**Reviewer 1: Comments on “The (perceived) quality of agricultural technology and its adoption: Experimental evidence from Uganda”**

This paper is concerned about the low adoption of improved maize seeds sold by agro-dealers. The authors argue that low adoption could be due to agro-dealers not knowing how to store or handle the seeds, or to misperceptions by farmers, thinking that the seeds are of lower quality than in reality. The authors design two interventions to test these two hypotheses: a training of agro-dealers and a rating system about the quality of each agro-dealer disseminated to participating farmers. They find that the training had no effect but that the rating system led to higher take-up of seeds, especially among farmers that were not using improved seeds at baseline.

*Bjorn: What the reviewer takes away is not entirely true. The clearinghouse is not supposed to only address misperceptions by farmers, but also cases where agro-dealers exploit information asymmetries. Should we make this clearer or do we assume that future reviewers are more careful in reading?*

*Caro: Below, under the heading “Mechanisms”, the reviewer summarizes the pathways correctly, so I think there’s no need to further clarify.*

*Robert: Yes. It is also pretty clear in the introduction, mechanism section, and the conclusion. Not sure how it can be more explicit.*

The paper covers an important topic, but I feel like the treatments could be better motivated, and that sharper tests should be provided for the various mechanisms that could drive the results. In what follows I try to provide suggestions of issues that should be clarified to rule out some pathways.

**Agro-dealer handling and storing of seeds**

The paper suggests that agro-dealers are unable to properly store or handle the seeds due to a combination of lack of knowledge and/or poor storage facilities. This claim should be backed by clear evidence.

*Bjorn: This is not really a claim, but rather a hypothesis.*

*Caro: I agree with Bjorn. Also, we provide a bit of evidence of poor storage facilities later: “We find that 65% of agro-dealers had problems with pests such as rats or insects, while 16% store maize seed in open containers, thus exposing the seed to a range of pests and contaminants. (…) Turning to the seed samples obtained from the agro-dealers, our measurements of moisture content in the bag indicated an average of 13.6%, with a minimum of 10.3% and a maximum of 17.4%. On average, these moisture rates were above the recommended rate of 13%, suggesting potential for the growth of molds and pests that can negatively affect seed quality and performance. (…)“*

*However, I agree with the reviewer that evidence of the knowledge lack would fit our narrative. The knowledge indices generally mask how much dealers knew at baseline. I found this table covering baseline knowledge in a previous version of the paper. We could include some of this information in the current version, if you think it helps to make our case.*

*Robert: This table is useful info to further motivate the hypothesis. I think that the paper is already clear on this point, but some additional support could still be useful. Maybe not add the table to the text, but just mention some of its results (and perhaps add the table to the appendix).*

*Ein Bild, das Text, Screenshot, Schrift, Zahl enthält.

Automatisch generierte Beschreibung*

While 65% of agro-dealers had pests and 16% had opened bags in the storage facility, the paper also reports that the amount of maize seed lost/wasted is only a small share of the amount of maize seed sold. There might be under-reporting by agro-dealers, but wastage does not seem to be an issue, prima facie.

*Bjorn: I do not see why poor storage and handling would necessarily also mean that agro-dealers report more losses. In the context of informal agro-dealers, spoiled seed will likely be sold to farmers (perhaps at reduced prices). More importantly, if you do not know what correct storage and handling means, you are also not very likely to be able to identify spoiled seed.*

Of course, farmers could still be purchasing damaged seeds that will not germinate. To their credit, the authors proceed to purchase one bag of seeds from each agro-dealer and check for its moisture content, finding that the average moisture was higher than the recommended one. We do not know, however, the share of bags above the moisture threshold nor the probability that a bag of seeds with excess moisture will not germinate properly if planted. Related, moisture should presumably be more of an issue for repackaged seeds, that is, seeds sold in smaller bags repackaged by the agro-dealer from the original one manufactured by the seed provider. The paper should be clear about the share of agro-dealers that repackage seeds, whether the seeds purchased at random came from a repackaged bag, and finally, the share of farmers that actually purchase repackaged seeds.

