

### A Gentle, Caring Intro To Security

John Strand



### **Big Thanks!!**



### **LEVEL UP**

The MSP Security Training Challenge

Presented by



Mission: Raise the collective security posture across the channel.

Our challenge for ourselves: Help 500 MSPs get training in 30 Days.

#### The channel needs more security practitioners.

That's why we've teamed up with vendors across the channel who are passionate about security to make some of the industry's best training more accessible and affordable.



#### Our Sponsors

Each one of our sponsors has contributed funds to help secure the course discount and tuition assistance for those needing financial help. In addition, they each will be providing free seats in the course to help us hit our goal of providing the training to as many MSPs as possible.



















**SOPHOS** 







#### What Is This?

- This is meant to be a "bootstrap" security class
- We are going to cover what works to defend a network
- We are going to cover the things that BHIS loves/hates to see in a customer network
- We are going to cover 11 topics



### What We Are Covering




# What Works



# Key Tracking Indicators == Atomic Controls



- Mapping MITRE to Critical Controls we see trends:
  - Application Allow Listing
  - Password Controls
  - Egress Traffic Analysis
  - UEBA
  - Advanced Endpoint Protection
  - Logging
  - Host Firewalls
  - Internet Allow Listing
  - Vulnerability Management
  - Active Directory Hardening
  - Backup and Recovery






#### What We Are Not Covering



- Intro to Windows
- Intro to Linux
- Intro to TCP/IP
- Intro to Crypto
- Intro to Security Models
- The CBK
- NIST 800 series
- DLP
- Exploit of the day!







## Implementing CIS as an MSP







## https://www.cisecurity.org/controlsols/cis-controlsnavigator/?version=8



### What do you have?


- You probably have a lot of things in place now
- Backups, Endpoint Protection, Logs, Firewalls, etc.
- Find your gaps
- Then, map to CIS
- Sounds hard... Pretty easy with AuditScripts
- Set different price tiers





### **Tracking**





Backdoors &Breaches

### **Tracking**



	AuditScripts	Ç	CIS Contro	l #5: Account Managem	ent		(	enclave		
	Total Implementation of CSC #5		dressed:	0%					255	
		Risk Ac	ccepted:	100%					iess	
ID	CIS Control Detail	NIST CSF	Implementation	Sensor or Baseline	Policy Defined	Control Implemented	Control Automated or Technically Enforced	tontrol Reported to Business		
5.1	Establish and maintain an inventory of all accounts managed in the enterprise. The inventory must include both user and administrator accounts. The inventory, at a minimum, should contain the person's name, username, start/stop dates, and department. Validate that all active accounts are authorized, on a recurring schedule at a minimum quarterly, or more frequently.	Identify	1,2,3	Identity Management System	No Policy	Not Implemented	Not Applicable	Not Applicable		
5.2	Use unique passwords for all enterprise assets. Best practice implementation includes, at a minimum, an 8-character password for accounts using MFA and a 14-character password for accounts not using MFA.	Protect	1,2,3	Privileged Account Management System	No Policy	Not Implemented	Not Automated	Not Reported		
	Delete or disable any dormant accounts after a period of 45 days of inactivity, where supported.	Respond	1,2,3	Identity Management System	No Policy	Not Implemented	Not Automated	Not Reported		
5.4	Restrict administrator privileges to dedicated administrator accounts on enterprise assets. Conduct general computing activities, such as internet browsing, email, and productivity suite use, from the user's primary, non-privileged account.	Protect	1,2,3	Privileged Account Management System	No Policy	Not Implemented	Not Automated	Not Reported		
5.5	Establish and maintain an inventory of service accounts. The inventory, at a minimum, must contain department owner, review date, and purpose. Perform service account reviews to validate that all active accounts are authorized, on a recurring schedule at a minimum quarterly, or more frequently.	Identify	2,3	Privileged Account Management System	No Policy	Not Implemented	Not Applicable	Not Applicable		
5.6	Centralize account management through a directory or identity service.	Protect	2,3	Identity Management System	No Policy	Not Implemented	Not Automated	Not Reported		
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	EV 59									



