SOCIALIST DIARY

S I RESEARCH COUNCIL

The sixth seminar of the Socialist International Research Council was held in Amsterdam at the invitation of the Dutch Labour Party from 17-18 November. Representatives from research departments or institutes associated with member parties of the International in the following countries took part in the seminar: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Israel, Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Sweden. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions was also represented in an observer capacity.

The main subject discussed was Economic Planning, a continuation of the discussion begun at the last seminar held in April this year in Denmark. Countries which were not represented at that seminar were able to provide information on the techniques of intervention used in those countries. The discussion was then guided by a paper, 'Towards an Assessment of Economic Planning', presented by Geoff Bish, Research Secretary of the British Labour Party, which helped participants to make a preliminary assessment of the problems and practices of Economic Planning.

The other main topic for consideration by the seminar was Employment Policy, introduced by Oscar Debunne, Director of the Emile Vandervelde Institute of Belgium. Participants discussed a paper, 'Towards Full Employment', by Oscar Debunne which he had presented to a conference held last June in Stockholm, at the invitation of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, at which European member parties of the International took part to consider co-ordinated policies for full employment and economic growth without inflation.

The seminar accepted an invitation from the French Socialist Party to hold the next seminar in Paris next April at which the problems created by multinational companies and proposals put forward by the International's sub-committee on multinationals for a code of practice on multinational companies for possible adoption by governments, would be the main subject.

SICCO MANSHOLT

Sicco Mansholt, Vice-Chairman of the Socialist International and former President of the EEC Commission, represented the Socialist International at the annual conference of the Irish Labour Party held at Dun Laoghaire, 21-23 November.

EAST GERMANY

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Different Ways of Thinking

A major aspect of the various discussions concerned the difference between the two political systems. Although it was agreed that both democratic socialism and communism pursue radical change of the capitalist system, the PvdA delegation emphasised that it was unacceptable that in the so-called socialist countries, democratic socialists were invariably, for convenience's sake, thrown together with the capitalists. This was denied by Erich Honecker as follows: "with the capitalists we talk at Leipzig rather than with you". By no means for the first time, it was clear to the delegation that debate on such issues can lead to painful clashes. However, these were not evaded since it was felt that even embarrassing clashes on concepts of personal freedom and political freedom in general can contribute to improved East-West understanding. This is true, even if it is only to discover that what both sides understand by the word "democracy" can be divorced by deep-seated conceptual differences.

Portugal

The GDR is intensely pre-occupied with developments in Portugal and the SED maintains strong links with the Portuguese Communist Party (PC). For that reason, the PvdA delegation deliberately brought the matter to the fore. A summary of its agruments follows: The delegation regards the Portuguese Socialist Party (PSP) as the most important party in bringing social changes about in Portugal and demands that the SED, as the sister-party of the Portuguese Communist Party, respect and acknowledge freedom of action for all democratic parties. In the Portuguese situation, the SED should promote continued cooperation between the PSP, PC and the Portuguese Popular Democratic Party within the present government because this ensures a government that represents the chief social groups in Portugal and is in a position, moreover, to act as a barrier against a regression to fascism. The PvdA delegation also identified an important international political facet of the Portuguese development: a democratic evolution in Portugal is of the greatest significance to the interpretation of détente in Europe.

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CROSLAND ON DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM

JANITSCHEK ON THE INTERNATIONAL

VAN DEN BERGH ON EAST GERMANY

PONTILLON ON GUY MOLLET

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Antonio Giolitti

THE ITALIAN LEFT

What key should one adopt to open the first door leading into the field of the Italian Left?

I am very tempted to try a psychoanalytical one even at the risk of irritating dogmatic Marxists. In fact I believe that to decipher the behaviour of the Italian Left, one needs to attempt to understand its complexes: a guilt complex as far as the Communist party is concerned; an inferiority complex for the Socialists. An analysis of these complexes may provide a reply to the question which comes naturally to the mind of those who observe the historical position of the Italian Left: Why haven't these political forces, which were the protagonists in the struggle against fascism in the Resistance and in the foundation of a democratic Republic, been able to present themselves as a possible and viable alternative in the area of government, to the political forces of the Centre and the Right.

Why is it that in Italy we don't have a normal democratic dialect? Why is it that every alternative hypothesis takes on overdramatised traumatic aspects?

Lacking an alternative to the forces of the right Italian democracy is lame and limps along on one leg. The present situation of dead-lock created by the distribution of electoral forces and the opposed ideologies of the two main parties — the Christian Democrats and the Communist Party — has been defined as an "imperfect two-party system". This has led to a perverse form of political stability. In the thirty years between 1945 and 1975 Italian society has grown up and changed profoundly; the political framework of this society, however, has remained substantially the same during this period which has seen the Christian Democrats uninterruptedly in power at the head of the government. However, this has not led to stable government because of the recurrent contrasts between the parties which have made up the government coalitions and between the various groups or "correnti", as we call them, making up these parties. As a result, we have had the worst of all political worlds, with the majority parties and opposition both suffering from immobility, unstable governments, and the combination of both these evils which has led to a sort of political "stagflation".

This state of affairs leads to the impression that many foreign political commentators have that democracy in Italy is always in the balance and, held together by acrobatic feats and byzantine manoeuvres, it hovers on the brink of the abyss. This situation also gives rise to the opinion that as the *Economist* wrote on 29 March 1972 —"in a sense Italian democracy is at the mercy of the Italian Communists. But paradoxically" — the *Economist* added — "they would be the ones least likely to benefit from its collapse. And that is the single best guarantee of democratic survival at the moment."

The Italian Look

The Communist Party's guilt complex can be understood if we consider the way in which many people in Italy look at it: with admiration for the decisive contribution it made to the struggle against Fascism, to the Resistance movement, for its seriousness, competence, organisation and efficiency; and with fear for its origins, its leanings in the international field, its ideological and programmatic ambiguities and I imagine also on account of its name. It's serious, it's sound, it talks sense; it's just a pity, that it's a Communist party, and therefore to use the title of a famous English play " 'Tis Pity She's a Whore". It is in this light that many Italians and many foreigners see the Communist Party. Moreover the Party is aware of this and suffers on account of it, but, however hard it tries, whatever it says or does it cannot get rid of this reputation. It has said and done many things to establish itself as a bona fide democratic party. I would even go so far as to say that in a certain sense it has done too much: to keep in with the Catholics it even voted the famous Article 7 of the Constitution which incorporates in the structure of the Italian Republic the Concordat stipulated in 1929 between the fascist government and the Vatican; its economic programmes have always been extremely prudent, not to say cautious, the word "nationalisation" never appears in them and not too much is even made of the word "planning".

To be sure the Communist party should do just this to get rid of this fear: "name his name and tell plainly" that it is a Socialist party. On the contrary it does just the reverse; it continues to call Socialist countries, parties and régimes which are the reverse of Socialism. This is not only equivocal and ambiguous, it is a fundamental divergence which divides Communists from Socialists as Leszek Kolokawski makes abundantly clear in an essay in the form of a letter in *The Socialist Register* in the issue of June this year, with which I wholeheartedly agree. I further believe that the time has come to raise the problems of the struggle for socialism in the communist countries

Caught in this dilemma, suspected on account of its bad reputation, what can the Community Party do if it doesn't want to change its name or its bad company. It is trying to do what old-fashioned girls did when they wanted to safeguard their honour; get themselves chaperoned. And what could be better than a Catholic chaperone? The search for this chaperone — that is an agreement with the Christian Democrats — has been constant in Communist Party policy from the government of national unity in the years 1945-1947 up to the present proposal for the "historic compromise".

Now I must explain what I mean by the Socialist Party's inferiority complex. This originated with two traumatic experiences and two disappointments. The first of these was its loss of the leadership of the Left in electoral terms. After their successes in the first post-war elections the Socialists have seen a continual modification of the balance of power between them and the Communists. The balance has tilted in the latter's favour with a continual haemorrhage of votes going to them.

The second trauma and disappointment has been caused by the repeated splits in the party in comparison with the massive solidarity of the Communist Party; these splits moreover have always had as their determining factor the relationship between the Socialist Party and the Communist Party. The most traumatic moment in the relations between them was the Fronte Democratico Popolare (Democratic Popular Front) experience in the 1948 April elections. The catastrophic electoral result that we had in this election forced us to re-examine the relationship with the CP and marked the beginning of a long period of separation and the reconquest of autonomy for the party.

The Socialist Purge

Having re-established itself as an autonomous and democratic party, "above every suspicion" the Socialist Party seemed to purge itself of its inferiority complex and managed to stabilise itself and, almost in defiance of the Communist Party, collaborated with the Christian Democrat Party in the Centre-Left Governments which followed one another in the period between 1963 and 1974. But it is just the experience of the Centre-Left coalitions which brought on a recurrence of the inferiority complex because in fact the Communist Party managed to profit at one and the same time both from the advantages of providing a vigorous efficient and relatively easy opposition in a country where cause for dissatisfaction and protest have multiplied daily, and the advantage accruing from having an indirect influence on the government resulting from the "special" relationship with the Christian Democrats, who, from behind a façade of rigid anti-communism, have always tried to soften up the opposition of the Communist Party.

Now the proposal of an open agreement with the Christian Democrat Party advanced by the Communist Party with the "historic compromise" once more threatens to reduce the Socialist Party's rôle from that of the lead to a walking-on part.

It is now time to bring out into the open the so-called "villians of the piece", the Christian Democrats who have remained in the wings all this time. Both the socialist strategy proclaimed at their 1955 conference about an agreement between Socialists and Catholics, and the Communist Party's "historic compromise" are founded on two assumptions; first that the Christian Democrats are a large popular force and secondly that there are large Catholic sections of the population which as such constitute a political problem and which are naturally represented by the Christian Democrat Party.

The qualification Catholic was instrumental in carrying out that function. It supplied the mortar for cementing together very different social forces, from agricultural labourers to tycoons of Capitalism. It obtained the support of the Church and forced the Americans to choose the Christian Democrats as the main bulwark against Communism. If therefore it is true to say that the Christian Democrats are a large popular force on account of the varied social composition of their electorate, it is just as true to say that its political function has been that of an important reactionary force. By now there is a large authoritative and well documented literature in support of this thesis.

Crisis of Identity

International détente, the new Catholicism after the Vatican Council, the increasing maturity of Italian society have taken something away from the *raison d'être* of Catholic anti-Communism. This does not mean that there is any less room or need for a moderate conservative party. But the original identity of the Christian Democrat Party is in crisis. The Christian Democrat Party no longer appears as the guarantor of either the religious ideals of the former or of the material interests of the latter. If the Christian Democrat Party doesn't change itself radically and continues to remain in a bunker of Catholic anti-Communism it will leave room in the centre for other political forces, which may of course be of a Christian or Catholic inspiration themselves.

Italian society today is very different from the society over which the Christian Democrats established their hegemony in 1945 and in which, for fifteen years, from 1948 to 1963, the left as a whole was unable to enlarge its sphere of influence. I want briefly to mention what seem to me the most important aspects of this change. There has been a headlong rush to industrialisation—mainly export-led—which has been entrusted to the forces of the market economy; parallel to this there has been a massive shift in the working population from agriculture into industry and from the South to the North. There has therefore been a growth in the influence and the rôle of the workers and a parallel growth, increase in maturity and acquisition of responsibility in the most important trade unions. These have begun a process of unification and conquest of autonomy *vis-à-vis* the parties. The most advanced sectors of the entrepreneurial and managerial classes have shown that they fully understand the new realities of the working scene and have begun to show a growing intolerance of the vast "Old-Boy" network

and political graft put together by the Christian Democrat Party, and the attendant evils of the running down and wasting of financial resources which has been its direct consequence. This "pork-barrel" policy has favoured the abnormal growth of an unproductive bureaucratic middle class which has flooded into the service industries, local government and public bodies.

This impetuous but distorted development has provoked widespread and serious social unrest which on the one hand has increased the electoral strength of the Communist Party and on the other nourished extremist groups. The spread of an urban way of life and of mass communications has favoured the public debate of ideas, the development of movements of women's liberation, students' protest, the spread of grass roots of democratic reform and a cultural reawakening in which the so-called forces of Catholic dissent have played a particularly significant part — and this in Italy is a factor of far greater importance than in other countries.

The Centre Left

At the beginning of the sixties it appeared clear that this development model was entering a crisis situation. The awareness of this crisis and these necessities led the Socialist Party to try to agree a programme with the Christian Democrats and assume responsibility in government; this opened the way to the decade of the Centre-Left. The initial hopes and ambitions were great; the results were disappointing. It was to have been a decade of reforms and of economic planning; it was in fact a decade of continual bickering and disagreement between Christian Democrats and Socialists about the nature of those reforms and the necessary economic planning. Certainly a coalition of this type dominated by the right-wing conservative forces in the Christian Democrat Party was not in a position to overcome the barrier of vested interests. But I am speaking from personal experience — having been several times Minister of Budget and Economic Planning (lucus a non lucendo!) in Centre-Left governments — when I saw how just was Lord Keynes' observation that "the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas".

