

1 **Public Acceptance of International Redistribution**
2 **in High-Income Countries**

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5

6 **Abstract**

7 Using an original survey of 12,000 respondents representative of eleven high-income
8 countries, I examine public support for global redistribution and climate policies. Al-
9 though global inequality is not a salient concern, political programs that address it
10 are more likely to be preferred. In every country, majorities accept nearly all global
11 policies tested, including those that would redistribute 5 percent of global income or
12 entail personal costs for respondents. Survey experiments demonstrate the robust-
13 ness of support. In particular, an information treatment shows that support for global
14 policies causally increases among respondents who perceive them as likely; an effect
15 opposite to warm glow.

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16 The development gap between the Global North and the Global South is central in
17 international relations. The issue of North-to-South transfers of resources and power per-
18 meates negotiations in many areas, including debt restructuring, development assistance,
19 tax cooperation, UN reform, and climate finance.¹ In all international fora, Global South
20 countries seek a more equal world order. Indeed, redirecting just 1% of high-income
21 countries' output to low-income countries (LICs) would mechanically double their na-
22 tional income.²

23 Public attitudes in high-income countries (HICs) are key to understanding whether
24 globally redistributive policies would be politically feasible. Recent large-scale surveys
25 reveal worldwide support for a globally coordinated tax on billionaires (Cappelen, Støstad
26 and Tungodden 2025), a democratic world government for global issues (Ghassim and
27 Pauli 2024), climate action at the global (rather than national) level (Dechezleprêtre et al.
28 2025), as well as globally redistributive climate or tax policies (Fabre, Douenne and Mat-
29 tauch 2025).

30 Despite strong stated support even in HICs, international redistribution is rarely dis-
31 cussed in public debates, let alone advocated by policymakers. Fabre, Douenne and Mat-
32 tauch (2025) conduct survey experiments in the U.S. and four Western European coun-
33 tries to understand this mismatch, focusing on a “Global Climate Scheme” (GCS) costly
34 to these countries. The authors reject hypotheses that support for the GCS might be over-
35 stated: they find no social desirability bias in a list experiment, 6 out of 10 respondents
36 prefer a political program that includes the GCS over one that does not, and most respon-
37 dents are willing to sign a petition in favor of the GCS. While the authors find support
38 reduced by 11 percentage points (p.p.) following a (fictitious) negative media campaign
39 — an effect size similar to the actual decrease in support for the “Green New Deal” after it
40 was publicly debated (Gustafson et al. 2019) — a campaign effect of this magnitude would
41 not generate majority opposition to policies favored by three-quarters of the population,
42 such as a globally redistributive wealth tax. Therefore, Fabre, Douenne and Mattauch

¹The (re)distribution of resources between countries is debated in different official fora, such as the G20, the OECD's Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project, the Conference on Financing for Development, the International Maritime Organization, the Global Solidarity Levies Taskforce, the UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation, and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Appendix III.A. provides references on official initiatives for global redistribution.

²The GDP per capita of high-income countries (HICs) is 28 times greater than that of low-income countries (LICs) at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) and 68 times greater in nominal terms, from World Bank 2024 data. Given that 625 million people live in one of the 25 low-income countries and 1.42 billion people in high-income countries, 1% of HICs' GDP corresponds to 60% of LICs' GDP using PPP values and 153% using nominal data.

43 (2025) conclude that support for global redistribution is genuine, and another hypothesis
44 is needed to explain the lack of prominence of this issue. A promising candidate is “pluralistic
45 ignorance”: the underestimation of public support. Indeed, pluralistic ignorance
46 has been documented regarding climate action (Andre et al. 2024a,b; Mildenberger and
47 Tingley 2019), the billionaire tax (Cappelen, Støstad and Tungodden 2025), and the GCS
48 (Fabre, Douenne and Mattauch 2025). Nevertheless, pluralistic ignorance has not pre-
49 vented climate policies or a national wealth tax from entering public debates, suggesting
50 that other mechanisms may be at play concerning global redistribution.

51 In this paper, I conduct a pre-registered large-scale survey to examine whether global
52 redistribution policies are robustly accepted and to investigate the reasons for their lack
53 of prominence. I test several hypotheses. Surveying eleven HICs, I test whether inter-
54 national policies are accepted by majorities in countries considered conservative and not
55 yet surveyed on this topic, such as Japan, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Switzerland.
56 Recognizing that some key countries would likely not participate if these policies were
57 implemented, I test how acceptance is affected when a climate scheme or a wealth tax
58 is international but not truly global. I also test for pluralistic ignorance. I analyze the
59 salience of global redistribution, and whether it is a vote-determining issue. I test for
60 “warm glow”, whereby people delude themselves into supporting hypothetical policies
61 in order to ease their conscience, notably by testing whether the support is only claimed
62 for as long as the policies are deemed unlikely. Finally, I explore a variety of international
63 policies, ranging from the plausible to the radical.

64 Throughout the paper, I make a distinction between *support* and *acceptance*. I use the
65 term *support* to refer to the absolute share of *Somewhat* or *Strong support* on Likert scales,
66 and *acceptance* to refer to relative support — specifically, the support share among non-
67 *Indifferent* responses. Although binary (Yes/No) questions are typically worded in terms
68 of “support”, I generally report their results using the term *acceptance*. This approach
69 avoids mistaking passive consent for active support among respondents who could not
70 choose a neutral option.

71 The results confirm earlier studies: I find majority acceptance in every country sur-
72veyed for almost all globally redistributive policies tested. Policies currently discussed
73 in international negotiations are accepted by large majorities. The most supported pol-
74 icy is the 2% tax on billionaire wealth proposed by Zucman (2024), with 81% acceptance
75 in the pooled sample. Proposals such as debt relief for vulnerable countries, developed
76 countries contributing 0.7% of their GDP in foreign aid, an expansion of the UN Security

77 Council, or the Bridgetown initiative (expanding sustainable investments at low interests
78 rates in LICs) all garner at least 70% acceptance overall.

79 Radical proposals are also widely accepted. Majorities in every country agree that
80 “governments should actively cooperate to have all countries converge in terms of GDP
81 per capita by the end of the century”, and that globally coordinated climate policies are
82 preferable to the status quo, even if they entail completely electrifying cars by 2045 and
83 doubling the prices of heating fuel, flights, and red meat. Overall, I find 64% acceptance
84 for a progressive income tax that would finance poverty reduction in the Global South,
85 which would collect 5% of world income from the global top 3%, with tax rates ranging
86 from 15% above \$80,000 per year to 45% above \$1 million. Relatedly, in an interactive
87 task where respondents design their preferred global income redistribution, nearly half
88 choose a redistribution that would make them poorer (versus less than 10% choosing
89 one that would make them richer). The average custom redistribution entails over 5% of
90 world income in transfers from the rich to the poor.

91 Before respondents could infer the survey’s topic, they had to complete a budget allo-
92 cation task and a conjoint experiment. When asked to allocate the revenue from a global
93 wealth tax among five spending items, 87% of respondents allocate a positive amount to
94 the global item (public services in LICs). This item receives an average preferred share of
95 17.5% of the revenue, slightly below an equal split of 20%. This indicates that most people
96 prioritize sustainable development abroad less than the average issue, but still consider
97 it worthwhile.

98 While policies to address global inequality are widely accepted, they have low salience.
99 Indeed, this topic is rarely mentioned in open-ended fields at the beginning of the survey,
100 where respondents were asked to write about various considerations. Respondents’ top
101 concern is the cost of living, and their most frequent wish is for greater purchasing power.
102 While inequality is most often regarded as the greatest injustice—with some inconclusive
103 indications that these responses relate to inequality at the global level—global inequal-
104 ity almost never appears among issues respondents consider important but neglected in
105 public debate. The low priority placed on global redistribution may explain why it is
106 seldom discussed in public debates, despite widespread acceptance of related policies.

107 Despite its low salience, global redistribution may be a vote-determining issue for
108 some people, as the conjoint experiment suggests. In this task, respondents express their
109 preference between two political programs, each composed of policies randomly selected
110 from those prominently debated in their country. When a program includes a *global tax*

111 *on millionaires with 30% of the revenue funding LICs*, the likelihood of that program being
112 preferred increases by 4 p.p., while *cutting development aid* reduces it by 4 p.p. A direct
113 question confirms that some voters might change their vote intention if a candidate cam-
114 paigned on sustainable development: 36% of respondents report they would be more
115 likely (versus 17% less likely) to vote for a party if it participated in a global movement
116 for climate action, taxes on millionaires, and poverty reduction in LICs. In a related ques-
117 tion, 68% of respondents (and 52% of the 561 millionaires who responded) state they
118 could actively participate in such a movement (either by signing a petition, attending a
119 demonstration, going on strike, or donating to a strike fund).

120 What if a sustainable development policy is international but not global? Acceptance
121 decreases only slightly. In the case of a wealth tax with 30% of revenue financing LICs,
122 acceptance is reduced from 74% to 68% when the policy is implemented only by some
123 countries (e.g. the EU, the UK, and Brazil) rather than all countries. Likewise, acceptance
124 of an International Climate Scheme (ICS), defined as a cap-and-trade with equal per capita
125 allocation of emissions rights, decreases from 68% to 65% when participating countries
126 shrink from a group covering 72% of world emissions to one covering 33% of emissions.

127 I identify pluralistic ignorance through an incentivized question that asks respondents
128 for their belief regarding support for the Global (version of the) Climate Scheme, either
129 among their compatriots or in the U.S. In Japan and in European countries, there is ma-
130 jority support for the GCS, yet most people believe there is not. Overall, the median
131 respondent underestimates support in their own country by 16 p.p. and non-American
132 respondents underestimate support in the U.S. by 22 p.p. Pluralistic ignorance may be an
133 important reason why global solidarity solutions are neglected.

134 To test whether support might drop if the prospect of global policies materializes (a
135 form of *warm glow*), I manipulate the belief that large international transfers are likely in
136 the next fifteen years. More specifically, I inform a random half of the respondents that
137 “countries have agreed to demonstrate some degree of solidarity in addressing global
138 challenges”, providing diverse examples including the adoption of a shipping levy at the
139 International Maritime Organization that should partly finance LICs, developed coun-
140 tries’ commitments to finance climate action in developing countries, and the study by
141 the G20 of a coordinated tax on billionaires. The information treatment increases the be-
142 lief that transfers are likely by 7 p.p. from a baseline of 33%, and it also *increases* the share
143 of global policies supported by 1 p.p. An IV estimation shows that the share of policies
144 supported causally increases by 18 p.p. when people believe that international transfers

145 are likely, consistent with the non-causal effect estimated by OLS. In other words, I find
146 no evidence of *warm glow*. On the contrary, the effect goes in the opposite direction com-
147 pared to the *warm glow* hypothesis: if people believed that a global policy were likely,
148 they would be more likely to support it (which can be interpreted as a *status quo* bias).

149 Finally, I test respondents' broad values to verify their consistency with global redis-
150 tribution. The majority of respondents agree that "helping countries in need is the right
151 thing to do". However, only a minority is convinced that it is in HICs' long-term interest
152 to do so, or that it is their historical responsibility. Similarly, there is no majority support
153 for reparations for colonization and slavery in the pooled sample. These results suggest
154 that support for global solidarity is driven by a sense of empathy and duty rather than
155 guilt or interest.

156 Universalism has been identified as one of the best predictors of voting behavior (Enke
157 2020) and ideology (Cappelen, Enke and Tungodden 2025; Enke, Rodríguez-Padilla and
158 Zimmermann 2023), particularly in Western countries (Cappelen, Enke and Tungodden
159 2025). I use a new question to measure universalism, asking respondents which group
160 they advocate for when they vote. 45% choose a universalist response (either "Humans"
161 or "Sentient beings (humans and animals)"), while 32% opt for their fellow citizens. Us-
162 ing a variance decomposition, I find that universalism is a stronger predictor of policy
163 attitudes than sociodemographic variables such as income, country, or even vote choice,
164 echoing the results of Enke, Rodríguez-Padilla and Zimmermann (2023). Besides, there is
165 a majority of universalists in Europe, Saudi Arabia, and among left-wing voters.

166 This observation aligns with the cross-national differences observed in synthetic in-
167 dicators: Saudi Arabia, Italy, and Spain exhibit the highest levels of support for global
168 redistribution, while Japan, Switzerland, the U.S., and Poland show the lowest.

169 By studying in depth the support for global policies, this paper departs from the usual
170 methodological approach of attitudinal surveys. In general, academic surveys focus on
171 estimating effect sizes of some treatment on political attitudes, or identifying the socio-
172 demographic factors and the beliefs that correlate with attitudes (e.g. Alesina, Stantcheva
173 and Teso 2018; Douenne and Fabre 2022; Kuziemko et al. 2015). The magnitude of support
174 for a given proposal is often deemed unsuitable for satisfactory estimation, because such
175 attitudes are viewed as weakly held, inconsistent, or unstable. The measure of support
176 is usually left to non-academic pollsters, who rarely apply all academic best practices:
177 transparency, representative sampling, neutral and precise question wording, compari-
178 son with existing literature, and the use of multiple questions and complementary meth-

179 ods to correctly interpret the results. However, although estimating the extent of support
180 is challenging, this question seems too important not to be addressed using scientific
181 methods. Furthermore, [Ansolabehere, Rodden and Jr \(2008\)](#) refute common perceptions
182 regarding policy attitudes, showing that they are as stable and nearly as predictive of
183 vote choice as party identification. In this paper, I examine support for various policies,
184 approach the question from diverse angles, and run a battery of pre-registered tests to
185 check the reliability of stated support estimates.

186 **Related literature.** Previous cross-country surveys consistently find strong public sup-
187 port for globally redistributive policies ([Cappelen, Støstad and Tungodden 2025](#); [Fabre,](#)
188 [Douenne and Mattauch 2025](#)) or global democratic governance ([Ghassim and Pauli 2024](#)).

189 The first questions on respondents' considerations contribute to an extensive litera-
190 ture in political science on "issue salience" —the priority attributed to a given issue. Is-
191 sue salience is now widely acknowledged as a key factor in determining voting behavior
192 ([Dennison 2019](#); [Edwards, Mitchell and Welch 1995](#); [Egan 2013](#); [Krosnick 1988](#); [RePass](#)
193 [1971](#)). Furthermore, according to open-ended responses, the "most important issues" re-
194 late to the economy and healthcare ([Wlezien 2005](#)). Although climate change and hunger
195 appear in the top five problems when the question is framed at the global rather than
196 national level ([Yeager et al. 2011](#)), public acceptance of sustainable development policies
197 may be overshadowed by more pressing concerns in voters' choices.

198 Although this paper focuses on multilateral policies, it relates to the literature on at-
199 titudes toward foreign aid. [Kaufmann, McGuirk and Vicente \(2019\)](#) and [Fabre, Douenne](#)
200 [and Mattauch \(2025\)](#) find that, despite substantial overestimation of aid amounts, desired
201 aid exceeds perceived aid in most countries. [Hudson and van Heerde \(2012\)](#) provide a
202 critical review of the literature and show that the strong support for poverty alleviation
203 largely stems from intrinsic altruism, in line with Eurobarometer data ([Cho 2024](#)).

204 [Nair \(2018\)](#) finds that Americans underestimate their rank in the global income dis-
205 tribution by 27 percentiles on average and overestimate the global median income by
206 a factor of 10, which lowers their support for foreign aid. Similarly, [Fehr, Mollerstrom](#)
207 [and Perez-Truglia \(2022\)](#) find that 9 out of 10 Germans express support for global re-
208 distribution, even though respondents underestimate their position in the global income
209 distribution by an average of 15 percentiles.

210 Finally, the paper contributes to the literature analyzing dispositions towards free-
211 riding on climate action and the ways in which support for climate agreements depends

212 on their country coverage. Using conjoint analyses in Western countries, [Beiser-McGrath](#)
213 and [Bernauer \(2019b\)](#) demonstrate that climate agreements with broader country cover-
214 age are more likely to be preferred. In Germany and the U.S., [Gampfer, Bernauer and](#)
215 [Kachi \(2014\)](#) also find stronger support for funding climate action in low-income coun-
216 tries when the cost is shared with other countries. Nevertheless, surveys consistently
217 show that people support their country taking unilateral climate action, even in the ab-
218 sence of such action in other countries ([Beiser-McGrath and Bernauer 2019a](#); [Bernauer](#)
219 and [Gampfer 2015](#); [McGrath and Bernauer 2017](#)). [Aklin and Mildenberger \(2020\)](#) show
220 that the empirical evidence for free-riding is not compelling, and that climate inaction can
221 be equally well explained by distributive conflicts. Still, survey evidence indicates some
222 degree of conditional cooperation: support for domestic climate action increases if other
223 countries join forces ([Carlsson et al. 2025](#)).

224 I. Data and Design

225 **Samples.** I conducted an original survey of 12,001 respondents representative of the
226 adult population in eleven high-income countries (see Figure 1). The countries were cho-
227 sen to span the diversity of high-income countries and the sample sizes to be commen-
228 surate with each country's population size.³ The survey was fielded online in 2025 using
229 the companies *Yandex* (for Russia), *Kantar* (for Saudi Arabia), and *Bilendi* (for the other
230 countries).⁴

231 In Russia, I could not administer the same questionnaire as in the other countries.⁵
232 I had to curtail it for two reasons. First, I could not use the platform *Qualtrics*, which
233 prevented me from using certain question formats (such as constant sum scales) or em-
234 bedding Javascript (used to design the interactive question). Second, I had to cut or re-
235 word some questions due to preventive censorship by the survey company. In the other
236 countries, the questionnaires are almost identical, though the figures in the questions are


³The sample sizes are as follows: U.S.: 3,000; Japan: 2,000; Russia: 1,001; Saudi Arabia: 1,000; Europe: 5,000, split in proportion to the countries' adult population sizes (except for Switzerland), i.e. France: 798; Germany: 1,048; Italy: 756; Spain: 603; Poland: 500; Switzerland: 469. The maximum margins of error (at the 5% threshold) for country samples range from ± 1.8 p.p. in the U.S. to ± 4.5 p.p. in Switzerland, with an intermediate value of ± 3.1 p.p. in Saudi Arabia.

⁴For all countries except Russia, responses were collected between April 15 and July 3, 2025. For Russia, responses were collected between September 19 and October 9, 2025. Each complete response was rewarded with approximately €3 in gift points.

⁵To the best of my knowledge, [Toews and Suvorov \(2025\)](#) were the first to manage surveying the Russian public on climate attitudes.

237 adapted to the country-specific context (e.g. respondents are informed about the cost of
238 the Global Climate Scheme to the average person in their country). Appendix III.B. lists
239 the unique features of the questionnaire in each country.

Figure 1: Country coverage of the survey.



240 **Representativeness.** The samples are stratified to be representative of the country's
241 adult population based on the following quota variables (with some exceptions⁶): gender,
242 age (5 brackets), income (4), diploma (3), region (2 to 5), and urbanicity (2 to 3). Tables S4-
243 S7 in Appendix D show that the samples closely match the actual population frequencies
244 along these dimensions, except for Russia and Saudi Arabia, where individuals without a
245 high school diploma are somewhat underrepresented, as well as low-income individuals
246 in Russia and non-Saudis in Saudi Arabia. All results are reweighted to be fully repre-
247 sentative of the population along the quotas, with weights trimmed between 0.25 and 4.
248 Results aggregated at the global or European levels weigh each country in proportion to
249 its adult population size. Descriptive results on a random branch use weights that are
250 recomputed within that subsample.

251 As shown in Figure S68, sociodemographic variables explain 10% to 15% of the vari-
252 ance in our main attitudinal outcomes, and this figure drops to 5% after accounting for
253 country and vote. In other words, although variables such as age and diploma are signif-
254 icantly correlated with attitudes (see Tables S8-S9), differences in average acceptance of a
255 policy between (say) age groups rarely exceed a dozen percentage points. In contrast, our
256 measure of universalism is a stronger predictor than any sociodemographic variable.

257 Appendix K shows how our main attitudinal outcomes vary by political leaning. Non-
258 voters exhibit attitudes close to the center of the political spectrum. Besides, attitudes are

⁶In the U.S., I also use race (4 categories) as a quota variable. In Saudi Arabia, I do not use urbanicity, but I use citizenship (Saudi vs. non-Saudi). In Russia, I do not use region nor urbanicity.

259 much less polarized in Japan compared to Europe and the U.S. Figures S66–S67 show how
260 our weighted samples compare to actual voting results in the most recent election. Al-
261 though the proportion of self-reported non-voters is lower than in reality, voting patterns
262 across the three main political leanings are similar to the actual distribution. Appendix L
263 shows that our main results are robust to reweighting by vote.

264 **Data Quality.** The median survey duration is 17 minutes (13 min in Russia). Best prac-
265 tices have been implemented to ensure top-notch data quality (Stantcheva 2023). The
266 questionnaire was carefully worded in a neutral and informative way;⁷ tested on ran-
267 dom people in public spaces to ensure correct comprehension; translated by professional
268 translators, with figures converted into national currencies; and double-checked by native
269 speakers.

270 Of all respondents who started the questionnaire, 23% respondents were allowed to
271 continue (as their quotas were not full). Among them, 17% dropped out (including 10%
272 who dropped out after the socio-demographic questions). The final sample is obtained
273 after excluding 16% of respondents from the extended sample for suspicion of low qual-
274 ity: 9% for failing an attention test and 13% for completing the questionnaire in less than
275 6 minutes⁸ (including 5% for both reasons). Appendix H checks for differential attrition
276 and finds no correlation of treatment arms with attrition. Appendix M shows that our
277 main results replicate in the extended sample.

278 The order of question items is randomized whenever possible. Appendix N exam-
279 ines the effect of item order on answers. Item order generally has a significant but small
280 effect (2 to 14 p.p.). The size of this effect helps identify questions for which opinions
281 are strongly held (e.g. a preference for a sustainable scenario over the status quo) versus
282 weakly held (e.g. the preferred amount of climate finance).

283 Appendix G compares the responses to two attitudinal questions borrowed from other
284 surveys. The overall averages differ by 2 to 4 p.p. and the cross-country correlations are
285 high: .70 (Global Nation 2023) to .86 (Cappelen, Støstad and Tungodden 2025).

286 **Incentives.** The questionnaire includes three incentivized questions, each awarding a
287 \$100 prize to one randomly selected winner. First, a comprehension question about the


⁷ At the end of the survey, 70% of the respondents find it politically unbiased (Figure S62). The most common comment left by respondents in the feedback field is that the survey was “interesting”; very few criticize it (Figure S63).

⁸ 6 minutes corresponds to 30% of the expected median duration of 20 min. In Russia, the cutoff is 200 seconds, or 30% of the expected median duration of 11 minutes.

288 Global Climate Scheme (GCS) checks whether respondents understand the policy's cost.
 289 Second, a donation lottery allows respondents to choose what portion of the prize they
 290 would donate to a reforestation NGO, should they win. Third, a question assesses re-
 291 spondents' perception of the actual support for the GCS, rewarding a correct guess.

292 **Survey Structure.** While Appendix B provides the full questionnaire, Figure 2 depicts
 293 the survey flow with all random branches. The various treatments are independent and
 294 uniformly distributed. Whenever there is a treatment, the acceptance rates reported are
 295 computed using the control group. Appendix J runs placebo tests to check if earlier treat-
 296 ments affect unrelated outcomes.

Figure 2: Survey flow.



297 After collecting sociodemographic characteristics, the questionnaire begins with broad
 298 questions to assess the prioritization and salience of global solidarity before respondents
 299 become aware of the survey topic. First, respondents answer open-ended fields on either
 300 their main concerns, wants, issues of interest, or perceived injustices. Second, they com-

301 plete a conjoint experiment where they have to select their preferred political program,
302 or abstain. Both programs are randomly generated: each policy (or lack thereof) in five
303 policy domains is selected at random from a pool of policies that are prominent in the
304 country's public debate. Third, respondents allocate the revenue of a global wealth tax
305 among five (national or global) spending items.

306 Then follow attitudinal questions about the main policies studied: a *Climate Scheme*
307 at the national, global, or international level; an international wealth tax funding low-
308 income countries; and ten plausible global solidarity policies. These questions include
309 treatments that vary the international coverage of policies or test for warm glow.

310 The final part of the questionnaire explores attitudes towards more radical global re-
311 distribution scenarios and includes more sophisticated questions, such as an interactive
312 task in which respondents can choose their preferred custom redistribution of global in-
313 comes by manipulating sliders.

314 The survey concludes with a comprehension question, synthetic questions (e.g. re-
315 garding one's moral circle), and a feedback field.

316 **Pre-registered Hypotheses and Data Availability.** The project has been approved by
317 the CIRED institutional review board (IRB-CIRED-2025-2) and preregistered in the Open
318 Science Foundation registry (osf.io/7mzn4). The study did not deviate from the registra-
319 tion; the questionnaires and hypotheses tests used are the ones *specified ex ante*. All data,
320 code, and figures from the paper are available at github.com/bixiou/robustness_global_redistr.

321 **II. Salience and Prioritization of Global Solidarity**

322 In this section, I analyze the salience of global solidarity in undirected open-ended
323 fields, and the prioritization of global programs in a budget allocation task.

324 **II.A. Top-of-mind Considerations**

325 At the beginning of the survey, respondents are randomly assigned one of four open-
326 ended questions: their main concerns, their needs or wishes, an issue important to them
327 but neglected in public debate, or the greatest injustice of all. The questions are deliber-
328 ately broad and vague to let respondents express their top-of-mind considerations with-
329 out any priming.

330 To analyze the answers, I automatically translated each field into English.⁹ Then, I
331 used AI and my own reading of a few hundred answers to identify the most common
332 concepts, from which I selected 27 categories. Next, I classified each answer into one
333 or more of these categories, both manually (Figures S3-S6) and automatically using AI
334 (Figure S2). Finally, I manually defined a list of 47 (conjunctions of) keywords and used it
335 to automatically classify all responses.¹⁰ Figure S1 reports the 24 most common keyword
336 matches.

337 The three different classification methods yield consistent results but differ in accu-
338 racy. While the keyword classification allows for an exact and reproducible search, the
339 AI search is not limited to specific words and captures more matching responses. Over-
340 all, manual classification seems to provide the most accurate results, with a number of
341 matches generally falling between those of the other two methods. For example, to the
342 *injustice* question, 1.2% of answers match the keywords for *global inequality* and ChatGPT
343 identifies this category in 7.5% of answers, versus 3.2% according to my manual coding.¹¹
344 Indeed, the AI incorrectly classifies unspecific answers like “poverty” in this category,¹²
345 while the keyword search misses answers like “inequality among humans”. Given this
346 observation, I use the manual classification as the benchmark and the two other methods
347 as robustness checks.

348 While less accurate than the classifications, word clouds (Figure 3) provide a simple
349 visualization of the most common concepts in each question. By far, the most frequent
350 *concerns* or *wishes* of respondents relate to their purchasing power, with concepts such
351 as “money”, “inflation”, the “cost of living”, or “financial stability” appearing in 31% of
352 these fields. Within countries, the share of people concerned with money decreases with
353 income: it ranges from 22% in the top income decile to 35% in the bottom one.¹³ The next
354 most frequent *concerns* are health (or the healthcare system, 13%), far-right governments
355 (or related concepts such as “Trump” or “trade tariffs, 10%) and war (either in general

⁹I used onlinedoctranslator.com, which is powered by *Google Translate*.

¹⁰The list of keywords is provided in Appendix III.D..

¹¹The keyword matching searches the regular expression “global poverty—global in-
equal—hunger—drinking water—starv”, ignoring case. The automatic and manual classifications
are based on the category definition “Inequality at the international level / Hunger or poverty in poor
countries”.

¹²Interestingly, out of the 47 (one-word) answers “poverty”, ChatGPT-4.1 only coded 42 of them as *global
inequality*, illustrating the lack of consistency of this classifier.

¹³At the country level, the concern for money is significantly correlated with inequality (an additional
point in the Gini index is associated with 0.8 p.p. more respondents concerned with money). Interestingly,
the concern for money is higher in richer countries, though the correlation vanishes once one controls for
the Gini.

356 or specific conflicts, such as the Gaza War, 9%). Most *wishes* are personal, with the next
357 most frequent (after money) relating to one's own or one's relatives' health (21%) or peace
358 of mind (10%). Interestingly, almost none of the responses mention relational consider-
359 ations, such as love, friendships, loneliness, intimate life, or the desire to have children
360 (except in Saudi Arabia, where the latter was mentioned). Though the predominance
361 of materialistic considerations is consistent with previous studies (Singer 2011; Wlezien
362 2005), further research is needed to determine whether this arises from the context (an
363 impersonal survey) or truly reflects people's primary thoughts.

364 Asked about the greatest *injustice*, the most frequent answers relate to "inequality" or
365 "poverty", with 19% of occurrences (28% in Europe but only 9% in the U.S.). It is unclear
366 whether these respondents are thinking about inequality in their own country or at the
367 global level, since only 11% of them specify a geographical scope. One clue is that 2%
368 mention their own country versus 10% the global level (or Global South issues such as
369 "clean water" or "starvation"). Italians, Poles, and Spaniards are the most likely to men-
370 tion "global inequality" or "global poverty", while Japanese and Russian respondents
371 are the least likely to do so. The next most common answers relate to "discrimination"
372 (based on gender, race, or sexual orientation, 9%), "violence" or "wrongful convictions"
373 (many respondents denounce the unjust sentencing of innocents, 9%), or their country's
374 "welfare state" (with people criticizing either the lack of public services or the excessive
375 welfare given to undeserving people, 8%).

376 Asking people about "an issue important to them but neglected in the public debate"
377 fails to uncover unusual topics. 21% of respondents are unable to identify such an issue.
378 The most frequently mentioned concepts are "public services" (12%), the "cost of living"
379 (10%), "health" (9%), "ageing" (6%), and the "environment" (6%).¹⁴ The fact that the
380 most frequently mentioned topics are already well-publicized suggests that public debate
381 reflects or shapes what people have in mind.

382 Reading and coding each field one by one took about 30 hours, but it was worthwhile:
383 not only does it result in an arguably more accurate classification; it also provided first-
384 hand insight into how people think. For example, most people reason from their own
385 perspective (e.g. "my pension is too low", "I want to buy a house") and do not refer
386 to the broader picture or to political reforms. To get a sense of people's own words, a
387 random display of responses can be found at bit.ly/fields2025.

¹⁴Although "immigration" is one of the most frequent words according to the word cloud, the issue is only mentioned in 5% of cases.

Figure 3: Most common concepts in open-ended fields. (Questions 19-21)

(a) "What are your main concerns these days?"



(c) "What according to you is the greatest injustice of all?"



(b) "What are your needs or wishes?"



(d) "Can you name an issue that is important to you but is neglected in the public debate?"



