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Security aspects of avionics protocols

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Ai miei genitori

Ringraziamenti

Contents

1	Introduction	1
2	Scenario	3
2.1	OldGen	5
2.2	NextGen and SESAR	7
3	Software Testing and Fuzzing	11
3.1	Software testing methods	11
3.1.1	Black Box	11
3.1.2	White Box	12
3.1.3	Gray Box	12
3.2	The fuzzing world	12
3.3	State of the art	13
3.3.1	American Fuzzy Lop	14
3.3.2	Peach	15
4	Experimental Setup	17
4.1	Hardware Setup	17
4.2	Software Setup	17
4.3	Tools	17
4.4	Proceedings	18
5	Results	19
5.1	Caveats	19
5.2	Results	19
6	Conclusions and Future Work	21

Acronyms

ACARS Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System.

ACAS Airborne Collision Avoidance System.

ADS-B Automated Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast.

ADS-C Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Contract.

AOC Air and Space Operations Center.

ATC Air Traffic Control.

ATM Air Traffic Management.

ATS Air Traffic Service.

ENAC Ente Nazionale Aviazione Civile.

ENAV Ente Nazionale Assistenza Volo.

EUROCAE European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment.

FAA Federal Aviation Administration.

FIS-B Flight Information Services - Broadcast.

HF High Frequency.

IC Interrogator Code.

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization.

IFF Identification Friend or Foe.

IFR Instrument Flight Rules.

MTOW Maximum Takeoff Weight.

RA Resolution Advisory.

RTCA Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics.

SESAR Single European Sky ATM Research.

SPI Special Identification Pulse.

SSR Second Surveillance Radar.

TIS-B Traffic Information Services - Broadcast.

UAT Universal Access Transceiver.

VHF Very High Frequency.

Chapter 1

Introduction

T0D0 1: Short introduction

The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:

T0D0 2:

- *Chapter 2: Scenario*
- *Chapter 3: Software Testing and Fuzzing*
- *Chapter 4: Experimental Setup*
- *Chapter 5: Results*
- *Chapter 6: Conclusions and Future Work*

Chapter 2

Scenario

The technological explosion of the last years influenced also the aviation sector. Better planning, more efficient planes and many other management improvements brought the price of airline tickets down making traveling by plane accessible to anyone. More recently the drone market rapidly grew to the point where every professional and amateur video maker must have at least one drone to capture great aerial shots that in the past could only be done with the use of an helicopter. Moreover companies like *Amazon* and *DHL* successfully tested a parcel delivery service operated by drones[1] while other companies like *Facebook* and *Google* started testing an affordable and reliable method to bring internet connection to remote areas of the planet[2]. All this sudden progress lead to an overcrowding of the skies to which the innovation in the **Air Traffic Management (ATM)** field must keep up.

We can no longer see just airplanes as the main users of the sky but We must consider a wider spectrum of objects since nowadays flying objects are quite heterogeneous: aircraft alone are divided into different categories depending on the maximum altitude, their weight and other parameters. Commercial drones like the ones from *Amazon* or the cinematography ones are starting to have capabilities similar to a small aircraft in term of performance. On the other hand *Facebook* Aquila drones have the same wingspan as a Boeing 737 and they fly at a considerably high altitude[3]. Also Project Loon internet balloons travel at high altitude and trough busy airspace. In addition to those there are many other objects like gas balloons, helicopters and gliders operating in certain areas and airspace class that must be tracked, managed and monitored efficiently to ensure high safety standards.

