Abstract: Against the extended mind - why our brain remains special

Where does our mind stop, and the world begin? Clark and Chalmers (1998) have argued for the view that it just does not. Both are a closed loop, highly interconnected and not to be separated. This is active externalism to you, and this is why our mind should be seen as extended. During my talk, I will argue against the extended mind theory. In my opinion, there is a line between mind and world to be drawn as only our mind processes information the way it does, the only way which enables us to actually access information. Moreover, I will also point out that Clark and Chalmers' flagship example of the person with Alzheimer's disease, Otto, proves exactly this point. Otto, with his highly reliable notebook, still does not carry around beliefs in it. What he has is severely different to a belief. His written down sentences are neither reconstructive nor prone to error. Features our beliefs have.

In my talk, I will firstly introduce the extended mind theory more thoroughly. Secondly, I will introduce my first argument for our external and internal world being different on the basis of the example of Otto and Inga. Subsequently, I will thirdly introduce my second argument against active externalism. I will argue for the view that a retrieved belief needs to be highly reconstructive and prone to error in order to count as belief based on research from cognitive science.

Keywords: Extended mind, active externalism, philosophy of mind, philosophy of memory, belief, epistemology, cognitive science

References

Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The Extended Mind. *Analysis*, 58(1), 7–19.