

SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL TIME PLAN 1977-1978

When	What	Where
Second half 1977		
29-31 August 2-10 September	Conference on Chile Mission to Southern Africa	Rotterdam Angola, Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania
22-23 September 15-16 October 17-27 October	Conference on Energy Policies Bureau Meeting Mission to Latin America	Marseilles Madrid Mexico, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Dominican Republic
5- 6 November	Conference on Youth Unemployment	Zurich
17-19 December	Party Leaders' Conference	Yokohama
1978		
9-10 February 24-26 April 12-13 May 28-29 September 2 November 3- 5 November	Bureau Meeting Conference on Disarmament Bureau Meeting Bureau Meeting Bureau Meeting Congress	Hamburg Helsinki Dakar Paris Vancouver Vancouver

This time-plan is subject to modifications and additions.

SOCIALIST AFFAIRS

July/August 1977 Socialist International Information Vol.27 No. 4



DÉTENTE OR...



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Contents

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- 83 The drift to nuclear War
Frank Barnaby
86 Is humanity going mad?
Egon Bahr
87 Marx of change
Bettino Craxi
89 Willy Brandt
94 Social democracy and Eurocommunism
Horst Ehmke
102 SI Rome Bureau meeting
104 Conferences
Norway, France, ICFTU
106 Elections
Spain, Irish Republic, Netherlands
107 Socialist Notebook

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DÉTENTE OR DESTRUCTION

Frank Barnaby THE DRIFT TO NUCLEAR WAR

We publish below the first of three articles by the Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in which he describes the continuing massive build-up of nuclear military capacity by the two super-powers. In subsequent articles, which will be published in the next two issues of SOCIALIST AFFAIRS, he will deal with military expenditure and the arms race and the consequences of a nuclear war.

We live in an age of conflict, some would say an age of barbarism. According to a leading expert on war, Hungarian Professor Istvan Kende, about 130 wars have been fought since World War II. The total duration of these conflicts adds up to nearly 400 years. The territory of some 70 countries and the armed forces of more than 80 countries have been involved. Almost all of these countries are in the Third World. Since World War II there was not a single day in which the world was free of war. On an average day 12 wars were fought. Since 1945 tens of millions of people have been killed in war — more in fact than in World War II.

But here we will concentrate on the danger of nuclear war mainly because a nuclear world war is the greatest single threat to mankind. At the very least such a war would destroy civilisation as we know it.

A growing number of scientists believe that military technology, by its sheer momentum, will inevitably lead to a nuclear world war. The greatest danger is then not that nuclear war will result, as President Kennedy feared, because of madness, miscalculation or accident, but because weapons

will emerge which will make nuclear war appear "winnable". The side which first develops such weapons will, it is said, be under severe pressures to use them preemptively.

That weapons — tactical and strategic — are being developed suitable for fighting, rather than deterring, a nuclear war is indisputable. Very accurate ballistic missile warheads for land- and sea-based missiles, supersonic cruise missiles, and mini-nukes are just some examples. And research is actively underway in strategic defence systems — such as high-energy lasers and charged-particle beams for use against ballistic missiles, and anti-satellite and anti-submarine warfare devices. A breakthrough in strategic defence, which is probably only a matter of time, would be extremely destabilising.

The activity mainly responsible for the development of new destabilising weapons is military research and development (R and D). As much as about \$30,000 million is being spent annually on military R and D, mostly by the USA and the USSR. Significantly less — about \$20,000 million annually — is spent on civil R and D. In the USA, for example, Federal R and D funds

currently total about \$24,000 million a year — about \$12,000 million for military R and D, \$3,200 million for space, \$3,000 million for energy and \$2,500 million for health.

Military R and D absorbs enormous manpower resources as well as financial ones. More than one-half of the world's research physical and engineering scientists work only in military R and D. Not surprisingly, military technology produces impressive results.

In 30 years nuclear warheads, for example, have been developed from the Hiroshima atomic bomb which weighed about 4,000 kilograms and had an explosive yield equivalent to that of about 12,000 tons (12 kilotons) of TNT to today's US Minuteman III multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) which weighs about 100 kilograms and has an explosive yield of 200,000 tons (200 kilotons) of TNT. And the modern counterpart to the extremely inaccurate B-29 bomber which dropped the Hiroshima bomb is the cruise missile, accurate to a few tens of metres at a range of 2,000 kilometres. Many other examples could be given. If this rate of military technological advance goes on — and there is no reason why it should not — where will it lead us in the next 30 years?

Soviet and American Nuclear Arsenals

The most worrisome aspect of military technology is that the Soviet-American nuclear arms race is leading to a first-strike capability. Such a capability does not mean the ability to destroy the other side's ability to retaliate. Rather it means that one side perceives that it has the capability to destroy enough of the other side's retaliatory forces so as to limit the casualties and damage it would itself suffer from a retaliatory strike to an "acceptable" level for a given political goal. The more reckless the political military leaders, the higher this level is likely to be.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have enormous strategic nuclear arsenals. The United States admits to having 2,124 strategic nuclear delivery systems: 1,054 land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 656 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) on 41 strategic nuclear submarines; and 414 strategic bombers. The US arsenal can deliver about




Dr Frank Barnaby has been the Director of SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) since October 1971. Before that he was the Executive Secretary of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, and a research physicist at University College, London. He is the author of 'Radionuclides in Medicine' and 'Man and the Atom' and he has written or edited books and articles on disarmament issues. He is currently writing a book on 'Science in War'.

8,500 independently targetable nuclear warheads directly on to Soviet territory.

The Soviet Union is thought to have 2,404 strategic nuclear delivery systems: 1,452 ICBMs; 812 SLBMs on 60 strategic nuclear submarines; and about 140 strategic bombers. The Soviet arsenal can deliver about 4,000 independently targetable nuclear warheads on to the United States.

And, in addition to their strategic nuclear forces, the United States and the Soviet Union have tens of thousands of tactical nuclear weapons in their arsenals, mostly much more powerful than the atomic bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. The total number of nuclear warheads in today's world is not far short of 100,000.

But the number



of targets
in the USA, the
USSR, China and Europe
that would "justify" the use of
a nuclear explosion for destruction does not
exceed 500.

So far as bolstering perceptions about "winning" a nuclear war is concerned, recent qualitative developments in offensive and defensive strategic weapons and delivery systems are as dangerous, if not more so, than the size of the nuclear arsenals.

The United States and the Soviet Union are improving their strategic nuclear forces along roughly the same lines. The United States remains ahead of the Soviet Union in almost all areas of strategic nuclear technology, but the gap is closing. Much more information is available about US weapons than about Soviet ones, and so a description of developments inevitably, but unfortunately, emphasizes US systems.

Nuclear Warhead Delivery

The most dangerous current development in strategic nuclear weapons is the continuous improvement of the accuracy of warhead delivery. This accuracy is normally measured by the circular error probability (CEP) — the radius of a circle, centred on the target, within which 50 per cent of the warheads aimed at the target will fall.

The current US Minuteman III MIRV, for example, probably has a CEP of about 350 metres at a range of 13,000 kilometres. But the guidance system of the Minuteman III — the NS 20 — is capable of providing a CEP of about 200 metres. And the new MIRV soon to be deployed on Minuteman III — the Mark 12A — is expected to have this accuracy. The Mark 12A will be capable of destroying enemy missiles in hardened silos.

Recently deployed Soviet ICBMs — the SS-17 (with four MIRVs), the SS-18, and the SS-19 (with six MIRVs) — probably

have CEPs of about 600 metres, a considerable improvement on earlier Soviet ICBMs.

The next generation of US guidance systems — currently planned for the MX ICBM, the proposed replacement for the Minuteman III — is expected to provide CEPs of about 100 metres. And in the generation after that, in which warheads will presumably be guided right on to their targets, CEPs as small as 30 metres will probably be achieved. These warheads, likely to be available in the mid- or late-1980s, may also be provided with a manoeuvring capability so that they can take evasive action against missile defences. Such manoeuvring independently targetable re-entry vehicles (called MARVs) will represent the ultimate in accurate ICBM delivery systems.

Nuclear Catastrophe

The probability of nuclear war will increase if the USA and the USSR engage in such activities as civil defence, the protection of heavy industry and vital machinery from nuclear attack, and so on. The likelihood is that these measures will be taken as first-strike weapons and developed

and deployed.
The signs are that the great powers are already attaching increasing importance to civil defence.

Recovery from a general nuclear war, even if civil defence and other measures were taken, is unlikely to be as rapid or complete as some authorities have recently suggested. The psychological, social, political, and other consequences of such a war, although unpredictable, would certainly be extremely severe. It is true that the sort of general nuclear war predicted would lead to immediate casualties and damage to industry in the belligerents of about the same order of magnitude as those suffered by the Soviet Union in World War II. But there are three important differences. First, the war would be over in a matter of hours rather than being spread over four years. Secondly, industrial societies are now considerably "softer" than they were thirty years ago and correspondingly less able to take the intense suffering and trauma resulting from a war in which all social, medical and municipal services were destroyed in a flash. And thirdly, the long-term consequences of such a war — arising from genetic effects, the depletion of ozone layer, and so on — are simply not known. They may well be utterly catastrophic.

Nuclear-weapon Proliferation

There has been talk recently of fighting limited nuclear wars. But it is unrealistic to believe that the use of one or a few nuclear weapons would not lead to the use of all available ones. A limited nuclear war

is simply not credible. Experience shows that countries are unlikely to surrender before they have used all the weapons at their disposal or which they can rapidly produce. It is for this reason that the proliferation of the capability to produce nuclear weapons is seen to be a serious threat to world security.

There is a direct link between nuclear-weapon proliferation and the spread of peaceful nuclear technology. In this connection the most important peaceful application of nuclear energy is the use of nuclear-power reactors to generate electricity. The plutonium produced as an inevitable by-product in a nuclear reactor can be used to manufacture nuclear weapons. About eight kilograms of plutonium can produce an explosion equivalent to that from 20 kilotonnes of TNT in an atomic bomb of modest (10 per cent) efficiency.

At the end of 1976, the world's nuclear power reactors had a total generating capacity of about 79,000 megawatts of electricity (MWe)¹. This nuclear capacity, provided by 173 power reactors in 19 countries, was capable of producing 16,000 kilograms of plutonium annually. About 30 per cent of it was in 15 non-nuclear weapon countries: Argentina, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.

By the end of 1980, about 250,000 kilograms of plutonium will probably have been accumulated worldwide. Australia, Brazil, Finland, Hungary, Iran, South Korea, Taiwan and Yugoslavia will also then

have nuclear reactors. And by 1984, 28 non-nuclear weapon countries will probably have nuclear power reactors with a potential annual plutonium production rate of about 30,000 kilograms — theoretically enough to produce ten 20-kiloton atomic bombs per day.

The Achilles heel of the nuclear-weapon proliferation problem is that the fissile material for atomic bombs can be produced on a relatively small scale and secretly. A small reactor could produce annually enough plutonium for two 20-kiloton atomic bombs. The components for such a reactor could be easily obtained on the open market for a cost of less than \$20 million. The reactor and a small chemical reprocessing unit to remove the plutonium from the reactor fuel elements could be clandestinely constructed and run.

Many countries have deposits of uranium ore on their territory and so it would normally not be difficult to obtain fuel for such a reactor. The small-reactor route may

¹ The national electricity grid of, for example, the United Kingdom is about 50,000 MWe.

well be the one chosen even by countries with large peaceful nuclear power programmes, if they should decide to produce atomic bombs.

This does not, of course, mean that the possibility of the diversion of plutonium from a peaceful nuclear power programme to military purposes should be ignored. Nor does it necessarily mean that the current concern over the acquisition of nuclear power reactors, reprocessing plants or enrichment plants by new countries is misplaced. But, contrary to conventional wisdom and often even to official statements, it does mean that a lack of access to a commercial reprocessing plant need not (and probably would not) prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to countries which make the decision to acquire them.

The problem of controlling plutonium will be even more difficult if, and when, breeder reactors are developed to a commercial stage. The elements from the breeder blanket — in which uranium is converted into plutonium — will normally contain plutonium of just the right sort for manufacture of very efficient atomic bombs.

The military uses of highly enriched uranium include the use of this material for the trigger of a hydrogen (thermonuclear) bomb, and, with plutonium for the manufacture of more efficient atomic bombs. The spread of uranium-enrichment plants could, therefore, contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Once again, attention has been mainly focused on plants large enough for commercial use. But a small enrichment facility — a dozen or so centrifuges, for example — would be enough to produce the kilogram-per-year quantities of suitably enriched uranium needed for the development of a modest nuclear weapon force.

The London Club

The major suppliers of nuclear material and equipment have for the past few years, periodically held secret meetings in London to discuss ways of making the nuclear market place less anarchic. The aim is to minimize the risk of the diversion of nuclear technology — a technology which they are so eager to supply — to the production

of nuclear explosives. The very fact that these meetings are deemed necessary is essentially an official admission of the failure of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to establish a viable non-proliferation régime.

Countries that are party to the NPT are committed to have International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards applied to all their nuclear facilities, whether indigenously constructed or imported. A sensible course of action to slow down the proliferation of nuclear weapons would be for the exporters to insist that their clients accede to the NPT, or at least subscribe to the same system of international safeguards as that which the parties to the NPT are required to take on. So far the major suppliers have failed to establish such a general rule (although Canada has decided to operate such a rule unilaterally). The fact that states acceding to the NPT are subject to more stringent controls than those outside the Treaty is an absurd and intolerable discrimination.

It is unrealistic to hope that any new international measure to establish a non-proliferation régime will succeed where the NPT has failed. The most that can be hoped for is that measures will be taken to slow down the rate of proliferation. Such measures include a moratorium on the construction of reprocessing plants and breeder reactors until the necessity for these reactors is unambiguously demonstrated. Also, any new uranium-enrichment plant should be constructed under multi-national ownership and operated under IAEA safeguards.

But the most essential action of all to slow down nuclear-weapon proliferation is the demonstration by the political leaders of the nuclear-weapon states that they see no political or military value in nuclear weapons. This they could most convincingly do by undertaking measures of nuclear disarmament.

Delivery Systems for Small Countries

A new nuclear-weapon power should be able to produce a 20-kiloton atomic bomb with a weight of about 1,000 kilograms, even at an early stage in its nuclear-weapon programme. Such a warhead could be transported by many delivery systems, including the American A-4 Skyhawk, F-104 Starfighter and F-4 Phantom; the French Mirage V; the British Canberra and Buccaneer; and the Soviet Illyushin 28. Because of the international trade in arms many near-nuclear countries already have such systems in their arsenals.

Surface-to-surface missiles such as the US Honest John, Lance, Pershing and Sergeant; the Soviet Scud and Frog; and Israel's Jericho are nuclear-capable.

Recent developments in cruise missile technology could have far-reaching consequences for the proliferation of credible nuclear delivery systems — both tactical and strategic. Apart from their relative invulnerability, modern cruise missiles have

Some argue that the bonds formed between states as a result of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in economic, social and political affairs are sufficiently strong,

two important characteristics: they are very accurate and relatively cheap. Many states, Third World as well as industrialised, may see cruise missiles as highly desirable tactical and strategic delivery systems.

Most countries, including Third World ones, with a moderately sized defence industry producing, say, jet aircraft and missiles could produce effective (even though relatively unsophisticated) tactical cruise missiles should they choose to do so. Many of these countries would, or will soon be able to, produce cruise missiles suitable for use by them as credible strategic delivery systems. Such non-industrialized countries with well-developed defence industries include Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Israel and Taiwan. If present trends continue, this list will quickly grow.

