

# SOCIALIST DIARY

## André van der Louw

André van der Louw, former Chairman of the Dutch Party of Labour, was elected Mayor of Rotterdam on 16 November 1974. Ina van der Heuvel, former Vice-Chairman of the Party is now Acting Chairman.

## Fred Mulley

Fred Mulley MP, was elected Chairman of the British Labour Party at its Annual Conference held last November. He replaces James Callaghan MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

## Mario Soares

Mario Soares, Portugal's Foreign Minister, was re-elected General Secretary of the Portuguese Socialist Party on the last day of the Party's Congress held from 13-15 December 1974. Mario Soares was re-elected by a 63 to 37 per cent vote of the some 900 delegates. His opponent was Manuel Serra, representing the militant current of the Party. (The November-December 1974 issues of the ICSDW Bulletin carries a full report of the Congress.)

## Bureau meeting

An ordinary Bureau meeting of the International was held on 13-14 January, presided over by the Chairman of the International, Bruno Pittermann. Representatives of member parties in the following countries participated: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Finland, Germany, Great Britain, Israel, Italy (both the Socialist and the Social Democratic Parties), Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden. The International Council of Social Democratic Women and the International Union of Socialist Youth were also represented. Representatives from the Portuguese Socialist Party and the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party attended as guests.

## Next Congress

The Bureau agreed in principle that the next Congress of the International should now be held in November 1975 and that a joint conference of the

Socialist International and the International Council of Social Democratic Women should be held the day before the congress on the subject 'Socialists on sexes'.

## Bureau meeting in Australia

The Bureau discussed an invitation from its Australian member party, the ruling Labour Party, to hold a Bureau meeting in Australia. This invitation was accepted and it was decided that the provisional dates for that meeting should be 9-16 May 1975.

## Portugal, Spain and Chile

The Bureau heard a report from the Secretary of the Portugal Committee which had met prior to the Bureau meeting. It also heard a report from the Portuguese Socialist Party's representative at the Bureau who attended as a guest, on the present political situation in Portugal and the run-up to the elections for a constitutional assembly to be held in March 1975.

The Bureau also heard of the Dutch Labour Party's fund-raising campaign in aid of democratic socialism in Portugal. This campaign included, a nationwide house-to-house collection, an all-day radio and television programme on one channel on the progress of democratic socialism in Portugal in which fraternal parties of the International were invited to participate. The campaign culminated in a demonstration of solidarity held on 25 January in Amsterdam.

The Bureau heard a report from the Spain Committee which had met before the Bureau meeting and a report from its Spanish member party's representative who attended as a guest.

The Chile Committee had also met prior to the Bureau meeting and submitted to the Bureau recommendations for action by the Socialist International to further the restoration of democracy and human rights in Chile.

## Party Leaders' Conference

The Bureau agreed to accept an invitation from the Chairman of the

German Social Democratic Party, Willy Brandt, to hold the next Party Leaders' Conference of the Socialist International in West Berlin on 22 February 1975. The Conference will be followed by a Bureau meeting of the International also to be held in West Berlin.

## European Security Study Group

The Bureau accepted an invitation from the Finnish Social Democratic Party to hold the next meeting of the International's European Study Group in Helsinki from 1-2 March 1975.

## Denmark:

### Social Democrats Gain

In the second general election held in Denmark on 9 January during the past thirteen months, both the Social Democrats and the Liberals made big gains. The following are the number of seats gained by each party in the 149-seat Folketing (the 1973 results are given in brackets):

	seats
Social Democrats	53 (46)
Radical Liberals	13 (20)
Conservatives	10 (16)
Single Tax Party	0 (5)
Socialist People's Party	9 (11)
Communists	7 (6)
Centre Democrats	4 (14)
Christian People's Party	9 (7)
Liberal Party	42 (22)
Left Socialists	4 (0)
Progress Party	24 (28)

The Socialist Bloc (comprising the Social Democrats, the Socialist People's Party, the Communists and the Left Socialists) now have 73 seats compared to the 63 seats gained at the last election. Despite the fact that the Liberal Party, led by Poul Hartling, Prime Minister of last year's minority Liberal government, won 42 seats as compared with 22 seats at the last election, it will be difficult for them to form a majority because 20 of the seats were at the expense of the non-Socialist parties with which the Liberals were in unofficial coalition.

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JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1975 SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION VOL. XXV No. 1

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# Socialism is Indivisible

What will European socialist society look like, how can it be achieved? These questions are as old as the socialist movement itself. The contradictory development in the Eastern European societies, the culmination of which was the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the events in Chile in 1973 restate these questions, however, in a new historical context.

In Western Europe there are forces which are conscious of the fact that the political system prevailing here, based on capitalist production, is not capable of resolving the contradictions of Western European societies, which have been multiplied by post-industrial development. These forces aim for a socialist restructuring of these societies, rejecting the Stalinist model of political system installed in the Eastern European countries.

In these countries of Eastern Europe, there are in turn forces which are conscious of the fact that the political system prevailing there, based on the power monopoly of one party, is not capable of effectively resolving

the contradictions of Eastern European society. The socialist opposition prevailing within these forces rejects the restoration of the capitalist system, favouring instead the democratization of the existing system and its transformation into a system of democratic socialism.

Both currents, the socialist forces in Western Europe and the socialist opposition in Eastern Europe are thus pursuing the same objective. The question arises here of what future European society will look like and of how it can be achieved. The socialist opposition in Eastern Europe is beginning to realize, thanks to the experiences in Czechoslovakia, that development towards democratic socialism without the involvement of Western European socialists and progressive influences is practically blocked.

On the other hand, the Western European socialists are beginning to realize that within the present power structure in Europe, any autonomous socialist development in any Western country is not only threatened by the opposition of the currently ruling

classes, but also by that of the forces acting in the name of what they call proletarian internationalism. Socialism threatened in Western Europe not only by the Atlantic Doctrine but also by the Brezhnev Doctrine.

The strengthening of the democratic socialist opposition in Eastern Europe is in the interests of any socialist development in Western Europe. Conversely: any positive development towards democratic socialism in Western Europe means a strengthening of the socialist opposition in Eastern Europe. The forces struggling for social change in Eastern and Western Europe are in the same boat, socialism in Europe is indivisible.

The logical conclusion: in spite of the differences in conditions in East and West, the identity of aims of both currents of socialism in Europe, but above all their mutual interdependence in the realization of these aims, imposes the urgent need for cooperation between them in form and method.

Bruno Pittermann

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Tel: 01-586 1103, Telex 261735

Cables: INTESICON, LONDON

Editorial Committee: Gino

Bianco, Giampiero Rolandi,  
Carlos Parra,

Jenny Little, Yoram Peri,  
Hans Janitschek (Editor)

Indian Correspondent: M. S. Hoda  
Editorial Assistant: Caroline Soper

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## SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND EUROPE

### Europe's Future

The following is a shortened version of a speech given by Willy Brandt to the European Movement in Paris on 19 November 1974:

If there is a feeling of profound uneasiness in Europe today, it is because a growing number of people are wondering whether Europe has not reached a critical turning point. More bluntly: whether Europe is not facing a crisis in which many not only cannot see *how* but cannot see *whether* it can be overcome. There can be no doubt that Europe is approaching its most difficult trial since the war. I do not use these words lightly; I speak from my experience of a political career during which I have time and again seen precious opportunities wasted and the work of generations ruined.

Within the Community this development will make it very much more structural imbalances and to abolish social injustice, which was already a difficult enough task in itself. When less is available, there is less to go round.

Nor do I speak only of a trial for the European Communities—although that is our central consideration—but of one of the most difficult times for Europe generally. For if the Community breaks down the whole future of Western Europe is at risk. And the future of detente and cooperation in Europe as a whole depends on stability in the West.

I now ask: what are the specific dangers threatening Europe and particularly the Community?

My next question is: are we really prepared for the consequences of a real transfer of resources to petroleum and primary product producers? A glance at the size of annual payments for petroleum imports shows that by the end of the decade it will be difficult to avoid a certain shift in economic power favouring the petroleum producers and so increasing their influence on our economy. This would be a serious threat to the democratic system in Western Europe. That this is no imaginary danger can be seen quite clearly from internal social developments in more than one country.

The economic prosperity that Western Europe has worked hard since the war to achieve, the level of social equality and individual freedom that prosperity has provided are threatened.

The two decades of economic growth, high employment and relatively stable prices since 1950, which looking back might very well be regarded as a golden age, are over.

Oil and raw material shortages and price increases have caused disruption of catastrophic proportions. The symptoms of a structural crisis in the world economy including those due to the expansion of the multinational companies.

