

# *An Introduction to Mathematical Cryptography*

## Notes and Exercises

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### Chapter 1

**Exercise (1.5).** Suppose  $A$  is an alphabet of  $n$  letters.

- (a) There are  $n!$  simple substitution ciphers on  $A$ .
- (b) Define the function  $!n$  recursively by<sup>1</sup>

$$!n = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } n = 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } n = 1 \\ n! - \sum_{k=1}^n \binom{n}{k} \cdot !(n-k) & \text{if } n > 1 \end{cases}$$

- (i) There are  $!n$  simple substitution ciphers on  $A$  leaving no letters fixed.
- (ii) There are  $n! - !n$  simple substitution ciphers on  $A$  leaving at least one letter fixed.
- (iii) There are  $n \cdot !(n-1)$  simple substitution ciphers on  $A$  leaving exactly one letter fixed.
- (iv) There are  $n! - !n - n \cdot !(n-1)$  simple substitution ciphers on  $A$  leaving at least two letters fixed.

*Proof.* For (a), note that a simple substitution cipher on  $A$  is just a permutation of  $A$ , and there are  $n!$  permutations of  $A$ .

For (b), we prove (i) by induction on  $n$ . Cases  $n = 0, 1$  are trivial. Suppose  $n > 1$  and the result is true for all  $m < n$ . Let  $\varphi_k$  be the number of permutations

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<sup>1</sup>A more efficient recursive definition for  $n > 1$  is given by  $!n = (n-1)[!(n-1) + !(n-2)]$ .

of  $A$  fixing exactly  $k$  elements, for  $1 \leq k \leq n$ . Clearly the desired number is

$$n! - \sum_{k=1}^n \varphi_k$$

To compute  $\varphi_k$ , note that in order to permute the elements of  $A$  while fixing  $k$  elements, we must choose  $k$  elements to fix and then permute the remaining  $n - k$  elements without fixing any of them. The number of possible ways to choose  $k$  elements from  $A$  is just  $\binom{n}{k}$ . By induction, the number of ways to permute the remaining  $n - k$  elements without fixing any of them is  $!(n - k)$ . So  $\varphi_k = \binom{n}{k} \cdot !(n - k)$ .

Now (ii) follows trivially from (a) and (i); (iii) follows from the proof of (ii) by taking  $\varphi_1$ ; and (iv) follows trivially from (a), (i), and (iii).  $\square$

For example, when  $n = 4$ , there are 24 simple substitution ciphers, 9 of which leave no letters fixed, 15 of which leave at least one letter fixed, 8 of which leave exactly one letter fixed, and 7 of which leave at least two letters fixed.

**Exercise (1.11).** Let  $a$  and  $b$  be positive integers.

- (a) If  $u$  and  $v$  are integers with  $au + bv = 1$ , then  $\gcd(a, b) = 1$ .
- (b) If  $u$  and  $v$  are integers with  $au + bv = 6$ , it is not necessarily true that  $\gcd(a, b) = 6$ , but  $\gcd(a, b)$  will be a divisor of 6.
- (c) If  $(u_1, v_1)$  and  $(u_2, v_2)$  are solutions of  $au + bv = 1$ , then  $a$  divides  $v_2 - v_1$  and  $b$  divides  $u_2 - u_1$ .
- (d) If  $g = \gcd(a, b)$  and  $(u_0, v_0)$  is a solution to  $au + bv = g$ , then each other solution has the form

$$u = u_0 + \frac{kb}{g} \quad v = v_0 - \frac{ka}{g}$$

for some integer  $k$ .

*Proof.* (a) Trivially  $1 \mid a$  and  $1 \mid b$ . If  $d \mid a$  and  $d \mid b$ , then  $d \mid au$  and  $d \mid bv$ , so  $d \mid au + bv = 1$ .

- (b) Let  $a = b = 3$  and  $u = v = 1$ . Then  $au + bv = 6 \neq 3 = \gcd(a, b)$ . The second claim follows from the proof of (a).

(c) We have

$$\begin{aligned} au_1 + bv_1 &= au_2 + bv_2 \\ au_1 - au_2 &= bv_2 - bv_1 \\ a(u_1 - u_2) &= b(v_2 - v_1) \end{aligned}$$

Now  $a \mid b(v_2 - v_1)$ , but  $\gcd(a, b) = 1$  by (a), so  $a \mid v_2 - v_1$ . Similarly  $b \mid u_2 - u_1$ .

