*Mediterranean Politics,*
*Vol. 10, No. 3, 385–405, November 2005*

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

# EU Relations with Islam in the Context of the EMP's Cultural Dialogue

SARA SILVESTRI
University of Cambridge, UK

ABSTRACT *Starting from the awareness that Islam is both an internal and an external crucial factor the EU has come to deal with at the turn of the century, this article examines recent EU attitudes and initiatives towards Islam and Muslims with a focus on the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). In this context, particular attention is given to the increased international concern with the development of its third basket, the one devoted to cultural and social exchanges across the Euro-Mediterranean space.*

## Introduction

Social scientists agree that, by the end of the twentieth century, Islam had become a permanent feature of European society and that the transnational nature of the Muslim population in Europe plays a role in the process of European integration (Allievi, 2003; Cesari, 2003; Nielsen, 1999; Roy, 2004). It has also been argued that 'much of our relationship with Islam and our capacities to understand it, both within and outside Europe, comes into play in the weave of . . . two dynamics': an 'internal' or 'national' one, and an 'external' or 'international' one (Allievi, 2003: 451). Yet (and perhaps also owing to the challenges posed by this dual dimension of Islam), at the popular level, Islam and Muslims are often still perceived, both in cultural and in political terms, as a threat to European identity and cohesiveness, as well as to the integration process of the EU. The crisis of Europe and the West facing Islam became more acute in the aftermath of 9/11 (and, later, with the bombings in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005), when the analogy 'Muslim-terrorist' was hastily established by many. While the official US response to the terrorist attacks was primarily military and based on a Manichean discourse of absolute good versus absolute evil, the EU adopted an approach founded on the notion of dialogue between cultures and societies.

The strategy to which the EU resorted – intercultural dialogue – corresponds with the approach that is central to the third basket of the Euro-Mediterranean

*Correspondence Address:* Sara Silvestri, PhD Researcher, Cambridge University, Centre of International Studies, First Floor, 17 Mill Lane, Cambridge CB2 1RX, UK. Email: ss384@hermes.cam.ac.uk

ISSN 1362-9395 Print/1743-9418 Online/05/030385-21 © 2005 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/13629390500289474

Partnership (EMP), which is 'one of the main innovations within Euro-Mediterranean relations' (Pace and Schumacher, 2004: 122). The EMP is a scheme of 'multilateral relations' or a 'regional cooperation' mechanism that the EU set up, during the Spanish Presidency of 1995, with 12 southern Mediterranean 'partner' countries (originally comprising Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey)[1] and in which the partners commit themselves to 'conduct and to strengthen political dialogue at regular intervals' (Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 1995). The EMP, also called the Barcelona Process after the name of the Catalan city where the Euro-Mediterranean ministerial meeting took place, was the first attempt in modern history to create strong and durable bonds based on peace and political and economic stability between the two shores of the Mediterranean.[2] The statement of purpose of the EMP is spelt out in the *Barcelona Declaration*, the programmatic document that was produced at the end of the ministerial meeting and whereby the EMP was established (Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 1995). The Declaration's objectives are threefold: (1) to enhance prosperity and economic exchanges with a view to gradually establishing a free trade zone in the Mediterranean region; (2) to define a common area of peace and political stability, also through political contacts and cooperation in security matters; and (3) to encourage understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies (the so-called 'intercultural dialogue'), from which a more cohesive and democratic society would emerge.[3]

'Dialogue' – both in a political and a cultural sense – is a key term of the *Barcelona Declaration*.[4] In its third chapter, the Declaration provides an embryonic structure of how intercultural and interfaith dialogue should be conducted across the Mediterranean:

> Greater understanding among the major religions present in the Euro-Mediterranean region will facilitate greater mutual tolerance and cooperation. Support will be given to periodic meetings of representatives of religions and religious institutions as well as theologians, academics and others concerned, with the aim of breaking down prejudice, ignorance and fanaticism and fostering cooperation at grass-roots level (Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 1995).

The efficiency and effectiveness of this basket have often been criticized for its fuzzy terminology (Pace and Schumacher, 2004) and for the lack of a coordinated multilateral approach matching the discourse on cultural and social dialogue. However, in the face of the need to improve relations and to re-establish trust, especially after 9/11 and the 'War on Terror', between the EU and its Muslim citizens, as well as with what is more traditionally considered the Muslim world (North Africa and the Middle East), the intercultural agenda of the EMP now seems the most comprehensive answer.

Islam is intertwined in so many aspects of contemporary European life and policies (e.g. immigration from Muslim countries, integration of newcomers, employment, social cohesion, identity issues, freedom of religion, protection of minorities,

diplomatic relations with Muslim countries), that European society and EU institutions need to coordinate their response to the Muslim presence within EU borders as well as to their Muslim interlocutors abroad. For a series of reasons – ranging from the heterogeneity that is inherent in Islam, to structural constraints that do not allow EU competence over religious affairs (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997; Treaty establishing a constitution for Europe, 2004), to the fact that Islam has become socially and politically a highly sensitive issue – it is unlikely that the EU will ever develop a 'policy towards Islam and/or Muslims' (Spencer, 1997; Allievi, 2003: 469). Nonetheless, the EU has elaborated informal practices as well as policies that have an impact on Islam and Muslims living in the Euro-Mediterranean zone. There are initiatives in the sphere of immigration control, social affairs, and external relations (especially in the Mediterranean area) as well as some *ad hoc* activities (on intercultural and interfaith dialogue) sponsored by EU institutions and officials. Yet, no clear comprehensive design appears to be behind this ongoing series of separate initiatives, except for the social and cultural basket (i.e. the third one) of the EMP.

The following sections will briefly illustrate how EU initiatives relate to the theme of Islam. More specifically, I expand on the implications of those activities – such as the conferences and meetings organized by the European Commission's Forward Studies Unit/Group of Policy Advisers[5] – that are devoted to fostering dialogue with Islam within the intercultural and interfaith chapter of the EMP framework.

Undoubtedly, the treaty provisions that protect religious freedom apply to Muslims living in the EU. Declaration No.11 of the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and Article 52 of the Constitutional Treaty of the EU,[6] although emphasizing the separation of competences between states and EU institutions over religious affairs, also suggest the formalization of EU relations with spiritual communities in the form of consultations and/or regular meetings. In addition to these general principles and mechanisms that regulate the space of religion in the EU, the EU has repeatedly dealt with Islam and with Muslim people – though indirectly and informally – by using specific approaches according to different priorities. For instance, at least three EU policy areas can be identified that are related, in various degrees and forms, to the issue of Islam. These areas are: (1) Justice and Home Affairs, (2) Social Affairs, and (3) Euro-Mediterranean relations (in particular by using the third basket of social and cultural dialogue).

## Justice and Home Affairs

The area of Justice and Home Affairs – renamed at the end of 2004 as the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) – includes a range of activities, from immigration and borders control to development of security and anti-terrorism measures. It is interesting to note how the new name emphasizes the link between freedom of movement and security concerns. At first glance one might think that this is the result of a securitization of EU policies and discourses in response to 9/11. In fact, the AFSJ simply implements what the Amsterdam Treaty had called for back in 1997: Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union (as revised after Amsterdam) states that one of the 'objectives' of the Union is 'to maintain and develop the Union

as an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to internal border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime'. More specifically, Articles 61 and 63 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (Consolidated version after Amsterdam) declare that 'In order to establish progressively an area of freedom security and justice', the Union shall adopt 'measures on asylum' and 'measures on immigration policy' within five years from the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, that is by 2004.