In my opinion, the situation must not arise where unilateral economic dependence, which has been justifiably criticised in the past in terms of the relations existing between industrialized and developing countries, should be accepted as inevitable or even equitable, if it means the overwhelming dependence of the industrialized countries on the petroleum producers by the 80's.

And now I go on to ask: are we truly aware what the consequences for our social and political order are when not only growth of production and income, which we have until now taken for granted, has temporarily come to a standstill, but when here and there actual recession is possible and to some extent even probable?

Because of our dependence on imports for energy and primary products, we shall for a considerable time

be forced, because of high prices, to transfer real resources outside the Community. This cannot happen without restricting prosperity in Europe. And I would add: in the whole of Europe. This also applies to the German Federal Republic, where the economic situation has so far been sounder than in most other industrial states.

Within the Community this development will make it very much more structural imbalances and to abolish social injustice, which was already a difficult enough task in itself. When less is available, there is less to go round.

An intensification of the conflict over distribution coinciding with high rates of inflation and sectoral unemployment would be bound to heighten social tension and increase the danger of extremism. This would be a serious threat to the democratic system in Western Europe. That this is no imaginary danger can be seen quite clearly from internal social developments in more than one country.

This, together with a national scramble for oil, raw materials and credit creates ideal conditions for the kind of short-sighted nationalistic policy which expects to solve problems by imposing restrictions, closing frontiers or engaging in special bilateral relations, when in fact this short-sighted approach is threatening the entire structure with collapse.

Because of the high degree of interdependence of our economies today we are all much more in the same boat than during the world economic crisis of the thirties. Besides, the major economic social and political effects of the increases in raw material prices on the balance of payments and income structures of nearly all countries of the world are still to come. The new problems are just beginning.

Let us not deceive ourselves: no sincere person who has the slightest understanding of the issue can tell us how to find a satisfactory solution next year — let alone by the end of this decade — to the problem of the huge balance of payments deficits of the Community and the OECD.

Just how real the danger of the Community collapsing is can be seen

from the economic situation some Member States are in and from the restrictive measures recently introduced as a temporary solution. It can also be seen from the European Community's extremely low capacity to act as a body in the world economy.

How will things stand in a few years, when the difficulties have become even more acute? To speak bluntly: if Community solidarity collapses once again as it did last winter when faced with the embargo on oil deliveries this will mean, in view of the new situation created by even graver economic difficulties, the end of the Community.

With the Community in danger, the future of detente and cooperation with the Eastern countries is in the balance. But how can the alliance continue to work if democracy is weakened by social chaos or is even disabled by the encroachments of political extremism in key countries?

Prerequisites of the diplomacy of detente are trust and cooperation between allies, which would be undermined if, as a result of restrictive measures, an atmosphere of mistrust and tension were to arise in the West. The economic weakening of the Community and of the West would also distort the balance between East and West, without which no diplomacy of detente is possible.

Besides, would the eastern states still be interested in economic cooperation with western Europe if the latter were so overwhelmed by internal difficulties that it could not be relied on as a partner in long-term agreements on exchanges of technological skills and capital goods and cooperation between economic undertakings?

What the Community needs is an emergency programme of self-defence.

The draftsmen of the Rome Treaties tried, with some success, to prepare the Community for difficulties which could not be foreseen at the time of drafting and to provide it with the necessary equipment for dealing with them. But no-one could then have anticipated the difficulties which the Community of the Nine now faces.

The question now is one of survival, that is of maintaining the substance of the Community, even if it means that for a time the Treaty cannot be applied on certain points.

This ought to mean that we should relegate the squabbling between functionalists and federalists — or whatever other school of thought —

to the background, take them less seriously and concentrate on practical solutions for keeping the Community together and giving it the means to overcome the new difficulties.

What could be the basic elements in an emergency programme for the Communities? I should like to make six suggestions.

1. The Community needs a permanent body for crisis management. On the one hand, this means a change in orientation: 'survival as a Community' must be the dominant theme; the implementation of this or that provision of the Community must take second place. At the same time, the Treaty objective of the most comprehensive economic and political integration possible must not be lost sight of. This means, then, that the Community needs a body for crisis management.

With the Community in danger, the future of detente and cooperation with the Eastern countries is in the balance. But how can the alliance continue to work if democracy is weakened by social chaos or is even disabled by the encroachments of political extremism in key countries?

The central issues of crisis management must be: the fight against unemployment and inflation and, above all, the effort to bring about a common Community energy policy.

2. The Community needs a policy of realistic limitation to what is at present possible.

I repeat: we can no longer take growth of prosperity and income for granted. The effects of the energy crisis are being felt throughout our whole economic structure, and not just in some branches of industry. In addition to this, there is the effect of world-wide inflation, which had already begun before the oil crisis.

The fall in the value of money is clearly due to more than the rises in oil and raw material prices. It is also due to the inability of governments and parliaments to resist the demands of interest groups who are putting too great a strain on the gross national product of our economy.

Every responsible European politician worthy of the name must tell the people of our countries frankly that we can no longer take growth for granted and that, if we are lucky, the best we can expect for some time is a roughly stationary incomes situation — although society must, at the same time, make special provisions in favour of its most under-privileged members.

Anyone who wants to keep Europe together must start telling people that it will not be possible to do so without sacrifice and restraint and that it will require the fairest possible distribution of gains and obligations.

Only in this way — and this includes the special provisions for the underprivileged I mentioned — will we have a chance of maintaining the Community as a union of stable democratic institutions.

This policy demands unreserved sincerity and a frank dialogue with those concerned. I here refer specifically to the proposal which Chancellor Schmidt put forward at the last meeting of the Social Democratic Parties of the Community whereby, as part of the new Community crisis management, heads of government should seek a dialogue with the leaders of the European trade unions. It goes without saying that there should be a similar dialogue with the employers.

A policy of limitation to what is at present possible is of course impossible without the support of a large number of Europeans. I am confident that this support, which is bound here and there to involve sacrifices, will be forthcoming if Europe's political leaders have the courage to describe the situation soberly and to make it clear what has to be done.

We have much to lose. The Community has, in spite of many setbacks, remained a living reality. This is clear from the high level of exchanges of economic goods, the free movement of millions of people, the emergence of a new area of progress and mutual dependence. These are not trifles.

3. The Community needs a policy of solidarity, at any rate, a policy of mutual consideration between European democrats.

Faced with economic difficulties, shortages of materials and foreign trade problems, European governments tend more and more to see a contradiction between national and European interests. This outlook is as false today as it was yesterday, but now its consequences can be even more serious.

Without Europe, a proper defence of national interests will scarcely be possible. What looks like a sacrifice in the short- and medium-term is, in the long-term, the action which must be taken to maintain a healthy social order and democracy in Europe.

I am myself chairman of a large party and I know that it would be an illusion and an irrelevance to hope to eliminate the rivalry that exists between parties. But what I wish to point out with complete frankness is this: as long as oppositions in the Community countries attack every sacrifice for Europe — which is really

a long-term investment in its survival — as selling out national interests, democratic governments can have only a limited ability to act.

Our countries need therefore — whatever differences of opinion there may continue to be in other respects — a relationship between government and opposition which enables them to cooperate on what, looking ahead to the future, I shall here call 'investment for Europe'.

I should like to avoid giving any impression of wanting to get mixed up in British internal debate. But I wish to leave no doubt — having myself entered into considerable commitments — that I consider continued British membership of the Community to be desirable. I also feel that an objective response to the relevant British demands could be found without weakening the foundations of the Treaty.

4. The Community needs a policy for gradual integration. In view of the considerable divergencies between the economic situation of the Member States of the Community, an automatic and identical treatment of all members in regard to their rights and obligations would, at present, constitute a serious threat to the unity of the Nine. For this reason, the Community must come round to the idea that it will not be weakened but rather reinforced if countries in a stronger economic position push forward with economic integration, while other countries, by reason of their objectively different economic position, share, at first, in differing degrees in the process of economic integration.

This could in no sense involve the detachment of any country; our concern must be with maintaining the common framework and the common structure.

It would not be wronging anyone to point out that West Germany, France and the Benelux countries share conditions more favourable to concerted action than do at present Italy and the United Kingdom.

It is clearly in our own interest that the Community should show understanding for the problems of its members and actively help to solve them. This principle has already been discussed at various levels, but the countries in question can be helped only through judicious differentiation.

5. The Community needs a policy of self-defence as regards the world economy and also in world policy.

Achievements of the necessary conditions has been greatly facilitated by the French proposals for extensive integration of European economic cooperation with political cooperation, which needs to be further strengthened.