388 The topics mentioned vary according to sociodemographic characteristics. For exam-
389 ple, a respondent who mentions *immigration* is 3.5 times more likely to vote for the far
390 right (correlation of .17); one who mentions *old age* is twice as likely to be 65 or older
391 (correlation of .13). Beyond these examples, the strongest effects I find are that *criticiz-
392 ing the far right* correlates with voting for the left (.16), mentioning *health* with age (.11),

393 *employment* with being unemployed (.09), *animals* with extending one's moral circle to
394 sentient beings (.09), *education* with being a student (.09), *the environment* with voting for
395 the left (.08), and *money* with one's income (−.08).

396 Interestingly, the topics also vary significantly across countries. Below are my im-
397 pressions of each country's slant. Compared to other countries, the concepts overrep-
398 resented in France are: *insecurity*, *holidays* or *free time*, the *public deficit*, *equality*, or
399 *gender equality*; in Germany: *old age poverty*, *immigration*, the *return of growth* or the
400 *economic situation*, *free time*, *war* (in Europe), and *bureaucracy*; in Italy: *health*, *serenity*
401 or *peace of mind*, *war*, *work stress* and *free time*, *world hunger*, and *femicides*; in Poland:
402 *war*, *inequality*, *holidays*, *honesty*, and *disabled people*; in Spain: "health, *money* and
403 *love*", *housing*, *corruption*, *water access*, *global poverty*, and *squatters*; in the UK: the
404 *cost of living*, *immigration*, *having a comfortable life*, *mental health*, the *Holocaust*, *roads*
405 *dangerous for driving*, *being unjustly imprisoned*, and *cuts to the winter fuel allowance*;
406 in Switzerland: *equality*, *immigration*, and *gender equality*; in Japan: the *level of pen-*
407 *sions*, a *cut to the consumption tax*, the *price of rice*, the *declining birth rate*, *childcare*
408 *support*, *reducing the number of parliament members*, *foreigners' preferential treatment*,
409 *excessive social assistance* or the *lack of reward for hard work*, and *stock prices*; in Rus-
410 *sia*: *metaphysical questions* or *profound interrogations*, "lies", *buying a house* or *a car*,
411 *traveling*, the *desire to live*; in Saudi Arabia: *hobbies* such as *sports* or *soccer*, the *willing-*
412 *ness to become millionaire* (or *billionaire*), *one's business project*,¹⁵ *buying a house*, *one's*
413 *car*, *satisfaction with one's income*, "self-injustice" or *sin*, *raising children*, *Palestine*, the
414 *oppression of orphans*, and *travel*; in the U.S.: the *economy*, *Donald Trump*, *breaches of*
415 *the Constitution*, *abortion*, and *gun control*.

416 Our topic of interest, *global inequality*, does not emerge as an issue salient to most
417 people. Indeed, most considerations relate to issues that directly affect oneself or one's
418 family, and political considerations (regarding e.g. *public services*, *pensions*, or *taxes*) are
419 often framed at the national level. *Global redistribution* almost never appears as a *wish*.
420 Furthermore, *global inequality* is rarely mentioned as a neglected *issue* or as a *concern*, in
421 contrast to international issues such as *war*, *climate change*, or the *rise of the far right*.
422 However, it is mentioned as frequently as these other international issues in terms of
423 *injustice*.

424 In summary, the low salience of global solidarity may explain why this topic fails to
425 mobilize political forces, despite being referred to as a just cause and it being accepted by

¹⁵This can be linked to the high risk-taking disposition of Saudis (Falk et al. 2018).

426 majorities (as shown below).

427 II.B. Prioritization of Public Spending Items


428 **Fabre, Douenne and Mattauch (2025)** find that 58% of Americans and 71% of West-
429 ern Europeans would support a global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries
430 (LICs), with only 26% and 14% opposing it, respectively; around half of them would pre-
431 fer to allocate half (rather than none) of the revenue from a global wealth tax to LICs; and,
432 on average, respondents prefer to allocate 33.4% of the revenue to LICs (versus domestic
433 healthcare and education). In other words, while most people would prefer a globally
434 redistributive tax to the status quo, the more leeway they are granted to allocate the rev-
435 enue from such a tax, the less they would allocate to LICs. The greatest leeway tested by
436 **Fabre, Douenne and Mattauch (2025)** let the respondents select their preferred share for
437 LICs versus one alternative spending item, and the average preference was 33.4%—that
438 is, 66.8% of an equal split. Naturally, one expects respondents to split the revenue among
439 all desirable spending items, so that the revenue allocated to one item depends on the
440 number of items. Therefore, if LICs compete with not one but several national items, the
441 share allocated to LICs is expected to diminish. If this share is less than 67% of an equal
442 split, it would mean that (**Fabre, Douenne and Mattauch 2025**) overestimated the priori-
443 tization of LICs, perhaps due to an excessive salience of LICs when only one alternative
444 is proposed, or because the domestic alternative—healthcare and education—was not the
445 most desired. Conversely, if several items relate to a global issue, the total “global spend-
446 ing” should increase. If global spending increases by less than the proportionate amount
447 for the number of global items, it could indicate that people view global items as a single
448 entity and that some domestic issues were missing from the binary version.

449 To test whether the results in (**Fabre, Douenne and Mattauch 2025**) provide an accurate
450 picture of the prioritization of global spending as well as to uncover the prioritization of
451 different global causes, I conduct a revenue allocation task with five spending items. In
452 each of the two variants of this task, respondents use sliders to allocate the revenue of
453 a hypothetical global wealth tax (at a rate of 2% on wealth in excess of \$5 million), after
454 being informed of the revenue the tax would collect in their country (from \$1 billion in
455 Poland to \$514 billion in the U.S.) versus in all LICs combined (\$1 billion).

456 In the *Few* variant, one global item (“Education, Healthcare and Renewable energy in
457 LICs”) competes with four domestic ones. In every country, the most prioritized item is
458 “Domestic: Education and healthcare”, with an average preferred share of 26% (Figures

459 S24, S25). The global item is the least prioritized overall, at 17.5% (from 14% in Japan to
 460 21% in Saudi Arabia and Spain). However, global spending is the second most prioritized
 461 item in Europe (19%) and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, global spending is 31% higher than
 462 the expected 13.4% (that is, 66.8% of 20%)¹⁶ and only 13% of respondents do not allocate
 463 any revenue to it (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Preferred split of revenue from an international wealth tax. The first two items are from the *Few* variant with 5 fixed items (the *Global* one and the most preferred one are displayed); the last four items are from the *Many* variant with 5 items taken at random out of 13 (the 4 *Global* ones are displayed). (Questions 24-25)



464 In the *Many* variant, five items are selected at random from a pool of four global and
 465 nine domestic items. While domestic healthcare (27%) and education (22%) are the most
 466 prioritized items, the average allocation for global items ranges from 16% for “Forestation
 467 and biodiversity projects” to 19% for “Education and Healthcare in LICs” (Figures 4, S26-
 468 S27). On average, tasks include 1.5 global items, which together receive 26.9% of the

¹⁶The one-sided test that global spending is equal to 33.4% is rejected at the 1% threshold in all countries except Japan, where it is rejected at the 10% threshold. If one restricts the comparison to the countries surveyed by (Fabre, Douenne and Mattauch 2025), the global item is allocated 17.8%, which is 34% more than expected. The most credible explanation for outperforming expectations is that the domestic item chosen by (Fabre, Douenne and Mattauch 2025) was the preferred one. Indeed, the global item is allocated 68% of the “Domestic: Healthcare and Education” share, almost exactly as expected.

469 revenue — again, equivalent to 17.5% per global item. Interestingly, there is no significant
470 correlation between the number of global items and the average allocation per global
471 item.¹⁷

472 Overall, the revenue allocation tasks validate and confirm the findings from (Fabre,
473 Douenne and Mattauch 2025). Most people would favor using a substantial share of
474 the revenue from a global wealth tax to finance sustainable development in LICs, even
475 though global spending is somewhat less prioritized than domestic spending.

476 III. Acceptance of Policies as a Function of Country Cover- 477 age

478 While acceptance of global climate or redistributive policies is widespread (Cappelen,
479 Støstad and Tungodden 2025; Fabre, Douenne and Mattauch 2025), acceptance may drop
480 if policies are not truly *global* but only *international*, i.e. if key countries such as China, Rus-
481 sia, or the U.S. do not participate. Indeed, people may be concerned about a domestic loss
482 of competitiveness resulting from the expatriation of taxpayers to low-tax jurisdictions;
483 or about unfair burden-sharing if non-cooperating countries free-ride on decarbonization
484 or sustainable development funding. In this section, I examine the acceptance of glob-
485 ally redistributive policies depending on the coalition of countries that would implement
486 them. I study, in turn, a carbon price and a wealth tax.

487 III.A. International Climate Scheme

488 **Presentation of the Schemes.** “Cap and dividend” is a reference climate policy (Baer
489 et al. 2000; Barnes et al. 2008; Bertram 1992; Blanchard and Tirole 2021; Grubb 1990),
490 whereby fossil fuel companies at the source of emissions must buy emission permits on a
491 carbon market, with the revenue from carbon pricing rebated equally to individuals. The
492 limited and declining number of emission permits guarantees that emissions are capped
493 according to the climate objective. As polluting companies pass the cost of emission per-
494 mits down the value chain, the carbon price is ultimately paid by consumers, in propor-
495 tion to their carbon footprint. Meanwhile, the equal cash transfer (or “dividend”) offsets

¹⁷In Russia, the question could not be asked in the same way due to different software. Instead, re-
spondents had to choose what share of the global tax revenue to allocate to sustainable development in
low-income countries. On average, Russians allocate 12.2% to LICs, with a median allocation of just 5%,
but only 12% allocate nothing to LICs.

496 price increases for the average consumer. Those with a higher-than-average carbon foot-
497 print financially lose, while those with a lower carbon footprint (who are on average
498 poorer) financially gain.

499 Using simple Yes/No questions, I test the acceptance of three types of “cap and div-
500 idend” (or “Climate Scheme”) policies that differ by geographical scope: the National,
501 Global, and International Climate Schemes (Figures 6, S29). While average consumers in
502 a high-income country are financially unaffected by the National Climate Scheme (NCS),
503 they lose out in the Global and International versions, since their carbon footprint is larger
504 than the world (or climate coalition) average.

505 The National Climate Scheme (NCS) is accepted by 68% of respondents (ranging from
506 56% in Poland to 88% in Saudi Arabia).¹⁸

507 **The Global Climate Scheme.** Before presenting the Global Climate Scheme (GCS), re-
508 spondents are instructed to pay careful attention, with the incentive that they may win a
509 \$100 lottery prize if they correctly answer a comprehension question at the end of the sur-
510vey. When presented with the Global Climate Scheme (GCS), respondents are informed
511 that the cash transfer would lift 600 million people out of extreme poverty, and the cost
512 to them is made salient. Respondents are informed of the amount of the cash transfer,
513 as well as the price increases and the net cost to the average person in their country (e.g.
514 2% price increases and a net cost of \$90 per month in the U.S., or 2% and €45 per month
515 in Germany).¹⁹ The GCS is accepted by 55% of respondents (from 49% in the U.S. and
516 Russia to 85% in Saudi Arabia). The salience of costs in the GCS question may explain the
517 somewhat lower acceptance of the GCS compared to the NCS.²⁰

¹⁸The acceptance of the NCS is higher than the support for a *tax-and-dividend* policy found in other surveys (Douenne and Fabre 2022; Mildenberger et al. 2022), 12 p.p. higher than in Dechezleprêtre et al. (2025). Indeed, most people prefer emissions trading schemes to carbon taxes (Funke et al. 2025), and support drops (before recovering) in specific contexts, such as the Yellow Vests movement.


¹⁹The computations use a carbon price of \$95/tCO₂. For Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S., computations assume universal country coverage and the cash transfer is \$35 per month. For Europe and Japan, the net loss is computed in a non-universal but *High* participation scenario, which implies a lower cash transfer (€20 per month) and a higher net cost (by about \$10 per month) since the coalition’s average carbon footprint is lower than the world average.

²⁰Acceptance of the GCS is also around 10 p.p. lower than in (Fabre, Douenne and Mattauch 2025). There may be different reasons for this: attitudes may have changed in the two-year interval; I added information on the price increases, which allows respondents to estimate the cost to themselves (rather than to their average fellow citizen).

518 **Pluralistic Ignorance.** After assessing support for the GCS, respondents are asked in an
 519 incentivized way about their belief concerning the actual support, either in their country
 520 or in the U.S. (Figure S29).²¹ In every country and for any variant of the question, actual
 521 support is underestimated. The median respondent underestimates the support in their
 522 own country by 16 p.p. and the support in the U.S. by 22 p.p. In Japan and in European
 523 countries, the underestimation is more severe, with most people wrongly believing that
 524 the GCS does not garner majority support in their country. Such pluralistic ignorance
 525 might explain why politicians do not dare to propose global climate justice policies.

526 **International Climate Scheme.** To test how country coverage influences the acceptance
 527 of the International Climate Scheme (ICS), respondents are randomly assigned to one of
 528 four variants. They can visualize the country coverage on a map (see examples in Figure
 529 5), where their own country is striped to denote its potential participation. Respondents
 530 are also informed of the number of countries that would participate in the assigned sce-
 531 nario, the list of these countries or world regions, and their share of world emissions.

Figure 5: Example maps of the International Climate Scheme question. (Question 35).




532
 533 The *Mid* scenario covers 56% of world emissions and includes China and Global South
 534 countries. The *Low* scenario replaces China with the EU and covers 33% of emissions. The
 535 *High scenario* adds various high-income countries to the *Mid* scenario, including the EU,
 536 Japan, Canada, and South Korea, and covers 72% of emissions. The last variant, *High*
 537 *color*, combines the *High* participation scenario with a colored map that displays not only
 538 the country coverage, but also the net gain or cost for each country, with China appearing

²¹Americans are asked about either their country or the EU. In Russia, I was not permitted to enquire about beliefs in a foreign country.

539 as neither gaining nor losing from the policy.²²

Figure 6: Percentage of support for the National, Global, and International Climate Schemes (Yes/No questions).
(Questions 26-35.)



540 As expected, the wider the coverage, the higher the acceptance. However, this effect
 541 is relatively small, as acceptance is only 4 p.p. higher in the *High* variant (at 68%) com-
 542 pared to the *Low* variant (65%). Interestingly, acceptance among Europeans significantly
 543 increases when China is added to the coalition, but does not rise further when other HICs
 544 are also added. Conversely, for Americans and Japanese, the participation of the EU or
 545 China yields similar levels of acceptance, and only the combined participation of China,
 546 the EU, and other HICs significantly increases acceptance.

547 The effect of country coverage is entirely driven by the 74% of respondents who un-
 548 derstand that the GCS would result in increased gasoline prices. It is worth noting that
 549 acceptance is higher among the minority of respondents who misunderstand the policy:
 550 by 5 p.p. for the GCS and 4 p.p. for the ICS.

551 Acceptance is 6.6 p.p. lower in the *High color* variant compared to the *High* variant.
 552 Three reasons may explain this effect. First, the cost may be more salient with the col-
 553 ored map. Third, with the colored map, respondents learn how their own country fares
 554 compared to others. In fact, the effect is no longer significant (and of opposite sign) for

²²In a standard cap and dividend, China should lose, as its carbon footprint exceeds the world average. However, the Global Climate Scheme departs slightly from the standard policy so that middle-income countries do not lose out (Fabre 2025).

555 countries that appear to lose less than 0.5% of their GDP (Spain and Switzerland).

556 Notice that acceptance of the ICS in the *Low* coverage variant is similar to that of the
557 NCS. This suggests that the average respondent is willing to pay the ICS's higher cost for
558 the guarantee of poverty alleviation and decarbonization in the Global South.

559 Finally, the greater acceptance of the ICS compared to the GCS is somewhat puzzling.
560 Perhaps people view the proposal as more credible when a list of participating countries
561 is provided, compared to the GCS, which is framed as if all countries might join (or, on
562 the contrary, as one in which the participation of any country is uncertain). Relatedly,
563 acceptance may be stronger for more precise or more visual proposals, either because
564 they are viewed as more advanced or because they induce an experimenter demand bias.
565 The greater acceptance could also be due to costs being less salient in the ICS question
566 (but acceptance is still greater than in the GCS in the *High color* variant, where costs are
567 visible). Unfortunately, the data does not allow testing these different hypotheses.

568 III.B. Wealth Tax Funding LICs


569 I test the effect of country coverage on the acceptance of an internationally redistributive
570 wealth tax using a simple Yes/No question with three random variants. The policy is
571 described as a 2% tax on wealth above \$1 million, with 30% of its revenue financing public
572 services in LICs. In the *Global* variant, all countries except the respondent's own are as-
573 sumed to participate. The *HIC* variant covers all HICs (except the respondent's country).
574 The *International* variant covers some countries and not others, with the precise coverage
575 varying by respondent's country but always including Brazil and European countries (or
576 the whole EU) and excluding China and the U.S.²³

577 Here again, acceptance increases with the country coverage, but the effect is small. The
578 middle-ground *HIC* variant garners 70% acceptance (from 58% in Switzerland to 81% in
579 Saudi Arabia). Compared to *HIC*, acceptance is 5 p.p. higher with *Global* coverage, while
580 it is only 1.4 p.p. and non-significantly lower with *International* coverage (Figure 7).

581 Overall, the results indicate that the acceptance of internationally redistributive poli-
582 cies is quite robust to country coverage. This confirms that the issues of competitiveness
583 or free riding are not decisive factors in public support (Aklan and Mildenberger 2020).

²³More precisely, in the U.S., excluded countries differ and are *China, Japan, and Canada*. As for included countries, in addition to *Brazil*, they are: *the EU and the UK* for Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S.; *the EU* for Russia and the UK; and *France, Germany, Spain, and the UK* (except one's own country) for EU countries.

Figure 7: Percentage of support for an international wealth tax with 30% of revenue funding LICs, depending on the country coverage (Yes/No question). (Questions 41-43).



584 IV. Sincerity of Support for Global Redistribution

585 Skeptics about the public's support for global redistribution would argue that this
 586 support is not reflected in real-stake decisions or that it mostly results from *warm glow*.
 587 According to the *warm glow* hypothesis, many people would express their support to en-
 588 joy moral comfort as long as the policy appears out of reach and supporting it seems
 589 harmless. In case of *warm glow*, support would vanish if (i) the prospect of implemen-
 590 tation materialized or if (ii) moral comfort could be obtained from a substitute. In this
 591 section, I test whether global redistribution is a vote-determining issue using a conjoint
 592 analysis, and I test both forms of *warm glow* (i and ii) using two other survey experiments.

593 IV.A. Conjoint Analysis

594 I conduct a conjoint experiment in all countries except Russia and Saudi Arabia. This
 595 question is positioned at the beginning of the survey, before respondents know the sur-
 596vey's topic. Respondents are presented with two random political programs, framed as
 597 the fictitious programs of the leading candidates in the next election, and are asked which
 598 candidate they would vote for (27% of the respondents choose the outside option *Neither*
 599 of them). Each program contains a policy or an absence of policy, chosen at random, for
 600 each of five policy domains (the order of which is also randomized). Our domain of inter-
 601 est is *Foreign policy*, whose pool contains three policies: *Cut development aid*, *International*

602 *tax on millionaires with 30% financing healthcare and education in low-income countries*, and a
 603 country-specific policy. I included both an *anti-* and a *pro-global* redistribution policy to
 604 capture a potential status quo bias or, on the contrary, a bias in favor of reform. The poli-
 605 cies, except for these two of interest, have been selected from the programs of the main
 606 candidates in the country's most recent election, ensuring coverage of the entire political
 607 spectrum and the most prominent proposals in the national public debate.

608 Figure 8 shows the effect of including our policies of interest in a program on the
 609 likelihood that it is preferred (see Figures S9-S22 for full country-by-country results²⁴).
 610 More specifically, Figure 8 and Table S18 present the results of the following regression,
 611 estimated by simple OLS with standard errors clustered by respondent:

$$(1) \quad \text{Preferred}_{pi} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Cut_aid}_{pi} + \beta_2 \text{Intl_tax}_{pi} + \beta_3 \text{Foreign3}_{pi} + \varepsilon_{pi}$$

612 where pi denotes the program p faced by respondent i , and each variable is a dummy.

613 Both policies significantly affect program choice: the internationally redistributive
 614 millionaire tax increases the likelihood that a program is preferred by 4 p.p., while cut-
 615 ting development aid decreases it by 4 p.p. At the country level, the effects are generally
 616 non-significant due to lack of power, but when significant, they are of the same sign as
 617 the global effect (except for *cut aid* in Switzerland). Overall, the effects are of comparable
 618 size to the effects of other policies,²⁵ suggesting that global redistribution issues may be
 619 as vote-determining as policies prominent in the national debate.


620 One concern with this type of conjoint analysis is that it involves unrealistic political
 621 programs, namely programs that contain both left and far-right policies, which distorts
 622 the actual choices that voters may face. *De la Cuesta, Egami and Imai (2022)* showed that
 623 to fully address this issue, one should weigh each pair of programs by the probability
 624 that it would arise in a real election. Since this probability cannot be computed, the best
 625 practice is to bound the effects by estimating them with extreme probabilities. The results
 626 just presented are based on one extreme, the uniform distribution. To construct the other
 627 extreme, I classify each policy proposal according to its originating political party²⁶ and

²⁴With a few exceptions, *raising the minimum wage* is among the most popular policies, alongside *re-distributive taxes or transfers*, *anti-immigration regulations*, and *abortion rights*. Conversely, a *ban on new combustion-engine cars* is among the least popular ones.

²⁵Overall, the average absolute effect size (weighted by countries' population sizes) is 6 p.p., and our effects of interest are not significantly lower than this average (at the 15% threshold).

²⁶Interestingly, the most popular policies originate from left-wing parties, except in Germany and

Figure 8: Effect on the likelihood that a political program is preferred of containing the following policies (compared to no foreign policy in the program). No control is included, 95% confidence intervals are shown. (See Figure S8 for effects by vote.) (Question 23)



628 consider a program consistent if it does not contain policies from both the *left* and the *far*
 629 *right*. Then, I re-estimate the regression after dropping the 29% of pairs with an incon-
 630 sistent program, effectively assigning them a probability of zero. Effects are preserved:
 631 +4 p.p. for the tax and -4 p.p. for cutting aid.²⁷ This indicates that our results are robust
 632 to the critique of [De la Cuesta, Egami and Imai \(2022\)](#).

633 IV.B. Testing Warm Glow

634 Some people might claim to support a policy of global redistribution merely to ease
 635 their conscience. If support were mainly due to this psychological mechanism, called
 636 *warm glow*, it might dissipate when the prospect of the policy materializes or if the policy
 637 support could be replaced by a substitute with the same moral appeal.


Switzerland. Indeed, the average deviation from the mean effect is highest for policies originating from the *Left*, and lowest for those from the *Center-right or Right*.

²⁷In the main specification, I consider our policies of interest as consistent with any program. As an alternative, I classify them as either *left* (for the tax) or *far right* (for cutting aid). In that case, only 43% of observations are retained, yet effects are still preserved (+4 p.p. for the tax and -5 p.p. for cutting aid).


638 **Moral Substitute.** Following Nunes and Schokkaert (2003), warm glow would be re-
 639 vealed if support for the GCS decreased after respondents are offered the opportunity
 640 to express generosity towards the cause of climate change. To test this hypothesis, right
 641 before the GCS page, I assign a random subset of the respondents to a donation lottery,
 642 while the control group faces no question.²⁸ In the *Donation* branch, respondents must
 643 decide how much they would donate to the reforestation NGO *Just One Tree*, should they
 644 win the question's \$100 lottery. Lower support for the GCS in the treated group would be
 645 evidence of warm glow, as it would indicate that the support derives (at least partially)
 646 from moral satisfaction at having recently supported a just cause.

Figure 9: Testing warm glow (negative effects would indicate the presence of warm glow). Regressions include controls, 95% confidence intervals are shown.

(a) Effect of a *Donation lottery* treatment on support for the Global Climate Scheme. (Questions 27-28)



(b) Effect of information about ongoing global redistribution initiatives on the share of plausible global policies supported. (Questions 36-38)



647 On the contrary, support for the GCS is 3 p.p. higher in the *Donation* branch compared
 648 to the control group, and the coefficient is positive in every country, though often not sig-
 649 nificant (Figure 9a, Table S19). While the reason for this positive effect remains unclear,²⁹

²⁸More precisely, right before the GCS question, the sample is split into three branches: the *Donation* lottery, the NCS question, and the control group. The NCS treatment is excluded from this analysis as it is unrelated to this experiment (restricting the NCS question to a subsample was done to prevent it from influencing responses to the GCS).

²⁹Perhaps the *Donation* question triggers thoughts favorable to the GCS, such as the realization that indi-

650 the results show no evidence of warm glow.

651 **Realism Treatment.** To test the hypothesis that some people express support for global
652 redistribution only as long as its implementation seems unlikely, I randomly assign half of
653 the respondents to receive information about ongoing negotiations on globally redistribu-
654 tive policies. Among other things, treated respondents are informed that the International
655 Maritime Organization recently adopted a levy on maritime carbon emissions that should
656 partly finance LICs; that the G20 considered introducing a global tax on billionaires; that
657 the UN General Assembly recently agreed on the principle of expanding the UN Security
658 Council to new members; and that the UN Secretary-General supports financial system
659 reforms that would drive resources towards sustainable development (see Question 36).
660 Then, respondents are asked “how likely [it is] that international policies involving sig-
661 nificant transfers from HICs to LICs will be introduced in the next 15 years”, right before
662 their support for ten plausible global policies is tested.³⁰ Here, warm glow would be re-
663 vealed if the information treatment increased the belief that global redistribution is likely
664 but decreased support for global policies.

665 The treatment was designed to satisfy the exclusion restriction required for the instru-
666 mental variables (IV) strategy. The exclusion restriction states that the treatment affects
667 support for global policies only through its impact on beliefs that global redistribution
668 is likely. Table 1 reports the corresponding regression results. Although the treatment is
669 randomly assigned, the preferred specification includes the sociodemographic variables
670 as controls to improve precision.³¹ Informed respondents are 7 p.p. more likely to believe
671 that global redistribution is likely, from a baseline of 33% in the control group. With an
672 effective F-statistic of 67, this highly significant effect provides a strong first stage for the
673 IV estimation. Assuming that the exclusion restriction holds, the IV is well identified. The
674 local average treatment effect estimated by 2SLS is 18 p.p., indicating that believing global
675 redistribution is likely causally *increases* the share of global policies supported. This esti-
676 mate is consistent with both the non-causal OLS coefficient of 15 p.p. and the direct effect
677 of the treatment on policy support, estimated at 1 p.p. (see Figure 9b and Table S20).

678 Again, the effects go in the opposite direction to warm glow. In this case, increased

679 vidual actions like donations are ill-suited to address climate change, so that we need a global policy, even
680 if it is imperfect.

681 ³⁰Section V.A. reports acceptance of these policies and Appendix III.A. describes the corresponding in-
682 ternational negotiations.

683 ³¹See Table S21 for results without controls.

Table 1: Effect on support for global redistribution of believing that it is likely.

	Believes global redistribution likely		Share of plausible global policies supported		
	IV 1st Stage	IV 1st Stage	IV 2nd Stage	OLS	Direct Effect
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Information treatment	0.077 (0.010)	0.074 (0.009)			0.013 (0.007)
Believes global redistribution likely			0.181 (0.086)	0.145 (0.007)	
(Intercept)	0.332 (0.007)	0.078 (0.067)	0.216 (0.065)	0.220 (0.064)	0.230 (0.066)
Controls: sociodemos and vote		✓	✓	✓	✓
Effective F-statistic	65.04	67.09			
Observations	12,001	12,001	12,001	12,001	12,001
R ²	0.006	0.134	0.174	0.176	0.141

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) are reported in parentheses. As in Appendix E, control variables are: vote, gender, age, income, education, urbanity, likelihood of becoming millionaire, living with partner, employment status, foreign born, country region.

679 support may stem from enhanced credibility of policies that are known to be discussed
 680 in international organizations. Overall, the results of these two experiments provide no
 681 evidence that support for global redistribution is affected by warm glow. On the contrary,
 682 they suggest that support is sincere and robust to the prospect of implementation or to
 683 the possibility of a moral substitute.

684 V. Breadth of Accepted International Policies

685 Knowing that some internationally redistributive policies are sincerely supported and
 686 may influence voting behavior, I now examine the range of international policies that
 687 could be accepted. In this section, I analyze, in turn, the support for global policies cur-
 688 rently debated in the international community, as well as more radical proposals; I also
 689 assess broader willingness to defend global solidarity, the preferred channels to transfer
 690 resources to LICs, and a custom redistribution task designed to reveal the preferred extent
 691 of international transfers.

692 V.A. Acceptance of Currently Debated Global Policies

693 **Plausible Global Policies.** Figure 10 reveals the acceptance of plausible global policies
 694 (see Figure S31 for absolute support). These policies are deemed “plausible” because they
 695 are debated in international organizations, as detailed in Appendix III.A.. Almost every
 696 policy garners majority acceptance in each country. The only exception is the acceptance
 697 among Japanese respondents of a globally redistributive tax on carbon emissions from
 698 aviation, at 46%. This proposal has the most salient cost: a 30% increase in flight prices. It
 699 is the least supported in every country. The most supported policies, with over two-thirds
 700 acceptance in every country and a majority of absolute support in the pooled sample, are
 701 the 2% minimum tax on billionaires’ wealth proposed by Zucman (2024), the expansion
 702 of low-interest-rate sustainable investments in LICs (Bridgetown Initiative 2025), and de-
 703 veloped countries contributing to the climate loss and damage fund.

Figure 10: Acceptance of plausible global redistribution policies (Percentage of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* among non-*Indifferent* responses). See Figure S31 for the absolute support. (Question 38).

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Minimum tax of 2% on billionaires’ wealth, in voluntary countries	81	84	87	83	89	79	81	85	77	81	80	86	77
Bridgetown initiative: MDBs expanding sustainable investments in LICs, and at lower interest rates	79	82	81	81	88	72	81	85	75	81	83	87	74
L&D: Developed countries financing a fund to help vulnerable countries cope with climate Loss and damage	75	75	72	73	84	72	77	72	67	73	87	89	70
International levy on shipping carbon emissions, returned to countries based on population	70	73	78	70	78	61	74	75	72	59	73	81	67
At least 0.7% of developed countries’ GDP in foreign aid	70	69	66	67	79	59	77	65	64	62	83	86	67
Debt relief for vulnerable countries, suspending payments until they are more able to repay	70	70	64	60	81	79	72	72	65	68	75	88	67
Expand Security Council to new permanent members (e.g. India, Brazil, African Union), restrict veto use	69	76	72	76	80	73	76	78	72	68	53	84	67
NCQG: Developing countries providing \$300 bn a year in climate finance for developing countries	68	69	68	69	76	63	73	67	65	59	88	86	61
Raise global minimum tax on profit from 15% to 35%, allocating revenues to countries based on sales	68	75	75	74	85	66	70	74	63	72	50	77	66
International levy on aviation carbon emissions, raising prices by 30%, returned to countries based on population	53	55	62	54	56	53	54	54	51	46	51	70	51

704 **Ranking of Countries in Terms of Support for Global Redistribution.** On average,
 705 respondents support 51% of the plausible policies and oppose 21% of them. This means
 706 they support +30 p.p. more policies than they oppose (Figure S32). The countries with

707 the highest mean difference between support and opposition are Saudi Arabia (+50 p.p.),
708 Italy (+49) and Spain (+39). In contrast, net support is lowest in Japan (+20), Switzerland
709 (+24), Poland, and the U.S. (+25).

