Empowering Women through Agricultural Extension: Assessing Cognitive and Behavioral Channels

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Programs designed to increase well-being among low-income households generally include an information provision component. Often, these components ignore complex dynamics that govern intra-household decision making. In a field experiment, we explore how gendered information campaigns affect women's agency and achievements. We focus on two impact pathways—a cognitive pathway in which information asymmetries between spouses are removed, and a behavioral pathway in which households are exposed to female role models—in the context of agricultural extension information provision in Uganda, where male targeting bias and the absence of female extension agents is prevalent.

JEL: O13, O33, Q16, J16

Women have limited ability to make strategic choices that are important to live the life they value, and to transform those choices into desired action and outcomes. This lack of agency manifests itself in a variety of contexts (Kabeer, 1999). For instance, only 6.6 percent of companies on the Fortune 500 list for 2019 had a female chief executive, and while there is an increase in the share of women in middle management globally, women are often promoted in positions that involve little strategic decisions making, relegated instead to departments such

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as human resources or communications. This problem is even more pervasive in developing countries and when accounting for unpaid work conducted primarily by women, such as household care and child care (Jayachandran, 2015). For instance, while women bare the brunt of child care, their voice in deciding how many children to bear is limited (Ashraf, Field and Lee, 2014). Partly as a results of this lack of decision making power, women are also often constrained in their achievements. Women get significantly lower wages for similar work (Blau and Kahn, 2017). In societies with son-biased fertility preferences, mothers breastfeed girls less than boys, with consequences for survival rates and potentially long run health effects (Jayachandran and Kuziemko, 2011).

There are various factors that limit women's agency and achievements. Some of these are linked to economic inequalities by gender in access to resources. In patrilineal communities, land is inherited through the male lineage and property passes directly to sons. Unequal access to land has also been linked to reduced investment in human capital of girls within the household (Deininger, Goyal and Nagarajan, 2013). Unequal access to resources is thus often the result of gendered norms and institutions. At the same time, these norms and institutions may constrain women's agency, even if women have access to resources (Agarwal, 1997).

Public programs designed to reduce gender inequality in productive activities often emphasize the provision of information alongside the supply of new technologies, legal rights, financial capital, and other factors and inputs to production. Research suggests that targeting women with information may be one route towards increasing women empowerment. Information asymmetries between spouses have been empirically shown to affect intra-household resource allocations by limiting women's bargaining power relative to their male spouse's (Ambler, 2015; Castilla and Walker, 2013; Ashraf, 2009; Chen, 2006). For example, Bandiera et al. (2020) find that the share of girls reporting sex against their will dropped by close to a third as a result of providing them with, inter alia, information on sex, reproduction, and marriage. Dupas (2011) finds that providing new information to adolescent girls—that older men are more likely to be infected with HIV—reduced sex with older men.

At the same time, it is well known that not all information campaigns are equally successful, and that seemingly small design attributes can often have a substantial impact on effectiveness. While particular emphasis is often placed on selecting who to target information to within the household, less emphasis is typically placed on selecting who should provide the information. Some studies show that information may be more credible if it comes from an official source (eg. Cole et al., 2013), or if the recipient of the information can identify with the person or persons who provide the information (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook, 2001). Homophily effects, where individuals learn from similar individuals, may be particularly important in the context of information campaigns to promote women empowerment. This is highlighted in recent studies in behavioral economics on

role model effects which suggest important non-cognitive impact pathways that can be instrumental to information campaigns. For instance, Porter and Serra (2019) show that successful role models can increase entry into traditionally maledominated sectors. Beaman et al. (2009) show that role models not only affect the behavior of those that identify with the model, but also influence the behavior of others in situations where women are constrained by relationships and social norms. More generally, role models may facilitate shifts in social norms: Banerjee and Duflo (2012) attribute a large share of reductions in fertility in Brazil to soap operas that projected a very different vision of the "good life"—including smaller families—than what Brazilians were otherwise used to (see La Ferrara, Chong and Duryea (2012)).

These gendered dimensions of information campaigns are particularly relevant in developing-country agriculture, where smallholder production systems are typically characterized by strong social norms that marginalize women in productive decision-making processes (Croppenstedt, Goldstein and Rosas, 2013). In these systems, women typically work long days in the field, yet have little voice in deciding what crops to grow, which technologies and inputs to use, and how much of the output to allocate to home consumption or sale in markets (Magnan et al., 2015; Fisher and Carr, 2015). However, in addition to its intrinsic value, there are many well-established benefits to empowering women farmers in developing countries. A more prominent role for women in the farm household has been shown to result in more efficient intra-household allocations of scarce resources, more equitable distributions of the returns to investments in household production, and general improvements in welfare and poverty (Fiala and He, 2016; Croppenstedt, Goldstein and Rosas, 2013; de Brauw et al., 2014). Involving women in the choice of which crops to cultivate may also lead to better dietary and nutritional outcomes at the household level (Heckert, Olney and Ruel, 2019; Duflo and Udry, 2004; Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003).

A constraint to realizing such outcomes is the presence of asymmetric information between spouses on a range of productivity-enhancing technologies, inputs, and practices. The fact that women possess less knowledge than their male spouses necessarily limits their participation in decision-making on agricultural production (Fisher and Carr, 2015). In many contexts, men rarely discuss agronomic practices or management choices with their wives or female partners (Magnan et al., 2015; Fisher and Carr, 2015), and agricultural extension services rarely recognize women in their role as agricultural producers (Doss and Morris, 2000; Doss, 2001).

Reducing gendered information asymmetries by targeting women with information may thus be empowering, particularly if the information is presented in an appealing manner. BenYishay et al. (2020) show that men and women learn and retain information about the new technology equally well, with women applying it on their own farm more often than their male counterparts. In Uganda, Kabunga, Dubois and Qaim (2014) find that women in female-headed households

would be as likely to adopt innovations in banana cultivation as men in maleheaded households if they were as knowledgeable about the technology.

There are also reasons to believe that the source of information may be important for women's empowerment in agriculture. Peer effects have been found important in learning about new technologies or practices (Beaman and Dillon, 2018; Conley and Udry, 2010; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995). BenYishay and Mobarak (2019) find that social identity of the person that provides extension information influences others' learning and adoption, as farmers appear most convinced by communicators who share a group identity with them, or who face agricultural conditions most comparable to themselves. In Mozambique, Kondylis et al. (2016) find that women's awareness of pit planting farming techniques increased by 9 percentage points and adoption of the technology by 5 percentage points in communities where they trained female messengers on sustainable land management techniques.

In smallholder agriculture systems in developing countries, information related to productivity-enhancing technologies, inputs, and practices is generally disseminated though public extension services. However, agricultural extension services are typically biased toward men, with information targeted mainly to male members of a farm-household and in formats that are rarely tailored to women. A recent survey on public service delivery in Uganda found that only 16 percent of extension agents are women. This suggests that extension systems do not sufficiently recognize the gendered power dynamics governing intra-household information exchanges, thus reinforcing the dis-empowerment of women in agricultural decision-making processes (Doss, 2001; Quisumbing and Pandolfelli, 2010).

In this paper, we examine ways in which extension services can be designed to effectively increase women's access to informational resources, their agency, and their achievements in farming, all of which directly relate to women's empowerment in agriculture (Kabeer, 1999). We conduct a field experiment among 3,330 maize-farming households in eastern Uganda to test cognitive and behavioral channels through which extension information affects outcomes related to maize management and production. To test the cognitive channel, we compare outcomes of households where the female co-head was included in the target audience to outcomes of households where information was targeted to the male co-head alone. To test the behavioral channel, we compare outcomes of households where a women was included in the dissemination of the information to outcomes of households where the information is provided exclusively by a man. Our study design, which takes the form of a factorial experiment with 3 levels in each of the two factors, allows us to further explore mechanisms behind these channels, such as the the importance of gender homophily effects and of challenging gendered norms.

The information intervention is implemented as a short video that provides viewers with information and recommendations on appropriate input use, management practices, and investment strategies that can be followed to obtain higher maize yields. To test the impact of reducing information asymmetries between spouses, we randomly varied who was shown the video within the household. This could either be the male co-head alone, the female co-head alone, or both co-heads together (the couple). Furthermore, three versions of the video were created—one featuring a male actor, another featuring a female actor, and a third featuring both actors together—with no difference in the information contained in the video. Varying the exposure to the actors of different gender in this way allows us to test a second hypothesis related to the importance of role models to empower women. The videos were shown to study participants twice, once before the start of the agricultural season and once at the time of planting, using tablet computers.

We find that targeting women within the household (as opposed to only the male co-head) with extension information has a positive effect on different domains of empowerment—including women's knowledge of agronomic practices, their participation in agricultural decision-making, and their adoption of recommended practices and inputs. Most of the impact seems driven by the subsample of women who received the information alone, suggesting that both male and female co-heads tend to monopolize information. While there is some evidence that the subsample of women who received information jointly with their husbands increased joint decision-making somewhat, effects are much weaker.

The empowerment impacts of involving women as messengers—the role model effect—seem more complicated. While we find no effect on women's knowledge, decision-making, or adoption of recommended agronomic practices, involving women as messengers may lead to an increase in the use of organic fertilizer by women. Looking only at households where women co-heads were targeted, we find that if these women were shown a video featuring a woman, they are more likely to make decisions than if they were shown a video in which a man provided the information. This suggests that gender homophily may be at work. Furthermore, if we look only at households where male co-heads were targeted, we find that if these men were shown a video featuring a woman, they are less likely to make decisions unilaterally. This suggests that involving women as messengers may have challenged beliefs and stereotypes about women being less able to make decisions related to agriculture (Beaman et al., 2009).

The paper is structured as follows. In Section I we review the literature on women's information deficiencies and how this is linked to women empowerment. We then give an overview of the emerging literature on how exposure to role models may affect women's decision making power. In Section II the research hypotheses are presented. Section III describes the context of female and male smallholder farmers in eastern Uganda. In Section IV we explain the methods and elaborate on the experimental design, present the specifications we will estimate, look at baseline data, and define indicators that will be used to assess impact of the different interventions. The design of our experiment in combination with the richness of the data we collected means we have a lot of results to present; Section

V does this in a systematic way. The results are then interpreted and discussed in a separate section (Section VI). A final section concludes.

I. Prior Literature

This section offers a review of related literature on gender and agriculture with specific emphasis on the gendered dimensions of intra-household asymmetries of information and role models, drawing on examples that highlight their influence on extension service provision and technology adoption. Throughout the study, we define empowerment as a process where those (women) who were previously denied the ability to make and act upon important choices in their lives gain such ability (Kabeer, 1999). This ability to make choices is based on three main components: access to resources including material assets, informational resources, and social capital; agency, including a person's ability to act on their decisions; and achievement, or social and economic outcomes such as income and well-being. Women's empowerment can imply that women have greater ability to make and act upon choices both individually, or jointly with their male co-head (Johnson et al., 2016).

A. Information Asymmetry

There is ample evidence that women face information deficiencies and asymmetries relative to men in a range of circumstances, and thus may hold weaker bargaining positions. In agriculture, women farmers have been shown to be more deprived of information regarding good agronomic practices (Doss and Morris, 2000; Doss, 2001; Lambrecht, Vanlauwe and Maertens, 2016). In certain situations, this may be directly linked to unequal access to agricultural extension and advisory services between men and women farmers (Ndiritu, Kassie and Shiferaw, 2014). This unequal access may contribute to lower adoption rates of improved agricultural practices and technologies among women. For example, studies show that with equal access to extension services, land, and labor, men and women farmers in male-headed households in Ghana would be as likely to adopt modern agronomic practices (Doss and Morris, 2000). Women in female-headed households would be as likely to adopt innovations in banana cultivation as men in maleheaded households if they were as knowledgeable about the technology (Kabunga, Dubois and Qaim, 2014).

Women's access to information—specifically, to information provided by agricultural extension services—may be subject to both extra-household and intra-household constraints. The extra-household constraints can be infrastructural and logistic, such as for instance women not being targeted for extension services, women lacking the money to travel to extension training locations, or women lacking the time to attend because of household management, domestic and reproductive responsibilities (Fletschner and Mesbah, 2011; Wodon and Blackden, 2006).

Extra-household constraints may also exist in terms of information content or delivery: it may not be adapted to women's interests or needs, or may not recognize women's role as agricultural producers, and therefore may not appeal to women. Human capital constraints may also play a role given women's generally lower levels of education in many rural contexts in developing countries. Norms limiting women's mobility and women's interaction with men may impose additional constraints (Fletschner and Mesbah, 2011). These extra-household constraints to women's access to information mean that, in many situations, women may rely more on informal networks for gathering information. When these networks are gender-specific and gender-segregated, problems associated with asymmetric information persist (Zeltzer, 2020).

A (married) woman's interaction with her husband may often be her (intrahousehold) source of information on agriculture. This assumption is implicit in most extension strategies that target the male household head (Fletschner and Mesbah, 2011). Yet the assumption requires that the preferences of male and female co-heads within a household align; that household resources, including information, are shared; and that households cooperate to reach Pareto-optimal outcomes. However, the conceptualization of the agricultural household as a unit with such properties has been challenged in theoretical work (Lundberg and Pollak, 1994; Pollak, 1994; Alderman et al., 1995) and rejected in empirical work (Udry, 1996; Duflo and Udry, 2004; Ashraf, 2009; Iversen et al., 2011).

Several studies explore intra-household information asymmetries in the context of developing-country agriculture and the provision of agricultural extension services using non-cooperative models of the household. Kondylis et al. (2016) start from the observation that information about sustainable land management practices in Mozambique does not reach female farmers as effectively as male farmers, and is not perfectly shared between male and female co-heads within these households. They find a positive effect on awareness and adoption among female farmers when they introduce additional female extension agents who reach out to female farmers. Pan, Smith and Sulaiman (2018) explore similar issues in Uganda with women model farmers who facilitate training and access to hybrid maize seed, particularly for fellow women smallholder farmers. They find significant positive effects on the adoption of low-cost recommended agronomic practices and inputs by households, and on household food security. Lambrecht, Vanlauwe and Maertens (2016) investigate whether extension services are more effective if the information is provided to both the male and female co-head, the male cohead, or the female co-head in the household. Focusing on integrated soil fertility management practices in eastern DR Congo, they find that joint participation of male and female co-heads increases adoption most. Fisher and Carr (2015) use observational data to explore explanations for the relatively low adoption rates for drought-tolerant maize varieties among women farmers (in male-headed households) in eastern Uganda. They do not find support for the idea that differences in technology preferences are at the basis, but that differences in adoption are related to awareness, and particularly whether the woman farmer received information about the varieties.

B. Role Models and Aspirations

There is also a growing literature that explores the socio-psychological dimensions of gender inequality. For instance, an emerging literature investigates the importance of role models in challenging gender stereotypes and empowering women in domains where they are active but lack voice and agency. Role models are defined as individuals who inspire people to make similar choices, to adopt a similar set of values, or to achieve comparable results (Porter and Serra, 2019).

Role models are seen as important in stimulating aspirations and the development of an internal locus of control. They can update beliefs in one's own ability (self-efficacy) or beliefs about the returns to investments, especially for disadvantaged social groups that have few examples of success (Beaman et al., 2012; Riley, 2017). Updated beliefs in self-efficacy and returns to investments can, in turn, raise aspirations and increase people's ambitions, which create the motivation to work hard and attain the success projected by the role model (Riley, 2017). Inspiring films about successful farmers' life choices promoted welfare-improving aspirations among Ethiopian farmers (Bernard et al., 2015). Women chief village councilors in rural India raised parents' and girls' aspirations with regard to education and adult life opportunities (Beaman et al., 2012). In Nicaragua, proximity of women promoters of a conditional cash transfer program made women more optimistic about the future, happier in life, and less fatalistic (Macours and Vakis, 2014).

Evidence shows that role models not only increase aspirations, but also lead to changes in the choices they make. In Ethiopia, while the inspiring films did not specifically mention what choices made the role models successful, viewers were more likely to save. The number of children enrolled in school and school-related expenditures went up as well (Bernard et al., 2015). Porter and Serra (2019) observed an increase in female student enrollment in an intermediate economics class after women alumni's testimonies. The proximity of women promoters in Nicaragua positively affected investments in education and nutrition (Macours and Vakis, 2014). Some studies also show that role models can help people becoming more successful. Nguyen (2008) finds that in Madagascar, role models increase children's test scores. Riley (2017) finds a direct positive effect of a movie about a poor Ugandan girl championing in chess on the educational achievements of lower and higher secondary school students. Beaman et al. (2012) show that women leaders in Indian village councils not only raised aspirations, but also boosted girls' educational attainment and reduced girls' time spent on domestic chores.

The power of role models can also be linked to the fact that people's tendency to conform (i.e., not wanting to deviate from the group) can be challenged by an influential person whose behavior is non-conformist (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).

Role models thus have been found important in challenging role incongruity, which can be defined as prejudiced views and cognitive biases about the capabilities of specific social groups in specific social roles that arise from a combination of perceptions about the characteristics of members of that social group and perceptions about the capabilities and characteristics that specific social roles require (Eagly and Karau, 2002). Role models can affect women's empowerment directly: as women start questioning cultural norms and gender stereotypes, their locus of control may shift, resulting in increased entry into traditionally maledominated domains. Indirectly, role models can challenge beliefs and stereotypes about lesser abilities of another group held by the group whose abilities are not underestimated. For example, Beaman et al. (2009) show that the appointment of women leaders to Indian village councils improved men's perceptions of women's leadership abilities.

