

SOCIALIST AFFAIRS


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Party Leaders Meeting



James Callaghan, Joop den Uyl, Willy Brandt



Bruno Kreisky, Joop den Uyl and Willy Brandt

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PARTY LEADERS' CONFERENCE AMSTERDAM

A Party Leaders' Conference of the Socialist International took place in Amsterdam on April 16-17, 1977, at the invitation of the Dutch Labour Party. It was the first conference of this kind to have been held since the Congress of the Socialist International in Geneva in November of last year.

The conference was attended by leaders of Socialist International member parties from twenty-four countries and the participants included eight prime ministers: Bruno Kreisky (Austria), Anker Joergensen (Denmark), Helmut Schmidt (Federal Republic of Germany), James Callaghan (Great Britain), Seewoosagur Ramgoolam (Mauritius) who is also the chairman of the Organisation of African Unity, Joop den Uyl (Netherlands), Odvar Nordli (Norway) and Mario Soares (Portugal). A full list of participants appears below.

Willy Brandt, President of the Socialist International, opened the conference and presided over the two sessions on April 16 and April 17. After Willy Brandt's opening remarks, the Dutch Prime Minister, Joop

den Uyl, delivered an introductory statement. This led into the general debate on the main theme of the conference, which was 'The Relations between East and West after the Helsinki Declaration of 1975'.

Discussions centred upon the results of the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the preparations and prospects for the follow-up meeting to be held in Belgrade in the summer and autumn of 1977. Questions of détente and arms limitation in a broader, more global context were also discussed.

The conference expressed its strong support for a continued policy of détente. It also criticized the attempts to sabotage this policy made by conservative forces under the pretext of their newly discovered interest in promoting human rights.

It was felt that a return to cold war tactics would not only add to the danger of continued arms race escalation but also be harmful to the movement for the advancement of civil rights.

Other subjects were also raised, however, such as the recent developments in Africa

and the problem of ensuring adequate safeguards for the civil use of nuclear energy.

The conference also heard reports on the situation in India, where the recent elections had resulted in defeat for the Congress Party and victory for the Janata Front, and on the situation in Spain, where the first free elections for more than forty years were shortly to be held. The first report was delivered by George Fernandes, Chairman of the Indian Socialist Party and Minister of Communications in the newly-formed Indian government, who had been imprisoned by the previous Indian government in 1976, and the second report was presented by Felipe Gonzalez, First Secretary of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, PSOE.

A summary of the conclusions of the conference appears below.

The next Party Leaders' Conference of the Socialist International will be held in Japan on December 17-19, 1977, at the invitation of the Japan Democratic Socialist Party and the Japan Socialist Party.

CONCLUSIONS: DÉTENTE AND THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE

(1) There is no realistic alternative to the policy of détente. It is the only way to prevent a catastrophe. It is the only possible way of achieving a more secure peace.

(2) 'Belgrade' [i.e. the follow-up to the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] is a chance which must be used. One should avoid useless speeches of nothing but rhetorical value, but one should try to agree upon some concrete projects, giving new impulses to economic cooperation and détente. There is no need to aim at texts even more perfect than the final document of Helsinki. Instead of this, one should reach agreements upon what now is in the interest of all parties concerned.

(3) Democratic Socialists have always dedicated themselves and their policy to human rights. Also in the future they will work intensively for the universal realisation of individual, social and ethnic human rights.

Abuses of human rights, wherever in the world they occur, should be met by adequate action.

The member parties of the Socialist International do not see any contrast between these efforts and the policy of détente. Therefore they are opposed to conservative forces putting into danger in the name of human rights what has been initiated in the field of humanitarian reliefs by the policy of détente.

(4) Détente will only last if the armaments race can be stopped soon.

Therefore the Soviet-American SALT negotiations are of great importance.

A second SALT agreement would be of great importance for a first result of the Vienna negotiations.

This is also important because — given a nuclear balance — a regional balance of conventional forces seems indispensable.

Particular attention should be paid to the institution of extended international safeguards for all civil nuclear facilities.

(5) The policy of détente as a dynamic concept cannot be carried out without taking into account developments outside the European sphere. Détente will only continue if causes of tensions are removed. In southern

Africa the process of self-determination and independence should be speeded up as time is running out. A failure of the North-South Dialogue would have disastrous effects on the necessary basis of confidence and cooperation between industrialized and developing nations.

(6) The growing gap between North and South and the difficult problems of world economy, we have to face, is of concern for all industrialized states, not only for the Western ones.

In the long run it will not be possible for the Communist states to deny their responsibility in this field. The fight against poverty should be a sector of cooperation between West and East and of efforts for common solutions.

(7) The parties of democratic socialism will continue to engage themselves in changing experiences in the field of East-West relations.

We consider further progress of détente to be of high political priority and we will continuously deliberate about additional possible initiatives in this field.

List of participants:

Socialist International:
Willy Brandt
Bernt Carlsson

Argentina:
Victor O. Garcia Costa

Austria:
Bruno Kreisky
Walter Hacker

Belgium:
Henri Fayat
Karel van Miert

Chile:
Carlos Parra

Denmark:
Anker Joergensen
K. B. Andersen
Kjeld Olesen
Ejner Hovgaard Christiansen

Dominican Republic:
José Francisco Peña Gomez

Finland:
Kalevi Sorsa
Pentti Väänänen

France:
Gaston Defferre
Robert Pontillon

Germany:
Helmut Schmidt
Hans-Eberhard Dingels

Italy PSDI:
Pier Luigi Romita
Giampiero Rolandi

Italy PSI:
Bettino Craxi
Aldo Aiello
Francesco Gozzano

Luxembourg:
Benny Berg
Robert Krieps

Great Britain:
James Callaghan
Ron Hayward
Ian Mikardo

Mauritius:
Seewoosagur Ramgoolam
Harold Walter

India:
George Fernandes

Iceland:
Kjartan Johannsson

Israel:
Yigal Allon
Israel Gat

Norway:
Odvar Nordli
Reiulf Steen
Thorvald Stoltenberg

Portugal:
Mario Soares
J. Madeiros Ferreira

Spain:
Felipe Gonzalez
Francisco Lopez Real

Sweden:
Miriam Martinez

Switzerland:
Gian Nath

Netherlands:
Sven Andersson
Pierre Schori

Malta:
Babacar Bâ

Senegal:
G. Brincat

Spain:
G. Egius

Switzerland:
Max van der Stoel

JOOP DEN UYL

The text of the introductory statement made by the Netherlands Prime Minister and Leader of the Dutch Labour Party.