Nevertheless we do not regret that experience. And if on occasions we do tend to have regrets, we can say with Boccaccio "better to do something and regret it than not to do something and regret it"; although it is true that when he said it he was talking about love; but it is Machiavelli who quotes him and therefore I feel fully authorised to apply it to politics. We are convinced that the presence of the Socialists in the government during that decade created a political climate which was more favourable for the civilised discussion of ideas, eliminated intolerable "witch hunting" practices, and achieved very significant progress in the democratic organisation of the State. The regions were set up, and there were important reforms in the field of civil rights with the Workers' Statute, the divorce law and reforms in the educational and fiscal fields. No less important was the fact that in this way the Socialist Party benefitted from being a party of government, that is a party able to take into the area of government responsibilities, the social forces that it represents and that always in the history of Italy have been condemned to remain in opposition.

Change at Last

The change in society finally managed to produce the beginnings of a change on the political scene with the victory of the supporters of divorce against the Christian Democrats and the fascists in the Referendum of the 12th of May 1974 and with the local government and regional elections of the 15th June 1975. The Christian Democrat Party now finds itself in a crisis; it is the beginning of the end of a period of "masterly inactivity" which has lasted for thirty years. But since no establishment prepares for the succession following its replacement there is no ready made alternative to the Christian Democrat régime. And for the reasons stated above any alternative is made more difficult and problematic because the Communist Party has had greater electoral success than the Socialists. We are now faced by a transition period which of necessity will be long; and with a series of governments which will be necessarily weak. The gap between society and the State is widening. And at the same time social differences and the political struggle are becoming more acute because the struggle for the distribution of income is always bitterer when the size of the cake to be distributed is getting smaller.

It is because we are faced by this situation that we must weigh up the rôle of the Trade Unions. In any discussion of the Italian Left this must be carefully considered.

Two fundamental attitudes today characterise the three large Italian Trade Union Confederations which have joined forces, pursuing a common policy, although their organisation is still separate. They feel themselves coresponsible for the defence and consolidation of the democratic system. They do not consider an increase in money wages as their number one priority but rather full employment and the increase of real purchasing power, and the improvement of the working and living conditions of the working classes; they therefore regard those reforms and public investments (in the educational, health, housing and public transport sectors, which improve the quality of life of the working classes, as of paramount importance.

This position of the Trade Unions is a necessary condition for safeguarding democracy and for a policy of economic development and social progress. It is not however sufficient on its own. The Unions must find themselves in tune with the parties in the government and the latter must carry out their policies clearly, coherently and with credibility, working towards the same objectives. I stress *carry out* their policies and not just *promise to want to carry* them out.

The Socialist Role

The problem is therefore: how can we get round the difficulties created by this state of affairs. To begin with, the balance between the various parties making up the coalition governments (and in Italy at the present time and in the forseeable future there will only be majorities for coalition governments) should be such as to render the programme of reforms and investment credible to the unions. With this end in view the presence and weight and rôle of the Socialist Party could be decisive; but the Socialist Party must be put in such a position as to provide the government with this credibility, without losing its own credibility. No re-edition of a Centre-Left government, that is of a government with the pretentions of being the expression of a permanent, stable — the Communists would call this "historic" — compromise between the Christian Democrats and the Socialist Party would be credible. Between these two parties which are so profoundly different — more different after ten years of Centre-Left governments than before — only tactical compromises, agreed programmes, consisting of precise, well-defined commitments, linked to a similar precise distribution of government responsibilities are possible and perhaps necessary. This hypothesis however can only arise if the general election which should be held in 1977 evens up the balance of power between the two parties, thereby obliging the Christian Democrats to renounce their hegemony of the past thirty years; and when at the beginning of the new legislature a government programme can be planned over a period of time which will permit credible commitments to be made. Until new elections we can only have a government by the so-called "small coalition", like the present one supported in parliament by the Socialists.

Secondly, we must establish a relationship between the government and the Communist Party in opposition based not on collision but on discussion. Naturally discussion like marriage needs the consent of both parties. The Communist Party proclaims and professes that it wishes to hold this discussion. Furthermore it is clearly not aiming at the target of achieving a majority of the left that is of polling more than 50 per cent together with the Socialists. Besides we are divided from the Communists by their way of interpreting socialism; when the Communist Party maintains that there is socialism in Czechoslovakia it is admitting that there can be socialism without the democratic liberties. The Communist Party is still not in agreement with us on this point; it hasn't as yet changed sufficiently.

Communist Involvement

But discussion is not sufficient in the present situation of profound crisis in the country as a whole. Through discussion we must obtain a commitment of co-responsibility from the Communist Party on all fundamental decisions and questions of choice. Italy's place in the world (European Community, NATO), the guidelines of economic policy and problems of institutional reform. As the *Economist,* which I quoted earlier has said, the Communist Party is deeply and sincerely committed to the consolidation of democracy in Italy: it has been demonstrating this for at least thirty years and is now demonstrating with its large scale direct participation in local government and all the responsibilities that entails. What we must now finally do is to persuade it to translate this attitude into an active acceptance of responsibility, and this naturally means it must agree to pay the price in terms of coherence. The Italian problem today is to involve the Communist Party in democratic progress, not to defend democracy from the Communist Party. In order to achieve this the parties forming the government must abandon the arrogance they have assumed with long years in power, recognise their own limits, allow the main opposition party to exercise its full powers of inspection and verification with unlimited access to information and unlimited freedom of enquiry. This is the necessary condition for ensuring that the measure of consent supporting the government is equal to the difficulties it must face.

If those are our short-term problems, our maximum effort should be devoted as well to ensuring there is coherence between present political action and our long term strategy, for translating the values of socialism into political, social and economic realities. This is our essential *raison d'être* and we must never lose sight of the fact. A socialist party cannot limit itself to parish-pump politics. Moreover, Nietzsche warned us a century ago that "The time of parish-pump politics is past; already the next century will bring with it the struggle for the domination of the world — the obligation to politics on a world scale". Our mission, our vocation — and this we can call historic — is to struggle towards the goal of a world not dominated and overwhelmed by the barbarities of a system in which wealth is power and power is wealth, but is rather governed by the rules of civilised societies.

SOCIALISM: EQUALITY WITH LIBERTY

Social Democracy

Anthony Crosland

I start by asking the basic question: how should we define Socialism? We must not subscribe to the fallacy that some ideal Socialist society can be said to exist, of which blueprints can be drawn, and which will be ushered in as soon as certain specific reforms have been achieved. When presented with such blueprints, we should react as the great liberator Simón Bolívar reacted when, having by then learned many hard lessons in practical politics, he wrote the first of his great manifestoes in temporary exile in 1812. He then expressed himself as follows:

"The codes consulted by our magistrates were not those which could teach them the practical sciences of government, but were those devised by certain benevolent visionaries who, creating fantastic republics in their imaginations, have sought to attain political perfection, assuming the perfectibility of the human race. Thus we were given philosophers for rulers, philanthropy for legislation, dialectics for tactics, and sophists for soldiers."

So we shall not suddenly wake up one day, as many early Socialist revolutionaries naïvely hoped and expected, and find that something called "Socialism" has arrived outside the window. For the word "Socialism" is not in any way an exact descriptive term, connoting a particular social structure, past, present or even immanent in some ideologue's mind.

Rather it describes a set of values,

of aspirations, of principles which socialists wish to see embodied in the organisation of society. What are these values? I believe that essentially they are these.

First, an overriding concern for the poor, the deprived and generally the underdog, so that when considering the claims on our resources we give an exceptionally high priority to the relief of poverty, distress and social squalor.

Secondly, a belief in equality. By equality we mean more than a meritocratic society of equal opportunities, in which unequal rewards would be distributed to those most fortunate in their genetic endowment or family background. We also mean more than a simple redistribution of income We want a wider social equality embracing the distribution of property, the educational system, social-class relationships, power and privilege in industry—indeed, all that is enshrined in the age-old socialist dream of a "classless" society.

To us, the fundamental divide between Left and Right, socialists and non-socialists, has always been about the distribution of wealth, power and class status.

Thirdly, strict social control over the environment—to enable us to cope with the exploding problems of urban life, to plan the use of our land in the interests of the community, and to diminish the growing divergence between private and social cost in the whole field of environmental pollution. (This is also an aspect of social equality, since the rich can often buy themselves a good environment; only social action can give the less well-off the same protection).

This is not necessarily an exhaustive list; but when I search my mind, these three aims seem to me to constitute the essence of social democracy in the 1970s.

Social Democracy and Communism

How then does Social Democracy differ from Communism? It differs in two fundamental respects.

First, it is a thesis about means as well as ends. In particular, it rejects the Marxist thesis that Socialism requires, depends on, and indeed can be defined as, the nationalisation of the means of production, distribution and exchange. The ownership of the means of production is not now, in our view, the key factor which imparts to a society its essential character. Collectivism, private ownership or a mixed economy are all compatible with widely varying degrees of equality, freedom, democracy, exploitation, class feeling, industrial democracy and economic growth. We can therefore pursue our goals within the framework of a mixed economy, with public ownership taking its place as only one of a number of possible means for attaining our objectives. Indeed, I would go further. A mixed economy is essential to Social Democracy. For while a substantial public sector is clearly needed to give us the necessary control over the economy, complete state collectivism is without question incompatible with liberty and democracy.

This leads me to the second and most fundamental difference—indeed, an unbridgeable gulf—between Social Democracy and Communism: namely, that Social Democracy is democratic. Underlying all our beliefs is a profound concern for liberty, democracy and the rule of law. We refuse to accept that Socialism has any meaning except within a framework of liberty for the individual and representative democracy.

Democracy today is under threat, as it always has been and always will be. The brutal events in Chile have evoked anxious doubts about the democratic road to Socialism in Latin America. The recent developments in India have come as a truamatic shock to Social Democrats all over the world. In Portugal the balance between democracy and dictatorship is still tragically poised and precarious.

Less than a month ago Mr Brezhnev publicly voiced his support for those hard-liners like Konstantin Zarodov, who argue that any cooperation between Communist Parties and others is only tactical and that Communist Parties must never lose their hegemony over the working class in the revolutionary process.

Even in Western Europe, there is deep scepticism about the democratic credentials of the powerful French and Italian Communist Parties. And some pessimists fear the consequences for democracy of a combination of slow economic growth and rapid inflation in societies where rising expectations have developed from aspirations into fierce demands.

Italian Communism

I want to say a word about Italy which is, after Portugal, the West European country most seriously threatened by Communism. It is quite wrong to believe that the Italian Communists are basically different from Communists in other countries. What is different is their strategy, their style and perhaps also their record as extremely efficient administrators in local government. But it would be a disastrous mistake for democrats in Italy, either on the Left or on the Right, to believe that the "historic compromise" proposed by the Communists can actually be achieved. It is impossible to envisage a Communist party in power in Italy which would in the long run safeguard democratic principles. It is impossible to imagine Communist rule in Italy without a gradual watering-down of basic civil liberties such as freedom of the press. And I certainly cannot see the Italian Communist Party, after having come to power by democratic means, allowing their electoral strength to be tested in any subsequent election.

For such action would not only contradict their Marxist philosophy of the dictatorship of the proletariat, it would also be utter stupidity on their part. And whatever one can and should say about the Communists, one can hardly call them fools.

These threats and anxieties must make us more resolute, not less, in the defence of liberty.

Need we define more closely what we mean by liberty? I doubt it. For we all know what in practice it means to speak our minds quite freely, to write and debate without fear of censorship, to support this democratic party or that, and above all to live without the fear of secret police, arrest, interrogation and torture. The difference between our system and theirs is surely summed up in a poignant passage in Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago*: "It seems a virtual fairy tale that somewhere, at the ends of the earth, an accused person can avail himself of a lawyer's help. This means having beside you, in the most difficult moment of your life, a clear-minded ally who knows the law." Simple words; but never was a more eloquent tribute paid to freedom and the rule of law.

If I argue for Social Democracy as against Communism, I must answer the common but facile question: is not dictatorship more *efficient* than democracy? Do we not pay a heavy price, in terms for example of economic growth, if we choose the road of freedom and democracy?

My answer, which I assert dogmatically, is: No. I call for support on innumerable historical examples.

When I was growing up in the 1930s, Britain seemed indolent and incompetent, while Nazi Germany appeared a terrifying symbol of ruthless totalitarian competence. Yet in World War II, when the final crunch came, democratic Britain mobilised its resources far more fully and efficiently than Nazi Germany; and of all the great nations engaged in that war, Mussolini's Italy was incomparably the least efficient.

In the immediate post-war years, many of my European colleagues were deeply alarmed by the rapid rate of economic growth in the Communist countries, which they attributed to the advantage of dictatorship. But, in fact, if we compare different countries in terms of economic growth, we find no evidence that dictatorships perform better than democracies. The Soviet Union, with her agriculture still a disaster area, is forced to buy 10 million tons of wheat from capitalist America. The rates of growth of Germany and Japan far outstrip those of the Communist bloc. Some of the least efficient — and most corrupt — countries of the world are to be found amongst the dictatorships. In recent times, authoritarian régimes seized power in Greece and Chile in the name of clean government and economic competence; both régimes proved a catastrophe.