### Mapping



AuditScripts	CIS Controls	Master Mappings Tool (v7.1c)	enclave	
Critical Security Control	NIST 800-53 rev4	NIST CSF v1.0	NIST CSF v1.1	NIST 800-82 rev2
Critical Security Control #10: Data Recovery Capabilities	CP-9: Information System Backup CP-10: Information System Recovery and Reconstitution MP-4: Me dia Storage	BBJE 4	PRJP-4	6.2.16 6.2.17
Critical Security Control #11: Secure Configuration for Network Devices, such as Firewalls, Routers and Switches	AC-4: Information Flow Enforcement CA-3: System Interconnections CA-7: Continuous Monitoring CA-9: Internal System Connections CM-2: Baseline Configuration CM-3: Configuration Change Control CM-5: Access Restrictions for Change CM-6: Configuration Settings CM-8: Information System Component Inventory MA-4: Nonlocal Maintenance SC-44: Fall in Known State S1-4: Information System Monitoring	PR.AC-5 PR.JP-1 PR. PT-4	PR AC-5 PR IP-1 PR PT-4	5.15 6.2.7
Critical Security Control #12: Boundary Defense	AC-4: Information Flow Enforcement AC-17: Remote Access AC-20: Use of External Information Systems CA-3: System Interconnections CA-7: Continuous Monitoring CA-9: Internal System Connections CM-2: Baseline Configuration SA-9: External Information System Services SC-7: Boundary Protection SC-8: Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity SI-4: Information System Monitoring	PR.AC-3 PR.AC-5 PR.MA-2 DE.AE-1	PRAC-3 PRAC-5 PRMA-2 DEAE-1	5.1 - 5.11
Critical Security Control #13: Data Protection	AC-3: Access Enforcement AC-4: Information Flow Enforcement AC-23: Data Mining Protection CA-7: Continuous Monitoring CA-9: Internal System Connections IR-9: Information Spillage Response MP-5: Media Transport SA-18: Tamper Resistance and Detection SC-8: Transmission Confidentiality and Integrity SC-28: Protection of Information at Rest SC-31: Covert Channel Analysis SC-41: Port and I/O Device Access SI-4: Information System Monitoring	PR.AC-5 PR.DS-2 PR.DS-5 PR.PT-2	PRAC-5 PR.05-2 PR.05-5 PR.PT-2	
Critical Security Control #14: Controlled Access Based on the Need to Know	AC-1: Access Control Policy and Procedures AC-2: Account Management AC-3: Access Enforcement AC-6: Least Privilege AC-24: Access Control Decisions CA-7: Continuous Monitoring	PB.AC-4 PB.AC-5 PB.DS-1 PB.DS-2	PB.AC-4 PB.AC-5 PB.DS-1 PB.DS-2	5.1 5.4 5.5





### Compliance and the Critical Controls



## Why We Are Covering What We Are Covering



- We started tracking vulnerabilities in our pentests
- Over 650+ per year
- We started tracking what would have stopped us
- This is a class based on what works
- Kind of took a bit of unlearning
- We are also tying this to MITRE
- Because everything has to tie to MITRE
- By Law....