The Need for Nuclear Disarmament

In modern war munitions, particularly missiles and major weapons, are likely to be used at a very high rate. During the 18-day October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, for example, about 600 aircraft, 3,000 tanks and 16 ships were lost at an average of one aircraft about every 40 minutes, one tank every 9 minutes and one ship every 27 hours. The immediate financial cost of the war has been estimated at about \$20 million per hour. Because of the international arms trade the military forces of even small powers come to rely on the most up-to-date armaments.

The main recipients of arms can become bound to their suppliers, almost as strongly as if they were allies. In particular, the knowledge that victory in war may well depend upon the receipt of lavish supplies of munitions throughout the fighting can result in the great-power supplier becoming the virtual guarantor of the survival of the client state. The rate of loss of weapons and the consumption of munitions was so high during the October 1973 war that both sides requested additional supplies from their great-power suppliers within a very few days of the outbreak of the fighting.

In a future conflict, a war in an unstable region, involving such client states, may escalate to a general nuclear war between the two great powers. The conflict may start as a conventional war but escalate to a local nuclear war fought with the nuclear weapons of the regional powers. This nuclear war could then escalate further to the involvement of the great powers, intent on preventing the annihilation of their clients. This chain of events is most likely if it starts at a time when one of the great powers perceives the chance of making a first-strike. In fact, the pressures for escalation may, under such circumstances, be so strong that only an exceptionally strong-willed political leader could resist them.

Some argue that the bonds formed between states as a result of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in economic, social and political affairs are sufficiently strong,

or may soon become so, to overcome tendencies towards such a confrontation. But given the speed at which military technology is advancing and spreading throughout the world, and the frailty and uneven progress of international détente, it is reasonable to doubt this argument.

The efforts to control military technology have until now failed miserably. And there might not be much time left. Could it be that man's intelligence enables him to accomplish technological marvels but makes him incapable of evolving the political and social institutions necessary to control his technology?

There is, though, one possible way out. That is nuclear disarmament. It is often said that in today's world of many sovereign states far-reaching disarmament and the development of effective measures of peace-keeping and crisis management are politically unrealistic goals. It is true that fifteen years of experience have shown that arms control negotiations do not lead to disarmament but, at most, to the management of the arms race. But this does not mean that the direct negotiation of far-reaching (but not necessarily total) disarmament measures is bound to fail. In fact, such an exercise has not yet been tried to any serious extent. The basic requirement is that strong enough political leaders should emerge in the great powers to control those forces within these countries who, for a number of reasons, are continuously pushing for higher levels of armaments.

Few are rash enough to hope that sufficiently responsible politicians will be in power at the crucial times to avoid a future nuclear war. And advances in military technology have made deterrence by 'mutual assured destruction', always an utterly immoral strategy, obsolete. If our civilisation is to survive there really is no reasonable alternative to nuclear disarmament. It is to be hoped that a comprehensive disarmament programme, beginning with nuclear disarmament, will be launched at next year's UN General Assembly's Special Session on Disarmament.

Sources: *World Armament and Disarmament*, SIPRI Yearbook 1977, Stockholm, Almqvist and Wiksell, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; Barnaby, Frank, "The danger of winnable wars", *New Scientist*, Vol. 74 No. 1055, p. 578, 1977; Barnaby, Frank, "The mounting prospects of nuclear war", *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 33, No. 6, p. 10, 1977.

IS HUMANITY GOING MAD?

Egon Bahr

The following is the text of a statement issued in mid-July by the Federal Secretary of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). Egon Bahr, on the American neutron bomb currently in process of development:

"For some years we in the SPD have been leading the discussion about the quality of life. After the unprecedented economic recovery coupled with material reforms, in which almost the whole population has participated, the question is now being asked as to what is the meaning of this development. Man would be impoverished if material success became the measure of success in general. The production of more and more goods cannot be the goal of our society but only a means to an end if we do not want to be slaves to these goods. Man's self-realization and the development of his personality must be the aim, and this is why we are also questioning more and more thoughtfully the quality of growth and not its quantity.

"For a few days now we have been having the effect of the neutron bomb explained to us in the newspapers. In short, this is a weapon which causes little or no damage to property but which kills people 'cleanly'. Is this the latest step forward? Is humanity going mad?"

"It is a question to do with humanity,

for never until now has a new weapon been able to remain the monopoly of one country. Here the scale of all values is turned upside down. The preservation of material has become the goal, and man takes second place. To be able to use production facilities, streets and communications systems almost immediately 'afterwards' — this is what it means. Progress also means that it is easier to remove the corpses of people than the ruins of towns and factories. Man with his intelligence is making himself less than a slave to machines; when the crunch comes it is not man but the machine which is worth preserving. The neutron bomb is a symbol of mental perversion.

"No matter whether one thinks from a Christian point of view or along the lines of humanist ethics, whether one asks what is worth defending or remembers . . . the discussion on the sanctity of life — with the neutron bomb man is banished from the centre to the periphery, for matter takes the central position. What do we want to protect — materialism in triumphal excess, or life?

"The longer one thinks about it, the more questions come to mind, including ones about the value of established concepts. But they are all subordinate to the central problem . . . the mutation of human thinking, which for me is manifested in the words neutron bomb, against which emotions and conscience revolt."

MARX OF CHANGE

A special seminar organized by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Trier on May 4 to mark the 30th anniversary of the opening of Karl Marx House in that town was attended by some 30 leading representatives of Socialist International member parties and by the President of the International and Chairman of the German Social Democratic Party, Willy Brandt, and by the General Secretary, Bernt Carlsson. The theme of the seminar was "Freedom and Socialism", and we publish below the text of the introductory lecture given by the Secretary of the Italian Socialist Party, Bettino Craxi, together with the speech of Willy Brandt.

BETTINO CRAXI

A profound passion dominated the founding fathers of "scientific socialism", namely the emancipation of mankind from all forms of material and moral slavery. Their highest value was not social justice divorced from liberty; they always conceived socialism as a social order in which freedom for all was the condition for the freedom of every single individual. They rejected what they bitingly termed "caserne communism". A petrified, lowest-level humanity encased in tight martial discipline was always seen by them as a danger to be averted. They turned against 19th century capitalism because this proclaimed the ideal of liberty while in reality reserving it unto a dwindling minority, the possessing class, and excluding from it the mass of the proletariat which, in order to survive, was forced to sell their bodies, their energy and even their human substance. Such a system had to be radically changed in order to expand freedom to all and to make them complete and substantial. And it was to be the communist society before all others that was to be the realm of liberty.

And yet, in the name of Marx and Engels, totalitarian regimes of oppression have been installed in the world.

Confronted by such a phenomenon we can ask ourselves what connection there is between Marxist theory and such regimes and whether there is not within it a fundamental ambivalence which has turned it into the opposite of what it was intended to be. It is no coincidence that at a certain point Marxism gave rise to a plethora of schools which called themselves orthodox and which in some respects really were so. This occurred probably because from the outset Marxism was not a "singular" but a "plural" phenomenon. As an outstanding synthesis of modern knowledge — many have spoken of a new Aristotelianism to depict the grandiosity of Marxist-Engelian "Weltanschauung" — it has incorporated

within itself practically all significant contributions to Western culture of the past century. But it is precisely for this reason that it has always had a polyvalent structure and played a contradictory historical role.

Critical Attitude

It is imperative to take a critical attitude to the socialism of Marx and Engels and to distinguish between the various models of socialism which they have advanced as alternatives to the capitalist system. There have been various Marxisms and there continue to be several. And I am referring not only to the Marxism of the Marxists but also to the Marxism of Marx and Engels.

Their thinking underwent an evolution closely related to the development of capitalist society, whose socio-economic dynamics they never ceased to observe, so as to give the actions of the labour movement the highest possible measure of realism. The first scheme of the transition from capitalism to socialism is set out in the "Manifesto" in a form which was to become classical and which in the following is compressed into the concepts of class warfare, violent conquest of the state, revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat, economic collectivism. Marx and Engels overestimated the revolutionary potential inherent in the system at that time. Under this strong influence they believed that an actual social rebirth was close at hand.

After the disillusionment of the 1848 revolution they comprehended that the strategy of head-on collision was no more than the projection of a strong yearning, which imagined that there already existed in Europe the material and spiritual conditions for passage from the class society to a classless one. Thereupon they worked out the strategy of the "long traversal of the desert". They became convinced — and tried also to convince the leaders of the

international movement — that the passage from capitalism to socialism would not begin before the unfolding of productive forces had reached its peak, in other words only after the phase of cogent capital accumulation and the industrialisation of the productive system. They came clearly to realise that in order to liberate people from all that oppressed them socialism needed an adequate material basis, that is, a prosperous economic system.

From that realisation derives the preoccupation with the industrial revolution and the capitalist bourgeoisie as the driving force for the limitless unfolding of the productive forces. From that derives, moreover, the thesis of the communist revolution as post-industrial revolution. Capitalism must run its full historical cycle and expand worldwide. Then the fundamental contradiction between the productive forces and production conditions would become evident, which would lead to frontal collision between bourgeoisie and proletariat. But as long as the bourgeoisie had not fulfilled its historical mission it would not be possible to speak of socialism. One must therefore rein in the revolutionary impatience and withstand the continually resurgent temptation immediately and at any price to make the socialist project reality.

This is why a great theoretician of democratic socialism, who was also a great analyst of Marxist thinking — I'm referring to Rodolfo Mondolfo — used to say that *Das Kapital* is an invitation to prudence, an admonition not to take precipitous action in view of the fact that the birth of the new order can only take place in the ninth month and not before. Otherwise the revolutionaries would get a still-birth or, worse still, a monstrous creature which would be as distant as heaven from their expectations.

This was the strategy adopted by the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and above all its greatest theoretician, Karl Kautsky, who incessantly fought against all forms of revolutionary extremism and revolutionary impatience.

Kautsky was always mindful of the fact that the guiding idea of the strategy described in *Das Kapital* was to wait until souls and things had matured for the transition to socialism and in the meantime to work towards raising the state of consciousness of the working class and on perfecting its fighting organisations. From the moment that revolution was no longer spawned by the capricious will of a few doctrinaire spirits, but grew logically and inevitably out of the inner contradictions of the market system, the SPD had to define itself as a revolutionary party, but not as a party which made revolution.

Second Strategy

The second strategy elaborated by Marx and Engels rested on a hypothesis: that the capitalist system had only a limited number of years to run and that due to its incurable inner contradictions it would plunge into historical nothingness. If facts did not harden this hypothesis the socialist parties would have to modify their lines of action. They would then have to return to the strategy of gradual, methodical and progressing expansion of the bourgeois sector of liberal democracy.

Marx already in 1872 in *The Hague* anticipated a similar turning. He said that wherever there was consolidated liberal-democratic tradition (England, the USA and the Netherlands) it was possible and opportune to try a reformist strategy and so to act that socialism should ultimately carry the day with absolute peaceful means. But it was Engels above all who shortly before his death laid down in what is rightly regarded as his political testament — I'm referring to the Preface of 1895 (to Karl Marx's *The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850*) — the ideological basis of the democratically-reformist way to socialism.

Engels explicitly recognised above all that the revolutionary perspective — i.e. the destruction of the bourgeois state as the only means of liberation of the working class from capitalist exploitation — was superseded from both technical and political points of view. The revolutionaries of past generations — among whom Engels counted himself and Marx — had been enamoured of the idea of establishing socialism with a surprise attack, the energetic and determined actions of a conscious and active minority. The historical development of modern society made clear, however, that this was absolutely impossible. The Commune testified to the unrealistic character of the 1848 model.

From this he drew a logical conclusion: that it was necessary to change the tactics of the labour movement. In harmony with the conclusions of his new analysis he expressed his full confidence in the instruments of liberal democracy and saw in universal suffrage an incomparable means to enter into contact with the population masses and to force the bourgeois parties to defend themselves before the people against the attacks of the socialists. In the *Civil War in France* Marx had seen in universal suffrage no more than a method of determining which member of the dominating class should oppress the population in parliament. A generation later Engels came to the conclusion that it was universal

suffrage above all that was the great weapon — naturally not the only one — to let the labour movement advance on the way to socialist democracy.

Engel's thoughts were taken up and developed by Eduard Bernstein in *Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie* (Eng. trans. 'Evolutionary Socialism', 1909). Not only was the operative model outlined in the *Manifesto* according to Engelian self-criticism put to discussion here; also the validity of the assumption of the catastrophic collapse of capitalism was subjected to merciless criticism. From the moment that nothing indicated that the market system had come to its end — this is in brief Bernstein's central tenet — there was only one way left open to the European labour movement; the one seen by Marx himself and theoretically underpinned by Engels: the gradualist method based on social and political reforms and on the class struggle for overcoming the bourgeois limits of liberal democracy.

Consequently the Socialist International had to lay aside the thousand-year-old Utopia of the revolutionary leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom and to work like a mole within the system so as to change its structure from the inside. It was necessary, in other words, to erode the centres of power of the dominant class, to subject economic development to public control, to democratise the institutions and to develop participation from below and the forms of self-government. But the conquest of power by the Bolsheviks kindled the flame of revolutionary hope anew. The operative model of the *Manifesto*, which Marx and Engels explicitly repudiated, in one stroke returned on to the historical stage. It seemed to many that Lenin and Trotsky had found the right method to bring about the birth of the socialist society: militarisation of the labour movement, class warfare, single-party dictatorship, total state control of economic life. Antonio Gramsci did not hesitate to

write that the power seizure by the Bolsheviks had to be regarded as a "revolution against *Das Kapital*".

The Bolsheviks certainly regarded themselves as being orthodox Marxists. But they were such only inasmuch as everything Marx and Engels had written after the disappointment of 1848 was regarded as insignificant. In short: the Marxism of Lenin and Trotsky was nothing else than the juvenile Jacobinism of Marx and Engels, a concentrate of voluntarism and extremism, of thousand-year-old hopes and authoritarianism, of exaggerated moralism and Machiavellian realism.

Refusal of Bolshevik Concept

Given this background, one understands why all the leading figures of the Second International refused to identify themselves with the Bolshevik concept. Despite the often profound differences of opinion which divided them they were all of one mind on one point: that socialism and Jacobinism were antithetic concepts. Jacobinism, indeed, is an elist, authoritarian and totalitarian concept of revolution. It allots to a conscious and active minority the competence autocratically to create the perfect society. Jacobinism promises substantial democracy and true liberty while in actual fact it leads to totalitarian dictatorship of the customs and norms of ideology. Proudhon recognised better than anyone else the core of the Jacobinistic concept and condemned it: "Give us the power to decide over life and death for you all, they say, and we will lead you to salvation."

But the relationship between Bolshevism and Marxism was not limited to re-adoption of the juvenile Jacobinism of Marx and Engels. There was one idea to which the latter attached the greatest importance: the superiority of collectivism over the market economy, which they equated with capitalism and thus also with exploitation. In their writings the complete state control over means of production is conceived as an obligatory transition in order to arrive at a socialist society. It was particularly this idea which the Bolshevik doctrinaires wanted to apply with rigorous consequentiality. "State capitalism," Lenin used to say, "is the ante-chamber to socialism." Today we all know the negative consequences of that assumption. The monopoly on material resources leads to a fusion between economic and political power, i.e. to total power. Far removed from liberating the workers, the all-encompassing state control of the economy turns into the material basis of the one-party dictatorship and the formation of a new class. Thus one is able to conclude from this that the Bolsheviks believed they were working for the liberation of humanity from exploitation but that they in fact ultimately became the first victims of that sociological law Marx called "the paradoxes of consequences". They sincerely sought the realm of liberty but instead allowed the realm of the totalitarian unity-party and its functionaries to develop.

The socialistic and social democratic parties went the opposite way. They preferred to go by the advice of the elder Engels and the operative methodology designed by Bernstein. Instead of destroying representative democracy they strengthened

it; instead of doing away with the market, they aim to subject it to political control; instead of centralising the decision-taking processes, they have tried to decentralise them and to bring public affairs closer to the workers. To be sure, they have not yet succeeded in creating a type of society conforming with the principles of socialistic democracy when one considers that to this day the European societies still bear traits typical of class societies. But the method they use has proved the only one able to expand the liberty and the influence of the working classes. This is why we still have a great deal of work ahead of us, with many problems proving to be of a complexity which is far greater than we thought.