If we divide the inhabitants of the EU into two categories – 'citizens' and 'immigrants' – we will realize that the majority of the Muslim population of the EU tends to be composed of immigrants or descendants of immigrants. Hence, controlling or restricting immigration into the EU could be seen as an attempt to create a cultural barrier between those who are seen 'European' and those perceived as the 'other', i.e. both immigrants and Muslims (cf. Zolberg and Litt Woon, 1999). Increasing immigration controls and security measures could also be interpreted as a way to check on Muslims, to identify and separate the so-called 'moderates' from the 'extremists'.[7] Especially after 9/11, the fear of violent actions by terrorist groups claiming to be inspired by Islam (Wahhabi,[8] and Salafist-inspired[9] movements such as al-Qa'ida) has led European governments to pay special attention to the typology of Islamic groups present on their territory or in neighbouring zones. They have been seeking to differentiate dangerous Islamist cells from ordinary, blameless people who are simply practising the religion of Islam. This task, however, has not been a simple one. It has met the opposition of many Muslim and citizens' associations, who have denounced the discriminatory practices and the violation of civil rights and fundamental freedoms carried out by state authorities across Europe.

Concerns with terrorism and migration have been 'at the heart of the EMP from the very start of the process' (Volpi, 2004: 156). Nonetheless, the post-9/11 emphasis on a direct link between migration and security risks has provoked a tension in EMP efforts to, on the one hand, promote democracy and liberalization in the southern shore of the Mediterranean and, on the other hand, carefully monitor potential terrorist elements or subversive political movements (Gillespie, 2003; Volpi, 2004). The consequence is that, in order to guarantee short-term security in the Euro-Mediterranean area, the EU does not engage fully in the social and political development of the Middle East and North Africa (MEDA), relying instead on the autocratic power of local regimes to keep a close eye and a firm hand on the 'Islamist' threat (Brumberg, 2000). But since in the southern Mediterranean, 'Islamic associations constitute the backbone of any non-governmental and "civil society"-type activities', any anti-Islamist measure often results in the suppression of potential sources of democratization, thus jeopardizing the purpose and the impact of the EMP (Volpi, 2004).

## Social Affairs

Within the area of Social Affairs it is important to focus on the non-Discrimination principle. Although Article 13 of the Treaty establishing the European Community

affirms the principle of non-discrimination ('based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation'), it was only recently that the EU addressed the specific problem of religious discrimination by issuing, in 2000, a *Directive prohibiting discrimination in employment on grounds of religion and belief, disability, age and sexual orientation* (cf. Council of the European Union, 2000; Margiotta-Broglio, 2003). This piece of legislation is meant to protect religious minorities, including Muslims, in the EU. However, the theme of Islam emerged even more visibly in connection with discrimination and racism when, soon after 9/11, an authority of the EU – the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) – commissioned a series of country reports on *Anti-Islamic reactions in the EU after the terrorist acts against the USA* (EUMC, 2001). These were first published in 2001 and then condensed in the *Summary Report on Islamophobia in the EU* published in May 2002 (Allen & Nielsen, 2002). The following winter, European Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs, Anna Diamantopoulou, also convened, in cooperation with the EUMC, three workshops, or 'round tables', where expert academics and policy makers discussed ethnic and religious discrimination in the EU. In particular they focused on: anti-Semitism (December 2002), Islamophobia (February 2003), and intercultural dialogue (March 2003) (see European Commission, 2002 and 2003). Nonetheless, neither these glamorous meetings, nor the European Commission-sponsored conference 'Youth and Gender, Trans-national Identities and Islamophobia' of May 2003 (European Commission, 2003c) seemed to deliver any particularly useful guideline for policy-makers on the subject of non-discrimination. What is important, though, is that through these initiatives the EU has sought to stimulate awareness about the problems and challenges that Europe is facing and also to maximize the participation of various categories of EU citizens (and inhabitants, if we include immigrants) in EU governance (cf. European Commission, 2001a). This is an example of how the EU, despite its institutional fragmentation and inefficiency, is still able to project itself, discursively, as a 'normative power' and as a 'contributor to global peace and better governance' in situations of conflict (Pace, 2006).

## Islam and Euro-Mediterranean Relations

Since the Islamic tradition is a major component of the cultural expressions of the North African and Middle Eastern countries that are involved in the Barcelona Process, the 'intercultural' dialogue pillar of the EMP clearly suggests that the whole 'Euro-Med' process is about improving contacts between Europe and the Muslim context (in a broad sense: including religious aspects as well as cultural and social traditions). The incorporation of the faith dimension in the culture basket has been explicitly encouraged by the Barcelona Declaration and repeatedly reiterated by EU officials.[10] The adoption, in June 2004, of an *EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East* (European Commission, 2004a) reinforces the idea that the Union is determined to enhance its relations with regions that are culturally and socially immersed in the tradition and history of Islam and seems to confirm that the EU is indeed determined to engage in a multi-level dialogue with

the Islamic world. This indicates a particular strength of the EU, that is, its 'dialogic' attitude, its preparedness to listen and to negotiate with the 'Other' (see Pace, this collection).

However, as we have seen above in the context of JHA, the complexities of the social and political situation in the MEDA as well as the global threat of terrorism *de facto* hinder the smooth translation of the rather idealistic discourse of the EMP into coherent practices. As Ziya Önis and E. Fuat Keyman have put it, 'While the nations of Europe endorse the expansion of religious freedom, they also dislike anything that smacks of "religious fundamentalism"' and are suspicious of Islamist factions (Önis and Keyman, 2003: 106). As explained above, short-term security threats heighten this sense of suspicion and often lead EU governments to back up authoritarian regimes that can provide an immediate repression of the threat.

At the same time, the EU knows that Islamism is primarily the product of sick social, political and economic systems that need a long-term process of healing. In addition, in the southern Mediterranean region, Islamism takes up the old nationalist, Third Worldist label and plays with the North-South opposition which 'stems from an unsolved dialectic between global trends, on the one hand, and the search for identity and authenticity on the other' (Aliboni, 1996: 58). In the MENA, where government policies, social services, democratization and modernization efforts are often unsuccessful, political Islam finds a vacuum to sneak into: 'Uncontrolled population growth, large national debts, corruption and bureaucracy serve to fuel the sense of frustration felt by the inhabitants of the area and increase their vulnerability to the siren calls of Islamism' (Biad, 1996: 42).

This is why fostering democratization and civil society participation has been deemed by the Euro-Mediterranean partners to constitute the most effective way to oppose Islamism, corruption, and autocratic governments (cf. Volpi, 2004; Panebianco and Attinà, 2004). Hence, EU efforts for the democratization of the Muslim MENA region are combined with the establishment of contacts with civil society and with seeking to understand the mobilizing power of Islamic identities and traditions. This EU concern is most apparent in the fact that the EU has increasingly created opportunities for encounters between EU policy-makers and religious leaders to explore the potential of intercultural and interfaith dialogue for the formation of a peaceful, tolerant and cohesive Euro-Mediterranean society. Some of the EU initiatives with these themes – namely workshops and meetings of experts promoted by the European Commission's Forward Studies Unit/Group of Policy Advisers – are mentioned below.

## Intercultural and Interfaith Dialogue, the EMP and Beyond

This final section draws attention to the growing importance of intercultural and interfaith dialogue not only within the framework of the cultural and social dialogue basket of the EMP but also in the wider international context. It also highlights EU activities that, although not explicitly defined as part of the third EMP pillar, are still closely related to it and contribute to endorse and consolidate the practice of intercultural dialogue.