So: our creed is "equality with liberty". How far, in practice, can we achieve it?

Despite Social Democratic Governments, say the Marxists, inequality has not diminished. The reason is the entrenched power of private ownership; and the solution lies in a massive programme of nationalisation.

In Britain, a passionate academic debate has raged over the trends in the distribution of income and wealth. Books, articles and pamphlets have appeared in a torrential flood. No sooner has one side produced figures to show that inequality persists unchanged, than the other side proves that it has shrunk to the point of non-existence.

Fortunately we now have the definitive first report of the Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth. The text runs to 371 paragraphs, 59 tables and 14 charts; so I hope you will excuse a somewhat breathless summary.

So far as post-tax income is concerned, the top 10 per cent of earners now command 21.4 per cent of total personal incomes, compared with 34.6 per cent immediately before the war. The bulk of the shift occurred between 1939 and 1950, but the trend has continued since, though at a slower pace.

For, as the Royal Commission concludes, "the combined effect of the tax system, the receipt of transfer payments and direct and indirect benefits in kind is . . . a major redistributive one".

For capital wealth, the picture is broadly similar. The top 1 per cent of the population own 17.4 per cent of total wealth (including all pension rights) and the top 10 per cent own 45.7 per cent. Since 1939 the share of the top 1 per cent has fallen very markedly and that of the top 10 per cent considerably; and this redistribution steadily continues.

This statistical evidence confirms the evidence of our senses. Continental beaches, the old haunts of the rich, are now crowded with working people from Germany, Sweden, Holland and Britain, enjoying the pleasures once reserved for the few. The motor-car —that *bête noir* of the conservationist extremists—brings a new freedom to millions of ordinary people. Meanwhile the middle classes moan endlessly over Sunday morning sherry, no longer about the servant problem which is past redemption, but about the imminent financial necessity of sending their children to state rather than to private schools. The evidence of increasing equality is surely undeniable.

Yet so, despite de Toqueville, is the persistence of inequality. I refer not only to the stubborn residue of grinding poverty, though that is real enough. I refer also to the grossly excessive sumptuary spending of the wealthy classes. And the kind of inequality which the statistics do not reveal—the deep-seated barriers of class attitudes and prejudice—has proved more resistant than we had hoped to the effects of economic levelling. We are much nearer to our goal than we were. But there is a long way still to go; and this will be a continuing challenge for generations of socialists to come.

Growth, Ownership and Socialism

The achievement of greater equality without intolerable social stress and a probable curtailment of liberty depends heavily on economic growth. The better-off have been able to accept with reasonable equanimity a decline in their *relative* standard of living because growth has enabled them (almost) to maintain their *absolute* standard of living despite redistribution. And much higher public expenditure has been possible without a general taxpayers' revolt because it too comes (at least in part) out of economic growth (though the now simmering resistance amongst British ratepayers and the meteoric rise of the anti-tax Glistrup Party in Denmark should warn us against over-complacency on this point).

But in the wake of the energy crisis, all the developed countries have suffered a sharp setback to economic growth. If there were reason to believe that this was permanent, and that we were entering a phase of zero growth, Social Democrats would indeed be anxious and confused; for while scarcity persists, we cannot possibly achieve our aims and redeem our pledges without a healthy rate of growth.

I do not myself believe that the setback is permanent, or that post-1972 experience should lead us to modify our views on either the desirability of growth or the possibility of achieving it.

Assuming we want growth, can we achieve it within the mixed economy? Or does it require, as a few people in Britain argue, a rapid and wholesale programme of nationalisation?

I argued the opposite case in my book *The future of Socialism* published in 1956, and again last year in my essay *Socialism Now*. It seems extraordinary that it should still need arguing in view of the unprecedented growth and success of the Western European mixed economies since the war — a success which surely should clinch the argument once and for all.

Moreover, I am not clear that it is appropriate to pursue this issue much further in a lecture on European Social Democracy. For amongst the European Socialist Parties, the British Labour Party is unique in the doctrinal energy which it still devotes to the issue of public ownership. In the comprehensive new draft Programme of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, precisely two brief mentions are made of the extension of collective ownership. In Germany, the SPD abandoned public ownership as a major goal as early as 1959 in the famous Bad Godesberg programme; and Brandt and Schmidt have successfully resisted attempts by some younger members of the Party to restore it to its former prominence. The Austrian Party made no mention of nationalisation in its 13-point programme for their recent—and brilliantly successful—election campaign. Even in France, where a vestigial

Marxism has deeper roots, much more thought is being given to the promotion of industrial democracy as a means of changing power relations, than to the mere transference of ownership.

My own views on public ownership remain unchanged. I believe that it is one of a number of instruments available to government to deal with excessive monopoly power, or consistent under-investment, or (as in the case of oil or minerals or development land) a failure to plan a national resource in the interests of the community. (In a Latin American context it may serve other purposes also; on this I am not competent to judge). It is a useful weapon in a Socialist Government's armoury, and each of the specific nationalisation proposals in the British Labour Government's present programme can be justified on its merits. But no sound social or economic case for a massive nationalisation programme has been made out. And certainly such a programme in Britain would not cure the underlying weakness of British industry. For this can be traced to a narrow and insular conservatism which in turn stems largely from basic weaknesses in our social class structures, causing us (as Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has recently commented) to "devote so much time, money and energy to the class struggle".

Social Democracy and the Voter

Whatever the intellectual verdict on European Social Democracy, there is no denying its immense political vitality.

In practically every West European country, a Social Democratic Party is either in power, or sharing power, or challenging hard for power.

In Britain, in Austria, in Norway, in Sweden, in Denmark and in Malta, Democratic Socialists currently govern alone.

In West Germany they dominate the governing coalition; in Holland they lead it; and they form part of it in Luxembourg, Switzerland and Eire.

As for challengers, in France a Socialist candidate came within 1 per cent of winning the Presidency in 1972. And the Socialist Parties have been in and out of power in the kaleidoscopic shifts of Italian politics.

So, Social Democracy has been highly successful in mobilising political support. Other more extreme parties have to rely on 'ifs' to maintain their plausibility. *If* only the people were not fooled by the mass media. *If* only the truth about our society was not suppressed. *If* only people understood elementary economics; *if* only they had read *Das Kapital*. Social Democracy can rely on hard facts, on how people have actually chosen to behave. And to a remarkable extent, they have chosen to vote for us.

The counterpart of the success of Social Democracy in post-war Western Europe has been the failure of Communism. We can easily forget how uncertain that seemed in the immediate aftermath of 1945. The Communists had established a brutal grip on Eastern Europe; they looked poised for eventual power in France and Italy; no-one could tell how events might develop in a defeated Germany; and even the more stable democracies might not have survived a return to the slumps and unemployment of pre-war capitalism.

Today, however, the Communist threat has been decisively turned back. There are now only three countries with substantial Communist Parties, and in two of those there are hopeful signs. In France, the polls recently showed François Mitterrand and the Socialist Party in a two-to-one lead over the Communists. In Portugal, which we watch with such agonised anxiety, the Soares' Socialists emerged from the elections to the Constituent Assembly as by far the largest single party. Only in Italy have the Communists retained most of their post-war strength, and that largely due to the further disastrous split in the Italian Socialist Party of July 1969.

The Future

The intellectual fashion in the Western World today is deeply pessimistic, even chiliastic. In the words of the American ecodoomster, Robert Heilbroner: "There seems to be a widespread sense that we are living in a period of historic exhaustion. . . . Economic growth and technical achievement, the greatest triumphs of our epoch of history, have shown themselves to be inadequate sources for collective contentment and hope. . . . A society . . . celebrating itself in the act of individual consumption is finally insufficient to retain our loyalty."

Now it may be true that, as Robert Nisbet has recently written, "we live in a kind of twilight age of government, one in which the loss of confidence in political institutions is matched by the erosion of traditional authority in kinship, locality, culture, language, school and other elements of the social fabric". It is certainly true that there is growing evidence of discontent with the authoritarian nature of the industrial work situation, though Social Democrats should welcome this as a force for future advances towards industrial democracy. And perhaps most dangerous, people make more and more incompatible (and often unreasonable) demands on government; and they grow sullen when their expectations, which they now see as entitlements, are not met.

And yet there is another side to the picture. There is little evidence either from casual observation or opinion surveys that people are less generally contented than they were; little evidence that they are less confident that their children's lives will be better than their own; little evidence of a general flight of faith from democratic parties and institutions — indeed, rather than turning to the political extremes, a majority in most European countries seems increasingly to be moving towards the centre.

So for my part, when I look beyond the discontented élite, I find the current pessimism to be much exaggerated. But whether it is or not, we European Socialists still have much to do. Large parts of our traditional aims — the relief of poverty and the pursuit of equality — remain to be accomplished. At the same time, there are new challenges.

For the contradictions of capitalism are not now those which Marx analysed 100 years ago. The need today is for the development of a more profound industrial democracy; for more democratic control over our private and public bureaucracies; for the fostering of a greater sense of community and spirit of cooperation — all combined with the ever-present, everlasting need for vigilance in the defence of liberty. These are challenges which should lift the spirit of socialists for the next stage in advancing our ideals.

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THE STATE OF THE INTERNATIONAL

Hans Janitschek

Like other great movements in world history, the international socialist movement as represented by the Socialist International is based upon an idea powerful enough to capture the imaginations of men and women of all creeds and races in all parts of the world. That idea is the concept of a world governed according to socialist principles, in which conflict, suffering, ignorance, fear, injustice and inequality are banished for ever. It is the concept of a world in which the fundamental things which men have in common and which make them equal would take precedence over the superficial things that may divide them.

Also like other great world movements, international socialism has to cope with a present which is greatly different from its vision of the future — and for that reason the Socialist International, while fully preserving its ideals, has to be practical and pragmatic, seeking solutions to particular problems and working towards limited objectives in the fulfilment of its declared rôle, which is to promote co-operation and understanding between democratic socialist parties throughout the world.

If we look back briefly through the history of the International, we can trace how the quest for the ideal has interacted with the need for pragmatism — how the vision which socialists have held for the future has stood up under the often very heavy burdens of the present.

The important thing about the First International — formed in London in 1864 under the inspiration of Karl Marx — was its psychological impact. Although a relatively small number of people were involved, the First International represented the first attempt by the new industrial working class of Europe to surmount national boundaries and to proclaim the international character of the socialist movement.

First International

The First International had collapsed by 1876, but the inspiration which it generated survived and strengthened as the years passed. The basic message of the First International was that the working classes in the various countries needed their own political organisations, and soon this message was transformed into reality as all over the industrialized world mass political parties based on the working classes were created and quickly reached positions of considerable strength in their respective countries.

By 1889 the time was judged right for the creation of a new International. At a founding Congress held in Paris on July 14, 1889 — exactly a hundred years after the storming of the Bastille at the start of the French Revolution — representatives of these new socialist parties created the Second International. Whereas the First International had suffered from being a "general staff without an army", the Second International was endowed with an ever-growing army of millions of men and women in the mass parties which comprised its membership.

But the world-shattering events of 1914 were to show that the Second International did not possess the strength many of its leading figures had claimed for it. When the critical moment came for European civilisation, the leaders of the socialist parties found themselves powerless to resist the march to war.

It was a tragic episode, which appeared to have buried the ideal of socialism as an international movement for ever. As it turned out, however, the burial was only temporary. Towards the end of the war the old ideal of socialist internationalism had been uncovered and was again inspiring men's actions — although formidable new obstacles to the realisation of the ideal now presented themselves.

Most obviously, the socialist movement found itself deeply divided at the end of the First World War, between Bolshevik-type Communists, who advocated the seizure of power according to Lenin's example in Russia, and the democratic socialists, who preferred the non-violent, parliamentary road to power.

Third International

In 1919 Lenin created the Third International (the Comintern) in Moscow as the international agent of revolution on the Bolshevik model, while the democratic socialist wing of the old Second International re-established separate contact. Attempts to bring the two sides together came to nothing, and in 1923 the rump of the Second International formally reconstituted itself as the Labour and Socialist International at a congress held in Hamburg.

The international socialist movement had suffered its historic schism — with both the Comintern and the LSI claiming to be the true heirs of the First International.

Both Internationals endeavoured to learn from the failures of 1914. From Moscow, the Comintern imposed an iron discipline on its affiliated parties, while the LSI adopted a statute which purported to make its decisions binding on member parties. Both Internationals maintained permanent Secretariats.

But both attempts at a new International resulted in distortion and failure. Stalin used the Comintern as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy, while the LSI found it impossible to impose mandatory decisions on democratic parties operating in democratic countries, especially when some parties had already assumed the reins of government.

In any case, the LSI and the Comintern spent a good deal of their respective energies fighting against one another, while the number of countries

in which their affiliated parties were allowed to exist became fewer and fewer as fascism extended its tentacles across the continent.

One result of the Soviet Communists' inability to tolerate opposition was the formation of the Fourth International by Leon Trotsky, which was dedicated to his doctrines of permanent revolution and which was adhered to then, as now, by extremists on the fringes of the socialist government.

