

# Public Acceptance of International Redistribution in High-Income Countries

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## Abstract

Using an original survey of 12,000 respondents representative of eleven high-income countries (the United States, Japan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and seven European countries), I examine public support for international redistribution and climate policies, as well as its sensitivity to key policy features such as the size of transfers and country coverage. Although global inequality is not a salient concern, it is perceived as a significant injustice. There is majority acceptance in every country for nearly all global policies tested, including those that would redistribute 5 percent of global income or entail personal costs for respondents. An information treatment shows that support for global policies causally increases among respondents who perceive them as likely; an effect opposite to warm glow. Support for international policies decreases only slightly as country coverage shrinks. Overall, the results reinforce previous findings and suggest that a broad coalition of countries could feasibly advance sustainable development.

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## 1 Introduction

The issue of North-to-South transfers of resources and power permeates negotiations in many areas, including debt restructuring, development assistance, tax cooperation, UN reform, and climate finance.<sup>1</sup> In all international fora, Global South countries seek a more equal world order. Indeed, redirecting just 1% of high-income countries' output to low-income countries (LICs) would mechanically double their national income<sup>2</sup>, more

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<sup>1</sup>The (re)distribution of resources between countries is debated in different official fora, such as the G20, the OECD's Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project, the Conference on Financing for Development, the International Maritime Organization, the Global Solidarity Levies Taskforce, the UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation, and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Appendix C.1 provides references on official initiatives for global redistribution.

<sup>2</sup>The GDP per capita of high-income countries (HICs) is 28 times greater than that of low-income countries (LICs) at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) and 68 times greater in nominal terms, from World Bank 2024 data. Given that 625 million people live in one of the 25 low-income countries and 1.42 billion people in high-income countries, 1% of HICs' GDP corresponds to 60% of LICs' GDP using PPP values and 153% using nominal data.

than enough to finance the eradication of extreme poverty (Sahoo et al. 2025).

Public attitudes in high-income countries (HICs) are key to understanding whether globally redistributive policies would be politically feasible. Recent large-scale surveys reveal worldwide support for a globally coordinated tax on billionaires (Cappelen et al. 2025b), a democratic world government for global issues (Ghassim & Pauli 2024), climate action at the global (rather than national) level (Dechezleprêtre et al. 2025), as well as globally redistributive climate or tax policies (Fabre et al. 2025).

Despite strong stated support even in HICs, international redistribution is rarely discussed in public debates, let alone advocated by policymakers. Fabre et al. (2025) conduct survey experiments in the U.S. and four Western European countries to understand this mismatch, focusing on a “Global Climate Scheme” (GCS) costly to these countries. The authors reject hypotheses that support for the GCS might be overstated: they find no social desirability bias in a list experiment, 6 out of 10 respondents prefer a political program that includes the GCS over one that does not, and most respondents are willing to sign a petition in favor of the GCS. While the authors find support reduced by 11 percentage points (p.p.) following a (fictitious) negative media campaign —an effect size similar to the actual decrease in support for the “Green New Deal” after it was publicly debated (Gustafson et al. 2019)—a campaign effect of this magnitude would not generate majority opposition to policies favored by three-quarters of the population, such as a globally redistributive wealth tax. Therefore, Fabre et al. (2025) conclude that support for global redistribution is genuine, and another hypothesis is needed to explain the lack of prominence of this issue. A promising candidate is “pluralistic ignorance”: the underestimation of public support. Indeed, pluralistic ignorance has been documented regarding climate action (Andre et al. 2024a,b; Mildenberger & Tingley 2019), the billionaire tax (Cappelen et al. 2025b), and the GCS (Fabre et al. 2025). Nevertheless, pluralistic ignorance has not prevented climate policies or a national wealth tax from entering public debates, suggesting that other mechanisms may be at play concerning global redistribution.

In this paper, I conduct a pre-registered large-scale survey to examine whether global redistribution policies are robustly accepted and to investigate the reasons for their lack of prominence. I test several hypotheses. Surveying eleven HICs, I test whether international policies are accepted by majorities in countries considered conservative and not yet surveyed on this topic, such as Japan, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Switzerland. Recognizing that some key countries would likely not participate if these policies were implemented, I test how acceptance is affected when a climate scheme or a wealth tax is

international but not truly global. I explore three potential mechanisms that could explain the preference–prominence gap. First, I test for pluralistic ignorance. Second, I analyze the salience of global redistribution, and whether it is a vote-determining issue. Third, I test for “warm glow”, whereby people delude themselves into supporting hypothetical policies in order to ease their conscience, notably by testing whether the support is only claimed for as long as the policies are deemed unlikely. Finally, I explore a variety of international policies, ranging from the plausible to the radical.

Throughout the paper, I make a distinction between *support* and *acceptance*. I use the term *support* to refer to the absolute share of *Somewhat* or *Strong support* on Likert scales, and *acceptance* to refer to relative support —specifically, the support share among non-*Indifferent* responses. Although binary (Yes/No) questions are typically worded in terms of “support”, I generally report their results using the term *acceptance*. This approach avoids mistaking passive consent for active support among respondents who could not choose a neutral option.

The results confirm earlier studies: I find majority acceptance in every country surveyed for almost all globally redistributive policies tested. Policies currently discussed in international negotiations are accepted by large majorities. The most supported policy is the 2% tax on billionaire wealth proposed by Zucman (2024), with 81% acceptance in the pooled sample. Proposals such as debt relief for vulnerable countries, developed countries contributing 0.7% of their GDP in foreign aid, an expansion of the UN Security Council, or the Bridgetown initiative (expanding sustainable investments at low interests rates in LICs) all garner at least 70% acceptance overall.

Radical proposals are also widely accepted. Majorities in every country agree that “governments should actively cooperate to have all countries converge in terms of GDP per capita by the end of the century”, and that globally coordinated climate policies are preferable to the status quo, even if they entail completely electrifying cars by 2045 and doubling the prices of heating fuel, flights, and beef. Overall, I find 64% acceptance for a progressive income tax that would finance poverty reduction in the Global South, which would collect 5% of world income from the global top 3%, with marginal tax rates ranging from 15% above \$80,000 per year to 45% above \$1 million. Relatedly, in an interactive task where respondents design their preferred global income redistribution, nearly half choose a redistribution that would make them poorer (versus less than 10% choosing one that would make them richer). The average custom redistribution entails over 5% of world income in transfers from the rich to the poor.

Before respondents could infer the survey's topic, they had to complete an open-ended field, a conjoint experiment, and a budget allocation task. When asked to allocate the revenue from a global wealth tax among five spending items, 87% of respondents allocate a positive amount to the global item (public services in LICs). This item receives an average preferred share of 17.5% of the revenue, slightly below an equal split of 20%. This indicates that most people prioritize sustainable development abroad less than the average issue, but still consider it worthwhile.

While policies to address global inequality are widely accepted, they have low salience. Indeed, this topic is rarely mentioned in open-ended fields at the beginning of the survey, where respondents were asked to write about various considerations. Respondents' top concern is the cost of living, and their most frequent wish is for greater purchasing power. While inequality is most often regarded as the greatest injustice—with some inconclusive indications that these responses relate to inequality at the global level—global inequality almost never appears among issues respondents consider important but neglected in public debate. The low priority placed on global redistribution may explain why it is seldom discussed in public debates, despite widespread acceptance of related policies.

Despite its low salience, global redistribution may be a vote-determining issue for some people, as the conjoint experiment suggests. In this task, respondents express their preference between two political programs, each composed of policies randomly selected from those prominently debated in their country. When a program includes a *global tax on millionaires with 30% of the revenue funding LICs*, the likelihood of that program being preferred increases by 5 p.p., while *cutting development aid* reduces it by 3 p.p. A direct question confirms that some voters might change their vote intention if a candidate campaigned on sustainable development: 36% of respondents report they would be more likely (versus 17% less likely) to vote for a party if it participated in a global movement for climate action, taxes on millionaires, and poverty reduction in LICs. In a related question, 68% of respondents (and 52% of the 561 millionaires<sup>3</sup> who responded) state they could actively participate in such a movement (either by signing a petition, attending a demonstration, going on strike, or donating to a strike fund).

What if a sustainable development policy is international but not global? Acceptance decreases only slightly. In the case of a wealth tax with 30% of revenue financing LICs, acceptance is reduced from 74% to 68% when the policy is implemented only by some

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<sup>3</sup>Millionaire is understood as having a net wealth of at least one million dollar or the equivalent in other currencies, cf. Question 15.

countries (e.g. the EU, the UK, and Brazil) rather than all countries. Likewise, acceptance of an International Climate Scheme (ICS), defined as a cap-and-trade with equal per capita allocation of emissions rights, decreases from 68% to 65% when participating countries shrink from a group covering 72% of world emissions to one covering 33% of emissions.

I identify pluralistic ignorance through an incentivized question that asks respondents for their belief regarding support for the Global (version of the) Climate Scheme, either among their compatriots or in the U.S. In Japan and in European countries, there is majority support for the GCS, yet most people believe there is not. Overall, the median respondent underestimates support in their own country by 16 p.p. and non-American respondents underestimate support in the U.S. by 22 p.p. Pluralistic ignorance may be an important reason why global solidarity solutions are neglected.

To test whether support might drop if the prospect of global policies materializes (a form of *warm glow*), I manipulate the belief that large international transfers are likely in the next fifteen years. More specifically, I inform a random half of the respondents that “countries have agreed to demonstrate some degree of solidarity in addressing global challenges”, providing diverse examples including the adoption of a shipping levy at the International Maritime Organization that should partly finance LICs, developed countries’ commitments to finance climate action in developing countries, and the study by the G20 of a coordinated tax on billionaires. The information treatment increases the belief that transfers are likely by 7 p.p. from a baseline of 33%, and it also *increases* the share of global policies supported by 1 p.p. An IV estimation shows that the share of policies supported causally increases by 18 p.p. when people believe that international transfers are likely, consistent with the non-causal effect estimated by OLS. In other words, I find no evidence of *warm glow*. On the contrary, the effect goes in the opposite direction compared to the *warm glow* hypothesis: if people believed that a global policy were likely, they would be more likely to support it (which can be interpreted as a *status quo* bias).

Finally, I test respondents’ broad values to verify their consistency with global redistribution. The majority of respondents agree that “helping countries in need is the right thing to do”. However, only a minority is convinced that it is in HICs’ long-term interest to do so, or that it is their historical responsibility. Similarly, there is no majority support for reparations for colonization and slavery in the pooled sample. These results suggest that support for global solidarity is driven by a sense of empathy and duty rather than guilt or interest.

Universalism has been identified as one of the best predictors of voting behavior ([Enke](#)

2020) and ideology (Cappelen et al. 2025a; Enke et al. 2023), particularly in Western countries (Cappelen et al. 2025a). I use a new question to measure universalism, asking respondents which group they advocate for when they vote. 45% choose a universalist response (either “Humans” or “Sentient beings (humans and animals)”), while 32% opt for their fellow citizens. Using a variance decomposition, I find that universalism is a stronger predictor of policy attitudes than sociodemographic variables such as income, country, or even vote choice, echoing the results of Enke et al. (2023). Besides, there is a majority of universalists in Europe, Saudi Arabia, and among left-wing voters.

This observation aligns with the cross-national differences observed in synthetic indicators: Saudi Arabia, Italy, and Spain exhibit the highest levels of support for global redistribution, while Japan, Switzerland, the U.S., and Poland show the lowest.

By studying in depth the support for global policies, this paper departs from the usual methodological approach of attitudinal surveys. In general, academic surveys focus on estimating effect sizes of some treatment on political attitudes, or identifying the socio-demographic factors and the beliefs that correlate with attitudes (e.g. Alesina et al. 2018; Douenne & Fabre 2022; Kuziemko et al. 2015). The magnitude of support for a given proposal is often deemed unsuitable for satisfactory estimation, because such attitudes are viewed as weakly held, inconsistent, or unstable. The measure of support is usually left to non-academic pollsters, who rarely apply all academic best practices: transparency, representative sampling, neutral and precise question wording, comparison with existing literature, and the use of multiple questions and complementary methods to correctly interpret the results. However, although estimating the extent of support is challenging, this question seems too important not to be addressed using scientific methods. Furthermore, Ansolabehere et al. (2008) refute common perceptions regarding policy attitudes, showing that they are as stable and nearly as predictive of vote choice as party identification. In this paper, I examine support for various policies, approach the question from diverse angles, and run a battery of pre-registered tests to check the reliability of stated support estimates.

**Related literature.** Previous cross-country surveys consistently find strong public support for globally redistributive policies (Cappelen et al. 2025b; Fabre et al. 2025) or global democratic governance (Ghassim & Pauli 2024).

The first questions on respondents’ considerations contribute to an extensive literature in political science on “issue salience”—the priority attributed to a given issue. Is-

sue salience is now widely acknowledged as a key factor in determining voting behavior (Dennison 2019; Edwards et al. 1995; Egan 2013; Krosnick 1988; RePass 1971). Furthermore, according to open-ended responses, the “most important issues” relate to the economy and healthcare (Wlezien 2005). Although climate change and hunger appear in the top five problems when the question is framed at the global rather than national level (Yeager et al. 2011), public acceptance of sustainable development policies may be overshadowed by more pressing concerns in voters’ choices.

Although this paper focuses on multilateral policies, it relates to the literature on attitudes toward foreign aid. Kaufmann et al. (2019) and Fabre et al. (2025) find that, despite substantial overestimation of aid amounts, desired aid exceeds perceived aid in most countries. Hudson & van Heerde (2012) provide a critical review of the literature and show that the strong support for poverty alleviation largely stems from intrinsic altruism, in line with Eurobarometer data (Cho 2024).

Nair (2018) finds that US-Americans underestimate their rank in the global income distribution by 27 percentiles on average and overestimate the global median income by a factor of 10, which lowers their support for foreign aid. Similarly, Fehr et al. (2022) find that 9 out of 10 Germans express support for global redistribution, even though respondents underestimate their position in the global income distribution by an average of 15 percentiles.


Finally, the paper contributes to the literature analyzing dispositions towards free-riding on climate action and the ways in which support for climate agreements depends on their country coverage. Using conjoint analyses in Western countries, Bechtel & Scheve (2013) and Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer (2019b) demonstrate that climate agreements with broader country coverage are more likely to be preferred. In Germany and the U.S., Gampfer et al. (2014) also find stronger support for funding climate action in low-income countries when the cost is shared with other countries. Nevertheless, surveys consistently show that people support their country taking unilateral climate action, even in the absence of such action in other countries (Beiser-McGrath & Bernauer 2019a; Bernauer & Gampfer 2015; McGrath & Bernauer 2017). Aklin & Mildenberger (2020) show that the empirical evidence for free-riding is not compelling, and that climate inaction can be equally well explained by distributive conflicts. Still, survey evidence indicates some degree of conditional cooperation: support for domestic climate action increases if other countries join forces (Carlsson et al. 2025; Tam et al. 2025).

## 2 Data and Design

**Samples.** I conducted an original survey of 12,001 respondents representative of the adult population in eleven high-income countries (see Figure 1). The countries were chosen to span the diversity of high-income countries and the sample sizes to be commensurate with each country's population size.<sup>4</sup> The survey was fielded online in 2025 using the companies *Yandex* (for Russia), *Kantar* (for Saudi Arabia), and *Bilendi* (for the other countries).<sup>5</sup>

In Russia, I could not administer the same questionnaire as in the other countries.<sup>6</sup> I had to curtail it for two reasons. First, I could not use the platform *Qualtrics*, which prevented me from using certain question formats (such as constant sum scales) or embedding Javascript (used to design the interactive question). Second, I had to cut or reword some questions due to preventive censorship by the survey company. In the other countries, the questionnaires are almost identical, though the figures in the questions are adapted to the country-specific context (e.g. respondents are informed about the cost of the Global Climate Scheme to the average person in their country).<sup>7</sup>

Figure 1: Country coverage of the survey.



<sup>4</sup>The sample sizes are as follows: U.S.: 3,000; Japan: 2,000; Russia: 1,001; Saudi Arabia: 1,000; Europe: 5,000, split in proportion to the countries' adult population sizes (except for Switzerland), i.e. France: 798; Germany: 1,048; Italy: 756; Spain: 603; Poland: 500; Switzerland: 469. The maximum margins of error (at the 5% threshold) for country samples range from  $\pm 1.8$  p.p. in the U.S. to  $\pm 4.5$  p.p. in Switzerland, with an intermediate value of  $\pm 3.1$  p.p. in Saudi Arabia.

<sup>5</sup>For all countries except Russia, responses were collected between April 15 and July 3, 2025. For Russia, responses were collected between September 19 and October 9, 2025. Each complete response was rewarded with approximately €3 in gift points.

<sup>6</sup>To the best of my knowledge, *Toews & Suvorov (2025)* were the first to manage surveying the Russian public on climate attitudes.

<sup>7</sup>Appendix C.2 lists the unique features of the questionnaire in each country.

**Representativeness.** The samples are stratified to be representative of the country's adult population based on the following quota variables (with some exceptions<sup>8</sup>): gender, age (5 brackets), income (4), diploma (3), region (2 to 5), and urbanicity (2 to 3). The samples closely match the actual population frequencies along these dimensions, except for Russia and Saudi Arabia, where individuals without a high school diploma are somewhat underrepresented, as well as low-income individuals in Russia and non-Saudis in Saudi Arabia (see Tables S4-S7 in Appendix D). All results are reweighted to be fully representative of the population along the quotas, with weights trimmed between 0.25 and 4. Results aggregated at the global or European levels weigh each country in proportion to its adult population size. Descriptive results on a random branch use weights that are recomputed within that subsample.

Sociodemographic variables explain 10% to 15% of the variance in the main attitudinal outcomes, and this figure drops to 5% after accounting for country and vote (Figure S68). In other words, although variables such as age and diploma are significantly correlated with attitudes (see Tables S8-S9), differences in average acceptance of a policy between (say) age groups rarely exceed a dozen percentage points. In contrast, our measure of universalism is a stronger predictor than any sociodemographic variable.

While support for the main attitudinal outcomes is highest among left-wing voters and lowest among far-right voters, non-voters exhibit attitudes close to the center of the political spectrum (Appendix J). Besides, attitudes are much less polarized in Japan compared to Europe and the U.S. Figures S66-S67 show how the weighted samples compare to actual voting results in the most recent election. Although the proportion of self-reported non-voters is lower than in reality, voting patterns across the three main political leanings are similar to the actual distribution. Additionally, the main results are robust to reweighting by vote (Appendix K).

**Data Quality.** The median survey duration is 17 minutes (13 min in Russia). Best practices have been implemented to ensure top-notch data quality (Stantcheva 2023). The questionnaire was carefully worded in a neutral and informative way;<sup>9</sup> tested on random people in public spaces to ensure correct comprehension; translated by professional

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<sup>8</sup>In the U.S., I also use race (4 categories) as a quota variable. In Saudi Arabia, I do not use urbanicity, but I use citizenship (Saudi vs. non-Saudi). In Russia, I do not use region nor urbanicity.

<sup>9</sup>At the end of the survey, 70% of the respondents find the survey politically unbiased (Figure S62). The most common comment left by respondents in the feedback field is that the survey was "interesting"; very few criticize it (Figure S63).

translators, with figures converted into national currencies; and double-checked by native speakers.

Of all respondents who started the questionnaire, 23% respondents were allowed to continue (as their quotas were not full). Among them, 17% dropped out (including 10% who dropped out after the socio-demographic questions). The final sample is obtained after excluding 16% of respondents from the extended sample for suspicion of low quality: 9% for failing an attention test and 13% for completing the questionnaire in less than 6 minutes<sup>10</sup> (including 5% for both reasons). I check for differential attrition and finds no correlation of treatment arms with attrition (Appendix G). I also show that the main results replicate in the extended sample (Appendix L).

The order of question items is randomized whenever possible. Item order generally has a significant but small effect on answers (2 to 14 p.p.), as shown in Appendix M. The size of this effect helps identify questions for which opinions are strongly held (e.g. a preference for a sustainable scenario over the status quo) versus weakly held (e.g. the preferred amount of climate finance).

**Incentives.** The questionnaire includes three incentivized questions, each awarding a \$100 prize to one randomly selected winner. First, a comprehension question about the Global Climate Scheme (GCS) checks whether respondents understand the policy's cost. Second, a donation lottery allows respondents to choose what portion of the prize they would donate to a reforestation NGO, should they win. Third, a question assesses respondents' perception of the actual support for the GCS, rewarding a correct guess.


**Survey Structure.** While Appendix B provides the full questionnaire, Figure 2 depicts the survey flow with all random branches. The various treatments are independent and uniformly distributed. Whenever there is a treatment, the acceptance rates reported are computed using the control group. Appendix I runs placebo tests to check if earlier treatments affect unrelated outcomes.

After collecting sociodemographic characteristics, the questionnaire begins with broad questions to assess the prioritization and salience of global solidarity before respondents become aware of the survey topic. First, respondents answer open-ended fields on either their main concerns, wants, issues of interest, or perceived injustices. Second, they complete a conjoint experiment where they have to select their preferred political program,

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<sup>10</sup>6 minutes corresponds to 30% of the expected median duration of 20 min. In Russia, the cutoff is 200 seconds, or 30% of the expected median duration of 11 minutes.

Figure 2: Survey flow.



or abstain. Both programs are randomly generated: each policy (or lack thereof) in five policy domains is selected at random from a pool of policies that are prominent in the country's public debate. Third, respondents allocate the revenue of a global wealth tax among five (national or global) spending items.

Then follow attitudinal questions about the main policies studied: a *Climate Scheme* at the national, global, or international level; an international wealth tax funding low-income countries; and ten plausible global solidarity policies. These questions include treatments that vary the international coverage of policies or test for warm glow.

The final part of the questionnaire explores attitudes towards more radical global redistribution scenarios and includes more sophisticated questions, such as an interactive task in which respondents can choose their preferred custom redistribution of global incomes by manipulating sliders.

The survey concludes with a comprehension question, synthetic questions (e.g. regarding one's moral circle), and a feedback field.

**Pre-registered Hypotheses and Data Availability.** The project has been approved by the CIRED institutional review board (IRB-CIRED-2025-2) and preregistered in the Open Science Foundation registry ([osf.io/7mzn4](https://osf.io/7mzn4)). The study did not deviate from the registration; the questionnaires and hypotheses tests used are the ones *specified ex ante*. All data, code, and figures from the paper are available at [github.com/bixiou/robustness\\_global\\_redistr](https://github.com/bixiou/robustness_global_redistr).

## 3 Salience and Prioritization of Global Solidarity

In this section, I analyze the salience of global solidarity in undirected open-ended fields, and the prioritization of global programs in a budget allocation task.

### 3.1 Top-of-mind Considerations

At the beginning of the survey, respondents are randomly assigned one of four open-ended questions: their main concerns, their needs or wishes, an issue important to them but neglected in public debate, or the greatest injustice of all. The questions are deliberately broad and vague to let respondents express their top-of-mind considerations without any priming.

To analyze the answers, I automatically translated each field into English.<sup>11</sup> Then, I used AI and my own reading of a few hundred answers to identify the most common concepts, from which I selected 27 categories. Next, I classified each answer into one or more of these categories, both manually (Figures S4-S7) and automatically using AI (Figure S3). Finally, I manually defined a list of 47 (disjunctions of) keywords and used it to automatically classify all responses.<sup>12</sup> Figure S2 reports the 24 most common keyword matches.

The three different classification methods yield consistent results but differ in accuracy. While the keyword classification allows for an exact and reproducible search, the AI search is not limited to specific words and captures more matching responses. Overall, manual classification seems to provide the most accurate results, with a number of matches generally falling between those of the other two methods. For example, to the *injustice* question, 1.2% of answers match the keywords for *global inequality* and ChatGPT

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<sup>11</sup>I used [onlinedoctranslator.com](https://onlinedoctranslator.com), which is powered by *Google Translate*.

<sup>12</sup>The list of keywords is provided in Appendix C.3.

identifies this category in 7.5% of answers, versus 3.2% according to my manual coding.<sup>13</sup> Indeed, the AI incorrectly classifies unspecific answers like “poverty” in this category,<sup>14</sup> while the keyword search misses answers like “inequality among humans”. Given this observation, I use the manual classification as the benchmark and the two other methods as robustness checks.

While less accurate than the classifications, word clouds (Figure 3) provide a simple visualization of the most common concepts in each question. By far, the most frequent *concerns* or *wishes* of respondents relate to their purchasing power, with concepts such as “money”, “inflation”, the “cost of living”, or “financial stability” appearing in 31% of these fields. Within countries, the share of people concerned with money decreases with income: it ranges from 22% in the top income decile to 35% in the bottom one.<sup>15</sup> The next most frequent *concerns* are health (or the healthcare system, 13%), far-right governments (or related concepts such as “Trump” or “trade tariffs, 10%) and war (either in general or specific conflicts, such as the Gaza War, 9%). Most *wishes* are personal, with the next most frequent (after money) relating to one’s own or one’s relatives’ health (21%) or peace of mind (10%). Interestingly, almost none of the responses mention relational considerations, such as love, friendships, loneliness, intimate life, or the desire to have children (except in Saudi Arabia, where the latter was mentioned). Though the predominance of materialistic considerations is consistent with previous studies (Singer 2011; Wlezien 2005), further research is needed to determine whether this arises from the context (an impersonal survey) or truly reflects people’s primary thoughts.

Asked about the greatest *injustice*, the most frequent answers relate to “inequality” or “poverty”, with 19% of occurrences (28% in Europe but only 9% in the U.S.). It is unclear whether these respondents are thinking about inequality in their own country or at the global level, since only 11% of them specify a geographical scope. One clue is that 2% mention their own country versus 10% the global level (or Global South issues such as “clean water” or “starvation”). Italians, Poles, and Spaniards are the most likely to mention “global inequality” or “global poverty”, while Japanese and Russian respondents

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<sup>13</sup>The keyword matching searches the regular expression `global poverty|global inequality|hunger|drinking water|starv`, ignoring case. The automatic and manual classifications are based on the category definition “Inequality at the international level / Hunger or poverty in poor countries”.

<sup>14</sup>Interestingly, out of the 47 (one-word) answers “poverty”, (the zero-shot prompt passed to) ChatGPT-4.1 coded only 42 of them as *global inequality*, illustrating the lack of consistency of this classifier.

<sup>15</sup>At the country level, the concern for money is significantly correlated with inequality (an additional point in the Gini index is associated with 0.8 p.p. more respondents concerned with money). Interestingly, the concern for money is higher in richer countries, though the correlation vanishes once one controls for the Gini.

Figure 3: Most common concepts in open-ended fields. (Questions 19-22)

(a) "What are your main concerns these days?"



(c) "What according to you is the greatest injustice of all?"



(b) "What are your needs or wishes?"



(d) "Can you name an issue that is important to you but is neglected in the public debate?"



are the least likely to do so. The next most common answers relate to "discrimination" (based on gender, race, or sexual orientation, 9%), "violence" or "wrongful convictions" (many respondents denounce the unjust sentencing of innocents, 9%), or their country's "welfare state" (with people criticizing either the lack of public services or the excessive welfare given to undeserving people, 8%).

Asking people about “an issue important to them but neglected in the public debate” fails to uncover unusual topics. 21% of respondents are unable to identify such an issue. The most frequently mentioned concepts are “public services” (12%), the “cost of living” (10%), “health” (9%), “ageing” (6%), and the “environment” (6%).<sup>16</sup> The fact that the most frequently mentioned topics are already well-publicized suggests that public debate reflects or shapes what people have in mind.

Reading and coding each field not only results in an arguably more accurate classification, but also offers insight into how people think. For example, most people reason from their own perspective (e.g. “my pension is too low”, “I want to buy a house”) and do not refer to the broader picture or to political reforms. To get a sense of respondents’ own words, random selections of responses are displayed at [bit.ly/fields2025](https://bit.ly/fields2025). In addition to the manual classification presented in this section, I compiled a list of topics that are uniquely prevalent in each country, which I report in Appendix A.2.

The topics mentioned vary according to sociodemographic characteristics. For example, a respondent who mentions *immigration* is 3.5 times more likely to vote for the far right (correlation of .17); one who mentions *old age* is twice as likely to be 65 or older (correlation of .13). Beyond these examples, the strongest effects I find are that *criticizing the far right* correlates with voting for the left (.16), mentioning *health* with age (.11), *employment* with being unemployed (.09), *animals* with extending one’s moral circle to sentient beings (.09), *education* with being a student (.09), *the environment* with voting for the left (.08), and *money* with one’s income (−.08).

Our topic of interest, *global inequality*, does not emerge as an issue salient to most people. Indeed, most considerations relate to issues that directly affect oneself or one’s family, and political considerations (regarding e.g. public services, pensions, or taxes) are often framed at the national level. *Global redistribution* almost never appears as a *wish*. Furthermore, *global inequality* is rarely mentioned as a neglected *issue* or as a *concern*, in contrast to international issues such as war, climate change, or the rise of the far right. However, it is mentioned as frequently as these other international issues in terms of *injustice*.

In summary, the low salience of global solidarity may explain why this topic fails to mobilize political forces, despite being referred to as a just cause and it being accepted by majorities (as shown below).

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<sup>16</sup>Although “immigration” is one of the most frequent words according to the word cloud, the issue is only mentioned in 5% of cases.

## 3.2 Prioritization of Public Spending Items

Fabre et al. (2025) find that 58% of US-Americans and 71% of Western Europeans would support a global tax on millionaires funding low-income countries (LICs), with only 26% and 14% opposing it, respectively. Meanwhile, around half of them would prefer to allocate half (rather than none) of the revenue from a global wealth tax to LICs. It seems that the more leeway respondents are granted to allocate the revenue from such a tax, the less they would allocate to LICs. The greatest leeway tested by Fabre et al. (2025) let the respondents select their preferred share for LICs versus domestic healthcare and education, and the average preference was 33.4% —that is, 66.8% of an equal split. Naturally, one expects respondents to split the revenue among all desirable spending items, so if LICs compete with not one but several national items, the share allocated to LICs is expected to diminish. If this share is less than 67% of an equal split, it would mean that Fabre et al. (2025) overestimated the prioritization of LICs, perhaps due to an excessive salience of LICs when only one alternative is proposed, or because the domestic alternative —healthcare and education— was not the most desired. Conversely, if several items pertain to a global issue and each global item is considered individually desirable, the total “global spending” should rise proportionately.

