Thank you for your feedback. Your thoughtful and constructive comments played an instrumental role in improving the quality of our paper. As a result of your guidance and suggestions, the clarity of the manuscript has significantly improved. In the following, we include point-by-point responses to the comments raised in your letter: we greatly appreciate to be challenged with such depth and to get the opportunity to clarify our design and results. As for the comments that call for a specific revision, we always find the suggestions useful and we now gladly comply with them.

As a summary of the many valuable below points, we changed …TODO!

*This study investigates the level and predictors of public support for the Global Climate Scheme which consists of introducing a global carbon pricing mechanism whose revenues would fund a universal basic income. The analysis of survey data from over 20 countries suggests that the policy finds supermajoritarian support in Europe and majority support in the United States. The main*

*conclusion is that the Global Climate Scheme is preferred by a robust majority across countries and that “the expressed preference is sincere”. 1. The results could be very context-dependent because existing conjoint- experimental research finds that this sensitivity is absent when voters can also select tax plans that would benefit the poor (see Ballard-Rosas et al. 2017 JOP) and because the impact of a policy on the richest individuals does not seem to drive preferences in other policy fields (Bechtel and Liesch 2020 POQ).*

Thank you for raising the issue of context-dependency. We agree that it is important to be clear that people’s attitudes are context-dependent (e.g. Fielding & Hornsey, 2016) because of attitudinal ambivalence (the fact that people hold conflicting values and exhibit different context-dependent social identities) and changes of opinion. We learn that we have not been clear that we also study some form of context-dependency in the manuscript: we analyse how attitudes towards the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) change once subjects are first prompted to reflect what they might like or dislike about such a policy. (subsection “Pros and Cons”).

. Thank you also for pointing out the important articles by Ballard-Rosas et al. (2017) and Bechtel and Liesch (2020). We acknowledge that we come to this field from empirical economics, not political science. In our field, there is one important precursor to our work, which is very compatible with our results: Carattini et al., 2019) also studies global carbon pricing and also find that people favor climate policies that are global and equitable, Furthermore, while the GCS benefits the poorest humans, our conjoint analyses already include policies benefiting poor fellow citizens (higher minimum wage, improved public services, higher welfare benefits) and we confirm that these policies are the most popular. We understand Ballard-Rosa et al. (2017) only compare different income tax schedules. Our conjoint analyses allow to compare the relative preference for the GCS and a national redistribution scheme (Figure 8). In Spain and in the U.S., the GCS has no significant effect on the likelihood that a platform in preferred; while in France, Germany and the UK it has a positive effect, larger than the national redistribution scheme. We also believe our results are compatible with those of Bechtel and Liesch (2020). This excellent conjoint analysis paper shows that American people care about the effects of a generic policy on the poorest fellow citizens about half as much as on their income, and that they care more about losses than gains. Extrapolating from these findings, we can infer that Americans would be indifferent between the status quo and a policy that costs them $1,000 per year while increasing the income of the poorest by $5,000; or that a majority would support a policy that doubles the income of the poorest (Americans) and reduce their own income by $1,000 per year. This is close to what we find in a global context, as the GCS would double the income of the poorest billion humans while costing about $1,000 per year to the typical American person. Our results do not imply that the support for global redistributive policies is driven by their impacts on the richest individuals: they might be driven by their effect on climate justice or public services, as all the tax policies we test specify the revenue-use — not mentioning that some previous papers have actually shown aversion for topmost inequality (e.g. Fisman, Kuziemko & Vannutelli, JEEA, 2020).

Realising that we have not been sufficiently clear about those matters, we made the following changes to the manuscript:

* We have revised the passage about “pros and cons” [just change some words, include the word context dependency and perhaps a paper they like ]
* We now collect the related contributions from political science in a new subsection in SI… TODO?