The thirties were a period of continual reverses for the international socialist movement, and when the LSI finally succumbed in 1940 with the capture by the Nazis of its Brussels Secretariat, only a handful of affiliated parties were still functioning. The Comintern was dissolved three years later as a gesture by Stalin to his wartime allies.

The Founding Congress

When the time came to revive the democratic socialist International after the Second World War, an attempt was made to learn from these past failures. The structure of the new organisation as it emerged from the founding Congress of the Socialist International held in Frankfurt in 1951 was determined by a desire to steer a middle course between the lack of structure of the pre-1914 days and the "general staff" concept of the inter-war years.

It was clearly established that the International should not try to impose policy lines on affiliated parties. The statute adopted at Frankfurt states that "the purpose of the Socialist International is to strengthen relations between the affiliated parties and to coordinate their political attitudes *by consent*".

These last two words recognised that affiliated parties which in many countries were now participating in, even forming on their own, the Governments of their respective countries and so could not submit themselves to the dictation of an outside body.

On the other hand, the Socialist International was invested with a much stronger institutional structure than it had ever possessed before.

It should be stressed that the parties affiliated to the International attach the greatest importance and value to their membership of the organisation and to the opportunities for contact and cooperation which it provides outside the usual diplomatic and international channels.

This is particularly true of Party Leaders' Conferences, which are not formally recognised in the Statute, but which have become an increasingly important part of the activity of the International in recent years.

The four most recent such gatherings were held in Paris in January 1973 at the invitation of François Mitterrand, in London in the autumn of the same year just after the October Arab-Israel war, and again in Britain in June 1974, at Chequers, the country home of the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson.

The last Conference took place in West Berlin in early 1975 at the invitation of Willy Brandt.

The special character of these meetings — which are of socialist comrades rather than of national politicians — cannot be fully appreciated by outsiders. They provide a unique forum of personal friendship and understanding, where world issues are discussed without rancour or national prejudice.

When the day arrives that a majority of the world's leaders come from the ranks of democratic socialism and are therefore able to discuss the problems of the world at Party Leaders' Conferences, the world will certainly be a safer place in which to live.

But this is not to imply that the Socialist International's current membership is weak. On the contrary. Whereas at the time of its foundation in 1951, the International comprised 34 member-parties, within little more than 20 years membership has risen to 56 parties. This expansion has taken place in accordance with the stipulation of the International's statute that it is a "self-evident" task to work for association with an ever-increasing number of like-minded parties.

The International Expands

And this expansion has been achieved primarily in the developing countries of the Third World, so that today the International can claim that its non-European members outnumber its European parties. A major advance in this respect was made in 1966 when the category of observer membership was created and the Statute amended so that not only "socialist" parties but also "other progressive democratic parties" became eligible for membership.

The immediate effect of this was to enable several of the traditional popular parties of Latin America to become observer members of the International — one of these being the Radical Party of Chile, which later became part of Salvador Allende's Popular Unity coalition in Chile.

At the same time, the Socialist International has built up close ties with other progressive parties throughout the world which have not become formally associated with the organisation but which share its basic principles.

For various reasons these parties have not wanted to become members of the Socialist International. But they are close to our movement both practically and because they share with us a rejection of the extremes of capitalism and communism and a belief in a middle road based on democracy and socialism.

One important feature of the development of the International in recent years has been the lowering of Cold War barriers. Whereas the Socialist International in its early years refused to accept any cooperation with communist parties, and in fact excluded from its ranks socialist parties which maintained alliances with communist parties, more recently it has taken a more moderate line, leaving each affiliated party to decide for itself how best to conduct its relations with all other parties, including communists.

In the new climate of international détente, several affiliated parties have formed alliances or understandings with the communists of their respective countries — the most notable example being the alliance of the Left in France, which so nearly brought François Mitterrand to the presidency in May 1974.

This is not to say that democratic socialists have in any way given up their ideological opposition to communism — any more than, for example, a Socialist-Liberal coalition would signify that socialists had accepted the principles of liberalism. What has happened is simply that socialist parties are now more able than before to judge their internal political strategies objectively, without the weight of international affairs influencing their decisions.

The essential point to remember is that in open elections democratic socialists have little to fear from communists. The strength of democratic socialism is often compared unfavourably to communism, with figures being cited which are supposed to show that there are more communist parties in the world, with a greater total membership and with a far higher number of voters than the International.

But these figures are extremely misleading. Over 90 per cent of world communism's claimed membership and voting support is concentrated in the handful of countries controlled by communists, where there are legitimate grounds for doubting whether the figures are an accurate reflection of popular feeling.

Social Democracy's Strength

It is undeniably true that with only one or two exceptions, democratic socialism, interpreted in the broad sense, has consistently proved itself to be a stronger electoral force than communism when the contest between the two ideologies has been fair and open.

If we look at the electoral state of democratic socialism in the world today, we find an extremely healthy position. Although recent results in Scandinavia and elsewhere have shown that democratic socialists, like other political movements, must beware of the increasing alienation of many people from the established political processes, nevertheless probably at no time in history have the parties of democratic socialism been stronger than they are today in mid-1975.

Of the parties affiliated to the International the following were participating in government, either alone or as coalition partners, in the course of 1975: the Australian Labor Party, the Austrian Socialist Party, the Costa Rican National Liberation Party, the Finnish Social Democratic Party, the German Social Democratic Party, the British Labour Party, the Irish Labour Party, the Israel Labour Party, the Danish Social Democratic Party, the Jamaican People's National Party, the Luxembourg Socialist Labour Party, the Maltese Labour Party, the Mauritius Labour Party, the Netherlands Labour Party, the Norwegian Labour Party, the Portuguese Socialist Party, the San Marino Independent Social Democratic Party, the Singapore People's Action Party, the Swedish Social Democratic Party, the Swiss Social Democratic Party, the Venezuelan Democratic Action and the New Zealand Labour Party.

During 1975 these governing parties provided no less than 16 heads of government, as follows: Gough Whitlam (Australia), Bruno Kreisky (Austria), Daniel Oduber Quiros (Costa Rica), Anker Jorgensen (Denmark), Kalevi Sorsa (Finland), Helmut Schmidt (Western Germany), Harold Wilson (Britain), Yitzhak Rabin (Israel), Michael Manley (Jamaica), Dom Mintoff (Malta), Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam (Mauritius), Joop den Uyl

THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL, DECEMBER 1975

Member Parties	*Members*	*Votes last elec.*	*Per cent*
Argentine Socialist Party	21,000	179,855	1.9
Australian Labor Party	45,000	3,000,000	48.0
Austrian Socialist Party	694,619	2,334,309	50.4
Belgian Socialist Party	226,731	1,401,725	26.6
Canadian New Democratic Party	350,000	1,467,748	15.4
Chile: Radical Party	27,500	307,126	13.4
Danish Social Democratic Party	120,000	913,155	29.9
Finnish Social Democratic Party	98,000	695,394	24.9
French Socialist Party	150,000	4,950,000	20.4
German Social Democratic Party	957,253	17,175,169	45.8
Great Britain: Labour Party	665,379	11,468,646	39.3
Icelandic Social Democratic Party	2,100	11,020	10.5
International Jewish Labour Bund	21,000		
Ireland: Labour Party	10,000	184,656	13.6
Israel: Labour Party	300,000	621,183	40.0
World Labour Zionist Movement	300,000		
Italian Socialist Party	538,000	3,290,503	9.6
Italian Social Democratic Party	303,000	2,063,528	6.1
Jamaica: People's National Party	125,000	267,655	57.0
Japan: Socialist Party	36,000	13,907,864	26.0
Japan: Democratic Socialist Party	60,000	3,660,953	6.9
Korean (South) United Socialist Party	33,033		
Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party	5,000	880,000	25.0
Malagasy Socialist Party			
Malaysian Democratic Action Party	20,000	350,000	20.6
Malta: Labour Party	10,600	85,448	51.0
Mauritius: Labour Party	30,000	150,000	52.0
Netherlands: Labour Party	105,000	2,021,473	27.4
New Zealand: Labour Party	195,000	*560,241	*38.9
Norwegian Labour Party	200,000	992,524	46.7
Portuguese Socialist Party	75,000	2,145,392	37.8
San Marino: Independent Social Democratic Party	900	2,328	18.0
Singapore: People's Action Party	10,000	65,812	84.4
Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	9,000		
Swedish Social Democratic Labour Party	981,778	2,247,727	43.6
Swiss Social Democratic Party	55,000	489,400	24.9
USA: Social Democrats USA	5,000		
Consultative Members			
Bulgarian Socialist Party in Exile			
Czech Social Democratic Party in Exile			
Estonian Social Democratic Party in Exile			
Hungarian Socialist Party in Exile			
Latvian Social Democratic Party in Exile			
Lithuanian Social Democratic Party in Exile			
N. Ireland: Labour Party	1,500	13,000	3.0
N. Ireland: Social Democratic & Labour Party		156,001	23.7
Polish Socialist Party in Exile			
Romanian Social Democratic Party in Exile			
South Yemen: People's Socialist Party	30,000		
Vietnam (South): Socialist Party	7,000		
Yugoslav Socialist Party in Exile			
Observer Members			
Bermuda: Progressive Labour Party	1,000	15,000	36.0
Costa Rica: National Liberation Party	75,000	294,266	55.0
Paraguay: Revolutionary Febrerista Party	3,500	16,741	2.6
Peru: Aprista Party	55,000	623,501	34.3
Venezuela: Democratic Action (AD)	450,000	939,935	25.6
Venezuela: Popular Electoral Movement (MEP)	275,000	475,909	13.0
*provisional results	*7,683,893*	*80,406,186*	

(Netherlands), Trygve Bratteli (Norway), Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore), Olof Palme (Sweden) and Carlos Andres Perez (Venezuela).

In terms of total voting strength and individual membership, the last official figures (December 1975) show that the total voting strength of the parties of the International was 80,406,186 and total individual membership 7,683,893. At no time in the history of the International have these totals been higher.

The Work of the International

Rooted in the growing strength of democratic socialism as a political movement, the work of the Socialist International as an organisation takes place on several different levels.

At one level, there is the day-to-day organisational work of the Secretariat in London, which keeps the International ticking over. At the highest level, there are the great set-piece occasions, such as Congresses or Party Leaders' meetings.

But in between these two levels there is a continuous programme of activity of a directly political or practical kind—sometimes involving only the Secretariat, but also often involving representatives of leading parties — which is concerned with specific issues or particular situations which demand attention or action by the democratic socialist movement.

A good example of this sort of activity was the Socialist International mission to Chile shortly after the coup which overthrew President Allende in September 1973. The mission went to establish for itself the position in that country after the violent overthrow of the Popular Unity Government and the suppression of its supporters which followed. I accompanied that mission and will never forget how its members were held at gunpoint by the soldiers of the junta when they tried to lay a wreath on the grave of President Allende.

A less dramatic example was the mission to the Middle East in 1974 and 1975 which was led by the Austrian Chancellor, Dr Bruno Kreisky, and which visited several Arab capitals and Israel in a fact-finding capacity and in an attempt to probe the underlying social and economic difficulties of the region.

It is true that a ceasefire and disengagement of opposing forces has now been achieved in the Middle East not because of the action of democratic socialists but as a result of the intervention of the US Government. But it is, in my opinion, equally true that any prospect of a long-term reconciliation between the two sides depends not on the intervention of the super-powers, but on the spread in that neutral region of the principles of democratic socialism.

Moral and Material Help

The case of Portugal and of Mário Soares is a good example of another major rôle of the International, which is to assist morally and materially democratic socialist forces fighting either underground or from exile against dictatorial régimes in their own country. It is no exaggeration to state that Mário Soares owes a great deal of his present international standing to the support and solidarity which he received from the International in the difficult years of his exile.

Following from its rôle as a protector of democratic socialists struggling against oppression, the Socialist International also promotes and assists new socialist forces in the developing countries of the third world — not in a paternalistic or neo-colonialist way, but on the basis of equality and in recognition of the indivisibility of the international socialist movement.

Partly to serve this end, the Socialist International has plans for a seminar to be held in the near future to which representatives of socialist and progressive movements in the Caribbean and Latin America will be invited. There is also a proposal made originally by President Senghor of Senegal and later supported by President Bourguiba of Tunisia for a conference of African, Arab and European socialist parties to help promote a better understanding and closer relations between these three elements of the international socialist movement.

Perhaps most important of all, the International is continuing to act as a focus for the international socialist movement on Spain. We are confident that just as a new dawn has come to Portugal, so too must Spain soon see the restoration of democratic rights and liberties.

I have tried in this short account of the past history of the International and of its present-day reality to show how the ideal of which I spoke at the beginning—the ideal of a world government according to democratic socialist principles — has never been lost sight of through the greatest difficulties and setbacks over the past hundred years, and how it is still the underlying inspiration of the organisation today, even though we have learnt to be pragmatic and not to set our immediate sights too high.