*Bjorn: I think we do have some info on that, even though we only buy unopened bags of seed. Perhaps we should add/expand a paragraph somewhere where we motivate the hypothesis that poor storage and handling is a problem by providing some of these statistics, such as: “Baseline data reveals various signs that seed storage and handling may affect seed quality in line with the first hypothesis. For examples...”.*

*Caro: We could use*

* *the paragraph mentioned above: “We find that 65% of agro-dealers had problems with pests …”*
* *the share of bags above the moisture threshold, as the reviewer suggested (transform Q2)*
* *the share of agro-dealers that repackage seeds, as the reviewer suggested (Q90)*
* *much more baseline info (see e.g.* [*mock report*](https://github.com/bjvca/Seed_systems_project/blob/master/papers/mock_report/mock_report.pdf)*, Tables 1-3)*

*We don’t have*

* *the probability that a bag of seeds with excess moisture will not germinate properly*
* *the share of farmers that actually purchase repackaged seeds*

*I also think that we should mention that the random bag of seed is a never repackaged one.*

Finally, and perhaps more importantly, one reason why the agro-dealer training was ineffective is that agro-dealers were already knowledgeable about how to store and handle seeds. To check that, Table 11 should report the raw score for the different questions that make up the index, since in the current version, both indexes are standardized, and one cannot assess actual knowledge.

*Bjorn: This is indeed a possible reason, and I thought we discuss this??? At the same time we should also knowledge that our measure of knowledge (the quiz) also has its limitations. Should we also outline the behavioral pathway that links outcomes to training (eg motivation of being trained, repetition, etc) instead of focusing only on the cognitive link?*

*Caro: The current subsection 7.1 does not discuss baseline knowledge. I could add a table similar to Table 16 above (to Appendix A.4 or to Table 11, as the reviewer suggested). As baseline knowledge is insufficient, I’m not sure whether we should emphasize the limitations of our quiz or behavioral pathways. Perhaps we should simply mention that “knowing something” and “doing something” is not the same thing?*

*Robert: Related to the earlier comments, this referee seems mainly annoyed about not having the raw knowledge scores. We can probably expect similar comments from future referees. I don't think we need to go more into behavioral pathways.*

**Mechanisms**

The paper correctly outlines the multiple pathways through which the ratings system could have an effect on purchases of improved seeds. First, the treatment may correct (mis)perceptions about seed quality that farmers have at baseline. Second, the treatment provides information about who the high-quality agro-dealers are, and so treated farmers switch to these agro-dealers after receiving the ratings. Finally, the ratings may increase the average quality by fostering competition across agro-dealers.

The paper tries to provide evidence to distinguish between these different mechanisms, but it should provide additional context and information.

Farmer misperceptions

To assess if initial mis-perceptions are driving the results, the paper should clarify if, given differences in clime, soil and cultivation practices of the farmer, there is an “optimal” seed variety. (As an aside, in a footnote or appendix the paper should also provide details about the pros and cons of hybrid seeds relative to OPV seeds, and between different varieties of hybrid seeds -Longe7H vs Longe 10H- and OPV seeds -Longe 4vs Longe 5).

If an optimal variety does exists for each farmer, are they aware of it? To address this, the paper should provide farmers’ baseline knowledge about the quality of different seed varieties and the suitability of each to their plots. Do they know, for example, the average yield of each seed variety in their plots given normal weather conditions?

*Bjorn: I think the reviewer is overthinking it. The choice is simply between higher yielding or local seed. Previous research in the area suggests that farmers have a pretty good understanding of yields that can be expected.*

*Caro: This feels like a comment for David ☺*

*I don’t think that it’s the purpose of this paper to outline the pros and cons of different seeds/varieties.*

*I also don’t think that we have information on farmers’ baseline knowledge about the quality, yield, or suitability of different varieties.*

*As e.g., cultivation practices are not fixed, and the interactions between clime, soil, and practices are complex, it would be quite difficult to measure whether farmers are aware of their “optimal” seed variety.*

Related, the paper reports that 2/3 of farmers think that seeds from the agro-dealer are counterfeit or adulterated and use it as evidence of mis-perceptions about seed quality, particularly among farmers that did not purchase improved seeds. It is unclear, however, whether this question asked about seeds in general sold by the agro-dealer or about arguably the more relevant seed variety that the farmer purchased (or would likely purchase if they did not purchase improved seeds). To be clear, perceptions of seed quality should depend on the seed variety used, how they are packaged, the reputation of the seed provider (manufacturer brand) and the reputation of the agro-dealer. For example, if repackaged seeds are of lower quality because of agro-dealer mishandling, a farmer that never purchased repackaged seeds would have different perceptions about seed quality used than a farmer that only purchases repackages seeds.

