

The (perceived) quality of agricultural technology and its adoption: Experimental evidence from Uganda

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Abstract

This article presents findings from a randomized control trial that tests two hypotheses on how the (perceived) quality of agricultural inputs affects adoption among smallholder farmers. First, poor quality could be caused by agro-input dealers' lack of knowledge about proper handling and storage. A training is expected to improve input quality and subsequent adoption. Second, information asymmetries could crowd out the market for quality inputs—a classic lemons problem. Here, we implement an information clearinghouse based on crowd-sourced reviews similar to yelp.com. We find that agro-input dealers and farmers benefit from the clearinghouse, but not from the training.

Keywords: agricultural technology adoption, agricultural input quality, agro-input dealers, knowledge, information asymmetry, perceptions, information clearinghouse

JEL Codes: D82, D83, O13, O33, Q12, Q16, C93

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1 Introduction

Over the next decades, farmers in sub-Saharan Africa will need to produce more food on less land under increasingly difficult climatic conditions (Tilman et al., 2011). The use of climate-smart agricultural practices and improved inputs such as higher-yielding and drought-tolerant crop varieties are thought to be at least part of the solution (Evenson and Gollin, 2003). Unfortunately, the adoption of improved agricultural inputs and technologies across the region seems to be stagnating, or at least advancing at a slower pace than required (Suri and Udry, 2022). As a result, differences in agricultural yields between sub-Saharan Africa and countries in Latin America and Asia have almost doubled since 1961 (Magruder, 2018).

Several key constraints to agricultural technology adoption have been tested in recent years. These include poor access to information (Ashraf, Giné, and Karlan, 2009), procrastination and time-inconsistent preferences (Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson, 2011), heterogeneity in the net benefits derived from the technology due to differences in infrastructure and transaction costs (Suri, 2011), missing markets for risk and credit (Karlan et al., 2014), and challenges related to learning about new technologies (Hanna, Mulinathan, and Schwartzstein, 2014).

More recently, issues related to the quality of inputs such as improved seed varieties, inorganic fertilizers, and pesticides have emerged as a potential constraint to their adoption by smallholder farmers. Bold et al. (2017) argue that farmers can hardly assess quality from simple visual inspection at the time of purchase, so information asymmetries between sellers and buyers characterize the markets for seed and fertilizer, in turn crowding out the market for quality inputs in Uganda, similar to what happens in Akerlof’s seminal “Market for Lemons” study (1970). However, subsequent research argues that it is not clear if these quality issues are due to agro-input dealers intentionally adulterating inputs, or if this is simply because they lack knowledge and skills to preserve quality (Barriga and Fiala, 2020). Furthermore, it is not even clear if these quality issues are real: While some studies argue that input quality is indeed lacking (Ashour et al., 2019), others argue that input quality is sufficient but farmers’ perceptions are to blame (Michelson et al., 2021; Wossen, Abay, and Abdoulaye, 2022).

We attempt to answer some of these questions through a field experiment targeting agro-input dealers and smallholder farmers in their catchment areas in the nascent market for improved maize varieties (high-yielding cultivars like open-pollinated and hybrid varieties) in eastern Uganda. Agro-input dealers are essential for agricultural technology adoption in countries with large farmer populations living in remote areas

with poor infrastructure. A reasonably dense network of semi-formal agro-input dealers provides access to technologies to rural farmers at a reasonable cost. Often, these agro-input dealers also provide services like agricultural advice or even credit to smallholders.

At the same time, the informal nature of many agro-input shops may imply that they are a weak link in the value chain for quality inputs, a risk that is likely to be smaller upstream where larger producers and importers face more scrutiny from the government. Agricultural inputs such as seeds and fertilizers are sometimes stored in sub-optimal conditions (e.g., in direct sunlight or in moist environments) or handled in harmful ways (e.g., stored beyond the expiry date or repackaged). There is some evidence of this kind of quality reduction. In a comprehensive study of the Ugandan seed supply chain, [Barriga and Fiala \(2020\)](#) document various issues related to handling and storage that may reduce input quality. For example, dealers often repack seed from larger bags packed by seed companies into smaller bags in order to offer quantities which are convenient and affordable to smallholder farmers. Important information including the expiry date and variety name can be lost during repackaging. Furthermore, seed is often repackaged in air tight polyethylene bags, which affect aeration and seed viability. Open air storage of bags can also lower the quality of seeds ([Bold et al., 2017](#)). Temperature control after the seed leaves the breeders is crucial, too ([Barriga and Fiala, 2020](#)). Inventory carryover, poor rotation of seed stock and storage in moist conditions or in direct sunlight further reduce seed quality. That is because the bio-deterioration of maize is sensitive to temperature and humidity ([Curzi, Nota, and Di Falco, 2022](#)), seed moisture affects the occurrence of storage fungi ([Govender, Aveling, and Kritzing, 2008](#)), and many quality attributes of seed tend to degrade with storage duration time and shelf life ([Hoffmann et al., 2021](#)).

In a first hypothesis, we expect that a lack of dealer knowledge leads to deterioration in maize seed quality. Training agro-input dealers and providing them with information on proper seed handling and storage will increase quality and subsequent adoption. Lack of information is pervasive in developing countries and often leads to sub-optimal outcomes for the rural poor. As a result, a small piece of information can make a large difference ([Duflo and Banerjee, 2011](#)). Also in the context of smallholder technology adoption, knowledge gaps have been identified as a key constraint, and governments around the world invest in public agricultural advisory services ([Anderson and Feder, 2004](#)). While the need for policies and interventions that strengthen input marketing capacity and infrastructure has been acknowledged decades ago ([Tripp and Rohrbach, 2001](#)), most studies target smallholder farmers with information, and we are unaware of studies that tackle knowledge gaps among (small) agro-input dealers.

The fact that seed quality cannot easily be observed by farmers may also result in a lack of incentives for agro-input dealers to invest in quality preservation. In a context similar to ours, [Hoffmann et al. \(2021\)](#) look at maize grain as an output in rural Kenya and find that there is no incentive for sellers to address food safety issues because they are not observable for buyers. Worse, agro-input dealers may intentionally sacrifice quality to cut costs and increase profits, e.g., by mixing improved or fresh seed with local or old seed. There is some evidence of this kind of adulteration in the Ugandan

agricultural input supply chain. [Bold et al. \(2017\)](#) find that hybrid maize seed contains less than 50% authentic seeds and that 30% of nutrient is missing in fertilizer. [Ashour et al. \(2019\)](#) find that the average bottle of herbicide is missing 15% of the active ingredient and nearly one in three bottles contains less than 75% of the ingredient advertised.

That is why, in a second hypothesis, we expect that asymmetric information reduces dealers' incentives to provide quality seed. Addressing these asymmetries may lead to better quality, in turn increasing adoption. In Kenya, some companies started marketing their seed using novel packaging features to signal product quality and authenticity ([Gharib et al., 2021](#)). Uganda regulates seed quality by means of certifications and standards, but they provide farmers with a relatively weak and unreliable indication of quality. We bought seed bags from agro-input dealers in our sample, and only 8% of them have a certification sticker from an inspection agency. Alternatives such as electronic verification systems have also been experimented with, but the cost of implementation has proven challenging, and they depend on the reliability of the underlying seed certification system.

In addition to these problems caused by the lack of incentives for agro-input dealers, asymmetric information may also lead to situations where farmers fail to adopt because they misperceive the quality of the inputs in the market. [Michelson et al. \(2021\)](#) establish that the nutrient content of fertilizer in Tanzania meets industry standards but that farmers believe that it is adulterated. [Wossen, Abay, and Abdoulaye \(2022\)](#) show that farmers in developing countries routinely misperceive input quality and that rectifying this misperception may improve farmers' investment choices and productivity outcomes. Note that also here, a vicious cycle emerges, where farmers continue to perceive quality to be poor even though it may have improved, which in turn reduces incentives for agro-input dealers to maintain quality.

To address issues caused by asymmetric information, we implement a decentralized information clearinghouse that is based on crowd-sourced information and works through reputational mechanisms, much like [yelp.com](#) or [tripadvisor.com](#). We ask smallholder farmers to rate agro-input dealers in their neighborhood on a number of seed quality attributes. We use this information to score and rank agro-input dealers, and disseminate these ratings back to both, farmers and agro-input dealers.

The objective of the clearinghouse is thus to make maize seed quality observable. However, some may argue that farmers can assess seed quality well after one agricultural season: Shortly after planting, farmers can observe germination rates, i.e. the proportion of seeds that germinate, and later how fast the seed matures. Some seed may also be more susceptible to pests and diseases, while other seed may be particularly tolerant in terms of drought. After harvest, the farmer can observe the yield. In the limit, farmers can perfectly observe seed quality, and there is no need for a clearinghouse. However, others may argue that farmers cannot assess seed quality even after using it, because there are so many factors at play in agricultural production: If farmers experience a disappointing harvest, they cannot safely conclude that the seed material was poor because it could have also been poor soil, insufficient, late or too much rain,

or own mismanagement like late planting or insufficient weeding. Misattribution occurs when farmers mistakenly ascribe bad outcomes to bad inputs, rather than to other possible causes. This would imply that the clearinghouse will not work, as farmers cannot observe seed quality at all. In the limit, improved maize seed would resemble a credence good and the clearinghouse ratings of farmers would be mainly noise. Even though farmers and dealers might still change their behavior in the short run because they expect the clearinghouse to work, this effect would fade out as soon as both actors learn that the ratings are as good as random. While there is considerable evidence that farmers cannot perfectly assess seed quality (e.g., [Bold et al., 2017](#)) and authors like [Tjernström et al. \(2021\)](#) argue that sub-Saharan Africa’s soil heterogeneity further hampers farmer learning about the returns to inputs, we argue that it seems unlikely that farmers cannot learn anything from their own experience. Research has shown that farmers do experiment with new technologies, but that (Bayesian) learning takes time. Therefore, farmers also learn about new technologies through peer networks ([Conley and Udry, 2010](#); [Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995](#)). The ability to combine own experience with the experience of farmers in a similar location is therefore likely to provide a good signal about the quality of seed.

A training is expected to work mainly through increasing agro-input dealer knowledge, which when applied will lead to improved seed quality. An information clearinghouse is expected to work through various impact pathways. Firstly, farmers may switch from lower rated shops to higher rated shops after ratings are revealed. Secondly, dealers could anticipate this and increase their efforts to outperform their competitors. This in turn may improve quality and agro-input dealers may want to signal this to farmers. Finally, farmers who did not buy improved maize seed before (because they were of the opinion that agro-input dealer sell poor quality seed) could start adopting when they learn that agro-input dealers generally receive good ratings. Ultimately, all this is expected to increase business at the agro-input dealer level and adoption and yields at the farmer level. Both interventions are tested in a randomized control trial (RCT) among 350 agro-input dealers and an associated 3,500 smallholder maize farmers in their catchment areas in eastern Uganda over the course of two agricultural seasons.

We find that the information clearinghouse improves outcomes for both agro-input dealers and farmers. Shops in areas exposed to the clearinghouse intervention receive more customers, sell more, and have higher revenues from maize seed than shops in control areas, and these effects become stronger with time. Clearinghouse treated farmers are significantly more likely to use improved maize varieties from agro-input dealers, and consequently have higher yields than control farmers after two seasons. We find indications that farmers move from lower rated agro-input dealers to higher rated ones. However, most impact seems to come from treated agro-input dealers who increase their efforts and expand the services that they provide to farmers. Treated shops are also more likely to be registered with the Uganda National Agro-input Dealers Association (UNADA), perhaps to signal quality. Finally, we find that farmers in the treatment group rate maize seed of shops in their neighborhood better, suggesting that the clearinghouse treatment is also effective in changing perceptions.

The agro-input dealer training does not have a clear impact on dealers nor their customers. We find no effect on knowledge as measured by a simple quiz, even though all coefficients point in the expected direction. Interestingly, we also find that the information clearinghouse does increase knowledge about proper seed storage and handling. This suggests that agro-input dealers search and find information that can help them to improve if they are incentivized. This further suggests that providing information is most effective when combined with incentives. Exploiting the factorial nature of our experimental design and zooming in on the interaction effect, we find suggestive evidence that the training does increase outcomes for the subgroup of farmers that is also exposed to the clearinghouse intervention.

Our study contributes to the literature on effective ways to reduce information asymmetries. For instance, [Lane, Schonholzer, and Kelley \(2022\)](#) show how providing information about bus safety to passengers affects the demand and supply of safer public transport, but only if there is a public signal (i.e., when bus drivers know that they are tracked and that this information is revealed to passengers). The article further fits into an emerging literature that tests how crowd-sourced information and reputational mechanisms can reduce information asymmetries and effectively change behavior. Even though advances in Information and Communications Technology (ICT) and the rise of e-commerce has led to numerous platforms that allow for consumer feedback and a variety of websites that aggregate crowd-sourced reviews, there is surprisingly little evidence on the effects of these developments. The few rigorous studies that are available report impressive impact. [Reimers and Waldfogel \(2021\)](#) compare the effects of professional critics and Amazon star ratings of books on consumer welfare and find the effect of star ratings on consumer surplus to be more than ten times the effect of traditional review outlets.