(d) If  $(u, v)$  is another solution, then

$$au_0 + bv_0 = au + bv = g$$

Dividing by  $g$ , this becomes

$$\frac{a}{g}u_0 + \frac{b}{g}v_0 = \frac{a}{g}u + \frac{b}{g}v = 1$$

Let  $a' = a/g$  and  $b' = b/g$ . By the proof of (c), there exists  $k$  such that  $ka' = v_0 - v$  and  $kb' = u - u_0$ , so

$$u = u_0 + kb' = u_0 + \frac{kb}{g} \quad v = v_0 - ka' = v_0 - \frac{ka}{g} \quad \square$$

**Exercise (1.21).** Let  $m > 1$ .

(a) If  $m$  is odd, then  $(m+1)/2 = 2^{-1} \pmod{m}$ .

(b) If  $b > 0$  and  $m \equiv 1 \pmod{b}$ , then

$$\frac{(b-1)(m-1)}{b} + 1 = b^{-1} \pmod{m}$$

*Proof.* Note (a) follows from (b) by taking  $b = 2$ , so it is sufficient to prove (b).

Since  $b \mid m-1$ , the quantity on the left of the equation is an integer, and since  $m > 1$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} 0 &\leq (b-1)(m-1) < b(m-1) \\ 0 &\leq \frac{(b-1)(m-1)}{b} < m-1 \\ 1 &\leq \frac{(b-1)(m-1)}{b} + 1 \leq m-1 \end{aligned}$$

Finally,

$$b \left[ \frac{(b-1)(m-1)}{b} + 1 \right] = (b-1)(m-1) + b = (b-1)m + 1 \equiv 1 \pmod{m} \quad \square$$

**Exercise (1.26).** There are infinitely many primes.

*Proof.* Suppose there are only finitely many primes, say  $p_1, \dots, p_k$ . Let

$$N = p_1 \cdots p_k + 1$$

By the fundamental theorem of arithmetic, there exists a prime  $p$  with  $p \mid N$ , so  $N \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$ . But by assumption,  $p = p_i$  for some  $1 \leq i \leq k$ , so  $p \mid p_1 \cdots p_k$  and hence  $N \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$ , a contradiction.  $\square$

**Exercise (1.33).** If  $p$  is prime,  $q = (p - 1)/2$  is also prime,  $0 < g < p$ ,  $g \not\equiv \pm 1 \pmod{p}$ , and  $g^q \not\equiv 1 \pmod{p}$ , then  $g$  is a primitive root mod  $p$ .

*Proof.* Let  $n$  be the order of  $g \pmod{p}$ . We claim  $n = p - 1$ .

By assumption,  $g^q \not\equiv 1 \pmod{p}$ , but by Fermat's little theorem,

$$(g^q)^2 = g^{2q} = g^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$$

Therefore  $g^q$  has order 2 mod  $p$ , and hence  $2 \mid n$  by Lagrange's theorem. If  $n = 2$ , then  $g^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$ , hence  $g \equiv \pm 1 \pmod{p}$ , contrary to our assumption. So we must have  $n > 2$ .

Now  $n \mid p - 1$ , so  $p - 1 = nk = 2jk$  for some integers  $j$  and  $k$  with  $j > 1$ . But since  $jk = (p - 1)/2 = q$  is prime, this means  $k = 1$  and hence  $n = p - 1$  as desired.  $\square$

**Exercise (1.46).** The XOR cipher defined on bit strings by

$$e_k(m) = k \oplus m \quad \text{and} \quad d_k(c) = k \oplus c$$

is not secure against a chosen plaintext attack.

*Proof.* If the pair  $m$  and  $c = k \oplus m$  are known, then  $k$  is easily recovered as

$$c \oplus m = (k \oplus m) \oplus m = k \oplus (m \oplus m) = k \oplus 0 = k \quad \square$$

For example, working with 16-bit strings, if  $m = 0010010000101100$  and  $c = 1001010001010111$ , then  $k = 1011000001111011$ .

## Chapter 2

**Exercise (2.3).** Let  $g$  be a primitive root modulo  $p$ . Define

$$\log_g : \mathbb{F}_p^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}/(p-1)\mathbb{Z}$$

as follows: for  $h \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$ ,  $\log_g(h) = x$  if and only if  $0 \leq x < p-1$  and  $g^x = h$ . Then  $\log_g$  witnesses an isomorphism from  $\mathbb{F}_p^*$  to  $\mathbb{Z}/(p-1)\mathbb{Z}$ .

*Proof.* First observe that  $\log_g$  is well defined. Since  $g$  is a primitive root mod  $p$ , for each  $h \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$  there exists at least one  $0 \leq x < p-1$  such that  $g^x = h$ . If  $0 \leq x, y < p-1$  and  $g^x = h = g^y$ , then  $g^{x-y} = 1$ , so  $p-1 \mid x-y$  and hence  $x = y$ .

Observe also that  $\log_g$  is injective. If  $h_1, h_2 \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$  and  $\log_g h_1 = x = \log_g h_2$ , then  $h_1 = g^x = h_2$ . Since  $\mathbb{F}_p^*$  and  $\mathbb{Z}/(p-1)\mathbb{Z}$  both have order  $p-1$ , this also shows that  $\log_g$  is surjective, and hence bijective.