Today, in the light of the completed experiments in those countries which have 'tried' the Leninist way, it appears clear to us that total state control of the means of production devours the pluralistic logic and tends to destroy all prerequisites for the development of the liberty of the working classes. We know, in other words, that in this specific point Marx and Engels erred. But we also know that they never ceased critically to review their positions and that their theory of the transition to socialism was multi-layered and in continuous evolution.

Fundamental Intention

There are, in other words, various ways of paying tribute to the great teachings of Marx and Engels. It is right to express a critical loyalty which permits us to correct our errors; constant review of our hypotheses, methodological verification of expectations in terms of consequences. Marx and Engels themselves used such a procedure on their own ideas, not hesitating to abandon some of them because they tried to remain true to their fundamental intention, the liberation of humanity from all those natural or artificial realities which impeded them and still impede them in realising themselves completely on their own.

For the rest, what Marxism meant to the European labour movement has long since become a part of history. Thanks to Marxism — thanks to its formidable analytical instruments and thanks to its destructive criticism of all forms of class rule — the workers have acquired a political consciousness, a fundamental role in our society. Marxism continues to be part of the intellectual and moral armament of democratic socialism, in particular because it has proclaimed the substantial right to liberty of all people, regardless of class, creed and race. Marxism was and is not always right. But to the extent that it is right this suffices to regard it as one of the indispensable components of the ethos of democratic socialism.


As regards the errors and illusions of Marx and Engels, it is up to us to ensure that they do not continue to operate and produce their typical negative effects. In this sense modern socialism can call itself Marxistic, but it must also call itself revisionistic. The destiny of all mankind's greats — Marx and Engels were such of the highest order — is to be superseded, but not to be embalmed and transformed into fetishes. This is the only way critically to develop what they have taught us.

WILLY BRANDT

Number 10 Brückenstrasse is one of Trier's most beautiful town houses. It has had a turbulent history. Karl Marx was born here on May 5, 1818 — *inter alia* a great German. The Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) bought the house in 1929 and had it restored. The planned museum could no longer be opened. The house was expropriated and misused by the Brownshirt usurpers for their purposes. In 1947 — 30 years ago now — an international committee headed by Léon Blum contributed to the museum and memorial, finally coming into being. Since 1969 the house has been taken care of by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. It is now an internationally renowned research centre and library.

What the house experienced at the hands of the Brown terror regime is what many Germans experienced in their relationship to Marx. The perversion of their history has not made it easy impartially to come to terms with important men. What I mean by that — not only in regard to intellectual rank — may become clear when I mention two names from our linguistic region: Freud and Einstein. All the same, one may ask oneself why the Chairman of the SPD is speaking today on this occasion and whether there are not more topical issues he should be addressing himself to. Well, as we all know, one does not commit oneself to such functions from one day to the next. In any event, I am not here merely to pay homage to history. What I have to say is meant to contribute to the spiritual debate we find ourselves engaged in today.

Alfred Nau (Honorary President of the SI) welcoming seminar participants to the Karl Marx House



(Left to right) Bettino Craxi, Prof. Horst Ehmke and Bernt Carlsson at the Karl Marx seminar



I have never been one to ignore the continuity between events of the day — even when they are less grave than they are these days — and fundamental orientation. To establish this continuity is today probably more important than ever — for tomorrow. This is not to mean that I am setting out to redefine the position of the German Social Democratic movement; there are no grounds for that. For us holds true what Kurt Schumacher formulated in 1946 and which I recalled here in Trier on the occasion of the 1968 anniversary celebration: "It is immaterial whether someone has become a Social Democrat through the methods of Marxist economic analysis, out of philosophical or ethical reasons or out of the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount; everyone has the same rights in the party to assert his spiritual personality and to justify his motives." This is also in conformity with our Basic Programme (i.e. the SPD's Godesberg Programme), namely that democratic socialism in Europe did not spring from one source, but that it is rooted in Christian ethics, in humanism and in classical philosophy; that it did not set out to proclaim any ultimate truths.

But we are not people who run away from their own past. Nor am I speaking on this occasion because we have had our problems in coming to grips with Marx. For us German Social Democrats this is a welcome opportunity to re-commit ourselves anew and self-confidently to the labour movement's traditions of liberty and socialism. I wish to deal in particular with the

theme of freedom and socialism.

This is a time when — not only in the Federal Republic of Germany — we are being challenged by stupid and evil slogans. This is a time when new efforts are demanded of us not only in the struggle for liberality and the state where liberty and the rule of law prevails. This is also a time when the relationship to communism has to be newly clarified, and a time when we must reflect even more intensively than hitherto on fundamental issues which arise out of the permanent tensions between the collective and the individual.

It pleases me greatly to see among us so large a number of foreign friends and I look forward to the serious debate about freedom and socialism to be held here this afternoon. It would be good if from this developed an ongoing international exchange of views.

A Democratic Revolutionary

Marx was not only a great German. He ranks with the outstanding figures of European liberation movements. Whatever one made or has tried to make out of Marx, the struggle for liberty, for the liberation of humanity from bondage and degrading dependency, was the motive of his thinking and his actions.

This is my basic observation; not a sensational one, to be sure, but directed equally against ignoramuses and scholastic would-be purists. And I add that the only way to avoid misunderstanding Marx is to see him as a son of his time. And as a son of his time we find him again and again on the side of freedom. His personal life matters less in this context, although from that, too, a lot could be concluded about this man's work for freedom.

As an émigré in Paris Marx became sharply aware how closely, under the conditions then obtaining in France — but also in England — the struggle for political freedoms, for democracy, was bound up with the struggle of the new class of industrial workers against the conditions of misery under which they lived. The pupil of Hegel and later critic of his historical philosophy came to the conviction that the liberation of the bourgeoisie from feudal domination and absolutism had to be followed by the liberation of the proletariat from the domination of capital; only then would liberation from all oppression be possible. A new faith in the salvation of mankind by the class that lived in the most abject misery, the proletariat, was born.

Marx became involved with the then topical fight for political freedom with his demand for the abolition of censorship and the granting of total freedom of the press. This demand, put forward with sometimes more and sometimes less vigour by German Liberals and Democrats since 1819, was more than the demand of a specific right important for the editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung*. It stood for an entire catalogue of basic political rights.

All his criticism of "bourgeois" democracy notwithstanding, Marx does not want to dispense with it later, either. It would be misunderstanding him to believe that he attached only strategic importance to the struggle for democratic rights such as freedom of the press and of association, or to have seen in them only means to enable the

Whatever one made or has tried to make out of Marx, the struggle for liberty, for the liberation of humanity from bondage and degrading dependency, was the motive of his thinking and his actions.

working class to establish itself as a party (or even as a trade union). Already in his youth, when even the majority of progressive Germans could visualise only the constitutional monarchy as the future form of state, he sought a combination of political freedom and democracy.

He was, in other words, a democratic revolutionary at a time when almost nowhere in Europe was there a democracy — just as the English Chartists or French Socialists were democratic revolutionaries in their ways. Despite all his later attacks on the indecisiveness and narrow-mindedness of many contemporary democrats he was always ready again to cooperate with them.

His conviction that he was ahead of all other currents of the labour movement and socialism by dint of his scientific insight into the overall process did not tempt Marx — as it later did Lenin — to enforce his solutions with organisational power means (and supposed shortcuts). In 1847, as we know, Marx and Engels freed the Association of Communists from the character of a secret society. In their *Manifesto* the communists — as they then called themselves — could "not be a special party besides or vis-à-vis the other worker parties". In the 1848 revolution they threw their support behind the radical-democratic movements.

After the defeat they went into self-criticism — at the address of the central authority of the Association of March 1850, the only Marxist document which approaches the later Bolshevik thinking — because of this organisational self-denial, and during this "ultra-left" interim phase they flirted with the organisational ideas of Blanqui. But when thereupon the association turned into a sect, Marx for all intents and purposes dissolved it. And when founding the First International he went out to do away with the sectarian quarrelling by emphasising the autonomy of the real movement in the various countries.

For the fight for political freedom he found ample ammunition in the occurrences of his day. Before 1848 he attacked the monarchical principle in Prussia, which caused him to be sought by "Wanted" posters. From 1851 he tirelessly attacked the "Praetorian" regime of Napoleon III — and rejoiced at its collapse. He scourged the Tsarist autocracy with articles and pamphlets and in so doing was not fussy about his allies. He also never tired of supporting national liberation movements. And so he was on the side of those who encouraged the Polish nation in their fight against division. And he supported, too, the

independence strivings of the Irish against British rule. During the American secessionist war he, of course, took the side of the North against slavery.

But in emphasising all this one must mention at the same time that Marx did not stand up for equal rights for all nations. In his kind of world-historical perspective he mostly saw only the larger nations; on top of that came specific prejudices. That what he disdainfully called "splinter nations" should have the right to national self-determination would not enter his head. He set the freedom of nations in a relationship to what he considered historical progress. Above all, however, he was out to accelerate the rights of the people to liberty.

We have learnt that the right to self-determination must be a right for every person and every nation if the principle of freedom is to be done justice. Be it the self-determination of the individual or of many — only on its foundation can freedom of the individual and of peoples flourish.

Salvation on Earth

Without doubt the struggle for political freedom sharpened Marx's sensitivity to the economic and social injustices of the time. In 1844 he took up studies in economics in Paris. Quickly he came to realise that the wealth of the few corresponded to the misery of the masses and that wealth and misery sprang from the same process. From then on his originally wide-ranging interest in issues of human emancipation concentrated on the criticism of political economies, and on exposing the economic processes which govern modern society. It was a man of Catholic social doctrine, it will be remembered, Professor Nell-Breuning who a few years ago said "we all" stood on the shoulders of Marx.

I do not want to spell out here what he wrote on the categories of property and labour, or on the central problem of private acquisition of the main means of production. But I do wish to recall this: he was aware that material production, even under the most favourable conditions imaginable, involved sacrifices, effort and necessities. And to him it appeared that only on the basis of this "realm of necessity" could the "true realm of freedom" grow; shaped by shortening the working day and meaningfully spent leisure time of the individual. That was the way he saw the real community of individuals interacting and thus the highest possible stage of human emancipation: lived and experienced personal freedom.

The greatness and durability of Marx's work in the final analysis probably rests on his combining the work capacity and analytical sharpness of a trail-blazing scientific thinker with the passion of a prophet, one who preached salvation on earth. The scientific achievement of analysing contemporary capitalism has shared the fate of other trail-blazing scientific achievements: it was first rejected, then increasingly recognised, then integrated in the overall structure of modern social science and ultimately partly overtaken in important part by the way society actually developed.

To speak today of a special science of Marxism makes especially little sense when one fully honours the greatness of the

scientific achievement in its time. The creed it gave birth to had an inspiring effect on the labour movement — also on anti-colonial movements — in a number of countries; like other creeds it gradually lost its effectiveness in the interpretation dispute, until decades later, partly in other social classes, it experienced a renaissance which had become fairly independent of the truthfulness of the originally scientific theories.

We know that Marx was unable to score any immediate political success, that in our country, Germany, for example, the labour movement became a mass organisation without him. It developed out of the sect, the crafts association and the worker education society under the leadership of Lasalle, Liebknecht and Bebel. Only the untiring work of Friedrich Engels and later of Karl Kautsky led to the German party's identifying in its Erfurt Programme with important basic Marxist tenets immediately after the revocation of the Bismarckian anti-Socialist laws. But with this it soon came into conflict with its own political reality; and although many of the party-political practitioners — supported by Kautsky's orthodoxy — believed they could live on easy terms with this contradiction — among them Bebel — there soon came fundamental criticism from a man who was among those who had best known Marx in his time, namely Eduard Bernstein.

Attention has been drawn in recent years to the in many respects remarkable modernity of Bernstein's work. Important points of Marx-criticism in later, indeed, in today's literature can already be found with him. Including, by the way, an understanding of democratic socialism which comes very close to the Godesberg Programme.

It has recently been set forth that the Marxist view as to how and in what concrete way the liberation of people from degrading dependencies was possible at all already contained elements which for parts of their later interpretation by Lenin provided certain starting points. Bernstein once said that in the important questions of socialist strategy Marx had left the Social Democrats in the lurch; he had led them astray by quite different pointers. If one approaches his work from this aspect, from the aspect of the thoughts and recommendations for a political practice for changing the world, then the undogmatic and unprejudiced observer is not spared the perplexing experience that a goodly part of the discordant orientation of his successors is rooted in this part of the work itself.

The utterances on the strategy for reshaping existing society are numerous, but nowhere summed up. There is no book by Marx about the state or about the revolution or about the party and the strategy of the labour movement. His main interest was completion of his life's work on the political economies of capitalism. Only topical events prompted him to write on other issues. The balance of his random observations is neither unitary nor unequivocal. The arguments do not add up to a conclusive concept of the prerequisites of and ways to establish a "socialist society". In the politically decisive part of his theory Marx has remained contradictory. Friedrich Engels made a passing reference to this in a late letter. In 1890 he wrote to Joseph Bloch that Marx and he were probably to blame

We know today that state takeover of the means of production does not solve the question of democratisation and humanisation of society.

In various parts of his overall works he defined the state as "the administrator of the economically dominant class" or, too, as the dictator of the bourgeoisie. Without considering the form of organisation, he denied the state the ability to remove the privileges of the economically dominant class. In line with the basic theories of historical materialism which, of course, underline the priority of the economic basis, he regarded the state as merely capable of securing the functions of given economic conditions by political means.

Under these circumstances a policy of gradual social change and the use of the state for purposes of the reform of society appeared unthinkable. In his analysis of the French February revolution of 1848 Marx, consistent with this tenet, went so far as to condemn as a "crime" against the interests of the working class any attempt to improve the situation of the workers within the bourgeois order rather than smashing it; this, of course, belongs with that "ultra-left" interim phase of his, as I over-pointedly called it before.

Anyone who takes this approach, and it is the one which not least has been linked with the proud claim to a concurrent "scientific" socialism, can only expect the establishment of a socialist society to come from violent overthrow, from a "proletarian revolution" which leads to a "dictatorship of the proletariat". Marx used this formula in various phases of his activity to express the necessary change from the domination of the exploiting minority to the dominance of the exploited majority, the necessary transformation of the state into a weapon of this majority. In this, however, he did not lay down any concrete political form for this dominance of the working majority.

This kind of materialistic understanding of history thought it could derive from the contradictory interaction between continually further-developing productive forces and man-made production conditions for given, foreseeable periods an on-going higher development of human society. How this law operates inside capitalism is what Marx examined in his main work. The opinions are known that the inevitable destruction of the capitalistic shell of the modern productive forces would at the same time be an act of establishment of a new society in which the free development of each individual would be the condition for the free development of all.

At this point let me once more refer to our historical experience. We know today that state-takeover of the means of production does not solve the question of democratisation and humanisation of society, the expansion of the free realm of the individual. We know — and I referred to this in my address in 1970 on the 150th birthday of Friedrich Engels in Wuppertal — that more freedom does not necessarily devolve from changing capitalistic production and private ownership of means of production. History over-abundantly shows that there is no such automatism. The earlier-mentioned "leap of humanity from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom" is not a leap, but a process demanding wilful and moral energies which are not only dependent on the economic basis.

Logical Consistency

There is much one can remark on Marx, but not that he lacked logical consistency. Up to a certain point in time he did not reckon with (nor hold to be worth striving for) the situation of the working class improving before the end of capitalist society. Increasing misery, bondage, insecurity and degradation of the broad masses were regarded by him as unavoidable in the course of developments.

