

1 Commodity Price Risk in Phosphorus Recycling Investments

2 **Abstract:** There are optimistic targets for phosphorus recycling from waste streams to solve
3 environmental and supply issues simultaneously. The recycling process requires high energy
4 inputs, thus the joint distribution of (input) energy and (output) fertilizer commodity prices is a
5 crucial determinant of the profitability of investing. We propose a methodology to model the
6 investment risk and price dependencies using quantile vector autoregression and copulas. We
7 find that price dynamics are not stable when gas prices are high. Moreover standard approaches
8 overestimate investment risk. Finally, we find that phosphorus recycling investments are only
9 profitable with substantial subsidies or savings on disposal expenditures.

10 Keywords: copula, investment analysis, phosphorus recycling, time series econometrics

11 **Introduction**

12 Phosphorus pollution has exceeded planetary boundaries (Richardson et al., 2023) and mineral
13 phosphorus sources are scarce (Barbieri et al., 2022). Recovering phosphorus fertilizers from
14 wastewater streams, has therefore become a top policy priority to close nutrient cycles (Tonini
15 et al., 2019; Brownlie et al., 2021; Springmann et al., 2018). In addition, phosphorus recycling
16 could enhance resilience by reducing the EU's dependence on imported fertilizers (Brownlie et
17 al., 2023). However, two major obstacles hinder the establishment of recycling facilities
18 (Uhlemann et al., 2024). Firstly, recycling processes often require significant energy inputs,
19 creating a trade-off between greenhouse gas and phosphorus pollution reduction targets (Shi et
20 al., 2021). Secondly, investment in recycling facilities carries substantial risks, primarily driven
21 by fluctuations in phosphorus and energy prices. Previous research indicates that phosphorus
22 recycling from wastewater becomes viable for dairy processing organizations when phosphorus
23 prices are high and energy prices are low (Uhlemann et al., 2024). Nevertheless, the European
24 Union is determined to achieve a target of substituting 17 % of the phosphorus supply with
25 recycled phosphorus (European Commission, 2020). Therefore, understanding the likelihood
26 of these opposing price trends occurring together is crucial for evaluating the feasibility of
27 recycling technologies in addressing phosphorus pollution and informing policy incentives for
28 their adoption.

29 In this paper, we estimate the profitability and risk therein of investing in phosphorus recycling
30 facilities from wastewater streams. We use the example of phosphorus rich dairy wastewater
31 and develop a methodology to put a particular emphasis on the joint distribution and the
32 dynamics of the marginal distribution of phosphorus and energy prices. More specifically, we
33 use a copula approach and Quantile Vector Autoregression (QVAR) to model the tail
34 dependence between these prices to determine the likelihood of coinciding high values in the

35 former and low values in the latter price (Joe, 2014). We use a stochastic simulation approach
36 to determine the conditions under which phosphorus recycling becomes profitable. Our study
37 therefore provides three important implications. First, we show if and under which
38 circumstances investments into Phosphorus recovery for dairy processors can become
39 economically viable. Second, we offer a methodological advancement that enables
40 consideration of price dependence in ex-ante investment assessments. Third, we assess the
41 asymptotic stability of the joint price dynamics between phosphorus and energy.

42 The profitability of phosphorus recycling has been commonly studied with techno-economic
43 analysis, where the input and output quantities of the production process are used to estimate
44 net present values of investments (Daneshgar et al., 2019; Molinos-Senate et al., 2011).
45 Moreover, the costs of recycling are often integrated into environmental life cycle assessments
46 by estimating life cycle costs of one functional unit. However, these analyses often do not
47 consider the profitability of an investment and assume the absence of price risk (cf. Tonini et
48 al., 2019). The phosphorus market has undergone shifts in recent decades, such as the increase
49 of phosphorus production and consumption in China and fertilizer import subsidies in India
50 (Mew et al., 2023). In recent years, the fertilizer market has become more spatially and
51 vertically integrated with the energy market (Bekkerman et al., 2021). Moreover, price volatility
52 is interdependent between agricultural commodities (Gardebroek et al., 2016; Ahmed and
53 Serra, 2015). We extend this literature by modelling the price dependence between phosphorus
54 fertilizer and energy by using QVAR in combination with a copula to simulate the price risk of
55 an investment (Patton, 2013). This approach identifies important implications for both policy
56 makers and investors to support the adoption of recycling technologies and underlying policies
57 that should accelerate this adoption.

58 Methodologically, we first analyse the structural process of gas, and Diammonium Phosphate
59 (DAP) prices and the food price index (FPI) between 1991–2024 from the World Bank (2024)
60 pink sheet. We model the prices as an autoregressive dynamic process while also considering
61 the tails of the process by conducting Quantile Vector Autoregression (QVAR) (Li and Chavas,
62 2023). We then use a copula approach in a stochastic simulation of the Net Present Value (NPV)
63 of recycling investments and provide NPV distributions. We thereby identify the likelihood of
64 phosphorus recycling technology becoming profitable and compare our simulation results with
65 standard stochastic simulation approaches that do not consider quantile dependent prices
66 (Spiegel et al. 2021).

67 We find that phosphorus recycling from dairy processing wastewater is not profitable, and
68 phosphorus and energy price processes do not exhibit a particularly large correlation in the tails.
69 In contrast, correlation between the two price lags occurs around the median of the two
70 commodities. Overall, the price lags of gas and phosphorus are negatively correlated, which
71 leads to a lower variance of the NPV distribution compared to the standard methodology. In
72 addition, we find the price dynamics are less stable when gas prices are high. We find that
73 investment subsidies of about 1.5 million EUR are necessary to make the investment profitable.
74 Savings in disposal costs of around 130 EUR per ton of wastewater sludge could have the same
75 effect. The results stress that phosphorus recycling from dairy processing wastewater is not
76 profitable and policy support is likely necessary for adoption.

77 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we stress the
78 importance of investigating the relationship between energy and phosphorus prices in the
79 profitability assessment of phosphorus recycling. We describe the proposition of phosphorus
80 fertilizer recycling and the economic challenges that arise with its implementation. We describe
81 the process of producing recovered fertilizer and the associated inputs and outputs. Next, we

82 position the recent fertilizer price rise in the commodity price volatility debate. We describe
83 how to model the dependence of the price processes for energy and phosphorus markets and
84 their relationship. Furthermore, we consider the asymptotic behaviour of the relationship.
85 Afterwards, we use a Monte Carlo simulation, to assess the profitability of the recycling
86 investment. Subsequently, we present the results of our analysis and close with a critical
87 discussion and conclusion from a policy maker's and investor's perspective.

88 **Phosphorus Recycling**

89 We investigated phosphorus recycling in the context of dairy processing companies. Dairy
90 processors collect raw milk, apply preservation processes, produce, and package products such
91 as milk, cheese, cream and the like. We call these processing firms producers. The producers
92 face two options for dealing with their waste, first their established methods or second by
93 adopting novel recycling technologies. We assume that producers will only adopt the recycling
94 technology if the sum of the expected discounted benefits arising from selling recycled fertilizer
95 or receiving subsidies over the lifespan of the project exceeds the costs of the initial investment
96 and the sum of expected discounted operational costs. That is, if they receive a positive net
97 present value on their investment. We assume that the NPV will determine the adoption
98 (Zilberman et al., 2019). The yearly cash flow R_t of the investment is described by the following
99 equation:

$$100 \quad R_t = pd_t m_t - pg_t x_t - Z_t + c_t \quad (1)$$

101 in which the subscript t denotes a future period. The quantity of recycled phosphorus fertilizer
102 is m_t , its price is pd_t . The natural gas input quantities are denoted by x_t other input
103 expenditures are described by the scalar Z_t . The prices for gas are pg_t . In our later analysis, we
104 consider pg_t and pd_t to follow a joint stochastic distribution. While we acknowledge that there

105 are multiple policy interventions possible, we assume that there will be investment subsidies
106 and regulation on sludge disposal. The most extreme regulation would ban the spreading of
107 processing sludge outright, while more lenient regulation would at least restrict current
108 practices. In any case, we expect that regulation will increase the costs of disposing of dairy
109 processing sludge. The disposal costs of dairy processing waste play a role because increases
110 in the price of disposal, would generate a direct benefit to the dairy processor. The income from
111 saving disposal costs is denoted as c_t . With cash flows we can calculate the NPV of an
112 investment into recycling technology:

$$113 \quad NPV = \sum_{t=1}^T R_t \delta_t - I_0 + S_0 \quad (2)$$


114 Where $\delta_t = (discount\ rate + 1)^{-t}$ is the discount factor, which is decreasing over time. I_0 is
115 the initial investment in year 0 and S_0 denotes investment subsidies.

