1 2 3	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS WESTERN SECTION		
4 5 6 7 8	Daniel Bradley) 18cv30039-MGM vs) Christian Cicero, Joseph Dunn, and Daniel Moynahan)		
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11	Jury Trial, Day 3, Held Before		
12	The Honorable Mark G. Mastroianni		
13	United States District Judge.		
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16	APPEARANCES:		
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18	See the following page.		
19			
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(Court commenced at 9:03.) THE CLERK: Your

THE CLERK: Your Honor, this is 18cv30039, Bradley versus Cicero, et al.

Counsel, will you please identify yourself starting on my right?

MR. SLEPCHUK, JR: Peter Slepchuk for the plaintiff

MR. SLEPCHUK: Peter Alexander Slepchuk for the plaintiff.

MR. COYLE: Kevin Coyle for the defendant, Christian Cicero.

MS. SZAFRANSKI: Cary Szafranski for defendant Joseph Dunn.

MR. SAINT LAURENT: Jeremy Saint Laurent for defendant Joseph Dunn, and for the record Attorney Schmidt is on his way, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

(The jury entered at 9:05.)

THE COURT: Good morning. Was everyone able to follow my instruction not to talk about the case? Begin deliberation? Discuss or post on the internet or post on social media? The entire group of instructions that I always give you, everyone follow it? Yes? Okay.

Based upon the response of each juror, they remain fair and impartial.

All right. Defendant.

MR. SAINT LAURENT: Your Honor, we are going to play the video deposition at this time.

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THE COURT: Okay. This was taken very recently?

MR. SAINT LAURENT: Yes, Your Honor, February

12th.

THE COURT: All right. And this person could not be in court and so it was agreed upon to take the video deposition?

MR. SAINT LAURENT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So, ladies and gentlemen, this is a video deposition that you're going to see.

A deposition is the taking of testimony under oath. So counsel for each side was at this deposition, which was done very recently, a few weeks ago, for this individual witness who couldn't appear in court.

The parties agreed that because the individual couldn't appear in court, they would take this person's deposition and record it on video and present it just as if it's testimony. All right.

So it's different from yesterday when someone read back a transcript. It wasn't actually that person; someone else was reading someone's else testimony. This is the person so you're able to look at this person,

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assess their demeanor, make any credibility determinations you want to.

You will be able to listen to the attorneys in this case conduct the examination. Again, that was a little different from the transcript you heard read back to you. It was not necessarily the attorneys in this case conducting the examination.

You should treat this deposition testimony just as if you would if someone was here on the witness stand. I think the reason for this particular witness not being available today, and this witness only, was that there was a trial date scheduled I think the week or two before when we actually started and because of another trial that ran longer --

(Attorney Schmidt entered the courtroom.)

THE COURT: -- this trial got pushed and delayed and so this gentleman couldn't be here today.

It's the defendants' witness so go right ahead, Mr. Saint Laurent.

(Video deposition of Mr. Silverman playing.)

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Ladies and gentlemen, why don't you just stand up and stretch?

The next witness?

MR. SAINT LAURENT: I believe the next witness

1 is Officer Moynahan. THE COURT: All right. Please take the witness 2 3 stand. THE CLERK: Please raise your right hand. 4 Daniel Moynahan (sworn) 5 DIRECT EXAMINATION 6 (By Mr. Schmidt) Officer Moynahan, could you state 7 8 your name and spell your last name for the record? Good morning. Daniel Moynahan, M-o-y-n-a-h-a-n. 9 How are you employed? 10 The city of Springfield, Springfield Police 11 Department. 12 13 And you're a police officer? Yes, I am. 14 Α. When did you start working for the Springfield Police 15 16 Department? In 2007 as a Springfield police cadet. 17 What does that mean? 18 The cadet program is a program designed for 19 20 individuals who are looking for a law enforcement career. 2.1 The Springfield police office offers this program to 22 individuals between the ages of 18 and 21 years old. a three-year training within the department. During my 2.3 time I worked in the detective bureau, the records bureau, 24 and the fingerprint identification bureau. 25

- 1 Q. So would it be fair to say it's almost like an
- 2 on-the-job apprenticeship?
- $3 \parallel A. \quad Yes, it is.$
- 4 | Q. And you did that for how long?
- 5 A. I did that until 2014, May, when I started the police
- 6 academy.
- 7 | Q. And prior to being a cadet in the Springfield Police
- 8 Department, how far did you get with your education?
- 9 A. High school.
- 10 | Q. You graduated from high school?
- 11 | A. Yes.
- 12 | Q. What high school?
- 13 A. High school of Commerce.
- 14 \parallel Q. And when did you actually become a sworn Springfield
- 15 police officer?
- 16 A. In October of 2014 I graduated the police academy.
- 17 \parallel Q. Now, directing your attention to October (sic) 26,
- 18 | 2015, the date we've been talking about in this trial,
- 19 | what was your assignment at that time?
- 20 | A. In August?
- 21 | Q. Yes.
- $22 \quad \parallel \text{A.} \quad \text{In August I was a uniformed police officer.} \quad \text{I worked}$
- \parallel in a fully marked police cruiser in the State Street,
- 24 Mason Square area of the city of Springfield.
- 25 Q. Now subsequent to being on patrol at that time, have

- 1 | you had any specialized assignments?
- 2 A. Yes. I'm currently in the 4-to-12 narcotics bureau
- 3 with the city of Springfield.
- 4 | Q. And how long have you been in the narcotics bureau?
- 5 A. Since October of 2016 until today's date.
- 6 Q. And fair to say that being a detective in the
- 7 | narcotics bureau that's a promotion from what you were
- 8 doing before?
- 9 \blacksquare A. Yes, in a sense.
- 10 Q. Now, directing you back to August 26, 2015, what
- 11 | shift were you working that night?
- 12 A. I was working the early role midnight shift. That
- 13 \parallel shift starts at 10:45 p.m. and ends at 6:45 a.m. the next
- 14 | morning.
- 15 | Q. Was that your usual shift at the time?
- 16 | A. Yes, it was.
- 17 \parallel Q. And were you eventually in the Gunn Square area?
- 18 | A. Yes, I was.
- 19 \parallel Q. And what neighborhood is that in the city?
- 20 \parallel A. The Mason Square Six Corners area is in between the
- 21 | two colleges of AIC and the rear of Springfield College.
- 22 | Q. Now, in your experience was that an area you
- 23 patrolled with some regularity at the time?
- 24 A. Yes, every single night that I worked.
- 25 | Q. While you were working there, were you aware about

what kind of criminal activity, if any, was occurring in that neighborhood?

- A. Yes. This was considered a high-crime area, still to this day is a high-crime area multiple felonies, armed robberies, shots fired incidents with both victims, property damage, and homicides were a result.
- Q. Now, in the evening of August 26, 2015, did you at some point arrive at a traffic stop initiated by Officers Cicero and Dunn?
- A. Yes, I did.

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- Q. Why did you come across or come upon that traffic stop?
 - A. Normal procedure for the Springfield Police

 Department when conducting traffic stops is for the police

 officers who are initiating the traffic stop to utilize

 their hand-held radios inside the cruiser to notify or

 dispatch of the traffic stop. This includes the location

 of the stop, the vehicle make, model, color, license

 plate, and their opinion at the time before exiting of how

 many occupants. This also includes at the end of the

 transmission whether the officers will be all set or

 they'll advice -- sometimes they don't say anything at

 all.
 - Q. And do you happen to remember what happened on this particular incident?

- A. I remember the transmission coming out. I remember the details being the same as in the arrest report, the plate, the Massachusetts plate of the car, the type of
- 4 car, the color of the car, and the number of occupants
- 5 being four.

- Q. And having received that information -- and who was
- 7 | your partner that night?
- 8 A. Tasha Ellison.
 - Q. And were you and Officer Ellison in a marked cruiser?
- 10 \parallel A. Yes, we were.
- 11 Q. And when you and Officer Ellison received this
- 12 | information, did you do anything in response to it?
- 13 \parallel A. Yes. We made our way from our area which is foxtrot
- 14 | one to Officer Dune and Officer Cicero's district which is
- 15 | fork trot two. The other thing that divides our districts
- 16 | is the State Street yellow line and so we made our way
- 17 | from our district across State Street towards their
- 18 | location.
- 19 \parallel Q. Okay. One side is on the east side of State Street
- 20 | and the other side is on the west side essentially?
- 21 A. Yes.
- Q. Which one is on the west?
- \square A. It's north and south.
- 24 \parallel Q. North and south, sorry.
- 25 A. Fork trot one is on the north side and foxtrot two is

on the south side.

- Q. Okay. And fair to say you got to the area of
- 3 Northampton and King Streets?
 - ∥ A. Yes.

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- Q. And what happened? What did you see?
- A. The traffic stop was already or the vehicle was
 already stopped. At the time we parked our cruiser behind

Officer Cicero and Officer Dunn's cruiser. We exited our

- yehicle. I proceeded to I believe Officer Dunn's side of
- 10 the cruiser which they were inside the cruiser and I spoke
- 11 \parallel to them.
- 12 Q. And after you spoke to the officers at their cruiser,
- 13 | what did you do?
- 14 A. I believe Officer Cicero at that time was getting off
- of an attempted phone call to the rental company. I spoke
- 16 to -- I also spoke to Officer Dunn and he stated that they
- 17 | were going to be towing the vehicle.
- I was then aware that they already approached the
- vehicle. At that time I didn't know if they had gone up
- 20 to the vehicle already or if they stayed in their cruiser
- 21 thinking that maybe more officers would arrive to the
- 22 | traffic stop.
- Q. So to be clear, did you have anything to do with the
- 24 decision to pull that vehicle over?
- 25 | A. No.

- Q. Did you have any contact with the operator in that initial conversation that Officer Cicero testified to?
- 3 A. No.
- 4 | Q. And so what happened after you had the conversation
- 5 at the police car with Officer Dunn? What did you do
- 7 A. Officer Dunn then exited his passenger side of the
- 8 police cruiser. I walked behind him. Officer Dunn
- 9 | approached the farthest pillar of the Chrysler 200. I
- 10 positioned myself in a tactical position to the 7 o'clock
- of Officer Dunn, more towards the rear trunk area, so I
- was able to visually see through the rear windshield into
- 13 \parallel the vehicle.
- 14 \parallel Q. And so what side of the vehicle is Officer Dunn on?
- 15 A. On the passenger side.
- 16 Q. He's on the passenger side and you're by the trunk in
- 17 | towards the center of the car a little bit; is that fair
- 18 | to say?
- 19 A. Correct, in between the center and the outer most
- 20 part of the passenger side of the trunk.
- 21 | Q. Is there any particular reason you're positioning
- 22 | yourself like that?
- 23 \parallel A. Yes. It's a position where we can see generally,
- 24 depending on the car, the heads of the occupants from the
- 25 rear. It's a tactic taught procedure by our academy.

- Q. And what happened after that?
- A. While I'm standing there and Officer Dunn is at the rear pillar, I observed the back rear passenger Mr.

 Bradley who's in a seated position.

I can see through the rear windshield his body shift towards the right, so which would be like the center console area, the center armrest as well in the back seat towards the right, and then Mr. Bradley came up and kind of shifted towards his right and then that was the end of the movement.

- Q. Before August 26, 2015 had you ever met or seen Mr. Bradley before?
- A. No.

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- Q. And having seen those movements that you just described as a police officer, does that have any significance to you?
- A. Yes. All of that that I just explained has a huge significance, including the fact that we as police officers were on a re-approach to a stopped motor vehicle. A re-approach or a secondary approach after the information was originally gathered by Officer Cicero and Officer Dunn is the most dangerous point in a traffic stop. That is because the occupants of the vehicle know generally how many police officers are on scene and have time to think if they were to do something, about how they

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would do it and when they would do it when the officers re-approached the vehicle.

On top of that with Mr. Bradley's movements from his left to his right -- again I'm only seeing his upper portion because I'm looking through the back windshield -- those movements are extremely dangerous. Just based on my experience in that year, those same movements where someone was moving from left to the right towards the door, when I opened the door in that same scenario in a different case --

MR. SLEPCHUK: Objection.