A significant EU initiative aimed to support the cause of interfaith and intercultural dialogue and to broaden awareness and participation in this area was, in 2003, the official decision to set up a Euro-Mediterranean Foundation to promote dialogue between cultures and civilizations (European Commission, 2003d).[11] The original proposal for this foundation had been spelt out in February 2002, in the 'Action Plan on Dialogue between Cultures and Civilizations' of the 'Valencia Action Plan', the Commission's document prepared together with the Spanish Presidency to set the agenda for the Euro-Mediterranean Conference that was held in Valencia in April 2002 (see Commission, 2002; Gillespie, 2003). The importance of the Valencia Action Plan and of the initiatives approved by the Valencia conference relies on the reinforcement of the third basket of the EMP along two somewhat contrasting directions: the Justice and Home Affairs programme, concerned with migration and security issues, and the 'civilizational rapprochement in the cultural sphere' (Gillespie, 2003: 34–45). Further to long discussions and country-divergences over the need for, the financing and the structure of the Foundation, the establishment of the institution was formalized in May 2004 as the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures. It was also specified that it should consist of a 'network of national networks' with its headquarters in Alexandria Library, Egypt, 'in tandem with the Swedish Institute in Alexandria' (Euro-Mediterranean Mid-Term Meeting, 2004: 13).

The Swedish Institute in Alexandria, opened in Egypt by the late Swedish foreign minister Anna Lindh on 3 October 2000, is itself the manifestation of the growing political support of a Nordic country, such as Sweden, for the Barcelona Process (Schumacher, 2001). Schumacher has highlighted four principal implications that are connected with the establishment of the Institute. Firstly, Sweden affirmed its interest in a region which would normally have been considered far from its 'natural' foreign policy interests in terms of vicinity. Second, the soft power of culture was acknowledged in international politics. Third, Sweden sought to give a fresh input to the third basket of the EMP by creating a forum to facilitate cultural and intellectual exchanges between the societies of both the European and the MENA region but outside the traditional top-down approach of the EU. Finally, the type of dialogue promoted by Sweden abroad – through the Institute – appears to be directly beneficial to the country's internal cohesion as well, if we consider that a large portion of the current Swedish population consists of immigrants originating from the Middle East and North Africa. The socio-cultural tensions that are normally associated with the two shores of the Mediterranean (North/EU versus South/non-EU countries) are replicated within Swedish society. This explains why, even before becoming openly committed to the cultural and social basket of the EMP, the Swedish government organized several conferences and open meetings on the impact of Islam in European society, in association with Muslim countries (Schumacher, 2001: 94) or with Muslim organizations (such as the 1996 pan-European meeting of Muslim youth organized in cooperation with WAMY, the World Association of Muslim Youth). Hence, the activities of the Swedish Institute in Alexandria can be interpreted as a continuation of this 'Euro-Islam' project (Schumacher, 2001: 95-6).

But let us go back and try to understand how the EU has gradually become involved in and supportive of intercultural and interfaith dialogue. In the mid-1990s, the Forward Studies Unit (FSU) of the European Commission promoted several conferences to study the impact of the 'religious factor' in Europe and to develop an alternative paradigm to the 'Clash of Civilizations' (Luyckx, 2000; Huntington, 1998). The first two, *The Mediterranean Society: A Challenge of Islam, Judaism and Christianity* and the *Carrefour Européen des sciences et de la culture* [*European meeting point of sciences and culture* ] took place respectively in Toledo (Spain) in 1995 and in Coimbra (Portugal) in 1996 (Forward Studies Unit, 1998; Jansen, 1999). The Coimbra meeting had essentially an academic character, whereas European Christian authorities played a major role in the Toledo conference, as an 'ecumenical working group – set up by European Christian authorities with responsibility for dialogue with Islam – was entrusted with the selection of participants by the European Commission' (Forward Studies Unit, 1998: 83). Apparently, this event was integral to the social and cultural chapter of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, as the Work Programme of the Barcelona Declaration suggests to take this Toledo meeting as an example of the type of intercultural and interfaith dialogue to conduct across the Mediterranean (Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 1995: 14).

Social cohesion through interfaith dialogue was also the subject of a meeting of EU ministers of the interior convened in Rome by the Italian Minister of the Interior Giuseppe Pisanu, during the Italian semester of the Presidency of the EU, on 30 and 31 October 2003. It was the first time that government ministers and officials of the then 15 EU member states had met in an official way to discuss the subject of religion together with representatives of the three monotheistic religions. The conference title was 'Interfaith dialogue: Factor of social cohesion in Europe and peace instrument in the Mediterranean area'. It was also attended by three religious personalities symbolically representing the three major beliefs present in Europe: Christianity, Judaism and Islam. It is likely that on many occasions before, EU governments' representatives have discussed the issue of religious identities and religious conflicts when addressing the problems of the Middle East, for instance, or perhaps when evaluating the case for Turkey's accession to the EU, but this was the first time that interfaith dialogue was officially invoked by civil authorities as the possible instrument to overcome social and political problems across the two shores of the Mediterranean. The EU ministers in charge of Home affairs that attended that meeting in Rome even promoted a European Charter of Interfaith Dialogue, which was officially presented at a Council meeting the following December (Council, 2003).

Although the October meeting was essentially advertised as an 'interfaith' event, Islam was *de facto* the real focus of the attention; thus, the Muslim representative Mr. Dalil Boubakeur, President of the *Conseil Français du Culte Musulman* (French Council of the Muslim Religion), turned out to be the principal interlocutor, both of the ministers and of the media. The establishment of national Muslim councils across Europe, the significance of this ministerial meeting for Italian, British and European relations with Islam, and the western attempt to support the so-called

'moderate' version of Islam have been discussed elsewhere (Silvestri, 2005a; Hamzawy, 2005; Rubin, 2005). Here we will just note that the term 'moderate' Islam tends to be an artificial one; it can mean several things to several people and can be interpreted or misinterpreted accordingly. For example, certain EU governments used this ministerial conference on interfaith dialogue and social cohesion in the Mediterranean in order to bring forward their own agenda concerning Islam and to provide a model for 'suitable' religious interlocutors.

Between the end of 2002 and the beginning of 2003, President Prodi and the FSU successor, the Group of Policy Advisers (GOPA), also promoted three High Level Advisory Groups to reflect on the values and cultural and religious heritage of Europe.[12] The role of the High-Level Advisory Groups was to 'identify and rethink the fundamental principles that form a basis for societal life in a society which is shared by all the inhabitants of the EU and with due attention to our neighbours' (Prodi, 2003). The two groups that are more relevant to our analysis of the intercultural/interfaith dialogue project of the EU are: the Reflection Group on the Spiritual and Cultural Dimension of Europe, and the *dei Saggi* (wise men) Group specializing in Intercultural Dialogue in the Mediterranean Area.[13] Since the societies and cultures of the southern shore of the Mediterranean tend to be Muslim,[14] it is not surprising that the advisory group has largely focused on the future of relations between Europe and Islam. With respect to this, it is also important to remember that the whole idea of launching the UN year dedicated to the Dialogue of Civilizations (UN General Assembly, 1998) came from Mr. Khatami, the President of the *Islamic* Republic of Iran, a country often 'associated in Western minds with "terrorism" and "extremism"' (Ahmed, 2002: 21). This trend could suggest that the EMP notion of intercultural/interfaith dialogue is expanding and having an impact not only on the Mediterranean but also on its neighbouring areas. It also confirms that this dialogic framework is acquiring importance both on a practical as well as on a theoretical level, for engaging in and theorizing international relations in the twenty-first century (see Petito, forthcoming, 2005).

All these European Commission initiatives for dialogue *with* and *between* religious traditions became more and more urgent with the approaching enlargement of the EU of May 2004. EU officials, politicians and ordinary people were becoming aware that the relatively new geo-political entity of the EU would comprise a growing multiplicity of states, cultures and spiritual and intellectual traditions. These differences needed not only to be acknowledged and respected but also to be understood and placed in harmonious relationship with each other. Almost certainly, global events such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11, or the second Palestinian *Intifada* ('uprising') which began in September 2000 urged the EU to engage in dialogue with different religious groups, especially with Muslim circles. In addition, intercultural and interfaith dialogue turned out to be a political strategy of the EU to express its decision to respond to violence in a different – peaceful – way in opposition to the methods (the 'War on Terror') adopted by the US, and to establish the EU as a global actor.