116 Phosphorus recycling aims to produce fertilizer products from waste streams, which have the
117 same functionality as conventional fertilizers (Velasco-Sánchez et al. 2023). Farmers currently
118 use the processing waste as fertilizer in its untransformed sludge form, but this practice faces
119 criticism (Shi et al., 2021). The sludge differs from recycled fertilizers and conventional
120 fertilizer in the following aspects. First, the untreated sludge is not concentrated, thus has a
121 greater mass than recycled fertilizer. Second, sludge also contains volatile compounds, that
122 release odours and are chemically active. The fertilizer components are combined with other
123 reactive waste components in the sludge, making them a potential environmental hazard.
124 Farmers cannot apply the sludge in an effective manner, leading to run off phosphorus pollution
125 (Shi et al., 2021). Thirdly, the sludge composition is very heterogenous over time, making it
126 infeasible to use it for precision fertilization. These reasons make the storage, transportation,
127 and field application of sludge problematic.

128 Public water utilities have been recycling phosphorus from their waste for years. At the same
129 time private sector firms with wastewater seldomly recycle phosphorus, because unlike public
130 companies they cannot internalize public goods associated with phosphorus recycling (Egle et
131 al., 2014). Societal benefits of both reducing negative externalities and providing public goods
132 arising from phosphorus pollution might justify policy interventions to incentivize the adoption.
133 One way phosphorus recycling reduces negative externalities is by reducing the toxic content
134 of fertilizers compared to processing sludge, another way is by simplifying the export of
135 phosphorus fertilizers to countries reducing country-level nutrient surpluses. In addition,
136 phosphorus recycling creates public goods such as improved water quality and a reduction of
137 trade vulnerabilities (Barbieri et al., 2022).

138 The recycling of fertilizer entails the chemical and thermal transformation of waste to enhance
139 its characteristics in a favourable way. Technologies to achieve this are similar for a range of
140 different waste types. We focus on Hydrothermal Carbonisation and chemical precipitation
141 technologies as being the most advanced and promising processes (Uhlemann et al., 2024).
142 Hydrothermal carbonization separates dry and wet components in sludge by applying heat and
143 pressure. The application of heat and pressure carbonifies the sludge, which produces a char
144 and a liquid. The char contains fertilizer components and has soil improving properties.
145 Chemical precipitation is then used to extract phosphorus salts from the liquid. The phosphorus
146 salts are similar to rock phosphate-derived fertilizer such as DAP (Shi et al., 2021). Other
147 technologies can be employed to recycle phosphorus, and we describe them in detail in the
148 appendix. All the individual applications have in common, that heat is used to separate
149 undesired components from the fertilizer compounds contained in the waste. This highlights
150 that any form of phosphorus recycling will have at least heat energy as an input and phosphorus
151 fertilizer as an output.

152 Figure 1 shows the trajectories of the log prices of gas and DAP, we note both price series
153 spikes around the time of the global financial crisis and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. While
154 the fertilizer price spike in 2022 has created a potential for firms to earn profits from selling
155 recycled phosphorus while addressing the phosphorous scarcity problem (Brownlie et al.,
156 2023). As commodity prices are interconnected energy prices have also risen during this time.
157 The fertilizer prices are connected to food and energy markets, as agricultural producers are
158 affected by phosphorus price volatility since fertilizers are an input to agricultural production.
159 Serra and Zilberman (2013) summarize the literature on biofuel related price transmission,
160 concluding that energy prices drive long-run agricultural price levels. Ciaian and d'Artis Kancs
161 (2011) developed a model that explains the relationship between prices of energy and prices of
162 agricultural commodities through an output and an input channel. Among the inputs that
163 determine the price links in their study is fertilizer. Price changes lead to investment risk, that
164 in turn disincentivize the adoption of phosphorus recycling.



165

166 *Figure 1: Trajectories of gas price (EUR/GJ) and Diammonium Phosphate price (EUR/mt), 1991–2024*

167 From the above we hypothesize, that the relationship of the individual price movements of
 168 energy and phosphorus and their volatility has to be considered when determining the
 169 profitability of phosphorus recycling investments in order to correctly reflect the price risks.
 170 More specifically, we expect that high phosphorus and low energy prices occurring together is
 171 particularly unlikely. The low probability would reduce the window of opportunity for investing
 172 into phosphorus recycling.

173 **Empirical Framework**

174 We propose a novel methodology to model the investment profitability by estimating the
 175 dynamic price process of DAP and gas, while placing special consideration on the moments of
 176 the joint distribution. In the agricultural economic investment literature, stochastic processes

177 have been used to simulate uncertainty in future prices, however mostly relying on the first two
178 moments of price return distribution (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).

179 Most prominently, Geometric Brownian Motion processes have been used in investment
180 modelling since they represent well the price movements of financial assets (Dixit and Pindyck,
181 1994). In contrast, gas and phosphorus prices and their raw commodities are extracted from
182 existing reserves and reserve owners make decisions about extraction based on their expected
183 profit. For higher prices supply the production sector increases output and vice versa. Therefore,
184 such commodity prices have been modelled as mean-reverting processes such as the Ornstein-
185 Uhlenbeck process (Lund, 1991; Spiegel et al. 2021). These two approaches have in common
186 that tail dependencies between different prices are assumed to be zero. Consequently, we
187 compare our combined approach of copula and QVAR modelling and simulation with the
188 standard method using an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes.

189 As this type of phosphorus recycling has not been implemented at scale, there is no revenue
190 data from actual investments for estimation purposes. Thus, simulations are necessary to study
191 the profitability and provide better information for technological research and policy. Sources
192 of risk such as production risk and institutional risk are likely to affect the investment, both
193 sources of risk have not been documented or measured (Uhlemann et al. 2024). The results of
194 this NPV simulation focus on input and output price risk.

195 We estimate vector autoregressions for each integer quantile of the joint price distribution of
196 gas pg_t and phosphorus pd_t . To include their joint dependence on food prices and shocks
197 therein, we additionally incorporate the food price index (FPI) as pf_t in our analysis (Enders
198 and Holt, 2012). To ease notation, we let $\mathbf{p}_t = (pd_t, pg_t, pf_t)$. That is, the prices of the three
199 commodities are formed by the autoregressive dynamic process in (3) where the distribution

200 functions $g(\cdot)$ explain the contemporaneous prices through their lags. This assumes that $g(\cdot)$
 201 is differentiable, and its error e is serially independent with a continuous distribution function.

$$202 \quad \mathbf{p}_t = \begin{bmatrix} pd_t \\ pg_t \\ pf_t \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} g_d(\mathbf{p}_{t-1}, \dots, \mathbf{p}_{t-n}) \\ g_g(\mathbf{p}_{t-1}, \dots, \mathbf{p}_{t-n}) \\ g_f(\mathbf{p}_{t-1}, \dots, \mathbf{p}_{t-n}) \end{bmatrix} \quad (3)$$

203 The joint distribution function of the multivariate distribution is described by,

$$204 \quad F(\mathbf{p} \mid \mathbf{P}_{t-1}) = Prob(g(\mathbf{p}_{t-1}, \dots, \mathbf{p}_{t-n}) \leq \mathbf{p}) \quad (4)$$

205 where $\mathbf{P}_{t-1} = (\mathbf{p}_{t-1}, \dots, \mathbf{p}_{t-n})$ includes lagged realizations of all prices. Following the
 206 approach by Li and Chavas (2023) using Sklar's theorem (Sklar, 1959) we model the
 207 multivariate distribution separately by beginning with the marginal distributions (F_d, F_g, F_f)
 208 described in (5a-c). The marginal distributions indicate the dependence between prices and their
 209 subsequent own price and cross price lags.

$$210 \quad F_d(pd \mid \mathbf{P}_{t-1}) = Prob(g(\mathbf{p}_{t-1}, \dots, \mathbf{p}_{t-n}) \leq pd) \quad (5a)$$

$$F_g(pg \mid \mathbf{P}_{t-1}) = Prob(g(\mathbf{p}_{t-1}, \dots, \mathbf{p}_{t-n}) \leq pg) \quad (5b)$$

$$F_f(pf \mid \mathbf{P}_{t-1}) = Prob(g(\mathbf{p}_{t-1}, \dots, \mathbf{p}_{t-n}) \leq pf) \quad (5c)$$

211 The marginal distributions can be used to describe the joint multivariate distribution F with a
 212 copula C with the mapping of the marginal distribution (F_d, F_g, F_f), that indicates the
 213 contemporaneous dependence between these marginal distributions.

$$214 \quad F(\mathbf{p} \mid \mathbf{P}_{t-1}) = C(F_d(pd \mid \mathbf{P}_{t-1}), F_g(pg \mid \mathbf{P}_{t-1}), F_f(pf \mid \mathbf{P}_{t-1})) \quad (6)$$

215 The analysis proceeds by modelling the marginal distributions (5a-c) with QVAR allowing us
 216 to vary price dependencies across quantiles of the distribution including their tails. The joint
 217 distribution function is estimated as pair copula-construction (Acar et al., 2012).