THE COURT: Sustained.

MR. SLEPCHUK: Move to strike the answer.

THE COURT: All right. To the extent there was an answer given, it's stricken anything that was said. So just ask another question.

- Q. (By Mr. Schmidt) Officer Moynahan, focusing on what you saw Mr. Bradley do, what concerns did you have approaching the vehicle?
- A. That he was arming himself with a weapon.
- Q. And have you received training specific to furtive movements during motor vehicle stops?
- A. Yes, we have. It was a huge portion of our academy.
- Q. And the academy training is how long?
 - A. Mine at the time I believe consisted of 23 or 24

- 1 weeks of total training.
- 2 | Q. And did it cover car stops in general?
- $3 \parallel A. \quad Yes, it did.$
- 4 | Q. Now, you observed these movements. Officer Dunn is
- 5 | in his location at the passenger side. What happens after
- 6 | that?
- 7 | A. I believe I hear Officer Dunn instructing what I
- 8 | believed to be in the direction of Mr. Bradley to keep his
- 9 | hands up.
- 10 \parallel Q. And what happened after that?
- 11 A. Officer Dunn then opened the motor vehicle's rear
- 12 passenger door, the one that went to Mr. Bradley's seat.
- 13 | Officer Dunn then told Mr. Bradley to exit the vehicle.
- 14 | Q. Did Mr. Bradley exit the vehicle?
- 15 | A. No.
- 16 | Q. What happened?
- 17 \parallel A. Officer Dunn then had to remove Mr. Bradley utilizing
- 18 | a modified escort position to get him out of the vehicle.
- 19 Q. What's the modified escort position?
- 20 \parallel A. A modified escort position would be any position
- 21 | where you're guiding a noncompliant individual that isn't
- 22 | directly behind him. A proper modified or the proper
- 23 | escort position would be taught from behind holding the
- 24 upper tricep and the wrist with your opposite hand to
- 25 control the movements of the person that you're moving.

- 1 Q. And at this point did Officer Dunn strike Mr.
- 2 | Bradley?
- 3 | A. No.
- 4 | Q. So essentially, if I understand your testimony, he's
- 5 grabbing him, holding him by the tricep and walking him
- 6 | out of the car?
- 7 | A. Yes.
- 8 | Q. And what was Mr. Bradley doing at this point?
- 9 A. Mr. Bradley was not making an attempt to walk with
- 10 Officer Dunn. It seemed like he was using his own body
- 11 | weight and just standing his ground and kind of not moving
- 12 | with Officer Dunn.
- 13 | Q. What was Mr. Bradley's manner?
- 14 A. Very hostile, not necessarily verbally hostile but
- 15 | you could tell based on my training and experience
- 16 someone's demeanor by the way that they carry their body
- and the way that I observed Officer Dunn having to escort
- 18 Mr. Bradley out of the vehicle.
- 19 Q. Did you see any -- did you notice anything about Mr.
- 20 | Bradley's hands?
- 21 A. Yes. His I believe it was his right hand in
- 22 particular was clinched in a fist in a ball.
- 23 \parallel Q. Now at this point did you say anything to Mr.
- 24 | Bradley?
- 25 A. Yes. I walked over, which was only a couple of feet

- towards Mr. Bradley and Officer Dunn, and I explained that

 was going to perform a patfrisk.
 - Q. And what happened when you attempted to perform the patfrisk?
 - A. So the patfrisk that I was performing -- because of movements, the training and experience, I stood in a generally rear position of Mr. Bradley. My attempt for the patfrisk was my right arm to go around Mr. Bradley's waist and start at the left hip portion of Mr. Bradley's waistband and come across. As soon as I got over to the left hip area, Mr. Bradley thrusted his pelvic area and waistband into the rear of the vehicle into the side.
- Q. So was your arm actually trapped between Mr. Bradley and the car?
- 15 | A. Yes.

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- Q. And you heard Mr. Bradley's testimony during this trial?
- 18 A. Yes, I did.
- 19 Q. Did you manipulate his penis in any way?
- 20 | A. No, I did not.
- 21 Q. Did you manipulate his testicles in any way?
- 22 A. No, I did not.
- Q. Is that something you would ever do when you patfrisk
- 24 someone?
- 25 | A. No.

- Q. Now after he -- you testified your hand gets trapped between Mr. Bradley and the car. What happened after that?
 - A. Officer Dunn and myself pulled Mr. Bradley away from the rear of the vehicle to where my hand was trapped in between his waistline and the vehicle. I then removed my right hand from in front of Mr. Bradley and I could observe Mr. Bradley bracing himself. Now I could clearly see his left fist as well balled up on the trunk holding the side of the vehicle.
 - Q. Were you ever able to complete that patfrisk?
- I A. No.

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- Q. So where you left off, he's got his fists balled up on the back of the vehicle. What happened next?
- A. Mr. Bradley is tense. You can feel -- when you put your hand on someone, even like the small of their back, you can feel when someone is tense. When someone is pushing back against you and your force even as slight as just touching the back, you can feel it.

At that point we were instructing Mr. Bradley to calm down. After Mr. Bradley's actions wouldn't cease and it seemed like there was no way that Mr. Bradley was going to become compliant enough for us to conduct a full thorough patfrisk is when Officer Dunn and I made the decision to detain Mr. Bradley to safely perform the patfrisk to its

fullest completion with Mr. Bradley in handcuffs.

- Q. And what happened when you put Mr. Bradley in handcuffs? And do you remember which one of you put Mr. Bradley in handcuffs?
- A. I believe it was Officer Dunn.

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The situation at that point when the handcuffs started to go on Mr. Bradley became more of a hostile environment, even more so than just prior when we were explaining for him to calm down. It became a situation where with everything that had gone on, the reason for us conducting the patfrisk, we needed to get Mr. Bradley in handcuffs as soon as possible and Mr. Bradley was not complying. He was not allowing me to take his arm to put it towards the small of his back to put him in handcuffs.

- Q. So if you could explain to the jury what happened as you were trying to put handcuffs on Mr. Bradley, what he did?
- A. Mr. Bradley then kicked back striking Officer Dunn in his shin.
- Q. Were you able to see that?
- A. I was able to see a motion of the leg come back. I wasn't able to see the actual contact.
 - Q. Now while all this is going on, is Mr. Bradley saying anything?
 - A. Yes. He's saying things like -- I can't recall at

- 1 | this moment the specifics of what he's saying.
- 2 \parallel Q. Was he angry?
 - A. Yes.

- 4 | Q. And so after the strike to Officer Dunn's leg, was
- 5 Mr. Bradley fully cuffed at that point?
- 6 | A. No.
- 7 | Q. How long did it take you to get him fully cuffed?
- 8 A. Approximately 45 seconds to a minute.
- 9 Q. And once you have him cuffed, what happened after 10 that?
- 11 A. After we had him cuffed, Officer Dunn -- I let go of
- 12 Mr. Bradley. Officer Dunn then started to walk him back
- 13 | to their marked police cruiser, the one that initially
- \parallel made the traffic stop and was right behind the vehicle.
- 15 | Q. What did you do after that?
- 16 A. I positioned myself in a tactical position because in
- 17 | my head there's still three people inside this car.
- 18 | There's still a patfrisk now that needs to be conducted in
- 19 a reasonable reach area of Mr. Bradley from within the
- 20 | vehicle if the weapon was disregarded in the vehicle, and
- 21 I also in the back of my mind know that Mr. Bradley was
- 22 | not compliant. There was a struggle and Officer Dunn is
- 23 | by himself -- although in handcuffs -- escorting a man who
- doesn't want to be going with Officer Dunn to the cruiser.
- 25 | Q. And fair to say you never did recover a weapon in

- | this case?
- 2 | A. No.

- Q. Now, so Officer Dunn is taking Mr. Bradley to his
- 4 | cruiser. What happens?
- 5 A. I can hear a commotion behind me. When I turn, I
- 6 still slightly see the commotion. In this instance it
- 7 | didn't seem like Officer Dunn was going to be able to put
- 8 Mr. Bradley in the cruiser by himself.
- 9 Q. So what did you do?
- 10 A. I then went to the cruiser. I don't remember which
- 11 | side I went to. I believe I was -- I had to unlock to
- 12 cruiser. It's normal for us during traffic stops to lock
- 13 \parallel the cruiser behind us and we use the key to then open it,
- 14 | but locking the cruiser also locks the back doors and
- 15 | causes there to be an unlock button to be hit to open
- 16 | those rear doors.
- Q. And is the purpose of locking the car during a
- 18 | traffic stop so no one can enter the cruiser?
- 19 A. Correct.
- $20 \quad \parallel \quad Q$. And what happened as you and Officer Dunn attempted
- 21 | to get Mr. Bradley in the cruiser?
- 22 A. Mr. Bradley -- I was more towards the driver door. I
- 23 | opened that door to unlock the cruiser. When it was
- 24 unlocked, Officer Dunn opened the rear driver's side
- 25 passenger door and the door of the cruiser was blocking my

- 1 | view but I could see at that point Mr. Bradley was looking
- 2 | towards Officer Dunn. A person in handcuffs should never
- 3 | be let go and looking towards the officer that's supposed
- 4 to be escorting them.
- 5 \parallel Q. Why is that?
- 6 A. There's flight risk, safety concern. Everything is
- 7 | not good about that.
- 8 Q. So what happened after that?
- 9 A. Well, Mr. Bradley was, from my perspective, appeared
- 10 | to be kind of like pushing towards Officer Dunn. Officer
- 11 Dunn then pushed back on Mr. Bradley towards the rear seat
- 12 and open the door of the cruiser.
- 13 \parallel Q. And did Mr. Bradley fall into the cruiser?
- 14 | A. Yes.

- Q. What kind of cruiser are we talking about?
- 16 A. A Ford Explorer with a modified interior.
- 17 | Q. And how did Mr. Bradley land in the cruiser?
- 18 A. On the seat, on the rear plastic seat.
- 19 Q. Now, you were in the courtroom and you heard Officer
- 20 | Dunn's testimony with regard to sort of the layout of the
- 21 back of that cruiser.
- 22 | A. Yes.
- 23 | Q. Was his testimony accurate?
- 24 | A. Yes.
- 25 | Q. So fair to say there's not a lot of room back there?

- 1 A. No, not at all.
- 2 | Q. Okay. Did you ever stomp on Mr. Bradley's back?
- 3 | A. No.
- 4 | Q. Could you and Officer Dunn be able to fit into the
- 5 | cruiser and stomp on Mr. Bradley's back at the same time?
- 6 A. That would be impossible.
- 7 | Q. Did Mr. Bradley ever complain to you that he had any
- 8 | injuries?
- 9 A. No, that was the last time I saw Mr. Bradley outside
- 10 of my instructions on what I was going to do. I did not
- 11 | ever speak to Mr. Bradley.
- 12 Q. When you say instructions about what you were going
- 13 | to do, you mean the patfrisk?
- 14 A. Yes, the patfrisk.
- 15 \parallel Q. Now, so you had no contact with Mr. Bradley after he
- 16 | left the scene?
- 17 A. Correct.
- 18 \parallel Q. And did you have any involvement in the booking?
- 19 | A. No.
- 20 \parallel Q. Now, are you ever on parole without a service pistol?
- 21 | A. No.
- 22 MR. SCHMIDT: Just a moment.
- 23 Q. (By Mr. Schmidt) Officer Moynahan, did you hear the
- 24 plaintiff Mr. Bradley's testimony about emptying his
- 25 possessions into the cruiser?

- Yeah -- or I heard into the vehicle in which we Α. exited him from.
- You're talking about the Chrysler 200 or 300?
- Yes, 200. 4
 - Did you do that?
- Α. No. 6

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- And is that something that an officer would do?
- Α. No. At no point when you exit someone from a car 9 would you then leave that car door open. That car door acts as a secondary barrier if we were to lose control of Mr. Bradley or anyone that we were conducting a patfrisk
- on so that their attempts to get back in the car were 12

13 stopped or slowed by the vehicle door.