This change in concrete political objectives corresponds obviously with the progressing experience of the second half of the 19th century, in which hitherto hardly known democracy with universal suffrage and accountable government gradually moved towards its realisation — a form of state which offered quite different possibilities for the assertion of majority interests than the previously predominating parliamentary systems of class suffrage, not to mention Bonapartist states or constitutional monarchies with governments not accountable to the governed.

Indeed, the elder Marx, without expressly correcting his revolutionary approaches, in many places of his writings approved of

another perspective of transition; namely in such texts as identify him as a politically active functionary of the International. In the inaugural address to the International Working Men's Association of 1864 he calls the implementation of the standard 10-hour working day in England a "victory" of the political economy of the working class" over the ruling political economy of capitalism. And he calls this reform a victory of this principle — brought about by a parliament under pressure from the labour movement.

In this text there is explained what in our objectives — and also on the basis of our experiences and aims — we call reform policies and what reformist socialists have formulated already decades before us: only by removing the most pressing conditions of capitalism can the workers gain that moral, intellectual and physical strength which is the prerequisite for the liberation struggle. Reforms within the political economy of capitalism would bring with them a measure of life quality for the working class and would at the same time enhance their ability to fight.

A short time later, that is after the founding of the International, Marx argued against the view that with reform policies in favour of the workers the socialist movement was ultimately only strengthening the existing state and thereby its own oppressors. He took the view that it depended on the kind of reform laws — whether reforms strengthened the government or the working class; whether through them the working class would be in a position to turn power used against it into its own servant. A decade before his death he then drew the conclusion from this approach. I call to mind that place in his speech at the 1872 Hague congress, where he declares as possible a peaceful transition to socialism in democratically constituted societies such as England, America — and "perhaps", as he said there — also Holland. With his arguments he has also laid open and substantiated a reformist way to realise socialist aims.

As contradictory as such a way may appear to the revolutionary position taken elsewhere in his works, so unreconciled did both standpoints indeed remain in him. His unshakeable conviction that revolution would come caused him as frequently to prophesy the imminent collapse of capitalism as his marked realism brought him back to the real pre-conditions for changing society. His ambition as founder of scientific socialism misguided him to over-emphasise the objective historical forces, while his experience showed him how much all progress begins with small steps.

And so it is no historical coincidence that democratic socialism received much impetus from Marx. But it also becomes visible that the revolutionary criticism of social democratic policy from within its own ranks at the time was able to find many points of departure in Marx's works for its propaganda of violent overthrow and explosive "smashing" of the ruling system.

Pedestal of Untouchability

It would not be useful for historical assessment nor for one's own political orientation if one were to try to force the antithetical twin-heritage into one. It is much more important critically to set forth and

Since 1917 no Communist party has come to power by its own efforts in any industrial country with a tradition of liberty.

understand these contradictions in a great life-work. And it must be decided which of its elements still have validity, which must be critically dispensed with and which have already been superseded.

I said that important impetuses emanate from Marx, which democratic socialism has adopted. It is our job, however — especially in the struggle with those who have latched on to the especially problematical and questionable sides of his work — to examine his theoretical estate without prejudice. And in so doing it emerges that in this inheritance there were also points to which Lenin could link. It is absurd, though, to want to make Marx into a premature Leninist.

One does Marx the most justice if in the positive and the negative one fetches him off the pedestal of untouchability. His name will have to lose the halo, but also be taken out of the zone of general defamation in order for rational debate to be able to take place about the historical achievement. And that is the best honour to the memory of a man whose main scientific principle was relentless criticism.

I for one am absolutely certain that the historical Marx, just as his friend Engels, would have done determined spiritual and political battle with that distortion of Marxist doctrine which was ultimately dogmatized by Stalin as "Marxism-Leninism" and which was and is used to justify the party dictatorship in the Soviet Union and other countries calling themselves "socialist". Rosa Luxemburg was still able to put that on record. The way of the pre-war left to Bolshevism was — and this applies not only to Germany — a fateful historical misunderstanding.

Indeed, the political concept of the role of the working class and its movement as bearers of social progress — even the historical-philosophical belief in the proletariat's salvation on earth — were a further development of the European tradition of liberation struggles of ever new social classes in a dynamically changing society — a tradition of democratic mass movements. Lenin, on the other hand, had built the Marxist analyses of capitalism and its contradictions into an action concept which was developed in the completely different kind of background of Russian history and from the traditions of revolutionary conspiracy. In this concept the success of the historical process was made dependent on the predetermined scientific insight of an avant-garde party, whose "leading role" was shielded from all effective control by the working masses themselves through a centralistic organisation.

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Two things have to be kept apart here which do not belong in the same cooking pot: one thing is the contradictions on

principle which separate us from communism; I have given my views on these today (and I could have made them even clearer to those who seem to think that in actual fact Trier belongs to the GDR); another thing is the recognition that the differences between political orders and systems of society must not prevent the striving to remove tensions.

It was only logical that the role of a thus-constructed party within a few years led to the establishment, in the name of a fictitious "dictatorship of the proletariat", of a "party dictatorship over the proletariat" (Rosa Luxemburg) — the first total party dictatorship in modern history. Stalin effectively used the party dictatorship to form the Soviet Union into a world power highly efficient in terms of power apparatus, although still backward in many other fields — at dreadful human cost. At the same time the Stalinist codification and dogmatization of what Lenin, in his way — more than wilfully, more than one-sidedly, I feel — depicted as Marxist doctrine, has created a convenient ideology of total power in "Marxism-Leninism". This hyphen-Marxism has also been advanced since then to justify the expansion of power and dictatorship to other countries and peoples.

It is not my intention here to trace in detail this historically important and tragic development. Nevertheless, a word should be said about the repercussions of the communist dictatorship on the democratic labour movement of the West. Since the founding of the Communist International in 1919, the Communists, citing Lenin, have been trying everywhere to split the democratic socialist parties. But it is certainly no coincidence that in the 60 years since then no Communist party has come to power by its own efforts in any industrial country with a tradition of liberty.

In the interval between the World Wars the Communist splitting policy was able only to weaken the socialist labour movement of the West; here in Germany, where the Communists were strongest, a blind fight against the Social Democratic movement — whose weaknesses and errors are another story — ended in the victory not of the Communists, but of the National Socialist dictatorship. Outside the Soviet sphere of power in postwar Germany the Communists never advanced beyond a sect role after this experience.

It seems even more significant to me that where, in the postwar time, communist mass parties asserted themselves in developed, democratic countries — in France, in Italy, in Japan — these parties sooner or later, in an often long and difficult process, have begun to adapt to their democratic environments and to break free of the dogma of party dictatorship and slavish orientation to the Soviet model.

I am not here trying to give my interpretation of what is called by that not particularly enlightening slogan of Euro-communism; it would in any case only be a very cautious interpretation indeed. But it is certainly not un-interesting what could be heard in recent years from out of the ranks of the Italian or Spanish Communist parties. From the point of view and responsibility of German Social Democrats, I see no basis for alliances. It would be good if European democracy were to get new allies, but the road away from the concept of dictatorship (of the proletariat) is a long one.

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principle which separate us from communism; I have given my views on these today (and I could have made them even clearer to those who seem to think that in actual fact Trier belongs to the GDR); another thing is the recognition that the differences between political orders and systems of society must not prevent the striving to remove tensions.

On the contrary, the responsibility for survival and for coming generations demands that tenacious work be put into securing peace — as we have tried to do with our treaties policy — and that in connection with this ever new efforts be undertaken to develop areas of mutual interest. This is the way in which something can also be achieved to make people's lives easier. The world would be condemned to destruction if it were to make ideological differences solely and radically the supreme maxim of debate and struggle.

As far as Western Europe is concerned, the German Social Democrats do not presume to take decisions in place of their sister parties in other countries. But we are agreed with them, for example, that in the directly-elected European Parliament there can only be one group of democratic socialists — that is Social Democrat deputies, without any admixtures or blurring. It must also be clear that in Europe there must be no claim to monopoly, but that under the common roof there must be room for all relevant forces which have grown out of European democracy.

Contradictory Inheritance

What I am to say in conclusion takes up again the thought of the contradictory Marxist inheritance. The important question to me seems to be how one deals with the inheritance, what use one makes of it. Relating it to our theme I should like to set it in a picture: there are those who declare the pre-thinker a saint and who administer his turning, the revolution of his thinking, in the mausoleum. And there are those who use the door opened by the critical analysis of a historic precursor — not in that they see in it a holy portal but in that they step through it in the knowledge that there are no ultimate truths, but that socialism has to be understood as a constant task orientating itself to basic values.

Karl Marx, his analyses and his historic achievements of the mind, are unsuited for either mausoleums or altars. And if there is a link between Marx and Social Democrats, and there always will be, then that is that he and we are concerned with a socialism which presupposes freedom and brings freedom about. Freedom is the big theme of Marx and in this he himself was an heir: an heir of the civic revolutions of the declining 18th and 19th centuries.

That these historical occurrences have been arbitrarily separated from Marx and his thinking has led not only to misunderstandings and misinterpretations. Many aberrations, which smothered the aims of socialism in terror and violence, were caused by the connections between Marx and his historical foundations not being recognised, being distorted or deliberately denied and perverted. To play him and his patrimony off against the tradition of the bourgeois revolutions means forcing living,

on going thinking, into a Procrustean bed.

The notion of an ultimate form of society is just as empty a dream as it is a dangerous one.

remove alienation, but that it can make new forms of alienation, of bondage. And the experience from this experiment is that the destruction of the heritage of the bourgeois revolution ends not in more but in less freedom. And if today we are seeing attempts at a revision vis-à-vis the Bolshevik deviation from Marxist intentions, then the link to the bourgeois-liberal heritage again becomes clear.

Here a root of tradition is being uncovered which was long buried. I mean — as I said four years ago in a government policy statement — the *Citoyen*, not the bourgeois, that is to say those citizens ready not to stop their struggle for liberty rights at the narrow confines of their own class interests. I go to the next step and say: the *Citoyen* of this civic tradition will today, as he has always done, put his demands for freedom on a broad basis. He will help make it possible for increasing freedom to be realised in as many sectors of society as possible and in the life of each individual. And he will find nothing astounding in discovering that here he finds himself in agreement with, or at least not at odds with, the aims of democratic socialism.

I said here in Trier in 1968 that we took up the challenge not only to interpret but also to change: 'That means today above all to understand democracy as a permanent process. For us the freedom of democracy is no static and abstract value. It is freedom to change society, but such a further-development and change as is borne by the free approval and verification of the people.'

Approval, co-determination, verification for what? We are a long way yet from a society where democracy as a practical form of freedom operates in all relevant spheres. It cannot remain hidden to us that — despite the historical successes of the labour movement and Social Democrats — the working human being is still having to overcome old and ever new forms of alienation and of bondage. The broadening of the theme on to the European level and that of universal responsibility offers itself; it cautions us as to the value of our own models, but it makes clear what is expected of us in the North-South contexts.

The challenge is great. It requires full effort from all political forces for freedom, justice and solidarity increasingly to become reality. Whatever we may achieve: as heirs of socialist thinking and the civic revolutions, democratic socialists will not make the mistake of holding achievements to be ultimate. The notion of an ultimate form of society is just as empty a dream as it is a dangerous one.

And so we will again and again examine whether the freedom achieved goes hand in hand with justice in all situations in which each individual can be free; and whether that fraternity and solidarity prevail which make freedom possible. We have stepped through the door which the thinker Marx helped to open. Freedom for us remains what it was to him: the critical measure by which every order has to justify itself.

Democratic socialism thus does not become Utopia nor socialism an empty formula. Socialism to us means a design towards freedom, which remains open, in motion and thereby human.

SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND EUROCOMMUNISM

Horst Ehmke

As the first in a proposed series of articles discussing the phenomenon of Eurocommunism from a democratic socialist viewpoint, we publish below the text of a lecture given by Professor Horst Ehmke, a member of the Executive of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), to a seminar organized by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Bonn. Although it was delivered in April 1976 (i.e. before the conference of European Communist parties held in East Berlin in June 1976), the lecture is of current relevance in its treatment of some of the basic elements of the debate on Eurocommunism.

Our world, which, thanks to the policy of détente, has just succeeded in freeing itself to a certain extent from the tension and fears of the Cold War, now finds itself facing new problems which have been brought about by precisely the same policy. The curbing of the East-West conflict has helped to reveal the seriousness of the North-South conflict, which, no matter how it is resolved, will result in worldwide structural changes. On the other hand, the policy of détente, for which — although it is given a different label from time to time — there are no real alternatives, has opened up new horizons, and set free new forces. This applies not only to Europe, but to the whole world, to both West and East.

People in Europe and in the rest of the world are evidently becoming increasingly conscious of the fact that conservative forces, clinging to out-dated structures as they do, have no answers to the new challenges, and the solutions will have to be sought and found in the direction of democratic socialism. But people in both the West and the East are also becoming increasingly conscious of the fact that socialism without freedom and democracy is not socialism at all and offers no acceptable pattern for our future.

No matter how much they may differ, the democratic socialist parties which have emerged from the European workers' movement can now certainly claim that their fundamental beliefs have been proved correct. They see themselves as the pioneers of a social democracy — the kind of democracy which also pervades the economic and social structures of society, and is not merely a superficial appendage to feudal or capitalist structures. However, they make no monopolistic claims even with regard to social democracy, but are open to all competition. On the other hand, they do not consider it mere chance that the com-

munist have become a force to be reckoned with in precisely those countries of south and west Europe which have had authoritarian or conservative governments, while in north and central Europe, where the social democrats are strong, the communists have gained scarcely any influence.

Without underestimating the opposing forces, it can be said that the political position of the parties based on democratic socialism has increased in importance in the last decade: in the German Federal Republic, in Austria, Great Britain, and the Scandinavian countries these parties have a decisive influence on political policy; in France the Socialist Party is emerging as the leading force of the left; in Italy it is trying to increase its influence between the two great blocs of the Christian Democrats and the Communists; in Portugal it has been the most significant political force in the breakthrough from fascism towards democratic perspectives and in preventing a communist coup; and in Spain it is developing into a decisive factor in the opposition.

The idea of social democracy is also gaining ground outside Europe. On the American continent, in Africa and Asia, the idea of a Third World free of hegemonic powers is beginning to be combined with the search for a third way somewhere between capitalism and communism. A political expression of this fact is to be found in the dialogue between the European socialist parties and parties with similar convictions in other parts of the world which was initiated by Willy Brandt at the SPD Conference in Mannheim in November of last year. One of the major themes of this dialogue will be the relationship between the industrial countries and the countries of the Third and Fourth Worlds.

The fact that the liberal ideas of democratic socialism are also making their mark in Eastern Europe — Alexander Dubcek's

"socialism with a human face" has become a symbol for it — is part of the dialectic of détente and ideological controversy: the policy of détente has liberated the ideological controversy of the evils of psychological warfare typical of the Cold War era, but at the same time has increased the tendency for both East and West — with varying motives — to present their ideological and social arguments with greater determination. This ideological controversy can exist side by side with the policy of détente, provided East and West — both sides never tire of saying that détente does not mean the end of ideological controversy — are just as determined that the ideological controversy should not be allowed to endanger peace, the East-West dialogue between the various states, or the improved inter-state relations. The ideological controversy must not be allowed to signal or encourage a return to the Cold War.