*2. The authors highlight that there is no “significant policy proposal” on the table but that could also be a weakness of the study: did individuals know any- thing about this somewhat complex policy reform? Relatedly, how plausible is it from the perspective of both mass publics and experts that such a global policy would ever materialize?*

Thank you for giving us a chance to explain our research design against the context of existing and hypothezised future climate policy. First, several policies that we test are already ongoing or on the table: e.g. international transfers for climate loss and damages, $100 billion per year in international transfers to help low-income countries adapt to climate change, and increasing foreign aid. All these policies obtain a similar level of support than options not currently on the agenda like the GCS. Second, we informed respondents about the policies studied, and some of them are pretty straightforward to understand (e.g. taxing the wealth of millionaires to finance low-income countries). TODO Third, while the most significant policy proposals (in terms of magnitude of international transfers) are currently not on the table, the implausibility from them ever materizalizing is what prompted us to conduct the research. One way to rephrase our research question is whether the public dislikes them. That such policies are not on the table and that public support for such policies is not discussed (see longer answer to Comment 5). unresolved question should pave the way for further research.

To reflect these changes in the manuscript, we

* [are more transparent about existing related policies in SI xxx]
* [make more precise how we tested understanding of the GCS]
* [rewrote the discussion section, emphasizing the rationale for our design again]

*3. There is a significant disconnect between the claims about support for the global climate scheme and the actual survey item meant to elicit preferences over such a policy. That item merely asks “at which level(s) do you think public policies to tackle climate change need to be put in place?” (lines 80-81). But asking such a broad and amorphous question does not seem to be informative about the level of support for a rather specific, costly, and strongly redistributive global reform. It could be useful to focus more directly on the studies that are clearly focused on the actual policy question.*

We believe there is a misunderstanding here. In fact, the question eliciting support for the policy is as follows:

but also questions on the support for specific policies such as a global tax on greenhouse gases financing a global basic income. the paper does not measure the support for the GCS with the question on the geographical level at which climate policies are needed.

*4. Similarly, it remains vague how preferences over dividing a carbon budget relates to the research question/claims. Also, one wonders whether these findings about burden-sharing resonate with existing research on this topic. The SI section A.1.2 is quite eclectic about how it portrays existing research on this topic and that review includes “staff discussion notes”papers instead of focusing*

*on high-quality public opinion work published in expert journals. Think of the increasingly large literature on cost aversion and compensation (e.g., Gaikwad et al. 2022 APSR and the literature cited therein).*

We realise the respective section of the SI that contains all relevant literature was unclear. Especially, we realise that the ordering is confusing and the section on burden sharing should come before the on discussion attitudes towards burden-sharing- Section A.1.2 now provides a comprehensive review of attitudes on how to share the burden of climate mitigation between countries, and shows that our results align well with the existing literature. Thank you for pointing out the typo regarding the outlet of the IMF paper by Dabla-Norris et al. (2023), as our bibliography reference failed to mention the institution. Although it belongs to grey literature, it conducts representative surveys over 28,541 respondents on 28 countries and represents one the most large-scale evidence on the question at stake.

The paper mentioned (Gaikwad et al., 2022) addresses the allocation of carbon tax revenues within a country, while we focus onburden-sharing between countries. Perhaps you were thinking about the really good Gaikwad, Genovese & Tingley (unpublished, 2023)? In short, the latter paper abstracts from the concept of burden-sharing and shows that Americans prefer to decarbonize the U.S. rather than India, and that Indians prefer a slow domestic decarbonization rather than a rapid one led by a foreign entity. This conjoint analysis paper only reports the effects of some features of a (sometimes global) climate policy on the support for it but does not report the base level of support for the policy (therefore, it can hardly be cited to give information on the level of support towards burden-sharing principles). The authors communicated to us the average base level on a 10-point scale: it is 6.0 in the U.S. and 7.2 in India. Combined with the effects in that paper’s Supplementary Section C, these results confirm majority support for international transfers even in the U.S.

As a consequence, we have partly reordered the literature section of the SI and completely revised Section A1.2, which now reads as follows:

[Put parts of A.2 before A 1.2]

[general literature on fairness of dividing carbon budget – I have some references]

[then the papers they want + related ones]

[then what we want to say] TODO?