I hope that it will be possible here to indicate the major points of a common line of thought. It is necessary and desirable that democratic socialists, despite nuances and different responsibilities, influence the course of developments in Europe from their own point of view. The forthcoming conference of Belgrade is probably the correct moment and we should not let this chance pass by. I would appreciate making my remarks about Belgrade from the point of view of the Labour Party in Holland. For four years have we been the government party with some other progressive and with Christian democratic parties. We have endeavoured to give the foreign policy of the Dutch Government an own profile during the past four years. This endeavour has been successful in some three directions.

In the first instance we have been active in the protection of human rights in our own part of the world, in Chile, in southern Africa, and in the support of the liberation of Portugal and Greece from repressive regimes — not to mention human rights in Eastern Europe and the offering of hospitality to dissidents such as Andrej Amalrik. In the second place we have also tried to stimulate a new relationship between the Western democratic world and the countries of the Third World at the 7th special General Assembly of the UN, and of Unctad, and currently in the North-South dialogue. Finally we have tried to provide a consequent content to détente policy.

If I apply this approach to Belgrade I must first of all say something about the nature of the relaxation policy. Relaxation must not be considered as a description of a condition which, once reached, must remain unchanged, but more as an instrument of policy, directed towards real changes. Relaxation policy is not only the recognition of the status quo, but also dynamically the removal of the causes of tensions, fears and mistrust and the non-avoidance of a confrontation of various mental and social conceptions.

The relaxation policy must lead to structural improvements in international cooperation, in Europe but also elsewhere. It does not concern the sanctioning of certain zones of influence, but the encouragement of a harmonious co-operation between states and peoples mostly faced by similar problems. These large, similar problems include the management of the world economy: energy supply, food supply, raw material exploitation and management, protection of the natural environment. But also the problems of the human society in the industrial and post-industrial era and the massive problems of poor and rich in

the world. And finally — most urgently — the avoidance of the danger of a nuclear war and the slowing down of the lead-heavy armaments race.

There is reason to worry about developments after Helsinki. In many respects a standstill seems to have occurred. In the field of the confidence-inspiring measures, Helsinki has only been given a very limited execution. Extremely serious appears the hold-up in the SALT and the MBFR talks. It is extremely disappointing that the offer of the Western nations of December last, which contained a considerable reduction of nuclear arms, has met such discouraging reactions.

Yet I believe there is some reason to hope that some progress may be made in the SALT II. The new American Administration quite rightly gives it priority. A success of SALT II can be used by accomplishing a break-through in the MBFR.

Socialist parties in government and those influencing government policies must not wait in the Vienna negotiations to see whether there will be new reactions in the Warsaw Pact. They will have to take new initiatives. In this connection I must warn against short-term policy. For us the Helsinki conference is of historic importance and that is still the case. In connection with other more concrete disarmament discussions, Helsinki has created the possibilities for the realisation of a long term truly different peace situation.

This is an important initial point. The two years which have gone by since Helsinki are insufficient for a complete implementation of the declaration of Helsinki. The process is far too complicated.

It is necessary to assess the situation of human rights against this background. Based on our opinion that human rights are an essential element of peace and safety — the declaration of Helsinki itself is proof of this — it is our duty explicitly to stress this element of the relations between East and West and to request a continued execution. We shall not be able to omit this important element, even though this is sometimes asked or suggested. We owe this to ourselves, but also to all those who look on our movement as the symbol for democracy and socialism. Simultaneously we must be open for criticism of our direction from those people who think that in our countries, for example, social and economic rights are not adequately realized. I do not fear this discussion.

We should not seek a confrontation in Belgrade neither avoid a discussion. President Carter has been much criticized for his remarkable initiatives and decisions in the area of human rights. Quite apart from timing and formulation, it is a fact that in the East-West relationship the non-consideration of the free exchange of information, ideas and persons makes both parties untrustworthy.

Essential for progress in East-West relationships is the recognition of the mutual interrelationship of developments elsewhere in the world and in Europe. It concerns the world-wide aspects of the relaxation policy. Whether the issues are formally linked together or not, it is certain that the behaviour of the Soviet Union elsewhere in the world, more particular in Africa and the Middle East, will influence the relation-

ships between the super-powers and therefore also détente in Europe.

Conversely, the West will also lose chances of relaxation if it does not succeed in receiving more confidence from the developing countries and to bring the North-South dialogue to a reasonable success.

In fact, the willingness of the Soviet Union to proceed with relaxation will depend considerably on the degree by which the confidence-based co-operation between the industrialized nations and the developing countries is realized.

This forces the socialist parties to energetic actions in order to overcome the crisis of confidence existing in the Third World with regard to the West. Simultaneously, it does not take away the duty — as pleaded by the European heads of government — to ask the Eastern bloc countries to participate in development assistance. It is equally necessary to use any realistic possibility of intensifying co-operation in the technical, scientific and economic field with the Eastern bloc countries. The Brezhnev proposals for pan-European conferences for energy, transport and environment have been received with scepticism. This is understandable, but we have the duty to make our own, better proposals for the termination of the stagnation situation by which the large problems of world economy are approached by separated, competing powers.

It is my considered opinion that Belgrade must not be a formal issue; it should be a challenge to break through the threatening standstill.

JAMES CALLAGHAN

Extracts from the contribution of the British Prime Minister and Labour Party Leader.

Two forecasts made by those of us who supported the idea of the Helsinki conference have been proved right.

First, that the CSCE was a two-way exercise. The series of agreements, starting with Willy Brandt's courageous and imaginative Ostpolitik, through the Four Power Agreement on Berlin to the Helsinki Final Act, have made the situation in Central Europe both more stable and, for the people living there, a little more tolerable. At the same time the whole span of issues covered by the words "human rights" are seen as legitimate topics for discussions between states and are indelibly inscribed on the agenda of international negotiations.

We warned that the Final Act was not a panacea for the problems of security in Europe. We cannot expect overnight changes and indeed we may have to face regression in certain areas.

Our assessment of détente and of the benefits to be derived from it is balanced

EXTRACTS FROM MAIN SPEECHES

WILLY BRANDT

A summary of the contribution made by the President of the Socialist International and Chairman of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD).

In his remarks, Willy Brandt stressed the importance of a realistic assessment of all further developments in the relationship between East and West. The chances of détente need not be judged pessimistically; there was, however, good reason for counteracting dangerous misjudgments and illusory ideas.