For this reasons and to overcome the absence of radar coverage in certain areas of the planet (e.g over the ocean) a modernization of the radar and communication system was launched starting from the 80s up to the present days with the development of two generations of protocols. Different organizations collaborate in defining the standards and guidance documents for aeronautics, the major of which are Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (**RTCA**) in the United States, European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment (**EUROCAE**) in Europe and International Civil Aviation Organization (**ICAO**) which is a United Nations organization. All those organizations are non governative therefore they produce standards, guidelines or rules that will then have to be adopted by the

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the United States, by the **EUROCONTROL**¹ and the single national aviation authority of the various European countries (ENAC/ENAV in Italy). This fragmentation of the organizations, the absence of a globally shared guidance on the standardization of the aviation sector (which is partially an ICAO task.²) and the development of different standards to accomplish the same task brought to an unclear situation regarding standards and regulations especially in the NextGen where there were some problems in the definition of a globally accepted family of protocols as it can be seen in the appropriate section.

Aircraft can be tracked in two ways, a **cooperative** one and a **non-cooperative** one:

- The classic radar (or Primary Radar), based on electromagnetic waves is able to give information only on the position of an object in the sky. Such system gives a real-time image of the portion of sky that it is observing, this includes aircraft, birds, clouds, and any other object in his field of view making it a basic and fairly unreliable system. Since this method requires no interaction with the aircraft that is being traced, for this reason it is called **non-cooperative** system.
- Second Surveillance Radar (**SSR**) is an evolution of the above system which, in addition to the spatial position of the aircraft, gives additional information depending on his mode of operation. Since this system requires an active cooperation from the aircraft which must reply to the interrogations sent by the system which makes it a **cooperative** system.

The cooperative systems allow having a bidirectional aircraft-ground as well as aircraft-aircraft data flow. This system stems from the military Identification Friend or Foe (**IFF**) one which was developed during the Second World War. The actual civil system uses a 4 digit code called "Transponder Code" or "**Squawk**" to identify the aircraft, this communicates via a **transponder** which handles the incoming interrogations and the responses. In Figure 2.1 is an overview of all the protocols and their division between the old generation and the new generation which is still in deployment.

Having a continuous data flow between the aircraft and the ground is beneficial not only for the ATM/ATC but also for the airline. In fact:

- Flight controllers can obtain much more information about a single aircraft, his intentions and the status of the flight. Moreover satellite based ADS-B allows tracing planes in areas where no radar coverage is available.
- The airline can keep track of his fleet in real time thus allowing a better planning of the turnover and, if needed, quick deployment of a replacement airplane.

¹Organization to provide unique centralized platform for civil and military aviation coordination in Europe.

²Art 1. The contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.[4]

- The maintenance branch of the airline can track in real time any anomalies reported by the aircraft instruments and sensors performing a remote analysis and helping the pilots in the troubleshooting process allowing them to take better decisions.

As previously mentioned the current avionics protocols can be divided in two families: **OldGen** and **NextGen**. The **OldGen** is currently deployed and used globally while the **NextGen** is standardized and set to be fully deployed by 2020. For this reason, to comply with regulations and to enhance safety Project Loon balloons are equipped with both OldGen and NextGen hardware[5] while some DJI drones are compatible with NextGen protocols[6].




Figure 2.1: All generation of avionics protocols

2.1 OldGen

The first generation of protocols is fairly simple, it uses the 1030MHz frequency for interrogation while the 1090MHz frequency is used for replies. The first two protocols are **Mode A** and **Mode C**.

Mode A is the simplest, it responds to an interrogation request just by broadcasting the **squawk** code which was previously assigned to the pilot by the controller. In this way the controller can identify the aircraft on his screen by such code. In addition to this the pilot can manually generate a special response called "*Ident*" or "*SPI*" (Special Identification Pulse) which is used to highlight the aircraft on the controller screen.

Mode C is an extension of the previous protocol which, in addition to the transponder code, sends information about the altitude and the pressure. This kind of transponders are often referred as **Mode A/C** transponder.