> At no time during a patfrisk for weapons would I then put the items that were to be deemed dangerous and taken from someone in front of them. They're not in handcuffed. Their hands would be easier to access the items then, more than it would be on the person.

- And in this case you weren't even able to complete the patfrisk, correct?
- Α. No. No.

MR. SCHMIDT: Nothing further.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Attorney Schmidt.

We're going to take a break. All right? We'll take

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our morning break. The same instructions as always apply. Don't talk to each other about the case or begin jury deliberations. Don't access the internet or try to post anything on the internet. Any instructions I have left out, all of the instructions continue to apply. All right? (The jury left at 11:03.) THE COURT: Attorney Schmidt, any witnesses after this? MR. SCHMIDT: I don't believe so. THE COURT: All right. So the defendant is going to rest? MR. SCHMIDT: Yes. THE COURT: So I imagine that we will go to cross-examine and then going into closings. All right. Very good. Thank you. (A recess was taken at 11:04 until 11:34.) MR. COYLE: Before the jury comes in, I don't know if we are going to discuss your charge and verdict slip? THE COURT: We will talk about it. We will definitely have a conference. (The jury entered at 11:35.) THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, was everyone able to follow all of my instructions during the break?

1 THE JURY: (Yes.) THE COURT: All right. Based upon the response, 2 the jury remains fair and impartial. All right. 3 Go right ahead. 4 MR. SLEPCHUK: Thank you, Your Honor. May I 5 proceed? 6 THE COURT: Sure. 7 8 CROSS-EXAMINATION (By Mr. Slepchuk) Good morning, Officer Moynahan. 9 Good morning. 10 Α. So back on that night, August 26, 2015, you testified 11 that you were working as a dually sworn officer of the 12 13 Springfield Police Department with your partner Tasha Ellison; is that correct? 14 15 Α. Yes. 16 And that night did you have any police body cameras that you were wearing? 17 No. Our police department does not have police body 18 19 cameras. 20 What about cruiser dash cameras, do you have those? 2.1 Our cruisers are also not equipped with cruiser dash 22 cameras. And sometime around 2 a.m. you responded to near King 2.3 Street and the intersection of Northampton Avenue upon 24 learning that Officer Cicero and Dunn had stopped a car; 25

- 1 | is that right?
- 2 | A. Yes.
- 3 | Q. And you had already known that there were four
- 4 | occupants and the make and model of the car and such
- 5 | information, correct?
- 6 A. Yes, that's true.
- 7 | Q. You talked a little bit about this neighborhood, the
- 8 | Gunn Square area; is that right?
- 9 | A. Yes.
- 10 Q. Okay. Officer Moynahan, do you see the map that's on
- 11 | your screen?
- 12 | A. Yes, I do.
- 13 \parallel Q. I'm showing you what's been marked as Exhibit No. 1
- 14 | in this case. And would you agree with me that this map
- 15 | depicts the area of where the motor vehicle stop occurred?
- 16 A. Yes.
- 17 | Q. And do you see up here it says Gunn Square? Is that
- the Gunn square that you were referring to?
- 19 | A. Yes.
- 20 \parallel Q. So Gunn Square has nothing to do with actual guns or
- 21 | weapons, correct?
- 22 A. Correct.
- 23 Q. That's just the name, G-u-n-n, correct?
- 24 A. Correct.
- 25 Q. Thank you.

You testified that when you arrived Officers Cicero and Dunn they were still in their cruiser, correct?

- A. They were in their cruiser, yes.
- Q. You went and spoke with them, correct?
- 5 | A. Yes.

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- Q. And Officer Dunn told you that they were going to
- 7 | have to tow the car, correct?
- 8 | A. Yes.
- 9 Q. So that determination had already been made before you arrived on scene?
- 11 A. Correct.
- Q. Okay. When that determination -- had you ever been
- 13 | involved in a stop where a car had to towed?
- 14 A. Yes, I have many times.
- Q. Okay. Have you been in a situation where there were
- 16 passengers in a car that needed to be towed?
- 17 | A. Yes.
- 18 \parallel Q. Okay. And when that determination is made, is it
- 19 | normal for you to tell the passengers that the car has got
- 20 | to be towed, everyone within needs to get out?
- 21 | A. Yes.
- 22 \parallel Q. Now that didn't happen in this case, correct?
- 23 A. Eventually, yes.
- Q. Okay. But what happened next was you went to the
- 25 side of the car, the passenger side with Officer Dunn,

correct?

- 2 A. Yes, the passenger rear side.
- 3 | Q. You positioned yourself you said at the 7 o'clock
- 4 position I believe behind Officer Dunn?
- 5 | A. Correct.
- 6 Q. Okay. And did you have your flashlight out?
- 7 A. Of course.
- 8 \parallel Q. Illuminating the interior of the car?
- 9 A. Illuminating my general area of view.
- 10 Q. Okay. At that point neither you nor Officer Dunn
- 11 | told the people in the car, hey, time to get out. The
- 12 | car's got to be towed, correct?
- 13 \parallel A. Correct. The point of contact I believe was Officer
- 14 | Cicero.
- 15 | Q. Okay. So instead of communicating that information,
- 16 you're standing at the 7 o'clock position. You're
- observing the occupants of the car, correct?
- 18 A. Yes.
- 19 Q. And in addition to you and your partner, do you
- 20 remember where she was positioned?
- 21 | A. I do not.
- 22 | Q. And what about Officers Bienvenue and Lariviere, you
- 23 | agree they were present as well?
- 24 A. Not at that moment?
- 25 Q. Not at that moment.

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But at that moment in time at least there were four of you around the car? There was four police officers, yes. Okay. All armed with service pistols, correct? Their duty belt includes their service pistol, OC spray, baton, handcuffs, radio, holster, and Taser. It's at this point in time while you're standing there in the 7 o'clock position that Officer Dunn opens the rear passenger door and reaches in and removes Mr. Bradley from the rear passenger seat; is that right? Just does it? I don't understand where your question is coming from. So just to walk through this, you speak to Officer Dunn at the cruiser. He says we got to tow this car, right? Correct. Α. You then approached the car, correct? Correct. Α. You and Officer Dunn are on the passenger side? Yes. Α. Officer Cicero goes to the driver's side? Α. Yes. The occupants are not given the opportunity to leave the car, correct?

No, not at that moment.

- Q. Even though the determination has already been made
- 2 | that the car has to be towed and they're going to have to
- 3 get out, correct?
- 4 | A. Correct.
- 5 | Q. And you're making some observations, correct?
- 6 A. Correct.
- 7 | Q. And you claim that you saw Mr. Bradley lean towards
- 8 | the interior of the vehicle near the center console; is
- 9 | that your testimony?
- 10 A. Correct.
- 11 Q. Okay. You never saw him holding a weapon, right?
- 12 A. No. My vision would have been obscured from anywhere
- 13 | below his high shoulders and below.
- 14 | Q. You didn't see him reaching down out of sight,
- 15 | correct?
- 16 A. Correct. His body maintained that upper portion in
- 17 | my view.
- 18 Q. And you didn't see him reaching down towards the
- 19 doorjamb, correct?
- 20 A. Correct.
- 21 | Q. All you saw was him lean not down but just lean
- 22 | towards the interior of the car, correct?
- 23 | A. Correct. There's an obvious dip when someone leans
- 24 | in their shoulders so that's what I'm seeing, but that's
- 25 all I can see and base my observations on are the

- shoulders. So I can't see if a hand has moved from a lap towards the ground. I can't see that. I can only see the shoulders themselves.
- Q. You didn't see his shoulders dip down out of sight, right?
 - A. Out of sight, no.

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Q. So you'd agree with me that if you're sitting -- if you're sitting in the seat, if you were going to reach to say below the seat, that you would be able to see the shoulders dip down to reach underneath the seat, correct?

MR. SCHMIDT: Objection.

THE COURT: Sustained.

- Q. (By Mr. Slepchuk) Would you be able to see that if somebody leaned down?
- A. Depending on the vehicle, it depends on what you would or wouldn't be able to see at that moment.
- Q. Okay. But you didn't see Mr. Bradley dip down out of sight, correct?
- A. Correct. I didn't lose sight of his upper body.
- Q. And your testimony is that that slight movement to the right, that made you fearful that he was armed with a weapon?
 - A. The right and the left, yes.
- Q. Okay. Now, you said that you saw him lean towards the interior, correct?

- 1 A. Left. That's to his left.
- 2 Q. That's to his left. Okay.
- 3 A. And my left because I'm behind.
- 4 | Q. So towards the interior which would have been his
- 5 | left, your left, correct?
- 6 A. Uh-huh.
- 7 | Q. You never saw him reach down to the right, correct?
- 8 A. I just saw him come back to generally his position
- 9 | before.
- 10 | Q. Okay.
- 11 A. But my vision is blocked towards that right side
- 12 because of that metal pillar on the vehicle so I wouldn't
- \parallel even have been able to make the observation towards the
- 14 door, the doorjamb.
- 15 \parallel Q. You wouldn't have been able to see that standing
- 16 | there?
- 17 | A. No.
- 18 | Q. Well, his body didn't disappear out of your field of
- 19 | view, right?
- 20 A. There's blind spots, yes, in every vehicle.
- 21 | Q. Are you saying that you lost sight of him?
- 22 | A. No.
- 23 \parallel Q. Okay. So you saw him lean a little bit towards the
- 24 center to the left, right?
- 25 A. Correct.

He's still in your field of view, correct? 1 Q. 2 Α. Correct. 3 Then he comes back to basically where he started, correct? 4 5 Correct. 6 Okay. He does't go beyond that further to the right, 7 correct? 8 Α. Not that I recall. Okay. And that movement made you think that he had a 9 weapon? 10 Yes. 11 Α. At this point Officer Dunn opens the door and removes 12 13 Mr. Bradley from the rear seat, correct? 14 Α. He gives him an order to, yes. An order to? 15 Q. 16 Α. Yes. MR. SLEPCHUK: May I approach the witness, Your 17 Honor? 18 THE COURT: Yes. 19 20 (By Mr. Slepchuk) Officer, I'm going to show you 21 your testimony from the prior criminal trial. I'm going to direct your attention you to line 12. 22 "Question: So that you physically took him out of 23 the vehicle; is that fair to say? 24

"Answer: Yes.

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"Question: Okay. So you didn't ask him to come out?
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            "Answer: No."
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            Do you remember testifying that you did not ask him
 3
       to get out of the car?
 4
            Now I do, yes. I did not but that's not me, that's
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 6
       Officer Dunn.
            Did you ask Mr. Bradley if he had any weapons on him
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       prior to ordering him out of the car or at any point?
            I don't recall.
 9
            I'm going to direct you to the same page, line 17:
10
       "Did you ask him if he had any weapons?
11
            "Answer:
                     No.
12
13
            "Question: You didn't ask him?"
           "Uh-uh," but.
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       Α.
15
       Q.
            You'd agree you didn't ask him?
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            No.
       Α.
            Now, when you got him out of the car, it's your
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       testimony that -- well, did you place him in handcuffs
18
       right away?
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            No.
       Α.
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            Now why wouldn't you do that if you thought that he
22
       had a weapon?
            Not all patfrisks call for someone to be put in
2.3
       handcuffs. You perform the patfrisk.
24
            Now you said this was a bad neighborhood, right?
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- A. That still doesn't justify us putting someone in handcuffs during a patfrisk.
- Q. So even though you claimed to be so concerned that he had retrieved a weapon and you needed to take steps to protect your safety and the safety of the other officers, you didn't take the precaution to place him in handcuffs; is that your testimony?

MR. SCHMIDT: Objection.

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: No. The patfrisk is for my safety, the officers' safety, the occupants' safety, everyone involved. But again, that doesn't make a determination on whether we put someone into handcuffs to perform the patfrisk. A patfrisk can and is normally performed uncuffed.

- Q. (By Mr. Slepchuk) It certainly would be safer if you cuffed him first, wouldn't it?
- A. Not necessarily.