The purpose of a policy of détente had never been the elimination of all differences

between states and societies in the West and in the East. Over the last few years the aim had been to live with these differences, to reduce or control threatening tension and at the same time to develop fields of common interest. A policy of détente and attempts to make life easier for man were not opposed to each other. If we failed to reduce tension and to ensure peace, we need not and could not talk seriously about human rights. Invoking human rights would become a mere farce and remain without effect if one departed from reality too far. An illusory view of a policy of détente would not help to ensure peace but would favour a climate of insecurity and tense instability.

Willy Brandt also commented on the talks regarding a further limitation of strategic arms, i.e. SALT, in which both the Soviet Union and the United States had shown readiness to compromise. He pleaded not to underestimate the Vienna MBFR talks. When the time had come, a first — though still limited — agreement on a reduction of such arms, which would take into consideration the principles of parity and collectivity, might be of great politico-psychological importance. Any steps likely

to create trust were of considerable importance for further progress in Vienna.

Regarding the Belgrade conference which is to follow up Helsinki, Willy Brandt pleaded for further developing what had already been achieved with regard to European cooperation in 1975. Belgrade was certainly not the right place for an extension of the demanding catalogue of Helsinki at this late stage.

Each participating state would of course have to have an opportunity of making critical comments within the framework of this intermediate assessment. This should show clearly enough where — particularly in the humanitarian field — positive developments had occurred since Helsinki. However, in Belgrade the representatives of the 35 governments would not get very far if they were expected to be 35 prosecutors sitting in judgment over each other. An attempt should be made to consider two or three concrete tasks in a number of main fields. This would serve closer co-operation and could be attempted in the economic field, with regard to the problems of the supply of energy and raw materials, environmental matters and questions of traffic and transportation.

and realistic. Its first benefit is a common understanding between East and West on the need for consultations and contact at governmental level to be frequent and close. With the present state of nuclear weaponry, we cannot allow international crises to develop through misunderstanding or miscalculation.

Détente means a state of relations much closer than a simple absence of war. We have in the past experienced a situation in which there has existed the very minimum of trading, cultural and other contacts, while the two armed camps viewed each other across a no-man's land of ignorance, suspicion and hostility. It is possible for such a situation to return. But it would be a very dangerous situation with maximum danger of miscalculation and almost no chance of settling individual human problems which would simply become crushed between the two leviathans. We shall work to prevent this.

It was to try and replace such a condition of Cold War that both sides began to explore ways of negotiating downwards the level of tension without impairing the basic security of either side. At the same time the neutral and non-aligned states asserted their rights to be consulted and to contribute to the basic stability of the European continent.


Looking at the situation today as against the moods prevailing twenty or thirty years ago, we can see that contacts are more regular, on a wider range of issues, and the scope for miscalculation — as a result — much less.

But even during this period of improving détente there have been developments which I think we should face fairly and squarely, both in discussing the issue ourselves and when discussing the progress of détente with the Soviet Union and its allies.

The first development is the refining by the Soviet Union of the concept of "the ideological struggle" as a political offensive which will run parallel to the improvement of interstate relations. Now we who are Social Democrats need have no fears in an ideological struggle between our beliefs and that group of ideas usually termed Marxism-Leninism. Both theory and practice show that the democratic system offers the people of Europe the prospects of a more fair, more free, more just, and more prosperous life than can be provided by pursuing a Marxist-Leninist philosophy. We can say to our people "if you want the proof look around you".

But the "ideological struggle" is a favourite term in the Soviet Union. It has been with us for the past sixty years and will remain so, for part of the philosophical basis of communism is that it is necessary to engage in a struggle of ideological attrition with the West. Marxism-Leninism constantly asserts that the success of the communist way of life will inevitably lead to the disappearance of our kind of society. I do not want to be misunderstood. It does not follow from this that the present Soviet leadership intends hostile military intentions towards the West. But the Russians have always professed to believe that even by means short of military aggression the eventual collapse of Western democracies is inevitable.

Now as this is not going to happen, the



carried out within the framework of our own democratic structures. At the same time we intend to keep a clear perception of priorities. On the one hand, we will work to ensure that the existence of détente, without which there would be very little prospect for any further improvements in the freer flow of ideas and people between East and West, is not jeopardized. This involves exercising particular care in the degree to which and the manner in which we apply pressure on points of concern to us in our relations with the Russians. It is a question of tactics and implies no devaluation of principle. On the other hand, we will continue to reflect accurately the general and legitimate level of Western public interest and concern about developments in the fields of dissent and human rights in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

A second area where East and West differ in their conceptions of détente is the way in which that process should be applicable to the pursuit of foreign policies in areas outside Europe. I believe that Western public and governmental reaction to Soviet actions in Angola went deeper than the Soviet Union expected. We must continue to emphasise to the Russians and other East Europeans what is often called the indivisibility of détente. This is applicable today, particularly in the affairs of Africa. My own country's approach to Africa over the last two decades has been to encourage the process of self-determination and independence, whilst trying to prevent the continent becoming a focus for super-power conflict.

This continues to be our policy. Throughout the years in southern Africa we have never sought to deny or escape from our final responsibility in Rhodesia. The British Foreign Secretary, David Owen, is at this very moment in Africa continuing our search for a peaceful settlement. At the same time we continue to urge the Government of South Africa to act with speed and imagination to deal with the problem of Namibia.

Our total condemnation of the system of apartheid is on the record, as our action on such matters as arms supply has shown.

It is our view that there is still time and opportunity for Africa herself to evolve peaceful solutions to many outstanding problems. But those solutions should come from within Africa. There is much dry tinder on that continent which outside countries could be the means of igniting and not only in the White-ruled countries. This would increase the chances of conflict in general and a race war in particular. It will be tragic if the people of Africa have a new foreign orthodoxy thrust upon them having so recently thrown off the old imperialism.

And if such involvement continues then it will have its effects on other East-West interests.

My message is simple and direct. There is no such thing as "compartmentalised détente". Security and co-operation in Europe requires restraint and prudence in policies and practices outside Europe — in other continents.


In saying this I am not denying the Soviet Union her legitimate rights as a super-power. But super-power status brings


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Joop den Uyl, Willy Brandt

Mario Soares, Rui Mateus, Helmut Schmidt





Joop den Uyl, George Fernandes



Joop den Uyl, Yigal Allon

Yigal Allon, Ina van den Heuvel, Willy Brandt



Kies Bode, Yigal Allon, James Callaghan, Joop den Uyl, Willy Brandt, Bernt Carlsson



with it super-power responsibility, to know when to stay out.