Mode S is the newest protocol and it is an hybrid between the two generations. It is backward compatible with the **Mode A/C** but at the same time it is also part of the NextGen as it can be seen in Figure 2.1. **Mode S** ground stations and transponders support both all call interrogations and selective interrogation, in particular each aircraft is identified by a unique 24-bit address which is part of the aircraft registration documents and should never change. The address is transmitted with every **Mode S** reply. In this way a SSR station can perform an

all call interrogation to acquire each aircraft address which can then be used to selectively interrogate them. To identify each ground station a 4-bit³ Interrgator Code (IC) is used. In this way single aircraft interrogation as well as lock-out of the aircraft can be performed in order to avoid multiple pickups of the same aircraft by different SSR stations. **Mode S** messages can be of 56 or 112 bits and they are structured as in Figure 2.2.




Figure 2.2: Mode S messages

The above protocols are at the base of the Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS). This system requires both aircraft to be equipped with **Mode A/C**, **Mode C** or **Mode S** transponders. In this way it can keep track of the surrounding airplanes and, in case of colliding traffic, propose vertical Resolution Advisory (RA). NextGen systems have enhanced RA capabilities. It is clear that this is a critical part of the system and, if compromised, can lead to dramatic results such as mid air collision.

Mode A/C and **S** are the current standards and they are widely used, for example: according to the Italian regulation all aircraft must be equipped with at least a **Mode A/C** transponder and in some particular case with a **Mode S** transponder as it can be seen in GEN 1.5-3.1 of AIP Italia[7].

Beside the basic protocols that we described here there is a more sophisticated one that lays between the two generations. The Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) is in use since the 1978, at first it relayed only on VHF radio channels but in the years has been improved to add other transmission means to expand coverage. It is also now deeply integrated into the aircraft systems giving it access to a large number of data and the ability to operate autonomously. Acars messages can be delivered via 3 different transmission means: VHF Data Link, HF Data Link and satellite. Depending on the

³For aircraft complying with ICAO Annex 10, Volume IV Amendment 73 a 6-bits code can be used

position one method can be better than another, for example VHF works only in line of sight while satellite communication (SATCOM) is not available at the poles. **ACARS** messages can be of 3 different types:

- Air Traffic Control messages. Used in some busy airports as an alternative to the radio. And in routes where no radio contact is possible (e.g oceanic routes).
- Aeronautical Operational Control (AOC) and Airline Administrative Control (AAC) used to send documents to the aircraft as well as to receive error messages or information on the status of the flight.
- Free Text Message

Messages from aircraft can be pre-configured so that they are automatically delivered to the appropriate recipient based on the message type, in the same way ground-originated messages can be configured to reach the correct aircraft. This messages covers a fundamental part of the bidirectional aircraft-ground data link and their content can be of utmost importance. For example the Air France flight 447 which disappeared from the radars on 1 June 2009 sent in his final moments 24 **ACARS** messages some of them indicating anomalies and errors. In the first moments those messages where the only clue to understand what happened and to locate the aircraft [8].

2.2 NextGen and SESAR

Both **NextGen** and **SESAR** (Single European Sky ATM Research) are efforts to modernize the air transportation system respectively from the United States government and from the European Union along with other private parties. Both programs aims to achieve a higher degree of safety enhancing communications, navigation, surveillance technologies thus enabling all the users of the sky, even the future one, to virtually see each other. The introduction of those new standards will also bring a reduction of costs through better ATM and enabling low visibility operations. The efforts are coordinated in order to assure a globally accepted common standard, for this reason from now on I will not make any distinction and refer to both protocols as **NextGen**. However under the **NextGen** family goes many different protocols and some of them are not shared between Europe and America even if there are plans to do that.

The main component of this system is Automated Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (**ADS-B**). *"The American Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as well as its European counterpart EUROCONTROL named ADS-B as the satellite-based successor of radar."*[9] **ADS-B** is an automatic system which broadcasts aircraft sensors information to the outside world. It is divided in "ADS-B Out" which requires just a transponder able to properly encode messages and "ADS-B In" which requires a receiver, a computer and an interface to display the data. **ADS-B** messages are also picked up by ground stations which feeds the data to a central system where they are used, in combination with other data (e.g radars), to create a Traffic Situation Picture.