This should help the Community above all to adhere to a common policy on energy and raw materials as part of the concerted action by consumer countries defined in the proposed international energy strategy. Cooperation between the Nine is not enough; cooperation by all industrial countries is needed. The belief that this problem can be solved by independent national action is so shortsighted as to be nearly suicidal.

The Community must not only pool its resources but agree to pursue an internal programme of economy, substitution and development of new energy sources.

It goes without saying that we must view a dialogue between Europe and the Arab countries — at the same time as the Community must succeed in important negotiations with Israel — as part of the attempt to avoid a confrontation with the oil and raw-material producing countries and to use European technical and organizational know-how to bring about a relationship of bilateral 'strategic' dependence.

The attempt is all the more essential in that only a solution based on cooperation between the oil and raw-material producing countries on the one hand and the industrialized countries on the other can prevent, or at any rate reduce, the catastrophic economic effects of the energy crisis on the developing countries in the narrow sense of the term. Both sides should be aware of their responsibility to the developing countries.

Alongside the United States, the Community, with its enormous intellectual and managerial resources, remains the most powerful economic entity in the world. Concerted action by the Nine can make all the difference between a viable policy of crisis management and collapse into chaos.

6. The Community needs a policy for upholding democracy on its southern flank. After many years of patient struggle, freedom and democracy have once again asserted themselves in Greece and Portugal. This faces the Community with a special task and a creative opportunity.

The solution to the problem of these countries cannot be found by them alone but must be regarded as a European task. Our understanding and support is due to those political forces which wish to create an enduring democracy in a just society.

The democratic forces in the Community countries should regard this as a task which concerns them all and should not let their assistance degenerate into rhetoric. The countries concerned must be helped to solve their economic and social problems, otherwise democracy cannot survive in them.

In practical terms, this means that the Community must review and expand its trade agreements with Portugal as quickly and as generously as possible.

In the case of Greece, the Association Agreement must be revived as quickly as possible.

Both countries should receive economic aid under the Community policy and also under bilateral agreements.

I shall not hesitate to add: in all probability Spain will move in the direction of democratic structures and in the direction of an organized Europe. It is important for us to be prepared for this probable development.

In order to implement what I have called an emergency programme for the Community, several conditions must be fulfilled. I should like to mention three which are particularly important.

First: a pre-condition of this policy is active participation by the citizens of Europe.

This requires complete frankness and a clear description of our present difficulties. Only then can we expect the cooperation — even if it involves certain sacrifices — without which an emergency programme cannot be implemented.

The cooperation of our citizens presupposes a functioning system of democratic legitimization. It could mean a great deal if the Europe of the bureaucrats, the businessmen and elites were to be enriched by a new form of participation in European society.

Discussion of the electoral system to be used should not however be allowed to divert attention from the main task at present, that of granting more concrete authority to the existing parliamentary assembly, especially with regard to the budget.

Second: the European Community shares many of its economic problems with the western industrial world in general, for example with the United States, Canada, Japan and other industrialized countries. Just as reliance on independent national measures is an illusion, the idea that the European Community can find a valid solution on its own is equally illusory.

Many of the present problems can be solved only by coordinating our efforts with these other regions. This does not and must not mean that the Community will disappear into a larger association. On the contrary, in the great debate now taking place in the western industrialized world, the Community must increasingly — now indeed more than ever — be heard to assert its identity, and to do with corresponding authority.

Coordination does not mean subordination. The Community must expect and must ensure that, in the process of concerted action, its own interests are given sufficient consid-

eration.

Third: An essential pre-condition for further progress in European policy remains, as always, good and confident Franco-German relations.

Whenever there has been agreement between these two countries, Europe has always made progress. Concern is often expressed in France at the power Germany represents at the centre of Europe. I feel, as in the past, that the firm ties of the German Federal Republic to the Community of European democracies and to their strengthening and further development is a constructive response to that anxiety.

The anxiety felt by other Community countries at a supposed Franco-German hegemony must be taken seriously but not encouraged. We must show convincingly that co-operation between us is in the interest of all Europe. And our attention, like that of our partners, should now be genuinely turned to what is possible in the interests of all the people of Europe.

## SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

### A Tribute to Norman Kirk

*A tribute to the Labour Prime Minister of New Zealand, who died on 7 September 1974 at the tragically early age of 51.*

Norman Kirk was that rare phenomenon a manual worker who rose to the top of a socialist party. Try as one might, comparable instances in recent history are difficult if not impossible to call to mind. Indeed, a cursory examination of parties affiliated to the Socialist International reveals not only that none of their leaders was ever obliged to be 'workers' in the traditional sense of that imprecise term, but also that very few of their principal associates were either.

To such observations many people would respond 'so what?'. Others would reach for accusations of inverted snobbery. Yet without exaggerating the importance of the average socialist leader's lack of first-hand experience of working-class life, or getting too misty-eyed about the benefits of working-class origins, one feels instinctively that this situation is not without relevance to some of the fundamental problems of democratic socialist politics in the last

quarter of the twentieth century. And to perceive how complex those problems are, one could start by comparing the political attitudes of, say, Ernest Bevin and George Brown — both self-educated products of the labouring class — with those of, say, Michael Foot and Anthony Wedgwood Benn — neither of them, whatever else they may be, self-educated products of the labouring class.

The story of Norman Kirk's rise to the top of the greasy pole in New Zealand makes fascinating reading. His working class background was impeccable. He was born in 1923 in the small South Island town of Waimate, the son of a cabinet-maker. The family moved to Christchurch in search of work when the future Labour leader was five years old. Norman Kirk left school at an early age, his first job being as a gutter cleaner at 77 cents a week. Still a boy he joined the state-owned railways as a cleaner and eventually earned his fireman's ticket. He later worked in various parts of the country as an engine driver on mining sites.

From the early 1940s Norman Kirk became active in Labour politics, at a

time when the party was in the middle of its long period of power from 1935 to 1949. During that era New Zealand Labour pioneered the welfare state policies later copied by many European social democratic parties. After turning down several invitations to stand for Parliament, on one occasion allegedly because he did not have a suit, Norman Kirk in 1951 became mayor of a small town near Christchurch and six years later, at the age of 34, he entered Parliament as member for Christchurch's port district of Lyttleton.

By that time the Labour Party had lost power and had entered a long period of uneasy opposition — following the pattern of other social democratic parties in not knowing where to go next after having implemented basic welfare state policies. It was an unhappy time for Labour, with the conservative National Party winning election after election (except for a brief unhappy Labour interlude in 1957-60) and Labour apparently only able to harp back nostalgically to the great days of 1935-49. However, in 1965 the Labour parliamentary caucus overthrew the leadership of Arnold Nordmeyer and elected Norman Kirk as its leader — at 42 the youngest in the party's history.

#### Kirk as Leader

Norman Kirk brought to the job of leading Labour back to power a healthy distrust of intellectuals. Although he was by no means a cloth-cap traditionalist, he retained many conservative attitudes characteristic of the working class, notably his dislike of long hair, the New Left and indiscriminate demonstrating; he was also keen on law and order and not enthusiastic for things like abortion and homosexual reform.

For him issues like unemployment, housing, social welfare and New Zealand's stance in the world were the real stuff of Labour politics, and it was on the strength of Labour's pledges in these areas that after two unsuccessful elections Norman Kirk in November 1972 achieved a landslide to Labour at the polls.

It was a famous victory. The final results showed that Labour had won 55 of the 87 seats in the House of Representatives (48 per cent of the votes), giving it a massive majority of 23 over the National Party. It was, said Norman Kirk, a victory for the little people — a prelude to a concerted effort to rectify the damage

done to New Zealand society by over 20 years of unchecked laissez-faire economics. It was also an opportunity for a reappraisal of New Zealand's foreign policy in an age when Britain was about to join the European Communities and the United States to pull out of Vietnam.

The Labour victory in New Zealand was made sweeter for socialists when the Australian Labour Party completed the rout of Antipodean conservatism the following month, returning to power under Gough Whitlam after an even longer period in the wilderness, although by a much narrower margin. In the following months it was often the Australian Labour Government which captured the world headlines, as it embarked upon a foreign policy that was radically different from that of its predecessor. But the New Zealand Labour Government under Norman Kirk, who also took the Foreign Affairs portfolio, made its impact felt — perhaps nowhere more so than on the question of French nuclear tests in the South Pacific.

#### Nuclear Tests

Before the November 1972 election Norman Kirk had pledged that if the French Government persisted in carrying out atmospheric tests on Mururoa Atoll, a New Zealand frigate with a cabinet minister on board would be sent to the testing zone in protest.