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- Q. You think it would be easier for him to retrieve a weapon if he was handcuffed than if he wasn't?
- A. It's more important that I would -- that I, being the officer patfrisking him, would become aware of the weapon rather than us attempting to put Mr. Bradley in handcuffs to which he fights and puts his hand in his waistband and takes out a firearm.

My knowledge by conducting the patfrisk quicker than attempting to put someone in handcuffs is more beneficial to my safety, officers' safety, and everyone's safety for me to patfrisk and find that weapon before taking time out to put someone in handcuffs.

- Q. Okay. Now, at the time of this -- you testified that as you're conducting -- you testified as you're conducting the frisk that when you got near the groin area that he that he slammed up against the car trapping your hand; is that correct?
- 11 A. The waistband area, yes.
- 12 Q. Okay. And then you told him to calm down?
- 13 | A. Yes.

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- Q. And he backed off. You were able to remove your hand, correct?
- 16 A. I never said that he backed off.
- Q. You were able to remove your hand from the area between his pelvis and the car, correct?
- 19 | A. Yes.
 - Q. And I think you described that he had his hands in a fist and he was on the car, something like this so to speak? (Indicating)
 - ∥ A. Yes.
- 24 \parallel Q. And you told him to calm down, right?
- 25 | A. Yes.

- Q. And you were going to continue the patfrisk?

 A. Attempt it again.
 - Q. Okay. And you claimed that you couldn't complete it?
- 4 A. Correct.

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- A. The patfrisk is larger than just the waistband area.

 That is a common starting point in a patfrisk. That is
- 8 based on training and experience the most common area for
- 9 an individual to have a weapon, a knife, a gun, a heavy
- 10 | object in that area. That's where generally a patfrisk
- 11 starts, but the patfrisk is of the whole individual
- 12 | themselves that's why.
- MR. SLEPCHUK: That really didn't answer my
 question and I move to strike the answer as nonresponsive.
- 15 THE COURT: The answer will stand.
- Q. (By Mr. Slepchuk) My question, Officer Moynahan, was
- he's positioned like this against the car. What prevented
- you from patfrisking him at that point in time
- 19 specifically? (Indicating)
- 20 A. His actions after that.
- 21 \parallel Q. What actions?
- A. His actions of backing up, stiffening up, his hands in a fist.
- Q. So is there a requirement that when somebody is being patfrisked, they have to have their hands open like this

and not like this? (Indicating) 1 There's no requirement for an individual's hands to 2 be in a certain way, but the manner in which someone holds 3 their fists is very indicative of possible action by the 4 5 person. Okay. How does it affect your ability to pat down 6 7 someone? 8 Α. Balled fists? 9 Yes. It just increases your concern. 10 Okay. But it doesn't affect your ability to conduct 11 a patfrisk, correct? 12 13 It can. 14 0. How? 15 MR. SCHMIDT: Objection. 16 THE COURT: Overruled. (By Mr. Slepchuk) You can answer. 17 Because those balled fists change the patfrisk from 18 uncuffed to cuffed. 19 20 So any time somebody goes like this on a car, that 2.1 means that you have a right to cuff him? (Indicating) 22 Α. No. So we can agree that the position of 2.3 somebody's hands, whether like this or like this, has no 24

physical impediment to you patted down their arms or their

- legs or any other part of their body, correct?
 (Indicating)
- 3 A. Again, I disagree.
- 4 Q. Okay. And you testified that he was tense; is that
- 5 || right?
- 6 | A. Yes.
- 7 | Q. Okay. And again whether somebody who's standing like
- 8 | this is tense, that also has no impact on your ability to
- 9 pat them down, correct? (Indicating)
- 10 A. Again, I still disagree.
- 11 Q. So there's a difference between somebody having a
- 12 | tense arm and a non-tense arm, that's going to make it
- 13 || more difficult for you to feel if there's a solid object
- 14 | like a gun; is that your testimony?
- 15 A. Yes. If someone was to tensely hold their arms
- 16 against the interior of their body and they had a knife,
- 17 | which is another dangerous weapon, that would essentially
- 18 | affect my ability to get in between that crevice in
- 19 | between the armpit area to feel that there was a knife
- 20 | because someone was being tense on their body.
- 21 | Q. Okay. But that's not what you testified happened in
- 22 | this case. You didn't say that his arms were like this.
- 23 || You said they were like this on the car? (Indicating)
- 24 A. That was your question that I answered.
- 25 \parallel Q. Okay. Well, I'm talking about the facts of this

- case. That he had his hands out like this, we already agreed? (Indicating)
- 3 | A. Yes.
- 4 | Q. They weren't in like this? There's no possibility
- 5 | that he was pinching a knife or something in his armpit,
- 6 | correct? (Indicating)
- 7 | A. Correct.
- 8 | Q. Okay. So there was nothing stopping you from
- 9 completing that patfrisk at that point in time?
- 10 A. He needed to be placed in handcuffs in order to have
- 11 \parallel it done.
- 12 Q. And at this time Mr. Bradley was wearing sweatpants;
- 13 | isn't that right?
- 14 A. Based on the booking video my recollection seemed to
- 15 | be jogged that he was.
- 16 Q. And you would agree with me that sweatpants are kind
- 17 | of a lose thin cloth most of the time?
- 18 A. Not always.
- 19 Q. They're soft and made of cotton, right?
- 20 A. Not always.
- 21 | Q. They're not made of denim, sweatpants?
- 22 A. Not that I know of.
- 23 \parallel Q. Do you remember the type of material that Mr. Bradley
- 24 was wearing that night?
- 25 | A. No.

- 1 Q. Would you agree that when dealing with sweatpants or
- 2 | that type of material, soft cotton, that it's fairly easy
- 3 | to feel a solid metal object inside that clothing?
- 4 A. Yes, to a certain extent.
- 5 | Q. Now, just to be clear, you never saw Mr. Bradley kick
- 6 | Officer Dunn, correct?
- 7 A. I saw the motion of the kick. I don't believe I saw
- 8 the actual contact of the kick.
- 9 Q. So after he was placed in handcuffs, I think your
- 10 testimony was that Officer Dunn led him over to his
- 11 | cruiser?
- 12 | A. Yes.
- 13 \parallel Q. And this was on the driver's side of the cruiser?
- 14 | A. Ye.
- 15 \parallel Q. You went over and unlocked the door, correct?
- 16 A. Yes, I believe so.
- 17 Q. And Officer Dunn was standing essentially right next
- 18 | to you with Mr. Bradley; is that right?
- 19 \parallel A. To my right if I am looking into the interior of the
- 20 | front of the vehicle.
- 21 | Q. Okay. So you're standing roughly a few feet away
- 22 | from him at that point in time?
- 23 A. Correct.
- 24 | Q. Now, you heard -- you were present when Officer Dunn
- 25 | testified; is that right?

- 1 | A. Yes.
- 2 Q. You heard his testimony?
- 3 | A. Yes.
- 4 | Q. Did you hear his testimony about Mr. Bradley falling
- 5 | out of his grip and falling into the rear floorboard area
- 6 of the cruiser? Did you hear that?
- 7 | A. No.
- 8 | Q. Okay. But that didn't happen, correct?
- 9 A. Not from my point of view.
- 10 Q. What you saw was Officer Dunn pushing him in his
- 11 | chest; is that right?
- 12 A. I think I said that Mr. Bradley seemed to be pushing
- 13 \parallel out and Officer Dunn was kind of holding and pushing in.
- 14 | Q. That was you said face to face?
- 15 | A. Yeah, it appeared so. Again, I had an open cruiser
- 16 door that was kind of blocking my whole field of vision.
- 17 | Q. But you would agree with me that when Mr. Bradley was
- 18 | ultimately secured in the rear of the cruiser, his head
- 19 was pointing towards the floor?
- 20 | A. Yes.
- 21 Q. Okay. And he was still handcuffed at that point in
- 22 | time?
- 23 | A. Yes, he was.
- Q. And are you aware that as a result of this incident
- 25 Mr. Bradley sustained a busted lip?

- 1 A. After the incident, yes, I became aware.
- 2 | Q. Okay. Do you have any idea how that happened?
- 3 | A. No.
- 4 | Q. And you didn't take any witness statements from any
- of the three girls in the car that night, correct?
- 6 A. No, I did not.
- 7 | Q. Now Mr. Bradley was searched incident to arrest; is
- 8 | that right?
- 9 \blacksquare A. Was he or?
- 10 Q. Was he searched?
- 11 \parallel A. I would suspect so by the arresting officers.
- 12 Q. Okay. Did you see him get searched by them?
- 13 A. No, I was out on the street.
- 14 \parallel Q. But when you were at the car, did you see Officer
- 15 | Dunn searching Mr. Bradley's person?
- 16 A. Not to my knowledge. I don't remember.
- 17 \parallel Q. So you didn't see him take his wallet out for
- 18 | instance?
- 19 | A. I'm not sure. Normal procedure when you put someone
- 20 | into the back of a cruiser is to take their cell phone,
- 21 | wallet, if they have a purse, and that goes to the front
- 22 | of the vehicle with usually whatever officer took it on
- 23 | the passenger side. This is to cut down on the chance of
- 24 someone attempting to make a phone call or retrieve
- 25 something from a wallet or something like that.

- 1 Q. Did you see him remove a wallet or a cell phone from
- 2 Mr. Bradley?
- 3 A. I don't recall.
- 4 | Q. You're aware that no weapons were found on Mr.
- 5 Bradley, correct?
- 6 A. Yes, I am.
- 7 | Q. And you were involved with the search of the vehicle
- 8 | along with your partner; is that right?
- 9 A. An inventory of the vehicle I believe we were.
- 10 Q. And you didn't find any weapons inside the car,
- 11 | correct?
- 12 A. No, we did not.
- 13 \parallel Q. No weapons? Nothing in the center console, right?
- 14 | A. No.
- 15 \parallel Q. Nothing in the area where Mr. Bradley was sitting,
- 16 | correct?
- 17 | A. For weapons?
- 18 | Q. Yes.
- 19 | A. No.
- 20 \parallel Q. The only thing that was found was the bottle of
- 21 | Hennessy?
- 22 A. An open bottle of Hennessy, yes.
- 23 \parallel Q. I think you testified on direct that you at the time
- 24 when Officer Dunn was leading Mr. Bradley back to the
- 25 police cruiser, that you were also concerned about the

- three other occupants of the car, the three girls; is that
 right?
- 3 | A. Yes.

- Q. Did anybody make any attempt to patfrisk any of them?
- 5 A. I would think my partner who's a female, Tasha
- 6 | Ellison, would have conducted the patfrisk.
- 7 | Q. Did you see her patfrisking any of those women?
- 8 | A. No.
- 9 Q. And you were asked a little bit about I guess the
- 10 | layout of the back seat of the police cruiser. Do you
- remember being asked some questions about the seat and the
- 12 space and stuff like that?
- 13 | A. When?
- 14 | Q. On direct examination do you remember your attorney
- 15 \parallel asking you a couple of questions about the spacing in the
- 16 back seat of the police cruiser? Do you remember that?
- 17 A. Yes, that it was tight and I agreed with officer or
- 18 | Lieutenant Dunn's description of the back seat.
- 19 Q. And I think you said it would have been impossible
- 20 \parallel for you to stomp somebody who was in the back seat?
- 21 A. That the two of us standing at the open door of a
- 22 cruiser would be impossible for us to simultaneously stomp
- 23 | someone.
- Q. Now if somebody was only partially in, let's just say
- 25 only their torso, they're on their knees and the rest of

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their legs are outside and just their torso is leaning in, you would agree with me it would be possible to kick somebody in that position? If someone is on their knees, their legs are outside of the cruiser and the rest of their body is on the seat, no, I would not be able to. If they were getting up, if they were starting to position themselves up, you would not be able to just stick your foot in the door and kick them? Α. No. MR. SLEPCHUK: I have nothing further. THE COURT: Thank you. Anything? MR. SCHMIDT: Briefly, Your Honor. REDIRECT EXAMINATION (By Mr. Schmidt) Detective Moynahan, Attorney Slepchuk went over some furtive movements with you a little bit. Yes. Α. Now you heard Officer Dunn testify he also saw furtive movements? Α. Correct. Now you're approaching the car at the same time from different viewpoints; is that fair to say? Yes. Α.