To test whether the results in Fabre et al. (2025) provide an accurate picture of the prioritization of global spending as well as to uncover the prioritization of different global causes, I conduct a revenue allocation task with five spending items. In each of the two variants of this task, respondents use sliders to allocate the revenue of a hypothetical global wealth tax (at a rate of 2% on wealth in excess of \$5 million), after being informed of the revenue the tax would collect in their country (from \$1 billion in Poland to \$514 billion in the U.S.) versus in all LICs combined (\$1 billion).


In the *Few* variant, one global item (“Education, Healthcare and Renewable energy in LICs”) competes with four domestic ones. In every country, the most prioritized item is “Domestic: Education and healthcare”, with an average preferred share of 26% (Figures S25, S26). The global item is the least prioritized overall, at 17.5% (from 14% in Japan to 21% in Saudi Arabia and Spain). However, global spending is the second most prioritized item in Europe (19%) and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, global spending is 31% higher than the expected 13.4% (that is, 66.8% of 20%)<sup>17</sup> and only 13% of respondents do not allocate

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<sup>17</sup>The one-sided test that global spending is lower than 33.4% is rejected at the 1% threshold in all countries except Japan, where it is rejected at the 10% threshold. If one restricts the comparison to the countries surveyed by Fabre et al. (2025), the global item is allocated 17.8%, which is 34% more than expected. The most credible explanation for outperforming expectations is that the domestic item chosen by Fabre et al.

any revenue to it (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Preferred split of revenue from a global wealth tax. The first two items are from the *Few* variant with 5 fixed items (the *Global* one and the most preferred one are displayed); the last four items are from the *Many* variant with 5 items taken at random out of 13 (the 4 *Global* ones are displayed). (Questions 24-25)



In the *Many* variant, five items are selected at random from a pool of four global and nine domestic items. While domestic healthcare (27%) and education (22%) are the most prioritized items, the average allocation for global items ranges from 16% for “Forestation and biodiversity projects” to 19% for “Education and Healthcare in LICs” (Figures 4, S27-S28). On average, tasks include 1.5 global items, which together receive 26.9% of the revenue —again, equivalent to 17.5% per global item. Interestingly, there is no significant correlation between the number of global items and the average allocation per global item.<sup>18</sup>

Overall, the revenue allocation tasks validate and confirm the findings from Fabre

(2025) was the preferred one. Indeed, the global item is allocated 68% of the “Domestic: Healthcare and Education” share, almost exactly as expected.

<sup>18</sup>In Russia, the question could not be asked in the same way due to different software. Instead, respondents had to choose what share of the global tax revenue to allocate to sustainable development in low-income countries. On average, Russians allocate 12.2% to LICs, with a median allocation of just 5%, but only 12% allocate nothing to LICs.

et al. (2025). Most people would favor using a substantial share of the revenue from a global wealth tax to finance sustainable development in LICs, even though global spending is somewhat less prioritized than domestic spending.

## 4 Acceptance of Policies as a Function of Country Coverage

While acceptance of global climate or redistributive policies is widespread (Cappelen et al. 2025b; Fabre et al. 2025), acceptance may drop if policies are not truly *global* but only *international*, i.e. if key countries such as China, Russia, or the U.S. do not participate. Indeed, people may be concerned about a domestic loss of competitiveness resulting from the expatriation of taxpayers to low-tax jurisdictions; or about unfair burden-sharing if non-cooperating countries free-ride on decarbonization or sustainable development funding. In this section, I examine the acceptance of globally redistributive policies depending on the coalition of countries that would implement them. I study, in turn, a carbon price and a wealth tax.

### 4.1 International Climate Scheme

**Presentation of the Schemes.** “Cap and dividend” is a reference climate policy (Baer et al. 2000; Barnes et al. 2008; Bertram 1992; Blanchard & Tirole 2021; Grubb 1990), whereby fossil fuel companies at the source of emissions must buy emission permits on a carbon market, with the revenue from carbon pricing rebated equally to individuals. The limited and declining number of emission permits guarantees that emissions are capped according to the climate objective. As polluting companies pass the cost of emission permits down the value chain, the carbon price is ultimately paid by consumers, in proportion to their carbon footprint. Meanwhile, the equal cash transfer (or “dividend”) offsets price increases for the average consumer. Those with a higher-than-average carbon footprint financially lose, while those with a lower carbon footprint (who are on average poorer) financially gain.

Using simple Yes/No questions, I test the acceptance of three types of “cap and dividend” (or “Climate Scheme”) policies that differ by geographical scope: the National, Global, and International Climate Schemes (Figures 6, S30). While average consumers in a high-income country are financially unaffected by the National Climate Scheme (NCS), they lose out in the Global and International versions, since their carbon footprint is larger

than the world (or climate coalition) average.

The National Climate Scheme (NCS) is accepted by 68% of respondents (ranging from 56% in Poland to 88% in Saudi Arabia).<sup>19</sup>

**The Global Climate Scheme.** Before presenting the Global Climate Scheme (GCS), respondents are instructed to pay careful attention, with the incentive that they may win a \$100 lottery prize if they correctly answer a comprehension question at the end of the survey. When presented with the Global Climate Scheme (GCS), respondents are informed that the cash transfer would lift 600 million people out of extreme poverty, and the cost to them is made salient. Respondents are informed of the amount of the cash transfer, as well as the price increases and the net cost to the average person in their country (e.g. 2% price increases and a net cost of \$90 per month in the U.S., or 2% and €45 per month in Germany).<sup>20</sup> The GCS is accepted by 55% of respondents (from 49% in the U.S. and Russia to 85% in Saudi Arabia). The salience of costs in the GCS question may explain the somewhat lower acceptance of the GCS compared to the NCS.<sup>21</sup>

**Pluralistic Ignorance.** After assessing support for the GCS, respondents are asked in an incentivized way about their belief concerning the actual support, either in their country or in the U.S. (Figure S30).<sup>22</sup> In every country and for any variant of the question, actual support is underestimated. The median respondent underestimates the support in their own country by 16 p.p. and the support in the U.S. by 22 p.p. In Japan and in European countries, the underestimation is more severe, with most people wrongly believing that the GCS does not garner majority support in their country. Such pluralistic ignorance might explain why politicians do not dare to propose global climate justice policies.

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<sup>19</sup>The acceptance of the NCS is higher than the support for a *tax-and-dividend* policy found in other surveys (Douenne & Fabre 2022; Mildenberger et al. 2022), 12 p.p. higher than in Dechezleprétre et al. (2025). Indeed, most people prefer emissions trading schemes to carbon taxes (Funke et al. 2025), and support drops (before recovering) in specific contexts, such as the Yellow Vests movement.

<sup>20</sup>The computations use a carbon price of \$95/tCO<sub>2</sub>. For Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S., computations assume universal country coverage and the cash transfer is \$35 per month. For Europe and Japan, the net loss is computed in a non-universal but *High* participation scenario, which implies a lower cash transfer (€20 per month) and a higher net cost (by about \$10 per month) since the coalition's average carbon footprint is lower than the world average. Appendix C.2 reports the country-specific figures.


<sup>21</sup>Acceptance of the GCS is also around 10 p.p. lower than in Fabre et al. (2025). There may be different reasons for this: attitudes may have changed in the two-year interval; and I added information on the price increases, which allows respondents to estimate the cost to themselves (rather than to their average fellow citizen).

<sup>22</sup>US-Americans are asked about either their country or the EU. In Russia, I was not permitted to enquire about beliefs regarding a foreign country.

Interestingly, support is strongly correlated with the perception of support: 51% of respondents who support the GCS perceive it as supported by at least 50% in their own country, compared to only 24% of those who do not support it.<sup>23</sup> In other words, in addition to pluralistic ignorance, there is a false consensus effect.

**International Climate Scheme.** To test how country coverage influences the acceptance of the International Climate Scheme (ICS), respondents are randomly assigned to one of four variants. They can visualize the country coverage on a map (see examples in Figure 5), where their own country is striped to denote its potential participation. Respondents are also informed of the number of countries that would participate in the assigned scenario, the list of these countries or world regions, and their share of world emissions.

Figure 5: Example maps of the International Climate Scheme question. (Question 35).




The *Mid* scenario covers 56% of world emissions and includes China and Global South countries. The *Low* scenario replaces China with the EU and covers 33% of emissions. The *High scenario* adds various high-income countries to the *Mid* scenario, including the EU, the UK, Japan, Canada, and South Korea, and covers 72% of emissions. The last variant, *High color*, combines the *High* participation scenario with a colored map that displays not only the country coverage, but also the net gain or cost for each country, with China appearing as neither gaining nor losing from the policy.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>23</sup>The median perception of support in one's own country is 20 p.p. higher among those who support the GCS (50% versus 30%). Reciprocally, support for the GCS reaches 72% among the 39% of respondents who believe that a majority in their country supports it, compared to 44% among those who do not.

<sup>24</sup>In a standard cap and dividend, China should lose, as its carbon footprint exceeds the world average. However, the Global Climate Scheme departs slightly from the standard policy so that middle-income countries do not lose out (Fabre 2025).

Figure 6: Percentage of support for the National, Global, and International Climate Schemes (Yes/No questions).  
 (Questions 26–35.)



As expected, the wider the coverage, the higher the acceptance. However, this effect is relatively small, as acceptance is only 3.8 p.p. higher in the *High* variant (at 68%) compared to the *Low* variant (65%). Interestingly, acceptance among Europeans significantly increases when China is added to the coalition, but does not rise further when other HICs are also added. Conversely, for US-Americans and Japanese, the participation of the EU or China yields similar levels of acceptance, and only the combined participation of China, the EU, and other HICs significantly increases acceptance.

The effect of country coverage is entirely driven by the 74% of respondents who understand that the GCS would result in increased gasoline prices. It is worth noting that acceptance is higher among the minority of respondents who misunderstand the policy: by 5 p.p. for the GCS and 4 p.p. for the ICS.

Acceptance is 6.6 p.p. lower in the *High color* variant compared to the *High* variant. Three reasons may explain this effect. First, the cost may be more salient with the colored map. Second, some respondents may be concerned by the information (made explicit in the question) that China would neither gain nor lose from the policy. Third, with the colored map, respondents learn how their own country fares compared to others. In fact, the effect is no longer significant (and of opposite sign) for countries that appear to lose less than 0.5% of their GDP (Spain and Switzerland).

Notice that acceptance of the ICS in the *Low* coverage variant is similar to that of the

NCS. This suggests that the average respondent is willing to pay the ICS's higher cost for the guarantee of poverty alleviation and decarbonization in the Global South.

Finally, the greater acceptance of the ICS compared to the GCS is somewhat puzzling. Perhaps people view the proposal as more credible when a list of participating countries is provided, compared to the GCS, which is framed as if all countries might join (or, on the contrary, as one in which the participation of any country is uncertain). Relatedly, acceptance may be stronger for more precise or more visual proposals, either because they are viewed as more advanced or because they induce an experimenter demand bias. The greater acceptance could also be due to costs being less salient in the ICS question (but acceptance is still greater than in the GCS in the *High color* variant, where costs are visible). Unfortunately, the data does not allow testing these different hypotheses.

## 4.2 Wealth Tax Funding LICs

I test the effect of country coverage on the acceptance of an internationally redistributive wealth tax using a simple Yes/No question with three random variants. The policy is described as a 2% tax on wealth above \$1 million, with 30% of its revenue financing public services in LICs. In the *Global* variant, all countries except the respondent's own are assumed to participate. The *HIC* variant covers all HICs (except the respondent's country). The *International* variant covers some countries and not others, with the precise coverage varying by respondent's country but always including Brazil and European countries (or the whole EU) and excluding China and the U.S.<sup>25</sup>


Here again, acceptance increases with the country coverage, but the effect is small. The middle-ground *HIC* variant garners 70% acceptance (from 58% in Switzerland to 81% in Saudi Arabia). Compared to *HIC*, acceptance is 4.8 p.p. higher with *Global* coverage, while it is only 1.4 p.p. and non-significantly lower with *International* coverage (Figure 7).

Overall, the results indicate that the acceptance of internationally redistributive policies is quite robust to country coverage. This confirms that the issues of competitiveness or free riding are not decisive factors in public support (Aklin & Mildenberger 2020).

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<sup>25</sup>More precisely, in the U.S., excluded countries differ and are *China, Japan, and Canada*. As for included countries, in addition to *Brazil*, they are: *the EU and the UK* for Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S.; *the EU* for Russia and the UK; and *France, Germany, Spain, and the UK* (except one's own country) for EU countries.

Figure 7: Percentage of support for an international wealth tax with 30% of revenue funding LICs, depending on the country coverage (Yes/No question). (Questions 41-43).



## 5 Sincerity of Support for Global Redistribution

Skeptics about the public's support for global redistribution would argue that this support is not reflected in real-stake decisions or that it mostly results from *warm glow*. According to the *warm glow* hypothesis, many people would express their support to enjoy moral comfort as long as the policy appears out of reach and supporting it seems harmless. In case of *warm glow*, support would vanish if (i) the prospect of implementation materialized or if (ii) moral comfort could be obtained from a substitute. In this section, I test whether global redistribution is a vote-determining issue using a conjoint analysis, and I test both forms of *warm glow* (i and ii) using two other survey experiments.

### 5.1 Conjoint Analysis

I conduct a conjoint experiment in all countries except Russia and Saudi Arabia. This question is positioned at the beginning of the survey, before respondents know the survey's topic. Respondents are presented with two random political programs, framed as the fictitious programs of the leading candidates in the next election, and are asked which candidate they would vote for (27% of the respondents choose the outside option *Neither of them*). Each program contains a policy or an absence of policy, chosen at random, for each of five policy domains (the order of which is also randomized). Our domain of interest is *Foreign policy*, whose pool contains three policies: *Cut development aid*, *International*

*tax on millionaires with 30% financing healthcare and education in low-income countries*, and a country-specific policy. The policies, except for these two of interest, have been selected from the programs of the main candidates in the country's most recent election, ensuring coverage of the entire political spectrum and the most prominent proposals in the national public debate.

Figure 8 shows the effect of including our policies of interest in a program on the likelihood that it is preferred (see Figures S10-S23 for full country-by-country results<sup>26</sup>). More specifically, following Hainmueller et al. (2014), Figure 8 and Table S18 present the results of the following regression, estimated by simple OLS with standard errors clustered by respondent.<sup>27</sup>

$$(1) \quad \text{Preferred}_{pi} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Cut\_aid}_{pi} + \beta_2 \text{Intl\_tax}_{pi} + \beta_3 \text{Foreign3}_{pi} + \varepsilon_{pi}$$

where  $pi$  denotes the program  $p$  faced by respondent  $i$ , and each variable is a dummy.

Both policies significantly affect program choice: the internationally redistributive millionaire tax increases the likelihood that a program is preferred by 5 p.p., while cutting development aid decreases it by 3 p.p. At the country level, the effects are generally non-significant due to lack of power, but when significant, they are of the same sign as the global effect. On average, the effects of the tax are of similar size to the effects of other policies,<sup>28</sup> suggesting that certain global redistribution proposals may be as vote-determining as policies prominent in the national debate.

One concern with this type of conjoint analysis is that it involves unrealistic political programs, namely programs that contain both left and far-right policies, which distorts the actual choices that voters may face. De la Cuesta et al. (2022) showed that to fully address this issue, one should weigh each pair of programs by the probability that it would arise in a real election. Since this probability cannot be computed, the best practice is to bound the effects by estimating them with extreme probabilities. The results just pre-


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<sup>26</sup>With a few exceptions, *raising the minimum wage* is among the most popular policies, alongside *redistributive taxes or transfers*, *anti-immigration regulations*, and *abortion rights*. Conversely, a *ban on new combustion-engine cars* is among the least popular ones.

<sup>27</sup>More specifically, I estimate the average marginal component effect (AMCE), which is the change in the probability that a program is chosen if a policy is present rather than not, averaged across all possible values in the other policy domains. Hainmueller et al. (2014) show that the linear model is an unbiased estimator of the AMCE under uniform and independent randomization of attributes. I verify that the results are similar when using a conditional logit: the average marginal effects of *Int'l tax* and *Cut aid* are 6 p.p. and -3 p.p., respectively.

<sup>28</sup>A simple permutation test shows that the effects of *int'l tax* is not significantly lower than the average absolute effect size (it is just 4% lower,  $p=.48$ ) but the effects of *cut aid* is significantly lower ( $p=.01$ ).

Figure 8: Effect on the likelihood that a political program is preferred of containing the following policies (compared to no foreign policy in the program). No control is included, 95% confidence intervals are shown. (See Figure S9 for effects by vote.) (Question 23)



sented are based on one extreme, the uniform distribution. To construct the other extreme, I classify each policy proposal according to its originating political party<sup>29</sup> and consider a program consistent if it does not contain policies from both the *left* and the *far right*. Then, I re-estimate the regression after dropping the 29% of pairs with an inconsistent program, effectively assigning them a probability of zero. Effects are preserved: +5 p.p. for the tax and -3 p.p. for cutting aid.<sup>30</sup> This indicates that the results are robust to the critique of De la Cuesta et al. (2022).

<sup>29</sup>Interestingly, the most popular policies originate from left-wing parties, except in Germany and Switzerland. Indeed, the average deviation from the mean effect is highest for policies originating from the *Left*, and lowest for those from the *Center-right or Right*.

<sup>30</sup>In the main specification, I consider our policies of interest as consistent with any program. As an alternative, I classify them as either *left* (for the tax) or *far right* (for cutting aid). In that case, only 43% of observations are retained, yet effects are still preserved (+5 p.p. for the tax and -4 p.p. for cutting aid).

## 5.2 Testing Warm Glow

Some people might claim to support a policy of global redistribution merely to ease their conscience. If support were mainly due to this psychological mechanism, called *warm glow*, it might dissipate when the prospect of the policy materializes or if the policy support could be replaced by a substitute with the same moral appeal.

**Moral Substitute.** Following Nunes & Schokkaert (2003), warm glow would be revealed if support for the GCS decreased after respondents are offered the opportunity to express generosity towards the cause of climate change. To test this hypothesis, right before the GCS page, I assign a random subset of the respondents to a donation lottery, while the control group faces no question.<sup>31</sup> In the *Donation* branch, respondents must decide how much they would donate to the reforestation NGO *Just One Tree*, should they win the question's \$100 lottery. Lower support for the GCS in the treated group would be evidence of warm glow, or moral licensing, as it would indicate that the support derives (at least partially) from moral satisfaction at having recently supported a just cause.

On the contrary, support for the GCS is 3 p.p. higher in the *Donation* branch compared to the control group, and the coefficient is positive in every country, though often not significant (Figure 9a, Table S19). While the reason for this positive effect remains unclear,<sup>32</sup> the results show no evidence of warm glow.

**Realism Treatment.** To test the hypothesis that some people express support for global redistribution only as long as its implementation seems unlikely, I randomly assign half of the respondents to receive information about ongoing negotiations on globally redistributive policies. Among other things, treated respondents are informed that the International Maritime Organization recently adopted a levy on maritime carbon emissions that should partly finance LICs; that the G20 considered introducing a global tax on billionaires; that the UN General Assembly recently agreed on the principle of expanding the UN Security Council to new members; and that the UN Secretary-General supports financial system reforms that would drive resources towards sustainable development (see Question 36).


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<sup>31</sup>More precisely, right before the GCS question, the sample is split into three branches: the *Donation* lottery, the NCS question, and the control group. The NCS treatment is excluded from this analysis as it is unrelated to this experiment (restricting the NCS question to a subsample was done to prevent it from influencing responses to the GCS).


<sup>32</sup>Perhaps the *Donation* question triggers thoughts favorable to the GCS, such as the realization that individual actions like donations are ill-suited to address climate change, so that we need a global policy, even if it is imperfect.

Figure 9: Testing warm glow (negative effects would indicate the presence of warm glow). Regressions include controls, 95% confidence intervals are shown.

(a) Effect of a *Donation lottery* treatment on support for the Global Climate Scheme. (Questions 27-28)



(b) Effect of information about ongoing global redistribution initiatives on the share of plausible global policies supported. (Questions 36-38)



Then, respondents are asked “how likely [it is] that international policies involving significant transfers from HICs to LICs will be introduced in the next 15 years”, right before their support for ten plausible global policies is tested.<sup>33</sup> Here, warm glow would be revealed if the information treatment increased the belief that global redistribution is likely but decreased support for global policies.

The treatment was designed to satisfy the exclusion restriction required for the instrumental variables (IV) strategy. The exclusion restriction states that the treatment affects support for global policies only through its impact on beliefs that global redistribution is likely. Table 1 reports the corresponding regression results. Although the treatment is randomly assigned, the preferred specification includes the sociodemographic variables as controls to improve accuracy.<sup>34</sup> Informed respondents are 7 p.p. more likely to believe that global redistribution is likely, from a baseline of 33% in the control group. With an effective F-statistic of 67, this highly significant effect provides a strong first stage for the

<sup>33</sup>Section 6.1 reports acceptance of these policies and Appendix C.1 describes the corresponding international negotiations.

<sup>34</sup>See Table S21 for results without controls. In fact, some effects are no longer significant in the specification without controls, with  $p$ -values for the IV and the direct effect at .11 and .12, respectively (Table S21).

IV estimation. Assuming that the exclusion restriction holds, the IV is well identified. The local average treatment effect estimated by 2SLS is 18 p.p., indicating that believing global redistribution is likely causally *increases* the share of global policies supported. This estimate is consistent with both the non-causal OLS coefficient of 15 p.p. and the direct effect of the treatment on policy support, estimated at 1 p.p. (see Figure 9b and Table S20).

Table 1: Effect on support for global redistribution of believing that it is likely.

	Believes global redistribution likely		Share of plausible global policies supported		
	IV 1st Stage	IV 1st Stage	IV 2nd Stage	OLS	Direct Effect
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Information treatment	0.077*** (0.010)	0.074*** (0.009)			0.013** (0.007)
Believes global redistribution likely			0.181** (0.086)	0.145*** (0.007)	
(Intercept)	0.332*** (0.007)	0.078 (0.067)	0.216*** (0.065)	0.220*** (0.064)	0.230*** (0.066)
Controls: sociodemos and vote		✓	✓	✓	✓
Effective F-statistic	65.04	67.09			
Observations	12,001	12,001	12,001	12,001	12,001
R <sup>2</sup>	0.006	0.134	0.174	0.176	0.141

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) are reported in parentheses. \* $p<0.1$ ; \*\* $p<0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p<0.01$ . As in Appendix E, control variables are: *vote, gender, age, income, education, urbanity, likelihood of becoming millionaire, living with partner, employment status, foreign born, country region*.

Again, the effects go in the opposite direction to warm glow. In this case, increased support may stem from enhanced credibility of policies that are known to be discussed in international organizations. Overall, the results of these two experiments provide no evidence that support for global redistribution is affected by warm glow. On the contrary, they suggest that support is sincere and robust to the prospect of implementation or to the possibility of a moral substitute.

## 6 Breadth of Accepted International Policies

Knowing that some internationally redistributive policies are sincerely supported and may influence voting behavior, I now examine the range of international policies that

could be accepted. In this section, I analyze, in turn, the support for global policies currently debated in the international community, as well as more radical proposals; I also assess broader willingness to defend global solidarity, analyze the preferred channels to transfer resources to LICs, and I use a custom redistribution task to reveal the preferred extent of international transfers.

## 6.1 Acceptance of Currently Debated Global Policies

**Plausible Global Policies.** Figure 10 reveals the acceptance of plausible global policies (see Figure S32 for absolute support). These policies are deemed “plausible” because they are debated in international organizations, as detailed in Appendix C.1. Almost every policy garners majority acceptance in each country. The only exception is the acceptance among Japanese respondents of a globally redistributive tax on carbon emissions from aviation, at 46%. This proposal has the most salient cost: a 30% increase in flight prices. It is the least supported in every country. The most supported policies, with over two-thirds acceptance in every country and a majority of absolute support in the pooled sample, are the 2% minimum tax on billionaires’ wealth proposed by Zucman (2024), the expansion of low-interest-rate sustainable investments in LICs (Bridgetown Initiative 2025), and developed countries contributing to the climate loss and damage fund. Figure S72 shows that most policies garner majority support across the political spectrum in Europe and Japan, whereas Trump voters oppose more policies than they support.

**Ranking of Countries in Terms of Support for Global Redistribution.** On average, respondents support 51% of the plausible policies and oppose 21% of them. This means they support +30 p.p. more policies than they oppose (Figure S1). The countries with the highest mean difference between support and opposition are Saudi Arabia (+50 p.p.), Italy (+49) and Spain (+39). In contrast, net support is lowest in Japan (+20), Switzerland (+24), Poland, and the U.S. (+25).

Other synthetic indicators of support for global redistribution show consistent country rankings. In particular, the countries previously identified as having the highest and lowest net support retain their rankings when ordered by average latent support for global redistribution (Figure S1). To construct this latent variable, I standardize all variables of support and average them, weighted by loadings obtained from an exploratory factor analysis (see details and loading weights in Appendix C.4).

One might wonder why the countries leading in support are the Saudi kingdom and

Figure 10: Acceptance of plausible global redistribution policies (Percentage of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* among non-*Indifferent* responses). See Figure S32 for the absolute support. (Question 38).

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Minimum tax of 2% on billionaires' wealth, in voluntary countries	81	84	87	83	89	79	81	85	77	81	80	86	77
Bridgetown initiative: MDBs expanding sustainable investments in LICs, and at lower interest rates	79	82	81	81	88	72	81	85	75	81	83	87	74
L&D: Developed countries financing a fund to help vulnerable countries cope with climate Loss and damage	75	75	72	73	84	72	77	72	67	73	87	89	70
International levy on shipping carbon emissions, returned to countries based on population	70	73	78	70	78	61	74	75	72	59	73	81	67
At least 0.7% of developed countries' GDP in foreign aid	70	69	66	67	79	59	77	65	64	62	83	86	67
Debt relief for vulnerable countries, suspending payments until they are more able to repay	70	70	64	60	81	79	72	72	65	68	75	88	67
Expand Security Council to new permanent members (e.g. India, Brazil, African Union), restrict veto use	69	76	72	76	80	73	76	78	72	68	53	84	67
NCQG: Developing countries providing \$300 bn a year in climate finance for developing countries	68	69	68	69	76	63	73	67	65	59	88	86	61
Raise global minimum tax on profit from 15% to 35%, allocating revenues to countries based on sales	68	75	75	74	85	66	70	74	63	72	50	77	66
International levy on aviation carbon emissions, raising prices by 30%, returned to countries based on population	53	55	62	54	56	53	54	54	51	46	51	70	51

right-wing-dominated Italy. Breaking down the support by political leaning and other selected sociodemographics, Figures S71-S73 shed some light on this question. In Saudi Arabia, half of the adult population is immigrant. However, foreign workers do not drive the results, as Saudi citizens exhibit slightly higher support than non-Saudis.<sup>35</sup> As for Italy, it is both the country with the lowest gap in support between left-wing and far-right voters (along with Japan, at 33 p.p.) and the country with the highest support among left-wing voters.<sup>36</sup>

**Climate Finance Goal.** Climate finance refers to the financing of climate action in developing countries by developed countries. In 2024, countries agreed on a “New Collective Quantified Goal” (NCQG) of climate finance set at \$300 billion per year by 2035, which is triple the previous goal. However, while developing countries such as India called for \$600 billion in grants (or grant-equivalent funding), the NCQG does not specify the share

<sup>35</sup>Therefore, tentative explanations may rather come from Saudi society. While Saudis benefit from a generous welfare state, the Islamic pillar of *Zakat* (almsgiving) might further foster a culture of generosity.

<sup>36</sup>While the former point may be linked to the vision of Italy’s far-right leader of an Africa-Italy partnership (trading off foreign aid with cooperation in fighting immigration), the Italian population might also be influenced by the Vatican’s messages in favor of global solidarity.

of finance that should be provided as grants. Currently, the goal is being met with only \$26 billion in grants and the remainder in loans ([OECD 2024](#)).

I test the preferred amount for the NCQG in grant-equivalent terms, using two random variants. Both variants inform respondents of the current situation and the agreed goal, expressing amounts in both absolute terms and as a proportion of developed countries' GDP. The *Short* variant uses qualitative, textual responses, and features a middle category of \$100 billion (namely, "Meet the newly agreed goal by tripling grants and loans (\$100 billion in grants, or 0.15% of GDP)."). The *Full* variant provides more detailed explanations in the question text and then uses numerical answers, with a midpoint of \$300 billion.

In both variants, the median preferred NCQG is \$100 billion in grants, with 19% of respondents choosing an amount of \$600 billion or larger (Figures [S35-S36](#)).

That differently framed variants yield consistent results suggests that, despite its length, the question was well understood. The median choice of a climate finance quantum in line with the internationally agreed NCQG can be interpreted in two distinct ways. Either diplomats of HICs are defending the level of generosity that reflects the median preferences of their compatriots, or respondents' attitudes are anchored in existing agreements (or in their governments' stance). The results presented below are more consistent with the latter interpretation, as they reveal majority acceptance of much larger international transfers.

## 6.2 Support for Radical Proposals, Political Action, and Broad Values

In the final part of the questionnaire, I pose a variety of questions to assess the range of global solidarity policies, actions or values that people may accept (Figure [11](#)).

**Sustainable Future versus Status Quo.** Respondents were asked which scenario they would prefer for the next twenty years: a sustainable future or the status quo (note that scenarios were not labeled that way in the questionnaire, but were instead randomly named *A* or *B*). In the sustainable scenario, most countries cooperate to tax millionaires and meet the +2°C target, through the electrification of cars and the doubling of prices for heating fuel or gas, air travel, and beef. Although overall purchasing power is preserved (through a reduction in sales tax), people change their habits (e.g. flying and eating meat are cut by half). In the status quo, no policy is implemented, people maintain their lifestyles, and global warming reaches +3°C by 2100, causing more severe disasters.

Overall, 68% of respondents prefer the sustainable future over the status quo.