If  $h_1, h_2 \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$ , we claim that

$$\log_g(h_1 h_2) \equiv \log_g h_1 + \log_g h_2 \pmod{p-1}$$

Indeed, let  $x_1 = \log_g h_1$  and  $x_2 = \log_g h_2$ , so  $h_1 = g^{x_1}$  and  $h_2 = g^{x_2}$ . Then  $h_1 h_2 = g^{x_1} g^{x_2} = g^{x_1 + x_2}$ , so  $\log_g(h_1 h_2) \equiv x_1 + x_2 \pmod{p-1}$  as claimed. This shows that  $\log_g$  is a homomorphism, and since it is bijective, an isomorphism.  $\square$

Note by induction and the fact that  $\log_g(h^{-1}) \equiv -\log_g(h) \pmod{p-1}$  for all  $h \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$ , it also follows that

$$\log_g(h^n) \equiv n \log_g h \pmod{p-1}$$

for all  $h \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$  and  $n \in \mathbb{Z}$ .

**Exercise (2.4).** Using the brute force algorithm of computing powers  $g^x \pmod{p}$  manually for  $x = 0, 1, 2, \dots$  we obtain the following discrete logarithms:

(a)  $\log_2 13 = 7 \pmod{23}$

(b)  $\log_{10} 22 = 11 \pmod{47}$

(c)  $\log_{627} 608 = 18 \pmod{941}$

**Exercise (2.5).** Let  $p$  be an odd prime and  $g$  be a primitive root modulo  $p$ . Then  $a$  has a square root modulo  $p$  if and only if  $\log_g a$  is even.

*Proof.* Since  $\log_g$  is a homomorphism (Exercise 2.3), we know that

$$\log_g(x^2) \equiv 2\log_g(x) \pmod{p-1}$$

for all  $x \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$ , from which the desired result follows immediately.  $\square$

**Exercise (2.9).** A Diffie-Hellman oracle can be used to decrypt arbitrary ElGamal ciphertexts.

*Proof.* Let  $p$  and  $g$  be known parameters for ElGamal encryption. Given an ElGamal ciphertext  $(c_1, c_2)$ , we know that  $c_1 = g^k \pmod{p}$  for some ephemeral key  $k$  and  $c_2 = mA^k = m(g^a)^k = mg^{ak} \pmod{p}$  for some plaintext message  $m$  and public key  $A = g^a \pmod{p}$  with corresponding private key  $a$ . Now given  $A = g^a$  and  $c_2 = g^k$ , a Diffie-Hellman oracle provides us with  $g^{ak}$ , with which we can easily compute  $m = c_2(g^{ak})^{-1}$ .  $\square$

This result shows that decrypting arbitrary ElGamal ciphertexts is no harder than the Diffie-Hellman problem. Together with the converse result (Proposition 2.10), this result shows that the difficulty of decrypting arbitrary ElGamal ciphertexts is equal to that of the Diffie-Hellman problem.

**Exercise (2.17).** Using the Shanks algorithm, we obtain the following discrete logarithms:

(a)  $\log_{11} 21 = 37 \pmod{71}$

First we compute  $n = \lfloor \sqrt{71} \rfloor + 1 = 8 + 1 = 9$ . For  $i = 0, \dots, 9$  we compute values  $11^i \pmod{71}$  to obtain the following list:

$i$	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
$11^i \pmod{71}$	1	11	50	53	15	23	40	14	12	61

Now we compute  $u = 11^{-n} = 11^{-9} = (11^9)^{-1} = 61^{-1} = 7 \pmod{71}$ . For  $j = 0, \dots, 9$  we compute values  $21 \cdot 7^j \pmod{71}$  until we find a match:

$j$	0	1	2	3	4
$21 \cdot 7^j \pmod{71}$	21	5	35	32	11

We find a match 11 at  $i = 1$  and  $j = 4$ , so  $x = i + jn = 1 + 4 \cdot 9 = 37$  is the logarithm. Indeed,  $11^{37} \equiv 21 \pmod{71}$ .

**Exercise (2.18).** Using the Chinese remainder algorithm, we obtain solutions to the following systems of congruences:

(a)  $x \equiv 3 \pmod{7}$  and  $x \equiv 4 \pmod{9}$ .

We start with the solution  $x = 3$  to the first congruence. To find a solution to both congruences, we must find a solution to the second congruence which lies in the solution space of the first, which is  $x + 7y$  for  $y \in \mathbb{Z}$ . Such a solution must satisfy

$$\begin{aligned} 3 + 7y &\equiv 4 \pmod{9} \\ 7y &\equiv 1 \pmod{9} \\ y &\equiv 4 \pmod{9} \end{aligned} \quad \text{since } 7^{-1} \equiv 4 \pmod{9}$$

We take  $y = 4$  to yield the solution  $3 + 7 \cdot 4 = 31$ . Indeed,  $31 \equiv 3 \pmod{7}$  and  $31 \equiv 4 \pmod{9}$  as desired.