218 **Data**

219 Our data set consists of 404 monthly time series of gas prices, DAP prices and the FPI from
220 April 1991 until October 2024. As shown in Table 1, the gas price and the DAP price time
221 series are stationary without transformation, we continue with the stationary first difference of
222 the FPI. All data is taken from the World Bank (2024) Commodity Price Data - The Pink Sheet.
223 As phosphorus price we take the widely traded DAP price from the World Bank database. The
224 price is for the commodity price for free on board in the US Gulf, which was originally gathered
225 by Bloomberg – Green Markets (which was formerly Kennedy Information LLC). While our
226 analysis, focuses on an application in the EU, we assume that the recycled fertiliser is priced
227 with this DAP price as a reference. As the energy price we use the European natural gas price
228 from the same database. Formerly, the gas price was an average of import and spot prices in
229 Europe; since 2015 this measure uses the Netherlands title transfer facility price. The transfer
230 facility price is a gas delivery contract, which is widely used to price gas in the European
231 Union¹. To control for shocks in the economic environment that affect the relationship between
232 energy and phosphorus price indirectly we also include the food price index (Alam and Gilbert,
233 2017; Enders and Holt, 2014). The FPI is a differenced quantity weighted indicator of
234 international food prices, the FPI contains all the price information of global food markets. We
235 include it to capture the indirect connection between the price of energy and price of fertilisers
236 through the food price channel (Ciaian and Kancs, 2011; Bekkerman et al. 2021).

¹ Some producers may not purchase gas on these spot markets but hold long term delivery contracts with utility companies. Since the delivery contracts have an insurance effect, the price for gas in these contracts likely is going to be higher and reflect the inherent risk in the commodity price.

Variables	Gas	Diammonium Phosphate	Food Price Index
Min	1.8	122.19	-17.54
Max	80.09	1165.79	15.43
Mean	8.58	358.39	0.15
Standard Deviation	8.61	207.55	2.86
Skew	4.03	1.29	-0.15
Kurtosis	25.35	4.68	10.52
Trend	0.039	1.237	0
KPSS	2.152	3.58	0.043
ADF	-3.69*	-4.21*	-7.77*

*Note: This table presents statistics rounded to the second decimal on monthly gas (EUR/GJ), DAP prices (EUR/mt) and the differenced World Bank FPI, 1991–2024. The trend indicates the monthly change over time. * Denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level for the following tests: KPSS is the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test and ADF is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for stationarity.*

238 **Estimation**

239 We estimate the econometric model in equations (3)-(6) using a two-step approach, first
 240 estimating the marginal distribution with the QVAR and subsequently the copula. We test the
 241 dynamic stability of the dynamic process. Moreover, the estimates are then used to simulate
 242 future prices of gas and DAP that can compare to a standard approach of using stochastic
 243 processes without co-dependence in net present value simulations.

244 *Estimation of the Marginal Distribution*

245 The marginal distributions are estimated in the form of a Vector Autoregression (VAR) model.
 246 We specify a reduced form VAR without trying to identify causal parameters. The VAR allows
 247 to estimate lagged own and cross price relations of the marginal distribution. We determine the
 248 order n of the parsimonious VAR through common information criteria, such as the Schwarz
 249 Bayesian Information Criterion. The VAR based on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) only allows
 250 us to identify conditional mean effects. That is, price dependencies remain constant among all
 251 levels of prices, assuming tail correlations to be similar than correlations at average prices. To

252 allow price dependencies to be different across price quantiles, we use Quantile Vector
 253 Autoregression (QVAR) to estimate the linear relation between prices for each integer quantile
 254 q from 1 to 99 (Koenker, 2005).

$$p_{dq}(q_d | \mathbf{P}_{t-1}) = \boldsymbol{\beta}_{0,d}(q_d) + \boldsymbol{\beta}_{1,d}(q_d)\mathbf{P}_{t-1} \quad (7a)$$

$$p_{gq}(q_g | \mathbf{P}_{t-1}) = \boldsymbol{\beta}_{0,g}(q_g) + \boldsymbol{\beta}_{1,g}(q_g)\mathbf{P}_{t-1} \quad (7b)$$

$$p_{fq}(q_f | \mathbf{P}_{t-1}) = \boldsymbol{\beta}_{0,f}(q_f) + \boldsymbol{\beta}_{1,f}(q_f)\mathbf{P}_{t-1} \quad (7c)$$

256 The $\boldsymbol{\beta}_{0,i}(q_i)$ estimate, where $i \in \{d, g, f\}$ for each of the series, describes the intercept for
 257 price p_i in quantile q_i . $\boldsymbol{\beta}_{1,i}(q_i)\mathbf{P}_{t-1}$ is a matrix of parameters for the conditional effect of
 258 each lag and quantile.

259 The parameters $\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_i$ are estimated with the following optimisation, where ρ_{q_i} is an indicator
 260 function relating the conditional function to the quantile by weighting each observation in
 261 terms of its distance to the estimated quantile, ensuring that estimates closer to the estimated
 262 quantile have the highest weight in the estimation.

$$\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}_i(q_i) \in \operatorname{argmin}_{\boldsymbol{\beta}} \left\{ \sum_{t=1}^T \rho_{q_i} (p_{it} - p_{iq}(q_i | \mathbf{P}_{t-1})) \right\} \quad (8)$$

264 We investigate various functional specifications of the QVAR using the Schwarz Bayesian
 265 Information Criterion (SBIC) on the mean regression (VAR)². To conduct inference on the

² We supplement the linear model with a time trend and non-linear squared endogenous variables. The Information Criterion indicates that the squared variables slightly improve the parsimony of the model. Nevertheless, we remain with the linear model, as the non-linear specification does not produce a stable price simulation (see Appendix).

266 estimated parameters, standard errors are constructed by a standard bootstrap procedure. This
 267 is advantageous as the autoregressive properties invalidate other more conventional forms of
 268 inference (Koenker and Xiao, 2006).

269 *Dynamic Stability*

270 The dynamics of the marginal distribution under study can be characterized in terms of their
 271 stability, i.e., the effect of stochastic shocks on the variables (Enders, 2014, Appendix 6.1). The
 272 dynamic stability of a system describes the existence of an equilibrium to which the system
 273 moves back to after it is stochastically disturbed. The absence of an equilibrium implies that
 274 the system reacts unpredictably to perturbations. Thus, in the absence of stability, simulated
 275 future price distributions would come with unreasonably large variations. To quantify dynamic
 276 stability, we use the characteristic roots of quantile model combinations. We study the roots λ
 277 of the autoregressive process of equation (3). More specifically, we evaluate the modulus of the
 278 dominant root $|\lambda_d|$; dominant refers to the largest root. The roots can be derived from the
 279 Jacobian matrix in (9), which includes partial derivatives of the parameter function.

$$280 \quad J\Delta p_t = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{\delta pg}{\delta pg_1} & \frac{\delta pg}{\delta pd_1} & \frac{\delta pg}{\delta pf_1} & \frac{\delta pg}{\delta pg_2} & \frac{\delta pg}{\delta pd_2} & \frac{\delta pg}{\delta pf_2} \\ \frac{\delta pd}{\delta pg_1} & \frac{\delta pd}{\delta pd_1} & \frac{\delta pd}{\delta pf_1} & \frac{\delta pd}{\delta pg_2} & \frac{\delta pd}{\delta pd_2} & \frac{\delta pd}{\delta pf_2} \\ \frac{\delta pg}{\delta pg_1} & \frac{\delta pg}{\delta pd_1} & \frac{\delta pg}{\delta pf_1} & \frac{\delta pg}{\delta pg_2} & \frac{\delta pg}{\delta pd_2} & \frac{\delta pg}{\delta pf_2} \\ \frac{\delta pf}{\delta pd_1} & \frac{\delta pf}{\delta pg_1} & \frac{\delta pf}{\delta pf_1} & \frac{\delta pf}{\delta pg_2} & \frac{\delta pf}{\delta pd_2} & \frac{\delta pf}{\delta pf_2} \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \quad (9)$$