Two main protocols were proposed to deliver **ADS-B** messages:

- **1090ES** (Extended Squitter)
- **UAT** (Universal Access Transceiver)

1090ES it is the current global standard for **ADS-B** in commercial aviation. In Europe **1090ES** is required for IFR aircraft with a MTOW exceeding 12,566 pounds or maximum cruise airspeed faster than 250 KTAS. All aircraft must comply with this regulation by 2020. [10]

In USA **1090ES** will be mandatory for all aircraft after June 2020 and is the only technology that should be used when flying above 18 000 feet. [11]. An overview of the USA supported technologies in the various airspace can be seen in Figure 2.3

This protocol is backward compatible with the **OldGen** since it uses the same frequencies and, in particular, a transponder supporting **Mode S** messages can be easily updated to **ADS-B**. In fact **ADS-B** information are simply carried inside a 112 bit **Mode S** message as it can be seen in Figure 2.4.




Figure 2.3: USA airspace

Figure 2.4: 1090ES Message

UAT although in the name it says Universal Access it is not yet widespread as **1090ES**. This protocol is mainly deployed in North America and it is starting to be deployed also in China. It is not backward compatible with the **OldGen** and it was developed specifically to be used with **ADS-B**. It uses the 978MHz frequency and requires an entire new hardware to work.

However since it is a newly designed protocol built to be future proof it allows to carry more information compared to **1090ES**, such as weather reports, pilots reports and other messages using the **FIS-B** (Flight Information Services - Broadcast) and **TIS-B** (Traffic Information Services - Broadcast). Those are ground services that broadcasts to "ADS-B In" equipped aircraft information on weather and traffic detected by ground radars as well as coming from other ADS-B equipped planes. Moreover **FIS-B** service is also capable to deliver **NexRad** images captured from the United States Weather Surveillance Radar through **ADS-B** messages. US government is encouraging General Aviation (GA) aircraft, not flying in Class A airspace, to use a **UAT** transponder. In this way there is less pollution of the 1090MHz frequency and they can receive more information such as weather data.

NextGen protocols will also substitute a big part of the voice communications not only between pilots and air traffic control but also between air traffic controllers themselves using the **UAT** data link and the previously mentioned **ACARS** messages. In particular **ADS-C** (Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Contract) automatically aggregate data such as aircraft position, altitude, speed, intent and meteorological data from onboard sensors. The generated report can then be sent to an **ATS** (Air Traffic Service) unit or **AOC** (Air and Space Operations Center) facility ground system for surveillance and route conformance monitoring [12]. An **ATS** ground station must authenticate on the aircraft system to require a contract. Contracts can be of 3 types:

- **Periodic:** the **ATS** specify the time interval at which the aircraft sends the report.
- **Demand:** is a single report requested from the ground station. This request does not affect any other contracts that might be present.
- **Emergency:** this reports are tagged as "emergency" report and will be highlighted to the **ATC**. Emergency reports can be generated manually by the crew or as a consequence of triggering another type of emergency system.
- **Event:** the **ATS** unit can specify the event (limited to 1 per aircraft) at which the report will be send. The contract can contain multiple event types (e.g lateral deviation, vertical rate change ecc).

Chapter 3

Software Testing and Fuzzing

3.1 Software testing methods

T0D0 3: Short introduction on the various testing methodologies beside fuzzing

3.1.1 Black Box

For this methodology no access to the source code or knowledge of the design specifications and internal mechanisms of the program is required. The test is based only on what can be observed which means giving to the target different inputs and monitoring his behavior. If we reflect on this definition for a moment it is one of the many ways to describe fuzzing. Although the definition of Black Box Testing fits quite well the one of fuzzing they are not the same thing in fact black box testing is widely used and includes all the testing techniques where the only available information comes from the user interaction with the application. One example among all is SQL injection where the test is conducted against a plain web page without any previous knowledge about logic of the servers and the various scripts. Only interacting with them allows the user to get an idea of the inner working mechanisms, the interaction can be direct with the user via a manual testing or using automated testing tools for example SQLmap¹. Black Box testing has many advantages: it does not require access to the source code so it is always applicable and even in the presence of source code it can still be effective. Since it is not source code dependent an effective test case against one program (for example a zip extractor) can be easily reused to test any program that implements the same functionality. However due to his simplicity this method can only scratch the surface of the application being tested, achieving a extremely low code coverage. Moreover complex vulnerabilities which requires multiple attack vector will never be triggered and can only be discovered with a White Box approach.