(d)  $x \equiv 5 \pmod{9}$  and  $x \equiv 6 \pmod{10}$  and  $x \equiv 7 \pmod{11}$ .

We start with the solution  $x = 5$  to the first congruence. Proceeding as in (a), we obtain a solution to the first and second congruences by solving

$$\begin{aligned} 5 + 9y &\equiv 6 \pmod{10} \\ 9y &\equiv 1 \pmod{10} \\ y &\equiv 9 \pmod{10} \end{aligned} \quad \text{since } 9^{-1} \equiv 9 \pmod{10}$$

We take  $y = 9$  to yield the solution  $5 + 9 \cdot 9 = 86$ . Indeed,  $86 \equiv 5 \pmod{9}$  and  $86 \equiv 6 \pmod{10}$  as desired.

To find a solution to all three congruences, we must find a solution to the third congruence which lies in the *intersection* of the solution spaces of the first two, which is  $86 + 9 \cdot 10z$  for  $z \in \mathbb{Z}$ . Such a solution must satisfy

$$\begin{aligned} 86 + 90z &\equiv 7 \pmod{11} \\ 9 + 2z &\equiv 7 \pmod{11} \\ 2z &\equiv 9 \pmod{11} \\ z &\equiv 10 \pmod{11} \end{aligned} \quad \text{since } 2^{-1} \equiv 6 \pmod{11}$$

We take  $z = 10$  to yield the solution  $86 + 90 \cdot 10 = 986$ . Indeed,  $986 \equiv 5 \pmod{9}$ ,  $986 \equiv 6 \pmod{10}$ , and  $986 \equiv 7 \pmod{11}$ .

**Exercise (2.25).** Let  $p$  and  $q$  be distinct odd primes and let  $n = pq$ .

- (a) If  $\gcd(a, n) = 1$  and  $a$  has a square root modulo  $n$ , then  $a$  has four square roots modulo  $n$ .

*Proof.* (a) Let  $r$  be a square root of  $a$  modulo  $n$ . Then  $x$  is a square root of  $a$  modulo  $n$  if and only if  $x^2 \equiv a \equiv r^2 \pmod{n}$ , which is true if and only if  $x^2 \equiv r^2 \pmod{p}$  and  $x^2 \equiv r^2 \pmod{q}$ , which is true if and only if  $x \equiv \pm r \pmod{p}$  and  $x \equiv \pm r \pmod{q}$ , since  $p$  and  $q$  are distinct primes.

This implies that the square roots of  $a$  modulo  $n$  are just the solutions to the following systems of congruences:

$$x \equiv r \pmod{p} \quad \text{and} \quad x \equiv r \pmod{q} \quad (1)$$

$$x \equiv r \pmod{p} \quad \text{and} \quad x \equiv -r \pmod{q} \quad (2)$$

$$x \equiv -r \pmod{p} \quad \text{and} \quad x \equiv r \pmod{q} \quad (3)$$

$$x \equiv -r \pmod{p} \quad \text{and} \quad x \equiv -r \pmod{q} \quad (4)$$

Since  $p \neq q$ , the Chinese remainder theorem guarantees that for each one of these systems, there is a unique solution modulo  $n = pq$ . This implies that there are *at most* four square roots of  $a$  modulo  $n$ .

Now  $r$  is one of the roots, and clearly so is  $-r$ . Note  $r$  is also a unit since  $a$  is a unit (because  $\gcd(a, n) = 1$ ). If  $r \equiv -r \pmod{n}$ , then  $1 \equiv -1 \pmod{n}$ , so  $2 \equiv 0 \pmod{n}$ —a contradiction since  $n > 2$ . Therefore  $r$  and  $-r$  are distinct. Note  $r$  satisfies the first system, and  $-r$  satisfies the last system. Let  $s$  be the solution to the second system. Then  $-s$  is the solution to the third system, and  $s$  and  $-s$  are also distinct. If  $r \equiv s \pmod{n}$ , then  $r \equiv -r \pmod{q}$ , so  $2 \equiv 0 \pmod{q}$ —a contradiction since  $q > 2$ . Therefore  $r$  and  $s$  are distinct. Similarly  $r$  and  $-s$  are distinct since  $p > 2$ . Therefore  $\{\pm r, \pm s\}$  are the four square roots of  $a$  modulo  $n$ .  $\square$

## References

- [1] Hoffstein, J. and J. Pipher and J. H. Silverman. *An Introduction to Mathematical Cryptography*. Springer, 2008.