This is the framework within which the intellectual and political dispute between the democratic socialists and communists should be confined. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) constantly reiterates that the policy of peaceful coexistence between states of differing social structure is not incompatible with ideological controversy, but that, on the contrary, by its very nature, the policy of détente intensifies the ideological controversy. The German Social Democrats also work on the assumption that the policy of détente does not mean the end of the ideological controversy. They will therefore continue to defend against all attacks the constitutional democratic and social-welfare state which they have helped to build up and to govern. It forms an inalienable part of democratic socialism which we Social Democrats believe to be an historical and viable alternative to the Soviet communist society. But we also consider the ideological controversy

to be a positive element — on the one hand because it means that there is at least communication between the two sides, and on the other because it makes it clear to both sides that cooperation at state level does not obliterate the differences at party and socio-political level. The policy of détente enables an ideological controversy of this kind to be carried on without endangering improving inter-state relations — a point which is naturally important to the Federal Republic of Germany, in particular with regard to the Soviet Union.

It is this relationship between the policy of détente and ideological controversy that I should like to discuss today from my point of view as a German Social Democrat. I shall confine myself to five aspects of the problem:

- (1) Relations between the CPSU and social democracy, especially German social democracy;
- (2) the development of the communist parties in Yugoslavia and in south and west Europe;
- (3) relations between the CPSU and the above-mentioned communist parties, with special reference to the efforts to set up a European communist conference;
- (4) relations between the European socialist parties and the communist parties; and
- (5) the consequences for the policies of the socialist parties.

(1) Relations Between the CPSU and Social Democracy

Since the split in the workers' movement, and despite all the changes of course to fit in with national front and popular front movements, the CPSU has never ceased to consider social democracy to be its historical opponent, and, at certain times, even its main enemy. Recently an article appeared in *Pravda*, signed by "A. Wernov", saying that the CPSU has always supported unity of action in the international workers' and democratic movement (*Pravda*, 13.2.1976).

The evidence provided by international communism — from the Comintern and Cominform up to the World Conferences of 1957, 1960 and 1969 — speaks a different language. At best, the communists saw the social democrats as a party which, although supported by workers' votes, pursued a policy in the service of capital.

The Comintern did at first recommend cooperation with social democrats in order to ward off reactionary attacks. But, fundamentally, its policies were based on the assumption that capitalism was doomed to collapse in the very near future. When this collapse failed to materialize, the Comintern

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stood, and was now considered to be the principal enemy. The term "social fascism" was tacitly dropped; the solution now proposed was the formation of a popular front and the defence of the democratic freedom against fascism. The theory put forward was that the battle for a new social order could only be carried out on the basis of the democratic constitutional state, and that the most natural allies in the battle were the social democrats: what was really meant was that they were chosen to become the junior partner under the leadership of the communist movement.

However, this "new theory", which the communists developed following their bitter experiences in Italy and Germany, left the fundamental differences between social democrats and communists untouched. For, to begin with, the change had come about largely in the service of Soviet self-interest: the Comintern policy as dictated by the CPSU had resulted in a fiasco as far as foreign policy was concerned. The Soviet Union was faced with the prospect of being surrounded by an expanding coalition of authoritarian and fascist régimes. Furthermore, the popular front policy did not mean that a fundamental reappraisal of political democracy with its basic rights and basic political freedoms had taken place. Political democracy continued to be regarded not as an inalienable part of a just and humane model of a future society, but only as a better base from which to change society. In other words, it was merely a reappraisal which could be changed at any time as a matter of expedience, not a fundamental one.

This also became clear from the fact that the "new theory" had absolutely no effect on the internal structure of the communist parties. It was no coincidence that precisely the 7th World Congress of the Comintern, at which the popular front strategy was announced, was at the same time a congress of totally unified opinion. The Congress opened with a hymn to Stalin; genuine discussions with diverging opinions did not even get started. And in the individual parties, too, it became clear that the popular front policy outwardly pursued was coupled internally with a strict suppression of opinion, the extension of "democratic centralism", and rigorous measures against dissidents.

Thus the popular front policy remained part of the communist parties' "foreign policy". It had no effect on their fundamental attitude towards political democracy or on the internal character of the parties. This meant that it remained highly unstable and could be withdrawn at any time in

The Comintern's fixation on social democracy as the main opponent was to become a decisive factor in the failure to prevent the rise to power of fascism in Germany.

accordance with the changing political scene, as the Cominform period from 1947-1956 was to show.

I should like to note here that in this respect a certain interesting shift has recently become evident in the large West European communist parties. I shall come back to this later. For the CPSU and its supporters—and for many years for all communists—the "new theory" proclaimed at the 7th World Congress defined the (largely tactical) attitude to be taken by communists towards the social democrats; it is still valid for the CPSU and its supporters in international communism today. Only from this point of view have the communists pleaded at their various world conferences for close cooperation with the socialist parties.

It is not only their tactical nature that makes these statements of intent incapable of altering our fundamental evaluation of communism. There is another factor: these statements of intent are always tied to the strategic aim of bringing about a change in social democracy in order to put an end to its "class-motivated collaboration with the bourgeoisie", to isolate its "rightist leadership" from the broad base of the party, and to bring it into line with the communists. However, as the last few years and months in particular have shown, there are certain gradations of opinion within the CPSU. Thus, the Deputy Head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Mr Zagladin, has said that the communists are prepared to accept certain compromises and make certain concessions to the social democrats, "if the social democrats are for their part prepared to make concessions to the communists and are prepared to give up a number of their demands and positions". Anyone who rejects concessions and compromises as a matter of principle, says Mr Zagladin, blocks the way to cooperation and joint action. This kind of "loyalty to principles", he adds, was already criticized by Lenin in the early days of the communist movement (c.f. Zagladin, *The Communist World Movement. Outline of its Strategy and Tactics*, Frankfurt 1973, p. 200).

But at the same time, Zagladin too warns the communists against making opportunistic blunders, against making "inadmissible concessions, losing independence, and against becoming dependent on the social democrats". These warnings have become more frequent and considerably more strident in recent months — for me a sign that the intellectual and political impact of democratic socialism's liberal ideas is increasing; and that the CPSU finds itself facing growing problems in its own area of power and

in its relations with the West European communists. Thus, Suslov and Ponomarjov, both products of the Comintern apparatus, have spoken out several times recently against the dangers of so-called "social democratism". In July 1975, for example, Ponomarjov warned the communists "never to forget their independent class position for a moment, and not to abstain from serious, justifiable criticism of social democratism as the ideology and practice of co-operation between the classes". He called upon the sister parties to "continue concrete and demonstrably justifiable criticism of the ideology and policies of social democratism, and to firmly resist attempts to export this ideology to the socialist countries" (in *Communist* — Moscow, No. 11/1975).

Finally, you can no doubt all remember the article published in *Pravda* in August 1975 by Saradov, a close collaborator of Suslov and Ponomarjov. This article, in which — against the background of developments in Portugal — Saradov attempts to convince Western communists that the Russian Revolution of 1905 is an eternally valid model, is nothing but one long warning against the temptations of "social democratism". Thus the author underlines the traditional leadership role of the communists in any leftist alliance, and bluntly dubs Western communism "Menshevik opportunism". Above all, Saradov reminds his readers that for them the popular majority upon which revolutionaries must base their power is "not an arithmetical, but a political concept" (*Pravda*, 6.8.1975).

I hardly need to point out that all this is unacceptable to social democrats and that it is deliberately aimed at the concept of democratic socialism. Secretary General Brezhnev, by the way, declared at the 25th CPSU Party Conference: "There can be absolutely no question of an ideological compromise on the part of scientific communism in the direction of social democratic reformism." In my opinion, these more violent ideological reactions indicate an increasing uncertainty in the CPSU. They suggest that Moscow is on the ideological defensive. In any case, the democratic socialists feel that their fundamental principles have been confirmed. To quote Bruno Kreisky: "We social democrats have no reason to consider it a defeat when the two largest communist parties in democratic Europe formally reject political formulae which belong to the most immutable principles of so-called Marxism-Leninism" (speech to the Federal Conference of the Austrian Socialist Party in Vienna, 12.3.1976).

(2) Communist Parties in South and West Europe

This brings me to the development of the communist parties in south and west Europe. In view of the variations in international communism — starting with Titoism and Maoism, and followed now by the beginnings of a West European form of communism — we have to be prepared to vary our judgements. This does not only apply to the Chinese communists, who seem to be the only ones the German right-wing is really interested in, but to a much wider range. There are good reasons for the tug-of-war about the planned European communist conference, which has been going on for eighteen months: it is the result of profound differences of opinion between the parties allied to Moscow — like the SED (the ruling East German Socialist Unity Party) and the DKP — on the one hand, and the autonomistic parties of Yugoslavia, Italy, Spain, and France, etc., on the other

The first to break away from Moscow after 1945, and to pursue their own independent line, were the Yugoslav Communists. Their resistance movement during the Second World War had provided them with a broad platform among the people, and they had carried out their own revolution. They began to replace a society at first based on the Soviet model by a form of socialist self-administration. By pursuing this independent course, Yugoslavia represented a constant political challenge for Moscow, especially as the Yugoslav self-administration model exercised a strong influence at critical times in Russia's European sphere of influence (Poland and Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968). It soon became clear that an independent route to socialism entailed an independent line in foreign affairs.

Even during the preparations for the European communist conference the Yugoslavs have left no doubt about the fact that they intend to adhere to their policy of non-alignment. Furthermore, in January 1975, the leader of the Yugoslav delegation, Mr Grlickov, once again outlined the position of his party, making it quite clear that it differed from Moscow's (in *Communist*, Belgrade, 20.1.1975). The Yugoslav position can be summed up as follows: there are various ways to socialism, and every people must decide independently for itself which way to take. There can therefore be neither a joint centre, nor a joint strategy among the communist parties. The Yugoslav communists present their model of socialist self-administration as an alternative to the omnipotent state and party

bureaucracy of the Soviet model.

Even though it is still accompanied by numerous restrictive practices in home politics, this policy attracted the interest of the West if only because the Yugoslavs have succeeded in pursuing their own line and in withstanding Soviet pressure. Thus, even American willingness to provide the Communist Government in Yugoslavia with anti-tank weapons has been accepted without criticism in the West.

Some of the important non-ruling parties of Western Europe have developed the beginnings of independence from Moscow from a completely different basic situation to that of the ruling Yugoslav Communist Party. At the same time they have also shown signs of wanting to free themselves of some of the traditional communist dogma. This internal development in the Italian, Spanish, and now incipiently in the French, communist parties has been forced by the abatement of the Cold War.

The policy of détente allows more room for an autonomous development of communist parties, and in the countries belonging to the Western Alliance such a development could not be stamped out as they were in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

The fact that the parties mentioned are increasingly freeing themselves of the ideological and political domination of Moscow can, I believe, be traced back to two closely related processes. On the one hand, these parties have long realized that the CPSU's foreign policy is primarily dictated by self-interest, but that Moscow's interests are by no means necessarily the same as those of the communist parties.

From this development they have concluded, as the leader of the Spanish CP, Mr Carillo, recently said, that the criterion of "proletarian internationalism" is no longer loyalty to the Soviet Union, but the ability to "fight our own fights in our own countries". On the other hand, increasing orientation on specific national conditions and traditions and on regional background has been encouraged by the realization that submission to Moscow and dogmatism are not good vote catchers. Here, too, the laws of democracy are beginning to operate.

The Spanish, Italian, and French communist parties no longer blindly support Soviet foreign policy. There has even been direct conflict on some points: as, for example, when these three parties condemned the intervention of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia. With their fundamentally positive attitude towards the economic and political integration of (Western) Europe, the Italian and Spanish Communists — in contrast to the French Communists who in

Above all, Saradov reminds his readers that for them the popular majority upon which revolutionaries must base their power is "not an arithmetical, but a political concept" (*Pravda*, 6.8.1975)

free formation of, and the possibility of democratic change in, majorities and minorities, the secular character and the democratic functions of the state, and the independence of justice. They also support the free activity and autonomy of the trade unions; they place great importance in the development of democracy in industry in such a way that the workers can take an effective part in their management and possess far-reaching powers of decision" (in: *L'Unità*, 18.11.1975).

This policy, which breaks away from orthodox communist dogma, has old roots in the Italian Communist Party, the leader of this line of thought in West European communism. It can be traced back to Gramsci and Togliatti, who were both outstanding theorists in their party. According to Gramsci, the state is the "hegemony" of one class in respect to society as a whole — a hegemony which is realized by the construction of an "historic bloc", i.e. a system of political and social alliances. Gramsci considered that the task of the working class, as the most progressive class, and of its party, was to build up its own system of alliances within the framework of the bourgeois "hegemony", to permeate society ideologically and politically, and finally to take over the hegemony within the state. Thus Gramsci did not consider the bourgeois state to be an oppressive apparatus which would have to be totally smashed in the course of the revolution. On the contrary, like Engels but unlike Lenin, he considers that the bourgeois state — unlike the absolutistic state — leaves sufficient room for the working class to act and to convince other unsatisfied sections of society, so that the hegemony can finally be transferred to a new "historic bloc" under the leadership of the working class.

Togliatti, who proclaimed the independence of the Italian development from Moscow, followed up this theory of state and party by expanding the traditional communist cadre-style party into a mass party intended to permeate all the different political and social sectors of the nation in order to transform it from within. Finally, Berlinguer went even further, concluding from the events in Chile that gaining 51% of the country's votes is not sufficient. In a parallel process, he argues, it would at first be necessary to strengthen the communist presence and impact on all social sectors and to establish a broad consensus of the relevant political powers. This is the only way, he reasons, of preventing backward-looking forces from organizing a counter-movement supported by broad masses of the people. Thus Berlinguer ex-

In the foreign affairs sector, it is important that the CPI is in favour of West European integration and accepts Italy's membership of NATO as an expression of the given world situation.

tended Gramsci's idea of an alliance of the classes in an "historic bloc" to what he called, in 1973, an "historic compromise" — cooperation between the "three great popular streams: communist, socialist and Catholic".

Here the fact that, unlike the German Christian Democrats and Christian Socialists, the Italian Christian Democrats have a tradition of resistance against the fascists which they share with the CPI should not be forgotten. On the occasion of the 14th CPI Conference in March 1975, for example, the Christian Democratic Mayor of Rose sent a message of welcome to the conference delegates in which he spoke of "the power which you represent in our national reality and in this city community". He reminded the delegates of the common battle they fought against fascism, and spoke of the present necessity of uniting, despite all differences of opinion, to defend the democratic and republican state and its institutions (in *L'Unità*, 19.3.1975). It is no secret that there is already a tacit agreement on many important questions between the DC and the CPI: for years the Christian Democrat Prime Ministers have consulted the CPI leaders on important political questions, and the Communists have supported the greater majority of the legislation in parliament.

In the foreign affairs sector, it is important that the CPI is in favour of West European integration and accepts Italy's membership of NATO as an expression of the given world situation. By becoming less dogmatic — in addition to its strong position in the trade union movement — the CPI has succeeded in winning over more and more supporters from the growing educational sector and service industry. The Italian Socialists are faced with the difficult task of, on the one hand, winning over voters from the ranks of those disappointed with the inefficiency and lack of credibility of the conservatives, and, on the other hand, of not losing them to the Communists who have for decades disparaged liberal socialism, have only reluctantly given up dogmatic communism, and have retained the cadre-style structure of their party despite the large number of members.

The Spanish Communist Party (CPS) — a not unimportant force, especially in the workers' commissions, though more as a result of its social influence than its support among the electorate — has, judged by its leaders' words at least, made the biggest leap forward in the last few years. The violent pressure exerted by the CPSU in 1968 after the sharp protest made by the Spanish party against the intervention in

Czechoslovakia, which even included attempts to split the Spanish party, evidently confirmed the leadership centred round Santiago Carrillo and Dolores Ibárruri in their opinion that it was essential to rely on the party's own strength and to look for their own way to socialism. Thus the CPS became a severe critic of Moscow's policy of self-interest and of the Soviet system as a whole. Their party manifesto of September 1975, for example, proclaims with one eye on the Soviet system and one on the party's own model:

"No true Marxist developed the one-party concept, or the idea of a communist party privileged by law in comparison with other parties, or the raising of Marxism to the status of a state philosophy, or the subjection of culture and art to official administrative norms, or the state monopoly of information, or the existence of a single socialist model" ("Manifesto-Programma del Partido Comunista de Espana", Paris, September 1975).