281 In our case, since the marginal distributions are linear, the matrix elements reduce to parameter
 282 estimates.

283 The absolute value of the dominant root $|\lambda_d| < 1$ indicates stability or that the system is
 284 converging to the origin. $|\lambda_d| > 1$ indicate instability and divergence to infinity. The special

285 case of $|\lambda_d| = 1$ also indicates stability, but the system converges to an equilibrium rather than
 286 the origin or diverges to infinity. Thus, we conduct hypothesis test for $H_0 = |\lambda_d| = 1$ and two
 287 alternative hypotheses $H_{a1} = |\lambda_d| < 1$ and $H_{a2} = |\lambda_d| > 1$. For inference we create a
 288 distribution of the roots from the bootstrap realization of the QVAR estimation. We generate
 289 standard errors by assuming a normal distribution.

290 *Functional Form of the Copula*

291 The estimates for the marginal QVAR from (7a-c) are used to assign quantiles that have the
 292 best fit for the estimates over time to generate F_f, F_g and F_d . This is done by calculating
 293 $\hat{p}_{iq}(q_i | \mathbf{P}_{t-1})$ for all t and q, which \hat{p}_{iq} is then compared to the observed p_{it} to find \hat{q}_{it} . These
 294 quantile distributions are used to estimate the copula connecting the marginal distributions. The
 295 copula indicates the contemporaneous co-dependence between the marginal distributions. That
 296 is, a function relating the current state of the quantile in 1. unconditional copula.

$$297 C^1(q_1 | q_2) = \frac{\partial C_{12}(q_1, q_2)}{\partial d q_2} \Rightarrow \int C^1(q_1 | q_2) dq = C_{12}(q_1, q) \quad (11)$$

298 We use the conditional copulas $C^1(q_1 | q_2)$ in the simulations further down.

299 The overall joint distribution function in F in equation (6) takes the form of the FPI F_f and the
 300 two copulas $C_d(F_d | F_f)$ and $C_g(F_g | F_f)$, in which the DAP price is conditional on the FPI the
 301 gas price is conditional on the FPI, respectively. The copulas are also estimated with quantile
 302 regression on the inverse quantile of the marginal distribution. The copulas C_d and C_g are
 303 estimated with conditional distribution functions D_d and D_g that take the following form:

$$304 D_d(q_d | q_f) = \gamma_{d,0}(q_d) + \gamma_{d,1}(q_d)q_f \quad (12a)$$

$$D_g(q_g | q_f) = \gamma_{g,0}(q_g) + \gamma_{g,1}(q_g)q_f \quad (12b)$$

305 *Simulation*

306 The estimates of the two proceeding steps are the foundation for the simulation of price series
307 from the joint distribution. The following algorithm is used to create a distribution over P
308 simulation paths and the investment horizon T. We choose the planning horizon of 15 years
309 corresponding to 180 months, a common planning horizon for engineering problems. This
310 rather long planning horizon highlights the problem of stability, as unstable dynamics tend
311 towards infinite prices over time. We simulate q_1^* , q_2^* and q_3^* with a uniform distribution for each
312 integer quantile (1-99) (Wang et al., 2024).

313 1. The first random number q_1^* selects the quantile of the FPI marginal to predict the
314 current observation based on the past observations.

315
$$\beta_f(q_1^*) * \mathbf{P}_{t-1} = p_{f_t} \quad (13a)$$

316

317

318 2. q_1^* also selects the quantiles of the two copulas distribution γ_d and γ_g , which are
319 fitted with the respective random draws q_2^* and q_3^* . The fitted \hat{q}_4 and \hat{q}_5 reflecting
320 contemporaneous dependence through the two bivariate copulas distributions.

321
$$q_2^* * \gamma_d(q_1^*) = \hat{q}_4 \quad (13b)$$

322
$$q_3^* * \gamma_g(q_1^*) = \hat{q}_5 \quad (13c)$$

323 3. \hat{q}_4 and \hat{q}_5 select the quantiles for the DAP and the gas price marginals. The selected
324 quantile estimates with past observation predict the current DAP and the gas price.

325
$$\beta_d(\hat{q}_4) * \mathbf{P}_{t-1} = p_{d_t} \quad (13d)$$

326
$$\beta_g(\hat{q}_5) * \mathbf{P}_{t-1} = p_{g_t} \quad (13e)$$

327 The simulation draws are then used to calculate NPVs based on equations (1) and (2), as well
328 as additional parameters describing the phosphorus recycling investments that are described in
329 the appendix.

330 *Stochastic Processes*

331 The QVAR methodology allows us to estimate the shapes of the conditional distribution. We
332 compare the QVAR simulations to simulations with Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes, which only
333 incorporate a mean and a diffusion parameter in the simulation and do not incorporate
334 dependence between prices. The price change in a month δp is indicated by,

335
$$\delta p g_t = \mu_g (\theta_g - p g_t) \delta t + \sigma_g \delta W_t^g \quad (14a)$$

336
$$\delta p d_t = \mu_d (\theta_d - p d_t) \delta t + \sigma_d \delta W_t^d \quad (14b)$$

337 Where θ indicates the long run mean, μ is a parameter that indicates the speed of the mean
338 reversion, σ indicates the dispersion of the Wiener process δW_t . These parameters are
339 estimated from the same price observation, the estimation procedure is explained in the
340 appendix.

341 *Environmental Policies*

342 Policy makers place attention on phosphorus recycling because it provides a multitude of
343 positive externalities like pollution reduction, waste disposal and phosphorus supply security
344 as detailed in the introduction. These positive externalities generally lead to a gap between
345 private investment incentives and optimal investment levels. As a result of this, we deem it
346 worthwhile to include potential political interventions and their impact on the NPV distribution
347 in the analysis. In addition, we will consider the firm perspective on the investment decision
348 under the higher moments of price volatility.

349 First, we quantify the required investment subsidy to shift all simulated scenarios so that they
 350 have a positive NPV. Second, we quantify the required investment subsidy so that the average
 351 NPV is equal to zero. A major argument for phosphorus recycling is waste disposal (Uhlemann
 352 et al. 2024). Thus, we quantify the two measures in terms of the monetary benefit, the investing
 353 firm would need to gain from recycling phosphorus from a ton of waste sludge. Third, we focus
 354 on the certainty equivalent CE of the investment. The certainty equivalent is certain payment,
 355 which provides the decision maker with the equivalent utility as the uncertain investment
 356 decision. The CE is the expectation of the NPV π subtracted by the risk premium RP .

357
$$CE = E(\pi) - RP \quad (15)$$

358 The risk premium is a function of investor's level of risk aversion and the second and the third
 359 moment of the profit distribution. Following Conradt et al. (2015) we use a negative exponential
 360 utility function,

361
$$U = 1 - e^{-r_a * \pi} \quad (16)$$

362 where r_a is the risk aversion parameter and π represents the firms net present value. The risk
 363 premium can be approximated by the Taylor expansion $RP \approx \sum_{i=2}^k -\frac{1}{i!} \frac{U^i}{U^1} M^i$, where $M^i =$
 364 $E[\pi - E(\pi)]^i$ and $U^i = \frac{\partial^i U}{\partial \pi^i}$. Thus, the risk premium for the negative exponential function is
 365
$$RP \approx 1/2 * r_a * \sigma_\pi^2 - 1/6 * r_a^2 * \sigma_\pi^3. \quad (17)$$

366 **Results**

367 In this section we first show the conditional Quantile Vector Autoregression (QVAR)
368 distributions of the gas prices, DAP prices and FPI, respectively. Second, we present the
369 outcomes of the copula model which provides a valid joint distribution of the dependence
370 between the two prices. Here, we observe a relation between the two prices, this relationship is
371 not skewed in a particular direction. Third, we estimate the quantile stability of the dynamic
372 process. Fourth, we compare the QVAR price simulation results to the simulation of the
373 Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes. Finally, we use NPV distributions to determine the profitability
374 of the phosphorus recycling investment.