¹<http://sqlmap.org/>

3.1.2 White Box

This methodology is nothing more than a source code review or analysis, it can be done either by a human or by automated tools. Human analysis is not always feasible and might be inaccurate since, especially in large projects, it is easy to miss one line or make simple mistakes. For this reasons automated source code analysis is the way to go in a white box approach. This method has many advantages mainly regarding code coverage since it is possible to test all the paths for vulnerabilities. However, source code rarely is available for projects outside the open source community and this approach still requires a human interaction to review the results and identify the parts that are actually related to security problems. Moreover the review might require significant time to complete, effectively bringing the performance down to the level of the BlackBox approach.

3.1.3 Gray Box

The definition of this technique is quite trivial because a lot of different methods can be seen as Gray Box approach. This takes the Black Box method as a starting point augmenting it with the use of common reverse engineering and binary analysis techniques using disassemblers, debuggers and similar tools. The majority of those tools still requires human interaction and reverse engineering a program can often be a tedious and hard job. However there are some automated tools that aims to facilitate this analysis, for example one of them is Ropper². For this reasons the Gray Box technique is able to efficiently improve the coverage produced by the classic Black Box approach still requiring access only to the compiled application. However reverse engineering is a complex task and requires specific set of skills and tools which might not always be available.

3.2 The fuzzing world

"Fuzzing is the process of sending intentionally invalid data to a product in the hopes of triggering an error condition or fault." [13]

Fuzz Testing dates back to 1989 when it started as a project of the operating systems course at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. At his first stages it was nothing more than a simple black box technique to test the robustness of some UNIX utilities. The first two fuzzers *fuzz* and *ptyjig*, developed by two students, where incredibly successful in finding previously unknown vulnerabilities: they where able to crash around 30% of the considered utilities using the random inputs generated by the fuzzers[14]. It quickly become clear that this was a powerful and strong technique to test the robustness of a piece of software.

During the years fuzz testing evolved and developed gaining popularity and expanding to more and more fields (networks, files, wireless and more) until it became a proper field of research and engineering. As for today this field is quite vast and, using this kind of tools in the software testing phase, is starting to be

²<https://github.com/sashs/Ropper>

a best practice. However it is still uncommon to find fuzzing outside the security world, for this reason is hard to give a precise and unique definition for this technique. I will now try to give an overview of the modern fuzzing world with particular reference to the local fuzzers.

First of all they can be divided in two main categories:

- **Mutation Based (or Dumb):** apply random mutations to the given input without any knowledge of the data that are being manipulated. Common mutations include bitflipping, shortening or expanding and similar. This method is really simple and is a pure brute force approach, it can be applied to user provided inputs as well as to automatically generated ones to progressively generate a valid input.
- **Generation Based (or Smart):** requires some knowledge of the data or protocol that is being fuzzed, this information are then used to generate proper inputs. For example generating valid CRC codes for mutated strings or keeping the correct structure for particular files (jpg). Obviously this approach has some advantages but in some cases a mutation based approach can give better results as it can test programs even outside their functioning boundaries.

As always the best sits in the middle so a fuzzer that combines the two methods is the one that can give the most comprehensive results.

We can then relate fuzzers to the previously mentioned testing methods, in this way fuzzers can be further differentiated by the approach that they have to the problem and the information they require to test the binary. This divides the fuzzing world in three theoretical categories: **BlackBox Fuzzing**, **WhiteBox Fuzzing** and **GrayBox Fuzzing**. However fuzzing is not an exact science, in the real world choosing the right approach can be trivial and usually there is not a clear distinction between the different categories.

