



UNIVERSITÀ DI PISA

SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS
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Cambridge Analytica and Facebook: The Scandal and the Fallout on Twitter

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Data drives all we do.

Cambridge Analytica main slogan.

*Rules don't matter for them.
For them, this is a war, and it's all fair.*

Christopher Wylie,
former Cambridge Analytica datascientist, about its leaders.

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1 | The case story

On Saturday 17 of March 2018, the newspapers The Observer and The New York Times broke reports on how the consulting firm Cambridge Analytica harvested private information from the Facebook profiles of more than 50 million users without their permission, making it one of the largest data leaks in the social network's history. [1]. REF OBSERVER

The whistleblower Christopher Wylie, datascientist and former director of research at Cambridge Analytica revealed... Cambridge Analytica described itself as a company providing consumer research, targeted advertising and other data-related services to both political and corporate clients.

What, Where, Who, Why, Where ?

Timeline da sistemare: [2]

- March 17, 2018: The Observer and The New York Times publish joint reports on data harvesting by Cambridge Analytica. UK Information Commissioner Elizabeth Denham issues statement that they are "investigating circumstances in which Facebook data may have been illegally acquired and used." Politicians in US and UK call for investigation.
- March 19, 2018: Channel 4 News publishes part 1 of their undercover investigation into Cambridge Analytica. Facebook sends investigators to Cambridge Analytica's offices. UK Information Commissioner orders them to stand down.
- March 20, 2018: Channel 4 News publishes part 2 of their undercover investigation into Cambridge Analytica, where they boast about getting Donald Trump elected. British MP Damian Collins calls on Facebook to present oral evidence on Cambridge Analytica. Facebook agrees to send former operations manager Sandy Parakilas. Facebook holds internal Q&A with attorney Paul Grewal to discuss the crisis, but CEO Mark Zuckerberg and COO Sheryl Sandberg do not attend. Cambridge Analytica suspends CEO Alexander Nix. Facebook demands to inspect Christopher Wylie's phone. FTC opens investigation into Facebook.
- to be continued...

2 | Building the network



Figure 2.1: New authors time history

3 | Network properties



Figure 3.1: New authors time history

4 | Network dynamics

5 | Network robustness

In this chapter we'll provide some results about the **robustness** and **attack tolerance** of our network. Thaking as reference the concepts described in [3], we'll define the **critical threshold** of our network, and we'll test its robustness against attacks conducted following a random nodes' selection or one based on decreasing degree centrality. Finally we'll test the **Failure Propagation Model**, following our implementation of the model, on our network.

5.1 Critical threshold

As described in [3], we have obtained the **critical threshold** representing the fraction of the nodes that must be removed to break apart our network. This fraction, represented by f_c , is obtained by the following formula:

$$f_c = 1 - \frac{1}{\frac{\gamma-2}{3-\gamma} k_{min}^{\gamma-2} k_{max}^{3-\gamma} - 1} = 1 - \frac{1}{1.50 * 1^{0.6} * 19073^{0.4} - 1} = 0.99$$

which, remembering that the γ for our scale-free network corresponds to 2.6 and that k_{min} and k_{max} are equals to 1 and 19073 respectively, tells us that, in order to break apart our network it is mandatory to remove the 99% of the nodes. Keeping in mind that our network is, in fact, a finite network, we can adjust the obtained result by utilizing the following formula, still in [3]:

$$f_c \approx 1 - \frac{C}{N^{\frac{3-\gamma}{\gamma-1}}} \approx 1.00$$

where $C = \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{k^{-\gamma}}$ is a constant and N represents the number of nodes of the network. As we can see, this new approximation tells us that in order to break apart our network the totality of its nodes must be removed.

5.2 Simulation of an attack

In order to validate the results obtained in Section 5.1, here we simulate an attack to our network. We've chosen to simulate the remotion of 50 nodes from the network following two distinct criterions: **random selection** and **degree centrality** (decreasing order). For every criterion we've monitored the fragmentation of the connected components.




Figure 5.1: In Figure 5.1a we can see the fragmentation of the connected components during the remotion based on a randomic choice, while in Figure 5.1b we can see the same fragmentation, but this time based on decreasing degree centraility.