More specifically, we advance the literature on information clearinghouse mechanisms in developing countries, which have been studied to some extent, but mostly address market price information asymmetries between smallholders and middlemen. Assuming that middlemen are better informed about prevailing prices in the market than farmers, theory suggests that providing farmers with price information improves the functioning of rural agricultural markets. However, evidence is mixed: While [Goyal \(2010\)](#) finds that internet kiosks that provide wholesale price information significantly increase soy prices farmers receive in India, [Fafchamps and Minten \(2012\)](#) do not find a statistically significant effect of price information delivered to farmers' mobile phones in a neighboring state. However, a clearinghouse that relies on crowd-sourced ratings may be more effective in increasing the (perceived) quality of agricultural inputs in the market: While prices can generally be observed quite easily, assessing the performance of inputs such as seed or fertilizer is more difficult. Aggregating the experiences of many users may thus be a particularly powerful way to reveal their quality. For example, [Hasanain, Khan, and Rezaee \(2023\)](#) implement a crowd-sourced information clearinghouse in the market for artificial insemination of livestock in Punjab, Pakistan, where individual signals of quality are noisy. Using an RCT, they find that farmers who receive information enjoy 25% higher insemination success and no higher prices. The

existing veterinarians seem to increase effort, while farmers are not likely to switch to better providers. This result illustrates how information clearinghouses can successfully aggregate information in low-capacity markets.

Our study also contributes to a large literature on the effectiveness of providing training to small businesses in developing countries. Helping entrepreneurs to grow small firms by teaching them business skills has yielded mixed results when subjected to rigorous impact evaluation methods (eg. [Karlan and Valdivia, 2011](#); [Drexler, Fischer, and Schoar, 2014](#); [Giné and Mansuri, 2021](#)). While these studies often suffer from methodological issues such as lacking statistical power, it has also been argued that simply providing knowledge may be insufficient to move the needle ([McKenzie and Woodruff, 2013](#)). More promising results have emerged recently when the focus shifts from traditional trainings to trainings designed to instill personal initiative ([Campos et al., 2017](#)).¹ Our study similarly shows the importance of (external) motivation in making trainings reach their objective.

2 Experimental design

We designed an experiment with two interventions (described in detail in the next section), and evaluate their impact using an RCT. The interventions are randomized at the catchment area level. Generally, agro-input shops are clustered in towns, villages, markets, trading centers, and other key market sheds, so that a single catchment area may be served by several dealers. If the catchment areas of two or more shops overlap because these dealers operate in the same town, street or right next to each other, they are assigned to the same catchment area and treatment. Clustering agro-input dealers into catchment areas is done on the basis of geographical location.²

We randomize at catchment area level for three reasons. Firstly, randomizing at the level of the individual agro-input shop prompted ethical concerns. In cases where two or more agro-input dealers operate very close to each other, treating only one of them may lead to a competitive (dis-)advantage. Randomizing at catchment area level substantially reduces the risk of (dis-)advantaging shops. Secondly, it reduces the likelihood of spillovers from treated to control agro-input dealers. Thirdly, randomizing at catchment area level allows us to measure the effect of the treatments on farmers, as all farmers in the catchment area are now exposed to agro-input dealers who all received the same treatment.

We used simulations to determine the sample sizes for this experiment. Simulating provides a flexible and intuitive way to analyze statistical power. Furthermore, instead of relying on theoretical distributions for the outcome variables that make assumptions

¹Personal initiative is defined as a self-starting, future-oriented, and persistent proactive mindset.

²We use the haversine function to construct an adjacency matrix based on GPS coordinates, and shops that are less than 5 kilometer apart are assigned to the same catchment area. The 5 kilometer threshold was selected based on a visual inspection of the map, the size of an average village and the reported distance between farmers and dealers in survey data from a previous study of the maize value chain that can be found [here](#).

Table 1: Factorial design

		dealer training	
		1	0
clearinghouse	1	28 areas	28 areas
	0	28 areas	28 areas

and return analytic solutions, we run simulations that (re-)sample from real data data that was collected in previous surveys.³ Power simulations show that if the number of catchment areas is larger than 112, our experiments will return statistically significant results 80% of the time on a selection of primary outcomes. This corresponds to about 318 agro-input dealers. Based on further simulations to study impacts at the farmer-household level, we decide to collect information on 10 farmers per dealer, leading to a sample size of 3,180 households.⁴

The two interventions are combined in a field experiment which takes the form of a 2^2 factorial design. The resulting layout is illustrated in Table 1. We measure impact on both, agro-input dealers and farmers.

3 Interventions

This section provides a detailed description of the two interventions. We start with the agro-input dealer training and then explain the information clearinghouse treatment.

3.1 Agro-input dealer training

Content and training material

To determine the content of the training and to make sure it is locally anchored, we consulted experts from different Ugandan institutions and organizations like the ministry of agriculture, the seed sector and agro-input dealer associations. A series of semi-structured interviews and a workshop were organized. The experts identified common problems and malpractices by dealers, and then determined effective and realistic solutions and best practices in seed storage and handling. We then developed a training manual to ensure standardization and a simple but visually appealing poster illustrating the most important best practices.

³We use data from 78 agro-input dealers and 1,529 smallholder farmers in the catchment areas of these dealers that were collected in three districts in eastern Uganda in July 2019. These surveys were part of another study of the maize value chain and can be found [here](#).

⁴More detailed information can be found in the pre-analysis plan which was pre-registered at the [AEA RCT registry](#) under RCT ID 0006361.




Figure 1: Timeline

Training

In each treatment catchment area, all shops were selected to receive a training. Of each treated shop, both the owner and the shop manager who is in charge of day-to-day activities were invited. The owner was invited because some of the recommended techniques and practices required investments. The shop manager was invited because many of the recommendations were hands-on practices. We handed out one free portable seed moisture meter per shop as an incentive. All attendants were compensated for transport, lunch and drinks were provided. The training took place at a time of the year when dealers were not too busy. Trainings were organized in small groups, with on average about 10-15 agro-input dealers present. The trainings took place in locations that were easily reachable for agro-input dealers.

The trainers explained the correct handling and storage practices for improved maize seed and used the poster and an example seed bag for illustration. Afterwards the dealers rehearsed the more challenging practices like measuring moisture using a moisture meter. At the end of the training, they were asked to answer a couple of multiple choice questions. The dealers were told at the beginning of the training that receiving a moisture meter was conditional on passing this test, which might have motivated them to pay closer attention. They also received the poster as a handout which could be hung in their store.

The trainings took one day and were organized in May 2021, late enough so that dealers were not busy with selling for the first agricultural season but early enough so that they could use the newly learned practices on the seed of the second agricultural season. A timeline is illustrated in Figure 1. The trainings were organized together with UNADA, the national organization for agro-inputs in Uganda.

Table 2: Questions for farmers to rate dealers

	min	max
Do you know this <i>shop name</i> or <i>dealer name</i> , sometimes called <i>nickname</i> , located in <i>market name</i> ?	no	yes
The place can be described as <i>description</i> .		
Please rate this agro-input shop on:		
Quality and authenticity of seed	1 star	5 stars
Please rate the maize seed that this agro-input shop sells on:		
General quality	1 star	5 stars
Yield as advertised	1 star	5 stars
Drought tolerance as advertised	1 star	5 stars
Pest/disease tolerance as advertised	1 star	5 stars
Speed of maturing as advertised	1 star	5 stars
Germination	1 star	5 stars

3.2 Information clearinghouse

Collection and computation of ratings

At the time of baseline data collection from smallholder farmers, we asked them to rate agro-input dealers in their proximity on a number of characteristics. Enumerators were guided by an application on a tablet computer that iterated through all the agro-input dealers in the catchment area. For each dealer, we provided the common names that are used to refer to the shop, a description of where the store was located, and a picture of the store front (obtained during the agro-input dealer census—see Section 5.1). We further asked if farmers knew the dealer. We then asked farmers to rate them using the questions which are outlined in Table 2. For example, we asked farmers to rate the maize seed that an agro-input shop sells on a scale of one to five stars on germination. Ratings were always collected after harvest, when smallholders were able to assess seed quality based on observing germination and yield, the resistance against droughts, pests and diseases, and how fast the seed matures; see Figure 1 for a timeline of the interventions.

It may be argued that by asking farmers to rate dealers, one also makes farmers aware of the existence of all dealers in the area, and that this awareness effect may potentially confound the clearinghouse effect. In the control group, we thus also iterated through dealers in the catchment areas, to make control farmers similarly aware of the existence of dealers in their vicinity. However, control farmers were not asked to rate dealers as the process of rating a dealer’s seed could make quality more salient, which we consider to be an important impact pathway in the treatment.

Based on the answers of all farmers about all dealers in a catchment area, we computed the ratings for each agro-input shop. These ratings were translated into words

and stars for dissemination, such that they are comprehensible for farmers and dealers who are not used to interpreting numbers. More details about the rating computations can be found in appendix A.2.

Caro: 1. Would doing this multiple times change the overall rating?

Dissemination of ratings to farmers

For the success of the clearinghouse it is crucial to disseminate the agro-input dealer ratings before farmers start buying seed for the next agricultural season, such that they can use this information when choosing whether and where to purchase inputs; see Figure 1. Ratings were disseminated to farmers in person and by means of text messages.

Text messages We sent farmers one text message (Short Message Service - SMS) per dealer in their proximity. This message was translated into three local languages - Lusoga, Lugwere, Samia - chosen at the sub-county level to increase specificity. Table 21 in the appendix provides more details about these messages. Also in control catchment areas, farmers received text messages with the names of dealers in their proximity, so that they were aware of the presence of these dealers. [Dillon, Aker, and Blumenstock \(2020\)](#) demonstrate the importance of these control messages. They introduced a "Yellow Pages" phone directory with contact information for local enterprises in central Tanzania. They find that enterprises randomly assigned to be listed in the directory receive more business calls, make greater use of mobile money, and are more likely to employ workers. To separate this knowledge effect from the effect emanating from the information clearinghouse, we also disseminate control dealer information. An additional advantage is that it is harder for farmers to identify if they are being treated or not, reducing the likelihood of experimenter demand effects ([Bulte et al., 2014](#)).

In person The enumerators also re-visited the farmers in our sample. For this purpose, we designed a visually appealing dissemination application (shown to farmers on tablet computers) which cycles through all dealers in the catchment area of each farmer and states: "We wanted to let you know that customers from [name of the shop] rate the quality of maize seed sold there as okay/good/very good/excellent! The quality of the maize seed that this agro-input shop sells got a score of [score] out of 5!" in treated catchment areas. The application also showed the stars associated with the score. Again, we also cycled through dealers in control areas without providing ratings, but just indicating to farmers that these agro-dealers are operating in their area.

As was the case for the collection of ratings at baseline, the application provides different names under which the shop is known, a description of where the store was located, and a picture of the store front to make sure farmers associate the score to the correct shop.



Figure 2: SeedAdvisor certificate

Dissemination of ratings to dealers

Agro-input dealers received their ratings by means of a report on laminated paper which was delivered to their shops. The front shows a visually appealing certificate with a logo and the own general rating; see Figure 2. We encouraged agro-input dealers to display the ratings in the shop, similar to a "certificate of excellence" from TripAdvisor.

The back of the report shows more detailed information. In addition to the dealer's general rating, it shows the separate ratings that the seed of the agro-input dealer received on the different attributes (overall quality, yield, drought and disease resistance, speed of maturing, and germination) and the average ratings of other agro-input dealers in the same catchment area in a table, visualized by stars. This shows dealers their relative position in the area and could provide an important incentive to improve.

The intervention was repeated in the course of 2022; see Figure 1. We expect dealers to be more likely to change their behavior if they know that the clearinghouse will remain in place for some time, so that they will be scored again. It could also increase farmers' trust in the ratings.