While many other politicians might have been tempted to forget a pledge of this kind once he had obtained power, not so Norman Kirk. On 24 June, 1973, he ordered the frigate *Otago* to stand by to sail to the danger zone and on the following day the Minister of Immigration, Mr Fraser Coleman, was chosen for the voyage in a draw involving the names of all the cabinet ministers, including that of Norman Kirk himself. In all the *Otago* and its successor, the *Canterbury*, sailed in the testing zone for six weeks, generating world-wide publicity for the New Zealand government's case and contributing significantly to the isolation of France before world public opinion.

Together with the Australian Labour Government, New Zealand under Norman Kirk instituted proceedings against France in the International Court of Justice in The Hague and in June 1973 secured an interim ruling ordering the French Government to suspend nuclear testing in the South Pacific — which

France, under President Pompidou proceeded to ignore. But Norman Kirk's Government stuck to its guns, continuing its opposition to the tests during the 1974 series, despite attempts by the French Government to blackmail New Zealand into calling off its opposition in return for more sympathetic treatment of its case for continued access to the Common Market. The final victory was New Zealand's and Norman Kirk's — with the French Government announcing in June 1974 that the 1974 series of tests would be the last conducted in the atmosphere.

In other areas of foreign policy Norman Kirk's impact was also felt to beneficial effect. In the two years that he held the premiership he was able to develop a sense of nationhood and self-reliance in a country which had hitherto been reluctant to forego its British identity. He also succeeded in making New Zealanders aware of their country's place and influence in the southern Pacific and in South East Asia. Moreover, his deep humanitarian instincts were apparent when he banned all visiting sports teams from South Africa until, as he said, there was 'clear and irrefutable evidence that sport in South Africa was no longer organised on a racial basis'.

Norman Kirk was a good friend of the Socialist International, being fully aware of the ideological and historical links between his own party and the world democratic socialist movement. He was particularly concerned to promote better contact between the Labour parties of New Zealand and Australia and like-minded movements in South East Asia and any progress made in that direction in recent years is mainly attributable to his influence.

#### Advice to Europeans

He was not afraid to give advice to European socialists. I remember him speaking at a Socialist International luncheon in 1972, before he came to power, and telling the assembled comrades that they should beware of promoting new concentrations of power such as the EEC and should rather be directing their efforts on diversifying power away from non-accountable central bureaucracies back to the people, where it belonged.

Norman Kirk will be missed not only in New Zealand, by his wife and five children and by the party which he led back to power, but in the international socialist movement as a whole. He was a big man, both physi-

ally and mentally — able to inspire and lead. He had proved himself capable of that most difficult and too infrequent accomplishment among democratic socialist politicians — the winning of power. In the tragically short period he was able to exercise that power he left the deep impression of his bigness both on New Zealand politics and on world affairs generally. For his successors in the party and the Government, notably the new Prime Minister, Bill Rowling, he leaves a big example to follow.

## SOCIALISM IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

### Indonesia and its Rulers

1975 marks the tenth anniversary of the worst setback the international labour movement has ever suffered: the right-wing generals' take-over in Indonesia and subsequent appalling holocaust. It is a fitting time to take stock of this event and to draw some conclusions for socialists throughout the world.

Indonesia, with over 125 million of a population, is the fifth biggest country in the world. It is situated in a crucially sensitive geographical location, its sprawling islands acting as an international crossroads linking the Asian heartland with Australasia and the western world with the Far East. For hundreds of years it has been renowned for its bounty and variety of natural resources, and indeed acted as the original magnet for European colonial expansion in the 15th century. Clearly, the fate of its working class movement and the alignment of its government are of intense international concern.

Strange, then, that so little notice has been taken of developments in the country in western media. True, the information organs of business discuss it far more often and more thoroughly than the run-of-the-mill media. There is a very good reason for that, of course: since 1965 no place on earth has offered such a freebooting bonanza for the foreign investor and speculator as Indonesia under **Orde Baru** (the New Order — a phrase significantly self-chosen by the Suharto regime).

A little history is in order here. As the Netherlands East Indies, the Indonesian archipelago was subjected to one of the longest and cruelly deforming colonial experiences of all. Forcibly turning Indonesian labour into capital, the Dutch hoisted their colony into the greatest treasure house of tropical produce in the world. In the process, they wiped out or crippled all indigenous industry and enterprise: Java became, in the words

of the leading English-language historian of the country, an island of peasants; peasants, moreover, whose labour — on public work, in the sugar fields — often went totally unrewarded.

The economic potential of Indonesia was well known to American leaders. From an early date, American capital elbowed its way into the colony by fair means and foul. Thus it was that, after quite unscrupulous pressure from Washington, American oil interests (now dominant in the archipelago) got that all-important foot in the door in the 1920's. Subsequently, American oil men carried out (just before the outbreak of the Pacific War) the then largest and most thorough oil-prospecting operation ever undertaken. The results were sufficiently exciting to make Indonesia one of the biggest plums up for grabs in the post-war world.

#### US Dependence

But it was not simply a question of oil, important though that was. By the inter-war period Indonesia had a dominating lead in the provision of a whole variety of products essential to the industrial economies, and particularly, therefore, to the United States. Among these we may mention tin, rubber, kapok, cinchona, and coconut oil. America was especially dependent upon Indonesia (and neighbouring Malaya) for the first two of these, both of them of tremendous strategic and industrial importance. Unfortunately for American business, supplies were tightly controlled by Anglo-Dutch interests. During the inter-war depression these interests, backed by their respective governments, cut back production and exports in order to maintain prices. The American business community was enraged by thus being 'held to ransom', and leading political figures, such as Cordell Hull (later to become the longest serving Secretary

of State and the man responsible for formulating US post-war foreign economic policy), swore to terminate the grip European colonialism had upon raw material resources.

The Second World War afforded the golden opportunity. To a very large extent, the Pacific War was fought over Indonesia's resources. The Japanese were desperately dependent upon the primary products of the region, to buy which they had to export their manufactured goods to the colonies. With the onset of depression, the colonial powers one by one shut Japanese goods out of their controlled markets. In effect, the Japanese were left with no choice but to strike south in a wild gamble that the USA would accept a *fait accompli* and agree to a division of spheres of influence in Asia.

Washington was not, of course, prepared to accept this. South East Asia was regarded as absolutely vital to American economic viability. Besides, it was appreciated that, unless Japan could establish naval supremacy, she was doomed to go down to defeat in her inability actually to utilize the key raw materials — notably oil — of South East Asia. So it proved.

Meantime, while allied forces island-hopped their way to Toyko, two developments of great relevance to our narrative were taking place. On the one hand, the Indonesian nationalist movement was receiving great impetus from the abject defeat and surrender of the Dutch and from Japanese occupation policy (both positively and negatively). On the other, Washington planners, conscious of the fact that the US would emerge from the war with almost a monopoly of international wealth and power, were carefully plotting the contours of the post-war international economy. As far as Asia was concerned, two problems — aside from the future of China, which had rather special features — stood out. The first was how to rehabilitate Japanese capitalism and assimilate it to an American-dominated global imperialism. The second was how to secure Indonesia and to open its economy more satisfactorily than had proved possible with the mercantilistic Dutch in control.

Actually, the two problems were closely related, because it was self-evident that Japan could not be resuscitated without guaranteed access to South East Asia, and notably to Indonesia. American policy was flex-

ible: if a colonial power showed promise of being able to re-establish occupation, it was allowed to do so on condition that major concessions were made to US business; if, on the other hand, the colonial power showed ineptitude, as did the Dutch, it was pushed aside. No one doubts that it was American economic threats that ultimately forced the Dutch to grant Indonesia independence in 1949. US economic interests were now paramount in the newly-freed archipelago. We should note, too, that it was the Korean War (1950-53) which made the American design for Asia at all workable, for it was the consequent price rise and accompanying general boost to business which put Asian capitalism back on its feet after the catastrophe of the war.

#### De-colonisation Attempts

By 1957, the Korean war boom now deflated, the Indonesian economy was already in crisis. For the following eight years, President Sukarno made a major attempt at de-colonisation by taking over first Dutch and then British economic interests in the country. When, in 1964 and early 1965, he began threatening American interests — particularly Caltex and Stanvac, the two oil giants — his fate was sealed. But the fall of Sukarno, and inauguration of **Orde Baru** was a complex affair to which we should now turn.

There had been, in 1958, an abortive rebellion of pro-western elements in Indonesia against Sukarno's seeming left-wing drift. When it was put down, the leaders — many of them western-educated — went into exile, the majority in the United States, where they took the chance to undertake postgraduate studies. It is these men, now known as 'the Berkeley Mafia' from their background, who constitute the civilian element in Suharto's largely military regime. American influence upon them is obviously very strong, and is backed up by the presence in their ministries of dozens of American advisers.