Détente can have only limited significance until it is extended into the military sphere. A small start was made with the confidence-building measures agreed at Helsinki, but much more important are the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the negotiations in Vienna on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR).

The subject matter of the MBFR negotiations is immensely complex. So it is not surprising that progress has not been rapid. The two sides have gained a better understanding of each other's preoccupations, and some valuable groundwork has been done. Nevertheless we are disappointed that more progress has not been made.

Likewise success in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks is the key to building up mutual confidence and co-operation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The reduction of strategic arms is a highly important aim in itself. In view of the shape of the Soviet Strategic Missile Armament such a reduction presents difficulties to them, and they will obviously need time to consider the latest proposals of President Carter. But we need not view the recent setback in Moscow too tragically. Each side has started an initial position, and we may now be in for some months of hard negotiation.

Of particular importance to progress in détente is our approach to the problem of nuclear proliferation. It is a subject on which both Western and East European Governments work together at the highest levels.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty now has over 100 contracting parties. We should like to see the states which have yet to adhere to it do so soon. It is in the interest of all mankind that the provision of nuclear material and technology for peaceful purposes does not lead to the proliferation of nuclear explosive capability. The Nuclear Suppliers Group, of which my country is the chairman, has met several times since early 1975 and has agreed that the need to prevent proliferation should over-ride commercial advantage where nuclear exports are concerned. I can report that Britain's policy fully accords with the Guidelines agreed in this Group.

At the UN General Assembly in September 1975, I called for the universal application of appropriate international safeguards to all civil nuclear facilities. This has been followed up and I am glad a model agreement has now been prepared by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Meanwhile, the British and American Governments have voluntarily placed their own civil nuclear facilities under the safeguards. We hope that other countries will do the same.

It is of the utmost importance that East and West work together on the problems of proliferation. We have little time left in which to develop an effective international strategy. It will soon be too late.

At the same time Britain would support a ban on all nuclear tests, on condition that such a Comprehensive Test Ban Agreement provided for adequate verification as well as ensuring that peaceful nuclear explosions are not used to obtain weapons-related benefits. In our view these need

not be insuperable obstacles and for our part we will gladly enter into negotiations to achieve a comprehensive test ban.

Before leaving the subject of arms control and disarmament let me draw attention to another area where détente should be having its influence in producing positive results.

First there is a need to work for the reduction of global military spending and the arms trade. The vast build-up of conventional weapons throughout the world is in a very real sense a "threat to peace". I have already referred to the situation in Africa; but there are other equally dangerous flash-points where arms are supplied in alarming quantities. I do not point a finger at anyone but I emphasise the need to begin the search for solutions.

You will see that Britain looks towards Belgrade with a determination that it should be a further positive development of détente. We shall not go there to win propaganda victories, but to have a businesslike and constructive discussion if at all possible.

We do not nurse expectations which are too high — of what can be achieved at Belgrade. We are both realistic and patient. European security and co-operation is essentially a long-term process.

Nevertheless we are convinced of the political importance of the Belgrade meeting for its long-term value in continuing the dialogue which has opened between East and West, and in emphasising the seriousness of the political commitments which all signatory states have assumed.

It will not be the task of the Belgrade meetings to re-write or prejudice the Final Act. This remains a central and fundamental document, and we should satisfy ourselves that the Final Act is working effectively before we plan sequels or supplements to it.

The implementation of the Final Act is a continuing process, and at Belgrade we shall be looking for steady and measured progress towards the equal implementation of all three Baskets, which in our view constitute a balanced whole.

I must point out that public opinion in Britain is concerned about the freedom movement of people and ideas, and respect for human rights. We will draw attention at Belgrade to shortcomings where there is good evidence that they exist. We have never denied that abuses of human rights, wherever in the world they occur, are a legitimate subject of international concern.

Concern for human rights — whether voiced at international fora like Belgrade or in private bilateral representations — is an integral part of British policy, and not a diversionary tactic, hastily conceived and as quickly forgotten.

The CSCE process has already achieved a number of gains; it has opened a dialogue from which we work for improvements in many fields; it has enabled us to develop habits of co-operation; it is serving as a source of encouragement to those who seek to make their own societies more open. These gains, and the many opportunities which CSCE may provide us in the future, are not lightly to be abandoned. We in Britain attach real importance to the development of the CSCE process, and we, together with the Government of Holland, intend to play an active role in the Belgrade meetings.

HELMUT SCHMIDT

A summary of the contribution made by the German Federal Chancellor.

The German Federal Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, commented as follows on the development of East-West relations since the Helsinki Conference:

The Helsinki agreements were the result of enormous progress that had been made over thirty years. Although the ideas so far conceived had not yet been realized in a satisfactory manner, there had been positive effects as far as Europe was concerned, for instance in the field of economic cooperation and the efforts to reunite families.

Nevertheless we are convinced of the political importance of the Belgrade meeting for its long-term value in continuing the dialogue which has opened between East and West, and in emphasising the seriousness of the political commitments which all signatory states have assumed.

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The CSCE process has already achieved a number of gains; it has opened a dialogue from which we work for improvements in many fields; it has enabled us to develop habits of co-operation; it is serving as a source of encouragement to those who seek to make their own societies more open. These gains, and the many opportunities which CSCE may provide us in the future, are not lightly to be abandoned. We in Britain attach real importance to the development of the CSCE process, and we, together with the Government of Holland, intend to play an active role in the Belgrade meetings.

world economic developments along a reasonable path. The biggest danger was the fact that the states still could not agree on constructive cooperation between East and West. In Belgrade it would have to be shown to the communist governments that they could not afford forever to shirk joint responsibility for world economic matters. The development aid granted by them must not consist predominantly of the supply of arms.

A successful policy of armament control depended on two important conditions. First of all armament control could only be achieved if it was, in principle, desired by the United States and the Soviet Union. Secondly, it would constitute a risk to life if the balance of the military powers was endangered by a policy of armament control. However, the contacts between the big powers gave reason to believe that both had a strong will to control and reduce armaments. The balance of power must be maintained both with regard to strategic arms and measures to limit conventional arms. In the course of the Vienna talks on a reduction of troops the Federal Republic would do all in its power to ensure progress in this respect.

SVEN ANDERSSON

The text of the statement made by Sven Andersson of the Swedish Social Democratic Party.

In Sweden, we have criticized the harassments and persecution of dissidents in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and other East European communist countries. We know that our protests have been heard from the violent reactions by the Husak regime against Olof Palme and from messages from the opposition in Czechoslovakia.