#### Compliance Issues



- Far too many frameworks
- Overlapping and conflicting recommendations
- Recommendations get out of date quickly
- NIST Greenbook
- PCI Min Password length
- Meeting the Minimum







- Create a smaller framework set
- Create a framework based on actual attacks and things that matter
- Create a cross-reference to other frameworks
- Differing levels of compliance
- Dynamic Meant to be updated regularly
- History and Future
- Heavy lifting by James and Kellie Tarala
- https://www.auditscripts.com/freeresources/critical-security-controls/














### To the Future!



<b>AuditScripts</b>			Sed	curity Control	Category Cov	erage Analys	is (v1.0g)
Security Control Category	Common Control Count	CIS Control (v7.1) Count	NIST CSF (v1.1) Count	NIST CSF (v1.0) Count	: ISO 27002:2013 Count	: NIST 800-171 Count	NIST Privacy (v1.0)
Security Program Governance	60	17%	32%	30%	25%	8%	28%
Auditing and Reporting	53	15%	15%	6%	21%	8%	11%
Security Program Operations	38	21%	95%	95%	87%	34%	45%
Asset Inventory and Control	18	94%	17%	17%	22%	22%	22%
System Protection	55	76%	20%	20%	7%	38%	11%
System Monitoring	23	65%	30%	30%	22%	57%	30%
Identity and Access Management	51	41%	25%	22%	43%	67%	37%
Network Device Protection	7	71%	14%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Boundary Protection	35	63%	11%	11%	6%	29%	6%
Internal Network Protection	16	94%	19%	19%	25%	25%	19%
Secure Software Development	18	44%	17%	11%	72%	0%	17%
Data Privacy	15	0%	0%	0%	0%	7%	107%



### To the Future!



	AuditScripts	Common Cor	ntrol Library	(v1.0g)					
Control Reference ID #	Control Description	CIS Control (v7.1)	NIST CSF (v1.1)	NIST CSF (v1.0)	ISO 27002:2013	NIST 800-171	VIST Privacy (v1.0)	Australian DSD35	CMMC (v1)
GOV-01	Create an information assurance charter that articulates the organization's commitment to data protection and its goals towards the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data.		ID.BE-3 PR.DS-4 PR.PT-5	ID.BE-3 PR.DS-4	A.12.1.3 A.17.2.1		ID.BE-P2 PR.DS-P4		
GOV-02	Establish the authority of a committee to define the organization's information assurance program strategy and administer the program.								
GOV-03	Define the key stakeholders that will serve as members of the organization's information Assurance program committee.								
GOV-04	Establish that an senior executive leadership representative with authority will always be a member of this organization's committee.								
GOV-05	Define additional leadership roles and responsibilities for the organization's information security program and committee.								
GOV-06	Ensure that the organization's information security program committee is composed of key stakeholders from a cross-section of the organization, not simply technology workforce members.		ID.RM-1	ID.RM-1					
GOV-07	Ensure that the organization's information assurance program charter defines the organization's approach to addressing cyber security risk.	9	ID.RM-1 ID.RM-2 ID.RM-3 ID.GV-4 ID.RA-4	ID.RM-1 ID.RM-2 ID.RM-3 ID.GV-4 ID.RA-4			ID.DE-P1 GV.PO-P6 GV.RM-P1 GV.RM-P2 GV.RM-P3		
GOV-08	Ensure that the organization's information assurance program charter defines the specific regulatory requirements, contractual requirements, and standards that the organization's assurance program shall achieve.		ID.BE-2 ID.GV-3 ID.RM-3	ID.BE-2 ID.GV-3 ID.RM-3	A.18.1.1 A.18.1.2		GV.PO-P5		



