would annually raise \$816 billion, leaving unaffected 99.9% of the world population. More specifically, it would collect €5 billion in Spain, €16 billion in France, £20 billion in the UK, €44 billion in Germany, \$430 billion in the U.S., and \$1 billion collectively in all low-income countries (28 countries, home to 700 million people).

Figure S1: [For Supplementary Material, except first row to be included in Figure 2] Support for the GCS, NR and the combination of GCS, NR and C.
 (p. 92, Questions 20, 22, 35, 36, and 26).

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)	54	76	80	71	81	74
National redistribution scheme (NR)	56	73	77	66	79	75
National climate policy + GCS + NR	52	74	79	69	81	70

Figure S2: [For Supplementary Material] Percent of global wealth tax that should finance low-income countries (*mean*). (Question 37)



315 should be pooled to finance low-income countries. In each country, at least 88% of re-
 316 spondents indicate a positive amount, with an average ranging from 30% (Germany) to
 317 36% (U.S., France) (Figure S2). To other respondents ($n = 1,233$), we inquire whether they
 318 would prefer each country to retain all the revenues it collects or that half of the revenues
 319 be pooled to finance low-income countries. Approximately half of the respondents opt to
 320 allocate half of the tax revenues to low-income countries.

321 2.2.4 Other global policies

322 We also assess support for other global policies (Figure 2). Most policies garner rel-
 323 ative majority support in each country, with two exceptions: the “cancellation of low-
 324 income countries’ public debt” and “a maximum wealth limit” for each individual. The
 325 latter policy obtains relative majority support in Europe but not in the U.S., despite the
 326 cap being set at \$10 billion in the U.S. compared to €/£100 million in Europe. Notably,

Figure 2: Relative support for various global policies (percentage of *somewhat* or *strong support*, after excluding *indifferent* answers). (Questions 44 and 45; See Figure S33 for the absolute support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	55	71	72	70	79	70
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	68	82	82	82	85	81
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	60	76	77	79	79	71
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	46	53	53	43	62	61
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	58	71	69	69	78	72
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	62	73	58	73	80	83
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	63	80	80	78	81	83
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	62	87	90	86	91	87
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	46	62	58	62	65	67
National tax on millionaires funding public services	73	85	81	87	89	88
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	69	84	84	84	87	83

327 climate-related policies enjoy significant popularity, with “high-income countries funding
 328 renewable energy in low-income countries” receiving absolute majority support across all
 329 surveyed countries. Additionally, relative support for loss and damages compensation, as
 330 approved in principle at the international climate negotiations in 2022 (“COP27”), ranges
 331 from 55% (U.S.) to 81% (Spain), with absolute support ranging from 41% to 62%.

332 2.2.5 Foreign aid

333 We provide respondents with information about the actual amount “spent on foreign
 334 aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries” relative to their country’s government
 335 spending and GDP. Less than 16% of respondents state that their country’s foreign aid

should be reduced, while 62% express support for increasing it, including 17% who support an unconditional increase (Figure S3). Among the 45% who think aid should be increased under certain conditions, we subsequently ask them to specify the conditions they deem necessary (Figure S4). The three most commonly selected conditions are: “we can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted” (73% chose this condition), “that recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights” (67%), and “that other high-income countries also increase their foreign aid” (48%).⁷ On the other hand, respondents who do not wish to increase their country’s foreign aid primarily justify their view by prioritizing the well-being of their fellow citizens or by perceiving each country as responsible for its own fate (Figure S5). In response to an open-ended question regarding measures high-income countries should take to fight extreme poverty, a large majority of Americans expressed that more help is needed (Figure S46). The most commonly suggested form of aid is financial support, closely followed by investments in education.

We also inquire about the perceived amount of foreign aid. Consistent with prior research (see Appendix A.1.3), most people overestimate the actual amount of foreign aid (Figure S27). We then elicit respondents’ preferred amount of foreign aid, after randomly presenting them with either the actual amount or no information. Most of the respondents who learn the actual amount choose a bracket at least as high as the actual one, and most of those without the information choose a bracket at least as high as the perceived one (Figures S25–S29). Finally, we ask a last question to the respondents who received the information. To those who prefer an increase of foreign aid, we ask how they would finance it: by far, the preferred source of funding is higher taxes on the wealthiest (Figure S30). To those who prefer a reduction, we ask how they would use the funds becoming available: In every country, more people choose higher spending on education or healthcare rather than lower taxes (Figure S31).

2.3 Robustness and sincerity of support for the GCS

We use several methods to assess the sincerity of the support for the GCS: a list experiment, a real-stake petition, conjoint analyses, and the prioritization of policies. All methods suggest that the support is either completely sincere, or the share of insincere answers is limited.

⁷It is worth noting that these conditions align closely with the principles of the GCS.

Figure S3: [For Supplementary Material] Attitudes regarding the evolution of [own country] foreign aid. (Question 46)





Figure S4: [For Supplementary Material] Conditions at which foreign aid should be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish an increase of foreign aid at some conditions.] (Question 47)



³⁶⁷ 2.3.1 List experiment

³⁶⁸ By asking *how many* policies within a list respondents support and varying the list
³⁶⁹ among respondents, a list experiment allows identifying the tacit support for a policy of
³⁷⁰ interest. The tacit support is estimated as the difference in the average number of poli-
³⁷¹ cies supported between two groups, whose list differ only by the inclusion of that policy
³⁷² (Hainmueller et al. 2014). For example, say a first subsample faces the list of policies A,
³⁷³ B, and C, while a second subsamples faces the list A, B, C, and GCS. We do not need to

Figure S5: [For Supplementary Material] Reasons why foreign aid should not be increased (in percent). [Asked to those who wish a decrease or stability of foreign aid.] (Question 48)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Aid perpetuates poverty as it makes people feel less responsible for themselves	29	30	31	35	31	24
Aid is not effective as most of it is diverted	40	53	48	57	60	49
Aid is a pressure tactic for high-income countries that prevents low-income countries from developing freely	16	16	15	14	23	13
[Country] is not responsible for what happens in other countries	45	30	28	30	20	37
Charity begins at home: there is already a lot to do to support the [country] people in need	63	63	51	62	71	69

374 know which policies each respondent support to estimate the average (tacit) support for
 375 the GCS, we simply need to compute the difference in the average number of supported
 376 policies between the two random subsamples. List experiments have been used to reveal
 377 social desirability bias, silencing either racism in the Southern U.S. (Kuklinski et al. 1997)
 378 or opposition to the invasion of Ukraine in Russia (Chapkovski & Schaub 2022). In our
 379 case, as shown in Table 1, the tacit support for the GCS measured through the list exper-
 380 iment is not significantly lower than the direct stated support.⁸ Hence, we do not find a
 381 social desirability bias in our study.

382 2.3.2 Petition

383 We ask respondents whether they are willing to sign a petition in support of either
 384 the GCS or NR policy. We inform them that the petition results will be sent to the head
 385 of state's office, highlighting the proportion of fellow citizens endorsing the respective
 386 scheme. Even when framed as a real-stake petition, both policies continue to receive
 387 majority support. In the U.S., we find no significant difference between the support in the

⁸We utilize the difference-in-means estimator, and confidence intervals are computed using Monte Carlo simulation with the R package *list* (Imai 2011).

Table 1: Number of supported policies in the list experiment depending on the presence of the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) in the list. The tacit support for the GCS is estimated by regressing the number of supported policies on the presence of the GCS in the list of policies. The social desirability is estimated as the difference between the tacit and stated support, and it is not significantly different from zero even at a 20% threshold (see [Methods](#)).

	Number of supported policies		
	All	U.S.	Europe
List contains: GCS	0.624*** (0.028)	0.524*** (0.041)	0.724*** (0.036)
<i>Support for GCS</i>	0.65	0.542	0.757
<i>Social desirability bias</i>	-0.025	-0.019	-0.033
<i>80% C.I. for the bias</i>	[-0.06; 0.01]	[-0.07; 0.04]	[-0.08; 0.01]
Constant	1.317	1.147	1.486
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000
R ²	0.089	0.065	0.125

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

real-stake petitions and the simple questions (GCS: $p = .30$; NR: $p = .76$).⁹ In Europe, the petition leads to a comparable lower support for both the GCS (7 p.p., $p = 10^{-5}$) and NR (4 p.p., $p = .008$). While some European respondents are unwilling to sign a petition for policies they are expected to support, this effect is not specific to the GCS, and the overall willingness to sign a real-stake petition remains strong, with 69% expressing support for the GCS and 67% for NR.

2.3.3 Conjoint analyses

In order to assess the public support for the GCS in conjunction with other policies, we conduct a series of conjoint analyses. We ask respondents to make five choices between pairs of political platforms.

The first conjoint analysis suggests that the GCS is supported independently of being complemented by the National Redistribution Scheme and a national climate policy (“Coal exit” in the U.S., “Thermal insulation plan” in Europe, denoted C).¹⁰ For the sec-

⁹Paired weighted *t*-tests are conducted to test the equality in support for a policy among respondents who were questioned about the policy in the petition.

¹⁰Indeed, 54% of U.S. respondents and 74% of European ones prefer the combination of C, NR and the

⁴⁰¹ ond analysis, we split the sample into four random branches.¹¹ The outcome is that there
⁴⁰² is majority support for the GCS and for C, which are seen as neither complement nor sub-
⁴⁰³ stitute. A minor share of respondents like a national climate policy and dislike a global
⁴⁰⁴ one, but as many people prefer a global rather than a national policy; and there is no
⁴⁰⁵ evidence that implementing NR would increase the support for the GCS.

⁴⁰⁶ In the third analysis, we present two random branches of the sample with hypothetical
⁴⁰⁷ progressive and conservative platforms that differ only by the presence (or not) of the
⁴⁰⁸ GCS in the progressive platform. Table 2 shows that a progressive candidate would not
⁴⁰⁹ significantly lose voting share by endorsing the GCS in any country, and may even gain
⁴¹⁰ 11 p.p. ($p = .005$) in voting intention in France. Though the level of support for the GCS is
⁴¹¹ significantly lower in swing States (at 51%) that are key to win U.S. elections, the electoral
⁴¹² effect of endorsing the GCS remains non-significantly different from zero (at +1.2 p.p.) in
⁴¹³ these States.¹²

Table 2: Preference for a progressive platform depending on whether it includes the GCS or not. (Question 28)

	Prefers the Progressive platform					
	All	United States	France	Germany	UK	Spain
GCS in Progressive platform	0.028* (0.014)	0.029 (0.022)	0.112*** (0.041)	0.015 (0.033)	0.008 (0.040)	-0.015 (0.038)
Constant	0.623	0.604	0.55	0.7	0.551	0.775
Observations	5,202	2,619	605	813	661	504
R ²	0.001	0.001	0.013	0.0003	0.0001	0.0003

Note: Simple OLS model. The 14% of *None of them* answers have been excluded from the regression samples. GCS has no significant influence on them. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

⁴¹⁴ Our last two analyses make respondents choose between two random platforms. In
GCS to the combination of C and NR alone, indicating similar support for the GCS conditional on NR and
C than for the GCS alone (Figure S15).

¹¹Results from the first branch show that the support for the GCS conditional on NR, at 55% in the U.S. ($n = 757$) and 77% in Europe ($n = 746$), is not significantly different from the support for the GCS alone. This suggests that rejection of the GCS is not driven by the cost of the policy on oneself. The second branch shows that the support for C conditional on NR is somewhat higher, at 62% in the U.S. ($n = 751$) and 84% in Europe ($n = 747$). However, the third one shows no significant preference for C compared to GCS (both conditional on NR), neither in Europe, where GCS is preferred by 52% ($n = 741$) nor in the U.S., where C is preferred by 53% ($n = 721$). The fourth branch shows that 55% in the U.S. ($n = 771$) and 77% in Europe ($n = 766$) prefer the combination of C, NR and the GCS to NR alone.

¹²We define swing states as the 8 states with less than 5 p.p. margin of victory in the 2020 election (MI, NV, PA, WI, AZ, GA, NC, FL). The results are robust to using the 3 p.p. threshold (that excludes FL) instead.


⁴¹⁵ Europe, respondents are prompted to imagine that a left or center-left coalition will win
⁴¹⁶ the next election and are asked what platform they would prefer that coalition to have
⁴¹⁷ campaigned on. In the U.S., the question is framed as a hypothetical duel in a Democratic
⁴¹⁸ primary, and asked only to non-Republicans ($n = 2,218$), i.e. the respondents who declare
⁴¹⁹ as political affiliation *Democrat*, *Independent*, *Non-Affiliated* or *Other*. In the fourth analysis,
⁴²⁰ a policy (or an absence of policy) is randomly drawn for each platform in each of five
⁴²¹ categories: *economic issues*, *societal issues*, *climate policy*, *tax system*, *foreign policy* (Figure S6).

⁴²² Except for the category *foreign policy*, which features the GCS 42% of the time, the
⁴²³ policies are prominent progressive policies and they are drawn uniformly. In the UK,
⁴²⁴ Germany, and France, a platform is about 9 to 13 p.p. more likely to be preferred if it
⁴²⁵ includes the GCS rather than no foreign policy.¹³ This effect is between 1 and 4 p.p.
⁴²⁶ and no longer significant in the U.S. and in Spain. Moreover, a platform that includes
⁴²⁷ a global tax on millionaires rather than no foreign policy is 5 to 13 percentage points
⁴²⁸ (p.p.) more likely to be preferred in all countries (the effect is significant and at least
⁴²⁹ 9 p.p. in all countries but Spain). Similarly, a global democratic assembly on climate
⁴³⁰ change has a significant effect of 8 to 12 p.p. in the U.S., Germany, and France. These
⁴³¹ effects are large, and not far from the effects of the policies most influential on the plat-
⁴³² forms, which range between 15 and 18 p.p. in most countries (and 27 p.p. in Spain), and
⁴³³ all relate to improved public services (in particular healthcare, housing, and education).


¹³This is the Average Marginal Component Effect computed following Hainmueller et al. (2014).

Figure S6: [For Supplementary Material] Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See English translations in Figure S16; Question 29)

(a) U.S. (Asked only to non-Republicans)



(b) France



(c) Germany

Klimaschutz:

- Verpflichtende Solaranlagen auf allen geeigneten Dächern
- Plan zur Wärmedämmung
- Verbot des Verkaufs von Neuwagen mit Verbrennungsmotor bis 2030

Wirtschaftspolitik:

- Erhöhung des Regelsatzes des Bürgergelds auf bis zu 600€ pro Monat
- Bürgerversicherung als gerechtere Sozialversicherung
- Staatschuldenquote auf unter 60% reduzieren
- Investitionen für Gigabit-Netzwerke bereitstellen

Außenpolitik:

- Globales Klimaprogramm
- Globale Steuer auf Millionäre
- Globale demokratische Versammlung zum Klimawandel
- Verdopplung der Mittel für die Entwicklungshilfe in einkommensschwachen Ländern


Gesellschaft:

- Volksscheid auf Bundesebene

- Cannabis-Legalisierung

Steuerpolitik:

- Nationales Umverteilungsprogramm
- Die Vermögenssteuer wieder in Kraft setzen



(d) Spain

Política climática:

- 100% de electricidad producida con energías renovables en 2040
- Plan de aislamiento térmico
- Prohibir la venta de coches nuevos con motor de combustión para 2030

Asuntos económicos:


- Más necesidades sanitarias dentro del sistema público (cuidado dental, gafas, salud mental)
- Ingreso Básico Garantizado de 600€ al mes
- Jornada laboral de 34 horas semanales
- Inversión en el sistema educativo y universalización de la educación preescolar

Política exterior:

- Plan climático global
- Impuesto mundial a los millonarios
- Asamblea democrática mundial sobre el cambio climático
- Duplicar la ayuda exterior a los países de renta baja

Asuntos sociales:

- Reformar la ley electoral para hacer el Senado más proporcional
- Abolición de la prostitución
- Plan de redistribución nacional
- Aumentar los impuestos sobre las rentas superiores a 100.000 euros anuales



(e) UK

Climate policy:

- Ban of most polluting vehicles in city centers (low-emission zones)
- Thermal insulation plan
- Ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030

Economic issues:

- £150 billion to upgrade schools, hospitals, care homes and council houses
- Real Living Wage of £11 per hour for all workers aged 16 and over
- Reduce the average full-time weekly working hours to 32
- Re-establish neighbourhood policing and recruit 2,000 more frontline officers

Foreign policy:


- Global climate scheme
- Global tax on millionaires
- Global democratic assembly on climate change
- Doubling foreign aid

Societal issues:

- Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation
- Legalization of cannabis


Tax system:

- National redistribution scheme
- Wealth tax



434 The fifth analysis draws random platforms similarly, except that candidate A's platform
 435 always contains the GCS while B's includes no foreign policy. In this case, A is chosen by
 436 60% in Europe and 58% in the U.S. (Figure S7). Overall, taking the U.S. as an example, our
 437 conjoint analyses indicate that a candidate at the Democratic primary would have more
 438 chances to obtain the nomination by endorsing the GCS, and this endorsement would not
 439 penalize her or him at the presidential election. This result reminds the finding that 12%
 440 of Germans shift their voting intention from SPD and CDU/CSU to the Greens and the
 441 Left when they are told that the latter parties support global democracy (Ghassim 2020).

Figure S7: [For Supplementary Material] Influence of the GCS on preferred platform: Preference for a random platform A that contains the Global Climate Scheme rather than a platform B that does not (in percent). (Question 30; in the U.S., asked only to non-Republicans.)



442 2.3.4 Prioritization

443 Towards the end of the survey, we ask respondents to allocate 100 points among six
 444 randomly selected policies from the previous conjoint analyses, using sliders. The instruc-
 445 tion was to distribute the points based on their level of support, with a higher allocation
 446 indicating greater support for a policy. As a result, the average support across policies is
 447 16.67 points. In each country, the GCS ranks in the middle of all policies or above, with
 448 an average number of points from 15.4 in the U.S. to 22.9 in Germany.

449 Interestingly, in Germany, the most prioritized policy is the global tax on millionaires,
 450 while the GCS is the second most prioritized policy. The global tax on millionaires con-
 451 sistently ranks no lower than fifth position (out of 15 or 17 policies) in every country,
 452 garnering an average of 18.3 points in Spain to 22.9 points in Germany.

453 This question sheds light on a potential discrepancy between the policy priorities of
 454 the public and those enacted by legislators. For instance, while the European Union and
 455 California have enacted plans to phase out new combustion-engine cars by 2035, the pro-
 456 posal to “ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2030” emerged as one of the

⁴⁵⁷ three least prioritized policies in each country, with an average allocation of 7.8 points in
⁴⁵⁸ France to 11.4 points in the UK.

⁴⁵⁹ **2.3.5 Pros and Cons**

⁴⁶⁰ We survey respondents to gather their perspectives on the pros and cons of the GCS,
⁴⁶¹ utilizing either an open-ended or a closed question. In the closed question format, re-
⁴⁶² spondents tend to consider every argument as important in determining their support
⁴⁶³ or opposition to the GCS (see Figure S17). Notably, the least important aspect was the
⁴⁶⁴ negative impact on their household, with 60% in Europe ($n=1,505$) and 75% in the U.S.
⁴⁶⁵ ($n=493$) finding it important. The most important elements differ between Europe and the
⁴⁶⁶ U.S. In Europe, the key factors are the GCS's potential to limit climate change and reduce
⁴⁶⁷ poverty in low-income countries, both deemed important by 85% of respondents. In the
⁴⁶⁸ U.S., having sufficient information about the scheme ranks highest at 89%, followed by
⁴⁶⁹ its potential to foster global cooperation at 82%. However, due to the limited variation in
⁴⁷⁰ the ratings for each element, the closed question format is inconclusive (Figure S17).