710 Other synthetic indicators of support for global redistribution show consistent country
711 rankings. In particular, the countries previously identified as having the highest and low-
712 est net support retain their rankings when ordered by average latent support for global
713 redistribution (Figure S32). To construct this latent variable, I standardize all variables
714 of support and average them, weighted by loadings obtained from an exploratory factor
715 analysis (see details and loading weights in Appendix III.C.).

716 One might wonder why the countries leading in support are the Saudi kingdom and
717 right-wing-dominated Italy. Breaking down the support by political leaning and other
718 selected sociodemographics, Figures S72-S74 shed some light on this question. In Saudi
719 Arabia, half of the adult population is immigrant. However, foreign workers do not drive
720 the results, as Saudi citizens exhibit slightly higher support than non-Saudis.³² As for
721 Italy, it is both the country with the lowest gap in support between left-wing and far-right
722 voters (along with Japan, at 33 p.p.) and the country with the highest support among
723 left-wing voters.³³

724 **Climate Finance Goal.** Climate finance refers to the financing of climate action in devel-
725 oping countries by developed countries. In 2024, countries agreed on a “New Collective
726 Quantified Goal” (NCQG) of climate finance set at \$300 billion per year by 2035, which
727 is triple the previous goal. However, while developing countries such as India called for
728 \$600 billion in grants (or grant-equivalent funding), the NCQG does not specify the share
729 of finance that should be provided as grants. Currently, the goal is being met with only
730 \$26 billion in grants and the remainder in loans (OECD 2024).

731 I test the preferred amount for the NCQG in grant-equivalent terms, using two ran-
732 dom variants. Both variants inform respondents of the current situation and the agreed
733 goal, expressing amounts in both absolute terms and as a proportion of developed coun-
734 tries’ GDP. The *Short* variant uses qualitative, textual responses, and features a middle cat-
735 egory of \$100 billion (namely, “Meet the newly agreed goal by tripling grants and loans

³²Therefore, tentative explanations may rather come from Saudi society. While Saudis benefit from a generous welfare state, the Islamic principle of *Zakat* (almsgiving) might further foster a culture of generosity.

³³While the former point may be linked to the vision of Italy’s far-right leader of an Africa-Italy partnership (trading off foreign aid with cooperation on fighting immigration), the Italian population might also be influenced by the Vatican’s messages in favor of global solidarity.

736 (\$100 billion in grants, or 0.15% of GDP.”). The *Long* variant provides more detailed
737 explanations in the question text and then uses numerical answers, with a midpoint of
738 \$300 billion.

739 In both variants, the median preferred NCQG is \$100 billion, with 19% of respondents
740 choosing an amount of \$600 billion or larger (Figures [S35-S36](#)).

741 That differently framed variants yield consistent results suggests that, despite its length,
742 the question was well understood. The median choice of a climate finance quantum in
743 line with the internationally agreed NCQG can be interpreted in two distinct ways. Either
744 diplomats of HICs are defending the level of generosity that reflects the median prefer-
745 ences of their compatriots, or respondents’ attitudes are anchored in existing agreements
746 (or in their governments’ stance). The results presented below are more consistent with
747 the latter interpretation, as they reveal majority acceptance of much larger international
748 transfers.

749 **V.B. Support for Radical Proposals, Political Action, and Broad Values**

750 In the final part of the questionnaire, I pose a variety of questions to assess the range
751 of global solidarity policies, actions or values that people may accept (Figure [11](#)).

752 **Sustainable Future versus Status Quo.** Respondents were asked which scenario they
753 would prefer for the next twenty years: a sustainable future or the status quo (note that
754 scenarios were not labeled that way in the questionnaire, but were instead randomly
755 named *A* or *B*). In the sustainable scenario, most countries cooperate to tax millionaires
756 and meet the +2°C target, through the electrification of cars and the doubling of prices
757 for heating fuel or gas, air travel, and beef. Although overall purchasing power is pre-
758 served (through a reduction in sales tax), people change their habits (e.g. flying and eating
759 meat are cut by half). In the status quo, no policy is implemented, people maintain their
760 lifestyles, and global warming reaches +3°C by 2100, causing more severe disasters.

761 Overall, 68% of respondents prefer the sustainable future over the status quo.

762 **Global Income Redistribution.** I test the support for a global tax on top incomes to fi-
763 nance poverty reduction in LICs, with the tax targeting either the global top 1% or top 3%,
764 depending on random assignment. The top 1% variant describes an additional 15% tax on
765 income in excess of \$120,000 per year (at Purchasing Power Parity), while the top 3% vari-
766 ant features additional rates of 15%, 30%, and 45% above \$80,000, \$120,000, and \$1 mil-

lion, respectively. Each tax is calibrated to finance the poverty gap, with poverty defined using thresholds of \$250 and \$400 per month for the top 1% and top 3% variants, respectively. These taxes entail international transfers of 2% and 5% of world nominal income, respectively (see Appendix III.B. for details). Two numerical examples explain to respondents how the tax would affect taxpayers' income. The question also states the share of affected taxpayers worldwide and in their country, as well as the share of their country's GDP that would be transferred. For example, in the U.S., the top 1% tax would affect the top 8% and transfer 3% of GDP, while the top 3% tax would affect the top 18% and transfer 8% of GDP (see Figure S39). These figures are about half as high in Japan and Germany, and around four times lower in France and Spain.

Overall, 56% (resp. 50%) of the respondents support the top 1% (resp. top 3%) tax, and 25% (resp. 28%) oppose it (Figure S40). The top 1% tax obtains majority of absolute support in every country except Japan. Both variants are accepted by a majority in every case except Switzerland for the top 3% variant (in which case 18% of Swiss people would be affected). Overall, the tax garners majority acceptance even among the 6% of respondents who would be affected, though this is not the case in every country for the top 3% variant (Figure S41).

Global Convergence. A simple question captures the acceptance of global solidarity: "Should governments actively cooperate to have all countries converge in terms of GDP per capita by the end of the century?" Overall, 61% answer *Yes* and 26% *No*, with the lowest relative agreement (i.e. excluding people not responding) in the U.S., at 56%.

Willingness to Act. Two questions asked the respondents how they would react to a "worldwide movement in favor of a global program to tackle climate change, implement taxes on millionaires and fund poverty reduction in [LICs]".

In a multiple-choice question (censored in Russia), 29% report they could participate in the movement by either attending a demonstration (19%), going on strike (7%), or donating \$100 to a strike fund (10%). This share rises to 68% in favor of the movement when including the 52% of respondents who "could sign a petition and spread ideas" for the movement (Figure S45). Interestingly, 52% of the 584 millionaires³⁴ who answered the survey would be in favor of such a movement.

When asked whether they would be more or less likely to vote for the political party

³⁴In the weighted subsample of millionaires, 60% are Americans and 26% Europeans.

798 they feel closest to if it were part of such a movement, 36% of the respondents state they
799 would be more likely versus 17% less likely (Figure S46). Among the 5% of respondents
800 who did not vote in the last election and feel closest to a left-wing party, the share more
801 likely to vote in that case increases to 46% (versus 10% who are less likely).

802 **Reasons for Helping LICs.** In a multiple-choice question, I asked respondents which
803 reasons for HICs supporting LICs they agree with, among arguments involving *duty*,
804 *long-term interest*, or *historical responsibility*. At 54%, the reason most frequently chosen in
805 every country (except France) is *duty*, specifically “Helping countries in need is the right
806 thing to do” (Figure S47). Additionally, 38% select *interest*, and 25% *responsibility*, with
807 only 16% disagreeing with every reason.

808 **Reparations.** In former colonial or slave States,³⁵ I asked respondents whether they
809 would support “reparations for colonization and slavery to former colonies and descen-
810 dants of slaves”, specifying that the reparations “could take the form of funding edu-
811 cation and facilitating technology transfers”. Consistent with the general disagreement
812 that HICs have a *historical responsibility* to support LICs, only a minority of 35% of re-
813 spondents support reparations (except in Italy where 56% do), while 42% oppose them
814 (Figure S48). This suggests that framing global solidarity as a decolonial struggle might
815 be counterproductive for its advocates.

816 **Agreement That Own Taxes Should Solve Global Problems.** Overall, 41% agree and
817 28% disagree that “[their] taxes should go towards solving global problem”. With 60%
818 relative agreement, there is a relative majority in favor of one’s own taxes financing global
819 solidarity, though a lower one than for specific proposals that would make the richest
820 contribute.³⁶ As explained in Section I. and shown in Appendix G, the present results
821 replicate well the “Global Solidarity Report” that first asked this question (Global Nation
822 2023)

³⁵I did not ask this question in Japan or Russia, because these countries’ historiographies do not present their past as colonial but rather as an empire.

³⁶This confirms that the willingness to pay for global solidarity, even through taxes, does not equate to acceptance of global redistribution proposals.

Figure 11: Acceptance of broad action or radical proposals of global redistribution. (Questions 44-46, 49-51, 53, 61).

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Accepts tax on world top 1% to finance global poverty reduction (Additional 15% tax on income over [\$120k/year in PPP])	69	73	71	72	84	69	73	67	60	69	75	82	62
Accepts tax on world top 3% to finance global poverty reduction (Additional 15% tax over [\$80k], 30% over [\$120k], 45% over [\$1M])	64	66	70	62	71	70	66	67	42	55	76	82	57
Prefers sustainable future	68	70	72	70	76	58	73	68	66	76	69	72	62
"Governments should actively cooperate to have all countries converge in terms of GDP per capita by the end of the century"	70	78	77	76	87	85	84	66	66	70	78	93	56
Would support a global movement to tackle CC, tax millionaires, and fund LICs (either petition, demonstrate, strike, or donate)	68	72	70	69	82	71	74	68	63	56	56	73	67
More likely to vote for party if part of worldwide coalition for climate action and global redistribution	68	72	72	71	82	64	77	69	57	56	NA	NA	67
Accepts reparations for colonization and slavery in the form of funding education and technology transfers	45	50	44	44	69	NA	51	46	NA	NA	NA	NA	40
"My taxes should go towards solving global problems"	59	61	43	62	77	63	70	58	53	59	57	89	55
"My taxes ... global problems" (Global Nation, 2023)	56	59	43	65	76	58	60	52	NA	76	NA	NA	44

823 **Moral Circle.** Asked "Which group of people do you advocate for when you vote?",³⁷
 824 45% select a universalist answer ("Humans" or "Sentient beings (humans and animals)"),
 825 which is more than the most common answer, referring to one's fellow citizens (32%).
 826 Universalists are fewer in Japan (30%) but constitute a majority in Europe (50%) and Saudi
 827 Arabia (57%), as shown in Figures 12 and S61. Among those who lean to the left, 59% are
 828 universalists, compared to 32% on the center-right or far-right.


829 Following Enke et al. (2024), I construct an alternative measure of universalism based
 830 on the vocabulary used in open-ended fields.³⁸ Although latent support for global re-
 831 distribution is significantly correlated with this measure, the correlation is only .05, less
 832 than the correlation with manual, keyword, or AI classifications of a field as relating to
 833 inequality or poverty (at .09, .08, and .06, respectively), and much less than the correlation
 834 with our universalism variable based on moral circle (at .37). Furthermore, the correlation
 835 between the two measures of universalism is only .03. This observation demonstrates that

³⁷In Russia and Saudi Arabia, the question was asked differently. It read: "Which group do you advocate for? For example, if you were the richest person on Earth, which group would you predominantly help with your money?"

³⁸More specifically, I use the Moral Foundation Dictionary (MFD) 2.0 (Frimer, Chan and darloap 2019) and define *universalism* as the number of occurrences of *care* or *fairness* words minus the number of *loyalty* or *authority* words. I also test an alternative definition, based on the extended MFD (Hopp et al. 2021), that uses weights rather than dummy variables to indicate a word's belonging to a moral dimension. The latter definition is even less (though still significantly) correlated with the latent support for global redistribution, at .03.

836 the various indicators labeled as “universalism” by different authors may not all capture
837 the same dimension.

Figure 12: “Which group of people do you advocate for when you vote?”³⁷ (Question 62).



838 V.C. Preferred Channels for Transferring Resources to LICs

839 Asked to evaluate ways of transferring resources to reduce poverty in LICs on a 4-
840 point Likert scale, the most preferred option in every country is “Cash transfers to parents
841 (child allowances), to the disabled and to the elderly”, with 16% selecting it as the *Best way*
842 overall, and 49% as a *Right way* or *Best way* (Figures 13, S42-S43). “Unconditional transfers
843 to the national government” is the only option seen as a *Wrong way* by the majority, but
844 this share falls from 51% down to 21% (becoming the third most supported option out of
845 seven) when “transfers to the national government [are] conditioned on the use of funds
846 for poverty reduction programs”. Interestingly, “unconditional cash transfers to each
847 household” are controversial: they are the second most chosen *Best way*, yet 33% view
848 them as a *Wrong way*. Conversely, “transfers to public development aid agencies which
849 then finance suitable projects” is uncontroversial, with only 16% considering it a *Wrong*
850 *way*, while 37% rate it as a *Right* or *Best way*.

851 V.D. Custom Global Income Redistribution

852 The last task of the questionnaire allowed respondents to manipulate the shape of the
853 global income distribution.³⁹ The question text included the following instructions:

854 “Below you will find a graph of the world distribution of after-tax income and
855 three sliders that vary it. The current distribution is in red, and your custom
856 one is in green. The first two sliders control the proportion of winners and the
857 proportion of losers, among all humans. The third slider controls the degree of
858 redistribution from the richest to the poorest. If you do not want new policies
859 to reduce global inequality, you can set the third slider to zero.”

³⁹Appendix III.B. details how I obtained the world distribution of PPP incomes.

Figure 13: “How do you evaluate each of these channels to transfer resources to reduce poverty in LICs?”

Percentage of *Right* or *Best way* (other options: *Wrong* or *Acceptable way*). (Question 48).

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Targeted cash transfers (child allowances, disability & elderly pensions)	49	48	43	46	57	45	54	44	47	36	65	73	45
Development aid agencies	37	42	42	47	39	32	44	43	44	36	23	57	37
Government, conditional on financing poverty reduction	37	40	39	43	48	33	41	37	35	27	34	62	35
Unconditional cash transfers to each household	34	30	31	27	31	30	34	27	32	24	54	62	31
Local NGOs with democratic processes	29	33	39	33	34	33	33	29	32	22	17	53	29
Local authorities	22	23	25	22	22	30	23	19	19	18	19	47	22
Government, unconditional	18	18	21	14	18	22	21	16	14	14	18	50	18

860 The interactive question is available at bit.ly/custom_redistrib, an explainer screencast
 861 video at youtu.be/gSfsQwczT7w, and the algorithm translating slider positions into a re-
 862 distribution is described in Appendix F. Figure 14 displays what respondents see below
 863 the instructions, including the interactive graph and a table summarizing how their cus-
 864 tom redistribution would affect five example income levels (including their own, asked
 865 right before). To mitigate potential anchoring at the sliders’ initial positions,⁴⁰ sliders are
 866 initialized in one of two random positions: either 60% of winners, 20% of losers, and a de-
 867 gree of redistribution of 2 out of 10 (as in Figure 14); or 40%, 10%, and 7/10, respectively.
 868 Given the complexity of the task and its inconvenience on mobile devices, respondents
 869 are given the explicit option to skip it.

870 Overall, 56% are satisfied with their custom redistribution and 43% skip it. Although
 871 the non-response rate may seem high, it is relatively evenly spread across the popula-
 872 tion. Indeed, the share of satisfied respondents is 52% for non-voters, 54% for center-
 873 right or right-wing voters, 57% for far-right voters, and 61% for left-wing voters; while
 874 it ranges from 49% for people without a high-school diploma to 57% for those with a
 875 post-secondary diploma. The limited heterogeneity in response rates across crucial so-

⁴⁰To test for anchoring, I regress responses on the sliders’ initial positions. I define the anchoring effect as the effect size relative to the difference between the initial positions of the two variants. It is always significant, at 36% for the share of winners, 57% for the share of losers, and 42% for the degree of redistribution. While anchoring plays a role, the responses converge to a middle point between the two anchors, indicating that the anchors themselves may have been defined by the surveyor (myself) drifting away from a shared preference in opposite directions.

Figure 14: Custom global redistribution: screenshot of the bottom of the page. (Question 55).

Examples of income changes after your proposed redistribution:


Now	After
0 \$/year	2 215 \$/year
10 000 \$/year	10 115 \$/year
60 000 \$/year	55 793 \$/year
100 000 \$/year	90 965 \$/year
Your <i>individual</i> income	
40 000 \$/year	38 206 \$/year

Proportion of winners: 60%

Proportion of losers: 20%

Degree of redistribution: 2

— Income after global redistribution — Current income (\$/year)



I am satisfied with my custom redistribution.

I want to skip this question.

⁸⁷⁶ sociodemographic groups suggests that the task enabled motivated respondents to make an informed choice regarding their preferred redistribution with little sacrifice in terms

878 of sample representativeness.

879 Figure S49 shows the median preferred redistribution among satisfied respondents,
880 i.e. the curve obtained by setting the sliders at their median preferred values: 49% of
881 winners, 18% of losers, and a degree of redistribution of 5/10, resulting in a transfer of
882 5.4% of world income from rich to poor and in a minimum income of \$287 per month.
883 Interestingly, 48% choose to lose from their custom redistribution while only 9% choose
884 to win; the median satisfied respondent selects parameters such that they neither win
885 nor lose. Besides, 10% of satisfied respondents opt for the status quo, preserving the cur-
886 rent income distribution. Finally, Figure S50 presents the average preferred redistribution
887 among satisfied respondents, obtained by pointwise averaging custom curves. The av-
888 erage preferred redistribution transfers 5.4% of world income from the top 27% to the
889 bottom 73% and entails a minimum income of \$247 per month. As shown in Figure S70,
890 at the top of the distribution, the average preferred redistribution can be achieved with
891 a 7% marginal income tax rate above \$25,000 and a 16% rate above \$40,000 per year (at
892 Purchasing Power Parity).

893 Figures S52-S53 reveal limited heterogeneity in custom redistributions across coun-
894 tries. However, Figures S54-S57 show greater variation at the individual level, though
895 the bulk of respondents favor a custom redistribution implying transfers of 4% to 5% of
896 world income and a minimum income of \$150 to \$350 per month.

897 Fabre (2022) applied the same method to uncover French preferences regarding na-
898 tional income redistribution and tested support for the median and average preferred
899 redistributions on a separate sample. Excluding the 22% to 24% of people not respond-
900 ing, 51% of respondents accepted the average redistribution and 67% the median one.⁴¹
901 While one cannot be sure that these results would replicate in the context of a global redis-
902 tribution, they suggest that a majority might accept the average or median redistribution
903 described above.

904 VI. Conclusion

905 Applying the theory of optimal taxation, Kopczuk, Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2005) show
906 that the level of U.S. foreign aid could only be rationalized if the U.S. government placed
907 a value 2,000 times higher on the welfare of a American than on that of a foreigner (al-

⁴¹Fabre (2022) also tested a redistribution obtained from median parameters and a 5% lower aggregate income to account for adverse behavioral responses. This was accepted by 62% of French respondents.

908 though this ratio should be reduced by the proportion of foreign aid transfers diverted or
909 wasted). Our results contradict the notion that government action accurately reflects at-
910 titudes towards global redistribution, and are consistent with a conservative bias among
911 legislators (Broockman and Skovron 2018; Gilens and Page 2014; Pilet et al. 2024). Indeed,
912 a majority of respondents in high-income countries support a global tax on top incomes
913 to finance poverty reduction in low-income countries. Additionally, over two-thirds of
914 respondents accept a tax on the wealth of millionaires with 30% of the revenue financing
915 LICs, even in the case of only a few countries implementing it. In every country, majori-
916 ties accept an International Climate Scheme that is costly to them but beneficial to the
917 poorest globally, showing that most people value climate action and poverty reduction.

918 The revenue allocation task sheds light on how much people value global versus do-
919 mestic public goods. On average, respondents allocate 17.5% of the revenue from a hypo-
920 thetical global wealth tax to sustainable development out of the five specified categories.
921 This indicates that people are neither selfless universalists, who would allocate all the rev-
922 enue from this tax to the poorest countries, nor devoid of altruism towards foreigners, as
923 this would imply allocating nothing to global spending. The custom redistribution task
924 confirms that most people would actually prefer much greater global redistribution than
925 currently exists, as the average respondent opts for a global minimum income of \$247 per
926 month, financed by transfers amounting to over 5% of world income.

927 An exploration of respondents' underlying values reveals that support for global re-
928 distribution primarily stems from a sense of duty and empathy towards the destitute. For
929 some, this issue appears important enough to factor into their voting decision. Indeed,
930 the likelihood that a political program is preferred increases if it includes a globally redis-
931 tributive tax on millionaires and decreases if it includes cuts to foreign aid. Additionally,
932 one-third of respondents report that they would be more likely to vote for a political party
933 if it were part of a global movement for sustainable development, and a similar propor-
934 tion state that they could themselves participate in such a movement.

935 These results raise the question of why so few policymakers campaign on sustain-
936 able development proposals. The lack of supply of such campaigns might stem from
937 pluralistic ignorance among policymakers and activists, consistent with the public's un-
938 derestimation of support for a Global Climate Scheme. Alternatively, it could be due to a
939 lack of demand from constituents. Indeed, global inequality is rarely a top-of-mind con-
940 sideration. People's most frequent concerns relate to self-interested issues such as their
941 purchasing power or health; articulated political demands generally refer to national is-

942 sues such as public services; and the most salient international issues are climate change,
943 wars, and the rise of the far right.

944 The low salience of global inequality may manifest as a lack of popular mobilization,
945 resulting in it being a low priority for policymakers. Combined with the necessary trade-
946 off between global redistribution and fellow citizens' purchasing power, policymakers
947 may prioritize the latter —which is the primary concern of voters— to the point of ig-
948 noring universalist attitudes. Status quo bias is a compounding factor: the weakness of
949 global institutions and the primacy of national polities make international cooperation
950 unlikely, which may discourage universalist thought and make it seem utopian. Indeed,
951 support for global policies is partly caused by the belief that they are possible, as our
952 information experiment demonstrated. Therefore, the organization of the world order
953 based on nation-states might silence demands for universalist reforms and perpetuate a
954 cycle where the low salience of universalist concerns and status quo institutions reinforce
955 each other.

956 Nevertheless, the survey results suggest some untapped potential for global solidarity.
957 In light of these findings, it is unlikely that the public would resist global redistribution
958 policies. This is especially true for balance sheet operations with expansionary impacts
959 and indirect costs, such as debt restructuring, liquidity provision, the expansion of lend-
960 ing by Multilateral Development Banks, and their recapitalization through the rechannel-
961 ing of Special Drawing Rights. These reforms are widely accepted and are the natural
962 focus of multilateral initiatives ([Bridgetown Initiative 2025](#); [FfD4 2025](#)). Since public at-
963 titudes do not appear to be a limiting factor, further research is needed to understand
964 policymakers' motivations and the obstacles they face in cooperating on sustainable de-
965 velopment reforms.

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1125 A Raw Results

Figure S1: Keyword classification of open-ended fields (matches with at least one keyword in a list). (Questions 19-21). (Back to Section II.A.)

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Money; own income; cost of living; inflation	18	16	15	15	16	17	14	19	15	21	13	16	22
Health; healthcare system	10	13	10	11	15	12	16	14	10	4	9	5	10
Own country referred	9	9	11	9	6	11	8	10	6	8	6	6	10
Family; children; childcare	7	7	5	4	7	8	5	11	4	7	7	10	8
War; peace	6	9	7	11	14	14	6	5	9	4	3	4	5
Work; (un)employment; business	6	6	7	5	8	4	7	5	3	4	5	10	5
Nothing; don't know; empty	5	4	5	4	3	7	3	3	2	13	4	4	2
Economy	4	4	1	4	6	1	5	5	3	4	1	2	7
Government; president	4	3	3	2	2	2	3	5	2	4	0	0	7
International issues	4	5	5	6	5	5	4	4	4	3	2	8	3
Inflation; cost of living	4	4	2	2	5	3	3	8	2	2	1	1	6
Poverty; inequality	4	6	5	7	6	7	6	5	4	3	2	3	2
Tax system; welfare benefits; public services	3	3	2	4	3	2	2	3	2	10	0	0	3
Old age; retirement; ageing society	3	3	3	7	1	2	2	3	2	6	4	0	2
Criticism of immigration; national preference	3	5	4	8	3	4	3	9	5	1	0	0	3
Housing	3	3	2	2	2	3	6	3	1	1	6	3	3
Security; violence; crime; judicial system	3	3	2	2	4	1	2	5	2	2	1	1	5
Criticism of far right; Trump; tariffs	3	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	3	0	0	6
Environment; climate change	3	4	2	5	7	2	4	5	5	1	0	5	3
Rights; democracy; freedom; slavery	3	2	1	2	2	1	2	3	2	1	1	4	5
Discrimination; gender inequality; racism; LGBT	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	4	2	2	0	3	4
Happiness; peace of mind	2	3	2	2	4	0	2	5	1	1	1	1	3
Trump	2	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	2	0	0	5
Relationships; love; emotions	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	1	0	2	2	3

Figure S2: AI classification of open-ended fields (using ChatGPT-4.1). (Questions 19-21). (Back to Section II.A..)

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Money; own income; cost of living; inflation	26	21	22	18	24	22	19	24	18	26	26	21	32
Other topic; unclear; vague	19	17	17	17	17	16	14	19	17	17	20	29	22
Own country referred	19	17	14	20	14	15	16	21	14	23	8	8	25
Happiness; peace of mind	17	15	16	11	17	15	14	19	13	12	13	30	20
Poverty; inequality	14	16	16	18	17	16	14	14	17	15	14	12	11
Nothing; don't know; empty	14	11	15	11	7	14	12	10	13	20	28	8	9
International issues	13	16	12	18	19	16	11	18	19	8	5	13	15
Health; healthcare system	13	15	13	12	16	15	18	17	13	7	13	6	13
Tax system; welfare benefits; public services	11	11	10	17	9	5	9	14	10	23	6	2	10
Security; violence; crime; judicial system	9	10	14	7	11	5	9	12	7	5	4	8	12
Work; (un)employment; business	8	8	8	8	11	5	9	7	6	8	7	17	8
Family; children; childcare	8	7	6	5	7	7	6	11	6	9	7	11	9
Discrimination; gender inequality; racism; LGBT	8	8	9	9	8	3	7	10	10	6	3	10	10
Rights; democracy; freedom; slavery	7	6	5	5	6	4	5	8	6	2	3	9	13
Corruption; criticism of the government	7	6	4	4	6	6	10	7	3	5	4	3	10
War; peace	7	10	8	13	14	13	7	6	11	3	4	8	5
Old age; retirement; ageing society	6	5	5	10	2	2	4	7	4	9	5	3	5
Housing	5	4	4	2	3	4	8	6	3	1	7	4	7
Criticism of immigration; national preference	4	6	4	9	3	4	4	11	7	2	0	1	5
Environment; climate change	4	6	4	7	9	3	5	7	7	2	1	4	4
Education	4	3	2	5	2	2	5	4	4	3	4	8	3
Criticism of far right; Trump; tariffs	3	2	2	4	2	1	1	3	2	2	0	0	6
Relationships; love; emotions	3	3	4	2	2	1	2	3	3	1	3	3	5
Global poverty; hunger; global inequality	3	4	4	3	6	3	7	4	3	1	0	3	2
Social division; fake news; (social) media	2	1	1	2	0	1	2	1	1	1	3	1	3
Religion; sin; God	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	4	2
Animal welfare	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1

Figure S3: Manual classification of open-ended fields. (Questions 19-21). (Back to Section II.A..)

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Money; own income; cost of living; inflation	19	16	17	13	17	18	13	17	12	15	20	22	23
Other topic; unclear; vague	13	10	12	8	11	12	10	11	13	18	15	18	13
Health; healthcare system	12	14	12	11	16	14	16	16	12	6	13	5	12
Nothing; don't know; empty	10	9	10	13	5	11	7	7	12	16	11	8	8
Tax system; welfare benefits; public services	7	7	10	7	7	4	5	11	5	16	4	0	6
Poverty; inequality	6	9	8	11	9	10	7	8	12	7	5	4	4
Security; violence; crime; judicial system	6	7	11	4	8	2	6	8	3	2	1	4	8
Family; children; childcare	5	5	5	3	6	5	4	7	3	5	6	8	5
War; peace	5	8	5	11	12	12	5	5	10	2	3	6	3
Criticism of far right; Trump; tariffs	4	2	2	4	2	1	1	3	1	3	0	0	9
Work; (un)employment; business	4	4	5	3	6	3	5	2	2	2	4	13	4
Criticism of immigration; national preference	4	6	4	8	3	4	3	9	5	1	1	1	4
Housing	4	3	2	2	2	3	7	4	3	0	7	3	4
Discrimination; gender inequality; racism; LGBT	3	3	3	3	3	1	3	4	4	3	0	2	6
Old age; retirement; ageing society	3	3	3	7	1	1	3	3	3	7	4	1	2
Environment; climate change	3	5	4	6	8	2	5	5	6	1	1	4	3
Rights; democracy; freedom; slavery	3	2	1	2	2	1	2	4	4	3	1	4	5
International issues	3	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	2	1	5	3
Happiness; peace of mind	3	3	3	2	5	2	2	6	3	1	3	2	3
Education	2	2	1	4	2	1	4	2	4	2	3	5	2
Relationships; love; emotions	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	5	3
Corruption; criticism of the government	2	3	2	2	1	2	8	3	1	2	1	1	2
Own country referred	2	3	2	5	1	4	2	2	1	2	2	1	2
Social division; fake news; (social) media	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	3	1	1
Global poverty; hunger; global inequality	1	2	1	1	3	2	2	1	1	0	0	1	1
Religion; sin; God	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	1
Animal welfare	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1

Figure S4: Manual classification of *concerns* fields: “What are your main concerns these days?” (Question 19). (Back to Section II.A..)




Figure S5: Manual classification of *wish* fields: “What are your needs or wishes?” (Question 20) (Back to Section II.A..)