But the immediate detonator is to be found in domestic Indonesian politics in the twilight of the Sukarno period. In the early 1960's, the Indonesian working-class, beset with runaway inflation and economic chaos generally, was becoming markedly militant. Peasants were staging what were known as *aksi sepihak* (unilateral actions), seizing land and defending their seizures violently. In numbers

and vociferousness, the Indonesian Trade Unions, Peasant Unions, and above all the Communist Party (PKI), had never seemed more powerful.

Naturally this alarmed and alerted those in the élite who stood to lose if Indonesia drifted any further to the Left. The great — and as it was to prove — decisive advantage which lay with the forces of reaction was their control over the tools of murder: the weapons of the army. Oddly enough, it was an intra-army affair which afforded the pretext for the slaughter which took the lives of some million Indonesian labour movement leaders and rank and file. And in this intra-army affair the present Indonesian President, Suharto, played a devious and sinister role.

A number of junior army officers, including a Lt.-Col. Untung, were dissatisfied with the corruption, inefficiency, and lack of concern for the ranks, which prevailed among the top officers of the Indonesian army. In addition, they suspected that a group of the most powerful, known as the Council of Generals and with very strong links with both the US government and pro-US Indonesian civilians, was plotting to oust Sukarno and seize power on Army Day, 5 October 1965.

The Untung group were in touch with Suharto, who knew of their plans and who let it be thought that he was sympathetic and would throw his weight behind them when they struck. Two or three of the top leaders of the PKI also knew what Untung intended. They were put by this knowledge into a desperately difficult situation. On the one hand, they obviously hoped that the planned pre-emptive coup would succeed, in which case the PKI would clearly be in a stronger position than ever. On the other, they thought the attempt would fail, and therefore it was their responsibility as leaders of the Party to keep it safely aloof and not, in theory, exposed to the fury of the backlash that would certainly follow such a failure. It was for this reason that not even the cadres of the Party were informed of what was brewing. Not that such circumspection was to deter in any way the military butchers when they turned joyfully and systematically to their task of extirpating the Indonesian Left.

Untung struck on the night of 30 September - 1 October. Six of the most corrupt and hated generals were killed, but not of course Suharto, who thus had eliminated for him his main Army rivals. He now turned on his friend

Untung and, rallying those military units loyal to him, struck down the plotters and unleashed the white terror which grips Indonesia to this day (only Saigon can claim as many political prisoners as Djakarta).

#### De-colonisation Reversed

The process of de-colonisation was abruptly reversed. The 'Berkeley Mafia' returned to assume economic control, and within a couple of years American advisers had drafted the legislation enabling and safe-guarding foreign investment and the first five-year plan of the New Order. The IMF dictated domestic deflation in the interests of stability, and to this date about 60% of indigenous Indonesian industry has gone into liquidation, strangled by the credit squeeze (which did not, of course, embarrass the foreign concerns flocking into the re-colonised archipelago).

For the international labour movement, two aspects in particular of Suharto's rule are of especial interest and concern: the fate of the trade union movement and the fate of the Leftist political parties. The trade union movement has a long history in Indonesia. By the end of the first world war there was already in existence a Trade Union Alliance combining and co-ordinating the activities of some twenty member unions. These were militant unions, as indeed they needed to be in the face of ruthless Dutch suppression. After the attainment of independence, the Indonesian trade union movement rapidly developed into a powerful arm of the broader working-class and anti-imperialist movement. SOBSI for the workers and BTI for the peasants, both organisations associated with the PKI, defended the interests of their members and by all means at their disposal promoted their welfare. There were other unions, connected with other segments of the political spectrum, but it is important to be clear that it was the PKI-led unions that most truly represented the aspirations of the Indonesian masses, that had far and away the largest number of members, and that worked hardest and most incorruptibly in their interests.

Suharto set about systematically dismembering the Indonesian trade union movement. Leading trade unionists were assassinated or incarcerated. Working-class organisations were disbanded and outlawed. In their place, the right-wing generals who had

usurped power set about constructing a classically corporative 'union' structure. Organisations were instructed to stress 'unity' rather than class struggle, and were forced to enlist employers as well as employees. Finally, in February 1973, the FBSI (All-Indonesian Labour Federation) was set up, with one of the top military anti-subversion (ie anti-left wing) officers as one of its two principal officials. The intention is, of course, to bring all combinations of working people in Indonesia under the constant and close scrutiny and surveillance of the ubiquitous and deadly 'security' apparatus; nothing at all remains of the trade union movement for which Indonesian workers and peasants, like their fellows elsewhere throughout the world, had for so long struggled and suffered.

An important and original analysis and account of the trade union movement of Indonesia is contained in Elaine Capizzi's article 'Trade Unions Under the New Order' in the British Indonesia Committee's recent booklet **Repression and Exploitation in Indonesia** (Russell Press, Nottingham, 1974). All socialists ought to acquaint themselves with the damning material recorded herein.

#### Political Parties Banned

The fate of the political parties is a matter for equal concern. For the contemptuously programmed 'elections' of 1971 the Army created its own political organisation *Sekber Golkar*, supposedly a vehicle for Indonesian functional groups, but in reality the chosen instrument of military dominance. However, so carefully were the constitution and membership of representative institutions devised that the armed forces ran not the slightest risk of sharing power. Meanwhile, all the leading parties with their roots in Indonesian history had been banned or so shackled as to be virtually moribund. This includes the PSI, the Indonesian Socialist Party, which in fact had always been closely identified with American interests, and many of whose leading members (prominent at one time in the 'Berkeley Mafia') have recently been eclipsed by the steady rise of pro-Japanese elements in the Indonesian hierarchy. The important fact to stress, however, is that constitutional functioning of political parties is impossible in today's Indonesia. It is ironic that Mochtar Lubis, once the darling of the anti-communist *Encounter* group of Western intellec-

tuals for his out-spoken criticisms of Sukarno, is now under arrest by the generals' regime for his attacks on their smothering of civil liberties; the entire Indonesian press, it should be added as a footnote to this summary account of the fate of one of the most distinguished of the country's editors and writers, has been muzzled and castrated.

The Army wields control through a pervasive and terrifying network of repression. Every social unit down to and including the tiniest hamlet has its soldier-spy. It is sufficient, even today, to have someone accused of having been *terlibat* (involved — ie involved in the 1965 Untung coup) to see him or her imprisoned without trial or right of appeal for life. Young people who were barely school-age in 1965 are now being caged indefinitely on the infinitely pliable charge of *terlibat*.

Other young people, jailed with their parents, have grown up in prison or concentration camp. Virtually all the writers, artists and musicians of any note in the country are currently rotting in gaols and camps (such as that on the notorious hell island of Buru).

Two matters remain to be sketched. The first is the present role of Indonesia in American tactical thinking, and the second the present stage of armed struggle by left-wing forces for the liberation and final de-colonisation of this, the third largest country in the Asia-Africa-Latin America complex, the evolution of whose destinies will so largely determine Man's fate in the last quarter of the twentieth century and on into the third millennium.

Although there is as yet no indication that the Americans intend voluntarily to abandon their remaining toeholds in Indochina, it has been clear ever since the Tet offensive of 1968 that if these 'forward positions' (now in effect reduced to enclaves) were to be held it would require hardening of a 'second line' of containment in South East Asia. (This is somewhat paradoxical, considering that Vietnam was initially chosen as the front line of the American empire precisely to guarantee economic access to the rest of South East Asia, and Indonesia in particular; however, today oil industry rumours credit the Vietnamese off-shore resources with a potential possibly as high as those of Indonesia itself). Geography and strategic considerations dictated that this should run through the crescent of countries looping south through

Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia and then northwards to the Philippines. These five countries, as it happens, were already associated in ASEAN (the Association of South East Asian Nations); the Philippines and Thailand housed major US base complexes; Malaysia and Singapore had sound anti-communist credentials; and from 1965 on Indonesia was firmly in the American orbit.

Increased American interest in the ASEAN countries, involving stepped-up military assistance, the presence of greater numbers of 'advisers', and the like (familiar from the early part of the Indochina war), inevitably heightened internal contradictions. The consequences have become increasingly plain in the last few years with political upheavals, active guerrilla movements, and the virtual suspension of civil liberties in all five countries. Indonesia is, of course, the vital link in the chain, with its dominating numbers and military might. Small wonder, then, that large numbers of American Special Forces closely supervise the build-up of Indonesian 'counter-insurgency' potential. The 'loss' of Indonesia (i.e., its liberation from neocolonialism) would virtually seal the fate of the US empire in South East Asia.