375 *QVAR*

376 The results of the QVAR model (see appendix table A2-A4) show that the gas price is mostly
377 correlated to its own lags, while the DAP price is also correlated to the lags of other variables.
378 All correlations are stronger around median prices and weaker in the tails of the price
379 distributions. For the marginal distribution, the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC)
380 indicates that a VAR of order two is parsimonious. We compare this with several different
381 specifications (The specifications and their information criteria are described in Appendix C).
382 While the SBIC improves when we add non-linear terms, but not with a linear trend. We further
383 consider specification (1) and (4). The following description corresponds to specification (1)³.
384 Bootstrap standard errors are used to conduct hypothesis tests on the QVAR estimates.
385 Appendix C additionally includes Figure A1 and A2 showing the probability density functions
386 of the observed and the simulated prices.

³ The results correspond to this equation $P_{t-1} = pg_{t-1} + pd_{t-1} + pf_{t-1} + pg_{t-2} + pd_{t-2} + pf_{t-2}$. The other specifications include (2) additional third lag, (3) a linear time trend, (4) squared first lag for the gas and DAP prices and (5) a linear time trend as well as squared first lag for the gas and DAP prices.

387 We find the lagged own price effects are most often significant. The gas price is significantly
388 affected by all its own lags. In the OLS VAR regression, the first lag coefficient of (standard
389 error: 0.049) means that an increases of the gas price of one EUR in the previous month is
390 significantly correlated with a contemporaneous price increase of 1.076 EUR. Conversely,
391 increases in the second lag of the gas price decrease the contemporaneous price. The FPI
392 correlation with the gas price is only significant in the second lag, while the effect of DAP is
393 significant on the first lag. The R^2 of the VAR on the gas price is 0.91. There is considerable
394 fluctuation of the Pseudo- R^2 of the quantile regressions, the Pseudo- R^2 of the lower tails of the
395 gas price is lower indicating that the explanatory power of the model decreases for lower prices.
396 The DAP price is positively and is significantly affected by the first, and negatively by the
397 second lag of its own price. The FPI effect on the DAP price is significant in the higher quantiles
398 of the first lag. The VAR R^2 is very high at 0.98, showing that a large fraction of the variation
399 in the DAP price can be explained by the lags in the model. The own price effect of the FPI is
400 significant and positive in the first lag. The second lag is only significant in the 90th quantile.
401 The other correlations are not significant. The VAR R^2 is 0.19 showing less of the variation of
402 the FPI is explained in the model. The Pseudo- R^2 indicate that the model explains more
403 variation in the upper and lower tails of the FPI. The These results for all three dependent
404 variables vary across quantiles, the effects remain strongest in the median regressions,
405 dissipating in the tails.

406 *Copula*

407 We use the results of the QVAR models to estimate the two quantile copula from equation (12
408 a-b) of the marginal distributions using bootstrapping to estimate the standard errors. The results
409 can be found in the appendix tables A5 and A6. The regression results indicate how the marginal
410 distributions are correlated contemporaneously. The linear correlation between the FPI and the

411 gas price distribution is only significant in the 10th quantile indicating co-movement when gas
412 prices are low. Here, the FPI distribution positively affects increases in the DAP price in the
413 70th quantile. The constants in both regression specification and across quantiles are mostly
414 positive and significant. The coefficients increase across quantiles, leading the constant
415 coefficients to roughly correspond to their quantiles regardless of the independent variable.
416 None of the parameters are negative, indicating that the prices do not move in opposite
417 directions.

418 *Stability*

419 Table 2 shows the modulus of the dominant root $|\lambda_d|$ for different quantiles of phosphorus and
420 gas prices under median FPI. The results show that the dynamic instability is prevalent amongst
421 the higher gas price quantiles 0.7 and 0.9. The DAP price quantiles are stable for lower gas
422 prices and unstable for higher gas prices. The tables A7 and A8 in the Appendix report these
423 results for the 0.1 and 0.9 quantiles of the FPI. While the dynamic stability at the 0.1 quantile
424 of the FPI is fairly similar to the median results, the 0.9 quantile increases the frequency of
425 dynamic stability. All $|\lambda_d|$ in the 0.9 quantile of the FPI and DAP indicate instability. Overall,
426 the results indicate that the gas price is the most important determinant for dynamic instability,
427 additionally dynamic instability generally occurs in the higher quantiles. From that we can
428 conclude, prices diverge more when prices are high.

429 *Table 2: Modulus of the dominant root for selected has and DAP quantiles at the median FPI*

q_d	0.1	0.3	0.5	0.7	0.9
q_g					
0.1	0.819 (0.00181)	0.929 (0.00115)	0.976 (0.00067)	1.004 (0.00075)	1.045 (0.00116)
0.3	0.884 (0.0015)	0.937 (0.00083)	0.978 (0.00055)	1.007 (0.00061)	1.051 (0.00091)
0.5	0.957 (0.00131)	0.969 (0.00085)	0.987 (0.00053)	1.013 (0.00052)	1.052 (0.00082)
0.7	1.018 (0.0025)	1.024 (0.00234)	1.031 (0.0022)	1.052 (0.0019)	1.086 (0.00156)
0.9	1.305 (0.00517)	1.306 (0.00513)	1.307 (0.00508)	1.31 (0.00491)	1.316 (0.00467)

Note: The table shows the estimated modulus from the dominant root $|\lambda_d|$. The bootstrap standard errors are below in parenthesis.
 q_d indicates the DAP quantile, q_g indicates the gas quantile.

430 *Simulation*


431 We use the QVAR estimates to simulate the multivariate distribution of the gas and the fertilizer
432 prices. The simulation for specification (4) produces unrealistic price scenarios that go to
433 infinity; thus, we will present the simulation results for specification (1). The price simulations
434 are then used to calculate the distribution of net present values (NPVs). Finally, we compare
435 the results with simulations from the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes (OUP). The parameters for
436 the simulation are found in Table 3.

437 *Table 3: Parameters for the stochastic processes*

	Gas price	Diammonium Phosphate Price
Long-run mean θ	8.93	393.41
Speed of reversion μ	0.05	0.015
Standard deviation σ	1.99	24.02


438 Note: this table indicates the parameters used in simulating the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes

439 Our analysis shows that all simulated NPVs are negative. The QVAR NPV distribution has
440 thinner tails and higher kurtosis than the OUP NPV distribution. This result reflects the negative
441 correlation between the lags in the QVAR being more important than the positive correlation
442 of the copulas between the FPI and the gas price distribution and the FPI and the DAP price
443 distribution. Consequently, the QVAR NPV distribution exhibits second-order stochastic
444 dominance over the OUP NPV distribution.



445

446 *Figure 2a: Cumulative density of NPV of investments into phosphorus recycling from dairy*
447 *wastewater. Simulations based on quantile vector autoregression (QVAR) and Ornstein-Uhlenbeck*
448 *Processes (OUP) representation of underlying price processes.*



449

450 *Figure 2b: Kernel density of NPV of investments into phosphorus recycling from dairy wastewater.*
 451 *Simulations based on quantile vector autoregression (QVAR) and Ornstein-Uhlenbeck Processes*
 452 *(OUP) representation of underlying price processes.*

453 The summary statistics in Table 4 show that the flexible QVAR simulations result in an NPV
 454 distribution that has a mean of about -1.6 million EUR while the OUP simulation's mean is
 455 lower at -1.7 million EUR. The standard deviation of the distribution at 74,605 is about half of
 456 the OUP's at 142,089. We conduct statistical tests for skewness and kurtosis. There, we find
 457 that the QVAR distribution has significant skew of -5.55, while the OUP skewness is not
 458 significantly different from zero. The Anscombe test finds that the QVAR distribution is
 459 leptokurtic indicating flat tails, while the OUP distribution is platykurtic or heavy-tailed.

460

461 Table 4: Summary statistics of the NPV simulations

Variables	<i>QVAR</i>	<i>OUP</i>
Min	-2,689,252	-2,093,424
Max	-1,477,048	-1,352,070
Mean	-1,616,032	-1,709,716
Standard Deviation	74,605	142,089.4
Skew	-5.55***	-0.03
Kurtosis	61.05***	2.67***

Note: The ***, ** and * in the skew and kurtosis rows indicate the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1,5, and 10 % percent level with the respective Agostino and Anscombe test indicating the absence of skew or kurtosis.