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Money; own income; cost of living; inflation	32	26	30	22	30	35	22	20	25	23	39	49	37
Health; healthcare system	21	25	20	33	21	19	26	29	26	10	19	4	22
Other topic; unclear; vague	13	13	17	9	11	24	13	11	10	16	13	10	12
Family; children; childcare	10	8	6	5	8	6	7	16	2	8	9	12	14
Happiness; peace of mind	10	11	9	7	17	6	5	21	8	4	9	5	11
Nothing; don't know; empty	7	10	10	16	6	5	10	10	12	7	7	2	4
Work; (un)employment; business	7	5	4	2	10	4	5	4	3	1	10	22	9
Housing	7	5	3	3	7	10	6	3	3	1	19	9	6
War; peace	5	8	5	17	4	8	6	5	8	8	2	1	4
Relationships; love; emotions	5	5	6	7	4	2	4	4	2	1	2	5	9
Tax system; welfare benefits; public services	4	3	3	3	5	3	1	4	5	19	0	0	2
Old age; retirement; ageing society	3	2	2	3	1	0	2	0	2	8	0	2	3
Security; violence; crime; judicial system	3	3	7	3	4	1	1	2	6	3	2	0	3
International issues	2	3	3	4	1	1	2	3	4	3	1	1	2
Poverty; inequality	2	2	3	4	1	2	0	1	4	3	0	1	1
Education	2	1	1	1	1	0	2	2	1	2	3	4	2
Own country referred	1	2	2	3	1	0	0	4	2	4	1	2	1
Environment; climate change	1	2	1	3	0	1	0	2	5	1	0	0	1
Rights; democracy; freedom; slavery	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	2	9	2	0	0	1
Corruption; criticism of the government	1	1	2	0	2	0	2	1	1	2	0	0	0
Religion; sin; God	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	2
Criticism of immigration; national preference	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	4	1	0	0	1
Criticism of far right; Trump; tariffs	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Global poverty; hunger; global inequality	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Discrimination; gender inequality; racism; LGBT	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	1
Social division; fake news; (social) media	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
Animal welfare	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Figure S6: Manual classification of *injustice* fields: “What according to you is the greatest injustice of all?” (Question 21) (Back to Section II.A..)


	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Poverty; inequality	19	28	28	32	30	41	23	19	31	23	22	10	9
Other topic; unclear; vague	15	9	10	8	10	5	7	11	15	17	22	26	16
Discrimination; gender inequality; racism; LGBT	9	8	10	5	10	2	6	11	10	9	1	7	14
Security; violence; crime; judicial system	9	9	11	3	12	3	11	15	3	1	1	12	15
Nothing; don't know; empty	8	6	7	7	3	2	7	6	5	14	10	11	7
Tax system; welfare benefits; public services	8	9	12	16	4	4	3	12	8	16	3	0	4
Rights; democracy; freedom; slavery	7	4	4	3	6	1	4	5	4	4	3	16	13
Criticism of far right; Trump; tariffs	5	2	0	2	2	2	1	3	0	0	0	0	13
Money; own income; cost of living; inflation	4	4	2	5	5	3	3	2	5	6	8	3	3
War; peace	4	8	3	4	10	29	10	6	5	1	3	5	1
Health; healthcare system	4	3	8	2	3	5	2	3	5	3	9	2	3
Global poverty; hunger; global inequality	3	6	4	4	11	8	8	4	5	1	0	3	3
International issues	3	6	4	5	8	6	6	6	1	0	0	3	2
Corruption; criticism of the government	3	4	2	4	2	2	10	4	3	3	2	0	2
Criticism of immigration; national preference	3	4	3	6	1	4	3	6	2	3	0	2	3
Family; children; childcare	3	2	3	2	4	1	2	0	5	2	5	3	2
Old age; retirement; ageing society	2	3	2	8	2	0	2	3	3	3	5	0	1
Social division; fake news; (social) media	2	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	13	2	1
Own country referred	2	2	3	5	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	2
Relationships; love; emotions	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	3	8	2
Housing	1	2	2	2	0	0	4	2	2	0	0	0	2
Education	1	1	0	5	0	0	1	0	2	3	0	0	1
Religion; sin; God	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	15	1
Work; (un)employment; business	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	0	1	2	1	3	0
Animal welfare	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	0	0	1	0	1
Environment; climate change	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	0	0	0	1	0
Happiness; peace of mind	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Figure S7: Manual classification of *issue* fields: “Can you name an issue that is important to you but is neglected in the public debate?” (Question 22). (Back to Section II.A..)

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Nothing; don't know; empty	21	15	14	21	7	32	5	11	19	36	27	19	19
Other topic; unclear; vague	13	11	11	6	13	9	13	14	13	11	21	12	13
Tax system; welfare benefits; public services	12	12	17	7	13	6	14	19	8	19	12	0	10
Money; own income; cost of living; inflation	10	7	6	6	9	7	8	7	4	9	18	11	11
Health; healthcare system	9	10	8	6	18	7	17	11	6	4	8	7	11
Old age; retirement; ageing society	6	7	5	15	1	4	7	5	4	10	12	1	2
Environment; climate change	6	7	4	10	8	2	7	6	10	1	4	10	8
Criticism of immigration; national preference	5	8	8	10	4	6	5	13	8	2	1	1	3
Security; violence; crime; judicial system	5	6	9	4	10	4	4	5	2	3	1	3	5
Education	4	5	2	7	5	3	7	3	10	2	5	4	3
Poverty; inequality	4	5	3	7	5	1	4	5	9	1	1	7	4
Discrimination; gender inequality; racism; LGBT	3	3	2	3	3	1	3	4	4	2	1	3	6
Housing	3	2	2	0	1	1	5	5	2	0	4	1	5
Family; children; childcare	2	3	3	2	3	1	2	4	2	2	5	1	1
Rights; democracy; freedom; slavery	2	2	1	1	3	3	2	4	2	4	1	0	2
Corruption; criticism of the government	2	2	3	1	1	2	5	1	1	2	1	0	2
Work; (un)employment; business	2	2	2	2	7	1	1	1	0	1	1	7	1
War; peace	2	2	2	3	2	2	0	2	1	0	3	11	1
International issues	2	2	2	2	2	3	0	3	1	0	1	12	1
Criticism of far right; Trump; tariffs	2	1	0	1	0	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	4
Own country referred	1	2	2	3	2	5	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
Social division; fake news; (social) media	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	0	3	0	1	1	2
Animal welfare	1	2	3	2	1	2	0	1	3	0	0	0	1
Religion; sin; God	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
Relationships; love; emotions	0	1	1	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	2	0
Global poverty; hunger; global inequality	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
Happiness; peace of mind	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0

Figure S8: Effect by vote at the last election on the likelihood that a political program is preferred of containing the following policy (compared to no foreign policy in the program). (See Figure 8 for the simple figure). (Question 23). [\(Back to Section II.A.\)](#)

(a) Cut development aid.



(b) Int'l tax on millionaires with 30% financing health and education in low-income countries.




Figure S9: Conjoint analysis in France (Average Marginal Component Effect). Cf. Figure S18 for French. (Question 23) [\(Back to Section IV.A..\)](#)




Figure S10: Conjoint analysis in Germany (Average Marginal Component Effect). Cf. Figure S19 for German. (Question 23). [\(Back to Section IV.A..\)](#)

Climate policy:

- Repeal the heating law that requires renewable energy
- Ban new combustion-engine cars from 2035

Economic issues:

- Lower electricity prices by 12% through tax reductions
- Raise the minimum wage to €15 by 2026
- Invest €500 billion in strategic industries like steel, automotive, and defense

Foreign policy:

- International tax on millionaires with 30% financing healthcare and education in low-income countries
- Cut development aid
- Support Ukraine militarily and financially

Social issues:

- Use electronic ankle monitors to track violent offenders against women
- Offer a birth grant of €20,000 for newborns
- Restrict the fast-track path to German citizenship

Tax system:

- Exempt from taxes overtime work and work of retired people
- Abolish the inheritance tax
- Fully reinstate the debt brake
- Higher taxes for the richest 1% to finance higher child benefit, citizen's income and minimum pension




Figure S11: Conjoint analysis in Italy (Average Marginal Component Effect). Cf. Figure S20 for Italian. (Question 23) [\(Back to Section IV.A..\)](#)

Climate policy:

Cancel the ban on new combustion–engine cars from 2035

Double the capacity of renewable energy by 2030

Economic issues:

Increase the birth grant to up to €3,600 for newborns

Use unspent EU funds to exempt hiring companies from taxes

Introduce a legal minimum wage at 10€ per hour

Reduce working hours without reducing salaries

Foreign policy:

International tax on millionaires with 30% financing healthcare and education in low–income countries

Cut development aid

Develop a common EU defense

Social issues:

Legal limit on migration and process asylum requests outside the EU

Recognize same–sex marriage

Introduce free and mandatory early education (until 3 years old)

Tax system:

Reduce the income tax on low–income households

Replace the income tax by a 15% flat tax




Figure S12: Conjoint analysis in Poland (Average Marginal Component Effect). Cf. Figure S21 for Polish. (Question 23). [\(Back to Section IV.A..\)](#)

Climate policy:

- Phase out coal by 2035
- Ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2035

Economic issues:

- Expansion of rail production and infrastructure investment
- Allocate 5% of GDP to military expenditures by 2030

Foreign policy:

- International tax on millionaires with 30% financing healthcare and education in low-income countries
- Cut development aid
- Detention of rejected asylum seekers until they can be deported

Social issues:

- Restoring abortion rights
- Relax restrictions on public assembly and protest
- Extended parental leave, tax benefits for children, and remote work option

Tax system:

- Reduce taxes on low-income households by increasing the tax-free income allowance
- Taxes on the profits of large digital corporations and fossil fuel companies
- Income tax exemption for seniors delaying retirement




Figure S13: Conjoint analysis in Spain (Average Marginal Component Effect). Cf. Figure S22 for Spanish. (Question 23). [\(Back to Section IV.A..\)](#)

Climate policy:

- Extend the social electricity voucher
- A national investment plan to enhance water management

Economic issues:

- Set the minimum wage at 1350€/month
- Reduce the workweek to 36 hours by 2030 without salary cut
- Promote flexible working hours through a time bank

Foreign policies:

- International tax on millionaires with 30% financing healthcare and education in low-income countries
- Cut development aid
- Increase support for Ukraine and maintain sanctions on Russia

Social issues:

- Strengthen social media regulation for transparency, misinformation control, and verified identity
- Free early education (from 0 to 3 years)
- Create centers outside the EU to process asylum requests

Tax system:

- Lower the income tax on the middle class and increase it on rich households
- Abolish the wealth tax and lower corporate tax rates
- Reduce taxation in rural areas through the Agricultural Taxation Act




Figure S14: Conjoint analysis in the UK (Average Marginal Component Effect). (Question 23). [\(Back to Section IV.A..\)](#)

Climate policy:

Investment in renewables and nuclear to achieve zero-emissions electricity in 2030

A ban on domestic flights for trips under three hours by train

Economic issues:

30 hours of free childcare per week for working parents

Healthcare plan: more appointments by utilising overtime employment, recruitment in mental care and dentistry coverage

Raising the minimum wage to £15 per hour

A 4-day working week

Foreign policy:

International tax on millionaires with 30% financing healthcare and education in low-income countries

Cut development aid

Deepen Brexit by removing or reforming EU-inherited laws

Social issues:

Legal limit on migration and deportation to Rwanda

Enforce neighbourhood policing through recruitment and new equipment

Increase the Universal Credit for low-income households

Tax system:

Fight tax avoidance by abolishing the non-domiciled tax status

Abolish the inheritance tax for estates under £2 million

Abolish business rates




Figure S15: Conjoint analysis in Switzerland (Average Marginal Component Effect).
 (Question 23) [\(Back to Section IV.A..\)](#)




Figure S16: Conjoint analysis in Japan (Average Marginal Component Effect). (Question 23). [\(Back to Section IV.A..\)](#)




Figure S17: Conjoint analysis in the U.S. (Average Marginal Component Effect). (Question 23). [\(Back to Section IV.A..\)](#)




Figure S18: Conjoint analysis in France (in French, cf. Figure S9 for English). (Question 23). (Back to Section IV.A..)




Figure S19: Conjoint analysis in Germany (in German, cf. Figure S10 for English). (Question 23). (Back to Section IV.A..)

- Klimaschutz:
- Aufhebung des Heizungsgesetzes, das erneuerbare Energien vorschreibt
 - Neuwagen mit Verbrennungsmotor ab 2035 verbieten.
- Wirtschaftspolitik:
- Strompreise durch Steuersenkungen um 12 % senken
 - Mindestlohn bis 2026 auf 15 € erhöhen
 - 500 Milliarden Euro in strategische Sektoren wie Stahl, Automobilindustrie und Verteidigung investieren
- Außenpolitik:
- Internationale Millionärssteuer mit 30 % zur Finanzierung von Gesundheit und Bildung in Ländern mit niedrigem Einkommen
 - Kürzung der Entwicklungshilfe
 - Die Ukraine militärisch und finanziell unterstützen
- Gesellschaft:
- Einsatz elektronischer Fußfesseln zur Verfolgung von Gewalttätern gegen Frauen
 - 20.000 € staatlicher Zuschuss bei Geburt eines Kindes
 - Beschleunigte Verfahren zur Erlangung der deutschen Staatsangehörigkeit einschränken
- Steuerpolitik:
- Keine Steuern auf Überstunden und Arbeit im Rentenalter
 - Abschaffung der Erbschaftssteuer
 - Komplette Wiedereinführung der Schuldenbremse
 - Höhere Steuern für die reichsten 1% zur Finanzierung von höherem Kindergeld, Bürgergeld und Mindestrente




Figure S20: Conjoint analysis in Italy (in Italian, cf. Figure S11 for English). (Question 23). (Back to Section IV.A..)

Politica climatica:

Annnullare il divieto di nuove auto con motore a combustione a partire dal 2035

Raddoppiare la capacità di energia rinnovabile entro il 2030

Politica economica:

Incrementare l'assegno di nascita fino a 3.600 euro per i neonati

Destinare i fondi UE non utilizzati all'esenzione fiscale per le aziende che assumono

Introdurre un salario minimo a norma di legge di 10€ all'ora

Riduzione dell'orario di lavoro senza ridurre gli stipendi

Politica estera:

Tassa internazionale sui milionari, il cui 30% finanzierebbe l'assistenza sanitaria e l'istruzione nei Paesi a basso reddito

Tagliare gli aiuti allo sviluppo

Sviluppare una difesa militare comune europea

Politica sociale:

Imporre un limite legale della migrazione in Italia e trattare le richieste di asilo al di fuori dell'UE

Riconoscere il matrimonio tra persone dello stesso sesso

Introdurre l'istruzione in età della prima infanzia gratuita e obbligatoria (fino ai 3 anni)

Politica fiscale:

Riduzione dell'imposta sul reddito per i nuclei familiari a basso reddito

Sostituire l'imposta sul reddito con una flat tax del 15%.




Figure S21: Conjoint analysis in Poland (in Polish, cf. Figure S12 for English). (Question 23). (Back to Section IV.A..)

Polityka klimatyczna:

Rezygnacja z węgla do 2035 r.

Zakaz sprzedaży nowych samochodów z silnikiem spalinowym do 2035 r.

Kwestie ekonomiczne:

Rozwój produkcji kolejowej i inwestycje w infrastrukturę

Przeznaczenie 5% PKB na wydatki wojskowe do 2030 r

Polityka zagraniczna:

Miedzynarodowy podatek od milionerów, z 30% finansowaniem opieki zdrowotnej i edukacji w krajach o niskich dochodach

Ograniczenie pomocy rozwojowej

Zatrzymanie osób, którym odmówiono azylu, do czasu ich deportacji

Kwestie społeczne:

Przywrócenie praw reprodukcyjnych, w tym prawa do aborcji

Zlagodzenie restrykcji w zakresie zgromadzeń publicznych i protestów

Wydluzony urlop rodzicielski, ulgi podatkowe na dzieci i możliwość pracy zdalnej

System podatkowy:

Obniżenie podatków dla gospodarstw domowych o niskich dochodach poprzez zwiększenie kwoty wolnej od podatku

Zwiększenie podatków od zysków dużych korporacji cyfrowych oraz firm zajmujących się paliwami kopalnymi

Zwolnienie z podatku dochodowego dla seniorów opóźniających przejście na emerytury




Figure S22: Conjoint analysis in Spain (in Spanish, cf. Figure S13 for English). (Question 23). (Back to Section IV.A..)

Políticas climáticas:

Ampliar los bonos sociales térmico y eléctrico

Un plan nacional de inversiones para mejorar la gestión del agua

Asuntos económicos:

Fijar el salario mínimo en 1350€/mes

Reducir la semana laboral a 36 horas antes de 2030 sin merma salarial

Fomentar la flexibilidad horaria mediante un banco de horas

Política exterior:

Impuesto internacional a los millonarios con un 30% para financiar la sanidad y la educación en países de renta baja

Reducir la ayuda al desarrollo a los países de renta baja

Aumentar el apoyo a Ucrania y mantener las sanciones a Rusia

Asuntos sociales:

Reforzar la regulación de las redes sociales en materia de transparencia, control de la desinformación e identidad verificada

Educación de 0 a 3 años gratuita

Crear centros fuera de la UE para tramitar las solicitudes de asilo

Sistema fiscal:

Bajar el impuesto sobre la renta a la clase media y aumentarlo a los hogares ricos

Suprimir el impuesto sobre el patrimonio y bajar los tipos del impuesto de sociedades

Reducir los impuestos en zonas rurales mediante la Ley de Fiscalidad Agraria




Figure S23: Conjoint analysis in Japan (in Japanese, cf. Figure S16 for English). (Question 23). (Back to Section IV.A.)

気候政策:

2030年までに再生可能エネルギーによる電力50%を達成
エコロジカル・トランジションに150兆円を投資

経済問題:

最低賃金を時給1,500円に引き上げる
18歳までの子ども全員に月額15,000円の子ども手当を支給する

外交政策:

富裕層への国際課税を実施し、その30%を低所得国の医療・教育に充てる
政府開発援助を削減する
北朝鮮の核・ミサイル計画の完全な廃棄を要求する。

社会問題:

選挙区合併の廃止
同性婚を認める
パートタイム労働者への年金受給資格の拡大
リスキル、公正な賃金、キャリアの継続性を通じて女性のエンパワーメントを促進する

税制:

最富裕層への(所得税と相続税の)増税と最貧困層への減税
中低所得世帯への消費税還付制度の導入
財政均衡を回復し、2025年までに財政黒字を達成する。




Figure S24: Average preferred revenue split for a global wealth tax (variant *few*). (Question 24)
 (Back to Section II.A..)




Figure S25: Decomposition of preferred shares for each spending item in the revenue split
 (All countries together; variant *few*). (Question 24). (Back to Section II.A..)




Figure S26: Decomposition of preferred shares for each spending item in the revenue split (All countries together; variant *many*). (Question 25). [\(Back to Section II.A..\)](#)




Figure S27: Average preferred revenue split for a global wealth tax (variant *many*). (Question 25). [\(Back to Section II.A..\)](#)




Figure S28: "By taking this survey, you will be automatically entered into a lottery to win up to [amount_lottery: \$100].

Should you be selected in the lottery, you will have the option to channel a part of this additional compensation to the charity *Just One Tree* to plant trees.

In case you win the lottery, what share of the [amount_lottery: \$100 prize] would you donate to plant trees?" (Question 27).




Figure S29: Support for the National, Global, and International Climate Schemes, and median belief regarding the support for the GCS. (Questions 26-35). (Back to Section III.A.)




Figure S30: “According to you, how likely is it that international policies involving significant transfers from high-income countries to low-income countries will be introduced in the next 15 years?” (Question 37).




Figure S31: Absolute support for plausible global redistribution policies (Percentage of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support*). See Figure 10 for the relative support. (Question 38).

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Minimum tax of 2% on billionaires' wealth, in voluntary countries	63	70	75	71	73	63	66	70	64	54	57	67	61
Bridgetown initiative: MDBs expanding sustainable investments in LICs, and at lower interest rates	56	60	56	61	72	47	57	63	61	45	58	70	54
L&D: Developed countries financing a fund to help vulnerable countries cope with climate Loss and damage	55	58	55	55	68	55	61	56	52	44	61	75	52
Debt relief for vulnerable countries, suspending payments until they are more able to repay	49	52	48	44	64	53	55	54	52	38	52	70	48
At least 0.7% of developed countries' GDP in foreign aid	49	51	50	48	59	42	58	50	51	33	59	69	47
Raise global minimum tax on profit from 15% to 35%, allocating revenues to countries based on sales	49	58	58	57	70	47	50	58	51	42	35	53	46
NCQG: Developing countries providing \$300 bn a year in climate finance for developing countries	48	53	51	54	62	46	54	52	53	32	60	67	44
International levy on shipping carbon emissions, returned to countries based on population	47	54	59	49	62	45	54	53	56	30	46	60	46
Expand Security Council to new permanent members (e.g. India, Brazil, African Union), restrict veto use	46	56	54	54	64	50	55	55	54	35	35	63	44
International levy on aviation carbon emissions, raising prices by 30%, returned to countries based on population	37	43	47	42	45	39	42	41	42	26	34	53	36

Figure S32: Average synthetic indicators of support for global redistribution. (Question 38). (Back to Section V.A..)

	All	Europe	Saudi Arabia	Italy	Spain	Germany	United Kingdom	Russia	France	Poland	USA	Switzerland	Japan
Latent support for global redistribution (standardized)	0.00	0.11	0.49	0.39	0.23	0.08	0.05	0.04	0.02	-0.09	-0.10	-0.11	-0.21
Share of plausible global policies supported	0.51	0.56	0.64	0.65	0.58	0.55	0.55	0.50	0.55	0.49	0.48	0.53	0.38
Share of plausible global policies opposed	0.21	0.21	0.14	0.16	0.19	0.21	0.21	0.18	0.22	0.23	0.23	0.28	0.18
Difference between share of plausible policies supported and opposed	0.30	0.36	0.50	0.49	0.39	0.34	0.34	0.31	0.33	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.20
Ratio of share of plausible policies supported over supported or opposed	0.70	0.72	0.80	0.79	0.74	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.67	0.68	0.65	0.67

Figure S33: Share of plausible global redistribution policies supported (*somewhat* or *strongly*). (Question 38). Section V.A..




Figure S34: Share of plausible global redistribution policies opposed (*somewhat* or *strongly*). (Question 38). Section V.A..




Figure S35: Preferred North-to-South climate grant funding in 2035, specified in qualitative terms or in terms of who advocates for that amount (NCQG, variant *Short*). (Question 40).
 (Back to Section V.A.)




Figure S36: Preferred North-to-South climate grant funding in 2035, specified in money terms (NCQG, variant *Full*). (Question 39).
 (Back to Section V.A.)




Figure S37: Support for an international wealth tax with 30% of revenue funding LICs, depending on the country coverage (Yes/No question). (Questions 41-43).

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Global: implemented by all other countries	74	78	81	78	85	79	73	71	70	72	77	84	67
High-income: implemented by all other HICs and not by some MICs (such as China)	69	71	72	73	81	66	68	70	56	66	69	84	67
International: implemented by some (e.g. EU, UK, Brazil) and not by others (e.g. U.S., China)	68	72	73	70	82	57	77	68	61	61	74	83	64

Figure S38: Prefers a *sustainable* rather than a *business-as-usual* future. (Question 44).




Figure S39: Acceptance of a global progressive income tax on the richest households to finance global poverty reduction (Questions 45-46, Percentage of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* among non-*Indifferent* responses), and features of the tax presented to the respondents (Section III.B.).
 (Back to Section V.B..)

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Accepts tax on world top 1% to finance global poverty reduction (Additional 15% tax on income over [\$120k/year in PPP])	69	73	71	72	84	69	73	67	60	69	75	82	62
Percentage of fellow citizens affected by top 1% tax	5	3	2	4	2	2	2	4	4	4	2	11	8
Percentage of GDP transferred abroad in top 1% tax	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	5	3
Accepts tax on world top 3% to finance global poverty reduction (Additional 15% tax over [\$80k], 30% over [\$120k], 45% over [\$1M])	64	66	70	62	71	70	66	67	42	55	76	82	57
Percentage of fellow citizens affected by top 3% tax	11	6	5	10	5	4	5	5	18	10	4	16	18
Percentage of GDP transferred abroad in top 3% tax	5	3	2	4	3	4	3	3	3	4	5	12	8

Figure S40: Absolute support for a global progressive income tax on the richest households to finance global poverty reduction (Percentage of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support*).
 (Questions 45-46).
 (Back to Section V.B..)

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Supports tax on world top 1% to finance global poverty reduction (Additional 15% tax on income over [\$120k/year in PPP])	56	61	62	62	75	50	61	55	53	44	60	68	51
Supports tax on world top 3% to finance global poverty reduction (Additional 15% tax over [\$80k], 30% over [\$120k], 45% over [\$1M])	50	56	59	53	60	55	57	54	36	35	61	67	45

Figure S41: Acceptance of a global progressive income tax on the richest households to finance global poverty reduction *among respondents affected by the tax* (Questions 45-46, Percentage of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* among non-*Indifferent* responses), and share of respondents affected by the tax (Section III.B.).
 (Back to Section V.B..)

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Saudi Arabia	USA
Supports tax on world top income to finance global poverty reduction (Any variant)	53	61	60	61	65	46	54	71	32	45	79	43
Affected by the top tax (any variant)	6	4	3	3	5	2	3	7	11	3	21	8
Supports tax on world top 1% to finance global poverty reduction (Additional 15% tax on income over [\$120k/year in PPP])	61	70	80	65	77	100	60	65	56	67	76	51
Affected by the top 1% tax (income > \$PPP 120k)	3	2	2	2	4	1	1	4	7	2	14	4
Supports tax on world top 3% to finance global poverty reduction (Additional 15% tax over [\$80k], 30% over [\$120k], 45% over [\$1M])	50	58	55	59	56	32	53	73	22	38	81	41
Affected by the top 3% tax (income > \$PPP 80k)	9	6	5	4	7	2	5	10	16	4	28	11

Figure S42: "How do you evaluate each of these channels to transfer resources to reduce poverty in LICs?"

Percentage of *Best* way (other options: *Right*, *Wrong* or *Acceptable* way). (Question 48).
[\(Back to Section V.C..\)](#)

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Targeted cash transfers (child allowances, disability & elderly pensions)	16	14	8	14	19	14	15	14	12	8	29	36	14
Unconditional cash transfers to each household	12	8	6	9	10	9	10	8	9	7	25	24	10
Government, conditional on financing poverty reduction	8	9	8	10	12	6	9	8	10	2	6	23	9
Development aid agencies	7	7	6	10	6	4	8	9	6	4	4	17	8
Local NGOs with democratic processes	5	6	7	7	5	7	6	6	6	1	3	16	6
Local authorities	5	5	6	4	4	6	5	5	3	2	3	14	5
Government, unconditional	4	4	5	3	3	4	3	4	3	1	3	15	5

Figure S43: "How do you evaluate each of these channels to transfer resources to reduce poverty in LICs?"

Percentage of *Wrong* way (other options: *Best*, *Right* or *Acceptable* way). (Question 48).
[\(Back to Section V.C..\)](#)

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Government, unconditional	51	56	49	69	50	42	52	62	65	51	32	18	56
Local authorities	42	44	37	50	44	31	49	49	49	36	34	19	47
Unconditional cash transfers to each household	33	39	32	49	36	32	33	44	46	38	13	8	35
Local NGOs with democratic processes	29	26	23	30	24	20	27	27	27	25	44	16	29
Government, conditional on financing poverty reduction	21	22	24	23	13	20	23	26	28	20	18	8	24
Development aid agencies	16	16	19	14	15	19	17	13	19	12	21	7	16
Targeted cash transfers (child allowances, disability & elderly pensions)	14	15	18	18	8	14	12	17	18	18	6	2	16

Figure S44: "Should governments actively cooperate to have all countries converge in terms of GDP per capita by the end of the century?" (Question 49).




Figure S45: "If there was a worldwide movement in favor of a global program to tackle climate change, implement taxes on millionaires and fund poverty reduction in low-income countries, to what extent would you be willing to be part of that movement? (Multiple answers possible)" (Question 50). (Back to Section V.B..)




Figure S46: "Let us call "your political party" the party you voted for in the last election, or the party that represents your views most closely.

Imagine there was a worldwide coalition of political parties in favor of a common program to tackle climate change, implement taxes on millionaires and fund poverty reduction in low-income countries.

Would you be more likely to vote for your party if it were part of that coalition?"
(Question 51) [\(Back to Section V.B.\)](#)




Figure S47: "Some people think that high-income countries should support low-income countries.

Among the different reasons given, which ones do you agree with? (Multiple answers possible)" (Question 52). [\(Back to Section V.B.\)](#)




Figure S48: "Some people argue that Western countries owe reparations for colonization and slavery to former colonies and descendants of slaves."

Reparations could take the form of funding education and facilitating technology transfers, to address unequal opportunities passed down from the past.

Do you support or oppose reparations of this kind for colonization and slavery? "
(Question 53). [\(Back to Section V.B..\)](#)




Figure S49: Global redistribution obtained from median custom parameters: 49% of winners; 18% of losers; degree of redistribution of 5 (out of 10). (Question 55). (Section V.D.)



Figure S50: Average custom global redistribution. (Question 55). (Back to Section V.D..)




Figure S51: Mean answers to custom redistribution. (Question 55). (Back to Section V.D..)

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Saudi Arabia	USA
Preferred share of winners	47.4	47.9	47.2	46.5	48.7	49.5	49.0	48.4	44.8	46.8	49.9	46.8
Preferred share of losers	17.7	17.7	18.4	17.5	17.2	16.8	18.5	17.4	18.4	17.7	17.5	17.8
Preferred degree of redistribution	4.7	4.8	4.6	4.6	5.2	4.9	5.0	4.8	4.4	4.5	5.0	4.5
Implied minimum income (in PPP \$/month)	242.0	251.1	238.0	238.6	272.4	264.6	264.2	246.6	222.7	233.0	274.3	232.5
Implied transfer (in % of world income)	5.1	5.4	5.0	5.1	5.9	5.9	5.7	5.3	4.7	4.7	5.9	4.9
Loses in own custom redistribution	46.4	41.1	42.5	46.9	35.2	11.4	35.8	54.9	73.9	36.9	40.5	56.6
custom_redistr_satisfied	55.8	58.2	52.8	56.8	63.3	56.7	62.8	58.7	54.1	39.6	67.6	58.4
custom_redistr_skip	42.9	40.0	44.4	41.4	34.8	42.4	35.5	40.0	43.5	59.2	32.4	40.8

Figure S52: Mean answers to custom redistribution among respondents satisfied with their custom redistribution. (Question 55). (Back to Section V.D..)

