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Valuation and emotion according to John Dewey

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The role of morals, ethics and values in economics is a much-discussed topic. The purpose of this article is to review the pragmatist philosopher John Dewey's contribution to this debate. He particularly points out the importance of emotion. Indeed, emotion has remained a blind spot in the author's thinking on values, given the extent to which the debate on rationality and value has taken precedence. We begin by showing the contiguity of the notions of valuation and emotion in the author's thinking. We then discuss the role of emotion in the conduct of moral inquiry by situating his thinking in relation to emotivism, before more specifically addressing the role of emotion in Dewey's thinking. Finally, we discuss how Dewey's thinking can contribute to the debate on values and valuation in economics.

Key words: Emotion, Valuation, Dewey, Moral judgment
JEL classifications: B25, B41, D91

1. Introduction

For a little over a decade, economic analysis has been re-reading the thought of the pragmatist philosopher John Dewey. In particular, works have highlighted the interest if his analysis of habit transformation (Cohen, 2007; Jung, 2010; Cuffari, 2011; Pratten, 2015; Pedwell, 2017) and the role of emotions in this transformation (Cohen, 2007; Morse, 2010; Pedwell, 2017; Petit and Ballet, 2021). We extend these analyses by highlighting the role of emotions in value inquiry.

Throughout his career, John Dewey developed the idea that values are generated in society and that they can (and should) be subjected to rigorous methods of inquiry. Dewey developed his thinking in numerous texts written over a protracted period of time, from the end of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century. Initially proposed in lectures given at the University of Chicago in 1898 (Dewey, 1898A, 1898B), and subsequently extended by his reflections on ethics in 1908 (*Ethics*, a work co-authored with Tufts, revised and republished in 1932), Dewey's analysis can also be found in articles published in 1915 (*The logic of judgments of practice*), 1918 (*The objects of valuation*), 1922 (*Valuation and Experimental Knowledge*), 1923 (*Values, Liking and Thought*) and

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in 1925A (*Value, Objective Reference and Criticism*) as well as in his works on education and democracy (*Democracy and Education*, 1916; *Experience and Education*, 1938B). This analysis is further developed in the last chapter of Dewey's book *Experience and Nature* (*EN,* 1925B), and again in Chapter IX of *Logic, Theory of Inquiry*, published in 1938A. However, the real keys to interpreting the pragmatist author's conception of value formation are found in *Valuation Theory* (1939). This text elicited an impressive number of comments in the field of philosophy (Schneider, 1939; Zink, 1942; Rice, 1943; Mitchell, 1945; White, 1949; Fingarette, 1951; Ezorsky, 1958; Eames, 1961). Dewey responded to the first criticisms in a series of texts on the question of valuation published in the 1940s (1941A, 1941B, 1943A, 1943B, 1944, in particular).[1]

Upon its reception, Dewey's work (1939) was partly misunderstood. The importance of emotion was underestimated. Indeed, this has remained a blind spot in the author's thinking on values, given the extent to which the debate on rationality and value has taken precedence. However, many authors today recognise the crucial role of emotion in the pragmatist author's conception of morality (Pappas, 1993, 1997A, 1997B; Rommetveit et al., 2013; Fesmire, 2018; Anderson, 2019; Quéré, 2020; Dreon, 2021). In the fields of philosophy, sociology and aesthetics, these authors underline the affective, qualitative or even imaginative scope of the inquiry suggested by Dewey. Hereafter, we extend this analysis by showing how, in economics, emotion influences the capacity to anticipate the moral choices made by individuals.

We begin by showing the contiguity of the notions of valuation and emotion in the author's thinking (Section 2). We then discuss the role of emotion in the conduct of moral inquiry by situating his thinking in relation to emotivism (Section 3), before more specifically addressing the role of emotion in the inquiry (Section 4). Finally, we discuss how Dewey's thinking can contribute to the debate on values and valuation in economics (Section 5).

2. Comparison of the concepts of valuation and emotion in John Dewey's work

As we pointed out in the introduction, Dewey's work on values has been the subject of many articles and books. However, his thinking on ethics relates to the more general field of experience or inquiry,[2] a central concept in Dewey's constructs (1938A). Value is a component of any immediate experience (or inquiry) in the sense that we like or dislike what we encounter, or what is happening. Making a value judgment—what Dewey calls a valuation—can therefore be seen as a certain kind of experience in which the process of inquiry is reinforced. Valuation and emotion thus share the fact that they can be understood via the notion of inquiry. We begin by examining the extent of the similarities shared by the concepts of valuation and emotion with regard to inquiry.

Emotion and valuation are comparable in the sense that (a) they have an objective dimension, (b) they are the result of a transaction between the subject and its environment, (c) they both correspond to a "mode of behaviour" and occur for similar reasons

[1] Texts republished in 1946 in *Problems of men* (Part 3, *Values and Thought*).

[2] In Dewey's texts, inquiry is a specific kind of experience, occurring when a situation becomes indeterminate or morally problematic. The term inquiry leans more towards the reflexive part of moral judgment and decision. Hereafter, we will therefore favour this term.

(d). They also have an "ordinary" aspect (e). In addition, emotion and valuation are malleable and "plastic" notions (f).