**Global Income Redistribution.** I test the support for a global tax on top incomes to finance poverty reduction in LICs, with the tax targeting either the global top 1% or top 3%, depending on random assignment. The top 1% variant describes an additional 15% tax on after-tax individual income in excess of \$120,000 per year (at Purchasing Power Parity), while the top 3% variant features additional rates of 15%, 30%, and 45% above \$80,000, \$120,000, and \$1 million, respectively. Each tax is calibrated to finance the poverty gap, with poverty defined using thresholds of \$250 and \$400 per month for the top 1% and top 3% variants, respectively. These taxes entail international transfers of 2% and 5% of world nominal income, respectively (see Appendix C.2 for details). Two numerical examples explain to respondents how the tax would affect taxpayers' income. The question also states the share of affected taxpayers worldwide and in their country, as well as the share of their country's GDP that would be transferred. For example, in the U.S., the top 1% tax would affect the top 8% and transfer 3% of GDP, while the top 3% tax would affect the top 18% and transfer 8% of GDP (see Figure S39). These figures are about half as high in Japan and Germany, and around four times lower in France and Spain.

Overall, 56% (resp. 50%) of the respondents support the top 1% (resp. top 3%) tax, and 25% (resp. 28%) oppose it (Figure S40). The top 1% tax obtains majority of absolute support in every country except Japan. Both variants are accepted by a majority in every case except Switzerland for the top 3% variant (in which case 18% of Swiss people would be affected). Overall, the tax garners majority acceptance even among the 6% of respondents who would be affected, though this is not the case in every country for the top 3% variant (Figure S41).

**Global Convergence.** A simple question captures the acceptance of global solidarity: "Should governments actively cooperate to have all countries converge in terms of GDP per capita by the end of the century?" Overall, 61% answer *Yes* and 26% *No*, with the lowest relative agreement (i.e. excluding people not responding) in the U.S., at 56%.

**Willingness to Act.** Two questions asked the respondents how they would react to a "worldwide movement in favor of a global program to tackle climate change, implement taxes on millionaires and fund poverty reduction in [LICs]".

In a multiple-choice question (censored in Russia), 29% report they could participate

in the movement by either attending a demonstration (19%), going on strike (7%), or donating \$100 to a strike fund (10%). This share rises to 68% in favor of the movement when including the 52% of respondents who “could sign a petition and spread ideas” (Figure S45). Taken at face value, these results would mean that a successful global solidarity movement could collect up to \$10 billion and organize some of the largest demonstrations in history, matching Earth Day mobilizations.<sup>37</sup> Interestingly, 52% of the 584 millionaires<sup>38</sup> who answered the survey would be in favor of such a movement.

When asked whether they would be more or less likely to vote for the political party they feel closest to if it were part of such a movement, 36% of the respondents state they would be more likely versus 17% less likely (Figure S46). Among the 5% of respondents who did not vote in the last election and feel closest to a left-wing party, the share more likely to vote in that case increases to 46% (versus 10% who are less likely).

**Reasons for Helping LICs.** In a multiple-choice question, I asked respondents which reasons for HICs supporting LICs they agree with, among arguments involving *duty*, *long-term interest*, or *historical responsibility*. At 54%, the reason most frequently chosen in every country (except France) is *duty*, specifically “Helping countries in need is the right thing to do” (Figure S47). Additionally, 38% select *interest*, and 25% *responsibility*, with only 16% disagreeing with every reason.

**Reparations.** In former colonial or slave States,<sup>39</sup> I asked respondents whether they would support “reparations for colonization and slavery to former colonies and descendants of slaves”, specifying that the reparations “could take the form of funding education and facilitating technology transfers”. Consistent with the general disagreement that HICs have a *historical responsibility* to support LICs, only a minority of 35% of respondents support reparations (except in Italy where 56% do), while 42% oppose them (Figure S48). This suggests that framing global solidarity as a decolonial struggle might be counterproductive.

**Agreement That Own Taxes Should Solve Global Problems.** Overall, 41% agree and 28% disagree that “[their] taxes should go towards solving global problems”. With 60%

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<sup>37</sup>On April 22, 1970, 20 million US-Americans (10% of the population) demonstrated for the environment. Since then, Earth Day events regularly mobilize hundreds of millions of people worldwide.

<sup>38</sup>In the weighted subsample of millionaires, 60% are US-Americans and 26% Europeans.

<sup>39</sup>I did not ask this question in Japan or Russia, because these countries’ historiographies do not present their past as colonial but rather as an empire.

relative agreement, there is a relative majority in favor of one's own taxes financing global solidarity, though a lower one than for specific proposals that would make the richest contribute.<sup>40</sup> As explained in Section 2, the present results replicate well the “Global Solidarity Report” that first asked this question (Global Nation 2023)

Figure 11: Acceptance of broad action or radical proposals of global redistribution. (Questions 44-46, 49-51, 53, 61).

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Accepts tax on world top 1% to finance global poverty reduction (Additional 15% tax on income over [\$120k/year in PPP])	69	73	71	72	84	69	73	67	60	69	75	82	62
Accepts tax on world top 3% to finance global poverty reduction (Additional 15% tax over [\$80k], 30% over [\$120k], 45% over [\$1M])	64	66	70	62	71	70	66	67	42	55	76	82	57
Prefers sustainable future	68	70	72	70	76	58	73	68	66	76	69	72	62
"Governments should actively cooperate to have all countries converge in terms of GDP per capita by the end of the century"	70	78	77	76	87	85	84	66	66	70	78	93	56
Would support a global movement to tackle CC, tax millionaires, and fund LICs (either petition, demonstrate, strike, or donate)	68	72	70	69	82	71	74	68	63	56	56	73	67
More likely to vote for party if part of worldwide coalition for climate action and global redistribution	68	72	72	71	82	64	77	69	57	56	NA	NA	67
Accepts reparations for colonization and slavery in the form of funding education and technology transfers	45	50	44	44	69	NA	51	46	NA	NA	NA	NA	40
"My taxes should go towards solving global problems"	59	61	43	62	77	63	70	58	53	59	57	89	55
"My taxes ... global problems" (Global Nation, 2023)	56	59	43	65	76	58	60	52	NA	76	NA	NA	44

**Moral Circle.** Asked “Which group of people do you advocate for when you vote?”,<sup>41</sup> 45% select a universalist answer (“Humans” or “Sentient beings (humans and animals)”), which is more than the most common answer, referring to one’s fellow citizens (32%). Universalists are fewer in Japan (30%) but constitute a majority in Europe (50%) and Saudi Arabia (57%), as shown in Figures 12 and S61. Among those who lean to the left, 59% are universalists, compared to 32% on the center-right or far-right.

Following Enke et al. (2024), I construct an alternative measure of universalism based on the vocabulary used in open-ended fields.<sup>42</sup> Although latent support for global re-


<sup>40</sup>This confirms that the willingness to pay for global solidarity, even through taxes, does not equate to acceptance of global redistribution proposals.

<sup>41</sup>In Russia and Saudi Arabia, the question was asked differently. It read: “Which group do you advocate for? For example, if you were the richest person on Earth, which group would you predominantly help with your money?”

<sup>42</sup>More specifically, I use the Moral Foundation Dictionary (MFD) 2.0 (Frimer et al. 2019) and define *universalism* as the number of occurrences of *care* or *fairness* words minus the number of *loyalty* or *authority* words. I also test an alternative definition, based on the extended MFD (Hopp et al. 2021), that uses weights rather than dummy variables to indicate a word’s belonging to a moral dimension. The latter definition is

distribution is significantly correlated with this measure, the correlation is only .05, less than the correlation with manual, keyword, or AI classifications of a field as relating to inequality or poverty (at .09, .08, and .06, respectively), and much less than the correlation with our universalism variable based on moral circle (at .37). Furthermore, the correlation between the two measures of universalism is only .03. This observation demonstrates that the various indicators labeled as “universalism” by different authors may not all capture the same dimension.

Figure 12: “Which group of people do you advocate for when you vote?”<sup>41</sup> (Question 62).



### 6.3 Preferred Channels for Transferring Resources to LICs

Asked to evaluate ways of transferring resources to reduce poverty in LICs on a 4-point Likert scale, the most preferred option in every country is “Cash transfers to parents (child allowances), to the disabled and to the elderly”, with 16% selecting it as the *Best way* overall, and 49% as a *Right way* or *Best way* (Figures 13, S42-S43). “Unconditional transfers to the national government” is the only option seen as a *Wrong way* by the majority, but this share falls from 51% down to 21% (becoming the third most supported option out of seven) when “transfers to the national government [are] conditioned on the use of funds for poverty reduction programs”. Interestingly, “unconditional cash transfers to each household” are controversial: they are the second most chosen *Best way*, yet 33% view them as a *Wrong way*. Conversely, “transfers to public development aid agencies which then finance suitable projects” is uncontroversial, with only 16% considering it a *Wrong way*, while 37% rate it as a *Right* or *Best way*.

### 6.4 Custom Global Income Redistribution

The last task of the questionnaire allowed respondents to manipulate the shape of the global income distribution.<sup>43</sup> The question text included the following instructions:

even less (though still significantly) correlated with the latent support for global redistribution, at .03.

<sup>43</sup> Appendix C.2 details how I obtained the world distribution of PPP incomes.

Figure 13: “How do you evaluate each of these channels to transfer resources to reduce poverty in LICs?”

Percentage of *Right or Best way* (other options: *Wrong or Acceptable way*). (Question 48).

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Targeted cash transfers (child allowances, disability & elderly pensions)	49	48	43	46	57	45	54	44	47	36	65	73	45
Development aid agencies	37	42	42	47	39	32	44	43	44	36	23	57	37
Government, conditional on financing poverty reduction	37	40	39	43	48	33	41	37	35	27	34	62	35
Unconditional cash transfers to each household	34	30	31	27	31	30	34	27	32	24	54	62	31
Local NGOs with democratic processes	29	33	39	33	34	33	33	29	32	22	17	53	29
Local authorities	22	23	25	22	22	30	23	19	19	18	19	47	22
Government, unconditional	18	18	21	14	18	22	21	16	14	14	18	50	18

“Below you will find a graph of the world distribution of after-tax income and three sliders that vary it. The current distribution is in red, and your custom one is in green. The first two sliders control the proportion of winners and the proportion of losers, among all humans. The third slider controls the degree of redistribution from the richest to the poorest. If you do not want new policies to reduce global inequality, you can set the third slider to zero.”

The interactive question is available at [bit.ly/custom\\_global\\_redistr](https://bit.ly/custom_global_redistr), an explainer video at [youtu.be/gSfsQwczT7w](https://youtu.be/gSfsQwczT7w), and the algorithm translating slider positions into a redistribution is described in Appendix F. Figure 14 displays what respondents see below the instructions, including the interactive graph and a table summarizing how their custom redistribution would affect five example income levels (including their own, asked right before). To mitigate potential anchoring at the sliders’ initial positions,<sup>44</sup> sliders are initialized in one of two random positions: either 60% of winners, 20% of losers, and a degree of redistribution of 2 out of 10 (as in Figure 14); or 40%, 10%, and 7/10, respectively. Given the complexity of the task and its inconvenience on mobile devices, respondents are given the explicit option to skip it.

<sup>44</sup>To test for anchoring, I regress responses on the sliders’ initial positions. I define the anchoring effect as the effect size relative to the difference between the initial positions of the two variants. It is always significant, at 36% for the share of winners, 57% for the share of losers, and 42% for the degree of redistribution. While anchoring plays a role, the responses converge to a middle point between the two anchors, indicating that the anchors themselves may have been defined by the surveyor (myself) drifting away from a shared

Figure 14: Custom global redistribution: screenshot of the bottom of the page. (Question 55).


Examples of income changes after your proposed redistribution:

Now	After
0 \$/year	2 215 \$/year
10 000 \$/year	10 115 \$/year
60 000 \$/year	55 793 \$/year
100 000 \$/year	90 965 \$/year
Your <i>individual</i> income	
40 000 \$/year	38 206 \$/year

Proportion of winners: 60%

Proportion of losers: 20%

Degree of redistribution: 2



I am satisfied with my custom redistribution.

I want to skip this question.

preference in opposite directions.

Overall, 56% are satisfied with their custom redistribution and 43% skip it. Although the non-response rate may seem high, it is relatively evenly spread across the population. Indeed, the share of satisfied respondents is 52% for non-voters, 54% for center-right or right-wing voters, 57% for far-right voters, and 61% for left-wing voters; while it ranges from 49% for people without a high-school diploma to 57% for those with a post-secondary diploma. The limited heterogeneity in response rates across crucial sociodemographic groups suggests that the task enabled motivated respondents to make an informed choice regarding their preferred redistribution with little sacrifice in terms of sample representativeness.

Figure S49 shows the median preferred redistribution among satisfied respondents, i.e. the curve obtained by setting the sliders at their median preferred values: 49% of winners, 18% of losers, and a degree of redistribution of 5/10, resulting in a transfer of 5.4% of world income from rich to poor and in a minimum income of \$287 per month. Interestingly, 48% choose to lose from their custom redistribution while only 9% choose to win; the median satisfied respondent selects parameters such that they neither win nor lose. Besides, 10% of satisfied respondents opt for the status quo, preserving the current income distribution. Finally, Figure S50 presents the average preferred redistribution among satisfied respondents, obtained by pointwise averaging custom curves. The average preferred redistribution transfers 5.4% of world income from the top 27% to the bottom 73% and entails a minimum income of \$247 per month. As shown in Figure S70, at the top of the distribution, the average preferred redistribution can be achieved with a 7% marginal income tax rate above \$25,000 and a 16% rate above \$40,000 per year (at Purchasing Power Parity).

Figures S52-S53 reveal limited heterogeneity in custom redistributions across countries. However, Figures S54-S57 show greater variation at the individual level, though the bulk of respondents favor a custom redistribution implying transfers of 4% to 5% of world income and a minimum income of \$150 to \$350 per month.

Fabre (2022) applied the same method to uncover French preferences regarding national income redistribution and tested support for the median and average preferred redistributions on a separate sample. Excluding the 22% to 24% of people not responding, 51% of respondents accepted the average redistribution and 67% the median one.<sup>45</sup> While one cannot be sure that these results would replicate in the context of a global redis-

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<sup>45</sup>Fabre (2022) also tested a redistribution obtained from median parameters and a 5% lower aggregate income to account for adverse behavioral responses. This was accepted by 62% of French respondents.

tribution, they suggest that a majority might accept the average or median redistribution described above.

## 7 Conclusion

Applying the theory of optimal taxation, Kopczuk et al. (2005) show that the level of U.S. foreign aid could only be rationalized if the U.S. government placed a value 2,000 times higher on the welfare of a US-American than on that of a foreigner (although this ratio should be reduced by the proportion of foreign aid transfers diverted or wasted). Our results contradict the notion that government action accurately reflects attitudes towards global redistribution, and are consistent with a conservative bias among legislators (Broockman & Skovron 2018; Gilens & Page 2014; Pilet et al. 2024). Indeed, a majority of respondents in high-income countries support a global tax on top incomes to finance poverty reduction in low-income countries. Additionally, over two-thirds of respondents accept a tax on the wealth of millionaires with 30% of the revenue financing LICs, even in the case of only a few countries implementing it. In every country, majorities accept an International Climate Scheme that is costly to them but beneficial to the poorest globally, showing that most people value climate action and poverty reduction.

The revenue allocation task sheds light on how much people value global versus domestic public goods. On average, respondents allocate 17.5% of the revenue from a hypothetical global wealth tax to sustainable development out of the five specified categories. This indicates that people are neither selfless universalists, who would allocate all the revenue from this tax to the poorest countries, nor devoid of altruism towards foreigners, as this would imply allocating nothing to global spending. The custom redistribution task confirms that most people would actually prefer much greater global redistribution than currently exists, as the average respondent opts for a global minimum income of \$247 per month, financed by transfers amounting to over 5% of world income.

An exploration of respondents' underlying values reveals that support for global redistribution primarily stems from a sense of duty and empathy towards the destitute. For some, this issue appears important enough to factor into their voting decision. Indeed, the likelihood that a political program is preferred increases if it includes a globally redistributive tax on millionaires and decreases if it includes cuts to foreign aid. Additionally, one-third of respondents report that they would be more likely to vote for a political party if it were part of a global movement for sustainable development, and a similar propor-

tion state that they could themselves participate in such a movement.

These results raise the question of why so few policymakers campaign on sustainable development proposals. The lack of supply of such campaigns might stem from pluralistic ignorance among policymakers and activists, consistent with the public's underestimation of support for a Global Climate Scheme. Alternatively, it could be due to a lack of demand from constituents. Indeed, global inequality is rarely a top-of-mind consideration. People's most frequent concerns relate to self-interested issues such as their purchasing power or health; articulated political demands generally refer to national issues such as public services; and the most salient international issues are climate change, wars, and the rise of the far right.

The low salience of global inequality may manifest as a lack of popular mobilization, resulting in it being a low priority for policymakers. Combined with the necessary trade-off between global redistribution and fellow citizens' purchasing power, policymakers may prioritize the latter—which is the primary concern of voters—to the point of ignoring universalist attitudes. Status quo bias is a compounding factor: the weakness of global institutions and the primacy of national polities make international cooperation unlikely, which may discourage universalist thought and make it seem utopian. Indeed, support for global policies is partly caused by the belief that they are possible, as our information experiment demonstrated. Therefore, the organization of the world order based on nation-states might silence demands for universalist reforms and perpetuate a cycle where the low salience of universalist concerns and status quo institutions reinforce each other.

Nevertheless, the survey results suggest some untapped potential for global solidarity. In light of these findings, it is unlikely that the public would resist global redistribution policies. This is especially true for balance sheet operations with expansionary impacts and indirect costs, such as debt restructuring, liquidity provision, the expansion of lending by Multilateral Development Banks, and their recapitalization through the rechanneling of Special Drawing Rights. These reforms are widely accepted and are the natural focus of multilateral initiatives ([Bridgetown Initiative 2025](#); [FfD4 2025](#)). Since public attitudes do not appear to be a limiting factor, further research is needed to understand policymakers' motivations and the obstacles they face in cooperating on sustainable development reforms.

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# A Raw Results

## A.1 Figures

Figure S1: Average synthetic indicators of support for global redistribution. (Question 38).  
[\(Back to Section 6.1.\)](#)

	All	Europe	Saudi Arabia	Italy	Spain	Germany	United Kingdom	Russia	France	Poland	USA	Switzerland	Japan
Latent support for global redistribution (standardized)	0.00	0.11	0.49	0.39	0.23	0.08	0.05	0.04	0.02	-0.09	-0.10	-0.11	-0.21
Share of plausible global policies supported	0.51	0.56	0.64	0.65	0.58	0.55	0.55	0.50	0.55	0.49	0.48	0.53	0.38
Share of plausible global policies opposed	0.21	0.21	0.14	0.16	0.19	0.21	0.21	0.18	0.22	0.23	0.23	0.28	0.18
Difference between share of plausible policies supported and opposed	0.30	0.36	0.50	0.49	0.39	0.34	0.34	0.31	0.33	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.20
Ratio of share of plausible policies supported over supported or opposed	0.70	0.72	0.80	0.79	0.74	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.67	0.68	0.65	0.67

Figure S2: Keyword classification of open-ended fields (matches with at least one keyword in a list). (Questions 19-21).  
 (Back to Section 3.1.)

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Money; own income; cost of living; inflation	18	16	15	15	16	17	14	19	15	21	13	16	22
Health; healthcare system	10	13	10	11	15	12	16	14	10	4	9	5	10
Own country referred	9	9	11	9	6	11	8	10	6	8	6	6	10
Family; children; childcare	7	7	5	4	7	8	5	11	4	7	7	10	8
War; peace	6	9	7	11	14	14	6	5	9	4	3	4	5
Work; (un)employment; business	6	6	7	5	8	4	7	5	3	4	5	10	5
Nothing; don't know; empty	5	4	5	4	3	7	3	3	2	13	4	4	2
Economy	4	4	1	4	6	1	5	5	3	4	1	2	7
Government; president	4	3	3	2	2	2	3	5	2	4	0	0	7
International issues	4	5	5	6	5	5	4	4	4	3	2	8	3
Inflation; cost of living	4	4	2	2	5	3	3	8	2	2	1	1	6
Poverty; inequality	4	6	5	7	6	7	6	5	4	3	2	3	2
Tax system; welfare benefits; public services	3	3	2	4	3	2	2	3	2	10	0	0	3
Old age; retirement; ageing society	3	3	3	7	1	2	2	3	2	6	4	0	2
Criticism of immigration; national preference	3	5	4	8	3	4	3	9	5	1	0	0	3
Housing	3	3	2	2	2	3	6	3	1	1	6	3	3
Security; violence; crime; judicial system	3	3	2	2	4	1	2	5	2	2	1	1	5
Criticism of far right; Trump; tariffs	3	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	3	0	0	6
Environment; climate change	3	4	2	5	7	2	4	5	5	1	0	5	3
Rights; democracy; freedom; slavery	3	2	1	2	2	1	2	3	2	1	1	4	5
Discrimination; gender inequality; racism; LGBT	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	4	2	2	0	3	4
Happiness; peace of mind	2	3	2	2	4	0	2	5	1	1	1	1	3
Trump	2	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	2	0	0	5
Relationships; love; emotions	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	1	0	2	2	3

Figure S3: AI classification of open-ended fields (using ChatGPT-4.1). (Questions 19-21).  
 (Back to Section 3.1.)

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Money; own income; cost of living; inflation	26	21	22	18	24	22	19	24	18	26	26	21	32
Other topic; unclear; vague	19	17	17	17	17	16	14	19	17	17	20	29	22
Own country referred	19	17	14	20	14	15	16	21	14	23	8	8	25
Happiness; peace of mind	17	15	16	11	17	15	14	19	13	12	13	30	20
Poverty; inequality	14	16	16	18	17	16	14	14	17	15	14	12	11
Nothing; don't know; empty	14	11	15	11	7	14	12	10	13	20	28	8	9
International issues	13	16	12	18	19	16	11	18	19	8	5	13	15
Health; healthcare system	13	15	13	12	16	15	18	17	13	7	13	6	13
Tax system; welfare benefits; public services	11	11	10	17	9	5	9	14	10	23	6	2	10
Security; violence; crime; judicial system	9	10	14	7	11	5	9	12	7	5	4	8	12
Work; (un)employment; business	8	8	8	8	11	5	9	7	6	8	7	17	8
Family; children; childcare	8	7	6	5	7	7	6	11	6	9	7	11	9
Discrimination; gender inequality; racism; LGBT	8	8	9	9	8	3	7	10	10	6	3	10	10
Rights; democracy; freedom; slavery	7	6	5	5	6	4	5	8	6	2	3	9	13
Corruption; criticism of the government	7	6	4	4	6	6	10	7	3	5	4	3	10
War; peace	7	10	8	13	14	13	7	6	11	3	4	8	5
Old age; retirement; ageing society	6	5	5	10	2	2	4	7	4	9	5	3	5
Housing	5	4	4	2	3	4	8	6	3	1	7	4	7
Criticism of immigration; national preference	4	6	4	9	3	4	4	11	7	2	0	1	5
Environment; climate change	4	6	4	7	9	3	5	7	7	2	1	4	4
Education	4	3	2	5	2	2	5	4	4	3	4	8	3
Criticism of far right; Trump; tariffs	3	2	2	4	2	1	1	3	2	2	0	0	6
Relationships; love; emotions	3	3	4	2	2	1	2	3	3	1	3	3	5
Global poverty; hunger; global inequality	3	4	4	3	6	3	7	4	3	1	0	3	2
Social division; fake news; (social) media	2	1	1	2	0	1	2	1	1	1	3	1	3
Religion; sin; God	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	4	2
Animal welfare	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1

Figure S4: Manual classification of open-ended fields. (Questions 19-21). (Back to Section 3.1.)

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Money; own income; cost of living; inflation	19	16	17	13	17	18	13	17	12	15	20	22	23
Other topic; unclear; vague	13	10	12	8	11	12	10	11	13	18	15	18	13
Health; healthcare system	12	14	12	11	16	14	16	16	12	6	13	5	12
Nothing; don't know; empty	10	9	10	13	5	11	7	7	12	16	11	8	8
Tax system; welfare benefits; public services	7	7	10	7	7	4	5	11	5	16	4	0	6
Poverty; inequality	6	9	8	11	9	10	7	8	12	7	5	4	4
Security; violence; crime; judicial system	6	7	11	4	8	2	6	8	3	2	1	4	8
Family; children; childcare	5	5	5	3	6	5	4	7	3	5	6	8	5
War; peace	5	8	5	11	12	12	5	5	10	2	3	6	3
Criticism of far right; Trump; tariffs	4	2	2	4	2	1	1	3	1	3	0	0	9
Work; (un)employment; business	4	4	5	3	6	3	5	2	2	2	4	13	4
Criticism of immigration; national preference	4	6	4	8	3	4	3	9	5	1	1	1	4
Housing	4	3	2	2	2	3	7	4	3	0	7	3	4
Discrimination; gender inequality; racism; LGBT	3	3	3	3	3	1	3	4	4	3	0	2	6
Old age; retirement; ageing society	3	3	3	7	1	1	3	3	3	7	4	1	2
Environment; climate change	3	5	4	6	8	2	5	5	6	1	1	4	3
Rights; democracy; freedom; slavery	3	2	1	2	2	1	2	4	4	3	1	4	5
International issues	3	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	2	1	5	3
Happiness; peace of mind	3	3	3	2	5	2	2	6	3	1	3	2	3
Education	2	2	1	4	2	1	4	2	4	2	3	5	2
Relationships; love; emotions	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	5	3
Corruption; criticism of the government	2	3	2	2	1	2	8	3	1	2	1	1	2
Own country referred	2	3	2	5	1	4	2	2	1	2	2	1	2
Social division; fake news; (social) media	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	3	1	1
Global poverty; hunger; global inequality	1	2	1	1	3	2	2	1	1	0	0	1	1
Religion; sin; God	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	1
Animal welfare	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1

Figure S5: Manual classification of *concerns* fields: “What are your main concerns these days?” (Question 19).  
 (Back to Section 3.1.)

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Money; own income; cost of living; inflation	30	24	24	19	22	26	20	36	14	22	26	20	41
Health; healthcare system	13	15	10	5	19	28	20	20	7	7	32	8	11
Other topic; unclear; vague	13	9	11	8	9	13	9	10	13	28	13	27	11
Criticism of far right; Trump; tariffs	10	6	7	11	5	0	3	6	7	12	0	0	17
War; peace	9	15	10	20	32	10	6	8	26	1	16	7	5
Security; violence; crime; judicial system	7	9	17	6	9	0	9	10	5	2	3	1	8
Criticism of immigration; national preference	7	9	5	14	7	4	7	15	8	0	3	0	7
Environment; climate change	6	11	9	9	17	4	11	11	12	2	0	5	3
Family; children; childcare	6	6	9	1	8	10	6	7	6	7	12	16	3
Work; (un)employment; business	6	7	10	4	7	5	13	4	2	2	4	17	4
International issues	6	8	14	8	8	11	7	3	10	2	4	7	5
Tax system; welfare benefits; public services	6	5	8	2	6	2	3	10	1	9	1	0	6
Nothing; don't know; empty	4	6	9	7	5	4	6	3	10	7	4	3	2
Own country referred	4	4	2	7	1	7	6	2	0	1	17	1	3
Housing	3	3	2	1	1	0	12	6	4	0	1	3	4
Corruption; criticism of the government	3	4	1	3	2	3	14	3	0	1	1	2	3
Old age; retirement; ageing society	3	2	3	1	2	1	0	3	3	7	3	1	2
Education	2	2	2	2	1	0	6	3	3	1	5	12	1
Rights; democracy; freedom; slavery	2	1	0	2	1	0	1	2	0	1	2	0	5
Poverty; inequality	2	2	1	2	1	0	1	6	4	0	2	0	2
Discrimination; gender inequality; racism; LGBT	1	1	0	2	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	2
Social division; fake news; (social) media	1	1	0	3	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	2
Relationships; love; emotions	1	2	1	1	2	3	3	1	3	0	0	1	1
Happiness; peace of mind	1	1	0	0	3	0	1	2	1	0	3	3	1
Religion; sin; God	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Global poverty; hunger; global inequality	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Animal welfare	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Figure S6: Manual classification of *wish* fields: “What are your needs or wishes?” (Question 20). (Back to Section 3.1.)

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Money; own income; cost of living; inflation	32	26	30	22	30	35	22	20	25	23	39	49	37
Health; healthcare system	21	25	20	33	21	19	26	29	26	10	19	4	22
Other topic; unclear; vague	13	13	17	9	11	24	13	11	10	16	13	10	12
Family; children; childcare	10	8	6	5	8	6	7	16	2	8	9	12	14
Happiness; peace of mind	10	11	9	7	17	6	5	21	8	4	9	5	11
Nothing; don't know; empty	7	10	10	16	6	5	10	10	12	7	7	2	4
Work; (un)employment; business	7	5	4	2	10	4	5	4	3	1	10	22	9
Housing	7	5	3	3	7	10	6	3	3	1	19	9	6
War; peace	5	8	5	17	4	8	6	5	8	8	2	1	4
Relationships; love; emotions	5	5	6	7	4	2	4	4	2	1	2	5	9
Tax system; welfare benefits; public services	4	3	3	3	5	3	1	4	5	19	0	0	2
Old age; retirement; ageing society	3	2	2	3	1	0	2	0	2	8	0	2	3
Security; violence; crime; judicial system	3	3	7	3	4	1	1	2	6	3	2	0	3
International issues	2	3	3	4	1	1	2	3	4	3	1	1	2
Poverty; inequality	2	2	3	4	1	2	0	1	4	3	0	1	1
Education	2	1	1	1	1	0	2	2	1	2	3	4	2
Own country referred	1	2	2	3	1	0	0	4	2	4	1	2	1
Environment; climate change	1	2	1	3	0	1	0	2	5	1	0	0	1
Rights; democracy; freedom; slavery	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	2	9	2	0	0	1
Corruption; criticism of the government	1	1	2	0	2	0	2	1	1	2	0	0	0
Religion; sin; God	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	2
Criticism of immigration; national preference	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	4	1	0	0	1
Criticism of far right; Trump; tariffs	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Global poverty; hunger; global inequality	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Discrimination; gender inequality; racism; LGBT	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	1
Social division; fake news; (social) media	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
Animal welfare	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Figure S7: Manual classification of *injustice* fields: “What according to you is the greatest injustice of all?” (Question 21).  
 (Back to Section 3.1.)