In the aftermath of 9/11, many EU institutions and public figures vigorously supported mutual understanding and cultural exchanges across Europe and across

the Mediterranean. Above all, European Commissioners were involved in these activities, but the conference organized by Mr Pisanu is an example of European ministers' involvement too. The relevance of the EMP in the post-9/11 international context was reaffirmed at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Brussels at the beginning of November 2001. The agenda of that meeting included the need to reinforce the Barcelona Process 'to step up the fight against terrorism and to address structural causes for extremism' and the EU's formal rejection of 'any equating of terrorism with the Arab and Muslim world' (European Commission, 2001c). It was a strident coincidence that the 9/11 tragedy had occurred in the very same year that the UN had devoted to the Dialogue of Civilizations.[15] EU leaders decided to espouse this slogan and to emphasize the need to engage in dialogue with religions, especially Islam, in order to maintain peace and stability. It seems important to remark here that, whilst strongly asserting its commitment to dialogue, the EU also slightly shifted the focus from the notion of 'civilizations' to that of 'cultures' (see also Malmvig in this volume), perhaps for fear that a 'Dialogue of Civilizations' would imply a previous 'Clash of Civilizations', an idea that the EU has always tried to dismiss.[16]

The following sections present and analyse some public EU initiatives and statements in support of this form of dialogue. Such statements and events should be understood against the background of international events and of the challenges that the EU has been facing in this turn of the century.

In the autumn of 2001, whilst the United States launched the 'War on Terror', the EU relentlessly tried to stick to a position of conciliator. Faced with the fear of falling into the announced 'clash of civilizations', the Union, and especially the European Commission, adopted a discourse focused on the notion of 'dialogue'. More and more frequently, since September 2001, European Commissioners have been adopting this terminology in their speeches. This was especially true, during their mandate, of Romano Prodi (Commission's President), Anna Diamantopolulou (responsible for Social Affairs), Viviane Reading (in charge of Culture) and Chris Patten (External Relations). 'Peace and stability are borne out of dialogue' was repeatedly stressed by EU officials (Prodi, 2002: 3). At the height of the post-9/11 anxiety, in November 2001, Commissioner Patten and President Prodi participated in important meetings, respectively at the UN and at the Euro-Parliamentary Forum, advocating the need for dialogue to promote tolerance and understanding between different cultures. In particular, Prodi emphasized the responsibility of the countries of the EMP to engage in such a dialogue (i.e. a relation of communication in which the two partner groups involved share equal rights to speak and equal responsibility to listen), with reference to the battle against terrorism and the need to establish good relations with the Muslim world:

> We must avoid at all costs the association between terrorism and the Arab and Islamic world. We are engaged in a dialogue between equals and we should promote this through cultural exchange. It is of utmost importance that we continue our dialogue. Sending a joint message of solidarity in the common

> fight against terrorism is one of the best ways to demonstrate the common ground we share in our partnership (European Commission, 2001d).

In May 2004, Patten gave an all-embracing speech in Oxford on 'Islam and the West – at the Crossroads', where he used the topic of Islam to discuss a range of political issues – such as development and democracy in the Arab world – and to defuse stereotypes and fears about the future entry of an 'Islamic' country (Turkey) into the EU club (Patten, 2004). Moreover, the then German Commissioner in charge of Enlargement, Günter Verheugen, expressed his full support for Turkey's entry into the EU throughout his mandate (1999–2004) (Verheugen, 2001 and 2004). Prominent personalities within the EU who visibly broke off from this line in favour of Turkey, were: the Dutch Commissioner Frits Bolkestein, responsible for the internal market, taxation and customs-union issues; the President of the European Convention on the Future of Europe, France's former President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing; and Austrian Agriculture Commissioner Franz Fischler. Bolkestein expressed his concerns about the Islamic character of Turkey's culture, which – he argued – does not allow the country to belong to Europe (AFP, 2004; *Euractiv*, 2004a; Evans-Pritchard, 2004; Waterfield, 2004). Fischler cast doubt on Turkey's commitment to democracy and secularism, maintaining that Turkey is culturally 'oriental' and 'geographically Asian' (*Euractiv*, 2004b). Giscard d'Estaing also argued that Turkey is in Asia; moreover he attacked those institutional actors within the EU – especially the Council's ministers – who use an 'ambiguous language' about Turkey's accession, never revealing to the Turks the fact that 'the majority of the members of the European Councils are in fact against it' (*Le Monde*, 2002).

In contrast to these contestations about the accession of what is often regarded as a 'non-European' country, Prodi emphasized Europe's plural character during a discussion meeting on anti-Semitism, in February 2004, as he significantly spoke of a 'Union of Minorities' (Prodi, 2004). Although his speech was aimed at praising the capacity of the Jews of Europe to integrate in European society, it was welcomed by other religious minorities too, namely Muslims. According to Imam Dr Abduljalil Sajid (a prominent British-Pakistani Islamic preacher), for instance, the Jewish example of integration in Europe should be a spur for European Muslims to do the same (Sajid, 2005).

Transversal conferences, involving Ministers of the Interior, as well as religious leaders, intellectuals and Ministers for Social Affairs, were organized by various institutions and offices of the EU around the subject of 'intercultural and interfaith dialogue' between 2001 and 2003. As explained above, the EU had gradually developed an interest in and a specific discourse on these themes throughout the 1990s. Therefore, the EU's visible concern with intercultural dialogue in the early years of the new century cannot be regarded as a 'post-9/11 syndrome', although one cannot deny that the terrorist attacks of 2001 (and the subsequent circle of violence that spread globally, from Iraq, to Bali, to Istanbul, to Madrid, and to London) intensified the global attention to and need for cultural and social dialogue as a response to the international crisis.

In December 2001, the European Commission supported and hosted a conference, entitled 'The Peace of God in the World', which had been promoted by the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, Bartholomew. The conference was attended by EU officials and by a large number of European representatives of the world religions (though their presence did not seem to be well balanced) who then produced a declaration of mutual respect and faith in God. In March 2002, the Commission also organized a more intellectually oriented conference, where world experts and academics – including high-profile Muslim intellectuals (and modernizers) living in Europe such as Muhammad Arkoun, Tariq Ramadan and Malek Chebel – discussed the modalities of intercultural dialogue in twenty-first century Europe.

Specific initiatives to address the issue of Islam and to reach out directly to the Muslims of Europe and beyond were undertaken by the Commission, especially between 2001 and 2002, to defuse the post-9/11 hysteria. Soon after the attacks, in October 2001, then Commission President Prodi made an emblematic visit to Brussels' central mosque, to express his friendship, solidarity and respect for the Muslim communities of Europe who were facing an atmosphere of hostility as a direct consequence of the terrorist attacks that had been carried out in the US by what have since been labelled as 'Islamic fanatics' or 'Islamic extremists'.