*5. A key question is whether the predicted levels of support are plausible, especially since the policy would entail considerable redistribution that would require exceptional and maybe even unprecedented levels of international administrative coordination with respect to both the extraction of resources and their re-allocation. I currently am missing a strategy to address the argument that the high levels of support reflect the fact that many respondents simply discount the reform as being purely speculative, having a close-to-zero probability of ever materializing, and lacking any clear (personal) costs above and beyond that any costs would fall on the very rich and respondents therefore think they would be net beneficiaries. The importance of (personal) costs has been documented in existing experimental global climate policy research and the findings suggest that a moderate increase in personal costs could lead to sizable shifts in public support even if there is a causally identified preference for allocating costs in line with fairness norms such as the ability-to-pay principle (see Bechtel and Scheve 2013 PNAS). This is in some sense consistent with the descriptive patterns report in Figure 2 and it would be helpful to make this explicit and think about possible explanations. Overall, however, it seems that any study intending to generate predicted levels of support for the types of global and unprecedented policies would have to carefully account for cost sensitivities.*

Many thanks for the substantial discussion. We see two issues here. One is whether subjects implicitly think the examined policies are politically infeasible and that this influences their support. The other is whether subjects realized the policies imply a material loss (personal cost) to them.

First… Granted, that some of the policies we test have low chances of materializing might be a reason why people would overstate their support. TODO? To be clear, though, our results indicate that…First, the support is about as high for distant policies like the GCS as for existing ones like the $100 billion of international transfers for climate finance. Second, our results show that in some European countries like France, vote intention for a progressive candidate may increase by 11 p.p. if they propose the GCS, which may be the most compelling evidence that the support is profound. Third, the reason why people could overstate their support in case the policy has few chances to occur is likely a social desirability bias. Yet, our list experiment shows no social desirability bias in favor of the GCS.

We do not agree that the GCS suffers from “the lack of a clear and somewhat attributable cost component”. We make clear to the respondents that the policy would be costly to them (e.g. $85 per month for a typical American), and verify that people understand this cost with an incentivized comprehension question (after which we give the correct answer that the typical person in their country would lose).

On the question of personal costs, our results are in line with the literature, which shows that support for a climate policy mostly depends on the perceptions that it is fair, effective and in one’s interest (e.g. Douenne & Fabre, 2022). Because it is global and corresponds to an equal right to emit for each human, the GCS is by construction effective and fair. On the other hand, it is costly to people in high-income countries. This explains why the policy is less supported in countries (like the U.S.) where costs are higher. This also explains why policies like the global tax on millionaires obtain more support: it involves no direct costs to the respondents (only opportunity costs). Also, note that respondents support only some degree of global redistribution: if 90% of the respondents prefer to allocate some positive share of a global wealth tax revenues to low-income countries, the average preferred share for low-income countries is 33%, not 100%. Although this would represent an unprecedented international transfer (of about 0.7% of high-income countries’ GDP), this would still be a small amount compared to the magnitude of public transfers that people consent to within a country. If the burden of a wealth tax is concentrated on the top 1%, the massive public support should not come as a surprise. Rather, the conundrum becomes why such a policy is not being implemented: as a frequent argument against a rich tax is that wealthy people would flee to another country, it is totally understandable that the support is high for a global wealth tax, which would address this concern.