Other mechanisms, including peer effects (which are linked to recognition and conformity) and gender homophily may also be at play in the case of role models of the same sex. Gender homophily is defined as the preference for interaction with individuals of the same sex, and is linked to having more trust in individuals of the same social group (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook, 2001; Zeltzer, 2020). Such mechanisms imply that the information contained in a message brought by role models of the same sex is better understood and more trusted, thereby contributing to changes in an individual's choices and improving chances of success.

II. Testable Hypotheses

We explore cognitive and socio-psychological dimensions of extension information campaigns on various dimensions of women's empowerment. We consider women's empowerment along the lines of Johnson et al. (2016), where empowerment encompasses both an increase in women's individual and joint decisionmaking within the household with respect to a set of key livelihood-related variables. We thus assess empowerment as a positive change both for the female co-head individually and for the female and male co-heads jointly in each to the following spheres: their knowledge about recommended agronomic practices and inputs; their participation in intra-household decision-making on farm production; the choices they make about the adoption of recommended practices and the use of inputs; the output and yield from plots; and their participation in selling farm output. A reduction in male domination over these different dimensions is considered empowering as well. In the context of our study, these variables are specific to the types of smallholders defined by our population of interest (and described in detail below), but are likely to be relevant for other smallholder agricultural contexts.

In a first hypothesis, we test the relative importance of the cognitive dimension. Involving women in receiving extension information may strengthen women's knowledge about recommended practices and inputs, and possibly make common knowledge about other agronomic practices more salient. There are differ-

ent ways in which (also) targeting women with information may lead to these outcomes. The first assumes that information that would otherwise be, to some extent, monopolized by the male co-head, now also reaches women. If the female co-head receives the information alone and does not monopolize that information or if both the female and male co-head of a household receive the information as a couple, we would expect an increase in both women's individual knowledge and the couple's overall (joint) knowledge where intra-household communication, consultation, and learning occur, which can lead to an increase in women's individual and joint decision-making and outcomes. If the female co-head receives the information alone, she might also monopolize that information, in which case changes in women's individual knowledge, decision-making and outcomes may be expected. The second channel is through a change in a woman's bargaining position that results from possession of an informational asset, which may prevent a male co-head from advancing his preferences at the expense of hers.

In a second hypothesis, we test the relative importance of the behavioral pathway. Directly involving women in conveying information may also affect women's empowerment. Giving women key roles in conveying information may affect recipients of the information via role-model effects. Role model effects work via learning externalities through peers and gender homophily effects. In addition, role models may also challenge role incongruity. Peer effects occur where information recipients can relate to the information messenger as a peer—as an individual with a similar identity or experience, or as an individual possessing credible knowledge and information. Gender homophily effects occur where these peer effects are specifically based on a match in the sex of the messenger and recipient. Role incongruity effects occur where women update their beliefs about roles and responsibilities in the household as a result of receiving information from a messenger that is somehow inconsistent with their beliefs. We expect such effects to increase women's aspirations about their households and livelihoods, thereby causing them to make more ambitious choices, in turn contributing to improved outcomes.

Role incongruity may also work indirectly. The involvement of women in conveying information may cause men to revise their beliefs about women's agency and capacity to make sound investment decisions on the farm. As a result, men may leave more space for decision-making by their wife and relax any inhibition to their wife's access to complementary inputs, their decision-making on the adoption of recommended practices, or the improvement of crop production.

III. Study Context

To explore these effects, we conducted a field experiment in 2017 among small-holder maize-farming households in eastern Uganda. Participants in the field experiment were drawn from monogamous maize-cultivating households residing in five districts where maize is particularly important, both as a staple and as a marketable crop. The experiment was conducted during the second maize-growing

season which runs from approximately August to January of the following year, and is characterized by a shorter period of rainfall than the first maize-growing season. During this second season, the complete cycle from planting to harvest requires three to three and a half months, and farmers tend to cultivate early-maturing but lower yielding maize varieties. Fields are prepared in August, planted in September, and harvested from December onward.

Maize yields in the study area, and in Uganda more generally, are well below their potential. Research station trials in Uganda have demonstrated that yields range between 730 kg per acre and 1,820 kg per acre (Fermont and Benson, 2011). Yet, on-farm estimates are generally lower. A recent study of on-farm yield reports figures between 270 kg per acre and 995 kg per acre (Gourlay, Kilic and Lobell, 2019). There is also evidence that maize plots under female management are less productive than maize plots under male management. Ali et al. (2016) observe that, generally, male-managed plots are on average 17.5 percent more productive than female-managed plots in Uganda. They link the productivity gap between male- and female-managed plots (controlled for plot size but without distinguishing between type of crops) to an unequal distribution between men and women of responsibilities and resources, including modern inputs such as improved varieties, fertilizer, and agrochemicals.

Decision-making power over agricultural production is related to the actual or perceived ownership of the land. In Uganda, ownership of land for married women is constrained by patrilineal land inheritance customs and by customs and traditional rules prescribing that, through marriage, women gain access to land owned by their husband (Jacobs and Kes, 2015). Fisher and Carr (2015) show that in eastern Uganda, married women farmers are the primary owners of only 2.7 percent of all maize plots in the study's sample, and are the main decisionmaker for the choice of maize variety on only 15.4 percent of the plots. They did not find evidence that land quality (in terms of soil fertility and slope) or type of tenure differ between female- and male-managed maize plots. Decisionmaking power is also related to customary gender roles and responsibilities which, in turn, affect intra-household labor allocations. Based on data from the 2011/12 Uganda Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS), Fisher and Carr (2015) further found that, in total, more household labor was used on male-managed maize plots than on female-managed maize plots in male-headed households. On those female-managed plots, more female and child labor (and less male labor) was allocated to maize cultivation. In Uganda, generally, men tend to concentrate on marketable crops that generate cash income, while women tend to focus on other food crops for household consumption.

IV. Methods

A. The Experiment: A Video Extension Information Intervention in a Factorial Design

In this study, we test hypotheses about the (relative) effectiveness of involving women in receiving and conveying extension information via ICT-enabled videos on a range of outcomes related to knowledge, intra-household decision-making, adoption of maize cultivation practices, maize outputs and yields, and maize marketing, both for women individually and jointly with their male co-heads of households. To do so, we developed a 3x3 factorial design, in which one factor corresponds to the gender of the person (or persons) who receives the information (henceforth referred to as the recipient factor) and the other factor corresponds to the gender of the person (or persons) who delivers the information (henceforth referred to as the messenger factor). Each factor contained three levels: man alone, woman alone, or man and woman together (as a couple). The design is represented in Figure 1 below, with sample sizes shown in each of the nine treatment combinations to indicate the number of households randomly allocated to one of these nine treatments.

		ı	Messenge	r
		Man	Woman	Couple
	Man	385	385	369
Recipient	Woman	385	385	369
_	Couple	342	342	369

FIGURE 1. LAYOUT OF EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

¹In the context of this study, we refer to these factors in terms of "gender" and not "sex" because the implicit differences in the person(s) receiving or delivering the information are social and cultural in nature, and not simply biological.

²Power calculations were based on a set of comparisons using different outcomes to power the complete 3x3 factorial design. We used simulation techniques that allowed us to sample from actual data on outcome variables (maize yields obtained from Uganda National Household Survey of 2005/06) instead of a theoretical distribution with an assumed mean and standard deviation. Detailed information on the power calculations can be found in the pre-analysis in Lecoutere, Spielman and Van Campenhout (2017).

To operationalize this design, we developed a series of videos that was shown to participating farmers according to this design. Corresponding to the recipient factor, the video was shown to one of the three recipients: the male co-head of the household; the female co-head; or the male and female co-heads together as a couple. To operationalize the messenger factor, we produced three versions of essentially the same video, with the only difference being the actor(s) featured in the video. In a first version of the video, a male actor-farmer is featured in the video. The second version of the video features a female actor-farmer. In a third version of the video, both the male and female actor-farmers are featured. The videos can be found here.

During implementation of the experiment, one of these three versions of the video was screened to the participating individual(s) according to the treatment arm that the household was randomly assigned to. The videos were shown on 10-inch Android tablet computers by trained field enumerators during a private meeting with the participant (or participants if the recipient was the couple). Information on the sampled households and their treatment assignment was preloaded onto the tablet computers, such that the correct video was automatically queued and enumerators were only able to screen the appropriate version of the video. The video was shown twice to our study participants, once before the maize planting time (July 2017) and once around the actual time of planting (August 2017).

The video itself consists of a 10-minute inspirational story in which a farmer (man, woman, or a man and woman acting together as a couple) recounts how s/he used to struggle with low maize yields. The actor-farmer then shows what inputs s/he used and what recommended practices s/he followed to successfully increase his/her yields. The choice of what inputs and practices to promote in this video was based on key informant interviews conducted in May 2017 with agronomists, maize breeders, district agricultural officers and other government staff, extension workers, and maize farmers. The information provided in the video is also generally consistent with the package of recommendations promoted by the Ugandan Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries.

The video includes information about a range of productivity-enhancing strategies including: management of pests and disease, including striga (Striga hermonihica) a parasitic plant affecting maize growth; improvement of soil fertility through the timely application of organic and inorganic fertilizers; use of fresh seed of improved maize varieties and hybrids; and crop management practices such as timely planting, optimal plant spacing, and timely weeding. The video also contained content on the costs and benefits of the different practices and inputs being promoted, and recommended that viewers take a long-term perspective on improving their maize cultivation by starting small and reinvesting profits

 $^{^3}$ To investigate the effect of gender for small business performance, Delecourt and Ng (2019) use a similar approach in India, where they try to fix business aspects such as location, goods supplied, and hours of operation, and only vary the gender of the seller.

on increasingly larger areas of land.

The factorial design laid out in Figure 1 allows us to test the different hypotheses described earlier by comparing outcomes across different treatment groups. This is visualized in Figure 2. To examine the impact of providing women with direct access to extension information on different measures of women's empowerment—the cognitive channel—we compare outcomes of the 2,192 households where the female co-head was involved in watching the video (either alone or as part of a couple) to outcomes of the 1,139 households where only the male co-head watched the video (Model 1). There are likely to be different effects from showing the video to the female co-head alone as compared to showing it to the female co-head as part of the couple, for instance related to the possibility of monopolizing information or gaining bargaining power on the basis of uniquely held information. That is why we additionally zoom in on the effect of showing the video to the female co-head alone versus showing it to the male co-head (Model 1A) and the effect of showing it to the female and male co-head as a couple versus only to the male co-head (Model 1B).

Next, to examine the impact of providing women and men with information provided by women as messengers—our hypothesis on role-model effects through peer effects, gender homophily, and challenging role incongruity—we compare outcomes of the 2,219 households where a female actor featured in the video (either alone or as part of a couple) to outcomes of the 1.112 households where only a male actor featured in the video (Model 2). To specifically assess the impact of women receiving information conveyed by women—a specific test of our hypothesis of peer and gender homophily effects and challenges to role incongruity among women—we compare outcomes of the 754 households where the video in which a female actor was featured (either alone or as part of a couple) was shown to the female co-head within the household to outcomes of the 385 households where the video in which a male actor featured was shown to the female co-head (Model 2A). We additionally zoom in on effects following from men updating role incongruent beliefs when a woman is providing information and portrayed as a successful farmer by comparing outcomes of the 754 households where the video in which a female actor was featured (either alone or as part of a couple) was shown to the male co-head to outcomes of the 385 households where the video in which a male actor featured was shown to the male co-head (Model 2B).

B. Estimation

We estimate average treatment effects using the following Ordinary Least Squares specification for the impact of the different treatments on outcome y in household i,

$$(1) y_i = \alpha + \beta . T_i + \gamma X_i + \delta . O_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Hypothesis

Hypothesis

Messenger Messenger M W Cpl M W Cpl Model 1 - Involving Model 2 - Involving women in receiving women in conveying Σ Recipient Recipient information information ≥ ≥ 명 d Messenger Messenger Model 1A - Zooming in Model 2A - Involving M W Cpl M W Cpl on providing women in conveying Σ Σ information to the information to the Recipient Recipient female co-heads alone female co-heads alone ≥ ≥ d d Messenger Messenger Model 1B - Zooming in Model 2B - Involving M W Cpl M W Cpl on providing women in conveying Σ Σ information to women information to the Recipient Recipient as part of the couple male co-heads alone ≷ ≥ d d

Note: M=man; W= woman; Cpl= couple. Dark grey cells represent the control group and light gray cells represent the treatment group used to test the specific hypothesis.

FIGURE 2. HYPOTHESES TESTS

In the equation, T_i is an indicator that takes the value one if a household received the treatment for the particular hypothesis that is tested, and zero otherwise. O_i is a vector of indicators for the orthogonal factor for household i. X_i is a vector of baseline control variables that are included to adjust for any imbalance that is found between treatment and control at baseline (See Section IV.C), and ε_i is the error term. For example, to test the first hypothesis whether involving women as recipients of information is effective, T_i equals one if the video was shown to the couple or to the female co-head alone, and zero if the video was shown to the male co-head alone within the household. O_i is a vector of two dummy variables, corresponding to what version of the video was shown.⁴

⁴The first dummy takes the value of one if the version of the video was shown where the information was provided by a woman alone (and zero otherwise). The second dummy takes the value of one if the version of the video was shown where the information was provided by a couple (and zero other wise). The reference category is thus the video where a man alone provides the information.

The parameter of interest in equation 1 is the treatment effect (β). It is important to note that this is a composite parameter, denoting the effect of the treatment when approximately equal shares of households receive the orthogonal treatments. In factorial designs where each factor has a treatment and a control condition, one can run a fully interacted model. The main effects can then be interpreted as the effect of the treatment alone. However, in our design, we do not have strict control categories in the factors (at least someone needs to provide information in the video and at least one person in the household was shown a video). It is therefore more informative to estimate treatment effects that are weighted-averages of the interactions with other treatments. To continue with the example of the first hypothesis, β thus denotes the effect of involving women in receiving information when about one third of the sample receives this information in the form of a video where only a man provides the information, one third where only a women provides this information, and one third where the information is given by a couple.

In addition to controlling for the orthogonal factor O_i in equation 1, we need to take into account the fact that also within a factor, treatment cells may have a different number of observations. This becomes an issue when two cells are pooled. For example, in testing the first hypothesis, we see from figure 1 that there are 1,139 households where the female co-head alone is to receive the information treatment, but only 1,053 households are allocated to receive the information treatment as a couple. When pooling these two groups into a single group to assess women involvement in receiving information, the women alone group gets a higher weight. We thus make sure each group gets an appropriate weight when pooling groups.

Furthermore, we use randomization inference to calculate associated p-values for the two-sided hypothesis of no effect. We aggregate families of outcomes into indices, which are constructed as the weighted mean of the individual standardized outcomes, using as weights the inverse of the co-variance matrix of the transformed outcomes (Anderson, 2008). Combining outcomes in indices is a common strategy to guard against over-rejection of the null hypothesis due to multiple inference. However, it may also be interesting to see the effect of the intervention on individual outcomes. An alternative strategy to deal with the multiple comparisons problem is to adjustment the significance levels to control the Family Wise Error Rates (FWER). We used re-randomization to construct the joint null distribution for the family of outcomes we are testing. From this family-wise sharp null, we obtained the corresponding FWER-consistent significance thresholds by determining which cutoffs yield 10 percent, five percent and one percent significant hypothesis tests across all tests and simulations (Ottoboni et al., 2021; Caughey, Dafoe and Seawright, 2017).

C. Data

Data were collected from households in five districts in eastern Uganda: Bugiri, Mayuge, Iganga, Namayingo, and Namutumba. From among these districts, we first removed town councils and two sub-counties that consisted of islands in Lake Victoria. We then used a two-stage cluster sampling approach to obtain a representative sample of this population. Specifically, we first selected parishes randomly and in proportion to the number of villages within each parish. In the selected parishes, all villages were included in the study. Within each village, we then listed all households, from which we randomly selected households to be included in the study.

Table 1 summarizes pre-treatment characteristics of the households that were enrolled in the study. The first column provides averages for the entire sample, with corresponding standard deviations in parentheses below. The 5 percent trimmed log maize yield (defined as kilograms produced per acre) was 5.3 on average. The average household head is about 40 years old, and in only 37 percent of households did the head finish primary school. Households are large, consisting of more than 7.6 members. Only 11 percent of sampled households reported having access to extension in the previous year. Few farmers use inorganic fertilizer at baseline; the use of fresh improved seed is higher. About 78 percent of households report to be owning a mobile phone.

The table also serves as a balance test for the two main comparisons we will make (Balance tests for the other hypothesis tests can be found in Appendix Tables A1 and A2). We find baseline imbalance in observable characteristics that are statistically significant, especially for the hypothesis related to empowering women with information (Model 1 in the upper panel of Table 1). For example we find that, at baseline, male co-heads were significantly younger in households where women were involved in receiving information, and that male co-heads were less likely to have finished primary education. We also find that they were less likely to use improved seed, use fertilizer, or own a mobile phone and that they reported lower maize yields. Households also were larger. A test for joint significance of the differences confirms this imbalance for the comparison in Model 1 (F-statistic = 20.253; p-value < 0.001). For the comparison to test the impact of role model effects, we do not find imbalance between the groups (lower panel in Table 1) (F-statistic = 0.682; p-value = 0.742). We will control for baseline characteristics that show up as significant in the balance tables when treatment and control outcomes are compared throughout the paper.

Endline data was collected between February and April 2018. Households were revisited and male and female co-heads where interviewed separately.