On 29 October 2001, Commissioner Diamantopoulou had a private meeting in Brussels with the representatives of European associations of Muslim and Jewish women, whom she had invited to explore and stimulate their contribution to peace and social cohesion between religious and ethnic groups within the EU (European Commission, 2001b). A conference on 'Muslim Women in Europe: Voices to be heard in the intercultural dialogue' was also organized by then Commission Vice-President Neil Kinnock on the occasion of International Women's Day, 8 March 2002. Equal opportunities Commissioner Anna Diamantopoulou took part in this conference, urging for an end to the stereotyping and ignorance of Islam. She also stressed – by using somewhat stereotypical words – that Muslim women living in Europe should be allowed to 'exert free choice and independence in their personal and family lives' (Diamantopoulou, 2002). The European Convention's emphasis on the contribution of civil society to the debate on the future of Europe, as well as the feedback that Mrs Diamantopoulou must have received from these two events are probably the factors that pushed her to host an online interactive conference with Muslim women on 24 October 2002 (European Commission, 2002d). She had acquired visibility as a supporter of Muslim women thanks to two major events the previous year. She was invited as keynote speaker first at the conference on 'Women and the three Mediterranean Cultures: Development, Democracy and Liberty' (Seville, 23-24 November) and then at the 'Roundtable on Women's Leadership in Rebuilding Afghanistan'. This summit was organized in Brussels on 4-5 December 2001 by the European Women's Lobby, the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), and Afghan women themselves (cf. European Commission, 2001d and 2001e) to discuss the role of Afghan women in the reconstruction of their country after the overthrow of the Taliban regime by US-led coalition Operation Enduring Freedom. This meeting ran almost simultaneously with the UN-sponsored

Afghan peace conference – attended by Afghan men only – in Bonn (5 December 2001), which then led to the creation of the Afghan Interim Administration.

From all these initiatives devoted to 'dialogue' emerged the image of the EU extending its hands towards Muslim women and offering them support to gain confidence in themselves and thus be able to participate in public life, be it in Europe or abroad. This was neither a condemnation of the plight of women in Islam, nor an invitation to violent self-assertion breaking off with their cultural traditions. Rather, the overall impression from the type of discourse that characterized these meetings was that the EU, as a model of democracy, tolerance and equality, was smoothly proposing an important change in the lives of these women; they were shown the possibility to become engaged in the 'human' community of Europe's citizens, and to stand together – to support women's causes – irrespective of their nationality, religion and political tradition. Once again, these types of EU initiatives illustrate the normative power of the EU and the way it is projected beyond the limits of the EU.

An example of how the notion of intercultural dialogue was absorbed and re-elaborated outside the EU and then re-proposed to the EU is the Joint Forum on Civilization and Harmony (also publicized by the media as the 'EU-Islam forum'), which took place in Istanbul on 12-13 February 2002. It was organized by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)[17] and by the Turkish government with the aim of asserting their political engagement to promote harmony amongst cultures. Several EU officials and politicians participated.

The OIC is an important organization in the Muslim world. Although it is not always considered to be very successful due to a lack of coordination, the OIC has been attempting to institutionalize and represent Islam at a global level and as a major interlocutor with the EU (Haynes, 2001). However, if the EU blindly accepts the OIC as a main Muslim interlocutor – which at the moment does not seem to be the case – then the space for the articulation of identity politics of indigenous European Muslims would be jeopardized because the OIC would represent a foreign institutionalized version of 'Islam of the states' and not the Islam of the peoples.

The OIC's commitment to fostering dialogue between the West and the Muslim world started long before 9/11 and is connected with the establishment in Turkey, back in the 1980s, of the OIC Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture (IRCICA). The Centre first dealt with research projects in the fields of history of Muslim nations, history of science, Islamic arts, as well as bibliographic works relating to translations of the Holy Quran and other manuscripts. Subsequently it became gradually engaged in fostering scholarly interest in the history of arts, sciences and culture in Islam worldwide and in cultivating 'both inter-Islamic dialogue and dialogue with other nations and communities'. When the OIC adopted the Tehran Declaration on the Dialogue of Civilizations, the IRCICA mandate was also reinforced. It was 'expected to play a pivotal role … through its objective studies portraying the true image of Islamic civilisation, representing the Muslim world in multicultural scholarly forums, and helping to create awareness of Islamic culture and civilisation in world opinion'.[18] The IRCICA publication *The West and*

*Islam: Towards a Dialogue* (Abuhusayn and Waley, 1999), which dates back to 1999, is another tangible example of the OIC's engagement in intercultural dialogue.

Going back to the 2002 OIC conference in Turkey, one notes its political importance for Turkey if we consider the delicate position of the country at that particular point in time. As a Muslim candidate country of the EU, in the aftermath of 9/11, and in the midst of an economic crisis (*Economist*, July 2002: 20-22), Turkey probably felt under pressure to prove its distance from extreme versions of political Islam and to reaffirm its commitment to the EU and to its values of democracy, tolerance and respect of human rights.

A second meeting of the OIC-EU Foreign Ministers Joint Forum was scheduled to be held in Istanbul on 4 and 5 October 2004 but was then cancelled for political reasons that, unsurprisingly, were related to the Cyprus issue. A communiqué from the conference organizers explained that the conference had to be cancelled because the Dutch Presidency had decided not to participate – and had invited the other EU member states to do the same – 'under the pretext of the representational status of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus under observer title of the "Turkish Cypriot State" at OIC' (OIC, 2004). Seeking to minimize the embarrassing situation, the same OIC source added that the Dutch Presidency's decision 'did not have a political aim but rather had the goal of providing an opportunity to discuss the political, economic and cultural dimensional mechanisms of creating a world public opinion that promotes harmony and cooperation amongst different cultures and religions' (OIC, 2004a). Whilst this diplomatic crisis prevented the OIC-EU ministerial Forum from taking place, the international symposium 'Civilization and Harmony: The Values and Mechanisms of the Global Order' that was foreseen to take place prior to the Forum, with the participation of academics, intellectuals and journalists, went on as planned. Despite the absence of the big political actors of the EU in the Forum, this conference enjoyed the contribution of the Director (Alvaro de Vasconcelos) and other members of the EU-sponsored network of experts of the Euro-Mediterranean region, EuroMeSco. EuroMeSco had hailed the previous OIC-EU meeting of 2002 as an attempt to 'create a platform of dialogue' and as 'the first high-level meeting devoted to the intensification of multicultural dialogue in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in United States' (EuroMeSco, 2004).

In 2002, the European Commission (or, more precisely, the Presidency, together with the directorates and cabinets in charge of external relations and culture) had also become involved with the Lebanese government and with the representatives of the Arab Mediterranean countries in the organization of a conference on intercultural dialogue, to take place in Lebanon at the end of September 2002.[19] Besides the geo-political significance of hosting this event in a critical zone of the Middle East, the importance of the initiative ought to be considered perhaps more in the whole preparation process rather than in the actual outcome of the conference. The joint organization of any conference requires a great deal of exchanges, communication, capacity to interact and an agreement on the programme, on the expenditures, and so on. Perhaps this was a test, or a training process, to improve Euro-Mediterranean relations. It certainly exemplifies the meaning of the notion of partnership in the EMP and the specific dialogic attitude of the EU. Although slow

and occasionally disorganized in planning and delivering tangible results in the short term, the EU possesses valuable qualities for a long-term commitment to political dialogue: flexibility and patience to listen and to negotiate.

## Conclusions

This essay has sought to highlight the centrality of intercultural/interfaith dialogue practices in the context of EU relations with the Muslim world as well as with the Muslim inhabitants of the EU. Compared to various EU provisions and policies (on freedom of religion, anti-discrimination, immigration control, anti-terrorism) that affect (by protecting and indeed also controlling) the lives of many Muslims residing in Europe, the intercultural dialogue approach seems a more comprehensive and engaging method to interact, on an equal basis, not only with Muslims that live within EU borders but also with the whole Muslim world. In this study we have seen how the EU first developed its intercultural dialogue approach – with the Barcelona Declaration in 1995 – in order to establish economic and political contacts with the southern shore of the Mediterranean (which hosts a large part of the Muslim world), with the ultimate aim of creating a neighbouring area of peace and stability. Initially, EU activities in the field of intercultural dialogue tended to be a private business for the few; they consisted of meetings that took place behind closed doors or that were only accessible at the elite level (invited intellectuals and EU officials). However, with the world crisis triggered by 9/11, the EU visibly became a stronger advocate of intercultural and interfaith dialogue. This type of dialogue was considered the best way to stimulate civil society participation and social cohesion, and at the same time was seen as the recipe to fend off the violent, radical, extremists' threat. Gradually, this instrumental character was dropped and the intercultural dialogue project gained a life of its own detached from the EMP.