We must, therefore, ask what prospects does the PKI have in the immediate future. But it is important to grasp that, just as the liberation struggles of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were — and are — closely interlocked, so those of Thailand, Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines must — and do — have multiple reciprocal repercussions. The guerrilla upsurge in the Philippines after the American-engineered Marcos coup of 1972 has been much better reported in the Western media than armed struggle in the other three countries. The fact is, however, that the Thai Patriotic Front and the Malayan Communist Party have both made major and encouraging strides in recent years, working in harmony and in southern Thailand and northern Malaya in actual alliance. Again, the North Kalimantan Communist Party and the PKI work closely together along and across the rugged border separating Indonesian Kalimantan (Borneo) from Malaysian. There can be no doubt that steady gains for the guerrilla in Thailand and Malaya would impart immeasurable impetus to development of the guerrilla in neighbouring Indonesia, just as the triumphs of the Indo-

chinese peoples brought tangible benefit to the struggles in Thailand and Malaya.

Or, to take another example of interdependence, when the students of Bangkok succeeded in overthrowing the corrupt and oppressive Thanom-Praphas clique in October 1973, the shock-waves reverberated throughout the region. Shortly afterwards, the wave of student and worker protest culminating in the riots of January, 1974, swept Indonesia and for a time threatened to engulf and wash away the government of Suharto. Nor was the message of Bangkok lost on the students of Malaya and Singapore, hitherto relatively dormant by Third World political standards. Unprecedented student-worker demonstrations have, in recent months, rocked the two former British colonies, triggering off massive police and security sweeps which so far have netted thousands of critics of the Kuala Lumpur and Singapore regimes. It would appear that the writing is very definitely on the wall for Western neo-colonialism in South East Asia, US determination to act Canute notwithstanding.

Might Japan, however, step in to shore up the present economic dispensations which have proved so profitable for the industrialised countries? Increasingly, the Japanese have the necessary 'counter-insurgency' muscle, and awareness of their dependence upon the raw materials of South East Asia has never been keener than it is today. There are, of course, serious problems, as the riots which accompanied Tanaka round the region in 1974 amply demonstrated. But at the top in Indonesia, and in its ASEAN neighbours, the influence of Japan appears to be growing at the expense of a waning American credibility. Ladbrokes would probably compromise by nominating a joint US-Japan yoke as the most likely short-term fate for South East Asia in general and Indonesia in particular. It is a golden yoke for the regional élites — that goes without saying — but it is an extremely harrowing one for the mass of the peoples.

In the context of the prevailing energy crisis, South East Asia, with Indonesia at its core, looms larger than ever in the thinking of those responsible in Washington and Tokyo. Meanwhile, the PKI has succeeded against all the odds in establishing a secure base area in north-west Kalimantan, with other areas of activity

in most of the major islands of the archipelago, such as Sumatra, Java, Sulawesi, and further east. Such tenacity speaks volumes for the support the Party quietly receives from a people groaning under a tyranny outstanding even by the degraded standards of 1975. With an economy geared almost wholly to alien interests, and with outright famine ravaging the land, it is a support that can only flourish and grow in the next few years. Let me simply round off this recital of the current woes of Indonesia with an example or two of the operations of rampant neo-colonialism there.

For a variety of reasons, the major oil companies now busily engaged in draining the country of its precious petroleum reserves (and there do not appear to be sizeable reserves of the other major fossil fuel: coal), have some financial returns which cannot readily be repatriated. Some of them are therefore investing in huge rice estates, displacing subsistence peasants in the process, in order to cash in on presently buoyant world rice prices. Using mechanised 'slaughter' methods of production, heavily boosted by inputs of chemical fertiliser, good crops per head of labour employed are confidently anticipated. But the rice thus forced from the soil is for export to Japan, not for the starving people of Java.

Nor is the regime hesitant to permit the employment of slave labour from the many camps and gaols dotting the archipelago. Western sources have heard of several foreign investment projects where unpaid concentration camp labour has been used by alien contractors — as at the Japanese cement factory at Cilacap, and on the oil pipeline running from Cilacap to Cirebon. The Japanese companies concerned are: Onoda Cement Co. Ltd., and Mitsui & Co., in conjunction with the Indonesian company PT Gunung Ngadeg Djaja. Connotations of **Orde Baru** spring easily to mind in this context. Let us, however, end on a cheerful note and recall that Hitler's vaunted 1000-year Reich collapsed in blood and rubble in a mere dozen years. The mini-Mussolini gauleiters of Djakarta, despite American and Japanese backing, surely cannot be expected to last much longer?

Malcolm Caldwell

#### Appendix — Foreign Investment in Indonesia

Table (i): 1937 (in million guilders; one guilder=US\$ 0.40)		
Dutch	..	2,250
British	..	500
Chinese	..	350
American	..	233
French	..	90
Japanese	..	30
German	..	25
Italian	..	25
Belgian	..	22
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		3,525
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Source: **Foreign Capital in South-east Asia** (H. G. Callis, New York, 1941, p. 36).

Table (ii): 1974 (in US\$ million)		
Japan & other Asian	1,543.6	
(mainly Hong Kong & Singapore)		
USA	..	956.4
Europe	..	255.7
Australia	..	131.7
Africa	..	1.0

Source: **Sinar Harapan** (Djakarta, 16.3.74)

Total foreign investment in the country was estimated at the end of 1974 at US \$3,777.9 million (**Indonesian News**, 5.11.4), with Japan heading the list at \$1,038.9, closely followed by the US with \$966.2; among European countries the leading investors were then West Germany with \$162.1, the Netherlands with \$155.1, and the U.K. with \$147.2 (all sums quoted in US dollars and millions). However, it should be borne in mind that there are great technical difficulties in exactly quantifying such figures, and for a discussion of these the reader is referred to Richard Payne's excellent essay on "British Investment in Indonesia" in the British Indonesia Committee's booklet **Repression and Exploitation in Indonesia**, cited above.

#### SOCIALIST AFFAIRS

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#### SOCIALISM AND THE SEA

### Law and Order on the High Seas

No one will be putting forward a specifically socialist draft ocean convention when the second session of the third UN conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) opens in Geneva in March: that is not how UN conferences work — or international socialists.

All the same, there are certain goals and standards that socialist negotiators and delegates (and their background parliamentarians and advisors) can and should keep in mind. What is happening is a massive conceptual shift in the general view of the oceans, (of the wet 5/7ths of the globe) and only if socialist principles of Sea Use Planning are embodied in the framework of law that is about to be set up, will there be any chance of the new system lasting, or indeed of it working, even in the short term. By socialist principles I do not mean those embodied in the proposals of the Soviet Union and some of its allies: these tend to serve the great power interests of the Soviet Union rather than the interests of either the international community as a whole or — which is the same thing — social justice.

The idea of the Open Seas has served since the early 17th century, but we are now moving inexorably into a time of Managed Seas: inexorably because as more and more uses are made of the seas, these uses tend more and more to conflict, and, more and more, sea-use planning becomes the condition of any use at all. This is true equally in international and national terms.

In national terms, governments are having to coordinate the rights and duties of sea-using interests within their own waters — shipping, fishing, hydrocarbon extraction, waste disposal, recreation, research, etc. — and to enforce order and law where they have never before been enforced.

In international terms, national rights and duties in coastal and distant seas are having to be identified, coordinated and established, and international law and order enforced where they have never before been enforced — or even admitted.

#### National Rights

In effect, the first session of UNCLOS III accepted the idea of the extension of certain national rights into the

than the whole of ocean space, and the (necessary) extensions of national use and responsibility must not neglect this universal character. The Conference is so far without proposals for a new regime that will embrace the *whole* of ocean space. The only regimes now under discussion would extend international sovereignty only over the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond zones of national jurisdiction; this would leave all waters beyond national jurisdiction (and of course their natural resources) still unregulated and unprotected against the familiar ravages of greed, folly and short-sightedness. Proposals for an all-embracing legal framework are necessary, because nothing less will be enough.

The third lesson is that regulation of ocean-space can no longer be optional: it is largely because optional regulation, in existing Fishery Commissions, within the IMCO system of shipping and pollution control conventions, is inadequate that the idea of the EEZ has made such swift headway. Within the EEZ the legitimacy of national means of enforcement will be in no doubt, at first in relation to fishery protection, and to the protection, say of oil field installations and so on. But national enforcement of international regulations will almost certainly follow concerning pollution regulations, concerning compulsory traffic control schemes in fragile or overcrowded waters, concerning licensing, particularly of high risk shipping — vessels with nuclear propulsion, liquified natural gas carriers, very large tankers and so on.