462 *Environmental Policies*


463 Phosphorus recycling is the focus of political considerations, which could have considerable
464 effects on the revenue of phosphorus recycling. The results in Table 5 show that the calculated
465 investment subsidy and the required disposal costs are not sensitive to the different investment
466 thresholds. The break-even revenue from avoiding sludge disposal is lower than the potential
467 costs for sludge disposal of 250 EUR described in Medina-Martos et al. (2020). For the mean
468 NPV threshold we see that disposal costs of around 130 EUR would make recycling profitable,
469 this corresponds to a 37 % subsidy of the mean DAP price⁴.

⁴ $133.92 / 358.39 \approx 0.37$

470

471 *Table 5: Necessary policy interventions to reach policy targets.*

Interventions	Policy targets	
	(1) All positive profit	(2) Average profit of zero
Investment subsidy in EUR	2,689,252	1,616,032
Avoiding the disposal of sludge in EUR/mt	222.86	133.92



472

473 *Figure 3: Function of certainty equivalents with respect to risk aversion in EUR.*

474 The certainty equivalents in Figure 4 imply that even at a negligible risk aversion level of
475 0,0003 the mean NPV doubles due to the high variance of the NPV distribution. The skewness
476 of the NPV distribution only contributes minimally to the certainty equivalent leading to
477 a linear function. Since the certainty equivalent is negative, we can interpret the values in figure

478 4 as minimum required subsidies in order to make decision makers with the respective x-axis
479 risk aversion level choose to invest in phosphorus recycling with uncertain profitability. Thus,
480 if policy makers want firms to invest in phosphorus recycling, they would have to compensate
481 the firms in with the certainty equivalent. The results indicate that even at low risk aversion
482 levels firms might require subsidies that are much higher than the mean NPV.

483 **Discussion**

484 Quantile Vector Autoregression (QVAR) combined with two bivariate copulas allowed us to
485 investigate the structure of the multivariate distribution of the prices of food, gas, and
486 Diammonium Phosphate (DAP). We find that the negative correlation between the gas and the
487 DAP price lags, particularly around the median, combined with low tail dependence, results in
488 lower variance of the NPV distribution compared to standard investment assessments that do
489 not consider price dependence. These results differ from other results looking at market
490 integration of nitrogen fertilizer and energy markets in the United States (Bekkerman et al.,
491 2021). This difference might stem from energy being even more crucial in nitrogen fertilizer
492 production than in phosphorus recycling. Moreover, price dynamics are less stable when gas
493 prices are high. Although our newly established methodology results in a lower variance of the
494 NPV distribution from investing in phosphorus recycling, the entire distribution is negative.
495 While findings from Uhlemann et al. (2024) suggest that phosphorus recycling can become
496 profitable with a combination of high phosphorus and low energy prices, our results show that
497 this scenario is highly unlikely. In addition, our work provides methodological innovations,
498 such as flexibly modelling price time series and employing the estimates to simulate NPVs, that
499 should be considered in future investment studies where prices are dependent on each other.

500 We modelled the future price of recycled phosphorus fertilizers by assuming that they are close
501 substitutes for conventional fertilizer and will therefore have the same price. However, on a

502 critical note, recycled fertilizers still must prove whether they can substitute for conventional
503 fertilizers in terms of fertilizing effectiveness (Velasco-Sánchez et al. 2023). Policies could
504 introduce standards that ensure agronomic equivalence of recycled fertilizers. In addition to the
505 political interventions, we quantified (investment subsidies and savings through avoiding
506 sludge disposal), policymakers might also incentivize the adoption of phosphorus recycling by
507 increasing the relative price of recycled fertilizer compared to conventional fertilizers, which
508 could make investments profitable (Koppellar and Weikard, 2013). Our empirical framework
509 can be extended to assess such policy interventions.

510 We now proceed to discuss limitations that stem from assumptions that were necessary to
511 conduct the research. Our method of estimating investment risk only captures price risk. Future
512 research might complement this by also considering other sources of risk. An analysis of
513 production risk can identify common shocks that change the production function of phosphorus
514 recycling (Lien et al., 2022). Potential shocks could be the breakdown of machinery or
515 heterogeneity in sludge. The analysis of policy risks can investigate the manner, the likelihood,
516 and magnitude of potential regulation on phosphorus recycling (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
517 Policies on the other hand might also play a significant role in the handful of phosphorus
518 producing countries. While often state-owned phosphorus mining companies might have
519 incentives to provide domestic farmers with affordable fertilizer, other companies might focus
520 purely on profit maximization from phosphorus mining. Therefore, idiosyncratic shocks in
521 specific phosphorus-producing countries might affect phosphorus policies (e.g., on trade) in
522 these countries which can have heterogeneous effects on global phosphorus markets. To
523 provide a more nuanced reflection of these potentially heterogenous effects across producing
524 countries, future research might engage in estimating producer specific supply curves and
525 simulating country specific shock and policy scenarios which in turn could further improve the
526 reflection of risk in phosphorus price related investments (Mew et al., 2023).

527 The negative NPV distribution with a large standard deviation indicates that the price risk
528 results in significant investment risk and non-profitability. Our here proposed procedure can be
529 considered as a first step of a more extensive investment assessment. However, due to the
530 negative returns and high risk of the investment, it is unlikely that investors will pursue such a
531 project without further technological developments and or investment support. Yet, future
532 research could more explicitly consider future technological development that makes the
533 recycling process more efficient and thereby more profitable. Furthermore, policy instruments
534 and their likelihood of being implemented can also be a useful extension of our model in future
535 research. If such technological changes materialize and supporting policies are implemented,
536 investments in phosphorus recycling might become less risky and more profitable. In case this
537 is fulfilled, further research could use Real Options Theory to better model investors' behaviour
538 in a positive modelling setting or derive optimal decision making in a normative way towards
539 such an analysis. Regarding the further policy support, beyond subsidies and saved disposal
540 cost considered here, other policies such as tradable pollution permits, a tax on unrecycled
541 phosphorus or requirements for recycled fertilizer in commercial fertilizers could raise the
542 incentives of the investment and be an interesting entry point for future research. Moreover,
543 future research should attempt to validate our results in a real-world setting using observational
544 data as soon as investments into phosphorus recycling are realized. Especially, the potential
545 disposal savings could be investigated in regions where the application of dairy processing
546 sludge as a fertilizer is already restricted.

547 Phosphorus is exchanged between countries through trade of phosphorus minerals and
548 agricultural commodities, which are produced with phosphorus and subsequently exported.
549 Barbieri et al. (2021) call this telecoupling and document the resulting threats to food system
550 resilience due to the dependence of many importers on few exporters. The phosphorus in the
551 soil has become scarce due to agricultural practices, while food production waste is rich in

552 phosphorus. This creates a paradox of simultaneous phosphorus scarcity and abundance. To
553 address this, phosphorus recycling is highlighted as a way to reduce both phosphorus scarcity
554 and pollution, thereby creating a more resilient food system. Brownlie et al. (2021) posit the
555 concept of phosphorus vulnerability analysing the potential impacts of shocks of the
556 phosphorus system along the dimensions of exposure to shocks, the sensitivity to said shocks,
557 and potential adaption pathways. Again, here widespread phosphorus recycling is seen as a
558 crucial lever to achieve sustainable food systems. However, our analysis shows that without
559 substantial public support, the adoption of recycling technologies is highly unlikely.

560 **Conclusion**

561 Phosphorus recycling is regarded as a key strategy for closing phosphorus cycles and reducing
562 dependence on phosphorus imports. We found that the dynamic processes of phosphorus and
563 gas prices are correlated. Moreover, this dynamic process remains stable in the lower part of
564 the distribution, but high gas prices significantly increase instability. Our results indicate that
565 phosphorus recycling entails substantial economic costs for investors. In fact, investments in
566 phosphorus recycling from dairy processing wastewater are unprofitable in all simulation
567 iterations. Unlike earlier studies with ambiguous findings on recovery profitability, our results
568 clearly indicate that phosphorus recycling from dairy wastewater is not viable without
569 significant policy support, making private investment highly unlikely.