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Saudi Arabia	USA
Preferred share of winners	47.6	48.4	48.4	47.0	49.3	50.6	48.9	48.8	45.1	45.8	50.0	46.5
Preferred share of losers	18.3	18.2	19.8	17.5	17.0	16.7	19.7	18.4	19.6	18.9	17.6	18.2
Preferred degree of redistribution	4.7	4.9	4.4	4.7	5.3	5.2	5.1	4.6	4.4	4.4	4.9	4.5
Implied minimum income (in PPP \$/month)	247.3	259.5	239.1	242.9	282.2	288.5	272.8	248.4	217.6	224.9	267.5	232.8
Implied transfer (in % of world income)	5.4	5.8	5.3	5.5	6.2	6.6	6.0	5.6	4.7	4.6	5.8	5.1

Figure S53: Median answers to custom redistribution among respondents satisfied with their custom redistribution. (Question 55). [\(Back to Section V.D..\)](#)

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Saudi Arabia	USA
Preferred share of winners	49.0	50.0	50.0	48.0	50.0	51.0	50.0	50.0	42.0	48.0	49.0	46.0
Preferred share of losers	18.0	18.0	20.0	17.0	15.0	17.0	20.0	17.0	14.0	20.0	18.0	16.0
Preferred degree of redistribution	5.0	5.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.0	5.0	5.0	4.0
Implied minimum income (in PPP \$/month)	208.3	219.2	184.6	188.3	277.7	267.2	255.6	199.6	184.6	184.6	262.4	184.6
Implied transfer (in % of world income)	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.4	3.7	4.4	4.5	4.4

Figure S54: Preferred share of winners in the custom redistributions among satisfied respondents. (Question 55). [\(Back to Section V.D..\)](#)




Figure S55: Preferred share of losers in the custom redistributions among satisfied respondents. (Question 55). [\(Back to Section V.D..\)](#)




Figure S56: Minimum worldwide income implied by custom redistributions among satisfied respondents (in PPP \$ per month). (Question 55). [\(Back to Section V.D..\)](#)




Figure S57: Rich-to-poor transfer implied by custom redistributions among satisfied respondents. (Question 55). [\(Back to Section V.D..\)](#)




Figure S58: “Comprehension question: one respondent with the expected answer will get [amount_lottery: \$100].

How would gasoline prices change as a result of the Global Climate Scheme? Gasoline prices would...” (Correct answer: *increase*) (Question 60).




Figure S59: Relative agreement for: “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “My taxes should go towards solving global problems.”” (Percentage of Agree or Strongly agree among non-Neither agree nor disagree responses). (Question 61).




Figure S60: Absolute agreement for: "To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? "My taxes should go towards solving global problems."'" (Percentage of *Agree* or *Strongly agree*). (Question 61).




Figure S61: "Which group of people do you advocate for when you vote?"³⁷ (Question 62). (Back to Section V.B..)




Figure S62: “Do you feel that this survey was politically biased?” (Question 63). (Back to Section I.)




Figure S63: Manual classification of *feedback* fields: “The survey is nearing completion. You can now enter any comments, thoughts, or suggestions in the field below.” (Question 64). (Back to Section I.)




Figure S64: "How likely are you to become a millionaire at some point in your life?" (Question 15).




Figure S65: "Were you or your parents born in a foreign country?" (Question 5).




Figure S66: Vote in the last election, compared to actual results among voters. (Questions 16, 18).
[\(Back to Section I..\)](#)





Figure S67: Vote in the last election, compared to actual results on the entire population.
(Questions 16, 18). [\(Back to Section I.\)](#)



1126 **B Questionnaire**

1127 The U.S. version of the questionnaire is presented. Features that vary across countries
1128 are placed in square brackets within the question text, as follows: [feature_name: U.S.
1129 value]. The features values for each country are provided in [this spreadsheet](#). Random
1130 branches or conditions for displaying the question are specified in square brackets before
1131 the question text (cf. Figure 2 for the survey flow). The question text is followed by square
1132 brackets that refer to Sections, Figures, and Tables presenting the question results, and the
1133 variable name(s) corresponding to the question. Finally, response options are displayed
1134 in italics. Unless otherwise specified, responses are compulsory and a single response
1135 much be chosen.

(Back to Section I.)

1136 **Welcome**

1137 1. Welcome to this survey!

1138 This survey is **anonymous** and is conducted **for research** purposes on a representa-
1139 tive sample of [sample_size: 3,000] [nationality: American people].

1140 1141 It takes around 20 min to complete.

1142 1143 The survey contains lotteries and awards for those who get the correct answer to
1144 some comprehension questions.

1145 1146 If you are attentive and lucky, **you can win up to [amount_lottery: \$100]**.

1147 1148 Please answer every question carefully.

1149 By clicking on the button below, you consent to the terms and conditions.

1150 **Socio-demographics**

1151 2. What is your gender? [gender]

1152 *Woman; Man; Other*

1153 3. What is your country? [hidden_country]

1154 4. What is your age? [age_exact, age]

1155 *Below 18; 18 to 20; 21 to 24; 25 to 29; 30 to 34; 35 to 39; 40 to 44; 45 to 49; 50 to 54; 55 to*
1156 *59; 60 to 64; 65 to 69; 70 to 74; 75 to 79; 80 to 84; 85 to 89; 90 to 99; 100 or above*

1157 5. Were you or your parents born in a foreign country? [Figure S65; foreign]

1158 *Yes, I was born in a foreign country; Not me but both my parents were born in a foreign*
1159 *country; Not me but one of my parents was born in a foreign country; No, I was born in this*
1160 *country and my parents too*

1161 6. Do you live with your partner (if you have one)? [couple]

1162 *Yes; No*

1163 7. How many people are there in your household?

1164 The household includes: **you**, your spouse, **your family members** who live with
1165 you, and your dependents (not flatmates). [hh_size]
1166 *1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more*

1167 8. How many children under the age of 14 live with you? [Nb_children__14]

1168 *0; 1; 2; 3; 4 or more*

1169 9. [new page] [Only in: US] What race or ethnicity do you identify with? (Multiple
1170 answers are possible) [race]

1171 *White; Black or African American; Hispanic; Asian; American Indian or Alaskan Native;*
1172 *Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; Other; Prefer not to say*

1173 10. What is the [periodicity_text: monthly] [income_type: gross] income of your house-
1174 hold, [income_type_long: after taxes and transfers]?

1175 This includes all sources of income: wages, pensions, welfare payments, property
1176 income, dividends, self-employment earnings, Social Security benefits, and income
1177 from other sources. [income]

1178 [All but RU, US: Custom thresholds, taking into account household composition
1179 Questions 6-8, and corresponding to the country's deciles and quartiles of standard
1180 of living, cf. the sheet "Income" in this spreadsheet;

1181 RU, US: Items based on household total income deciles and quartiles, namely in US:
1182 *Less than \$17,000; between \$17,001 and \$30,000; between \$30,001 and \$36,000; between*
1183 *\$36,001 and \$43,000; between \$43,001 and \$56,000; between \$56,001 and \$72,000; between*
1184 *\$72,001 and \$91,000; between \$91,001 and \$115,000; between \$115,001 and \$130,000;*

1185 *between \$130,001 and \$150,000; between \$150,001 and \$213,000; More than \$213,000; I*
1186 *prefer not to answer]*

1187 11. What is your highest completed education level? [education]
1188 [Country-specific, usually: 0-1 Primary or less; 2 Medium school; 2 Some high
1189 school; 3 High school diploma; 3-4 Vocational training; 5 Short-cycle tertiary; 6 Bach-
1190 elor's; 7-8 Master's or higher]

1191 12. What is your employment status? [employment_status]
1192 *Full-time employed; Part-time employed; Self-employed; Unemployed (searching for a job);*
1193 *Student; Retired; Inactive (not searching for a job)*

1194 13. [Only the first digits asked in RU, SA] What is your zipcode?
1195 We ask for the zipcode to balance the sample in terms of degree of urbanization (ru-
1196 ral, town or city). The survey will be terminated if your zipcode is not recognized.
1197 [zipcode]

1198 14. Are you a homeowner or a tenant? (Multiple answers are possible) [home_owner]
1199 *Tenant; Owner; Landlord renting out property; Hosted free of charge*

1200 15. [new page] How likely are you to become a millionaire at some point in your life?
1201 [Figure S64; millionaire]
1202 *Very unlikely; Unlikely; Likely; Very likely; I am already a millionaire*

1203 16. [Except in: RU, SA] Did you vote in the [election: 2024 presidential election]? [Figures
1204 S67-S66; voted]
1205 *Yes; No; Prefer not to say; I didn't have the right to vote in [country_name: the United
1206 States].*

1207 **Vote**

1208 17. [Only in: SA] What is your nationality?
1209 If you have both the Saudi and a foreign nationality, choose "Saudi". [nationality_SA]
1210 *Saudi; India; Bangladesh; Syria; Yemen; Egypt; Pakistan; Indonesia; Philippines; Sudan;*
1211 *Myanmar; Jordan; Sri Lanka; Nepal; Turkey; Somalia; Lebanon; Other*

1212 18. [Except in: RU, SA] [If voted: Which candidate did you vote for in the [election: 2024
1213 presidential election]?; Otherwise: Even if you did not vote in the [election: 2024

1214 presidential election], please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to
1215 have voted for or who represents your views more closely.] [Figures S67-S66; vote]
1216 [Candidates/parties with at least 1% of votes, e.g. in US: Harris; Trump; Other; Prefer
1217 not to say. In FR, IT, PL, ES, election is the 2024 European election]

1218 **Open-ended field**

1219 [Four random branches; Section II.A.; Figures 3, S1-S6; Random answers can be found on
1220 bit.ly/fields2025; field, variant_field]

- 1221 19. [Branch: concerns] What are your main concerns these days? [Figure S4; concerns_field]
- 1222 20. [Branch: wish] What are your needs or wishes? [Figure S5; wish_field]
- 1223 21. [Branch: injustice] What according to you is the greatest injustice of all?
1224 [Figure S6; injustice_field]
- 1225 22. [Branch: issue] Can you name an issue that is important to you but is neglected in
1226 the public debate? [Figure S7; issue_field]

1227 **Conjoint analysis**

- 1228 23. [Except in: RU, SA] Imagine if the two top candidates in your constituency in the
1229 next general election campaigned with the following policies in their party's plat-
1230 forms.

1231
1232 Which of these candidates would you vote for?

Candidate A	Candidate B	
[Random policy]	[Random policy]	[Policy field in random order]
[Random policy]	[Random policy]	[Policy field in random order]
[Random policy]	[Random policy]	[Policy field in random order]
[Random policy]	[Random policy]	[Policy field in random order]
[Random policy]	[Random policy]	[Policy field in random order]

1233
1234 [Section IV.A.; Figures 8, S8-S22; conjoint]

1235
1236 Candidate A; Candidate B; Neither of them

1238 **Revenue split of global tax**

1239 [Two random branches; field, variant_split]

- 1240 24. [Branch: Few] Imagine a wealth tax applied to households with a net worth above
1241 [tax_threshold: \$5 million], implemented in every country around the world.

1242
1243 [tax_country_name: In the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would be [tax_revenue:
1244 \$514 billion] per year (that is, [tax_revenue_gdp: 2]% of [tax_country_gdp: U.S.
1245 GDP]), while it would be [LIC_revenue: \$1 billion] in all low-income countries com-
1246 bined (700 million people live in a low-income country, most of them in Africa).
1247 Each country would retain part of the revenues it collects and use it for different
1248 domestic purposes. The remaining part would be pooled globally to finance sus-
1249 tainable development in low-income countries.

1250
1251 **What percentage of the global wealth tax revenue should be allocated to each**
1252 **category?**

1253 **The total allocation must sum to 100%.**

1254
1255 [Section II.B.; Figures 4, S24-S25; revenue_split_few]

1256 *Domestic: Education and Healthcare; Domestic: Social welfare programs; Domestic: Re-*
1257 *duction in the federal income tax; Domestic: Reduction of the deficit; Global: Education,*
1258 *Healthcare and Renewable energy in low-income countries*

- 1259 25. [Branch: Many] Imagine a wealth tax applied to households with net worth above
1260 [tax_threshold: \$5 million], implemented in all countries around the world.

1261
1262 [tax_country_name: In the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would be [tax_revenue:
1263 \$514 billion] per year (that is, [tax_revenue_gdp: 2]% of [tax_country_gdp: U.S.
1264 GDP]), while it would be [LIC_revenue: \$1 billion] in all low-income countries com-
1265 bined (700 million people live in a low-income country, most of them in Africa).
1266 Each country would retain part of the revenues it collects and use it for different
1267 domestic purposes. The remaining part would be pooled globally to finance sus-
1268 tainable development.

1269
1270 **What percentage of the global wealth tax revenue should be allocated to each**

1271 **category?**

1272 **The total allocation must sum to 100%.**

1274 [Section *II.B.*; *Figures 4, S26-S27*; *revenue_split_many*]

1275 [Five items are chosen at random among the 13 possible ones: *Domestic: Education and Research*; *Domestic: Healthcare*; *Domestic: Defense*; *Domestic: Deficit reduction*; *Domestic: Justice and Police*; *Domestic: Retirement pensions*; *Domestic: Social welfare programs*; *Domestic: Infrastructure* (public transport, water systems...); *Domestic: Income tax reduction*; *Global: Education and Healthcare in low-income countries*; *Global: Renewable energy and infrastructure to cope with climate change*; *Global: Loss and Damage Fund* (to rebuild after climate disasters); *Global: Forestation and biodiversity projects*]

1282 **Warm glow – moral substitute**

1283 [Three random branches: *NCS*; *Donation*; *control group*; *variant_warm_glow*]

1284 26. [Branch: *NCS*] Do you agree with the following policy?

1285 Climate Scheme:

1286 To meet the national climate target, a limited number of permits to emit greenhouse
1287 gases would be issued nationally. Polluting firms would be required to buy per-
1288 mits to cover their greenhouse gas emissions. Such a policy would make fossil
1289 fuel companies pay for their emissions and gradually raise the price of fossil fuels.
1290 Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil fuels,
1291 reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

1292 The revenues generated by the sale of permits would finance an equal cash trans-
1293 fer. Each [country_adjective: *American*] would receive [*amount_expenses*: \$115] per
1294 month, thereby offsetting price increases for the average [country_adjective: *Amer-
1295 ican*].

1296
1297 **Do you support the Climate Scheme?** [Section *III.A.*; *Figures 6, S29*; *ncs_support*]

1298 Yes; No

1299 27. [Branch: *Donation*] By taking this survey, you will be automatically entered into a
1300 lottery to win up to [*amount_lottery*: \$100].

1301 Should you be selected in the lottery, you will have the option to channel a part of
1302 this additional compensation to the charity *Just One Tree* to plant trees.

1303
1304 **In case you win the lottery, what share of the [amount_lottery: \$100 prize] would**
1305 **you donate to plant trees? [Section IV.B.; Figures 9a, S28 ; donation]**
1306 *Share to plant trees*

1307

Cap & Share

1308 28. Do you support the following policy?

1309 To ensure that you have attentively read the description, we will ask some com-
1310 prehension questions later in the survey: those who get correct answers can win
1311 [amount_lottery: \$100].

1312 Global Climate Scheme:

1313
1314 In 2015, all countries agreed to contain global warming "well below +2 °C". To
1315 achieve this, there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally.

1316
1317 To meet the climate target, a limited number of permits to emit greenhouse gases
1318 would be issued globally. Polluting firms would be required to buy permits to cover
1319 their greenhouse gas emissions. Such a policy would make fossil fuel companies
1320 pay for their emissions and gradually raise the price of fossil fuels. Higher prices
1321 would encourage people and companies to use less fossil fuels, reducing green-
1322 house gas emissions.

1323
1324 In accordance with the principle that each human has an equal right to pollute, the
1325 revenues generated by the sale of permits could finance a global basic income. Every
1326 adult would receive [amount.bi: \$20]per month, thereby lifting 600 million people
1327 who earn less than \$2 a day out of extreme poverty.

1328 The typical [national: American] would lose out financially [amount.lost: \$105]per
1329 month (as he or she would face around [price_increase: 2]% in price increases, which
1330 is higher than the [amount.bi: \$20]per month they would receive).

1331
1332 The policy could be implemented as soon as 100 countries agree to it. Countries
1333 that would refuse to take part in the policy could face sanctions (like tariffs) from
1334 the rest of the world and would be excluded from the basic income program.

1336
1337 **Do you support the Global Climate Scheme?** [Section III.A.; Figures 6, 9a, S29;
1338 gcs_support]
1339 *Yes; No*

1340
1341 [new page] [Two random branches: own; US; Figure S29; gcs_belief, variant_belief]

- 1342 29. [Branch: US] According to you, **what percentage of [belief_nationality: All but US: Americans; US: Europeans] would answer Yes to the previous question** (considering that typical [belief_nationality] would lose [belief_loss: \$140] per month from the Global Climate Scheme)?

1343
1344
1345 The respondent who is closest to the correct value will get [amount_lottery: \$100].
1346 *Percentage of [belief_nationality] in favor of Global Climate Scheme*

- 1348 30. [Branch: own] According to you, **what percentage of [nationality: fellow citizens] would answer Yes to the previous question?**

1349
1350 The respondent who is closest to the correct value will get [amount_lottery: \$100].
1351 *Percentage of [nationality: fellow citizens] in favor of Global Climate Scheme*

1352 **Cap & Share non-universal**

1353 [Four random branches: low; mid; high; high_color; Section III.A.; Figures 6, S29; ics_support]

- 1354 31. [Branch: low] Below is a map showing a possible set of countries that would participate in the Global Climate Scheme previously described.

1355
1356
1357 These countries include India, the European Union, as well as all Africa, Latin America, South-Asia and South-East Asia.

1358
1359 Collectively, these [nb_countries_low: 145] countries account for [emissions_low_without: 40]% of global emissions (if [ics_country: the U.S.] joined them, [emissions_low_with: 40]% of global emissions would be covered).

- 1362
1363
1364 32. [Branch: mid] Below is a map showing a possible set of countries that would participate in the Global Climate Scheme previously described.

1367 These countries include China, India, as well as all Africa, Latin America, South-
1368 Asia and South-East Asia.

1369 Collectively, these 119 countries account for 56% of global emissions (if [ics_country:
1370 the U.S.] joined them, [emissions_mid_with: 70]% of global emissions would be cov-
1371 ered).

- 1372
- 1373
- 1374 33. [Branch: high] Below is a map showing a possible set of countries that would par-
1375 ticipate in the Global Climate Scheme previously described.

1376

1377 These countries include China, India, [text_countries_high: the European Union,
1378 Japan, the United Kingdom], Canada, South Korea, as well as all Africa, Latin Amer-
1379 ica, South-Asia and South-East Asia.

1380 Collectively, these [nb_countries_high: 153] countries account for [emissions_high_without:
1381 71]% of global emissions (if [ics_country: the U.S.] joined them, [emissions_high_with:
1382 86]% of global emissions would be covered).

- 1383
- 1384
- 1385 34. [Branch: high_color] Below is a map showing a possible set of countries that would
1386 participate in the Global Climate Scheme previously described.

1387

1388 These countries include China, India, [text_countries_high: the European Union,
1389 Japan, the United Kingdom], Canada, South Korea, as well as all Africa, Latin Amer-
1390 ica, South-Asia and South-East Asia.

1391 Collectively, these [nb_countries_high: 153] countries account for [emissions_high_without:
1392 72]% of global emissions (if [ics_country: the U.S.] joined them, [emissions_high_with:
1393 86]% of global emissions would be covered).

1394

1395 Note that a provision would prevent the Global Climate Scheme from harming low-
1396 and middle-income countries: this is why countries like China, Mexico, or Egypt are
1397 in white on the map (they would neither win nor lose financially).

- 1398
- 1399 35. Do you support [ics_country: the U.S.] joining the Global Climate Scheme, in case it

1400 is adopted by the above countries? [Section III.A.; Figures 6, S29; ics_support]

1401 Yes; No

1402 **Warm glow – realism**

1403 36. [Two random branches: with or without this informational text.] To ensure that you have
1404 attentively read the description below, we will ask some comprehension questions
1405 later in the survey: those who get correct answers can win \$100.

1406

1407

1408 In several international organizations, **countries have agreed to demonstrate some**
1409 **degree of solidarity in addressing global challenges.**

1410 Negotiations are ongoing to implement specific mechanisms for sustainable devel-
1411 opment.

1412

1413 Here are a few examples:

1414  In 2025, to reduce carbon emissions from shipping, **the International Maritime**
1415 **Organization adopted an international levy on excess emissions from maritime**
1416 **fuel, that should partly finance low-income countries.**

1417  Since 1970, **developed countries have agreed to contribute 0.7% of their GDP in**
1418 **foreign aid and development assistance.**

1419  In international climate negotiations, **developed countries have committed to fi-**
1420 **nance climate action in developing countries.** In 2009, they committed to provide
1421 \$100 billion per year by 2020. In 2023, all countries agreed to set up a fund to help
1422 vulnerable countries cope with loss and damage from climate change. In 2024, the
1423 \$100 billion goal was increased to \$300 billion per year by 2035.

1424  In 2021, 136 countries adopted a minimum tax rate of 15% on multinational prof-
1425 its.

1426  In 2024, under the leadership of Brazil, **the G20 considered the introduction of a**
1427 **global tax of 2% on the wealth of billionaires.**

1428  In 2024, the UN General Assembly adopted the Pact for the Future, which fore-
1429 sees a reform of the UN Security Council to limit the power of its five permanent
1430 member and expand it to new members.

1431  Led by the Prime Minister of Barbados and supported by the UN Secretary Gen-

1432 eral, the Bridgetown initiative seeks a new financial system that would drive financial
1433 resources towards climate action and sustainable development. [Section IV.B.;
1434 Figure 9b; info_solidarity]

- 1435 37. According to you, how likely is it that international policies involving significant
1436 transfers from high-income countries to low-income countries will be introduced in
1437 the next 15 years? [Section IV.B.; Figures 9b, S30; likely_solidarity]
1438 *Very unlikely; Unlikely; Likely; Very likely*

- 1439 38. Do you support or oppose the following policies?

1440

1441 [Only in PL, SA: (As some items refer to “developed countries”, note that we consider
1442 [Saudi Arabia] to be a developed country in this question.)] [Section V.A.; Fig-
1443 ures 10, S31-S34; solidarity_support]

1444 [Item order is randomized]

- 1445 • Institutions like the World Bank investing in many more sustainable projects
1446 in lower-income countries, and offering lower interest rates (the Bridgetown
1447 initiative)
- 1448 • Developed countries financing a fund to help vulnerable countries cope with
1449 loss and damage from climate change
- 1450 • Expanding the UN Security Council (in charge of peacekeeping) to new per-
1451 manent members such as India, Brazil, and the African Union, and restricting
1452 the use of the veto⁴²
- 1453 • Raising the globally agreed minimum tax rate on profits of multinational firms
1454 from 15% to 35%, closing loopholes and allocating revenues to countries where
1455 sales are made
- 1456 • Debt relief for vulnerable countries by suspending repayments until they are
1457 better able to repay, promoting their development
- 1458 • An international levy on carbon emissions from shipping, funding national
1459 budgets in proportion to population
- 1460 • An international levy on carbon emissions from aviation, raising ticket prices
1461 by 30% and funding national budgets in proportion to population

⁴²In Russia, due to a mistake in the questionnaire, this item was not asked to the control group. Therefore, results are based on the treated group for this item in Russia.

- Developed countries providing \$300 billion a year (0.4% of their GDP) to finance climate action in developing countries
- Developed countries contributing at least 0.7% of their GDP in foreign aid and development assistance
- A minimum tax of 2% on the wealth of billionaires, in voluntary countries

Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Indifferent; Somewhat support; Strongly support

NCQG

[*Two random branches: Full; Short; ncqg_fusion, variant_ncqg*]

39. [Branch: Full] **At international climate negotiations, developing countries call for larger provision of "climate finance": the financing of climate action from developed countries in developing countries.** [developed_note: (Note that we consider Saudi Arabia to be a developed country in this question.)]

There are two kinds of climate finance: grants (that is, donations) and loans. In 2022, \$26 billion was provided as grants and the rest as loans, for a total of \$116 billion.

In 2009, developed countries agreed to mobilize \$100 billion per year in climate finance by 2020. In 2024, they committed to raise this goal to \$300 billion by 2035. None of the goals specify which share should be provided as grants.

Below are different positions on the amount of climate finance that should be provided in 2035, all expressed in grant-equivalent terms (that is, not counting loans):

- \$0: There should be no contributions from developed countries to climate action in developing countries.
- \$26 billion (0.04% of developed countries' GDP): The current amount, consistent with the old (2020) goal.
- \$100 billion (0.14% of GDP): The old (2020) goal, if all climate finance were provided as grants.
- \$300 billion (0.43% of GDP): The new (2035) goal, if all climate finance were provided as grants.

- 1493 - \$600 billion (0.86% of GDP): The goal called for by India, a position shared by
1494 most developing countries.
1495 - \$1,000 billion (1.43% of GDP): The goal called for by Climate Action Network (a
1496 network of NGOs including Greenpeace, Oxfam, and WWF).
1497 - \$5,000 billion (7.14% of GDP): The goal called for by Demand Climate Justice (a
1498 network of NGOs including 350.org and the World Council of Churches)

1499
1500 **If you could choose the amount of climate finance provided by developed coun-**
1501 **tries to developing countries in 2035, what amount would you choose (in grant-**
1502 **equivalent terms)?**

1503 [Section V.A.; Figure S36; ncqg_full]

1504 [Item order is randomly reversed or not]

1505 \$0; \$300 billion; \$600 billion; \$26 billion; \$100 billion; \$1,000 billion; \$5,000 billion

- 1506 40. [Branch: Short] **"Climate finance" designates the financing of climate action from**
1507 **developed countries in developing countries.** [developed_note: (Note that we con-
1508 sider Saudi Arabia to be a developed country in this question.)]

1509
1510 **There are two kinds of climate finance: grants (that is, donations) and loans. The**
1511 **large majority is currently provided as loans.**

1512
1513 In 2009, developed countries agreed to mobilize \$100 billion per year in climate
1514 finance. In 2024, they committed to triple this goal by 2035. None of the goals spec-
1515 ify which share should be provided as grants.

1516 At international climate negotiations, developing countries call for larger provision
1517 of climate finance, particularly in the form of grants.

1518
1519 **If you could choose the level of climate finance provided by developed coun-**
1520 **tries to developing countries in 2035, what would you choose?**

1521 [Section V.A.; Figure S35; ncqg]

1522 [Item order is randomly flipped or not]

1523 *Stop all provision of climate finance.;*

1524 *Reduce the provision of climate finance.;*

1525 *Maintain current contributions (\$26 billion per year in grants, that is 0.04% of developed*
1526 *countries' GDP, and \$80 billion in loans, or 0.1% of GDP).;*

1527 *Meet the newly agreed goal by tripling grants and loans (\$100 billion in grants, or 0.15%*
1528 *of GDP);;*
1529 *Increase climate finance to a level between what developed countries have agreed and what*
1530 *developing countries are asking for (\$300 billion in grants, or 0.45% of GDP);;*
1531 *Increase climate finance to match what developing countries are asking for (\$600 billion in*
1532 *grants, or 0.9% of GDP);;*
1533 *Increase climate finance to match what NGOs are asking for (at least \$1,000 billion per year*
1534 *in grants, that is 1.4% of GDP, is what Greenpeace, Oxfam, WWF, and the World Council*
1535 *of Churches ask for).*

1536 **Wealth tax depending on sets of countries**

1537 *[Three random branches: Global; HIC; Int'l; Section III.B.; Figures 7, S37; wealth_tax_support]*

- 1538 41. [Branch: Global] **Imagine an international tax on individuals with net worth**
1539 **above [wealth_threshold: \$1 million].**

1540 Only wealth above [wealth_threshold: \$1 million] would be taxed, at a rate of 2%.
1541 Each country would retain 70% of the revenues it collects, while 30% would be
1542 pooled at the global level to finance public services in low-income countries (in par-
1543 ticular, access to drinking water, healthcare, and education in Africa).

1544
1545 Say we are in 2030. **Imagine that all other countries in the world adopt this policy.**
1546 **Do you support [country_name: the United States] adopting this international tax**
1547 **on millionaires?**

1548 Yes; No

- 1549 42. [Branch: HIC] **Imagine an international tax on individuals with net worth above**
1550 **[wealth_threshold: \$1 million].**

1551 Only wealth above [wealth_threshold: \$1 million] would be taxed, at a rate of 2%.
1552 Each country would retain 70% of the revenues it collects, while 30% would be
1553 pooled at the global level to finance public services in low-income countries (in par-
1554 ticular, access to drinking water, healthcare, and education in Africa).

1555
1556 Say we are in 2030. **[hic_tax: Imagine that all other high-income countries (such**
1557 **as the European Union, Japan, and Canada) adopt this policy and some middle-**
1558 **income countries (such as China) do not.]**

1559 **Do you support [country_name: the United States] adopting this international tax**
1560 **on millionaires?**

1561 *Yes; No*

1562 43. [Branch: Int'l] **Imagine an international tax on individuals with net worth above**
1563 **[wealth_threshold: \$1 million].**

1564 Only wealth above [wealth_threshold: \$1 million] would be taxed, at a rate of 2%.
1565 Each country would retain 70% of the revenues it collects, while 30% would be
1566 pooled at the global level to finance public services in low-income countries (in par-
1567 ticular, access to drinking water, healthcare, and education in Africa).

1568
1569 Say we are in 2030. [intl_tax:⁴³ **Imagine that some countries (such as the Euro-**
1570 **pean Union) adopt this policy and others (such as Japan, Canada, and China) do**
1571 **not.]**

1572 **Do you support [country_name: the United States] adopting this international tax**
1573 **on millionaires?**

1574 *Yes; No*

1575 **Scenarios & radical tax**

1576 *[Scenario A & B are randomly interverted.]*

1577 44. **Consider two possible scenarios for the world for the next 20 years.**

1578 **Scenario A:**

1579 Most countries implement coordinated policies to limit global warming to +2°C and
1580 reduce inequality. The world greatly reduces greenhouse gas emissions and is on
1581 track to meet its climate target. Taxes on millionaires fund the installation of heat
1582 pumps, the thermal insulation of buildings, and improved public transportation.
1583 Yachts and private jets are phased out worldwide. Cars are all electric by 2045, and
1584 they are about the same price as internal combustion cars nowadays. By 2045, envi-
1585 ronmental regulations gradually double the price heating fuel or gas, air travel, and
1586 beef. As a result, people fly half as much, eat half as much meat, and use more pub-

⁴³Excluded countries are *China, Japan, and Canada*. As for included countries, on top of *Brazil*, they are: *the EU and the UK* for Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S.; the EU for Russia and the UK; and *France, Germany, Spain, and the UK* (except one's own country) for EU countries.

1588 lic transportation in 2045 than they did in 2025. Despite higher prices for polluting
1589 goods, the overall purchasing power is preserved, thanks to a decrease in sales tax
1590 that reduces the prices of non-polluting goods.

1591
1592 **Scenario B:**

1593 Since 2025, no additional policies are implemented to address climate change or in-
1594 equality. People maintain the same lifestyles as in 2025. For example, most people
1595 continue to drive cars with internal combustion engines. Greenhouse gas emissions
1596 are stable. Global warming is expected to reach +3°C by 2100 and higher levels
1597 beyond that date. A warmer climate will cause more frequent and more severe
1598 droughts, heatwaves, wildfires, and flooding.