I am convinced that we can be confident in the future of democratic socialism as the political creed of an ever-increasing proportion of the human race — both because of the basic validity of its assertion that men must solve their own problems on this earth in liberty, equality and fraternity, and because the other major ideologies of dictatorial communism and free-enterprise capitalism are increasingly being revealed as morally and materially bankrupt.

We can therefore be confident in the future of the International as the standard-bearer and institutional embodiment of true socialism, and look forward to a day, perhaps distant but not immeasurably so, when all forces working for world peace and human progress will be united under its banner.

Social Democracy and Communism

IN EASTERN GERMANY

Harry van den Bergh

A delegation of the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) visited East Germany from 22-26 September 1975 at the invitation to the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland (SED). The delegation consisted of: Ina van den Heuvel (chairman); Harry van den Bergh (international secretary); Huub Franssen (2nd vice chairman of the Second Chamber parliamentary party); Jan Nagel, Frans Uyen and Evert van Dijk (members of the party executive).

The aim of the visit was to deal with a number of important themes in the context of critical and lucid dialogue, continuing a line of policy followed in earlier official visits by PvdA delegations to Romania and Hungary and an informal visit to the Soviet Union. In the delegation's view, this visit was in conformance with the relevant paragraph in the Peace and Security resolution on 'contacts and exchanges with parties and organizations in Eastern Europe for the purposes of exchanging information on future policy in the East-West relationship, on social structure, on relations with the Third World and also to give opportunity for airing criticism and open discussions aimed, for instance, at promoting the humanistaion of the different systems'.

It was in this spirit that the delegation raised and discussed a large number of themes. The following is a summing-up of discussions and impressions.

Economic Development

The delegation informed itself to the best of its ability on the economic development of the GDR and the standard of housing, education, culture, child care, etc., these have brought.

The delegation was struck by the great emphasis on collective facilities and that the economic system is so arranged that the necessary finances are forthcoming. Of course, it is true that the economic system emanates to a large extent from the political system, allowing for highly dirigistic and centralistic planning. The delegation was impressed by important advances in economic development and came to the independent conviction that the GDR is making intensive efforts to strengthen he collective sector still more. As mentioned this is mainly due to a political system in which income and social policy are strictly controlled from the centre, whilst the same applies to price policy. It has to be admitted that this has led to improtnat successes. Hence the delegation made it clear to the SED that although the merit of these results are acknowledged, there can be no condonement of a political system alien to the basic principles of democratic socialism.

European Security

Naturally this topic led to extensive exchange of ideas over a number of discussions. Main points discussed included: the results of the Helsinki Conference on European Security and Cooperation; the disarmament talks in Vienna and the initiative of the Dutch government in bringing tactical nuclear arms within the scope of these talks. At the discussion on Helsinki, the delegation was at pains to stress the necessity to humanise mutual contact.

The main issue in this context was to establish the de facto significance of the results. In this, the delegation maintained that Helsinki represented an acceptance of relations that emerged from World War II creating a point of departure for further improvement in East-West relations.

In other words: Helsinki cannot and should not be an end in itself and only comes fully into its own if it is regarded as a starting-point for further possibilities of development. Thus the PvdA delegation attached vital importance to more liberalisation respecting human contacts. Progress in this regard has already been evinced in humanised relations between the Federal Republic and the GDR, arranged in accordance with the Basic Agreement. However, Helsinki offers wider possibilities which should be exploited to an optimal extent. On these, the delegation expressed that the existing possibilities should be explored in all sorts of ways including, for instance, the opportunities for marriage between GDR citizens and those of other countries and the granting of exit visas for these cases. In this connection, the delegation intervened with the GDR Minister of Foreign Affairs on behalf of specific cases. Furthermore, the delegation stated that it attached great importance to matters of his kind.

From the SED side, it was stressed that the Helsinki declaration should be a starting-point only and that means should be sought to expand its possibilities. The GDR here argues for what is described as a careful and realistic step by step approach. It was a source of disappointment to hear that according to the SED there is no necessity to bring special talks on East-West matters into the 1977 Belgrade meeting in order to see whether the Helsinki declaration is leading to satisfactory results since loyal observance of its tenets is expected from all parties concerned.

Another deeply-discussed issue, especially with Erich Honecker, was the disarmament of Central Europe. The PvdA delegation did its utmost to convince its partners in discussion that much faster steps could be taken in this direction than is the case now and that it is not necessary to see cutbacks in this connection exclusively in terms of the overall balance of power. In our view, there is such danger of concentrations of these arms piling up in Central Europe that, quite apart from the overall conventional balance of power, there could well be call for special measures that would by no means diminish any European country's sense of security.

Here, we found no rapport. The SED holds that the framework for discussion on the whole arms package in Central Europe should first be set by the superpowers via SALT talks. Nor can they see the question of tactical nuclear arms in any context but that; all arms questions should be discussed together since SED maintains a principle of undiminished security for all involved. The PvdA delegation countered that rapid progress in this direction would, in fact, signal increased security. Here again, the delegation was disappointed over the lack of unanimity. Nor was there any sign that the GDR maintained a stand diverging by even a fraction from the rest of the Warsaw Pact countries: the focus of their foreign and defense policies is even more orientated towards the Soviet Union than had been expected and the points of view put forward were, for all practical purposes, identical.

The Partition Question

Inevitably the manner of the GDR's closed attitude towards the West came in for wide-ranging discussion. The PvdA delegation proposed that the ultimate aim of the East-West normalisation process must mean free traffic in people, goods and information. This entails no more or less than that minefields, barbed-wire and walls will have to go since, as long as these persist, genuine co-existence between states is not possible; nor does this statement need further qualification. Similarly, the delegation expressed its belief that the killing or wounding of people attempting illegal frontier crossings cannot, under any circumstances, be condoned and that actions of this kind are alien to the very first principles of democratic socialism.

This did not deter the delegation from admitting that the West was partly responsible for the state of isolation in which the GDR found itself in the post-war era. It is a fact that until the process of normalisation was instigated by the SPD (the SED specifically demonstrated its approbation of the historical significance of this gesture and declared its hope that the SPD would remain in power in the FRG), the partition of Germany was not accepted as a reality: this refusal to recognise the facts of the German situation, i.e. the two Germanies, significantly contributed to GDR isolation, apart from an aversion to its political system. This partly accounted for the GDR opting for "Abgrenzung" in 1961, plus the fact that the country was in a state of economical collapse. The delegation indicated its awareness of the latter and, whilst insisting on normalised relations, conceded that the GDR was to a great extent forced into isolation.

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Obituary

GUY MOLLET

Robert Pontillon

Guy Mollet has just left us. How can we not recall at this time the whole phase of our common history, and a quarter of a century of the French Socialist Movement's life which Guy Mollet marked with his strong personality.

Above all a militant, Guy Mollet has been involved in every fight of the French Socialist Party since the end of the second world war. He had been Mayor of Arras for 30 years and Deputy for the Pas-de-Calais; General Secretary of the SFIO for 23 years and one of the Vice-Presidents of the Socialist International for 20 years.

Having been for a long time one of his nearest collaborators, I owe him this tribute in the magazine of the Socialist International, to the revival of which he so largely and usefully contributed.

How many congresses, meetings, at the SILO, at the COMISCO, and then within the frame of the Socialist International, reconstituted in Frankfurt, has he not marked by his presence, his lucidity, his fervor, and on occasion his rigour.

He was, in the International, what he had been in all his posts of responsibility, essentially and only a worker of the socialist action. Guy Mollet was primarily a party man. The SFIO of which he constantly obtained the assent of the majority, was his life. Coming from the people, he was faithful to the people.

Socialism was his fight and his hope. European militant first of all, internationalist second, he rediscovered Jaurès' thoughts in order to express the demands of a patriotism which found its expression in the struggles of the Resistance.

A teacher of English, he had an inborn sense of teaching which characterised his method of education and of propagandist and which led him to create the "Office Universitaire de Recherche Socialiste" where he led an effort of historic and ideological thinking which contributes to the enrichment of socialist thought.

Guy Mollet died on Friday, 3 October. He would have been 70 years old on 31 December. In accompanying him on his last journey the following Monday, many of us were asking ourselves about this destiny and we were not alone in this crowd, forming a procession, to look back to what was for many of us our youth, marked by his personality, his action and his responsibilities. Beyond the militant we loved, there was also the man and his sensitivity. How many times have we seen him suffer injustice and injury that are typical of political struggles. Only revolt, briefly shown, revealed how much affected he was by these attacks, for under the often grumpy and rough mask he was wearing, through modesty and discretion, was hidden a deep sensibility. History will retain his action, it will judge, restituted in its context, the work of the political man who, for 20 years, dominated French political life with his authority.

From now on, Guy Mollet will belong to our memories. He has now entered history of international and French socialism.

Documents

FRENCH SOCIALISTS ON PORTUGAL

The Executive Committee of the French Socialist Party meeting on 4-5 October 1975, unanimously adopted the following resolution on Portugal:

1. The Socialist Party wishes all success to the moves taking place in Portugal to maintain and develop the achievements of the Revolution, to strengthen the nationalised sector, carry out agrarian reform and to develop democracy at all levels.

It expresses the hope that the Portuguese Socialist Party (PSP), in its particular field of endeavour, will make its contribution to the establishment of good relations between the parties of the left, in order to create the conditions needed for the development of a union of popular forces and in order to guarantee the effectiveness of the government coalition.

2. The Socialist Party (SP) has decided to make a positive response to the invitation of the PSP, officially extended by Mario Soares, for a meeting between the Socialist Parties and the Communist Parties of Spain, France, Italy and Portugal. It hopes that this meeting can take place at the earliest possible date.

3. Within the framework of talks held by parties which signed the Common Programme on questions concerning Europe, collective security and peace, the SP gives its delegate a mandate to propose an examination of the situation in Portugal.

The Executive Committee also adopted the following text analysing the situation in Portugal:

It was inevitable that the events in Portugal should be assessed by many of our colleagues in terms of the French situation and on the basis of criteria which do not correspond with the reality of the situation in Portugal itself. For this reason, we considered it necessary to throw light on a certain number of basic data, without which it is not possible to understand the development of the Portuguese Revolution.

1) One must never forget that the overthrow of the dictatorship on 25 April 1974 was the act of a *military movement*, and not of a popular uprising. It was not therefore a revolution, but an anti-fascist liberation. The section of the Army which had carried out the operation was guided primarily by the need to end the colonial war. It was not politically homogeneous. Nevertheless, a determining influence was soon to be exerted by officers whose political persuasion was distinctly of the left. Some of these officers were connected with parties (particularly the Communist Party, PCP), but the overwhelming majority were motivated by ideologies very close to that military populism which has emerged in recent years in the Arab world, in Peru and in several African countries.

2) *Military populism* is essentially a phenomenon of the Third World. It relates to situations in which the ruling classes are utterly discredited, are particularly small in numbers or are virtually non-existent (for example, in Algeria) and in which the labour movement itself is very weak. This social vacuum may give rise to a more or less fascist régime, but also to a kind of neo-napoleonism, the keynotes of which are national independence, nationalisation of the sources of energy and of the main sectors of industry, agrarian reform and the establishment of a "non-party" political system, which precludes the confrontation of political groups and enables the new rulers to establish "direct contact" between them and the people. This napoleonism has undoubtedly some very positive features, but it almost always leads to the mixing in of paternalism, manipulation and repression.

3) Portugal, however, only partially belongs to the Third World; it is also a *European country*.

The labour movement had been repressed and smothered by the Salazar dictatorship, but it represented a reality which sooner or later would once again rise to the surface.

Clandestine Parties

The activities of the clandestine parties were a promise of this: they were harbingers of both continuity and legitimacy.

This is why the revolutionary forces in the Army were not able to initiate a populist movement in its true state. They had to come to terms with the labour movement, and the labour movement for its part could not act without taking into account the dominant position of the Armed Forces Movement (AFM). Hence, a series of compromises was struck in which each side abandoned part of its programmes. The military accepted political pluralism, which was not very attractive to them, and elections, of which they did not expect much good to come (indeed, the AFM recommends abstention). The leaders of the labour movement on the other hand undertook not to call into question the hegemonic rôle of the Armed Forces. Like all compromises, these are temporary ones. They provide a "photograph" of a balance of forces which is clearly destined to evolve. But in what direction?

4) This is where the plan of the Communist Party came in. Just as their Egyptian comrades had hoped to use Nasserism to their own advantage by lending it their unconditional support, Cunhal and the leadership of the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) thought that they could use the AFM by giving it support and comfort on every occasion. Their reasoning was not without its coherence. Since they did not believe it possible to establish a parliamentary democracy in Portugal (and indeed did not want to), they felt that the choice was between a kind of Portuguese "peronism" (the most plausible variant in their view being a neo-fascist movement of the right) and the establishment of a régime which would doubtless not be a carbon copy of the Eastern European régimes but would draw extensively on their example. This is the meaning which they attributed to the "counter-revolution or revolution" dilemma. They knew that, in the medium term, totalitarian populism would only represent a "transition" and they hoped that, for once, the transition would be towards a "popular democracy".