Our criticism has been as hard before as after the Helsinki declarations. In view of this summer's Belgrade conference we feel, however, that our criticism should not be carried too far with the risk of jeopardizing pan-European cooperation and of obstructing the process of détente. We do not want to join those reactionary forces who want the efforts towards increased cooperation to fail and who seek a continuous confrontation between East and West.

Europe is still divided in two halves between which deep opposition prevails. The security of Europe — the question of war or peace — depends on how the relations between the two super powers develop. We consider the policy of détente to be decisive for peace in Europe. The

security conference and its final declaration are of utmost importance both in order to consolidate peace and to deepen the contacts and the peaceful cooperation between the peoples of Europe. The results from the conference must not be wasted. On the contrary, they must be upheld and the cooperation expanded and deepened still more. On this point our attitude must be absolutely clear.

The Helsinki conference gave great attention to the question of human contacts and rights. But its main task was not primarily to solve these problems. Its historic task was, 30 years after the end of World War II, to confirm the borders of that war and to consolidate the situation in Europe. If the main efforts from either side in the negotiations had been directed towards changes in the political and social systems — in the East or West — the conference would not have produced any positive results. A main precondition for pan-European cooperation is the mutual respect for each country's choice of security policy and political system. The idea of being able overnight — or in a few years — to agree on fundamental changes in the political systems is not a realistic one. Such changes can only be conceived as a result of a continuously ongoing process and of the struggle between different political ideologies. The contribution of the Helsinki declaration, by confirming the principal of human rights, is to indicate the trend of developments in each individual country.

The persecutions of dissidents in Eastern Europe show that the respect for human rights in the communist countries is low. This is not a new situation, things have always been like that. Those regimes have been little influenced by the Helsinki declaration. The demands for increased freedom are, however, being more and more heard in Eastern Europe, where courageous and freedom-loving people ask their governments to follow the obliging words of the declaration concerning the respect for human rights. For these people the Final Act is an encouragement and a support. They do not see the security conference as a moral capitulation of the West. It is in this respect important to underline that in the case of, for instance, Charter '77, its signatories do not want to change their country's political and social system. They just demand respect for human rights. With all these people we feel a deep solidarity.

But our possibilities to influence the situation of these countries are very limited. Changes must come through an internal process led by the peoples themselves. Any attempt to give active support from abroad to oppositional groups in the communist countries will be met by a determined reaction and would harm those we want to help. The opposition in these countries is determined to lead the struggle themselves and to conquer step by step their freedom. And in spite of their present hard conditions, they are not without hope.

We, who represent the democratic socialist creed, must always publicly express our criticism of oppression, racial discrimination and torture. We consider such measures to be an obstacle to the policy of détente. And it has always been we socialists who have

been pioneering the struggle for human rights and liberties. We have conquered them in struggle against conservative forces.

Therefore we react strongly when communists try to impose bureaucratic dictatorships in the name of socialism or of the people. Such criticism does not imply an intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. As we see it, détente has given us, on the contrary, increased scope for frank words on these questions. We do not want to engage Europe's governments in a political confrontation, but we want an open debate between representatives of different ideas and social systems.

We are only at the beginning of pan-European cooperation. The road to a Europe free of military blocs and economic zones is long. We have been able to take the first steps on this road, thanks to our friend and President, Willy Brandt, who led the radical reorientation of the Federal Republic's foreign policy, thereby opening the way to the Helsinki conference and pan-European cooperation. Our task is now to continue on this road, not to stop. We should concentrate our efforts to make the work in Belgrade positive and constructive, with a view to the future.

PIER LUIGI ROMITA

Extracts from the remarks made by the Secretary of the Italian Social Democratic Party (PSDI).

There are many negative signs emerging in the preparatory phase of the Belgrade conference. The most important to watch is the new climate, more rigid and more paralysing, which now exists between the United States and the Soviet Union, following the stand taken by President Carter in support of the dissidents in the communist countries. These negative signs must be met by a more penetrating initiative on the part of the Socialist International.

We must grant our solidarity to the new initiative of the United States in defence of human rights but, at the same time, our being directly involved in the European area and our being socialists must place us in an autonomous position vis-à-vis both communist countries and capitalistic forces.


Our objective must be, on the one hand, to block all risks or temptations to revive the Cold War, and on the other to make further progress in Belgrade on the road of détente and peace and in the controlled reduction of strategic arms while, at the same time, we stand on the firm conviction in defence of human rights and of civil liberties for all men, regardless of the ruling

political regimes of their respective countries.

There is no question that there must be a common strategy of the socialist and democratic movement on the issue of dissidents. And we must be conscious of the feelings of preoccupation inside the Socialist International which affects especially our German comrades in view of the destabilization of the international political picture and of a worsening of the relationship between East and West in Europe, since it is the German Federal Republic who is to be exposed to the greatest reaction. Yet, although one knows of these preoccupations and realizes how well founded they are, I am of the opinion that, since we are social democrats, we have obligations and idealistic duties which cannot be sacrificed to reason of state.

The calling of the Belgrade conference has aroused in the East, in the communist world, such hopes that it is our duty that they are not frustrated. At this moment, many people are suffering for their act of courage in dissenting against their own governments. Goma is in jail; Havemann is under house arrest; the signatories of Charter '77 are the subject of extreme repression. Both in Poland and in the Soviet Union, prison sentences for crimes of opinion have multiplied. The Yugoslav authorities have pounced on Giles. We all know of the gravity of the situation in Eastern Europe as well as of the dramatic appeals to the West. There is no need for further comments.

At this point, we are facing a delicate moral problem, which must however be solved, and in a clear way. Must we settle for the defence of the logic of the 'homeland', or must we combine reason of state with the reasons of the peoples, and give them a guarantee of existence and survival? I think that the Socialist International should take the second path, and work out its own



direct proposal on which to insist during the Belgrade Conference. It is in fact our duty to make it as clear as possible that we are different from both capitalism and communism, a distinction which, after all, was unanimously approved at the last Geneva Congress.

We must be different from capitalism in the form of an enlargement of the concepts on freedom and social justice. We must be different from communism in the name of a restitution to socialism of the values of exaltation of the human personality, which communism clamours for abroad, yet repressing them at home. This must clearly emerge in Belgrade, and this must represent the united will of the future united Europe, namely to play an autonomous and social democratic role vis-à-vis the two international powers.