Since agro-dealers appear to stock up different seed varieties (according to Table 6, the mean is 2.8), and presumably some have better protection against droughts, pests and diseases, but are likely more expensive, the single rating given per agro-dealer, will likely mask differences in the type of seeds sold by the agrodealer with differences in the quality of the storage facilities.

*Bjorn: This was about seed in general, but also about particular seed traits (eg drought tolerant or early maturing seed) where quality was assessed relative to the trait.*

*Caro: The question was: “Do you think that maize seed that you can buy at agro-input dealers is counterfeit/adulterated?”*

*I agree with the reviewer that it would be better to have all ratings differentiated by variety (and even by provider/manufacturer, packaging, etc.) but then we would have needed to ask many many more farmers to have a sufficient sample of e.g. Longe 5 at dealer x ratings. That is why we asked many of the rating questions in relationship to what was advertised, see Table 1.*

In addition, some farmers might be willing to trade-off lower quality for a lower price, and yet pricing is not reflected in the ratings. Finally, ratings are also silent about how seeds were actually sold, whether in the original packages as sold by the manufacturer, or in smaller bags repackaged by the agro-dealer.

*Bjorn: Pricing is reflected in the rating. We ask about price competitiveness relative to the particular seed. We assume that farmers know that hybrids like bazooka are more expensive than OPVs, and take this into account when rating.*

*Caro: I don’t agree with Bjorn here. While we do ask about the price, it does not contribute to the ratings, see Table 1. The ratings are supposed to provide indications of quality, not indications of quality relative to the price (which is easier to observe) or other dimensions. Other farmers might be willing to trade-off lower quality for a convenient location or for seed on credit, but our objective is not to provide a rating that captures every aspect why a farmer might (not) prefer a specific dealer but to make seed quality better observable at the time of purchase.*

In short, the authors should explain why they decided to use a “generic” ratings system (one rating per agro-dealer), instead of an alternative one that was explicit about the seed variety and how it was sold (i.e. Longe 10H manufactured by X sold by agro-dealer Y in the original package).

*Bjorn: We do something in between, I guess.*

*Caro: Data collection efforts and costs. In our current sample, we often have none or only 1 observation per dealer for “Longe 10H manufactured by X in the original package” – how representative would that rating be (if we even have one)?*

Agro-dealer quality


To assess if the ratings system identified the agro-dealers of high quality, the paper should clarify the relationship between farmers and agro-dealers. We are told that there are between one and three agro-dealers in each of the study’s catchment areas. With multiple agro-dealers, do farmers purchase seeds from the same agro-dealer every year? Since farmers could tell their peers that the seeds sold by their agro-dealer were of poor quality, it seems like reputational effects could play a role in this context. And if so, is it the reputation of the agro-dealer that matters, or that of the manufacturer of the seeds?

*Bjorn: As there are only a limited number of seed manufactures, it is likely the reputation of the agro-dealer that matters.*

*Caro: Correction: there are between 1 and 18 dealers in a catchment area (3 on average).*

*I agree that reputational effects are likely to play a role, especially because also farmers who did not buy seed at a dealer can rate this dealer if they know someone who bought seed there.*

*Here some descriptive about the relationship between dealers and farmers who rate them:*

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*Robert: If it is the reputation of the dealer and not the manufacturer, then we would expect some variation in ratings within catchment areas. Can we assess this?*

Related, seed characteristics such as germination time, yield, resistance against droughts, pests and diseases and duration relate to the quality of the product made by the manufacturer, so long as the maize is properly stored. In this sense, knowing that a given agro-dealer carries seeds from a particular manufacturer, and that seeds have not been repackaged should be enough to convince farmers of the quality of the seeds.

*Bjorn: I think a lot also depends on how the seed is stored (eg left in the sun for days).*

*Caro: I don’t believe that seed being in the original package is a sufficient signal for quality. Then farmers would simply need to pay attention to that, seed quality would be observable, there wouldn’t be any lemon’s problem, and our clearinghouse would indeed have no use.*

*In our sample of random not repackaged seed bags, the average moisture is above 13%.*

*However, I agree that seed quality is not the dealer’s responsibility alone. If the manufacturer provides seed of low quality and the dealers sells it without being aware, our clearinghouse could solve another information asymmetry by informing the dealer about the surprisingly low quality.*

More broadly, the paper should report how well farmers knew the number of agro-dealers operating in their catchment area and their quality at baseline. Since knowledgeable treated farmers should not switch agro-dealers, the degree to which farmers are knowledgeable at baseline, can inform the likelihood of switching. In addition, it should make the result that the increase in the number of clients and in the usage of improved seeds is the result of the ratings (and not of the dissemination telling farmers about the existence of agro-dealers) more credible.