	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Poverty; inequality	19	28	28	32	30	41	23	19	31	23	22	10	9
Other topic; unclear; vague	15	9	10	8	10	5	7	11	15	17	22	26	16
Discrimination; gender inequality; racism; LGBT	9	8	10	5	10	2	6	11	10	9	1	7	14
Security; violence; crime; judicial system	9	9	11	3	12	3	11	15	3	1	1	12	15
Nothing; don't know; empty	8	6	7	7	3	2	7	6	5	14	10	11	7
Tax system; welfare benefits; public services	8	9	12	16	4	4	3	12	8	16	3	0	4
Rights; democracy; freedom; slavery	7	4	4	3	6	1	4	5	4	4	3	16	13
Criticism of far right; Trump; tariffs	5	2	0	2	2	2	1	3	0	0	0	0	13
Money; own income; cost of living; inflation	4	4	2	5	5	3	3	2	5	6	8	3	3
War; peace	4	8	3	4	10	29	10	6	5	1	3	5	1
Health; healthcare system	4	3	8	2	3	5	2	3	5	3	9	2	3
Global poverty; hunger; global inequality	3	6	4	4	11	8	8	4	5	1	0	3	3
International issues	3	6	4	5	8	6	6	6	1	0	0	3	2
Corruption; criticism of the government	3	4	2	4	2	2	10	4	3	3	2	0	2
Criticism of immigration; national preference	3	4	3	6	1	4	3	6	2	3	0	2	3
Family; children; childcare	3	2	3	2	4	1	2	0	5	2	5	3	2
Old age; retirement; ageing society	2	3	2	8	2	0	2	3	3	3	5	0	1
Social division; fake news; (social) media	2	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	13	2	1
Own country referred	2	2	3	5	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	2
Relationships; love; emotions	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	3	8	2
Housing	1	2	2	2	0	0	4	2	2	0	0	0	2
Education	1	1	0	5	0	0	1	0	2	3	0	0	1
Religion; sin; God	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	15	1
Work; (un)employment; business	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	0	1	2	1	3	0
Animal welfare	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	0	0	1	0	1
Environment; climate change	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	0	0	0	1	0
Happiness; peace of mind	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Figure S8: Manual classification of *issue* fields: “Can you name an issue that is important to you but is neglected in the public debate?” (Question 22). (Back to Section 3.1.)

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Nothing; don't know; empty	21	15	14	21	7	32	5	11	19	36	27	19	19
Other topic; unclear; vague	13	11	11	6	13	9	13	14	13	11	21	12	13
Tax system; welfare benefits; public services	12	12	17	7	13	6	14	19	8	19	12	0	10
Money; own income; cost of living; inflation	10	7	6	6	9	7	8	7	4	9	18	11	11
Health; healthcare system	9	10	8	6	18	7	17	11	6	4	8	7	11
Old age; retirement; ageing society	6	7	5	15	1	4	7	5	4	10	12	1	2
Environment; climate change	6	7	4	10	8	2	7	6	10	1	4	10	8
Criticism of immigration; national preference	5	8	8	10	4	6	5	13	8	2	1	1	3
Security; violence; crime; judicial system	5	6	9	4	10	4	4	5	2	3	1	3	5
Education	4	5	2	7	5	3	7	3	10	2	5	4	3
Poverty; inequality	4	5	3	7	5	1	4	5	9	1	1	7	4
Discrimination; gender inequality; racism; LGBT	3	3	2	3	3	1	3	4	4	2	1	3	6
Housing	3	2	2	0	1	1	5	5	2	0	4	1	5
Family; children; childcare	2	3	3	2	3	1	2	4	2	2	5	1	1
Rights; democracy; freedom; slavery	2	2	1	1	3	3	2	4	2	4	1	0	2
Corruption; criticism of the government	2	2	3	1	1	2	5	1	1	2	1	0	2
Work; (un)employment; business	2	2	2	2	7	1	1	1	0	1	1	7	1
War; peace	2	2	2	3	2	2	0	2	1	0	3	11	1
International issues	2	2	2	2	2	3	0	3	1	0	1	12	1
Criticism of far right; Trump; tariffs	2	1	0	1	0	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	4
Own country referred	1	2	2	3	2	5	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
Social division; fake news; (social) media	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	0	3	0	1	1	2
Animal welfare	1	2	3	2	1	2	0	1	3	0	0	0	1
Religion; sin; God	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
Relationships; love; emotions	0	1	1	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	2	0
Global poverty; hunger; global inequality	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
Happiness; peace of mind	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0

Figure S9: Effect by vote at the last election on the likelihood that a political program is preferred of containing the following policy (compared to no foreign policy in the program). (See Figure 8 for the simple figure). (Question 23). [\(Back to Section 3.1.\)](#)

(a) Cut development aid.



(b) Int'l tax on millionaires with 30% financing health and education in low-income countries.




Figure S10: Conjoint analysis in France (Average Marginal Component Effect). Cf. Figure S19 for French. (Question 23). [\(Back to Section 5.1.\)](#)




Figure S11: Conjoint analysis in Germany (Average Marginal Component Effect). Cf. Figure S20 for German. (Question 23). [\(Back to Section 5.1.\)](#)

Climate policy:

- Repeal the heating law that requires renewable energy
- Ban new combustion-engine cars from 2035

Economic issues:

- Lower electricity prices by 12% through tax reductions
- Raise the minimum wage to €15 by 2026
- Invest €500 billion in strategic industries like steel, automotive, and defense

Foreign policy:

- International tax on millionaires with 30% financing healthcare and education in low-income countries
- Cut development aid
- Support Ukraine militarily and financially

Social issues:

- Use electronic ankle monitors to track violent offenders against women
- Offer a birth grant of €20,000 for newborns
- Restrict the fast-track path to German citizenship

Tax system:

- Exempt from taxes overtime work and work of retired people
- Abolish the inheritance tax
- Fully reinstate the debt brake
- Higher taxes for the richest 1% to finance higher child benefit, citizen's income and minimum pension




Figure S12: Conjoint analysis in Italy (Average Marginal Component Effect). Cf. Figure S21 for Italian. (Question 23) [\(Back to Section 5.1.\)](#)

Climate policy:

Cancel the ban on new combustion–engine cars from 2035

Double the capacity of renewable energy by 2030

Economic issues:

Increase the birth grant to up to €3,600 for newborns

Use unspent EU funds to exempt hiring companies from taxes

Introduce a legal minimum wage at 10€ per hour

Reduce working hours without reducing salaries

Foreign policy:

International tax on millionaires with 30% financing healthcare and education in low-income countries

Cut development aid

Develop a common EU defense

Social issues:

Legal limit on migration and process asylum requests outside the EU

Recognize same-sex marriage

Introduce free and mandatory early education (until 3 years old)

Tax system:

Reduce the income tax on low-income households

Replace the income tax by a 15% flat tax




Figure S13: Conjoint analysis in Poland (Average Marginal Component Effect). Cf. Figure S22 for Polish. (Question 23). [\(Back to Section 5.1.\)](#)

Climate policy:

- Phase out coal by 2035
- Ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2035

Economic issues:

- Expansion of rail production and infrastructure investment
- Allocate 5% of GDP to military expenditures by 2030

Foreign policy:

- International tax on millionaires with 30% financing healthcare and education in low-income countries
- Cut development aid
- Detention of rejected asylum seekers until they can be deported

Social issues:

- Restoring abortion rights
- Relax restrictions on public assembly and protest
- Extended parental leave, tax benefits for children, and remote work option

Tax system:

- Reduce taxes on low-income households by increasing the tax-free income allowance
- Taxes on the profits of large digital corporations and fossil fuel companies
- Income tax exemption for seniors delaying retirement




Figure S14: Conjoint analysis in Spain (Average Marginal Component Effect). Cf. Figure S23 for Spanish. (Question 23). [\(Back to Section 5.1.\)](#)




Figure S15: Conjoint analysis in the UK (Average Marginal Component Effect). (Question 23).  
[\(Back to Section 5.1.\)](#)

Climate policy:

Investment in renewables and nuclear to achieve zero-emissions electricity in 2030

A ban on domestic flights for trips under three hours by train

Economic issues:

30 hours of free childcare per week for working parents

Healthcare plan: more appointments by utilising overtime employment, recruitment in mental care and dentistry coverage

Raising the minimum wage to £15 per hour

A 4-day working week

Foreign policy:

International tax on millionaires with 30% financing healthcare and education in low-income countries

Cut development aid

Deepen Brexit by removing or reforming EU-inherited laws

Social issues:

Legal limit on migration and deportation to Rwanda

Enforce neighbourhood policing through recruitment and new equipment

Increase the Universal Credit for low-income households

Tax system:

Fight tax avoidance by abolishing the non-domiciled tax status

Abolish the inheritance tax for estates under £2 million

Abolish business rates




Figure S16: Conjoint analysis in Switzerland (Average Marginal Component Effect).  
 (Question 23) [\(Back to Section 5.1.\)](#)




Figure S17: Conjoint analysis in Japan (Average Marginal Component Effect). (Question 23). [\(Back to Section 5.1.\)](#)




Figure S18: Conjoint analysis in the U.S. (Average Marginal Component Effect). (Question 23).  
[\(Back to Section 5.1.\)](#)




Figure S19: Conjoint analysis in France (in French, cf. Figure S10 for English). (Question 23).  
[\(Back to Section 5.1.\)](#)

Climat:

- Construire 14 nouveaux réacteurs nucléaires
- Supprimer les Zones à Faibles Émissions (ZFE)

Économie:

- Indexer totalement les retraites sur l'inflation
- Augmenter le SMIC à 1600€ net par mois
- Restaurer l'âge légal de départ à la retraite à 62 ans

Politique étrangère:

- Taxe mondiale sur les millionnaires, dont 30 % financerait la santé et l'éducation dans les pays à bas revenus
- Réduire l'aide au développement
- Doubler le budget militaire d'ici 2030

Société:

- Supprimer le droit du sol
- Peines planchers pour les récidivistes et responsabilité pénale à 16 ans
- Instaurer le Référendum d'Initiative Citoyenne (RIC)

Fiscalité:

- Défiscaliser les primes jusqu'à 10 000 € par an
- Exonérer d'impôt sur le revenu les jeunes de moins de 30 ans
- Baisser l'impôt sur le revenu jusqu'à 4000€/mois net et l'augmenter au-delà
- Rétablissement un impôt sur la fortune (ISF) renforcé




Figure S20: Conjoint analysis in Germany (in German, cf. Figure S11 for English). (Question 23).  
[\(Back to Section 5.1.\)](#)

Klimaschutz:

- Aufhebung des Heizungsgesetzes, das erneuerbare Energien vorschreibt
- Neuwagen mit Verbrennungsmotor ab 2035 verbieten.

Wirtschaftspolitik:

- Strompreise durch Steuersenkungen um 12 % senken
- Mindestlohn bis 2026 auf 15 € erhöhen
- 500 Milliarden Euro in strategische Sektoren wie Stahl, Automobilindustrie und Verteidigung investieren

Außenpolitik:

- Internationale Millionärssteuer mit 30 % zur Finanzierung von Gesundheit und Bildung in Ländern mit niedrigem Einkommen
- Kürzung der Entwicklungshilfe
- Die Ukraine militärisch und finanziell unterstützen

Gesellschaft:

- Einsatz elektronischer Fußfesseln zur Verfolgung von Gewalttätern gegen Frauen
- 20.000 € staatlicher Zuschuss bei Geburt eines Kindes
- Beschleunigte Verfahren zur Erlangung der deutschen Staatsangehörigkeit einschränken

Steuerpolitik:

- Keine Steuern auf Überstunden und Arbeit im Rentenalter
- Abschaffung der Erbschaftssteuer
- Komplette Wiedereinführung der Schuldenbremse
- Höhere Steuern für die reichsten 1% zur Finanzierung von höherem Kindergeld, Bürgergeld und Mindestrente




Figure S21: Conjoint analysis in Italy (in Italian, cf. Figure S12 for English). (Question 23). (Back to Section 5.1.)

Politica climatica:

Annnullare il divieto di nuove auto con motore a combustione a partire dal 2035

Raddoppiare la capacità di energia rinnovabile entro il 2030

Politica economica:

Incrementare l'assegno di nascita fino a 3.600 euro per i neonati

Destinare i fondi UE non utilizzati all'esenzione fiscale per le aziende che assumono

Introdurre un salario minimo a norma di legge di 10€ all'ora

Riduzione dell'orario di lavoro senza ridurre gli stipendi

Politica estera:

Tassa internazionale sui milionari, il cui 30% finanzierebbe l'assistenza sanitaria e l'istruzione nei Paesi a basso reddito

Tagliare gli aiuti allo sviluppo

Sviluppare una difesa militare comune europea

Politica sociale:

Imporre un limite legale della migrazione in Italia e trattare le richieste di asilo al di fuori dell'UE

Riconoscere il matrimonio tra persone dello stesso sesso

Introdurre l'istruzione in età della prima infanzia gratuita e obbligatoria (fino ai 3 anni)

Politica fiscale:

Riduzione dell'imposta sul reddito per i nuclei familiari a basso reddito

Sostituire l'imposta sul reddito con una flat tax del 15%.




Figure S22: Conjoint analysis in Poland (in Polish, cf. Figure S13 for English). (Question 23).  
[\(Back to Section 5.1.\)](#)

Polityka klimatyczna:

Rezygnacja z węgla do 2035 r.

Zakaz sprzedaży nowych samochodów z silnikiem spalinowym do 2035 r.

Kwestie ekonomiczne:

Rozwój produkcji kolejowej i inwestycje w infrastrukturę

Przeznaczenie 5% PKB na wydatki wojskowe do 2030 r

Polityka zagraniczna:

Miedzynarodowy podatek od milionerów, z 30% finansowaniem opieki zdrowotnej i edukacji w krajach o niskich dochodach

Ograniczenie pomocy rozwojowej

Zatrzymanie osób, którym odmówiono azylu, do czasu ich deportacji

Kwestie społeczne:

Przywrócenie praw reprodukcyjnych, w tym prawa do aborcji

Zlagodzenie restrykcji w zakresie zgromadzeń publicznych i protestów

Wydłużony urlop rodzicielski, ulgi podatkowe na dzieci i możliwość pracy zdalnej

System podatkowy:

Obniżenie podatków dla gospodarstw domowych o niskich dochodach poprzez zwiększenie kwoty wolnej od podatku

Zwiększenie podatków od zysków dużych korporacji cyfrowych oraz firm zajmujących się paliwami kopalnymi

Zwolnienie z podatku dochodowego dla seniorów opóźniających przejście na emerytury




Figure S23: Conjoint analysis in Spain (in Spanish, cf. Figure S14 for English). (Question 23).  
[\(Back to Section 5.1.\)](#)

Políticas climáticas:

- Ampliar los bonos sociales térmico y eléctrico
- Un plan nacional de inversiones para mejorar la gestión del agua

Asuntos económicos:

- Fijar el salario mínimo en 1350€/mes
- Reducir la semana laboral a 36 horas antes de 2030 sin merma salarial
- Fomentar la flexibilidad horaria mediante un banco de horas

Política exterior:

- Impuesto internacional a los millonarios con un 30% para financiar la sanidad y la educación en países de renta baja
- Reducir la ayuda al desarrollo a los países de renta baja
- Aumentar el apoyo a Ucrania y mantener las sanciones a Rusia

Asuntos sociales:

- Reforzar la regulación de las redes sociales en materia de transparencia, control de la desinformación e identidad verificada
- Educación de 0 a 3 años gratuita
- Crear centros fuera de la UE para tramitar las solicitudes de asilo

Sistema fiscal:

- Bajar el impuesto sobre la renta a la clase media y aumentarlo a los hogares ricos
- Suprimir el impuesto sobre el patrimonio y bajar los tipos del impuesto de sociedades
- Reducir los impuestos en zonas rurales mediante la Ley de Fiscalidad Agraria




Figure S24: Conjoint analysis in Japan (in Japanese, cf. Figure S17 for English). (Question 23.)  
 (Back to Section 5.1.)

気候政策:  
 2030年までに再生可能エネルギーによる電力50%を達成  
 エコロジカル・トランジションに150兆円を投資

経済問題:  
 最低賃金を時給1,500円に引き上げる  
 18歳までの子ども全員に月額15,000円の子ども手当を支給する

外交政策:  
 富裕層への国際課税を実施し、その30%を低所得国の医療・教育に充てる  
 政府開発援助を削減する  
 北朝鮮の核・ミサイル計画の完全な廃棄を要求する。

社会問題:  
 選挙区合併の廃止  
 同性婚を認める  
 パートタイム労働者への年金受給資格の拡大  
 リスキル、公正な賃金、キャリアの継続性を通じて女性のエンパワーメントを促進する

税制:  
 最富裕層への(所得税と相続税の)増税と最貧困層への減税  
 中低所得世帯への消費税還付制度の導入  
 財政均衡を回復し、2025年までに財政黒字を達成する。




Figure S25: Average preferred revenue split for a global wealth tax (variant *few*). (Question 24).  
[\(Back to Section 3.2.\)](#)




Figure S26: Decomposition of preferred shares for each spending item in the revenue split  
 (All countries together; variant *few*). (Question 24). (Back to Section 3.2.)




Figure S27: Decomposition of preferred shares for each spending item in the revenue split (All countries together; variant *many*). (Question 25). [\(Back to Section 3.2.\)](#)




Figure S28: Average preferred revenue split for a global wealth tax (variant *many*). (Question 25). [\(Back to Section 3.2.\)](#)

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Saudi Arabia	USA
Global: Education and Healthcare in low-income countries	18.6	19.5	17.2	18.4	19.8	22.3	24.2	18.4	21.0	14.7	21.3	18.8
Global: Renewable energy and infrastructure to cope with climate change	18.3	18.7	18.1	20.0	18.5	17.2	16.2	20.4	18.7	17.7	19.6	17.7
Global: Loss and Damage Fund (to rebuild after climate disasters)	16.7	16.4	14.4	16.6	18.1	14.2	19.3	14.9	17.6	16.0	20.6	16.7
Global: Forestation and biodiversity projects	16.2	17.2	17.5	18.8	18.1	17.1	14.9	16.3	17.0	14.1	19.3	15.6

Figure S29: "By taking this survey, you will be automatically entered into a lottery to win up to [amount\_lottery: \$100].

Should you be selected in the lottery, you will have the option to channel a part of this additional compensation to the charity *Just One Tree* to plant trees.

**In case you win the lottery, what share of the [amount\_lottery: \$100 prize] would you donate to plant trees?" (Question 27).**




Figure S30: Support for the National, Global, and International Climate Schemes, and median belief regarding the support for the GCS. (Questions 26-35). (Back to Section 4.1.)




Figure S31: “According to you, how likely is it that international policies involving significant transfers from high-income countries to low-income countries will be introduced in the next 15 years?” (Question 37).




Figure S32: Absolute support for plausible global redistribution policies (Percentage of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support*). See Figure 10 for the relative support. (Question 38).

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Minimum tax of 2% on billionaires' wealth, in voluntary countries	63	70	75	71	73	63	66	70	64	54	57	67	61
Bridgetown initiative: MDBs expanding sustainable investments in LICs, and at lower interest rates	56	60	56	61	72	47	57	63	61	45	58	70	54
L&D: Developed countries financing a fund to help vulnerable countries cope with climate Loss and damage	55	58	55	55	68	55	61	56	52	44	61	75	52
Debt relief for vulnerable countries, suspending payments until they are more able to repay	49	52	48	44	64	53	55	54	52	38	52	70	48
At least 0.7% of developed countries' GDP in foreign aid	49	51	50	48	59	42	58	50	51	33	59	69	47
Raise global minimum tax on profit from 15% to 35%, allocating revenues to countries based on sales	49	58	58	57	70	47	50	58	51	42	35	53	46
NCQG: Developing countries providing \$300 bn a year in climate finance for developing countries	48	53	51	54	62	46	54	52	53	32	60	67	44
International levy on shipping carbon emissions, returned to countries based on population	47	54	59	49	62	45	54	53	56	30	46	60	46
Expand Security Council to new permanent members (e.g. India, Brazil, African Union), restrict veto use	46	56	54	54	64	50	55	55	54	35	35	63	44
International levy on aviation carbon emissions, raising prices by 30%, returned to countries based on population	37	43	47	42	45	39	42	41	42	26	34	53	36

Figure S33: Share of plausible global redistribution policies supported (*somewhat* or *strongly*). (Question 38). Section 6.1.




Figure S34: Share of plausible global redistribution policies opposed (*somewhat* or *strongly*). (Question 38).  
 Section 6.1.




Figure S35: Preferred North-to-South climate grant funding in 2035, specified in qualitative terms or in terms of who advocates for that amount (NCQG, variant *Short*). (Question 40).  
 (Back to Section 6.1.)




Figure S36: Preferred North-to-South climate grant funding in 2035, specified in money terms (NCQG, variant *Full*). (Question 39).  
 (Back to Section 6.1.)




Figure S37: Support for an international wealth tax with 30% of revenue funding LICs, depending on the country coverage (Yes/No question). (Questions 41-43).




Figure S38: Prefers a *sustainable* rather than a *business-as-usual* future. (Question 44).




Figure S39: Acceptance of a global progressive income tax on the richest households to finance global poverty reduction (Questions 45-46, Percentage of *Somewhat or Strongly support* among non-*Indifferent* responses), and features of the tax presented to the respondents (Section C.2.). [\(Back to Section 6.2.\)](#)

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Accepts tax on world top 1% to finance global poverty reduction (Additional 15% tax on income over [\$120k/year in PPP])	69	73	71	72	84	69	73	67	60	69	75	82	62
Percentage of fellow citizens affected by top 1% tax	5	3	2	4	2	2	2	4	4	4	2	11	8
Percentage of GDP transferred abroad in top 1% tax	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	5	3
Accepts tax on world top 3% to finance global poverty reduction (Additional 15% tax over [\$80k], 30% over [\$120k], 45% over [\$1M])	64	66	70	62	71	70	66	67	42	55	76	82	57
Percentage of fellow citizens affected by top 3% tax	11	6	5	10	5	4	5	5	18	10	4	16	18
Percentage of GDP transferred abroad in top 3% tax	5	3	2	4	3	4	3	3	3	4	5	12	8

Figure S40: Absolute support for a global progressive income tax on the richest households to finance global poverty reduction (Percentage of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support*). (Questions 45-46).  
[\(Back to Section 6.2.\)](#)

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Supports tax on world top 1% to finance global poverty reduction (Additional 15% tax on income over [\$120k/year in PPP])	56	61	62	62	75	50	61	55	53	44	60	68	51
Supports tax on world top 3% to finance global poverty reduction (Additional 15% tax over [\$80k], 30% over [\$120k], 45% over [\$1M])	50	56	59	53	60	55	57	54	36	35	61	67	45

Figure S41: Acceptance of a global progressive income tax on the richest households to finance global poverty reduction *among respondents affected by the tax* (Questions 45-46, Percentage of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* among non-*Indifferent* responses), and share of respondents affected by the tax (Section C.2).  
[\(Back to Section 6.2.\)](#)

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Supports tax on world top income to finance global poverty reduction (Any variant)	53	61	60	61	65	46	54	71	32	45	79	43	
Affected by the top tax (any variant)	6	4	3	3	5	2	3	7	11	3	21	8	
Supports tax on world top 1% to finance global poverty reduction (Additional 15% tax on income over [\$120k/year in PPP])	61	70	80	65	77	100	60	65	56	67	76	51	
Affected by the top 1% tax (income > \$PPP 120k)	3	2	2	2	4	1	1	4	7	2	14	4	
Supports tax on world top 3% to finance global poverty reduction (Additional 15% tax over [\$80k], 30% over [\$120k], 45% over [\$1M])	50	58	55	59	56	32	53	73	22	38	81	41	
Affected by the top 3% tax (income > \$PPP 80k)	9	6	5	4	7	2	5	10	16	4	28	11	

Figure S42: “How do you evaluate each of these channels to transfer resources to reduce poverty in LICs?”  
Percentage of *Best* way (other options: *Right*, *Wrong* or *Acceptable* way). (Question 48).  
[\(Back to Section 6.3.\)](#)

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Targeted cash transfers (child allowances, disability & elderly pensions)	16	14	8	14	19	14	15	14	12	8	29	36	14
Unconditional cash transfers to each household	12	8	6	9	10	9	10	8	9	7	25	24	10
Government, conditional on financing poverty reduction	8	9	8	10	12	6	9	8	10	2	6	23	9
Development aid agencies	7	7	6	10	6	4	8	9	6	4	4	17	8
Local NGOs with democratic processes	5	6	7	7	5	7	6	6	6	1	3	16	6
Local authorities	5	5	6	4	4	6	5	5	3	2	3	14	5
Government, unconditional	4	4	5	3	3	4	3	4	3	1	3	15	5

Figure S43: "How do you evaluate each of these channels to transfer resources to reduce poverty in LICs?"

Percentage of *Wrong way* (other options: *Best*, *Right* or *Acceptable* way). (Question 48).

(Back to Section 6.3.)

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Government, unconditional	51	56	49	69	50	42	52	62	65	51	32	18	56
Local authorities	42	44	37	50	44	31	49	49	49	36	34	19	47
Unconditional cash transfers to each household	33	39	32	49	36	32	33	44	46	38	13	8	35
Local NGOs with democratic processes	29	26	23	30	24	20	27	27	27	25	44	16	29
Government, conditional on financing poverty reduction	21	22	24	23	13	20	23	26	28	20	18	8	24
Development aid agencies	16	16	19	14	15	19	17	13	19	12	21	7	16
Targeted cash transfers (child allowances, disability & elderly pensions)	14	15	18	18	8	14	12	17	18	18	6	2	16

Figure S44: "Should governments actively cooperate to have all countries converge in terms of GDP per capita by the end of the century?" (Question 49).




Figure S45: “If there was a worldwide movement in favor of a global program to tackle climate change, implement taxes on millionaires and fund poverty reduction in low-income countries, to what extent would you be willing to be part of that movement? (Multiple answers possible)” (Question 50). [\(Back to Section 6.2.\)](#)

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Saudi Arabia	USA
Would not support such a movement	32	28	29	31	18	29	25	31	36	44	26	33
Could sign a petition and spread ideas	52	55	53	53	58	54	57	55	48	51	40	50
Could attend a demonstration	19	21	22	18	26	15	27	19	14	4	24	23
Could go on strike	7	9	7	11	15	8	10	5	6	2	9	7
Could donate [\$100] to a strike fund	10	10	8	12	12	7	10	12	13	2	18	12

Figure S46: "Let us call "your political party" the party you voted for in the last election, or the party that represents your views most closely."

**Imagine there was a worldwide coalition of political parties in favor of a common program to tackle climate change, implement taxes on millionaires and fund poverty reduction in low-income countries.**

**Would you be more likely to vote for your party if it were part of that coalition?"**  
 (Question 51) [\(Back to Section 6.2.\)](#)




Figure S47: "Some people think that high-income countries should support low-income countries."

Among the different reasons given, which ones do you agree with? (Multiple answers possible)" (Question 52). [\(Back to Section 6.2.\)](#)




Figure S48: "Some people argue that Western countries owe reparations for colonization and slavery to former colonies and descendants of slaves.

Reparations could take the form of funding education and facilitating technology transfers, to address unequal opportunities passed down from the past.

**Do you support or oppose reparations of this kind for colonization and slavery? "**  
 (Question 53). (Back to Section 6.2.)




Figure S49: Global redistribution obtained from median custom parameters: 49% of winners; 18% of losers; degree of redistribution of 5 (out of 10). (Question 55). (Section 6.4.)



Figure S50: Average custom global redistribution. (Question 55). (Back to Section 6.4.)




Figure S51: Mean answers to custom redistribution. (Question 55). (Back to Section 6.4.)

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Saudi Arabia	USA
Preferred share of winners	47.4	47.9	47.2	46.5	48.7	49.5	49.0	48.4	44.8	46.8	49.9	46.8
Preferred share of losers	17.7	17.7	18.4	17.5	17.2	16.8	18.5	17.4	18.4	17.7	17.5	17.8
Preferred degree of redistribution	4.7	4.8	4.6	4.6	5.2	4.9	5.0	4.8	4.4	4.5	5.0	4.5
Implied minimum income (in PPP \$/month)	242.0	251.1	238.0	238.6	272.4	264.6	264.2	246.6	222.7	233.0	274.3	232.5
Implied transfer (in % of world income)	5.1	5.4	5.0	5.1	5.9	5.9	5.7	5.3	4.7	4.7	5.9	4.9
Loses in own custom redistribution	46.4	41.1	42.5	46.9	35.2	11.4	35.8	54.9	73.9	36.9	40.5	56.6
custom_redistr_satisfied	55.8	58.2	52.8	56.8	63.3	56.7	62.8	58.7	54.1	39.6	67.6	58.4
custom_redistr_skip	42.9	40.0	44.4	41.4	34.8	42.4	35.5	40.0	43.5	59.2	32.4	40.8

Figure S52: Mean answers to custom redistribution among respondents satisfied with their custom redistribution. (Question 55). (Back to Section 6.4.)