This strategy was, as we have said, coherent, but it should be added that it was a mad one. It did not take into account the realities of working class Portugal, or of the international background, or of the nature of military populism. The communist transplant triggered a phenomenon of rejection within the nation and within the Army. Cunhal's strategy was doomed to failure. For us, at all events, the concept of the avant-garde party cannot under any circumstances take precedence over the unitary concept.

5) Success of the PCP's venture would have meant the neutralisation of the Portuguese Socialist Party (PSP) in full flight, making it impossible for it to demonstrate the importance of the sector which it effectively represented and ultimately making it impossible for it to state its case. From the moment the PCP opted for conquest of the machine of state from above, instead of a rise to power of a union of popular movements, the PSP became its "enemy no. 1". The PSP was bound to oppose any attempt to monopolise power on the part of a PCP-AFM alliance.

To have acted in any other way would have been suicidal for it. By agreeing to endorse a policy reminiscent of the manoeuvres of the Stalin régime in 1948-50, Mario Soares would have emerged as a Portuguese Fierlinger: he would have lost at one stroke the support which his party has been able to gain among the mass of the people. This would have given to the right (both civilian and military) a preponderance which it could not have hoped for and would have opened up the way to all kinds of adventures. The support of the masses among the people (notably by way of street demonstrations) enabled the PSP to resist successfully.

French Socialists' Support

And this is the main reason why the French SP must defend the Portuguese SP: not because it endorses its conduct, either as a whole or in detail, but essentially because the rejection or elimination of a powerful and dynamic Socialist Party, which had from the beginning carried a socialist programme, would have meant that the Portuguese Revolution had turned its back on democratic socialism.

But it is not enough to oppose a strategy: it is necessary to define an alternative one. The PSP refused that which would have required it to demand the withdrawal of the military and the setting up of a civilian government. It would have been right to do so on the basis of principles, but absurd in the context of the actual situation in Portugal and of the chances of furthering the revolutionary process by this means. It was therefore necessary to propose to an AFM which was to become divided a programme capable of attracting the support of an important section of the Army.

6) This was a very difficult task, and one for which the PSP was not sufficiently well prepared. The basis for the programme did exist, but its practical implications remained uncertain. The socialism of workers' control which formed the frame of reference was defined first and foremost by a double negative: neither the Russian model nor the Swedish model. No link was established between the works' councils, district committees and assemblies of representative democracy.

Portuguese Coalition Government

It is for this reason that, having unequivocally supported the Portuguese SP in its fight against the progressive establishment of a Stalinist military dictatorship, the French SP approves its decision to join a *coalition government which will also include the PCP*. The Portuguese communists have been forced to retreat. What is now needed is an endeavour to recreate an alliance which should never have been broken.

It is not certain that the coalition government will manage to cope with the terrible problems which Portugal must solve, failing which it will suffer real economic collapse in eight to ten months, but it must do all in its power to succeed in coping. For if the regrouping of democratic forces proves to be a failure, there will no longer be any choice between a classic right-wing dictatorship and a dictatorship of the "left", which will certainly not be one of leftists and even less a communist one, but one which will meet with some approval in the United States and in certain European capitals.

7) The success of the coalition does not only depend on the implementation of a stringent economic policy, in contrast with the laxity and incompetence which the government of Vasco Gonçalves has consistently shown. It also depends on the consolidation of *revolutionary achievements*. The main essentials are the nationalisation of the banks and main sectors of industry, action to transform the agrarian structures in the southern part of the country and the development of a network of committees and councils in firms and districts, the institution of universal suffrage, independent trade unions, freely elected municipal councils, and freedom of expression for the various shades of political opinion, since no-one has so far been able to supply a clear political response to the various manifestations of "base democracy". Indeed, the conduct of the leftist organisations, for whom committees and councils have mainly served as a field for manipulation and agitation, cannot be regarded as a political response. Moreover, we can only condemn the plan presented at one of the meetings of the AFM which sought to replace the assembly elected by universal suffrage with a meeting of delegates from the base committees. This so-called direct democracy would merely have been a camouflage for the dictatorship "of the left" of which certain officers have been dreaming.

Linking Groups

The problem was, and still is, to establish a link between base groups, intermediate assemblies and the National Assembly. This means both real decentralisation of powers (at workshop and district level too) and *extension to all levels of universal suffrage and the secret ballot.*

In this context refusal to establish the links which are needed between the different levels of democracy (by adhering only to the "traditional" levels: municipal councils, National Assembly, central government) would be tantamount to abandoning the plan of workers' control, the new and original plan which the Portuguese Socialists have made their own and which alone can secure the future of the Portuguese Revolution.

Portugal is not France, nor is it Italy or Spain. But the events in Portugal have since the spring loomed so large in the discussions and activities of the political groupings of the left in Southern Europe because the debate currently in progress, as serious in its way as that of the Prague Spring, and symmetrical, is of special concern to all the parties, whether they be communist parties in the process of destalinisation or socialist parties in a process of renewal, fighting for a pluralist government of the left in their countries, and seeking to advance beyond social democracy and stalinism.

While it is true that the Portuguese Revolution has its own particular features, it must not be forgotten that these also function in conformity with general principles, which in turn are universally valid.

Thus the concept of the avant-garde party cannot in our opinion take precedence in any circumstances over the unitary concept. Hence any mutual commitment between democratic parties is subordinate to the fundamental principle of respect for the popular will as expressed by universal suffrage.

Documents

SPANISH SOCIALISTS

During the final days of Spain's 40-year Dictator, General Franco, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), member party of the Socialist International, issued the following statements:

Madrid, 30 October 1975

Facing the seriousness of the present political moment and conscious of the right of public opinion to be informed and guided by clear and concrete views on the opposition's attitude, the Platform of Democratic Convergence and the Democratic Junta of Spain:

Assert their irrevocable decision to continue—today more than ever—a political peaceful action in order to establish in the Spanish State a democratic pluralist system based on the people's sovereignty.

Are, consequently, fully **OPPOSED** to the continuity of the Régime and of all the institutions preventing the exercise of democratic freedoms, either under the concrete form established in the succession laws, or under any type of monarchical or republican government which is to be imposed on the people without the necessary previous consultation, with full guarantees of freedom and impartiality.

STATE the intention of launching jointly and without any delay adequate political action in order to achieve the following fundamental aims:

(a) the immediate release of political and trade union prisoners arrested and the return of exiles;

(b) effective and the full exercise of all human right and political freedoms expressed in international law and, more particularly, the freedom of trade union association and of all political parties without exception;

(c) the full, immediate and real exercise of political rights and freedoms for all the different nationalities and region of the Spanish State;

(d) the realisation of the democratic break by the opening of a constituent period, which through a popular referendum based on universal franchise, would determine the form of State and Government.

CALL UPON all democratic, political, trade union and social forces, and all the citizens of the regions of the Spanish State to take part in peaceful mobilisation and activity to attain effectively fundamental rights and freedoms necessary for the establishment of executive bodies in a broad coalition, without exceptions nor obligations, which would guarantee the full use of such freedoms and rights and the opening and development of a constituent process until the handing over of power to the governmental bodies constitutionally elected.

The Democratic Junta of Spain and the Platform of Democratic Convergence hope that the different sectors of the country shall understand the importance and urgency of a Democratic Alternative and shall cooperate respectively in order to ensure the peaceful coexistence and the advancement of all citizens and nations of the Spanish State.

In order to fulfill these aims, the Democratic Junta of Spain and the Platform of Democratic Convergence shall remain in contact and shall concert their efforts relevantly.

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Madrid, 5 November 1975

Aware of the historical significance of the situation in Spain today, a country in the process of transition from a worn out dictatorship to a democracy, more strongly claimed by the people every day, the PSOE:

STATES its will to continue the fight in order to achieve a democratic political structure, based on the sovereign will of the people; to faithfully supervise the respect of individual and collective freedoms; to guarantee the free democratic process for all political and trade union organisations which are ready to respect it; that Spain should be governed on a federal basis according to the desires, the peculiarities and the rights of the different peoples.

REFUSES, consequently, any type of continuity of the dictatorial régime and the institutions on which it is based and which have prevented for 40 years the free expression of democratic will.

CONSIDERS as indispensable, in order to make more efficient the fight for freedom and to guarantee the transitory process from one phase to another, that there is **Agreement among all democratic political and trade union organisations** acting in the State as a whole and among its different nationalities, on a concrete programme including the means necessary to achieve a way open for democracy.

This programme should include:

(1) freedom for all political and trade union prisoners and the return of exiles to their motherland; this should be the first condition for obtaining normal coexistence between the citizens;

(2) the freedom without exception of all political parties proclaiming in their programmes the respect for pluralist democracy;

(3) the freedom of trade unions;

(4) the dismantling of all the institutions impeding or limiting the development of individual and collective freedoms;

(5) the acknowledgement of nationalities and regions with their different characteristics making up the Spanish State, and their right to self-government;

(6) the beginning of a constituent process without delay.

DECLARES the need to involve all the people in the setting up of a democratic alternative, channelling the mobilisation of the working class, the professional and intellectual sectors of society towards this aim.

This thesis presented to the XIII Congress of the PSOE is still valid today. Conquering the lack of freedom at all levels is necessary in order to obtain absolute freedom.

Elections

SPD IN BREMEN

Despite the German Social Democratic Party's (SPD) share of the vote falling by 7 per cent in the state elections of Bremen held on 28 September, the Party maintained its absolute majority in the state Parliament. The results (previous results in brackets) are as follows:

	seats	% of votes
SPD	52 (59)	48.5 (55.3)
CDU	35 (34)	33.4 (31.6)
FDP	13 (7)	13.3 (7.1)

Bremen, with some 530,000 voters, is the smallest state in the Federal Republic and the election reflects the political trend in the country as a whole only to a limited extent. SPD losses were probably due to general concern about the economic situation coupled with the activities of the left-wing of the party.

Elections

ON THE SWEDISH ROAD

Since 5 October Austria's Socialists have been holding their heads higher. They do so out of joy and pride at the magnificent election result won by them on that day. As the tables below show, the election results for 5 October 1975 only brought gains for the Socialists:

Party	*Votes*	
SPÖ (Socialist Party)	2,324,309	(+44,141)
ÖVP (People's Party)	1,980,374	(+15,661)
FPÖ (Freedom Party)	249,317	(+ 844)
KPÖ (Communist Party)	54,971	(— 6,791)
Others	1,462	(— 412)

Party	*Per cent results*		*Seats*	
SPÖ	50.41	(+0.37)	93	(+1)
ÖVP	42.95	(—0.16)	80	(+1)
FPÖ	5.41	(—0.04)	10	(—2)
KPÖ	1.19	(—0.17)	—	
Others	0.03	(—0.01)	—	

The electorate has increased since 1971 from 4,984,448 to 5,019,168, representing a total of 34,720 new electors. But because the turn-out of 92.84 per cent was higher than in 1971, a total of 4,610,433 valid votes were cast. This was 53,443 more than in 1971.

The only province in which there was a decrease in the electorate was Vienna. The number of those eligible to vote declined in this province from 1,243,424 in 1971 to 1,198,647 in 1975, representing a drop of 44,777.

The remarkable feature of this election result is that the changes which have occurred are minimal. The shares secured by the various political parties in the vote have only changed by tenths and hundredths of a per cent, in overall terms. The distribution of seats in the Assembly is even exactly the same as before: 93:80:10. It should be noted here, however, that following the census of 1971 certain changes were made in the number of constituencies attributed to individual provinces. Population growth has been greater in the western provinces than in the eastern provinces. According to Article 26 (2) of the Federal Constitution, the number of deputies and their constituencies have to be in proportion to the population of the Republic. Thus Vienna Province lost three seats in the Assembly and Lower Austria one to other provinces of the Republic. Had this new distribution already been in force at the time of the National Assembly elections in 1971, the tenure of seats would have been as follows: SPÖ 92, ÖVP 79, FPÖ 12. It might therefore be said that the SPÖ and the ÖVP this time have gained a seat each and the FPÖ has lost two.

So, after an election campaign waged at great expense and with unusual ferocity, the composition of the National Assembly is absolutely unchanged. Does this mean that this great confrontation ended as match drawn? Certainly not!

The Austrian and foreign press quite rightly speak of a great victory won

by Federal Chancellor Bruno Kreisky and the Socialist Party.

The two opposition parties in the National Assembly, the ÖVP and the FPÖ, after all went into battle with the intention of toppling the Red Majority in the National Assembly. The ÖVP's spokesman declared, after socialist setbacks in the provincial elections in Salzburg, Upper Austria and Styria that the SPÖ no longer had the majority of the electorate behind it. They therefore launched their campaign, sure of victory, repeatedly announcing that the hustings of 5 October were to be the most important National Assembly elections since 1945.

Socialist Majority in Six Provinces

In addition to the great national victory of the SPÖ there was a second sensation on election night: a socialist majority in conservative Lower Austria. The result before postal votes were counted was: 424,371 for the SPÖ, 424,299 for the ÖVP. After the postal votes were counted there was in fact a slight ÖVP lead, but that did not alter the fact that to all intents and purposes, the SPÖ finished neck and neck with the ÖVP.