To reflect these points in the manuscript, we have:

* Changed the framing of the introduction and discussion and stressed the uprecedentend levels of international coordination required when writing: …
* The role of costs now reads: [essentially no change, just change some words where we mention it]

*6. This is related to the potential role of the list experiment as an attempt to address social desirability concerns. This problem would be particularly relevant if a policy is highly ethically sensitive or very politicized. But the main concern with the current study would be about the lack of a clear and somewhat attributable cost component. Also, Table 1 does not provide any information about what is being reported here and how the quantities have been estimated which is inconsistent with accepting transparent reporting standards. It is also somewhat misleading to claim that any differences here would indicate (through the wording selected for this table) that these reflect social desirability bias. There could be many alternatives explanations such as interaction effects between the proposed alternatives, e.g., beliefs about the political and economic consequences of pursuing multiple policies simultaneously that are unrelated to social desirability.*

We do not agree that the GCS suffers from “the lack of a clear and somewhat attributable cost component”. We make clear to the respondents that the policy would be costly to them (e.g. $85 per month for a typical American), and verify that people understand this cost with an incentivized comprehension question (after which we give the correct answer that the typical person in their country would lose).

We understand this is a minor point.

Thank you for pointing out that the Table deserves a explanatory caption1. We added the following sentence to the caption of Table 1: “The tacit support for the GCS is estimated by regressing the number of supported policies on the presence of the GCS in the list of policies. The social desirability is estimated as the difference between the tacit and stated support, and it is not significantly different from zero even at a 20% threshold (see Methods).”

To clarify, while list experiments are commonly used to measure social desirability bias (e.g. Kuklinski et al., JoP, 1997), the question does not specify whether the policies of the list would be implemented or not, let alone simultaneously. That the support for some policy in the list might spill over to the support for the GCS has no consequence on the result of the list experiment, as the other policies are present in the lists of both branches. Finally, the results from our first conjoint analyses show no interaction effects between the policies present in the list.

*7. It is not obvious how deviating from the standard conjoint design (lines 239-244) by adding the points component to assess a selection of previously shown profiles improves over existing work. To be clear, there could be a good reason for this design, but one would have to make that reason explicit. Moreover, these results again show that taxing the rich is the overriding concern. Since this finding conflicts with what we know about tax policy preferences (at least in the US, see Ballard et al. 2016 JOP; Scheve/Stasavage 2022 CPS), one would have to acknowledge this discrepancy which raises questions about the validity of the findings. One could begin exploring this issue by analyzing the results for the US separately although there are obvious limits to what can be realized within the current design framework due to comparability issues.*

We believe this is a minor point. In our view, the question on the prioritization of policies is not a conjoint analysis. The prioritization allows inferring individual-level preferences for one policy over another, while a conjoint analysis only allows inferring individual level preferences for one platform over another or collective-level preferences for one policy over another. Also, by comparing platforms, conjoint analyses may be subject to interaction effects between policies of a platform (which can be seen as complementary, substitute, or antagonistic) while the prioritization frames the policies as independent. That being said, we agree that both methods yield similar results. We used both to get more reliable results but we are ready to

drop the prioritization from the main text if needed. TODO?

There is no such paper as Ballard et al., Journal of Politics, 2016, an for Scheve & Stasavage (2022), this paper does not provide any survey evidence and simply highlights three explanations for why we do not observe more wealth redistribution: that other

issues are more important to citizens, that citizens do not support wealth redisitribution, and that decisions are not taken democratically. The first and third explanations are compatible with our results: on the one hand, policies such as a higher minimum wage or improved public services are generally seen as more important as a wealth tax; on the other hand, taxing the rich may be hindered by tax dodging and the lack of tax cooperation between countries, and given the electoral system, the majority may not have the final word in countries like France or the U.S. The second explanation does not seem to hold: previous surveys also find that majorities support redistribution, even in the U.S. For

example, ISSP (2019) finds that in each of the 29 surveyed countries, a majority agrees that “It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes”, with 70% agreement and 14% disagreement overall.

We note that the reader can already find the results for the U.S. in Supplementary Figure A29. We see that wealth taxes rank high in the prioritization of policies, right after funding affordable housing, student loan forgiveness and universal childcare (not mentioning that wealth taxes would be complementary to these policies).

8. There is also the issue of effectiveness and financing portion of such a

global policy scheme. How plausible is it that taxing the richest would generate

sufficient revenue? Moreover, one would want to know more about the mech-

anisms that explain mass preferences. For example, to what extent is it those

who care strongly about addressing global warming who support drastic reforms?