D. Indicator Definition

This study aims to estimate effects on women's empowerment. We consider a woman as 'empowered' not only if she decides or achieves things on her own, but

Table 1—Balance tests

	36 1 1	4 T 1 .				
					eiving infor	
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Yield (log)	5.310	0.823	-0.068	0.031	0.013	3,153
Age of male co-head	39.891	13.834	-4.788	0.499	0.000	3,294
Male co-head finished primary school	0.371	0.483	-0.076	0.018	0.000	3,322
Household size	7.623	3.309	0.211	0.120	0.069	3,322
Nbr of bedrooms	2.236	1.144	-0.033	0.042	0.401	3,322
Access to extension	0.110	0.313	-0.003	0.011	0.748	3,322
Used fertilizer	0.207	0.405	-0.049	0.015	0.001	3,322
Used improved seed	0.384	0.486	-0.068	0.018	0.000	3,322
Distance to input provider	5.554	5.544	-0.027	0.202	0.876	3,322
Household owns mobile	0.779	0.415	-0.081	0.015	0.000	3,322
	Model 2 Avg	2: Involvii S.D.	ng womer ATE	in conv	veying info	rmation N
					F	
Yield (log)	5.310	0.823	-0.014	0.031	0.619	3,153
Age of male co-head	39.756	13.798	0.236	0.490	0.644	3,294
Male co-head finished primary school	0.368	0.482	0.015	0.018	0.403	3,322
Household size	7.621	3.307	-0.024	0.121	0.844	3,322
Nbr of bedrooms	2.234	1.143	0.003	0.042	0.945	3,322
A	0.110	0.313	0.013	0.012	0.236	3,322
Access to extension	0.110					٠,٠
Access to extension Used fertilizer	0.206	0.405	-0.009	0.015	0.516	3,322
		$0.405 \\ 0.486$	-0.009 0.022	$0.015 \\ 0.018$	0.516 0.213	
Used fertilizer	0.206					3,322

Note: First column reports sample means; standard deviations are in the second column; column 3 reports differences between treatment and control as defined in Figure 2 (Model 1 for top panel and Model 2 for bottom panel); associated standard errors are in column 4; column 5 reports p-values based on randomization inference.

also if she does so in partnership with the male co-head in the household. Thus, we examine effects on both women's outcomes and outcomes that are shared (joint) between the female and male co-heads of household. Those outcomes are cast as increases in (a) the female co-head's knowledge (individually and/or jointly with her male co-head) about the information promoted in the video or re-activated by it; (b) the extent to which maize production decisions in the household are taken by the female co-head alone and/or jointly with her male co-head; (c) the adoption of the recommended practices and inputs decided upon by the female co-head individually and/or jointly with her male co-head; (d) output and yield on maize plots that were female-managed and/or jointly managed; and (e) maize sales decided upon by the female co-head individually or jointly with her male co-head. Additionally, we will examine effects on men's outcomes assuming that

a reduction of men's individual decision-making and adoption can be empowering for women as well.

Knowledge about four different practices recommended in the video is measured by the extent to which respondents answered correctly to multiple choice questions about the practices.⁵ A woman's (man's) knowledge score is based on responses from the female (male) co-head; the joint knowledge score is based on responses from both the female and male co-heads, where it was considered a correct joint answer if both of them got the answer correct, otherwise, not. We combine the outcomes of the four knowledge questions into a Women's Knowledge Index, a Joint Knowledge Index and a Men's Knowledge Index as mentioned in Section IV.B.

Agricultural decision-making is based on the woman's answers about whether she made a series of decisions related to household maize production. We differentiate between decisions made individually by the female co-head and decisions made jointly with her spouse. As women's empowerment may also lead to a reduction in unilateral decision making by the male co-head, we also consider decisions that, according to the female co-head, were decided by the man without consulting her. For each maize plot within the household, we thus recorded if the following decisions were made by the female co-head, jointly or by the male co-head: whether to plant maize on the plot; when to start planting the maize on the plot; what spacing of maize plants to use and how many maize seeds per hill to plant on the plot; what strategies to use to control striga on the plot; and when to start weeding on the plot. Per household, we consider the proportion of maize plots within the household on which the female co-head reported that she made the decision alone, that the decision was taken jointly with her husband, or that her husband took the decision alone. Following a similar procedure as discussed above, we constructed a Women's Decision-making Index, based on the proportion of the household's maize plots for which the female co-head made the decisions described above alone. We also make indices for joint decision making and for male unilateral decision making.

Decision making is central to women's empowerment. However, we may also want to check if the practices and inputs that were recommended in the video were also implemented on the plots. For instance, it may be that, due to the video, women gain voice in the decision making process, but if additional investments are needed (for instance in terms of labour time or inputs), they may still be con-

⁵First, respondents are considered knowledgeable about plant spacing if they correctly answered that the best spacing is two and a half feet between rows and one foot between plants, with one seed per hill. Second, respondents are considered knowledgeable about combining practices if they correctly answered they would allocate 40,000 Ugandan shillings to buy improved seed and fertilizer, as combining inputs is a better strategy than putting all the eggs in one basket. Third, respondents are considered knowledgeable about optimal weeding if they correctly answered weeding is most important during the first four weeks after planting. Fourth, respondents are considered knowledgeable about fall armyworm eats during night. The information needed to correctly answer the first three questions was provided in the videos. The videos did not provide information on fall armyworm control, hence no effect was expected for this question.

strained. We thus also consider the proportion of the household's maize plots for which the female co-head decided about a particular practice alone and adopted the recommended practice. Similarly, we consider the proportion of the household's maize plots for which the female and male co-head decided and adopted a particular practice jointly, as well as the proportion of household's maize plots for which the male co-head decided unilaterally and adopted the practice. We measure adoption of the following practices as recommended in the video: planting within one day after the start of the rain, using the recommended spacing and number of seeds per hill, removing striga before it flowers, and doing the first weeding in the third week after planting. As before, we use the same method to construct a Women's Adoption Index, a Joint Adoption Index and a Men's Adoption index.

We measure use of inputs such as DAP (*Diammonium phosphate*), urea, organic fertilizer, maize hybrids, and open pollinated varieties (OPVs). Similar to adoption of recommended practices, we consider the proportion of the household's maize plots for which a particular input was used and this was decided individually by the female co-head. Similar outcomes for input adoption were constructed for joint input adoption and for unilateral adoption by the male co-head. Also here, adoption of different inputs is aggregated in a Women's Input Use Index, a Joint Input Use Index, and a Men's Input Use Index respectively.

Next, we measured outcomes related to production, area of production, and productivity on maize plots under female and joint management. Female (jointly) managed plots are defined as plots on which, according to female co-head respondents, female co-heads alone (jointly) took at least three out of five decisions. We use the total amount of maize produced on female-managed maize plots within the household as our measure of production. The area of production is the total area (in acres) of female-managed maize plots in the household. Yield (in kg per acre) is the total amount of maize produced on female-managed plots divided by the total area of the female-managed maize plots in the household. A secondary, more subjective indicator for yield effects is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the female co-head indicates if the yield on at least one of the maize plots under her management was greater than in a normal year. To capture the change in women's control over total household maize production, we measure both the share of household maize production that was produced on female-managed maize plots and the share of household acreage under maize cultivation that is female-managed. We also defined similar indicators for jointly managed plots.

Finally, we look at maize sales as an outcome. A first indicator takes the value of one if any amount of the maize produced in the household was reported by the

⁶It is important to note that our intervention may change both the likelihood that a spouse makes a decision as well as the likelihood that the decision maker then adopts what was recommended in the video. We thus estimate the compound likelihood of both deciding on a particular practice or input and also adopting it. Therefore, it will be instructive to look back at changes in the probability in decisions making to get an idea of changes in the probability of adoption conditional on having made the decision.

female co-head respondent to have been sold independently by the female co-head (respectively, jointly and independently by the male co-head). Selling independently by the female (male) co-head means all decisions regarding quantity, price and to whom the maize was sold were taken by the female (male) co-head according to the female co-head respondent. Jointly means all those decisions were taken together by the female and male co-head together. A second indicator is the amount of maize (in bags of about 100 kg) that the female co-head respondent reported to have sold independently (jointly/independently by the male co-head). For the first indicator of the likelihood of selling independently we assumed women did not sell any maize independently if they did not know the amount sold independently. For the second indicator (amount of maize sold independently), we only considered non-zero positive amounts of maize sold independently.

V. Results

We present results for the six comparisons laid out in Figure 2. As mentioned above, we consider results for female co-head alone, for male and female co-head jointly as a couple, and for male co-heads alone. We look at the changes in knowledge, decision making, adoption of recommended practices and input use, production, and sales. Together, this means a large number of results have to be presented, so a fairly rigid structure is adopted. In the next section (Section VI) we summarize and interpret the most important findings.

A. Knowledge of Recommended Practices

We begin our discussion of results by examining women's knowledge outcomes, focusing on the knowledge index described earlier as well as the individual recommended practices that respondents answered questions about.

First, we examine whether involving women as recipients of information leads to an increase in their knowledge (Model 1 in Figure 2). We do this by comparing knowledge of women in households in which female co-heads received the information, either alone or with their male spouse, to knowledge of women in households in which only the male co-head received the information. Results are reported in the upper panel of Table 2. Results show involving women as recipients of information leads to an overall positive and statistically significant increase women's knowledge as judged by the index. This is driven by a positive and significant treatment effect of involving women as recipients of information on women's knowledge about adequate spacing and the number of maize seeds per hill, and about the importance of combining inputs. Knowledge about the former increased by 7 percentage points (pp), essentially doubling women's knowledge on this topic. We observe a 5 pp increase in women's knowledge about combining inputs.

In the Appendix, we also report results for comparisons between households in which the female co-head received the information alone and households in which the male co-head received the information alone (model 1A in in Figure 2). Results for this comparison, reported in the top panel in Appendix Table A3, show similar increase in knowledge. Also in the Appendix, we report results for comparisons between households in which the female and male co-heads together as a couple received the information and households in which the male co-head received the information alone (model 1B in in Figure 2). Results for this comparison, reported in the lower panel in Appendix Table A3. Also for this comparison, the increase in knowledge is similar to the one reported in the top panel of Table 2.

Second, we examine the knowledge outcomes that result from variation in the provider of information, as in model 2 in Figure 2. We examine results for role-model effects by comparing women's knowledge outcomes in households that were shown the video in which a female actor in the video provides information (whether alone or with a male co-actor), to women's knowledge outcomes in households that were shown the video in which only a male actor provides information. Results, reported in the lower panel of Table 2, show no evidence of a generalized role-model effect: we observe no change in women's knowledge outcomes as a result of involving female actors in the provision of information. Restricting the sample to households where only women were shown the video (as in model 2A in 2) does not change this conclusion. Results for this are reported in the top panel in of Appendix Table A4. Restricting the sample to households where only men were shown the video (as in model 2B in 2) also does not change this conclusion (bottom panel in Appendix Table A4).

Third, we examine joint knowledge outcomes, and present results in terms of a comparison between the same sets of groups. Results are reported in Table 3 for model 1 (top panel) and model 2 (bottom panel). Neither reducing intra-household information asymmetries nor female role models seem to affect joint knowledge outcomes. There is some indication that new information (about spacing) received by female co-heads alone (as in model 1A in 2) is somewhat less likely to be passed on to their spouses than when male co-heads received the information, which is evident from the negative treatment effect of -2.6 pp on joint knowledge (reported in top panel in Appendix Table A5). However, the difference becomes insignificant after controlling FWER. Appendix Table A6 also reports results for Models 2A and 2B for joint knowledge.

In Appendix Tables A7 to A9, we also repeat the analysis for men's knowledge. Men's knowledge index, and particularly his knowledge of new information (about spacing and starting small with a combination of practices), is negatively affected by involving women in receiving information (top panel in Appendix Table A7). Appendix Table A8 shows this is especially the case if women co-heads receive information alone.

Table 2—Women's knowledge of recommended practices

	Model	1: Invol	ving wome	n in rece	eiving infor	mation
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
			-	-	-	-
Proper spacing and seeds per hill	0.127	0.334	0.066^{**}	0.016	0.000	2,758
Combining practices	0.817	0.387	0.051**	0.015	0.000	2,758
Optimal weeding	0.880	0.325	0.005	0.013	0.699	2,758
Fall armyworm control	0.207	0.406	-0.011	0.016	0.459	2,758
Women's knowledge index	-0.018	0.605	0.114**	0.024	0.000	2,758
	Model	2: Involu	ing womer	n in con	veying info	rmation
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Proper spacing and seeds per hill	0.169	0.375	0.007	0.015	0.651	2,753
	0 0 40					
Combining practices	0.848	0.359	0.005	0.014	0.719	2,753
Combining practices Optimal weeding	0.848 0.888	$0.359 \\ 0.316$	0.005 -0.003	0.014 0.013	0.719 0.842	2,753 2,753
Optimal weeding						,
0 1	0.888	0.316	-0.003	0.013	0.842	2,753

Note: First column reports sample means; standard deviations are in the second column; column 3 reports differences between treatment and control as defined in Figure 2 (Model 1 for top panel and Model 2 for bottom panel); associated standard errors are in column 4; column 5 reports p-values based on randomization inference; the last column is sample size; **, * and + indicate that the difference is significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level after controlling FWER using an omnibus test. Note that no information on the recommended way to fight fall armyworm was given in the video, so no effects were expected.

B. Decision-making about Maize Production

Next, we explore the effect of the treatments on decision-making related to maize production within the household. We do this by first examining whether involving women as information recipients (alone or as part of a couple) results in an increase in their participation in decisions about maize production on an average plot managed by the household (Figure 2, Model 1).

Results (Table 4, top panel) show a positive and statistically significant treatment effect of 0.13 on the women's decision-making index. The results are also evident across all of the decisions, where low mean values in the control group suggest high percent increases in women's decision-making. Comparing the group in which the female co-head received the information alone versus the male co-head alone (as in Figure 2, Model 1A) shows a larger positive effect on the women's decision-making index of 0.22 (Appendix Table A10, top panel). No such increase is found when the treatment group is restricted to the group in which female co-heads received the information together with their male spouse (as in Figure 2, Model 1B; results in Appendix Table A10, bottom panel). The gains in women's individual decision-making are thus largely driven by exclusively targeting female co-heads with information.

In the lower panel of Figure 4, we explore decision-making outcomes that result

Table 3—Joint knowledge of recommended practices

Model	1: Invol	ving wom	en in re	ceiving info	ormation
Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
0.073	0.260	0 003	0.012	0.780	2,361
			0.0		2,361 $2,361$
0.805	0.396	-0.003	0.018	0.855	2,361
0.075	0.264	0.019	0.012	0.096	$2,\!361$
-0.003	0.602	0.010	0.026	0.636	2,361
M 11	0 1 1				
Avg	z: Invoit S.D.	nng wom ATE	en in con S.E.	nveying inf p-value	ormation N
0.073	0.261	-0.003	0.011	0.783	2,358
0.739	0.439	0.008	0.019	0.683	2,358
0.817	0.387	-0.018	0.017	0.295	2,358
0.091	0.288	-0.012	0.012	0.310	2,358
	Avg 0.073 0.737 0.805 0.075 -0.003 Model Avg 0.073 0.739 0.817	Avg S.D. 0.073 0.260 0.737 0.440 0.805 0.396 0.075 0.264 -0.003 0.602 Model 2: Involv Avg S.D. 0.073 0.261 0.739 0.439 0.817 0.387	Avg S.D. ATE 0.073 0.260 0.003 0.737 0.440 0.015 0.805 0.396 -0.003 0.075 0.264 0.019 -0.003 0.602 0.010 Model 2: Involving wom AVE 0.073 0.261 -0.003 0.739 0.439 0.008 0.817 0.387 -0.018	Avg S.D. ATE S.E. 0.073 0.260 0.003 0.012 0.737 0.440 0.015 0.019 0.805 0.396 -0.003 0.018 0.075 0.264 0.019 0.012 -0.003 0.602 0.010 0.026 Model 2: Involving women in color AYE S.E. 0.073 0.261 -0.003 0.011 0.739 0.439 0.008 0.019 0.817 0.387 -0.018 0.017	0.073 0.260 0.003 0.012 0.780 0.737 0.440 0.015 0.019 0.449 0.805 0.396 -0.003 0.018 0.855 0.075 0.264 0.019 0.012 0.096 -0.003 0.602 0.010 0.026 0.636 Model 2: Involving women in conveying inf Avg S.D. ATE S.E. p-value 0.073 0.261 -0.003 0.011 0.783 0.739 0.439 0.008 0.019 0.683 0.817 0.387 -0.018 0.017 0.295

Note: First column reports sample means; standard deviations are in the second column; column 3 reports differences between treatment and control as defined in Figure 2 (Model 1 for top panel and Model 2 for bottom panel); associated standard errors are in column 4; column 5 reports p-values based on randomization inference; the last column is sample size; **, * and + indicate that the difference is signficantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level after controlling FWER using an omnibus test. Note that no information on the recommended way to fight fall armyworm was given in the video, so no effects were expected.

from variations in the information provider (illustrated in Model 2 of Figure 2). Results show no evidence of a generalized role-model effect on women's decision-making. However, when we restrict this comparison to groups in which a female actor in the video provides information (whether alone or with a male co-actor) to female co-heads against groups in which a male actor provides information to female co-heads (2, Model 2A), we do observe positive and statistically significant effects (top panel of Appendix Table A11). Specifically, we observe an increase of 0.16 in the women's decision-making index and an increase in women's decision-making about the timing for planting maize, about spacing, about striga control measures, and the timing of weeding that amount to 7, 9 and 7 pp respectively, which translates into increases of 26, 34 and 39 percent, respectively, over the mean of the control group. Challenging role incongruity among male co-heads by showing them the video that involves a female actor (whether alone or with a male co-actor) instead of a male actor (as in 2, Model 2B) does not make a difference for women's decision-making (bottom panel of Appendix Table A11).