As we can see, for the randomic choice of the nodes to be removed, the structure of the network is barely altered. After the random remotion of 50 nodes, the original 62 connected components became slightly more than 80. For the remotion of the nodes based on decreasing degree centraility there is, as expected, a different situation. This kind of criterion guarantees that the original structure of the network is broken apart more easily, because the original network's hubs are removed one by one in decreasing order.

5.3 Simulation of a Failure Propagation Model

To test more the robustness of our network, we've written the code in order to implement (and test) the **Failure Propagation Model**, as described in [3]. In Figure 5.2 you can see some iterations of the model in which we used different values for the φ parameter.




Figure 5.2: The test for the Failure Propagation Model was conducted over 20000 iterations.

We can see that, as expected, the network doesn't accuse the failure propagation for φ equals to 0.01, in which less than 30 nodes failed. For the smaller values of φ we can see that the situation is different, with a greater amount of nodes which fail over the iterations.

6 | Communities discovery

In this chapter we'll provide the results obtained by applying **K-Clique**, **Label Propagation**, **Louvain**, **Girvan-Newman** and **Demon** to a sample of 1000 nodes taken from the original network. We've chosen to sample the crawled data in order to ease the application of the various algorithms. Each partition is evaluated by applying an implementation of the scoring functions listed in [4], and, for each algorithm, the results are represented in a table. Together with the results of the scoring functions are also provided the total number of communities discovered (Communities), the number of nodes in the smallest/biggest community (Smallest/Biggest), the hashtags utilized in the biggest community (Tags) and finally the languages of the users in the biggest community (Langs).

6.1 K-Clique

We have chosen to apply the **K-Clique** algorithm, described in [5], to the sample using three different values for k : 3, 4 and 5, respectively. The results are represented in Table 6.1. As we can see, even if the result is not so good, the best partition is obtained by using k equals to 3, which returns a low modularity partition composed by low degree nodes. It is interesting to note that all the biggest partitions returned by the various applications of the algorithm are composed only by english speaking users.

K	Communities	Biggest	Smallest	Modularity	Conductance	IED	AND	Tags	Langs
3	21	30	3	0.12	0.56	0.21	2.51	cambridgeanalytica, deletefacebook, facebook, facebookgate	English
4	1	16	16	0.013	0.35	0.11	6.38	cambridgeanalytica, deletefacebook, facebook, facebookgate	English
5	2	7	6	0.00015	0.67	0.23	5.05	cambridgeanalytica, deletefacebook, facebook	English

Table 6.1: Evaluation of the partitions obtained by the application of the K-Clique algorithm.

6.2 Label Propagation

In Table 6.2 are represented the results of the application of the **Label Propagation** algorithm, described in [6]. According to the modularity score the partition provided by this algorithm represent a good subdivision of the original network, even if it is composed for the vast majority by small communities, as suggested by the high number of communities and the low value for the Average Node Degree score. As for the kclique algorithm, it is interesting to note that the biggest community is composed only by english speaking users.

Communities	Biggest	Smallest	Modularity	Conductance	IED	AND	Tags	Langs
714	53	1	0.65	0.26	0.18	1.48	zuckerberg, cambridgeanalytica, deletefacebook, facebook, facebookgate	English

Table 6.2: Evaluation of the partition obtained by the application of the Label Propagation algorithm.

6.3 Louvain

The application of the **Louvain**, described in [7], along with the last iteration of the Girvan-Newman algorithm, returns the best partition among all the partitions returned by the other algorithms. The results of its application are represented in Table 6.3. As for the Label Propagation algorithm, this partition also is composed by an high number of small communities, composed by nodes with degree between 1 and 2.

Communities	Biggest	Smallest	Modularity	Conductance	IED	AND	Tags	Langs
683	51	1	0.75	0.087	0.14	1.76	cambridgeanalytica, deletefacebook, facebook, facebookgate	English, Spanish

Table 6.3: Evaluation of the partition obtained by the application of the Louvain algorithm.