Did he communicate to you what he was seeing?

- A. Yes, and especially with the utterance of him stating again like I had testified to before, it appeared towards Mr. Bradley to keep his hands up that was in conjunction with exactly what I was seeing. My thought, as a police officer, knowing Lieutenant Dunn and his training are the same. We're all police officers. If I'm seeing something and he's continuously seeing something and it causes him to tell someone to put their hands up, that's me in a sense a reassurance that what I'm seeing is exactly what he's seeing. That I'm not seeing something else.
- Q. So your determination on what you were seeing, those furtive movements, was that dependant or independent of anything that you heard from Officer Dunn?
- A. Mine was independent.
- Q. Now you were asked about why couldn't you have patfrisked Mr. Bradley when he was behind the car with his fists balled. Did you feel safe doing it at that point?
- 18 | A. No.

- Q. When you tried to put handcuffs on Mr. Bradley, was that an easy process?
- 21 A. No, it was not.
- Q. Again how long did it take you to get him in handcuffs?
- A. Forty-five seconds to 60 seconds.
- MR. SCHMIDT: Nothing further.

1 MR. SLEPCHUK: Just briefly, Your Honor. 2 RECROSS-EXAMINATION (By Mr. Slepchuk) Officer Moynahan, have you had a 3 chance to review the arrest report in this case? 4 5 Α. Yes. And as far as you know, is there anything inaccurate 6 7 in that report as to what happened? 8 Α. I don't believe so. Would you agree --9 MR. SCHMIDT: Objection. 10 THE COURT: Basis? 11 MR. SCHMIDT: It's not his report. 12 13 THE COURT: Sustained. Rephrase the question. 14 The question and answer are stricken so just rephrase the 15 question. 16 (By Mr. Slepchuk) You testified that Officer Dunn told Mr. Bradley to show his hands; is that right? 17 MR. SCHMIDT: Objection. We're outside. 18 THE COURT: I'll allow it. Go ahead. 19 20 THE WITNESS: In some form, yes. 2.1 (By Mr. Slepchuk) Okay. Would you agree with me 22 that no where in the arrest report does it say anything about Officer Dunn telling Mr. Bradley to show his hands? 2.3 Α. Correct. 24 MR. SLEPCHUK: Nothing further. 25

THE COURT: Anything, Attorney Schmidt? 1 MR. SCHMIDT: No, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Thank you. You can step down. 3 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir. 4 THE COURT: Any further witnesses? 5 MR. SCHMIDT: No, Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: Defense rest? 7 MR. SCHMIDT: 8 We do. THE COURT: All right. 9 MR. SLEPCHUK: If I could have just one moment? 10 THE COURT: Yes. 11 MR. SLEPCHUK: Your Honor, at this time I'd like 12 13 to recall Mr. Bradley to the stand in rebuttal. THE COURT: All right. Sidebar. 14 15 (Sidebar conference.) 16 THE COURT: Okay. What's your proffer that the testimony is going to be regarding, the general area? You 17 don't have to be too specific. 18 MR. SLEPCHUK: Very briefly on the issue of 19 20 whether or not he had a wallet that night. There was 2.1 testimony that I heard for the first time that Officer 22 Dunn seized his wallet at the car. THE COURT: So on the wallet issue. 2.3 MR. SLEPCHUK: Very brief. 24 THE COURT: All right. 25

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MR. SAINT LAURENT: Your Honor, may I be heard?
I believe there was previous testimony that the wallet was
in his possession. That when asked for ID, the wallet was
already in his possession in front of the cruiser. I
don't think --
          THE COURT: That's what Officer Dunn said.
         MR. SLEPCHUK:
                        Yes.
          THE COURT: Is that what you're talking about,
the first time you heard it was from Officer Dunn?
         MR. SLEPCHUK: Correct.
         THE COURT: So Officer Dunn did testify about
that.
         MR. SAINT LAURENT: I'm sorry. I thought he
said this was the first time.
          THE COURT: No, not with Moynahan.
         MR. SLEPCHUK: I'm talking about Dunn.
         THE COURT: I do remember Dunn saying that about
the wallet.
         MR. SAINT LAURENT:
                             Okay.
          THE COURT: Very good. I mean, I don't want to
limit you to other rebuttal. I just want to make sure you
give me a general outline of what's going on.
         MR. SLEPCHUK:
                        That's it.
          THE COURT: All right.
(End of sidebar conference.)
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THE COURT: So, ladies and gentlemen, the defense has rested which means they are calling no further witnesses. Now it goes back that the plaintiff may offer a rebuttal case if they would like. This goes back and becomes the plaintiff's case and the plaintiff has asked to put on a witness as their rebuttal case.

Go right ahead.

MR. SLEPCHUK: Daniel Bradley please.

THE COURT: Mr. Bradley, when someone takes the witness stand and then leaves and comes backs, I need to remind that person you remain under oath.

THE WITNESS: Okay.

THE COURT: Do you understand?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COURT: All right.

REBUTTAL DIRECT EXAMINATION

- Q. (By Mr. Slepchuk) Mr. Bradley, did you hear when Officer Dunn testified that he took your wallet from you when you were at the car, at the police cruiser that is?
- A. Correct.
- Q. Did you have a wallet on you that night?
- 22 | A. No.

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- Q. And remind us when he asked you for your ID? When you provided your ID?
- A. I was in the rear passenger's seat after they ran her

license and he returned to the car. 1 Thank you. I have nothing 2 MR. SLEPCHUK: further. 3 THE COURT: All right. Any questions? 4 MR. SAINT LAURENT: Nothing, Your Honor. 5 MR. SCHMIDT: No, Your Honor. 6 MR. COYLE: No, Your Honor. 7 8 THE COURT: Thank you. Anything further from the plaintiff? 9 MR. SLEPCHUK: No, Your Honor, but I do have a 10 motion. 11 THE COURT: All right. Both sides rest? 12 13 MR. SCHMIDT: Yes, Your Honor. 14 MR. COYLE: Yes. 15 THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, 16 I'm going to excuse you while I talk to each side about legal issues and this will in preparation for closing 17 arguments. 18 I don't know how long or short this might be but I'd 19 20 like to move into the closing arguments as soon as we can 2.1 but sometimes there's legal issues that take longer to deal with. 22 So your lunch might be here. We don't know. 2.3 depends how long this takes. If I can resolve all these 24 issue fairly quickly, I'm going to ask you to come back 25

and we'll do closing arguments, which would take certainly no longer than an hour of closing arguments. Then I'm going to have you go to lunch and I'll make a determination if the jury instructions can be put together to be able to give them to you today or whether you come back tomorrow morning and start the jury instructions.

So right now we're going to take a break. All right? All instructions apply. Don't talk about the case even though the case is over. Don't begin to talk about anything to do with the case and all the instructions that I always give you all apply. Thank you.

(The jury left at 12:13.)

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THE COURT: All right. There's motions?

MR. SLEPCHUK: Yes, Your Honor. I've got a motion for judgment as a matter of law.

THE COURT: On what issue, what count, and against what defendant?

MR. SLEPCHUK: Well, Your Honor, it's for all counts, but I won't waste the court's time with arguing every single fact at this point but I'd like to focus on two points which I think deserves discussing right now.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. SLEPCHUK: With respect to, you know, the first thing is the traffic stop. Obviously we've got disputed testimony so I'll move on from that. But beyond

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that, clearly under the law once the police have determined whether or not they're going to issue a citation, whether or not a car is going to be towed, that's the end of the inquiry. The police cannot detain people in a car further than is reasonably necessary to effecutate the purpose of the stop.

The testimony from the defendants themselves is at the time they re-approached that car, they had already determined -- they had already made whatever calls they needed to make, that that car was going to be towed and that Ms. Robinson was going to be issued a citation. That is it. The inquiry -- the detention needs to stop at that point in time but that's not what happened. Instead there was further detention.

Now Mr. Bradley testified, and Ms. Tucker previously corroborated, that at this point they asked him for his identification, which would be a violation of Article 14. The defendants deny that. I understand that. But even if we take their word for it, even if we accept their testimony, it's still a violation.

Mr. Bradley and everybody in that car should have been given the opportunity to leave because the car was going to be towed. There was no longer any legitimate purpose to keep them in that car. That's what they did, and at some point later that's when they claimed they see

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these movements and move him out of the car. So right there, from my position, no reasonable jury could find in the defendants' favor on that issue with respect to seizure and length of the stop.

THE COURT: I thought the testimony was that calls were made to a rental agency; the rental agency couldn't be contacted. They went back to the car.

Moynahan arrived when Dunn was going to the area where Mr. Bradley was seated, and that's when it was this re-approach that was described and that's when the testimony was, at least from the police perspective, they saw certain movements.

MR. SLEPCHUK: You're right, but it's not when they're approaching. It's not when they're walking up to the car. They've already gone up to the car. They've already positioned themselves around this car and they're still shinning their flashlights in it.

There's a period of continued detention at this point. Now it wasn't stated exactly how long. I don't know if anybody was timing it, but certainly it didn't -- these observations were not made on the re-approach. That might be different. They're made at some further point in time when they're already surrounding this car. They should have been allowed to leave as soon as they got up to that car and that's not what happened, and that leads

me to --

THE COURT: What do you mean as soon as they got up to the car? Before they did all the rental agreement inquiry?

MR. SLEPCHUK: They already did. That had already been done at this point. The testimony was that they initially got her license and the rental agreement. They went back to the cruiser and they ran it all.

When Officer Moynahan gets back or arrives, he's speaking to Officer Dunn and they've already made the determination, hey, we ran everything. We called the rental agency. This car needs to be towed. That determination is made at that point in time.

So what needs to happen next -- again, it's a routine traffic stop up to this point. The officers under Article 14 and the Fourth Amendment cannot detain any further than reasonably necessary. Their duty is to go back to that car to say, sorry, guys. The car is being towed. You're on your own. That's what needs to happen and that's not what happened.

THE COURT: And that happened before or after Moynahan arrives --

MR. SLEPCHUK: That happened before.

THE COURT: -- in your view?

MR. SLEPCHUK: They already made -- first it was

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Officer Cicero and Dunn, they're the first ones there.

They get the license and the rental agreement. They come back. They're in their cruiser making the calls doing the RMV look up. They've already made the determination what the status is that they have to tow this car.

When Officer Moynahan comes, they're still in the cruiser. He speaks to them at the cruiser. They say, hey, we got to tow this thing. So the determination is made at that point in time.

THE COURT: But how much time elapsed? It didn't seem from the testimony that very much time elapsed.

MR. SLEPCHUK: It may not have been a lot of time but that is irrespective. It doesn't matter.

THE COURT: No, it's quite respective. I mean, is this ten seconds? Thirty seconds? Two minutes? Other police are arriving. Was it happening -- it seemed to have happened about the same time that they were ready to go approach the car. It seems to me that's the reason they -- the evidence supports that's why they were approaching the car. This is getting towed. Everybody's got to go.

MR. SLEPCHUK: I'm not saying they didn't have the right to re-approach the car. They did. But when they get to the car, the next step is to tell them we have

to tow the car. You have to leave.

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THE COURT: Right.

MR. SLEPCHUK: That didn't happen. They didn't say that. They continued detaining the car. They continued monitoring the car, standing by the car.

THE COURT: Who's they?

MR. SLEPCHUK: Officer Moynahan, Officer Cicero, Officer Dunn, and Officer Ellison. That was the testimony that all four of them re-approached the car, surrounded the car, were shining their flashlights into the car, and at some point after that, after they positioned themselves, they claim that they see these observations and then there's the exit order.

My point is if they had done what they were supposed to do and got up to that car and said to everybody, the car is being towed, good-bye, then these supposed movements -- again we deny them -- but would have never been made. There never would have been an exit order and we wouldn't be here today. That's the argument with respect to the prolonged detention. The continued --

THE COURT: I'm really not following you. There would have had to have been an exit order.

MR. SLEPCHUK: Correct, but not a patfrisk.