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Saudi Arabia	USA
Preferred share of winners	47.6	48.4	48.4	47.0	49.3	50.6	48.9	48.8	45.1	45.8	50.0	46.5
Preferred share of losers	18.3	18.2	19.8	17.5	17.0	16.7	19.7	18.4	19.6	18.9	17.6	18.2
Preferred degree of redistribution	4.7	4.9	4.4	4.7	5.3	5.2	5.1	4.6	4.4	4.4	4.9	4.5
Implied minimum income (in PPP \$/month)	247.3	259.5	239.1	242.9	282.2	288.5	272.8	248.4	217.6	224.9	267.5	232.8
Implied transfer (in % of world income)	5.4	5.8	5.3	5.5	6.2	6.6	6.0	5.6	4.7	4.6	5.8	5.1

Figure S53: Median answers to custom redistribution among respondents satisfied with their custom redistribution. (Question 55). [\(Back to Section 6.4.\)](#)

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Saudi Arabia	USA
Preferred share of winners	49.0	50.0	50.0	48.0	50.0	51.0	50.0	50.0	42.0	48.0	49.0	46.0
Preferred share of losers	18.0	18.0	20.0	17.0	15.0	17.0	20.0	17.0	14.0	20.0	18.0	16.0
Preferred degree of redistribution	5.0	5.0	4.0	5.0	6.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.0	5.0	5.0	4.0
Implied minimum income (in PPP \$/month)	208.3	219.2	184.6	188.3	277.7	267.2	255.6	199.6	184.6	184.6	262.4	184.6
Implied transfer (in % of world income)	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.4	3.7	4.4	4.5	4.4

Figure S54: Preferred share of winners in the custom redistributions among satisfied respondents. (Question 55). [\(Back to Section 6.4.\)](#)




Figure S55: Preferred share of losers in the custom redistributions among satisfied respondents. (Question 55). [\(Back to Section 6.4.\)](#)




Figure S56: Minimum worldwide income implied by custom redistributions among satisfied respondents (in PPP \$ per month). (Question 55). [\(Back to Section 6.4.\)](#)




Figure S57: Rich-to-poor transfer implied by custom redistributions among satisfied respondents. (Question 55).  
 (Back to Section 6.4.)




Figure S58: “Comprehension question: one respondent with the expected answer will get [amount\_lottery: \$100].

How would gasoline prices change as a result of the Global Climate Scheme?  
 Gasoline prices would...” (Correct answer: *increase*) (Question 60).




Figure S59: Relative agreement for: “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “My taxes should go towards solving global problems.”” (Percentage of Agree or Strongly agree among non-Neither agree nor disagree responses). (Question 61).




Figure S60: Absolute agreement for: "To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? "My taxes should go towards solving global problems."'" (Percentage of Agree or Strongly agree). (Question 61).




Figure S61: "Which group of people do you advocate for when you vote?"<sup>41</sup> (Question 62). (Back to Section 6.2.)




Figure S62: “Do you feel that this survey was politically biased?” (Question 63).  
 (Back to Section 2.)




Figure S63: Manual classification of *feedback* fields: “The survey is nearing completion. You can now enter any comments, thoughts, or suggestions in the field below.” (Question 64).  
 (Back to Section 2.)

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Nothing / No comment	13	7	6	4	6	16	6	7	5	26	12	9	15
Praise survey	12	11	13	10	13	10	11	16	4	5	8	20	17
Other / Vague / Unclassifiable	12	9	10	10	8	10	10	7	9	16	23	17	7
Thank you	3	2	2	2	0	2	3	1	2	0	4	15	4
Confusing/difficult	2	2	3	2	1	0	4	1	1	7	3	0	1
Criticize survey	2	2	2	3	1	5	3	2	6	1	1	1	2
Doubt global redistribution	2	1	2	1	0	2	2	1	2	0	4	0	3
Pro global redistribution	2	1	0	1	2	1	2	0	0	1	7	2	1
Doubt climate action	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Pro climate action	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	2	1

Figure S64: "How likely are you to become a millionaire at some point in your life?" (Question 15).




Figure S65: "Were you or your parents born in a foreign country?" (Question 5).




Figure S66: Vote in the last election, compared to actual results among voters. (Questions 16, 18).  
[\(Back to Section 2.\)](#)





Figure S67: Vote in the last election, compared to actual results on the entire population.  
 (Questions 16, 18). [\(Back to Section 2.\)](#)



## A.2 Countries' slant in the open-ended fields

Reading and coding each field one by one took about 30 hours. It gives first-hand insight on the topics vary significantly across countries. Here are what I noted as each country's unique topics. Compared to other countries, the concepts overrepresented in each country are as follows:

- France: insecurity, holidays or free time, the public deficit, equality, gender equality;
- Germany: old age poverty, immigration, the return of growth or the economic situation, free time, war (in Europe), bureaucracy;
- Italy: health, serenity or peace of mind, war, work stress and free time, world hunger, femicides;
- Poland: war, inequality, holidays, honesty, disabled people;
- Spain: "health, money and love", housing, corruption, water access, global poverty, squatters;
- the UK: the cost of living, immigration, having a comfortable life, mental health, the Holocaust, roads dangerous for driving, being unjustly imprisoned, cut to the winter fuel allowance;
- Switzerland: equality, immigration, gender equality;
- Japan: the level of pensions, a cut on the consumption tax, the price of rice, the declining birth rate, childcare support, reducing the number of parliament members, foreigners' preferential treatment, excessive social assistance or the lack of reward for hard work, stock prices;
- Russia: metaphysical questions or profound interrogations, "lies", buying a house or a car, traveling, the desire to live;
- Saudi Arabia: hobbies such as sports or soccer, the willingness to become millionaire (or billionaire), one's business project,<sup>46</sup> buying a house, one's car, satisfaction with one's income, "self-injustice" or sin, raising children, Palestine, the oppression of orphans, travel;
- the U.S.: the economy, Trump, breaches of the Constitution, abortion, gun control.

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<sup>46</sup>This can be linked to the high risk-taking disposition of Saudis (Falk et al. 2018).

## B Questionnaire

The U.S. version of the questionnaire is presented. Features that vary across countries are placed in square brackets within the question text, as follows: [feature\_name: U.S. value]. The features values for each country are provided in [this spreadsheet](#). Random branches or conditions for displaying the question are specified in square brackets before the question text (cf. Figure 2 for the survey flow). The question text is followed by square brackets that refer to Sections, Figures, and Tables presenting the question results, and the variable name(s) corresponding to the question. Finally, response options are displayed in italics. Unless otherwise specified, responses are compulsory and a single response must be chosen.

[\(Back to Section 2.\)](#)

### Welcome

1. Welcome to this survey!

This survey is **anonymous** and is conducted **for research** purposes on a representative sample of [sample\_size: 3,000] [nationality: American people].

It takes around 20 min to complete.

The survey contains lotteries and awards for those who get the correct answer to some comprehension questions.

If you are attentive and lucky, **you can win up to [amount\_lottery: \$100]**.

Please answer every question carefully.

By clicking on the button below, you consent to the terms and conditions.

### Socio-demographics

2. What is your gender? [gender]

*Woman; Man; Other*

3. What is your country? [hidden\_country]

4. What is your age? [age\_exact, age]

*Below 18; 18 to 20; 21 to 24; 25 to 29; 30 to 34; 35 to 39; 40 to 44; 45 to 49; 50 to 54; 55 to 59; 60 to 64; 65 to 69; 70 to 74; 75 to 79; 80 to 84; 85 to 89; 90 to 99; 100 or above*

5. Were you or your parents born in a foreign country? [Figure S65; foreign]

*Yes, I was born in a foreign country; Not me but both my parents were born in a foreign country; Not me but one of my parents was born in a foreign country; No, I was born in this country and my parents too*

6. Do you live with your partner (if you have one)? [couple]

*Yes; No*

7. How many people are there in your household?

The household includes: **you**, your spouse, **your family members** who live with you, and your dependents (not flatmates). [hh\_size]

*1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more*

8. How many children under the age of 14 live with you? [Nb\_children\_\_14]

*0; 1; 2; 3; 4 or more*

9. [new page] [*Only in: US*] What race or ethnicity do you identify with? (Multiple answers are possible) [race]

*White; Black or African American; Hispanic; Asian; American Indian or Alaskan Native; Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; Other; Prefer not to say*

10. What is the [**periodicity\_text: monthly**] [**income\_type: gross**] **income of your household**, [**income\_type\_long: after taxes and transfers**]?

This includes all sources of income: wages, pensions, welfare payments, property income, dividends, self-employment earnings, Social Security benefits, and income from other sources. [income]

*[All but RU, US: Custom thresholds, taking into account household composition Questions 6-8, and corresponding to the country's deciles and quartiles of standard of living, cf. the sheet "Income" in this spreadsheet;*

*RU, US: Items based on household total income deciles and quartiles, namely in US: Less than \$17,000; between \$17,001 and \$30,000; between \$30,001 and \$36,000; between \$36,001 and \$43,000; between \$43,001 and \$56,000; between \$56,001 and \$72,000; between \$72,001 and \$91,000; between \$91,001 and \$115,000; between \$115,001 and \$130,000;*

*between \$130,001 and \$150,000; between \$150,001 and \$213,000; More than \$213,000; I prefer not to answer]*

11. What is your highest completed education level? [education]  
[Country-specific, usually: 0-1 Primary or less; 2 Medium school; 2 Some high school; 3 High school diploma; 3-4 Vocational training; 5 Short-cycle tertiary; 6 Bachelor's; 7-8 Master's or higher]
12. What is your employment status? [employment\_status]  
*Full-time employed; Part-time employed; Self-employed; Unemployed (searching for a job); Student; Retired; Inactive (not searching for a job)*
13. [Only the first digits asked in RU, SA] What is your zipcode?  
We ask for the zipcode to balance the sample in terms of degree of urbanization (rural, town or city). The survey will be terminated if your zipcode is not recognized.  
[zipcode]
14. Are you a homeowner or a tenant? (Multiple answers are possible) [home\_owner]  
*Tenant; Owner; Landlord renting out property; Hosted free of charge*
15. [new page] How likely are you to become a millionaire at some point in your life?  
[Figure S64; millionaire]  
*Very unlikely; Unlikely; Likely; Very likely; I am already a millionaire*
16. [Except in: RU, SA] Did you vote in the [election: 2024 presidential election]? [Figures S67-S66; voted]  
*Yes; No; Prefer not to say; I didn't have the right to vote in [country\_name: the United States].*

## Vote

17. [Only in: SA] What is your nationality?  
If you have both the Saudi and a foreign nationality, choose "Saudi". [nationality\_SA]  
*Saudi; India; Bangladesh; Syria; Yemen; Egypt; Pakistan; Indonesia; Philippines; Sudan; Myanmar; Jordan; Sri Lanka; Nepal; Turkey; Somalia; Lebanon; Other*
18. [Except in: RU, SA] [If voted: Which candidate did you vote for in the [election: 2024 presidential election]?; Otherwise: Even if you did not vote in the [election: 2024

presidential election], please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who represents your views more closely.] [Figures S67-S66; vote] [Candidates/parties with at least 1% of votes, e.g. in US: Harris; Trump; Other; Prefer not to say. In FR, IT, PL, ES, election is the 2024 European election]

## Open-ended field

[Four random branches; Section 3.1; Figures 3, S2-S7; Random answers can be found on [bit.ly/fields2025](https://bit.ly/fields2025); field, variant\_field]

19. [Branch: concerns] What are your main concerns these days? [Figure S5; concerns\_field]
20. [Branch: wish] What are your needs or wishes? [Figure S6; wish\_field]
21. [Branch: injustice] What according to you is the greatest injustice of all? [Figure S7; injustice\_field]
22. [Branch: issue] Can you name an issue that is important to you but is neglected in the public debate? [Figure S8; issue\_field]

## Conjoint analysis

23. [Except in: RU, SA] Imagine if the two top candidates in your constituency in the next general election campaigned with the following policies in their party's platforms.

Which of these candidates would you vote for?

Candidate A	Candidate B	
[Random policy]	[Random policy]	[Policy field in random order]
[Random policy]	[Random policy]	[Policy field in random order]
[Random policy]	[Random policy]	[Policy field in random order]
[Random policy]	[Random policy]	[Policy field in random order]
[Random policy]	[Random policy]	[Policy field in random order]

[Section 5.1; Figures 8, S9-S23; conjoint]

*Candidate A; Candidate B; Neither of them*

## Revenue split of global tax

[*Two random branches; field, variant\_split*]

24. [Branch: Few] Imagine a wealth tax applied to households with a net worth above [tax\_threshold: \$5 million], implemented in every country around the world.

[tax\_country\_name: In the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would be [tax\_revenue: \$514 billion] per year (that is, [tax\_revenue\_gdp: 2]% of [tax\_country\_gdp: U.S. GDP]), while it would be [LIC\_revenue: \$1 billion] in all low-income countries combined (700 million people live in a low-income country, most of them in Africa). Each country would retain part of the revenues it collects and use it for different domestic purposes. The remaining part would be pooled globally to finance sustainable development in low-income countries.

**What percentage of the global wealth tax revenue should be allocated to each category?**

The total allocation must sum to 100%.

[*Section 3.2; Figures 4, S25-S26; revenue\_split\_few*]

*Domestic: Education and Healthcare; Domestic: Social welfare programs; Domestic: Reduction in the federal income tax; Domestic: Reduction of the deficit; Global: Education, Healthcare and Renewable energy in low-income countries*

25. [Branch: Many] Imagine a wealth tax applied to households with net worth above [tax\_threshold: \$5 million], implemented in all countries around the world.

[tax\_country\_name: In the U.S.], the tax revenues collected would be [tax\_revenue: \$514 billion] per year (that is, [tax\_revenue\_gdp: 2]% of [tax\_country\_gdp: U.S. GDP]), while it would be [LIC\_revenue: \$1 billion] in all low-income countries combined (700 million people live in a low-income country, most of them in Africa). Each country would retain part of the revenues it collects and use it for different domestic purposes. The remaining part would be pooled globally to finance sustainable development.

**What percentage of the global wealth tax revenue should be allocated to each**

**category?**

**The total allocation must sum to 100%.**

[Section 3.2; Figures 4, S27-S28; revenue\_split\_many]

[Five items are chosen at random among the 13 possible ones: *Domestic: Education and Research*; *Domestic: Healthcare*; *Domestic: Defense*; *Domestic: Deficit reduction*; *Domestic: Justice and Police*; *Domestic: Retirement pensions*; *Domestic: Social welfare programs*; *Domestic: Infrastructure (public transport, water systems...)*; *Domestic: Income tax reduction*; *Global: Education and Healthcare in low-income countries*; *Global: Renewable energy and infrastructure to cope with climate change*; *Global: Loss and Damage Fund (to rebuild after climate disasters)*; *Global: Forestation and biodiversity projects*]

## **Warm glow – moral substitute**

[Three random branches: NCS; Donation; control group; variant\_warm\_glow]

26. [Branch: NCS] Do you agree with the following policy?

Climate Scheme:

To meet the national climate target, a limited number of permits to emit greenhouse gases would be issued nationally. Polluting firms would be required to buy permits to cover their greenhouse gas emissions. Such a policy would make fossil fuel companies pay for their emissions and gradually raise the price of fossil fuels. Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

The revenues generated by the sale of permits would finance an equal cash transfer. Each [country\_adjective: American] would receive [amount\_expenses: \$115] per month, thereby offsetting price increases for the average [country\_adjective: American].

**Do you support the Climate Scheme?** [Section 4.1; Figures 6, S30; ncs\_support]

Yes; No

27. [Branch: Donation] By taking this survey, you will be automatically entered into a lottery to win up to [amount\_lottery: \$100].

Should you be selected in the lottery, you will have the option to channel a part of this additional compensation to the charity *Just One Tree* to plant trees.

**In case you win the lottery, what share of the [amount\_lottery: \$100 prize] would you donate to plant trees? [Section 5.2; Figures 9a, S29 ; donation]**

*Share to plant trees*

## Cap & Share

28. Do you support the following policy?

To ensure that you have attentively read the description, we will ask some comprehension questions later in the survey: those who get correct answers can win [amount\_lottery: \$100].

Global Climate Scheme:

In 2015, all countries agreed to contain global warming "well below +2 °C". To achieve this, there is a maximum amount of greenhouse gases we can emit globally.

To meet the climate target, a limited number of permits to emit greenhouse gases would be issued globally. Polluting firms would be required to buy permits to cover their greenhouse gas emissions. Such a policy would make fossil fuel companies pay for their emissions and gradually raise the price of fossil fuels. Higher prices would encourage people and companies to use less fossil fuels, reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

In accordance with the principle that each human has an equal right to pollute, the revenues generated by the sale of permits could finance a global basic income. Every adult would receive [amount.bi: \$35]per month, thereby lifting 600 million people who earn less than \$2 a day out of extreme poverty.

The typical [national: American] would lose out financially [amount.lost: \$90]per month (as he or she would face around [price\_increase: 2]% in price increases, which is higher than the [amount.bi: \$35]per month they would receive).

The policy could be implemented as soon as 100 countries agree to it. Countries that would refuse to take part in the policy could face sanctions (like tariffs) from the rest of the world and would be excluded from the basic income program.

**Do you support the Global Climate Scheme?** [Section 4.1; Figures 6, 9a, S30; gcs\_support]

Yes; No

[new page] [Two random branches: own; US; Figure S30; gcs\_belief, variant\_belief]

29. [Branch: US] According to you, **what percentage of [belief\_nationality: All but US: Americans; US: Europeans] would answer Yes to the previous question** (considering that typical [belief\_nationality] would lose [belief\_loss: \$140] per month from the Global Climate Scheme)?

The respondent who is closest to the correct value will get [amount\_lottery: \$100].  
*Percentage of [belief\_nationality] in favor of Global Climate Scheme*

30. [Branch: own] According to you, **what percentage of [nationality: fellow citizens] would answer Yes to the previous question?**

The respondent who is closest to the correct value will get [amount\_lottery: \$100].  
*Percentage of [nationality: fellow citizens] in favor of Global Climate Scheme*

## Cap & Share non-universal

[Four random branches: low; mid; high; high\_color; Section 4.1; Figures 6, S30; ics\_support]

31. [Branch: low] Below is a map showing a possible set of countries that would participate in the Global Climate Scheme previously described.

These countries include India, the European Union, as well as all Africa, Latin America, South-Asia and South-East Asia.

Collectively, these [nb\_countries\_low: 145] countries account for [emissions\_low\_without: 40]% of global emissions (if [ics\_country: the U.S.] joined them, [emissions\_low\_with: 40]% of global emissions would be covered).

32. [Branch: mid] Below is a map showing a possible set of countries that would participate in the Global Climate Scheme previously described.

These countries include China, India, as well as all Africa, Latin America, South-Asia and South-East Asia.

Collectively, these 119 countries account for 56% of global emissions (if [ics\_country: the U.S.] joined them, [emissions\_mid\_with: 70]% of global emissions would be covered).

33. [Branch: high] Below is a map showing a possible set of countries that would participate in the Global Climate Scheme previously described.

These countries include China, India, [text\_countries\_high: the European Union, Japan, the United Kingdom], Canada, South Korea, as well as all Africa, Latin America, South-Asia and South-East Asia.

Collectively, these [nb\_countries\_high: 153] countries account for [emissions\_high\_without: 71]% of global emissions (if [ics\_country: the U.S.] joined them, [emissions\_high\_with: 86]% of global emissions would be covered).

34. [Branch: high\_color] Below is a map showing a possible set of countries that would participate in the Global Climate Scheme previously described.

These countries include China, India, [text\_countries\_high: the European Union, Japan, the United Kingdom], Canada, South Korea, as well as all Africa, Latin America, South-Asia and South-East Asia.

Collectively, these [nb\_countries\_high: 153] countries account for [emissions\_high\_without: 72]% of global emissions (if [ics\_country: the U.S.] joined them, [emissions\_high\_with: 86]% of global emissions would be covered).

Note that a provision would prevent the Global Climate Scheme from harming low- and middle-income countries: this is why countries like China, Mexico, or Egypt are in white on the map (they would neither win nor lose financially).

35. Do you support [ics\_country: the U.S.] joining the Global Climate Scheme, in case it

is adopted by the above countries? [Section 4.1; Figures 6, S30; ics\_support]

Yes; No

## Warm glow – realism

36. [Two random branches: with or without this informational text.] To ensure that you have attentively read the description below, we will ask some comprehension questions later in the survey: those who get correct answers can win \$100.

In several international organizations, **countries have agreed to demonstrate some degree of solidarity in addressing global challenges.**

Negotiations are ongoing to implement specific mechanisms for sustainable development.

Here are a few examples:

- 🚢 In 2025, to reduce carbon emissions from shipping, **the International Maritime Organization adopted an international levy on excess emissions from maritime fuel, that should partly finance low-income countries.**
- ♦ Since 1970, **developed countries have agreed to contribute 0.7% of their GDP in foreign aid and development assistance.**
- In international climate negotiations, **developed countries have committed to finance climate action in developing countries.** In 2009, they committed to provide \$100 billion per year by 2020. In 2023, all countries agreed to set up a fund to help vulnerable countries cope with loss and damage from climate change. In 2024, the \$100 billion goal was increased to \$300 billion per year by 2035.
- ☒ In 2021, 136 countries adopted a minimum tax rate of 15% on multinational profits.
- ♥ In 2024, under the leadership of Brazil, **the G20 considered the introduction of a global tax of 2% on the wealth of billionaires.**
- 🌐 In 2024, the UN General Assembly adopted the Pact for the Future, which foresees a reform of the UN Security Council to limit the power of its five permanent member and expand it to new members.
- 🕒 Led by the Prime Minister of Barbados and supported by the UN Secretary Gen-

eral, the Bridgetown initiative seeks a new financial system that would drive financial resources towards climate action and sustainable development. [Section 5.2; Figure 9b; info\_solidarity]

37. According to you, how likely is it that international policies involving significant transfers from high-income countries to low-income countries will be introduced in the next 15 years? [Section 5.2; Figures 9b, S31; likely\_solidarity]

*Very unlikely; Unlikely; Likely; Very likely*

38. Do you support or oppose the following policies?

[Only in PL, SA: (As some items refer to “developed countries”, note that we consider [Saudi Arabia] to be a developed country in this question.)] [Section 6.1; Figures 10, S32-S34; solidarity\_support]

[Item order is randomized]

- Institutions like the World Bank investing in many more sustainable projects in lower-income countries, and offering lower interest rates (the Bridgetown initiative)
- Developed countries financing a fund to help vulnerable countries cope with loss and damage from climate change
- Expanding the UN Security Council (in charge of peacekeeping) to new permanent members such as India, Brazil, and the African Union, and restricting the use of the veto<sup>47</sup>
- Raising the globally agreed minimum tax rate on profits of multinational firms from 15% to 35%, closing loopholes and allocating revenues to countries where sales are made
- Debt relief for vulnerable countries by suspending repayments until they are better able to repay, promoting their development
- An international levy on carbon emissions from shipping, funding national budgets in proportion to population
- An international levy on carbon emissions from aviation, raising ticket prices by 30% and funding national budgets in proportion to population

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<sup>47</sup>In Russia, due to a mistake in the questionnaire, this item was not asked to the control group. Therefore, results are based on the treated group for this item in Russia.

- Developed countries providing \$300 billion a year (0.4% of their GDP) to finance climate action in developing countries
- Developed countries contributing at least 0.7% of their GDP in foreign aid and development assistance
- A minimum tax of 2% on the wealth of billionaires, in voluntary countries

*Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Indifferent; Somewhat support; Strongly support*

## NCQG

[Two random branches: Full; Short; ncqg\_fusion, variant\_ncqg]

39. [Branch: Full] **At international climate negotiations, developing countries call for larger provision of "climate finance": the financing of climate action from developed countries in developing countries.** [developed\_note: (Note that we consider Saudi Arabia to be a developed country in this question.)]

**There are two kinds of climate finance: grants (that is, donations) and loans. In 2022, \$26 billion was provided as grants and the rest as loans, for a total of \$116 billion.**

In 2009, developed countries agreed to mobilize \$100 billion per year in climate finance by 2020. In 2024, they committed to raise this goal to \$300 billion by 2035. None of the goals specify which share should be provided as grants.

Below are different positions on the amount of climate finance that should be provided in 2035, all expressed in grant-equivalent terms (that is, not counting loans):

- \$0: There should be no contributions from developed countries to climate action in developing countries.
- \$26 billion (0.04% of developed countries' GDP): The current amount, consistent with the old (2020) goal.
- \$100 billion (0.14% of GDP): The old (2020) goal, if all climate finance were provided as grants.
- \$300 billion (0.43% of GDP): The new (2035) goal, if all climate finance were provided as grants.

- \$600 billion (0.86% of GDP): The goal called for by India, a position shared by most developing countries.
- \$1,000 billion (1.43% of GDP): The goal called for by Climate Action Network (a network of NGOs including Greenpeace, Oxfam, and WWF).
- \$5,000 billion (7.14% of GDP): The goal called for by Demand Climate Justice (a network of NGOs including 350.org and the World Council of Churches)

**If you could choose the amount of climate finance provided by developed countries to developing countries in 2035, what amount would you choose (in grant-equivalent terms)?**

[Section 6.1; Figure S36; ncqg\_full]

[Item order is randomly reversed or not]

\$0; \$26 billion; \$100 billion; \$300 billion; \$600 billion; \$1,000 billion; \$5,000 billion

40. [Branch: Short] **"Climate finance" designates the financing of climate action from developed countries in developing countries.** [developed\_note: (Note that we consider Saudi Arabia to be a developed country in this question.)]

**There are two kinds of climate finance: grants (that is, donations) and loans. The large majority is currently provided as loans.**

In 2009, developed countries agreed to mobilize \$100 billion per year in climate finance. In 2024, they committed to triple this goal by 2035. None of the goals specify which share should be provided as grants.

At international climate negotiations, developing countries call for larger provision of climate finance, particularly in the form of grants.

**If you could choose the level of climate finance provided by developed countries to developing countries in 2035, what would you choose?**

[Section 6.1; Figure S35; ncqg]

[Item order is randomly flipped or not]

*Stop all provision of climate finance.;*

*Reduce the provision of climate finance.;*

*Maintain current contributions (\$26 billion per year in grants, that is 0.04% of developed countries' GDP, and \$80 billion in loans, or 0.1% of GDP).;*

*Meet the newly agreed goal by tripling grants and loans (\$100 billion in grants, or 0.15% of GDP);*

*Increase climate finance to a level between what developed countries have agreed and what developing countries are asking for (\$300 billion in grants, or 0.45% of GDP);*

*Increase climate finance to match what developing countries are asking for (\$600 billion in grants, or 0.9% of GDP);*

*Increase climate finance to match what NGOs are asking for (at least \$1,000 billion per year in grants, that is 1.4% of GDP, is what Greenpeace, Oxfam, WWF, and the World Council of Churches ask for).*

## Wealth tax depending on sets of countries

[Three random branches: Global; HIC; Int'l; Section 4.2; Figures 7, S37; wealth\_tax\_support]

41. [Branch: Global] **Imagine an international tax on individuals with net worth above [wealth\_threshold: \$1 million].**

Only wealth above [wealth\_threshold: \$1 million] would be taxed, at a rate of 2%. Each country would retain 70% of the revenues it collects, while 30% would be pooled at the global level to finance public services in low-income countries (in particular, access to drinking water, healthcare, and education in Africa).

Say we are in 2030. **Imagine that all other countries in the world adopt this policy. Do you support [country\_name: the United States] adopting this international tax on millionaires?**

Yes; No

42. [Branch: HIC] **Imagine an international tax on individuals with net worth above [wealth\_threshold: \$1 million].**

Only wealth above [wealth\_threshold: \$1 million] would be taxed, at a rate of 2%. Each country would retain 70% of the revenues it collects, while 30% would be pooled at the global level to finance public services in low-income countries (in particular, access to drinking water, healthcare, and education in Africa).

Say we are in 2030. **[hic\_tax: Imagine that all other high-income countries (such as the European Union, Japan, and Canada) adopt this policy and some middle-income countries (such as China) do not.]**

**Do you support [country\_name: the United States] adopting this international tax on millionaires?**

Yes; No

43. [Branch: Int'l] **Imagine an international tax on individuals with net worth above [wealth\_threshold: \$1 million].**

Only wealth above [wealth\_threshold: \$1 million] would be taxed, at a rate of 2%. Each country would retain 70% of the revenues it collects, while 30% would be pooled at the global level to finance public services in low-income countries (in particular, access to drinking water, healthcare, and education in Africa).

Say we are in 2030. [intl\_tax:<sup>48</sup> Imagine that some countries (such as the European Union) adopt this policy and others (such as Japan, Canada, and China) do not.]

**Do you support [country\_name: the United States] adopting this international tax on millionaires?**

Yes; No

## Scenarios & radical tax

[Scenario A & B are randomly interverted.]

44. Consider two possible scenarios for the world for the next 20 years.

### Scenario A:

Most countries implement coordinated policies to limit global warming to +2°C and reduce inequality. The world greatly reduces greenhouse gas emissions and is on track to meet its climate target. Taxes on millionaires fund the installation of heat pumps, the thermal insulation of buildings, and improved public transportation. Yachts and private jets are phased out worldwide. Cars are all electric by 2045, and they are about the same price as internal combustion cars nowadays. By 2045, environmental regulations gradually double the price heating fuel or gas, air travel, and beef. As a result, people fly half as much, eat half as much meat, and use more pub-

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<sup>48</sup>Excluded countries are *China, Japan, and Canada*. As for included countries, on top of *Brazil*, they are: *the EU and the UK* for Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S.; the EU for Russia and the UK; and *France, Germany, Spain, and the UK* (except one's own country) for EU countries.

lic transportation in 2045 than they did in 2025. Despite higher prices for polluting goods, the overall purchasing power is preserved, thanks to a decrease in sales tax that reduces the prices of non-polluting goods.

### **Scenario B:**

Since 2025, no additional policies are implemented to address climate change or inequality. People maintain the same lifestyles as in 2025. For example, most people continue to drive cars with internal combustion engines. Greenhouse gas emissions are stable. Global warming is expected to reach +3°C by 2100 and higher levels beyond that date. A warmer climate will cause more frequent and more severe droughts, heatwaves, wildfires, and floodings.

Apart from the elements described, the two scenarios are the same (for example, in terms of unemployment or crime).

**Which scenario do you prefer for the future?** [Section 6.2; Figures 11, S38; sustainable\_future]  
Scenario A; Scenario B

[new page] [Two random branches: top1; top3; Section 6.2; Figures 11, S39-S40; top\_tax\_support, variant\_top\_tax]

45. [Branch: top1] Currently, 2 billion people live in acute poverty, with less than [lcu\_250: \$250][periodicity: per month].

The Sustainable Development Goals, adopted by all countries in 2015, aim to alleviate poverty and give access to healthcare, education, drinking water, and sanitation for all by 2030. Due to lack of funding, the world is not on track to meet these poverty reduction goals.