We must exercise all possible pressure on them so that their pacifistic statements are backed up by the control and reduction of armaments, both through the SALT and the Vienna talks. In fact, we must point out that some discussions on disarmament, based on more or less deceiving attempts to retain a military superiority over the counterpart, give cause to great worries and suspicions, and are very dangerous.

Secondly, we must insist on the necessity of a total respect for human rights, which are not only rights to freedom and dignity but also a right to an effective equality of all citizens in their respective countries, as well as rights to a real social justice. It is up to us, socialists and democrats, to reaffirm the indissolubility of rights and freedom from those of social justice, insisting on their respect both in the communist and in the capitalistic countries, in the name of the authentic socialist society we aim to build. Under this profile, I believe in the usefulness of an initiative on the part of the Socialist International to analyse and possibly prepare a charter of human rights, based on Socialist International principles, in order to offer it to the whole world.

It is necessary that Europe in general and the European socialist parties in particular take autonomous initiatives in order to guarantee the independence and the autonomy of developing countries.

It is absolutely necessary that the Socialist International explores all ways in order to secure in this area of world politics a larger political and ideological presence of democratic socialism, as a guarantee of a pacific development.

All those who are fighting against oppression from their own governments, and they are increasing in number all over the world, as denounced and documented by Amnesty International, must know that they are not alone in their struggle, and that they can rely on the active solidarity of the Socialist International.

In order to give them a reply which does not stop at Belgrade, but to give them a message that is a standing commitment of the socialist movement and a reply to the injustice and the oppression of today's world, we must work, and fight. By taking forward this initiative, we shall be able to make a positive contribution to world peace, because there is no more lasting peace than that based on the consensus of the people towards their governments.

BACKGROUND PAPERS

Introduction

The Round Table Conference on Peace and Security, held in Amsterdam on November 5-6, 1976, on the initiative of the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA), was attended by representatives of fifteen Socialist and Social-Democratic parties affiliated to the Socialist International.

In the words of the International Secretary of the PvdA, Harry van den Bergh, it was the conference's task to "demonstrate the political will to bring up for joint discussion ideas on peace and security".

The actual work of the conference was carried out in three working parties: the first discussed the topic "Between Helsinki and Belgrade"; the second, military possibilities; and the third the need for closer co-operation.

Since the meeting was more in the nature of a symposium than a congress with motions for a resolution, amendments and decisions, the following reports submitted by the working parties to the plenary meeting should not be regarded as resolutions but rather as the outcome of the discussions and observations. The PvdA furnished the basis for discussion in all except Working Party No. 1, where a paper by Willy Brandt mainly served that function.

Working Party I

The détente process is to bring about improvements in relations between and within East and West. The aim of détente should be greater military security and the absence of war. It must also go further than that and help in bringing about new freedoms and economic opportunities inside and between the European states. Détente policy, therefore, is not an isolated item cut out from the overall picture of security policy, social-economic policies etc.

In Europe détente has already had some effects. For example, improvements have been made in inter-German relations and in Berlin. However, it should be realised that détente, and more particularly the implementation of the Helsinki Act, is a long-term process.

In pursuing détente policies the democratic socialist parties should attach particular importance to the following issues:

1. The Belgrade conference, besides being an assessment of what has and has not been achieved, should secure the continuity of the détente process and provide for new initiatives. The Helsinki Act should be viewed as an integral whole. No basket should be dealt with in isolation. Military and political détente are interlinked and interdependent.

2. New initiatives are called for, particularly in the field of arms control and

confidence building measures. Progress must be made at the MBFR negotiations. To this end the new proposals of Willy Brandt are supported.

3. Is there room for unilateral cuts in European defence?

There was a common feeling that Europe

for its security should not be entirely dependent on an American decision to defend it. A European identity should be developed within the context of the Alliance. We therefore should look into the possibility to construct a European pillar within NATO, which, on the basis of the European conventional effort, would diminish the dependence on the protection from US nuclear weapons. Such a policy would increase Europe's freedom in foreign policy and in economic matters. Social democratic action which is based in Western Europe is directed towards changing the social-economic pattern of our own society and at the same time achieving a more equitable pattern of world relationships. This action cannot be pursued without the necessary freedom not only formally but also in practice.

5. In widening fields of cooperation it should be recognised that the détente process is of a global and not just of a regional nature. Developments outside Europe have an important bearing on the relationships within Europe. For this reason democratic socialist parties should speak out on worldwide developments and should be responsive to the aspirations of the Third World, particularly with regard to a New International Economic Order.

It was agreed that in order to consolidate gains, and to reinforce our ideas of détente a common European voice is needed. More unity in our views and approach can be achieved within the existing alliances and international organisations. According to the programmes of the social democratic parties of the European Community, particular importance is to be given to the role of the nine countries of the EC. Cooperation is to be extended to such problems as security and détente. It is recognised that there is considerable diversity among the European socialist parties, as some of their countries belong to NATO, others are neutral and some are inside, others outside the European Community. Such diversity is a stimulus to intensify the exchange of views on the basis of a common ideology so as to prepare and undertake common action. A role of special importance has to be fulfilled by the European neutral and non-aligned countries. Special attention should be given to facilitating contacts between the foreign machinery of the Nine and these countries in an early stage of the negotiation process.

As interdependency increases détente should become more comprehensive. This is particularly true for the Mediterranean area, the security and stability of which should be consistent with European developments if desirable backlashes such as economic insecurity, military threats, reactionary or even fascist coups etc. are to be avoided.

Working Party II

Peace and Security in Europe

The working party devoted much time to the question which was put forward by the Dutch comrades in their document, whether there is a special European conception of military security. This problem was split up in three different questions:

1. Should Western Europe make a joint military effort of its own, separated from the American effort?
2. Should the Western European effort

concern nuclear weapons or only conventional warfare?

3. Is there room for unilateral cuts in European defence?

There was a common feeling that Europe

for its security should not be entirely dependent on an American decision to defend it. A European identity should be developed within the context of the Alliance. We therefore should look into the possibility to construct a European pillar within NATO, which, on the basis of the European conventional effort, would diminish the dependence on the protection from US nuclear weapons. Such a policy would increase Europe's freedom in foreign policy and in economic matters. Social democratic action which is based in Western Europe is directed towards changing the social-economic pattern of our own society and at the same time achieving a more equitable pattern of world relationships. This action cannot be pursued without the necessary freedom not only formally but also in practice.

This does not mean that European defence should be organised completely apart from the US, but that within the framework of Atlantic cooperation the European effort should be given a status complementary to the American effort. Nato, which is the existing expression of Atlantic cooperation, must be accepted by social democrats but they should never stop stressing also inside Nato the ideals which form the basis of their political activity.