4 Empirical strategy

Due to the random assignment to treatment and control groups, comparing outcome variable means of treated and control participants provides unbiased estimates of the effects of the interventions. Note that impact will be judged by looking at outcomes at

the agro-input dealer level as well as at the farmer level. To increase power, we condition the estimates on baseline values of the outcome variables. We estimate the following specification using Ordinary Least-Squares to get the average treatment effects of both interventions:

$$Y_{ij} = \alpha + \beta T_j + \gamma' X_{ij} + \delta Y_{0ij} + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad (1)$$

where for dealer level outcomes, Y_{ij} is the outcome variable for dealer i in catchment area j at mid- or endline, Y_{0ij} is the corresponding outcome at baseline, T_j is a dummy for the treatment status of catchment area j , X_{ij} is a vector of controls for the orthogonal treatments in the factorial design (demeaned and interacted with the main treatment effect, see [Lin, 2013](#); [Muralidharan, Romero, and Wüthrich, 2019](#)), and ε_{ij} an error term that is potentially correlated withing catchment areas. The coefficient β is the estimated average treatment effect. For farmer level outcomes a similar equation is estimated, where Y_{ij} is now the outcome variable for farmer i in catchment area j at mid- or endline, ε_{ij} is an error term that is potentially correlates within catchment areas, and all other terms are defined as above.

Because we randomize at catchment area level, we use cluster-robust variance-covariance matrices that cluster standard errors at this level. For outcomes at the farmer level where we have almost 3,500 observations in 130 clusters, the original form of the sandwich estimator ([Liang and Zeger, 1986](#)) which does not make any small-sample correction, is used. For outcomes at the agro-input dealer level where we have almost 350 observations in 130 clusters, we approximate the leave-one-cluster-out jackknife variance estimator ([Bell and McCaffrey, 2002](#)).

We account for multiple hypothesis testing by aggregating different outcomes within each domain into summary indices, following [Anderson \(2008\)](#).⁵ However, interpreting these overall impacts can be difficult while effects on individual outcomes show us which variables drive the results and inform us about the different impact channels. That is why we also report the treatment effects on individual variables even though they have to be interpreted with care.

5 Data

5.1 Sample

Our sample consists of agro-input dealers, and smallholder maize farmers who live in the catchment areas of these dealers. The dealer sample was obtained by listing all input shops in 11 districts in southeastern Uganda, which roughly corresponds to the

⁵Each index is computed as a weighted mean of the standardized values of the outcome variables. The weights of this efficient generalized least squares estimator are calculated to maximize the amount of information captured in the index by giving less weight to outcomes that are highly correlated with each other.

Busoga kingdom. We found 348 dealers, sufficient to detect treatment effects according to our power simulations; see section 2.

After the census, these agro-input shops were assigned to 130 catchment areas (for details, see Section 2, Footnote 2 in particular). We find that 1 to 18 dealers operate in an area, with a mean of 2.7. To connect shops to customers, we asked dealers the name of the villages where most of their customers come from. Then enumerators were instructed to randomly sample ten households that grow maize in these villages. Consequently, about 3,500 smallholder maize farmers were sampled, sufficient to detect treatment effects for the outcomes used in our power simulations (see Section 2).

Baseline data was collected from dealers in September and October 2020 and from farmers in April 2021. Midline data from both farmers and dealers was collected in January and February 2022, and endline data from farmers and dealers was collected in July and August 2022.

5.2 Descriptive statistics

This subsection describes the baseline sample. Information about the average agro-input shop can be found in Table 3. When enumerators approached a shop, they tried to interview the person who is most knowledgeable about the day to day operations, which was usually the shop manager. The average respondent is 32 years old. 60% are male and more than 90% finished primary education. In 55% of the cases, the respondent is also the owner of the shop.

We see substantial heterogeneity among agro-input shops. Some are small informal stores which are located in rural areas and sell maize seed only during the planting season. Others have many customers, are located in towns and specialize in inputs and equipment used in agricultural production. The average shop was established 5 years ago and is located 7 kilometers from the nearest tarmac road. It has 41 customers per day. 74% are specialized shops which only sell farm inputs.

We also collected information that would allow us to assess the quality of maize seed sold at these agro-input shops. Enumerators asked if they could inspect the area where seed is stored and noted that there is quite some room for improvement. 65% of shops have problems with pests like rats or insects and 16% store maize seed in open containers. When we asked dealers about the services that agro-input dealers provide, around half reported to offer credit and extension or training. On the other hand, 2 in 3 shops received a complaint about seed they sold from a customer over the course of the last season.

We also purchased a bag of maize seed. However, only 232 of the 348 shops in our sample had seed in stock at the time of the baseline interview. We measured the moisture in the bag and found that it was 13.6% on average, with a minimum of 10.3 and a maximum of 17.4. Note that seed moisture content determines whether molds and storage pests thrive. It is recommended to keep moisture below 13%. While 68% of seed bags show a packaging date, only 18% show an expiry date, and 8% show a certification sticker.

Table 4 reports means in the farmer sample. When approaching a household, enumerators were instructed to interview the person who is most knowledgeable about maize farming. However, a set of questions deals with the household head, who could be or could not be the respondent. 78% of household heads in our sample are male, 51% have finished primary education. The average household head is 49 years old.

On average, 9 people belong to one household and share 3 rooms. The homestead is located 4 kilometers from the nearest agro-input shop and 9 kilometers from the nearest tarmac road. The average farmer started growing maize 23 years ago and has 3 acres of land for crop production.

Half of the farmers in our sample adopted improved maize seed on at least one of their plots last season. Of these adopting farmers, 2 out of 3 bought seed at an agro-input shop. Only 25% applied chemical fertilizers like Di-Ammonium Phosphate (DAP) or Nitrogen, Phosphorus, and Potassium (NPK) on a randomly selected maize plot. Productivity is low at about 500 kilograms per acre.

5.3 Orthogonality tests of randomization balance

To test if treatment and control groups are comparable in terms of a set of baseline characteristics we include standard orthogonality tables with pre-registered variables for both dealers and farmers (Tables 3 and 4 respectively). Some of these characteristics are unlikely to be affected by the intervention, while others are picked from the outcome variables we will use to measure the impact of our interventions and explore impact pathways in the next sections.

For outcomes at the agro-input dealer level reported in Table 3, we find that from a total of 16 comparisons, only one is significant at the 5% level for the agro-input dealer training. For the clearinghouse treatment, we find two significant differences, both at the 10% level. This is consistent with a balanced sample. For outcomes at the farmer level, out of 32 comparisons, none is statistically significant.

6 Results

This section presents results on the impact of the agro-input dealer training and the information clearinghouse treatments. We report impact at the agro-input dealer level as well as at the level of the farmers that reside in catchment areas of the agro-input dealers. Furthermore, we separately present impact one agricultural season after the intervention (referred to as impact at midline) and two seasons after the intervention (referred to as impact at endline).

We take transparency and replicability serious. All outcome variables have been registered in a pre-analysis plan which can be found in the [American Economic Association \(AEA\)’s registry for RCTs](#). In addition to the pre-analysis plan, we completed the entire econometric analysis on simulated data in a [mock report](#) and added it to the

Table 3: Descriptive statistics and orthogonality tests at dealer level

	mean	training	CH
Respondent's age in years	32.43 (11.49)	0.56 (1.19)	-2.24 ⁺ (1.21)
Respondent is male	0.59 (0.49)	0.02 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)
Respondent finished primary education	0.92 (0.27)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Respondent owns shop	0.55 (0.50)	0.03 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)
Respondent received training on maize seed handling	0.53 (0.50)	0.05 (0.07)	0.12 ⁺ (0.07)
Respondent knows how to store seed after repackaging	0.27 (0.44)	0.07 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)
Shop's distance to nearest tarmac road in km	6.56 (10.39)	-0.92 (2.21)	-1.58 (2.24)
Shop only sells farm inputs	0.74 (0.44)	-0.09 (0.07)	0.03 (0.06)
Years since shop establishment	5.34 (6.30)	-0.09 (0.77)	0.21 (0.78)
Number of customers per day	41.49 (46.49)	11.35 (7.16)	6.43 (6.72)
Quantity of maize seed sold in kg	695.50 (1497.18)	201.06 (252.97)	176.31 (235.92)
Amount of maize seed lost/wasted last season in kg	3.50 (18.65)	1.99 (2.47)	2.40 (2.30)
Shop has problem with pests	0.65 (0.48)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)
Shop stores maize seed in open containers	0.16 (0.36)	0.00 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)
Shop received seed related complaint from customer	0.64 (0.48)	-0.11 [*] (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)
Moisture in bag of maize seed in %	13.56 (1.44)	0.25 (0.25)	-0.18 (0.26)

Note: 1st column reports sample means at baseline and standard deviations below; 2nd-3rd column reports differences between treatment and control groups and standard errors below; they are clustered at the level of randomization; **, * and + denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.

Table 4: Descriptive statistics and orthogonality tests at farmer level

	mean	training	CH
Household head's age in years	48.62 (13.38)	-0.08 (0.56)	-0.24 (0.56)
Household head is male	0.78 (0.42)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Household head finished primary education	0.51 (0.50)	0.00 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
Homestead's distance to nearest tarmac road in km	9.39 (10.81)	0.33 (1.69)	-1.23 (1.71)
Homestead's distance to nearest agro-input shop in km	3.78 (4.79)	-0.11 (0.37)	0.11 (0.37)
Number of people in household (incl. respondent)	8.70 (3.98)	-0.16 (0.18)	-0.09 (0.18)
Number of rooms in house	3.49 (1.45)	-0.01 (0.09)	0.02 (0.09)
Farmer's land for crop production in acres	3.35 (4.32)	0.07 (0.21)	0.00 (0.22)
Years since farmer started growing maize	23.09 (13.14)	0.61 (0.55)	-0.55 (0.58)
Yield in kg/acre	443.01 (304.99)	27.15 ⁺ (13.71)	-6.14 (13.52)
Farmer used quality maize seed on any plot	0.49 (0.50)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Farmer bought this seed at agro-input shop	0.32 (0.47)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Amount of this seed farmer bought at agro-input shop in kg	9.52 (6.92)	0.16 (0.53)	-0.34 (0.53)
Farmer thinks maize seed at agro-input shops is adulterated	0.68 (0.46)	0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)
Farmer used DAP/NPK	0.25 (0.43)	0.04 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)
Farmer used organic manure	0.07 (0.26)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)

Note: 1st column reports sample means at baseline and standard deviations below; 2nd-3rd column reports differences between treatment and control groups and standard errors below; they are clustered at the level of randomization; **, * and + denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.

AEA registry before midline data was collected.⁶ These mock reports are essentially dynamic documents that integrate all the code within the document. As such, when midline and endline data becomes available, we simply had to replace the simulated with real data.⁷ All documents, code, and data are under revision control and publicly accessible via [GitHub](#) which provides time-stamped records of all changes made over the course of the project.⁸

Exact variables definitions are provided in the results section below. In terms of variable construction, we follow some (preregistered) overall principles. For continuous variables, trimmed values are used to reduce the influence of outliers. In particular, we trim 1% of each side of the distribution for agro-input dealer level outcomes and we trim 2.5% of each side of the distribution for farmer level outcomes. Inverse hyperbolic sine transforms are used if variables are skewed, with skewness being defined as the adjusted Fisher-Pearson coefficient of skewness exceeding 1.96. Outcomes for which 95% of observations have the same value within the relevant sample will be omitted from the analysis.

Results tables have a common layout. The first column (1) provides sample means (with standard deviations in brackets below). This is mainly to get an idea of effect sizes and so we always provide averages in levels, even though we may use inverse hyperbolic sine transforms when we compare differences between treatment and control groups. In the second column, we provide the average treatment effect for the dealer training at midline, while the third column reports the average treatment effect for the clearinghouse treatment at midline. We also report the number of observations that were used for the outcome at midline in column four. The fifth and sixth column reports average treatment effects for the dealer training and the clearinghouse treatment respectively, but now at endline (after two seasons). Also here, we report the number of observations that was used in the estimation. As mentioned in Section 4, we account for multiple hypothesis testing by aggregating different outcomes within a family into overall summary indices, following [Anderson \(2008\)](#). Results for these indices are

⁶Mock reports serve to further tie the hands of researchers, reducing their freedom in choosing which specifications and variables to select when testing hypotheses. [Humphreys, De la Sierra, and Van der Windt \(2013\)](#) argue that mock reports can reduce intentional and unintentional fishing, and make published research more reliable.

⁷We use the knitr engine to integrate R code in L^AT_EX ([Xie, 2017](#)).