1599
1600 Apart from the elements described, the two scenarios are the same (for example,
1601 in terms of unemployment or crime).

1602
1603 **Which scenario do you prefer for the future?** [Section [V.B.](#); Figures [11](#), [S38](#); [sustainable_future](#)]
1604 *Scenario A; Scenario B*

1605
1606 [new page] [Two random branches: *top1*; *top3*; Section [V.B.](#); Figures [11](#), [S39-S40](#); [top_tax_support](#),
1607 [variant_top_tax](#)]

- 1608 45. [Branch: *top1*] Currently, 2 billion people live in acute poverty, with less than
1609 [lcu_250: \$250][periodicity: per month].

1610 The Sustainable Development Goals, adopted by all countries in 2015, aim to alle-
1611 viate poverty and give access to healthcare, education, drinking water, and sanita-
1612 tion for all by 2030. Due to lack of funding, the world is not on track to meet these
1613 poverty reduction goals.

1614
1615 **Poverty reduction could be funded by a global tax on individual income above**
1616 **[lcu_120k: \$120,000][periodicity_tax: per year].**

1617 **The tax rate would be 15% for every [currency: dollar] over [lcu_120k: \$120,000]**
1618 **of income** after existing taxes.

1619 For example, a single person earning [lcu_130k: \$130,000][periodicity_tax: per year]
1620 after taxes would pay [lcu_1500: \$1,500] in additional taxes, or 15% of [lcu_10k:
1621 \$10,000] = [lcu_130k: \$130,000] – [lcu_120k: \$120,000]. Meanwhile, a married couple

1622 earning [lcu_200k: \$200,000][periodicity_tax: per year], [lcu_100k: \$100,000] for each
1623 of them, would go untaxed.

1624 This tax would apply to the richest 1% of the world's population. [tax_country_name:
1625 In the United States], it would affect the richest [affected_top1: 8)% and redistribute
1626 [transfer_top1: 3)% of GDP to lower-income countries.

1627
1628 **Do you support or oppose such a global tax on the richest people to finance global
1629 poverty reduction?**

1630
1631 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support; Somewhat oppose; Indifferent*

1632 46. [Branch: top3] Currently, 3 billion people live in deep poverty, with less than
1633 [lcu_400: \$400][periodicity: per month].

1634 The Sustainable Development Goals, adopted by all countries in 2015, aim to al-
1635 leviate poverty and achieve access to healthcare, education, drinking water, and
1636 sanitation for all by 2030. Due to lack of funding, the world is not on track to meet
1637 these poverty reduction goals.

1638
1639 **Poverty reduction could be funded by a global tax on individual income above
1640 [lcu_80k: \$80,000][periodicity_tax: per year].**

1641 The tax rate would be 15% for every [currency: dollar] over [lcu_80k: \$80,000] of
1642 income after existing taxes, 30% over [lcu_120k: \$120,000], and 45% over [lcu_1M:
1643 \$1 million].

1644 For example, a single person earning [lcu_90k: \$90,000][periodicity_tax: per year] af-
1645 ter taxes would pay [lcu_1500_top3: \$1,500] in additional taxes, or 15% of [lcu_10k_top3:
1646 \$10,000] = [lcu_90k: \$90,000] - [lcu_80k: \$80,000]. Meanwhile, a married couple
1647 earning [lcu_150k: \$150,000][periodicity_tax: per year], [lcu_75k: \$75,000] for each of
1648 them, would go untaxed.

1649 This tax would apply to the richest 3% of the world's population. [tax_country_name:
1650 In the United States], it would affect the richest [affected_top3: 18)% and redistribute
1651 [transfer_top3: 8)% of GDP to lower-income countries.

1652
1653 **Do you support or oppose such a global tax on the richest people to finance global
1654 poverty reduction?**

1655 [Section V.B.; Figures 11, S39-S40; top3_tax_support]

1656 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support; Somewhat oppose; Indifferent*

1657 47. To show that you are attentive, please select "A little" in the following list: [attention_test]

1658 *Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*

1659 **Preferred transfer means to LICs**

1660 48. Below are different ways to transfer resources to help reduce poverty in a low-
1661 income country.

1662 How do you evaluate each of these options?

1663 [Section V.C.; Figures 13, S42-S43; transfer_how] [Item order is randomly flipped or
1664 not]

- 1665 • Transfers to public development aid agencies which then finance suitable projects
- 1666 • Transfers to the national government conditioned on the use of funds for poverty
1667 reduction programs
- 1668 • Unconditional transfers to the national government
- 1669 • Unconditional transfers to local authorities (municipality, village chief...)
- 1670 • Transfers to local NGOs with democratic decision-making processes
- 1671 • Cash transfers to parents (child allowances), to the disabled and to the elderly
- 1672 • Unconditional cash transfers to each household

1673 *A wrong way; An acceptable way; A right way; The best way*

1674 **Radical redistribution**

1675 49. Should governments actively cooperate to have all countries converge in terms of

1676 GDP per capita by the end of the century? [Section V.B.; Figures 11, S44; convergence_support]

1677 *Yes; No; I prefer not to answer*

1678 50. If there was a worldwide movement in favor of a global program to tackle climate

1679 change, implement taxes on millionaires and fund poverty reduction in low-income
1680 countries, to what extent would you be willing to be part of that movement? (Mul-
1681 tiple answers possible) [Section V.B.; Figures 11, S45; global_movement]

1682 *I would not support such a movement.; I could sign a petition and spread ideas.; I could*

1683 attend a demonstration.; I could go on strike.; I could donate [amount_lottery: \$100] to a
1684 strike fund.

- 1685 51. [Except in: RU, SA] Let us call "your political party" the party you voted for in the
1686 last election, or the party that represents your views most closely.

1687 **Imagine** there was a **worldwide coalition** of political parties in favor of a com-
1688 mon program **to tackle climate change, implement taxes on millionaires and fund**
1689 **poverty reduction in low-income countries.**

1690

1691 **Would you be more likely to vote for your party if it were part of that coalition?**

1692 [Section [V.B.](#); Figures [11](#), [S46](#); `vote_intl_coalition`] [Item order is randomly flipped
1693 or not]

1694 *Yes, I would be **more likely** to vote for my party if it joined that coalition (or to vote for
1695 another party if only that other party joined the coalition).;*

1696 *My choice would **not depend** on which parties are part of that coalition.;*

1697 *No, I would be **less likely** to vote for my party if it joined that coalition.*

- 1698 52. Some people think that high-income countries should support low-income coun-
1699 tries.

1700 Among the different reasons given, which ones do you agree with? (Multiple an-
1701 swers possible) [Section [V.B.](#); Figure [S47](#); `why_hic_help_lic`] [Order of the first three
1702 items is randomized]

1703 *High-income countries have a historical responsibility for the current situation in low-
1704 income countries.;*

1705 *In the long run, it is in the interest of high-income countries to help low-income countries.;*

1706 *Helping those in need is the right thing to do. This is also true at the international level.;*

1707 *None of the above.*

- 1708 53. [Only in: FR, DE, IT, ES, GB, US] Some people argue that Western countries owe
1709 reparations for colonization and slavery to former colonies and descendants of slaves.
1710 Reparations could take the form of funding education and facilitating technology
1711 transfers, to address unequal opportunities passed down from the past.

1712

1713 **Do you support or oppose reparations of this kind for colonization and slavery?**

1714 [Section [V.B.](#); Figures [11](#), [S48](#); `reparations_support`]

1715 *Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Indifferent; Somewhat support; Strongly support*

1716 [Except in: RU] Custom redistribution

- 1717 54. What is the *[periodicity_text]: yearly* income of your household **after taxes and social**
1718 **benefits?**

1719 This includes all sources of income: salaries, pensions, allowances, welfare benefits,
1720 property income, etc.

1721 My household earns ... *[text_unit: \$ per year]* (answer with no comma, no space, no
1722 period):

1723 *[income_exact]*

- 1724 55. [new page] If you could redistribute income at the global level, what would you
1725 do? In this question, we let you choose your preferred parameters for a redistribu-
1726 tion of income at the world level.

1727 If you prefer to skip this question, check the corresponding box at the bottom of the
1728 page.

1729
1730 The worldwide redistribution of income would take the form of additional poli-
1731 cies, taxes, and transfers, on top of existing ones.

1732 These policies would lower the income of the richest (the losers from the redistribu-
1733 tion) and increase the income of the poorest (the winners).

1734
1735 Below you will find a graph of the world distribution of after-tax income and three
1736 sliders that vary it. The current distribution is in red, and your custom one is in
1737 green.

1738 The first two sliders control the proportion of winners and the proportion of losers,
1739 among all humans. The third slider controls the degree of redistribution from the
1740 richest to the poorest.

1741 If you do not want new policies to reduce global inequality, you can set the third
1742 slider to zero.

1743
1744 **You need to move the sliders** (by holding the mouse down on the little squares
1745 and moving to the side) to make the green curve evolve: the idea is to move the
1746 sliders **until you get a green curve you are satisfied with**.

1749

1750

Examples of income changes after your proposed redistribution:

1751

Now	After
0 [text_unit: \$ per year] [now_10k] [text_unit]	[after_0] [text_unit: \$ per year] [after_10k] [text_unit]
[now_60k] [text_unit]	[after_60k] [text_unit]
[now_100k] [text_unit]	[after_100k] [text_unit]
Your <i>individual</i> income	
[own] [text_unit]	[after_own] [text_unit]

1752

[Section [V.D.](#); [Figures 14, S50-S57](#)] I am satisfied with my custom redistribution.;
I want to skip this question.

1755

Well-being (for another project)

1756

[Four random branches: `gallup_0`; `gallup_1`; `wvs_0`; `wvs_1`; `well_being`, `variant_well_being`]

1757

56. [Branch: `gallup_0`] Please imagine a ladder, with steps numbered from 0 at the bottom to 10 at the top. The top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for you.

1760

On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time? [`well_being_gallup_0`]

1763

Worst possible 0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; Best possible 10

1764

57. [Branch: `gallup_1`] Please imagine a ladder, with steps numbered from 1 at the bottom to 10 at the top. The top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for you.

1767

On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time? [`well_being_gallup_1`]

1770

Worst possible 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; Best possible 10

1771

58. [Branch: `wvs_0`] All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? [`well_being_wvs_0`]

1773

Completely dissatisfied 0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; Completely satisfied 10

- 1774 59. [Branch: wvs_1] All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a
1775 whole these days? [well_being_wvs_1]
1776 *Completely dissatisfied 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; Completely satisfied 10*

1777 **Comprehension**

- 1778 60. *Comprehension question: one respondent with the expected answer will get [amount_lottery: 1779 \$100].*

1780
1781 How would gasoline prices change as a result of the Global Climate Scheme?
1782 Gasoline prices would... [Figure S58; gcs_comprehension] [Item order is randomly
1783 flipped or not]
1784 *increase; not be affected; decrease*

1785 **Synthetic questions**

- 1786 61. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? "My taxes
1787 should go towards solving global problems." [Section V.B.; Figures 11, S59-S60; my_tax_global_nat
1788 *Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree*
- 1789 62. Which group of people do you advocate for when you vote?⁴⁴ [Section V.B.; Figures
1790 12, S61; group_defended]
1791 *Sentient beings (humans and animals); Humans; [country_adjective_plural: Americans];*
1792 *People from my community (for example my region, my religion, my gender...); My family*
1793 *and myself*

1794 **Feedback**

- 1795 63. Do you feel that this survey was politically biased? [Figure S62; survey_biased]
1796 *Yes, left-wing biased; Yes, right-wing biased; No, I do not feel it was biased*
- 1797 64. The survey is nearing completion. You can now enter any comments, thoughts, or
1798 suggestions in the field below. [Figure S63; Random answers can be found on bit.ly/fields2025;
1799 comment_field] (Back to Section I.)

⁴⁴In Russia and Saudi Arabia, the question was worded as follows: "Which group do you advocate for? For example, if you were the richest person on Earth, which group would you predominantly help with your money?". In Russia, the item *Russians* had to be replaced with *My compatriots*.

1800 **C Survey Sources and Features**

1801 **III.A. Sources Regarding Plausible Global Policies**

1802 Table S1 provides references showing that the “plausible global policies” I test (Sec-
1803 tion V.A.) are (similar to proposals) debated in international negotiations.

Table S1: Proposals similar to the “plausible global policies” in international negotiations.

Proposal	Appearance in international negotiations and source
A minimum tax of 2% on the wealth of billionaires, in voluntary countries	Proposal by Zucman (2024) in a report commissioned by the Brazilian presidency of the G20.
Raising the globally agreed minimum tax rate on profits of multinational firms from 15% to 35%, closing loopholes and allocating revenues to countries where sales are made	In the context of OECD/G20 discussions to address Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), a similar proposal has been proposed by the Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation (ICRICT 2020): taxing corporate income through formulary apportionment at a 25% rate.
Expanding the UN Security Council (in charge of peacekeeping) to new permanent members such as India, Brazil, and the African Union, and restricting the use of the veto	The Pact for the Future was adopted by the UN General Assembly. It includes “Action 39. We will reform the Security Council, recognizing the urgent need to make it more representative, inclusive, transparent, efficient, effective, democratic and accountable (...) we agree on the following guiding (...) Enlarge the Security Council (...) increase representation of developing countries (...) The question of the veto is a key element of Security Council reform. We will intensify efforts to reach an agreement on the future of the veto, including discussions on limiting its scope and use” (UN 2024).
Developed countries contributing at least 0.7% of their GDP in foreign aid and development assistance	This commitment has been made at the UN in 1971 and renewed ever since, e.g. in the SDG 17.2 (UN 2017 ; UNGA 1971). In 2024, developed countries contributed 0.33% of their GNI in Official Development Assistance (OECD 2025).

(continued)

Debt relief for vulnerable countries by suspending repayments until they are better able to repay, promoting their development

Institutions like the World Bank investing in many more sustainable projects in lower-income countries, and offering lower interest rates (the Bridgetown initiative)

Developed countries financing a fund to help vulnerable countries cope with loss and damage from climate change

Developed countries providing \$300 billion a year (0.4% of their GDP) to finance climate action in developing countries

An international levy on carbon emissions from shipping, funding national budgets in proportion to population

An international levy on carbon emissions from aviation, raising ticket prices by 30% and funding national budgets in proportion to population

At the Financing for Development conference, all countries (except the U.S.) have “recognize[d] the need to assist developing countries in attaining long-term debt sustainability through coordinated policies aimed at fostering debt financing, debt relief, debt restructuring and sound debt management” ([FfD4 2025](#)).

The [Bridgetown Initiative \(2025\)](#) has been initiated by the government of Barbados and endorsed by the UN Secretary-General ([UN 2023](#)). It includes different proposals, including the rechanneling and new issuance of Special Drawing Rights to recapitalize Multilateral Development Banks.

The COP27 “decide[d] (...) to establish a fund for responding to loss and damage” ([COP27 2022](#)), to which \$768 million have been pledged as of [April 7, 2025](#).

COP29 adopted the NCQG and “decide[d] to set a goal, (...) with developed country Parties taking the lead, of at least USD 300 billion per year by 2035 for developing country Parties for climate action” ([UNFCCC 2024](#)).

The International Maritime Organization recently adopted a draft standard and feebate on carbon emissions from shipping ([IMO 2025](#)). While countries still have to agree on the allocation of the revenue, a [group of countries](#) including China and Brazil proposed to allocate 30% for developing countries; [Norway](#) proposed to let the Green Climate Fund manage the revenue; and [Germany](#) that the revenue be used to “strengthen the green transition, in particular in the SIDS and LDCs.”

While more narrow in scope, in 2025, a “new aviation solidarity coalition on premium flyers (first- and business-class tickets, and private jets) has been launched by France, Kenya, Barbados, Spain, Somalia, Benin, Sierra Leone and Antigua & Barbuda. It will be supported by the European Commission, and the [Global Solidarity Levies Task Force](#) (...) The coalition aims to improve domestic revenue mobilization of developing countries and support international solidarity.”

1804 **III.B. Country-specific Features**

1805 In the survey, various features are tailored to country-specific characteristics. The
1806 workbook at github.com/bixiou/robustness_global_redistr/raw/main/questionnaire/sources.xlsx
1807 contains all such features as well as their sources. In particular, it includes the following
1808 spreadsheets:

- 1809 • Quotas: targets for each category based on frequencies among the adult popula-
1810 tion, as well as their sources (namely official statistical agencies) and the defini-
1811 tion of regions. The coding of regions and urbanicity is done in Qualtrics based
1812 on zip codes; with the zipcode correspondences exported in the repository folder
1813 `data_ext/zipcode_urbanity_region` using code in `data_ext/code_robustness/zipcodes`.
- 1814 • Income, income_raw: brackets used in the income question (10), and associated
1815 sources and computations. I use household-level income Russia and the U.S.; equal-
1816 split income for Saudi Arabia; and equivalised income (i.e. standard of living, ac-
1817 counting for family composition) for other countries. Data sources are Eurostat for
1818 EU countries, Rosstat for Russia, WID for Saudi Arabia, Census Bureau for the U.S.,
1819 and LIS for the other countries.
- 1820 • Policies, policies_sources, policies_leaning, policies_party, policies_leaning_party: re-
1821 spectively the policies used in the conjoint experiment (Question 23), the source of
1822 each policy (i.e. the political program from which they come), their political leaning
1823 (classified manually as 0 if the policy is consistent only with a left-wing program,
1824 2 for a right-wing one, and 1 otherwise), the party that proposed each policy, and
1825 their political leaning based on the party that proposed each policy.
- 1826 • Elections: results at the last election (used in Questions 16-18) including abstention
1827 share among citizens, as well as classifications of the parties: whether they are major
1828 (i.e. obtained more than 5% of votes), and their political leaning (Left, Center-right
1829 or Right, Far right).
- 1830 • Figures, features: country-specific figures used in the questionnaire, as detailed be-
1831 low.

1832 Table S2 reports the figures used for each country for the National or Global Climate
1833 Scheme; the top income tax; and the revenue allocation of a wealth tax. Below, I detail the
1834 methodologies used for these and other questions.

Table S2: Country-specific features of the questionnaire.

Question; Feature	FR	DE	IT	PL	ES	GB	CH	JP	RU	SA	US
26 NCS amount_expenses (LCU/m.)	35	65	35	235	35	35	35	10k	5500	510	125
28 GCS net cost (\$/month)	17	48	18	39	13	24	14	48	30	101	88
28 GCS amount_lost (LCU/month)	15	45	15	150	10	20	15	7000	2500	400	90
28 GCS amount_bi (LCU/month)	20	20	20	85	20	15	20	3500	3000	130	35
28 GCS price_increase (%)	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	2	2	3	2
10 Income type: net/gross	n	n	n	n	n	g	g	g	n	g	g
46 Income period: month/year	m	m	m	m	m	y	y	y	m	m	y
46 80k \$PPP 1cu_80k	5k	5k	4.5k	13k	4k	60k	85k	8M	200k	10k	80k
45 120k \$PPP 1cu_120k	7.5k	7.5k	7k	20k	6k	90k	130k	12M	300k	15k	120k
46 1M \$PPP 1cu_1M	60k	60k	60k	150k	50k	700k	1M	100M	2.5M	130k	1M
24 Wealth tax revenue (\$ bn)	48	43	11	1	6	14	15	26	21	4	514
24 Wealth tax revenue (% GNI)	1.6	0.9	0.5	0.2	0.4	0.4	1.8	0.5	1	0.4	1.9
LCU per dollar (on Apr. 2, 2025)	.926	.926	.926	3.87	.926	.773	.9	149	84.3	3.75	1

1835 **Climate Scheme.** In the Climate Schemes, I assume a carbon price of \$95/tCO₂, corre-
 1836 sponding to the price in 2025 for an emissions trajectory compatible with a global warm-
 1837 ing peaking at +1.8°C before 2100.⁴⁵ After 2025, the decline in emissions is estimated
 1838 to almost balance out the carbon price increase, in the sense that the GDP share of car-
 1839 bon pricing revenue would be roughly constant over the thirty years following the initial
 1840 phase-in, before plummeting as net-zero approaches (Fabre 2024a). In other words, the
 1841 cost of climate schemes provided to the respondents reflects the direct monetary costs
 1842 expected from a carbon price aligned with the Paris Agreement.

1843 In the National Climate Scheme, the average increase in expenditures is equal to the
 1844 carbon price multiplied by the country's emissions per capita,⁴⁶ and corresponds to the
 1845 equal cash transfer each person would receive (Question 26). Relative to the country's
 1846 GDP per capita, this translates into the price increase reported in the Global Climate
 1847 Scheme (GCS). To compute the amount lost, i.e. the net cost of the GCS for the average
 1848 person in the country (Question 28), I subtract the equal cash transfer from the increase
 1849 in expenditures.

⁴⁵More precisely, I use the price trajectory of the integrated assessment model IMAGE in the scenario SSP2-2.6, as given by the IIASA.

⁴⁶I use territorial CO₂ emissions from non-LULUCF by country from Gütschow et al. (2021). I use the same source to estimate the emissions covered by the different scenarios in the International Climate Scheme.

1850 In case of a strictly equal per adult allocation of carbon price revenue, the global ba-
1851 sic income would amount to \$45 per month, corresponding to the world average emis-
1852 sions multiplied by the carbon price. However, to prevent highly emitting middle-income
1853 countries from losing financially, the GCS departs from the egalitarian allocation by of-
1854 fering them a waiver from the mutualization of revenue, thereby lowering cash transfers
1855 in other countries (Fabre 2024b). When the country coverage is *global*, as is implicitly the
1856 case in questionnaires for Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S., this results in a global ba-
1857 sic income of \$36 per month. In European countries and Japan, the cash transfer is even
1858 lower, at \$22 per month, since I implicitly assume a *high* country coverage (cf. Figure 5)
1859 that excludes countries with the greatest emissions per capita. As I conservatively use low
1860 figures for the cash transfer, the GCS question could somewhat underestimate acceptance
1861 of a global, egalitarian cap-and-trade in high-income countries.

1862 **Global Income Distribution.** To estimate the global income distribution, I use the dis-
1863 tributions of disposable income by country in 2019 constructed by Fisher-Post and Gethin
1864 (2023) (FPG).⁴⁷ I inflate all generalized percentiles by real GDP growth observed between
1865 2019 and 2024 (using IMF data), factor in country-specific inflation until 2022 and convert
1866 values from LCU to 2022 PPP dollars (using FPG), and finally assume that all countries
1867 experienced the same inflation as in the U.S. in 2023 and 2024 (using IMF data).

1868 To aggregate country distributions, I compute the global cumulative distribution func-
1869 tion and interpolate it at each thousandile. I obtain the global distribution of disposable
1870 income at purchasing power parity (PPP) in 2024.

1871 I use this distribution for the custom redistribution task, after converting back to LCU
1872 (Section V.D., Question 55). I also use it to calibrate the top income tax schedules so that
1873 they raise an amount equivalent to the poverty gap (Section V.B., Questions 45-46). Then,
1874 I use country-level data to estimate the share of GDP collected as well as the share of the
1875 population affected by each tax in each country. Finally, I compute the poverty gaps and
1876 the tax revenue in every country in proportion to GDP, and aggregate them at the global
1877 level after converting national disposable income back to market exchange rates (using
1878 World Bank's PPP conversion factors for 2022). I find that the top 1% tax collects 1.8%
1879 of global nominal income, while the top 3% tax collects 4.8% of global nominal income.
1880 These amounts are higher than the respective poverty gaps: 1.3% of global nominal in-
1881 come for a \$250 per month poverty line, and 3.2% for a \$400 per month poverty line.

⁴⁷The data is available on Amory Gethin's [website](#).

1882 While the cost of poverty reduction declines relative to tax revenue once one accounts for
1883 market exchange rates, closing the poverty gap actually requires extra revenue due to im-
1884 perfect targeting and administrative costs (Sahoo et al. 2025). Therefore, the tax schedule
1885 calibrations are consistent with the poverty reduction objectives.

1886 **Wealth Tax Revenue.** To estimate the revenue from a global tax on wealth above \$5
1887 million at a rate of 2% (Section II.B., Questions 24-25), I use the distribution of net wealth
1888 by country in current dollar for 2022 from the World Inequality Database. I assume that
1889 the taxable base is reduced by 30% due to tax avoidance and asset depreciation. I report
1890 expected tax revenue as a share of countries' 2023 GNI (from the World Bank). I also
1891 report the absolute revenue after converting them into LCU.

1892 **NCQG.** The sources used for the New Collective Quantified goal of climate finance for
1893 2035 (Section V.A., Questions 39-40) are the following: UNFCCC (2024) states the goal
1894 itself, OECD (2024b) provides figures on past achievements, Earth Negotiations Bulletin
1895 (2024) reports the positions of India and other countries, and Climate Action Network
1896 (2024); Demand Climate Justice (2025) those of NGOs. Note that the question wordings
1897 do not mention the gap between climate finance needs and the official goal identified in
1898 official reports (OECD 2024a; Songwe, Stern and Battacharya 2024), nor that existing plans
1899 by Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to ramp up climate finance would achieve
1900 most of the new goal (MDBs 2024).⁴⁸

1901 To express the NCQG as a share of developed countries' GDP, I use 2024 data from the
1902 World Bank on nominal GDP in high-income countries. This figure —of \$70 trillion— is
1903 conservative, since it does not account for growth or inflation until 2035.

⁴⁸ According to the OECD (2024b), MDBs contributed \$81 billion to climate finance in 2022 (both directly through finance provision and indirectly through mobilization of the private sector), with 71% (or \$58 billion) attributable to developed countries. Before the NCQG was agreed at COP29, they jointly stated that they will contribute an estimated \$185 billion in 2030 (including \$65 billion from the private sector). Assuming that this increase of \$104 billion is replicated in the period 2030-2035, MDBs would contribute \$289 billion in 2035, including \$205 attributable to developed countries, that is \$147 billion more than in 2022. As (multilateral plus unilateral) developed countries' climate finance totaled \$116 billion in 2024, adding the \$147 billion expected in their multilateral finance would achieve three-quarter of the required increase, at \$263 billion.

1904 **III.C. Exploratory Factor Analysis**

1905 To construct a latent variable of support for global redistribution, I proceed in three
 1906 steps. First, I standardize each variable of support by converting them into z -scores, by
 1907 subtracting the sample average and then dividing the result by the standard error. Both
 1908 the mean and the standard error are computed using survey weights on the global sam-
 1909 ple. Second, I run an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) with one factor, to obtain the
 1910 *loadings*, i.e. the weight of each variable in the latent factor (reported in Table S3). Third, I
 1911 average all z -scores, weighted by the loadings.

Table S3: Loadings from the Exploratory Factor Analysis

Variable name	Loading	
share_solidarity_diff	0.991	convergence_support
share_solidarity_ratio	0.926	reparations_support
share_pl_supported	0.901	how_agencies
share_solidarity_opposed	-0.852	how_govt_conditional
pl_support_loss_damage	0.800	sustainable_future
pl_support_ncqg_300bn	0.792	how Ngo
pl_support_foreign_aid	0.767	ncqg
pl_support_shipping_levy	0.759	global_movement_spread
pl_support_bridgetown	0.736 ¹⁹¹²	how_social_protection
pl_support_debt_relief	0.724	universalist
pl_support_un_reform	0.684	help_lic_duty
pl_support_aviation_levy	0.675	ncs_support
pl_support_billionaire_tax	0.670	help_lic_responsibility
pl_support_corporate_tax	0.669	global_movement_donate
top_tax_support	0.564	help_lic_interest
my_tax_global_nation	0.536	ncqg_fusion
vote_intl_coalition	0.533	global_movement_demonstrate
ics_support	0.522	how_local_authorities
global_movement_no	-0.522	how_govt_unconditional
wealth_tax_support	0.489	how_cash_unconditional
gcs_support	0.483	nationalist
help_lic_none	-0.46 ¹³	revenue_split_few_global
		global_movement_strike
		individualist
		humanist

1913 Note: Some variable names have been shortened: I shortened occurrences of `help_lic` into `why_hic_help_lic`,
 1914 `solidarity_support` into `pl_support`, and expanding `security_council` into `un_reform`.

1915

1916 The loading of a variable is similar to the average absolute correlation with the other
1917 support variables. Interestingly, the average absolute correlation of the latent indicator,
1918 at .54, is only marginally greater than that of share_solidarity_diff (the difference be-
1919 tween the shares of plausible policies supported and opposed), at .49, or that of the share
1920 of plausible policies supported, at .45. In other words, simple indicators based on the
1921 support or opposition to plausible policies capture attitudes towards global redistribu-
1922 tion almost as well as a sophisticated latent variable. [\(Back to Section V.A.\)](#)

1923 **III.D. Definition of Keywords**

1924 Below are the keywords used to classify the open-ended fields on top-of-mind con-
1925 siderations (Figure S1, Section II.A., Questions 19-22). The keyword search uses the R
1926 function grep1 and ignores case. The special character ^ indicates the start of the string
1927 and \$ the end. [\(Back to Section II.A.\)](#)

- 1928 • **Money; own income; cost of living; inflation:** money|inflation|price|wage|wealth
1929 |income|salar|finance|cost|financial|afford|illionaire|expensive;
- 1930 • **Relationships; love; emotions:** relationship|husband|wife|love|partner|emotion;
- 1931 • **Work; (un)employment; business:** business|work|employ|job;
- 1932 • **Poverty; inequality:** poverty|inequalit|poor|social justice;
- 1933 • **Global poverty; hunger; global inequality:** global poverty|global inequal|hunger
1934 |drinking water|starv;
- 1935 • **Health; healthcare system:** health|sick|disease|NHS|medica;
- 1936 • **Criticism of immigration; national preference:** migration|migrant|asylum|refugee
1937 |alien;
- 1938 • **Corruption; criticism of the government:** corruption;
- 1939 • **Environment; climate change:** environment|climat|pollution|warming|drought;
- 1940 • **Security; violence; crime; judicial system:** safe|murder|crime|criminal|fraud
1941 |rape|terrorism;

- 1942 • **Discrimination; gender inequality; racism; LGBT:** gender|raci|scrimination|women|xenophob|LGB|machism|antisemit;
- 1943
- 1944 • **Rights; democracy; freedom; slavery:** freedom|rights|democra|dictator;
- 1945
- 1946 • **Happiness; peace of mind:** happiness|happy|serenity|peace of mind|tranquility|inner peace|relax;
- 1947
- 1948 • **War; peace:** peace|war|WW;
- 1949
- 1950 • **Tax system; welfare benefits; public services:** tax|social benefit|social security;
- 1951
- 1952 • **Criticism of far right; Trump; tariffs:** Trump|AfD|populist|far right|radical right|extreme right|tariff| PiS |fascism;
- 1953
- 1954 • **Social division; fake news; (social) media:** social division|social cohesion|media|fake news;
- 1955
- 1956 • **Animal welfare:** animal;
- 1957
- 1958 • **Religion; sin; God:** religion| god|self injustice|self-injustice|theism|disbelief;
- 1959
- 1960 • **Housing:** hous|apartment|real estate|mortgage;
- 1961
- 1962 • **Education:** education|school|exam|universit;
- 1963
- 1964 • **Old age; retirement; ageing society:** old age|pension|retire| aging| ageing;
- 1965
- 1966 • **Family; children; childcare:** family|child|daughter| son|parent|mother|father|loved ones|kids;
- 1967
- 1968 • **International issues:** world|humanity|foreign|countries|Ukraine|Gaza|Palestin|Hamas|Israel|Yemen|Sudan|middle east|Iran|geopol;
- 1969
- 1970 • **Own country referred:** country|German|Saudi|France|French|Ital|Poland|Polish|Spain|Spanish| UK|U.K.|Great Britain|England|British|Japan|Russia|America|U.S.| USA|United States;
- 1971
- 1972 • **Nothing; don't know; empty:** ^nothing\$|^no\$|^.\$|^-\$|^do not have\$|^nothing in particular\$|^None\$|^I don't know\$|^I would not know\$;
- 1973
- 1974 • **Economy:** econom|growth;

- 1968 • **Media:** internet|media;
- 1969 • **Trump:** Trump;
- 1970 • **Tariffs:** tariff|customs dut|custom dut;
- 1971 • **Palestine:** Palestine|Gaza;
- 1972 • **Car:** car;
- 1973 • **Mental health:** mental |mental health;
- 1974 • **Sport:** sport|soccer;
- 1975 • **Holiday; travel:** travel|vacation|holiday| rest;
- 1976 • **Time; more free time:** time|leisure;
- 1977 • **Politics:** politic;
- 1978 • **Millionaire; billionaire:** illionaire;
- 1979 • **Inflation; cost of living:** inflation|rising price|cost of living;
- 1980 • **Abortion:** abort;
- 1981 • **Stock; investment:** investment|asset|stock;
- 1982 • **Birthrate:** birth rate|birthrate;
- 1983 • **Government; president:** government|president|PSOE|Sanchez|Sánchez|Liberal
- 1984 Democratic Party|LDP|Komeito|Tusk|Nawrocki| PO |Macron|Trump|Meloni|Starmer
- 1985 |Labour;
- 1986 • **Hunger:** hunger;
- 1987 • **Stability:** stability|stabl;
- 1988 • **Wage:** wage|salar;
- 1989 • **Youth:** young|youth .