⁴⁷¹ The open-ended question provides more insights into what people associate with the
⁴⁷² GCS when prompted to think about it. Analyzing keywords in the responses (automati-
⁴⁷³ cally translated into English), the most frequently mentioned topics are the international
⁴⁷⁴ aspect and the environment, each appearing in approximately one-quarter of the answers
⁴⁷⁵ (see Figure S19). This is followed by discussions on the effects of the GCS on poverty and
⁴⁷⁶ prices, each mentioned by about one-tenth of the respondents. We also manually clas-
⁴⁷⁷ sified each answer into different categories (see Figure S18). This exercise confirms the
⁴⁷⁸ findings from the automatic search: the environmental benefit of the GCS is the most
⁴⁷⁹ commonly discussed topic, while obstacles to implementation or agreement on the pro-
⁴⁸⁰ posal are relatively infrequently mentioned.¹⁴

⁴⁸¹ In the US2 survey, we divided the sample into four random branches. Two branches
⁴⁸² were presented the pros and cons questions (either in open or closed format) *before* being
⁴⁸³ asked about their support for the GCS or NR. Another branch received information on
⁴⁸⁴ the actual level of support for the GCS and NR (estimated in US1, see Section 2.5), and
⁴⁸⁵ one control group received none of these treatments. The objective of this "pros and
⁴⁸⁶ cons treatment" was to simulate a "campaign effect", which refers to the shift in opinion

¹⁴Moreover, around one in four respondents explicitly cites pros or cons. Few individuals explicitly express support or opposition, and misunderstandings are rare. Only 11% of the responses are empty or express a lack of opinion, though one-quarter are unclassifiable due to the rarity, nonsensical nature, or irrelevance of the conveyed idea.

487 resulting from media coverage of the proposal. To conservatively estimate the effect of
488 a (potentially negative) campaign, we intentionally included more cons (6) than pros (3).
489 Interestingly, the support for the GCS decreased by 11 p.p. after respondents viewed a
490 list of its pros and cons.¹⁵ Notably, the support also decreased by 7 p.p. after respondents
491 were asked to consider the pros and cons in an open-ended question. Although support
492 remains significant,¹⁶ these results suggest that the public success of the GCS would be
493 sensitive to the content of the debate about it, and subject to the discourse adopted by
494 interest groups.

495 2.4 Universalistic values

496 We also elicit underlying values, to test whether broad values are consistent with peo-
497 ple's support for specific policies. When we ask respondents which group they defend
498 when they vote, 20% choose "sentient beings (humans and animals)," 22% choose "hu-
499 mans," 33% select their "fellow citizens" (or "Europeans"), 15% choose "My family and
500 myself," and the remaining 10% choose another group (mainly "My State or region" or
501 "People sharing my culture or religion"). The first two categories, representing close to
502 one out of two people, can be described as universalist in their vote. Notably, a majority
503 of left-wing voters can even be considered universalist voters (see Figure S47 for main
504 attitudes by vote).

505 When asked what their country's diplomats should defend in international climate
506 negotiations, only 11% prefer their country's "interests, even if it goes against global jus-
507 tice." In contrast, 30% prefer global justice (with or without consideration of national
508 interests), and the bulk of respondents (38%) prefer their country's "interests, to the ex-
509 tent it respects global justice."

510 Furthermore, when we ask respondents to assess the extent to which climate change,
511 global poverty, and inequality in their country are issues, climate change is generally
512 viewed as the most significant problem (with a mean score of 0.59 after recoding answers
513 between -2 and 2). This is followed by global poverty (0.42) and national inequality (0.37).

514 Finally, we conduct a lottery experiment to elicit universalistic values. Respondents

¹⁵Surprisingly, the support for National Redistribution also decreased by 7 p.p. following the closed question about the GCS. This suggests that some individuals may lack attention and confuse the two policies, or that contemplating the pros and cons alters the mood of some people, moving them away from their initial positive impression.

¹⁶Despite some significant effects of pondering the pros and cons, approximately half of the Americans express support for the GCS across all treatment branches (see Table S2).

515 were automatically enrolled in a lottery with a \$100 prize and had to choose the proportion
516 of the prize they would keep for themselves versus give to a person living in poverty.
517 The charity donation is directed either to an African individual or a fellow citizen, de-
518 pending on the respondent's random assignment. In Europe, we observe no significant
519 variation in the willingness to donate based on the recipient's origin. In the U.S., the do-
520 nations to Africans are 3 p.p. lower (with an average donation of 34%), but the slightly
521 lower donations to Africans are entirely driven by Trump voters and non-voters (Table
522 S3).

523 Overall, answers to these broad value questions are consistent with half of Ameri-
524 cans and three quarters of Europeans supporting global policies like the GCS: people are
525 almost as much willing to give to poor Africans than to poor fellow citizens, find that
526 global issues are among the biggest problems, almost half of them are universalist when
527 they vote, and most of them wish that their diplomats take into account global justice.

528 2.5 Second-order Beliefs

529 To explain the strong support for the GCS despite its absence from political platforms
530 and public debate, we hypothesized pluralistic ignorance, i.e. that the public and policy-
531 makers mistakenly perceive the GCS as unpopular. As a result, individuals might conceal
532 their support for such globally redistributive policies, believing that advocating for them
533 would be futile. However, the evidence for pluralistic ignorance is limited based on an
534 incentivized question about perceived support (Figure S8).

535 In the case of Americans, their beliefs about the level of support for the GCS are rel-
536 atively accurate. The mean perceived support is 52% (with quartiles of 36%, 52%, and
537 68%), which closely aligns with the actual support of 53%. Europeans, on the other hand,
538 underestimate the support by 17 p.p. Nonetheless, 65% of them correctly estimate that
539 the GCS garners majority support, and the mean perceived support is 59% (and quar-
540 tiles of 43%, 61%, and 74%), compared to the actual support of 76%. Second-order beliefs
541 are equally accurate for NR in the U.S. and similarly underestimated in Europe. Finally,
542 consistent with Americans accurately perceiving the levels of support for the GCS or NR,
543 providing information on the actual level had no significant effect on their support in the
544 US2 survey.

Figure S8: [For Supplementary Material] Beliefs regarding the support for the GCS and NR. (Questions 21 and 23)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Belief about GCS	52	59	61	56	63	57
Support for the GCS	54	76	80	71	81	74
Belief about NR	55	58	60	53	62	59
Support for NR	56	73	77	66	79	75

545 3 Discussion

546 Our point of departure are recent surveys conducted in 20 of the largest countries, as
 547 they reveal robust majority support for global redistributive and climate policies, even
 548 in high-income countries that would financially lose from them. The results from com-
 549 plementary surveys conducted in the U.S. and four European countries reinforce these
 550 findings. We find strong support for global taxes on the wealthiest individuals, as well
 551 as majority support for our main policy of interest – the Global Climate Scheme (GCS).
 552 The GCS encompasses carbon pricing at a global level through an emissions trading sys-
 553 tem, accompanied by a global basic income funded by the scheme's revenues. Additional
 554 experiments, such as a list experiment and a real-stake petition, demonstrate that the
 555 support for the GCS is real. Such genuine support is further substantiated by the prioriti-
 556 zation of the GCS over prominent national climate policies and aligned with a significant
 557 portion of the population holding universalistic values rather than nationalistic or ego-
 558 istic ones. Moreover, the conjoint analyses indicate that a progressive candidate would
 559 not lose voting shares by endorsing the GCS, and may even gain 11 p.p. in voting shares
 560 in France. Similarly, a candidate endorsing the GCS would gain votes in a U.S. Demo-
 561 cratic primary, while in Europe, a progressive platform that includes the GCS would be
 562 preferred over one that does not.

563 Having ruled out insincerity and underestimation of fellow citizens' support as po-
 564 tential explanations for the scarcity of global policies in the public debate, we propose
 565 alternative explanations. The first two are variations of pluralistic ignorance, and the last

566 three represent complementary explanations.

567 First, there may be pluralistic ignorance *among policymakers* regarding universalistic
568 values, support for the GCS, or the electoral advantage of endorsing it. Second, people or
569 policymakers may believe that globally redistributive policies are politically infeasible in
570 some key (potentially foreign) countries like the U.S. Third, political discourse centrally
571 happens at the national level, shaped by national media and institutions such as voting.
572 National framing by political voices may create biases and suppress universalistic values.
573 Fourth, many individuals, including policymakers, may perceive global redistributive
574 policies as ill-defined or technically infeasible, ultimately dismissing them as unrealistic.
575 In particular, policymakers may have insider information about the technical feasibility of
576 such policies. Alternatively, the perception of unrealism may stem from an unawareness
577 of specific proposals. Fifth, just as policy is disproportionately influenced by the economic
578 elites (Gilens & Page 2014; Persson & Sundell 2023), public debate may be shaped by the
579 wealthiest, who have vested interests in preventing global redistribution.

580 Confirmation of any of these hypotheses would lead to a common conclusion: there
581 exists substantial support for global policies addressing climate change and global in-
582 equality, even in high-income countries, and the perceived boundaries of political realism
583 on this issue may soon shift. Uncovering evidence to support the above hypotheses could
584 draw attention to global policies in the public debate and contribute to their increased
585 prominence.

586 Methods

587 **Data collection.** The paper utilizes two sets of surveys: the *Global* survey and the *Complementary*
588 surveys. The *Complementary* surveys consist of two U.S. surveys, *US1* and *US2*, and one European
589 survey, *Eu*. The *Global* survey was conducted from March 2021 to March 2022 on 40,680 respon-
590 dents from 20 countries (with 1,465 to 2,488 respondents per country). *US1* collected responses
591 from 3,000 respondents between January and March 2023, while *US2* gathered data from 2,000
592 respondents between March and April 2023. *Eu* included 3,000 respondents and was conducted
593 from February to March 2023. We used the survey companies *Dynata* and *Respondi*. To ensure rep-
594 resentative samples, we employed stratified quotas based on gender, age (5 brackets), income (4),
595 region (4), education level (3), and ethnicity (3) for the U.S. We also incorporated survey weights
596 throughout the analysis to account for any remaining imbalances. These weights were constructed
597 using the quota variables as well as the degree of urbanity, and trimmed between 0.25 and 4. By
598 applying weights, the results are fully representative of the respective countries. Results at the
599 European level apply different weights which ensure representativeness of the combined four Eu-

600 ropean countries. Appendix G confirms that our samples are representative of the population.
601 Appendix I shows that the treatment branches are balanced. Appendix J runs placebo tests of the
602 effects of each treatment on unrelated outcomes. We do not find effects of earlier treatments on
603 unrelated outcomes arriving later in the survey.

604 **Data quality.** The median duration is 28 minutes for the *Global* survey, 14 min for *US1*, 11 min
605 for *US2*, and 20 min for *Eu*. To ensure the best possible data quality, we exclude respondents who
606 fail an attention test or rush through the survey (i.e., answer in less than 11.5 minutes in the *Global*
607 survey, 4 minutes in *US1* or *US2*, 6 minutes in *Eu*).

608 **Questionnaires and raw results.** The questionnaire and raw results of the *Global* survey can be
609 found in the Appendix of the companion paper (*Dechezleprêtre et al. 2022*). The raw results are
610 reported in Appendix B¹⁷ while the surveys' structures and questionnaires are given in Appen-
611 dices C and D. The questionnaires are the same as the ones given *ex ante* in the registration plan
612 (osf.io/fy6gd).

613 **Incentives.** To encourage accurate and truthful responses, several questions of the *US1* survey
614 use incentives. For each of the three comprehension questions that follow the policy descrip-
615 tions, we randomly select and reward three respondents who provide correct answers with a \$50
616 gift certificate. Similarly, for questions involving estimating support shares for the GCS and NR,
617 three respondents with the closest guesses to the actual values receive a \$50 gift certificate. In the
618 donation lottery question, we randomly select one respondent and split the \$100 prize between
619 the NGO GiveDirectly and the winner according to the winner's choice. In total, our incentives
620 scheme distributes gift certificates (and donations) for a value of \$850. Finally, respondents have
621 an incentive to answer truthfully to the petition question, as they are aware that the results for
622 that question (the share of respondents supporting the policy) will be transmitted to the U.S. Pres-
623 ident's office.

624 **Data and code availability**

625 All data and code of the *Complementary* surveys as well as figures of the paper are available on
626 github.com/bixiou/global_tax_attitudes. Data and code for the *Global* survey will be made public
627 upon publication.

¹⁷Country-specific raw results are also available as supplementary material files: [US](#), [EU](#), [FR](#), [DE](#), [ES](#), [UK](#).

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998 **A Literature review**

999 **A.1 Attitudes and perceptions**

1000 **A.1.1 Population attitudes on global policies**

1001 Using representative samples in 125 countries covering 96% of the world's greenhouse
1002 gas emissions, Andre et al. (2024) show that 69% of the global population express willingness
1003 to contribute 1% of their income to fight global warming. Carattini et al. (2019) test
1004 the support for six variants of a global carbon tax on samples in five countries, representative
1005 along gender and age. For a given variant, the sample size is about 167 respondents per country.
1006 They find over 80% support for any variant in India, between 50% and 65% in Australia, the UK and South Africa, and 43% to 59% in the U.S., depending on the
1007 variant. Notably, the support for a global carbon tax funding an equal dividend for each
1008 human is close to 50% in high-income countries (e.g., at 44% in the U.S.), consistently with
1009 our results from the *Global* survey (see Figure 1). This is another piece of evidence that the
1010 support is lower for a tax that would "only" reduce CO₂ emissions than for a quota that
1011 would unambiguously achieve the climate target. Using a conjoint analysis in the U.S.
1012 and Germany, Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019b) find that the support for a carbon tax
1013 increases by up to 50% if it applies to all industrialized countries rather than exclusively
1014 to one's own country.

1016 In surveys conducted in Brazil, Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S., Ghassim (2020)
1017 finds support ranging from 55% to 74% for "a global democracy including both a global
1018 government and a global parliament, directly elected by the world population, to recom-
1019 mend and implement policies on global issues". Through an experiment, he also finds
1020 that, in countries where the government stems from a coalition, voting shares would shift
1021 by 8 (Brazil) to 12 p.p. (Germany) from parties who are said to oppose global democracy
1022 to parties that supposedly support it. For instance, when Germans respondents were told
1023 that (only) the Greens and the Left support global democracy, these parties gained re-
1024 spectively 9 and 3 p.p. in vote intentions, while the SPD and the CDU-CSU each lost 6
1025 p.p. Ghassim (2020) also presents survey results showing strong majorities in favor of the
1026 direct election of one's country's UN representative in all 18 surveyed countries. Simi-
1027 larly, in each of 10 countries, there are clear majorities in favor of "a new supranational
1028 entity [taking] enforceable global decisions in order to solve global risks" (Global Chal-
1029 lenges Foundation 2018). Remarkably, already in 1946, 54% of Americans agreed (while

1030 24% disagreed) that “the UN should be strengthened to make it a world government with
1031 the power to control the armed forces of all nations” (Gallup 1946). Furthermore, in sur-
1032 veys conducted in Argentina, China, India, Russia, Spain, and the U.S., Ghassim et al.
1033 (2022) find majority support for UN reforms that would make United Nations’ decisions
1034 binding, give veto powers to a few other major countries at the Security Council, or com-
1035 plement the highest body of the UN with a chamber of directly elected representatives.

1036 Relatedly, Meiland et al. (2023) find that both Americans and French people prefer an
1037 international settlement of climate justice, even if it encroaches on sovereignty. In a 2013
1038 survey conducted in China, Germany, and the U.S., Schleich et al. (2016) show that over
1039 three-quarter of people think that international climate agreements reached so far are not
1040 successful and that future agreements are important. In Finland, Sivonen (2022) finds that
1041 that support for a carbon tax is higher if implemented at the global level (54%) rather than
1042 at the national level (40%).

1043 The results from these specific questions are in line with the answers to more general
1044 questions. In each of 36 countries, ISSP (2010) find near consensus that “for environmental
1045 problems, there should be international agreements that [their country] and other coun-
1046 tries should be made to follow” (overall, 82% agree and 4% disagree). In each of 29 coun-
1047 tries, ISSP (2019) uncover near consensus that “Present economic differences between rich
1048 and poor countries are too large” (overall, 78% agree and 5% disagree). Leiserowitz et al.
1049 (2021) reveal that 66% of Americans support providing “financial aid and technical sup-
1050 port to developing countries that agree to limit their greenhouse gas emissions.” Fehr
1051 et al. (2022) find that 90% of Germans want some degree of global redistribution.

1052 A.1.2 Population attitudes on climate burden sharing

1053 Despite differences in the description of fairness principles, surveys on burden-sharing
1054 rules show consistent attitudes. Or at least, their seemingly contradictory results can be
1055 made compatible with the following interpretation: Concerning emissions reductions,
1056 most people want that every country engage in strong and collective decarbonization ef-
1057 forts, with a global quota converging to climate neutrality in the medium run. Concerning
1058 the financial effort, most people support high-emitting countries paying and low-income
1059 countries receiving funding. The most supported rules are those perceived as equitable,
1060 in particular an equal right to emit per person.

1061 This interpretation helps to understand the apparent differences between articles that
1062 approach burden sharing from different angles: cost sharing (in money terms), effort shar-

1063 ing (in terms of emissions reductions), or resource sharing (in terms of rights to emit).
1064 Existing papers adopt either the cost sharing or effort sharing approach, which preclude
1065 any country from being a net receiver of funds. Also, by focusing on *either* the financial
1066 or the decarbonization effort, these surveys miss the other half of the picture, which can
1067 explain why some papers find strong support for the ability-to-pay principle while others
1068 find strong support for grandfathering (defined as emissions reductions being the same
1069 in every country). The literature follows these approaches to align with the notions used
1070 by the UNFCCC. Yet, we argue that the resource sharing approach is preferable for un-
1071 covering attitudes, as it unambiguously describes the distributive implications of each
1072 rule while achieving an efficient geographical distribution of emissions reductions and
1073 explicitly allowing for monetary gains for some countries.

1074 Now, let us summarize the results of the different papers in the light of this clarifica-
1075 tion. [Schleich et al. \(2016\)](#) find an identical ranking of support for burden-sharing prin-
1076 ciples in China, Germany, and the U.S.: polluter-pays followed by ability-to-pay, equal
1077 emissions per capita, and grandfathering. Note that the authors do not allow for emis-
1078 sions trading in their description of equal *emissions per capita*, which may explain its rel-
1079 atively low support. Yet, the relative support for egalitarianism also depends on how
1080 *the other* rules are described. Indeed, [Carlsson et al. \(2011\)](#) find that Swedes prefer that
1081 “all countries are allowed to emit an equal amount per capita” rather than options where
1082 emissions are reduced based on current or historical emissions, for which it is explicitly
1083 stated that high-emitting countries “will continue to emit more than others”. [Bechtel &](#)
1084 [Scheve \(2013\)](#) find agreement that rich countries should pay more and historical emissions
1085 should matter, but that efforts should not be solely borne by wealthy nations. More pre-
1086 cisely, their conjoint analysis conducted in France, Germany, the UK, and the U.S. shows
1087 that a climate agreement is 15 p.p. more likely to be preferred (to a random alternative)
1088 if it includes 160 countries rather than 20, and 5 p.p. less likely to be preferred if “only
1089 rich countries pay” compared to other burden-sharing rules: “rich countries pay more
1090 than poor”, “countries pay proportional to current emissions” or “countries pay propor-
1091 tional to historical emissions”. In Germany and the U.S., [Gampfer et al. \(2014\)](#) also find
1092 stronger support for funding climate action in low-income countries when cost is shared
1093 with other countries. Using a choice experiment, [Carlsson et al. \(2013\)](#) find that the least
1094 preferred option in China and the U.S. is when low-emitting countries are exempted from
1095 any effort. Ability-to-pay is appreciated in both countries and is the preferred option in
1096 the U.S., though the preferred option in China is another one that accounts for historical

1097 responsibility. In the U.S. and France, [Meilland et al. \(2023\)](#) find that the most favored
1098 fairness principle is that “all countries commit to converge to the same average of total
1099 emissions per inhabitant, compatible with a controlled climate change”. Furthermore, in
1100 each country, 73% disagree with grandfathering defined as “countries which emitted a
1101 lot of carbon in the past have a right to continue emitting more than others in the future”.
1102 The study by [Meilland et al. \(2023\)](#) contains many other results: for instance, majorities
1103 prefer to hold countries accountable for their consumption-based rather than territorial
1104 emissions, and the median choice regarding historical responsibility is to hold a country
1105 accountable for its post-1990 emissions (rather than post-1850 or just their current emis-
1106 sions). Finally, in each of 28 (among the largest) countries, [Dabla-Norris et al. \(2023\)](#) find
1107 strong majority for “all countries” to the question “Which countries do you think should
1108 be paying to reduce carbon emissions?”. When asked to choose between a cost sharing
1109 based on *current* vs. *accumulated historic emissions*, a majority prefers *current emissions* in
1110 all countries but China and Saudi Arabia (where the two options are close to equally
1111 preferred).