⁸Presentation of results in this paper differs somewhat from the way it was pre-registered and how it was presented in the mock reports (and midline report, endline report and previous versions of this manuscript). In the pre-registered report, the structure of the presentation of the results was mainly focusing on reducing researcher degrees of freedom and committing to decision rules to determine if the interventions worked or not. As such, we had a table of key outcomes along the entire causal chain (combined in an index) to assess overall treatment impact. Other tables then went into detail (for instance focusing on a particular seed type sold by an agro-input dealer or a particular plot cultivated by a farmer). In this paper, we reorganized the reporting to better match a structure where we first look at impact on outcomes downstream of the causal chain and then look at impact on intermediate outcomes to explore potential mechanisms. While this change did have an impact on some of the indices that we define, the results in terms of overall conclusions did remain the same. An analysis that follows the preregistered structure can be found through the project history in [GitHub](#), for instance [here](#).

reported at the bottom of the tables.⁹

6.1 Impact on agro-input dealers

We start by testing if the interventions have an impact on general business operations of agro-input dealers (Table 5). Outcomes that can be classified under this heading include sales volume, prices, and revenue. A measure of sales volume was constructed by asking total quantities that were sold during the course of the previous season. We restrict attention to the four most popular improved seed varieties, two of which are hybrid seed varieties (Longe 7H and Longe 10H) and two of which are Open Pollinated Varieties (Longe 4 and Longe 5). Total sales is then simply the sum of quantities sold of these four varieties. As can be seen in column 1 of Table 5, the average agro-input dealer sold about 700 kilograms of improved seed. We also asked agro-input dealers about the sales price at the start of the season for each of these four seed types and again calculate the simple average at the dealer level. Table 5 shows that at baseline the average price for one kilogram of improved maize seed was about 4,300 ugandan shillings (or about USD 1.2). We then calculate revenue derived from sales of improved seed varieties (expressed in millions of Ugandan shillings) by first multiplying prices by quantities and then summing for the four seed types. For each of the four seed types, we then multiply the reported price with the reported quantities sold and sum over the four seed types to obtain total revenue. Average revenue is about UGX 2.9 million (or about USD 800). We also include the number of customers that come to buy seed on an average day at the start of the previous season, as well as the number of improved seed varieties that the agro-input dealer had in stock. At baseline, we find the average agro-input dealer receives 20 customers per day, and has almost three different improved maize seed varieties in stock. The variables in this family of outcomes are combined in an index to assess overall impact of the two interventions on agro-input dealer business operations.

Table 5 shows that we do not find an impact of the agro-input dealer training on agro-input dealer business outcomes. Both at midline (column 2) and at endline (column 5), the index is not significantly different from zero. Looking at the individual outcomes, there is no consistent pattern. At midline, we find a negative impact of the agro-input dealer training on the average sales price of improved maize varieties. At endline, we find some evidence that the training reduced amounts sold, and this is also reflected in lower revenue.

We do find a positive impact for the clearinghouse intervention on agro-input dealer operations. At midline, the overall index (in column 3) is significantly higher among dealers that were in the information clearinghouse treatment group. Looking at individual outcomes, we see that dealers in the treatment group sold more maize seed at a higher price, albeit not significantly so. However, the combination of this does

⁹In the regressions with these overall indices, we do not control for the baseline values because this would imply having the result only for dealers and farmers who have no missing values for any of the variables constituting these indices at mid-/endline and at baseline, severely reducing statistical power.

lead to revenues that are almost 20% higher (and this difference is significant at the 10% level).¹⁰ At endline, the positive effects of the clearinghouse intervention seems to become stronger, with the overall index now becoming significant at the 1% level. The effect seems to be driven by a 31% increase in the number of customers that a treated shop attracts, which translates into an extra 6 customers.

While Table 5 looks at overall business impact based on four most commonly used improved seed varieties, Tables 6 and 7 focus on the effect of the interventions on business related to a particular seed. We look at the most recently released hybrid seed variety (Longe 10H) in Table 6 and the most recent OPV variety (Longe 5) in Table 7.

In line with Table 5, we start by looking at sales volumes, prices, and revenue for the particular seeds. At baseline, agro-input dealers sold almost 400 kilograms of the OPV versus about 300 kilograms of the hybrid seed, the latter being significantly more expensive than the OPV. We also focus on outcomes related to stock management. For instance, one problem affecting seed quality is stale seed. We asked agro-input dealers how much of the particular seed that they sold was carried over from the previous season. Many agro-input dealers reported that they did not carry over seed. Furthermore, we asked agro-input dealers to estimate how much of their stock was procured directly from seed companies in the same season. For both seed, this is slightly more than what was reported to be sold. We expect that our treatments will reduce amounts of seed carried over and increase fresh seed procured from seed companies. We also asked agro-input dealers to provide an estimate of how much of the seed stock was wasted or lost during the season, and how often they ran out of stock for the particular seed. At baseline, losses seem limited while stockouts do occur. We expect the interventions to reduce both losses and stockouts.

For Longe 10H, we do not find significant effects of the training nor clearinghouse treatment at midline. However, at endline, for the information clearing, house individual outcomes all go in the expected direction, and when the effects are combined in an index, the effect becomes positive and significant at the 1% level. Results are very similar for Longe 5.

One step further down the impact chain, increased sales are driven by an increase in (perceived) quality of agricultural inputs. Unfortunately, the quality of seed is hard to assess, which is one of the key reasons why information asymmetries exist and the clearinghouse intervention was implemented. Nevertheless, to get an idea of the quality of seed sold, we bought a bag of seed at each dealer and inspected it on a number of attributes. First, we measured the moisture content of the seed. Table 8 shows that mean moisture at baseline was good. We see that the clearinghouse treatment reduced moisture as expected, but the parameter is estimated imprecisely (partly due to the small dataset as we were not able to source seed from all agro-input dealers).

We further look at the integrity of the package and whether it shows important information such as the packaging date and the lot number. We do not find that the

¹⁰For reasonable large values, regression coefficients for regressions involving a dependent variable that has been transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine can be interpreted as elasticities (Bellemare and Wichman, 2020).

Table 5: Effects agro-input dealer operations

	<i>baseline</i>		<i>midline</i>		<i>endline</i>	
	mean		training	CH	training	CH
Quantity of maize seed sold in kg ^{§†}	695.503 (1497.183)		-0.092 (0.220)	0.284 (0.227)	-0.597* (0.289)	0.747* (0.307)
Sales price of maize seed in UGX/kg [†]	4273.897 (955.073)		-192.784+ (114.934)	99.272 (113.292)	-33.867 (143.152)	145.861 (138.816)
Revenue from maize seed in mln UGX ^{§†}	2.890 (6.286)		-0.069 (0.104)	0.185+ (0.108)	-0.227+ (0.118)	0.143 (0.118)
Number of maize seed customers per day ^{§†}	19.764 (20.689)		-0.056 (0.098)	0.127 (0.101)	-0.190 (0.116)	0.310** (0.112)
Number of maize varieties in stock [†]	2.834 (1.589)		0.042 (0.266)	0.245 (0.245)	-0.216 (0.234)	0.221 (0.220)
Overall index	0.031 (0.610)		-0.130 (0.095)	0.197* (0.092)	-0.114 (0.077)	0.226** (0.077)
Max. number of obs.						
				306		297

Note: 1st column reports baseline means and standard deviations below; 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th column reports differences between treatment and control groups and standard errors below; they are clustered at the level of randomization; 4th and 7th column reports number of observations; **, * and + denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels; † indicates that the variable is included in the overall index; larger indices indicate more desirable outcomes.

§Due to the skewness of this variable, the regression was run after an Inverse Hyperbolic Sine transformation. Coefficient estimates can therefore be interpreted as percentage changes. The baseline mean column shows the untransformed variable.

Table 6: Effects on dealer operations: Longe 10H

	<i>baseline</i>		<i>midline</i>		<i>endline</i>	
	mean		training	CH	obs.	obs.
Quantity sold in kg ^{§†}	288.384 (727.049)		0.050 (0.206)	0.236 (0.204)	-0.205 (0.231)	242 (0.239)
Sales price in UGX/kg ^{§†}	9.417 (0.145)		-0.025 (0.026)	-0.013 (0.026)	-0.019 (0.030)	187 (0.029)
Revenue in mln UGX ^{§†}	1.625 (3.839)		0.008 (0.119)	0.130 (0.123)	-0.106 (0.130)	241 (0.136)
Amount carried forward in kg ^{§†}	2.679 (12.137)		-0.186 (0.212)	0.090 (0.215)	-0.012 (0.138)	250 (0.134)
Amount shop bought from provider in kg ^{§†}	294.672 (741.810)		0.118 (0.218)	0.206 (0.213)	-0.022 (0.250)	243 (0.253)
Amount lost/wasted in kg ^{§†}	0.036 (0.405)		-0.001 (0.093)	0.019 (0.097)	-0.058 (0.037)	243 (0.041)
Number of times per month shop ran out ^{§†}	1.039 (1.575)		-0.236 ⁺ (0.129)	-0.045 (0.133)	-0.180 (0.128)	185 (0.136)
Overall index	0.080 (0.437)		0.030 (0.067)	0.029 (0.070)	0.021 (0.052)	233 (0.057)
Max. number of obs. ¹						254

Note: 1st column reports baseline means and standard deviations below; 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th column reports differences between treatment and control groups and standard errors below; they are clustered at the level of randomization; 4th and 7th column reports number of observations; **, * and + denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels; † indicates that the variable is included in the overall index; larger indices indicate more desirable outcomes.

[§]Due to the skewness of this variable, the regression was run after an Inverse Hyperbolic Sine transformation. Coefficient estimates can therefore be interpreted as percentage changes. The baseline mean column shows the untransformed variable.

¹The comparisons were only made for shops which had Longe 10H in stock at mid- or endline.

Table 7: Effects on dealer operations: Longe 5

	<i>baseline</i>	<i>midline</i>		<i>endline</i>	
	mean	training	CH	training	CH
Quantity sold in kg ^{§†}	389.492 (716.556)	-0.040 (0.222)	0.304 (0.216)	-0.215 (0.234)	0.316 (0.230)
Sales price in UGX/kg ^{§†}	8.730 (0.110)	0.017 (0.016)	-0.015 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.022)	0.013 (0.022)
Revenue in mln UGX ^{§†}	1.193 (2.175)	0.019 (0.099)	0.111 (0.096)	-0.080 (0.100)	0.114 (0.105)
Amount carried forward in kg ^{§†}	4.312 (19.088)	0.247 (0.324)	-0.092 (0.306)	-0.095 (0.148)	-0.004 (0.155)
Amount shop bought from provider in kg ^{§†}	431.451 (803.696)	-0.005 (0.221)	0.253 (0.215)	-0.179 (0.232)	0.289 (0.235)
Amount lost/wasted in kg ^{§†}	1.756 (10.173)	-0.150 (0.128)	0.031 (0.128)	-0.055 (0.055)	-0.033 (0.058)
Number of times per month shop ran out ^{§†}	0.839 (1.509)	0.053 (0.100)	0.086 (0.101)	0.094 (0.120)	-0.054 (0.126)
Overall index	0.039 (0.401)	0.037 (0.068)	0.012 (0.062)	-0.038 (0.058)	0.152* (0.058)
Max. number of obs. ¹					269

Note: 1st column reports baseline means and standard deviations below; 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th column reports differences between treatment and control groups and standard errors below; they are clustered at the level of randomization; 4th and 7th column reports number of observations; **, * and + denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels; † indicates that the variable is included in the overall index; larger indices indicate more desirable outcomes.

[§]Due to the skewness of this variable, the regression was run after an Inverse Hyperbolic Sine transformation. Coefficient estimates can therefore be interpreted as percentage changes. The baseline mean column shows the untransformed variable.

¹The comparisons were only made for shops which had Longe 5 in stock at mid- or endline.

clearinghouse treatment nor the agro-input dealer training affected quality proxies of the seed that agro-input dealers sell.

Caro: 1. Again, there was an extensive discussion about measuring seed quality and the question if farmers can assess seed quality (so that their ratings are valuable). I address this specifically in the Discussion, but we should keep in mind that people are worried about this. 1. Suggestion related to that: To compare seed quality before and after the intervention, we could look at between and within dealer variation.

Caro: 1. Any way to test the quality of the seeds more quantitatively? DNA fingerprinting?

6.2 Impact on smallholder farmers

We first look at production related outcomes for farmers that live in catchment areas of agro-input dealers involved in our study (reported in Table 9). We start by looking at overall production, total area of maize planted, and production scaled by plot size (yield). We also look at market participation (amounts sold, sales price and total revenue from maize sales) and how much grain farmers save for seed for use in the next season. While we expect positive effects on harvest and sales, we expect that the intervention reduces the likelihood that farmers recycle grain as seed for the next season. We collect these variables into an overall production index. The index shows no effect of the agro-input dealer training, and a positive effect of the clearinghouse on farmer level production related outcomes (but only after two seasons of implementation).

Caro: 1. Welfare implications: We should emphasize more that the CH was good for farmers: their production and yield increased.

Looking into individual production related outcomes, we see that the average farmer in our sample produces about 460 kilograms of maize. As the average area used for cultivation is about 1.1 acre, productivity is similar. We do not find an impact of the clearinghouse intervention on production or productivity at midline. However, at endline, we see that farmers that live in areas where the clearinghouse was implemented report higher production and productivity. Yield differences are significant at the 1% level and amount to 10% of baseline means.