In Styria, the ÖVP suffered its most painful defeat. In the provincial parliament elections in October 1974 the socialists got about 300,000 votes (41.2 per cent) and the ÖVP 388,000 (53.3 per cent). On 5 October 1975 the socialists raised their count to 372,000 votes (50.27 per cent) — the ÖVP fell back to 325,000 and 43.94 per cent. Green Styria now had a red majority of 47,000 votes.

A substantially similar political development is to be observed in Upper Austria and Salzburg. In Upper Austria where the Party had suffered a major setback in the last provincial elections, the SPÖ increased its total vote to 359,000 (48.75 per cent), while the ÖVP's result fell back to 322,000 votes (43.68 per cent). Compared with the provincial elections, the socialist share of the vote in Upper Austria rose by 8.5 per cent.

In Salzburg the SPÖ had got 79,000 votes (36.2 per cent) in the elections for the provincial parliament on 31 March 1974. On 5 October 1975 it increased its total vote to 107,000 (44.42 per cent), while the ÖVP only got 102,000 (42.55 per cent). The Province of Salzburg therefore also has a red majority! Only two provinces, Tirol and Vorarlberg, with a combined electorate of about 500,000, still have ÖVP majorities. It is worth noting that Burgenland, which has the largest share of the farming population (14.6 per cent), recorded the biggest increase in the number of votes over the National Assembly elections of 1971. The share of the vote increased from 50.23 per cent to 51.76 per cent. This farming province also has an established socialist majority.

A Hard-Won Victory

The socialists had great difficulties to overcome in this election campaign. Five and a half years in government produces signs of wear and fatigue. An added factor, and one of fundamental significance, is that these elections took place at a time of world economic crisis, the effects of which are a rising cost of living and unemployment — a form of stress to which many a democratic government has fallen victim. The ÖVP took full advantage of this situation. It held the socialist government responsible for all the economic difficulties flowing from the world economic crisis. Even Dr Josef Taus, the new Conservative leader, who as an economist himself should know better, did not flinch from attributing the crisis in the capitalist economy to the effects of socialist government policy. Why then is the crisis much graver in the USA, France and Italy, where socialists are not in power, than in Austria, Federal Germany or Sweden? The ÖVP conducted its election campaign not only by gross untruths, but also by heavy expenditure and smear-advertisements — indeed, an ÖVP deputy even tried to bribe a journalist.

The Swedish Example

It is a tribute to the maturity of the Austrian electorate that the ÖVP campaign of lies remained wihout effect. The voters obviously had in mind the biblical reference that false prophets should be known not by their words but by their fruits. They judged Federal Chancellor Bruno Kreisky and his team on their achievements and found that these were good. The verdict of October was that the Austrian people want "another four good years" under a Kreisky government. And we are convinced that it will not be just these four years. In the Scandinavian countries, Sweden, Norway and Denmark, social democrats have been in power, sometimes with interruptions, for several decades. The Swedish Social Democrats, under the leadership of the famous Hjalmar Branting (1860-1925), after a few short periods of government in the first half of the twenties, took over the helm of state in 1932 — and have held it ever since. During these 43 years of socialist government, Sweden has become a model country with the highest standard of living in Europe. At the end of this new government's term of office, Austria will have been ruled by socialists for almost a decade. Who will then shout: "Get the ÖVP back"? It looks to us as though Austria's Socialists are now on the Swedish road. The ÖVP voter who on election night anxiously asked "Ought we to learn Swedish, perhaps?" seemed to have the right idea.

Elections

SWISS TRIUMPH

The General Secretary of the Socialist International congratulated the Swiss Social Democratic Party on their great victory in the general election held on 23-24 October, in which the Party emerged as the largest single political party in Switzerland.

In both the National Council (200 seats) and in the Council of State (44 seats), the Social Democrats increased their number of seats. The following are the results of the National Council (gains or losses since the last election are given in brackets):

Social Democrats	55	(+9)
Christian Democrats	46	(+2)
Independents	11	(−2)
Liberals	47	(−2)
Centre Party	21	(−2)
Communists	4	(−1)
Protestant and Liberal Party	9	(9)
Republicans	4	(−3)
National Action	2	(−2)

There are now 14 women members of the National Council, an increase of 7 per cent.

The situation in the Council of State has remained almost as before, but the Social Democrats increased their number of seats by one, ousting the only woman in the Council of State, who was elected in 1971, giving them a total of 5 seats. The majority in the Council of State consists of Liberals and Christian Democrats.

The 7-man government consists, as before, of four parties divided as follows: 2 Social Democrats, 2 Christian Democrats, 2 Liberals and 1 Centre Party. The President for this year is the Social Democrat Pierre Graber.

Conferences

BRITISH LABOUR '75

Vera Matthias

A Labour conference held while the party is in opposition is usually very different from one held during a period of government. In the former case the party leadership and delegates engage in extensive policy-making exercises, seeking to lay down what Labour will do when it returns to power. In the latter case those members of the party leadership who have been elevated to ministerial rank are closely scrutinized by conference on their efforts to implement party policy and are sometimes roundly censured for failing to do so.

The 1975 annual conference of the Labour Party held in Blackpool on 29 September to 3 October took place some 18 months after Mr Wilson moved back into number 10 Downing Street and was therefore an example of party delegates examining the record of a Labour Government — although not, on the whole, subjecting it to excessive criticism. This was because, as Mr Wilson justly claimed in his major speech to conference, the Labour Government had made unprecedented progress in implementing party policy in the short time it had been in power.

The Prime Minister reeled off a lengthy catalogue of legislation which Labour had placed on the statute book since March 1974, ranging from higher pension and social security benefits to the setting up of the National Enterprise Board and the British National Oil Corporation, with the purpose, respectively, of regenerating British industry and of obtaining a stake in North Sea oil for the British public. The measures already implemented, said Mr Wilson, represented over half the pledges made in the party's 1974 election manifestos—a record of which all sections of the party could be proud.

Moreover, in the central debate of the conference, the Government's counter-inflation policy was endorsed by a large majority, despite an attempt by the left wing to secure its rejection on the grounds that it constituted a departure from the party's pledge not to introduce a statutory incomes policy. At the same time, a left-wing resolution calling for reflationary measures backed by import controls was heavily defeated.

Left Swing

The victories for the Government were to some extent counter-balanced by what was seen as a slight swing to the left in the elections for the party's National Executive Committee. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Denis Healey, was ousted from the executive by Eric Heffer in the voting section reserved for constituency parties—this being interpreted as a warning to the Government to be wary of the financial orthodoxy traditionally associated with the Treasury in the fight against inflation. Mr Heffer, who in his earlier career was well-known to many socialists on the continent as an ardent supporter of European unity, subsequently became a convinced anti-marketeer and in April 1975 was dismissed from the Government for disregarding Mr Wilson's directive that anti-Market ministers should not state their views on this issue in the House of Commons.

The Labour left wing also benefitted at the conference from the strange attempt by a right wing pressure group within the party—the Social Democratic Alliance—to label half the members of the National Executive as fellow-travellers. These allegations, which cited such unremarkable evidence as that the Labour Party had sent delegations to communist party conferences in Eastern Europe and that certain executive members had been heard on Radio Moscow, were received with general derision.

However, despite the fact that Mr Wilson found it necessary in his speech to inveigh against the activities within the party of extremists of both the right and the left, it would not be accurate to give the impression that the conference was dominated by left-versus-right clashes. On the contrary, the most important factor to emerge from the gathering was the central unity of the party, embracing left-wing ministers like Michael Foot, Tony Benn and Barbara Castle as well as powerful trade unionists like Jack Jones and Joe Gormley, in the fight against inflation, and for the revival of British industry. These two aims, it was repeatedly stressed by various Conference speakers, both from the platform and the floor, were the basic priorities enumerated in the party's manifestos; if the battle on those two fronts were lost, all would be lost.

Reversing the Decline

If the 1975 conference is placed in the broader perspective of the party's strategy and policies over the last five years or so, it becomes apparent that a crucial point in the party's history was reached at Blackpool. Throughout its period of opposition from 1970 to 1974 the Labour Party produced a stream of new policy documents and proposals which were eventually codified into a comprehensive new programme of a more unequivocally socialist character than the party had ever before adopted. What was basically at issue was whether the Labour Party could, by means of a massive extension of public ownership and direction, reverse Britain's ever-steepening industrial decline—the low investment, the low productivity, the poor industrial relations and so on.

This was a huge challenge in any circumstances, but the difficulties were immeasurably compounded when the economies of the developed world went into the spin of recession from late 1973 due to the five-fold increase in oil prices. Soon after, in March 1974, Labour came to power in Britain, armed with policies which were in many ways more relevant because of the even greater difficulties of British industry but whose success or failure was also more crucial both to Britain as a nation and to democratic socialism as a viable political philosophy in the modern world.

The Blackpool conference indicated that the mainstream of both wings of the British labour movement — the party and the trade unions — were united and prepared to accept the challenge of the daunting tasks facing it.

TWO VERSIONS OF ECONOMIC PLANNING

Vilem Bernard

Social Change and Stratification in Postwar Czechoslovakia, by Jaroslav Krejci, Macmillan, London, £3.95, pp. 197.

Rafael Abramovitch, the grand old man of Russian Social Democracy in the 1960s, recalled in his 'Soviet Revolution' the period in the mid-twenties when the State Planning Commission was 'full of Mensheviks'; tolerated by the régime at a time when it was not demanded from them to sacrifice their Social Democratic convictions they 'found the work of industrial reconstruction particularly attractive because it enabled them to influence the planning and shaping of a state-operated industry, to take an active part in an experiment for which there was no precedent in the history of mankind', this short-lived episode having come to an end when Stalin imposed his own brand of planning on the country.

Twenty years later, the Social Democratic economists in Czechoslovakia were luckier in as far as they were even able to submit their party's own draft five-year economic plan; Jaroslav Krejci, its chief architect, by comparing it in this book with the simultaneously submitted communist draft, made the most valuable contribution to the continuing discussion to what should be the socialist answer to economic planning. The social democratic draft, he says, put an emphasis on 'harmonious development' and on developing the structure of production according 'to the spontaneous inter-industrial relationship within the planned rate of growth and income policy affecting consumer demand'. In contrast, the communist draft was concerned with 'a substantial reorientation of the economy, with the faster rate of growth and with considerably higher investment'.

At a time when communist influence was already prevailing but the social democratic voice could still be heard a compromise solution was reached but after the February coup in 1948 the original communist draft was not only adopted but even revised in favour of yet greater emphasis on heavy industry as demanded by the Soviet government. At first the Stalinist planning was attaining an impressive — though by no means unique — rate of growth but in the 1960s the economy of the country—which had all pre-requisites for expansion and for a creating of a more equitable society — stagnated and was lagging behind all the industrially advanced countries outside the Soviet block.

The author investigates thoroughly the causes of the decline, detecting them mainly in the distortion of the economic relationship between wholesale, retail and foreign trade prices, the rigidity of the economic indicators and in part also in the secretiveness prevailing in the country where the most relevant economic data were kept secret and only in the sixties gradually became accessible. The study examines how the urge for new ways gradually gained momentum to become universal and overwhelming in the yearnings for both relaxation in the political field and economic recovery through simplification of economic administration, greater emphasis on qualitative aspects of production, decentralisation and the re-introduction of the market which, however, the author stresses, was not understood in the sense of a free market economy.

Yet before any real advance to the implementation of the reform could be reached the new search for the optimum method of planning was interrupted by the invading Soviet army. Jaroslav Krejci, who stood at the cradle of economic planning in Czechoslovakia, was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment after the prosecutor found him guilty of promoting social democratic conceptions. Having been released from prison after more than five years but never fully rehabilitated he resumed and extended his studies into the area where economics touch on sociology and his book reflects this extended approach to the subject. As there is in the country which since 1961 proudly calls itself socialist no room for men dedicated to democratic socialism and able to shape the economic life along socialist lines he went into exile and is now a lecturer of comparative cultural analysis at the university of Lancaster.

GOLDA AND THE INTERNATIONAL

Hans Janitschek

My Life, by Golda Meir, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, October 1975, £4.95, pp. 397.

Although Golda Meir in her autobiography, written very much in the same forthright manner in which she usually speaks, refers only on 17 out of 397 pages to the Socialist International and its leaders, the events she is referring to are outstanding and references to individuals are quite revealing.

The International

Her first reference to the Socialist International (on page 92) is about her first appearance at a Congress of the Socialist Interntaional in Brussels in 1928 where she went as the most junior member of her delegation which included Ben-Gurion and Ben-Zvi:

"I had time to sightsee and to listen for hours to the speeches of famous socialists whom I had, of course, never seen before — men like Arthur Henderson, the British Labour Party leader, who was the president of the Socialist International; or Léon Blum, who became France's first socialist and first Jewish premier. Henderson had just agreed to organise a League for Labour Palestine, for which he came under bitter attack from the Jewish non-Zionist socialists — of all people — and as far as we were concerned, the atmosphere was very charged."