EU initiatives aimed at promoting civilizational, intercultural or interfaith dialogue (including the EMP) appear to have been welcome across and beyond the Euro-Mediterranean zone. Even beyond the geographical limits of the EMP, in 1998 an Islamic country (Iran) promoted the year as one of the dialogue of civilizations, to which several OIC members subscribed. After 9/11, the intercultural dialogue project gained even more importance and appeal. In a sense, one may conclude that the intercultural dialogue approach is working as a powerful statement of purpose of the EU in the face of global challenges. By successfully disseminating this new attitude centred on dialogue in order to achieve democracy and social justice, the normative power of the EU is also reinforced. As a consequence, the success of the EU's soft power (through social and cultural policies) provides added value to EU external relations and can contribute to the establishment of the EU in a symbolic new position of hegemony.

Truly believing in the dialogue of cultures, religious and civilizations means nourishing the hope that political, economic and social tensions can be resolved through a dialogic relation based on shared values, sense of responsibility and reciprocal desire to come into contact with and make space for new cultures and traditions. This is not a straightforward exercise to put into practice. Therefore, this

ambitious and noble intention, centred on an honest and transparent dialogue of cultures and societies, faces two main challenges. On the one hand, it risks being hijacked by those that exploit this positive rhetoric in order to achieve visibility in the public sphere and pursue private political goals. On the other hand, none of the EU or EMP initiatives in the field of intercultural dialogue has yet produced any immediate results or clear guidelines on how to improve relations, in practical terms, with and within religious and ethnic communities in Europe and across the Mediterranean. In particular, no illuminating solution has been put forward to tackle a highly critical problem of the Euro-Mediterranean zone, the alienation of Muslim youth, who (as the July 2005 bombings in London show) can easily become prey to circles of violence. This last comment is not intended to discredit the whole intercultural dialogue project but simply to point out that this is a serious domain and it will not produce any positive outcome if exploited in a superficial way.

In general, having observed in this essay some diverse EU activities within or related to the third basket of the EMP, it may be concluded that, through the EMP, the 'soft power' of culture has been gradually acknowledged not only by the EMP partners but also in international politics and has *de facto* been elevated to a higher level. Especially when dealing with global terrorism, intercultural and interfaith dialogue seems the only effective instrument available for re-establishing trust relations and social cohesion within and between communities.

## Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the editors of this volume in particular Dr Michelle Pace, for insightful comments and guidance. I am also grateful to both my mentors at the European Commission, Leonello Gabrici and Sandro Gozi, as well as Andrew Fielding, for their kind support throughout my research.

## Notes

[1] With the fifth EU enlargement of 1 May 2004, the number of the partners that are not EU members has obviously decreased, since Malta and Cyprus joined the EU. Euro-Mediterranean relations clearly form a privileged area of EU External Relations and policy-making. During 2004 the Euro-Mediterranean *partenariat* became incorporated into the broader 'European Neighbourhood Policy' (ENP). As a framework designed to strengthen 'the Union's relations with those neighbouring countries that do not currently have the perspective of membership of the EU' (European Commission, 2003: 4), the ENP 'reinforces the Barcelona Process and represents an essential plank in the implementation of the EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean countries' (European Commission, 2004c). It currently (2005) includes only ten southern Mediterranean states (that is, the original 12 minus those that became members of the EU in May 2004 – Cyprus and Malta – and Turkey – now a candidate country; plus Libya, which has the status of observer) as well as Armenia, Azerbajian, Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine. For an update on the EMP and its members see the EU weblink http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed. On the ENP see Johansson-Nogués (2004) and Smith (2005).

[2] cf. European Commission (2004). As the Partnership's tenth anniversary is approaching, it is becoming evident that the Barcelona Process needs further impetus. Attention to the Mediterranean areas has thus been slightly redefined and has been included, as mentioned above, into the European Commission's vision for a Wider Europe and a Neighbourhood Policy: the *New Framework for Relations with Our Eastern and Southern Neighbours* (European Commission, 2003).

[3] The third basket also includes the control of migration movements across the Mediterranean Sea.

[4] On the meaning and importance of 'Dialogue' as 'Dialogic Understanding' in Euro-Mediterranean relations see the contribution by Michelle Pace in this volume.

[5] The Forward Studies Unit (FSU) was re-structured and re-named Group of Policy Advisers (GOPA) with the change of College of Commissioners in 1999. In 2005, further to the installation in office of the Barroso Commission, the GOPA was in turn transformed and re-named as Board of European Political Advisers (BEPA).

[6] The Constitutional Treaty was signed by the EU member states and candidate countries in October 2004; however, it will need to be ratified by all the 25 member states in order to be enforced.

[7] Later on in this article I will expand on the contested notion of 'moderate' Islam/Muslims.

[8] Wahhabism, also called *Wahhābīya*, is defined in the *Oxford Dictionary of World Religions* (Bowker [1997] 1999: 1031), as an 'ultra-conservative, puritanical Muslim movement adhering to the Hanbalite law'. Its followers regard the Qur'an and the Sunna (i.e. the tradition deriving from the Prophet's life and religious experience) as the only sources of legitimacy for Islam, thus rejecting '1400 years of development and interpretation in Islamic theology and mysticism' and forbidding 'any importation of *kāfir* (pagan) culture in their society'. Wahhabism was founded in the Arabian peninsula in the eighteenth century by Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb, who soon found support amongst the influential Al Sa'ūd family. The conservative kingdom of Saudi Arabia, still led by the Saudis, has since been its stronghold.

[9] Salafism (from the arab *Salaf*, predecessors) is a sort of 'puritanical' interpretation of Islam which has been ideologically inspiring renewal of and political action in the Muslim (originally the Arab) world since the second half of the nineteenth century. It arose as a modernist response, through the re-appropriation of Islamic identity, to colonialism and the apparent European superiority; its main proponents were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad 'Abduh. Salafism acquired a strong political character between the 1930s and the 1960s, primarily through the Muslim Brotherhood movement of Hasan al Banna. Influential figures of the second generation of the Muslim Brotherhood such, as Ala Maududi and Sayyid Qutb, contributed to developing the activist character of the movement and reinterpreted the notion of *Jihad* (literally, the strife for spiritual purification) in violent terms. Salafist thought did not originally consider violence as an appropriate method to achieve its aim – the re-Islamisation of society. Yet, the desire to revive the authentic and true principles of Islam by renewing and purging society from injustice, corruption and infidels combined with the Jihadist ideology has produced a deadly cocktail. These ideas have provided a powerful rhetoric for terrorist groups that claim to be inspired by Islam (cf. Joffé, 2004; Kepel, 2002).

[10] See for instance the contribution of Juan Prat (then acting Director of the External Relations DG of the Commission) in the 1996 conference *Islam in a Changing World – Europe and the Middle East* (Prat, 1997).

[11] However, the original Commission's proposal dated back to February 2002 (cf. European Commission, 2002a/b).

[12] Further information on the work done by these groups can be found in the final report. See 'Report by the High Level Advisory Group Established at the Initiative of the President of the European Commission' (European Commission, 2003e).