570 Our results have implications for various stakeholders of phosphorus recycling namely policy
571 makers, the food industry, and future research. Based on our results, policymakers should not
572 expect phosphorus recycling to simultaneously solve sustainability issues and remain profitable
573 for recyclers. Achieving sustainable waste disposal with current technologies requires
574 substantial policy interventions. The food sector should integrate financial decision-making
575 about waste recycling into its risk management, potentially enabling a more optimal investment

576 portfolio than the single-decision approach considered here. Moreover, our results reveal a gap
577 between the aspirations for phosphorus recycling and its current feasibility. Research on
578 recycling should also examine how businesses decide in favour of recycling, beyond just
579 technological innovation. In addition to the economic hurdles, environmental considerations of
580 the large energy demand of the recycling process present further challenges (Behjat et al.,
581 2022). Methodologically, we provide an approach to more precisely quantify investment risk
582 in settings with non-linear input- and output-price price dependence of the investment.

583 In conclusion, we provide evidence on the quantile correlation between phosphorus and gas
584 prices to assess the investment risk of novel phosphorus recycling applications. This approach
585 enables us to simulate the price risk within historical multivariate price distribution, offering
586 insights into the feasibility of new technology investments. Currently, phosphorus recycling
587 from dairy processing wastewater is not profitable, exacerbated by variation in the net present
588 value due to price risk. To increase the adoption of phosphorus recycling, the investments
589 should be supported by targeted policies such as investment subsidies, waste disposal payments
590 and compensation for positive externalities.

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702 **Appendix A: Phosphorus Recycling**

703 *Potential Pathways*

704 For a better understanding of the research subject, we describe possible recycling pathways.
705 The recycling process can consist of a single application or a combination of different steps,
706 namely drying, Hydrothermal Carbonization, Pyrolysis, Precipitation, and Incineration. Drying
707 is usually the first step in treating wastewater sludge, the drying can vary in its energy intensity
708 by the degree of technology and time as an input. The drying step mitigates runoff and storage
709 issue but does not address the fertilizing effect and potential toxicity of waste sludge. Pyrolysis
710 is similar to Hydrothermal Carbonization with higher pressure and higher temperature. During
711 Incineration, the organic components of the sludge are burned, which yields an ash that can
712 easily divided in its components (Kabbe and Rinck-Pfeiffer 2019).

713 *Model Parameters*

714 The values for the estimation are taken from Uhlemann et al. (2024). We choose the technically
715 efficient process specification from Khalaf et al. (2022) for the NPV calculation. The
716 parameters describe the monthly cashflow of the investment model.

717 $83333.383 \text{ kg of sludge} = 100,000 \text{ t of milk} / 12 \text{ months} * 10 \text{ kg /t of sludge per milk}$

718 $83333.33 \text{ kg of sludge} * 73.04\% \text{ recovery ratio} * 0.05717706 \text{ phosphorus per kg of sludge}$

719 Exchange rate: 1 EUR to 1.08 Dollar

720 • I: Investment cost for Hydrothermal Carbonization and Precipitation in EUR

721 ○ $1,038 \text{ T EUR} = 252 \text{ T EUR} + 786 \text{ T EUR}$

722 • x: Gas usage in EUR/megajoule

723 ○ $0.9883244 \text{ kWh per kg of sludge} = 3557.968 \text{ KJ}$

- 724 ○ 296.4973 GJ = 296497308.36 kJ = 3557.968 KJ per kg of sludge * 83333.33 kg
- 725 • Z: Additional production costs in: EUR
- 726 ○ $4285.687 = 0.05142825 \text{ EUR per kg of sludge} * 83333.33 \text{ kg}$
- 727 • Disposal Savings:
- 728 ○ $83333.33 \text{ kg} / 1000\text{kg/t} * 245 \text{ EUR/T} = 20416.67 \text{ EUR}$
- 729 • q: DAP price in EUR/metric tons
- 730 • Phosphorus content in DAP: 46 %
- 731 ○ 7.480177 metric tons
- 732 ○ $7565.602 \text{ kg DAP} = 83333.33 \text{ kg of sludge} * 0.7304 \text{ recovery ratio} * 0.05717706$
 733 kg phosphorus per kg of sludge * (1 / 0.46)
- 734 • discount rate: 3 %

735 **Appendix B: Ornstein-Uhlenbeck Price Simulation**

736 $\delta pg_t = \mu_g(\theta_g - pg_t)\delta t + \sigma_g \delta W_t^g$

737 Here the gas prices change δpg_t is represented by a deterministic mean reversion term, with μ_g
 738 indicating the speed at which the process returns to the long-run mean θ_g . The random
 739 fluctuation stems from a Wiener Process δW_t^g with standard deviation σ_g .

740 A reformulation with the Euler-Maryama method can be estimated by OLS to retrieve the
 741 parameter used in the simulation.

742 $p_{t+\delta t} = \underbrace{(1 - \mu_i \cdot \delta t) \cdot p_t}_{\hat{\beta}_i} + \underbrace{\mu_i \cdot \theta_i \cdot \delta t}_{\alpha_i} + \xi \underset{\text{iid normally distributed}}{\underbrace{\sigma \cdot \sqrt{\delta t} \cdot \varepsilon}}$

743 $(\hat{\mu}, \hat{\theta}_i) = \left(\frac{1 - \hat{\beta}_i}{\delta t}, \frac{\hat{\alpha}_i}{1 - \hat{\beta}_i} \right) \hat{\sigma} = \sqrt{\frac{\text{Var}(\xi)}{\delta t}}$

744 **Appendix C: Regression**745 *Selection of regression specification*

746
$$\mathbf{P}_{t-1} = pg_{t-1} + pd_{t-1} + pf_{t-1} + pg_{t-2} + pd_{t-2} + pf_{t-2} \quad (1)$$

747
$$\mathbf{P}_{t-1} = pg_{t-1} + pd_{t-1} + pf_{t-1} + pg_{t-2} + pd_{t-2} + pf_{t-2} + pg_{t-3} + pd_{t-3} + pf_{t-3} \quad (2)$$

748
$$\mathbf{P}_{t-1} = pg_{t-1} + pd_{t-1} + pf_{t-1} + pg_{t-2} + pd_{t-2} + pf_{t-2} + tt_t \quad (3)$$

749
$$\mathbf{P}_{t-1} = pg_{t-1} + pd_{t-1} + pf_{t-1} + pg_{t-2} + pd_{t-2} + pf_{t-2} + pg_{t-1}^2 + pd_{t-1}^2 \quad (4)$$

750
$$\mathbf{P}_{t-1} = pg_{t-1} + pd_{t-1} + pf_{t-1} + pg_{t-2} + pd_{t-2} + pf_{t-2} + pg_{t-1}^2 + pd_{t-1}^2 + tt_t \quad (5)$$


751 *Table A1: Results for Information Criteria: Akaike, Hannan-Quinn, Schwarz-Bayesian, and Final*752 *Prediction Error*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
AIC(n)	10.60	10.59	10.59	10.47	10.47
HQ(n)	10.69	10.71	10.69	10.58	10.59
SC(n)	10.81	10.89	10.83	10.74	10.77
FPE(n)	40326.27	39734.37	39902.43	35239.57	35405.96

753 *Comparison of observed data and simulations*

754 Figures A1 and A2 compare probability distribution functions of the observed data with the
 755 simulated prices from all iteration. The figures show that the OUP prices are not very flexible,
 756 while the QVAR and the data distributions have multiple peaks. The axis on both distribution
 757 is limited by the maximum and minimum value indicating the absence of extreme prices.


Distribution of gas prices



758

759 *Figure A1: Distribution of gas prices from the observed data and the simulations*

Distribution of DAP prices



760

761 *Figure A2: Distribution of DAP prices from the observed data and the simulations*

762 *Regression Estimates*

763 The following tables A1-A5 show a selection of the regression results. They contain the results
764 from the VAR estimated by OLS and the quantile regression results for the major quantiles 10,
765 30, 50, 70 and 90 described in equations (7a-c). Those estimates are in three individual tables
766 each representing different dependent variables gas price, DAP price and the FPI in the
767 (Q)VAR. Moreover, this subsection contains the estimates for the 10, 30, 50, 70 and 90
768 quantiles of the copula regressions from equation (10 a-b) in tables A5 and A6. The Pseudo-R²
769 of the quantile regression is described in Koenker and Machado (1999). Lastly, the tables report
770 the dynamic stability results similar to table 2 in the main manuscript for the 10 and 90 quantiles
771 of the FPI in tables A7 and A8.