(Back to Section [2.2.1](#))

1112 A.1.3 Population attitudes on foreign aid

1113 There is an extensive literature on attitudes towards foreign aid in donor countries.
1114 The key findings indicate that most people overestimate the amount of foreign aid and
1115 that only a minority wants a cut in foreign aid compared to actual amounts, especially
1116 once they become aware of them.

1117 For instance, [PIPA \(2001\)](#) shows that 83% of Americans support a multilateral effort
1118 to cut world hunger in half. [PIPA \(2008\)](#) shows that in each of 20 countries, a majority
1119 thinks that developed countries “have a moral responsibility to work to reduce hunger
1120 and severe poverty in poor countries”, with an average agreement of 81%. In 7 OECD
1121 countries, the study finds that at least 75% of respondents are willing to pay for a program
1122 to cut hunger in half (at an estimated cost of, e.g., \$50 a year for each American).

1123 ? find that perceived aid is overestimated in each of the 24 countries they study, on
1124 average by a factor of 7. In most countries, desired aid is larger than perceived aid.¹⁸ They
1125 show that individuals in the top income quintile desire aid 0.13 p.p. lower than those in
1126 the bottom 40% – which is very close to what we find. By employing a theoretical model
1127 and examining correlations between lobbying and actual aid (controlling for desired aid),

¹⁸[Kaufmann et al. \(2012\)](#) offer the best results on desired aid because (as [Hudson & van Heerde \(2012\)](#) criticize), other studies did not take into account misperceptions of actual aid.

they argue that the gap between actual and desired aid stems from the political influence of the rich who defend their vested interests. In Kaufmann et al. (2012), the U.S. is an outlier: desired aid is at the other countries' average (3% of GNI), but as misperceptions are enormous, perceived aid is twice as large as desired aid. Indeed, Gilens (2001) shows that even Americans with high political knowledge misperceive actual aid, and finds that 17% fewer of them want to cut aid when we provide them specific information about the amount of aid. Similarly, Nair (2018) finds that the relatively low support for aid in the U.S. is driven by information on global distribution, as people underestimate their rank by 27 centiles on average and overestimate the global median income by a factor 10.

Hudson & van Heerde (2012) provide a critical review of the literature and show that the strong support for poverty alleviation largely stems from intrinsic altruism. They note that, according to DFID (2009) and PIPA (2001), 47% of British people find that the aid is wasted (mainly due to corruption), while Americans estimate that less than a quarter of the aid reaches those in need, with over half ending up in the hands of corrupt government officials. Despite these perceptions, most people still support aid, suggesting the presence of nonutilitarian motives. Consistent with Henson et al. (2010), Bauhr et al. (2013) find that support for aid is reduced by the perception of corruption in recipient countries. However, this effect is mitigated by the aid-corruption paradox: countries with higher levels of corruption often need more help. Bodenstein & Faust (2017) further show that right-wing Europeans, as well as those who perceive strong corruption in their country, are more likely to agree that recipient countries should "follow certain rules regarding democracy, human rights and governance as a condition for receiving EU development aid." Using a 2002 Gallup survey and the 2006 World Values Survey, and in line with Bayram (2017), Paxton & Knack (2012) show that the main determinants for wanting more aid are trust, left-wing ideology, interest in politics, and being a woman (all positively associated).

(Back to Section 2.2.5)

A.1.4 Population attitudes on taxes on the rich

We are not aware of any previous survey on a global wealth tax,¹⁹ though surveys consistently show strong support for national wealth taxes. In a comprehensive survey conducted in the UK, Rowlingson et al. (2021) show that a wealth tax is the preferred option for raising revenues. Only 8% of respondents state that total net wealth should not

¹⁹We did not find any using the combination of "survey" or "attitudes" with "wealth tax" or "global wealth tax" in Google Scholar.

be taxed (with little differences between Labour and Conservative voters). The study also finds that the preferred design would be a 1% or 3% tax on net wealth above £1 million. By asking how much taxes per year should a person with a certain income and wealth level pay, Fisman et al. (2017) finds that the average American favors a 0.8% linear tax rate on unspecified wealth up to \$2 million (the highest wealth level tested), and a 3% linear rate on inherited wealth. Through a conjoint analysis conducted in three high-income countries, Schechtl & Tisch (2023) find widespread support for a wealth tax (from 78% in the U.S. to 86% in Germany and the UK), with a preference for an exemption threshold set at \$/€1 million (rather than 500,000 or 2 million) with the tax rate and tax unit having little influence on the preferred design. In 21 OECD countries, the OECD (2019) uncovers strong majority support for higher taxes on the rich to support the poor, with nearly 70% overall agreement and less than 20% disagreement. Isbell (2022) finds similarly high level of support in 34 African countries. In the UK, Patriotic Millionaires (2022) find 69% support (and 7% opposition) for a 1.1% tax on wealth in excess of £10 million. In the U.S., Americans for Tax Fairness (2021) find that 67% to 71% of the respondents support to “raise taxes for those earning more than \$400,000 a year”, “raise the income tax rate for those earning over \$1 million a year by 10 percentage points”, or “apply a 2% tax on an individual’s wealth above \$50 million each year, and 3% on wealth above \$1 billion”.

A.1.5 Population attitudes on ethical norms

As argued by Nyborg et al. (2016), social norms can be the solution to the collective action problem. As such, universalistic values and free-riding attitudes are key.

Universalism Various studies have examined the concept of global identity (see Reysen & Katzarska-Miller (2018) for a review). In the 2005-2008 wave of the World Values Survey, Bayram (2015) notes that “78% of the participants in 57 countries see themselves as citizens of the world”, though the 2017-2022 wave reveals that more people feel close to their town, region or country than to the world. Enke et al. (2023a) measure universalism at the U.S. district level using donation data, and find that a district’s universalism predicts electoral outcomes better than its income or education level. To measure universalism at the individual level, Enke et al. (2023c) ask American respondents to split \$100 between a random stranger and a random person with the same income but closer to them. They distinguish different facets of universalism, and define *foreign universalism* as the inclination to give to a foreigner rather than a fellow citizen. They find a home bias

1191 for most people, which could partly be attributed to concerns about inequality, as the split
1192 involves two persons with the same income, with the foreigner most certainly living in
1193 a poorer country than the American and thus enjoying a higher social status. That being
1194 said, a home bias probably remains even after accounting for concerns about inequality,
1195 as 84% of Americans agree that “taking care of problems at home is more important than
1196 giving aid to foreign countries” (PIPA 2001). Enke et al. (2023b) also measure univer-
1197 salism and analyze its correlates in 7 countries, and Cappelen et al. (2022) deploy this
1198 method in 60 countries. In a lab experiment with students in the U.S., Cherry et al. (2017)
1199 show that a substantial share of people prefer policies detrimental to them due to their
1200 egalitarian worldview. Waytz et al. (2019) show that left-leaning people exhibit a wider
1201 “moral circle”. Jaeger & Wilks (2023) find that judgments of moral concern are equally
1202 well explained by characteristics of the judge and the evaluated target.

1203 **Free-riding** Despite the long-standing explanation of the lack of climate action as a re-
1204 sult of free-riding, surveys consistently show that people support climate mitigation ac-
1205 tion in their own country, even in the absence of such action in other countries. Bernauer
1206 & Gampfer (2015) show this for Americans and Indians, who both overestimate their
1207 country’s emissions at one third of the global total. Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019a)
1208 show this in the U.S. and China using an experimental design. McEvoy & Cherry (2016)
1209 show that Americans mostly invoke leadership and morality to justify unilateral climate
1210 action. Using a range of methods, Aklin & Mildenberger (2020) show that the empiri-
1211 cal evidence for free-riding is not compelling, and that climate inaction can be equally
1212 well explained by distributive conflicts. Finally, review of the literature by McGrath &
1213 Bernauer (2017) shows that climate attitudes are largely nonreciprocal, and primarily
1214 driven by values and perceptions of the policies, rather than by considerations of what
1215 other countries do.

1216 A.1.6 Second-order beliefs

1217 Allport (1924) introduced the concept of pluralistic ignorance: a shared misperception
1218 concerning others’ beliefs. The concept became notorious when O’Gorman (1975) showed
1219 that, towards the end of the civil rights movement, 47% of Americans believed that a ma-
1220 jority of white people supported segregation, while only 18% did so. PIPA (2001) has
1221 shown that while 75% of Americans are willing to contribute \$50 annually to halve world
1222 hunger (the cost of the program), only 32% believed that the majority would share this

1223 willingness. Pluralistic ignorance regarding climate-friendly norms in the United States
1224 has been documented by Andre et al. (2022), who further show that correcting the misper-
1225 ceptions would be effective to enhance pro-climate behaviors. Relatedly, Sparkman et al.
1226 (2022) show that Americans underestimate the support for climate policies by nearly half,
1227 while Drews et al. (2022) document pluralistic ignorance of carbon tax support in Spain.
1228 Additionally, Geiger & Swim (2016) show that pluralistic ignorance regarding concern for
1229 climate change leads people to self-silence, resulting in reduced discussions on the topic.

1230 A.1.7 Elite attitudes

1231 In a survey of climate negotiators on their preferences in terms of burden-sharing,
1232 Lange et al. (2007) uncovers a mix of self-serving bias and support for the egalitarian
1233 principle. Dannenberg et al. (2010) elicit climate negotiators' equity preferences and find
1234 that regional differences in addressing climate change are driven more by national inter-
1235 ests than by different equity concerns. Hjerpe et al. (2011) indicate that voluntary con-
1236 tribution, indicated as willingness to contribute, was the least preferred principle among
1237 both negotiators and observers. Three of the four principles for allocating mitigation
1238 commitments were recognized widely across the major geographical regions: historical
1239 responsibilities, ability-to-pay, and equal per capita emissions. This result is confirmed
1240 by Kesternich et al. (2021), who observe tendencies for a more harmonized view among
1241 key groups towards the ability-to-pay rule in a setting of weighted burden sharing rules.
1242 Mildenberger & Tingley (2019) survey elites (Congress staffers and international relations
1243 scholars) as well as the population in U.S. and China. They document pluralistic igno-
1244 rance of pro-climate attitudes, egocentric bias, and increasing support after beliefs are
1245 updated.

1246 A.2 Proposals and analyses of global policy-making

1247 A.2.1 Global carbon pricing

1248 Global carbon pricing is widely regarded by economists as the benchmark climate
1249 policy, as it would efficiently correct the carbon emissions externality. For instance, Hoel
1250 (1991) shows that an international carbon tax can be designed to simultaneously achieve
1251 efficiency and accommodate any distributional objective. Concerning the distributional
1252 objective, Grubb (1990), Agarwal & Narain (1991) and Bertram (1992) were the first to
1253 advocate for an equal right to emit for each human. As Grubb (1990) states it: "by far the

1254 best combination of long term effectiveness, feasibility, equity, and simplicity, is obtained
1255 from a system based upon tradable permits for carbon emissions which are allocated on
1256 an adult per capita basis".²⁰ Support for such solution has been renewed ever since (Baer
1257 et al. 2000; Blanchard & Tirole 2021; Jamieson 2001; Rajan 2021).

1258 While many endorse the egalitarian allocation of emissions permits, economists also
1259 considered this outcome as politically unfeasible. Thus, to preserve the current level of
1260 inequalities and to preclude transfers between countries, they adjusted their (integrated
1261 assessment) models by assigning more weight to the interest of rich countries (Stanton
1262 2011).

1263 Gollier & Tirole (2015) synthesize the distributional decision with a *generosity* parame-
1264 ter which would allocate emissions permit to countries in proportion to their population
1265 if set to one, in proportion to their emissions (on the start date of the policy) if set to zero,
1266 and as a mixture of the egalitarian and grandfathering rules if set in between. Using a
1267 similar formula in the context of a tax, Cramton et al. (2015) (summarized in MacKay
1268 et al. 2015) propose that countries with emissions per capita around the average fix the
1269 generosity parameter, so that it is strategically chosen to maximize the tax rate, and to
1270 fix the tax rate at the minimum price proposed by participating countries. Negotiations
1271 would exclude countries with low ambition beforehand; and the treaty would impose
1272 trade sanctions on non-participating countries. van den Bergh et al. (2020) propose a
1273 "dual-track transition to global carbon pricing": an expanding climate club that would
1274 integrate existing and new emissions trading systems, and a reorientation of UNFCCC
1275 negotiations towards a global carbon price and burden-sharing rules. The IMF (2019)
1276 also supports global carbon pricing or, as a first step, a carbon price floor. They propose
1277 either differentiated prices among countries or international transfers, and estimate that
1278 a price of \$75/tCO₂ in 2030 would be compatible with a 2°C trajectory.

1279 Other authors have put forth more radical proposals. For instance, Weitzman (2017)
1280 envisions a World Climate Assembly with proportional representation at the global scale,
1281 so that the median (human) voter would choose the carbon price level. To finance an
1282 adaptation fund, Chancel & Piketty (2015) propose a global *progressive* carbon tax (or a
1283 progressive tax on air tickets as a first step), so that rich people (who are high emitters)
1284 contribute more to the public good. Fleurbaey & Zuber (2013) highlight that, given that
1285 current emitters are probably richer than future victims of climate change damages, cli-
1286 mate policies deserve a *negative* discount rate. In other words, we cannot dissociate the

²⁰By "adult per capita", Grubb (1990) means that permits would be allocated equally among adults.

¹²⁸⁷ climate issue from global inequalities, and an ethical response to this issue requires global
¹²⁸⁸ redistribution.

¹²⁸⁹ A.2.2 Climate burden sharing

¹²⁹⁰ The literature has discussed different burden-sharing principles (Ringius et al. 2002).
¹²⁹¹ While there is no agreement on their definitions as different approaches are used (cost
¹²⁹² sharing, effort sharing, or resource sharing, see Section A.1.2), we describe here the burden-
¹²⁹³ sharing principles consistently using the resource sharing approach (i.e., allocating emis-
¹²⁹⁴ sions rights). For other papers that define or compare different burden-sharing principles,
¹²⁹⁵ see Leimbach & Giannousakis (2019); Vaillancourt & Waaub (2004); Zhou & Wang (2016).

¹²⁹⁶ **Equal per capita.** The simplest principle is perhaps to allocate each year's global carbon
¹²⁹⁷ quota based on an equal right to emit per capita, or an equal right to emit for each adult.
¹²⁹⁸ Implementing this principle would result in large transfers from high-emitting to low-
¹²⁹⁹ emitting countries.

¹³⁰⁰ **Grandfathering.** In contrast, *grandfathering* entails allocating emissions rights in pro-
¹³⁰¹ portion to current emissions. From the perspective of allocating carbon pricing revenues
¹³⁰² between countries, grandfathering amounts to each country retaining the revenues it col-
¹³⁰³ lects. Given that nations are sovereign and have not agreed to share emissions rights,
¹³⁰⁴ this principle can be considered as the default option against which the other ones can be
¹³⁰⁵ compared in terms of distributive effects.

¹³⁰⁶ **Historical responsibilities.** At the opposite end of the spectrum is the principle of *his-
1307 torical responsibilities*, which assigns to each country a carbon budget proportional to its
1308 population. Countries that have emitted more than the average have accumulated a car-
1309 bon debt towards countries that have emitted less, which have a carbon credit.²¹

¹³¹⁰ To fully specify this rule, one needs to define a start date for the responsibilities on
¹³¹¹ past emissions and specify how to account for population size. 1990 is often chosen as
¹³¹² a start year as it is the date of the first IPCC assessment report, marking the widespread
¹³¹³ acknowledgment of climate change, though variants include 1972, 1960, 1950 or 1850.²²

²¹It is not clear how these debts would be settled. Approaches could involve carbon removal from the atmosphere, or using a conventional social cost of carbon to monetize them, by crediting (positively or negatively) emissions rights to countries in an international carbon market.

²²Climate equity monitor uses 1850 for example.

1314 Several solutions have been proposed to account for evolving populations, none of which
1315 is flawless. Matthews (2015) allocates emissions rights on a given year proportionally to
1316 the countries' populations in that year. An alternative is to use fixed populations, such
1317 as the populations at the chosen start year (Neumayer 2000), or at a future date such
1318 as projected when the global total population will reach 9 billion (Raupach et al. 2014).
1319 Fanning & Hickel (2023) convert the projected climate debt up to 2050 into monetary
1320 terms in a 1.5°C scenario.

1321 The rationale for using fixed populations is to prevent countries from intentionally
1322 increasing their population size to gain more emissions rights. However, this approach
1323 treats countries with different demographic trajectories similarly, effectively penalizing
1324 countries which grow more than others (if past populations are used) or grow more than
1325 expected (if future populations are used). Using current populations like Matthews (2015)
1326 also comes with its own problems. Consider two countries having contributed very little
1327 to cumulative emissions, with the same emissions per capita but different demographic
1328 patterns: country A's population has doubled in the last 30 years, while country B's pop-
1329 ulation has remained stable. Despite the similar present situation, country B would ac-
1330 cumulate more carbon credit than country A. Essentially, compensating country B more
1331 due to its past population size amounts to compensating the dead although it is future
1332 generations who will suffer. That being said, using current populations is likely a more
1333 viable solution than relying on fixed populations since, in practice, countries with similar
1334 emissions per capita tend to have relatively similar demographic trajectories.

1335 **Ability to pay.** Another prominent burden-sharing principle is the ability to pay whereby
1336 richer countries should contribute more to mitigation efforts. To operationalize this prin-
1337 ciple, Baer et al. (2008) define *capacity* as the share of global income above an exemption
1338 threshold. They use the threshold of \$7,500 per year (in 2005 PPP), which corresponds to
1339 the top 28% of the global income distribution. According to this principle, the effort of a
1340 country should be proportional to the revenues it would raise with a linear income tax on
1341 individual income above \$7,500.

1342 **Climate Equity Reference Framework** Baer et al. (2008) propose another effort-sharing
1343 method, the *Climate Equity Reference Framework* (CERF), which blends the ability to pay
1344 principle with their version of historical responsibilities. They define *responsibility* as fol-
1345 lows: they determine the mitigation requirement as the emissions gap between the Busi-

ness as Usual scenario from IEA (2007) and a 2°C (with 68-86% probability) scenario.
The mitigation requirement is then allocated to countries proportionally to their cumulative emissions (starting in 1990). The emissions right of a country according to their responsibility are then determined by its Business as Usual emissions minus its mitigation requirement. A country's emissions right, dubbed its *greenhouse development right* (GDR), is defined using a combination of *capacity* (C) and *responsibility* (R) to allocate the mitigation requirement between countries. This allocation key is called the *Responsibility and Capacity Indicator* (RCI) and defined as $RCI = R^a \cdot C^{1-a}$, with $a = .4$.