T0D0 4: Fuzzing approaches.

3.3 State of the art

There are many software available to do a multitude of fuzzing jobs. The choice is vast and goes from the simple hobby project to the much more complex and advanced commercial software. Choosing a good fuzzer is a crucial step for the success of the task, a fuzzer which is too basic and relays solely on a pure brute force approach (like *ptyjig*) can require ages to find a simple bug on a modern program where, for a "smarter" fuzzer, it will take just few minutes or hours.

The following two software represents the actual state of the art in term of binary fuzzers.

TODO 5: describe afl, afl-unicorn and peach.

3.3.1 American Fuzzy Lop

We ended up choosing American Fuzzy Lop or AFL³ as it represents the state of the art in this category, it has a high rate of vulnerabilities discovery as stated in the "bug-o-rama trophy case" section of the website, it is widely used and in active development.

AFL has many different features that makes it a quite sophisticated software. It is a gray box fuzzer which require access to the source code in order to perform what it calls "instrumentation". This process consist in adding some custom code to the program that is being compiled; this automatic operation, performed by the custom compilers `afl-gcc` and `afl-clang-fast`, adds small code snippets in critical positions without weighting down the program but allowing the fuzzer to obtain information on the execution flow at run time. However, even without access to the source code, it can leverage the QEMU emulator to obtain information about the execution state of the binary though this slows down the fuzzing speed.

The information gathered by the fuzzer will then be used to mutate the input: the tool uses a genetic algorithm approach keeping a queue of interesting inputs that will then be mutated and appending a file to the queue if it triggers a previously unknown internal state. This has been empirically proven to be a successful approach in sintetizing complex files or sentences form scarce or null information[\[aflblog\]](#).

One of the best characteristic of afl is that is open source meaning that every person can improve the code and modify it to meet different needs. For example one really active researcher in the fuzzing field, Dr. Marcel Böhme[\[mbhome\]](#), created some really interesting variations of afl trying to achieve better code coverage[\[aflfast\]](#)[\[greybf\]](#) and better path discovery[\[pythia\]](#).

afl-unicorn

TODO 6: review

`afl-unicorn` is a fork of afl that was build to leverage the power of afl and fuzz trivial binaries *"For example, maybe you want to fuzz a embedded system that receives input via RF and isn't easily debugged. Maybe the code you're interested in is buried deep within a complex, slow program that you can't easily fuzz through any traditional tools."*[\[aflunicorn\]](#). In particular it uses the unicorn engine[\[unicorn\]](#), which is a CPU emulator, to run the extracted context of a previously running instance of the same program making it architecture independent and easy to selectively fuzz. It might sound hard to understand but it is not: the unicorn engine allows to fuzz a program in the exact same way as before but, in addition to this, one have

³<http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/>

now control over the memory, the CPU registers, and the code of the program. This is useful in many different situations for example when you do not have access to the source code or when you have the sources but you want to fuzz a precompiled binary, which is our case. Moreover `afl-unicorn` allow the user to specify portions of code to be fuzzed, for example a single function, and the fuzzing takes place directly inside the emulated memory manipulating the user defined region. It is also possible to write custom "hooks" when certain functions are called or particular addresses are reached so to skip particular functions or to trigger a defined behavior, such as a crash, if the program reaches a particular portion of the code.

T0D0 7: While it is true that this approach is very powerful the template for the unicorn engine must be hand written and the process is quite time consuming (we wrote a tool to automatically generate it, more details in Section ??). Moreover, we had some troubles getting the unicorn engine to work on the multicore server: while on two different laptops it has the exact same behavior when we try to run the engine on the server it has a completely different behavior.