She refers again to the International (on page 124) when she describes her relationship with Ben-Gurion and his style of government. Recalling a conversation she had 'a few years ago at a party held during a meeting of the Socialist Internaional' (probably 1971) in Helsinki, she writes:

"I was sitting with Willy Brandt, Bruno Kreisky, one of the prime ministers of a Scandinavian country and Harold Wilson, who was not prime minister then. We were chatting about the processes of government when one of them turned to me and asked 'How do you conduct cabinet meetings?' I said 'We vote'. They were all horrified. 'You vote at cabinet meetings?' 'Well, of course,' I answered. 'What do you do?' Brandt explained that in Bonn he presented an issue, it was discussed, he gave a résumé of the discussion and then his decision. Kreisky nodded his head in agreement and added 'Any minister who dared say that he was opposed to the prime minister's summary and decision, well, he'd have to go home.' But that's not the way it is or ever was in Israel, even in Ben-Gurion's day. We always have long discussions and when necessary take a real vote. I don't think that I was ever in the minority when I was prime minister, but since we have coalition governments and therefore large cabinets — and most members of an Israeli cabinet think that they aren't performing their duty properly if they don't ask for the floor on each and every question — cabinet meetings often last for hours, even when the subjects discussed could be decided upon in half an hour. I shall never forget the astonishment on Brandt and Kreisky's faces when I patiently explained all this to them."

The most candid account, however, of a Socialist International encounter is given on page 375 of the Party Leaders' Conference of the Socialist International which took place in London in November 1973, only a few weeks after the Yom Kippur War:

"I phoned Willy Brandt, who is much respected in the Socialist International, and said: 'I have no demands to make of anyone, but I want to talk to my friends. For my own good, I need to know what possible meaning socialism can have when not a single socialist country in all of Europe was prepared to come to the aid of the only democratic nation in the Middle East. Is it possible that democracy and fraternity do not apply in our case? Anyhow, I want to hear for myself, with my own ears, what it was that kept the heads of these socialist governments from helping us.'

"The leadership meeting of the Socialist International was called in London and everyone came. Such meetings consist of the heads of socialist parties, those in government and those that are in parliamentary opposition. On that occasion, since I had asked that the meeting be called, I opened it. I told my fellow-socialists exactly what the situation had been, how we were taken by surprise, fooled by our own wishful thinking into believing the interpretation we were given of our intelligence reports, and how we had won the war. But it had been touch and go for days. Then I said: 'I just want to understand, in the light of this, what socialism is really about today. Here you are, all of you. Not one inch of your territory was put at our disposal for refuelling the planes that saved us from destruction. Now, suppose Richard Nixon had said: 'I am sorry but since we have nowhere to refuel in Europe, we just can't do anything for you, after all.' What would all of you have done then? You know us and who we are. We are all old comrades, long-standing friends. What did you think? On what grounds did you make your decisions not to let those planes refuel? Believe me, I am the last person to belittle the fact that we are only one tiny Jewish state and that there are over twenty Arab states with vast territories, endless oil and billions of dollars. But what I want to know from you today is whether these things are decisive factors in socialist thinking too?

"When I got through, the chairman asked if anybody wanted to speak. But nobody did. Then someone behind me — I didn't want to turn my head and look at him because I didn't want to embarrass him — said, very clearly: 'Of course they can't talk. Their throats are choked with oil.' And although there was a discussion, there wasn't really any more to say. It had all been said by that man whose face I never saw."

Harold Wilson

As far as individual leaders of the Socialist International are concerned, Harold Wilson is the only one whom she describes as a 'good friend', in connection with his attempt in 1967 to set up an International naval ask force to police the Straits of Tiran after U Thant had withdrawn United Nations' forces (page 297).

Guy Mollet

Guy Mollet is the only one with whom she admits secret dealings (on page 246) in connection with the Anglo-French plans to assault the Suez Canal in 1956:

Bruno Kreisky

The only one for whom she openly expressed her discontent of course was Bruno Kreisky over the closing of the Jewish transit camp Schonau, in Austria. And this is her account of their meeting in Vienna in September 1973:

"Kreisky was adamant about closing Schonau. 'I will never be responsible for any bloodshed on the soil of Austria,' he repeated. 'Other arrangements must be made.' 'But if you close Schonau,' I pleaded, 'you will be handing the Russians the perfect excuse for not letting the Jews go, because they will certainly say that if there is no possibility of transit, then they won't allow any emigrants to leave Russia.' 'Well,' Kreisky said, 'there isn't anything I can do about that. Let the Jews be picked up by your people just as soon as the trains arrive.' 'That is impossible,' I said, 'since we never know how many Jews are on each train. Anyhow, I don't think it is safe to have dozens of people waiting at the airport for an El Al plane to collect them.' But I could see that it was no use. Nothing I said would make any difference. Above all, Kreisky wanted to avoid more trouble with the Arabs. I thanked him for having received me and I left.

"A press conference had been called so that both Kreisky and I could answer questions, but when we passed the room in which the press was waiting for us and Kreisky held the door open for me, I shook my head. 'No,' I said, 'I have nothing to say to the press. I don't want to come in.' I don't know to this day whether he spoke to the press alone or cancelled the conference; I only know that I felt as though my mouth were filled with ashes."

It was very much the same Golda Meir who only a few months later told the same Kreisky at a reception in Jerusalem how grateful Israel was to him and Austria for all that had been done for Soviet Jews in Austria en route to Israel.

CONTRIBUTORS

Anthony Crosland is Secretary of State for the Environment in the British Labour Government.

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Vilem Bernard is Chairman of the Czechoslovak Socialist Democratic Party in exile.

Antonio Giolitti is a member of the Executive of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) and former Minister of Budget. From 1946-56 he was Secretary of the Communist Group of Deputies in the Italian Parliament, but resigned following the Hungarian uprising of 1956 and joined the PSI.

Hans Janitschek is General Secretary of the Socialist International.

Vera Matthias is Secretary of the International Council of Social Democratic Women.

SOCIALIST DIARY

IDEAS ON SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

An international seminar was held in Adelboden, Switzerland, from 12-18 August, on the subject of the proliferation of social democratic ideas. The following leading party officials participated: Holger Boerner, General Secretary of the German Social Democratic Party, Fritz Marsch, General Secretary of the Austrian Socialist Party, and Heidi Flühmann, Secretary of the Swiss Socialist Party.

JAPAN'S SOCIALISTS TO US

A Japanese Socialist Party delegation headed by Saburo Eda, visited the US in September. This was the first delegation of the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) to visit the US for 18 years and it was JSP Secretary General Masashi Ishbashi who proposed the visit. During the campaign for the House of Councillors (Upper House) election in July last year, he revealed his desire 'to send a mission to the US in order to demonstrate to the Japanese people that the JSP must be taken seriously as a party capable of assuming power'. Many JSP leaders have said that the Eda mission would adhere to the JSP's basic diplomatic policy line of advocating abrogation of the Japan-US Security Treaty, and of pursuing non-aligned neutrality.

After their visit to the US the delegation took the opportunity to attend the British Labour Party annual Conference at Blackpool, 29 September-3 October, as the first delegation from the JSP. The group received a special welcome from Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, when he spoke at the reception for international visitors.

* * * A four-member mission of Japan's Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), also a member party of the International, visited Moscow in August for talks with Soviet leaders on pending problems between Japan and the Soviet Union. The mission was headed by Ryosaku Sasaki, Deputy Chairman of the Party and it was the first official mission ever sent to the Soviet Union by the DSP.

WILLY BRANDT

Willy Brandt, Chairman of the German Social Democratic Party and Vice-Chairman of the Socialist International, represented the International at the Congress of the Swedish Social Democratic Party held in Stockholm from 27 September-5 October.

In his address to the Congress on 5 October Willy Brandt referred to three 'essentials' necessary in facing up to the challenges in these times of crisis:

'A **first essential** in my view is that we must examine our ideas together more than in the past and coordinate our proposals with one another better than in the past, in order that we can face up to the dangers arising from the world economic situation. Security for the incomes of ordinary people, protection for the social security system, the fight for full employment and the need to beat inflation, the struggle to work out a completely new basis for our relationship with the raw material producing countries and the developing countries—all these things require better European cooperation.

'This is in part a task for social democrats in the countries and institutions of the European Community. It is in no small measure a task which we must tackle together within an enlarged framework. We must increasingly learn to act in concert with the political forces in other parts of the world whose aims are similar to our own. In this context—outside and beyond the traditional framework of the Socialist International—the concept of alliance for progress could take on new meaning.

'A **second essential** is that we should not allow for striving for détente, active safeguards for peace, more exchanges and better cooperation between the countries of East and West to become wasted effort. What was proclaimed this summer in Helsinki must not be allowed to become a dead letter to be confined to the archives but must be the starting point for unflagging concrete efforts in the interests of peace and mankind.

'We social democrats have a particular mission to concern ourselves with the further development of that which had to do with security and cooperation in Europe. We must not ignore the dangers which reappear again and again. We are not secure against failures and setbacks. So much greater is the need for a long-haul peace policy.

'A **third essential** flows from our commitment to solidarity with the peoples who, after long years of repression, are once more on the road to democratic self-determination. It is not for us to interfere. But it is for us to help those who wish to tread the path of freedom and social democracy'.

In conclusion he said:

'It is precisely the developments in Southern Europe which demonstrate that the combination of democracy and socialism represents the only vision for the future, a vision which shows the nations a viable road between obsolete capitalism and dust-laden communism. I do not wish to overestimate us social democrats, but for me there is no doubt that we have a vital contribution to make to what is being called developing world domestic politics'.

SURENDRA MOHAN

The General Secretary of the Socialist International, Hans Janitschek, strongly protested against the arrest of the General Secretary of the Indian Socialist Party, Surendra Mohan, in a cable to the Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, on 15 October.

In the cable Hans Janitschek described Mohan's arrest as 'an intensification of the campaign against Indian Socialist leaders who are in the forefront of the struggle for the restoration of civil rights and liberties in India'.

Mr Mohan is the 80th leading Socialist to be arrested in India since 26 June, when the Indian government clamped down on opposition parties.

In an article which Surendra Mohan, having gone underground after 26 June, wrote for 'Socialist Affairs' in August, he said:

'We, in this country, are faced with an authoritarian, anti-democratic rule. We expect from fellow socialists and fellow democrats that they extend all moral support to our struggle. We trust that this will be forthcoming. Socialists, the world over, have an unparalleled record of fighting against dictatorships, and Indian Socialists will most certainly aspire to keeping that glorious tradition alive'.

WHITLAM: AUSTRALIAN CRISIS

The General Secretary of the Socialist International, Hans Janitschek, pledged solidarity and full support to Gough Whitlam, Leader of the Australian Labor Party, in a telegram sent on 11 November, following the dismissal of Gough Whitlam as the Prime Minister by the Governor-General of Australia, who also dissolved both Houses of Parliament, paving the way for the bitteret election campaign in decades.

The dramatic news of the fall of the Labor Government swept the country like wildfire and provoked an immediate industrial backlash. Seamen and waterside workers stopped work and leading trade union officials from all states were summoned to a special meeting in Canberra. There have been demonstrations in Canberra, Sydney, Brisbane and Melbourne. A rally of 3,000 people in Melbourne city square was followed by an impromptu march. A similar rally and march took place in Sydney.

The Governor-General's action follows the stalemate which developed between Government and Opposition in the Senate where the Opposition had a majority of one. The Senate repeatedly deferred the passage of the Government's budget bills and demanded an election. Prime Minister Gough Whitlam steadfastly refused these demands, saying that governments were made and unmade in the House of Representatives and only in that chamber.

Mr Whitlam has claimed his dismissal to be unconstitutional. On the steps of Parliament House, Mr Whitlam said: 'Well may we say God save the Queen, because nothing will save the Governor-General'.

The House of Representatives later passed a vote of no-confidence in the caretaker government by 64 votes to 54.

BRATTELI AT SPD CONGRESS

The Vice-Chairman of the Socialist International, Trygve Bratelli, Prime Minister of Norway, represented the Socialist International at the Party Congress of the Social Democratic Party of Germany in Mannheim, held from 11-15 November.

In concluding his address which had referred to the necessity at certain times in history for a thoroughgoing re-examination of the important fundamental principles for safeguarding the living conditions of the people, Trygve Bratelli said:

'In this century the Social Democratic Movement has been the strongest and most effective factor for promoting democracy and the rule of law in our continent. Our Movement must also be prepared to assume responsibility and be an active factor in a policy to overcome the dangers which are now threatening the security of the broad mass of the people. Here the German Federal Republic will play a role of central importance. It is only by means of a broadly based system of international cooperation with regard to the practical issues involved that these problems can be solved in time'.

* * *

Trygve Bratteli announced at the Party's National Conference on 25 September that he would resign as Prime Minister when the Norwegian Parliament meets again after Christmas. It had been expected for some time that Mr Bratteli, aged 65, would step down this Autumn and according to a party decision he will be succeeded by Odvar Nordli, Labour Parliamentary leader.