Under the heading of market participation, we see that the average farmer sells almost 2 bags of 100 kilograms at about UGX 50,000 per bag, the total which would correspond to less than USD 30. The clearinghouse intervention seems to have a positive impact on the sales price, but the higher prices do not translate into increased revenue. Finally, we also look at the amount of maize grain that farmers keep for seed in the next season. We find that the average farmer at baseline keeps about 15 kilograms. At midline, we see that clearinghouse treatment farmers save less grain for seed, which is in line with expectations.

As a second important family of outcomes at the farmer level, we look at adoption of improved seed varieties. For the agro-input dealer training, we can again be very brief: We do not find any effect on farmers at midline, nor at endline. The effect for the clearinghouse treatment on overall adoption as measured by the index is positive

Table 8: Effects on bag of maize seed bought at dealer

	<i>baseline</i>		<i>midline</i>		<i>endline</i>	
	mean	training	CH	obs.	training	CH
Moisture in % [†]	13.564 (1.482)	0.017 (0.142)	-0.122 (0.144)	175	-0.041 (0.198)	-0.220 (0.197)
Bag shows packaging date [†]	0.689 (0.464)	0.053 (0.069)	0.050 (0.072)	179	-0.091 (0.063)	0.035 (0.064)
Shelflife in days ^{1†}	60.951 (40.960)	-18.930 (22.091)	-8.272 (20.869)	164	13.091 (8.243)	6.352 (8.289)
Seed is in original undamaged bag [†]	0.940 (0.238)	0.025 (0.044)	0.002 (0.046)	179	0.006 (0.053)	0.051 (0.055)
Bag shows lot number [†]	0.508 (0.501)	0.025 (0.106)	-0.001 (0.107)	179	-0.138* (0.062)	0.027 (0.064)
Overall index	0.065 (0.364)	0.083 (0.103)	0.108 (0.103)	160	-0.067 (0.094)	0.108 (0.090)
Max. number of obs. ²				179		265

Note: 1st column reports baseline means and standard deviations below; 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th column reports differences between treatment and control groups and standard errors below; they are clustered at the level of randomization; 4th and 7th column reports number of observations; **, * and + denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels; [†] indicates that the variable is included in the overall index; larger indices indicate more desirable outcomes.

¹Days since the packaging date or, if the bag does not show the packaging date, days since the expiry date minus 6 months.

²The comparisons were only made for shops in which the enumerator was able to buy a bag of maize seed at mid- or endline. Also, we do not control for the baseline values of the outcome variables in the entire table because only 144 of the 179 dealers who had seed at midline also had seed at baseline and only 183 of the 265 dealers who had seed at endline also had seed at baseline, so that controlling for baseline values would reduce the sample sizes drastically.

Table 9: Effects on farmer outcomes: Harvest on specific plot

	<i>baseline</i>		<i>midline</i>		<i>endline</i>	
	mean	training	CH	obs.	training	CH
Production in kg [†]	463.203 (399.595)	-0.806 (14.050)	-20.372 (14.529)	2884	16.959 (17.957)	38.570* (17.833)
Area in acres	1.094 (0.655)	-0.013 (0.029)	-0.003 (0.029)	3004	0.000 (0.032)	0.010 (0.031)
Yield in kg/acre [†]	443.222 (304.964)	-12.216 (16.234)	-23.006 (16.964)	2878	5.118 (15.596)	44.372** (15.603)
Amount sold in kg ^{§†}	195.295 (297.545)	-0.046 (0.126)	-0.201 (0.124)	3063	-0.147 (0.159)	0.139 (0.157)
Sales price in UGX/kg	506.954 (139.389)	-7.787 (14.395)	33.027* (14.244)	610	-47.215 (30.547)	43.506 (30.380)
Revenue in UGX ^{§†}	97.783 (156.538)	-0.141 (0.260)	-0.393 (0.257)	3058	-0.354 (0.341)	0.263 (0.336)
Amount kept as seed in kg [§]	14.506 (18.530)	-0.098 (0.092)	-0.188* (0.092)	2931	-0.043 (0.108)	0.036 (0.104)
Overall index	-0.020 (0.784)	-0.015 (0.039)	-0.061 (0.039)	2932	0.018 (0.041)	0.097* (0.041)
Max. number of obs.				3407		3441

Note: 1st column reports baseline means and standard deviations below; 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th column reports differences between treatment and control groups and standard errors below; they are clustered at the level of randomization; 4th and 7th column reports number of observations; **, * and + denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels; † indicates that the variable is included in the overall index; larger indices indicate more desirable outcomes.

§Due to the skewness of this variable, the regression was run after an Inverse Hyperbolic Sine transformation. Coefficient estimates can therefore be interpreted as percentage changes. The baseline mean column shows the untransformed variable.

and significant at the 5% level both at midline and at endline. We describe individual outcomes in detail next.

A first key outcome in this family simply asks if farmers used quality maize seed in the previous season on any of their maize plots. We find that at baseline roughly half of the sample used quality seed. We see that by midline, farmers residing in catchment areas of agro-input dealers that were subjected to the clearinghouse treatment were 3.5 percentage points more likely to be using quality seed than control farmers. After two full agricultural seasons, the difference between treatment and control farmers increased to 4.2 percentage points. Related, we ask if farmers bought maize seed at an agro-input shop for any plot during the previous season. Here, we see that on average about one in three farmers uses fresh seed from an agro-input dealer. At midline, we find a difference between the clearinghouse treatment group and control group of about 6 percentage points (which amounts to an almost 20% increase relative to baseline mean). At endline, the difference is about 3 percentage point, but it is not significant anymore. For farmers that did buy from agro-input dealers, we also asked how much seed they bought. Farmers buy on average 10 kilograms of seed at baseline. We do not see any impact of the clearinghouse treatment. However, it should be kept noted that sample size is very small.

We then turn to seed use on a randomly selected plot and ask if farmers used improved seed varieties (defined as non farmer-saved OPV or hybrid seed) on this plot during the previous season. Also here, we estimate positive treatment effects for the clearinghouse treatment, but the coefficients are not significantly different from zero. As for the more general questions above, we also ask if the seed that was used on the random plot was obtained from an agro-input dealer. We find an almost 5 percentage point treatment effect for the clearinghouse treatment at midline and a 3.6 percentage point effect at endline. A related question asks if farmers used farmer-saved seed on the randomly selected plot. At baseline almost 60% of sampled farmers used farmer saved seed. Again in line with expectations, we find that farmers that were exposed to the clearinghouse treatment reduced the use farmer-saved seed, albeit only significantly so during midline.

Finally, we look at the amount of maize seed that was used on the randomly selected plot, what the price per kg was for the maize seed that was used on the selected plot, and the product of the two to get the total cost of maize seed used on that plot. The fact that at baseline the price of seed used on the plot is lower than the one for the OPV in Table 7 suggests many farmers use farmer-saved seed (perhaps obtained from neighbors). We also see that among farmers in areas where the clearinghouse was implemented, the price of the seed that farmers used is higher (particularly at midline) and this also translates into higher investment in seed on the randomly selected plot.

Table 10: Effects on farmer outcomes at end of causal chain: Adoption

	baseline		midline		endline		
	mean	training	CH	obs.	training	CH	obs.
Farmer used quality maize seed on any plot [†]	0.492 (0.500)	-0.021 (0.020)	0.035 ⁺ (0.020)	3206	-0.009 (0.020)	0.042* (0.020)	3282
Farmer bought maize seed at agro-input shop for any plot [†]	0.325 (0.468)	-0.014 (0.021)	0.059** (0.021)	3145	0.004 (0.019)	0.031 (0.020)	3225
Amount of this maize seed farmer bought at agro-input shop in kg	9.519 (6.920)	0.512 (0.348)	-0.105 (0.358)	599	0.457 (0.419)	0.378 (0.431)	621
Farmer used hybrid/open-pollinated maize seed on specific plot ^{††}	0.432 (0.495)	-0.019 (0.023)	0.035 (0.023)	2954	0.009 (0.023)	0.030 (0.023)	3047
Farmer bought maize seed at agro-input shop for specific plot [†]	0.330 (0.470)	-0.010 (0.022)	0.047* (0.022)	3153	0.012 (0.019)	0.036 ⁺ (0.019)	3240
Farmer used farmer-saved maize seed on specific plot	0.579 (0.494)	0.020 (0.022)	-0.042 ⁺ (0.022)	3153	-0.009 (0.020)	-0.016 (0.020)	3240
Cost of maize seed used on specific plot in UGX ^{§†}	14078.272 (24654.685)	-0.181 (0.235)	0.499* (0.235)	2848	0.283 (0.208)	0.350 ⁺ (0.209)	2942
Overall index	-0.013 (0.899)	-0.030 (0.043)	0.087* (0.042)	2854	0.015 (0.039)	0.086* (0.039)	2978
Max. number of obs.				3407			3441

Note: 1st column reports baseline means and standard deviations below; 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th column reports differences between treatment and control groups and standard errors below; they are clustered at the level of randomization; 4th and 7th column reports number of observations; **, * and + denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels; † indicates that the variable is included in the overall index; larger indices indicate more desirable outcomes.

[†]For this variable, only non-recycled (newly purchased, not farmer-saved) seed counted hybrid/open-pollinated seed.

[§]Due to the skewness of this variable, the regression was run after an Inverse Hyperbolic Sine transformation. Coefficient estimates can therefore be interpreted as percentage changes. The baseline mean column shows the untransformed variable.

7 Causal Chain and Mechanisms

The clearinghouse is a unique intervention because it solves a variety of potentially interlinked problems simultaneously. If the quality of maize seed at agro-input shops is reasonable but some farmers think agro-input dealers provide sub-standard quality, a clearinghouse may correct perceptions of at least some farmers. If quality of seed differs between agro-input dealers, it provides farmers with information that can help them to switch to agro-input dealers that provide better quality. Furthermore, the rating system is expected to provide a direct incentive to agro-input dealers to stay ahead of immediate competitors. The mechanism underlying the dealer training is increased knowledge. In this section, we provide some additional evidence on the relative importance of these different impact pathways, starting with the latter.

7.1 Learning

The primary mechanism underlying the agro-input dealer training is learning, which in turns is expected to increase knowledge of treated agro-input dealers. To test if our interventions affect knowledge at the agro-input dealer level, we construct two indices that summarize different underlying measures of knowledge. The first summary index aims to measure knowledge about seed storage and handling and directly tests if the information that was provided to agro-input dealers during the training was retained. This was done using a short multiple choice quiz of five questions. The questions tested knowledge related to seed carryover between agricultural seasons, how seed should be stored after repackaging, what the minimal distance between floor and seed should be when storing, how seed should be stored in the storeroom, and whether seed should be repackaged. The exact questions, the options presented to the farmers and the correct answer are explained in Appendix A.4.

The second index that we use to measure knowledge is broader. It does not only focus on the seed storage and handling recommendations that we highlighted in the agro-input dealer training, but aims to capture knowledge about seed more broadly. We again use multiple choice questions to test if dealer knows which seed variety to recommend if farmer complains about poor soil, if farmer complains about lack of rain, if farmer is late for planting, and whether they know what to tell clients when they inquire about yield benefits of hybrid seed. The exact questions, the options presented to the farmers and the correct answer are again explained in Appendix A.4.

Table 11 suggests a positive impact of the agro-input dealer training on knowledge at midline, but the coefficient is just not significant at the 10% level. The (insignificant) effect of the training is strongest at midline, which seems reasonable as the training was organized only once at the start of the study. Interestingly, we also find knowledge effects from the clearinghouse treatment, particularly knowledge related to seed storage and handling. This effect also becomes stronger over time, which again seems reasonable given that this treatment is repeated over time. As agro-input dealers become aware of the recurrent nature of the ratings, they will try to improve the quality of their seed

by searching for information on better ways to store and handle seed.

The above suggests that simply providing knowledge through trainings is unlikely to improve outcomes if agro-input dealers lack motivation to improve quality. At the same time, when agro-input dealers experience bottom-up pressure to increase quality, they may respond by actively seeking out information. Taken together, this suggests that knowledge may be more useful if agro-input dealers are also motivated to put it into practice. To further look into this, we can exploit our factorial design, where a random subset of agro-input dealers received both a training and were also in the clearinghouse treatment group. We indeed find that there is a significant positive interaction effect between the training and clearinghouse treatment on key outcomes at the agro-input dealer level (most notably the overall operations index). The positive interaction effect for the index seems to be driven by a significant increase in (both capital intensive and labor intensive) seed handling practices. This confirms that if agro-input dealers are encouraged to excel through a clearinghouse, they are more likely to put into practice the seed handling practices that they were taught during the training. However, care should be taken when interpreting this finding as we are likely to be under-powered to estimate interaction effects.