For Dewey, emotion has, first and foremost, an *objective dimension* (a). If individuals are afraid or angry, for example, it is primarily because their environment is potentially dangerous or unjust. Similarly, '[v]alues are values, things immediately having certain intrinsic qualities. Of them as values there is accordingly nothing to be said; they are what they are' (Dewey, *EN*, 1925B, p. 396). Simply put, values are, first and foremost, facts (in the same way as desires, as we shall see later): they are part of what occurs, of what happens. They emerge as the result of a direct appraisal (positive or negative) of the immediate qualities of a situation, an event or an object.

Like emotions, valuations emerge from the life process under certain specific conditions of *interaction* (or rather transaction) of *the organism with its environment* (b). Values 'change and vanish not only with changes in the environing medium but with changes in ourselves' (Dewey, *EN*, 1925B, p. 399). Consequently, values and emotions do not relate to purely private events but can be observed publicly in the kind of attitude the organism exhibits towards the objects to which it attaches importance. One consequence of this immersion of value in the subject's environment is that valuation (like emotion) must be analysed in a social and cultural context. In this sense, values depend on habits, customs, norms and/or institutions.

In connection with this life process, valuations, as well as emotions, correspond to a *mode of behaviour* (c) that aims to restore *the balance* between the organism and its environment in order to integrate or unify it. This integration is the very principle of the inquiry and its potential completeness. According to Dewey (1939, p. 54, emphasis added) '[u]ntil there is actual or threatened shock and disturbance of a situation, there is a green light to go ahead in immediate act – overt action. There is no need, no desire, and *no valuation*, just as where there is no doubt, *there is no cause of inquiry*'. However, emotion and valuation come into play at different phases of the inquiry. Emotion arises as soon as a 'problematic situation' (irrespective of its nature) arises: this situation is at the origin of the inquiry and initiates it. In turn, moral inquiry begins when individuals raise the question of the value of a good (which they had previously desired unquestioningly) by examining the relative value of that good in relation to other goods and other possible ends. In a certain manner, as we shall see later, moral judgment (i.e. valuation) acknowledges an existing desire and questions its nature. What is desired is examined in terms of its potential or actual anticipated consequences.

The *motives* that trigger an inquiry are also similar or related (d). Emotion initiates an experience in very general cases (even if, of course, it is also mobilised in the case of value judgments). When conflict between dissonant or incompatible behaviours occurs, or when the environment and the organism are misaligned, emotion signals this imbalance. In the case of morality, valuation only occurs when 'there is some trouble to be done away with, some need, lack, or privation to be made good, some conflict or tendencies to be resolved by means of changing existing conditions' (Dewey, 1939, p. 34). Again, the link between valuation and desire is emphasised.

Valuation and emotion also have a very *ordinary* aspect (e) that should be underlined. Both notions are mobilised in the vast majority of Dewey's texts and are commonly found in our everyday life. For Dewey (1934), aesthetic emotion and the associated experience (i.e. inquiry) are exemplary in the sense that in this case, emotion brings about a perfect and complete integration (of the artist with their work). Dewey (1934),

however, points out that emotion comes into play in everyday life. Similarly, for valuations, far from a moral ideal, they

> are not traits of rare and festal occasions; they occur whenever any object is welcomed and lingered over; whenever it arouses aversion and protest; even though the lingering be but momentary and the aversion a passing glance toward something else. (Dewey, EN, 1925B, p. 400)

Therefore, valuation is, in particular, triggered by an aversion, a rejection, a lack or a need. In other words, it occurs for quite common and frequent reasons. Moral decisions are not reserved for philosophical thought. They apply to everyone. According to Dewey (1939, p. 58), '[h]uman beings are continuously engaged in valuations'.

Finally, emotion and valuation also share the fact that they *are not fixed in time*. Both notions are essentially plastic (f) (as is also the case with habits). Emotion, as we shall see later, is transformed during the inquiry. The construction of values is also the result of a continuous and dynamic process of transaction between the subject and the environment in which he or she is living. According to Dewey, values 'are as unstable as the forms of clouds' (Dewey, EN, 1925B, p. 399). This is why, in relation to Dewey, we cannot talk about 'ultimate values', which are finalised once and for all.[3] A value emerges and stabilises (for a time) at the end of an inquiry when it is accomplished and complete: the value of a given good is then established until a new inquiry questions it again. In fact, we are constantly and continuously encountering new experiences and conducting inquiries. In other words, we can consider that any evaluation is, in reality, a re-evaluation, a judgment made on the value of what was immediately 'valued', thereby reconstructing the motives that guide an individual's activity.

Summarising the above, in Dewey's work, the notions of emotion and valuation are related (although dissimilar) in the sense that they are both associated with behavioural, dynamic, objective and ordinary attitudes whose aim is to promote the integration of subjects into their environment. Emotions, however, have a special place in moral judgment. Dewey dissociates himself from the emotivism of his time.

3. Rejection of emotivism but not of emotions

While the role of emotions in Dewey's discussion of values has long been neglected, this is probably due, on the one hand, to the commentators' focus on the possibility of conducting an empirical inquiry into values and the role of rationality in values, which are points to which Dewey (1941A, 1941B, 1943A, 1943B, 1944) personally responded, and on the other hand, to his clear rejection of emotivism, which may have been interpreted as a rejection of emotions. This section therefore broadly outlines the relationship between emotions and values, as compared to emotivism, in Dewey's work.

Early in his career, Dewey sought to challenge common sense by distinguishing between what morality does and does not cover:

> Moral theory cannot emerge when there is positive belief as to what is right and wrong, for then there is no occasion for reflection. It emerges when men are confronted with situations in which different desires promise opposed goods and in which incompatible courses of action seem to be morally justified. (Dewey and Tufts, 1932, p. 173)

[3] In particular, Dewey is opposed to the construction of intangible moral principles as proposed in Kantian deontological theory.