This choice of parameter may seem somewhat arbitrary, but the EcoEquity calculator allows for a customization all CERF parameters (Holz et al. 2018, 2019). The Climate Action Network has adopted the CERF as its *fair share* framework, though the different national chapters of the organization could not agree on a choice of parameters (Athanasios et al. 2022).²³

The CERF approach was adopted by a prominent network of climate NGOs because it operationalizes the principle of *common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities* recognized by the UNFCCC. However, this approach suffers from three drawbacks. First, its definition of historical responsibility as an effort sharing principle is inconsistent with the principle of an equal right of cumulative emissions per capita, which is a resource sharing principle. For instance, consider a fully decarbonized country that has exhausted *exactly* its cumulative carbon budget. According to the CERF notion of responsibility, this country would still be expected to contribute significantly to mitigation efforts due to its relatively high cumulative emissions. Yet, according to the usual definition of the historical responsibility based on an equal right of cumulative emissions p.c., this country would have no liability as it has not exceeded its carbon budget. Second, a country with moderate incomes²⁴ and low historical responsibility would be assigned a relatively low effort, even if its emissions per capita are high. In other words, the CERF approach favors countries that have experienced recent growth. Third, the poorest countries would be granted emissions rights close to the Business as Usual trajectory, as they

²³The U.S. Climate Action Network and the think tank EcoEquity (funded by Tom Athanasiou and late Paul Baer) choose the following parameters: an equal weight for R and C ($a = .5$), their own business as usual projections of CO₂ emissions based on trends of GDP growth and emissions intensity reduction, a 1.5°C (Low Energy Demand) pathway, 1950 as the start year for responsibility, a gradual inclusion of income to compute capacity (which adds complexity to the calculation) from a full exemption of the bottom 70% (\$7,500 per year) linearly to a full inclusion of the top 2% (\$72,211), the inclusion of non-CO₂ gases but not of emissions embodied in trade (i.e. imported emissions) nor LULUCF (land-use).

²⁴Using the above parameters, moderate incomes means few incomes above the global 70th. percentile.

Figure S9: Net gains from the CERF burden-sharing rule in 2030.




Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO₂.

would bear virtually none of the effort. But this trajectory carries the current (unfair) income distribution and amounts to grandfathering. For example, the baseline trajectory for emissions²⁵ in the DRC entail 0.8 tCO₂ p.c. in 2030, which is five times less than the world average emissions right per capita. In this framework, if the DRC were to grow faster than projected in the baseline, it would actually have to pay to the rest of the world for mitigation efforts. This is what is likely to happen to countries like Mexico or Senegal, from our simulation of the net gains of CERF compared to a situation without international transfers (see Figure S9). In contrast, a resource sharing approach based on equal per capita emissions would result in low-income countries receiving emissions rights exceeding their projected trajectories, leading to transfers from high-income countries. By construction, such transfers do not occur in an effort sharing approach like the CERF, implying lower transfers to low-income countries. Compared to an equal right to emit per capita, this method favors countries like China (whose emissions are allowed to remain stable over 2020-2030 instead of a reduction of 35-40%) and penalizes regions like Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (see Figure S10).

²⁵The baseline trajectory is computed as the “product of the projected GDP and CO₂ emission intensity”.

Figure S10: Difference between net gains from Greenhouse Development Rights and equal rights per capita.



Note: GDRs are calibrated with the preferred parameters of the [U.S. Climate Action Network](#) ([Athanasios et al. 2022](#)) using the Efficiency scenario (2°C with >50% chance) of the Global Energy Assessment ([Johansson et al. 2012](#)) and a price of \$144/tCO₂.

1389 **Contraction and Convergence.** Meyer (2004) defines a rule called *contraction and con-*
 1390 *vergence* (C&C), which combines elements of grandfathering and equal per capita ap-
 1391 proaches. According to C&C, each country is granted (tradable) emissions rights, starting
 1392 at their current emission level and converging linearly to an equal per capita level at some
 1393 pre-specified date. The *contraction* part refers to the reduction of total emissions rights in
 1394 line with the climate objective. When discussed around year 2000, the convergence date
 1395 was specified between 2020 and 2050. This rule, advocated by the Global Commons Insti-
 1396 tute (a UK think tank), was on the agenda from COP2 to COP15 (i.e., until Copenhagen,
 1397 and including in Kyoto), including at Kyoto, and was endorsed by the European Parlia-
 1398 ment in 1998. More recently, Gignac & Matthews (2015) have shown how C&C can be
 1399 made consistent with historical responsibilities by computing carbon debts and credits
 1400 until the convergence date.

1401 **Assessments of the NDCs against burden-sharing principles.** The regime established
 1402 by the 2015 Paris agreement to regulate climate change respects none of the burden-

sharing principles and relies instead on voluntary contributions from each country, known as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). A body of literature (reviewed by Höhne et al. 2014) assesses the NDCs against the emissions reduction objective and different burden-sharing principles. To evaluate the NDCs, Gao et al. (2019) examine their emissions projections for 2030 and estimate the resulting increase in temperature. The most recent and comprehensive assessment of NDCs against burden-sharing principles is conducted by van den Berg et al. (2020) (see also Raupach et al. 2014; Robiou du Pont et al. 2016, 2017).

1411 A.2.3 Global redistribution

Addressing global poverty, inequalities, and climate change are central to the universally agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). As highlighted by Bolch et al. (2022), low-income countries often lack sufficient domestic resources to eradicate poverty in the short term, indicating the need for international transfers to rapidly end global poverty. In *Beyond the Welfare State*, Gunnar Myrdal (1960) called for a *welfare world*. In his Nobel lecture, he emphasized the necessity of increasing foreign aid to low-income countries, stating that “The type of marginal foreign aid we have provided, is clearly not enough to meet their barest needs” (Myrdal 1975).

Drawing on the labor theory of value, some economists have argued that global inequalities arise from unequal exchange in international trade (Arghiri 1972). Indeed, the stark disparity in wages between countries implies that one unit of labor exported by an American commands five units of labor embodied in imported goods, whereas Ethiopians need to export 50 units of labor to obtain one unit through imports (Alsamawi et al. 2014; Reyes et al. 2017). Taking stock, Hickel (2017) proposes to globally establish minimum wages at 50% of the local median wage. Hickel (2017) also suggests other solutions against global inequality, which served as inspiration for our questionnaire. These measures include the cancellation of low-income countries’ public debt, fair trade practices (such as eliminating tariffs from high-income countries, reducing patent protections, and reducing farming subsidies in rich countries), initiatives to combat tax evasion (e.g., implementing a global financial register), land reform, and a fair international climate policy.

Piketty (2014) prominently advocates for a progressive wealth tax on a global scale, although he does not specify whether the resulting revenues should fund international transfers.

Kopczuk et al. (2005) compute the optimal linear income tax rates for all countries in

1436 two ways: globally centralized and decentralized (i.e., within each country and without
1437 international transfers). They show that the average decentralized rate is 41%. In con-
1438 trast, the global rate is 62%, which would generate funds to finance a basic income of
1439 250\$/month (higher than the GPD per capita of 73 countries). From a current global Gini
1440 index of 0.695, they show that decentralized optimal taxation would only marginally re-
1441 duce global inequality to 0.69, whereas global taxation would significantly decrease the
1442 Gini to 0.25. The study also shows that the existing level of foreign aid can only be ratio-
1443 nalized if the U.S. attaches 2,000 less value to a citizen in the poorest countries than to an
1444 American citizen (or 1,000 less if half of the transfers are diverted due to corruption).

1445 A.2.4 Basic income

1446 Unconditional cash transfers (UCT) are increasingly seen as an effective way to end ex-
1447 treme poverty. A growing body of evidence from randomized control trials supports this
1448 notion: [Gangopadhyay et al. \(2015\)](#) find that UCT outperform a food subsidy; [Haushofer & Shapiro \(2016\)](#) find significant impacts on health, economic outcomes, and psycholog-
1449 ical well-being; [Egger et al. \(2022\)](#) find large positive spillovers on non-recipient people,
1450 and minimal inflation. Reviews of existing research further confirm the positive outcomes
1451 of UCT ([Bastagli et al. 2016](#); [Standing 2014](#)).

1452 While the delivery of cash to remote areas and the prevention of fraud is challenging
1453 in regions without a proper civil register, the use of mobile phones as banking and bio-
1454 metric identification tools could provide viable solutions ([Harnett 2017](#)). Although many
1455 places still lack internet access, satellite internet technology shows promising progress,
1456 with some experts suggesting that it could soon become affordable and universally ac-
1457 cessible ([Hanson 2016](#)).

1458 A.2.5 Global democracy

1459 The idea of world federalism has a long-standing history, dating back at least to [Kant \(1795\)](#), who argued that a world federation was essential for achieving perpetual peace.
1460 International organizations were eventually created to foster peace, though the League
1461 of Nations and its successor, the United Nations, never succeeded in avoiding military
1462 conflicts. Many have argued that we need stronger and more democratic global institu-
1463 tions, competent to address global challenges such as extreme poverty, climate change,
1464 wars, pandemics, or financial stability. Before World War II, feminist and pacifist [Maver-](#)
1465


¹⁴⁶⁷ **Wick Lloyd & Schwimmer (1937)** founded the *Campaign for World Government*, advocating
¹⁴⁶⁸ for direct representation at the global scale. **Einstein (1947)** called for the subordination of
¹⁴⁶⁹ the UN Security Council to the General Assembly and the direct election of UN delegates.
¹⁴⁷⁰ Since 2007, there has been widespread support for a United Nations Parliamentary As-
¹⁴⁷¹ semby (UNPA) from individuals and institutions in over 150 countries, including 1,800
¹⁴⁷² member of parliament, heads of state, as well the European Parliament, the Pan-African
¹⁴⁷³ Parliament, and the Latin-American Parliament. The UNPA campaign calls for a gradual
¹⁴⁷⁴ implementation of a democratic assembly, starting with a consultative assembly com-
¹⁴⁷⁵ posed of members of national parliaments, allowing for the direct election of its members
¹⁴⁷⁶ in voluntary countries, and progressing towards a world parliament with binding legisla-
¹⁴⁷⁷ tive powers once all members are directly elected (**Leinen & Bummel 2018**). Besides the
¹⁴⁷⁸ UNPA, various scholars have put forward different models of global democracy, ranging
¹⁴⁷⁹ from deliberative spaces to a world federation (**Archibugi et al. 2011**). While the most rad-
¹⁴⁸⁰ical proposals may still be on the horizon, an assembly of random citizens representative
¹⁴⁸¹ of the world population has already been convened. It has produced a joint statement at
¹⁴⁸² the COP26 (**Global Assembly 2022**), and a similar *World Citizens' Assembly* should soon
¹⁴⁸³ follow.

1484 B Raw results

1485 Country-specific raw results are also available as supplementary material files: **US**,
 1486 **EU**, **FR**, **DE**, **ES**, **UK**.

Figure S11: Absolute support for global climate policies.

Share of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* (in percent, $n = 40,680$). The color blue denotes an absolute majority. See Figure 1 for the relative support. (Questions A-I of the global survey.)



*In Denmark, France and the U.S., the questions with an asterisk were asked differently, cf. Question F.

Figure S12: Correct answers to comprehension questions (in percent). (Questions 16-18)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
With NR, typical [country] people win and richest lose	68	73	76	73	73	70
With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win	60	68	62	72	67	67
With GCS+NR, typical [country] people neither win nor lose	54	60	63	59	57	61

Figure S13: Number of correct answers to comprehension questions (mean). (Section 2.2.2, Questions 16-18)




Figure S14: List experiment: mean number of supported policies. (Section 2.3.1, Question 24)




Figure S15: Conjoint analyses 1 and 2. (Questions 25-27, Back to Section 2.3.3)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Global climate scheme (GCS)	54	76	80	71	81	74
C+NR+GCS preferred to C+NR	55	74	79	71	78	68
NR+GCS preferred to NR	55	77	79	74	79	77
NR+C preferred to NR	62	84	88	83	84	82
GCS+NR preferred to C+NR	47	52	53	53	49	52
NR+C+GCS preferred to NR	55	77	86	73	83	72

Table S2: Effects on the support for the GCS of a question on its pros and cons and on information about the actual support, in the U.S. (See Section D in the US2 Questionnaire) (Back to Section 2.3.5)

	Support			
	Global Climate Scheme		National Redistribution	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Control group mean	0.557	0.557	0.569	0.569
Treatment: Open-ended field on GCS pros & cons	-0.073** (0.035)	-0.071** (0.031)	-0.035 (0.035)	-0.030 (0.032)
Treatment: Closed questions on GCS pros & cons	-0.109*** (0.034)	-0.096*** (0.031)	-0.065* (0.034)	-0.062** (0.031)
Treatment: Info on actual support for GCS and NR	-0.021 (0.034)	-0.015 (0.031)	0.048 (0.033)	0.056* (0.031)
Includes controls		✓		✓
Observations	2,000	1,995	2,000	1,995
R ²	0.007	0.170	0.007	0.154

Figure S16: Effects of the presence of a policy (rather than none from this domain) in a random platform on the likelihood that it is preferred to another random platform. (See original translations in Figure S6; Question 29)




Figure S17: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements seen as important for supporting the GCS in a 4-Likert scale (in percent). (Question 32) [\(Back to Section 2.3.5\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
It would succeed in limiting climate change	78	85	85	86	86	83
It would hurt the [Country] economy	81	67	61	67	66	69
It would penalize my household	75	60	55	63	59	63
It would make people change their lifestyle	78	79	83	79	78	77
It would reduce poverty in low-income countries	77	85	88	85	86	81
It might be detrimental to some poor countries	79	72	79	67	78	70
It could foster global cooperation	82	81	81	82	85	80
It could fuel corruption in low-income countries	79	75	82	69	79	72
It could be subject to fraud	80	79	80	74	83	81
It would be technically difficult to put in place	77	71	74	62	79	71
Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences	89	82	89	68	91	88

Figure S18: Perceptions of the GCS. Elements found in the open-ended field on the GCS (manually recoded, in percent). (Question 31) [\(Back to Section 2.3.5\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
environment	26	31	37	26	43	24
unclassifiable	25	24	23	28	25	22
pro	22	23	21	22	33	20
con	22	17	12	18	20	16
cost	17	12	11	14	17	7
poorest humans	11	7	6	9	5	6
tax redistribution	10	7	11	8	4	9
support	8	6	3	5	6	8
oppose	7	3	2	3	1	4
don't know	6	8	10	8	7	10
empty	6	3	0	0	0	13
difficult agreement	5	10	7	12	8	8
difficult implement	3	5	5	6	4	6
misunderstands gcs	3	2	2	1	3	1
misunderstands question	2	2	1	3	3	3

Figure S19: Perceptions of the GCS. Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent). (Question 31) [\(Back to Section 2.3.5\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
world: international world country global	28	22	23	19	22	23
environment: climate environment animal emission nature	26	21	17	28	21	17
poorest: poor low-income 700 poverty	16	8	8	9	4	10
pro: pro pros pros:	16	3	0	1	9	5
con: con con: cons cons:	15	4	0	1	8	6
cost: cost expensive higher price 85 inflation	13	7	5	9	7	6
tax: tax	8	3	4	3	2	2
redistribution: rich redistribution	8	4	5	4	3	5
implementation: implement enforce policy monitor	6	4	5	6	0	5
agreement: agree accept participate	3	4	5	6	2	3

Figure S20: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality (mean). (Question 34) [\(Back to Section 2.4\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Donation to own country	35	34	31	38	34	32
Donation to Africa	32	35	33	41	32	33

Table S3: Donation in case of lottery win, depending on the recipient's (randomly drawn) nationality. (Question 34)
 (Back to Section 2.4)

	Donation to poor people (in %)			
	All	US	US	Eu
Poor is in own country	0.590 (0.799)	2.509** (1.152)	0.046 (1.691)	-1.349 (1.108)
Poor is in own country × Vote: <i>not</i> Biden			3.954* (2.279)	
Mean	34.034	33.658	33.658	34.41
Observations	6,000	3,000	3,000	3,000
R ²	0.0001	0.002	0.034	0.0005

Figure S21: Support for a global wealth tax.

"Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-income countries?

Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking water, healthcare, and education." (Question 35)




Figure S22: Support for a national wealth tax financing public services like healthcare, education, and social housing. (Question 36)




Figure S23: Preferred share of global wealth tax revenues that should be pooled to finance low-income countries. (Question 37)




Figure S24: Support for sharing half of global tax revenues with low-income countries, rather than each country retaining all the revenues it collects (in percent). (Question 38)



Figure S25: Actual, perceived and preferred amount of foreign aid, with random info (or not) on actual amount. (Mean, Questions 39, 40) [\(Back to Section 2.2.5\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Actual foreign aid (in % of public spending)	0.4	1.1	0.8	1.3	0.5	1.7
Belief about foreign aid	4.7	2.9	2.7	2.9	2.8	3.5
Preferred foreign aid (with info)	1.8	2.7	3.4	2.9	2.1	2.5
Preferred foreign aid (no info)	4	3.9	4.7	4.4	3.1	3.4

Figure S26: Preferred foreign aid (after info or after perception). (Questions 39 and 40)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as current	70	75	91	76	77	57
Preferred foreign aid is higher than current	47	59	75	58	63	43
Preferred foreign aid is at least as high as perceived	57	74	83	79	77	58
Preferred foreign aid is higher than perceived	37	53	64	59	54	39

Figure S27: Perceived foreign aid. “From your best guess, what percentage of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?” (Question 39) (Back to Section 2.2.5)

Actual values: France: 0.8%; Germany: 1.3%; Spain: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%; U.S.: 0.4%.




Figure S28: Preferred foreign aid (without info on actual amount).

“If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?” (Question 40) (Back to Section 2.2.5)




Figure S29: Preferred foreign aid (after info on actual amount).

"Actually, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [own country] government spending is allocated to foreign aid.

If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate to foreign aid?" (Question 40) [\(Back to Section 2.2.5\)](#)




Figure S30: Preferences for funding increased foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]
 "How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent) (Question 41) (Back to Section 2.2.5)




Figure S31: Preferences of spending following reduced foreign aid. [Asked iff preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than [Info: actual; No info: perceived] foreign aid]
 "How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible)" (in percent)
 (Question 42) [\(Back to Section 2.2.5\)](#)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Higher spending on defense	19	23	11	21	17	31
Higher spending on retirement pensions	23	41	22	51	57	35
Higher spending on healthcare	40	57	31	42	80	70
Higher spending on welfare benefits	13	20	7	19	39	20
Higher spending on education	30	45	31	47	58	43
Higher spending on other programs	6	6	6	4	9	8
Lower taxes on the wealthiest	5	2	5	2	0	2
Lower corporate income tax rate	12	6	10	4	8	6
Lower personal income tax rates	48	29	26	27	37	30
Lower public deficit	32	24	21	13	41	21

Figure S32: Willingness to sign real-stake petition for the Global Climate Scheme or National Redistribution, compared to stated support in corresponding subsamples (e.g. support for the GCS in the branch where the petition was about the GCS). (Question 43)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Petition for the GCS	51	69	69	66	78	69
(Comparable) support for the GCS	53	76	81	74	81	74
Petition for NR	57	67	65	66	74	68
(Comparable) support for NR	58	72	76	65	78	75

Figure S33: Absolute support for various global policies (Percent of (*somewhat or strong*) support). (Questions 44 and 45. See Figure 2 for the relative support.)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for climate damages	41	54	52	53	62	51
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	53	65	62	66	68	62
High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income countries adapt to climate change	45	58	55	60	62	54
Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt	31	37	36	30	45	40
Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting right proportional to its population	34	44	44	43	52	43
Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries	39	49	39	51	50	54
A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage	42	55	54	54	61	53
Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of all assets	44	70	73	70	72	65
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	34	45	40	48	44	50
National tax on millionaires funding public services	62	76	70	79	79	77
Global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries	58	71	69	72	78	71

Figure S34: Preferred approach of diplomats at international climate negotiations. In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend [own country] interests or global justice? (Question 49)




Figure S35: Percent of selected issues viewed as important.
 “To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem?” (Question 56)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Income inequality in [Country]	55	59	54	58	71	57
Climate change	59	66	66	63	73	63
Global poverty	50	57	50	58	75	49

Figure S36: Group defended when voting.
 “What group do you defend when you vote?” (Question 57)




Figure S37: Mean prioritization of policies.