It was stressed that a European force would only be conceivable in the perspective of the creation of a highly developed European political unity. If this was achieved an independent European nuclear capability would seem necessary to create a sufficient balance on the continent. It was however the general opinion in the working party that this European nuclear option should be rejected. A possible future common European defence system should be based solely upon conventional forces; the security of Europe shall also in the long run depend upon the super-power-relationship and upon our ability to build up a mutual interest in the preservation and development of a stable pattern of cooperation.

The working party underlined the importance of the MBFR talks in Vienna. Since 1945 practically no disarmament has taken place in Eastern Europe. It would be of historic importance to reach an agreement.

The nature of the relationship between political détente and military détente makes it necessary that some results are now achieved in the Vienna negotiations in order to maintain the credibility of the process of political détente. This illustrates the timetable link between the perspective of CSCE and the perspective of the MBFR.

Stability and peace being the overriding goal of the social democrats, we have always found it right to aim at an optimal defence rather than maximal defence and we have been the most active promoters of the MBFR talks.

It should be noted, however, that the very idea of engaging ourselves in negotiation on these matters necessarily implies changes in the existing military situation as a product of these negotiations. This does

not exclude the possibility of giving impetus to the process of negotiation by means of bringing forward new initiatives of reduction but the working party saw it as a precondition for success that the incentive of reaching a result through the talks as such is not taken away. No matter how great importance we attach the the achievement of results within a short period of time, the participants of the working party all agreed that we may have to accept a rather slow development at the MBFR. This is not only due to the fact that we simply have to wait for a political breakthrough in Vienna. There are possibilities of substantial reductions but the need for stability makes it absolutely necessary to agree only on reduction which result in a situation of military balance.

European nations should more seriously than has been the case until now work for standardisation of armaments and accept a redistribution of defence tasks. There is a special reason for social democrats, who do not believe in any dogmatic importance of "national defence", to achieve more efficiency in this way. In order to remove pressure from the military industrial complex, which also results in efficient defence spending, nationalisation of arms factories should be considered favourably. At the same time it is necessary to make provisions for coping with the unemployment resulting from future disarmament and reduction of troops.

The working party supported the idea of prolonging the discussion among social democrats about security policy. In many countries social democrats are taking part in government. The common political background of these governments should make it possible to achieve common goals of political day to day action.

The Attitude Towards the Army

It appeared in the working group that many social democratic parties experienced difficulties in dealing with defence matters. Especially when social democratic ministers take the responsibility for defence, this becomes clear. These politicians are being criticized by the army for having a negative attitude towards defence and they are criticized by their parties for having too much understanding for the army. It is part of social democratic policy to take responsibilities in a society which is far away from social democratic ideals. This principle must also be applied in defence matters.

Military leaders as a result of tradition, as a result of their training and selection, tend to have a more conservative outlook on society than the average outlook. Social democrats necessarily have a more progressive outlook on society than the average outlook. Therefore the distance between the two will generally be rather big. It is not a sufficient solution to declare that military leaders should submit themselves to the democratically elected governments, in the way this is expected from other civil servants. Pragmatic approaches should be started in order to achieve a good cooperation. One of the possibilities is to have high officers take part in seminars together with other civil servants and politicians.

The army as a whole in most countries is still structured in a way which has been left behind in other parts of society. It must

be gradually transformed into a democratically working body. Social democrats do not accept the argument that co-management diminishes the efficiency of industrial and other enterprises. Therefore they cannot accept it from the army either.

Arms Production

The working group also paid attention to the problem of arms development, production and sales. Great concern was expressed about the present situation characterized by the fierce competition of private industries and the nationalistic approach to this problem by the various countries. This situation does not only provide a stimulus for the arms race, but has also dangerous implications for the developing countries. Many firms who lose competition for the sale of arms in their own country or in allied countries are bound to look for markets in developing countries, in order to recover their investments.

The need to get this phenomenon under political control, by setting up general criteria for export of arms on the one hand and by developing and putting into practice a common philosophy about arms production on the other hand, was generally subscribed to. In this respect attention was also paid to the position of European industries in relation to the United States. It was considered undesirable to follow a course which would make Europe more dependent upon US policies and production in this respect.

The group recommends that this subject be studied thoroughly in order to seek a common social democratic answer to these pressing questions.

Working Party III

1. The need for more coordination of policies was stressed by all delegates. Several remarked that not only foreign and defence policies should be coordinated, but also economic and monetary policies. These problems of peace and security could not be isolated from economic and other problems.

The need was stressed for a thorough ideological exchange of views and coordination before coordinating other policies.

As to the procedure to be followed, the working group was of the opinion that detailed proposals for the realisation of this coordination should be drawn up and decided upon by the next Congress of the Socialist International and the new Bureau of the S.I.

The coordination should be realised within the S.I. to prevent the emerging of a third policymaking body between the Federation of Social Democratic Parties of E.C. member states and the S.I.

To prevent criticism of a too European-centred S.I., more attention should be given to activities of the S.I. with regard to Latin America and Africa.

As a step to 'coordination' an informal structure could be set up, with the task to make an inventory of different policies.

Some working groups should formulate common positions, as a preparation of the Belgrade Conference.

The S.I. could ask one of the member parties to carry out the work in the initial stages, to speed things up.

2. On the different aspects of 'peace and security' the following aspects were discussed.

Security situation in Europe

- Several delegates were of the opinion that an independent European security policy is impossible: the situation is controlled by the superpowers — who would eventually "shoot it out" on European ground.
- Security policy can only be defined at a global level.
- Several delegates attributed more importance to the potential conflict between "the haves and the have-nots", than to the East-West military confrontation.
- It was deemed important to press for the human rights of the East Europeans.

Spain-Nato

Membership of Spain in Nato can only be considered if Spain has a democratic government.

Some delegates expressed doubts as to the advantages of Spanish Nato membership.

Naturally the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party does not wish Spain to apply for Nato membership because it would upset the strategic equilibrium and would harm the security situation in general, with possible adverse effects on Yugoslavia in particular.

Briefly the problem of France's and Britain's exports of armaments and development of nuclear forces was touched upon.

The following were considered as problem areas: Yugoslavia and the northern part of the Atlantic Ocean.

Greece, Turkey, Cyprus

The conflict is influenced by the East-West confrontation. The working group was of the opinion that social democratic parties have a responsibility in contributing to a solution.