THE COURT: Well, there might have been a patfrisk if you believe the observations of the police.

1 MR. SLEPCHUK: But if the exit order was given right away --2 THE COURT: What do you mean right away? 3 MR. SLEPCHUK: When they came up to the car. 4 THE COURT: Your scenario is this is a rental, 5 everyone out of the car. Bye? 6 MR. SLEPCHUK: Yes. 7 8 THE COURT: I don't see that that's -- there's 9 no time frame that was laid out in the testimony. The police went back -- their testimony was they tried 10 contacting the rental agency because there could have been 11 someone there. They could have gotten in touch with the 12 13 rental agency so that took up some time to verify. 14 MR. SLEPCHUK: That's not my issue. 15 THE COURT: All right. 16 MR. SLEPCHUK: My issue is only when they come back to the car --17 THE COURT: So when they come back to the car, 18 Moynahan is there with them? 19 20 MR. SLEPCHUK: Yes. 2.1 THE COURT: And you're saying they come back to 22 the car, they shouldn't have been looking at the occupants. They just should have said everyone go? 2.3 MR. SLEPCHUK: Correct. 24 THE COURT: All right. That's denied. 25

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MR. SLEPCHUK: Okay. Then the next question is, is the exit order lawful? Again we need reasonable suspicion of a safety threat.

Now, Mr. Bradley testified he didn't make any movements. Both the girls in the previous testimony said they didn't make any movements. Officer Cicero is standing right there and just in a position as anybody else to see anything and he didn't see any movements.

Officer Moynahan he didn't see any reaching out of sight, anything like that. He saw him not tucking down but just leaning towards the center of the vehicle. I would argue that that, even if believed, is completely insufficient to warrant an exit order.

Their best argument is Officer Dunn that he observed this shuffling from side to side and reaching towards the doorjamb. A point I want to make about that is it's against the weight of the evidence. You have all the other witnesses who deny seeing it. That's one point. But when you look at the evidence as a whole, it defies reason. There was nothing found there. There was no weapon. There was no contraband found on Mr. Bradley's person or in that area.

THE COURT: But the legitimacy and the legality of a patfrisk is not based upon if something was or was not found. That would be absurd.

MR. SLEPCHUK: Certainly.

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THE COURT: It's based upon the observations themselves and here there was testimony regarding the observations which could be fairly categorized as minimal, minimal, but not nonexistent. There were some indicia, some of the criteria were mentioned, as I said minimal. So why wouldn't that be a jury issue?

MR. SLEPCHUK: Your Honor, I'm preserving my rights.

THE COURT: Good enough. Okay. So that's denied.

MR. SLEPCHUK: I got to make the argument.

THE COURT: Denied.

MR. SLEPCHUK: Again with respect to the use of force, I know it's disputed but I think when you look at the evidence as a whole, the defendants have offered zero reasonable explanation as to how Mr. Bradley got his lip hurt, how he had injuries to his back. And I think that in light of the weight of the evidence, his testimony and the photographs and any lack of reasonable explanation from defense as to how these things happened, that no reasonable juror could conclude that what happened to him was justified. That would be my argument with respect to that.

THE COURT: Again based upon the evidence given

by the defense it's up for the jury. 1 MR. SLEPCHUK: Understood, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: For purposes of your motion, that's 3 denied. 4 THE COURT: Any motion? 5 MR. COYLE: Your Honor, I would renew my motion 6 for judgment as a matter of law that I articulated in the 7 8 plaintiff's case. THE COURT: All right. As to Mr. Cicero, 9 10 correct? MR. COYLE: Correct, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Mr. Cicero previously it was allowed 12 13 the judgment as a matter of law on Counts 5, 6, and 7. Motions for judgment as a matter of law are now allowed on 14 15 Count 8, Count 9, Count 10, and Count 11. 16 I need -- let's now talk about Counts 1 and Counts 2 as to Cicero. In each of your verdict forms there is no 17 specificity regarding a theory as to what the unlawful 18 restraint was, as to what the violation was. 19 20 In other words, was it effectuating the traffic stop 2.1 or was it assaulting someone and arresting someone? 22 the verdict forms don't lay it out. Does it matter in each parties' perspective what the 2.3 action was to violate either state-given rights or 24 federally-given rights? 25

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The reason why I bring that up for Officer Cicero is I find only the theory of the traffic stop is applicable to Mr. Cicero, but your verdict form just says unlawful seizure which could be anything and so how do you plan to deal with that?

Another way to ask the question is does there need to be unanimity about jury on the theory of a violation?

Since you can say a violation could have been the traffic stop, it could have been the use of force to take Mr.

Bradley out of the car, it could have been the punching of him. It could have been a number of things.

So does there need to be unanimity on each of the potential theories of the violation of federal or state law which is I guess another way of getting to this question regarding Cicero? Because I'm telling you right now my decision on Cicero is the required finding is allowed on Counts 1 and 2 as well as to any theory except for the traffic stop. That survives. That's the only theory that survives on Cicero.

But if we're splicing and cutting so finally the theory, we're using the complaint against Cicero as an example, we need to talk more generally about how it applies to everyone and how we instruct the jury and create a verdict form.

MR. SLEPCHUK: I agree. I think that if we get

into every -- there are a lot of theories --1 THE COURT: Right. 2 MR. SLEPCHUK: -- and I think the verdict form 3 is going to get very messy and complicated. Perhaps just 4 an unanimity instruction on the theory is sufficient to 5 cure that. You can instruct the jury that with respect to 6 Officer Cicero the only --7 8 THE COURT: So that we would like have a jury form that has boxes, do you find -- if you found there's a 9 violation as to... you pick the name of an officer, 10 provide boxes that they could check that might be the 11 violation? 12 13 Of course, for Mr. Cicero it would only be the 14 traffic stop. That would be the only possibility that 15 remains for him. Something to think about for both 16 sides. MR. SLEPCHUK: Maybe with respect to --17 THE COURT: I'm not saying we are there right 18 now but something to think about. 19 20 MR. SLEPCHUK: I understand. 21 THE COURT: What do you think? 22 MR. COYLE: If I can make a couple comments, Your Honor. You didn't address Count 4 which is --2.3 I did or did not? THE COURT: 24 MR. COYLE: I'm sorry? 25

THE COURT: I did not?

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MR. COYLE: Which I think I would argue the motion should be allowed.

THE COURT: I did not address Count 4?

MR. COYLE: If you did, I missed it. That's the false arrest claim relating to the arrest and charging of Mr. Bradley with a crime. That was obviously done based on the probable cause.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, if I didn't address that.

Let me rephrase this. All counts against Cicero for judgment as a matter of law is allowed as to all counts except one and two, and one and two only survive on the theory of the stop, the traffic stop. That would be the seizure, the pulling the car over.

MR. COYLE: I guess the argument I would make,
Your Honor, and I don't have a citation here to offer up,
is whether or not, first of all, Mr. Bradley has a right
-- a standing even to contest the traffic stop.

If you say that he does, in essence, I guess what you're saying is that any time a car full of people is stopped and the police officer was mistaken in whether he reasonable suspicion for a traffic violation, that the whole car full of people can all sue that police officer for federal civil rights violation and that just doesn't seem to be a result that --

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THE COURT: Well, here let's be clear. Here the evidence is not that it was mistaken. Here the plaintiff has offered evidence to say we didn't do it. We didn't go through a stop light, a stop sign.

MR. COYLE: That doesn't mean they weren't mistaken. It's clearly disputed. I'll acknowledge that, but the theory that's being offered here is if it isn't valid, if there isn't the reasonable suspicion of the traffic violation, it's a federal civil rights claim that everybody in the car can bring against that police officer.

THE COURT: Why wouldn't a pretextual stop give support for a federal lawsuit if that was true?

MR. COYLE: It probably would be but I don't think there's any evidence here or even any allegation that it was pretextual. They're claiming that there wasn't -- I mean, maybe you would say there's no distinction between untrue and pretextual, but there is no evidence of a basis for pretext.

THE COURT: Well, there's very little difference. I mean, pretextual was they had something else in mind and they wanted to use the traffic stop to get or allow them to do something else.

MR. COYLE: There's certainly no evidence of that or anything from which that could be inferred I would

offer. 1 THE COURT: All right. 2 MR. COYLE: So those would be my thoughts. 3 again I can't argue specifically but a lot of the case law 4 that we're talking about here in terms of passengers in 5 cars is all state law decided under Article 14 of the 6 state constitution. 7 8 THE COURT: Yeah. MR. COYLE: I'm not sure --9 THE COURT: I hear what you're saying. 10 MR. COYLE: And I'm not sure it's applicable to 11 a 1983 claim. 12 13 THE COURT: I hear what you're saying and I think you're starting to formulate an argument that has 14 15 some substance to it, but right now your motion is 16 denied. MR. COYLE: Thank you. 17 THE COURT: And the claims survives as to Cicero 18 relative to traffic stop only, Counts 1 and 2. All right. 19 20 MR. COYLE: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: What does the defense think 21 22 regarding unanimity on a theory of the violation of federal law or state right? You know, this issue of a 2.3 traffic stop in and of itself could be a violation; 24 punching someone could be a violation; yanking them out of 25

a car could be a violation.

Neither of your jury instructions talk about unanimity as to asking the jury to say here's what we think created the violation. I'm not saying there should be. I'm just asking what your position is did you think about that and do you think it's not necessary? The only reason, quite frankly, this is coming up is because of the way I'm splicing this as to Officer Cicero's conduct.

MR. SAINT LAURENT: Could we just have a moment please?

THE COURT: Sure.

(Off-the-record discussion.)

MR. SAINT LAURENT: Your Honor, we've come to an agreement that we would like it to be parsed out as far as the different levels I guess of the detention. So the traffic stop, the patfrisk. Well, first the exit order, the patfrisk, but we'd like those to be special questions.

THE COURT: Special questions on the verdict form.

MR. SAINT LAURENT: Yes.

THE COURT: You guys better call back to the law department and get someone busy drafting one.

MR. SCHMIDT: We all have concern, Your Honor, with regard to his standing to contest the stop. Also my client had nothing to do with that decision and so we have

that issue as well. 1 THE COURT: Your client had nothing to do with 2 the stop but your client is in the middle of the contested 3 issues about all the other things. 4 MR. SCHMIDT: He's fair game for everything 5 else. 6 THE COURT: Yeah. All right. 7 8 MR. SAINT LAURENT: Your Honor, just note my 9 objection for my client. We also agree the plaintiff does not have standing for the stop. His rights were first --10 he first comes in contact with my client when the exit 11 order is issued for him. We don't believe he has 12 13 standing. THE COURT: So the defense theory in a nutshell 14 15 is there is no potential violation of federal or state 16 rights by a traffic stop that was effectuated without merit? 17 MR. SAINT LAURENT: Not for Mr. Bradley, no. 18 For the driver of the vehicle, yes. 19 20 THE COURT: For the driver of the vehicle. 21 MR. SAINT LAURENT: For the driver of the 22 vehicle, yes, if she were to bring a claim if that's what the facts point out to be. 2.3 THE COURT: So for an occupant. 24 MR. SAINT LAURENT: For an occupant when they 25

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are first addressed in an unconstitutional manner, then --THE COURT: So an occupant is in a car -- and this isn't this case. I'm not saying this is in this case -- but police pull over a car. There's no stop sign. The police pull over the car for no reason. There's an occupant in that car. The occupant has no claim you're stating for a violation of federal or state rights --MR. SAINT LAURENT: Correct. THE COURT: -- based on the stop alone? MR. SAINT LAURENT: Unless they are addressed in an unconstitutional manner. THE COURT: All right. I'll look at that. MR. SLEPCHUK: I cited case law to the contrary. It's on page 4 of my proposed jury instructions. footnote number 5. THE COURT: Okay. MR. SLEPCHUK: I refer to United States v. Brown cited Delaware v Prouse, also Brendelin v. California, all United States Supreme Court cases. THE COURT: What does it say? MR. SLEPCHUK: "When a passenger in vehicle stopped for traffic violation is seized and may challenge constitutionality of stop," so I think it pretty clear --THE COURT: When a passenger is? MR. SLEPCHUK: "Passenger in vehicle stopped for

traffic violation is seized and may challenge constitutionality of stop." I mean this is going back to 1979. This is pretty well established case law.