6.4 Girvan-Newman

For the **Girvan-Newman** algorithm, described in [8], we've decided to record the results of 5 iterations over the sample network. The results are represented in Table 6.4. As you can see, the first iteration returns a very poor partition, with a low modularity score, due to the fact that the edge with the highest betweenness centrality in the starting sample network doesn't provide a good grade of separation among the nodes of the network. With the second iteration, and the ones after that, there is a consistent improvement either in the modularity score and in the other measures.

Iteration	Communities	Biggest	Smallest	Modularity	Conductance	IED	AND	Tags	Langs
1	673	275	1	0.21	0.0049	0.20	1.40	cambridgeanalytica, deletefacebook, privacy, zuckerberg, facebook, facebookgate	English, French, Deutsch, Arabic, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Hindi, Finnish, Hungarian
2	674	165	1	0.55	0.011	0.19	1.49	cambridgeanalytica, deletefacebook, privacy, zuckerberg, facebook, facebookgate	English, French, Deutsch, Hindi, Finnish, Spanish
3	675	110	1	0.63	0.017	0.18	1.53	cambridgeanalytica, deletefacebook, privacy, zuckerberg, facebook, facebookgate	English, French, Deutsch, Arabic, Italian, Portuguese, Hungarian
4	676	110	1	0.66	0.025	0.17	1.57	cambridgeanalytica, deletefacebook, privacy, zuckerberg, facebook, facebookgate	English, French, Deutsch, Arabic, Italian, Portuguese, Hungarian
5	677	87	1	0.71	0.030	0.17	1.65	zuckerberg, cambridgeanalytica, deletefacebook, facebook, facebookgate	English, French, Deutsch, Italian, Hindi

Table 6.4: Evaluation of the partition obtained by the application of the Girvan-Newman algorithm.

In general, the partitions returned by the five iterations of the algorithms are all composed by an high number of small communities.

6.5 Demon

Finally in Table 6.5 we provide the results of the application of the **Demon** algorithm, described in [9], that we tested for three different values of ϵ , 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75, respectively. In general, the three partitions are not so good from the point of view of the modularity score, with the first application of the algorithm beign the best among the three. Contrary to the results obtained by the application of the other algorithms, the partitions for the Demon algorithm are all composed by a small number of communities, with the last one being the "denser" one, which are composed by nodes with a degree between 3 and 4.

Epsilon	Communities	Biggest	Smallest	Modularity	Conductance	IED	AND	Tags	Langs
0.25	6	30	4	0.098	0.43	0.11	3.65	cambridgeanalytica, deletefacebook, facebook, facebookgate	English
0.50	9	30	4	0.085	0.49	0.12	4.05	cambridgeanalytica, deletefacebook, facebook, facebookgate	English
0.75	13	27	4	0.082	0.51	0.14	3.86	cambridgeanalytica, deletefacebook, facebook, facebookgate	English

Table 6.5: Evaluation of the partition obtained by the application of the Demon algorithm.

6.6 Comparisons

In this final section of the chapter we compare the algorithms used so far by confronting the best instances among the iterations provided in the past sections. The comparisons are performed by using the NF1 score, as described in [10].

A1	A2	F1 mean	Ground Truth Communities	Identified Communities	Community Ratio	Ground Truth Matched	Node Coverage	NF1
K-Clique 3	Label Propagation	0.44	714.0	21.0	0.029	0.022	0.10	0.0076
K-Clique 3	Louvain	0.32	683.0	21.0	0.031	0.016	0.10	0.0027
K-Clique 3	Girvan-Newman 5	0.25	677.0	21.0	0.031	0.012	0.10	0.0011
K-Clique 3	Demon 0.25	0.92	6.0	21.0	3.5	1.0	1.44	0.24
Label Propagation	Louvain	0.96	683.0	714.0	1.05	1.0	1.0	0.92
Label Propagation	Girvan-Newman 5	0.95	677.0	714.0	1.06	1.0	1.0	0.90
Label Propagation	Demon 0.25	0.38	6.0	714.0	119.0	1.0	14.17	0.0032
Louvain	Girvan-Newman 5	0.99	677.0	683.0	1.01	1.0	1.0	0.98
Louvain	Demon 0.25	0.38	6.0	683.0	113.83	1.0	14.17	0.0033
Girvan-Newman 5	Demon 0.25	0.36	6.0	677.0	112.83	1.0	14.17	0.0032

Table 6.6: Comparisons among the best iterations of the algorithms utilized in this chapter.