*Bjorn: Could we do something with the fact that some farmers know the dealers they rated and other not? We also have questions on when they last bought?*

*Caro: Some farmers were not able to rate dealers because they didn’t know them. We could indeed use the rating\_dyads dataset to get a proxy of how many dealers farmers knew and relate it to the total number of dealers in that catchment area.*

*We didn’t ask farmers when they last bought seed but we did ask whether they bought seed at a specific shop in the last season and for how long they have been customers.*

*We don’t have baseline information on how well farmers knew dealers’ quality – we only have their perceptions, we don’t know how (in)correct they are.*

*Because we also inform control farmers about the existence of dealers (control SMS, revisiting control farmers, etc.), I think it’s credible that the measured effects are the result of the ratings.*

As an aside, I’d be curious to learn whether treated farmers were more accurate about the quality of agro-dealers over time and in general whether there was a lot of intra-market differences in quality.

*Caro: We could investigate intra-market differences in quality by looking at the variables in Table A.1, but I don’t know how useful that would be. Alternatively, we could look at the intra-market differences in quality perceptions.*

Competition

The authors see an increase in registrations of treated agro-dealers with UNADA (the association of agro-dealers, as well as a significant increase in inspections. Do farmers value that agro-dealers are registered with UNADA? Do they know which agro-dealer is registered and who is not? Do they rate agro-dealers that are registered higher? Finally, did the ratings system lead to the opening of new agro- dealers in the catchment area?

*Bjorn: Many questions but I think we can only answer one: do farmers rate agro-dealers that are registered higher than those that are not? But I don’t think that says a lot because being registered is endogenous...*

*Caro: Agreeing with Bjorn. Registration certificates are often hung in shops (I think, we don’t have data on that), so we can speculate that farmers know which dealers are registered with UNADA. We don’t know whether the clearinghouse led to the opening of new dealers.*

*Robert: Maybe even an anecdotal reference could be useful? As long as we explain why dealers may think the UNADA registration can improve their ratings.*

Differential attrition

The authors report differential attrition, perhaps due to a larger share of control agro-dealers going out of business and then go on to conjecture that the unadjusted estimates likely provide lower bounds because the attritors are likely the ones that would have benefited the most from the treatment. I have two comments on this issue. First, the authors should check this claim using existing data. How do the characteristics of attritors in the control group compare to treated agro-dealers that benefit the most from treatment? And to those of treated agro-dealers that benefit the least?Second, the literature suggests different methods to deal with differential attrition. One is to construct bounds following Lee (2009).

*Bjorn: Both reviewers have issues with attrition. A more elaborate analysis of attrition (comparing characteristics at baseline and ratings) may be needed.*

*Caro: I’m not surprised that we didn’t get away with this … I could compare baseline characteristics of different groups (control attritors vs. treated dealers that benefitted most vs. treated dealers that benefitted least?) and I am familiar with Lee bounds, but coding this kind of analysis is going to take more than 1 or 2 days, so I’d like to hear everyone’s option on whether both (comparing baseline characteristics and Lee bounds) are necessary.*

*Robert: I agree that we need to look into this more. But maybe first have a look at the patterns in attrition? Just to see how much we need to worry about it.*

Other Comments

1. Table 4 should also report the number of maize varieties in stock, since this outcome variable

appears in Table 6.

*Caro: I don’t see why we should include this variable in the descriptives and orthogonality tests. We also don’t include sales price, revenue, and many other variables here.*

2. A rough back of the envelope calculation from Tables 6-8 suggests that 56% of revenues come from sales of Longe 10H while 41% from Longe 5 leaving the remaining 3% of revenues from the sale of the other two varieties… Is this true?

*Caro: No. Table 7 reports the mean quantity sold of Longe 10H only for dealers who had Longe 10H in stock (see footnote). Table 8 reports the mean quantity sold of Longe 5 only for dealers who had Longe 5 in stock (see footnote). On the other hand, table 6 reports the mean quantity sold for all agro-dealers. Hence the tables cannot be compared using a simple back of the envelope calculation.*

3. Table 6-8 could be run as a pooled regression, adding a dummy for whether data was collected at endline, as well as interactions with the treatment dummies. The midline and endline coefficients from this pooled regression could still be reported separately, but standard errors should be smaller given the larger number of observations in the pooled regression.