[13] All the relevant information was found on the following European Commission webpages: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/commissioners/prodi/group/michalski_en.htm (accessed 28 August 2003) and http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/policy_advisers/experts_groups/index_en.htm (accessed 30 July 2003).

[14] With the expression 'Muslim countries' I do not imply any predetermined relationship between Islam and politics. It is just to define the countries where Islam is the main religion of the majority of the population and/or has strongly influenced the local culture and history.

[15] See UN General Assembly 1998 and also website http://www.un.org/Dialogue (accessed 15 April 2005).

[16] The most prominent proponent of the Clash of Civilizations paradigm is Samuel Huntington (1998).

[17] The OIC was set up by the kings and heads of state and government of Islamic States in Rabat, Morocco, in 1969. As of May 2005, it was composed of 56 countries. Its website states that the OIC is

'the concrete expression of a great awareness, on the part of the *Ummah*, of the necessity to establish an Organization embodying its aspirations and capable of carrying out its just struggle against the various dangers which threatened it and still persist' (cf. http://www.oic-oci.org (accessed 5 May 2005)). Haynes (2001), Khan (2001) and Sheikh (2002) have studied the growing role of the OIC and its attempt to represent Islam globally and transnationally and the implications for international relations.

[18] All quotes in this paragraph from www.ircica.org, Introduction (accessed 16 May 2005).

[19] Source: privately circulated European Commission. Cf. also Prodi (2002).

## References


Abuhusayn, Z. D. & Waley, M. I. (Eds) (1999) *The West and Islam: Towards a Dialogue* (Istanbul: Organisation of the Islamic Conference Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture).

Agence France Press (AFP) (2004) EU Commissioner takes Ottoman swipe at Turkey's hopes, 7 September, http://www.turkishpress.com/turkishpress/news.asp?ID=26424 (13 September 2004).

Ahmed, A. (2002) Ibn Khaldun's understanding of civilizations and the dilemma of Islam and the West today, *Middle East Journal*, 56(1), pp. 20–45.

Aliboni, R. (1996) Collective political co-operation in the Mediterranean, in: R. Aliboni, G. Joffé & T. Niblock (Eds) *Security Challenges in the Mediterranean Region*, pp. 51–64 (London: Frank Cass).

Allen, C. & Nielsen, J. (2002) *Summary Report on Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001* (Vienna: European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia).

Allievi, S. (2003) The international dimension, in: B. Maréchal, S. Allievi, F. Dassetto & J. Nielsen (Eds) *Muslims in the Enlarged Europe: Religion and Society*, pp. 449–488 (Leiden/Boston: Brill).

Allievi, S. & Nielsen, J. Eds (2003) *Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities in and across Europe* (Leiden/Boston: Brill).

Biad, A. (1996) Security and co-operation in the Mediterranean: a Southern viewpoint, in: R. Aliboni, G. Joffé & T. Niblock (Eds) *Security Challenges in the Mediterranean Region*, pp. 41–49 (London: Frank Cass).

Bowker, J. (Ed.) (1999) *The Oxford Dictionary of World Religions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Brumberg, D. (2000) The trap of liberalised autocracy, *Journal of Democracy*, 13(4), pp. 56–68.

Cesari, J. (2004) *When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and in the United States* (New York: Palgrave).

Council of the European Union (2000) *Directive Prohibiting Discrimination in Employment on Grounds of Religion and Belief, Disability Age and Sexual Orientation* 2000/78/EC, 27 November.

Council of the European Union, Presidency (2003) Statement on Inter-faith Dialogue and Social Cohesion, 5983/03 – JAI 373, 10 December.

Diamantopoulou, A. (2002) Speech: The Voice of Muslim Women in Europe. International Women's Day event organised by the European Commission, SPEECH/02/103, Brussels, 8 March.

*Euractiv* (2004a) Turkish accession could make Europe 'implode', says Bolkestein, 7 September, www.euractiv.com (14 September 2004).

*Euractiv* (2004b) Fischler challenges EU plans for Turkey, 10 September, www.euractiv.com (14 September 2004).

Euro-Mediterranean Conference (1995) *Barcelona Declaration and Work Programme* (adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of 27 and 28 November 1995). Brussels: European Commission – External Relations Directorate General.

Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (2003) Presidency Conclusions, Naples, 2–3 December.

Euro-Mediterranean Mid-Term Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (2004) Presidency Conclusions, Dublin, 5–6 May.

Euro-MeSco (2004) OIC-EU Joint Forum. *EuroMeSco* website, www.euromesco.net (1 February 2005).

European Commission (2001a) European Governance. A White Paper, COM (2001) 428 final, Brussels, 25 July.

European Commission (2001b) Midday Express, MEX/01/1030, 30 October.

European Commission (2001c) Press Release: Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers meet to reaffirm relevance of the Barcelona Process in aftermath of 11 September, IP/01/1530, Brussels, 31 October.
European Commission (2001d) Memo, President Prodi participation in the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Forum, Brussels, 8 November.
European Commission (2001e) Press Release, Anna Diamantopoulou: 'We must work for equal opportunities between men and women throughout the Mediterranean region', 21 November.
European Commission (2001f) Press Release, Afghan Women's Summit for Democracy, 4–6 December, Brussels. Fifty Afghan women leaders to attend, IP/01/1717, 3 December.
European Commission (2002a) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, To Prepare the Meeting of Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers, Valencia, 22–23 April 2002, SEC(2002) 159 final, Brussels, 13 February.
European Commission (2002b) Press Release, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Commission proposes new initiatives and urges Member States and Partner Countries to reaffirm political commitment, IP/02/249, Brussels, 13 February.
European Commission (2002c) Press Release, International Women's Day: Diamantopoulou speaks out against double burden of gender and racism on Muslim women, IP/02/377, 8 March.
European Commission (2002d) Press Release, Diamantopoulou to take live Web questions on Muslim women in Europe, Brussels, IP/02/1516, 24 October.
European Commission (2002e) Press Release, First Round Table on manifestations of anti-Semitism across the EU, IP/02/1809, Brussels, 5 December.
European Commission (2003a) Press Release, Anna Diamantopoulou launches Round Table on Islamophobia, IP/03/190, Brussels, 5 February.
European Commission (2003b) Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, COM (2003) 104 final, Brussels, 11 March.
European Commission (2003c) Press Release, Hatred of Muslims in Europe: the EU addresses Islamophobia, IP/03/735, Brussels, 22 May.
European Commission (2003d) Press Release, Sixth Euro-Med Ministerial Conference: reinforcing and bringing the Partnership forward, IP/03/1613, Brussels, 28 November.
European Commission (2003e) Report by the High-Level Advisory Group established at the Initiative of the President of the European Commission, *Euromed Report*, 68, 2 December.
European Commission (2004a) EU Strategic Partnership with The Mediterranean and the Middle East – Final Report, *Euromed Report*, 78, 23 June.
European Commission (2004b) *Enlargement Weekly*, 14 September, http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/newsletter/weekly_140904.htm (20 June 2005).
European Commission (2004c) Memo, The EU, the Mediterranean and the Middle East: a longstanding partnership, MEMO/04/294, Brussels, 10 December.
European Commission (2005) Press Release, José Manuel Barroso meets European religious leaders, IP/05/904, 12 July.
European Council (1999) Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council, SI (1999) 800, 15–16 October.
European Council (2004) Presidency Conclusions. Brussels European Council, Brussels, 16-17 December.
European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) (2001) *Reports on Anti-Islamic Reactions within the European Union after the Acts of Terror against the USA* (Vienna: EUMC).
Evans-Pritchard, A. (2004) Turkey's Muslim millions threaten EU values, says commissioner, *Daily Telegraph*, 8 September.
Forward Studies Unit, European Commission (1998) *The Mediterranean Society: A Challenge for Islam, Judaism and Christianity* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities).
Fuller, G. E. (2004) *The Future of Political Islam* (New York/Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
Gillespie, R. (2003) Reshaping the agenda? The internal politics of the Barcelona Process in the aftermath of September 11, *Mediterranean Politics*, 8(2–3), pp. 21–36.