In this quotation, the first case—which Dewey states is often mentioned in lectures on morality despite its profound disparities—is exemplified by individuals who want to do something that they know is wrong, such as the bank employee who is tempted to embezzle funds. According to Dewey and Tufts, the employee 'may … argue himself into finding reasons why it would not be wrong for him to do it' (Dewey and Tufts, 1932, p. 174). But, in fact, he does not really believe this, or at least not sincerely. He simply lets his desires govern his beliefs (and consequently his attitude if the embezzlement is implemented by the employee). Therefore, for Dewey, this is not a case involving a moral decision.

The second case concerns the quite different situation of an individual who finds that his country, to which he is deeply attached, has declared a war—which he considers unjust—on another neighbouring country. As a result, this citizen is confronted with a powerful moral conflict in which his patriotic values clash with his (possibly religious) sense of injustice. 'The struggle is not between a good which is clear to him and something else which attracts him but which he knows to be wrong. It is between values each of which is an undoubted good in its place, but which now get in each other's way' (Dewey and Tufts, 1932, p. 174).

According to Dewey, moral judgment thus implies a reflection—an inquiry—which aims to separate two (or more) registers of values which, because of the situation that now confronts the individual due to a change in his environment, are in opposition and have become incompatible. Moral judgment involves doubt. It does not come into play when one knows that what one is doing is wrong. Moral reflection thus begins when an individual raises the question of the value of a good that he or she previously valued (e.g. national identity) by examining the relative value of that good in relation to other current or possible goods or ends (such as justice).

In their discussion on values and ethics, Dewey and Tufts (1932), and Dewey (1939), sought to break away from the emotivist (or empiricist) interpretation which assumes that values are directly inspired by emotions, stating that values are not 'emotional epithets or mere ejaculations' (Dewey, 1939, p. 1). A proportion of the article written by Dewey on the *Theory of Valuation* (1939) is indeed devoted to a critique of emotivism, embodied at that time by Ayer (1936), who posited that statements expressing value judgments are simply manifestations of feelings, emotions or expressions of approval or disapproval. They are merely interjections or exclamations. Since these statements have no propositional content, they are not likely to be true or false, and cannot be empirically verified in any way, which means that value choices cannot be discussed or rationally based. What Dewey rejects, therefore, is mainly the fact that values are expressed directly through sensations and emotions (as some authors such as Tappolet (2000) have recently assumed).

In the *Theory of Valuation* (1939), Dewey consequently insists on the degree of reflexive evaluation that a value judgment involves. By insisting on this dimension, Dewey helps to show that it is possible, via an inquiry procedure, to discuss values rationally. However, this does not imply that emotion does not play a prominent role in the valuation process developed by Dewey. He uses the example of a crying baby:

> Let us begin with phenomena that admittedly say nothing, like the first cries of a baby, his first smiles, or his easy cooings, gurglings, and squeals. When it is said that they 'express feelings', there is a dangerous ambiguity in the words 'feelings' and 'express'. What is clear in the case of tears or smiles ought to be clear in the case of sounds involuntarily uttered. They are not in themselves expressive. They are constituents of a larger organic condition. They are facts of

organic behavior and are *not* in any sense whatever value-expressions. They may, however, be taken by other persons as *signs* of an organic state, and, so taken, *qua* signs or treated as *symptoms*, they evoke certain responsive forms of behavior in these other persons. A baby cries. The mother takes the cry as a sign the baby is hungry or that a pin is pricking it, and so acts to change the organic condition inferred to exist by using the cry as an evidential sign. (Dewey, 1939, p. 79, emphasis in original)

This example shows that emotions are not expressions of values but rather participate in the inquiry into values. If the baby cries because it is hungry and the mother feeds it, it will stop crying. If it continues, then it is crying for a different reason. The inquiry continues. At the same time, crying is a fact and an objective part of the inquiry. It reveals a problem (the baby's discomfort) and triggers the search for a solution (the removal of the discomfort) because the mother values her baby's well-being. Emotions do not express values but are facts that generate an inquiry into values.

To avoid any confusion, Dewey expressly clarifies the prevalence of emotion in judgment at the end of his text on values:

If, then, discussion in the earlier sections of this study seems to have placed chief emphasis upon the importance of valid *ideas* in formation of the desires and interests which are the sources of valuation, and to have centered attention chiefly upon the possibility and the necessity of control of this ideational factor by empirically warranted matters-of-fact, it is because the *empirical* (as distinct from a priori) theory of valuation is currently stated in terms of desire as emotional in isolation from the ideational. In fact, and in net outcome, the previous discussion does not point in the least to supersession of the emotive by the intellectual. Its only and complete import is the need for their integration in behavior – behavior in which, according to common speech, the head and the heart work together, in which, to use more technical language, prizing and appraising unite in direction of action. (Dewey, 1939, p. 65, emphasis in original)

In many recent works (Pappas, 2016; Fesmire, 2018; Dreon, 2021; Henne, 2021), the part of emotion has been highlighted in the literature mentioning Dewey's work on the construction of individual morality and ethics. The term 'emotion' is rarely used in Dewey's *Theory of valuation*. Dewey (1939) replaces it with the adjective 'affective-motor' (to qualify a valuation phase) or the word 'energy', and most frequently uses the term 'vital impulse'. It is therefore important to remember that in a previous publication, *Art as Experience* (1934), cited in the bibliography of *Theory of valuation* (1939), Dewey differentiates between a 'primitive' or 'raw' emotion, which he calls a 'vital impulse', and a more developed and constructed emotion, which he calls an 'impulsion'.[4]

This distinction, as we shall see, is fundamental to understanding the author's theory of valuation insofar as it suggests a transformation of emotion, that is, its transition from a raw impulse to something more developed that he refers to precisely as an emotion. This distinction, in particular, and as we shall see, underlies the difference that can be expressed between an object that we desire and an object that we consider desirable.