7.2 Dealer Effort and Services Rendered

The rating system provides agro-input dealers with an incentive to become better than their direct competitors. To do so, agro-input dealers may increase effort and may also start providing more services to their customers in an effort to get better scores and retain or even increase the number of customers.

In Table 12 we provide evidence that agro-input dealers that are exposed to the clearinghouse indeed provide more effort and services than agro-input dealers in the control group. The table shows results for one overall index, and four separate indices that each try to capture different dimensions of effort and service provision. A first index focuses on effort and service provision as reported by the agro-input dealer him or herself. It is composed of 7 different variables: Whether shop offers explanations on how to use improved seed, whether agro-input dealers recommend complementary inputs to get optimal results from improved seed varieties, whether agro-input dealers provide extension or training, whether they offer discounts for larger quantities, whether they offer credit, whether they received seed related customer complaints since last season, and whether the agro-input dealer accepts mobile money. A second index summarizes the perceptions of farmers that are customers at the agro-input dealer. This index is also constructed from 7 variables: Whether shop offers refund/insurance, whether the agro-input dealer provides credit, if the agro-input dealer offers training/advice to customers, if the shop delivers at the farm-gate, whether the shop provides after-sales services, accepts different payment methods, and sells small quantities. The answers of the farmers are aggregated at dealer level before the index is computed.

Improving quality of seed requires a mix of labor intensive practices and investments. Also during the agro-input dealer training, we made sure that we had a good mix of

Table 11: Effects on dealer knowledge

	<i>baseline</i>		<i>midline</i>		<i>endline</i>	
	mean		training	CH	training	CH
Index of dealer's knowledge about seed storage ^{1†}	0.000 (0.482)		0.091 (0.076)	0.115 (0.075)	0.030 (0.053)	0.124* (0.055)
Index of dealer's knowledge about seed ^{2†}	0.000 (0.533)		0.102 (0.072)	0.065 (0.070)	-0.009 (0.080)	-0.007 (0.078)
Overall index	0.000 (0.729)		0.208 (0.125)	0.211+ (0.119)	0.038 (0.107)	0.142 (0.102)
Max. number of obs.						
				306		297

Note: 1st column reports baseline means and standard deviations below; 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th column reports differences between treatment and control groups and standard errors below; they are clustered at the level of randomization; 4th and 7th column reports number of observations; **, * and + denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels; † indicates that the variable is included in the overall index; larger indices indicate more desirable outcomes.

¹The index of dealer's knowledge about seed storage contains 5 variables: whether dealer knows how long seed can be carried over, how seed should be stored after repackaging, what the min. distance between floor and seed is, how seed should be stored in storeroom, whether seed should be repackaged.

²The index of dealer's knowledge about seed contains 4 variables: whether dealer knows which seed variety to recommend if farmer complains about poor soil, if farmer complains about little rain, if farmer is late for planting, what to tell clients about yield benefits of hybrid seed.

Table 12: Effects on dealer efforts

	<i>baseline</i>		<i>midline</i>		<i>endline</i>	
	mean	training	CH	obs.	training	CH
Index of dealer's self-reported efforts and services ^{1†}	0.000 (0.454)	-0.063 (0.062)	0.066 (0.060)	243	-0.031 (0.051)	0.086 ⁺ (0.048)
Index of dealer's efforts and services according to farmers ^{2†}	-0.027 (0.583)	-0.151 [*] (0.074)	0.301 ^{**} (0.069)	259	0.006 (0.092)	0.086 (0.084)
Index of labor-intensive seed handling practices ^{3†}	0.010 (0.484)	0.058 (0.070)	0.099 (0.065)	285	0.083 (0.067)	0.074 (0.068)
Index of capital-intensive seed handling practices ^{4†}	0.000 (0.508)	-0.019 (0.063)	0.000 (0.072)	270	-0.087 (0.092)	0.070 (0.081)
Overall index	0.032 (0.540)	-0.029 (0.121)	0.359 ^{**} (0.113)	189	0.006 (0.099)	0.165 ⁺ (0.091)
Max. number of obs.				306		297

Note: 1st column reports baseline means and standard deviations below; 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th column reports differences between treatment and control groups and standard errors below; they are clustered at the level of randomization; 4th and 7th column reports number of observations; **, * and + denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels; † indicates that the variable is included in the overall index; larger indices indicate more desirable outcomes.

¹The index of dealer's self-reported efforts and services contains 7 variables: whether shop offers explanations, complementary input recommendations, extension/training, discounts for larger quantities, credit, did not receive seed related customer complaint, accepts mobile money.

²The index of dealer's efforts and services according to farmers contains 7 variables: whether shop offers refund/insurance, credit, training/advice, delivery, after-sales service, accepts different payment methods, sells small quantities. The answers are aggregated at dealer level, then the index is computed.

³The index of labor-intensive seed handling practices contains 6 variables: whether seed is stored in open containers, cleanliness and professionalism rating by enumerator, stored in correct lighting, whether seed is stored on correct surface, whether seed is not stored in dedicated area, whether shop has no pest problem, whether seed is

⁴The index of capital-intensive seed handling practices contains 6 variables: whether roof is leak-proof, whether roof is insulated, whether walls are insulated, whether shop is ventilated, whether any official certificate is displayed, whether expired seed is handled correctly.

recommended practices and investments that were in reach of the different types of agro-input dealers, some of which may have excess labour while others have access to money to invest. A third index groups a set of labour intensive practices. The index of labor-intensive seed handling practices contains 6 variables: Whether seed is stored in dedicated area, whether the shop has no pest problem, whether seed is stored in correct lighting, whether seed is stored on correct surface, whether seed is not stored in open containers, and a cleanness and professionalism rating provided by the enumerator. A fourth index groups a set of capital intensive practices. This index groups 6 variables: Whether roof is leak-proof, whether roof is insulated, whether walls are insulated, whether shop is ventilated, whether any official certificate is displayed, and whether expired seed is handled correctly. Many of these variables were collected or at least confirmed through visual inspection by enumerators.

We find that the clearinghouse intervention increased dealer effort and services, especially at midline. The effect at midline is driven by a significant difference in efforts and services provided by treated agro-input dealers according to farmers. We also see an increase in labor intensive seed handling practices. We do not find that the agro-input dealer training increased efforts and services.

As it is hard to assess quality via visual inspection, agro-input dealers may use various strategies to signal to customers that their seed is of good quality. One way to do this is through membership of professional organizations. Agro-input dealers that try to signal quality will also not shy away from inspections; on the contrary, they may actively seek out inspection such that they can then advertise this in their shops. Alternatively, it could also be that inspectors use the ratings in guiding their inspections.

Table 13 collects a set of variables that agro-input dealers can use to signal quality, including membership of UNADA, number of inspections that took place in the last season, and warnings or confiscation of seed. We find that at endline, judged by the overall index, the clearinghouse treatment led to a significant increase in quality assurance measures. Looking at the individual outcomes, the effect seems due to an increase registration with UNADA. We also find that the number of inspections increased significantly.

7.3 Switching

An important potential mechanism underlying the clearinghouse treatment is farmers' propensity to switch from lower rated agro-input dealers to shops that get better scores. We provide some evidence here on this impact pathway.

At the farmer level, we asked farmers if they switched agro-input dealers from the previous season (reported in Table 14). We see that few farmers reported switching at baseline. However, at midline we see that in the clearinghouse treatment group a significantly higher share of farmers reported switching agro-input dealer. Also at endline, we find a higher propensity to switch dealers among clearinghouse treated farmers.

Table 13: Effects on dealer memberships, licenses, inspections

	<i>baseline</i>		<i>midline</i>		<i>endline</i>	
	mean		training	CH	training	CH
				obs.		obs.
Shop is registered with UNADA [†]	0.442 (0.497)		0.040 (0.072)	0.066 (0.068)	-0.050 (0.072)	0.118 ⁺ (0.070)
Shop is member of other professional association [†]	0.345 (0.476)		-0.035 (0.051)	0.058 (0.052)	0.001 (0.073)	0.069 (0.066)
Shop has trading license issued by local government [†]	0.749 (0.435)		-0.042 (0.053)	0.021 (0.054)	-0.033 (0.056)	0.008 (0.057)
Number of shop inspections ^{§†}	1.532 (1.859)		0.037 (0.247)	-0.097 (0.259)	0.038 (0.109)	0.292 [*] (0.111)
Shop received warning after inspection [†]	0.317 (0.466)		0.045 (0.072)	0.005 (0.073)	0.013 (0.062)	-0.009 (0.063)
Shop's products were confiscated after inspection [†]	0.145 (0.353)		0.021 (0.046)	-0.027 (0.046)	0.014 (0.033)	-0.025 (0.036)
Overall index	-0.004 (0.433)		-0.005 (0.056)	0.047 (0.055)	-0.006 (0.078)	0.203 ^{**} (0.074)
Max. number of obs.				306		297

Note: 1st column reports baseline means and standard deviations below; 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th column reports differences between treatment and control groups and standard errors below; they are clustered at the level of randomization; 4th and 7th column reports number of observations; **, * and + denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels; † indicates that the variable is included in the overall index; larger indices indicate more desirable outcomes.

[§]Due to the skewness of this variable, the regression was run after an Inverse Hyperbolic Sine transformation. Coefficient estimates can therefore be interpreted as percentage changes. The baseline mean column shows the untransformed variable.

Table 14: Effects on farmer switching behavior

	<i>midline</i>		<i>midline</i>		<i>endline</i>	
	mean		training	CH	training	CH
Farmer switched to different agro-input shop ¹	0.168		-0.013	0.042**	-0.024	0.026 ⁺
	(0.374)		(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Max. number of obs.					3407	3441

Note: 1st column reports baseline means and standard deviations below; 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th column reports differences between treatment and control groups and standard errors below; they are clustered at the level of randomization; 4th and 7th column reports number of observations; **, * and + denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels; [†] indicates that the variable is included in the overall index; larger indices indicate more desirable outcomes.

¹We report the mean and standard deviation at midline because this variable was not collected at baseline.




Figure 3: Switching

The above reveals increased mobility in the treatment group, but it does not establish that farmers move from poorly rated shops to better rated agro-input dealers. To further investigate if farmers switch from lower ranked to higher ranked dealers, we simply calculate the difference between the rating from shop where the farmer is switching to and the rating of the shop that the farmer is switching from. If farmers indeed move to better rated shops, we expect this difference to be positive. We do find that this is indeed the case, and more so during the second season, but the difference is not significantly different from zero at conventional levels ($p=0.166$).

We also explore switching at the agro-input dealer level. Here we explore the relationship between ratings that agro-input shops receive and the number of customers (standardized within catchment area). If farmers switch from poorly rated input dealers to higher rated agro-input dealers, we would expect to see a positive correlation in areas where the information clearinghouse treatment was implemented. Figure 3 shows that shops that are rated higher at midline also receive more customers at endline. However, also here, the evidence is not very robust.

7.4 Perceptions

Finally, the rating system is assumed to change perceptions held by farmers about the quality of seed sold by agro-input dealers. Table 15 provides a more detailed analysis of this impact pathway.

A first variable we use to measure perceptions is at the farmer level. We simply asked farmers if they think that maize seed that they can buy at agro-input dealers is counterfeit or adulterated. Recall that at baseline, more than 2 in 3 farmers responded affirmative on this question (Table 4). The first four columns show impact of the clearinghouse intervention at midline and endline for the full sample. We do not find that the treatment significantly affects farmer perceptions as measured by this variable. However, we expect that the effect on perceptions will be largest for farmers in treatment areas that are not adopting improved seed at baseline. Therefore, in columns 5 to 8, we repeat the analysis but only for the subset of farmers that do not adopt improved maize seed varieties at baseline. We see that at midline, farmers that do not adopt at baseline and live in areas exposed to the clearinghouse are now 12.5 percentage points less likely to think that agro-input dealers sell adulterated seed than similar farmers that live in areas not affected by the treatment. The effect disappears at endline.

Two other important outcomes are related to the perception of product quality, shop and seller. To be able to calculate these indices at the smallholder level, the farmer needs to have rated at least one dealer in the catchment area on all the components of the indices, which leads to a reduction of the sample size, which in turn may have affected power. Nonetheless, we see that the index of farmer’s maize seed ratings of shops within the catchment area is significantly and positively affected by the clearinghouse treatment, albeit only at the 10% significance level. Furthermore, if we restrict the sample to farmers that did not adopt improved maize seed varieties at baseline, the increase in ratings becomes significant at the 5% significance level.

Finally, we also test if average ratings at the dealer level differ between treatment and control groups for the clearinghouse. While we do see that agro-input dealers are higher rated in treatment areas, the difference is not significant, probably due to the small sample.