Thus the CPS shifted into more or less the same theoretical position as the CPI, with which it had been in close contact for some years, and signed a joint document with the CPI five months before the French Communists did. Part of this document reads:

"The perspective of a socialist society is built on the assumption that in our countries socialism can only be achieved by the development and full application of democratic principles. Socialism includes the recognition and guarantee of personal and collective freedom, the secular character of the state and its democratic structure, party pluralism based on free dialectic the autonomy of the trade unions, freedom of religion and cult, as well as freedom of opinion and of cultural, artistic, and scientific activities" (*L'Unità*, 12.7.1975).

It still has to be seen whether these theoretical assurances of leaders living in exile in Paris coincide with the ideas of the organization functioning in Spain. There is evidence that the communists on the spot by no means always adhere to the democratic rules.

The French Communist Party (CPF) has in the meantime also given up some of its dogmatic positions. This is illustrated by the joint declaration with the CPI already mentioned and by the decision at the last party conference to drop the term "dictatorship of the proletariat". This is not a question of semantics. And, no matter to what extent it may be dictated by tactical considerations (especially by the fear of being overtaken by the French Socialists under Mitterrand), the fact remains that

traditional communist dogma is actually being put into question within the French CP.

This, however, is meeting with strong resistance from the middle ranks of functionaries and at the party roots. This became clear as early as 1972, when Secretary-General Marchais had to bring the whole of his prestige to bear in order to persuade the Central Committee to accept the compromise arranged with the Socialists in the Common Programme. The same kind of resistance was shown more recently in the discussion about the elimination of the concept of "dictatorship of the proletariat", which many members considered to amount the relinquishment of the party's revolutionary character. In this connection the fact that the CPF is a classical, cadre-style party plays an important part: it has been calculated that about every third member of the CPF is a functionary. It is not easy to persuade this cadre, trained in the orthodox style, to accept democratic rules. The change in the generations now taking place has led to an increase in membership, but has done nothing to alter the character of the CPF as a cadre-style party.

Added to this is the fact that the CPF is at present going through a serious identity crisis. The Socialists have overtaken the Communists at the polling booths as the strongest party in the opposition. They have won new members and voters in precisely those areas in which the Communists hoped to gain a hold: in the new middle strata. By cross-connections with the CFDT trades union federation and by the forming of their own factory groups, the Socialists are competing with the Communists even in the industrial and social spheres of influence — an area which the Communists have so far considered to be their own domain and from which they draw their real strength — partly through their leading role in the CGT.

For a whole year the Communists tried to regain their lost ground. In a large-scale campaign they tried to discredit the Socialists as politically and ideologically unreliable partners. By increased militancy in industrial strife and greater activity in other extra-parliamentary areas, the French Communists tried to establish their leadership as the party of the working classes.

This hard line, which originated in parts of the cadre and at the party roots, and was, apparently, only reluctantly accepted by Marchais, has in the meantime largely failed. It was rejected by the population, and, above all, by the electorate. Thus Marchais was able to assert himself to a large extent at the latest CPF Congress.

However, this does not mean a new CPF line, especially as the party's anti-Atlantic and anti-European course has so far remained unchanged.

The Portuguese Communists (CPP) differ in principle to the three parties so far dealt with — the Italian, Spanish and French. The CPI and the CPS both sharply criticize the theoretical and political conceptions of the Portuguese party, which Carrillo accuses of suffering from a "winter-palace complex". Up to now, the CPP has rejected any kind of pluralistic articulation of the political and social forces, and continues to style itself on the Soviet model. It still considers itself to be the vanguard party of the working classes in the sense that communists, even if they remain in the minority after elections, consider themselves legitimately entitled and destined to take over the ideological and political leadership and to determine the speed and the direction of the revolutionary process while at the same time hegemonizing the other, non-communist forces and gradually eliminating them from the genuine process of political education and persuasion.

The Soviet leaders seem to have been of two minds about the Portuguese development. On the one hand, they saw a chance of controlling at least one party in the West which is loyal to Moscow and is potentially a large party, and of using it to increase their influence in Portugal. On the other hand, it must have been clear to the CPSU that Portugal belongs to the Western sphere of influence and that therefore any attempt at a communist take-over must bring a high risk of confrontation with it and would furthermore have a generally negative effect on the policy of détente and cooperation with the West in which Moscow — as the 25th CPSU Congress again showed — is still interested.

I believe that the hard line taken by the CPP is largely due to the special circumstances of its history and its national and social environment. In pre-1974 Portugal, in contrast to Italy, France and Spain, there had been neither the beginnings of an organized political and social pluralism, nor a general consensus among the various opposition forces on the future development of the country. The Communist Party of Portugal, which had fought underground for 50 years, and had been supported in its struggle by Moscow, evidently considered that it had a right to take over the leading role, and together with the armed forces, forcibly to project the backward country into the modern age via a development dictatorship, as it were.

It remains to be seen whether, after the

failure of the leftist coup in November 1975, there will be internal developments in the CPP which will enable the party to accept the concepts of the Italian, Spanish and French Communists. At the same time it should not be forgotten that Cunhal still has considerable prestige in his party.

(3) The CPSU and the South West European Communists: the European CP Summit

This short outline of the concepts of the individual parties makes it clear that the number of ideological variations in European communism has increased considerably in the last few years. In that case, was the CPSU not taking a risk in pressing again for a European communist conference? This question no doubt looked quite different from the CPSU point of view. The CPSU needs such conferences in order to underline the legitimacy of its leadership of world communism, of the socialist community of states, and in the Soviet Union itself. It is in this light that the communist world conferences (three times in Moscow so far: 1957, 1960, 1969) and the communist regional conferences of the Latin American, Arab and European parties must be seen. To give them up would amount to an open confession on the part of the CPSU that, after the failure of institutionalized cooperation between the communist parties in the form of Comintern and Cominform, the instrument of multi-lateral communist conferences as an expression of international unity was also no longer viable. Furthermore, the CPSU may have hoped, as at the first European summit in Carlsbad in 1967, to make the sister parties toe the line, and thus be able to present its own 25th Party Conference with another success.

But things did not work out that way. Far from lessening, the differences became more marked during the preparations for the conference. We have been able to follow an open and tough controversy about the course to be taken. On the one side were the autonomists, composed of the ruling Communist parties of Romania and Yugoslavia — which did not attend the Carlsbad Conference in 1967 — and the non-ruling Communist parties of Italy, Spain, and now France. But there are also other parties which can be counted on this side like the British Communist Party. They all stress their independence from Moscow, but have diverging views on democracy. On the other side is the group of traditionalists loyal to the CPSU. Among them is the East German SED (and its West German extension, the DKP). The SED was entrusted by Moscow with preparing the conference papers and

with holding the European Conference in East Berlin. During the preparations the SED confirmed its role as the outrider of the CPSU, and thus, if anything, widened the gap between the traditionalists and the autonomists.

On what points were Moscow and the autonomists unable to agree? As the contrasting positions have already been outlined in the foregoing, I can restrict myself to a practical example here. Practical disagreement seems to me to centre mainly on the character of the final communiqué. The CPSU would like the autonomists to agree to an ideologically and politically binding declaration in order to associate them more closely with Moscow's line. Thus the first draft documents, for example, drawn up by the SED but inspired by Moscow, aimed at committing the Western communists to a strategic line based on the assumptions that the communists follow a united ideological course, have identical aims, and fulfil a vanguard function. As far as the ideological sector is concerned, they were to set up more distinct boundaries between themselves and the non-communists, stress the special character of the CP more clearly, and underline their claim to leadership in the process of changing society. In this connection the Soviets wanted a positive mention on the conception of the Portuguese CP. They also placed great importance on characterizing — and this is extremely important, although we usually overlook it — the phase between capitalism and socialism as a relatively short traditional phase marked by tough class struggles. This reflects their fear that the Western communists might otherwise discard the concept "dictatorship of the proletariat" altogether and strive for a socialist model with a pluralistic society and ideas about the relationship between democracy and socialism which would approximate too closely to the ideas of the liberal socialists.

As regards foreign policy, the Soviets wanted a collective evaluation of the crisis in western Europe, the perspectives of the EEC and NATO, and relations with the social democrats. Furthermore they wanted — according to Ponomarov at the Warsaw Consultative Conference in October 1974 — "to underline the special role played by the socialist community's foreign policy, and by the common front presented by the socialist countries, in changes taking place in the international arena". That would, for one thing, have increased the legitimacy of Moscow as the leader of world communism. For another, it would have weakened the reproach made by the Western communists that the Soviet Union pursues a

Internal developments in the Communist parties of Italy, Spain and France have decisively contributed towards the process of loosening up the rigid structure of world communism.

policy of détente primarily out of self-interest with the result that both the political and the social status quo are institutionalized, and the hands of the west communists tied. Finally, all of this was to be rounded off by a general acknowledgement of the principle of "proletarian internationalism" — a principle which, for example, helped to justify the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and which is not much more than a pseudonym for Soviet hegemonic ambitions.

The Yugoslav Communists, the CPI, CPS and CPF refused to sign such a declaration. They were supported in this by the understandably more cautious Romanians (not, by the way, because of ideological principles in common, but because the Government in Bucharest, like the Government in Belgrade, and the parties in Rome, Madrid, and Paris, want to decide on their own political line). The group of autonomists pleaded for the idea of restricting the declaration to the lowest common denominator, i.e. to a declaration on the political situation in Europe after Helsinki. In view of the different conditions prevailing in the various countries, they argued, there was no longer any question of a common ideology and strategy. This applied to both the Soviet wish to carry out a joint investigation into the European crisis and to the idea of a collective evaluation of the character and attitudes of social democracy. Apart from insisting that it would not do to represent the economies of west and east Europe in stark blacks and whites, they considered that such an evaluation was not within the terms of reference of the planned pan-European summit conference, but lay solely within the competence of the Western communists. Today, relations with the communist parties of the East Bloc — said the CPI foreign policy expert Segre — were, for his party, only one point of reference among others. Relations within western Europe and with the European Community were just as important (*L'Unità*, 31.10.1975).

Seen in this light, loyalty to the Soviet Union and acceptance of its conceptions is no longer a criterion of "proletarian internationalism" as the Soviets would like it to be. As already pointed out, the autonomists are much more concerned with the ability of the individual parties to bring about changes in their own societies and to express solidarity with oppressed peoples.

Thus it was no coincidence that the CPI, the CPS and the CPF signed the bilateral declarations already referred to while preparations were actually being made for the communist conference: by their acceptance in particular of the basic civic rights,

of pluralism in political and social groups during the transition to socialism and during the building up of a socialist society, the declarations form what is essentially a political counterpoint to the Moscow concepts as expressed once again in the draft documents drawn up by the SED.

I believe that the points at issue show that this is a fundamental controversy rather than a merely tactical one. What it will lead to cannot yet be judged. But in any case, internal developments in the Communist parties of Italy, Spain and France have decisively contributed towards the process of loosening up the rigid structure of world communism.

(4) Relations between the Socialist and Communist Parties of Western Europe

Democratic socialists have had enough experience with communists to be able to look at this development objectively. As already pointed out, no one knows whether this development will "peter out" in tactical manoeuvres or whether it will lead to a genuine appreciation of liberal values by the West European communist parties. Democratic socialists will not accept the word for the deed. But, on the other hand, democratic socialists, with their roots in the working class, with their century-old democratic tradition and their decades of experience with the communists, will also not, out of fear, immediately take up the neo-conservative slogan that precisely "moderate" communists are particularly dangerous.

Looking at the entire political scene, we cannot condemn the development as negative. Thus, for example, from the foreign affairs point of view, we are certainly in favour of the independence of the various communist parties, particularly as regards their relations with Moscow. And from the ideological point of view we would be making a mistake if we did not welcome every move towards the acceptance of democratic rules and democratic beliefs and include them in our judgments.

In this connection, I should like to refer to the situation in Germany: the fact that we have accepted the DGR as a partner for political discussions at national level does nothing to change the incompatibility of social democratic ideas with the Soviet-inspired ideas of the SED and its West German offspring the DKP. We have not forgotten the suppression of the SPD by the SED in the Soviet Zone of Occupation, and the DKP is of no interest to us either from the point of view of ideology or its political weight. Only recently, at its party conference, the DKP adequately proved that

it has nothing to say. We Social Democrats have given the DKP no chance to develop; and we shall do all we can in the future to keep it as insignificant as it is today.

As far as the autonomistic communist parties of south and west Europe are concerned, however, it would be insufficient for us to set up boundaries. Even Christian Democratic exponents like the Spaniard Ruiz-Gimenez and the Italian Forlani now openly plead for a new relationship with the communist parties in their countries. Ruiz-Gimenez, for instance, considers the Spanish CP to be an integral part of the opposition in Spain. Arnaldo Forlani, Minister of Defence in Rome, and former Secretary of the Christian Democrats, is even more unequivocal. At a meeting of the European Christian Democratic Parties in September 1975 he made it clear to the other delegates that a serious consideration of the CPI did not mean a retreat, but "a commitment to measure up to the forces created by society". In view of the economic crisis in Italy, it should not be taken amiss when the Government, despite the different roles played by the two sides, calls upon the CPI to "give its opinion and to accept responsibility for the evaluation" of the situation. Mr Forlani concluded with the remark that considering the problems confronting the Mediterranean states, he believed that a "hardening of a north European, Atlantic, and anti-communist front" would be foolish (*Il Popolo* — official Christian Democratic newspaper — 21.9.1975). And the Christian Democratic leader, Mr Andreotti, recently stated: "I do not believe that there would be a contradiction between an active, and even a committed participation of the (Italian) communists in the EEC and the complete fulfilment of the Treaties of Rome" (interview in the *Corriere della Sera*, 8.2.1976). Similar statements have been made, by the way, by Italian industrialists.

This means that also the democratic socialist parties in these countries will have to take signs of change in the communist philosophy into consideration. Whether this can lead to communist participation in government in individual cases, and if so, under what conditions, must ultimately be decided by each party for itself. The conditions vary from country to country too much, if only with regard to the proportional strengths of the communist and socialist parties, for any general solution to be applicable.

In any case, the question of participation in government is at the moment acute only in Italy, and even there not in the form of a "popular front" government. In contrast to France, neither the Socialists nor the

Communists are in favour of it in Italy. What has been put forward for discussion by the CPI is the so-called "historical compromise" between the three big parties, DC, PSI and CPI.

A decision has yet to be taken. Although we would rather not have communists in the governments of NATO states, we should refrain from trying to tell the PSI and the DC what to do. For, although NATO problems would certainly not be eased by the participation of the Italian Communists in the Government, especially not with regards to the relations between Europe and the United States, neither the American politicians nor we can provide patent remedies for Italian internal affairs. An intervention from outside would meet with practically unanimous resistance in the country, especially as the CPI has achieved its success through the medium of free elections. It is to be hoped, especially after the bitter experiences of the military regime in Greece, that no responsible person will think in terms of undemocratic solutions. In our eyes, the only possible way is further political confrontation with the Communists.

The vitality of democratic socialism has been amply demonstrated in France in recent years. For, together with the Communists, the Socialists succeeded in bringing the conservatives to the verge of defeat two years ago. Furthermore, they have reorganized the old SFIO, which was in a decrepit condition only five years ago, and made it so attractive politically and programmatically that it has become the leading party not only on the Left, but altogether, as the local elections showed last March. This has thrust the CPF, which for decades was the leading party on the Left, into the identity crisis described above, from which it is now trying to escape by cautiously breaking away to a certain extent from communist orthodoxy.