772

<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
	<i>pg_t</i>					
	<i>OLS</i>		<i>quantile regression</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>pg₁</i>	1.076*** (0.049)	0.753*** (0.216)	0.908*** (0.115)	1.104*** (0.048)	1.222*** (0.164)	1.678*** (0.150)
<i>pd₁</i>	0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.0005 (0.003)
<i>pf₁</i>	0.033 (0.050)	0.029 (0.041)	0.018 (0.015)	-0.003 (0.006)	0.002 (0.014)	0.012 (0.024)
<i>pg₂</i>	-0.214*** (0.049)	-0.123 (0.189)	-0.051 (0.104)	-0.132*** (0.040)	-0.213 (0.143)	-0.475*** (0.130)
<i>pd₂</i>	0.003 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.00001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)
<i>pf₂</i>	-0.117** (0.051)	0.010 (0.045)	-0.006 (0.015)	0.013** (0.006)	0.006 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.025)
Constant	-0.323 (0.265)	0.130 (0.162)	-0.002 (0.053)	0.001 (0.028)	-0.204*** (0.066)	-0.572*** (0.099)
Observations	404	404	404	404	404	404
R ²	0.911			Pseudo-R ²		
Adjusted R ²	0.910	0.677	0.785	0.837	0.848	0.872

Note: The price lags are denoted by subscript indicating the lag *i* in *t-i*. The quantile regression standard errors are calculated by bootstrapping. The stars denote significance levels of 10 %, 5 % and 1 % as *, **, *** respectively. The Pseudo-R² for quantile regression is described in Koenker and Machado (1999).

Dependent variable: pd_t						
	<i>OLS</i>		<i>quantile regression</i>			
	.1	.3	.5	.7	.9	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
pg_1	0.600 (0.571)	0.623 (2.724)	0.260 (0.769)	1.171 (0.728)	0.531 (1.450)	-0.774 (2.544)
pd_1	1.378*** (0.043)	1.396*** (0.154)	1.358*** (0.037)	1.437*** (0.035)	1.415*** (0.051)	1.338*** (0.048)
pf_1	0.970* (0.580)	-0.519 (1.184)	0.120 (0.371)	0.486 (0.350)	1.115*** (0.392)	2.014*** (0.637)
pg_2	-0.492 (0.566)	-0.124 (2.486)	-0.373 (0.819)	-1.227** (0.606)	-0.381 (1.736)	1.952 (2.941)
pd_2	-0.400*** (0.045)	-0.529*** (0.159)	-0.384*** (0.035)	-0.439*** (0.035)	-0.401*** (0.054)	-0.289*** (0.054)
pf_2	3.439*** (0.589)	0.055 (1.264)	1.546*** (0.342)	1.334*** (0.351)	1.982*** (0.418)	4.243*** (0.832)
Constant	6.572** (3.062)	16.022*** (4.306)	3.322** (1.359)	0.948 (1.202)	0.596 (1.468)	-0.672 (3.523)
Observations	404	404	404	404	404	404
R ²	0.980			Pseudo-R ²		
Adjusted R ²	0.979	0.805	0.879	0.905	0.907	0.909

Note: The price lags are denoted by subscript indicating the lag i in $t-i$. The quantile regression standard errors are calculated by bootstrapping. The stars denote significance levels of 10 %, 5 % and 1 % as *, **, *** respectively. The Pseudo-R² for quantile regression is described in Koenker and Machado (1999).

<i>Dependent variable:</i>						
	<i>pf_t</i>					
	<i>OLS</i>			<i>quantile regression</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>pg₁</i>	0.076 (0.049)	0.170** (0.085)	0.095* (0.052)	0.069 (0.052)	0.029 (0.201)	-0.195* (0.117)
<i>pd₁</i>	-0.0004 (0.004)	0.012 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.0003 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.006)
<i>pf₁</i>	0.370*** (0.050)	0.233*** (0.083)	0.176*** (0.053)	0.319*** (0.051)	0.431*** (0.081)	0.598*** (0.064)
<i>pg₂</i>	-0.042 (0.049)	-0.055 (0.073)	-0.045 (0.073)	-0.076* (0.043)	-0.059 (0.252)	0.287** (0.141)
<i>pd₂</i>	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.023* (0.013)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.003 (0.008)	0.006 (0.007)
<i>pf₂</i>	0.063 (0.051)	-0.110 (0.105)	0.019 (0.050)	0.062 (0.056)	0.133 (0.081)	0.089* (0.046)
Constant	0.643** (0.265)	0.125 (0.416)	0.059 (0.216)	0.122 (0.195)	0.570* (0.302)	0.927*** (0.157)
Observations	404	404	404	404	404	404
R ²	0.191			Pseudo-R ²		
Adjusted R ²	0.179	0.210	0.094	0.072	0.107	0.233

Note: The price lags are denoted by subscript indicating the lag *i* in *t-i*. The quantile regression standard errors are calculated by bootstrapping. The stars denote significance levels of 10 %, 5 % and 1 % as *, **, *** respectively. The Pseudo-R² for quantile regression is described in Koenker and Machado (1999).

779 *Table A5: Quantile estimates: Conditional Gas copula*

<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	q_g				
	.1 (1)	.3 (2)	.5 (3)	.7 (4)	.9 (5)
q_f	0.072 (0.047)	0.111 (0.074)	0.143* (0.076)	0.182** (0.077)	0.100* (0.051)
Constant	0.050* (0.028)	0.240*** (0.034)	0.403*** (0.040)	0.566*** (0.050)	0.814*** (0.031)
Observations	403	403	403	403	403

Note: q_d and q_f denote the quantile distribution of DAP and the FPI. The quantile regression standard errors are calculated by bootstrapping. The stars denote significance levels of 10 %, 5 % and 1 % as *, **, *** respectively.

780 *Table A6: Quantile estimates: Conditional DAP copula*

<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	q_d				
	.1 (1)	.3 (2)	.5 (3)	.7 (4)	.9 (5)
q_f	0.078 (0.050)	-0.099 (0.079)	-0.073 (0.088)	0.000 (0.077)	0.000 (0.051)
Constant	0.048* (0.029)	0.330*** (0.054)	0.510*** (0.045)	0.690*** (0.039)	0.890*** (0.034)
Observations	403	403	403	403	403

Note: q_d and q_f denote the quantile distribution of DAP and the FPI. The quantile regression standard errors are calculated by bootstrapping. The stars denote significance levels of 10 %, 5 % and 1 % as *, **, *** respectively.

781

782 *Dynamic stability results for different FPI quantiles*

783 *Table A7: Modulus of the dominant root for selected gas and DAP quantiles at the 0.1 quantile FPI*

q_d	0.1	0.3	0.5	0.7	0.9
q_g					
0.1	0.828 (0.00184)	0.909 (0.00137)	0.947 (0.00119)	0.962 (0.00143)	0.989 (0.00181)
0.3	0.887 (0.00148)	0.925 (0.001)	0.956 (0.00085)	0.977 (0.00096)	1.005 (0.00133)
0.5	0.958 (0.00129)	0.968 (0.00092)	0.979 (0.00071)	0.997 (0.00063)	1.021 (9e-04)
0.7	1.02 (0.00247)	1.025 (0.00233)	1.03 (0.00223)	1.046 (0.002)	1.069 (0.00175)
0.9	1.306 (0.00516)	1.307 (0.0051)	1.308 (0.00506)	1.311 (0.0049)	1.316 (0.0047)

Note: The table shows the estimated modulus from the dominant root $|\lambda_d|$. The bootstrap standard errors are below in parenthesis.
 q_d indicates the DAP quantile, q_g indicates the gas quantile.

784 *Table A8: Modulus of the dominant root for selected gas and DAP quantiles at the 0.9 quantile FPI*

q_d	0.1	0.3	0.5	0.7	0.9
q_g					
0.1	0.818 (0.00177)	0.943 (0.00103)	0.991 (0.00055)	1.024 (7e-04)	1.074 (0.00104)
0.3	0.883 (0.0015)	0.946 (8e-04)	0.991 (5e-04)	1.026 (0.00063)	1.077 (0.00092)
0.5	0.957 (0.00131)	0.971 (0.00079)	0.995 (0.00048)	1.028 (0.00058)	1.077 (0.00089)
0.7	1.018 (0.00251)	1.023 (0.00233)	1.033 (0.00215)	1.059 (0.00182)	1.101 (0.00147)
0.9	1.305 (0.00518)	1.305 (0.00516)	1.306 (0.00509)	1.31 (0.00492)	1.317 (0.00463)

Note: The table shows the estimated modulus from the dominant root $|\lambda_d|$. The bootstrap standard errors are below in parenthesis.
 q_d indicates the DAP quantile, q_g indicates the gas quantile.

785