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D Representativeness of the Surveys

Table S4: Sample representativeness overall, in Europe, and in the European Union.

	All			Eu			EU		
	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample
Sample size		12,001	12,001		5,000	5,000		3,705	3,705
Gender: Woman	.51	.50	.51	.51	.51	.51	.52	.51	.52
Gender: Man	.49	.49	.49	.49	.49	.49	.48	.49	.48
Income_quartile: Q1	.25	.26	.25	.25	.27	.25	.25	.26	.25
Income_quartile: Q2	.25	.24	.25	.25	.26	.25	.25	.26	.25
Income_quartile: Q3	.25	.24	.25	.25	.21	.25	.25	.22	.25
Income_quartile: Q4	.25	.26	.25	.25	.26	.25	.25	.26	.25
Age: 18-24	.10	.10	.10	.09	.10	.09	.09	.10	.09
Age: 25-34	.16	.17	.16	.15	.15	.15	.14	.15	.14
Age: 35-49	.26	.26	.26	.25	.25	.25	.25	.25	.25
Age: 50-64	.24	.23	.24	.25	.25	.25	.25	.25	.25
Age: 65+	.25	.24	.25	.26	.25	.26	.27	.25	.27
Diploma_25-64: Below upper secondary	.09	.08	.09	.13	.12	.13	.14	.13	.14
Diploma_25-64: Upper secondary	.31	.29	.31	.26	.26	.26	.28	.27	.28
Diploma_25-64: Post secondary	.29	.32	.29	.25	.28	.25	.22	.25	.22
Urbanity: Cities	.63	.52	.52	.41	.41	.41	.42	.44	.42
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs	.15	.17	.15	.36	.38	.36	.35	.34	.34
Urbanity: Rural	.20	.14	.16	.22	.21	.22	.23	.22	.23
Country: FR	.07	.07	.07	.18	.16	.18	.22	.22	.22
Country: DE	.08	.09	.08	.23	.21	.23	.28	.28	.28
Country: IT	.06	.06	.06	.16	.15	.16	.20	.20	.20
Country: PL	.04	.04	.04	.10	.10	.10	.13	.13	.13
Country: ES	.05	.05	.05	.13	.12	.13	.16	.16	.16
Country: GB	.07	.07	.07	.18	.17	.18			
Country: CH	.01	.04	.01	.02	.09	.02			
Country: JP	.13	.17	.13						
Country: RU	.14	.08	.14						
Country: SA	.03	.08	.03						
Country: US	.33	.25	.33						

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. Bold cells denote frequencies beyond $\pm 20\%$ of population frequencies. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

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Table S5: Sample representativeness in France, Germany, Italy.

	France			Germany			Italy		
	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample
Sample size		798	798		1,048	1,048		756	756
Gender: Woman	.52	.52	.52	.51	.49	.51	.52	.52	.51
Gender: Man	.48	.48	.48	.49	.51	.49	.48	.48	.49
Income_quartile: Q1	.25	.26	.25	.25	.27	.25	.25	.26	.25
Income_quartile: Q2	.25	.26	.25	.25	.27	.25	.25	.26	.25
Income_quartile: Q3	.25	.23	.25	.25	.20	.25	.25	.22	.25
Income_quartile: Q4	.25	.25	.25	.25	.26	.25	.25	.25	.25
Age: 18-24	.10	.11	.10	.09	.10	.09	.08	.08	.08
Age: 25-34	.15	.15	.15	.15	.16	.15	.12	.12	.12
Age: 35-49	.23	.23	.23	.23	.25	.23	.23	.23	.23
Age: 50-64	.24	.24	.24	.27	.27	.27	.28	.29	.28
Age: 65+	.27	.27	.27	.27	.22	.27	.29	.28	.29
Diploma_25-64: Below upper secondary	.10	.09	.10	.11	.11	.11	.22	.19	.22
Diploma_25-64: Upper secondary	.26	.26	.26	.32	.32	.32	.28	.28	.28
Diploma_25-64: Post secondary	.26	.27	.26	.22	.24	.21	.14	.17	.14
Urbanity: Cities	.47	.47	.46	.39	.42	.39	.36	.37	.36
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs	.19	.19	.19	.42	.42	.42	.46	.47	.46
Urbanity: Rural	.34	.33	.34	.19	.17	.19	.18	.16	.18
Region: 1	.18	.19	.18	.17	.19	.17	.66	.70	.65
Region: 2	.22	.23	.22	.29	.32	.29	.34	.29	.34
Region: 3	.11	.11	.11	.54	.48	.54			
Region: 4	.21	.22	.21						
Region: 5	.28	.26	.28						

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. Bold cells denote frequencies beyond $\pm 20\%$ of population frequencies. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

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Table S6: Sample representativeness in Poland, Spain, the UK, Switzerland.

	Poland			Spain			United Kingdom			Switzerland		
	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.
Sample size		500	500		603	603		826	826		469	469
Gender: Woman	.52	.53	.52	.51	.51	.51	.51	.50	.51	.50	.48	.50
Gender: Man	.48	.46	.47	.49	.49	.49	.49	.50	.49	.50	.52	.50
Income quartile: Q1	.25	.26	.25	.25	.28	.25	.25	.28	.25	.25	.30	.26
Income quartile: Q2	.25	.25	.25	.25	.27	.25	.25	.23	.25	.25	.28	.25
Income quartile: Q3	.25	.23	.25	.25	.21	.25	.25	.21	.25	.25	.17	.25
Income quartile: Q4	.25	.26	.25	.25	.25	.24	.25	.27	.25	.25	.25	.24
Age: 18-24	.08	.09	.08	.10	.11	.09	.11	.10	.11	.09	.10	.09
Age: 25-34	.15	.16	.15	.15	.14	.14	.17	.17	.17	.16	.18	.17
Age: 35-49	.30	.29	.30	.30	.27	.31	.24	.25	.25	.26	.27	.25
Age: 50-64	.23	.21	.23	.19	.22	.19	.25	.25	.24	.26	.24	.26
Age: 65+	.24	.24	.24	.26	.26	.26	.24	.24	.23	.23	.22	.24
Diploma 25-64: Below upper secondary	.04	.05	.04	.23	.18	.23	.12	.11	.12	.09	.06	.09
Diploma 25-64: Upper secondary	.38	.34	.38	.15	.15	.15	.19	.17	.19	.27	.29	.27
Diploma 25-64: Post secondary	.26	.28	.26	.27	.29	.26	.35	.38	.35	.31	.33	.31
Urbanity: Cities	.35	.37	.35	.54	.58	.54	.40	.36	.39	.30	.32	.30
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs	.28	.29	.28	.32	.30	.33	.42	.45	.43	.53	.54	.53
Urbanity: Rural	.37	.34	.37	.13	.12	.13	.18	.19	.18	.17	.14	.17
Region: 1	.47	.41	.47	.15	.16	.15	.13	.14	.13	.70	.70	.70
Region: 2	.53	.59	.53	.28	.25	.28	.31	.33	.31	.26	.26	.26
Region: 3				.14	.16	.14	.21	.17	.21	.04	.04	.04
Region: 4				.18	.19	.18	.24	.25	.24			
Region: 5				.25	.24	.25	.11	.10	.11			

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. Bold cells denote frequencies beyond $\pm 20\%$ of population frequencies. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

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Table S7: Sample representativeness in non-European countries.

	Japan			Russia			Saudi Arabia			USA		
	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.
Sample size		2,000	2,000		1,001	1,001		1,000	1,000		3,000	3,000
Gender: Woman	.51	.50	.51	.54	.52	.54				.50	.52	.50
Gender: Man	.49	.50	.49	.46	.48	.46				.50	.48	.50
Income_quartile: Q1	.25	.26	.25	.25	.19	.24	.25	.32	.26	.25	.23	.25
Income_quartile: Q2	.25	.24	.25	.25	.18	.24	.25	.23	.25	.25	.24	.25
Income_quartile: Q3	.25	.25	.25	.25	.27	.24	.25	.22	.24	.25	.27	.25
Income_quartile: Q4	.25	.25	.25	.25	.32	.24	.25	.23	.24	.25	.26	.25
Age: 18-24	.08	.08	.08	.09	.09	.09	.15	.16	.16	.12	.10	.12
Age: 25-34	.12	.12	.12	.16	.15	.16	.32	.35	.32	.17	.18	.17
Age: 35-49	.22	.23	.22	.30	.30	.30	.36	.37	.37	.25	.24	.25
Age: 50-64	.24	.24	.24	.25	.25	.25	.13	.11	.13	.24	.24	.24
Age: 65+	.34	.34	.34	.21	.20	.21	.04	.00	.02	.23	.24	.23
Diploma_25-64: Upper secondary	.26	.25	.26	.62	.62	.62	.15	.23	.16	.27	.27	.27
Diploma_25-64: Post secondary	.32	.33	.32	.28	.32	.28	.35	.50	.39	.33	.34	.33
Diploma_25-64: Below upper secondary				.10	.06	.10	.31	.11	.27	.05	.05	.05
Urbanity: Cities	.92	.92	.92							.76	.78	.76
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs	.08	.08	.08								.24	.22
Urbanity: Rural												.24
Region: 1	.17	.17	.17				.14	.06	.12	.17	.18	.17
Region: 2	.17	.18	.17				.34	.45	.35	.21	.21	.21
Region: 3	.34	.35	.34				.36	.36	.36	.38	.40	.38
Region: 4	.11	.11	.11				.16	.12	.16	.24	.21	.24
Region: 5	.20	.19	.20							.09	.07	.09
Gender_nationality: Woman, Saudi							.24	.31	.25			
Gender_nationality: Woman, non-Saudi							.10	.12	.11			
Gender_nationality: Man, Saudi							.24	.33	.27			
Gender_nationality: Man, non-Saudi							.41	.24	.37			
Race: White only										.58	.56	.58
Race: Hispanic										.20	.21	.19
Race: Black										.14	.15	.14
Race: Other										.09	.07	.09


Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. Bold cells denote frequencies beyond $\pm 20\%$ of population frequencies. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

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
1992 E Determinants of Support

Figure S68: Variance decomposition: share of the variance explained by each covariate ("Group defended when voting" is present only in bottom subfigures.).


(a) Support for the Global Climate Scheme (10% of the variable's variance is explained by this linear model). (Question 28)



(b) Share of plausible global policies supported (15% of the variable's variance is explained by this linear model). (Question 38)



(c) Support for the Global Climate Scheme (14% of the variable's variance is explained by this linear model). (Question 28)



(d) Share of plausible global policies supported (20% of the variable's variance is explained by this linear model). (Question 38)




Table S8: Correlates of support for global redistribution (multivariate OLS regressions).

	Share of plausible policies supported	Supports the Global Climate Scheme	Universalist (Group defended: Humans or Sentient beings)	More likely to vote for party in global coalition	Endorses convergence of all countries' GDP p.c. by 2100	Supports an international wealth tax funding LICs	Prefers a sustainable future
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Mean	0.508	0.554	0.454	0.365	0.61	0.704	0.681
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.015 (0.010)	0.008 (0.015)	-0.083*** (0.014)	0.029** (0.013)	0.041*** (0.014)	-0.026* (0.014)	-0.061*** (0.014)
Vote: Far right	-0.090*** (0.013)	-0.143*** (0.020)	-0.225*** (0.019)	-0.063*** (0.018)	-0.065*** (0.020)	-0.140*** (0.019)	-0.169*** (0.020)
Vote: Left	0.211*** (0.010)	0.170*** (0.014)	0.150*** (0.015)	0.257*** (0.014)	0.190*** (0.014)	0.184*** (0.013)	0.147*** (0.014)
Gender: Man	0.016** (0.007)	0.018* (0.010)	-0.044*** (0.010)	0.029*** (0.010)	0.009 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.043*** (0.009)
Age: 18-24	0.012 (0.014)	0.175*** (0.020)	0.104*** (0.021)	0.108*** (0.022)	0.109*** (0.020)	0.101*** (0.018)	0.062*** (0.019)
Age: 25-34	0.020* (0.011)	0.094*** (0.015)	0.075*** (0.016)	0.102*** (0.016)	0.046*** (0.015)	0.046*** (0.014)	0.027* (0.015)
Age: 50-64	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.036** (0.014)	-0.034** (0.014)	-0.033** (0.014)	-0.025* (0.013)	-0.021 (0.013)	-0.020 (0.013)
Age: 65+	0.041*** (0.012)	-0.020 (0.018)	-0.010 (0.018)	0.002 (0.017)	-0.021 (0.017)	-0.018 (0.016)	0.016 (0.016)
Income quartile: Q1	0.154** (0.061)	0.121 (0.091)	0.090 (0.092)		0.099 (0.082)	0.158* (0.088)	-0.030 (0.082)
Income quartile: Q2	0.171*** (0.061)	0.125 (0.091)	0.066 (0.092)	0.016 (0.015)	0.085 (0.082)	0.171* (0.087)	-0.021 (0.082)
Income quartile: Q3	0.161*** (0.061)	0.112 (0.091)	0.109 (0.092)	-0.009 (0.015)	0.076 (0.082)	0.140 (0.087)	-0.029 (0.081)
Income quartile: Q4	0.143** (0.061)	0.079 (0.091)	0.087 (0.092)	-0.032* (0.017)	0.024 (0.082)	0.080 (0.087)	-0.024 (0.081)
Diploma: Upper secondary	0.042*** (0.011)	0.001 (0.016)	0.018 (0.016)	0.036** (0.015)	0.029* (0.015)	0.022 (0.014)	0.022 (0.015)
Diploma: Above upper secondary	0.085*** (0.011)	0.026 (0.016)	0.025 (0.016)	0.079*** (0.015)	0.015 (0.015)	0.015 (0.015)	0.039** (0.016)
Urbanicity: Rural	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.054*** (0.015)	0.016 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.014)	-0.015 (0.015)	-0.021 (0.014)	-0.020 (0.015)
Urbanicity: Towns and suburbs	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.039** (0.015)	-0.022 (0.015)	-0.023 (0.015)	-0.016 (0.015)	-0.024* (0.014)	0.026* (0.014)
Will become millionaire: Likely	0.036*** (0.008)	0.070*** (0.012)	-0.001 (0.012)	0.039*** (0.013)	0.055*** (0.012)	-0.019* (0.011)	-0.019 (0.012)
Will become millionaire: Already	-0.020 (0.017)	-0.019 (0.023)	0.008 (0.024)	-0.058** (0.023)	-0.042* (0.023)	-0.236*** (0.023)	-0.047** (0.022)
Foreign born	0.065*** (0.014)	0.083*** (0.020)	0.088*** (0.021)	0.051** (0.022)	0.037* (0.020)	0.040** (0.018)	0.030 (0.019)
Observations	12,001	12,001	12,001	10,000	12,001	12,001	12,001
R ²	0.141	0.104	0.100	0.115	0.105	0.091	0.069

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Covariates omitted in the Table: *Country; Employment; Couple; Region; Constant*. Omitted variables are: *Vote: Non-voter, PNR or Other; Gender: Woman; Age: 35-49; Income_quartile: Q1; Diploma: Below upper secondary; Urbanicity: City*. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

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Table S9: Correlates of answers on custom redistribution (multivariate OLS regressions).

	Custom transfer (in % of world GDP)			Loses from custom redistribution		Satisfied with own custom redistr.	Has not touched the sliders	Touched the sliders and satisfied
Mean	5.138	5.443	5.809	45.596	47.417	55.945	40.609	39.818
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.098 (0.140)	0.046 (0.224)	0.073 (0.309)	-0.188 (1.221)	-4.590** (2.137)	5.296*** (1.363)	-0.663 (1.389)	3.201** (1.337)
Vote: Far right	-0.532*** (0.198)	-0.571* (0.298)	-0.816** (0.408)	-1.514 (1.699)	-5.659** (2.819)	5.180*** (1.882)	-0.442 (1.874)	3.801** (1.876)
Vote: Left	0.838*** (0.151)	1.027*** (0.228)	1.465*** (0.315)	3.837*** (1.235)	3.604* (2.118)	10.655*** (1.369)	-2.586* (1.393)	6.785*** (1.363)
Gender: Man	0.130 (0.103)	0.021 (0.154)	-0.066 (0.216)	0.594 (0.856)	1.305 (1.437)	14.488*** (0.944)	-9.003*** (0.960)	12.468*** (0.953)
Age: 18-24	0.440* (0.230)	0.381 (0.311)	0.356 (0.420)	5.203*** (1.774)	4.328 (2.703)	6.111*** (1.869)	-4.468** (1.920)	7.171*** (1.969)
Age: 25-34	0.084 (0.157)	0.115 (0.217)	0.109 (0.299)	-0.205 (1.304)	0.241 (2.051)	1.342 (1.403)	-1.653 (1.439)	2.230 (1.475)
Age: 50-64	-0.297** (0.142)	-0.500** (0.206)	-0.652** (0.286)	-1.761 (1.238)	-5.753*** (2.034)	-8.345*** (1.356)	5.846*** (1.370)	-6.881*** (1.363)
Age: 65+	-0.066 (0.179)	0.142 (0.296)	0.291 (0.424)	-1.220 (1.512)	-4.200 (2.745)	-12.927*** (1.713)	11.619*** (1.764)	-11.794*** (1.677)
Income quartile: Q2	-0.294** (0.148)	-0.351 (0.226)	-0.536* (0.318)	24.103*** (1.142)	25.065*** (1.966)	1.227 (1.333)	-0.627 (1.357)	1.091 (1.327)
Income quartile: Q3	-0.400** (0.157)	-0.559** (0.235)	-0.838** (0.330)	41.546*** (1.235)	36.022*** (2.098)	-1.066 (1.427)	-0.675 (1.444)	0.202 (1.417)
Income quartile: Q4	-0.910*** (0.168)	-1.030*** (0.252)	-1.506*** (0.356)	55.784*** (1.370)	47.659*** (2.306)	0.829 (1.560)	0.492 (1.598)	1.589 (1.572)
Diploma: Upper secondary	-0.034 (0.154)	-0.002 (0.244)	-0.032 (0.354)	0.042 (1.225)	-2.482 (2.214)	4.167*** (1.468)	-0.750 (1.495)	3.213** (1.416)
Diploma: Above upper secondary	0.074 (0.162)	0.077 (0.253)	0.053 (0.367)	2.772** (1.315)	1.238 (2.382)	4.277*** (1.537)	-3.900** (1.567)	5.666*** (1.486)
Urbanicity: Rural	-0.277* (0.161)	-0.214 (0.245)	-0.251 (0.338)	0.933 (1.293)	1.297 (2.154)	-2.899** (1.459)	-1.949 (1.458)	-2.878** (1.456)
Urbanicity: Towns and suburbs	-0.199 (0.171)	-0.097 (0.255)	-0.085 (0.358)	0.990 (1.324)	0.148 (2.199)	-0.537 (1.488)	0.163 (1.495)	-1.293 (1.482)
Will become millionaire: Likely	0.235* (0.130)	0.392** (0.186)	0.677*** (0.260)	2.006* (1.081)	1.359 (1.720)	6.105*** (1.172)	-0.230 (1.195)	1.806 (1.207)
Will become millionaire: Already	0.400 (0.257)	0.342 (0.391)	0.550 (0.564)	4.912** (2.043)	-2.519 (3.520)	-0.547 (2.243)	5.065** (2.319)	-3.604 (2.249)
Subsample: <i>Satisfied</i>	✓							
Subsample: <i>Touched & Satisfied</i>	✓							
Foreign born	-0.119 (0.197)	-0.372 (0.250)	-0.472 (0.369)	-2.265 (1.614)	-1.128 (2.608)	3.051* (1.810)	3.123* (1.867)	-0.312 (1.863)
Observations	10,990	6,148	4,374	10,990	4,374	11,000	11,000	11,000
R ²	0.023	0.030	0.042	0.266	0.195	0.092	0.038	0.059

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Covariates omitted in the Table: *Country; Employment; Couple; Region; Constant*. Omitted variables are: *Vote: Non-voter, PNR or Other; Gender: Woman; Age: 35-49; Income_quartile: Q1; Diploma: Below upper secondary; Urbanicity: City*. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

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1994 F The Determination of a Custom Redistribution

1995 In Question 55, respondents are asked for their preferred redistribution of the world's
1996 post-tax income. This custom redistribution is determined by modifying the current dis-
1997 tribution using the respondent's three input parameters:⁴⁹

- 1998 • The *proportion of winners*, i.e. the share of people (at the bottom of the distribution)
1999 advantaged by the custom redistribution;
- 2000 • The *proportion of losers*, i.e. the share of people (at the top) disadvantaged by the
2001 redistribution;
- 2002 • The *degree of redistribution*, ranging from 0/10 (no redistribution) to 10/10 (maximal
2003 redistribution).

2004 The determination of the custom distribution given these parameters relies on the al-
2005 gorithm *Dis/adv* introduced by [Fabre \(2022\)](#). In that paper, [Fabre \(2022\)](#) surveyed two
2006 representative samples of French respondents. The first survey uncovered the median
2007 preferred parameters for a national income redistribution.⁵⁰ The second survey showed
2008 that 52% supported the income redistribution defined using these parameters while only
2009 26% opposed it. Furthermore, a majority among the French respondents who expressed
2010 an opinion agreed that it is a good idea to "determine the citizens' preferred tax sched-
2011 ule from a survey and then submit the proposal that would emerge from the survey to
2012 a referendum." Therefore, the algorithm *Dis/adv* applied to median preferred param-
2013 eters has been validated both through the support for the resulting redistribution and
2014 through the support for such democratic method of preference aggregation to determine
2015 an income redistribution. Nonetheless, the algorithm *Dis/adv* is just a first attempt to ad-
2016 just the tax schedule by aggregating citizens' preferences, and more appropriate methods
2017 may be proposed. Although [Fabre \(2022\)](#) finds that the algorithm *Dis/adv* fares better
2018 than another algorithm tested, the method still suffers from some limitations. In par-
2019 ticular, the current method is difficult to understand for the users, and it only allows

⁴⁹Overall, 35% of the respondents did not move the sliders from their original position. Excluding the 39% of them who still state that they are satisfied with the redistribution does not change the results qualitatively. Indeed, the average responses are similar between satisfied respondents who moved the sliders and all satisfied respondents: the shares of winners or losers, the implied minimum income or transfer all differ by less than 8%. Therefore, I keep all satisfied respondents in the analysis.


⁵⁰The median preferred proportions of winners and losers were 50% and 10%, respectively. The median preferred degree of redistribution was defined indirectly, using the median preferred demogrant: €800/month. The resulting redistribution entailed 12% of GDP redistributed from the top 10% to the bottom 50%.

2020 for redistribution from the rich to the poor (it would thus be inappropriate if the level
 2021 of inequality were considered too low). Below, I describe the algorithm *Dis/adv*, avail-
 2022 able for use at bit.ly/custom_redistr, and implemented in the R function `algo_dis_av` at
 2023 github.com/bixiou/robustness_global_redistr/raw/main/code_robustness/2_prepare.R.

2024 **Algorithm Dis/Adv** It is worth recalling that over a range of income (concerning people
 2025 who are neither winner nor loser from the reform), both the current and custom distribu-
 2026 tions coincide. The algorithm proceeds as follows:

- 2027 1. Define the *extreme distribution* as the current distribution bounded by the income
 2028 thresholds of winners and losers. In other words, draw two horizontal lines at each
 2029 end of the distribution, by setting the incomes of winners to the income of the richest
 2030 winner, and those of losers to the income of the poorest loser.
- 2031 2. Compute what can be redistributed on either side as the area between the extreme
 2032 and current distributions: what can be given to winners on the left side (L) or taken
 2033 on the right side (R). If and only if what can be given is lower than what can be
 2034 taken ($L < R$, as in Figure S69), the left side is binding, and it determines the *amount*
 2035 *transferred* from the rich to the poor: $\min\{L; R\} \cdot \text{degree}$.
- 2036 3. On the binding side, define the custom distribution as a linear mixture between the
 2037 current and extreme distributions, with the mixture parameter set by the *degree of*

Figure S69: Algorithm for the custom redistribution, with parameters *winners*: 60%, *losers*: 20%, *degree*: 4/10.



2038 *redistribution*. In other words, starting from the current distribution, narrow the gap
2039 with the extreme distribution by a factor *degree*.


- 2040 4. Adjust the non-binding side by narrowing the gap with the extreme distribution,
2041 using the unique mixture parameter that preserves aggregate income (so that the
2042 amount transferred is the same on both sides).⁵¹
- 2043 5. [Optional step, used in the survey.] To increase the demigrant (i.e. the lowest
2044 income) and make the reform more progressive on the left side, try to replace the
2045 left side with a straight line. In other words, find the demigrant and the straight
2046 line between the demigrant and the threshold of winners that respects the amount
2047 transferred. If this straight line crosses the current distribution or if it implies a
2048 regressive redistribution (in that some incomes would increase less than higher in-
2049 comes), abandon the straight line and keep the custom redistribution as is.

2050 Once the custom redistribution has been determined, it is straightforward to compute
2051 the additional tax schedule required to attain it.⁵² Figure S70 presents the tax schedule re-
2052 quired to attain the average custom redistribution (weighted over all respondents). Figure
2053 S70 shows that (on the losers' side) this redistribution can be approximated by additional
2054 marginal tax rates of 7% above \$25,000 per year, and 16% above \$40,000. Figure S70 also
2055 compares this tax schedule with those associated with the radical income redistribution
2056 tested in Questions 45-46: While the average custom redistribution features a much larger
2057 tax base than the radical tax targeting the top 3% (as it taxes the top 28%), its top tax rate
2058 is three times lower, so that the two redistributions entail similar transfers from the rich
2059 to the poor, at around 5% of the world's income. (Back to Section V.D.)

⁵¹While we do not account for behavioral responses, one can adjust the algorithm to account for them. It suffices to define a post-reform aggregate income, which can be lower than the pre-reform one if the reform disincentivizes economic activity.

⁵²For a sophisticated calculation of the required tax schedule, which allows for behavioral responses and a gradual implementation, see Appendix IX of [Fabre \(2022\)](#).

Figure S70: Additional tax schedule associated with the radical and custom redistributions. (Questions 45-46, 55).




2060

(Back to Section V.D..)


G Comparison with Other Surveys

Figure S71: Comparison with similar questions in other surveys.

(a) Absolute support for an international 2% tax on billionaire wealth (cross-country correlation between this survey and [Cappelen, Støstad and Tungodden \(2025\)](#): .86). (Question 38)



(b) Relative agreement that “My taxes should go towards solving global problems” (cross-country correlation with [Global Nation \(2023\)](#): .70). (Question 61)



H Attrition Analysis

Table S10: sociodemographic determinants of attrition and exclusion. (Back to Section I.)