We find no change in joint decision-making outcomes as a result of involving women as information recipients (alone or as part of a couple, see top panel in Table 5). But, when the treatment group is restricted to the group in which female co-heads received the information together with their male spouse (as in

Table 4—Women decision making

	Model	1: Invol	ving wome	n in rece	eiving infor	rmation
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
TD1 (1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	0.150	0.000	0.040**	0.015	0.000	0.001
Planting maize on the plot	0.158	0.338	0.046**	0.015	0.002	2,661
Timing of planting maize	0.163	0.340	0.053**	0.016	0.001	2,661
Spacing and number of seeds	0.150	0.333	0.049**	0.015	0.001	2,661
Striga control measures	0.113	0.295	0.055**	0.014	0.000	2,596
Timing of the first weeding	0.178	0.357	0.049**	0.016	0.002	2,661
Women's decision-making index	-0.032	0.783	0.132**	0.034	0.000	2,596
			U		veying info	
	Model 2	2: Involu S.D.	ing womer ATE	n in conv	veying info p-value	rmation N
Planting maize on the plot			U		0 0 0	
Planting maize on the plot Timing of planting maize	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
9	Avg 0.184	S.D. 0.359	ATE 0.004	S.E. 0.015	p-value 0.762	N 2,714
Timing of planting maize	Avg 0.184 0.197	S.D. 0.359 0.367	ATE 0.004 0.000	S.E. 0.015 0.015	p-value 0.762 0.989	N 2,714 2,714
Timing of planting maize Spacing and number of seeds	0.184 0.197 0.180	S.D. 0.359 0.367 0.356	0.004 0.000 0.004	S.E. 0.015 0.015 0.015	0.762 0.989 0.782	N 2,714 2,714 2,714

Model 1B in Figure 2), there is a significant and positive effect on joint decision-making about the novel way of spacing and number of seeds (bottom panel of Appendix Table A12).

We do find significant negative effects of involving women in receiving information on men's individual decision-making. The men's decision-making index decreases by 0.18 and men are less likely to make each of the decisions alone (top panel Appendix Table A14). These negative effects on men's individual decision-making do not only follow from giving the female co-head the information alone (in which case the female co-head can monopolize the information) (top panel Appendix Table A15), but also from giving the female and male co-head the information together (bottom panel Appendix Table A15).

While joint decision-making does not change as a result of variations in the information provider (bottom panel of Table 5), men's decision-making does. Men's unilateral decision-making about whether to plant maize on the plot is reduced by 4 pp (an 11 percent reduction over the mean of the control) when a female actor is involved in providing the information (alone or together with a male actor) as compared to only a male actor, regardless of whom the video was shown to (Appendix Table A14, Model 2). The fact that this reduction in men's

Table 5—Joint decision making

	Model	1: Invo	lving wor	nen in r	eceiving inf	ormation
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Planting maize on the plot	0.520	0.472	0.015	0.020	0.443	2,661
Timing of planting maize	0.477	0.470	0.011	0.020	0.553	2,661
Spacing and number of seeds	0.475	0.473	0.029	0.020	0.135	2,661
Striga control measures	0.420	0.464	0.024	0.020	0.193	2,596
Timing of the first weeding	0.535	0.469	-0.007	0.020	0.702	2,661
Joint decision-making index	0.021	0.787	0.008	0.033	0.294	2,596
	$egin{aligned} Model \ \mathrm{Avg} \end{aligned}$	2: Invol S.D.	ving won ATE	nen in co S.E.	p-value	$egin{array}{l} formation \ \mathrm{N} \end{array}$
Planting maize on the plot	0.524	0.469	-0.007	0.019	0.702	2,714
r failting maize on the plot						2,114
Timing of planting maize	0.471	0.465	0.006	0.019	0.733	2,714 $2,714$
0	$0.471 \\ 0.481$	$0.465 \\ 0.471$	$0.006 \\ 0.003$	$0.019 \\ 0.019$	$0.733 \\ 0.870$,
Timing of planting maize				0.0-0		2,714
Timing of planting maize Spacing and number of seeds	0.481	0.471	0.003	0.019	0.870	2,714 $2,714$

decision-making about whether to plant maize is mirrored when male co-heads viewed the video that involved a female actor instead of the video with only a male actor (Model 2B) suggests that role incongruity challenges may be at work among male co-heads (bottom panel in Appendix Table A16).

C. Adoption of Recommended Practices

We apply the same approach to our presentation of changes in the likelihood that spouses both decide on and also adopt each of the recommended practices. We start by making the comparison illustrated in Model 1 of Figure 2. Results (top panel of Table 6) show a positive and statistically significant treatment effect of involving women in receiving information, denoted by an increase of 0.12 in the women's adoption index. The likelihood of a woman both deciding and adopting a particular recommended practice increases by between 1 and 5 pp. Given that women alone both decided and adopt a particular practice is generally low in the control group, these changes translate into sizable percent increases. Effects remain generally consistent when the treatment group is restricted to the group in which the female co-head received the information alone (Model 1A in Figure 2), in which case the women's adoption index increases by 0.15 (top panel in

Appendix Table A17). When the treatment group is restricted to the group in which the female co-head receives the information together with her male spouse (Model 1B in Figure 2), the women's adoption index increases by 0.09 and only the likelihood of the female co-head unilateral deciding about striga control and adoption the recommended striga control strategy is positively affected (bottom panel in Appendix Table A17).

We proceed by assessing the effects of variation in the information provider in the same manner as before (Model 2 of Figure 2). Results (bottom panel of Table 6) do not indicate any difference in women's adoption outcomes as a result of involving women in conveying information. But when we compare groups in which the female co-heads were shown the video with a female actor (alone or with a male co-actor) instead of the video with only a male actor (Model 2A of Figure 2), there are indications of positive role-model effects on the likelihood that female co-heads both decide about when to plant and adopt the recommended timing of planting maize (top panel in Appendix Table A18): an increase of 2.6 pp, which translates into a 62 percent increase over the mean of the control.

Table 6—Women adoption of recommended practices

	Model	1: Invol	vina wome	n in rece	eiving infor	mation
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Tii	0.049	0.170	0.021**	0.000	0.014	9.402
Timing of planting maize Spacing and number of seeds	0.043 0.001	0.179 0.034	0.021 $0.007**$	0.009 0.003	$0.014 \\ 0.015$	2,493
Striga control measures	0.001 0.080	0.054 0.253	0.007 $0.052**$	0.003	0.013	2,660
9	0.080 0.157		0.032	0.013		2,595
Timing of the first weeding		0.338	0.048	0.0-0	0.001	2,660
Women's adoption index	0.001	0.599	0.117	0.026	0.000	2,433
	Model 2	2: Involv	ing womer	n in con	veying info	rmation
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Timing of planting maigo	0.050	0.104	0.007	0.000	0.410	2 5/12
Timing of planting maize	0.050	0.194	0.007	0.009	0.419	2,542 2,713
Spacing and number of seeds	0.005	0.069	0.001	0.003	0.703	2,713
Spacing and number of seeds Striga control measures	0.005 0.116	0.069 0.302	0.001 0.002	0.003 0.012	0.703 0.871	2,713 2,644
Spacing and number of seeds	0.005	0.069	0.001	0.003	0.703	2,713

Note: First column reports sample means; standard deviations are in the second column; column 3 reports differences between treatment and control as defined in Figure 2 (Model 1 for top panel and Model 2 for bottom panel); associated standard errors are in column 4; column 5 reports p-values based on randomization inference; the last column is sample size; **, * and + indicate that the difference is significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level after controlling FWER using an omnibus test.

Next, we examine joint adoption outcomes, and present results in terms of a comparison depicted in Model 1 of Figure 2 in Table 7. Involving women in receiving information has a positive and significant effect of 1.5 pp on the likelihood of jointly deciding upon spacing and subsequent adoption of the recommended

practice of spacing and number of seeds per hill (top panel of Table 7). Joint adoption outcomes follow from providing the information to the female and male co-head together in contrast to only providing the male co-head with information (Model 1B of Figure 2): Results (bottom panel in Appendix Table A19) show an increase in the joint adoption index of 0.08, a 2 pp increase in the jointly decided-upon adoption of proper spacing, and a 5 pp increase in the jointly decided-upon adoption of striga control measures.

In the appendix, we examine the effect of involving women as recipients and messengers on men's adoption as well. Involving women in receiving information, alone or as part of the couple, as compared to giving the information only to the male co-head (Model 1 of Figure 2), reduces the likelihood that men unilaterally decide on and subsequently adopt striga control measures by 3 pp (top panel in Appendix Table A21). Providing only the female co-head with information as compared to only the male co-head (Model 1A of Figure 2) reduces this likelihood by 4 pp. We further find that it also reduces the likelihood that man alone decide about when to weed and also follow recommendations by 6 pp, which is equivalent to a 30 percent reduction (top panel in Appendix Table A22).

Table 7—Joint adoption of recommended practices

	Model	1: Invol	ving wome	en in rece	eiving infor	rmation
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Timing of planting maize	0.110	0.294	0.006	0.013	0.624	2,493
Spacing and number of seeds	0.014	0.112	0.015**	0.006	0.011	2,660
Striga control measures	0.321	0.437	0.025	0.019	0.154	2,595
Timing of the first weeding	0.478	0.470	0.006	0.020	0.751	2,660
Joint adoption index	-0.010	0.577	0.043^{*}	0.026	0.044	2,433
	Model 2	2: Involu	ving women	n in con	veying info	rmation
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Timing of planting maize	0.125	0.307	-0.015	0.013	0.226	2,542
Spacing and number of seeds	0.024	0.147	-0.001	0.006	0.925	2,713
Striga control measures	0.328	0.439	0.006	0.018	0.744	2,644
Timing of the first weeding	0.478	0.468	-0.012	0.019	0.541	2,713
Joint adoption index	-0.004	0.585	-0.003	0.026	0.898	2,478

Note: First column reports sample means; standard deviations are in the second column; column 3 reports differences between treatment and control as defined in Figure 2 (Model 1 for top panel and Model 2 for bottom panel); associated standard errors are in column 4; column 5 reports p-values based on randomization inference; the last column is sample size; **, * and + indicate that the difference is significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level after controlling FWER using an omnibus test.

Involving women in conveying information does not make any difference in joint adoption outcomes (bottom panel of Table 7). There are indications, however, that men's adoption outcomes are negatively affected by showing male co-heads

the video with a female actor (whether alone or with a male co-actor) rather than with only a male actor (Model 2B). Results (bottom panel in Appendix Table A23) show a decrease of 2.9 pp (a 38 percent decrease relative to the mean of the control) in men's individually decided-upon adoption of the appropriate timing for planting maize.

D. The Use of Fertilizer and Improved Seeds

In this section, we explore the impact of the different treatments on the use of specific types of fertilizer (DAP, urea, and organic fertilizer) and improved seeds (hybrids or OPVs) by women who decided individually upon using the specified inputs, by female and male co-heads who jointly decided upon using those inputs, and by men who individually decided upon using those inputs.

First, we examine the effect of involving women in receiving information, alone or as part of the couple (Model 1 of Figure 2). Results (top panel Table 8) show a positive and significant increase of women's input use index by 0.08. The effect of providing only female co-heads with information as opposed to only male co-heads (as in Figure 2, Model 1A) is an increase of the women's input use index by 0.13. We register an increase of the use of all inputs (top panel of Appendix Table A24). Providing the female co-heads together with their male co-heads with information as opposed to only the male co-heads (as in 2, Model 1B) has only a weak effect on women's input use index (bottom panel of Appendix Table A24).

We continue by examining role-model effects with the comparison illustrated in 2, Model 2. Involving women in conveying extension information has a positive and significant effect of 2 pp on the use of organic fertilizer by women who individually made the decision about its use (bottom panel of Table 8). There are also indications of positive effects on women's decided-upon use of OPVs and the women's input use index. The estimated effects have p-values lower than 0.10 but are not significant according to FWER consistent significance thresholds.

Next, we examine the effects of involving women in receiving information, alone or as part of the couple, on joint input-use outcomes. Results (top panel Table 9) show a positive and significant effect on the joint input use index, which is increased by 0.06. Providing only female co-heads with information as opposed to only male co-heads (Model 1A of Figure 2) increases the joint input use index by 0.04 (top panel Appendix Table A26). Providing female co-heads and their male co-heads with information as opposed to only the male co-heads (Model 1B of Figure 2) increases the joint input use index by 0.09 (bottom panel Appendix Table A26).

The effect of involving women in receiving information, alone or as part of the couple, on input use decided upon by men is mixed: it is negative for the use of the fertilizer DAP and positive for organic fertilizer (Model 1 of Figure 2; top panel Appendix Table A28). The negative effect on men's decided-upon use of DAP is driven by the female co-heads receiving the information alone (Model 1A).

TABLE 8—WOMEN INPUT USE

	Model	1: Invol	ving wome	n in rece	eiving infor	mation
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
DAP	0.016	0.121	0.017**	0.006	0.002	2,661
Urea	0.010	0.121 0.038	0.017	0.000	0.002 0.001	2,661
						,
Organic fertilizer	0.017	0.126	0.011	0.006	0.057	2,661
Hybrid seeds	0.013	0.111	0.009	0.005	0.078	2,661
OPV	0.018	0.126	0.011	0.006	0.059	2,661
Women's input use index	0.009	0.547	0.083**	0.021	0.000	2,661
•						
	Model 2	2: Involv	ing womer	n in con	veying info	rmation
·	Model 2 Avg	2: Involv S.D.	ing women ATE	n in con S.E.	veying info p-value	rmation N
DAR	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
DAP	Avg 0.020	S.D. 0.133	ATE 0.004	S.E. 0.006	p-value 0.524	N 2,714
DAP Urea	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
	Avg 0.020	S.D. 0.133	ATE 0.004	S.E. 0.006	p-value 0.524	N 2,714
Urea	Avg 0.020 0.011	S.D. 0.133 0.099	0.004 -0.004	S.E. 0.006 0.003	p-value 0.524 0.279	N 2,714 2,714
Urea Organic fertilizer	0.020 0.011 0.016	S.D. 0.133 0.099 0.111	0.004 -0.004 0.015 ⁺	S.E. 0.006 0.003 0.006	0.524 0.279 0.013	2,714 2,714 2,714

of Figure 2; top panel Appendix Table A29), which may be linked to men lacking information about the use of DAP.

Involving women in conveying the information has no significant effects on joint input use (bottom panel of Table 9). Yet there are indications that jointly decided-upon use of urea increased by 2 pp as a result of female co-heads having seen the video with a female actor (alone or with a male co-actor) instead of the video with only a male actor (Model 2A of Figure 2; top panel Appendix Table A27). The use of DAP individually decided upon by men, however, seems negatively affected by that treatment (bottom panel of Appendix Table A28). There are indications that the use of both urea and hybrid seed individually decided upon by men are positively affected as a result of showing male co-heads the video with a female actor (alone or with a male co-actor) instead of the video with only a male actor (bottom panel of Appendix Table A30).

E. Production and Productivity

Next, we assess effects on production and productivity of female-managed maize plots as a result of involving women in receiving information versus only targeting the man (as illustrated in 2, Model 1). The results (top panel of Table 10) show a

Table 9—Joint input use

	Model	1: Invol	ving wome	en in rece	eiving infor	mation
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
DAP	0.050	0.207	0.022^{*}	0.009	0.014	2,661
Urea	0.014	0.116	0.003	0.005	0.528	2,661
Organic fertilizer	0.051	0.209	0.027^{*}	0.010	0.005	2,661
Hybrid seeds	0.027	0.150	0.021*	0.008	0.004	2,661
OPV	0.021	0.084	0.005	0.004	0.157	2,700
Joint input use index	0.002	0.484	0.063**	0.020	0.000	2,661
	Model 2	2: Involu	ring women	n in con	veying info	rmation
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	
DAP	0.048	S.D. 0.201	0.017	S.E. 0.009	p-value 0.049	
DAP Urea					1	N
	0.048	0.201	0.017	0.009	0.049	N 2,714
Urea	0.048 0.011	0.201 0.095	0.017 0.009	0.009 0.005	0.049 0.074	N 2,714 2,714
Urea Organic fertilizer	0.048 0.011 0.065	0.201 0.095 0.235	0.017 0.009 0.003	0.009 0.005 0.010	0.049 0.074 0.716	N 2,714 2,714 2,714
Urea Organic fertilizer Hybrid seeds	0.048 0.011 0.065 0.036	0.201 0.095 0.235 0.176	0.017 0.009 0.003 0.002	0.009 0.005 0.010 0.007	0.049 0.074 0.716 0.787	N 2,714 2,714 2,714 2,714

significant and positive increase of the total area of female-managed maize plots in the household, an increase of the total amount of household maize produced on female-managed plots, and an increase of the yield on female-managed maize plots. There is also a 2 pp increase in the likelihood of reporting better-thannormal yield. Both the share of household maize production and maize area under female management increased by 6 pp. The positive effects on production and productivity outcomes on female-managed plots that result from providing only the female co-head with information instead of the male co-head (Model 1A of Figure 2) are even larger in magnitude (top panel in Table A31). In contrast, involving the female co-head as part of a couple receiving the information instead of only the male co-head (Model 1B of Figure 2) shows no effect on production and productivity outcomes on female-managed plots (bottom panel in Table A31).