[4] 'Every experience, of slight or tremendous import, begins with an impulsion, rather as an impulsion. I say "impulsion" rather than "impulse." An impulse is specialized and particular; it is, even when instinctive, simply a part of the mechanism involved in a more complete adaptation with the environment. "Impulsion" designates a movement outward and forward of the whole organism to which special impulses are auxiliary' (Dewey, 1934, p. 58, emphasis in original). In fact, Dewey took an early interest in the question of emotion (see the bibliography in Petit and Ballet, 2021). In four seminal articles (Dewey, 1894A, 1894B, 1895, 1896), one can find in particular the foundations of Dewey's theory of the organic circuit that informs his theory of valuation as well as his logic of 'judgments of practice' (Dewey, 1915).

4. The role of emotion in the moral experience

Emotions and values are similar but distinct (Point 1 of our discussion). Emotions play a role in moral inquiry (Point 2 of our discussion). This role must now be clarified.

Moral inquiry has its peculiarities in the sense that not all forms of inquiry are moral. This is what is meant by the fact, according to Dewey (EN, 1925b, p. 398, emphasis in original), that '[a]ny *theory* of values perforce entrance into the field of criticism'. As we pointed out in the introduction, ethical judgment implies the existence of a conflict of values that causes an individual to ask questions. This conflict may arise as a result of a change in the individual's environment or a change in the individual's own preferences or desires.

More precisely, moral judgment is the fruit of a reflection which consists in contrasting what is desired with what is desirable:

> Possession and enjoyment of goods passes insensibly and inevitably into appraisal. First an immature experience is content simply to enjoy. But a brief course in experience enforces reflection; it requires but brief time to teach that some things sweet in the having are bitter in after-taste and in what they lead to. Primitive innocence does not last. Enjoyment ceases to be a datum and becomes a problem. As a problem, it implies *intelligent inquiry into the conditions and consequences of a value-object*; that is, criticism. (Dewey, 1925B, pp. 398–9, emphasis added)

As we have already stressed, morality is therefore integrated into the inquiry (Dewey, 1938A, p. 179): '[T]he more problematic the situation and the more thorough the inquiry that has to be engaged in, the more explicit becomes the valuational phase'. In his assessment of moral judgment, Dewey goes further. With an analytical objective, he divides the inquiry into two phases—phases which he nevertheless considers to be closely related.

The first phase consists of the agent performing an immediate appraisal of the good on the basis of an emotional form linked to pleasure (or displeasure). This phase corresponds to '*prizing*', or caring for 'in the sense of holding precious, dear (and various other nearly equivalent activities like honoring, regarding highly)' (Dewey, 1939, p. 5). This first phase identifies the affective and motor dimension of the valuation. Dewey explicitly uses the adjective 'affective-motor' to ensure that the affective dimension is not solely associated with a private feeling. By using this term, he stresses that the action of 'prizing' 'takes place in the public and observable world, and […] has observable conditions and consequences' (Dewey, 1939, p. 14). '[L]iking' […], 'looking out for or after', 'cherishing', 'being devoted to', 'attending to', in the sense of 'tending', 'ministering to' and 'fostering' [are] words that all seem to be variants of what is referred to by 'prizing' "(Dewey, 1939). A behavioural dimension (linked to the environment) is therefore associated with the fact of 'prizing'.

The second phase of the valuation corresponds to an actual evaluation of what is valued, and therefore has a reflective and reflexive dimension. During this other phase, the individual evaluates in the sense of attributing a value to an object or estimating it. Dewey (1939, p. 5) uses the term 'appraising' and states: '[T]his is an activity of rating, an act that involves comparison, as is explicit, for example, in appraisals in money terms of goods and services'. He subsequently adds:

> [v]aluation as *appraisal* [...] is primarily concerned with a relational property of objects so that an intellectual aspect is uppermost of the same general sort that is found in 'estimate' as distinguished from the personal-emotional word 'esteem'. (Dewey, 1939, p. 5, emphasis in original)

At first sight, valuation seems to include two distinct phases: one emotional, the other more intellectual or ideational. Contrary to what is suggested by this interpretation, emotion is present at all levels of the valuation, not least because it is described in a circular fashion (rather than as an arc).[5] Consequently, a valuation corresponds to the 'union of prizing and appraising' (Dewey, 1939, p. 31). To describe this activity comprehensively, there must be reference to an 'affective-*ideational*-motor activity' (Dewey, 1939, emphasis in original) and no dualistic opposition of the two phases.

Figure 1 summarises his thinking.

We comment on this figure below by showing how the transition from what is initially desired to what is *ultimately* desirable for the individual takes place during the moral inquiry, and by means of the transformation of emotions.