Mean number of points allocated policies to express intensity of support (among six policies chosen at random). Blue color means that the policy has been awarded more points than the average policy. (Question 58)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	13	21	10	14	35	31
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	23	22	25	21	22	23
econ3	21	15	13	18	17	13
econ4	28	22	27	17	24	20
soc1	10	17	13	17	12	21
soc2	13	9	14	8	10	8
climate1	14	15	11	18	20	12
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	20	18	22	19	15	17
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030	11	9	8	8	9	11
tax1: National redistribution scheme	14	15	16	15	15	15
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	19	19	21	18	17	19
foreign1: Global climate scheme	15	20	20	23	16	17
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	21	20	20	23	19	20
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	15	15	15	17	14	13
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	9	11	13	14	9	8

Figure S38: Positive prioritization of policies.

Percent of people allocating a positive number of points to policies, expressing their support (among six policies chosen at random). (Question 58)

	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
econ1	64	78	61	67	96	95
econ2: [Higher minimum wage] (DE: Bürgerversicherung)	83	86	85	84	87	89
econ3	81	69	50	78	80	68
econ4	88	86	91	79	89	85
soc1	57	75	69	74	74	78
soc2	58	58	72	53	64	48
climate1	70	76	65	79	89	75
climate2: Thermal insulation plan (US: also transport)	79	83	86	84	78	80
climate3: Ban the sale of new combustion–engine cars by 2030	62	58	56	48	60	70
tax1: National redistribution scheme	67	79	79	76	82	79
tax2: Wealth tax (ES: raise tax on top incomes)	80	79	76	78	83	85
foreign1: Global climate scheme	71	83	84	85	84	78
foreign2: Global tax on millionaires	80	81	79	83	82	82
foreign3: Global democratic assembly on climate change	71	77	79	74	83	76
foreign4: Doubling foreign aid	58	70	79	74	74	57

Figure S39: Charity donation.

"How much did you give to charities in 2022?" (Question 50)




Figure S40: Interest in politics.

"To what extent are you interested in politics?" (Question 51)




Figure S41: Desired involvement of government (from 1 to 5). (Question 52)




Figure S42: Political leaning on economics (from 1: Left to 5: Right). (Question 53)




Figure S43: Voted in last election. (Question 54)




Figure S44: Vote in last election (aggregated). PNR includes people who did not vote or prefer not to answer. (Question 55)




Figure S45: Perception that survey was biased.
“Do you feel that this survey was politically biased?” (Question 61)





Figure S46: Opinion on the fight against extreme poverty.

“According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme poverty in low-income countries?” (Question 62) [\(Back to Section 2.2.5\)](#)

(a) Elements found in the open-ended field on the question
(manually recoded, in percent)



(b) Keywords found in the open-ended field on the GCS (automatic search ignoring case, in percent).




Figure S47: Main attitudes by vote (“Right” spans from Center-right to Far right).
 (Relative support in percent in Questions 20, 35, 45, 46, 49) (Back to Section 2.4)

	Europe Left	Europe PNR/Non-voter	Europe Right	U.S. Left	U.S. PNR/Non-voter	U.S. Right
Support for the GCS	85	72	71	74	53	26
Global tax on millionaires	94	83	76	85	71	40
Sharing half of global tax with low-income countries	61	52	45	55	67	41
A maximum wealth limit of \$10 billion (US) / €100 million (Eu) for each human	73	65	52	62	49	23
High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries	93	79	74	87	70	38
[Country]'s foreign aid should be increased	93	83	72	92	81	48
Universalist	56	48	26	53	49	23

1487 C Questionnaire of the global survey (section on global
1488 policies)

1489 A. At which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be
1490 put in place? (Multiple answers are possible) [Figures 1 and S11]
1491 *Global; [Federal / European / ...]; [State / National]; Local*

1492 B. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “[country] should take mea-
1493 sures to fight climate change.”

1494 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly
1495 agree*

1496 C. How should [country] climate policies depend on what other countries do?

- 1497 • If other countries do more, [country] should do...
1498 • If other countries do less, [country] should do...

1499 *Much less; Less; About the same; More; Much more*

1500 D. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] All countries have signed the
1501 Paris agreement that aims to contain global warming “well below +2 °C’. To limit
1502 global warming to this level, there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we
1503 can emit globally, called the carbon budget. Each country could aim to emit less
1504 than a share of the carbon budget. To respect the global carbon budget, countries
1505 that emit more than their national share would pay a fee to countries that emit less
1506 than their share.

1507 Do you support such a policy? [Figures 1 and S11]

1508 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1509 support*

1510 E. [In all countries but the U.S., Denmark and France] Suppose the above policy is in
1511 place. How should the carbon budget be divided among countries? [Figures 1 and
1512 S11]

1513 *The emission share of a country should be proportional to its population, so that each human
1514 has an equal right to emit.; The emission share of a country should be proportional to its
1515 current emissions, so that those who already emit more have more rights to emit.; Countries
1516 that have emitted more over the past decades (from 1990 onwards) should receive a lower*

1517 *emission share, because they have already used some of their fair share.; Countries that will*
1518 *be hurt more by climate change should receive a higher emission share, to compensate them*
1519 *for the damages.*

1520 F. [In the U.S., Denmark, and France only] To achieve a given reduction of greenhouse
1521 gas emissions globally, costly investments are needed. Ideally, how should countries
1522 bear the costs of fighting climate change?

- 1523 • Countries should pay in proportion to their income
- 1524 • Countries should pay in proportion to their current emissions [Used as a sub-
1525 stitute to the equal right per capita in Figure 1]
- 1526 • Countries should pay in proportion to their past emissions (from 1990 on-
1527 wards) [Used as a substitute to historical responsibilities in Figure 1]
- 1528 • The richest countries should pay it all, so that the poorest countries do not have
1529 to pay anything
- 1530 • The richest countries should pay even more, to help vulnerable countries face
1531 adverse consequences: vulnerable countries would then receive money instead
1532 of paying [Used as a substitute to compensating vulnerable countries in Figures
1533 1 and S11]

1534 *Strongly disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Somewhat agree; Strongly*
1535 *agree*

1536 G. Do you support or oppose establishing a global democratic assembly whose role
1537 would be to draft international treaties against climate change? Each adult across
1538 the world would have one vote to elect members of the assembly. [Figures 1 and S11]
1539 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1540 *support*

1541 H. Imagine the following policy: a global tax on greenhouse gas emissions funding a
1542 global basic income. Such a policy would progressively raise the price of fossil fuels
1543 (for example, the price of gasoline would increase by [40 cents per gallon] in the
1544 first years). Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil
1545 fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Revenues from the tax would be used to
1546 finance a basic income of [\$30] per month to each human adult, thereby lifting the
1547 700 million people who earn less than \$2/day out of extreme poverty. The average

1548 [American] person would lose a bit from this policy as they would face [\$130] per
1549 month in price increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive.

1550 Do you support or oppose such a policy? [Figures 1 and S11]

1551 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1552 *support*

- 1553 I. Do you support or oppose a tax on all millionaires around the world to finance low-
1554 income countries that comply with international standards regarding climate ac-
1555 tion? This would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drink-
1556 ing water, healthcare, and education. [Figures 1 and S11]
1557 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1558 *support*

1559 D Questionnaire of the complementary surveys

1560 Below, we provide the generic questionnaire (based on the U.S. version), which roughly
 1561 corresponds to the *Eu* questionnaire as well as the combination of the *US1* and *US2* ques-
 1562 tionnaire. The main difference between Europe and the U.S. is that we split the *US2*
 1563 sample into four random branches to include some treatments before the Section D on
 1564 the GCS. Besides the control group, the treatments are: information regarding the sup-
 1565 port of Americans for the GCS and NR, an open-ended field, and a closed question on the
 1566 pros and cons of the GCS. The pros and cons of the GCS are also asked in *Eu* (likewise,
 1567 either as an open-ended field or a question), but only in Section D, after the support.

1568 At each section or question, square brackets specify in which questionnaires it is present
 1569 (*US1*, *US2* and/or *Eu*) as well as country specificities. Figures S48-S50 display the struc-
 1570 ture of each questionnaire. Each treatment randomization is independent. Qualtrics and
 1571 Word versions of the questionnaires in each language are available on our [public reposi-](#)
 1572 [tory](#), together with a spreadsheet that summarizes country specificities and our sources.

Figure S48: *Eu* survey structure




Figure S49: US1 survey structure





Figure S50: US2 survey structure



1573 [Eu, US1, US2] Socio-demographic characteristics

1574 1. Welcome to this survey!

1575
1576 This survey is **anonymous** and is conducted for research purposes on a representa-
1577 tive sample of [1,000 British people].

1578
1579 It takes [US1, US2: 10 to 15 min; Eu: around 20 min] to complete.

1580
1581 The survey contains lotteries and awards for those who get the correct answer to
1582 some understanding questions.

1583 If you are attentive and lucky, you can win up to [US1, Eu: \$350; US2: \$150] in
1584 points. (See terms and conditions).

1585 Please answer every question carefully.

1586
1587 Do you agree to participate in the survey?

1588 Yes; No

1589 2. What is your gender?

1590 Woman; Man; Other

1591 3. How old are you?

1592 Below 18; 18 to 20; 21 to 24; 25 to 29; 30 to 34; 35 to 39; 40 to 44; 45 to 49; 50 to 54; 55 to
1593 59; 60 to 64; 65 to 69; 70 to 74; 75 to 79; 80 to 84; 85 to 89; 90 to 99; 100 or above

1594 4. [Eu] In which country do you live?

1595 France; Germany; Spain; United Kingdom; Other

1596 5. What is your ZIP code? [UK: What is your Outcode (the left part of your postcode,
1597 e.g. if your postcode is N7 8H7, just enter N7)?]

1598 6. Do you live with your partner (if you have one)?

1599 Yes; No

1600 7. How many people are in your household? The household includes: you, the mem-
1601 bers of your family who live with you, and your dependants.

1602 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more

- 1603 8. [Eu] How many children below 14 live with you?
- 1604 1; 2; 3; 4 or more
- 1605 9. [US1, US2] What race or ethnicity do you identify with? (Multiple answers are
- 1606 possible)
- 1607 White; Black or African American; Hispanic; Asian; American Indian or Alaskan Native;
- 1608 Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; Other: {open field}; Prefer not to say
- 1609 10. What is the [US1, US2: annual; Eu: monthly] gross income of your household (before
- 1610 withholding tax)? This includes all income: wages, self-employment earnings, So-
- 1611 cial Security benefits, pensions, investment income, welfare payments, and income
- 1612 from other sources.
- 1613 [US1, US2: Items based on household total income deciles and quartiles, namely:
- 1614 Less than \$20,000; between \$20,001 and \$35,000; between \$35,001 and \$42,000; between
- 1615 \$42,001 and \$50,000; between \$50,001 and \$65,000; between \$65,001 and \$82,000; between
- 1616 \$82,001 and \$103,000; between \$103,001 and \$130,000; between \$130,001 and \$145,000;
- 1617 between \$145,001 and \$165,000; between \$165,001 and \$250,000; More than \$250,000; I
- 1618 prefer not to answer;
- 1619 Eu: custom thresholds, taking into account household composition Questions 6-8,
- 1620 and corresponding to the country's deciles and quartiles of standard of living, cf.
- 1621 the sheet "Income" in [this spreadsheet](#)]
- 1622 11. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
- 1623 [Below upper secondary, Upper secondary, and Post secondary are coded as the first two,
- 1624 middle three, and last three items, respectively.
- 1625 US1, US2: Primary school or less; Eighth grade; Some high school; Regular high school
- 1626 diploma/GED or alternative credential; Some college, no degree; 2-year college degree or as-
- 1627 sociates degree (for example: AA, AS); Bachelor's degree (for example: BA, BS); Master's
- 1628 degree or above (MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA, MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD, PhD);
- 1629 FR: École primaire / Aucun; Brevet; CAP ou BEP; Baccalauréat professionnel ou tech-
- 1630 nologique; Baccalauréat général; Bac +2 (BTS, DUT, DEUG...); Bac +3 (licence...); Bac
- 1631 +5 ou plus (master, école d'ingénieur ou de commerce, doctorat, médecine, maîtrise, DEA,
- 1632 DESS...)
- 1633 DE: Keine abgeschlossene Schulbildung / Grundschule; Untere Sekundarstufe (z.B. Haupt-
- 1634 oder Realschulabschluss); Erstausbildung; Beruflicher Abschluss / Ausbildung; Abitur;
- 1635 Zweitausbildung; Bachelor oder Fachhochschulabschluss; Master-Abschluss oder höher

1636 ES: *Educación primaria / No he completado la enseñanza básica; Educación secundaria obli-*
1637 *gatoria (ESO); Formación profesional básica (FP); Formación profesional de grado medio;*
1638 *Bachillerato; Formación profesional de grado superior; Grado universitario; Máster/doctrado*
1639 *UK: Primary education or less; Some secondary school; GSCE; Vocational Upper secondary*
1640 *(Level 3 award, level 3 certificate, level 3 diploma, advanced apprenticeship, etc.); High*
1641 *school degree (A level); Higher vocational education (Level 4+ award, level 4+ certificate,*
1642 *level 4+ diploma, higher apprenticeship, etc.); Bachelor's Degree (BA, BSc, BEng, etc.);*
1643 *Postgraduate diploma or certificate, Master's Degree (MSc, MA, MBA, etc.) or Ph.D.]*

1644 12. What is your employment status?

1645 *Full-time employed; Part-time employed; Self-employed; Student; Retired; Unemployed*
1646 *(searching for a job); Inactive (not searching for a job)*

1647 13. Are you a homeowner or a tenant? (Multiple answers are possible)

1648 *Tenant; Owner; Landlord renting out property; Hosted free of charge*

1649 14. [If lives with partner: What is the estimated value of your household's assets (in
1650 U.S. dollars)?]

1651 If does not live with partner: What is the estimated value of your assets (in U.S.
1652 dollars)?]

1653 Include here all your possessions (home, car, savings, etc.) net of debt. For example,
1654 if you own a house worth [\$]300,000 and you have [\$]100,000 left to repay on your
1655 mortgage, your assets are [\$]200,000.

1656 I estimate my [If lives with partner: household's] assets net of debt to be:

1657 [Items based on the following individual wealth quintiles, doubled if lives with
1658 partner. US1, US2: *Less than \$0 (I have a net debt); Close to \$0; Between \$4,000 and*
1659 *\$60,000; Between \$60,000 and \$190,000; More than \$190,000; For Eu, the thresholds are:*
1660 *FR: €5/50/150/300k; DE: €0/35/130/280k; ES: €0/50/100/200k; UK: £3/45/115/270k]*

1661 15. [US1, US2 (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the vote question)] What
1662 do you consider to be your political affiliation, as of today?

1663 *Republican; Democrat; Independent; Other; Non-Affiliated*

1666 [Eu, US1, US2] Global climate scheme

1667 In the following, we describe two policies, on which we will survey your opinion.
1668 To check that you have attentively read the descriptions, **we will ask some under-**
1669 **standing questions afterwards: those who get correct answers can win up to \$150.**

1670 **Global climate scheme:** At the Paris agreement in 2015, all countries have agreed
1671 to contain global warming “well below +2 °C”. To limit global warming to this
1672 level, **there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally.**

1673 To meet the climate target, a limited number of permits to emit greenhouse gases
1674 can be created globally. Polluting firms would be required to buy permits to cover
1675 their emissions. Such a policy would **make fossil fuel companies pay** for their
1676 emissions and progressively raise the price of fossil fuels. **Higher prices would en-**
1677 **courage people and companies to use less fossil fuels, reducing greenhouse gas**
1678 **emissions.**

1679 In accordance with the principle that each human has an equal right to pollute, the
1680 revenues generated by the sale of permits could finance a global basic income. **Each**
1681 **adult in the world would receive [US1, US2: \$30/month; UK: \$30 (that is £25) per**
1682 **month; FR, DE, ES: €30/month], thereby lifting out of extreme poverty the 700 mil-**
1683 **lion people who earn less than \$2/day.**

1684 **The typical [American] would lose out financially [US1, US2: \$85, FR: €10, DE:**
1685 **€25, ES: €5, UK: £20] per month** (as he or she would face [\$115] per month in price
1686 increases, which is higher than the [\$30] they would receive).

1687 The policy could be put in place as soon as countries totaling more than 60% of
1688 global emissions agree on it. Countries that would refuse to take part in the policy
1689 could face sanctions (like tariffs) from the rest of the World and would be excluded
1690 from the basic income.

(Back to Section [2.2.1](#))

1691 16. Who would win or lose financially in the Global climate scheme? [[Figure S12](#)]

1692
1693 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1694 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

1695 *Typical [Americans] would win and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.;*

1696 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would win.;*

1697 *Typical [Americans] would lose and the 700 million poorest humans would lose.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would lose and*

1699 the 700 million poorest humans would win from the Global climate scheme. Now, here
1700 is the second policy:

1701 **National redistribution scheme:**

1703 This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [US1, US2: 5%; Eu: 1%] and provide
1704 cash transfers to all adults. More precisely, **each [American] adult would receive**
1705 **[\$85] per month** (that is [\$1,000] per year). This would be financed by an increase
1706 of the federal income tax on household income in excess of [US1, US2: \$315,000 per
1707 year; FR: €15,000 per month; DE: €20,000 per month; ES: €10,000 per month; UK:
1708 £15,000 per month], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000]. [US1,
1709 US2: See more details.] ²⁶

1710 17. Who would win or lose financially in the National redistribution? [Figure S12]

1711 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1712 Typical [Americans] would win and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Ameri-
1713 cans] would win and the richest [Americans] would lose.; Typical [Americans] would lose
1714 and the richest [Americans] would win.; Typical [Americans] would lose and the richest
1715 [Americans] would lose.
1716

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was *Typical [Americans] would win and
1718 the richest [Americans] would lose* from the National redistribution scheme.

1719 To help you with the next question, here is a reminder of the policies:

1720 **Global Climate scheme:**

1721 To limit global warming and reach the international climate objective, the Global
1722 climate scheme would **impose a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can
1723 emit globally.**

²⁶8% of U.S. respondents click. They then see the following text, based on taxjusticenow.org by Saez & Zucman (2019): *The marginal income tax rates would evolve as follows:*

Below \$315,000: unchanged

\$315,000 - \$400,000: current rate 32% => new rate 41%

\$400,000 - \$600,000: 35% => 50%

\$600,000 - \$2.5 million: 37% => 60%

\$2.5 - \$5 million: 37% => 65%

Above \$5 million: 37% => 70%

1726 It would **make polluters pay** for their emissions, which in turn would increase fos-
1727 sil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities.

1728 The revenues would finance a **global basic income** of [\$30] per month for all hu-
1729 mans, lifting out of extreme poverty the poorest billion people.

1730 Considering the basic income and the fuel price increases, **the typical [American]**
1731 **would lose out financially** [\$85] per month.

1732

1733 **National redistribution scheme:**

1734 This policy would **increase taxes on the top** [5%] and provide cash transfers to
1735 all adults. More precisely, **each [American] would receive** [\$85] per month. This
1736 would be financed by an increase of the federal income tax on household income in
1737 excess of [\$315,000 per year], leaving taxes unchanged for income below [\$315,000
1738 per year].

- 1739 18. If both the Global climate scheme and the National redistribution scheme are imple-
1740 mented, how would a typical [American] be financially affected? [Figure S12]

1741 Three respondents with the expected answer will get [\$]50 in points.

1742 *A typical [American] would lose out financially.; A typical [American] would neither gain
1743 nor lose.; A typical [American] would gain financially.*

[new page] For your information, the expected answer was that *A typical [American] would nei-
1745 ther gain nor lose* from both schemes combined. [US1, Eu: Now, here are the last two
1746 policies:]

1747

1748 **[US1: Coal exit:**

1749 To reduce CO₂ emissions, this policy would require all U.S. coal power plants to be
1750 phased out by 2030. Coal would be replaced by renewable sources like wind and
1751 solar panels as well as stronger reliance on gas power plants.