3.3.2 Peach

T0D0 8: more detailed description

Another very popular fuzzer and "competitor" of afl is `Peach`, this is a bit different from afl since is capable of fuzzing different targets such as **network protocols, device drivers, file consumers, embedded devices, external devices** natively. Another difference is that while afl requires just an input file to start the fuzzing `Peach` in addition to this it requires a "*Peach Pit*" which is a file describing the protocol or the data format that you want to fuzz[`peach`]. Moreover as it is stated on the website: "Peach is not open source software, it's FREE software. Peach is licensed under the MIT License which places no limitations on it's use. This software license was selected to guarantee that companies and individuals do not have to worry about license tainting issues."[`peachlicense`]. For this reasons and since we believed that afl represented more the state of the art we did not choose `Peach`.

Chapter 4

Experimental Setup

4.1 Hardware Setup

T0D0 9: Describe the hardware used, why we used that hardware and why it can be useful to test also on such a hardware. Getting dedicated hw is difficult and expensive. This part is explained really well in the paper.

4.2 Software Setup

T0D0 10: Explain why we used what we used. Same as before, copy from paper and final report.

4.3 Tools

During the project I wrote a set of tools and scripts that played a major role in automating and simplifying some of the data processing and fuzzing tasks. Such tools are divided in two categories: **Data Tools** used to manage, modify and create the datasets. **Fuzzing Tools** used to facilitate and speed up the fuzzing process. The details and descriptions of the tools are as follows.

Data Tools:

- **converter.sh** and **runner.sh** this scripts are meant to interact with the data provided by the DO-358 zip file. This archive contains different files which are designed to be used with a dedicated test tool for real avionics hardware, for this reason there are 18 subfolders (called groups) and for each one of them there are 3 files: `TestGroupXX Procedures.doc`, `TestGroupXX Stimulus.csv` and a `bin` folder containing the actual data files. Each one of this folders contain many different files, each representing a unique type of information which has already been demodulated and is stored in a binary format. Since the program that we want to test only accepts data in a uplink(or downlink) format we wrote **converter.sh** to convert one single file

or an entire directory in the appropriate format. Every file contains just one encoded type of data and with many files feeding them into a program will be long and tedious. The **runner.sh** script will feed each file contained inside a specified directory through the specified program either interactively, namely stopping after each file and asking if the user wants to continue, or simply running all files at one.

- **message_generator.py** is a simple script that given the first part of a demodulated Mode-S message will calculate a correct CRC, it can do this virtually for every random string with a correct length. This is only for test purpose since we wanted to see what would happen when the test program is fed with messages composed by all 1 or all 0 having a valid CRC.

Fuzzing Tools:

- **start.sh**: afl can be parallelized on many cores, to do that a different command with slightly different parameters must be issued for every instance that you want to spawn. For this reason I wrote **start.sh** which takes as input the number of cores that the user wants to use and the other parameters required by the fuzzer. The script will then generate the required directories and then start the chosen number of fuzzers: 1 Master and $n - 1$ Slave.
- **unicorn_template_generator.py**: `afl-unicorn` requires quite some time to set up all the environment and gather all the information needed to properly write the template for the Unicorn engine. For this reason we wrote this script which will create the template for the Unicorn engine and populate it with proper addresses. The script is designed to be sourced into GDB while the debugger is on a breakpoint inside a function, it will not work if called inside the main since what we want to test is usually a particular function.
- **extract_from_memory.py** will dump the specified memory region from a running program in gdb so it can be used as input to `afl-unicorn`. More information on how `afl-unicorn` works and why this scripts are needed can be found in 3.3.1.
- **afl utility scripts**:
 - **killlem_afl.sh** → stop a running instance of afl.
 - **wazzup_afl.sh** → get information and statistics on the running instances of the specified fuzzer.
 - **afl_noroot.sh** → run afl on a system where the user does not have root privileges.

4.4 Proceedings

T0D0 11: which test we run, why and the result

Chapter 5

Results

5.1 Caveats

T0D0 12: Put all the problems we had here

5.2 Results

T0D0 13: Put the signicative Results here and the state of the fuzzers

Chapter 6

Conclusions and Future Work

T0D0 14: Future work and proprietary fuzzer development

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