**Poverty reduction could be funded by a global tax on individual income above [lcu\_120k: \$120,000][periodicity\_tax: per year].**

**The tax rate would be 15% for every [currency: dollar] over [lcu\_120k: \$120,000] of income after existing taxes.**

For example, a single person earning [lcu\_130k: \$130,000][periodicity\_tax: per year] after taxes would pay [lcu\_1500: \$1,500] in additional taxes, or 15% of [lcu\_10k: \$10,000] = [lcu\_130k: \$130,000] – [lcu\_120k: \$120,000]. Meanwhile, a married couple

earning [lcu\_200k: \$200,000][periodicity\_tax: per year], [lcu\_100k: \$100,000] for each of them, would go untaxed.

This tax would apply to the richest 1% of the world's population. [tax\_country\_name: In the United States], it would affect the richest [affected\_top1: 8)% and redistribute [transfer\_top1: 3)% of GDP to lower-income countries.

**Do you support or oppose such a global tax on the richest people to finance global poverty reduction?**

*Strongly oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support; Somewhat oppose; Indifferent*

46. [Branch: top3] Currently, 3 billion people live in deep poverty, with less than [lcu\_400: \$400][periodicity: per month].

The Sustainable Development Goals, adopted by all countries in 2015, aim to alleviate poverty and achieve access to healthcare, education, drinking water, and sanitation for all by 2030. Due to lack of funding, the world is not on track to meet these poverty reduction goals.

**Poverty reduction could be funded by a global tax on individual income above [lcu\_80k: \$80,000][periodicity\_tax: per year].**

**The tax rate would be 15% for every [currency: dollar] over [lcu\_80k: \$80,000] of income after existing taxes, 30% over [lcu\_120k: \$120,000], and 45% over [lcu\_1M: \$1 million].**

For example, a single person earning [lcu\_90k: \$90,000][periodicity\_tax: per year] after taxes would pay [lcu\_1500\_top3: \$1,500] in additional taxes, or 15% of [lcu\_10k\_top3: \$10,000] = [lcu\_90k: \$90,000] – [lcu\_80k: \$80,000]. Meanwhile, a married couple earning [lcu\_150k: \$150,000][periodicity\_tax: per year], [lcu\_75k: \$75,000] for each of them, would go untaxed.

This tax would apply to the richest 3% of the world's population. [tax\_country\_name: In the United States], it would affect the richest [affected\_top3: 18)% and redistribute [transfer\_top3: 8)% of GDP to lower-income countries.

**Do you support or oppose such a global tax on the richest people to finance global poverty reduction?**

[Section 6.2; Figures 11, S39-S40; top3\_tax\_support]

*Strongly oppose; Somewhat support; Strongly support; Somewhat oppose; Indifferent*

47. To show that you are attentive, please select "A little" in the following list: [attention\_test]  
*Not at all; A little; A lot; A great deal*

## Preferred transfer means to LICs

48. Below are different ways to transfer resources to help reduce poverty in a low-income country.

How do you evaluate each of these options?

[Section 6.3; Figures 13, S42-S43; transfer\_how] [Item order is randomly flipped or not]

- Transfers to public development aid agencies which then finance suitable projects
- Transfers to the national government conditioned on the use of funds for poverty reduction programs
- Unconditional transfers to the national government
- Unconditional transfers to local authorities (municipality, village chief...)
- Transfers to local NGOs with democratic decision-making processes
- Cash transfers to parents (child allowances), to the disabled and to the elderly
- Unconditional cash transfers to each household

*A wrong way; An acceptable way; A right way; The best way*

## Radical redistribution

49. Should governments actively cooperate to have all countries converge in terms of GDP per capita by the end of the century? [Section 6.2; Figures 11, S44; convergence\_support]  
*Yes; No; I prefer not to answer*

50. If there was a worldwide movement in favor of a global program to tackle climate change, implement taxes on millionaires and fund poverty reduction in low-income countries, to what extent would you be willing to be part of that movement? (Multiple answers possible) [Section 6.2; Figures 11, S45; global\_movement]

*I would not support such a movement.; I could sign a petition and spread ideas.; I could*

*attend a demonstration.; I could go on strike.; I could donate [amount\_lottery: \$100] to a strike fund.*

51. [Except in: RU, SA] Let us call "your political party" the party you voted for in the last election, or the party that represents your views most closely.

**Imagine** there was a **worldwide coalition** of political parties in favor of a common program **to tackle climate change, implement taxes on millionaires and fund poverty reduction in low-income countries.**

**Would you be more likely to vote for your party if it were part of that coalition?**

[Section 6.2; Figures 11, S46; vote\_intl\_coalition] [Item order is randomly flipped or not]

*Yes, I would be **more likely** to vote for my party if it joined that coalition (or to vote for another party if only that other party joined the coalition).;*

*My choice would **not depend** on which parties are part of that coalition.;*

*No, I would be **less likely** to vote for my party if it joined that coalition.*

52. Some people think that high-income countries should support low-income countries.

Among the different reasons given, which ones do you agree with? (Multiple answers possible) [Section 6.2; Figure S47; why\_hic\_help\_lic] [Order of the first three items is randomized]

*High-income countries have a historical responsibility for the current situation in low-income countries.;*

*In the long run, it is in the interest of high-income countries to help low-income countries.;*

*Helping those in need is the right thing to do. This is also true at the international level.;*

*None of the above.*

53. [Only in: FR, DE, IT, ES, GB, US] Some people argue that Western countries owe reparations for colonization and slavery to former colonies and descendants of slaves. Reparations could take the form of funding education and facilitating technology transfers, to address unequal opportunities passed down from the past.

**Do you support or oppose reparations of this kind for colonization and slavery?**

[Section 6.2; Figures 11, S48; reparations\_support]

*Strongly oppose; Somewhat oppose; Indifferent; Somewhat support; Strongly support*

## [Except in: RU] Custom redistribution

54. What is the [periodicity\_text]: *yearly*] income of your household **after taxes and social benefits**?

This includes all sources of income: salaries, pensions, allowances, welfare benefits, property income, etc.

My household earns ... [text\_unit: \$ per year] (answer with no comma, no space, no period):

[income\_exact]

55. [new page] If you could redistribute income at the global level, what would you do? In this question, we let you choose your preferred parameters for a redistribution of income at the world level.

If you prefer to skip this question, check the corresponding box at the bottom of the page.

The worldwide redistribution of income would take the form of additional policies, taxes, and transfers, on top of existing ones.

These policies would lower the income of the richest (the losers from the redistribution) and increase the income of the poorest (the winners).

Below you will find a graph of the world distribution of after-tax income and three sliders that vary it. The current distribution is in red, and your custom one is in green.

The first two sliders control the proportion of winners and the proportion of losers, among all humans. The third slider controls the degree of redistribution from the richest to the poorest.

If you do not want new policies to reduce global inequality, you can set the third slider to zero.

**You need to move the sliders** (by holding the mouse down on the little squares and moving to the side) to make the green curve evolve: the idea is to move the sliders **until you get a green curve you are satisfied with**.

Examples of income changes after your proposed redistribution:

Now	After
0 [text_unit: \$ per year] [now_10k] [text_unit]	[after_0] [text_unit: \$ per year] [after_10k] [text_unit]
[now_60k] [text_unit]	[after_60k] [text_unit]
[now_100k] [text_unit]	[after_100k] [text_unit]
<i>Your individual income</i>	
[own] [text_unit]	[after_own] [text_unit]

[Section 6.4; Figures 14, S50-S57] I am satisfied with my custom redistribution.;  
I want to skip this question.

## Well-being (for another project)

[Four random branches: gallup\_0; gallup\_1; wvs\_0; wvs\_1; well\_being, variant\_well\_being]

56. [Branch: gallup\_0] Please imagine a ladder, with steps numbered from 0 at the bottom to 10 at the top. The top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for you.

On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time? [well\_being\_gallup\_0]

Worst possible 0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; Best possible 10

57. [Branch: gallup\_1] Please imagine a ladder, with steps numbered from 1 at the bottom to 10 at the top. The top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for you.

On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time? [well\_being\_gallup\_1]

Worst possible 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; Best possible 10

58. [Branch: wvs\_0] All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? [well\_being\_wvs\_0]

Completely dissatisfied 0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; Completely satisfied 10

59. [Branch: wvs\_1] All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? [well\_being\_wvs\_1]  
*Completely dissatisfied 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; Completely satisfied 10*

## Comprehension

60. *Comprehension question: one respondent with the expected answer will get [amount\_lottery: \$100].*

How would gasoline prices change as a result of the Global Climate Scheme?  
Gasoline prices would... [Figure S58; gcs\_comprehension] [Item order is randomly flipped or not]  
*increase; not be affected; decrease*

## Synthetic questions

61. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? "My taxes should go towards solving global problems." [Section 6.2; Figures 11, S59-S60; my\_tax\_global\_nati]  
*Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree*
62. Which group of people do you advocate for when you vote?<sup>49</sup> [Section 6.2; Figures 12, S61; group\_defended]  
*Sentient beings (humans and animals); Humans; [country\_adjective\_plural: Americans]; People from my community (for example my region, my religion, my gender...); My family and myself*

## Feedback

63. Do you feel that this survey was politically biased? [Figure S62; survey\_biased]  
*Yes, left-wing biased; Yes, right-wing biased; No, I do not feel it was biased*
64. The survey is nearing completion. You can now enter any comments, thoughts, or suggestions in the field below. [Figure S63; Random answers can be found on [bit.ly/fields2025](http://bit.ly/fields2025); comment\_field]  
(Back to Section par:flow.)

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<sup>49</sup>In Russia and Saudi Arabia, the question was worded as follows: "Which group do you advocate for? For example, if you were the richest person on Earth, which group would you predominantly help with your money?". In Russia, the item *Russians* had to be replaced with *My compatriots*.

## C Survey Sources and Features

### C.1 Sources Regarding Plausible Global Policies

Table S1 provides references showing that the “plausible global policies” I test (Section 6.1) are (similar to proposals) debated in international negotiations.

Table S1: Proposals similar to the “plausible global policies” in international negotiations.

Proposal	Appearance in international negotiations and source
A minimum tax of 2% on the wealth of billionaires, in voluntary countries	Proposal by <a href="#">Zucman (2024)</a> in a report commissioned by the Brazilian presidency of the G20.
Raising the globally agreed minimum tax rate on profits of multinational firms from 15% to 35%, closing loopholes and allocating revenues to countries where sales are made	In the context of OECD/G20 discussions to address Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), a similar proposal has been proposed by the Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation ( <a href="#">ICRICT 2020</a> ): taxing corporate income through formulary apportionment at a 25% rate.
Expanding the UN Security Council (in charge of peacekeeping) to new permanent members such as India, Brazil, and the African Union, and restricting the use of the veto	The Pact for the Future was adopted by the UN General Assembly. It includes “Action 39. We will reform the Security Council, recognizing the urgent need to make it more representative, inclusive, transparent, efficient, effective, democratic and accountable (...) we agree on the following guiding (...) Enlarge the Security Council (...) increase representation of developing countries (...) The question of the veto is a key element of Security Council reform. We will intensify efforts to reach an agreement on the future of the veto, including discussions on limiting its scope and use” ( <a href="#">UN 2024</a> ).
Developed countries contributing at least 0.7% of their GDP in foreign aid and development assistance	This commitment has been made at the UN in 1971 and renewed ever since, e.g. in the SDG 17.2 ( <a href="#">UN 2017; UNGA 1971</a> ). In 2024, developed countries contributed 0.33% of their GNI in Official Development Assistance ( <a href="#">OECD 2025</a> ).

(continued)

Debt relief for vulnerable countries by suspending repayments until they are better able to repay, promoting their development

Institutions like the World Bank investing in many more sustainable projects in lower-income countries, and offering lower interest rates (the Bridgetown initiative)

Developed countries financing a fund to help vulnerable countries cope with loss and damage from climate change

Developed countries providing \$300 billion a year (0.4% of their GDP) to finance climate action in developing countries

An international levy on carbon emissions from shipping, funding national budgets in proportion to population

An international levy on carbon emissions from aviation, raising ticket prices by 30% and funding national budgets in proportion to population

At the Financing for Development conference, all countries (except the U.S.) have “recognize[d] the need to assist developing countries in attaining long-term debt sustainability through coordinated policies aimed at fostering debt financing, debt relief, debt restructuring and sound debt management” ([FfD4 2025](#)).

The [Bridgetown Initiative \(2025\)](#) has been initiated by the government of Barbados and endorsed by the UN Secretary-General ([UN 2023](#)). It includes different proposals, including the rechanneling and new issuance of Special Drawing Rights to recapitalize Multilateral Development Banks.

The COP27 “decide[d] (...) to establish a fund for responding to loss and damage” ([COP27 2022](#)), to which \$768 million have been pledged as of [April 7, 2025](#).

COP29 adopted the NCQG and “decide[d] to set a goal, (...) with developed country Parties taking the lead, of at least USD 300 billion per year by 2035 for developing country Parties for climate action” ([UNFCCC 2024](#)).

The International Maritime Organization recently adopted a draft standard and feebate on carbon emissions from shipping ([IMO 2025](#)). While countries still have to agree on the allocation of the revenue, a [group of countries](#) including China and Brazil proposed to allocate 30% for developing countries; [Norway](#) proposed to let the Green Climate Fund manage the revenue; and [Germany](#) that the revenue be used to “strengthen the green transition, in particular in the SIDS and LDCs.”

While more narrow in scope, in 2025, a “new aviation solidarity coalition on premium flyers (first- and business-class tickets, and private jets) has been launched by France, Kenya, Barbados, Spain, Somalia, Benin, Sierra Leone and Antigua & Barbuda. It will be supported by the European Commission, and the [Global Solidarity Levies Task Force](#) (...) The coalition aims to improve domestic revenue mobilization of developing countries and support international solidarity.”

## C.2 Country-specific Features and Policies' Costs

In the survey, various features are tailored to country-specific characteristics. The workbook at [github.com/bixiou/robustness\\_global\\_redistr/raw/main/questionnaire/sources.xlsx](https://github.com/bixiou/robustness_global_redistr/raw/main/questionnaire/sources.xlsx) contains all such features as well as their sources. In particular, it includes the following spreadsheets:

- Quotas: targets for each category based on frequencies among the adult population, as well as their sources (namely official statistical agencies) and the definition of regions. The coding of regions and urbanicity is done in Qualtrics based on zip codes; with the zipcode correspondences exported in the repository folder [data\\_ext/zipcode\\_urbanity\\_region](#) using code in [data\\_ext/code\\_robustness/zipcodes](#).
- Income, income\_raw: brackets used in the income question (10), and associated sources and computations. I use household-level income Russia and the U.S.; equal-split income for Saudi Arabia; and equivalised income (i.e. standard of living, accounting for family composition) for other countries. Data sources are Eurostat for EU countries, Rosstat for Russia, WID for Saudi Arabia, Census Bureau for the U.S., and LIS for the other countries.
- Policies, policies\_sources, policies\_leaning, policies\_party, policies\_leaning\_party: respectively the policies used in the conjoint experiment (Question 23), the source of each policy (i.e. the political program from which they come), their political leaning (classified manually as 0 if the policy is consistent only with a left-wing program, 2 for a right-wing one, and 1 otherwise), the party that proposed each policy, and their political leaning based on the party that proposed each policy.
- Elections: results at the last election (used in Questions 16-18) including abstention share among citizens, as well as classifications of the parties: whether they are major (i.e. obtained more than 5% of votes), and their political leaning (Left, Center-right or Right, Far right).
- Figures, features: country-specific figures used in the questionnaire, as detailed below.

Table S2 reports the figures used for each country for the National or Global Climate Scheme; the top income tax; and the revenue allocation of a wealth tax. Below, I detail the methodologies used for these and other questions.

Table S2: Country-specific features of the questionnaire.

Question; Feature	FR	DE	IT	PL	ES	GB	CH	JP	RU	SA	US
<b>26</b> NCS amount_expenses (LCU/m.)	35	65	35	235	35	35	35	10k	5500	510	125
<b>28</b> GCS net cost (\$/month)	17	48	18	39	13	24	14	48	30	101	88
<b>28</b> GCS amount_lost (LCU/month)	15	45	15	150	10	20	15	7000	2500	400	90
<b>28</b> GCS amount_bi (LCU/month)	20	20	20	85	20	15	20	3500	3000	130	35
<b>28</b> GCS price_increase (%)	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	2	2	3	2
<b>10</b> Income type: <b>net/gross</b>	n	n	n	n	n	g	g	g	n	g	g
<b>46</b> Income period: <b>month/year</b>	m	m	m	m	m	y	y	y	m	m	y
<b>46</b> 80k \$PPP 1cu_80k	5k	5k	4.5k	13k	4k	60k	85k	8M	200k	10k	80k
<b>45</b> 120k \$PPP 1cu_120k	7.5k	7.5k	7k	20k	6k	90k	130k	12M	300k	15k	120k
<b>46</b> 1M \$PPP 1cu_1M	60k	60k	60k	150k	50k	700k	1M	100M	2.5M	130k	1M
<b>24</b> Wealth tax revenue (\$ bn)	48	43	11	1	6	14	15	26	21	4	514
<b>24</b> Wealth tax revenue (% GNI)	1.6	0.9	0.5	0.2	0.4	0.4	1.8	0.5	1	0.4	1.9
LCU per dollar (on Apr. 2, 2025)	.926	.926	.926	3.87	.926	.773	.9	149	84.3	3.75	1

**Climate Scheme.** In the Climate Schemes, I assume a carbon price of \$95/tCO<sub>2</sub>, corresponding to the price in 2025 for an emissions trajectory compatible with a global warming peaking at +1.8°C before 2100.<sup>50</sup> After 2025, the decline in emissions is estimated to almost balance out the carbon price increase, in the sense that the GDP share of carbon pricing revenue would be roughly constant over the thirty years following the initial phase-in, before plummeting as net-zero approaches (Fabre 2024a). In other words, the cost of climate schemes provided to the respondents reflects the direct monetary costs expected from a carbon price aligned with the Paris Agreement.

In the National Climate Scheme, the average increase in expenditures is equal to the carbon price multiplied by the country's emissions per capita,<sup>51</sup> and corresponds to the equal cash transfer each person would receive (Question 26). Relative to the country's GDP per capita, this translates into the price increase reported in the Global Climate Scheme (GCS). To compute the amount lost, i.e. the net cost of the GCS for the average person in the country (Question 28), I subtract the equal cash transfer from the increase in expenditures.

<sup>50</sup>More precisely, I use the price trajectory of the integrated assessment model IMAGE in the scenario SSP2-2.6, as given by the IIASA.

<sup>51</sup>I use territorial CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from non-LULUCF by country from Gütschow et al. (2021). I use the same source to estimate the emissions covered by the different scenarios in the International Climate Scheme.

In case of a strictly equal per adult allocation of carbon price revenue, the global basic income would amount to \$45 per month, corresponding to the world average emissions multiplied by the carbon price. However, to prevent highly emitting middle-income countries from losing financially, the GCS departs from the egalitarian allocation by offering them a waiver from the mutualization of revenue, thereby lowering cash transfers in other countries ([Fabre 2024b](#)). When the country coverage is *global*, as is implicitly the case in questionnaires for Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S., this results in a global basic income of \$36 per month. In European countries and Japan, the cash transfer is even lower, at \$22 per month, since I implicitly assume a *high* country coverage (cf. Figure 5) that excludes countries with the greatest emissions per capita. As I conservatively use low figures for the cash transfer, the GCS question could somewhat underestimate acceptance of a global, egalitarian cap-and-trade in high-income countries.

**Global Income Distribution.** To estimate the global income distribution, I use the distributions of disposable income by country in 2019 constructed by [Fisher-Post & Gethin \(2023\)](#) (FPG).<sup>52</sup> I inflate all generalized percentiles by real GDP growth observed between 2019 and 2024 (using IMF data), factor in country-specific inflation until 2022 and convert values from LCU to 2022 PPP dollars (using FPG), and finally assume that all countries experienced the same inflation as in the U.S. in 2023 and 2024 (using IMF data).

To aggregate country distributions, I compute the global cumulative distribution function and interpolate it at each thousandile. I obtain the global distribution of disposable income at purchasing power parity (PPP) in 2024.

I use this distribution for the custom redistribution task, after converting back to LCU (Section 6.4, Question 55). I also use it to calibrate the top income tax schedules so that they raise an amount equivalent to the poverty gap (Section 6.2, Questions 45-46). Then, I use country-level data to estimate the share of GDP collected as well as the share of the population affected by each tax in each country. Finally, I compute the poverty gaps and the tax revenue in every country in proportion to GDP, and aggregate them at the global level after converting national disposable income back to market exchange rates (using World Bank's PPP conversion factors for 2022). I find that the top 1% tax collects 1.8% of global nominal income, while the top 3% tax collects 4.8% of global nominal income. These amounts are higher than the respective poverty gaps: 1.3% of global nominal income for a \$250 per month poverty line, and 3.2% for a \$400 per month poverty line.

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<sup>52</sup>The data is available on Amory Gethin's [website](#).

While the cost of poverty reduction declines relative to tax revenue once one accounts for market exchange rates, closing the poverty gap actually requires extra revenue due to imperfect targeting and administrative costs (Sahoo et al. 2025). Therefore, the tax schedule calibrations are consistent with the poverty reduction objectives.

**Wealth Tax Revenue.** To estimate the revenue from a global tax on wealth above \$5 million at a rate of 2% (Section 3.2, Questions 24-25), I use the distribution of net wealth by country in current dollar for 2022 from the World Inequality Database. I assume that the taxable base is reduced by 30% due to tax avoidance and asset depreciation. I report expected tax revenue as a share of countries' 2023 GNI (from the World Bank). I also report the absolute revenue after converting them into LCU.

**Sustainable future; aviation levy.** I assume a carbon price of \$300/tCO<sub>2</sub>. Given natural gas footprint at .1807 tCO<sub>2</sub>/MWh, this carbon price would double a gas price of \$54/MWh, which is a midpoint between U.S. and European prices. Similarly, the prices of beef and flights would double, assuming that beef costs \$10/kg and emits 33 kgCO<sub>2</sub>e/kg, and aviation emits 3 kgCO<sub>2</sub>e per dollar of flight. A 30% increase in flight prices corresponds to a carbon price of \$100/tCO<sub>2</sub>, or to a \$300/t levy which does not account for the warming effect of contrails (Lee et al. 2021).

**NCQG.** The sources used for the New Collective Quantified goal of climate finance for 2035 (Section 6.1, Questions 39-40) are the following: UNFCCC (2024) states the goal itself, OECD (2024) provides figures on past achievements, Earth Negotiations Bulletin (2024) reports the positions of India and other countries, and Climate Action Network (2024); Demand Climate Justice (2025) those of NGOs. Note that the question wordings do not mention the gap between climate finance needs and the official goal identified in official reports (OECD 2024; Songwe et al. 2024), nor that existing plans by Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to ramp up climate finance would achieve most of the new goal (MDBs 2024).<sup>53</sup>

<sup>53</sup> According to the OECD (2024), MDBs contributed \$81 billion to climate finance in 2022 (both directly through finance provision and indirectly through mobilization of the private sector), with 71% (or \$58 billion) attributable to developed countries. Before the NCQG was agreed at COP29, they jointly stated that they will contribute an estimated \$185 billion in 2030 (including \$65 billion from the private sector). Assuming that this increase of \$104 billion is replicated in the period 2030-2035, MDBs would contribute \$289 billion in 2035, including \$205 attributable to developed countries, that is \$147 billion more than in 2022. As (multilateral plus unilateral) developed countries' climate finance totaled \$116 billion in 2024,

To express the NCQG as a share of developed countries' GDP, I use 2024 data from the World Bank on nominal GDP in high-income countries. This figure —of \$70 trillion— is conservative, since it does not account for growth or inflation until 2035.

### C.3 Definition of Keywords

Below are the keywords used to classify the open-ended fields on top-of-mind considerations (Figure S2, Section 3.1, Questions 19–22). The keyword search uses the R function grep1 and ignores case. The special character ^ indicates the start of the string and \$ the end.  
[\(Back to Section 3.1.\)](#)

- **Money; own income; cost of living; inflation:** money|inflation|price|wage|wealth|income|salar|finance|cost|financial|afford|illionaire|expensive;
- **Relationships; love; emotions:** relationship|husband|wife|love|partner|emotion;
- **Work; (un)employment; business:** business|work|employ|job;
- **Poverty; inequality:** poverty|inequalit|poor|social justice;
- **Global poverty; hunger; global inequality:** global poverty|global inequal|hunger|drinking water|starv;
- **Health; healthcare system:** health|sick|disease|NHS|medica;
- **Criticism of immigration; national preference:** migration|migrant|asylum|refugee|alien;
- **Corruption; criticism of the government:** corruption;
- **Environment; climate change:** environment|climat|pollution|warming|drought;
- **Security; violence; crime; judicial system:** safe|murder|crime|criminal|fraud|rape|terrorism;
- **Discrimination; gender inequality; racism; LGBT:** gender|raci|scrimination|women|xenophob|LGB|machism|antisemit;

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adding the \$147 billion expected in their multilateral finance would achieve three-quarter of the required increase, at \$263 billion.

- **Rights; democracy; freedom; slavery:** freedom|rights|democra|dictator;
- **Happiness; peace of mind:** happiness|happy|serenity|peace of mind|tranquility|inner peace|relax;
- **War; peace:** peace|war|WW;
- **Tax system; welfare benefits; public services:** tax|social benefit|social security;
- **Criticism of far right; Trump; tariffs:** Trump|AfD|populist|far right|radical right|extreme right|tariff| PiS |fascism;
- **Social division; fake news; (social) media:** social division|social cohesion|media|fake news;
- **Animal welfare:** animal;
- **Religion; sin; God:** religion| god|self injustice|self-injustice|theism|disbelief;
- **Housing:** hous|apartment|real estate|mortgage;
- **Education:** education|school|exam|universit;
- **Old age; retirement; ageing society:** old age|pension|retire| aging| ageing;
- **Family; children; childcare:** family|child|daughter| son|parent|mother|father|loved ones|kids;
- **International issues:** world|humanity|foreign|countries|Ukraine|Gaza|Palestin|Hamas|Israel|Yemen|Sudan|middle east|Iran|geopol;
- **Own country referred:** country|German|Saudi|France|French|Ital|Poland|Polish|Spain|Spanish| UK|U.K.|Great Britain|England|British|Japan|Russia|America|U.S.| USA|United States;
- **Nothing; don't know; empty:** ^nothing\$|^no\$|^.\$|^-\$|^do not have\$|^nothing in particular\$|^None\$|^I don't know\$|^I would not know\$;
- **Economy:** econom|growth;
- **Media:** internet|media;

- **Trump:** Trump;
- **Tariffs:** tariff|customs dut|custom dut;
- **Palestine:** Palestine|Gaza;
- **Car:** car;
- **Mental health:** mental |mental health;
- **Sport:** sport|soccer;
- **Holiday; travel:** travel|vacation|holiday| rest;
- **Time; more free time:** time|leisure;
- **Politics:** politic;
- **Millionaire; billionaire:** illionaire;
- **Inflation; cost of living:** inflation|rising price|cost of living;
- **Abortion:** abort;
- **Stock; investment:** investment|asset|stock;
- **Birthrate:** birth rate|birthrate;
- **Government; president:** government|president|PSOE|Sanchez|Sánchez|Liberal Democratic Party|LDP|Komeito|Tusk|Nawrocki| PO |Macron|Trump|Meloni|Starmer |Labour;
- **Hunger:** hunger;
- **Stability:** stability|stabl;
- **Wage:** wage|salar;
- **Youth:** young|youth .

(Back to Section 3.1.)

## C.4 Exploratory Factor Analysis

To construct a latent variable of support for global redistribution, I proceed in three steps. First, I standardize each variable of support by converting them into z-scores, by subtracting the sample average and then dividing the result by the standard error. Both the mean and the standard error are computed using survey weights on the global sample. Second, I run an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) with one factor, to obtain the *loadings*, i.e. the weight of each variable in the latent factor (reported in Table S3). Third, I average all z-scores, weighted by the loadings.

Table S3: Loadings from the Exploratory Factor Analysis

Variable name	Loading	
share_solidarity_diff	0.991	convergence_support
share_solidarity_ratio	0.926	reparations_support
share_pl_supported	0.901	how_agencies
share_solidarity_opposed	-0.852	how_govt_conditional
pl_support_loss_damage	0.800	sustainable_future
pl_support_ncqg_300bn	0.792	how Ngo
pl_support_foreign_aid	0.767	ncqg
pl_support_shipping_levy	0.759	global_movement_spread
pl_support_bridgetown	0.736	how_social_protection
pl_support_debt_relief	0.724	universalist
pl_support_un_reform	0.684	help_lic_duty
pl_support_aviation_levy	0.675	ncs_support
pl_support_billionaire_tax	0.670	help_lic_responsibility
pl_support_corporate_tax	0.669	global_movement_donate
top_tax_support	0.564	help_lic_interest
my_tax_global_nation	0.536	ncqg_fusion
vote_intl_coalition	0.533	global_movement_demonstrate
ics_support	0.522	how_local_authorities
global_movement_no	-0.522	how_govt_unconditional
wealth_tax_support	0.489	how_cash_unconditional
gcs_support	0.483	nationalist
help_lic_none	-0.464	revenue_split_few_global
		global_movement_strike
		individualist
		humanist

*Note:* Some variable names have been shortened: I shortened occurrences of help\_lic into why\_hic\_help\_lic, solidarity\_support into pl\_support, and expanding\_security\_council into un\_reform.

The loading of a variable is similar to the average absolute correlation with the other support variables. Interestingly, the average absolute correlation of the latent indicator, at .54, is only marginally greater than that of `share_solidarity_diff` (the difference between the shares of plausible policies supported and opposed), at .49, or that of the share of plausible policies supported, at .45. In other words, simple indicators based on the support or opposition to plausible policies capture attitudes towards global redistribution almost as well as a sophisticated latent variable.