	Dropped out	Dropped out after socio-eco	Failed attention test	Duration (in min)	Duration below 6 min
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mean	0.166	0.102	0.088	53.896	0.087
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.046*** (0.008)	-0.040*** (0.008)	-0.007 (0.007)	-3.723 (10.677)	-0.027*** (0.008)
Vote: Far right	-0.055*** (0.010)	-0.049*** (0.010)	-0.011 (0.009)	-16.327 (15.607)	-0.022** (0.009)
Vote: Left	-0.032*** (0.008)	-0.026*** (0.008)	-0.013* (0.007)	-11.710 (10.647)	-0.043*** (0.008)
Gender: Man	-0.041*** (0.005)	-0.040*** (0.005)	0.024*** (0.005)	-17.884** (8.557)	0.005 (0.005)
Age: 18-24	-0.029*** (0.009)	-0.028*** (0.009)	0.027** (0.011)	-10.346 (11.025)	0.092*** (0.013)
Age: 25-34	-0.029*** (0.007)	-0.030*** (0.007)	0.021*** (0.008)	9.105 (13.496)	0.051*** (0.009)
Age: 50-64	0.011 (0.007)	0.010 (0.007)	-0.032*** (0.006)	13.629 (13.104)	-0.054*** (0.006)
Age: 65+	0.038*** (0.010)	0.037*** (0.010)	-0.055*** (0.007)	28.381* (14.773)	-0.099*** (0.008)
Income quartile: Q1	0.015* (0.008)	0.016* (0.008)	0.041 (0.029)	110.962** (48.477)	-0.002 (0.055)
Income quartile: Q2	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.011 (0.008)	0.001 (0.029)	107.759* (47.590)	-0.013 (0.055)
Income quartile: Q3	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.015 (0.029)	104.496** (52.198)	-0.015 (0.055)
Income quartile: Q4	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.018 (0.029)	139.207*** (51.961)	-0.035 (0.055)
Diploma: Upper secondary	-0.019** (0.008)	-0.018** (0.008)	-0.050*** (0.008)	12.642 (10.115)	-0.010 (0.008)
Diploma: Above upper secondary	-0.045*** (0.009)	-0.045*** (0.009)	-0.061*** (0.008)	-8.224 (11.372)	-0.016* (0.008)
Urbanicity: Rural	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.007)	-2.606 (8.635)	-0.004 (0.007)
Urbanicity: Towns and suburbs	0.008 (0.008)	0.008 (0.008)	-0.015** (0.007)	6.228 (16.432)	0.001 (0.007)
Foreign born	0.006 (0.010)	0.006 (0.010)	0.017 (0.011)	44.695* (24.418)	-0.029*** (0.008)
Country: Germany	-0.364 (0.262)	-0.362 (0.263)	-0.691** (0.332)	-19.841 (36.683)	-0.193*** (0.025)
Country: Italy	-0.138 (0.318)	-0.134 (0.318)	-0.684** (0.332)	640.179 (602.441)	-0.193*** (0.032)
Country: Japan	-0.334 (0.262)	-0.329 (0.263)	-0.716** (0.332)	-34.599 (30.589)	0.219 (0.195)
Country: Poland	-0.279 (0.261)	-0.276 (0.262)	-0.739** (0.332)	-96.647*** (36.916)	0.784*** (0.026)
Country: Russia	-0.355 (0.261)	-0.347 (0.262)	-0.664** (0.332)	117.725 (136.213)	-0.097** (0.043)
Country: Saudi Arabia	-0.093 (0.280)	-0.084 (0.281)	-0.271 (0.356)	-44.669 (41.881)	-0.299*** (0.036)
Country: Spain	-0.313 (0.261)	-0.311 (0.262)	-0.715** (0.332)	26.355 (34.327)	-0.304*** (0.027)
Country: Switzerland	-0.002 (0.025)	-0.001 (0.025)	-0.002 (0.020)	-3.527 (14.853)	-0.001 (0.020)
Country: United Kingdom	-0.278 (0.261)	-0.278 (0.262)	-0.841** (0.332)	9.534 (33.235)	-0.373*** (0.030)
Country: USA	-0.038 (0.025)	-0.032 (0.025)	-0.147*** (0.022)	-47.279* (25.547)	-0.130*** (0.021)
Observations	16,066	16,066	14,301	13,040	13,040
R ²	0.044	0.044	0.080	0.011	0.087

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table S11: Treatment effects on attrition.

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	Random branch:							
	Wealth tax coverage: Global	Wealth tax coverage: Int'l	Int'l CS coverage: Low	Int'l CS coverage: High	Int'l CS coverage: High color	National CS asked	Warm glow substitute: Control	Warm glow realism: Info treatment
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Mean	0.332	0.331	0.25	0.255	0.251	0.36	0.36	0.49
Dropped out	-0.038 (0.026)	-0.014 (0.027)	-0.024 (0.017)	-0.004 (0.017)	0.021 (0.017)	-0.004 (0.010)	0.003 (0.010)	0.006 (0.010)
Observations	14,609	14,609	14,968	14,968	14,968	17,150	17,150	17,150
R ²	0.0001	0.00002	0.0001	0.00000	0.0001	0.00001	0.00000	0.00002

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table S12: Treatment effects on attrition (continued).

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	Random branch:									
	Field: Concerns	Field: Injustice	Field: Issue	Field: Wish	Budget split: Few	GCS belief: Own	NCQG: Full	Sustainable Future: A	Income tax: top 1%	Custom sliders: Diffuse
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Mean	0.246	0.251	0.248	0.256	0.508	0.503	0.496	0.506	0.494	0.499
Dropped out	0.009 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)	0.001 (0.011)	-0.017 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.010)	0.009 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.010)	-0.050 (0.031)	-0.010 (0.010)	0.002 (0.010)
Observations	15,876	15,876	15,876	15,876	16,112	16,112	16,112	14,564	17,150	16,112
R ²	0.00005	0.00002	0.00000	0.0002	0.00002	0.00005	0.00003	0.0002	0.0001	0.00000

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

I Balance Analysis

Table S13: Balance analysis.

	Random branch:							
	Wealth tax coverage: Global (1)	Wealth tax coverage: Int'l (2)	Int'l CS coverage: Low (3)	Int'l CS coverage: High (4)	Int'l CS coverage: High color (5)	National CS asked (6)	Warm glow substitute: Control (7)	Warm glow realism: Info treatment (8)
Mean	0.332	0.334	0.25	0.256	0.252	0.36	0.358	0.489
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.001 (0.013)	0.018 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.013)	0.001 (0.012)	0.011 (0.012)	-0.013 (0.014)	0.003 (0.013)	-0.013 (0.014)
Vote: Far right	-0.026 (0.018)	0.016 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.017)	0.025 (0.017)	0.019 (0.017)	-0.008 (0.018)	0.019 (0.019)	-0.010 (0.020)
Vote: Left	-0.004 (0.014)	0.001 (0.014)	-0.004 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.013)	0.002 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.013)	-0.014 (0.014)
Gender: Man	-0.00003 (0.009)	-0.015* (0.009)	-0.013 (0.008)	0.005 (0.008)	-0.00005 (0.008)	0.001 (0.009)	-0.007 (0.009)	0.011 (0.010)
Age: 18-24	-0.009 (0.018)	0.007 (0.018)	-0.013 (0.017)	-0.001 (0.017)	0.007 (0.017)	0.009 (0.019)	-0.020 (0.018)	0.001 (0.020)
Age: 25-34	-0.024* (0.014)	0.025* (0.014)	-0.008 (0.012)	0.018 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	-0.003 (0.014)	-0.001 (0.014)	-0.011 (0.015)
Age: 50-64	-0.009 (0.013)	0.008 (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.016 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.012)	0.008 (0.013)	0.003 (0.013)	-0.009 (0.013)
Age: 65+	-0.013 (0.016)	0.031* (0.016)	0.011 (0.015)	0.030** (0.015)	-0.023 (0.015)	-0.014 (0.016)	0.020 (0.016)	-0.0004 (0.017)
Income quartile: Q1	0.007 (0.082)	-0.022 (0.084)	-0.086 (0.081)	0.058 (0.073)	0.048 (0.074)	0.085 (0.086)	-0.075 (0.085)	-0.034 (0.090)
Income quartile: Q2	0.001 (0.082)	-0.020 (0.084)	-0.086 (0.081)	0.040 (0.073)	0.040 (0.074)	0.082 (0.086)	-0.085 (0.085)	-0.046 (0.090)
Income quartile: Q3	0.009 (0.082)	-0.022 (0.084)	-0.081 (0.081)	0.044 (0.073)	0.048 (0.074)	0.075 (0.085)	-0.088 (0.085)	-0.030 (0.090)
Income quartile: Q4	-0.008 (0.082)	-0.010 (0.084)	-0.093 (0.081)	0.057 (0.073)	0.057 (0.074)	0.073 (0.085)	-0.074 (0.085)	-0.039 (0.090)
Diploma: Upper secondary	0.013 (0.014)	0.003 (0.014)	-0.0003 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.012 (0.013)	-0.013 (0.014)	0.018 (0.014)	-0.021 (0.015)
Diploma: Above upper secondary	0.030** (0.015)	-0.008 (0.014)	0.002 (0.013)	-0.015 (0.014)	0.020 (0.013)	-0.006 (0.015)	0.003 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.015)
Urbanicity: Rural	0.010 (0.014)	0.012 (0.014)	0.009 (0.013)	-0.013 (0.013)	-0.005 (0.013)	-0.003 (0.014)	0.012 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.015)
Urbanicity: Towns and suburbs	0.021 (0.015)	-0.015 (0.015)	0.008 (0.014)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.003 (0.013)	0.011 (0.015)	-0.015 (0.015)	0.004 (0.016)
Will become millionaire: Likely	0.016 (0.011)	-0.015 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.010)	0.014 (0.010)	-0.013 (0.010)	0.005 (0.011)	0.0002 (0.011)	0.006 (0.012)
Will become millionaire: Already	0.006 (0.022)	-0.010 (0.022)	-0.008 (0.020)	-0.001 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.020)	0.029 (0.022)	-0.005 (0.022)	-0.035 (0.023)
Foreign born	-0.010 (0.017)	0.017 (0.017)	-0.014 (0.016)	0.035** (0.017)	-0.012 (0.016)	0.014 (0.018)	-0.006 (0.018)	-0.014 (0.018)
Observations	12,001	12,001	11,993	11,993	11,993	12,001	12,001	12,001
R ²	0.006	0.006	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.021	0.025	0.006

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. CS: Climate Scheme. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

J Placebo Tests

Table S14: Placebo tests of treatments on unrelated outcomes (simple OLS regressions).

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme (1)	Supports the Int'l Clim. Sch. (2)	Share of policies supported (4)	Supports the int'l wealth tax (5)	Supports the int'l wealth tax (6)
Open-ended field variant: Injustice	0.001 (0.013)				
Open-ended field variant: Issue	0.018 (0.013)				
Open-ended field variant: Wish	0.031** (0.013)				
Revenue split variant: Many		0.006 (0.009)			
GCS belief variant: U.S.			0.003 (0.009)		
Warm glow variant: National CS				0.009 (0.007)	
Warm glow variant: Donation				0.007 (0.008)	
Int'l CS variant: High color					-0.019** (0.009) -0.010 (0.012)
Int'l CS variant: Low					0.007 (0.009) 0.004 (0.012)
Int'l CS variant: Mid					0.008 (0.009) 0.019 (0.012)
(Intercept)	0.543*** (0.009)	0.561*** (0.007)	0.665*** (0.006)	0.503*** (0.005)	0.509*** (0.006) 0.701*** (0.008)
Observations	11,839	11,000	11,000	12,001	11,993
R ²	0.001	0.00004	0.00001	0.0001	0.001

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table S14 shows that in two cases (out of thirteen), treatments are significantly correlated with unrelated outcomes later in the survey, with an effect size up to 3 p.p. While these framing effects are undesirable, their magnitude is limited. Indeed, the average value of affected outcomes always remain within ± 2 p.p. of the value it is estimated to have had if any treatment had been generalized.

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2065 K Main Results on Selected Demographics, Including Vote

2066 Figures S72 and S73 shows that polarization between left- and right-wing voters is
 2067 comparably high in Europe and the U.S. but almost non-existent in Japan, with Japanese
 2068 support comparable to the support among non-voters in Western countries. Interestingly,
 2069 although [Fabre, Douenne and Mattauch \(2025\)](#) exhibited much higher polarization in the
 2070 U.S. compared to Western Europe on similar questions (about the GCS, the globally re-
 2071 distributive millionaire tax, and universalism), in the current survey polarization has con-
 2072 verged in the two regions. More specifically, compared to early 2023, in Western Europe
 2073 (France, Germany, Spain and the UK), support has declined across the political spectrum,
 2074 but more so among right-wing voters. Meanwhile, in the U.S., support has increased
 2075 among Republican voters and decreased among Democrat voters.

Figure S72: [On selected demographics] Support for global redistribution action/policies.

	All	Millionaires	Europe Non-voters	Europe Left	Europe Center/Right	Europe Far right	Japan Non-voters	Japan Left	Japan Center/Right	Saudi Arabia	Saudi citizens	U.S. Non-voters	U.S. Harris	U.S. Trump
Supports the National Climate Scheme	68	58	64	80	64	47	69	69	70	88	91	64	79	50
Global climate scheme (GCS)	55	45	61	77	60	46	48	61	57	85	85	54	58	35
Supports int'l climate scheme (any variant)	66	58	67	85	71	55	61	75	69	88	91	63	75	43
Supports int'l tax on millionaires with 30% funding LICs (any variant)	70	43	72	89	68	59	60	74	68	83	83	69	79	50
Supports tax on world top 1% to finance global poverty reduction (Additional 15% tax on income over [\$120k/year in PPP])	56	39	58	81	50	48	36	51	45	68	74	50	64	37
Supports tax on world top 3% to finance global poverty reduction (Additional 15% tax over [\$80k], 30% over [\$120k], 45% over [\$1M])	50	32	51	72	50	44	34	46	31	67	74	46	57	34
Prefers sustainable future	68	62	68	83	70	54	74	81	76	72	70	67	78	43
"Governments should actively cooperate to have all countries converge in terms of GDP per capita by the end of the century"	70	50	79	88	75	66	73	73	69	93	94	69	69	44
Would support a global movement to tackle CC, tax millionaires, and fund LICs (either petition, demonstrate, strike, or donate)	68	52	71	89	64	58	43	70	58	73	74	64	83	47
More likely to vote for party if part of worldwide coalition for climate action and global redistribution	36	30	35	61	33	27	16	31	22	NA	NA	28	52	27
Supports reparations for colonization and slavery in the form of funding education and technology transfers	35	26	39	54	30	24	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	31	45	17
"My taxes should go towards solving global problems"	41	39	38	61	40	30	28	38	33	67	70	36	54	27

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Figure S73: [On selected demographics] Acceptance of plausible global redistribution policies (Percentage of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* among non-*Indifferent* responses).

	All	Millionaires	Europe Non-voters	Europe Left	Europe Center/Right	Europe Far right	Japan Non-voters	Japan Left	Japan Center/Right	Saudi Arabia	Saudi citizens	U.S. Non-voters	U.S. Harris	U.S. Trump
Minimum tax of 2% on billionaires' wealth, in voluntary countries	81	64	84	94	81	74	82	87	77	86	85	81	93	56
Bridgetown initiative: MDBs expanding sustainable investments in LICs, and at lower interest rates	79	74	77	93	86	63	77	86	80	87	87	78	92	52
L&D: Developed countries financing a fund to help vulnerable countries cope with climate Loss and damage	75	64	72	87	78	53	72	77	72	89	90	75	88	45
International levy on shipping carbon emissions, returned to countries based on population	70	60	70	87	72	56	57	64	59	81	84	68	86	47
At least 0.7% of developed countries' GDP in foreign aid	70	63	69	83	71	45	56	66	66	86	87	68	84	46
Debt relief for vulnerable countries, suspending payments until they are more able to repay	70	55	71	83	67	52	69	74	66	88	90	74	81	47
Expand Security Council to new permanent members (e.g. India, Brazil, African Union), restrict veto use	69	62	73	87	79	59	64	72	68	84	85	70	86	45
NCQG: Developing countries providing \$300 bn a year in climate finance for developing countries	68	55	67	85	71	44	51	66	60	86	87	67	83	34
Raise global minimum tax on profit from 15% to 35%, allocating revenues to countries based on sales	68	61	70	89	69	65	70	77	71	77	76	66	84	45
International levy on aviation carbon emissions, raising prices by 30%, returned to countries based on population	53	46	48	71	53	40	43	49	47	70	73	48	67	34

Figure S74: [On selected demographics] Average synthetic indicators of support for global redistribution. (Question 38). (Back to Section V.A..)

	All	Millionaires	Europe Non-voters	Europe Left	Europe Center/Right	Europe Far right	Japan Non-voters	Japan Left	Japan Center/Right	Saudi Arabia	Saudi citizens	U.S. Non-voters	U.S. Harris	U.S. Trump
Latent support for global redistribution (standardized)	0.00	-0.32	-0.01	0.64	0.03	-0.45	-0.32	-0.01	-0.20	0.49	0.57	-0.11	0.44	-0.70
Share of plausible global policies supported	0.51	0.51	0.49	0.72	0.56	0.42	0.29	0.46	0.41	0.64	0.68	0.42	0.64	0.35
Share of plausible global policies opposed	0.21	0.32	0.21	0.11	0.21	0.34	0.16	0.16	0.20	0.14	0.13	0.19	0.11	0.39
Difference between share of plausible policies supported and opposed	0.30	0.19	0.28	0.60	0.35	0.08	0.13	0.30	0.21	0.50	0.55	0.23	0.53	-0.04
Ratio of share of plausible policies supported over supported or opposed	0.70	0.61	0.70	0.85	0.71	0.55	0.66	0.73	0.66	0.80	0.82	0.68	0.84	0.49

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L Main Results Weighted by Vote

Figure S75: [Weighted by vote] Support for the National, Global, and International Climate Schemes (Yes/No question). (Questions 26-35).




Figure S76: [Weighted by vote] Support for an international wealth tax with 30% of revenue funding LICs, depending on the country coverage (Yes/No question). (Questions 41-43).




Figure S77: [Weighted by vote] Effect on the likelihood that a political program is preferred of containing the following policy (compared to no foreign policy in the program). (Question 23)




Figure S78: [Weighted by vote] Testing warm glow (negative effects would indicate the presence of warm glow).




Figure S79: [Weighted by vote] Acceptance of plausible global redistribution policies (Percentage of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* among non-*Indifferent* responses). (Question 38).

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	86	79	81	80	83	86	76
Minimum tax of 2% on billionaires' wealth, in voluntary countries	81	84	85	82	87	80	82	86	79	81	80	83	87	73
Bridgetown initiative: MDBs expanding sustainable investments in LICs, and at lower interest rates	79	82	79	80	86	71	80	84	75	80	83	87	87	73
L&D: Developed countries financing a fund to help vulnerable countries cope with climate Loss and damage	75	75	70	72	81	71	78	72	66	73	87	89	68	
International levy on shipping carbon emissions, returned to countries based on population	70	73	75	69	75	61	75	74	71	58	73	81	65	
At least 0.7% of developed countries' GDP in foreign aid	70	69	64	66	77	59	77	68	65	61	83	86	64	
Debt relief for vulnerable countries, suspending payments until they are more able to repay	70	70	64	58	80	79	72	74	64	68	75	88	66	
Expand Security Council to new permanent members (e.g. India, Brazil, African Union), restrict veto use	69	76	72	75	76	70	76	80	70	67	53	84	65	
NCQG: Developing countries providing \$300 bn a year in climate finance for developing countries	68	69	67	68	72	64	73	68	64	58	88	86	59	
Raise global minimum tax on profit from 15% to 35%, allocating revenues to countries based on sales	68	75	73	73	85	67	69	74	63	73	50	77	63	
International levy on aviation carbon emissions, raising prices by 30%, returned to countries based on population	53	55	61	54	52	48	51	51	50	46	51	70	48	

Figure S80: [Weighted by vote] Support for broad action or radical proposals of global redistribution. (Questions 44-46, 49-51, 53, 61).

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Accepts tax on world top 1% to finance global poverty reduction (Additional 15% tax on income over [\$120k/year in PPP])	69	73	71	72	83	70	70	67	60	68	75	82	60
Accepts tax on world top 3% to finance global poverty reduction (Additional 15% tax over [\$80k], 30% over [\$120k], 45% over [\$1M])	64	66	67	61	66	68	66	67	44	56	76	82	57
Prefers sustainable future	68	70	72	70	76	58	73	68	66	76	69	72	62
"Governments should actively cooperate to have all countries converge in terms of GDP per capita by the end of the century"	70	78	77	76	87	85	84	66	66	70	78	93	56
Would support a global movement to tackle CC, tax millionaires, and fund LICs (either petition, demonstrate, strike, or donate)	68	72	70	69	82	71	74	68	63	56	56	73	67
More likely to vote for party if part of worldwide coalition for climate action and global redistribution	68	72	72	71	82	64	77	69	57	56	NA	NA	67
Accepts reparations for colonization and slavery in the form of funding education and technology transfers	45	50	44	44	69	NA	51	46	NA	NA	NA	NA	40
"My taxes should go towards solving global problems"	59	61	43	62	77	63	70	58	53	59	57	89	55

M Main Results on the Extended Sample

Figure S81: [Extended sample] Support for the National, Global, and International Climate Schemes (Yes/No question). (Questions 26-35).




Figure S82: [Extended sample] Support for an international wealth tax with 30% of revenue funding LICs, depending on the country coverage (Yes/No question). (Questions 41-43).




Figure S83: [Extended sample] Effect on the likelihood that a political program is preferred of containing the following policy (compared to no foreign policy in the program). (Question 23)




Figure S84: [Extended sample] Testing warm glow (negative effects would indicate the presence of warm glow).




Figure S85: [Extended sample] Acceptance of plausible global redistribution policies (Percentage of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* among non-*Indifferent* responses). (Question 38).

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Minimum tax of 2% on billionaires' wealth, in voluntary countries	80	83	86	82	86	77	82	83	77	77	79	81	76
Bridgetown initiative: MDBs expanding sustainable investments in LICs, and at lower interest rates	77	80	79	78	86	70	82	82	75	73	82	85	72
L&D: Developed countries financing a fund to help vulnerable countries cope with climate Loss and damage	74	74	71	72	83	71	78	72	65	68	85	85	68
Expand Security Council to new permanent members (e.g. India, Brazil, African Union), restrict veto use	70	75	72	75	80	72	78	76	69	62	54	79	66
Debt relief for vulnerable countries, suspending payments until they are more able to repay	70	69	63	60	80	77	73	71	63	65	74	85	65
International levy on shipping carbon emissions, returned to countries based on population	69	72	77	69	77	62	75	74	70	55	72	79	66
At least 0.7% of developed countries' GDP in foreign aid	69	68	65	67	77	57	78	66	62	60	81	84	65
Raise global minimum tax on profit from 15% to 35%, allocating revenues to countries based on sales	68	72	75	72	82	66	72	73	59	66	48	76	65
NCQG: Developing countries providing \$300 bn a year in climate finance for developing countries	68	68	67	69	75	63	74	66	63	56	86	82	61
International levy on aviation carbon emissions, raising prices by 30%, returned to countries based on population	55	55	60	54	56	53	57	55	51	46	51	70	52

Figure S86: [Extended sample] Support for broad action or radical proposals of global redistribution. (Questions 44-46, 49-51, 53, 61).

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Accepts tax on world top 1% to finance global poverty reduction (Additional 15% tax on income over [\$120k/year in PPP])	69	71	69	72	82	69	73	68	61	67	73	82	61
Accepts tax on world top 3% to finance global poverty reduction (Additional 15% tax over [\$80k], 30% over [\$120k], 45% over [\$1M])	65	65	70	63	71	70	67	69	41	55	75	82	59
Prefers sustainable future	66	68	70	68	73	57	73	67	66	71	69	67	60
"Governments should actively cooperate to have all countries converge in terms of GDP per capita by the end of the century"	71	76	76	74	86	83	83	65	66	66	77	92	56
Would support a global movement to tackle CC, tax millionaires, and fund LICs (either petition, demonstrate, strike, or donate)	61	67	67	67	74	65	72	64	60	51	51	56	61
More likely to vote for party if part of worldwide coalition for climate action and global redistribution	66	71	71	71	80	65	77	69	59	52	NA	NA	67
Accepts reparations for colonization and slavery in the form of funding education and technology transfers	46	50	44	44	69	NA	51	46	NA	NA	NA	NA	41
"My taxes should go towards solving global problems"	62	61	44	63	77	64	71	58	53	60	58	88	57

N Influence of the Item Order on Answers

Table S15: Influence of the item order on answers.

(Back to Section I.)

	Prefers Sustain. future	Finds Uncond. cash transfers Right	Agrees it is HIC's duty to help LICs	Understood Global Clim. Sch.	Preferred NCQG $\geq \$100$ bn	Pref. NCQG $\geq \$100$ bn (variant <i>Short</i>)	Supports a plausible policy	Allocates $\geq 15\%$ to spending item
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Scenario A = Sustainable	0.036*** (0.009)							
Cash transfers first item		-0.140*** (0.009)						
Duty last item			-0.049*** (0.010)					
Correct answer first item				0.050*** (0.008)				
Variant: <i>Short</i>					-0.076*** (0.009)			
Items in increasing order						-0.092*** (0.013)		
That item is the first one							-0.024*** (0.005)	
Order of the item: 2								-0.020** (0.008)
Order of the item: 3								-0.040*** (0.008)
Order of the item: 4								-0.064*** (0.008)
Order of the item: 5								-0.071*** (0.008)
Constant	0.662*** (0.006)	0.396*** (0.006)	0.554*** (0.006)	0.713*** (0.006)	0.638*** (0.007)	0.608*** (0.009)	0.511*** (0.002)	0.592*** (0.006)
Observations	12,001	12,001	11,000	12,001	11,000	5,476	110,000	37,088
R ²	0.001	0.022	0.002	0.003	0.006	0.009	0.0002	0.003

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

O Supplementary Tables

Table S16: Support for an International Climate Scheme depending on country coverage.
(Back to Section III.A..)

	Supports the International Climate Scheme												
	All	Europe	FR	DE	IT	PL	ES	GB	CH	JP	RU	SA	US
Variant: High Color	-6.610*** (1.344)	-5.372*** (1.917)	-14.437*** (4.634)	-9.561** (3.946)	0.328 (4.368)	-13.170** (6.072)	3.570 (5.253)	2.012 (4.859)	-11.681* (6.130)	-7.254** (2.948)	-6.131 (4.626)	-3.512 (4.130)	-8.161*** (2.481)
Variant: Low	-3.789*** (1.333)	-4.520** (1.877)	0.221 (4.392)	-14.023*** (4.000)	4.404 (4.073)	-10.900* (5.788)	-3.060 (5.271)	-1.939 (4.766)	-13.109** (6.178)	-4.559 (2.944)	-2.570 (4.774)	-3.028 (3.775)	-4.275* (2.503)
Variant: Mid	-1.354 (1.333)	-0.185 (1.871)	1.200 (4.385)	-5.431 (3.993)	3.302 (4.028)	-17.458*** (6.354)	3.772 (5.216)	5.861 (4.726)	-10.552* (6.368)	-3.660 (2.944)	4.728 (4.447)	-3.323 (3.749)	-5.145** (2.561)
Observations	11,993	4,996	798	1,047	756	500	602	826	467	1,997	1,001	999	3,000
R ²	0.003	0.003	0.021	0.013	0.002	0.017	0.004	0.004	0.012	0.003	0.007	0.002	0.004

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) are reported in parentheses.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table S17: Support for an international wealth tax depending on country coverage.
(Back to Section III.B..)

	Supports the International Wealth Tax												
	All	Europe	FR	DE	IT	PL	ES	GB	CH	JP	RU	SA	US
Variant: Global	0.046*** (0.011)	0.063*** (0.016)	0.090** (0.036)	0.045 (0.033)	0.050 (0.036)	0.132*** (0.049)	0.066 (0.046)	0.007 (0.040)	0.137** (0.057)	0.071*** (0.025)	0.078** (0.035)	0.011 (0.037)	0.005 (0.021)
Variant: Int'l	-0.010 (0.011)	0.001 (0.016)	0.001 (0.039)	-0.035 (0.035)	0.008 (0.036)	-0.098* (0.054)	0.082* (0.047)	0.008 (0.040)	0.045 (0.057)	-0.051* (0.027)	0.042 (0.037)	-0.008 (0.036)	-0.025 (0.021)
Observations	12,001	5,000	798	1,048	756	500	603	826	469	2,000	1,001	1,000	3,000
R ²	0.003	0.004	0.010	0.005	0.003	0.040	0.006	0.0001	0.014	0.011	0.005	0.0004	0.001

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) are reported in parentheses.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table S18: Effect on the likelihood that a political program is preferred of containing the following policies (compared to no foreign policy in the program). (Back to Section IV.A..)

	Program is preferred										
	All	Europe	FR	DE	IT	PL	ES	GB	CH	JP	RU
Cut aid	0.043*** (0.009)	0.047*** (0.013)	0.013 (0.029)	0.057** (0.027)	0.044 (0.032)	0.050 (0.038)	0.079** (0.037)	0.046 (0.031)	0.013 (0.041)	0.033* (0.019)	0.044*** (0.015)
Int'l tax	-0.037*** (0.009)	-0.033*** (0.012)	0.010 (0.030)	-0.032 (0.026)	-0.109*** (0.030)	-0.055 (0.038)	-0.066* (0.034)	0.008 (0.030)	0.094** (0.042)	-0.004 (0.019)	-0.053*** (0.015)
Foreign3	-0.015* (0.008)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.043 (0.026)	0.013 (0.024)	-0.024 (0.029)	0.005 (0.037)	-0.002 (0.034)	0.031 (0.029)	0.060 (0.038)	-0.001 (0.018)	-0.035** (0.014)
Observations	20,000	10,000	1,596	2,096	1,512	1,000	1,206	1,652	938	4,000	6,000
R ²	0.004	0.003	0.002	0.004	0.014	0.006	0.011	0.002	0.009	0.001	0.006

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) are reported in parentheses.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table S19: Effect of a *Donation lottery* treatment on support for the Global Climate Scheme. (Questions 27-28) (Back to Section IV.B..)

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme										
	All	Europe	FR	DE	IT	PL	ES	GB	CH	JP	US
Variant: Donation	0.028** (0.012)	0.054*** (0.017)	0.048 (0.041)	0.087** (0.037)	0.017 (0.039)	0.100* (0.055)	0.028 (0.048)	0.053 (0.040)	0.054 (0.055)	0.008 (0.027)	0.001 (0.021)
Constant	0.55	0.551	0.484	0.471	0.628	0.396	0.766	0.595	0.907	0.408	0.381
Observations	6,665	3,307	525	687	484	349	392	544	326	1,350	2,008
R ²	0.110	0.118	0.126	0.150	0.081	0.097	0.136	0.250	0.137	0.041	0.140

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) are reported in parentheses.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Control variables (omitted in the table) are: *vote, gender, age, income, education, urbanity, likelihood of becoming millionaire, living with partner, employment status, foreign born, country region*.

Table S20: Effect of information about ongoing global redistribution initiatives on the share of plausible global policies supported. (Questions 36-38). (Back to Section IV.B..)

	Share of plausible policies supported											RU	SA	US
	All	Europe	FR	DE	IT	PL	ES	GB	CH	JP	RU	SA	US	
Info Treatment	0.013** (0.007)	0.018* (0.009)	0.003 (0.023)	0.039** (0.019)	0.027 (0.023)	0.005 (0.029)	0.058** (0.029)	-0.002 (0.023)	-0.011 (0.030)	0.013 (0.013)	-0.014 (0.022)	-0.024 (0.025)	0.020 (0.012)	
Constant	0.23	0.411	0.517	0.338	0.517	0.359	0.469	0.444	0.579	0.181	0.215	0.328	0.314	
Observations	12,001	5,000	798	1,048	756	500	603	826	469	2,000	1,001	1,000	3,000	
R ²	0.141	0.152	0.139	0.234	0.136	0.153	0.180	0.215	0.190	0.096	0.062	0.180	0.181	

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) are reported in parentheses.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Control variables (omitted in the table) are: *vote, gender, age, income, education, urbanity, likelihood of becoming millionaire, living with partner, employment status, foreign born, country region*.

Table S21: Effect on support for global redistribution of believing that it is likely, without control
 (Back to Section IV.B..)

	Believes global redistr. likely IV 1st Stage	Share of plausible global policies supported		
		IV 2nd Stage	OLS	Direct Effect
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Information treatment	0.077 (0.010)			0.011 (0.007)
Believes global redistr. likely		0.141 (0.088)	0.150 (0.007)	
(Intercept)	0.332 (0.007)	0.456 (0.033)	0.453 (0.004)	0.503 (0.005)
Effective F-statistic	65.04			
Observations	12,001	12,001	12,001	12,001
R ²	0.006	0.043	0.043	0.0002

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) are reported in parentheses.

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