4.1 Vital impulse and desire

To clarify the role of emotion during the course of valuation, we must return to the notion of desire.[6] Desires, like emotion or value, are objective facts that must be taken into account: '[d]esires are desires, and that is all that can be said' (Dewey, 1939, p. 16). Desires are such because they have an indisputable organic dimension (linked to the evolution of species): '[t]hat desires as they first present themselves are the product of mechanism consisting of native organic tendencies and acquired habits is an undeniable fact' (Dewey, 1939, p. 29).

Like valuations, 'desires arise only when "there is something in the matter," when there is some "trouble" in an existing situation' (Dewey, 1939, p. 33). A contrario, '[w]hen things are going completely smoothly, desires do not arise […] "going smoothly" signifies that there is no need for effort and struggle' (Dewey, 1939). Dewey (1939, p.



Fig. 1. *Dewey's process of moral inquiry.*

[5] This is an important point insofar as this apparent duality (between the two phases: one emotional, the other intellectual) may have given rise to the belief that the pragmatist author dissociated emotion and judgment. This is why, in later texts, Dewey (1946) insists on the fact that immediate valuation (corresponding to an immediate affective appraisal of an object) and evaluation (an appraisal as a judgment) are two phases of a similar nature. They differ in terms of 'emphasis or degree' but do not reveal a 'difference of kind' Dewey (1944, p. 229).

[6] A more comprehensive interpretation of Dewey's moral theory would also involve clarifying the notion of interest (as discussed, in particular, in Chapter 10 (*Interest and Discipline*) of *Democracy and Education* (1916)). However, for our study, we can restrict our analysis to the notion of desire, by considering that according to Dewey, interest constitutes a grouping of desires. More precisely, '[a]n interest represents not just a desire but a set of interrelated desires' (Dewey, 1939, p. 54). For more discussion on the notion of interest in Dewey's work see Santarelli (2020).

15, emphasis in original) is even more explicit in the following passage when he points out:

> Because valuations in the sense of prizing and caring for occur only when it is necessary to bring something into existence which is lacking, or to conserve in existence something which is threatened by outside conditions, valuation *involves* desiring.

Valuation implies the existence of a desire. This desire closely resembles a vital (organic) impulse in the sense that it arises from a lack, a frustration or a need, that is, from an imbalance, from a tension: desire 'arises within a *field* when the field is disrupted or is threatened with disruption, when conflict introduces the tension of need or threatens to introduce it' (Dewey, 1939, p. 54). Desire therefore initially has all the attributes of an uncontrolled reflex attitude. As shown in Figure 1, however, desire clearly differs for two reasons. The first is that desire is linked to effort. The second is that desire incorporates an 'end-in-view'.

As Dewey indicates in the above quotation, desire differs first and foremost from a vital impulse insofar as it involves an effort. 'Effort, instead of being something that comes after desire, is seen to be the very essence of the tension involved in the desire' Dewey (1939, p. 16). Effort in this case allows us to distinguish between desire and a wish or a simple aspiration. Indeed, desire implies that an effort needs to be furnished in order to accomplish the object of the desire. Effort therefore testifies to the fact that desire 'is an active relation of the organism to the environment' (Dewey, 1939). As is the case with emotion, Dewey does not see desire as something merely internal or personal. Desire implies an activity in connection with the environment, it integrates a conative dimension that is clearly intended to change the world and/or to change ourselves.

This brings us to a second central distinction. Desire is associated with a goal, what Dewey refers to as an 'end-in-view'. 'Wherever there are desires, there are ends-in-view, not simply effects produced in the case of sheer impulses, appetite, and routine habit' (Dewey, 1939, p. 52). The term 'end-in-view' is used to designate a type of purpose that involves a thoughtful, intelligent consideration of the future. It serves to show the impossibility of separating means from ends. Indeed, in Dewey's case, deliberation is never solely confined to means with a view to finding the most efficient or the most economical ways to achieve ends that have already been identified and finalised. Instead, it simultaneously and correlatively covers the ends and means. This is illustrated by the example proposed by Dewey in *Experience and Nature* (1925B, pp. 373–4, emphasis in original):

> To a person building a house, the end-in-view is not just a remote and final goal to be hit upon after a sufficiently great number of coerced motions that have been duly performed. The end-in-view is a plan which is *contemporaneously* operative in selecting and arranging materials. The latter, brick, stone, wood and mortar, are means only as the end-in-view is actually incarnate in them, informing them. Literally, they *are* the end in its present stage and realization. The end-in-view is present at each stage of the process; it is present as the *meaning* of the materials used and acts done.

This shows that desire implies an intelligent activity in search of a goal. The successful pursuit of this 'end-in-view' implies that the individual assesses and anticipates the consequences of this activity linked to accomplishing this desire. In other words,

> [T]he whole difference between impulse and desire is made by the presence in desire of an end-in-view, of objects *as* foreseen consequences. The foresight will be dependable in the degree in which it is constituted by examination of the conditions that will in fact decide the outcome. (Dewey, 1939, p. 30, emphasis in original)

This means that the presence of vital impulses is a prerequisite for the existence of desires. However, these desires incorporate anticipated consequences, and therefore ideas, which are indicators of the actions required to achieve the intended ends. This is why we must not identify valuation with the activity of desire, by confusing it with a vital impulse. One cannot therefore associate any organic activity—in the form of a raw or unthinking impulse—with a valuation, as emotivism might seem to suggest. If this is so, it is because the construction of a value relates more to the transformation of a vital impulse than to its mere emergence. This transformation naturally confirms the transition from the desired to the desirable.