*Caro: I understand the suggestion but feel like Tables 6-8 are already quite convincing, despite the the smaller samples and larger standard errors. Do you all agree that we should do this and change our “main regression?”*

4. Related, when reporting the treatment effects on individual variables, the authors should also include the standard errors computed using multiple hypothesis testing corrections (see for example List et al. 2019).

*Caro: In previous versions of the paper, we adjusted p-values according to Sankoh, Huque, Dubey (1997) but if I remember it correctly, this resulted in us not being able to report any significant effects on individual variables, so we didn’t know which variables drove the significant effects on the indices … This could look different if we have more power in the pooled regression, of course.*

5. Table 12 suggests that agro-dealers put more effort as they become more aware of the rating system. However, the ratings system only increases agro-dealer effort and services at midline and not at endline. Why? Should not the impacts be amplified over time? Or are agro-dealers able to make all the improvements by midline?

*Caro: Even if dealers made all improvements by midline and don’t further improve by endline, we should see a significant impact at endline (of the same magnitude as at midline), so this result is puzzling, and I have no explanation for it.*

6. The paper states that rating system led to an increase in the number of customers. Is this increase fully accounted for by study participants or did it come from other individuals outside the experiment? Put differently, were ratings shared among farmers in treated catchment areas?

*Caro: Because the SeedAdvisor certificate was part of the treatment, it’s likely that the increase also came from individuals outside the experiment. I think it’s also likely that farmers shared the rating information with their neighbors, etc. in treated catchment areas.*

7. It would be interesting to check if treated farmers were less likely to buy repackaged bags, (ie smaller quantities of seeds from opened bags)

*Caro: We don’t have the data.*

8. Feel free to ignore this comment, but I’m not a fan of the label clearinghouse for the ratings treatment, in part because clearinghouse refers to an institution that collects and disseminates information. The paper collects ratings and sends SMS with those ratings to participating farmers, but it does not create an institution or mechanism that can continue beyond the duration of the study. I would simply refer to the treatment as “ratings”.

*Caro: I don’t agree. I think our clearinghouse is an institution/mechanism that collects and disseminates information. However, simply referring to the treatment as “ratings” might be easier to understand for our readers?*

9. There are several typos throughout the paper so it would benefit from a review by a copy editor.

*Bjorn: OK. Caro: I agree.*

References

Lee, D. S. 2009. Training, wages, and sample selection: Estimating sharp bounds on treatment effects.

Review of Economic Studies 76: 1071–1102.

List, J.A., Shaikh, A.M. & Xu, Y. 2019. Multiple hypothesis testing in experimental economics.

Experimental Economics 22: 773–793.

**Reviewer 2: Referee report on “The (perceived) quality of agricultural technology and its**

**adoption: Experimental evidence from Uganda”**

Summary of the paper:  
This paper aims to study how the (perceived) quality of agricultural technology affects its adoption. They are using maize seeds embodying genetic gain as a case and randomly train agro-dealers in how to conduct simple tests for quality of the maize seeds and study whether under-adoption by farmers is caused by low quality due to sellers' lack of knowledge about proper storage and handling. In a second hypothesis, they randomly inform the farmers and the agro-dealers with information on how the farmers rank the quality of seeds at the different agro- dealers. The authors find a positive impact from the clearinghouse treatment that works primarily through changing farmers' perceptions of quality and they find no impact from the training intervention. Understanding why farmers in low-income countries are under-utilizing high quality agricultural products is a pressing and important topic. This paper implements two treatment arms using factorial design to test whether farmers and agro-dealers change their behaviour for using high-quality seeds. However, the paper has some issues, and I will comment on those below.

Main comments:

• The main concern relates to the fact that the authors do not measure the quality of the agricultural product (the maize seeds). They use the word “quality” already in the title and talk about observing how farmers adopt more high-quality products, but then they do not measure the quality of the seeds. They measure observable quality by looking at the date on the package, moisture, etc., but there is no real quality check. Hence, we do not know whether the agro dealers sold bad quality products to start with. They found that the moisture levels, on average, were 13.6% at baseline, which is just above the 13% threshold for excessively high moisture levels. As the paper is written today, it does not study what it purports to study – farmers and agro-dealers switching to high quality maize seeds following training and information. Therefore, the authors must rewrite the paper and be upfront with what they are measuring – output, perceptions, and preferences for agro-dealers but not measure of quality of seeds.