We also again examine the effect of involving women in conveying the information rather than only a man (Model 2 of 2) on production and productivity outcomes of female-managed plots. Results (bottom panel of Table 10) point to a significant and negative effect on the yield on female-managed plots. Suggestive indications of the negative effects on yield on female-managed plots emerge both when female co-heads and when male co-heads have seen the video featuring a female actor (alone or with a male co-actor) instead of the video featuring only a

male actor (respectively Model 2A and Model 2B in Figure 2). In the latter case, there are also indications of a negative effect on production on female-managed plots (Appendix Table A32).

Table 10—Women production outcomes

	Mode	l 1: Involve	ing women i	n receivin	g informat	tion
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Production	39.094	155.909	35.849**	8.687	0.000	2,700
Area	0.105	0.332	0.074**	0.019	0.000	2,700
Yield better than normal	0.024	0.142	0.026**	0.008	0.001	2,595
Yield	57.675	237.920	50.389**	12.853	0.000	2,700
Share of household maize production	0.122	0.315	0.060**	0.015	0.000	2,534
Share of area under maize cultivation	0.122	0.315	0.063^{**}	0.016	0.000	2,507
	Model	2: Involvi	ng women ir	ı conveyir	ng informa	tion
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Production	64.273	227.836	-7.349	8.347	0.381	2,754
Area	0.152	0.431	-0.001	0.018	0.955	2,754
Yield better than normal	0.041	0.177	0.001	0.007	0.916	2,64
Yield	112.428	410.309	-35.867**	12.415	0.003	2,75
Share of household maize production	0.171	0.358	-0.012	0.015	0.395	2,58

Note: First column reports sample means; standard deviations are in the second column; column 3 reports differences between treatment and control as defined in Figure 2 (Model 1 for top panel and Model 2 for bottom panel); associated standard errors are in column 4; column 5 reports p-values based on randomization inference; the last column is sample size; **, * and + indicate that the difference is significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level after controlling FWER using an omnibus test.

Involving women in receiving information, however, does not have any effect on production and productivity outcomes on jointly managed plots (top panel of Table 11). Even when the female and male co-heads received the information together (Model 1B of Figure 2), there is no impact on production and productivity outcomes on jointly managed plots (bottom panel of Appendix, Table A33).

There is no evidence that production and productivity outcomes of jointly managed plots changed as a result of involving women in conveying the information (alone or with a male co-actor) rather than only a man (bottom part of Table 11). However, both as a result of showing female co-heads and as result of showing male co-heads the video featuring a female actor (alone or with a male co-actor) instead of the video with only a male actor (Model 2A and Model 2B of Figure 2), the likelihood that the yield on jointly managed plots is better than normal increased by about 4 pp. This translates into about a 40 percent increase over the mean of the control (Appendix Table A34).

Table 11—Joint production outcomes

	Model	1: Involvir	ng women	in receivi	ng informe	ation
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Production	239.898	478.920	-14.825	17.251	0.359	2,700
Area	0.591	0.908	-0.019	0.036	0.576	2,700
Yield better than normal	0.132	0.326	0.003	0.014	0.799	2,598
Yield	222.381	383.192	-3.393	15.549	0.823	2,700
Share of household maize production	0.501	0.486	0.011	0.021	0.592	2,534
Share of area under maize cultivation	0.502	0.485	0.007	0.021	0.709	2,50'
	$egin{array}{l} Model \ Avg \end{array}$	2: Involvin S.D.	g women a	in conveys	ing inform p-value	ation N
D 1 (000 011	415 05 4	0.000	10 700	0.000	0.55
Production	222.311	417.654	-0.363	16.763	0.983	2,75
Area	0.586	0.874	-0.033	0.034	0.337	2,75
Yield better than normal	0.119	0.306	0.017	0.013	0.187	2,64
Yield	207.692	340.322	13.985	15.192	0.349	2,75
Share of household maize production	0.500	0.484	0.000	0.020	0.997	$2,\!58$
			-0.003			2,55

F. Sales

Maize produced in the household independently sold by the female co-head is not affected by involving women in receiving information, alone or as part of the couple (top panel of Table 12). Yet providing the information to only the female co-head as opposed to providing it to only the male co-head (Model 1A of Figure 2) increases the likelihood that she independently sells maize by 4 pp (top panel in Appendix Table A35). As few women in the control group actually sell maize independently, this translates into a substantial percentage increase of 46 percent over the mean of the control. There are indications of a positive effect on the amount of maize sold independently by women as well. Sales of maize by the female and male co-head jointly does not change by involving women in receiving information, alone or as part of the couple (top panel in Table 13). Neither does sales of maize individually by the male co-head (top panel Appendix Table A39).

Next, we look into the effect of involving women in conveying information (Model 2 of Figure 2). Results (bottom panel of Table 12) show a significant and negative effect on the amount of maize that women independently sell. There are indications of negative effects on the likelihood and the amount sold inde-

Table 12—Women sales outcomes

	Model 1: Involving women in receiving information								
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N			
Sold any	0.088	0.284	0.018	0.013	0.159	2,700			
Amount sold (in 100 kg bags)	0.184	0.977	0.030	0.037	0.399	2,700			
	Model 2: Involving women in conveying information								
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N			
Sold any	0.103	0.305	-0.009	0.012	0.490	2,754			
Amount sold (in 100 kg bags)	0.238	1.204	-0.084*	0.036	0.018	2,754			

pendently by women when male co-heads view the video featuring a female actor (alone or with a male co-actor) delivering the information instead of only a male actor (bottom panel of Appendix Table A36).

Involving women in conveying information has a positive effect of 4 pp (though just under the FWER-consistent significance threshold) on the likelihood that maize produced in the household is jointly sold. This translates into a 12 percent increase over the mean of the control (bottom panel in Table 13). An indication of a similar positive role model effect on joint sales emerges when women are involved in conveying information given to the female co-heads alone (top panel in Appendix Table A38).

The amount of maize independently sold by men, however, is significantly and negatively affected by involving women in conveying information (bottom panel Appendix Table A39). This seems particularly the case when female co-heads alone viewed the video in which women are involved in conveying information (top panel of Appendix Table A41), and seems unrelated to challenging role incongruity among men since significant effects are absent in that case (bottom panel of Appendix Table A41).

VI. Discussion

In this section we interpret the results provided in the previous section.

A. Women's Access to Information and Extension Services

Results suggest that, to some extent, spouses monopolize agricultural extension information. Involving women in receiving extension information (as opposed to

Table 13—Joint sales

	Model 1: Involving women in receiving information								
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N			
Sold any	0.319	0.466	-0.003	0.020	0.881	2,700			
Amount sold (in 100 kg bags)	1.179	3.173	-0.022	0.131	0.867	2,700			
	Model 2: Involving women in conveying information								
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N			
Sold any	0.296	0.457	0.035	0.019	0.060	2,754			

exclusively targeting the male co-head) has positive effects on women's individual knowledge. This finding suggests that male co-heads do not necessarily pass the information to their spouse. The fact that men's knowledge, particularly knowledge about new information, is reduced when the information if targeted exclusively to the female co-head (as opposed to exclusively to the male co-head), suggests that also female co-heads also do not necessarily share information with their spouse.

Results further show that women's knowledge gains are similar regardless of whether a woman saw the extension video alone or together with her male cohead; the presence of the male spouse in the exposure process does not influence her knowledge. Unlike for the female co-head, the presence of the female spouse in the exposure process does influence the knowledge of the male co-head, who appears to learn less when information is provided to the couple than when this information is targeted to him alone. This suggest limited discussion of the content of the video between spouses even when the video was shown to both of them as a couple. Hence, from a knowledge transfer point of view, it seems most effective to exclusively target the female co-head.

Women gain individual agricultural decision-making power when they are involved in receiving extension information, particularly if this information is exclusively provided to them. Joint decision-making remains unchanged. These results suggest that women's agency in the domain of agriculture gains footing vis-à-vis men's by the reduction of information asymmetries between the two co-heads in the household. This may follow directly from her access to the required information for making a decision, or, indirectly, from a gain in bargaining power based on her exclusive access to information.

Men's unilateral decision-making is reduced as a result of involving women in receiving information, no matter if this happens by targeting the female co-head alone or together with the male co-head. If this reduction only occurred in the former case, men's reduced decision-making could have been related to a lack of information. The fact that the reduction occurs in both cases suggest that men's individual decision-making does not only decrease due to a lack of direct access to information. Apparently, the fact that women can also access information leads them to refrain from unilateral decision making⁷.

Going beyond women's decision-making, the adoption of recommended practices and use of inputs individually decided upon by women is also positively affected by providing women with information. Hence, women seem to use their increased agency as a result of reduced intra-household information asymmetries to become more involved in farm-related activities. Additionally, the adoption of recommended practices and use of inputs jointly decided upon by the female and male co-head increases as a result of involving women in receiving information. This implies that informed women can also participate more in joint action. The positive effect on jointly decided adoption of recommended practices and inputs when the female and male co-heads receive the information together is consistent with Lambrecht, Vanlauwe and Maertens (2016) who found a positive impact of joint participation in an extension program on fertilizer adoption on jointly (and male-) managed plots. The adoption of recommended practices and use of inputs individually decided upon by men is negatively affected by providing women with information, but the effect is less convincing than for male unilateral decision-making.

As a result of providing only women with information, the total area of maize plots in the household managed by women increases and maize production on female-managed plots more than doubles. While increased women's decision-making about and adoption of each of the five recommended practices does not mean these all occurred on maize plots under female management (as the term is defined here), there is, however, an obvious positive correlation. We can thus infer that the increased decision-making about and adoption of recommended practices and inputs by women as a result of solely involving women as information recipients paid off in higher production, increased area, and higher productivity on female-managed maize plots.

In contrast, providing the information to the female and male co-head together did not make a change for area, production and productivity of female-managed maize plots. This is probably due to the fact that providing the information to the female and male co-head together does not have the same strong positive effects on women's individual agency as providing the information to only the woman. Her lack of an exclusive informational asset seems to be in the way of capitalizing on her gain of information. There is no evidence of an increase of maize produc-

⁷At the same time, it should be noted that men also seem to learn less in the presence of women. This may indicate that, if information is provided to the couple, men pay less attention and start shirking.

tion, productivity, or area under cultivation under joint management as result of involving women in receiving information either, not even when the female and male co-heads were reached together. While we can also assume a positive correlation between joint decision-making and adoption and the likelihood that it concerns jointly managed plots (as defined here), we cannot infer that increased joint decision-making and adoption as a result of the female and male co-head receiving the information together paid off in higher production and productivity on jointly managed maize plots.

Women are also more likely to sell (more) maize independently if they alone received the extension information instead of the male co-head. At the same time, sales of maize individually by men is less likely, which indicates that women's increased agency as a result of unique access to information reduces men's dominance over maize sales. Giving the information to the female and male co-head together does not affect women's (nor men's) individual sales of maize. Joint sales of maize remain unaffected by involving women in receiving information, even as part of a couple.

Women seem to gain in production and sales if they receive agricultural extension information alone. However, these effects are not there if the information is given to the couple. This suggests that a woman's monopoly over information is essential for her individual achievements. The fact that giving the information to the couple instead of only the male co-head increased women's agency in terms of joint decision-making and adoption but not joint achievement implies that, despite women's greater (joint) agency, these joint achievement are not different from what men individually achieve.

A lingering question is the extent to which the increased efforts by women that result from exclusively giving them extension information, in terms of applying the recommended practices and inputs and larger areas of maize cultivation under their management, augment their work burden. Indeed, we observe that the time women spent on preparing fields and weeding went up by 1.4 and 3.3 persondays/maize season, respectively, as a result of providing only the female co-head, instead of only the male co-head, with information. Women generally apply labor-based intensification practices, which are likely more accessible to women than capital intensive practices such as the use of improved seeds or fertilizer. This suggests the need for further research on the labor and drudgery implications of these outcomes and the need to reflect upon making less labor-intensive intensification practices accessible to women.

B. Role-model Effects

We expected that including women in the extension information videos portrayed as farmers, whom viewers can relate to and who become successful by applying the practices shown in the video, would have had role-model effects and improve women's outcomes. The evidence, however, is mixed. There is no impact on women's knowledge of agronomic practices, nor on women's individ-

ual decision-making and adoption of recommended practices, and indications of a negative effect on the yield on female-managed plots and sales of maize by women. There is some indication of a positive role-model effect on the use of organic fertilizer decided upon by women, a productivity-enhancing input that may be directly available to a woman without a need for bargaining.

There are no effects of involving women in conveying information on joint outcomes either, except for an indication that jointly selling maize has become more likely. The lack of effects on joint decision-making and adoption means that couples nor men were inspired to accept a greater participation of women in those decisions. There are, however, negative effects on men's unilateral decision-making, as well as on the amount of maize independently sold by men, which may make way for more involvement of women in decision-making and action.

Zooming in on role-model effects among female co-heads who viewed the extension information videos with women involved as messengers alone paints a slightly different picture. If women were the sole recipients of information provided by women, women's individual decision-making increased as well as women's individually decided-upon adoption of the appropriate timing for planting maize and use of organic fertilizer—again practices that are available to a woman at no or limited cost. Yet, the indication of a negative effect on yield on female-managed plots emerges in this case as well.

There are some indications of positive effects on joint outcomes as well, such as use of fertilizer, improved yields on jointly managed plots and a higher likelihood of jointly selling maize. The amount of maize sold independently by men seems to decrease as a result. The effects on joint and men's outcomes of including women in the extension information videos shown to female co-heads as the sole recipients of the information seems to suggest that women who are inspired by the female role models not only gained individual agency but managed to make some changes at the couple level.

The effects of involving women in conveying information in the extension videos shown to male co-heads alone, which most likely work through challenging role incongruity, seem to have reduced men's individual decision-making, particularly about whether to plant maize on a plot, men's individually decided-upon adoption, and improve yield of jointly managed plots. These results suggest that role-model effects and challenging role incongruity among male co-heads may have encouraged them to dominate agricultural decision-making less.

In sum, we find only weak evidence that role models work, both directly by increasing aspirations of women and indirectly by challenging role incongruity of men. The fact that effects we find are less convincing than what other studies such as Riley (2017) or Beaman et al. (2009) find may be due to the fact that our intervention was relatively light. A 10 minute video, even though screened twice, is still quite different from a two hour feel good movie or first hand experience with women leaders over the course of multiple years of quota policy.

VII. Conclusions

In smallholder agriculture, women perform a lot of the work, yet have little say in which crops to plant, what technologies and inputs to use, and how much of the crop to sell on the market. Targeting women with relevant information in formats that are appealing and accessible to them have been found to increase empowerment in a variety of settings, and so providing extension information to women may be an effective way to increase their voice in agricultural production. However, public agricultural advisory services, the main source of agricultural information in many developing countries, remains severely male biased, with predominantly male experts targeting the main decision maker within the household, which is assumed to be the male co-head.

In this paper, we test two different potential ways in which information may increase women's access to resources, their agency, and their achievements in the context of smallholder agriculture. We do this through a field experiment in the form of a factorial design that was run in eastern Uganda. Working with monogamous maize farming households, in one treatment arm, we assess the importance of who within the household is targeted with information in terms of knowledge, decision making, adoption of recommended agronomic practices and technology, and outcomes. In a cross treatment, we test if the gender of the person who provides this information makes a difference.

The information intervention is implemented using short videos shown twice to farmers. In these videos, farmer-actors explain and demonstrate various strategies and practices to intensify the production of maize. Three versions were randomized across farming households: one version portrays a male farmer, another a female farmer, the third a couple formed by male and female co-head. Three constellations of recipients of information in the household were randomized as well: the male co-head alone, the female co-head alone, the male and female co-heads together.

The results of this study clearly show that significant advances in women's role in agriculture are made by giving women direct and exclusive access to extension information. Furthermore, while the evidence is somewhat mixed, the results of this study suggest that women as role models, through peer effects, gender homophily effects, and/or through challenging role incongruity, influence women and men in different ways. In particular, women are inspired to aspire when they receive information delivered by women but cannot turn that into individual success, in terms of yield and maize sales. The success emerges in joint outcomes. Men's individual decision-making and agency, however, seems to reduce when men receive information delivered by women, which may create space for women's participation in decision-making and action.