I constructed another latent variable of support, using a full-information item factor analysis, based on multidimensional item response theory (MIRT). Unlike the EFA, MIRT does not assume that levels in a Likert-scale are spaced one unit apart; instead, it estimates parameters encoding the Likert scale that best account for latent support. The correlation between the two latent variables is extremely high (0.98). Therefore, although MIRT is a more accurate method, I use EFA because its results are more transparent to describe. (Back to Section [6.1](#).)

## D Representativeness of the Surveys

Table S4: Sample representativeness overall, in Europe, and in the European Union.

	All			Eu			EU		
	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample
Sample size		12,001	12,001		5,000	5,000		3,705	3,705
Gender: Woman	.51	.50	.51	.51	.51	.51	.52	.51	.52
Gender: Man	.49	.49	.49	.49	.49	.49	.48	.49	.48
Income_quartile: Q1	.25	.26	.25	.25	.27	.25	.25	.26	.25
Income_quartile: Q2	.25	.24	.25	.25	.26	.25	.25	.26	.25
Income_quartile: Q3	.25	.24	.25	.25	.21	.25	.25	.22	.25
Income_quartile: Q4	.25	.26	.25	.25	.26	.25	.25	.26	.25
Age: 18-24	.10	.10	.10	.09	.10	.09	.09	.10	.09
Age: 25-34	.16	.17	.16	.15	.15	.15	.14	.15	.14
Age: 35-49	.26	.26	.26	.25	.25	.25	.25	.25	.25
Age: 50-64	.24	.23	.24	.25	.25	.25	.25	.25	.25
Age: 65+	.25	.24	.25	.26	.25	.26	.27	.25	.27
Diploma_25-64: Below upper secondary	.09	.08	.09	.13	.12	.13	.14	.13	.14
Diploma_25-64: Upper secondary	.31	.29	.31	.26	.26	.26	.28	.27	.28
Diploma_25-64: Post secondary	.29	.32	.29	.25	.28	.25	.22	.25	.22
Urbanity: Cities	.63	.52	.52	.41	.41	.41	.42	.44	.42
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs	.15	.17	.15	.36	.38	.36	.35	.34	.34
Urbanity: Rural	.20	<b>.14</b>	.16	.22	.21	.22	.23	.22	.23
Country: FR	.07	.07	.07	.18	.16	.18	.22	.22	.22
Country: DE	.08	.09	.08	.23	.21	.23	.28	.28	.28
Country: IT	.06	.06	.06	.16	.15	.16	.20	.20	.20
Country: PL	.04	.04	.04	.10	.10	.10	.13	.13	.13
Country: ES	.05	.05	.05	.13	.12	.13	.16	.16	.16
Country: GB	.07	.07	.07	.18	.17	.18			
Country: CH	.01	<b>.04</b>	.01	.02	<b>.09</b>	.02			
Country: JP	.13	<b>.17</b>	.13						
Country: RU	.14	<b>.08</b>	.14						
Country: SA	.03	<b>.08</b>	.03						
Country: US	.33	<b>.25</b>	.33						

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. Bold cells denote frequencies beyond  $\pm 20\%$  of population frequencies. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

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Table S5: Sample representativeness in France, Germany, Italy.

	France			Germany			Italy		
	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample	Pop.	Sample	Weighted sample
Sample size		798	798		1,048	1,048		756	756
Gender: Woman	.52	.52	.52	.51	.49	.51	.52	.52	.51
Gender: Man	.48	.48	.48	.49	.51	.49	.48	.48	.49
Income_quartile: Q1	.25	.26	.25	.25	.27	.25	.25	.26	.25
Income_quartile: Q2	.25	.26	.25	.25	.27	.25	.25	.26	.25
Income_quartile: Q3	.25	.23	.25	.25	.20	.25	.25	.22	.25
Income_quartile: Q4	.25	.25	.25	.25	.26	.25	.25	.25	.25
Age: 18-24	.10	.11	.10	.09	.10	.09	.08	.08	.08
Age: 25-34	.15	.15	.15	.15	.16	.15	.12	.12	.12
Age: 35-49	.23	.23	.23	.23	.25	.23	.23	.23	.23
Age: 50-64	.24	.24	.24	.27	.27	.27	.28	.29	.28
Age: 65+	.27	.27	.27	.27	.22	.27	.29	.28	.29
Diploma_25-64: Below upper secondary	.10	.09	.10	.11	.11	.11	.22	.19	.22
Diploma_25-64: Upper secondary	.26	.26	.26	.32	.32	.32	.28	.28	.28
Diploma_25-64: Post secondary	.26	.27	.26	.22	.24	.21	.14	.17	.14
Urbanity: Cities	.47	.47	.46	.39	.42	.39	.36	.37	.36
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs	.19	.19	.19	.42	.42	.42	.46	.47	.46
Urbanity: Rural	.34	.33	.34	.19	.17	.19	.18	.16	.18
Region: 1	.18	.19	.18	.17	.19	.17	.66	.70	.65
Region: 2	.22	.23	.22	.29	.32	.29	.34	.29	.34
Region: 3	.11	.11	.11	.54	.48	.54			
Region: 4	.21	.22	.21						
Region: 5	.28	.26	.28						

*Note:* This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. Bold cells denote frequencies beyond  $\pm 20\%$  of population frequencies. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

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Table S6: Sample representativeness in Poland, Spain, the UK, Switzerland.

	Poland			Spain			United Kingdom			Switzerland		
	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.
Sample size		500	500		603	603		826	826		469	469
Gender: Woman	.52	.53	.52	.51	.51	.51	.51	.50	.51	.50	.48	.50
Gender: Man	.48	.46	.47	.49	.49	.49	.49	.50	.49	.50	.52	.50
Income quartile: Q1	.25	.26	.25	.25	.28	.25	.25	.28	.25	.25	.30	.26
Income quartile: Q2	.25	.25	.25	.25	.27	.25	.25	.23	.25	.25	.28	.25
Income quartile: Q3	.25	.23	.25	.25	.21	.25	.25	.21	.25	.25	.17	.25
Income quartile: Q4	.25	.26	.25	.25	.25	.24	.25	.27	.25	.25	.25	.24
Age: 18-24	.08	.09	.08	.10	.11	.09	.11	.10	.11	.09	.10	.09
Age: 25-34	.15	.16	.15	.15	.14	.14	.17	.17	.17	.16	.18	.17
Age: 35-49	.30	.29	.30	.30	.27	.31	.24	.25	.25	.26	.27	.25
Age: 50-64	.23	.21	.23	.19	.22	.19	.25	.25	.24	.26	.24	.26
Age: 65+	.24	.24	.24	.26	.26	.26	.24	.24	.23	.23	.22	.24
Diploma 25-64: Below upper secondary	.04	<b>.05</b>	.04	.23	<b>.18</b>	.23	.12	.11	.12	.09	<b>.06</b>	.09
Diploma 25-64: Upper secondary	.38	.34	.38	.15	.15	.15	.19	.17	.19	.27	.29	.27
Diploma 25-64: Post secondary	.26	.28	.26	.27	.29	.26	.35	.38	.35	.31	.33	.31
Urbanity: Cities	.35	.37	.35	.54	.58	.54	.40	.36	.39	.30	.32	.30
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs	.28	.29	.28	.32	.30	.33	.42	.45	.43	.53	.54	.53
Urbanity: Rural	.37	.34	.37	.13	.12	.13	.18	.19	.18	.17	.14	.17
Region: 1	.47	.41	.47	.15	.16	.15	.13	.14	.13	.70	.70	.70
Region: 2	.53	.59	.53	.28	.25	.28	.31	.33	.31	.26	.26	.26
Region: 3				.14	.16	.14	.21	.17	.21	.04	.04	.04
Region: 4				.18	.19	.18	.24	.25	.24			
Region: 5				.25	.24	.25	.11	.10	.11			

Note: This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. Bold cells denote frequencies beyond  $\pm 20\%$  of population frequencies. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

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Table S7: Sample representativeness in non-European countries.

	Japan			Russia			Saudi Arabia			USA		
	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.	Pop.	Sam.	Wght. sam.
Sample size		2,000	2,000		1,001	1,001		1,000	1,000		3,000	3,000
Gender: Woman	.51	.50	.51	.54	.52	.54				.50	.52	.50
Gender: Man	.49	.50	.49	.46	.48	.46				.50	.48	.50
Income_quartile: Q1	.25	.26	.25	.25	<b>.19</b>	.24	.25	<b>.32</b>	.26	.25	.23	.25
Income_quartile: Q2	.25	.24	.25	.25	<b>.18</b>	.24	.25	.23	.25	.25	.24	.25
Income_quartile: Q3	.25	.25	.25	.25	.27	.24	.25	.22	.24	.25	.27	.25
Income_quartile: Q4	.25	.25	.25	.25	<b>.32</b>	.24	.25	.23	.24	.25	.26	.25
Age: 18-24	.08	.08	.08	.09	.09	.09	.15	.16	.16	.12	.10	.12
Age: 25-34	.12	.12	.12	.16	.15	.16	.32	.35	.32	.17	.18	.17
Age: 35-49	.22	.23	.22	.30	.30	.30	.36	.37	.37	.25	.24	.25
Age: 50-64	.24	.24	.24	.25	.25	.25	.13	.11	.13	.24	.24	.24
Age: 65+	.34	.34	.34	.21	.20	.21	.04	<b>.00</b>	<b>.02</b>	.23	.24	.23
Diploma_25-64: Upper secondary	.26	.25	.26	.62	.62	.62	.15	<b>.23</b>	.16	.27	.27	.27
Diploma_25-64: Post secondary	.32	.33	.32	.28	.32	.28	.35	<b>.50</b>	.39	.33	.34	.33
Diploma_25-64: Below upper secondary				.10	<b>.06</b>	.10	.31	<b>.11</b>	.27	.05	.05	.05
Urbanity: Cities	.92	.92	.92							.76	.78	.76
Urbanity: Towns and suburbs	.08	.08	.08								.24	.22
Urbanity: Rural												.24
Region: 1	.17	.17	.17				.14	<b>.06</b>	.12	.17	.18	.17
Region: 2	.17	.18	.17				.34	<b>.45</b>	.35	.21	.21	.21
Region: 3	.34	.35	.34				.36	.36	.36	.38	.40	.38
Region: 4	.11	.11	.11				.16	<b>.12</b>	.16	.24	.21	.24
Region: 5	.20	.19	.20									.09
Gender_nationality: Woman, Saudi							.24	<b>.31</b>	.25			
Gender_nationality: Woman, non-Saudi							.10	.12	.11			
Gender_nationality: Man, Saudi							.24	<b>.33</b>	.27			
Gender_nationality: Man, non-Saudi							.41	<b>.24</b>	.37			
Race: White only										.58	.56	.58
Race: Hispanic										.20	.21	.19
Race: Black										.14	.15	.14
Race: Other										.09	.07	.09


*Note:* This table displays summary statistics of the samples alongside actual population frequencies. Bold cells denote frequencies beyond  $\pm 20\%$  of population frequencies. Detailed sources for each variable and country population frequencies, as well as the definitions of regions, diploma, urbanity, employment, and vote are available in [this spreadsheet](#).

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
## E Determinants of Support

Figure S68: Variance decomposition: share of the variance explained by each covariate (“Group defended when voting” is present only in bottom subfigures.).


(a) Support for the Global Climate Scheme (10% of the variable’s variance is explained by this linear model). (Question 28)




(b) Share of plausible global policies supported (15% of the variable’s variance is explained by this linear model). (Question 38)



(c) Support for the Global Climate Scheme (14% of the variable’s variance is explained by this linear model). (Question 28)



(d) Share of plausible global policies supported (20% of the variable’s variance is explained by this linear model). (Question 38)



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Table S8: Correlates of support for global redistribution (multivariate OLS regressions).

	Share of plausible policies supported	Supports the Global Climate Scheme	Universalist (Group defended: Humans or Sentient beings)	More likely to vote for party in global coalition	Endorses convergence of all countries' GDP p.c. by 2100	Supports an international wealth tax funding LICs	Prefers a sustainable future
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Mean	0.508	0.554	0.454	0.365	0.61	0.704	0.681
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.015 (0.010)	0.008 (0.015)	-0.083*** (0.014)	0.029** (0.013)	0.041*** (0.014)	-0.026* (0.014)	-0.061*** (0.014)
Vote: Far right	-0.090*** (0.013)	-0.143*** (0.020)	-0.225*** (0.019)	-0.063*** (0.018)	-0.065*** (0.020)	-0.140*** (0.019)	-0.169*** (0.020)
Vote: Left	0.211*** (0.010)	0.170*** (0.014)	0.150*** (0.015)	0.257*** (0.014)	0.190*** (0.014)	0.184*** (0.013)	0.147*** (0.014)
Gender: Man	0.016** (0.007)	0.018* (0.010)	-0.044*** (0.010)	0.029*** (0.010)	0.009 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.043*** (0.009)
Age: 18-24	0.012 (0.014)	0.175*** (0.020)	0.104*** (0.021)	0.108*** (0.022)	0.109*** (0.020)	0.101*** (0.018)	0.062*** (0.019)
Age: 25-34	0.020* (0.011)	0.094*** (0.015)	0.075*** (0.016)	0.102*** (0.016)	0.046*** (0.015)	0.046*** (0.014)	0.027* (0.015)
Age: 50-64	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.036** (0.014)	-0.034** (0.014)	-0.033** (0.014)	-0.025* (0.013)	-0.021 (0.013)	-0.020 (0.013)
Age: 65+	0.041*** (0.012)	-0.020 (0.018)	-0.010 (0.018)	0.002 (0.017)	-0.021 (0.017)	-0.018 (0.016)	0.016 (0.016)
Income quartile: Q2	0.018* (0.010)	0.004 (0.015)	-0.025* (0.015)	0.016 (0.015)	-0.014 (0.014)	0.013 (0.013)	0.010 (0.014)
Income quartile: Q3	0.007 (0.010)	-0.010 (0.015)	0.019 (0.015)	-0.009 (0.015)	-0.024* (0.015)	-0.018 (0.014)	0.002 (0.014)
Income quartile: Q4	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.042*** (0.016)	-0.004 (0.016)	-0.032* (0.017)	-0.075*** (0.015)	-0.078*** (0.015)	0.007 (0.015)
Diploma: Upper secondary	0.042*** (0.011)	0.001 (0.016)	0.018 (0.016)	0.036** (0.015)	0.029* (0.015)	0.022 (0.014)	0.022 (0.015)
Diploma: Above upper secondary	0.085*** (0.011)	0.026 (0.016)	0.025 (0.016)	0.079*** (0.015)	0.015 (0.015)	0.015 (0.015)	0.039** (0.016)
Urbanicity: Rural	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.054*** (0.015)	0.016 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.014)	-0.015 (0.015)	-0.021 (0.014)	-0.020 (0.015)
Urbanicity: Towns and suburbs	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.039** (0.015)	-0.022 (0.015)	-0.023 (0.015)	-0.016 (0.015)	-0.024* (0.014)	0.026* (0.014)
Will become millionaire: Likely	0.036*** (0.008)	0.070*** (0.012)	-0.001 (0.012)	0.039*** (0.013)	0.055*** (0.012)	-0.019* (0.011)	-0.019 (0.012)
Will become millionaire: Already	-0.020 (0.017)	-0.019 (0.023)	0.008 (0.024)	-0.058** (0.023)	-0.042* (0.023)	-0.236*** (0.023)	-0.047** (0.022)
Foreign born	0.065*** (0.014)	0.083*** (0.020)	0.088*** (0.021)	0.051** (0.022)	0.037* (0.020)	0.040** (0.018)	0.030 (0.019)
Observations	12,001	12,001	12,001	10,000	12,001	12,001	12,001
R <sup>2</sup>	0.141	0.104	0.100	0.115	0.105	0.091	0.069

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Covariates omitted in the Table: *Country; Employment; Couple; Region; Constant*. Omitted variables are: *Vote: Non-voter, PNR or Other; Gender: Woman; Age: 35-49; Income\_quartile: Q1; Diploma: Below upper secondary; Urbanicity: City*. \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

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Table S9: Correlates of answers on custom redistribution (multivariate OLS regressions).

	Custom transfer (in % of world GDP)			Loses from custom redistribution		Satisfied with own custom redistr.	Has not touched the sliders	Touched the sliders and satisfied
Mean	5.138	5.443	5.809	45.596	47.417	55.945	40.609	39.818
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.098 (0.140)	0.046 (0.224)	0.073 (0.309)	-0.188 (1.221)	-4.590** (2.137)	5.296*** (1.363)	-0.663 (1.389)	3.201** (1.337)
Vote: Far right	-0.532*** (0.198)	-0.571* (0.298)	-0.816** (0.408)	-1.514 (1.699)	-5.659** (2.819)	5.180*** (1.882)	-0.442 (1.874)	3.801** (1.876)
Vote: Left	0.838*** (0.151)	1.027*** (0.228)	1.465*** (0.315)	3.837*** (1.235)	3.604* (2.118)	10.655*** (1.369)	-2.586* (1.393)	6.785*** (1.363)
Gender: Man	0.130 (0.103)	0.021 (0.154)	-0.066 (0.216)	0.594 (0.856)	1.305 (1.437)	14.488*** (0.944)	-9.003*** (0.960)	12.468*** (0.953)
Age: 18-24	0.440* (0.230)	0.381 (0.311)	0.356 (0.420)	5.203*** (1.774)	4.328 (2.703)	6.111*** (1.869)	-4.468** (1.920)	7.171*** (1.969)
Age: 25-34	0.084 (0.157)	0.115 (0.217)	0.109 (0.299)	-0.205 (1.304)	0.241 (2.051)	1.342 (1.403)	-1.653 (1.439)	2.230 (1.475)
Age: 50-64	-0.297** (0.142)	-0.500** (0.206)	-0.652** (0.286)	-1.761 (1.238)	-5.753*** (2.034)	-8.345*** (1.356)	5.846*** (1.370)	-6.881*** (1.363)
Age: 65+	-0.066 (0.179)	0.142 (0.296)	0.291 (0.424)	-1.220 (1.512)	-4.200 (2.745)	-12.927*** (1.713)	11.619*** (1.764)	-11.794*** (1.677)
Income quartile: Q2	-0.294** (0.148)	-0.351 (0.226)	-0.536* (0.318)	24.103*** (1.142)	25.065*** (1.966)	1.227 (1.333)	-0.627 (1.357)	1.091 (1.327)
Income quartile: Q3	-0.400** (0.157)	-0.559** (0.235)	-0.838** (0.330)	41.546*** (1.235)	36.022*** (2.098)	-1.066 (1.427)	-0.675 (1.444)	0.202 (1.417)
Income quartile: Q4	-0.910*** (0.168)	-1.030*** (0.252)	-1.506*** (0.356)	55.784*** (1.370)	47.659*** (2.306)	0.829 (1.560)	0.492 (1.598)	1.589 (1.572)
Diploma: Upper secondary	-0.034 (0.154)	-0.002 (0.244)	-0.032 (0.354)	0.042 (1.225)	-2.482 (2.214)	4.167*** (1.468)	-0.750 (1.495)	3.213** (1.416)
Diploma: Above upper secondary	0.074 (0.162)	0.077 (0.253)	0.053 (0.367)	2.772** (1.315)	1.238 (2.382)	4.277*** (1.537)	-3.900** (1.567)	5.666*** (1.486)
Urbanicity: Rural	-0.277* (0.161)	-0.214 (0.245)	-0.251 (0.338)	0.933 (1.293)	1.297 (2.154)	-2.899** (1.459)	-1.949 (1.458)	-2.878** (1.456)
Urbanicity: Towns and suburbs	-0.199 (0.171)	-0.097 (0.255)	-0.085 (0.358)	0.990 (1.324)	0.148 (2.199)	-0.537 (1.488)	0.163 (1.495)	-1.293 (1.482)
Will become millionaire: Likely	0.235* (0.130)	0.392** (0.186)	0.677*** (0.260)	2.006* (1.081)	1.359 (1.720)	6.105*** (1.172)	-0.230 (1.195)	1.806 (1.207)
Will become millionaire: Already	0.400 (0.257)	0.342 (0.391)	0.550 (0.564)	4.912** (2.043)	-2.519 (3.520)	-0.547 (2.243)	5.065** (2.319)	-3.604 (2.249)
Subsample: <i>Satisfied</i>		✓						
Subsample: <i>Touched &amp; Satisfied</i>			✓		✓			
Foreign born	-0.119 (0.197)	-0.372 (0.250)	-0.472 (0.369)	-2.265 (1.614)	-1.128 (2.608)	3.051* (1.810)	3.123* (1.867)	-0.312 (1.863)
Observations	10,990	6,148	4,374	10,990	4,374	11,000	11,000	11,000
R <sup>2</sup>	0.023	0.030	0.042	0.266	0.195	0.092	0.038	0.059

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Covariates omitted in the Table: *Country; Employment; Couple; Region; Constant*. Omitted variables are: *Vote: Non-voter, PNR or Other; Gender: Woman; Age: 35-49; Income\_quartile: Q1; Diploma: Below upper secondary; Urbanicity: City*. \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

(Back to Section 2.)

## F The Determination of a Custom Redistribution

In Question 55, respondents are asked for their preferred redistribution of the world's post-tax income. This custom redistribution is determined by modifying the current distribution using the respondent's three input parameters:<sup>54</sup>

- The *proportion of winners*, i.e. the share of people (at the bottom of the distribution) advantaged by the custom redistribution;
- The *proportion of losers*, i.e. the share of people (at the top) disadvantaged by the redistribution;
- The *degree of redistribution*, ranging from 0/10 (no redistribution) to 10/10 (maximal redistribution).

The determination of the custom distribution given these parameters relies on the algorithm *Dis/adv* introduced by Fabre (2022). In that paper, Fabre (2022) surveyed two representative samples of French respondents. The first survey uncovered the median preferred parameters for a national income redistribution.<sup>55</sup> The second survey showed that 52% supported the income redistribution defined using these parameters while only 26% opposed it. Furthermore, a majority among the French respondents who expressed an opinion agreed that it is a good idea to "determine the citizens' preferred tax schedule from a survey and then submit the proposal that would emerge from the survey to a referendum." Therefore, the algorithm *Dis/adv* applied to median preferred parameters has been validated both through the support for the resulting redistribution and through the support for such democratic method of preference aggregation to determine an income redistribution. Nonetheless, the algorithm *Dis/adv* is just a first attempt to adjust the tax schedule by aggregating citizens' preferences, and more appropriate methods may be proposed. Although Fabre (2022) finds that the algorithm *Dis/adv* fares better than another algorithm tested, the method still suffers from some limitations. In particular, the current method is difficult to understand for the users, and it only allows for

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<sup>54</sup>Overall, 35% of the respondents did not move the sliders from their original position. Excluding the 39% of them who still state that they are satisfied with the redistribution does not change the results qualitatively. Indeed, the average responses are similar between satisfied respondents who moved the sliders and all satisfied respondents: the shares of winners or losers, the implied minimum income or transfer all differ by less than 8%. Therefore, I keep all satisfied respondents in the analysis.


<sup>55</sup>The median preferred proportions of winners and losers were 50% and 10%, respectively. The median preferred degree of redistribution was defined indirectly, using the median preferred demogrant: €800/month. The resulting redistribution entailed 12% of GDP redistributed from the top 10% to the bottom 50%.

redistribution from the rich to the poor (it would thus be inappropriate if the level of inequality were considered too low). Below, I describe the algorithm *Dis/adv*, available for use at [bit.ly/custom\\_global\\_redistr](https://bit.ly/custom_global_redistr), and implemented in the R function `algo_dis_av` at [github.com/bixiou/robustness\\_global\\_redistr/raw/main/code\\_robustness/2\\_prepare.R](https://github.com/bixiou/robustness_global_redistr/raw/main/code_robustness/2_prepare.R).

**Algorithm Dis/Adv** It is worth recalling that over a range of income (concerning people who are neither winner nor loser from the reform), both the current and custom distributions coincide. The algorithm proceeds as follows:

1. Define the *extreme distribution* as the current distribution bounded by the income thresholds of winners and losers. In other words, draw two horizontal lines at each end of the distribution, by setting the incomes of winners to the income of the richest winner, and those of losers to the income of the poorest loser.
2. Compute what can be redistributed on either side as the area between the extreme and current distributions: what can be given to winners on the left side ( $L$ ) or taken on the right side ( $R$ ). If and only if what can be given is lower than what can be taken ( $L < R$ , as in Figure S69), the left side is binding, and it determines the *amount transferred* from the rich to the poor:  $\min\{L; R\} \cdot \text{degree}$ .
3. On the binding side, define the custom distribution as a linear mixture between the current and extreme distributions, with the mixture parameter set by the *degree of*

Figure S69: Algorithm for the custom redistribution, with parameters *winners*: 60%, *losers*: 20%, *degree*: 4/10.



*redistribution*. In other words, starting from the current distribution, narrow the gap with the extreme distribution by a factor *degree*.

4. Adjust the non-binding side by narrowing the gap with the extreme distribution, using the unique mixture parameter that preserves aggregate income (so that the amount transferred is the same on both sides).<sup>56</sup>
5. [Optional step, used in the survey.] To increase the demigrant (i.e. the lowest income) and make the reform more progressive on the left side, try to replace the left side with a straight line. In other words, find the demigrant and the straight line between the demigrant and the threshold of winners that respects the amount transferred. If this straight line crosses the current distribution or if it implies a regressive redistribution (in that some incomes would increase less than higher incomes), abandon the straight line and keep the custom redistribution as is.

Once the custom redistribution has been determined, it is straightforward to compute the additional tax schedule required to attain it.<sup>57</sup> Figure S70 presents the tax schedule required to attain the average custom redistribution (weighted over all respondents). Figure S70 shows that (on the losers' side) this redistribution can be approximated by additional marginal tax rates of 7% above \$25,000 per year, and 16% above \$40,000. Figure S70 also compares this tax schedule with those associated with the radical income redistribution tested in Questions 45-46: While the average custom redistribution features a much larger tax base than the radical tax targeting the top 3% (as it taxes the top 28%), its top tax rate is three times lower, so that the two redistributions entail similar transfers from the rich to the poor, at around 5% of the world's income.


(Back to Section 6.4.)

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<sup>56</sup>While we do not account for behavioral responses, one can adjust the algorithm to account for them. It suffices to define a post-reform aggregate income, which can be lower than the pre-reform one if the reform disincentivizes economic activity.

<sup>57</sup>For a sophisticated calculation of the required tax schedule, which allows for behavioral responses and a gradual implementation, see Appendix IX of Fabre (2022).

Figure S70: Additional tax schedule associated with the radical and custom redistributions. (Questions 45-46, 55).



(Back to Section 6.4.)

## G Attrition Analysis

Table S10: sociodemographic determinants of attrition and exclusion. (Back to Section 2.)

	Dropped out	Dropped out after socio-eco	Failed attention test	Duration (in min)	Duration below 6 min
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mean	0.166	0.102	0.088	53.896	0.087
Vote: Center-right or Right	-0.046*** (0.008)	-0.040*** (0.008)	-0.007 (0.007)	-3.723 (10.677)	-0.027*** (0.008)
Vote: Far right	-0.055*** (0.010)	-0.049*** (0.010)	-0.011 (0.009)	-16.327 (15.607)	-0.022** (0.009)
Vote: Left	-0.032*** (0.008)	-0.026*** (0.008)	-0.013* (0.007)	-11.710 (10.647)	-0.043*** (0.008)
Gender: Man	-0.041*** (0.005)	-0.040*** (0.005)	0.024*** (0.005)	-17.884** (8.557)	0.005 (0.005)
Age: 18-24	-0.029*** (0.009)	-0.028*** (0.009)	0.027** (0.011)	-10.346 (11.025)	0.092*** (0.013)
Age: 25-34	-0.029*** (0.007)	-0.030*** (0.007)	0.021*** (0.008)	9.105 (13.496)	0.051*** (0.009)
Age: 50-64	0.011 (0.007)	0.010 (0.007)	-0.032*** (0.006)	13.629 (13.104)	-0.054*** (0.006)
Age: 65+	0.038*** (0.010)	0.037*** (0.010)	-0.055*** (0.007)	28.381* (14.773)	-0.099*** (0.008)
Income quartile: Q2	-0.026*** (0.007)	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.040*** (0.007)	-3.204 (8.024)	-0.012 (0.007)
Income quartile: Q3	-0.025*** (0.008)	-0.026*** (0.008)	-0.057*** (0.007)	-6.466 (8.615)	-0.014* (0.008)
Income quartile: Q4	-0.026*** (0.008)	-0.027*** (0.008)	-0.060*** (0.008)	28.244* (15.506)	-0.033*** (0.008)
Diploma: Upper secondary	-0.019** (0.008)	-0.018** (0.008)	-0.050*** (0.008)	12.642 (10.115)	-0.010 (0.008)
Diploma: Above upper secondary	-0.045*** (0.009)	-0.045*** (0.009)	-0.061*** (0.008)	-8.224 (11.372)	-0.016* (0.008)
Urbanicity: Rural	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.007)	-2.606 (8.635)	-0.004 (0.007)
Urbanicity: Towns and suburbs	0.008 (0.008)	0.008 (0.008)	-0.015** (0.007)	6.228 (16.432)	0.001 (0.007)
Foreign born	0.006 (0.010)	0.006 (0.010)	0.017 (0.011)	44.695* (24.418)	-0.029*** (0.008)
Country: Germany	-0.364 (0.262)	-0.362 (0.263)	-0.691** (0.332)	-19.841 (36.683)	-0.193*** (0.025)
Country: Italy	-0.138 (0.318)	-0.134 (0.318)	-0.684** (0.332)	640.179 (602.441)	-0.193*** (0.032)
Country: Japan	-0.334 (0.262)	-0.329 (0.263)	-0.716** (0.332)	-34.599 (30.589)	0.219 (0.195)
Country: Poland	-0.279 (0.261)	-0.276 (0.262)	-0.739** (0.332)	-96.647*** (36.916)	0.784*** (0.026)
Country: Russia	-0.355 (0.261)	-0.347 (0.262)	-0.664** (0.332)	117.725 (136.213)	-0.097** (0.043)
Country: Saudi Arabia	-0.093 (0.280)	-0.084 (0.281)	-0.271 (0.356)	-44.669 (41.881)	-0.299*** (0.036)
Country: Spain	-0.313 (0.261)	-0.311 (0.262)	-0.715** (0.332)	26.355 (34.327)	-0.304*** (0.027)
Country: Switzerland	-0.002 (0.025)	-0.001 (0.025)	-0.002 (0.020)	-3.527 (14.853)	-0.001 (0.020)
Country: United Kingdom	-0.278 (0.261)	-0.278 (0.262)	-0.841** (0.332)	9.534 (33.235)	-0.373*** (0.030)
Country: USA	-0.038 (0.025)	-0.032 (0.025)	-0.147*** (0.022)	-47.279* (25.547)	-0.130*** (0.021)
Observations	16,066	16,066	14,301	13,040	13,040
R <sup>2</sup>	0.044	0.044	0.080	0.011	0.087

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

Table S11: Treatment effects on attrition.