Hamzawy, A. (2005) The West and moderate Islam, *bitterlemons-international.org*, 20(3), 2 June, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=17036 (7 July 2005).

Haynes, J. (2001) Transnational religious actors and international politics, *Third World Quarterly*, 22(2), pp. 143–158.

Huntington, Samuel P. (1998) *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone Books).

Jansen, T. (Ed.) (1999) *Reflections on European Identity. Group of Policy Advisers Working Paper* (Brussels: European Commission).

Joffé, G. (Ed.) (1999) Perspectives on Development: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (London and Portland: Frank Cass).

Joffé, G. (2004) Global Terrorism, *EuroMeSco Papers*, 30.

Johansson-Nogués, E. (2004) A 'ring of friends'? The implications of the European neighbourhood policy for the Mediterranean, *Mediterranean Politics*, 9(2), pp. 240–247.

Jünemann, A. (2003) Repercussions of the emerging European security and defence policy on the civil character of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, *Mediterranean Politics*, 8(2-3), pp. 37–53.

Kepel, G. (2002) *The Trail of Political Islam* (London: I.B. Tauris).

Khan, S. S. (2001) *Reasserting International Islam: A Focus on the Organization of the Islamic Conference and Other Islamic Institutions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Luyckx, M. (2000) The EU and Islam: the role of religion in the emerging European polity, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 12(2), pp. 267–282.

Margiotta-Broglio, F. (2003) La Questione Religiosa nella 'Costituzione' dell'Unione Europea, *Diritti, nuove, tecnologie, trasformazioni sociali. Scritti in memoria di Paolo Barile*, pp. 493–506 (Padova: CEDAM).

*Le Monde* (2002) Pour ou contre l'adhésion de la Turquie à l'Union européenne, 9 November, http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3210,36-297386@45-100,0.html (15 June 2005).

Nielsen, J. (1999) *Towards a European Islam* (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave).

Önis, Z. & Keyman, E. F. (2003) A new path emerges, *Journal of Democracy*, 14(2), pp. 95–107.

Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) (2004) Press Release, OIC-EU Ministers Joint Forum, 1 October.

Pace, M. & Schumacher, T. (2004) Report: Culture and community in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: a roundtable on the third basket, Alexandria 5–7 October 2003, *Mediterranean Politics*, 9(1), pp. 122–126.

Pace, M. (2006, forthcoming) EU policy-making and border conflicts: perceptions and approaches, in: T. Diez, S. Stetter & M. Albert (Eds) *The European Union and the Transformation of Border Conflicts: Theorising the Impact of Integration and Association* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Panebianco, S. & Attinà, F. (2004) Security cooperation in the Mediterranean: EMP instruments to mitigate divergent security perceptions, *Euromesco Research Papers* July.

Patten, C. (2004) Islam and the West – at the Crossroads, SPEECH/04/256, Oxford, 24 May.

Petito, F. (2005, forthcoming) Khatami's dialogue among civilisations as international political theory, *Journal of Humanities of the Islamic Republic of Iran*.

Prat, J. (1997) The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, in: A. Jerichow & J. B. Simonsen (Eds) *Islam in a Changing World: Europe and the Middle East*, pp. 157–168 (Richmond: Curzon Press).

Prodi, R. (2002) The EU, Dialogue with Religions and Peace. Speech notes for Prof. Romano Prodi President of the European Commission. Dialogue: 'Build Europe, build peace'. Conference on Christianity and Democracy in the Future of Europe, Camaldoli (Italy), 14 July.

Prodi, R. (2003) First Meeting of the Group on the Spiritual and Cultural Dimensions of the Enlarged European Union, Speaking Notes, Brussels, 29 January.

Prodi, R. (2004) A Union of Minoritie: Seminar on Europe – Against anti-Semitism, For a Union of Diversity, SPEECH/04/85, Brussels, 19 February.

Roy, O. (2004) *Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (London: Hurst).

Rubin, B. (2005) The myth of 'moderate' Islamists, *FrontPageMagazine.com*, 2 June http://www.isranet.org/isranetbriefings/Permanent2005/Permanent_june_2005.htm (24 June 2005).

Sajid, A. (2005) Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Two sides of the same coin? Paper presented at the Discussion meeting organised by the Wyndham Place Charlemagne Trust, St Ethelburga Centre for Reconciliation and Peace London: 7 April.

Schumacher, T. (2001) The Mediterranean as a new foreign policy challenge? Sweden and the Barcelona Process, *Mediterranean Politics*, 6(3), pp. 81–102.

Sheikh, N. S. (2002) *The New Politics of Islam* (London: RoutledgeCurzon).

Silvestri, S. (2005a) The situation of Muslim immigrants in Europe in the XXI century: the creation of National Muslim Councils, in: H. Henke (Ed.) *Crossing Over: Comparing Recent Migration in Europe and the United States* (Lanham, MD: Lexington).

Silvestri, S. (2005b, forthcoming) Islam in Europe and Turkey's integration into the EU, in: N. Neuwahl & H. Kabaalioglu (Eds) *Proceedings of Conference, 'Turkey's Accession Process to the European Union: Legal, Political, and Cultural Aspects of Integration'* (Istanbul: Turkish Chambers of Commerce and Industry/Turkish Association of European Studies).

Smith, K. (2005) The EU and Its Neighbourhood, paper presented at The Enlarged European Union and its Institutions: Looking Out and Looking In under the New Constitutional Framework Cambridge University, 8 July.

Spencer, C. (1997) Europe and political Islam: defining threats and evolving policies, in: M. Kramer (Ed.) *The Islamism Debate* (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University).

Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (2004) *Official Journal of the European Union*, C310(24), 16 December.

Treaty Establishing the European Community (consolidated version) (1997) *Official Journal of the European Union*, C340, 10 November.

Treaty on European Union (consolidated version) (1997) *Official Journal of the European Union*, C340, 10 November.

Vasconcelos, Á. & Joffé, G. (Eds) (2000) *The Barcelona Process: Building a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Community* (London/Portland, OR: Frank Cass).

Verheugen, G. (2001) EP plenary debate on Turkey, SPEECH/01/487, Strasbourg, 24 October.

Verheugen, G. (2004) Turkey and the EU towards December 2004, SPEECH/04/309. Friends of Europe, Brussels, 17 June.

Volpi, F. (2004) Regional community building and the transformation of international relations: the case of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, *Mediterranean Politics*, 9(2), pp. 145–164.

Waterfield, B. (2004) EU's Bolkestein 'xenophobic and racist' over Turkey, *Eupolitix.com*, http://www.eupolitix.com/EN/News/200409/4676c532-a0f0-4a0d-b708-2dde1646b58d.htm (8 September).

Willis, M. (1996) The Islamist movements of North Africa, in: R. Aliboni, G. Joffé & T. Niblock (Eds) *Security Challenges in the Mediterranean Region* (London: Frank Cass), pp. 3–26.

Xenadis, D. K. & Chryssochoou, D. N. (2001) *Europe in Change: The Emerging Euro-Mediterranean System* (Manchester: Manchester University Press).

Youngs, R. (2003) European approaches to security in the Mediterranean, *Middle East Journal*, 57(3), pp. 414–431.

Zolberg, A. R. & Woon, L. L. (1999) Why Islam is like Spanish: cultural incorporation in Europe and the United States, *Politics and Society*, 27(1), pp. 5–38.