Thank you very much for finding our research interesting and the perceptive comments. We agree that we were too immodest about the generalizability of the findings in the previous version and agree that we here provide one bit of scientific evidence that global policies could be more popular than thought.

We see two major issues here: one whether our policies are sufficiently concrete to be understood by subjects in their economic implications (including to themselves) and one on whether our findings generalize in an appropriate way so to make our study relevant enough to public policy.

First, on whether the policies are concrete enough, we confess that we thought we had formulated the questions in concrete terms and with the cost implications on subjects properly spelt out. To focus on the main policy examined in our study, the wording for the Global Climate Scheme in the questionnaire is:

“Global climate scheme: Such a policy would (…) progressively raise the price of fossil fuels

(…) The typical[American] would lose out financially [$85] per month (as he or she would face [$115] per month in price increases, which is higher than the [$30] they would receive).” (p. 58 of SI).

Note that we calculate different losses to individuals in Global North countries and present subjects with the loss they would face as an individual. In that sense, we do not understand how this description is not a concrete policy – as far as survey design goes, at least. (What is more, a variant of the GCS has been discussed in international climate negotiations as soon as 1990, as we detail in Appendix A.2.1) and would have liked that our treatments relate to a more concrete policy (presumably the global millionaire tax). To explain further the focus on the GCs, we hypothesized that that it would be less popular than a global millionaire tax, given that it would come with a financial cost for most respondents. Therefore, if the support for a costly policy like the GCS was found to be genuine using our experiments, this result could reasonably be extended to more consensual policies like the millionaire tax.

Second, we very much understand the concern that support for global redistributive policies would be lower if they were becoming more discussed in policy circles and the general public, that is they “generalize” beyond surveys to other fora in which they are “tested”. , We realise we did not manage to describe the contribution to our study well – in a sense, we cannot test more real-worldly fora until such policies enter the public debate. We believed that we used all the methods available to us survey designers to test whether support for global redistributive policies is genuine. [These included…]

Note that we see this emphasis on probing the unexpected high support for the global policies by all these methods as a contribution of the paper – it is typically absent from major survey studies on environmental policy such as those which find moderate to high support for national carbon taxes and clean energy spending [] What is more, we see our contribution as a modest indication that such policies may be supported once they enter the public debate, and this would be the first step to test whether attitudes will change once global redistribution is debated. To us

(As an aside, we wondered whether the critique of insufficient “generalizability” was that our findings do not generalize to similar policies when eliciting support for them. For example, we expect strong majority support in a country such as the Netherlands for a global tax on top incomes (say, over $1 million per year) to finance vaccination campaigns in low-income countries or UN agencies like the World Food Program, even though that specific country or this specific policy were not tested. Yet, we believe that is not the sense in which the reviewer worries about “generalizability”.

To improve our presentation regarding these two major points, we made the following changes to the manuscript – noting that the very severe word limit of articles in Nature Sustainability force us to describe justifications of the design in the Appendices (we know this is rather unusual for social science):

* We have rewritten a passage describing how concrete we are on describing the main policy, the Global Climate Scheme, which now reads: “We present to respondents a detailed description of the GCS and explain its distributive effects, including specific amounts at stake (as specified in the box below [which details the calculation of the per capita sums involved] and Appendix xxx). Furthermore, we assess respondents’ understanding of the GCS with incentivized questions to test their comprehension of the expected financial outcome for typical individuals in high-income countries (loss) and the poorest individuals globally (gain), followed by the provision of correct answers. That is, subjects are made aware and we find they seem to understand that the policy will make them personally (slightly) poorer.”
* Second, we have completely rewritten the discussion – which even if it needs to be very brief due to the word limit acknowledges better the limitations of our approach. It now reads: “

Our analysis provides some cautious evidence that global climate and redistribution policy instruments may be more popular in the Global North than previously though. Our survey analysis rules out insincerity and underestimation of fellow citizens’ support as potential explanations for the scarcity of global policies in the public debate to the extent possible. Of course, once policies are subject of intense political debate, support for them tends to decay. WeWe conclude with additional hypotheses, to be tested in further work what explains the seeming inconsistency of the high support for global policies we document with their peripheral appearance in the policy sphere: First, policymakers may be unaware that global policies are popular. Second, policymakers may still believe that globally redistributive policies are politically infeasible in some key countries like the U.S. Third, political discourse centrally happens at the national level, shaped by media and national framing may suppress universalistic values.

* To reflect these changes in the abstract, we add words that make clear we merely provide evidence to the claim that such policies may be supported and we point out that costs have been made salient and seem to be understood by our subjects. We also point out at the beginning of the introduction that even if public opinion to these policies were favourable, there are obviously other major obstacles to such policies when writing: “Disagreements on burden-sharing and differing priorities among nations often hinder effective collaboration.” We also add to the introduction that “in the wording of the question, subjects are made aware of the cost to themselves of such global redistribution“