(Back to Section 2.)

	Random branch:							
	Wealth tax coverage: Global	Wealth tax coverage: Int'l	Int'l CS coverage: Low	Int'l CS coverage: High	Int'l CS coverage: High color	National CS asked	Warm glow substitute: Control	Warm glow realism: Info treatment
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Mean	0.332	0.331	0.25	0.255	0.251	0.36	0.36	0.49
Dropped out	-0.038 (0.026)	-0.014 (0.027)	-0.024 (0.017)	-0.004 (0.017)	0.021 (0.017)	-0.004 (0.010)	0.003 (0.010)	0.006 (0.010)
Observations	14,609	14,609	14,968	14,968	14,968	17,150	17,150	17,150
R <sup>2</sup>	0.0001	0.00002	0.0001	0.00000	0.0001	0.00001	0.00000	0.00002

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

Table S12: Treatment effects on attrition (continued).

(Back to Section 2.)

	Random branch:									
	Field: Concerns	Field: Injustice	Field: Issue	Field: Wish	Budget split: Few	GCS belief: Own	NCQG: Full	Sustainable Future: A	Income tax: top 1%	Custom sliders: Diffuse
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Mean	0.246	0.251	0.248	0.256	0.508	0.503	0.496	0.506	0.494	0.499
Dropped out	0.009 (0.011)	0.006 (0.011)	0.001 (0.011)	-0.017 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.010)	0.009 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.010)	-0.050 (0.031)	-0.010 (0.010)	0.002 (0.010)
Observations	15,876	15,876	15,876	15,876	16,112	16,112	16,112	14,564	17,150	16,112
R <sup>2</sup>	0.00005	0.00002	0.00000	0.0002	0.00002	0.00005	0.00003	0.0002	0.0001	0.00000

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

## H Balance Analysis

Table S13: Balance analysis.

	Random branch:							
	Wealth tax coverage: Global	Wealth tax coverage: Int'l	Int'l CS coverage: Low	Int'l CS coverage: High	Int'l CS coverage: High color	National CS asked	Warm glow substitute: Control	Warm glow realism: Info treatment
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Mean	0.332	0.334	0.25	0.256	0.252	0.36	0.358	0.489
Vote: Center-right or Right	0.001 (0.013)	0.018 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.013)	0.001 (0.012)	0.011 (0.012)	-0.013 (0.014)	0.003 (0.013)	-0.013 (0.014)
Vote: Far right	-0.026 (0.018)	0.016 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.017)	0.025 (0.017)	0.019 (0.017)	-0.008 (0.018)	0.019 (0.019)	-0.010 (0.020)
Vote: Left	-0.004 (0.014)	0.001 (0.014)	-0.004 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.013)	0.002 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.014)	-0.005 (0.013)	-0.014 (0.014)
Gender: Man	-0.00003 (0.009)	-0.015* (0.009)	-0.013 (0.008)	0.005 (0.008)	-0.00005 (0.008)	0.001 (0.009)	-0.007 (0.009)	0.011 (0.010)
Age: 18-24	-0.009 (0.018)	0.007 (0.018)	-0.013 (0.017)	-0.001 (0.017)	0.007 (0.017)	0.009 (0.019)	-0.020 (0.018)	0.001 (0.020)
Age: 25-34	-0.024* (0.014)	0.025* (0.014)	-0.008 (0.012)	0.018 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.013)	-0.003 (0.014)	-0.001 (0.014)	-0.011 (0.015)
Age: 50-64	-0.009 (0.013)	0.008 (0.013)	0.006 (0.012)	0.016 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.012)	0.008 (0.013)	0.003 (0.013)	-0.009 (0.013)
Age: 65+	-0.013 (0.016)	0.031* (0.016)	0.011 (0.015)	0.030** (0.015)	-0.023 (0.015)	-0.014 (0.016)	0.020 (0.016)	-0.0004 (0.017)
Income quartile: Q2	-0.006 (0.013)	0.001 (0.013)	0.00001 (0.012)	-0.018 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.012 (0.014)
Income quartile: Q3	0.002 (0.013)	0.0003 (0.013)	0.005 (0.012)	-0.014 (0.012)	0.0001 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.014)	0.004 (0.014)
Income quartile: Q4	-0.015 (0.015)	0.012 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.014)	0.010 (0.013)	-0.012 (0.015)	0.001 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.016)
Diploma: Upper secondary	0.013 (0.014)	0.003 (0.014)	-0.0003 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.012 (0.013)	-0.013 (0.014)	0.018 (0.014)	-0.021 (0.015)
Diploma: Above upper secondary	0.030** (0.015)	-0.008 (0.014)	0.002 (0.013)	-0.015 (0.014)	0.020 (0.013)	-0.006 (0.015)	0.003 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.015)
Urbanicity: Rural	0.010 (0.014)	0.012 (0.014)	0.009 (0.013)	-0.013 (0.013)	-0.005 (0.013)	-0.003 (0.014)	0.012 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.015)
Urbanicity: Towns and suburbs	0.021 (0.015)	-0.015 (0.015)	0.008 (0.014)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.003 (0.013)	0.011 (0.015)	-0.015 (0.015)	0.004 (0.016)
Will become millionaire: Likely	0.016 (0.011)	-0.015 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.010)	0.014 (0.010)	-0.013 (0.010)	0.005 (0.011)	0.0002 (0.011)	0.006 (0.012)
Will become millionaire: Already	0.006 (0.022)	-0.010 (0.022)	-0.008 (0.020)	-0.001 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.020)	0.029 (0.022)	-0.005 (0.022)	-0.035 (0.023)
Foreign born	-0.010 (0.017)	0.017 (0.017)	-0.014 (0.016)	0.035** (0.017)	-0.012 (0.016)	0.014 (0.018)	-0.006 (0.018)	-0.014 (0.018)
Observations	12,001	12,001	11,993	11,993	11,993	12,001	12,001	12,001
R <sup>2</sup>	0.006	0.006	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.021	0.025	0.006

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. CS: Climate Scheme. \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

## I Placebo Tests

Table S14: Placebo tests of treatments on unrelated outcomes (simple OLS regressions).

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme (1)	Supports the Int'l Clim. Sch. (2)	Share of policies supported (4)	Supports the int'l wealth tax (5)	Supports the int'l wealth tax (6)
Open-ended field variant: Injustice	0.001 (0.013)				
Open-ended field variant: Issue	0.018 (0.013)				
Open-ended field variant: Wish	0.031** (0.013)				
Revenue split variant: Many		0.006 (0.009)			
GCS belief variant: U.S.			0.003 (0.009)		
Warm glow variant: National CS				0.009 (0.007)	
Warm glow variant: Donation				0.007 (0.008)	
Int'l CS variant: High color					-0.019** (0.009) -0.010 (0.012)
Int'l CS variant: Low					0.007 (0.009) 0.004 (0.012)
Int'l CS variant: Mid					0.008 (0.009) 0.019 (0.012)
(Intercept)	0.543*** (0.009)	0.561*** (0.007)	0.665*** (0.006)	0.503*** (0.005)	0.509*** (0.006) 0.701*** (0.008)
Observations	11,839	11,000	11,000	12,001	11,993
R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.00004	0.00001	0.0001	0.001

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table S14 shows that in two cases (out of thirteen), treatments are significantly correlated with unrelated outcomes later in the survey, with an effect size up to 3 p.p. While these framing effects are undesirable, their magnitude is limited. Indeed, the average value of affected outcomes always remain within  $\pm 2$  p.p. of the value it is estimated to have had if any treatment had been generalized.

(Back to Section 2.)

## J Main Results on Selected Demographics, Including Vote

Figures S71 and S72 shows that polarization between left- and right-wing voters is comparably high in Europe and the U.S. but almost non-existent in Japan, with Japanese support comparable to the support among non-voters in Western countries. Interestingly, although Fabre et al. (2025) exhibited much higher polarization in the U.S. compared to Western Europe on similar questions (about the GCS, the globally redistributive millionaire tax, and universalism), in the current survey polarization has converged in the two regions. More specifically, compared to early 2023, in Western Europe (France, Germany, Spain and the UK), support has declined across the political spectrum, but more so among right-wing voters. Meanwhile, in the U.S., support has increased among Republican voters and decreased among Democrat voters.

Figure S71: [On selected demographics] Support for global redistribution action/policies.

	All	Millionaires	Europe Non-voters	Europe Left	Europe Center/Right	Europe Far right	Japan Non-voters	Japan Left	Japan Center/Right	Saudi Arabia	Saudi citizens	U.S. Non-voters	U.S. Harris	U.S. Trump
Supports the National Climate Scheme	68	58	64	80	64	47	69	69	70	88	91	64	79	50
Global climate scheme (GCS)	55	45	61	77	60	46	48	61	57	85	85	54	58	35
Supports int'l climate scheme (any variant)	66	58	67	85	71	55	61	75	69	88	91	63	75	43
Supports int'l tax on millionaires with 30% funding LICs (any variant)	70	43	72	89	68	59	60	74	68	83	83	69	79	50
Supports tax on world top 1% to finance global poverty reduction (Additional 15% tax on income over [\$120k/year in PPP])	56	39	58	81	50	48	36	51	45	68	74	50	64	37
Supports tax on world top 3% to finance global poverty reduction (Additional 15% tax over [\$80k], 30% over [\$120k], 45% over [\$1M])	50	32	51	72	50	44	34	46	31	67	74	46	57	34
Prefers sustainable future	68	62	68	83	70	54	74	81	76	72	70	67	78	43
"Governments should actively cooperate to have all countries converge in terms of GDP per capita by the end of the century"	70	50	79	88	75	66	73	73	69	93	94	69	69	44
Would support a global movement to tackle CC, tax millionaires, and fund LICs (either petition, demonstrate, strike, or donate)	68	52	71	89	64	58	43	70	58	73	74	64	83	47
More likely to vote for party if part of worldwide coalition for climate action and global redistribution	36	30	35	61	33	27	16	31	22	NA	NA	28	52	27
Supports reparations for colonization and slavery in the form of funding education and technology transfers	35	26	39	54	30	24	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	31	45	17
"My taxes should go towards solving global problems"	41	39	38	61	40	30	28	38	33	67	70	36	54	27

(Back to Section 2.)

Figure S72: [On selected demographics] Acceptance of plausible global redistribution policies (Percentage of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* among non-*Indifferent* responses).

	All	Millionaires	Europe Non-voters	Europe Left	Europe Center/Right	Europe Far right	Japan Non-voters	Japan Left	Japan Center/Right	Saudi Arabia	Saudi citizens	U.S. Non-voters	U.S. Harris	U.S. Trump
Minimum tax of 2% on billionaires' wealth, in voluntary countries	81	64	84	94	81	74	82	87	77	86	85	81	93	56
Bridgetown initiative: MDBs expanding sustainable investments in LICs, and at lower interest rates	79	74	77	93	86	63	77	86	80	87	87	78	92	52
L&D: Developed countries financing a fund to help vulnerable countries cope with climate Loss and damage	75	64	72	87	78	53	72	77	72	89	90	75	88	45
International levy on shipping carbon emissions, returned to countries based on population	70	60	70	87	72	56	57	64	59	81	84	68	86	47
At least 0.7% of developed countries' GDP in foreign aid	70	63	69	83	71	45	56	66	66	86	87	68	84	46
Debt relief for vulnerable countries, suspending payments until they are more able to repay	70	55	71	83	67	52	69	74	66	88	90	74	81	47
Expand Security Council to new permanent members (e.g. India, Brazil, African Union), restrict veto use	69	62	73	87	79	59	64	72	68	84	85	70	86	45
NCQG: Developing countries providing \$300 bn a year in climate finance for developing countries	68	55	67	85	71	44	51	66	60	86	87	67	83	34
Raise global minimum tax on profit from 15% to 35%, allocating revenues to countries based on sales	68	61	70	89	69	65	70	77	71	77	76	66	84	45
International levy on aviation carbon emissions, raising prices by 30%, returned to countries based on population	53	46	48	71	53	40	43	49	47	70	73	48	67	34

Figure S73: [On selected demographics] Average synthetic indicators of support for global redistribution. (Question 38).  
[\(Back to Section 6.1.\)](#)

	All	Millionaires	Europe Non-voters	Europe Left	Europe Center/Right	Europe Far right	Japan Non-voters	Japan Left	Japan Center/Right	Saudi Arabia	Saudi citizens	U.S. Non-voters	U.S. Harris	U.S. Trump
Latent support for global redistribution (standardized)	0.00	-0.32	-0.01	0.64	0.03	-0.45	-0.32	-0.01	-0.20	0.49	0.57	-0.11	0.44	-0.70
Share of plausible global policies supported	0.51	0.51	0.49	0.72	0.56	0.42	0.29	0.46	0.41	0.64	0.68	0.42	0.64	0.35
Share of plausible global policies opposed	0.21	0.32	0.21	0.11	0.21	0.34	0.16	0.16	0.20	0.14	0.13	0.19	0.11	0.39
Difference between share of plausible policies supported and opposed	0.30	0.19	0.28	0.60	0.35	0.08	0.13	0.30	0.21	0.50	0.55	0.23	0.53	-0.04
Ratio of share of plausible policies supported over supported or opposed	0.70	0.61	0.70	0.85	0.71	0.55	0.66	0.73	0.66	0.80	0.82	0.68	0.84	0.49

[\(Back to Section 2.\)](#)

## K Main Results Weighted by Vote

Figure S74: [Weighted by vote] Support for the National, Global, and International Climate Schemes (Yes/No question). (Questions 26-35).





Figure S75: [Weighted by vote] Support for an international wealth tax with 30% of revenue funding LICs, depending on the country coverage (Yes/No question). (Questions 41-43).



(Back to Section 2.)

Figure S76: [Weighted by vote] Effect on the likelihood that a political program is preferred of containing the following policy (compared to no foreign policy in the program). (Question 23)





Figure S77: [Weighted by vote] Testing warm glow (negative effects would indicate the presence of warm glow).

(a) Effect of a *Donation lottery* treatment on support for the Global Climate Scheme. (Questions 27-28)



(b) Effect of information about ongoing global redistribution initiatives on the share of plausible global policies supported. (Questions 36-38)




Figure S78: [Weighted by vote] Acceptance of plausible global redistribution policies (Percentage of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* among non-*Indifferent* responses). (Question 38).

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Minimum tax of 2% on billionaires' wealth, in voluntary countries	81	84	85	82	87	80	82	86	79	81	80	86	76
Bridgetown initiative: MDBs expanding sustainable investments in LICs, and at lower interest rates	79	82	79	80	86	71	80	84	75	80	83	87	73
L&D: Developed countries financing a fund to help vulnerable countries cope with climate Loss and damage	75	75	70	72	81	71	78	72	66	73	87	89	68
International levy on shipping carbon emissions, returned to countries based on population	70	73	75	69	75	61	75	74	71	58	73	81	65
At least 0.7% of developed countries' GDP in foreign aid	70	69	64	66	77	59	77	68	65	61	83	86	64
Debt relief for vulnerable countries, suspending payments until they are more able to repay	70	70	64	58	80	79	72	74	64	68	75	88	66
Expand Security Council to new permanent members (e.g. India, Brazil, African Union), restrict veto use	69	76	72	75	76	70	76	80	70	67	53	84	65
NCQG: Developing countries providing \$300 bn a year in climate finance for developing countries	68	69	67	68	72	64	73	68	64	58	88	86	59
Raise global minimum tax on profit from 15% to 35%, allocating revenues to countries based on sales	68	75	73	73	85	67	69	74	63	73	50	77	63
International levy on aviation carbon emissions, raising prices by 30%, returned to countries based on population	53	55	61	54	52	48	51	51	50	46	51	70	48

Figure S79: [Weighted by vote] Support for broad action or radical proposals of global redistribution. (Questions 44-46, 49-51, 53, 61).

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Accepts tax on world top 1% to finance global poverty reduction (Additional 15% tax on income over [\$120k/year in PPP])	69	73	71	72	83	70	70	67	60	68	75	82	60
Accepts tax on world top 3% to finance global poverty reduction (Additional 15% tax over [\$80k], 30% over [\$120k], 45% over [\$1M])	64	66	67	61	66	68	66	67	44	56	76	82	57
Prefers sustainable future	68	70	72	70	76	58	73	68	66	76	69	72	62
"Governments should actively cooperate to have all countries converge in terms of GDP per capita by the end of the century"	70	78	77	76	87	85	84	66	66	70	78	93	56
Would support a global movement to tackle CC, tax millionaires, and fund LICs (either petition, demonstrate, strike, or donate)	68	72	70	69	82	71	74	68	63	56	56	73	67
More likely to vote for party if part of worldwide coalition for climate action and global redistribution	68	72	72	71	82	64	77	69	57	56	NA	NA	67
Accepts reparations for colonization and slavery in the form of funding education and technology transfers	45	50	44	44	69	NA	51	46	NA	NA	NA	NA	40
"My taxes should go towards solving global problems"	59	61	43	62	77	63	70	58	53	59	57	89	55

(Back to Section 2.)

## L Main Results on the Extended Sample

Figure S80: [Extended sample] Support for the National, Global, and International Climate Schemes (Yes/No question). (Questions 26-35).





Figure S81: [Extended sample] Support for an international wealth tax with 30% of revenue funding LICs, depending on the country coverage (Yes/No question). (Questions 41-43).



(Back to Section 2.)

Figure S82: [Extended sample] Effect on the likelihood that a political program is preferred of containing the following policy (compared to no foreign policy in the program). (Question 23)




Figure S83: [Extended sample] Testing warm glow (negative effects would indicate the presence of warm glow).




Figure S84: [Extended sample] Acceptance of plausible global redistribution policies (Percentage of *Somewhat* or *Strongly support* among non-*Indifferent* responses). (Question 38).

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Minimum tax of 2% on billionaires' wealth, in voluntary countries	80	83	86	82	86	77	82	83	77	77	79	81	76
Bridgetown initiative: MDBs expanding sustainable investments in LICs, and at lower interest rates	77	80	79	78	86	70	82	82	75	73	82	85	72
L&D: Developed countries financing a fund to help vulnerable countries cope with climate Loss and damage	74	74	71	72	83	71	78	72	65	68	85	85	68
Expand Security Council to new permanent members (e.g. India, Brazil, African Union), restrict veto use	70	75	72	75	80	72	78	76	69	62	54	79	66
Debt relief for vulnerable countries, suspending payments until they are more able to repay	70	69	63	60	80	77	73	71	63	65	74	85	65
International levy on shipping carbon emissions, returned to countries based on population	69	72	77	69	77	62	75	74	70	55	72	79	66
At least 0.7% of developed countries' GDP in foreign aid	69	68	65	67	77	57	78	66	62	60	81	84	65
Raise global minimum tax on profit from 15% to 35%, allocating revenues to countries based on sales	68	72	75	72	82	66	72	73	59	66	48	76	65
NCQG: Developing countries providing \$300 bn a year in climate finance for developing countries	68	68	67	69	75	63	74	66	63	56	86	82	61
International levy on aviation carbon emissions, raising prices by 30%, returned to countries based on population	55	55	60	54	56	53	57	55	51	46	51	70	52

Figure S85: [Extended sample] Support for broad action or radical proposals of global redistribution. (Questions 44-46, 49-51, 53, 61).

	All	Europe	France	Germany	Italy	Poland	Spain	United Kingdom	Switzerland	Japan	Russia	Saudi Arabia	USA
Accepts tax on world top 1% to finance global poverty reduction (Additional 15% tax on income over [\$120k/year in PPP])	69	71	69	72	82	69	73	68	61	67	73	82	61
Accepts tax on world top 3% to finance global poverty reduction (Additional 15% tax over [\$80k], 30% over [\$120k], 45% over [\$1M])	65	65	70	63	71	70	67	69	41	55	75	82	59
Prefers sustainable future	66	68	70	68	73	57	73	67	66	71	69	67	60
"Governments should actively cooperate to have all countries converge in terms of GDP per capita by the end of the century"	71	76	76	74	86	83	83	65	66	66	77	92	56
Would support a global movement to tackle CC, tax millionaires, and fund LICs (either petition, demonstrate, strike, or donate)	61	67	67	67	74	65	72	64	60	51	51	56	61
More likely to vote for party if part of worldwide coalition for climate action and global redistribution	66	71	71	71	80	65	77	69	59	52	NA	NA	67
Accepts reparations for colonization and slavery in the form of funding education and technology transfers	46	50	44	44	69	NA	51	46	NA	NA	NA	NA	41
"My taxes should go towards solving global problems"	62	61	44	63	77	64	71	58	53	60	58	88	57

(Back to Section 2.)

## M Influence of the Item Order on Answers

Table S15: Influence of the item order on answers.

(Back to Section 2.)

	Prefers Sustain. future	Finds Uncond. cash transfers Right	Agrees it is HIC's duty to help LICs	Understood Global Clim. Sch.	Preferred NCQG $\geq \$100$ bn	Pref. NCQG $\geq \$100$ bn (variant <i>Short</i> )	Supports a plausible policy	Allocates $\geq 15\%$ to spending item
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Scenario A = Sustainable	0.036*** (0.009)							
Cash transfers first item		-0.140*** (0.009)						
Duty last item			-0.049*** (0.010)					
Correct answer first item				0.050*** (0.008)				
Variant: <i>Short</i>					-0.076*** (0.009)			
Items in increasing order						-0.092*** (0.013)		
That item is the first one							-0.024*** (0.005)	
Order of the item: 2								-0.020** (0.008)
Order of the item: 3								-0.040*** (0.008)
Order of the item: 4								-0.064*** (0.008)
Order of the item: 5								-0.071*** (0.008)
Constant	0.662*** (0.006)	0.396*** (0.006)	0.554*** (0.006)	0.713*** (0.006)	0.638*** (0.007)	0.608*** (0.009)	0.511*** (0.002)	0.592*** (0.006)
Observations	12,001	12,001	11,000	12,001	11,000	5,476	110,000	37,088
R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.022	0.002	0.003	0.006	0.009	0.0002	0.003

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

## N Supplementary Tables

Table S16: Support for an International Climate Scheme depending on country coverage.  
 (Back to Section 4.1.)

	Supports the International Climate Scheme												
	All	Europe	FR	DE	IT	PL	ES	GB	CH	JP	RU	SA	US
Variant: High Color	-6.610*** (1.344)	-5.372*** (1.917)	-14.437*** (4.634)	-9.561** (3.946)	0.328 (4.368)	-13.170** (6.072)	3.570 (5.253)	2.012 (4.859)	-11.681* (6.130)	-7.254** (2.948)	-6.131 (4.626)	-3.512 (4.130)	-8.161*** (2.481)
Variant: Low	-3.789*** (1.333)	-4.520** (1.877)	0.221 (4.392)	-14.023*** (4.000)	4.404 (4.073)	-10.900* (5.788)	-3.060 (5.271)	-1.939 (4.766)	-13.109** (6.178)	-4.559 (2.944)	-2.570 (4.774)	-3.028 (3.775)	-4.275* (2.503)
Variant: Mid	-1.354 (1.333)	-0.185 (1.871)	1.200 (4.385)	-5.431 (3.993)	3.302 (4.028)	-17.458*** (6.354)	3.772 (5.216)	5.861 (4.726)	-10.552* (6.368)	-3.660 (2.944)	4.728 (4.447)	-3.323 (3.749)	-5.145** (2.561)
Observations	11,993	4,996	798	1,047	756	500	602	826	467	1,997	1,001	999	3,000
R <sup>2</sup>	0.003	0.003	0.021	0.013	0.002	0.017	0.004	0.004	0.012	0.003	0.007	0.002	0.004

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) are reported in parentheses.

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

Table S17: Support for an international wealth tax depending on country coverage.  
 (Back to Section 4.2.)

	Supports the International Wealth Tax												
	All	Europe	FR	DE	IT	PL	ES	GB	CH	JP	RU	SA	US
Variant: Global	0.046*** (0.011)	0.063*** (0.016)	0.090** (0.036)	0.045 (0.033)	0.050 (0.036)	0.132*** (0.049)	0.066 (0.046)	0.007 (0.040)	0.137** (0.057)	0.071*** (0.025)	0.078** (0.035)	0.011 (0.037)	0.005 (0.021)
Variant: Int'l	-0.010 (0.011)	0.001 (0.016)	0.001 (0.039)	-0.035 (0.035)	0.008 (0.036)	-0.098* (0.054)	0.082* (0.047)	0.008 (0.040)	0.045 (0.057)	-0.051* (0.027)	0.042 (0.037)	-0.008 (0.036)	-0.025 (0.021)
Observations	12,001	5,000	798	1,048	756	500	603	826	469	2,000	1,001	1,000	3,000
R <sup>2</sup>	0.003	0.004	0.010	0.005	0.003	0.040	0.006	0.0001	0.014	0.011	0.005	0.0004	0.001

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) are reported in parentheses.

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01.

Table S18: Effect on the likelihood that a political program is preferred of containing the following policies (compared to no foreign policy in the program). (Back to Section 5.1.)

	Program is preferred										
	All	Europe	FR	DE	IT	PL	ES	GB	CH	JP	US
Cut aid	-0.029*** (0.010)	-0.030** (0.014)	0.035 (0.034)	-0.035 (0.030)	-0.087** (0.035)	-0.059 (0.043)	-0.060 (0.038)	-0.002 (0.034)	0.028 (0.045)	0.015 (0.021)	-0.046*** (0.017)
Int'l tax	0.051*** (0.010)	0.050*** (0.014)	0.038 (0.033)	0.053* (0.031)	0.067* (0.037)	0.046 (0.043)	0.085** (0.042)	0.036 (0.035)	-0.049 (0.048)	0.052** (0.022)	0.052*** (0.018)
Foreign3	0.015 (0.010)	0.006 (0.014)	0.047 (0.033)	-0.007 (0.029)	0.045 (0.038)	-0.009 (0.044)	0.012 (0.039)	-0.021 (0.034)	-0.130*** (0.043)	0.037* (0.021)	0.017 (0.018)
Observations	20,000	10,000	1,596	2,096	1,512	1,000	1,206	1,652	938	4,000	6,000
R <sup>2</sup>	0.004	0.003	0.001	0.004	0.015	0.006	0.011	0.002	0.015	0.002	0.006

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) clustered at the individual levels are reported in parentheses. \* $p<0.1$ ; \*\* $p<0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p<0.01$ .

Table S19: Effect of a *Donation lottery* treatment on support for the Global Climate Scheme. (Questions 27-28) (Back to Section 5.2.)

	Supports the Global Climate Scheme										
	All	Europe	FR	DE	IT	PL	ES	GB	CH	JP	US
Variant: Donation	0.028** (0.012)	0.054*** (0.017)	0.048 (0.041)	0.087** (0.037)	0.017 (0.039)	0.100* (0.055)	0.028 (0.048)	0.053 (0.040)	0.054 (0.055)	0.008 (0.027)	0.001 (0.021)
Constant	0.55	0.551	0.484	0.471	0.628	0.396	0.766	0.595	0.907	0.408	0.381
Observations	6,665	3,307	525	687	484	349	392	544	326	1,350	2,008
R <sup>2</sup>	0.110	0.118	0.126	0.150	0.081	0.097	0.136	0.250	0.137	0.041	0.140

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) are reported in parentheses. \* $p<0.1$ ; \*\* $p<0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p<0.01$ .

Control variables (omitted in the table) are: *vote, gender, age, income, education, urbanity, likelihood of becoming millionaire, living with partner, employment status, foreign born, country region*.

Table S20: Effect of information about ongoing global redistribution initiatives on the share of plausible global policies supported. (Questions 36-38). (Back to Section 5.2.)

	Share of plausible policies supported											RU	SA	US
	All	Europe	FR	DE	IT	PL	ES	GB	CH	JP	RU	SA	US	
Info Treatment	0.013** (0.007)	0.018* (0.009)	0.003 (0.023)	0.039** (0.019)	0.027 (0.023)	0.005 (0.029)	0.058** (0.029)	-0.002 (0.023)	-0.011 (0.030)	0.013 (0.013)	-0.014 (0.022)	-0.024 (0.025)	0.020 (0.012)	
Constant	0.23	0.411	0.517	0.338	0.517	0.359	0.469	0.444	0.579	0.181	0.215	0.328	0.314	
Observations	12,001	5,000	798	1,048	756	500	603	826	469	2,000	1,001	1,000	3,000	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.141	0.152	0.139	0.234	0.136	0.153	0.180	0.215	0.190	0.096	0.062	0.180	0.181	

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) are reported in parentheses. \* $p<0.1$ ; \*\* $p<0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p<0.01$ .

Control variables (omitted in the table) are: *vote, gender, age, income, education, urbanity, likelihood of becoming millionaire, living with partner, employment status, foreign born, country region*.

Table S21: Effect on support for global redistribution of believing that it is likely, without control  
[\(Back to Section 5.2.\)](#)

	Believes global redistr. likely IV 1st Stage	Share of plausible global policies supported		
		IV 2nd Stage	OLS	Direct Effect
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Information treatment	0.077*** (0.010)			0.011 (0.007)
Believes global redistr. likely		0.141 (0.088)	0.150*** (0.007)	
(Intercept)	0.332*** (0.007)	0.456*** (0.033)	0.453*** (0.004)	0.503*** (0.005)
Effective F-statistic	65.04			
Observations	12,001	12,001	12,001	12,001
R <sup>2</sup>	0.006	0.043	0.043	0.0002

*Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) are reported in parentheses.*

\* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

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