*Bjorn: It is true that we do not directly measure quality, but quality is hard to measure. We do mention in the title that it is the perceived quality we are talking about. Should we tone down even more?*

*Caro: Indeed, we don’t measure seed quality, but the paper is still about quality, not only about quality perceptions, isn’t it? Especially the training aims at changing quality itself through improved seed handing, not at changing perceptions. We could delete the parentheses around “perceived” in the title and be more careful when we write about quality (perceptions), but I don’t think that rewriting the paper is necessary.*

*Robert: Yes, but perceptions are at the heart of the clearinghouse treatment mechanism.*

*I agree that Caro's suggested edits should be sufficient. No need to rewrite anything.*

• The authors find an impact of the clearinghouse treatment arm, where they have asked farmers to rate different agro-dealers and then provide this information to other farmers and dealers so everyone is aware of the farmers' perceptions of the different agro-dealers. They find that at endline, farmers in the clearinghouse treatment arm are more likely to use improved maize, and they have higher yields. However, the authors cannot credibly say that this is because the agro-dealer sells better quality seeds or has improved their seeds. Another explanation for this result is that these agro-dealers now have more customers (they find that they have 31% more customers, 6 more per day). This implies that the dealer sells off their seeds faster (the seeds are stored for a shorter period of time in a humid and hot climate), and therefore, the yield increases. This has nothing to do with the dealer changing the quality of the seed; it is only because the seeds are sold faster due to higher demand. This is a different channel from the one discussed in the paper.

*Bjorn: This is an interesting observation. But I guess one could argue that due to higher turnover, the seed that farmers buy is actually of better quality (though not explicitly due to the actions of the agro-dealer). Is there a way we could look into this? How should we bring this into the paper?*

*Caro: We could add a subsection “Agro-dealer turnover” to 7. Causal chain and mechanisms and discuss this potential impact pathway. Or we could mention it in the conclusion. I wouldn’t know how to look into this using our data though. We could use the a) ratings or b) moisture as proxies for quality in t1 and c) quantity sold, d) number of customers, e) (-) amount carried over, or f) number of times shop ran out as proxies for turnover in t0 and correlate these variables but that wouldn’t really tell us whether higher turnover led to better quality because there would be a variety of alternative explanations + endogeneity issues.*

• The clearinghouse treatment is also a mixed treatment where both buyers and sellers are informed about the ranking of the agro-dealers in the vicinity. The authors cannot say whether it is information to buyers or sellers that is important for the impact.

*Bjorn: True, but that mixed treatment is a key characteristic of an information clearing house to address information asymmetries: making information available to all partners.*

*Robert: I agree. The treatment targets markets and the interaction between buyers and sellers.*

Smaller comments:

• Attrition was 14% at the endline of the agro-dealers. Did they attrit because they exited the market? Were these the worst-rated farmers that exited?

*Caro: I could compare the ratings of dealers that exited to the ratings of other dealers in the catchment area?*

*Also, Bjorn and I were very concerned about attrition at the time of the endline survey, so we included a question when enumerators couldn’t find a dealer: Why was this dealer not found? a) shop was located but sells different products now b) dealer does not want to be interviewed c) shop closed d) shop relocated e) other.*

*I remember looking into these answers at some point and writing an email to Bjorn, Charles, Wilber, and Leo. Now that I have lost access to all my KUL emails, I cannot find it. Perhaps you could have a look, @Bjorn? I think I wrote that email in shorty after endline data collection in the second half of 2022.*

• Please test whether the attrited sample is different from the non-attrited sample in baseline characteristics.

*Caro: Should I follow a) reviewer 1 and compare baseline characteristics of control attritors to treated dealers that benefitted most to treated dealers that benefitted least or a) reviewer 2 and compare baseline characteristics of attrited (treated) dealers to non-attrited (treated) dealers?*

• Compliance with treatment was 84%. They could try to estimate TOT to study the impact on those who actually were treated.

*Caro: I attended the trainings and noted which dealers actually arrived, so I could do this kind of analysis, if you think it’s useful.*

*Robert: Attendance is not random. So we would have to rely on DID assumptions?*

• Joint f-test on the balance tables (both agro-dealers and farmers)

*Bjorn: OK we can add this.*