4.2 The transition from the desired to the desirable or the transformation of emotion

The pursuit of desire involves careful observation of the discrepancies between the desired ends ('ends-in-view') and the actual ends or consequences associated with those desires. The transition from the desired to the desirable characterises a value judgment, that is, a valuation. A convergence between what is desired and anticipated and what is actually obtained confirms the validity of the selection of conditions serving as means to the desired end. If there is convergence, then there is no need for an inquiry and therefore no construction or affirmation of a value.

However, convergence, and consequently the absence of a need for valuation, is the exception rather than the rule. This is because 'vital impulses and acquired habits are capable of expending themselves in the channels of daydreaming and building castles in the air' (Dewey, 1939, p. 35), particularly because they 'often operate without the intervention of an end-in-view or a purpose'(Dewey, 1939, p. 33). There is therefore every reason to believe that 'discrepancies, which are experienced as frustrations and defeats, lead to an inquiry to discover the causes of failure' (Dewey, 1939, p. 31). The discrepancy between what is desired and what has been achieved implies an evaluation of this desire. Is what has been desired desirable? This question involves a valuation procedure.[7] Evaluation consists of conducting an in-depth examination of the conditions under which the initial desires were focussed on a given object. In particular, it is a matter of identifying the role played by vital impulses and habits:

> This inquiry consists of more and more thorough examination of the conditions under which impulses and habits are formed and in which they operate. (Dewey, 1939)

During this process, a discrepancy emerges between the desire as it initially appears—under the effect of impulses and habits—and the desire that emerges as a result of a revision of the initial impulse. As Dewey points out, the 'desirable' does not originate from an improbable moral 'Mount Sinai'; on the contrary, it emerges 'because past experience has shown that hasty action upon uncriticized desire leads to defeat and possibly to catastrophe' Dewey (1939, p. 32). In other words, '[t]he "desirable" as distinct from the "desired" […] points to the difference between the operation and consequences of unexamined impulses and those of desires and interests that are the product of investigation of conditions and consequences' (Dewey, 1939). To this end, individuals who embark on moral reflection rely on their past experience and on the knowledge they have accumulated:

[7] A discrepancy can also occur when an individual's environment changes and confronts him or her with a conflict of desires (as in the case of the citizen mentioned in the introduction), or when conflicting desires occur due to the present situation.

An individual within the limits of his personal experience revises his desires and purposes as he becomes aware of the consequences they have produced in the past. This knowledge is what enables him to foresee probable consequences of his prospective activities and to direct his conduct accordingly. (Dewey, 1939, pp. 58–9)

Far from being a purely intellectual activity, however, this activity of revision (of initial desires) is based on a mental activity that mobilises the imagination as well as emotion: the different ends pursued are evaluated according to the desirability that would result if they were considered effective action plans. This is why the two phases of emotional ('prizing') and intellectual ('appraising') valuation are closely intertwined. Valuation simultaneously mobilises these phases in such a manner that it corresponds entirely to an 'affective-*ideational*-motor' behaviour (Dewey, 1939, p. 52, emphasis in original).

A valuation process therefore leads to an appraisal of our desires, that is, to their reinforcement, or if necessary, to their transformation. In this assessment, the initial impulses that are the source of what was desired are transformed and developed into desirable objects during the course of the inquiry procedure. '[T]he occurrence of a desire related to an end-in-view *is* a transformation of a prior impulse or routine habit' (Dewey, 1939, p. 34, emphasis in original). In other words,

if and when *desire* and *an end-in-view* intervene between the occurrence of a vital impulse or a habitual tendency and the execution of an activity, then the impulse or tendency is to some degree modified and transformed. […] It is only in such cases that valuation occurs. (Dewey, 1939)

In short, desires are indeed the result of organic impulses and acquired habits. The shift from what is desired to what is desirable is the product of a transformation of these impulses and habits due to both their immersion in a cultural and institutional environment, and the critical scrutiny to which they are normally subjected. It is this scrutiny that takes account of the conditions of their emergence as well as their observed (or anticipated) consequences. It is therefore the fact of being formed through a valuation that distinguishes desires from simple impulses by endowing them with an end-in-view.

For Dewey, in the valuation process, the part of emotion is therefore just as important as the more critical or reflective part that he insists on in his study of moral judgment. This is reflected in the following statement concluding his study: 'the course of distinctively human behavior […] is influenced by emotion and desire in the framing of means and ends' (Dewey, 1939, p. 66).

5. Values and valuation in economics: Dewey's contributions

Values have been discredited in economic analysis involving marginalism (Peil and van Staveren, 2009) on grounds of the likelihood of being influenced by personal subjectivity, while valuation processes have been reduced to prices or willingness to pay. Of course, the role of morals, ethics and values in economics is a much-discussed topic (Boulding, 1969; Sen, 1973; Stigler, 1981; Anderson, 1995; Alvey, 1999; Hodgson and Hodgson, 2001; Atkinson, 2009, to name just a few of many references).

We consider that Dewey's thinking seems likely to contribute to the debate on values by integrating emotions, notably because his approach is in keeping with the idea, shared by economists, that what counts in decisions (or judgments) are mainly the consequences associated with them. On this basis, emotion serves judgment on three levels: (i) it allows us to rethink the distinction between ends and means, (ii) it is an

indispensable informational basis for decision-making and (iii) it accompanies the procedure of moral inquiry by means of imagination and anticipation.