Capping carbon emissions is widely seen as an effective and proven solution

to reduce carbon emissions, as exemplified by the EU emissions trading system.

The estimation of the global basic income that the GCS would finance is explained

in Supplementary Section E. The main hypothesis is a carbon price of

$90 per ton of CO2 in 2030, in line with common model projections (Stern &

Stiglitz, 2017).

Thank you for suggesting to study the beliefs surrounding the support for

the GCS. We have added regression tables analysing the attitudinal correlates

of the support for a global GHG tax and dividend policy (Supplementary

Tables A5 and A6). These tables show that an index of caring about global

warming is significantly correlated with the support in most countries, with a

magnitude as high as trust in the government or believing that climate policies

would be effective in reducing emissions.

9. The study connects a wide range of policy fields (tax policy, global climate

action, novel decisionmaking bodies, foreign aid, . . . ) and this renders the paper

difficult to digest and the main contribution appears (unnecessarily?) somewhat

superficial.

We now realize that the wide coverage of the paper and its large number of

results render it difficult to digest. Still, we tend to think that the overarching

result that majorities support global redistribution is better proven if we present

all results pertaining to these topics at once. TODO?

10. Is all the material presented sufficiently original given that Figure 1

is taken from an NBER working paper? Also, I am wondering whether the

referencing is correct since NBER working paper 1714 is from 1985 and on

“Does Deductibility Influence Local Taxation”. Instead, Figure 1 seems to come

from the “OECD Economics Department Working Paper, 1714.” The figure has

also been used in an 2022 op-ed, see: https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/fighting-

climate-change-international-attitudes-toward-climate-policies

Thank you for pointing out that the number 1714 mistakenly referred to another

working paper series of that paper. We note that Figure 1 does not appear

in the NBER nor in the OECD working papers. It

does not appear either in the VoxEU article (you have probably confused Figure

1 with the figure on national climate policies presented on VoxEU).We acknowledge

that Figure 1 appears in the appendix of the version of Dechezleprêtre et

al. (2022) on the website of Adrien Fabre (and that figure is never commented

in that paper). If it is important that this Figure be not reproduced, we can

make sure that it is not present in the final publication (which should come out

in the American Economic Review, given a favorable R&R decision). TODO?

11. Overall, the study and the survey design remains opaque at times. For

example, the survey structure seems to have included so many conditions and

skip-/assignment logics that it is hard to make sense of the results in terms of

experimental conditions and potential order effects. It is also unclear how the

Figure A8 results should be interpreted given that it includes a range of policy

reforms across multiple issue areas.

Thank you for pointing out that the survey design remained opaque. We

made our best to improve the description of the design in the revised version.

In particular, we added

in Supplementary Material D that “Each treatment randomization is in-

dependent.” We also added balance analyses (Supplementary Material I) and

placebo tests of the effects of each treatment on unrelated outcomes (Supplementary

Material J). They confirm that the randomization was satisfactory, as

our branches are balanced and there is no significant effect in the placebo tests.

In particular, we do not find effects of earlier treatments on unrelated outcomes

arriving later in the survey. As an example of what we changed we now write: “[quote some words]” TODO

Figure A8 is a conjoint analysis that mimick plausible choices between two

8

platforms of progressive candidates (stemming from different left or center-left

parties in Europe, or different candidates at a U.S. democratic party’s primary).

The goal of this conjoint design is precisely to assess how global redistribution

compares to other issues like national climate or social policies. We now write: “…” TODO?

12. Lastly, the title could be more informative about the content of the study.

Also, it would be useful to convey the key finding or relationship that is investi-

gated in the study in the title.

Thank you for this suggestion. We are willing to consider changing the title

to, e.g. “Global redistribution is genuinely supported by majorities worldwide”.

We thought that a more neutral title would be preferrable but are open on this

question and will consult the editor. TODO?