

# Borromean Ring Signature Algorithm and Implementation

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## 1 Borromean Ring Signature Algorithm

### 1.1 Signing

Suppose a signer has a collection of verification keys  $P_{i,j}$  for  $0 \leq i \leq n-1, 0 \leq j \leq m_i-1$ , and wants to create a signature of knowledge of the  $n$  keys  $\{P_{i,j^*}\}_{i=0}^{n-1}$ , where  $j_i^*$ s are some fixed and unknown (to a verifier) indices. Denote the secret key to  $P_{i,j_i^*}$  by  $x_i$ . The signing process is as follows:

1. Compute  $M$  as the hash of the message to be signed and the set of verification keys.
2. For each  $0 \leq i \leq n-1$ :
  - (a) Choose a scalar  $k_i$  uniformly at random.
  - (b) Set  $e_{i,j_i^*+1} = H(M || k_i G || i || j_i^*)$ .
  - (c) For  $j$  such that  $j_i^* \leq j < m_i-1$  choose  $s_{i,j}$  at random and compute

$$e_{i,j+1} = H(M || s_{i,j} G + e_{i,j} P_{i,j} || i || j)$$

3. Choose  $s_{i,m_i-1}$  for each  $i$  at random and set

$$e_0 = H(s_{0,m_0-1} G + e_{0,m_0-1} P_{0,m_0-1} || \dots || s_{n-1,m_{n-1}-1} G + e_{n-1,m_{n-1}-1} P_{n-1,m_{n-1}-1})$$

4. For each  $0 \leq i \leq n-1$ :
  - (a) For  $j$  such that  $0 \leq j < j_i^*$  choose  $s_{i,j}$  at random and compute

$$e_{i,j+1} = H(M || s_{i,j} G + e_{i,j} P_{i,j} || i || j)$$

where  $e_{i,0}$  means  $e_0$ .

- (b) Set  $s_{i,j_i^*} = k_i - x_i e_{i,j_i^*}$ .

The resulting signature on  $m$  consists of

$$\sigma = \{e_0, s_{i,j} : 0 \leq i \leq n-1, 0 \leq j \leq m_i-1\}$$

### 1.2 Verification

The verifier verifies the signature  $\sigma$  based on the message  $m$  and a collection  $\{P_{i,j}\}$  as follows:

1. Compute  $M$  as the hash of the message and the set of verification keys.
2. For each  $0 \leq i \leq n-1$ , for each  $0 \leq j \leq m_j-1$ , compute  $R_{i,j} = s_{i,j} G + e_{i,j} P_{i,j}$  and  $e_{i,j+1} = H(M || R_{i,j} || i || j)$ .  
 $e_{i,0} = e_0$ .
3. Compute  $e'_0 = H(R_{0,m_0-1} || \dots || R_{n-1,m_{n-1}-1})$  and return 1 iff  $e'_0 = e_0$

### 1.3 Explanation on the Algorithm

Let's formulate the ring based on the signing algorithm. For  $i_{th}$  ring, it starts from node  $j_i^*$  and the signer calculates the next hash as  $e_{i,j_i^*+1} = H(M || k_i G || i || j_i^*)$ . Then the signer goes on calculating  $e_{i,j_i^*+2}, \dots, e_{i,m_i-1}$ , until he gets to the last node  $m_i-1$  of ring  $i$ . The following equation is used in the next hash calculation:

$$e_{i,j+1} = H(M || s_{i,j} G + e_{i,j} P_{i,j} || i || j) \quad (1)$$

The next hash of last node  $m_i - 1$  of ring  $i$  is defined as  $e_0$ , which links the last and first node thus forming a ring:

$$e_0 = H(s_{0,m_0-1}G + e_{0,m_0-1}P_{0,m_0-1} || \dots || s_{n-1,m_{n-1}-1}G + e_{n-1,m_{n-1}-1}P_{n-1,m_{n-1}-1}) \quad (2)$$

This loops back to node 0 of ring  $i$  and the signer goes on calculating  $e_{i,1}, \dots, e_{i,j_i^*}$  until it gets back to node  $j_i^*$ , using the same Eq.1. Following this equation, we should have the next hash of node  $j_i^*$  of ring  $i$  to be  $e_{i,j_i^*+1} = H(M || s_{i,j_i^*}G + e_{i,j_i^*}P_{i,j_i^*} || i || j_i^*)$ . But in the first calculation, we already have  $e_{i,j_i^*+1} = H(M || k_iG || i || j_i^*)$ . To make sure both of the next hash equations are satisfied, the signer makes use of the knowledge of  $x_i$  and sets  $s_{i,j_i^*}$  as:  $s_{i,j_i^*} = k_i - x_i e_{i,j_i^*}$ . By multiplying both sides of this equation with  $G$ , we have:

$$s_{i,j_i^*}G = k_iG - x_i e_{i,j_i^*}G \quad (3)$$

$$k_iG = s_{i,j_i^*}G + e_{i,j_i^*}P_{i,j_i^*} \quad (4)$$

It is easy to see that both of the next hash equations are satisfied in this way. In calculating the ring signature, the  $s_{i,j}$  of nodes for which the signer does not know the private key is randomly picked, while the  $s_{i,j_i^*}$  of node for which the signer knows the private key is calculated using the knowledge of  $x_i$ . In this way, any verifier, starting from  $e_0$ , can calculate the next hash from node 0, ..., until node  $m_i - 1$  of ring  $i$ , using Eq.1. The verifier finally computes the  $e'_0$  using Eq.2. If  $e'_0 = e_0$ , meaning all the  $n$  rings can be connected, the signer must know at least one private key of each ring  $i$ .

## 2 Implementation

We used the GO's btcec library (<https://godoc.org/github.com/btcsuite/btcd/btcec>) which contains the parameters and methods to compute with the elliptic curve secp256k1. We use Go's built-in SHA-256 implementation for our cryptographic hash function.