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APPENDIX

Table A1—Balance tests for Models 1A and 1B

Model 1A: Zooming in on providing information									
	to the	e female	co-heads	alone					
Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N				
5.339	0.801	-0.029	0.035	0.370	$2,\!154$				
38.702	13.511	-8.630	0.541	0.000	2,242				
0.338	0.473	-0.162	0.020	0.000	2,269				
7.521	3.233	0.071	0.136	0.599	2,269				
2.218	1.126	-0.079	0.047	0.073	2,269				
0.112	0.316	0.001	0.013	0.967	2,269				
0.221	0.415	-0.036	0.017	0.023	2,269				
0.387	0.487	-0.081	0.020	0.000	2,269				
5.516	5.598	-0.113	0.235	0.577	2,269				
0.742	0.438	-0.180	0.018	0.000	2,269				
Model		_	_	ing inform	ation				
	to won	nen as pa	rt of the	couple					
Model Avg		_	_		nation N				
Avg	to won S.D.	nen as pa ATE	rt of the S.E.	couple p-value	N				
Avg 5.313	to wom S.D.	ATE -0.092	rt of the S.E. 0.036	couple p-value 0.004	N 2,077				
Avg 5.313 42.521	to wom S.D. 0.823 14.254	nen as pa ATE -0.092 -0.988	rt of the S.E. 0.036 0.612	couple p-value 0.004 0.098	N 2,077 2,176				
Avg 5.313 42.521 0.425	to wom S.D. 0.823 14.254 0.494	-0.092 -0.988 0.011	nt of the S.E. 0.036 0.612 0.021	couple p-value 0.004 0.098 0.596	N 2,077 2,176 2,187				
5.313 42.521 0.425 7.655	to won S.D. 0.823 14.254 0.494 3.355	-0.092 -0.988 0.011 0.352	rt of the S.E. 0.036 0.612 0.021 0.143	couple p-value 0.004 0.098 0.596 0.011	N 2,077 2,176 2,187 2,187				
5.313 42.521 0.425 7.655 2.263	0.823 14.254 0.494 3.355 1.180	-0.092 -0.988 0.011 0.352 0.014	0.036 0.612 0.021 0.143 0.051	0.004 0.098 0.596 0.011 0.779	N 2,077 2,176 2,187 2,187 2,187				
5.313 42.521 0.425 7.655 2.263 0.108	to wom S.D. 0.823 14.254 0.494 3.355 1.180 0.311	-0.092 -0.988 0.011 0.352 0.014 -0.008	0.036 0.612 0.021 0.143 0.051 0.013	0.004 0.098 0.596 0.011 0.779 0.543	N 2,077 2,176 2,187 2,187 2,187 2,187				
5.313 42.521 0.425 7.655 2.263 0.108 0.209	to wom S.D. 0.823 14.254 0.494 3.355 1.180 0.311 0.406	-0.092 -0.988 0.011 0.352 0.014 -0.008 -0.063	rt of the S.E. 0.036 0.612 0.021 0.143 0.051 0.013 0.017	0.004 0.098 0.596 0.011 0.779 0.543 0.000	N 2,077 2,176 2,187 2,187 2,187 2,187 2,187				
5.313 42.521 0.425 7.655 2.263 0.108	to wom S.D. 0.823 14.254 0.494 3.355 1.180 0.311	-0.092 -0.988 0.011 0.352 0.014 -0.008	0.036 0.612 0.021 0.143 0.051 0.013	0.004 0.098 0.596 0.011 0.779 0.543	N 2,077 2,176 2,187 2,187 2,187 2,187				
	5.339 38.702 0.338 7.521 2.218 0.112 0.221 0.387 5.516	to the S.D. 5.339 0.801 38.702 13.511 0.338 0.473 7.521 3.233 2.218 1.126 0.112 0.316 0.221 0.415 0.387 0.487 5.516 5.598	to the female Avg S.D. ATE 5.339 0.801 -0.029 38.702 13.511 -8.630 0.338 0.473 -0.162 7.521 3.233 0.071 2.218 1.126 -0.079 0.112 0.316 0.001 0.221 0.415 -0.036 0.387 0.487 -0.081 5.516 5.598 -0.113	to the female co-heads Avg S.D. ATE S.E. 5.339 0.801 -0.029 0.035 38.702 13.511 -8.630 0.541 0.338 0.473 -0.162 0.020 7.521 3.233 0.071 0.136 2.218 1.126 -0.079 0.047 0.112 0.316 0.001 0.013 0.221 0.415 -0.036 0.017 0.387 0.487 -0.081 0.020 5.516 5.598 -0.113 0.235	to the female co-heads alone Avg S.D. ATE S.E. p-value 5.339 0.801 -0.029 0.035 0.370 38.702 13.511 -8.630 0.541 0.000 0.338 0.473 -0.162 0.020 0.000 7.521 3.233 0.071 0.136 0.599 2.218 1.126 -0.079 0.047 0.073 0.112 0.316 0.001 0.013 0.967 0.221 0.415 -0.036 0.017 0.023 0.387 0.487 -0.081 0.020 0.000 5.516 5.598 -0.113 0.235 0.577				

Note: First column reports sample means; standard deviations are in the second column; column 3 reports differences between treatment and control as defined in Figure 2 (Model 1A for top panel and Model 1B for bottom panel); associated standard errors are in column 4; column 5 reports p-values based on randomization inference. A joint test for balance is rejected for the first model (F-statistic 49.319, p-value < 0.001) and also for the second model (F-statistic 4.168, p-value < 0.001).

Table A2—Balance tests for Models 2A and 2B

	Model 2A: Involving women in conveying information									
		to th	$he\ female$	co-head	$s\ alone$					
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N				
Yield (log)	5.303	0.824	-0.067	0.053	0.165	1,075				
Age of male co-head	34.370	11.043	0.851	0.696	0.220	1,118				
Male co-head finished primary school	0.257	0.437	0.002	0.027	0.928	1,135				
Household size	7.554	3.212	0.108	0.201	0.582	1,135				
Nbr of bedrooms	2.177	1.064	0.095	0.066	0.139	1,135				
Access to extension	0.113	0.316	-0.011	0.020	0.569	1,135				
Used fertilizer	0.203	0.402	-0.049	0.025	0.047	1,135				
Used improved seed	0.346	0.476	-0.037	0.030	0.186	1,135				
Distance to input provider	5.459	5.273	0.075	0.330	0.777	1,135				
Household owns mobile	0.652	0.477	0.007	0.030	0.803	1,135				
	Model 2	2B: Involu	ving wom	en in cor	nveying inf	formation				
		to t	the male	co-heads	alone					
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N				
Yield (log)	5.372	0.778	-0.022	0.050	0.629	1,075				
Age of male co-head	43.002	14.349	0.151	0.904	0.863	1,124				
Male co-head finished primary school	0.420	0.494	0.015	0.031	0.616	1,134				
Household size	7.487	3.257	-0.243	0.204	0.249	1,134				
Nbr of bedrooms	2.258	1.183	-0.100	0.074	0.154	1,134				
Access to extension	0.112	0.315	0.035	0.020	0.079	1,134				
Used fertilizer	0.239	0.427	-0.002	0.027	0.935	1,134				
Used improved seed	0.427	0.495	0.062	0.031	0.043	1,134				
Distance to input provider	5.573	5.898	-0.723	0.369	0.022	1,134				
Household owns mobile	0.832	0.374	-0.018	0.023	0.424	1,134				

Note: First column reports sample means; standard deviations are in the second column; column 3 reports differences between treatment and control as defined in Figure 2 (Model 2A for top panel and Model 2B for bottom panel); associated standard errors are in column 4; column 5 reports p-values based on randomization inference. A joint test for balance can not be rejected for the first model (F-statistic 0.974, p-value = 0.465) and also not for the second model (F-statistic 1.579, p-value = 0.108).

Table A3—Women's knowledge of recommended practices (models 1A and 1B)

	Model	1A: Zoo	oming in o	n provid	ing inform	nation
		to t	he female	co-heads	alone	
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Proper spacing and seeds per hill	0.127	0.334	0.058**	0.019	0.000	1,875
Combining practices and starting small	0.817	0.387	0.060**	0.018	0.001	1,875
Optimal weeding	0.880	0.325	0.026	0.016	0.078	1,875
Fall armyworm control	0.207	0.406	-0.014	0.020	0.416	1,875
Women's knowledge index	0.003	0.612	0.128**	0.028	0.000	1,875
	Model	1B: Zoo	$pming\ in\ o$	n provid	ing inform	nation
		to wo	men as pa	rt of the	couple	
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Proper spacing and seeds per hill	0.127	0.334	0.071**	0.018	0.000	1,770
Combining practices and starting small	0.817	0.387	0.051**	0.018	0.003	1,770
Optimal weeding	0.880	0.325	-0.005	0.016	0.761	1,770
Fall armyworm control	0.207	0.406	-0.008	0.019	0.652	1,770
Women's knowledge index	-0.028	0.622	0.102**	0.029	0.000	1,770

Note: First column reports sample means; standard deviations are in the second column; column 3 reports differences between treatment and control as defined in Figure 2 (Model 1A for top panel and Model 1B for bottom panel); associated standard errors are in column 4; column 5 reports p-values based on randomization inference; the last column is sample size; **, * and + indicate that the difference is significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level after controlling FWER using an omnibus test. Note that no information on the recommended way to fight fall armyworm was given in the video, so no effects were expected.

Table A4—Women's knowledge of recommended practices (models 2A and 2B)

	Model	2A: Inv	olving wo	men in	conveying a	information
		to	the femo	ale co-he	eads $alone$	
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Proper spacing and seeds per hill	0.196	0.398	0.000	0.027	0.991	981
Combining practices and starting small	0.868	0.339	0.003	0.023	0.907	981
Optimal weeding	0.896	0.306	0.005	0.020	0.805	981
Fall armyworm control	0.175	0.380	0.005	0.026	0.850	981
Women's knowledge index	0.007	0.578	0.008	0.040	0.835	981
	Model	2B: Inv	olving wo	men in	conveying i	information
		t	o the ma	le co-hec	$ads \ alone$	
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Proper spacing and seeds per hill	0.131	0.338	-0.006	0.024	0.800	887
Combining practices and starting small	0.815	0.389	-0.004	0.028	0.884	887
Optimal weeding	0.875	0.331	0.008	0.023	0.731	887
Fall armyworm control	0.212	0.410	-0.010	0.029	0.706	887
Women's knowledge index	0.000	0.548	0.005	0.043	0.987	887

Note: First column reports sample means; standard deviations are in the second column; column 3 reports differences between treatment and control as defined in Figure 2 (Model 2A for top panel and Model 2B for bottom panel); associated standard errors are in column 4; column 5 reports p-values based on randomization inference; the last column is sample size; **, * and + indicate that the difference is significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level after controlling FWER using an omnibus test. Note that no information on the recommended way to fight fall armyworm was given in the video, so no effects were expected.

Table A5—Joint knowledge of recommended practices (models 1A and 1B) $\,$

	Model	1A: Zoo	ming in o	on provid	ding inform	nation			
	$to\ the\ female\ co\mbox{-}heads\ alone$								
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N			
Proper spacing and seeds per hill	0.073	0.260	-0.026	0.013	0.032	1,626			
Combining practices and starting small	0.737	0.440	-0.011	0.024	0.638	1,626			
Optimal weeding	0.805	0.396	0.033	0.021	0.089	1,626			
Fall armyworm control	0.075	0.264	0.017	0.015	0.191	1,626			
Joint knowledge index	-0.022	0.642	-0.021	0.030	0.596	1,620			
	Model	1B: Zoo	ming in a	on provid	ding inform	nation			
		to wor	nen as pe	art of the	$e\ couple$				
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N			
Proper spacing and seeds per hill	0.073	0.260	0.026	0.014	0.067	1,540			
Combining practices and starting small	0.737	0.440	0.043	0.022	0.052	1,54			
Optimal weeding	0.805	0.396	-0.028	0.021	0.162	1,54			
	0.075	0.264	0.019	0.014	0.156	1.54			
Fall armyworm control	0.075	0.204	0.013	0.011	0.100	1,01			

Note: First column reports sample means; standard deviations are in the second column; column 3 reports differences between treatment and control as defined in Figure 2 (Model 1A for top panel and Model 1B for bottom panel); associated standard errors are in column 4; column 5 reports p-values based on randomization inference; the last column is sample size; **, * and + indicate that the difference is significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level after controlling FWER using an omnibus test. Note that no information on the recommended way to fight fall armyworm was given in the video, so no effects were expected.

Table A6—Joint knowledge of recommended practices (models 2A and 2B)

	Model 2A: Involving women in conveying information								
		to	$the\ fema$	le co-hea	$ids \ alone$				
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N			
Proper spacing and seeds per hill	0.053	0.224	-0.005	0.016	0.765	810			
Combining practices and starting small	0.732	0.444	-0.013	0.034	0.704	810			
Optimal weeding	0.853	0.355	-0.035	0.028	0.236	810			
Fall armyworm control	0.075	0.265	0.011	0.021	0.548	810			
Joint knowledge index	0.010	0.611	-0.049	0.045	0.273	810			
	Model	2B: Invo	lving wor	nen in c	onveying in	formation			
		to	the male	e co-head	ds $alone$				
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N			
Proper spacing and seeds per hill	0.076	0.266	-0.006	0.019	0.778	811			
Combining practices and starting small	0.746	0.436	-0.022	0.033	0.564	811			
Optimal weeding	0.812	0.392	-0.008	0.029	0.772	811			
Fall armyworm control	0.083	0.277	-0.015	0.020	0.435	811			
Joint knowledge index	-0.003	0.584	-0.027	0.045	0.552	811			

Note: First column reports sample means; standard deviations are in the second column; column 3 reports differences between treatment and control as defined in Figure 2 (Model 2A for top panel and Model 2B for bottom panel); associated standard errors are in column 4; column 5 reports p-values based on randomization inference; the last column is sample size; **, * and + indicate that the difference is significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level after controlling FWER using an omnibus test. Note that no information on the recommended way to fight fall armyworm was given in the video, so no effects were expected.

Table A7—Men's knowledge of recommended practices

	Model	1: Invo	lving wome	n in rece	eiving infor	rmation
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Proper spacing and seeds per hill	0.266	0.442	-0.083**	0.017	0.000	2650
Combining practices and starting small	0.893	0.310	-0.043**	0.014	0.003	2650
Optimal weeding	0.884	0.320	-0.011	0.014	0.411	2650
Fall armyworm control	0.237	0.426	0.002	0.018	0.893	2650
Men's knowledge index	0.004	0.614	-0.129**	0.024	0.000	2650
	Model	2: Invol	ving women	n in con	veying info	rmation
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Proper spacing and seeds per hill	0.187	0.390	0.022	0.016	0.157	2647
Combining practices and starting small	0.849	0.358	0.021	0.014	0.141	2647
Optimal weeding	0.888	0.316	-0.013	0.013	0.343	2647
Fall armyworm control	0.229	0.421	0.005	0.017	0.753	2647
Men's knowledge index	0.024	0.593	0.024	0.025	0.329	2647
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Note: First column reports sample means; standard deviations are in the second column; column 3 reports differences between treatment and control as defined in Figure 2 (Model 1 for top panel and Model 2 for bottom panel); associated standard errors are in column 4; column 5 reports p-values based on randomization inference; the last column is sample size; **, * and + indicate that the difference is signficantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level after controlling FWER using an omnibus test. Note that no information on the recommended way to fight fall armyworm was given in the video, so no effects were expected.

Table A8—Men's knowledge of recommended practices (models 1A and 1B)

	Model 1A: Zooming in on providing information								
		to t	the female of	co-heads	alone				
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N			
Proper spacing and seeds per hill	0.266	0.442	-0.151**	0.020	0.000	1833			
Combining practices and starting small	0.893	0.310	-0.091**	0.019	0.000	1833			
Optimal weeding	0.884	0.320	0.010	0.016	0.491	1833			
Fall armyworm control	0.237	0.426	-0.004	0.022	0.849	1833			
Men's knowledge index	0.049	0.619	-0.185**	0.028	0.000	1833			
	Model	l 1B: Zo	oming in or	n provida	ing inform	ation			
		to wo	omen as par	t of the	couple				
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N			
Proper spacing and seeds per hill	0.266	0.442	-0.044^{+}	0.021	0.029	1778			
Combining practices and starting small	0.893	0.310	-0.007	0.015	0.690	1778			
Optimal weeding	0.884	0.320	-0.030	0.016	0.067	1778			
Fall armyworm control	0.237	0.426	-0.004	0.020	0.832	1778			
Men's knowledge index	-0.010	0.606	-0.071*	0.029	0.042	1778			
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Note: First column reports sample means; standard deviations are in the second column; column 3 reports differences between treatment and control as defined in Figure 2 (Model 1A for top panel and Model 1B for bottom panel); associated standard errors are in column 4; column 5 reports p-values based on randomization inference; the last column is sample size; **, * and + indicate that the difference is significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level after controlling FWER using an omnibus test. Note that no information on the recommended way to fight fall armyworm was given in the video, so no effects were expected.

Table A9—Men's knowledge of recommended practices (models 2A and 2B)

	Model 2	2A: Invo	lving wor	nen in c	onveying in	formation	
	$to\ the\ female\ co\text{-}heads\ alone$						
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N	
Proper spacing and seeds per hill	0.115	0.320	0.005	0.023	0.831	867	
Combining practices and starting small	0.801	0.400	0.013	0.028	0.638	867	
Optimal weeding	0.913	0.283	-0.025	0.022	0.286	867	
Fall armyworm control	0.206	0.405	0.042	0.031	0.168	867	
Men's knowledge index	-0.007	0.603	-0.011	0.044	0.782	867	
	Model 2	2B: Invo	lving wor	nen in c	onveying in	formation	
		to	the male	e co - $head$	ds $alone$		
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N	
Proper spacing and seeds per hill	0.237	0.426	0.049	0.030	0.124	961	
Combining practices and starting small	0.891	0.313	0.002	0.021	0.942	961	
Optimal weeding	0.891	0.313	-0.007	0.022	0.744	961	
Optimal weeding							
Fall armyworm control	0.243	0.430	-0.007	0.029	0.789	961	

Note: First column reports sample means; standard deviations are in the second column; column 3 reports differences between treatment and control as defined in Figure 2 (Model 2A for top panel and Model 2B for bottom panel); associated standard errors are in column 4; column 5 reports p-values based on randomization inference; the last column is sample size; **, * and + indicate that the difference is significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level after controlling FWER using an omnibus test. Note that no information on the recommended way to fight fall armyworm was given in the video, so no effects were expected.