8 Attrition

Table 16 reports attrition levels in the treatment and comparison groups. We failed to collect data from 12% of dealers and 2% of farmers at midline, and from 14% of dealers and 1% of farmers at endline. To test if non-response is related to one of the treatments, we regress the likelihood of leaving the sample on the treatment indicators. We find that clearinghouse treated dealers are significantly less likely to leave the sample.

Whether our estimates are biased or not depends on whether this attrition is random or not. It is for instance plausible that the worst performing shops in the clearinghouse control group went out of business. Our clearinghouse treatment might have prevented bankruptcy and helped dealers to stay in the market because it served as some kind of advertisement if the rating was good.

On the other hand, it is plausible that enumerators invested less effort when searching control dealers because they did not have to deliver their SeedAdvisor certificates. Carrying this certificate might have made them more persistent when looking for a shop

Table 15: Effects of clearinghouse on farmer perceptions

	<i>baseline</i>		<i>midline</i>		<i>endline</i>		<i>midline</i>		<i>endline</i>	
	mean		CH	obs.	CH	obs.	CH	obs.	CH	obs.
Farmer thinks maize seed at agro-input shops is adulterated [†]	0.685 (0.465)		-0.041 (0.027)	2113	0.020 (0.028)	2167	-0.125** (0.036)	903	0.010 (0.035)	944
Index of farmer's maize seed ratings of shops within catchment area ^{1†}	0.000 (0.637)				0.092+ (0.054)	1664			0.141* (0.063)	693
Index of farmer's general ratings of shops within catchment area ^{2†}	0.000 (0.657)				-0.005 (0.042)	1706			0.006 (0.056)	717
Overall index	0.023 (0.697)				0.068 (0.052)	1462				

Note: 1st column reports sample means and standard deviations below; 2nd column reports differences between treatment and control groups and standard errors below; they are clustered at the level of randomization; 3rd column reports number of observations; **, * and + denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels; larger indices indicate more desirable outcomes.

¹The index of farmer's maize seed ratings contains 6 ratings: general quality, yield, drought tolerance, pest/disease tolerance, time of maturity, germination. The ratings are aggregated at farmer level (one farmer rates multiple shops), then this index is computed.

²The index of farmer's general ratings contains 6 ratings: general quality, location, price, product quality, stock, reputation. The ratings are aggregated at farmer level (one farmer rates multiple shops), then this index is computed.

³The index of shop's maize seed ratings by farmers contains 6 ratings: general quality, yield, drought tolerance, pest/disease tolerance, time of maturity, germination. Ratings are aggregated at shop level (one shop is rated by multiple farmers), then the index is computed.

Table 16: Attrition

	mean	training	CH
		<i>midline</i>	
Agro-input dealer left the sample	0.121 (0.326)	-0.007 (0.034)	-0.108** (0.035)
Farmer left the sample	0.018 (0.134)	-0.005 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)
		<i>endline</i>	
Agro-input dealer left the sample	0.144 (0.351)	0.017 (0.040)	-0.079+ (0.042)
Farmer left the sample	0.008 (0.091)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)

Note: 1st column reports sample means at mid- or endline and standard deviations below; 2nd-3rd column reports differences between treatment and control groups and standard errors below; they are clustered at the level of randomization; **, * and + denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels.

because they did not want to return to their supervisor without having delivered that paper. Moreover, the certificate might have helped enumerators to find the treated dealers because they were able to show the names to neighbors etc. (instead of just asking) who in turn helped finding them. In that case, a larger number of random dealers left the control sample, meaning that the dealers who were not found are not different from the ones that were found. The sub-sample of dealers that remained in the control group would then be representative for the entire control group, hence our estimates would be unbiased. Attrition would only reduce power.

We noticed the attrition problem after midline data collection and instructed our enumerators to be more thorough at endline. Consequently, 7 of 28 clearinghouse control dealers who were not found for the midline interview, were found for the endline interview later that year. This supports our claim that at least a share control dealer attrition can be explained by a lack of enumerator effort instead of bankruptcy. Furthermore, even if attrition is non-random, the bias is likely to be negative and treatment effects are expected to be positive. As such, the unadjusted selection-contaminated estimates provide lower bounds for the true treatment effect (Angrist, Bettinger, and Kremer, 2006; Duflo, Glennerster, and Kremer, 2007).

9 Conclusion

Caro: Training: If the quality problem arises before the dealers get the seed (e.g., at the breeder level), a dealer training will not help. \\ CH: 1. Could the perceived poor quality also result from direct breeding efforts? Which may sometimes be a deviation of farmer's expectations? Talking about this, it is important you differentiate between poor seed quality and poorly bred seeds. It is important to make this nuances clear.

...

Caro: 1. Provide more information on the rating of seed quality by farmers. How do you manage the responses to avoid bias? This could large be based on misperceptions rather than reality.

2. Also, are you sure you are not capturing personal relationships in the ratings? but how much can we really believe these ratings

...

Caro: 1. Dealer training had no effect, can we assume then that misperception about quality is the main issue here other than poor handling? Or what did you observe after the intervention, was there no change in handling methods?

...

Caro: 1. Scale-up? Potential issues

...

Even though agricultural technologies like high yielding seed varieties and inorganic fertilizers are considered to be key in increasing agricultural productivity and accelerate rural transformation, the adoption by smallholders remains persistently low in sub-Saharan Africa. We studied a particular constraint to technology adoption: The perceived quality of agricultural inputs. We hypothesized that seed quality deteriorates because agro-input dealers lack knowledge and/or because asymmetric information results in excessive search costs for farmers and reduced incentives for dealers.

To assess the importance of these potential constraints to agricultural technology adoption, we tested two interventions in the market for improved maize seed varieties in eastern Uganda using an RCT. A training informed agro-input dealers about correct seed handling and storage practices. An information clearinghouse based on crowd-sourced ratings of the quality of seed that agro-input dealers sell similar to yelp.com reduced the information asymmetry between seller and buyer by making the quality of maize seed sold by agro-input dealers observable.

The results of our analyses showed that training dealers did not change agro-input dealer practices and did not increase observable quality attributes of the seed. We also did not find any impact among farmers that are living in catchment areas of agro-input dealers that were trained: They did not rate quality differently nor had higher adoption rates than farmers that were not exposed to trained dealers.

The clearinghouse had clear impacts on the Ugandan market for maize seed as sellers and buyers started behaving in a way that is consistent with theory of change. Agro-input dealers reported more business and farmers reported higher yields and increased use of improved seed varieties. A large share of this effect seems to stem from increased competition that motivates agro-input dealers to increase effort and expand service provision. There is also evidence that the negative opinions that farmers hold about agro-input dealers is reduced by the information clearinghouse intervention. While we also find indications that farmers switch more between agro-input dealers in areas where the clearinghouse was implemented, it remains unclear if farmers switch from lower rated to higher rated input dealers.

We conclude that quality consideration are an important constraint to the adoption of agricultural inputs. Strategies to reduce information asymmetry between seller and

buyer by making input quality more observable, through for instance certification, electronic verification, inspection etc., is likely to benefit the development of a market for quality inputs and increase adoption. A crowd-sourced information clearinghouse can be an important institutional innovation to solve the problem of asymmetric information in the market for agricultural inputs. It may be preferable to alternative strategies due to its likely lower cost and self-sustaining nature, and helps to overcome problems such as insufficient public investment in regulatory systems, regulatory enforcement, and market surveillance.

Finally, the null results for the agro-input dealer training experiment shows that simply investing in training may not be an effective strategy as long as agro-input dealers are not incentivized. In fact, our results suggest that if agro-input dealers are exposed to the incentives created by competition and full information, farmers may actively seek out knowledge necessary to further improve and keep ahead of competitors.

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A Appendix

A.1 Outcome variables and results as they were pre-registered

A.2 Details about rating computations

What to do if a treated dealer does not receive a single rating? If a shop in a treated catchment area is not rated by a single farmer, e.g. because no farmer in our sample knows him or her, we could fill in the catchment area mean as his or her rating. However, this is not as innocent as it seems because it is likely that the lack of ratings is not random. Poor quality dealers have less customers, so their likelihood to get rated is lower. Giving them average catchment area ratings inflates the ratings of these low quality dealers. Instead, we simply told farmers that we do not have information about this shop (implicitly informing the farmer that it exists). 16 of 193 treated dealers were not rated by a single farmer in the first round.

Should more ratings lead to better ratings? Some shops were not rated by any smallholder in the first round, while others were rated by up to 22 smallholders. If dealer A is rated by 10 farmers and gets rating 3,5 and dealer B is rated by 1 farmer and gets rating 3,6, we treat dealer B as the better dealer. Even though receiving many (few) ratings can be related to good (poor) quality (the lack of ratings could be nonrandom, see previous paragraph), there could be other reasons why dealers are rated by many (few) farmers. Furthermore, giving higher ratings to better-known dealers could harm new dealers entering the market and dealers who are discriminated, e.g. due to their gender. Also on TripAdvisor, having more reviews than a rival hotel does not lead to a better rating.

Should ratings depend on catchment area dealer performance? The following examples show that ratings should not depend on catchment area averages. In an area with poor quality dealers in which one dealer is a bit better than the rest but still poor, we do not want this dealer to be rated well (i.e. expose farmers to poor quality dealers). Similarly, in an area with good dealers in which one dealer is a bit worse than the rest but still good, we do not want this dealer to be rated poorly (which would be unfair towards him or her). On the other hand, less than 9% of shops received a rating below 3 out of 5, so we would throw away valuable data if we would only disseminate good scores without any variation. Therefore, we take the distribution of ratings into account by using quintiles. Consequently, less dealers receive rating 4 or 5, more dealers receive rating 1 or 2. This could strengthen the effect of the treatment on dealer effort. If dealers get ratings 1 or 2 instead of 4 or 5, they could feel more inclined to improve their scores. Consequently, also the effect on seed quality itself could be larger. However, the clearinghouse should also have a signaling effect, which might be weaker if more dealers are rated 1 or 2 instead of 4 or 5 (dealers would seem to be of worse quality to farmers). Therefore, we chose words with a positive connotation as

Table 17: Effects on primary dealer outcomes

	<i>baseline</i>		<i>midline</i>		<i>endline</i>	
	mean		training	CH	training	CH
		obs.				obs.
Quantity of maize seed sold in kg ^{§†}	695.503 (1497.183)	292	-0.092 (0.220)	0.284 (0.227)	-0.597* (0.289)	0.747* (0.307)
Sales price of maize seed in UGX/kg	4273.897 (955.073)	275	-192.784+ (114.934)	99.272 (113.292)	-33.867 (143.152)	145.861 (138.816)
Revenue from maize seed in mln UGX ^{§†}	2.890 (6.286)	292	-0.069 (0.104)	0.185+ (0.108)	-0.227+ (0.118)	0.143 (0.118)
Number of maize seed customers per day ^{§†}	19.764 (20.689)	294	-0.056 (0.098)	0.127 (0.101)	-0.190 (0.116)	0.310** (0.112)
Moisture in randomly selected seed bag in %	13.563 (1.442)	175	0.017 (0.142)	-0.122 (0.144)	-0.041 (0.198)	-0.220 (0.197)
Index of capital-intensive seed handling practices ^{1†}	0.000 (0.508)	270	-0.019 (0.063)	0.000 (0.072)	-0.087 (0.092)	0.070 (0.081)
Index of labor-intensive seed handling practices ^{2†}	0.010 (0.484)	285	0.058 (0.070)	0.099 (0.065)	0.083 (0.067)	0.074 (0.068)
Index of all seed handling practices ³	0.009 (0.382)	251	0.042 (0.051)	0.052 (0.053)	0.021 (0.063)	0.083 (0.059)
Index of dealer's efforts and services ^{4†}	0.000 (0.454)	243	-0.063 (0.062)	0.066 (0.060)	-0.031 (0.051)	0.086+ (0.048)
Index of shop's maize seed ratings by farmers ⁵	-0.018 (0.595)	327			0.020 (0.102)	0.122 (0.101)
Overall index	0.007 (0.591)	215	-0.004 (0.130)	0.214+ (0.121)	-0.054 (0.118)	0.220* (0.109)
Max. number of obs. for dealer survey outcomes		306				297

Note: 1st column reports baseline means and standard deviations below; 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th column reports differences between treatment and control groups and standard errors below; they are clustered at the level of randomization; 4th and 7th column reports number of observations; **, * and + denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels; † indicates that the variable is included in the overall index; larger indices indicate more desirable outcomes.

[§]Due to the skewness of this variable, the regression was run after an Inverse Hyperbolic Sine transformation. Coefficient estimates can therefore be interpreted as percentage changes. The baseline mean column shows the untransformed variable.