#### Disappearing Freedoms

The old freedoms of the seas cannot in any case survive the increasing uses to which the seas are being put; the choice is between a chaos of uncoordinated national regulations and disruptive enforcement procedures, and a seamless regime that can ensure the orderly coincidence and interpenetration of appropriate standards and regulations, internationally or regionally agreed, and nationally or regionally enforced. Drop-outs like the flag of convenience system or the soviet doctrine of the 'immunity' of state-owned vessels, can no longer be tolerated. UNCLOS III is the occasion for providing the world with a legal framework for International Sea Use Planning: Socialists the world over should see to it that it does. *Elizabeth Young*

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## CONFERENCES

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# New Leaders for Iceland's Social Democrats

The 35th Congress of the Icelandic Social Democratic Party, the International's member party in Iceland, was held in the capital Reykjavík from 15-17 November 1974.

The Congress was the largest ever held by the Party and was notable for the increased participation and influence of labour leaders, women and young people, which is reflected in the new leadership. The debates at the Congress showed a realistic appraisal of recent electoral losses, and a strong determination to revitalise the party and regain strength. Three commissions were elected, one to review the basic party programme, another to review organisation and statutes and the third to study the problems of the party press.

A new party leadership was elected consisting of the following people:

**Benedikt Gröndal** Chairman  
Member of the Althing and former Vice-Chairman of the Party

**Björn Jónsson** Secretary  
President of the Icelandic Labour

Federation  
**Mrs. Kristín Gudmundsdóttir** Treasurer  
Chairman of the Social Democratic Women's Organisation

**Dr. Kjartan Johansson** Vice-Chairman  
Town councillor, Hafnarfjördur

**Karl Steinar Gudnason** Vice-Secretary  
Chairman of the Labour Union of Keflavík

**Eyjólfur Sigurdsson** Vice-Treasurer  
Reykjavík

Former Chairman of the Party, Dr Gylfi Th. Gíslason, remains Chairman of the Parliamentary Group of the Party, and former Secretary Eggert G. Thorsteinsson was elected Chairman of the 9 member Executive Board.

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## CONFERENCES

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# SDLP Seeks Role in Europe

The fourth annual conference of the Northern Irish Social Democratic and Labour Party was held in Belfast from 17-19 January. The Conference was attended on behalf of the Socialist International by the General Secretary, Hans Janitschek.

The conference adopted motions on a wide variety of issues including Internment, Europe, Security, Party Organisation, Housing and Local Government, and Education. With regard to internment the Conference called once again for an end to internment, deplored the failure of the British Government to honour its promises and demanded a vigorous campaign against internment and demanded that all those who have been held without trial be adequately compensated.

On Europe the Conference called upon the Executive of the Party to set up a sub-committee to investigate the implications of EEC membership and to form the concrete basis for a European policy, and declared that the people of the Six Counties of

bers as to their individual civil rights. As far as Party organisation was concerned the conference decided to urge the Executive of the Party to adopt a realistic attitude and fight only selected seats at future Westminster elections and that at future elections the Party should nominate candidates without consultation with any outside parties.

The Conference adopted its policy document 'Housing' which calls for a realistic house building target and maintained that the long term ideal was that everyone should own their own home and emphasised the need for increased Public Authority Housing.

The Conference also adopted its policy document 'Education' which rests on the basic principles of equality of educational opportunity and the primacy of parental right.

The following were elected as members of the Party Executive:

**Chairman:** Dennis Haughey; **Vice-Chairmen:** Owen Adams, Ben Caraher; **Treasurer:** J. Cosgrove; **Assistant Treasurer:** Paddy Duffy; W. J. Conaghan, T. Connolly, Sydney Courtney, John Cunningham, Arthur Doherty, Sean Farren, Eamonn Flanagan, Mrs Marie Hamill, John Kerr, Edward McGrady, Danny McLaughlin, Kevin J. Murphy, W. O'Connell, Brid Rodgers, John Turnly.

## Japanese Socialists For a United Front

The 38th National Convention of the Japanese Socialist Party, one of the International's member parties in Japan, was held in Tokyo from 20-22 December 1974. About 500 delegates from every local organisation of the Party attended the Convention and adopted the Party's Action Programme for 1975 after three days of debate which centred upon the problems of inflation and demanded complete observance of the present Constitution and democracy by the Government. The Action Programme suggested that the Party membership be increased to 100,000 from the present 50,000 and that the twice-weekly party paper *Shakai Shimpō* be made a daily publication within the next two years. The Programme also calls for the Party to take the initiative in a joint drive by the opposition parties to form a 'national coalition government'.

With regard to the Party's relations with the other opposition parties, the Action Programme criticised the Communist Party's idea of excluding the Democratic Socialist Party (also a member party of the International) from a joint opposition front and calls on Komeito and the DSP to cooperate with the Communists.

The Convention finalised its policies for the local elections to be held in March and April as well as for a general election which could be held during 1975. The following were elected as Members of the Central Executive Committee of the Socialist Party:

**Tomomi Narita** Chairman  
**Isamu Akamatsu** Vice-Chairman  
**Saburo Eda** Vice-Chairman  
**Ichio Asukata** Mayor of Yokohama  
**Masashi Ishibashi** Secretary General  
**Moichi Nakazawa** Chairman of the Disciplinary Committee  
**Shohei Tsukada** Director of the General Affairs Bureau  
**Hideyoshi Morinaga** Director of the Organization Bureau  
**Akio Kasahara** Director of the Labour Bureau.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

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### Shelley the Political Animal

**Shelley: The Golden Years:** Kenneth Neill Cameron, Harvard University Press, USA, October 1974, £10, pp. 564.

In his most recent work on the life and writings of Shelley, Professor Kenneth Cameron explores the last eight years of the brief, but eventful life of the writer. Chronologically, these events span the period from the breakdown of his marriage to Harriet Westbrook in England in 1814 to his drowning in Italy at the age of twenty-nine in 1822. Cameron assists his reader by dividing the book into sections concentrating in each section on either the biographical details, or the prose and poetry written during this time. Outlined in this way the reader is introduced to the controversial life of Shelley, with indications of which works were being written at what stage in his life, and then to the works themselves; first the prose where the ideas are easier to grasp and then to the less straightforward poetry.

Meticulously exploring the primary sources connected with each event, Cameron criticises those, Mark Twain included, who have defended Harriet as an abused and wretched wife. He points out that the author who had written in the Notes to *Queen Mab* 'How long then ought the sexual connection to last? What law ought to specify the extent of the grievances which should limit its duration? A husband and wife ought to continue so long united as they love each other; any law which should bind them to cohabitation for one moment after

the decay of their affection would be a most intolerable tyranny, the most unworthy of toleration,' and had been expelled from Oxford and broken with his family for the sake of his principles, could not forsake these principles even for the sake of his marriage.

Another theory that Cameron eliminates is that Shelley's drowning was suicidal: Shelley was full of enthusiasm in pursuing *The Liberal* project with Leigh and Lord Byron at Pisa and his letters show he had every intention of carrying on with it. However, Cameron does not only deal with the facts. In his work he shows sympathetic understanding for Shelley's political beliefs and principles and describes the political atmosphere in which Shelley grew up: his father was a Whig MP and planned that Shelley would succeed him. As political dependants of the Duke of Norfolk, a radical Whig, both his father and grandfather were influenced by the Duke's support for the American revolution, but opposed the war with France and championed Irish independence. However, Shelley had shown when at Eton that he was opposed to war and colonial oppression and by his last year he had moved beyond the Whigs, first into republicanism and then into Godwinian egalitarianism. As Cameron summarises, 'The republicans of the Thomas Paine and Mary Wollstonecraft school showed him the futility of the monarchical-aristocratic system and the virtues of democracy. The French revolutionary thinkers, Condorcet and Volney, inspired him with a glowing faith in the ever-ascending future of mankind and without their political influence neither *Hellas* nor *Prometheus Unbound* would have been written.'

Cameron maintains that although English socialist thought had its roots in Godwin and others, it really began with Robert Owen, who agreed with two of Godwin's major beliefs that the real roots of social evil were economic, and human nature was moulded by the social system. However, Owen did not accept Godwin's theory that the solution lay in the equalisation of private property. Owen believed that the industrial revolution had resulted in an imbalance between industrial production and consumption thus leading to unemployment and public distress. The only solution which he saw was in having the state take over the total economic system,

balancing production and consumption.