Table A10—Women's decision making (models 1A and 1B)

	Model	1A: Zoo	oming in o	n provid	ling inform	ation
		to t	he female	co-heads	alone	
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Planting maize on the plot	0.158	0.338	0.094**	0.019	0.000	1,809
Timing of planting maize	0.163	0.340	0.099**	0.020	0.000	1,809
Spacing and number of seeds	0.150	0.333	0.094**	0.019	0.000	1,809
Striga control measures	0.113	0.295	0.086^{**}	0.018	0.000	1,764
Timing of the first weeding	0.178	0.357	0.090**	0.020	0.000	1,809
Women's decision-making index	-0.015	0.825	0.220**	0.039	0.000	1,764
	Modei	! 1B: Zoo	omina in o	n provid	ling inform	ation
			men as pa	-		
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Planting maize on the plot	0.158	0.338	0.004	0.016	0.783	1,710
Timing of planting maize	0.163	0.340	0.013	0.017	0.450	1,710
Spacing and number of seeds	0.150	0.333	0.008	0.016	0.594	1,710
Striga control measures	0.113	0.295	0.025	0.015	0.076	1,665
Timing of the first weeding	0.178	0.357	0.011	0.018	0.507	1,710
Women's decision-making index	-0.015	0.784	0.037	0.039	0.345	1,665

Table A11—Women's decision making (models 2A and 2B)

	Model 2A: Involving women in conveying information								
		to	the female	e co-head	ds $alone$				
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N			
Planting maize on the plot	0.287	0.418	0.017	0.031	0.562	854			
Timing of planting maize	0.258	0.409	0.068^{+}	0.032	0.031	854			
Spacing and number of seeds	0.264	0.415	0.090*	0.032	0.008	854			
Striga control measures	0.175	0.364	0.068^{+}	0.029	0.018	835			
Timing of the first weeding	0.236	0.398	0.080*	0.031	0.011	854			
Women's decision-making index	0.066	0.856	0.155^{*}	0.060	0.006	835			
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	Model		0		nveying in	formation			
		to	the male	co-head:	$s\ alone$				
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N			
Planting maize on the plot	0.174	0.351	-0.023	0.025	0.337	858			
Timing of planting maize	0.174	0.345	-0.012	0.025	0.603	858			
Spacing and number of seeds	0.153	0.328	0.000	0.024	0.997	858			
Striga control measures	0.109	0.291	0.008	0.022	0.711	833			
Timing of the first weeding	0.192	0.365	-0.014	0.026	0.579	858			

0.765

-0.038

0.059

0.659

833

-0.029

Women's decision-making index

Table A12—Joint decision making (models 1A and 1B)

	Model	1A: Zoo	oming in a	on provid	ding inform	\overline{nation}
		to t	$he\ female$	co-head	s $alone$	
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Planting maize on the plot	0.520	0.472	-0.012	0.025	0.576	1,809
Timing of planting maize	0.477	0.470	-0.005	0.024	0.814	1,809
Spacing and number of seeds	0.475	0.473	0.006	0.025	0.790	1,809
Striga control measures	0.420	0.464	-0.010	0.025	0.652	1,764
Timing of the first weeding	0.535	0.469	-0.019	0.025	0.398	1,809
Joint decision-making index	0.018	0.790	-0.055	0.038	0.671	1,764
	Model	1B: Zoo	oming in a	on provid	ding inform	nation
		to wo	men as pe	art of the	e $couple$	
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Planting maize on the plot	0.520	0.472	0.038	0.023	0.106	1,710
Timing of planting maize	0.477	0.470	0.022	0.023	0.322	1,710
Spacing and number of seeds	0.475	0.473	0.053^{+}	0.023	0.019	1,710
Striga control measures	0.420	0.464	0.050	0.023	0.029	1,665
Timing of the first weeding	0.535	0.469	0.009	0.023	0.680	1,710
Joint decision-making index	0.010	0.781	0.074*	0.039	0.034	1,665
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Table A13—Joint decision making (models 2A and 2B)

	Model	$2A: \overline{Invo}$	lving wor	nen in c	onveying in	formation
		to	$the\ fema$	le co-hea	$ads\ alone$	
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Planting maize on the plot	0.502	0.474	-0.018	0.032	0.565	967
Timing of planting maize	0.461	0.464	-0.009	0.032	0.783	967
Spacing and number of seeds	0.438	0.468	0.026	0.032	0.412	967
Striga control measures	0.399	0.465	0.011	0.032	0.732	946
Timing of the first weeding	0.490	0.477	-0.013	0.033	0.669	967
Joint decision-making index	-0.045	0.805	-0.001	0.056	0.982	946
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	Model	2B: Invo	lving wor	nen in c	onveying in	formation
			the male			,
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Planting maize on the plot	0.512	0.471	0.006	0.034	0.857	858
Timing of planting maize	0.475	0.465	-0.003	0.034	0.941	858
Spacing and number of seeds	0.480	0.469	-0.016	0.034	0.638	858
Striga control measures	0.423	0.460	-0.017	0.034	0.612	833
Timing of the first weeding	0.540	0.462	-0.017	0.034	0.610	858
Joint decision-making index	0.035	0.781	0.000	0.058	0.753	833
		- /		. , , , ,		

Table A14—Men's decision making

	Model	1: Invo	lving wome	n in rece	eiving infor	rmation
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Planting maize on the plot	0.369	0.454	-0.077**	0.019	0.000	2,563
Timing of planting maize	0.395	0.461	-0.085**	0.019	0.000	2,563
Spacing and number of seeds	0.431	0.468	-0.107**	0.019	0.000	2,563
Striga control measures	0.323	0.442	-0.093**	0.018	0.000	2,497
Timing of the first weeding	0.394	0.460	-0.109**	0.019	0.000	2,563
Men's decision-making index	0.033	0.823	-0.184**	0.034	0.000	2,497
	Model	2: Invol	ving women	n in con	veying info	rmation
	Avg	S.D.	$\overline{\text{ATE}}$	S.E.	p-value	N
Planting maize on the plot	0.354	0.444	-0.039^+	0.018	0.030	2,612
Timing of planting maize	0.348	0.446	-0.004	0.019	0.848	2,612
Spacing and number of seeds	0.363	0.453	0.007	0.019	0.711	2,612
Striga control measures	0.273	0.418	-0.008	0.018	0.663	2,542
Timing of the first weeding	0.331	0.440	0.001	0.018	0.943	2,612
Men's decision-making index	0.047	0.829	-0.023	0.034	0.491	2,542
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Table A15—Men's decision making (models 1A and 1B)

	Model 1A: Zooming in on providing information							
		to t	he female o	co-heads	alone			
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N		
Planting maize on the plot	0.369	0.454	-0.092**	0.024	0.000	1,772		
Timing of planting maize	0.395	0.461	-0.114**	0.024	0.000	1,772		
Spacing and number of seeds	0.431	0.468	-0.136**	0.024	0.000	1,772		
Striga control measures	0.323	0.442	-0.121**	0.023	0.000	1,728		
Timing of the first weeding	0.394	0.460	-0.121**	0.024	0.000	1,772		
Men's decision-making index	-0.007	0.811	-0.210**	0.039	0.000	1,728		
	Model	! 1B: Zo	oming in or	n provida	ing inform	ation		
		to wa	omen as par	rt of the	couple			
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N		
Planting maize on the plot	0.369	0.454	-0.062*	0.022	0.005	1,721		
Timing of planting maize	0.395	0.461	-0.060*	0.022	0.006	1,721		
Spacing and number of seeds	0.431	0.468	-0.084**	0.022	0.000	1,721		
Striga control measures	0.323	0.442	-0.066**	0.021	0.001	1,673		
Timing of the first weeding	0.394	0.460	-0.087**	0.022	0.000	1,721		
Men's decision-making index	-0.026	0.816	-0.152**	0.040	0.001	1,673		

Table A16—Men's decision making (models 2A and 2B)

	Model 2A: Involving women in conveying information										
		to	the femo	ale co-he	$ads\ alone$						
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N					
Planting maize on the plot	0.228	0.398	0.012	0.027	0.652	967					
Timing of planting maize	0.232	0.395	0.024	0.028	0.399	967					
Spacing and number of seeds	0.237	0.404	-0.006	0.027	0.836	967					
Striga control measures	0.197	0.383	0.000	0.026	0.990	946					
Timing of the first weeding	0.274	0.431	-0.006	0.029	0.838	967					
Men's decision-making index	0.036	0.847	-0.001	0.057	0.985	946					
	Model 2B: Involving women in conveying information to the male co-heads alone										
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N					
Planting maize on the plot	0.421	0.462	-0.075	0.031	0.044	930					
Timing of planting maize	0.420	0.463	-0.035	0.032	0.288	930					
Spacing and number of seeds	0.445	0.466	-0.014	0.032	0.661	930					
Striga control measures	0.353	0.447	-0.040	0.031	0.187	904					
Timing of the first weeding	0.404	0.457	-0.014	0.032	0.656	930					
Men's decision-making index	0.069	0.825	-0.098	0.058	0.123	904					

Table A17—Women's adoption of recommended practices (models 1A and 1B)

	Model	1A: Zoo	oming in o	n provid	ling inform	ation
		to t	he female	co-heads	alone	
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Timing of planting maize	0.043	0.179	0.028**	0.011	0.003	1,686
Spacing and number of seeds	0.001	0.034	0.008*	0.003	0.005	1,808
Striga control measures	0.080	0.253	0.076^{**}	0.016	0.000	1,763
Timing of the first weeding	0.157	0.338	0.086**	0.020	0.000	1,808
Women Joint adoption index	-0.002	0.589	0.147^{**}	0.030	0.000	1,646
	Model	1B: Zoo	oming in o	n provid	ling inform	ation
		to wo	men as pa	rt of the	couple	
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Timing of planting maize	0.043	0.179	0.019	0.010	0.057	1,599
Spacing and number of seeds	0.001	0.034	0.007	0.003	0.035	1,709
Striga control measures	0.080	0.253	0.031^{+}	0.013	0.020	1,664
Timing of the first weeding	0.157	0.338	0.011	0.017	0.503	1,709
Women Joint adoption index	-0.011	0.601	0.092**	0.031	0.003	1,558
-						

Note: First column reports sample means; standard deviations are in the second column; column 3 reports differences between treatment and control as defined in Figure 2 (Model 1A for top panel and Model 1B for bottom panel); associated standard errors are in column 4; column 5 reports p-values based on randomization inference; the last column is sample size; **, * and + indicate that the difference is significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level after controlling FWER using an omnibus test.

Table A18—Women's adoption of recommended practices (models 2A and 2B)

	Model 2	2A: Invo	lving wor	nen in c	onveying in	formation			
			the fema			v			
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N			
Timing of planting maize	0.042	0.178	0.026	0.015	0.080	909			
Spacing and number of seeds	0.005	0.062	0.005	0.005	0.382	967			
Striga control measures	0.154	0.347	0.003	0.024	0.904	946			
Timing of the first weeding	0.248	0.419	-0.006	0.028	0.834	967			
Women adoption index	0.021	0.682	0.050	0.043	0.231	889			
	Model 2B: Involving women in conveying information to the male co-heads alone								
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N			
Timing of planting maize	0.053	0.196	-0.013	0.014	0.322	792			
Spacing and number of seeds	0.004	0.059	-0.003	0.002	0.327	857			
Striga control measures	0.077	0.244	0.008	0.019	0.652	832			
Timing of the first weeding	0.178	0.353	-0.025	0.024	0.311	857			
Women adoption index	-0.016	0.799	-0.074	0.050	0.242	771			

Table A19—Joint adoption of recommended practices (models 1A and 1B)

	Mode	l 1A: Zo	oming in a	on provid	ding inform	nation
		to t	the female	co-heads	s $alone$	
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Timing of planting maize	0.110	0.294	0.009	0.016	0.538	1,686
Spacing and number of seeds	0.014	0.112	0.011	0.007	0.081	1,808
Striga control measures	0.321	0.437	-0.005	0.023	0.828	1,763
Timing of the first weeding	0.478	0.470	-0.012	0.025	0.598	1,808
Joint adoption index	0.000	0.600	0.015	0.030	0.285	1,646
	Mode	l 1B: Zo	oming in a	on provid	ding inform	nation
		to we	omen as po	art of the	e $couple$	
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Timing of planting maize	0.110	0.294	0.007	0.015	0.651	1,599
Spacing and number of seeds	0.014	0.112	0.018^{*}	0.007	0.007	1,709
Striga control measures	0.321	0.437	0.051^{+}	0.022	0.018	1,664
Timing of the first weeding	0.478	0.470	0.029	0.023	0.206	1,709
Joint adoption index	0.004	0.619	0.076**	0.030	0.005	1,558

Table A20—Joint adoption of recommended practices (models 2A and 2B)

	Model	2A: Invo	lving wor	nen in c	onveying in	formation
		to	the fema	le co-hea	$ads \ alone$	
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Timing of planting maize	0.112	0.286	0.002	0.021	0.935	909
Spacing and number of seeds	0.027	0.149	-0.001	0.011	0.946	967
Striga control measures	0.317	0.441	-0.013	0.030	0.636	946
Timing of the first weeding	0.462	0.471	-0.037	0.032	0.228	967
Joint adoption index	-0.044	0.533	0.010	0.042	0.796	889
	Model i	2B: Invo	lving wor	nen in c	onveying in	formation
		tc	the male	e co-head	$ds \ alone$	
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Timing of planting maize	0.119	0.298	-0.010	0.022	0.640	792
Spacing and number of seeds	0.009	0.089	0.006	0.008	0.456	857
Striga control measures	0.317	0.428	-0.004	0.032	0.888	832
Timing of the first weeding	0.491	0.466	-0.030	0.034	0.384	857
Joint adoption index	0.058	0.631	0.008	0.046	0.999	771

Table A21—Men's adoption of recommended practices

	Model	1: Invo	lving wom	en in rec	eiving info	rmation
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Timing of planting maize	0.057	0.208	-0.009	0.009	0.308	2,493
Spacing and number of seeds	0.008	0.082	0.003	0.004	0.447	2,660
Striga control measures	0.143	0.325	-0.027^{+}	0.014	0.029	2,595
Timing of the first weeding	0.202	0.375	-0.019	0.016	0.226	2,660
Men adoption index	0.025	0.610	-0.002	0.026	0.386	2,433
	Model	2: Invol	ving wome	n in con	veying info	ormation
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
timing of planting maize	0.057	0.213	-0.002	0.009	0.793	2,542
spacing and number of seeds	0.012	0.105	-0.001	0.004	0.754	2,713
striga control measures	0.126	0.306	0.004	0.013	0.752	2,644
timing of the first weeding	0.189	0.363	0.014	0.015	0.355	2,713
Men adoption index	0.037	0.657	0.009	0.026	0.731	2,478
_						

Note: First column reports sample means; standard deviations are in the second column; column 3 reports differences between treatment and control as defined in Figure 2 (Model 1 for top panel and Model 2 for bottom panel); associated standard errors are in column 4; column 5 reports p-values based on randomization inference; the last column is sample size; **, * and + indicate that the difference is signficantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level after controlling FWER using an omnibus test.

Table A22—Men's adoption of recommended practices (models 1A and 1B)

	Model 1A: Zooming in on providing information								
		to t	the female	co-heads	alone				
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N			
timing of planting maize	0.057	0.208	-0.004	0.012	0.672	1,686			
spacing and number of seeds	0.008	0.082	0.003	0.005	0.487	1,808			
striga control measures	0.143	0.325	-0.039*	0.016	0.006	1,763			
timing of the first weeding	0.202	0.375	-0.056**	0.019	0.001	1,808			
men's adoption index	0.005	0.610	-0.014	0.030	0.179	1,646			
	Mode	l 1R+ Zo	oming in o	n nrovid	ina inform	ation			
	Mouc		omen as pa		0 0	auton			
	A		ATE	v	* -	N			
	Avg	S.D.	AIL	S.E.	p-value	IN			
timing of planting maiga	0.057	0.208	-0.012	0.010	0.242	1 500			
timing of planting maize					-	1,599			
spacing and number of seeds	0.008	0.082	0.004	0.005	0.361	1,709			
striga control measures	0.143	0.325	-0.013	0.016	0.398	1,664			
timing of the first weeding	0.202	0.375	0.009	0.019	0.623	1,709			
men's adoption index	-0.022	0.576	0.011	0.030	0.965	1,558			
						,			

Note: First column reports sample means; standard deviations are in the second column; column 3 reports differences between treatment and control as defined in Figure 2 (Model 1A for top panel and Model 1B for bottom panel); associated standard errors are in column 4; column 5 reports p-values based on randomization inference; the last column is sample size; **, * and + indicate that the difference is significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level after controlling FWER using an omnibus test.