1752 **Eu: Thermal insulation plan:**

1753 To reduce CO₂ emissions and energy insecurity, this policy would require that all
1754 buildings meet energy efficiency targets: at least rating E in 2030 and rating C in
1755 2040. The [UK] government would subsidise half the cost of insulation for all house-
1756 holds, and up to 90% for the poorest households. Insulation work would cost [FR,
1757 DE: €25; ES: €20; UK: £25] billion a year, but would deliver energy savings greater
1758 than this cost.]

1759

1760 [US1: **Marriage only for opposite-sex couples:**

1761 This policy is a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would legally
1762 define marriage as a union of one man and one woman.

1763 **Eu: Death penalty for major crimes:**

1764 This measure would reintroduce capital punishment for major crimes such as ter-
1765 rrorism and mass shootings.]

1766

1767 Now, we will ask your opinion on the [US1, Eu: four] policies.

1768 [Click here for the reminder of the \[US1, Eu: first\] two policies.](#) [Clicking displays the
1769 previous summarized descriptions.]

1770 19. [US2] [4 Random branches: control (*nothing*); Question 31 (*field*); Question 32 (*impor-
1771 tant*); or the following question (*info*).] For information, a recent survey has shown
1772 that:

- 1773 • 64% of Americans support the Global climate scheme.
1774 • 72% of Americans support the National redistribution scheme.

1775 20. Do you support the Global climate scheme? [Figure S1]

1776 Yes; No

1777 21. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the
1778 previous question? [Figure S8]

1779 The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

1780 Percentage of [Americans] in favor of Global climate scheme [slider from 0 to 100]

1781 22. Do you support the National redistribution scheme? [Figure S1]

1782 Yes; No

1783 23. [Eu, US1] According to you, what percentage of [Americans] answer Yes to the
1784 previous question? [Figure S8]

1785 The three people who are closest to the true value get [\$]50 in panel points.

1786 Percentage of [Americans] in favor of National redistribution [slider from 0 to 100]

1787 24. [Eu, US1] Beware, this question is quite unusual. Among the policies below, **how
1788 many** do you support? [Figure S14, Table 1]

1789 [Four random branches. Branch GCS/NR/C/O]

- 1790
- 1791 • Global climate scheme
 - 1792 • National redistribution scheme
 - 1793 • [Coal exit]
 - 1794 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

1795 0; 1; 2; 3; 4

1796

1797 [Branch GCS/C/O]

- 1798
- 1799 • Global climate scheme
 - 1800 • [Coal exit]
 - 1801 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

1802 0; 1; 2; 3

1803

1804 [Branch NR/C/O]

- 1805
- 1806 • National redistribution scheme
 - 1807 • [Coal exit]
 - 1808 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

1809 0; 1; 2; 3

1810 [Branch C/O]

- 1811
- 1812 • [Coal exit]
 - 1813 • [Marriage only for opposite-sex couples]

1814 0; 1; 2

1815

1816 [Eu, US1] Conjoint analyses

- 1817 25. Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you prefer? [Figure
1818 S15]

1819 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the
1820 same time.

1821 Bundle A	Bundle B
[Coal exit]	[Coal exit]
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme
Global climate scheme	

1822 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 1824 26. Do you support Bundle A (combining [Coal exit], the National redistribution scheme,
1825 and the Global climate scheme)?[Figure S1]

1826 Yes; No

- 1827 27. [new page] Among the two following bundles of policies, which one would you
1828 prefer? [Figure S15]

1829 Note that for each bundle, all policies of the bundle would be implemented at the
1830 same time.

1831 *[Four random branches. Branch C + NR vs. GCS + NR]*

1832 Bundle A	Bundle B
[Coal exit]	Global climate scheme
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme

1834 *[Branch NR vs. NR + C + GCS]*

1835 Bundle A	Bundle B
National redistribution scheme	National redistribution scheme [Coal exit] Global climate scheme

1837 *[Branch NR + GCS vs. NR]*

	Bundle A	Bundle B
1838	National redistribution scheme Global climate scheme	National redistribution scheme
1839		

	Bundle A	Bundle B
1840	[Branch NR + C vs. NR]	
1841	National redistribution scheme [Coal exit]	National redistribution scheme
1842		

1843 *Bundle A; Bundle B*

- 1844 28. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and
 1845 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies
 1846 in their platforms.
 1847 *Eu: Imagine if [DE, ES, UK: the two favorite candidates in your constituency in the
 1848 next general election; FR: the two candidates in the second round of the next pres-
 1849 idential election] campaigned with the following policies in their party's platforms.]*

1850
 1851 Which of these candidates would you vote for? [Table 2, Figure S15]
 1852 [Table 2. Two random branches: with and without the final row. The US1 version of the poli-
 1853 cies is given below, see the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the European versions.]

	Democrat	Republican
1854	Increase corporate income tax rate from 21% to 28% Coal exit Trillion dollar investment in childcare, healthcare, education and housing \$15 minimum wage National redistribution scheme [Global climate scheme / no row]	Decrease the payroll tax Permit completion of the Keystone pipeline Withdrawal of the Paris agreement Marriage only for opposite-sex couples Strict enforcement of immigration and border legislation [/ no row]

1855

1856 [US1: Democrat; Republican; None of them; Eu: Candidate A; Candidate B; None of them]

- 1857 29. [new page] [US1: [Asked only to non-Republicans] Imagine if the Democratic and
1858 Republican presidential candidates in 2024 campaigned with the following policies
1859 in their platforms.

1860 *Eu (where it is instead asked toward the end, after the Section "Values and politics"):* Imag-
1861 ine that [FR: the left or center-left; DE: a red-red-green coalition; ES: the PSOE; UK:
1862 the Labour Party] wins the next [general] elections. Here are two possible platforms
1863 on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are randomly drawn from a
1864 pool of credible [FR: left or center-left, DE: left-wing parties'; ES: PSOE; UK: Labour]
1865 policies).]

1866

1867 [US1: Which of these candidates do you prefer?

1868 *Eu: Even if you [FR: are not from the left or center-left; DE: do not support the left-*
1869 *wing parties; ES: do not support the PSOE; UK: do not support the Labour Party],*
1870 *which of these platforms do you prefer?]*

1871 [Figures S6, S16; see also the sheet "Policies" in *this spreadsheet* for the possible policies.]

	[Candidate A]	[Candidate B]	
1872	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]

1873 [US1: Candidate A; Candidate B; Eu: Platform A; Platform B]

- 1874 30. [new page] [Same wording and conditions as above. For brevity, only the UK version is
1875 given here.] Imagine that the Labour Party wins the next general elections. Here are
1876 two possible platforms on which it may campaign (the policies in each platform are
1877 randomly drawn from a pool of credible Labour policies).

1878

1879 Even if you do not support the Labour Party, which of these platforms do you pre-
1880 fer? [Figure S6]

		Platform A	Platform B
1881	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
1881	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
1881	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
1881	[Policy field in random order]	[Random policy]	[Random policy]
	Foreign policy	Global climate scheme	-
1882	<i>Platform A; Platform B</i>		

1883 **[Eu, US2] Perceptions of the GCS**

1884 [Eu: two random branches. US2: four random branches and the question is asked (if asked)
 1885 before Question 20]

1886 31. [Branch: field] When thinking about the Global climate scheme, what comes to
 1887 your mind?

1888 Please list pros and cons of the Global climate scheme. [Figures S18, S19]
 1889 {Open field}

1890 32. [Branch: important] When determining your support or opposition to the Global
 1891 climate scheme, which points are important to you? [Figure S17]

- 1892 • It would succeed in limiting climate change.
- 1893 • It would hurt the [U.S.] economy.
- 1894 • It would penalize my household.
- 1895 • It would make people change their lifestyle.
- 1896 • It would reduce poverty in low-income countries.
- 1897 • It might be detrimental to some poor countries.
- 1898 • It could foster global cooperation.
- 1899 • It could fuel corruption in low-income countries.
- 1900 • It could be subject to fraud.
- 1901 • It would be technically difficult to put in place.
- 1902 • Having enough information on this scheme and its consequences.

1903 *Not at all important; Not so important; Quite important; Very important*

1904 [Eu, US1] Donation lottery

1905 33. Please select “A little” (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).

1906 *Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*

1907 34. [Two random branches] By taking this survey, you are automatically entered into a
1908 lottery to win [\$]100 in panel points. This lottery is unrelated to the previous ones
1909 that rewarded answers’ accuracy. In a few days you will know whether you have
1910 been selected in the lottery. The payment will be made to you in the same way as
1911 your compensation for this survey, so no further action is required on your part.

1912
1913 Should you be selected in the lottery, you can also donate a part of this additional
1914 compensation to [[American] / African] people living in poverty through [US1: the
1915 charity GiveDirectly. The charity GiveDirectly; Eu: a charity. We would channel this
1916 donation to a charity that] provides small amounts of cash to people in need in [[the
1917 U.S] / Africa].

1918
1919 **In case you are winner of the lottery, what share of the [\$]100 would you donate
1920 to [[American] / African] people living in poverty [US1: through GiveDirectly]?
1921 [Figure S20, Table S3]**

1922 *Amount donated to [[American] / African] people in need (in [\$]) [slider from 0 to 100]*

1923 [Eu, US2] Wealth tax

1924 [Four random branches: Question 35 then Question 36 (global first); Question 36 then Ques-
1925 tion 35 (national first); Question 37 (global share); Question 38 (sharing)]

1926 35. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires of all countries to finance low-
1927 income countries?

1928 Such tax would finance infrastructure and public services such as access to drinking
1929 water, healthcare, and education. [Figures S1, S21]

1930 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
1931 support*

1932 36. Do you support or oppose a tax on millionaires in [the U.S.] to finance [US2: afford-
1933 able housing and universal childcare/pre-K; Eu: finance government hospitals and
1934 schools]? [Figures S1, S22]

1935 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly*
1936 *support*

1937 37. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in all
1938 countries around the world. In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount
1939 to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE: €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2:
1940 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount
1941 to [\$]1 billion in all low-income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700
1942 million people, most of them in Africa).

1943 Each country would retain part of the revenues it collects, and the remaining part
1944 would be pooled at the global level to finance infrastructure and public services in
1945 low-income countries.

1946 What percentage should be pooled to finance low-income countries (instead of re-
1947 tained in the country's national budget)? [Figure S23]

1948 *Percent of global wealth tax that should go to low-income countries [slider from 0 to 100]*

1950 38. Imagine a wealth tax on households with net worth above [\$]5 million, enacted in
1951 all countries around the world.

1952 In [the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would amount to [US2: \$430; FR: €16; DE:
1953 €44; ES: €5; UK: £20] billion per year (that is, [US2: 2%; FR: 0.7%; DE: 1.3%; ES:
1954 0.7%; UK: 0.9%] of [U.S.] GDP), while it would amount to [\$]1 billion in all low-
1955 income countries taken together (28 countries, home to 700 million people, most of
1956 them in Africa).

1957 Which of the following options would you prefer? [Figure S24]

- 1958 • The whole wealth tax financing national budgets in each country. For ex-
1959 ample, in [US2: the U.S., it could finance affordable housing and universal
1960 childcare/pre-K.; Eu-UK: the UK, it could finance the National Health Service
1961 and state-funded schools].
- 1962 • Half of the wealth tax financing national budgets in each country, half of it
1963 financing low-income countries. For example, it could finance [US2: universal
1964 childcare/pre-K in the U.S.; Eu-UK: state-funded schools in the UK] and access
1965 to drinking water, healthcare, and education in Africa.

1966 [Eu, US2] Foreign aid

1967 US2 Please select "A little" (this is a test to see if you are paying attention).

1968 Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal

- 1969 39. From your best guess, what percentage of [U.S.] government spending is allocated
1970 to foreign aid (that is, to reduce poverty in low-income countries)?

1971

1972 For your information, government spending totals [US2: 38%; FR: 55%; DE: 45%; ES:
1973 42%; UK: 41%] of [U.S.] GDP, it includes [US2: federal, State; Eu: national] and local
1974 government spending, and apart from foreign aid, it covers the following items: de-
1975 fense, social security (retirement pensions), health [US2: (including Medicare and
1976 Medicaid)], welfare benefits [US2: (including food stamps and EITC)], education,
1977 roads, justice, other programs [US2: and federal agencies (including in energy, sci-
1978 ence...)]. [Figure S27]

1979 Less than 0.1%; 0.1% to 0.2%; 0.3% to 0.5%; 0.6% to 1.0%; 1.1% to 1.7%; 1.8% to 2.6%;
1980 2.7% to 4%; 4.1% to 6%; 6.1% to 9%; 9.1% to 13%; 13.1% to 25%; More than 25%

- 1981 40. [Two random branches: with or without information on actual amount] [Info: Actually,
1982 [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [the U.S.] government spend-
1983 ing is allocated to foreign aid.]

1984

1985 If you could choose the government spending, what percentage would you allocate
1986 to foreign aid? [Figures S25, S26, S28 and S29]

- 1987 41. [Asked iff branch: Info and preferred foreign aid is strictly greater than actual for-
1988 eign aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to increase [U.S.] foreign
1989 aid.

1990

1991 How would you like to finance such increase in foreign aid? (Multiple answers
1992 possible) [Figure S30]

1993 Lower spending on defense; Lower spending on retirement pensions; Lower spending on
1994 healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Lower spending on welfare benefits [US2: (like
1995 EITC or food stamps)]; Lower spending on education; Lower spending on other programs
1996 [US2: and federal agencies]; Higher taxes on the wealthiest; Higher corporate income tax
1997 rate; Higher personal income tax rates; Higher public deficit

1998 42. [Asked iff branch: *Info* and preferred foreign aid is strictly lower than actual foreign
1999 aid] Your previous answer shows that you would like to reduce [U.S.] foreign aid.

2000

2001 How would you like to use the freed budget? (Multiple answers possible) [*Figure S31*]
2002

2003 *Higher spending on defense; Higher spending on retirement pensions; Higher spending on
2004 healthcare [US2: (Medicare and Medicaid)]; Higher spending on welfare benefits [US2:
2005 like EITC or food stamps)]; Higher spending on education; lower spending on other pro-
2006 grams [US2: and federal agencies]; Lower taxes on the wealthiest; Lower corporate income
2007 tax rate; Lower personal income tax rates; Lower public deficit*

2008 **[Eu, US1] Petition**

2009 43. [*Two random branches*] Would you be willing to sign a petition for the [Global cli-
2010 mate / National redistribution] scheme? [*Figure S32*]

2011

2012 As soon as the survey is complete, we will send the results to [the U.S. President's
2013 office], informing him what share of American people are willing to endorse the
2014 [Global climate / National redistribution] scheme. (You will NOT be asked to sign,
2015 only your answer here is required and remains anonymous.) Yes; No

2016 **[Eu, US1] Other policies**

2017 44. The following policies are discussed at international negotiations on how to deal
2018 with climate change. [*Figures 2 and S33*]

2019

2020 Do you support or oppose the following policies?

- 2021
- 2022 • Payments from high-income countries to compensate low-income countries for
2023 climate damages
 - 2024 • High-income countries funding renewable energy in low-income countries
 - 2025 • High-income countries contributing \$100 billion per year to help low-income
2026 countries adapt to climate change

2026 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
2027 support*

2028 45. Do you support or oppose the following global policies? [Figures 2 and S33]

- 2029 • Cancellation of low-income countries' public debt
- 2030 • Democratise international institutions (UN, IMF) by making a country's voting
2031 right proportional to its population
- 2032 • Removing tariffs on imports from low-income countries
- 2033 • A minimum wage in all countries at 50% of local median wage
- 2034 • Fight tax evasion by creating a global financial register to record ownership of
2035 all assets
- 2036 • A maximum wealth limit of [US1: \$10 billion; Eu: [€]100 million] for each
2037 human

2038 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
2039 support*

2040 46. Currently, [US1: 0.4%; FR: 0.8%; DE: 1.3%; ES: 0.5%; UK: 1.7%] of [U.S.] government
2041 spending (that is, [US1: 0.2%; FR: 0.4%; DE: 0.6%; ES: 0.2%; UK: 0.7%] of [U.S.] GDP)
2042 is spent on foreign aid to reduce poverty in low-income countries. [Figure S3]

2043 Do you support [the U.S.] transferring more money to low-income countries?

2044 *Yes, [U.S.] foreign aid should be increased.; Yes, but only if some conditions are met.; No,
2045 [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.; No, [U.S.] foreign aid should be reduced.*

2047 47. [Asked only if *Yes, but only if some conditions are met.* is chosen] What conditions
2048 should be required for [the U.S.] to increase its foreign aid? (Multiple answers pos-
2049 sible) [Figures S4, S25]

2050 *That recipient countries comply with climate targets and human rights.; That recipient
2051 countries cooperate to fight illegal migrations.; That other high-income countries also in-
2052 crease their foreign aid.; That this is financed by increased taxes on millionaires.; That we
2053 can be sure the aid reaches people in need and money is not diverted.; Other: [open field]*

2054 48. [Asked only if *No, [U.S.] foreign aid should remain stable.* or *No, [U.S.] foreign aid
2055 should be reduced.* is chosen] Why do you oppose [the U.S.] increasing its foreign
2056 aid? (Multiple answers possible) [Figure S5]

2057 *Aid perpetuates poverty as it makes people feel less responsible for themselves.; Aid is not
2058 effective as most of it is diverted.; Aid is a pressure tactic for high-income countries that*

2059 *prevents low-income countries from developing freely.; [The U.S.] is not responsible for what*
2060 *happens in other countries.; Charity begins at home: there is already a lot to do to support*
2061 *the American people in need.; Other: [open field]*

2062 **[Eu, US1, US2] Values and politics**

- 2063 49. [Eu (where it is instead asked at the beginning of Section “Other Policies”), US1]
2064 In international climate negotiations, would you prefer [U.S.] diplomats to defend
2065 [U.S.] interests or global justice? [Figure S34]
2066 *[U.S.] interests, even if it goes against global justice; [U.S.] interests, to the extent it re-*
2067 *spects global justice; ndifferent or don’t know; Global justice, to the extent it respects [U.S.]*
2068 *interests; Global justice, even if it goes against [U.S.] interests*
- 2069 50. How much did you give to charities in 2022? [Figure S39]
2070 *I did not make donations to charities last year.; Less than [\$]100.; Between [\$]101 and*
2071 *[\$]500.; Between [\$]501 and [\$]1,000.; Between [\$]1,001 and [\$]5,000.; More than [\$]5,000.*
- 2072 51. To what extent are you interested in politics? [Figure S40]
2073 *Not at all; A little; Moderately; A lot; A great deal*
- 2074 52. Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 means you think the
2075 government should do only those things necessary to provide the most basic gov-
2076 ernment functions, and 5 means you think the government should take active steps
2077 in every area it can to try and improve the lives of its citizens? [Figure S41]
2078 *Desired involvement of government [slider from 1 to 5]*
- 2079 53. **On economic policy matters**, where do you see yourself on a scale of 1 to 5, where
2080 1 is Left (favoring equality and government interventions) and 5 is Right (favoring
2081 free competition and little government intervention)? [Figure S42]
2082 *Left (1) to Right (5) on economic issues [slider from 1 to 5]*
- 2083 54. Did you vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election? [Figure S43]
2084 *Yes; No: I didn’t have the right to vote in the U.S.; Prefer not to say*
- 2085 55. [If voted: Which candidate did you vote for in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election?
2086 If did not vote: Even if you did not vote in the [2020 U.S. presidential] election,
2087 please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who
2088 represents your views more closely.] [Figure S44]

2089 [US1, US2: Biden; Trump; Jorgensen; Hawkins; Prefer not to say
2090 FR: candidates at the 2022 presidential election
2091 DE: parties with more than 1% of votes at the 2021 federal election and *Other*
2092 ES: lists with more than 0.9% at the November 2019 general election and *Other*
2093 UK: parties with more than 0.5% of votes at the 2019 general election and *Other*]

2094 56. To what extent do you think the following issues are a problem? [Figure S35]

- 2095 • Income inequality in [the U.S.]
2096 • Climate change
2097 • Global poverty

2098 *Not an important issue for me; An issue but there are other priorities; An issue but we
2099 already do what we can; An important issue, we should do more; One of the most pressing
2100 issue of our time*

2101 57. What group do you defend when you vote? [Figure S36]

2102 *Sentient beings (humans and animals); Humans; [Eu: Europeans]; [Americans]; People
2103 sharing my culture or religion; [US1, US2: My State]; [US1, US2: My town; Eu: My
2104 country, region or town]; My relatives and/or colleagues; My family and myself*

2105 [Eu, US1] Prioritization

2106 58. In this question, you have 100 points that you can allocate to different policies. The
2107 more you give points to a policy, the more you support it.