THE COURT: I'm going to step off the bench right now and take a quick look and be right back. I think you're all going to be doing closings really soon so I don't want to leave you with the misimpression that that's not going to happen.

MR. SLEPCHUK: Understood, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE CLERK: All rise.

(A recess was taken until 1:44.)

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THE COURT: All right. I've followed down the case law that you cited regarding the occupant of the motor vehicle and find that plaintiff is correct. So, yes, federal civil rights a violation do exist for the occupants. I'm sure you looked at the same case so that's that.

The next issue is I had time to look through cases that we could find regarding unanimity in this context and recognize that unanimity would be required in much, much more greater range of cases in a criminal context and sometimes in the civil context. And then I don't -- I do not plan at this point after looking at some of the law on it to include what would be a special interrogatory

verdict form.

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A special interrogatory verdict form lists out all those questions asking for jurors to explain and checkboxes, et cetera. It's going to remain general which is exactly consistent with both the proposals from defense and plaintiff that you had proposed.

There will be a change relative to Officer Cicero and that's going to be just in the language. So Officer Cicero's language on the applicable counts will simply say by conducting a traffic stop. So he will stand different than the others, and then there will be a limiting instruction that tells the jury not to draw any conclusions one way or another if there are different counts or different types of language regarding each of the individuals involved.

MR. SCHMIDT: You Honor, do you plan to address the fact that Officer Moynahan was not involved in the traffic stop?

THE COURT: Yeah, that's a good point. Perhaps we can talk about that after closings when we are talking about how we're going to work on the verdict form without it becoming too long of a special interrogatory form. All right. Okay.

So ready for closings?

MR. SCHMIDT: Yes.

1 THE COURT: Very good. MR. SLEPCHUK: Your Honor, I do have a few aids 2 I'll put on an easel when I get to my closing. I've shown 3 them to defense counsel and I don't think they have any 4 5 issues. MR. SCHMIDT: We don't. 6 THE COURT: You can set it up around the side of 7 8 the table? MR. SLEPCHUK: Probably right here. 9 THE COURT: Is that okay with you? 10 MR. SCHMIDT: We have seen it, Your Honor. 11 That's fine. 12 13 MR. COYLE: If you can just keep it so we can see the jurors, I'd appreciate that. 14 15 THE COURT: Perhaps you can put it in the middle 16 of the room. MR. SLEPCHUK: I can put it just over here 17 somewhere. 18 THE COURT: If at any point any defense wants to 19 see it, they can move to take a look at it. 20 21 (The jury entered at 1:48.) 22 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, you can be seated. 23 During that break, which turned into the lunch break, 24 did everyone follow my instructions not to discuss the 25

case and all the other instructions that apply?

All right. The jury answered affirmatively. They remain fair and impartial. All right.

There's going to be closing arguments now. The closing arguments probably, all of them together, will probably be in the range of an hour and then what will happen is that will be the end of your day.

So it worked out that you having lunch during this time allowed us to take care of what we needed to take care of for the closing arguments to occur.

Now what needs to occur is there needs to be a conference between myself and the lawyers and the perfection and drafting and redrafting of jury instructions, which are quite lengthy.

The jury instructions will probably themselves be close to an hour for me to read and you will get a copy of them. So that takes quite a bit of time and so that's why I'm going to let you go for the day after the closing arguments to give us that time to work on that so we can pick up in the morning and get right to this. All right.

Whenever the parties are ready, you can go right ahead.

MR. SAINT LAURENT: Thank you, Your Honor.

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CLOSING ARGUMENT BY MR. SAINT LAURENT

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MR. SAINT LAURENT: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. On behalf of myself and my client, Lieutenant Dunn, I'd like to again thank you for serving on this jury.

At the beginning of this case when Your Honor questioned you, he asked whether you would be fair and impartial and whether you would hold the plaintiff to his burden of proving beyond -- I'm sorry, by the preponderance of the evidence -- meaning it is more likely than not -- that the plaintiff's allegations in fact happened, proving beyond -- proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Officer Moynahan, Officer Dunn, and Christian Cicero in fact violated plaintiff's constitutional rights.

Additionally, ladies and gentlemen, I stood before you yesterday and asked that you evaluate the testimony with common sense and view the evidence through the lens of every day experiences. I am calling on you now to abide by those promises.

Let's look at the evidence presented over the last two days and see why the plaintiff has failed to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

You served -- you've heard from several witnesses yesterday and this morning. You heard first from

Christian Cicero. Officer Cicero told you that his interactions with the plaintiff were very limited.

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Officer Cicero stated that he didn't see Mr.

Bradley's removal from the vehicle. He didn't see any
alleged stomping on Mr. Bradley's back, and I'd suggest to
you that that did not occur.

He didn't see Daniel Bradley's foot strike Officer
Dunn's shin because he was on the other side of the rental
vehicle. But you did hear Officer Cicero testify that he
saw a brief struggle between Lieutenant Dunn, Officer
Moynahan, and Daniel Bradley as the officers were
attempting to handcuff him.

Even from the other side of the stopped rental car, Officer Cicero could tell that Daniel Bradley was not complying with the officers' attempts to search him and handcuff him.

Next you heard from my client Lieutenant Dunn. You heard Lieutenant Dunn tell how he and his partner saw the car the plaintiff was seated in speed past them, how they pulled behind the car and then observed it run a stop sign. There was no secret motive to this stop.

In fact, you heard the transcript read it from the driver of the car, Ms. Daeshavana Robinson and one of the passengers Savon Tucker. You heard Ms. Robinson admit herself that she was unsure if she stopped at the stop

sing at the corner of Northampton and King Street.

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It is clear from the testimony of the officers the only reason they stopped the car was they observed traffic stop violations.

You heard Lieutenant Dunn tell you that when he approached the car the second time, his plan was to release the passengers and have the car towed. This plan was foiled by the Lieutenant Dunn's observations of Mr. Bradley's movements in the car.

You heard Lieutenant Dunn testify that the movements he witnessed were consistent with someone trying to retrieve or place a firearm by the doorjamb during a traffic stop.

Mr. Bradley's actions transformed this routine traffic stop into something entirely different. This seems to be the theme of the evening of August 26, 2015.

Mr. Bradley's actions throughout the night consistently escalated the situation when Lieutenant Dunn removed Bradley from the car to perform a patfrisk. It was again Mr. Bradley's actions that led the officers to attempt to handcuff him.

Lieutenant Dunn explained to you that Mr. Bradley's actions heightened his awareness and his suspicion that Mr. Bradley was in fact concealing a weapon or had put a weapon down on the side of the car.

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Mr. Bradley's continued refusal to comply with the orders given to him by Lieutenant Dunn and Officer

Moynahan, his continued resistance and his decision to kick Lieutenant Dunn escalated the stop again at this point to the point where handcuffs were needed to restrain him.

In addition to the handcuffs being used at the point that Officer Dunn was kicked in the shin, Mr. Bradley was placed under arrest. Again, an escalation as a result of Mr. Bradley's actions.

Now Mr. Bradley testified about his alleged injuries. His bloody lip which he claims he sustained from a punch to the face, his bruised back which he claims he sustained from being stomped on. I'd suggest to you those injuries are not consistent with the actions that Mr. Bradley claims the officers engaged in.

I'd suggest to you that those injuries are consistent with someone that resisted lawful directives from an officer, resisted arrest, and was forced to be pushed into the rear of the crustier.

Lieutenant Dunn told you that specific uses of force were justified based on Mr. Bradley's actions. Lieutenant Dunn told you that Mr. Bradley escaped his grasp while he was trying to place him into the cruiser as a result of his violent movements.

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Lieutenant Dunn has been transparent and honest throughout this criminal and civil process. He explained to you the levels of force and he explained to you exactly why he felt he was obligated to use those levels of force. Lieutenant Dunn's testimony was consistent throughout and I'd suggest to you that is because he has nothing to hide.

Dr. Eli Silverman testified to you on the screens in front of you how the actions of the officers were in step throughout the entire process with acceptable police practices.

He testified how the officers were correct in using some level of pressure or force when searching Mr. Bradley including the groin area; how the manipulation, if you will, of the clothing might lead to an uncomfortable situation because it's warranted to search around the genitals for concealed weapons.

Dr. Silverman testified regarding the dangers the officers face on the daily during traffic stops like the one that Officer Moynahan and Officer Dunn encountered and Officer Cicero encountered on August 26, 2015.

The evidence shows that Lieutenant Dunn never punched Mr. Bradley. Lieutenant Dunn never kicked Mr. Bradley, and Mr. Bradley was in no way the victim of officer misconduct.

The events that unfolded on August 26, 2015 were the

result of the actions of one man and that man is Mr. Bradley. His continued insistence on escalating the situation led to this today.

Shortly you're going to be given this case and asked to retire to the jury room for deliberations. You will be given all the exhibits admitted throughout the trial. I ask that you take your time and review the evidence, refer to the notes you diligently took throughout the past two days, and evaluate the case critically; weigh the credibility of the witnesses and think whose testimony has been consistent throughout the entire process.

The credibility of the witnesses is yours to determine. Ask yourself was Mr. Bradley forthright?

Assess his demeanor; evaluate his behavior; consider what Mr. Bradley has to gain by bringing this action.

After careful consideration I trust you will come to the conclusion that the officers did not violate Mr. Bradley's constitutional rights. My client Lieutenant Dunn did nothing wrong and you will return a verdict in the defendants' favor. Thank you.

MR. COYLE: May I, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

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CLOSING ARGUMENT BY MR. COYLE

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MR. COYLE: On behalf of Christian Cicero I'd also thank you for your willingness to perform this important task. Jury duty is often is viewed as some sort of curse or something to be avoided, and unless good people are willing to do that, the whole system fails to work. So we do appreciate your willingness to be here and we appreciate the attention that you have shown throughout this trial.

As you know I represent Christian Cicero and his involvement in this matter and the claims against Officer Cicero the court will instruct you are limited to his actions as they relate to the traffic stop. There's the actual stopping of the vehicle after it had gone through the intersection of Northampton Street and King Street.

The evidence which you have heard are essentially the uniformed versions that were offered by Officer Cicero and Lieutenant Dunn that their attention was drawn to this vehicle on Northampton Street because it was going at what appeared to be an excessive rate of speed.

They told you that they didn't end up citing it for that because they didn't have the opportunity to clock it or have any basis for actually asserting speed greater than the speed limit, but certainly it attracted their attention and because of observing that, they then

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followed this vehicle to the stop sign at the end of Northampton Street and the vehicle turned right on King Street.

They testified that the vehicle failed to come to a complete stop at that location, and that really is the crux of this case, is has the plaintiff proven that that vehicle didn't come to a complete stop?

The issue in the case against Officer Cicero is was there a reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation? Reasonable suspicion requires both a particularized and objective basis for suspecting a civil traffic offense, and in assessing that you must consider the totality of the circumstances. There must be a finding -- it must be grounded in specific and articulable facts.

The articulable facts are pretty simple in this case. They saw the vehicle roll through the stop sign. That is a violation of the law. We all know that. No matter how many people we see every day rolling through stop signs, that is a traffic violation. That's a violation of the traffic statutes of the Commonwealth and it's a legitimate basis to stop the vehicle.

As you know, the vehicle then -- things progress from that point on with the questions about whether or not the vehicle was being used without authority. But the initial stop of the vehicle all turns around that question of

whether or not there was reasonable suspicion and that would be based on rolling through the stop sign.

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As I indicated, the testimony on that point of the officers is uniform and, yeah, the operator who they were not -- had no -- they didn't know who was in the car at point in time. The operator the vehicle rolled through the sign.

Now, Mr. Bradley would have you believe, he testified, that the vehicle stopped. The operator of the vehicle, whose testimony we have only from a prior trial transcript, Ms. Robinson, her testimony was read to you from that prior trial and twice in there she reiterated that she doesn't know whether she stopped or not.