5.1 Overcoming the dichotomy between ends and means

In economics, attempts to rehabilitate the role of values have naturally been proposed. For example, Sen (1985A, 1985B) distinguishes between 'internal consistency of choice' or correspondence rationality and 'Global rationality'. Correspondence rationality simply assumes that the means used to achieve an end are considered rational. Global rationality assumes that what one seeks to obtain can also be rationally evaluated (see Broome, 1978). The ends must therefore be rational. For example, someone may be trying to gain weight to an excessive extent, and in this case, a rational way to do so would be to eat candy all day long. While the conditions for correspondence rationality are met, the ends pursued are not actually rational, other than in special circumstances, in the knowledge that getting excessively fat will be detrimental to the person's health, and that we are justified in considering health to be an important end.

In the theory of valuation, Dewey specifies that the difference between what is desired and what is desirable forges a criterion for the appraisal of means as well as ends. To revisit the example of a crying baby, if the mother is concerned about her baby's crying, and is seeking to stop it, it is not only because she wants to stop hearing its cries (crying may be a source of irritation and fatigue for the mother). She wants to respond to its cries because they signal the baby's discomfort, and she wants to ensure its well-being. The desire to stop hearing the crying, because of the annoyance that this can cause, and for the sake of the child's well-being, which is desirable, are two different things. Easing the crying (the means) is related to the end (the baby's well-being, and possibly that of the mother who cannot tolerate the crying). From this perspective, it is possible that the means chosen will differ according to the end that is pursued.

Dewey uses this difference to illustrate the role of emotion. If the mother is simply seeking to quiet the baby because the crying is annoying her, she is responding to a raw impulse. If the mother's goal is to improve her baby's well-being, she will seek the cause of what is making it cry. She will investigate and take action to ease the baby's distress. She is driven by an emotion that is combined with reflection.

In this example, Dewey (1939) goes beyond the dichotomy between means and ends. Furthermore, Dewey (1934) makes this criterion a determining factor in the quality of the inquiry that has been carried out. He proposes a reasoning that supposes a continuum between means and ends, first because the appropriate means depend on the end-in-view,[8] and secondly because any end becomes a means to a subsequent end. He notes:

> The sole alternative to the view that *the* end is an arbitrary selected part of actual consequences which *as* "the end" then justifies the use of means irrespective of the other consequences they produce, is that desires, ends-in-view, and consequences achieved be valued in turn as means of further consequences. (Dewey, 1939, p. 42, emphasis in original)

The ends cannot be dissociated from the means because they become future means. The dynamic process between means and ends enables this dichotomy to be overcome without rejecting the means-ends relationship for each concrete situation.

[8] In the previous example, the means used to stop the baby's crying depends on why the mother is trying to stop it.

A value is *final* in the sense that it represents the conclusion of a process of analytic appraisals of conditions operating in a concrete case […] Any conclusion reached by an inquiry that is taken to warrant the conclusion is 'final' for that case. 'Final' here has logical force. The quality or property of value that is correlated with the *last* desire formed in the process of valuation is, tautologically, ultimate for that particular situation. It applies, however, to a specifiable temporal *means-end* relation and not to something which is an end per se. There is a fundamental difference between a final property or quality and the property or quality of finality" (Dewey, 1939, p. 45, emphasis in original).

5.2 Emotion is an essential informational basis for moral judgment

Any specific end is therefore distinct from the purpose of human action. We have stressed that for Dewey, the transition from what is desired to what is desirable implies emotions, and the transformation of emotions. Raw emotions are developed or modified. The mother may be annoyed by the baby's crying, but if her sole response is a crude impulse to shake her baby in order to stop it from crying, there is every chance that she will fail. Her initial desire (to stop hearing the crying) must give way to what is desirable (the baby's well-being).[9] The crude impulse must be transformed into a compassionate emotion that drives her to inquire into the origin of the crying. The mother needs to conduct an inquiry that will form her informational basis on how to resolve the problem of crying. This informational basis is not independent of the end-in-view she has set for herself (the baby's well-being or putting an end to the annoying crying).

Dewey's thinking is again in line with a contemporary debate on the informational basis required to form a judgment on a situation, an object or a choice. Sen (1982, 2005) noted the importance of taking a broader informational basis into account when making judgments about a situation or object. He proposed the notion of *rich description*. In his 1982 book, he uses a simple example (reused in the paper published in 2005):

Consider the statement 'Michelangelo produced the statue of David.' There is an obvious sense in which this would be accepted as a realistic description, despite its being informationally selective and the selection process not being primarily motivated by prediction or prescription. The production process in making the statue actually involved not merely Michelangelo, but his helpers, a huge block of stone, chisels, scaffoldings, etc., but the description quoted focuses on Michelangelo only as the most relevant bit of information. Note that the discrimination cannot be based on any marginal productivity consideration in the usual neoclassical sense. Without Michelangelo no statue, but without stone, no statue either!… The selection process involves other motivations, in particular, that of capturing the source of the imagination displayed in the statue. The labor theory of value, in its descriptive interpretation, shows a similar – but not the same – type of discrimination, focusing – in this case – on the human effort directly and indirectly involved in the process of production and exchange of commodities. (Sen, 1982, p. 441, repeated in Sen, 2005, p. 109)

Walsh (2003), drawing on the work of the pragmatist philosopher Putnam (2002) and Putnam's rejection of the fact/value dichotomy,[10] takes up Sen's concept of rich description and includes values. According to Walsh, valuation must take account of the values at stake in the objects of valuation. While Sen (2005) accepts this approach, he notes that his proposal should not be reduced to the consideration of values, and that the notion of rich description only implies the development of a broader informational

[9] Dewey also develops the concept of judgment of practice. This concept calls for a grounding in logic of human action, so that values become inseparable from action (Dewey, 1915, 1938A).