2108 How do you allocate the points among the following policies? [Figures S37 and S38]

2109 You can adjust the number of points either using the slider or entering the num-
2110 ber of your choice on the right-hand-side. **The sum of points must equal exactly
2111 100.** By pushing the last slider to the right, the total will automatically adjust to 100.
2112 Please read the 6 options before making your choice.

2113 See the sheet "Policies" in [this spreadsheet](#) for the pool of policies in each country.

2114 [sliders from 0 to 100]

2117 [FR, DE, ES] ETS2

2118 59. Similar to the Global Climate Scheme, the European Climate Scheme would impose
2119 a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit across the EU in the buildings
2120 and transport sectors. It would make polluters pay for their emissions, which in turn
2121 would increase fossil fuel prices and discourage polluting activities. Several options
2122 are possible regarding the use of the scheme's revenues:

- 2123 • Provide an equal cash transfer of €105 per year to each European.
- 2124 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European, proportional to their
2125 country's emissions: people in countries with higher emissions per person (like
2126 Germany) would receive more than people in countries with lower emissions
2127 (like Romania). For information, people in [Germany] would receive €[FR:
2128 110; DE: 130; ES: 90]/year.
- 2129 • Finance low-carbon investments: thermal insulation of buildings, switch to
2130 clean sources of heating, public transportation, and charging stations for elec-
2131 tric vehicles.
- 2132 • Provide cash transfers to the most vulnerable half of Europeans and finance
2133 low-carbon investments.

2134 Do you support or oppose the European Climate Scheme in case the revenue is used
2135 to... ?

- 2136 • Provide an equal cash transfer to each European
- 2137 • Provide a country-specific cash transfer to each European
- 2138 • Finance low-carbon investments
- 2139 • Provide cash transfers for the most vulnerable Europeans and low-carbon in-
2140 vestments

2141 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Neither support nor oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly
2142 support*

2143 60. [Asked iff none of the four variants of the European Climate Scheme is (somewhat or
2144 strongly) supported] Why do you not support a European Climate Scheme? (Mul-
2145 tiple answers possible)

2146 *I am opposed to climate policy being decided at the EU level, it should be decided at the na-*
2147 *tional level;*
2148 *I would prefer if the revenues were used in a different way (beyond the four suggestions*
2149 *above) than previously suggested;*
2150 *I would prefer if decreasing carbon emissions were regulated by other climate policies;*
2151 *I am generally opposed to additional, or more ambitious, climate policies;*
2152 *I do not fully understand how the European Climate Scheme is supposed to work;*
2153 *I don't know*

2154 **[Eu, US1, US2] Feedback**

- 2155 61. Do you feel that this survey was politically biased? [Figure S45]
2156 *Yes, left-wing biased; Yes, right-wing biased; No, I do not feel it was biased*
- 2157 62. [US2 Asked only to one random third of the respondents, instead of the feedback Ques-
2158 tion 63] According to you, what should high-income countries do to fight extreme
2159 poverty in low-income countries? [Figure S46]
2160 *{Open field}*
- 2161 63. The survey is nearing completion. You can now enter any comments, thoughts or
2162 suggestions in the field below.
2163 *{Open field}*
- 2164 64. Lastly, are you interested to be interviewed by a researcher (through videoconfer-
2165 encing) for 30 min?
2166
2167 This is totally optional and will not be rewarded.
2168 *Yes; No*

2169 E Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme

2170 To specify the GCS, we use the IEA's 2DS scenario (IEA 2017), which is consistent
2171 with limiting the global average temperature increase to 2°C with a probability of at least
2172 50%. The paper by Hood (2017) contributing to the Report of the High-Level Commission
2173 on Carbon Prices (Stern & Stiglitz 2017) presents a price corridor compatible with this
2174 emissions scenario, from which we take the midpoint. The product of these two series
2175 provides an estimate of the revenues expected from a global carbon price. We then use
2176 the UN median scenario of future population aged over 15 years (*adults*, for short). We
2177 derive the basic income that could be paid to all adults by recycling the revenues from
2178 the global carbon price: evolving between \$20 and \$30 per month, with a peak in 2030.
2179 Accounting for the lower price levels in low-income countries, an additional income of
2180 \$30 per month would allow **670 million people** to escape extreme poverty, defined with
2181 the threshold of \$2.15 per day in purchasing power parity.²⁷

2182 To estimate the increase in fossil fuel expenditures (or "cost") in each country by 2030,
2183 we make a key assumption concerning the evolution of the carbon footprints per adult:
2184 that they will decrease by the same proportion in each country. We use data from the
2185 Global Carbon Project (Peters et al. 2012). In 2030, the average carbon footprint of a
2186 country c , e_c , evolves from baseline year b proportionally to the evolution of its adult
2187 population $\Delta p_c = p_c^{2030} / p_c^b$. Thus, the global share of country c 's carbon footprint, s_c ,
2188 is proportional to $\sigma_c = e_c \Delta p_c$, and as countries' shares sum to 1, $s_c = \frac{\sigma_c}{\sum_k \sigma_k}$. Multiplying
2189 country c 's emission share with global revenues in 2030, R , and dividing by c 's adult pop-
2190 ulation in year y , yields its average cost per adult: $R \cdot s_c / p_c^y$. Using findings from Ivanova
2191 & Wood (2020) for Europe and Fremstad & Paul (2019) for the U.S., we approximate the
2192 median cost as 90% of the average cost. Finally, the net gain is given by the basic income
2193 (\$30 per month) minus the cost. We provided consistent estimates of net gains in all sur-
2194 veys (using $y = b = 2015$), though in the global survey we gave the average net gains
2195 vs. the median ones in the complementary surveys. The latter are shown in Figure S51.
2196 For the record, Table S4 also provides an estimate of *average* net gains (computed with

²⁷The average carbon footprint of Sub-Saharan Africa is 0.75tCO₂ per capita (World Bank), and it is even lower for people living in extreme poverty, under one tenth of the world average of about 5tCO₂ per capita (Chancel & Piketty 2015). Under a GCS with a cash transfer of \$30 per person, if one's emission is one tenth of the world average, their net gain would be \$27 per month in nominal terms. In regions with extreme poverty like Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding high-income countries), the conversion factor from Market Exchange Rate to Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is 2.4 (computed as the ratio of the World Bank series relating the GDP per capita of Sub-Saharan Africa in PPP and nominal). Therefore, the net gain for the extreme poor is \$65 per month (or \$2.13 a day) in PPP, enough to lift them out of extreme poverty.

²¹⁹⁷ $b = 2019$ and $y = 2030$).²⁸

²¹⁹⁸ Estimates of the net gains from the Global Climate Scheme are necessarily imprecise,
²¹⁹⁹ given the uncertainties surrounding the carbon price required to achieve emissions re-
²²⁰⁰ ductions as well as each country's trajectory in terms of emissions and population. These
²²⁰¹ values are highly dependent on future (non-price) climate policies, technical progress,
²²⁰² and economic growth of each country, which are only partially known. Integrated As-
²²⁰³ sessment Models have been used to derive a Global Energy Assessment (Johansson et al.
²²⁰⁴ 2012), a 100% renewable scenario (Greenpeace 2015) as well as Shared Socioeconomic
²²⁰⁵ Pathways (SSPs), which include consistent trajectories of population, emissions, and car-
²²⁰⁶ bon price (Bauer et al. 2017; Fricko et al. 2017; Riahi et al. 2017; van Vuuren et al. 2017).
²²⁰⁷ Instead of using some of these modelling trajectories, we relied on a simple and trans-
²²⁰⁸ parent formula, for a number of reasons. First and foremost, those trajectories describe
²²⁰⁹ territorial emissions while we need consumption-based emissions to compute the inci-
²²¹⁰ dence of the GCS. Second, the carbon price is relatively low in trajectories of SSPs that
²²¹¹ contain global warming below 2°C (less than \$35/tCO₂ in 2030), so we conservatively
²²¹² chose a method yielding a higher carbon price (\$90 in 2030). Third, modelling results are
²²¹³ available only for a few macro regions, while we wanted country by country estimates.
²²¹⁴ Finally, we have checked that the emissions per capita given by our method are broadly
²²¹⁵ in line with alternative methods, even if it tends to overestimate net gains in countries
²²¹⁶ which will decarbonize less rapidly than average.²⁹ For example, although countries' de-
²²¹⁷ carbonization plans should realign with the GCS in place, India might still decarbonize
²²¹⁸ less quickly than the European Union, so India's gain and the EU's loss might be over-
²²¹⁹ estimated in our computations. For a more sophisticated version of the Global Climate
²²²⁰ Scheme which includes participation mechanisms preventing middle-income countries
²²²¹ (like China) to lose from it and estimations of the Net Present Value by country, see Fabre
²²²² (2023).

(Back to Section 2.2.2)

²⁸2015 was the last year of data available when the global questionnaire was conceived (OECD data was then used – it does not cover all countries but give identical rounded estimates than those recomputed from the Global Carbon Project data for our complementary surveys). 2030 was chosen as the reference year as it is the date at which global carbon price revenues are expected to peak (and the GCS redistributive effects would be largest), and the GCS could not realistically enter into force before that date. In the surveys, we chose $y = b = 2015$ rather than $b = 2019$ and $y = 2030$ to get more conservative estimates of the monthly cost in the U.S. (\$20 higher than the other option) and in Europe (€5 or £10 higher).

²⁹Computations with alternative methods can be found on [our public repository](#).

Figure S51: Net gains from the Global Climate Scheme.




Table S4: Estimated net gain from the GCS in 2030 and carbon footprint by country.

	Mean net gain from the GCS (\$/month)	CO ₂ footprint per adult in 2019 (tCO ₂ /y)			
Saudi Arabia	-92	24.0	Algeria*	-1	6.0
United States	-76	21.0	Mexico	2	5.6
Australia	-59	17.6	Ukraine	2	5.6
Canada	-55	16.7	Uzbekistan*	4	5.1
South Korea	-49	15.6	Argentina	5	4.9
Taiwan	-41	14.0	Thailand	7	4.6
Germany	-30	11.7	Egypt	12	3.6
Russia	-28	11.5	Indonesia	13	3.3
Japan	-27	11.3	Colombia	15	3.0
Malaysia	-21	10.0	Brazil	15	2.9
Iran	-19	9.5	Vietnam	16	2.9
Poland	-18	9.5	Peru	16	2.8
United Kingdom	-18	9.4	Morocco	16	2.7
China	-14	8.6	North Korea*	17	2.5
Italy	-12	8.4	India	18	2.4
South Africa	-11	8.0	Philippines	18	2.3
France	-10	7.8	Pakistan	22	1.6
Iraq*	-7	7.4	Bangladesh	24	1.1
Spain	-6	7.0	Nigeria	25	1.0
Turkey	-2	6.2	Kenya	25	0.9
			Myanmar*	26	0.9
			Sudan*	26	0.9
			Tanzania	27	0.5
			Afghanistan*	27	0.5
			Uganda	28	0.4
			Ethiopia	28	0.3
			Venezuela	29	0.3
			DRC*	30	0.1

²²²³ Note: Asterisks denote countries where footprint is missing and territorial emissions is used instead.

²²²⁴ Values differ from Figure S51 as this table present estimates of *mean* net gain per adult in 2030, not at the

²²²⁵ present. Only the countries with more than 20 million adults (covering 87% of the global total) are shown.

F Determinants of support

Table S5: Determinants of support for the Global Climate Scheme. (Back to [2.2.2](#))

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme						
	All	United States	Europe	France	Germany	Spain	United Kingdom
Country: Germany	-0.157*** (0.022)		-0.144*** (0.022)				
Country: Spain	-0.044* (0.024)		-0.026 (0.024)				
Country: United Kingdom	-0.079*** (0.024)		-0.104*** (0.023)				
Country: United States	-0.375*** (0.019)						
Income quartile: 2	0.037** (0.017)	0.031 (0.022)	0.038 (0.023)	0.047 (0.043)	0.058 (0.049)	0.013 (0.053)	0.023 (0.043)
Income quartile: 3	0.042** (0.017)	0.033 (0.024)	0.049** (0.024)	0.080** (0.040)	0.059 (0.052)	0.074 (0.056)	-0.052 (0.052)
Income quartile: 4	0.056*** (0.018)	0.062** (0.026)	0.010 (0.026)	0.018 (0.047)	-0.015 (0.055)	-0.001 (0.056)	-0.005 (0.057)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.023* (0.012)	0.032* (0.017)	0.010 (0.018)	0.007 (0.029)	0.045 (0.039)	0.007 (0.039)	-0.010 (0.039)
Age: 25-34	-0.076*** (0.025)	-0.084*** (0.031)	-0.044 (0.035)	-0.031 (0.057)	-0.077 (0.083)	-0.050 (0.066)	-0.103 (0.091)
Age: 35-49	-0.101*** (0.024)	-0.109*** (0.030)	-0.069* (0.034)	-0.094* (0.055)	-0.009 (0.077)	-0.168** (0.070)	-0.050 (0.090)
Age: 50-64	-0.137*** (0.024)	-0.165*** (0.030)	-0.038 (0.035)	-0.039 (0.056)	-0.020 (0.082)	-0.146** (0.067)	-0.017 (0.087)
Age: 65+	-0.116*** (0.028)	-0.142*** (0.034)	-0.056 (0.044)	0.003 (0.076)	-0.045 (0.094)	-0.258*** (0.091)	0.011 (0.105)
Gender: Man	0.019* (0.011)	0.022 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.029)	-0.018 (0.033)	0.042 (0.038)	-0.005 (0.034)
Lives with partner	0.029** (0.013)	0.023 (0.017)	0.058*** (0.018)	0.070** (0.033)	0.082** (0.038)	0.017 (0.038)	0.040 (0.039)
Employment status: Retired	-0.020 (0.024)	-0.046 (0.030)	0.056 (0.038)	0.087 (0.081)	0.096 (0.075)	0.040 (0.082)	0.001 (0.073)
Employment status: Student	0.045 (0.033)	0.062 (0.048)	0.101** (0.044)	0.165* (0.085)	0.192** (0.087)	0.116 (0.074)	-0.021 (0.107)
Employment status: Working	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.020 (0.024)	0.011 (0.028)	0.082 (0.064)	0.006 (0.056)	-0.050 (0.056)	0.036 (0.051)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.331*** (0.013)	-0.435*** (0.017)	-0.106*** (0.019)	-0.131*** (0.035)	-0.004 (0.044)	-0.114*** (0.038)	-0.081* (0.041)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	-0.184*** (0.016)	-0.198*** (0.022)	-0.136*** (0.021)	-0.196*** (0.039)	-0.034 (0.043)	-0.116** (0.046)	-0.108*** (0.040)
Vote: Far right	-0.396*** (0.032)		-0.309*** (0.033)	-0.493*** (0.064)	-0.168*** (0.051)	-0.130 (0.102)	-0.314*** (0.080)
Urban	0.049*** (0.012)	0.072*** (0.018)	0.006 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.029)	0.019 (0.032)	-0.014 (0.036)	0.017 (0.033)
Race: White		-0.030 (0.019)					
Region: Northeast		0.010 (0.023)					
Region: South		0.006 (0.020)					
Region: West		0.010 (0.022)					
Swing State		-0.038** (0.019)					
Constant	1.048	0.736	0.89	0.7	0.732	0.935	0.886
Observations	7,986	4,992	2,994	977	727	748	542
R ²	0.160	0.181	0.064	0.116	0.067	0.043	0.063

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table S6: Support for the GCS regressed on comprehension of its financial effects.

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme					
	All	United States	France	Germany	United Kingdom	Spain
With GCS, typical [country] people lose and poorest humans win	0.029** (0.012)	-0.004 (0.016)	0.043 (0.033)	0.051 (0.033)	0.040 (0.036)	0.038 (0.037)
Constant	0.596	0.53	0.764	0.677	0.707	0.796
Observations	8,000	5,000	729	979	749	543
R ²	0.001	0.00001	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.002

Table S7: Correlation between (*Somewhat or Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in high-income countries.

	Support for a global GHG tax and dividend											
	USA (1)	DNK (2)	FRA (3)	DEU (4)	ITA (5)	ESP (6)	GBR (7)	JPN (8)	POL (9)	AUS (10)	CAN (11)	KOR (12)
Control group mean	0.34	0.409	0.34	0.361	0.341	0.421	0.288	0.317	0.309	0.294	0.316	0.334
Trusts the government	0.040*** (0.013)	0.0005 (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.051*** (0.011)	0.061*** (0.012)	0.046*** (0.011)	0.050*** (0.012)	0.039*** (0.013)	0.023** (0.011)	0.041*** (0.013)	0.019 (0.012)	0.079*** (0.013)
Believes inequality is an important problem	0.038*** (0.014)	0.051*** (0.012)	0.045*** (0.013)	0.040*** (0.011)	0.023** (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.052*** (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)	0.009 (0.010)	0.005 (0.013)	0.031*** (0.012)	0.024** (0.012)
Worries about CC	0.006 (0.018)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.005 (0.016)	0.048*** (0.014)	0.023* (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.044*** (0.015)	0.014 (0.014)	0.018 (0.013)	0.036** (0.017)	0.004 (0.014)	0.015 (0.013)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	0.009 (0.015)	0.007 (0.012)	0.018 (0.014)	0.015 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.012)	0.032** (0.011)	0.027** (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.024** (0.014)	0.018 (0.015)	0.014 (0.014)	0.001 (0.013)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.059*** (0.015)	0.019 (0.013)	0.008 (0.014)	0.032** (0.013)	0.012 (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.006 (0.014)	0.037** (0.014)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.033** (0.016)	0.026* (0.014)	0.033** (0.013)
Understands emission across activities/regions	-0.018 (0.011)	0.009 (0.013)	0.003 (0.012)	0.023* (0.012)	0.007 (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)	0.007 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.026** (0.011)	-0.002 (0.013)	0.003 (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	0.007 (0.012)	0.008 (0.014)	0.023 (0.014)	0.011 (0.012)	-0.0005 (0.012)	0.031*** (0.012)	-0.007 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.014 (0.011)	0.025* (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.024* (0.012)
Knows which gases cause CC	0.005 (0.011)	0.021* (0.012)	0.010 (0.013)	0.001 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.010)	0.020* (0.010)	0.015 (0.010)	0.017 (0.011)	0.011 (0.011)	-0.0003 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.013)
Understands impacts of CC	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.029*** (0.011)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.022* (0.012)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.024* (0.012)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	-0.005 (0.013)	0.007 (0.012)	0.021 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.014)	0.011 (0.014)	0.010 (0.013)	0.014 (0.013)	0.008 (0.013)	0.015 (0.013)	0.036** (0.016)	0.004 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.013)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	-0.013 (0.021)	0.037 (0.023)	0.043* (0.022)	-0.014 (0.020)	-0.038** (0.019)	0.029 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.017 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.006 (0.022)	0.021 (0.020)	-0.020 (0.019)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.086*** (0.024)	0.066*** (0.023)	0.075*** (0.023)	0.094*** (0.022)	0.105*** (0.020)	0.074*** (0.023)	0.091*** (0.021)	0.154*** (0.019)	0.089*** (0.020)	0.070*** (0.024)	0.053** (0.023)	0.112*** (0.020)
Believes own household would lose	-0.071*** (0.021)	-0.057*** (0.015)	-0.026 (0.020)	-0.087*** (0.017)	-0.066*** (0.017)	-0.053*** (0.017)	-0.073*** (0.017)	-0.008 (0.017)	-0.079*** (0.017)	-0.052*** (0.016)	-0.060*** (0.019)	-0.083*** (0.017)
Believes low-income earners will lose	-0.034* (0.019)	-0.020 (0.016)	-0.056*** (0.018)	-0.022 (0.017)	-0.021 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.016)	-0.015 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.056*** (0.017)	-0.025 (0.016)	-0.030 (0.020)	-0.056*** (0.018)
Believes high-income earners will lose	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.012)	0.013 (0.013)	0.003 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.011)	0.007 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.025** (0.012)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.0004 (0.013)
Observations	2,218	2,013	2,006	2,006	2,088	2,268	2,025	1,990	2,053	1,978	2,022	1,932
R ²	0.329	0.241	0.237	0.295	0.211	0.216	0.272	0.222	0.214	0.272	0.254	0.228

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 of Dechezleprêtre et al. (2022) for variable definitions.