¹The index of capital-intensive seed handling and storage practices contains 6 variables: whether roof is leak-proof, whether roof is insulated, whether walls are insulated, whether shop is ventilated, whether any official certificate is displayed, whether expired seed is handled correctly.

²The index of labor-intensive seed handling and storage practices contains 6 variables: whether seed is stored in dedicated area, whether shop has no pest problem, whether seed is stored in correct lighting, whether seed is stored on correct surface, whether seed is not stored in open containers, cleanliness and professionalism rating by enumerator.

³The index of all seed handling and storage practices contains 12 variables: the ones included in the index of capital-intensive practices and the ones included in the index of labor-intensive practices.

⁴The index of dealer's efforts and services contains 7 variables: whether shop offers explanations, complementary input recommendations, extension/training, discounts for larger quantities, credit, did not receive seed related customer complaint, accepts mobile money.

⁵The index of shop's maize seed ratings by farmers contains 6 ratings: general quality, yield, drought tolerance, pest/disease tolerance, time of maturity, germination. Ratings are aggregated at shop level (one shop is rated by multiple farmers), then the index is computed.

Table 18: Effects on secondary dealer outcomes: Indices

	<i>baseline</i>		<i>midline</i>		<i>endline</i>	
	mean	training	CH	obs.	training	CH obs.
Index of dealer's motivation and satisfaction ¹	0.000 (0.674)	0.033 (0.082)	0.000 (0.085)	306	-0.109 (0.082)	-0.076 (0.086) 286
Index of dealer's self-ratings ²	0.000 (0.651)	-0.068 (0.084)	-0.002 (0.079)	306	-0.132 (0.086)	0.080 (0.079) 297
Index of dealer's efforts and services according to farmers ³	-0.027 (0.583)	-0.151* (0.074)	0.301** (0.069)	259	0.006 (0.092)	0.086 (0.084) 271
Index of dealer's knowledge about seed storage ⁴	0.000 (0.482)	0.091 (0.076)	0.115 (0.075)	306	0.030 (0.053)	0.124* (0.055) 297
Index of dealer's knowledge about seed ⁵	0.000 (0.533)	0.102 (0.072)	0.065 (0.070)	306	-0.009 (0.080)	-0.007 (0.078) 297
Max. number of obs.				306		297

Note: 1st column reports baseline means and standard deviations below; 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th column reports differences between treatment and control groups and standard errors below; they are clustered at the level of randomization; 4th and 7th column reports number of observations; **, * and + denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels; † indicates that the variable is included in the overall index; larger indices indicate more desirable outcomes.

¹The index of dealer's motivation and satisfaction contains 3 variables: whether dealers see themselves working as agro-input dealers in future, would recommend working as dealers, how happy dealers feel when they come to work. We report the mean and standard deviation at midline because these variables were not collected at baseline.

²The index of dealer's self-ratings contains 5 ratings: location, price, product quality, stock, reputation.

³The index of dealer's efforts and services according to farmers contains 7 variables: whether shop offers refund/insurance, credit, training/advice, delivery, after-sales service, accepts different payment methods, sells small quantities. The answers are aggregated at dealer level, then the index is computed.

⁴The index of dealer's knowledge about seed storage contains 5 variables: whether dealer knows how long seed can be carried over, how seed should be stored after repackaging, what the min. distance between floor and seed is, how seed should be stored in storeroom, whether seed should be repackaged.

⁵The index of dealer's knowledge about seed contains 4 variables: whether dealer knows which seed variety to recommend if farmer complains about poor soil, if farmer complains about little rain, if farmer is late for planting, what to tell clients about yield benefits of hybrid seed.

Table 19: Effects on primary farmer outcomes

	<i>baseline</i>		<i>midline</i>		<i>endline</i>	
	mean	training	CH	obs.	training	CH
Farmer planted improved maize seed on any plot [†]	0.492 (0.500)	-0.021 (0.020)	0.035 ⁺ (0.020)	3206	-0.009 (0.020)	0.042* (0.020)
Farmer bought maize seed at agro-input shop for any plot [†]	0.325 (0.468)	-0.014 (0.021)	0.059** (0.021)	3145	0.004 (0.019)	0.031 (0.020)
Amount of this seed farmer bought at agro-input shop in kg	9.519 (6.920)	0.512 (0.348)	-0.105 (0.358)	599	0.457 (0.419)	0.378 (0.431)
Index of farmer's maize seed ratings of shops within catchment area ¹	0.000 (0.637)				0.021 (0.054)	0.092 ⁺ (0.054)
Index of farmer's general ratings of shops within catchment area ²	0.000 (0.657)				-0.026 (0.043)	-0.005 (0.042)
Index of services of shops within catchment area according to farmers ³	-0.037 (0.609)	-0.138 ⁺ (0.073)	0.161* (0.067)	312	0.034 (0.081)	0.131 ⁺ (0.077)
Farmer switched to different agro-input shop ^{4†}	0.168 (0.374)	-0.013 (0.014)	0.042** (0.014)	3407	-0.024 (0.015)	0.026 ⁺ (0.015)
Index of farmer's practices on randomly selected plot ^{5†}	0.008 (0.400)	0.011 (0.019)	-0.026 (0.019)	2929	0.001 (0.021)	0.016 (0.021)
Farmer thinks maize seed at agro-input shops is adulterated	0.685 (0.465)	-0.033 (0.027)	-0.041 (0.027)	2113	-0.041 (0.028)	0.020 (0.028)
Farmer planted land race maize seed on randomly selected plot [†]	0.448 (0.497)	0.015 (0.021)	-0.013 (0.020)	2954	0.009 (0.022)	-0.024 (0.022)
Overall index⁶	0.009 (0.698)	0.008 (0.033)	0.017 (0.034)	2933	-0.023 (0.034)	0.063 ⁺ (0.034)
Max. number of obs.				3407		3441

Note: 1st column reports baseline means and standard deviations below; 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th column reports differences between treatment and control groups and standard errors below; they are clustered at the level of randomization; 4th and 7th column reports number of observations; **, * and + denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels; † indicates that the variable is included in the overall index; larger indices indicate more desirable outcomes.

¹The index of farmer's maize seed ratings contains 6 ratings: general quality, yield, drought tolerance, pest/disease tolerance, time of maturity, germination. The ratings are aggregated at farmer level (one farmer rates multiple shops), then this index is computed.

²The index of farmer's general ratings contains 6 ratings: general quality, location, price, product quality, stock, reputation. The ratings are aggregated at farmer level (one farmer rates multiple shops), then this index is computed.

³The index of services of shops within catchment area contains 7 variables: whether shop offers refund/insurance, credit, training/advice, delivery, after-sales service, accepts different payment methods, sells small quantities. The answers are aggregated at shop level, then the index is computed at farmer level. Only 320 farmers answered all 7 questions for at least one shop within the catchment area at baseline and at endline.

⁴We report the mean and standard deviation at midline because this variable was not collected at baseline.

⁵The index of farmer's practices contains 10 variables: whether farmer spaced seed correctly, sowed correct number of seeds/hill, applied organic manure, DAP/NPK, Urea, pesticides/herbicides/fungicides, weeded sufficiently, weeded at correct time, planted at correct time, re-sowed.

⁶We report the mean and standard deviation at midline because not all variables in this index were collected at baseline.

Table 20: Effects on secondary farmer outcomes: Adoption on randomly selected maize plot

	<i>baseline</i>		<i>midline</i>		<i>endline</i>	
	mean		training	CH	training	CH
Farmer planted hybrid seed [†]	0.264 (0.441)		0.002 (0.022)	0.009 (0.022)	-0.023 (0.023)	0.032 (0.023)
Farmer planted open-pollinated seed [†]	0.260 (0.439)		-0.017 (0.022)	0.002 (0.022)	0.010 (0.020)	-0.007 (0.021)
Farmer planted farmer-saved seed [†]	0.579 (0.494)		0.020 (0.022)	-0.042 ⁺ (0.022)	-0.009 (0.020)	-0.016 (0.020)
Farmer planted seed bought at agro-input shop [†]	0.330 (0.470)		-0.010 (0.022)	0.047* (0.022)	0.012 (0.019)	0.036 ⁺ (0.019)
Farmer planted hybrid or open-pollinated seed ¹	0.432 (0.495)		-0.019 (0.023)	0.035 (0.023)	0.009 (0.023)	0.030 (0.023)
Overall index	-0.003 (0.553)		0.000 (0.024)	0.002 (0.024)	-0.010 (0.025)	0.026 (0.025)
Max. number of obs.						
				3407		3441

Note: 1st column reports baseline means and standard deviations below; 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th column reports differences between treatment and control groups and standard errors below; they are clustered at the level of randomization; 4th and 7th column reports number of observations; **, * and + denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels; † indicates that the variable is included in the overall index; larger indices indicate more desirable outcomes.

¹For this variable, only seed which was not farmer-saved counted as hybrid seed and only seed which was not recycled too often counted as open-pollinated seed.

the quintile names for rating dissemination. As most dealers received a good or very good rating before taking the distribution into account, we ensure that even a 2 is still communicated as "good" to farmers to not weaken the signaling effect. That is why the first quintile is translated to "okay" and gets one star, the second one is named "good" and receives two stars, the third quintile is "very good" and gets three stars, the fourth and fifth one are "excellent" and awarded with four and five stars. This way of considering the distribution of the original ratings when choosing the names also helps us to disseminate ratings as truthfully, purely and as closely to reality as possible.

Are female dealers rated worse than male dealers? Because we found significant differences between the ratings of female (41% of dealers) and male agro-input dealers (59% of dealers) after controlling for some potentially confounding variables like education and for several indications of quality, we have no reason to believe that these differences in perception can be explained by differences in real quality. Instead, it is likely that women are perceived to be worse due to discrimination (De, Mieke, and Van Campenhout, 2022), so that we adjusted the ratings of female dealers accordingly to prevent that they are harmed by our intervention. We regressed all seed quality attributes on the gender dummy and added the resulting coefficients to the initial ratings of female dealers.

A.3 Details about rating dissemination

Table 21: Text messages to disseminate ratings to farmers

treatment SMS	Hello from AgroAdvisor! Did you know that customers from <i>shop name</i> rate the quality of maize seed sold there as okay/good/very good/excellent?
control SMS	Hello from AgroAdvisor! Did you know that you can get quality maize seed in your area from <i>shop name</i> ?

A.4 Multiple choice questions to measure dealer's knowledge

Dealer's knowledge about seed storage

1. How long can seed be carried over before losing viability?
 - (a) Seed can be carried over into the next seasons as you can store seed for 12 months.
 - (b) Seed cannot be carried over into the next seasons as 6 months is the longest seed can be stored.

- (c) This depends on the seed: Hybrids cannot be carried over, OPVs can be carried over for 5 seasons.
 - (d) I don't know.
2. How should seed best be stored after repackaging?
- (a) Airtight in polyethylene bags.
 - (b) In paper bags or perforated polyethylene bags.
 - (c) In a sealed tin/plastic container.
 - (d) I don't know.
3. What is the minimum recommended distance between the floor and where seed is stored?
- (a) 0 inches, seed should be stored directly on the floor for maximum stability.
 - (b) Minimum 2 inches from the floor.
 - (c) Minimum 6 inches from the floor.
 - (d) I don't know.
4. How should seed ideally be stored in your store room?
- (a) In sealed cardboard boxes.
 - (b) Stacked on pallets.
 - (c) Arranged on shelves with sufficient space between packets.
 - (d) I don't know.
5. Which statement do you agree most with?
- (a) You should repackage all your seed to visually verify that you are selling good quality seed.
 - (b) You should repackages all your seed so you can sell more to small farmers.
 - (c) You should avoid repackaging your seed as much as possible.
 - (d) I don't know.

Dealer's knowledge about seed

1. If a farmer complains about poor soil, which maize variety do you recommend?
- (a) Longe 5.
 - (b) Bazooka.
 - (c) Longe 10H.

- (d) I don't know.
2. What do you tell clients who inquire about the yield benefits of hybrid seeds?
- (a) Hybrid seeds double maize yields (increasing yield from about 4 to 8 bags/acre).
 - (b) Hybrid seeds triple maize yields (increasing yield from about 4 to 12 bags/acre).
 - (c) Hybrid seeds increase yields tenfold (increasing yield from about 4 to 40 bags/acre).
 - (d) I don't know.
3. If a farmer misses the rains or lives in an area that receives little rain, which maize variety do you recommend?
- (a) Longe 10H.
 - (b) Longe 7H.
 - (c) Wema.
 - (d) I don't know.
4. If a farmer is late for planting in the short season and needs a fast maturing variety, which maize variety do you recommend?
- (a) Bazooka.
 - (b) Longe 10H.
 - (c) Myezi mitatu (mm3).
 - (d) I don't know.