In Table 6.6 we can see the comparisons among the best iterations of the algorithms utilized during the community discovery phase. As we can see, the best results are returned by the comparisons between the Label Propagation, Louvain and Girvan-Newman (fifth iteration) algorithms, since that, as we've seen in the past sections, they are in fact the best performing algorithms among the ones we've tested for the communities discovery.

7 | Spreading

In this chapter we'll describe the results we obtained by applying the **SI**, **SIS**, **SIR**, and **Threshold** diffusion models both on the crawled data and on the synthetic graphs (Erdős-Rényi and Barabási-Albert) generated from the original one. In each section, a comparison between the three networks will be provided along with some details on the implementation of the tests of every model.

7.1 SI model




Figure 7.1: In Figure 7.1a we can see the diffusion graph for the original network, while in Figure 7.1b and in Figure 7.1c we can see the diffusion graph for the Erdős-Rényi and Barabási-Albert networks, respectively. In Figure 7.1d we can see a comparison between the infection rate of the three networks.

For the **Susceptible-Infected** model we've started with a 0.005% of the total population (3 nodes) of each network being infected, and we've chosen a value of 0.01 for the infection rate β . As you can see from Figure 7.1, the original network is the only one that doesn't reach the saturation regime, while the other networks reach it within the first 25 iterations of the model. This is due to the fact that both the Erdős-Rényi and the Barabási-Albert network are extremely connected, hence it is more easy for the infection to spread among the nodes.

7.2 SIS model




Figure 7.2: In Figure 7.2a we can see the comparison between the endemic state, in orange, and the disease free state, in blue, for the original network. The same comparison can be observed for the Erdős-Rényi and the Barabási-Albert network, respectively, in Figure 7.2b and 7.2c

For the **Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible** model, thanks to the introduction of the recovery rate μ , we can model two possible outcomes for the epidemic: the **endemic state**, characterized by a low recovery rate and by the fraction of infected individuals that follows a logistic curve similar to the one observed for the SI model, for which $\mu < \beta\langle k \rangle$, and the **disease free** state, characterized by a sufficiently high recovery rate, for which $\mu > \beta\langle k \rangle$. A comparison between this two states is represented for every network in Figure 7.2.

7.3 SIR model

The key characteristic of the **Susceptible-Infected-Recovered** model consist in introducing the probability γ for the individuals to recover from the disease and hence to be "removed" from the population instead of returning to the susceptible state. We have choosen to test this model either for the case in which γ is smaller than β and the other way around. The graphs representing this different situations for all the three networks are visible in Figure 7.3.

7.4 Threshold model

Finally we describe the application of the **Threshold model** both on the original network and the synthetic ones. In order to test this model we've choosen to apply a threshold τ equals to 0.10, the diffusion of the infection for this model is represented in Figure 7.4. As we can see, for the original network we have that almost all the nodes become infected within the first 20 model's iterations, due to the fact that the value choosen for the threshold results to be sufficient for the




Figure 7.3: In Figure 7.3a and 7.3b we can see the representation of the diffusion on the original network both for the case in which γ is smaller than β and the other way around. The same kind of representation is plotted for the Erdős–Rényi network in Figure 7.3c and 7.3d and for the Barabási–Albert network in Figure 7.3e and 7.3f.

spreading of the infection. If we change the threshold's value, this time using 0.20, we can observe that the original network become immune to the infection, thanks to its internal structure. We can observe the same immunity in the Erdős–Rényi and Barabási–Albert network for the original threshold's value.




Figure 7.4: In Figure 7.4a is represented the diffusion of the infection for the original network, while in Figure 7.4b and 7.4c are represented the cases for the Erdős–Rényi and the Barabási–Albert network, respectively. A comparison between the three networks is represented in Figure 7.4d.

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