[10] Putnam's approach is in line with Dewey's, and he has dedicated several of his texts to Dewey.

basis for any valuation process: 'It is, of course, a kind of valuation to be interested in human imagination or human effort over other features that could have figured in the description, but it would be a mistake to reduce the reach of that valuation to mainly ethical or prescriptive interest' (Sen, 2005, p. 109).

Once again, Dewey sheds light on the debate. The absence of a dichotomy between means and ends coincides with the dichotomy between facts and values. Above all, emotions are disregarded in the current debate, whereas they play an essential role in Dewey's work. As we have underlined with the example of the baby's crying, the informational basis must contain emotions, first because emotions contribute to our judgment, and second because they are signals of the discrepancy between what is desired and what is desirable. There can be no judgment on a situation or an object without emotion. As Dewey points out at the end of his text:

> The hard-and-fast impassible line which is supposed by some to exist between 'emotive' and 'scientific' language is a reflex of the gap which now exists between the intellectual and the emotional in human relations and activities. The split which exists in present social life that have *scientific* warrant and uncontrolled emotions that dominate practice, the split between the affectional and the cognitive, is probably one of the chief sources of the maladjustments and unendurable strains from which the world is suffering. Dewey (1939, p. 65, emphasis in original)

5.3 Imagination and anticipation in the service of moral judgment

As we have noted, and as Pappas (2016) points out, many authors have overlooked the 'qualitative'—affective, imaginative, intuitive—scope of inquiry that is highlighted in *Qualitative Thought* (Dewey, 1930), in particular. Yet, as Dewey (1930, p. 249) notes in this text, 'mind consists in an ideational and conceptual transformation of what begins as an intuition'.

The intuition mentioned by the author, however, is not limited to simple instincts, because our intuitions are very often the result of habits that have been developed during our previous experiences and inquiries. It should therefore be borne in mind that when Dewey mentions intuition or imagination, he is not referring to a purely psychic process. As we have seen, this also applies to emotion.

Imagination is part of a narrative process linked to what Dewey calls 'dramatic rehearsal' (Fesmire, 1995; McVea, 2007). This conception, which is clearly explained by Dewey's (1934) evocation of the artist's relationship with creativity, also demonstrates that inquiry has a strong social dimension.[11] In the case of moral inquiry in particular, this suggests that individuals, taking into account the multiple transactions that occur (between themselves and their environment), can, via the imagination, reconsider their desires and relate them to the values to which they adhere (McVea, 2007).

This brings us to an important point of convergence between Dewey's analysis (integrating emotion) and the standard and/or behavioural approach in economics. Drawing on work by psychologists, economists have found that emotions can be consciously (and often correctly) anticipated by individuals. The case of regret is the most obvious example, but we could also discuss guilt, shame or even hope.

[11] The proximity between John Dewey and Herbert Mead should not be overlooked. The reader is also advised to consult De Oliveira (2017) on the importance attached to the concept of dramatic repetition, and its mobilisation by Alfred Schütz.

Such anticipations are central to what behavioural economists call 'moral preferences'. In this context, economists also take into account the fact that these anticipations can cause individuals to reconsider decisions (moral or otherwise) on the basis of these anticipated emotions. Typically, the informational loop described in Figure 1, which corresponds to Dewey's thinking on valuation, enables us to better understand how anticipation influences the inquiry process. Returning once again to the example of the mother and child, it transpires that it is because the mother is able to imagine the positive consequences of her child's welfare that she can, throughout the inquiry, subject the various means at her disposal to her moral reflection.

6. Conclusion

In this article, we have set out to highlight what John Dewey's theory of emotions—a theory that has been somewhat neglected in the literature—can contribute to the contemporary debate on the emergence of values in economics. The non-dualistic approach adopted by the pragmatist author enables the renewal of this debate by deconstructing the characteristic opposition between ends and means in standard theory, and by putting emotion and imagination at the heart of moral inquiry.

We believe that the approach to valuation proposed by Dewey can shed light on numerous debates, from issues concerning inequalities and conflicts to the environmental question. To conclude, we shall briefly illustrate its scope in relation to the issue of climate change, to which a pragmatist philosophical interpretation has recently been applied (Cojocaru, 2020).

The characteristic of Dewey's analysis is to refrain from separating individuals from their environment. Furthermore, the idea that emotions are continuously and continually at work (i.e. being transformed) during the course of transactions between individuals and the world around them enables us to understand the link between emotional expression and climate change. As we know, this issue generates a wide range of intense emotions—from fear and anger to despair—which are often perceived in the literature as obstacles to action in favour of climate change mitigation. Dewey's approach enables the rehabilitation of these emotions because they can be understood as emotional manifestations, signalling that what is desired does not correspond to what is desirable. Emotion shows that a change in values is underway; that a revision of desires can take place. However, during the course of this moral inquiry, Dewey suggests that (raw) emotion itself must be reworked: from eco-anxiety to measured fear, from anger to 'passionate disagreement' (Cojocaru, 2020), from despair to hope (Pecchenino, 2011, 2015). Beyond the link between values and emotion, Dewey offers us a way to envisage regulating or educating our emotions to facilitate action and change.

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