Whether this will lead to a more profound change in the CPF is still uncertain, even after its 22nd Party Conference. But this can in any case do nothing to weaken Mitterrand's position. To recommend that the French Socialists should align themselves with right-of-centre forces is to ignore the danger that the ever-increasing Left on the French political scene would then be largely ceded to the Communists.

Developments in Spain and Portugal are still difficult to analyze. A decisive point in Portugal was that the election to the constitutional assembly revealed the true strengths of the parties to the electorate. This limited the chance of the CPP to take too much advantage of its organizational

There is much to suggest that the south and west European communist parties are serious about their independence in foreign affairs.

and communists that has split the working-class movement. The democratic socialists will therefore remain sceptical and critical observers of the development.


There is much to suggest that the south and west European communist parties are serious about their independence in foreign affairs. A striking instance of this was their protest against the intervention of the Warsaw Pact countries in Czechoslovakia. This protest was coupled — at least in the case of the Italian and Spanish Communists — with a closer analysis of the reasons for the intervention and was followed by an increasing reluctance to be identified with the Soviet policy.

After all, the social democrats do understand something about organization. For us, therefore, assurances, protestations, and papers are basically less interesting than an answer to the question of to what extent the principle of "democratic centralism" still dominates the internal structure of the parties with the result that — despite high membership figures in some cases — they continue to maintain cadre-style organization. Unless essential changes are made here, then in the future fundamental changes in policy, including the removal of today's "liberal" by orthodox leaders, would still be possible — even though, after a long period of "liberalization", this would mean that a high price would have to be paid in loss of votes and possibly by a split in the party.

Democratic socialists will remain attentive observers of the further development of the European communist parties. But, to quote Olof Palme, they have "no cause to relapse into the manners of the Cold War or to join in a crusade of the kind that reactionary forces are ready to organize at any time", those forces "which would like to use the present crisis and the natural feeling of helplessness in order to reverse developments" (speech to the Stockholm Conference of Social Democratic Women, on 20.2.1976). Democratic socialists will carry on an open dialogue without forgetting their own mission. They will try more than ever to win over to democratic socialism the working people of Europe, who increasingly realize that the conservative parties are incapable of solving their problems. And they will call on them to elect those who — unlike the communists — have represented liberal socialism for over a century, and who have never blindly accepted dogma or allied themselves to a dictatorship. The development described above represents not only a great challenge, but also a great opportunity for the socialists in Europe.

SI BUREAU MEETING: ROME

(Left to right) Emilio Menendez del Valle, Robert Pontillon, President Léopold Senghor, Francisco Lopez Real, Birane Wane



(Left to right) Giampiero Rolandi, Gino Bianco, a PSI official, Pietro Lezzi, Pier Luigi Romita (standing), Aldo Ajello and Enrica Lucarelli



The second Bureau meeting of the Socialist International in 1977 was held in Rome on June 2-3, 1977, at the joint invitation of the Italian Social Democratic Party (PSDI) and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI). Willy Brandt chaired the meeting, which was attended by more than fifty participants (see list below) and a number of guests.

Among the guests were a delegation from Accion Democratica of Venezuela, led by its Chairman, Gonzalo Barrios, and including Enrique Tejera Paris and Marco Tulio Bruni Celli; a delegation from the Partido Revolucionario Institucional of Mexico; Congressman Donald Fraser of the Democratic Party of the United States; representatives of the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario of El Salvador, and representatives of the Janata Party of India and of the Confederation of Socialist Parties of the European Community.

Three major themes discussed by the meeting were Europe and the Mediterranean area (introduced by the PSI Secretary, Bettino Craxi), Human Rights (introduced by the First Secretary of the French Socialist Party, François Mitterrand), and Chile (introduced by the Chairman of the Chilean Radical Party, Anselmo Sule).

Among the decisions taken by the meeting were the following:

- (a) To double the budget of the Socialist International.
- (b) To establish a Socialist International Study Group on Multinational Corporations, with Oscar Debutte (Belgium) as chairman.
- (c) To establish a Socialist International Committee for Solidarity with Chile, with Alex Kitson (Great Britain) and André van der Louw (Netherlands) as co-chairmen.
- (d) To discuss the question of Euro-communism at a later Bureau meeting.
- (e) To send a message, on the eve of Turkey's general election, to Bulent Ecevit, leader of the Republican People's Party. The text of the message was as follows:

"At its meeting in Rome, the Bureau of the Socialist International expressed its strong interest in the Turkish elections. At the same time, it has been stated that we follow with deep concern the acts of violence which accompany the campaign in your country. The members of the Socialist International sincerely wish you and the Republican People's Party a successful election.

With fraternal regards

Willy Brandt
President of the Socialist International".

(f) To postpone until September 2-10, 1977, the Socialist International mission to southern Africa. The mission, which is to be led by Olof Palme, will visit Tanzania, Mozambique, Botswana, Zambia and Angola.

(g) That a Socialist International mission led by Mario Soares (the Portuguese Prime Minister and Socialist Party leader) will visit Latin America on October 17-27, 1977. The countries which the mission will visit are Mexico, Costa Rica, Venezuela and

the Dominican Republic. The delegation will be composed of the representatives from the Austrian Socialist Party, the British Labour Party, the French Socialist Party, the German Social Democratic Party, the Italian Social Democratic Party, the Italian Socialist Party, the Socialist Party of Senegal, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), the Swedish Social Democratic Party, the International Union of Socialist Youth and the General Secretary of the Socialist International.

(h) That disarmament will be a main theme at the next meeting of the Bureau of the Socialist International, to be held in Madrid on October 15-16, 1977.

(i) That a Socialist International Conference on Disarmament will be held in Helsinki on April 24-26, 1978, organized jointly by the Finnish Social Democratic Party and the Socialist International.

In addition, the Bureau agreed unanimously on the following text concerning human rights:

"After the report delivered by François Mitterrand, Vice-President of the Socialist International and First Secretary of the French Socialist Party, the Bureau of the Socialist International thought it necessary to continue the discussion on all aspects of the human rights problems. In order to study and analyse the questions involved, Willy Brandt, President of the Socialist International and Chairman of the German Socialist Democratic Party, will convene a small working group being composed of personalities with knowledge and experience in that field.

"Within this framework ways and means will be discussed on how to cooperate with others on that vital question. Bernt Carlsson, the General Secretary of the Socialist International, is to continue the informative and exploratory talks as decided at the Bureau meeting in London on March 30, 1977."

The Bureau also received a report on the preparations for the Conference on Chile to be held in Rotterdam on August 29-31, 1977, jointly organized by the Dutch Labour Party and the Socialist International. Invitations to the conference are being sent to the six parties constituting the Unidad Popular of Chile, to the Chilean Trade Union Confederation (CUT), to the Christian Democratic Party of Chile and to all the full member-parties of the Socialist International. The programme of the conference will centre on discussion of the future Chile, analysing this from four aspects — constitutional problems, economic problems, future foreign policy of a democratic Chile, and the general strategy for achieving these goals. No statements or resolutions are to be adopted by the conference.

Another Socialist International conference which will be held in the near future is a Conference on Energy Policies. It will take place in Marseilles on September 22-23, 1977, jointly organized by the French Socialist Party and the Socialist International.

List of Participants:

Socialist International:

Willy Brandt
Bettino Craxi
François Mitterrand
Léopold S. Senghor
Anselmo Sule
Bernt Carlsson

SI Secretariat:

Rodney Balcomb

Secretariat of SI President:

Thomas Mirow
Holger Quiring

International Council of Social Democratic Women:

Vera Matthias

International Union of Socialist Youth:

Friedrich Roll

Austria:

Walter Hacker

Belgium:

Oscar Debutte

Chile:

Anselmo Sule
Mario Hurtado
Carlos Parra

Dominican Republic:

José Francisco Peña Gomez
Antonio Guzman

Finland:

Pentti Väänänen
Helvi Saarinen

France:

François Mitterrand
Robert Pontillon
Daniel Mayer

Germany:

Wilhelm Dörescher
Horst Ehmkem
Hans-Eberhard Dingels
Volkmar Gabert
Wolfgang Hirsch-Weber

Great Britain:

Ron Hayward
Ian Mikardo
Alex Kitson
Judith Hart
Jenny Little

Israel:

Israel Gat

Italy (PSDI):

Pier Luigi Romita

Mauro Ferri

Pietro Longo

Egidio Ariosto

Luigi Preti

Antonio Cariglia

Lina Aliquò

Giampiero Rolandi

Ivanka Corti

Domenico Barilla

Italy (PSI):

Bettino Craxi

Mario Zagari

Pietro Lezzi

Aldo Ajello

Gianni Finocchiaro

Enrica Lucarelli

Gino Bianco

Luxembourg:

Lydie Schmit

Malta:

Joe Brincat

Netherlands:

Harry van den Bergh

Norway:

Thorvald Stoltenberg

Portugal:

Rui Mateus

Senegal:

Léopold S. Senghor
Babacar Bâ
Birane Wane

Spain:

Emilio Menendez del Valle
Francisco Lopez Real
Carmen Rodriguez


Sweden:

Pierre Schori
Annie-Marie Sundbom

USA (SD USA):

Carl Gershman

CONFERENCES



Norway

Pre-Election Labour Congress

Johs. Skeide Larsen, Norwegian Labour Party

The Norwegian Labour Party held its 47th congress on May 8-11. The congress turned out to be a very positive one, and the optimism of the delegates gives good hopes for a successful parliamentary election on September 12.

There were not any great political controversial questions at this congress. The items most eagerly discussed were those connected with questions of energy, resources and environment. The congress decided that Hardangervidda should be made a national park. These vast mountain areas represent unique natural wealth, both from a national and an international point of view. In these areas you find for example mountain pastures for the biggest wild reindeer stock in Europe. One of the most important issues to be discussed by the delegates was the possible development of waterpower in the outskirts of Hardangervidda. As far as this question was concerned, the interests and the arguments of the delegates were in strong opposition. The result of the debate was the adoption of a proposal, underlining that these areas are of great protection value; but the congress did not adopt a concrete and final decision on protection.

The Norwegian Labour Party's working programme for the next parliamentary period (1978-81) was adopted by the congress. This programme will be the guiding programme for a Labour Government. The Norwegian Labour Party finds it of vital importance to put forward a political account at the end of each parliamentary period, proving that the party is obliged to carry through — in Parliament and in Government, if we are in power — the programme on which we have been elected.

The new working programme underlines the following items for the next four years:

- A society of solidarity with a continued high common consumption based on extensive public expenditure and a more just distribution between those who own much and those who own little.
- Full employment, through strong economic measures by society and through an active interplay between the industries and trades and the different governmental bodies.

● A sound management of resources and the protection of both nature and working environments.

● Good conditions of living and a better standard of living, by securing employment for groups with special difficulties and providing a steady increase in real wages for groups with lower and middle incomes.

● Strengthening of local society and environments. The party wants increased decentralization, realizing that many problems are best solved by people who can state their needs directly through their own experience.

● An active policy for families. The demands of the family should be taken into consideration at all levels of social planning. There should be increased equality between the sexes.

● Improved conditions for youth. Lowering of the voting age to 18 years.

● Increased security for elderly people. Combinations of work and social insurance for elderly people should be facilitated. Improvement of general conditions for the majority of people on old age pensions.

● A more efficient and simple administration.

● Strengthening of the basis for a common incomes policy. Increased possibilities for governmental control of decisions made by big enterprises in managing industries and shipping. Workers influence on their general working situation has to be increased.

● The oil resources should primarily be used to create lasting wealth through the strengthening of industries and trades in the districts and a qualitative improvement of important social and governmental projects. The oil industry must be controlled by democratic bodies. The tempo in exploitation and use of oil resources should be moderate.

From the huge working programme adopted at the congress, other claims are:

● Parents should have the right to paid leave from work when their children are ill.

● Teaching on cohabitation questions and contraception should be strengthened in schools.

● Governmental efforts for urban renewal and improvement of older town areas.

● Within the first 12 weeks of pregnancy

the woman should have the right to decide whether she wants an abortion or not.

● In cooperation with the Federation of Trade Unions (LO), movement towards a five-week vacation.

● Increased possibilities for adult education and additional training.

● Labour market organisations (such as trade unions) and related questions should be included in educational courses. There should be improved possibilities for pupils and students, including facilities for political and organisational activities.

● Increased possibilities for income and work for practising artists. Increased use of artistic works as decorations for public buildings.

● New industrial areas based on high energy demand should not be established.

● Increased governmental economic assistance to develop technological methods for the saving and regaining of energy.

● Nuclear power plants should neither be planned nor built in the next four-year

period.

● The political supervision of oil activities must be further strengthened through a new ministry for oil and energy questions.

● The municipalities should have the right to be represented in decisive bodies in industrial concerns of special importance for the municipality.

● Equality of living conditions in agriculture, compared with living conditions for workers in the manufacturing industry, with special weight on better conditions for small farms and farms situated in difficult areas. The farmers should have an income equal to workers in industry for the same period of working hours.

● Fish resources should be secured through sound exploitation, using more of the raw material and providing for a larger proportion for human consumption.

● Small shops in sparsely populated areas should be provided with additional public duties (i.e. postal services).

● Nursing homes for old people should be built with single rooms.

● All dental care should be free for children and young people up to 18 years.

● The basis for regulation of immigration should be to guarantee satisfactory living conditions (jobs, housing etc.) for people who want to work in Norway.

● Incomes policy should be worked out in close cooperation with the Trade Union Federation. If necessary, and when the organisations involved find it suitable, reduction of taxes and other governmental initiatives should be combined with wage rises to limit the increase in prices and costs.

● The aim of incomes policy should be to give relatively higher salary rises to those with real low income than to those with high income. There should be no increase in salaries for those with the highest incomes.

● The growth in private consumption should be moderate, but at the same time as stable as possible.

Foreign Policy

The working programme states that it is of vital importance that the developing countries and their people should have independence, fair treatment and better conditions of living. The party strongly supports the claims of these countries for a new economic world order and will work to obtain control and management of international capitalist forces and economic and monetary conditions through strengthening and developing an international planned economy. It is a clear aim that the international ocean areas, outside the national zones, should be common property for all countries and the income shared accordingly.

The party wants to increase aid to developing countries. This aid should be given free of any claims or ties and should primarily go to countries promoting development, countries which belong to the poorest in the world or countries in an especially difficult position, due to political, geographical or other conditions. There should be increased aid to movements in developing countries fighting for democracy, national and social liberation.

The debate on the security policy was rather modest. The chairman of the party's youth movement, Thorbjorn Jagland, pro-

posed that Norway should gradually withdraw from NATO and build up a national and independent defence. The chairman of the party, Reulf Steen, strongly objected to this proposal. So did Prime Minister Odvar Nordli, who in his speech to the congress underlined that uncertainty regarding Norway's security policy could lead to increased tension in Europe and consequently harm the process of détente.

The congress adopted the position that Norway will base its security on continued membership in NATO. A proposal that Norway should cancel the agreement on associate membership with IEA (the International Energy Agency) got a small minority support.

From the international section of the working programme further points are:

● Continued Norwegian support for the building up of international instruments to further the accomplishment of human rights.

● Within NATO Norway will work against all tendencies for member countries to maintain or build up military contact with countries which systematically contravene human rights, in particular initiatives giving support to the racialist regime in South Africa.

The programme further states that the Norwegian Labour Party will strive to obtain a more efficiently organised cooperation between the socialist parties in Europe and between these parties and the European trade union federations. Furthermore, the party wants to strengthen the Socialist International as a forum of cooperation for social democratic parties and progressive political movements throughout the world.

General Secretary Leveraas said in a speech to the congress that the political prospects prior to the September elections are promising. The party is more vital than before, membership figures are increasing and opinion polls indicate increased voter support.

All leading officers of the party were re-elected, including Reulf Steen as Chairman, Gro Harlem Brundtland as Vice-chairman and Ivar Leveraas as General Secretary.

