


Poh Shi Hui 1002921

Chua Yong Teck 1003378

Reason for problematic protocol:

In the example AP provided with the project instructions to be discussed, this protocol fails when a malicious server interrupts the exchange and executes a replay attack.


The malicious server can then trick the naive client into believing that they have successfully uploaded their data onto the server when the server has in fact not received anything. Although the malicious server does not own the actual server's private key to decrypt the information, the client must go through repeated redundant uploads that might never reach the actual server.




Our CP1 and CP2 implementation:

To resolve this issue, the client sends a freshly generated nonce (random int) to the server. The server encrypts this nonce with its private key and sends it back to the client. Since the nonce is different for every session, the malicious server cannot save the transmitted information to trick the client in future sessions.

CP1




CP2



Throughput:

File Size(bytes)	Average Time Taken by CP1(ms)	Average Time Taken by CP2(ms)
4500	22.7724	1.0288
45000	188.1113	2.9713
450000	1741.6443	14.2488
4500000	17741.8838	113.18364
36962330	154446.8682	842.1843



CP1 makes use of an asymmetric RSA encryption for both certificate and data encryption. CP2 uses a symmetric AES encryption for the data, and RSA encryption for the certificate. The performance for each program can be seen above. CP1 and CP2 have linear relationship between average time taken for file transfer and size of file, but CP1 has a steeper gradient and thus a larger throughput than CP2.