Shelley and Owen had a great regard for each other and Owen's influence on Shelley shows itself in *A Philosophical View of Reform* where Shelley deals with the twin themes of the unprecedented industrial expansion of the economy and its inability to satisfy consumption. It is believed that some of Shelley's comments in *A Philosophical View of Reform* on the exploitation of children may have received inspiration from Owen who exposed the horrors of this practice and persuaded Robert Peel to introduce a bill for the abolition of child labour. Cameron illustrates, however, that Shelley never advanced beyond the Godwinian idea of equality of property with an anarchistic minimum of government, and does not reflect in his work the Owen vision of a 'co-operative commonwealth based on expanding productivity in an industrial economy of balanced production and consumption'.

Shelley was an atheist and also an humanitarian. As Mary Shelley wrote in a letter 'Shelley loved the people... he believed that a clash between the two classes of society was inevitable and he eagerly ranged himself on the people's side'. It is no wonder then that *Queen Mab* later became known as the Chartists' bible. This is also exemplified in his second political pamphlet *An Address to the People on the Death of Princess Charlotte* which dealt with the execution of three workingmen, the leaders of the so-called 'Derbyshire Insurrection'. The sentences were carried out the day following the death of Princess Charlotte, 7 November 1817, and Shelley contrasts the death of the princes with the execution of the men at Derby.

In his book Cameron analyses Shelley's poetry with great skill especially when it contains complicated symbols and allusions. He vividly illustrates Shelley's contempt for the privilege of monarchy and his sympathy with the workers, as exemplified in the first stanza of *Song to the Men of England* where Shelley writes:

*Men of England, wherefore plough  
For the lords who lay ye low?  
Wherefore weave with toil and care  
The rich robes which your tyrants  
wear?*

*The Masque of Anarchy*, perhaps Shelley's most influential political poem is discussed at length by Cameron. The poem was inspired by a cavalry attack upon a parliamentary

reform meeting at St. Peter's Field, Manchester, on 16 August, 1819, which became known as the 'Manchester Massacre'. When Shelley first heard of it he wrote from Italy 'These are, as it were, the distant thunders of the terrible storm which is approaching. The tyrants here, as in the French Revolution, have first shed blood. May their execrable lessons not be learnt with equal docility!'

*Shelley: The Golden Years* is a fascinating book for anyone interested in Shelley's life, writings or political views. Although at times the extensive detail takes patience to follow, the reward of Cameron's vast research into his subject is well worth the effort.

*Victoria Walters*

## Letter to the Editor

### Reply to Larock

Dear Sir,

I refer to the article 'The Taming of the Monsters' by Victor Larock published in the August-September-October 1974 issue. I don't share the fear and the conclusion of the author, so far as multinationals are not 'monopolies'.

It's easy to remark that the big company is a product of our era and that it may be considered 'a lesser evil'. In fact, such types of company can find out and use better techniques in order to increase production and can overcome periods of serious economic crisis, such as the current one.

Moreover, I don't think that they can easily evade paying taxes; our experience in Italy shows that it's much easier to control big concerns than small ones and that they are generally more honest both in dealing with personnel and with customers in general.

And as to fair competition between capital and labour (the two necessary components), don't you find that the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions is a multinational too?

Donatella Gorini

Member of the National Executive, of the women's section of the Italian Social Democratic Party.

## Revolution in Mozambique

**Mozambique: Sowing the Seeds of Revolution**, Samora Machel, Russell Press, Nottingham, 1974, 40p, pp68.

This thin volume, a collection of seven speeches and articles by Samora Machel, the President of FRELIMO, was compiled shortly before the collapse of fascism in Portugal last April, which led to the September 1974 Lusaka agreement under which Mozambique wins full independence on 25 June this year — the 13th anniversary of FRELIMO's foundation.

Machel became leader of FRELIMO in 1969 after the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane and led the movement through its most successful period of revolutionary armed struggle. These articles date from that period (1970-73) and are immediate in their impact. One is struck by the similarity with Mao Tse-tung's writings, particularly those written from a similar period of China's revolutionary struggle 30 years earlier. Naturally, similarities exist because of factors common to all revolutionary writings, but a far greater number arise in this case because of the obviously parallel outlook of the two leaders and the similar situation of FRELIMO in 1970 and the struggle in China in the late 30s and the 40s. In both instances it is a primarily agricultural society that is dealt with, and the basic importance of agricultural production as part of the revolutionary struggle is a central theme to both authors.

The role and nature of education is another dominating theme, and Mao's article 'Reform our Study', delivered to a cadres' meeting in Yenan in 1941 bears close comparison with Machel's 1972 lecture to cadres at a FRELIMO centre for political and military training. The correct balance of practice and theory in society, the political importance of self-criticism and the role of collective leadership are all further examples of the close links between the two men.

Machel, however, is not simply an African replica of Mao, and his society is faced with many problems peculiar to itself, such as racism, tribalism and the particular nature of the Portuguese colonial exploitation, all of which are dealt with in his speeches.

Above all, one is continually impressed in reading Machel (as with

Mao) by the overriding importance he attaches to establishing a strong personal morality in FRELIMO — in his attacks on all forms of waste and theft, on personal ambition, arrogance and élitism. His image is that of a modest yet very complete man, equally able, as shown by two of his speeches reproduced in the book, to deal in great detail with the role of a health service in the Mozambican revolution, as with the question of the emancipation and liberation of women. This last topic provides the longest article of the seven, and is striking in the depth of its political analysis. In fact, it stands on its own as a major contribution to the study of the position of women in society. In concluding his address to a conference of Mozambican women, Machel says:

'Millions of Mozambican women, for centuries oppressed, are hopefully waiting the dawn of freedom which will be born here. The Mozambican people, the Mozambican revolution, need your commitment, your struggle. You have a decisive weapon in your hand which is FRELIMO's political line on the emancipation of women.'

Perhaps this can be compared with Mao's words to a group of students 16 years earlier:

'The world is yours, as well as ours, but in the last analysis it is yours. You young people, full of vigour and vitality, are in the bloom of life, like the sun at eight or nine in the morning. The world belongs to you. China's future belongs to you.'

*Tony Kahane*

## Contributors

**Bruno Pittner** is Chairman of the Socialist International and a former Vice-Chancellor of Austria.

**Willy Brandt** is a Vice-Chairman of the Socialist International, Chairman of the German Social Democratic Party and a former Chancellor of Germany.

**Malcolm Caldwell** is a lecturer in History of South-East Asia at the London School of Oriental and African Studies.

**Elizabeth Young** is a writer and co-author of the Fabian pamphlet 'The

Law of the Sea'.

**Alan Day** is a former Editor of Socialist Affairs.

**Mary Saran** is a former Secretary of the International Council of Social Democratic Women.

**Victoria Walters** is Finance Officer of the Socialist International.

**Tony Kahane** is private secretary to the General Secretary of the Socialist International.

## Feminism and Socialism

**Hidden from History**: Sheila Rowbotham, Pluto Press, London, 1974, £3.30, paperback 75p, pp. 182.

International Women's Year offers welcome opportunities for campaigning for women's equality. Beyond the propaganda effort promoted by the UN for 1975, a study of the deeper problems of this still controversial subject is needed by men and women; where possible as a joint undertaking. This book contains useful material for such a study.

The book's subtitle says that it reviews 300 years of women's oppression and the fight against it. The relations between the feminist movement and socialism are explored. Socialists have often failed to give a satisfactory answer to the question of how under capitalism class cuts across the oppression specific to women as a sex. The author believes that this is one cause of the British Labour Party's failure to attract women in sufficient numbers. Her conclusion is wholesome: 'Patriarchy, the power of men as a sex to dispose of women's capacity to labour, especially in the family, has not had a direct and simple relationship to class exploitation.'

The survey, which ends with the thirties, does not cover the current Women's Lib movement. But the author is a keen supporter of that movement in which, as a 'socialist feminist' she sees 'part of the revolutionary reawakening in capitalism since 1968'. This book was written as her response to discussions in Women's Lib and left socialist groups. Much can be learned from history, she believes, since in essence the problems of women today are by no means new.

The different tendencies in the Labour and socialist movement in Britain and the conflicts between them over women's issues are fairly presented. The author rejects the 'gradualist' approach to social change and proclaims a 'revolutionary' one. Yet, as she shows, even in revolutionary socialism dominating male attitudes of 'patriarchic control' have prevailed. In fact, if not in theory, the failure to do justice to women's need for liberation, especially in sexual matters, have not been confined to any one quarter.

The author recognises the progress which women have after all made by reforms within capitalism. Her revolutionary emphasis is unconvincing not for this reason alone. More important is her failure to consider the relations between democracy and socialism. She has a good point in arguing in conclusion that for Women's Lib to succeed working-class women must transform it in accordance with their needs. The fact that working-class women are mainly in the gradualist organisations shows the dilemma she shares with many who proclaim themselves left-wingers.

*Mary Saran*

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