Table S8: Correlation between (*Somewhat* or *Strong*) support for a global tax on GHG financing a global basic income (Question H) and beliefs in middle-income countries.

	Support for a global GHG tax and dividend							
	IDN (1)	ZAF (2)	MEX (3)	TUR (4)	IND (5)	BRA (6)	CHN (7)	UKR (8)
Control group mean	0.697	0.396	0.681	0.44	0.719	0.539	0.737	0.622
Trusts the government	0.051*** (0.012)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.040*** (0.014)	0.066*** (0.017)	0.065*** (0.015)	0.038** (0.015)	-0.011 (0.015)	0.061*** (0.014)
Believes inequality is an important problem	0.048** (0.011)	0.002 (0.014)	0.057*** (0.015)	0.028 (0.017)	0.092*** (0.016)	0.055*** (0.015)	-0.001 (0.015)	0.027 (0.018)
Worries about CC	0.003 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.016)	0.013 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.017)	-0.0002 (0.016)	0.032* (0.017)	-0.0002 (0.016)	0.046*** (0.016)
Believes net-zero is technically feasible	0.020 (0.014)	0.026 (0.017)	0.004 (0.014)	0.039** (0.017)	0.022 (0.016)	0.019 (0.015)	0.034** (0.016)	0.018 (0.016)
Believes will suffer from climate change	0.020* (0.011)	0.038** (0.016)	0.032* (0.017)	-0.002 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.015)	-0.017 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.018 (0.016)
Understands emission across activities/regions	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.013)	0.003 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.010)	0.039*** (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.00004 (0.013)
Knows CC is real & caused by human	-0.006 (0.009)	0.011 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.016)	0.0002 (0.012)	0.003 (0.014)	-0.052*** (0.016)	0.022 (0.014)
Knows which gases cause CC	-0.026*** (0.009)	0.019 (0.015)	0.035** (0.014)	0.015 (0.015)	0.020 (0.013)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.023* (0.012)	0.023 (0.015)
Understands impacts of CC	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.0005 (0.015)	0.009 (0.017)	0.043*** (0.014)	-0.023 (0.015)	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.014 (0.014)
Believes policies entail positive econ. effects	-0.010 (0.007)	0.009 (0.016)	0.015 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.013)	0.002 (0.011)	-0.016 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.010)	0.035** (0.015)
Believes policies would reduce pollution	0.023 (0.015)	0.002 (0.021)	0.019 (0.022)	0.044 (0.029)	0.021 (0.020)	0.032 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.018)	-0.023 (0.025)
Believes policies would reduce emissions	0.111*** (0.019)	0.073*** (0.022)	0.088*** (0.024)	0.078** (0.031)	0.034 (0.025)	0.129*** (0.022)	0.060*** (0.022)	0.138*** (0.025)
Believes own household would lose	-0.027 (0.021)	-0.044** (0.020)	-0.071*** (0.019)	-0.054** (0.024)	-0.012 (0.019)	-0.067*** (0.023)	-0.119*** (0.022)	-0.045** (0.021)
Believes low-income earners will lose	-0.059*** (0.020)	-0.016 (0.019)	0.003 (0.017)	-0.053** (0.023)	-0.055*** (0.019)	-0.013 (0.020)	0.001 (0.018)	0.004 (0.020)
Believes high-income earners will lose	0.026** (0.011)	-0.020 (0.015)	0.010 (0.013)	0.010 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.014)	0.003 (0.016)	-0.047*** (0.014)	-0.007 (0.013)
Observations	2,488	2,003	2,045	1,932	2,472	1,860	1,717	1,564
R ²	0.366	0.175	0.242	0.248	0.370	0.272	0.280	0.255

Note: The table shows the results of regressions on standardized variables measuring respondents' beliefs and perceptions. Treatment indicators and individual socioeconomic characteristics are included but not displayed. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. See Appendix A-1 of Dechezleprêtre et al. (2022) for variable definitions.

2227 **G Representativeness of the surveys**

Table S9: Sample representativeness of the complementary surveys. (Back to [2.1](#))

	US1			US2			Eu		
	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample
Sample size		3,000	3,000		2,000	2,000		3,000	3,000
Gender: Woman	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.45	0.50	0.51	0.49	0.51
Gender: Man	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.49	0.55	0.50	0.49	0.51	0.49
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.23	0.25	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.11	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.18	0.15	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.18	0.15	0.17	0.15
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.24	0.26
Age: 65+	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.25	0.23	0.25
Diploma_25_64: Below upper secondary	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.13	0.14	0.13
Diploma_25_64: Upper secondary	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.28	0.29	0.28	0.23	0.19	0.23
Diploma_25_64: Post secondary	0.34	0.40	0.34	0.34	0.33	0.34	0.29	0.33	0.29
Race: White only	0.60	0.67	0.61	0.60	0.62	0.61			
Race: Hispanic	0.18	0.15	0.19	0.18	0.19	0.19			
Race: Black	0.13	0.16	0.14	0.13	0.17	0.14			
Region: Northeast	0.17	0.20	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.17			
Region: Midwest	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.21			
Region: South	0.38	0.39	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38			
Region: West	0.24	0.20	0.24	0.24	0.20	0.24			
Urban: TRUE	0.73	0.78	0.74	0.73	0.75	0.73			
Employment_18_64: Inactive	0.20	0.16	0.16	0.20	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.15
Employment_18_64: Unemployed	0.02	0.07	0.08	0.02	0.09	0.08	0.03	0.06	0.05
Vote: Left	0.32	0.47	0.45	0.32	0.46	0.45	0.30	0.32	0.32
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.30	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.32	0.32
Vote: Far right							0.10	0.10	0.10
Country: FR							0.24	0.24	0.24
Country: DE							0.33	0.33	0.33
Country: ES							0.18	0.18	0.18
Country: UK							0.25	0.25	0.25
Urbanity: Cities							0.43	0.49	0.43
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs							0.33	0.32	0.33
Urbanity: Rural							0.25	0.20	0.25

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

Table S10: Sample representativeness for each European country. (Back to [2.1](#))

	FR			DE			ES			UK		
	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.									
Sample size		729	729		979	979		543	543		749	749
Gender: Woman	0.52	0.50	0.52	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.53	0.51	0.50	0.43	0.50
Gender: Man	0.48	0.50	0.48	0.49	0.48	0.49	0.49	0.47	0.49	0.50	0.57	0.50
Income_quartile: 1	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.29	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 2	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.31	0.25	0.25	0.19	0.25
Income_quartile: 3	0.25	0.19	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.25
Income_quartile: 4	0.25	0.33	0.25	0.25	0.18	0.25	0.25	0.17	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.25
Age: 18-24	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.14	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.07	0.10
Age: 25-34	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.12	0.16	0.12	0.17	0.20	0.17
Age: 35-49	0.24	0.31	0.24	0.22	0.26	0.22	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.24	0.18	0.24
Age: 50-64	0.24	0.19	0.24	0.28	0.23	0.28	0.27	0.28	0.27	0.25	0.30	0.25
Age: 65+	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.26	0.21	0.26	0.25	0.22	0.25	0.24	0.25	0.24
Diploma_25-64: Below upper secondary	0.11	0.19	0.11	0.10	0.14	0.10	0.24	0.16	0.25	0.12	0.09	0.12
Diploma_25-64: Upper secondary	0.26	0.16	0.26	0.27	0.20	0.27	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.21	0.23	0.21
Diploma_25-64: Post secondary	0.26	0.30	0.26	0.29	0.31	0.29	0.28	0.38	0.27	0.33	0.36	0.33
Urbanity: Cities	0.47	0.52	0.47	0.37	0.47	0.37	0.52	0.58	0.52	0.40	0.41	0.40
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.40	0.35	0.40	0.22	0.27	0.22	0.42	0.43	0.42
Urbanity: Rural	0.34	0.29	0.34	0.23	0.18	0.23	0.26	0.15	0.26	0.18	0.16	0.18
Employment_18-64: Inactive	0.20	0.19	0.18	0.15	0.14	0.11	0.20	0.13	0.12	0.16	0.16	0.17
Employment_18-64: Unemployed	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.11	0.12	0.02	0.03	0.04
Vote: Left	0.23	0.19	0.21	0.37	0.44	0.44	0.33	0.37	0.38	0.25	0.28	0.29
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.26	0.30	0.29	0.28	0.27	0.29	0.18	0.24	0.24	0.36	0.44	0.41
Vote: Far right	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.01	0.03	0.03

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. In this Table, weights are defined at the country level. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

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Similar tables for the global surveys can be found in [Dechezleprêtre et al. \(2022\)](#).

2229 H Attrition analysis

Table S11: Attrition analysis for the US1 survey.

	Dropped out	Dropped out after socio-eco	Failed attention test	Duration (in min)	Duration below 4 min
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mean	0.08	0.059	0.082	21.198	0.016
Income quartile: 2	0.025*** (0.010)	0.025*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.740 (3.064)	-0.009 (0.006)
Income quartile: 3	0.062*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.754 (2.813)	-0.004 (0.007)
Income quartile: 4	0.035*** (0.011)	0.035*** (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-3.917 (2.798)	-0.003 (0.007)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.039*** (0.009)	0.039*** (0.009)	-0.000*** (0.000)	1.544 (2.665)	0.006 (0.006)
Age: 25-34	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.094*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.597 (2.604)	-0.031** (0.013)
Age: 35-49	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.100*** (0.015)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.824 (3.176)	-0.032** (0.013)
Age: 50-64	-0.060*** (0.015)	-0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	5.723** (2.763)	-0.039*** (0.012)
Age: 65+	0.048*** (0.017)	0.048*** (0.017)	0.000** (0.000)	8.952** (4.267)	-0.047*** (0.012)
Gender: Man	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.039*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.451 (2.210)	-0.0001 (0.005)
Urban	0.006 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.888** (2.443)	-0.004 (0.006)
Race: Black	0.020** (0.010)	0.020** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	8.554*** (2.600)	0.004 (0.007)
Race: Hispanic	0.021** (0.010)	0.021** (0.010)	-0.000*** (0.000)	4.119* (2.293)	-0.002 (0.007)
Region: Northeast	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-4.862 (4.782)	-0.004 (0.007)
Region: South	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-1.151 (4.710)	-0.004 (0.006)
Region: West	0.006 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-4.000 (4.305)	-0.003 (0.007)
Vote: Biden	-0.048*** (0.008)	-0.048*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-2.901 (2.379)	-0.009 (0.007)
Vote: Trump	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.145 (2.878)	-0.005 (0.008)
Observations	5,719	5,719	3,252	3,044	3,044
R ²	0.127	0.127	1.000	0.006	0.017

Table S12: Attrition analysis for the US2 survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 4 min (5)
Mean	0.095	0.074	0.092	16.338	0.052
Income quartile: 2	0.023* (0.013)	0.023* (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	1.352 (1.601)	-0.029** (0.014)
Income quartile: 3	0.054*** (0.014)	0.054*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	8.502 (9.649)	-0.009 (0.016)
Income quartile: 4	0.060*** (0.016)	0.060*** (0.016)	-0.000 (0.000)	5.254 (3.376)	0.0003 (0.017)
Diploma: Post secondary	-0.033*** (0.011)	-0.033*** (0.011)	0.000 (0.000)	1.601 (2.630)	0.012 (0.011)
Age: 25-34	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.929 (1.535)	-0.032 (0.024)
Age: 35-49	0.012 (0.014)	0.012 (0.014)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.076 (6.651)	-0.047** (0.022)
Age: 50-64	0.040*** (0.014)	0.040*** (0.014)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.364 (1.565)	-0.079*** (0.022)
Age: 65+	0.115*** (0.017)	0.115*** (0.017)	-0.000*** (0.000)	2.619 (3.150)	-0.095*** (0.022)
Gender: Man	-0.073*** (0.009)	-0.073*** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	4.707 (6.037)	0.010 (0.010)
Urban	0.019* (0.011)	0.019* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	1.766 (1.135)	0.005 (0.012)
Race: Black	0.060*** (0.015)	0.060*** (0.015)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.673 (13.328)	-0.010 (0.015)
Race: Hispanic	0.079*** (0.014)	0.079*** (0.014)	-0.000 (0.000)	2.930 (1.813)	-0.027** (0.012)
Region: Northeast	-0.026* (0.014)	-0.026* (0.014)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.837 (2.855)	-0.011 (0.015)
Region: South	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.000 (0.000)	3.220 (5.002)	0.009 (0.014)
Region: West	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.000 (0.000)	-1.759 (1.942)	-0.009 (0.015)
Vote: Biden	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.049*** (0.008)	-0.000*** (0.000)	3.230 (2.731)	-0.006 (0.014)
Vote: Trump	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.026*** (0.009)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.554 (1.272)	0.007 (0.016)
Observations	2,973	2,973	2,280	2,103	2,103
R ²	0.241	0.241	1.000	0.010	0.031

Table S13: Attrition analysis for the *Eu* survey.

	Dropped out (1)	Dropped out after socio-eco (2)	Failed attention test (3)	Duration (in min) (4)	Duration below 6 min (5)
Mean	0.067	0.044	0.151	54.602	0.039
Country: Germany	0.023** (0.010)	0.019** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	9.533 (18.906)	0.019* (0.010)
Country: Spain	-0.102*** (0.011)	-0.098*** (0.011)	0.000* (0.000)	-29.136* (15.948)	0.010 (0.010)
Country: United Kingdom	0.042*** (0.011)	0.043*** (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	-7.458 (18.046)	0.010 (0.010)
Income quartile: 2	0.032*** (0.010)	0.029*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.000)	32.749* (19.771)	-0.015 (0.010)
Income quartile: 3	0.049*** (0.010)	0.047*** (0.010)	0.000*** (0.000)	6.130 (11.734)	-0.021** (0.010)
Income quartile: 4	0.024** (0.011)	0.021* (0.011)	0.000*** (0.000)	18.659 (19.955)	-0.018* (0.011)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.035*** (0.008)	0.034*** (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	10.647 (12.959)	-0.007 (0.007)
Age: 25-34	0.028** (0.013)	0.025* (0.013)	-0.000*** (0.000)	36.132 (22.285)	-0.005 (0.018)
Age: 35-49	0.064*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	-0.000*** (0.000)	37.159** (17.190)	-0.013 (0.016)
Age: 50-64	0.085*** (0.013)	0.083*** (0.013)	-0.000 (0.000)	48.363** (22.526)	-0.063*** (0.015)
Age: 65+	0.117*** (0.014)	0.115*** (0.013)	-0.000** (0.000)	36.351** (14.226)	-0.061*** (0.015)
Gender: Man	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.000* (0.000)	-22.980 (14.093)	0.009 (0.007)
Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs	0.006 (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)	0.000*** (0.000)	-16.736 (17.256)	0.004 (0.008)
Degree of urbanization: Rural	0.023** (0.009)	0.023** (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)	-14.593 (19.733)	-0.001 (0.009)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.025*** (0.005)	-0.025*** (0.005)	0.000*** (0.000)	-17.558 (13.143)	0.019** (0.008)
Vote: Far right	0.005 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.000*** (0.000)	15.838 (32.281)	0.029** (0.014)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	0.023*** (0.006)	0.022*** (0.005)	0.000 (0.000)	24.631 (19.824)	0.030*** (0.010)
Observations	3,963	3,963	3,326	3,115	3,115
R ²	0.406	0.395	1.000	0.006	0.028

2230 I Balance analysis

Table S14: Balance analysis.

	List contains: G (1)	Branch petition: NR (2)	Branch donation: Own nation (3)	Branch conjoint 3: with GCS (4)
Mean	0.496	0.493	0.5	0.499
Country: Germany	-0.026 (0.026)	0.017 (0.026)	0.020 (0.026)	0.005 (0.026)
Country: Spain	0.025 (0.030)	0.026 (0.030)	0.026 (0.030)	0.043 (0.030)
Country: United Kingdom	0.002 (0.028)	0.018 (0.028)	0.037 (0.028)	0.063** (0.028)
Country: United States	-0.001 (0.024)	0.019 (0.024)	0.007 (0.024)	0.023 (0.024)
Income quartile: 2	-0.013 (0.021)	-0.024 (0.021)	0.012 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.021)
Income quartile: 3	0.021 (0.022)	-0.005 (0.022)	0.011 (0.022)	-0.004 (0.022)
Income quartile: 4	-0.001 (0.023)	-0.017 (0.023)	-0.013 (0.023)	0.0001 (0.023)
Diploma: Post secondary	0.008 (0.016)	0.014 (0.016)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.016)
Age: 25-34	0.023 (0.031)	-0.049 (0.031)	-0.003 (0.031)	-0.009 (0.031)
Age: 35-49	0.032 (0.030)	-0.002 (0.030)	-0.014 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.030)
Age: 50-64	0.030 (0.030)	-0.005 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.030)	-0.020 (0.030)
Age: 65+	0.029 (0.037)	-0.037 (0.037)	-0.015 (0.037)	-0.012 (0.037)
Gender: Man	0.024 (0.015)	0.012 (0.015)	0.002 (0.015)	-0.016 (0.015)
Degree of urbanization: Towns and suburbs	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.0005 (0.017)	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.011 (0.017)
Degree of urbanization: Rural	0.013 (0.024)	0.017 (0.024)	-0.004 (0.024)	0.027 (0.024)
Employment status: Retired	-0.005 (0.032)	-0.031 (0.032)	-0.034 (0.032)	-0.016 (0.032)
Employment status: Student	0.005 (0.044)	-0.023 (0.044)	-0.033 (0.044)	-0.025 (0.044)
Employment status: Working	0.010 (0.024)	-0.027 (0.024)	-0.033 (0.024)	-0.012 (0.024)
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.004 (0.017)	0.003 (0.017)	0.010 (0.017)	0.002 (0.017)
Vote: PNR/Non-voter	0.001 (0.019)	0.014 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.019)	-0.012 (0.019)
Vote: Far right	0.009 (0.034)	0.030 (0.034)	0.023 (0.035)	0.038 (0.034)
Observations	5,991	5,991	5,991	5,991
R ²	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.003

²²³¹ J Placebo tests

Table S15: Placebo tests.

	G+R+C preferred to R+C (1)	Supports G+R+C (2)	Signs petition (3)	Share of policies supported (4)	Conjoint 5 A+CGS preferred to B (5)
Mean	0.645	0.633	0.611	0.535	0.596
Branch of list experiment: l	-0.013 (0.019)	-0.024 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.019)	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.018 (0.021)
Branch of list experiment: rgl	0.005 (0.019)	0.006 (0.019)	-0.002 (0.019)	0.001 (0.012)	0.010 (0.021)
Branch of list experiment: rl	-0.009 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.019)	0.022 (0.019)	0.007 (0.012)	0.007 (0.021)
Branch of petition: nr	0.011 (0.014)	0.006 (0.014)	0.022 (0.014)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.015)
Poor is in own country	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.014)	0.015 (0.014)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.020 (0.015)
Observations	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000	5,218
R ²	0.0004	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001

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