France

Socialists at Nantes

The conference of the French Socialist Party held in Nantes on June 17-19, 1977, brought together some 1,500 delegates and about a hundred representatives from socialist parties of other countries, and the General Secretary of the Socialist International, Bernt Carlsson, as well as observers from other parties and liberation movements. This conference marked the beginning of an important phase in the life and development of the Socialist Party, and in a larger context beyond that of the conference itself, signalled the beginning of a new era in French political history.

A new phase begins in the life of the party, because the conference marks the end of a period for the Socialist Party, formed in 1971 at Epinay, and the beginning of its

consolidation on the basis of rules which concern the mechanisms of internal democracy, and of the interior life of the party. The very extensive debates which have been taking place with reference to the way in which different schools of thought will function within the party, effective means of internal communication and the training of militants, have contributed to make it a stronger and more cohesive party, better able to cope with the very important political choices which will be confronting France in the next few months. The majority opinion, under the aegis of François Mitterrand and Pierre Mauroy, has been confirmed in its position of strength by this exchange of ideas, thus assuring a cohesion in the guiding influences of the party, which is an indispensable condition for its success in the parliamentary elections due to be held in March 1978.

In the history of the country's political life, this conference of the foremost political party of France is equally an important event, insofar as it has been the testing ground for the future political direction of the party, and has determined the essential options which will be presented to the French voters on the matter of economic and social problems, cooperation in the context of Europe, and French foreign policy. In the course of very extensive and wide-ranging political discussions, the Socialist Party has once again demonstrated the two characteristics which are the keys to its success with the French people: it is a democratic party, where differences of opinion can be expressed openly and in complete freedom. And in addition, it is a governing party, with a leader of great stature, who is surrounded by a first-class team fully capable of taking on the highest responsibility.

During the congress, the delegation of the Portuguese Socialist Party (PSP), including the National Secretaries Manuel Alegre and António Reis, temporarily abandoned the conference room in protest against a remark by the then leader of the minority faction Ceres.

Jean-Pierre Chevénement of Ceres stated that the French party's motto should be "Neither to die like in Chile nor to betray like in Portugal". Manuel Alegre, commenting later on these words, said: "The Socialist Party is the largest party of the Portuguese workers and is an anti-fascist and anti-colonialist party that was able to resist the dictatorial attempt of the Portuguese Communist Party and resists presently the forces on the right. We are under the impression that the intellectualistic and petty-bourgeois complexes of Jean-Pierre Chevénement prevent him from understanding that, in a situation such as the one we have in Portugal, a socialist party was able to affirm its own authority and its own strength, refusing at all times to be destroyed by coups from civilian and military minorities."

The PSP also stated that this incident did not have any influence whatsoever on the excellent relations between the French and Portuguese parties and the mutual solidarity that exists at all levels; this was clearly reflected in François Mitterrand's speech and in the warm reception given to the PSP delegation throughout the conference.

ICFTU


"North-South" Talks

Some hundred trade unionists from both developing and industrialised countries met in Geneva on April 27-29 to discuss questions of development policy. The International Workshop on Development, which was organised by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and held at the headquarters of the International Labour Organization, was an opportunity for trade unionists to debate an issue to which UNCTAD, GATT, the North-South dialogue and other initiatives have lent added topicality.

Delegates discussed a draft ICFTU Development Charter, which points out that development policies must, if growth and investment are to be stimulated, benefit directly the mass of the population. Stressing the need for greater equality both within and between nations, the Charter states that trade union and rural workers' organisations have a vital part to play in the development process. It therefore emphasises that human and trade union rights must be safeguarded both at the national level and internationally, through bodies such as the ILO. The Charter insists that development policies must aim at creating employment and at satisfying basic material and social needs. Development of both the agrarian and the industrial sectors should be encouraged. The activities of multinationals and international "agri-business" should, the ICFTU believes, be strictly controlled, and the Charter supports the drawing-up of a UN code of conduct for transnational corporations. In this connection, a special meeting on the role of agri-business in developing countries preceded the Conference on April 25-26. The UN's call for a new international economic order is welcomed, with the proviso that governments of industrialised countries must adopt labour market policies to deal with changes in world trade. In this context, UNCTAD's proposals for a common fund for the finance of commodity buffer stocks receive strong support.

The discussions were chaired by ICFTU President, Dr P. P. Narayanan, and Otto Kersten, the ICFTU's General Secretary, addressed the delegates. National trade union centres in Africa, Asia, the Americas and Europe were represented, as well as five International Trade Secretariats, and the ICFTU's Asian and Interamerican regional organisations, the European Trade Union Confederation, the World Confederation of Labour, the Organisation of African Trade Union Unity and the Socialist International.

Willy Brandt in ICFTU talks: Willy Brandt, the President of the Socialist International, visited the headquarters of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in Brussels on April 4. He had wide-ranging discussions on matters of mutual interest with ICFTU General Secretary Otto Kersten and Assistant General Secretary J. Vanderveken.



Spain

PSOE Triumph

Luis Yáñez, International Secretary of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)

The Spanish elections held on June 15 were a triumph for democratic socialism. The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) received nearly 30 per cent of the votes, electing 119 out of 350 deputies. Only a few months ago, few observers would have dared to predict such a result for the party founded by Pablo Iglesias in 1879.

These elections were of decisive importance for the Spanish people. The first held since 1936, what was at stake was the conquest and consolidation of a democratic system, with guaranteed freedoms, after 40 years of dictatorship. The danger of a reversal of the process, of a reactionary *coup d'état*, which could be represented by the "Popular Alliance" coalition of Fraga Iribarne, proved to be weaker than the Government's intention to use the ballot box to perpetuate its pseudo-democratic régime and so enable the same social élite to hang on to the power they have enjoyed for decades.

To understand the circumstances surrounding these elections, it is necessary to look back to December 20, 1973 — the day the former head of government, Admiral Carrero Blanco, was assassinated. This break in the key link in the dictator's succession marked the beginning of the decisive decline of Europe's longest tyranny and opened up a process which culminated with Franco's death on November 20, 1975, only two months after executing five young anti-fascists.

During this process two different options had emerged amongst Franco's men: a "hard" line of pure conservatives anxious to maintain the régime, and a more flexible line favourable to a loosening of the political system. The partisans of the latter, who emerged the strongest, were aware of what had happened in Portugal in the post-Salazar period and took into account the groundswell of opinion favouring basic changes that was gaining momentum amongst the Spanish people, and saw the opportunity of riding on the crest of the wave, and the possibility of conserving the fundamental pillars of the system while capitalizing on changes at the same time.



(Left to right) Javier Solana, Felipe González and Alfonso Guerra at PSOE pre-election press conference

Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez, a political child of Francoism with a certain flair, was the man to push forward this policy of transforming a dictatorship into a democracy by peaceful evolution in such a way as to appease the people's desire for liberalisation and satisfy foreign pressure (particularly from EEC countries) while simultaneously preserving continuity of power.

With such a background, the circumstances surrounding the election campaign provided the Government with distinct advantages over its rivals (considering that it was not a democratic Government). It had the whole of the state apparatus at its disposal, as well as the local administration, which remained and still remains intact since Franco, as well as state controlled radio and television, an official press agency, and some 40 newspapers of the old National Movement, the Francoist sole legal party. If one adds to this the fact that the Government in fact forbade all emigrant workers from voting (though approximately one million of them had electoral rights) after seeing a confidential survey which showed that 60 per cent are favourable to left wing options, one can get a picture of the situation at the time.

It is no wonder that after all this, Suárez felt sure of getting 40 per cent of the vote, which according to the electoral system designed by the same Government would be translated into more than 50 per cent of the deputies. Heading the governmental electoral alliance the UCD or Democratic Centre Union, a coalition of about nine groups of ex-Francoists, liberals, Christian Democrats, social democrats, etc. — Suárez offered an ambiguous programme which

nonetheless clearly took its distance from Francoism.

The PSOE, on the other hand, had only begun a legal life a few months previously, in February 1977, and was faced with the enormous task of explaining, in the space of a three-week campaign, that the UCD represented the true right, today's conservatives, and at the same time explaining its own programme, making its candidates known and spreading its long-repressed ideas, until recently systematically deformed by official propaganda. The PSOE was alone in denouncing the real nature of the UCD, because other left-wing parties, particularly the Communist Party, based their campaign on a false enemy, namely the Popular Alliance (which was suffering from artificial paralysis induced by Suárez), or even on the PSOE itself, which it accused of dependence on the Socialist International, while at the same time taking a soft line against Suárez and his acolytes.

Polling-day went off fairly normally with the exception of the Castilian and Galician villages where *caciquismo*, or political control of rural workers, is still rampant. But the most notable example of fraud came with the official transmission of the results starting in the early hours of June 16: 12 hours after the closure of the electoral colleges, the Interior Ministry was only giving out the odd partial results, and falsified ones at that, as became clear later on when the PSOE's real strength became known. The intention was to prevent an explosion of popular joy in the streets which the real results would have led to. The only official results available are as follows:

	Votes	Percentages	Seats
UCD	6,142,460	33.86	165
PSOE	5,211,038	28.73	119
PCE (Communists)	1,673,765	9.22	20
AP (Popular Alliance) ...	1,480,657	8.16	17
PSP-FPS (other socialists) ...	783,593	4.32	6
PDC (Catalan nationalists) ...	517,131	2.85	10
PNV (Basque nationalists) ...	307,611	1.69	8

The most important political facts to emerge from these elections are the defeat of the forces claiming the Francoist heritage, that the anti-Franco opposition had won a majority of votes (though not of deputies due to the type of electoral system used), that the PSOE received an avalanche of votes which makes it once more Spain's largest single party, that the other Socialists have a limited popularity (Tierno Galván's PSP got 4 deputies and the FPS only 2), and that there is now a Socialist/Communist ratio of 6 to 1 in Parliament, which is rare for a southern European country.

The reasons for the PSOE's triumph are various, but the outstanding factor to our mind was our ability to interpret faithfully the Spanish people's profound desire for change, by identifying ourselves as an alternative to the existing power, and by constituting a viable replacement to the right-wing Government. Apart from this the present-day PSOE represents the link with the past, with the historical memory of the PSOE before the Civil War, so deeply fixed in the minds of the workers and transmitted from father to son. But the important thing was to make this link by projecting a dynamic, renovated image, through younger men, thus overcoming the pain left by the violent confrontation between Spaniards of 1936-39. Finally, our five million votes are a recognition of the PSOE's uninterrupted struggle against Francoism and for democracy.

It is also true that the PSOE was able to launch a homogeneous, energetic campaign which had a lot of impact, while other parties fell into contradictions and were slowed down, even on the left.

One aspect that has not been given much attention in the press is the geographical and sociological distribution of the PSOE's vote. In fact the Socialist Workers' Party was victorious in the politically decisive areas of the country. It is the first party in Catalonia, in the Basque Country, the Levante, Asturias, Andalusia and Madrid. These six regions comprise 90 per cent of all industry and the six Spanish cities with the largest population. Therefore the PSOE's electorate is composed fundamentally of the working class in the broad sense.

The correlation of forces resulting from the elections will oblige the UCD, since it does not have a majority, to modify its intention to maintain a continuity with the past, and force it to adopt a more open attitude towards democratic positions in order to make parliamentary cooperation with the PSOE possible. The PSOE can be cooperative if the party's primary objective for the coming period is met: namely, to finish off the process of democratization, which must include drawing up a new democratic constitution, holding municipal and provincial elections, giving legal recognition to all political parties, democratizing the administration, instituting parliamentary control over the mass media etc. At the same time, steps must be taken towards solving the serious economic crisis, without resorting to stopgap measures, but implementing structural changes designed to modernize and renew our economy.

The PSOE, avoiding the triumphalist trap, is serenely preparing to meet the

coming stage of consolidation of democracy with a sense of responsibility. It does so from a good starting point (the number of its party members has now reached 150,000), but with a keen awareness of the enormous task it faces, to educate, organize and reshape the party and overcome technical failings which are only natural in a party emerging from decades of underground life.

Ireland

Coalition Defeat

In general elections for the Irish House of Representatives held on June 16 the coalition of Fine Gael and the Labour Party which had held office since 1973 was defeated by the Fianna Fail party, which will have a majority of 20 seats in the new House. The state of the parties following the election is as follows:

	At	1977	1973	dissolution
Fianna Fail ...	84	69	66	
Fine Gael ...	43	54	53	
Labour Party ...	17	19	20	
Others ...	4	2	3	
Vacancies ...	—	—	2	

Some 76 per cent of the registered electorate of 2,118,600 voted for the 148 deputies (compared with 144 in the previous House).

The results showed a national swing of almost 5 per cent to Fianna Fail led by Jack Lynch, who himself had been succeeded as Prime Minister by the Fine Gael leader, Liam Cosgrave, in March 1973.

Among those who lost their seats were

two Labour ministers, Dr Conor Cruise O'Brien (Posts and Telegraphs) and Justin Keating (Labour). Also defeated was Brendan Halligan, who has won a by-election for a Dublin seat in June 1976; following the elections he resumed his post as General Secretary of the Labour Party.

The leader of the Irish Labour Party, Brendan Corish, announced his resignation on June 26 and was succeeded on July 1 by Frank Cluskey, who had been a Parliamentary Secretary in the coalition Government.

Netherlands

Landslide to Labour

The Netherlands Labour Party (PvdA), led by Prime Minister Joop den Uyl, achieved a virtual landslide in Dutch political terms in the general elections held on May 25. After leading a coalition government since 1973, The PvdA increased its share of the vote from about 27 per cent in 1972 to almost 34 per cent in 1977 and also increased its representation in the 150-seat Second Chamber from 43 to 53 seats, thus becoming the largest single party.

There was a record turn-out of voters — some 87.5 per cent of the registered electorate going to the polls, compared with 83 per cent in 1972.

HARRY VAN DEN BERGH, lists was the party's International Secretary,

Following the PvdA's election success, negotiations were instituted for the formation of a new coalition led by the Labour Party, with Joop den Uyl continuing as Prime Minister.

Socialist Notebook

Belgian Socialists return to Government

Following the general elections of April 17 in which the Belgian Socialists increased their strength in the Chamber of Representatives (see *SOCIALIST AFFAIRS*, 3/1977), a Socialist Party congress held in Brussels on May 29 voted by 821 to 26 with nine abstentions in favour of agreements providing for the formation of a four-party coalition Government comprising the Christian Socials, the Socialist Party, the *Volksunie* and the Brussels *Front démocratique des francophones* (FDF) under the continued premiership of Léon Tindemans (Christian Social). The Socialist ministers in the new Cabinet, which was sworn in on June 3, are: Léon Hurez (Deputy Prime Minister and Public Service), Henri Simonet (Foreign Affairs), Willy Claes (Economic Affairs), Jos Ramaekers (Flemish National Education), Jos Wijninckx (Pensions), Guy Spitaels (Employment and Labour), Hendrik Boel (Interior), Jean-Maurice Dehouze (Franco-phonie Culture), Guy Mathot (Public Works and Walloon Affairs). The Socialist secre-

taries of state are: Robert Urbain (Walloon Regional Economy), Roger de Wulf (Economic and Social Affairs) and Jacques Joyaux (Reform of Institutions).

Democratic Socialists in U.S. Congress

The May 1977 issue of the *Newsletter of the Democratic Left* reports: "For the first time in more than 50 years a member of a democratic socialist organization sits in the United States Congress. Ron Dellums, the black Representative from Oakland, California, recently joined the Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee (led by Michael Harrington and affiliated to the Socialist International). He had previously described himself publicly as a democratic socialist, but this is the first time he or any other member of Congress has joined a socialist organization. So far as we know, the last socialist to sit in Congress was Meyer London of New York City, who was defeated for re-election in 1926 by a Republican named Fiorello LaGuardia".