A special problem is the framework, within which contacts at the party level can be established,

In general, it was stated that the European Communities should develop a more precise and active policy with regard to the Mediterranean region.

Contacts between Social Democrats and Communists

There was general agreement on the usefulness of contacts. Some disagreement was noted on the formal procedures; especially contacts at the party level were questioned.

— It was indicated that one should differentiate between the several contacts. The criterion should be the possibility for useful discussions.

— Ideological competition is not feared. On the contrary, we should intensify our involvement in the ideological debate and struggle.

— Social democracy must represent an inspiring alternative. The S.I. should vitalize and modernize the ideological discussion.

— There is a very intricate relationship between problems of security, economic development, employment, social security, social systems and democracy.

The working group supported strongly the initiative of the Nordic social democratic parties to organize a conference of European social democratic parties on this problem.

— Further, the working group noticed a relationship between unemployment and the definition of the ethical value of employment.

— More information should become available on the usefulness of "traditional" socialist solutions to change society and solve the economic problems.

— The European Communities should be enlarged to include southern European countries.

The relation between "enlargement" and the possibility of finding a solution to the economic problems of the Nine should be analyzed.

ELECTIONS

Belgium

Socialist Party Gains

In general elections held in Belgium on April 17 the opposition Socialist Party made significant gains, increasing its representation in the Chamber of Representatives from 59 to 62 seats (out of 212) and its share of the votes from 26.7 to 27.1 per cent. At the same time, however, the ruling Christian Socials led by Prime Minister Léon Tindemans improved their position con-

siderably and will continue to form the major partner in whatever kind of new coalition government is eventually formed.

The Socialist Party issued separate lists of candidates for its Dutch- and French-speaking wings (respectively the BSP and the PSB) but campaigned on a joint document of proposed constitutional reform. During the campaign the Socialist Party co-chairman, Willy Claes, called for the formation after the election of a coalition government of Christian Socials, Socialists and one of the regional parties.

In the event, the Socialists gained three seats in French-speaking Wallonia and one in Flanders, but lost a seat in Brussels. The Christian Socials gained eight seats altogether while both the *Rassemblement Walloon* and the *Volksunie* — the two extremist national parties — suffered a loss in seats, the former being reduced from 13 to 5 members in the Chamber.

Socialist Notebook

Nordic Labour Congress

Adopted at the Nordic Labour Congress in Helsinki, November 24–25, 1976, with representatives of the Social Democratic Parties of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden and of the Confederation of Trade Unions of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden.

The Nordic labour movement intends to meet the future with the demand for a society built on solidarity and cooperation. We intend to work against a future society founded either on the competitive principles of capitalism or on communism's centralized control. Our goal is a society based on the principles of liberty, equality, solidarity and democracy, and a society that regards work as a basic value. A person's ability to work together with others is the most essential of all resources.

Work should allow people the possibility to develop according to their own capacities and abilities. Employment and the possibility to participate in work is therefore a fundamental value, and not merely a means of income and livelihood. Each person should have the right to have a meaningful job with a secure income. The result of this work shall serve the needs of the individual and of society. Production must be organized in such a way that everyone can carry out his work with a sense of self-realization and respect.

The right of ownership should not mean the right to wield power over people. The concentration of economic power in the hands of a few people conflicts with the ideals of democracy. Everyone should have a real possibility to influence the activities in which he participates. The goal is to make all people equal participants in working life and production.

The Nordic labour movement's historic contribution can be traced down through the centuries, from the introduction of political democracy, through the work for equality and social security and on to today's work for a democratic economy.

The cooperation between the trade union and the political labour movement has been of decisive importance for this development. This cooperation should continue if we are to develop society forms which are

founded on solidarity among men and freedom for the individual. Efforts should be concentrated along the following main lines:

1. **A long-range employment policy** should be set up to create more jobs and work for all. Jobs should be located in areas where people live.

2. The Nordic countries are rich in natural resources. Therefore the Nordic countries have a particular responsibility for a well thought out and **well-planned environment and resources policy**. The resources of the earth and the sea have to be preserved in such a way that they provide the basis for careful, productive use. The pace of energy consumption should be slowed down.

3. **The differences in the distribution of incomes and fortunes must be evened out.** The trade union movement itself must continue to create an equitable wage policy. Society should set up a planned income policy, which meets the demands of the trade union movement for a satisfactory development of incomes and a moderated rise in prices. Tax and social policies shall provide a more just distribution of goods. Just demands for better conditions for the handicapped and other underprivileged groups, as well as for children and young people, can only be met if the economy of society's agencies is strengthened. The fight for equality between men and women shall be continued with vigour. An education which is meaningful for the individual and prepares him or her for fully equal participation in working life should be guaranteed for all.

4. **Democracy in working life** is a central goal for the Nordic labour movement. It is our common view that participation in working life involves the right of influence and that influence should be used to change and improve the working environment and the working conditions. The working environment should be altered in such a way as to prevent those who work in production from being exposed to physical or mental injury. The objective of technical innovations should be to make work more meaningful, not to increase efficiency.

5. **A democratization of economic life** presupposes that people acquire influence over the vast resources of capital which today are controlled by powerful private

interests. Wage-earners have a legitimate claim to their share of the growth of capital. Present efforts to convert institutions of credit into democratically governed organs must be continued.

6. The longing for freedom, social justice and peace is the same for all peoples.

A world in peace implies respect for the independence and autonomy of all nations. A world in peace implies social and economic justice. A world in peace implies international cooperation in which the needs of the nations control production and trade.

The solidarity of democratic socialism embraces all peoples of the world. It provides an inspiring alternative to totalitarian communism and inhuman capitalism. The goal for democratic socialism is freedom of all peoples and peace of the whole world.

SPOe May Day Message

The 1977 May Day message of the Austrian Socialist Party (SPOe) contained the following passages related to détente and continental cooperation:

"Austria's Socialists declare themselves in favour of détente in world politics, which, as recently declared at the Conference of Social Democratic Party Leaders in Amsterdam [see this issue], is the only way to avoid war. A war in the atomic age would mean destruction."

"The policy of détente as substantiated by the signing of the final agreement of Helsinki by 35 nations has already produced certain improvements — 10,000 families were able to be reunited, and it at last became possible for millions of people to visit relatives and friends on the other side of a border which was previously practically uncrossable. In the communist countries themselves the voices of those who demand democratic freedoms at home are growing louder and more audible."

"Austria's Socialists support the policy of détente and advocate continental cooperation to solve common problems, especially in the fields of energy supplies, communications and protection of the environment."