Table A23—Men's adoption of recommended practices (models 2A and 2B)

	Model 2A: Involving women in conveying information									
		to	the fema	le co-hea	$ads\ alone$					
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N				
timing of planting maize	0.050	0.201	0.014	0.016	0.365	909				
spacing and number of seeds	0.011	0.100	0.002	0.007	0.774	967				
striga control measures	0.095	0.265	0.019	0.020	0.313	946				
timing of the first weeding	0.162	0.348	0.025	0.024	0.285	967				
men's adoption index	-0.008	0.599	0.047	0.044	0.259	889				
	Model 2B: Involving women in conveying information									
			the male							
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N				
timing of planting maize	0.076	0.239	-0.029	0.016	0.065	792				
spacing and number of seeds	0.011	0.102	-0.003	0.006	0.570	857				
striga control measures	0.140	0.318	0.009	0.024	0.678	832				
suriga comuror micasures										
timing of the first weeding	0.185	0.358	0.027	0.027	0.319	857				

Table A24—Women's input use (models 1A and 1B)

	Model 1A: Zooming in on providing information								
		to to	he female	co-heads	alone				
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N			
DAP	0.016	0.121	0.027**	0.007	0.000	1,809			
Urea	0.002	0.038	0.014**	0.004	0.000	1,809			
Organic fertilizer	0.017	0.126	0.021^{*}	0.008	0.004	1,809			
Hybrid seeds	0.013	0.111	0.024**	0.007	0.000	1,809			
OPV	0.018	0.126	0.017^{+}	0.008	0.020	1,809			
Women input use index	-0.027	0.461	0.129**	0.025	0.000	1,809			
	Model	1B: Zoo	ming in o	n provid	ing inform	ation			
		to wo	men as pa	rt of the	couple				
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N			
DAP	0.016	0.121	0.007	0.006	0.255	1,710			
Urea	0.002	0.038	0.006	0.003	0.028	1,710			
Organic fertilizer	0.017	0.126	0.006	0.006	0.332	1,710			
Hybrid seeds	0.013	0.111	-0.001	0.005	0.874	1,710			

0.126

0.484

0.002

 0.033^{+}

0.006

0.024

0.764

0.063

1,710

1,710

OPV

Women input use index

0.018

-0.012

Table A25—Women's input use (models 2A and 2B)

	Model 2A: Involving women in conveying information							
		to	the female	le co-hea	$ads\ alone$			
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N		
DAP	0.029	0.156	0.005	0.011	0.650	967		
Urea	0.017	0.127	-0.004	0.007	0.586	967		
Organic fertilizer	0.021	0.128	0.021	0.012	0.077	967		
Hybrid seeds	0.029	0.152	0.004	0.011	0.727	967		
OPV	0.031	0.169	0.007	0.012	0.545	967		
Women input use index	-0.037	0.470	0.041	0.037	0.272	967		
	Model	2B: Invo	lving wor	nen in c	onveying in	formation		
		to	the male	e co-head	$ds \ alone$			
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N		
DAP	0.015	0.120	0.002	0.009	0.780	858		
Urea	0.000	0.000	0.003	0.003	0.129	858		
Organic fertilizer	0.014	0.110	0.005	0.009	0.613	858		

0.097

0.120

0.385

0.003

0.006

0.038

0.008

0.009

0.035

0.747

0.553

0.238

858

858

858

Hybrid seeds

Women input use index

OPV

0.011

0.015

-0.028

Table A26—Joint input use (models 1A and 1B)

Model 1A: Zooming in on providing information										
		to t	the female	co-heads	s $alone$					
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N				
DAP	0.050	0.207	0.020	0.011	0.042	1,809				
Urea	0.014	0.116	0.001	0.006	0.886	1,809				
Organic fertilizer	0.051	0.209	0.008	0.011	0.385	1,809				
Hybrid seeds	0.027	0.150	0.013	0.009	0.110	1,809				
OPV	0.021	0.084	0.008	0.005	0.052	1,836				
Joint input use index	0.001	0.489	0.039**	0.023	0.010	1,809				
	Mode	l 1B: Zo	oming in ϵ	on provid	ling inforn	nation				
		to wa	omen as po	$irt\ of\ the$	e $couple$					
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N				
DAP	0.050	0.207	0.022	0.011	0.035	1,710				

Urea 0.014 0.116 0.0040.0060.5061,710 Organic fertilizer 0.0510.209 0.043**0.0120.0001,710 Hybrid seeds 0.027^{**} 0.0270.1500.0090.0021,710 OPV0.0840.0210.0020.0040.6291,735 Joint input use index 0.0010.5090.089**0.0240.000 1,710

Table A27—Joint input use (models 2A and 2B)

Model 2A: Involving women in conveying information							
	$to\ the\ female\ co\mbox{-}heads\ alone$						
Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N		
0.056	0.215	0.009	0.015	0.554	967		
0.006	0.079	0.019	0.009	0.056	967		
0.058	0.220	0.000	0.015	0.991	967		
0.034	0.173	0.001	0.012	0.959	967		
0.022	0.088	0.002	0.006	0.755	981		
0.007	0.489	0.043	0.033	0.199	967		
	Avg 0.056 0.006 0.058 0.034 0.022	to Avg S.D. 0.056 0.215 0.006 0.079 0.058 0.220 0.034 0.173 0.022 0.088	to the fema Avg S.D. ATE 0.056 0.215 0.009 0.006 0.079 0.019 0.058 0.220 0.000 0.034 0.173 0.001 0.022 0.088 0.002	to the female co-head Avg S.D. ATE S.E. 0.056 0.215 0.009 0.015 0.006 0.079 0.019 0.009 0.058 0.220 0.000 0.015 0.034 0.173 0.001 0.012 0.022 0.088 0.002 0.006	to the female co-heads alone Avg S.D. ATE S.E. p-value 0.056 0.215 0.009 0.015 0.554 0.006 0.079 0.019 0.009 0.056 0.058 0.220 0.000 0.015 0.991 0.034 0.173 0.001 0.012 0.959 0.022 0.088 0.002 0.006 0.755		

Model 2B: Involving women in conveying information to the male co-heads alone

	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
DAP	0.041	0.192	0.010	0.015	0.498	858
Urea	0.008	0.086	0.010	0.008	0.268	858
Organic fertilizer	0.040	0.186	0.019	0.015	0.188	858
Hybrid seeds	0.026	0.152	0.000	0.011	0.999	858
OPV	0.022	0.089	-0.001	0.006	0.850	871
Joint input use index	-0.003	0.505	0.044	0.035	0.200	858

Table A28—Men's use of inputs

	Model	1: Invol	ving womer	in rece	iving infor	mation			
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N			
DAP	0.067	0.239	-0.026**	0.009	0.002	2,661			
Urea	0.018	0.122	0.002	0.005	0.766	2,661			
Organic fertilizer	0.051	0.209	0.027^{*}	0.010	0.006	2,661			
Hybrid seeds	0.055	0.215	-0.006	0.009	0.495	2,661			
OPV	0.019	0.077	0.005	0.004	0.191	2,700			
Men input use index	-0.008	0.480	-0.012	0.021	0.381	2,661			
	Model 2: Involving women in conveying information								
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N			
DAP	0.055	0.217	-0.005	0.009	0.550	2,714			
Urea	0.015	0.114	0.005	0.005	0.309	2,714			
Organic fertilizer	0.065	0.235	0.003	0.010	0.717	2,714			
Hybrid seeds	0.048	0.204	0.002	0.008	0.854	2,714			
OPV	0.022	0.087	0.002	0.004	0.678	2,754			
Men input use index	0.010	0.516	-0.007	0.020	0.741	2,714			
-	2,713								
Men adoption index	0.037	0.657	0.009	0.026	0.731	2,478			

Table A29—Men's use of inputs (models 1A and 1B)

Model 1A: Zooming in on providing information									
		$to\ the\ female\ co\-heads\ alone$							
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N			
DAP	0.067	0.239	-0.032**	0.011	0.000	1,809			
Urea	0.018	0.122	-0.005	0.006	0.359	1,809			
Organic fertilizer	0.051	0.209	0.008	0.011	0.391	1,809			
Hybrid seeds	0.055	0.215	-0.011	0.011	0.271	1,809			
OPV	0.019	0.077	0.003	0.004	0.448	1,836			
Men input use index	0.018	0.514	-0.023^{+}	0.023	0.058	1,809			

Model 1B: Zooming in on providing information to women as part of the couple

	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
DAP	0.067	0.239	-0.021	0.011	0.036	1,710
Urea	0.018	0.122	0.007	0.007	0.269	1,710
Organic fertilizer	0.051	0.209	0.043**	0.012	0.000	1,710
Hybrid seeds	0.055	0.215	-0.003	0.010	0.804	1,710
OPV	0.019	0.077	0.006	0.004	0.166	1,735
Men input use index	-0.006	0.499	0.001	0.024	0.783	1,710

Table A30—Men's use of inputs (models 2A and 2B)

	Model 2A: Involving women in conveying information									
		$to\ the\ female\ co\-heads\ alone$								
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N				
DAP	0.054	0.218	-0.020	0.013	0.093	967				
Urea	0.017	0.127	-0.003	0.008	0.664	967				
Organic fertilizer	0.058	0.220	0.000	0.015	0.993	967				
Hybrid seeds	0.047	0.205	-0.006	0.013	0.650	967				
OPV	0.022	0.089	0.004	0.006	0.564	981				
Men input use index	-0.010	0.484	-0.045	0.034	0.168	967				

Model 2B: Involving women in conveying information to the male co-heads alone

	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
DAP	0.054	0.213	0.017	0.017	0.324	858
Urea	0.009	0.078	0.014	0.009	0.090	858
Organic fertilizer	0.040	0.186	0.019	0.015	0.183	858
Hybrid seeds	0.036	0.172	0.026	0.016	0.083	858
OPV	0.019	0.075	-0.001	0.006	0.819	871
Men input use index	-0.010	0.500	0.037	0.035	0.378	858

Table A31—Women's production outcomes (models 1A and 1B)

	Mod	lel 1A: Zoo	oming in on	providing	g informat	ion
		to ti	he female co	o-heads al	lone	
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Production	39.094	155.909	51.576**	10.641	0.000	1,836
Area	0.105	0.332	0.103**	0.022	0.000	1,836
Yield better than normal	0.024	0.142	0.043**	0.010	0.000	1,763
Yield	57.675	237.920	75.144**	16.607	0.000	1,836
Share of household maize production	0.122	0.315	0.106**	0.019	0.000	1,729
Share of area under maize cultivation	0.122	0.315	0.107^{**}	0.020	0.000	1,697
	Moc		oming in on			ion
		to wo	men as par	t of the ca	ouple	
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Production	39.094	155.909	18.834	8.911	0.033	1,735
Area	0.105	0.332	0.045	0.021	0.029	1,735
Yield better than normal	0.024	0.142	0.011	0.008	0.131	1,664
Yield	57.675	237.920	27.178	12.515	0.027	1,735
Share of household maize production	0.122	0.315	0.019	0.016	0.208	1,618
Share of area under maize cultivation	0.122	0.315	0.021	0.016	0.200	1,604

Table A32—Women's production outcomes (models 2A and 2B)

	Model 2A	4: Involvin	g women i	in conveyi	ing inform	ation
		to the	female co-	heads alo	ne	
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Production	74.487	183.926	11.897	16.217	0.458	981
Area	0.193	0.451	0.005	0.033	0.873	981
Yield better than normal	0.055	0.207	0.011	0.015	0.458	946
Yield	154.249	512.437	-49.172	25.418	0.053	981
Share of household maize production	0.235	0.413	-0.024	0.028	0.381	930
Share of area under maize cultivation	0.239	0.415	-0.027	0.028	0.329	918
	Model 21	3: Involvin	g women i	in conveyi	ing inform	ation
		to the	male co-l	heads alor	ie	
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Production	52.850	215.563	-19.752	11.276	0.070	871
Area	0.117	0.384	-0.017	0.024	0.477	871
Yield better than normal	0.029	0.156	-0.005	0.010	0.606	832
Yield	79.907	345.055	-32.709	17.220	0.061	871
Share of household maize production	0.131	0.320	-0.010	0.024	0.653	813
Share of area under maize cultivation	0.121	0.311	0.006	0.024	0.800	794

Table A33—Joint production outcomes (models 1A and 1B)

	Mode	el 1A: Zoor	$ning in \overline{on}$	providing	g $informat$	ion
		to the	e female ce	o-heads al	lone	
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Production	239.898	478.920	-35.666	21.564	0.057	1,836
Area	0.591	0.908	-0.036	0.044	0.343	1,836
Yield better than normal	0.132	0.326	-0.009	0.017	0.521	1,763
Yield	222.381	383.192	-16.996	19.671	0.338	1,836
Share of household maize production	0.501	0.486	-0.013	0.026	0.573	1,729
Share of area under maize cultivation	0.502	0.485	-0.012	0.026	0.633	1,697
	Mode	el 1B: Zoon	ning in on	providing	g $informat$	ion
		to won	nen as par	t of the co	ouple	
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Production	239.898	478.920	-1.069	21.157	0.960	1,735
Area	0.591	0.908	0.004	0.042	0.915	1,735
Yield better than normal	0.132	0.326	0.016	0.016	0.303	1,664
Yield	222.381	383.192	7.339	17.845	0.671	1,735
Share of household maize production	0.501	0.486	0.031	0.024	0.197	1,618
Share of area under maize cultivation	0.502	0.485	0.029	0.025	0.224	1,604

Table A34—Joint production outcomes (models 2A and 2B)

	Model 21	A: Involvin	g women i	in conveyi	ing inform	ation
		to the	female co-	heads alo	ne	
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Production	183.716	309.267	26.039	24.464	0.269	981
Area	0.555	0.878	-0.050	0.055	0.344	981
Yield better than normal	0.090	0.267	0.038	0.021	0.066	946
Yield	184.792	332.737	25.809	25.834	0.311	981
Share of household maize production	0.467	0.486	0.014	0.034	0.668	930
Share of area under maize cultivation	0.469	0.486	0.004	0.034	0.904	918
	$Model \ 21$	3: Involvin	g women i	in conveyi	ing inform	ation
		to the	male co-l	heads alor	ie	
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Production	250.434	526.708	-20.439	34.440	0.552	871
Area	0.621	0.915	-0.064	0.065	0.320	871
Yield better than normal	0.103	0.295	0.041	0.024	0.079	832
Yield	210.600	336.621	18.882	27.606	0.483	871
Share of household maize production	0.508	0.486	-0.019	0.036	0.610	813
Share of area under maize cultivation	0.518	0.484	-0.035	0.037	0.348	794

Table A35—Women's sales (models 1A and 1B)

	Model 1A: Zooming in on providing information						
		to t	the female	co-heads	s $alone$		
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N	
Sold any	0.088	0.284	0.041^{**}	0.016	0.005	1,836	
Amount sold (in 100 kg bags)	0.184	0.977	0.071	0.047	0.098	1,836	
	Model 1B: Zooming in on providing information to women as part of the couple						
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N	
		υ.υ.	71112	D.D.	p-varue		
Sold any	0.088	0.284	-0.005	0.013	0.691	1,735	
Amount sold (in 100 kg bags)	0.184	0.977	-0.025	0.044	0.574	1,735	

Table A36—Women's sales (models 2A and 2B)

	Model	2A: Inv	olving wo	men in	conveying in	n formation
		to	the femo	ale co-he	$ads \ alone$	
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Sold any	0.113	0.318	0.016	0.022	0.476	981
Amount sold (in 100 kg bags)	0.238	1.055	-0.023	0.057	0.684	981
	Model	2B: Inv	olvina wo	men in	conveying ir	a formation
						ijoi maailoi
			o the mai			ijorniacion
	Avg					N
Sold any		t	o the mai	le co-hea	ds alone	

TABLE A37—JOINT SALES (MODELS 1A AND 1B)

	Model	1A: Zoo	ming in	on provi	ding inform	mation
		to ti	$he\ female$	co-head	$s\ alone$	
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Sold any	0.319	0.466	-0.029	0.024	0.178	1,836
Amount sold (in 100 kg bags)	1.179	3.173	-0.157	0.151	0.241	1,836
	Model		0		ding inform	mation
		to wo	men as p	art of th	e $couple$	
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Sold any	0.319	0.466	0.009	0.023	0.673	1,735
Amount sold (in 100 kg bags)	1.179	3.173	0.053	0.162	0.740	1,735

Table A38—Joint sales (models 2A and 2B)

	Model	2A: Inv	olving wo	men in	conveying in	n formation	
	to the female co-heads alone						
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N	
Sold any	0.273	0.446	0.052	0.031	0.106	981	
Amount sold (in 100 kg bags)	0.959	2.210	0.171	0.189	0.372	981	
	Model	2B: Inv	olving wo	men in	conveying in	iformation	
	Model		olving wo			n formation	
	Model Avg		_			nformation N	
Sold any		t	o the ma	le co-hea	ds $alone$		

Table A39—Men's sales

	Model	1: Invo	lving wome	n in rece	eiving infor	mation
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Sold any	0.116	0.320	-0.006	0.013	0.669	2,700
Amount sold (in 100 kg bags)	0.409	2.544	-0.055	0.089	0.547	2,700
	Model	2: Invol	ving women	n in con	veying info	rmation
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N
Sold any	0.124	0.330	-0.015	0.013	0.234	2,754
			-0.228**	0.084		2,754

Table A40—Men's sales (models 1A and 1B)

	Mode		oming in o	•		nation		
		to t	the female	co-heads	$s\ alone$			
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N		
~								
Sold any	0.116	0.320	-0.028^+	0.016	0.053	1,836		
Amount sold (in 100 kg bags)	0.409	2.544	-0.111	0.109	0.273	1,836		
	Model 1B: Zooming in on providing information to women as part of the couple							
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N		
Sold any	0.116	0.320	0.008	0.016	0.596	1,735		
Amount sold (in 100 kg bags)	0.409	2.544	-0.021	0.114	0.855	1,735		

Note: First column reports sample means; standard deviations are in the second column; column 3 reports differences between treatment and control as defined in Figure 2 (Model 1A for top panel and Model 1B for bottom panel); associated standard errors are in column 4; column 5 reports p-values based on randomization inference; the last column is sample size; **, * and + indicate that the difference is significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level after controlling FWER using an omnibus test.

TABLE A41—MEN'S SALES (MODELS 2A AND 2B)

	Model	2A: Inv	olving wo	men in	conveying in	n formation	
	to the female co-heads alone						
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N	
Sold any	0.110	0.314	-0.007	0.021	0.741	981	
Amount sold (in 100 kg bags)	0.456	1.944	-0.181	0.103	0.077	981	
	Model	2B: Inv	olving wo	men in	conveying ir	iformation	
		t	o the mai	le co-hea	ds $alone$		
	Avg	S.D.	ATE	S.E.	p-value	N	
					*	- '	
Sold any	0.112	0.316	0.005	0.023	0.822	891	