### To the Future!


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<b>Audit</b> Scripts	Security Control System Coverage Analysis (v1.0g)								
Governance and Operations Controls	Common Control Count	CIS Control (v7.1) Count	NIST CSE (v1.1) Count	NIST CSE (v1.0) Count	ISO 27002:2013 Count	NIST 800-171 Count	NIST Drivacy (v1.0)		
Technical Infrastructure Controls	Common Control Count	<del></del>	<del></del>	<del></del>					
Asset Inventory and Discovery System	6	5	2	2	2	0	4		
Software Inventory and Discovery System	6	6			0	0	0		
Application Control System	6	6	0	0	2	4	0		
Patch Management System	3	2	0	0	0	0	0		
Vulnerability Management System	9	10	5	5	0	3	2		
Configuration Management System	21	14	2	2	0	6	2		
Endpoint Protection System	12	8			2	5	0		
Removable Media Protection System	5	3				6	1		
Backup and Recovery System	5	5				1	1		
Log Management System	20	14	6	6	5	13	5		
File Integrity Management System	3				0	0	2		
Identity Management System	16	10	3	1	9	13	2		
Data Inventory System	12	3	4	4	3	3	9		
Access Management System	10	2	5	5	9	11	6		
Privileged Account Management System	13	6				7	2		
Network Device Management System	7	5		0	0	0	0		
Boundary Filtering System	11	11			0	3	1		
Remote Access System	11					7	1		
Web Filtering System	8	7	0	0	0	0	0		
Email Filtering System	5	3	0	0	1	0	0		
Network Segmentation and Control System	8	9	3	3	4	1	3		
Wireless Access System	8	6	0	0	0	3	0		

#### MITRE and The Critical Controls











Media

#### MITRE and The Critical Controls



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<b>⟨⊕</b> ⟩Auc	ditScr	ipts &CK Enterprise Tech	nniques Mapped to the CIS Controls (v7.1a)	
Category	ID.	Technique Title	Technique Description	Johns call
Initial Access	T1189	Drive-by Compromise	A drive-by compromise is when an edversary gains access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is targeted for exploitation. This can happen in several ways, but there are a few main components:	CSC(17.0) CSC(8.0)
Initial Access	T1190	Exploit Public-Facing Application	The use of software, data, or commands to take advantage of a weakness in an internet-facing computer system or program in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system can be a bug, a gittch, or a design vulnerability. These applications are often websites, but can include databases (like SGL), standard services (like SAM or SSH), and any other applications with internet accessible open societs, such as web servers and related services. Depending on the flaw being exploited this may include Exploitation for Defense Evasion.	CSC(9.0) CSC(18.0)
Initial Access	T1200	Hardware Additions	Computer accessories, computers, or networking hardware may be introduced into a system as a vector to gain execution. While public references of usage by APT groups are acarce, many penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and open source products are laveraged with capabilities such as passive network tapping, man in the middle encryption breaking, Leystrole injection, Lernel memory reading via DMA, adding new wireless access to an existing network, and others.	CSC(2.0)
Initial Access	T1091	Replication Through Rensovable Media	Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is linerted into a system and executes. In the case of Lateral Movement, this may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look. Ilke a legitimate file to trick users into executing to an separate system, in the case of initial Access, this may occur through manual manipulation of the media, modification of systems used to initially format the media, or modification to the media's firmware itself.	CSC(8.8)
Initial Access	T1193	Spearphishing Attachment	Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it is employe the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry, in this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User loser observations.	CSC(7.0) CSC(8.8)
Initial Access	T1192	Spearphishing Link	Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of aparphishing in that it employs the use official to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email stell, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments.	CSC(7.0) CSC(8.8)
initial Access	T1194	Spearphishing via Service	Spearphishing via service is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of third party services rather than directly via enterprise email channels.	CSC(7.0) CSC(8.8)
Initial Access	T1195	Supply Chain Compromise	Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products or product delivory mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:	CSC(18.0)
Initial Access	T1199	Trusted Relationship	Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship exploits an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network.	CSC(9.4)
Initial Access	T1078	Valid Accounts	Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using Credential Access techniques or capture credentials earlier in their reconnaissance process through social engineering for means of gaining initial Access.	CSC(6.0)
Execution	T1155	AppleScript	macOS and OS X applications send AppleEvent messages to each other for interprocess communications (PC). These messages can be easily scripted with AppleExript for local or remote IPC. Osascript executes AppleExript and any other Open Scripting Architecture (OSA) language scripts. Aliat of OSA languages installed on a system can be found by using the osalang program.	CSC(5.0) CSC(8.8)