Now she was the operator of the vehicle. If anybody should know whether the vehicle stopped or not, it would be her. It's not believable that the passenger in the rear seat would take such notice of whether a vehicle actually came to a complete stop. And the stop under the law requires a stop, the wheels stop turning. Mr. Bradley claims that they came to a complete stop and I submit that it's inconceivable that he could actually know whether it came to a complete stop or not.

Similarly, Ms. Tucker said that the vehicle came to a stop. She also was in the back seat and I would submit she also couldn't really possibly know if the vehicle came

to a complete stop.

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Now, both of these witnesses are friends of the plaintiff Mr. Bradley. They were at this party at Mr. Bradley's brother's house. He was driving them home. Clearly they had at least sympathy towards Mr. Bradley when they testified at Mr. Bradley's criminal trial.

I would also ask you to take into consideration the fact that despite numerous and multiple attempts to obtain their presence here at this trial, they willfully avoided and evaded process that would have allowed them to come here and be cross-examined by the defendants' counsel.

So we had no opportunity to cross-examine either Ms. Robinson or Ms. Tucker on the finer points of this case, and I submit to you that they were biased in favor of their friend Mr. Bradley and their testimony was slanted in his favor.

We also know that the ability to proceed was somewhat impaired. I believe they all acknowledged drinking at this party. We know that Mr. Bradley himself was a regular user of marijuana, weed. The hospital records which will be in the jury room with you will show you that he told the intake personnel at the jail after he was booked and brought to the jail show that he told them that he smoked seven days a week, two to three times a day. He also told you that he smoked half an hour before this

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incident and so I submit to you that his perception, his ability to perceive was affected by that and perhaps even his behavior as later events evolved.

The theory of the plaintiff in this case is that the defendants I guess made all this up, concocted all this for what reason we don't know. They didn't know who was in that car so it's not as though they had some grudge or some prior interaction with Mr. Bradley or anyone in the car.

I believe Mr. Bradley testified he had no previous interactions with any of the officers involved in this case. So I guess you would have to think that they just cooked it all up. For what? They're bored? I don't know what motive would explain that, but it also would be a pretty bad concocted story.

Officer Cicero was candid. He said, no, I didn't really see what was going on on the other side of the car. I'm looking over the roof. I couldn't see if he got kicked or not. If they were cooking up a story, don't you think he would have more to say in support of the other officers?

I'd submit to you that his testimony was candid and truthful and he told you and he told this court exactly what he saw, which included the fact that this woman drove through the stop sign and that was the basis of the

traffic stop.

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The events which took place beyond that he did not have an involvement in. He did not have any physical interaction with Mr. Bradley in the process of placing him under arrest and he didn't see the furtive movements in the car.

Again, if this was a big conspiracy to cook up some story, he certainly could have said I saw that but he didn't say that because he came in here and he told you the truth.

And you, as Attorney Saint Laurent asked, I ask you to apply your common sense and your life experiences in weighing who is being with most truthful here, and bear in mind that the burden is on the plaintiff to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

He is seeking a judgment from you, a verdict from you, to award him money. You can take that into consideration as well when you go into the jury room.

I believe and I urge you to find after you consider all of the evidence in this case that Christian Cicero did not violate the rights of Mr. Bradley and that you should return a verdict for him. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right.

CLOSING ARGUMENT BY MR. SCHMIDT

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MR. SCHMIDT: Ladies and gentlemen, when I got in front of you at the beginning of this case to give my opening, I had suggested to you that your job here really would be about assessing the credibility of witnesses.

I asked you to pay attention to body language, tone, consistency of their testimony, and the consistency of their testimony to prior testimony that they gave earlier on, and I suggest to you that those answers would be right there in that witness box.

I'd suggest to you at this point after hearing all the evidence and there will be no more evidence in this case that you will find the defendants not liable and in particular my client Daniel Moynahan.

Now, focusing on credibility, I want to point out to you that the fact that Mr. Bradley was found not guilty at trial it has no bearing on your decision making other than that it's an element that they have to prove.

It doesn't mean that you have to find one way or another in this case. All you can reasonably presume from the fact that he had a positive prior verdict in the criminal case is that the prosecutor in that case was unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt -- which is the highest standard in the law -- that Daniel Bradley was guilty of resisting arrest and assault and battery.

That's all that that decision was.

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You, this jury, are here to decide whether or not the defendants violated Mr. Bradley's rights. It's a completely separate issue and it's up to you.

Now, focusing on credibility I'd like to start with Mr. Bradley. You heard him testify both with his attorney on direct and with me in cross-examination. You were able to consider his manner. I would suggest to you in answering questions he was evasive, uncooperative, and totally and entirely unable to justify inconsistencies in his testimony that I was able to point out.

Please remember in this courtroom the burden is on him. It's not on the defendants. Is he someone you can rely on? Did he meet that burden?

He testified earlier on several occasions I was at my brother's house for three or four hours. That's about the range he gave. At trial he said it was one hour. He claimed he had only two to three shots of Hennessy the entire time, but there was an open bottle in the car.

And when he was dipping down and the officers are seeing his shoulders move, well, maybe they're passing around that bottle of Hennessy. Use your common sense. Sure, there wasn't a gun found in the car. Sure there wasn't a gun in the center console but they could have been passing around that bottle of Hennessy.

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Then what about marijuana? I smoked weed. No, I didn't smoke weed. Yes, I smoked weed. Well, why did it keep changing? Why did he hide it the first couple of times he was asked? Well, probably because it might affect his ability and memory, his memory with regard to the incident. It might affect his ability to drive a car.

Again, Mr. Bradley wouldn't admit to anything that would hurt his case. He'd admit the things that helped his case, but he wouldn't admit to anything that would hurt his case.

What's the truth? It's in the medical records. He smokes marijuana two to three times a day. Nothing wrong with that. Who cares. But why is he lying about it? And he even said under cross-examination the first two times he said he didn't mention the marijuana, he hadn't seen the medical records. After he knew about the medical records and knew that he had admitted he smoked marijuana in the medical records, well, then suddenly it's showing up in legal documents. What does that say about his credibility? He has to be forced to tell the truth.

Now, Attorney Coyle touched on this but it's the two back seat passengers who are sure they stopped at the stop sign. Does that make any sense? Daeshavana Robinson testified at trial and it's in the transcript that was read to you, she didn't remember. She said, I mean, I

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probably did because there was a stop sign but I don't remember. Well, who's being honest? In his opening Attorney Slepchuk told you that she said she stopped. Well, think about that. What does it say that they have to stretch the facts?

Now, Mr. Bradley testified he's a back seat passenger. He has a perfect memory of her using her blinker and coming to a complete stop. Who on earth as a back seat passenger in a car pays attention to whether or not the driver uses their blinker?

Think of all the things he didn't remember on cross-examination but he remembers those little details. You know why? Because it hurts the stop -- it hurts the police argument and that's why he remembers that.

You know, a lot was made by plaintiff's counsel the number of officers present, officers have firearms; officers always have firearms, and again none of that has any bearing on whether they followed proper police procedure.

Of course they have their guns. They're working.

The issue is whether or not they followed procedure. It's not, oh, there were six of them there, nine of them there, the whole shift. It doesn't matter. It matters whether they followed procedure and I suggest to you that they did.

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And so two of the women in the car showed up to trial and they didn't show up to testify here today and Attorney Coyle touched on this. Do you think maybe it's a little different to go to court to try to help your friend get out of trouble in a criminal trial than it is to come into a civil federal court where they're seeking to get some money?

Mr. Bradley said, oh, the cop car just flew up behind us. Just everything everyone else is doing is wrong. Everything he's doing is right. So the police are speeding up behind him, and then at first he says I saw the blue lights if you remember on cross-examination, and then when I said, well, wait a second. They had their blew lights on when they're pulling up behind you. Then he changed it and said no, no, no it was just the headlights, just the headlights.

So even in one instance of testifying he can't stay consistent within 30 seconds, and you saw his demeanor on the stand. You saw him argue, interrupt questions, and he came before you and claimed to just be cool like Fonzie at the scene; just chill; everybody else was upset. He was calm. Who was calm in this courtroom and who wasn't?

In his interrogatories answers Officer Dunn asked for my ID; in his deposition, Officer Moynahan asked for my ID; yesterday, I don't know. Can you rely on this? Did

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he meet his burden? He hit me with an open hand the first time; the second time he hit me with an open hand. In the courtroom in front of the jury he hit me with a closed fist. He's exaggerating.

There were six police officers there. We all know there were six police officers there. There were nine cop cars -- I mean, nine cops. The whole shift was there. He's trying too hard.

Look at the medical records. These are minor injuries. Everything healed within a couple of -- in a couple of weeks. When you look at the medical records, subjective, subjective, subjective. Do you know what that means? What that means is that's what Daniel said. There's no tests. There's no diagnosis; there's no CAT scan; there's no bulging disks; there's no soft tissue injury. It's subjective reporting. They gave him essentially Icy Hot and some mild pain killers.

And look at his injury. We're not hiding from it.

He has a bloody lip. That injury, he could have bit his

lip. He could have bit his lip while he was resisting

officers' attempts to put the handcuffs on him. He could

have hit his mouth when he forced them -- when they had to

push him into the police car.

Does that lip right there that you're looking at, is that consistent with a man being completely defenseless,

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handcuffed, and coldcocked in the mouth? I suggest to you that the injury would be a lot more significant.

What reason or benefit would there have been to punch a handcuffed man? What point would be to that? This is a situation where it should have been a routine traffic stop followed by a tow. Why would these officers want to put themselves in this position?

And he's stomped? Well, you heard from Officer
Moynahan. It's physically impossible. We have no idea
based on his prior testimony and his testimony in this
courtroom how far into the car Daniel Bradley really was
because at one point he's saying it was just his feet
sticking out. The other time half of his body was
sticking out. Sometimes the officer is trying to close
the door on his feet; sometimes they're not. So it's
frankly very unclear, but what you did hear consistently
from the officers was it would have been physically
impossible to stomp on his back. Two of us could not have
done that.

And in all of his prior testimony I was face down.

Well, how can he see who's allegedly stomping on his back?

What did he do on the stand? Oh, no, I was on my side; I was on my side. I could see. And he complained about his medical treatment at the jail. Everyone is against him, everyone. Everyone else did something wrong.

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Now with regard to his damages, well, we've heard no evidence whatsoever of any loss wages. He claims to have had terrible back pain but meanwhile he's playing basketball. And then with regard to Officer Moynahan, we really get to the cherry on top of Mr. Bradley's story which is the ultimate exaggeration is that Mr. Moynahan manipulated Mr. Bradley's penis and testicles. Why on earth would he do that? What possible benefit would an officer have to do that? Do you think when Officer Moynahan gets up in the morning and he goes out to do his shift as a police officer that that's what he's looking to do? It makes absolutely no sense.

Now, what really happened here? Well, you heard from the officers and I'd suggest to you they were very consistent. You heard from three different people. They saw -- now my officer is not involved in the initial stop but Dunn and Cicero see the car go through the red light.

Mr. Bradley is on the passenger's side. Once my client Mr. Moynahan is there, they've already looked at the rental agreement. This car is getting towed. Mr. Bradley is going to have to get out of the car. It's all inevitable. He chose to make it go this way. He chose to be difficult.

Officer Dunn and Officer Moynahan independently made the decision that they saw furtive movements requiring

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action. This wasn't, hey, you know, let's go after Mr. Bradley. Oh, I see this or I see that. There's no time for that. They're both walking up to the car and they get in position and they both see the same thing at the same time. This isn't something you can concoct.

THE COURT: One minute, Attorney Schmidt.

MR. SCHMIDT: Thank you, Your Honor.

It was Mr. Bradley who resisted. It was Mr. Bradley who pressed my client's hands into the car. It was Mr. Bradley who kicked Mr. Dunn in the shin.

Again this should have been officers walking back to the car and saying, hey, we have to tow this car.

Instead, Mr. Bradley moved around the car putting those officers in fear for their safety and, again, they want to get home to their families. They don't want to have an interaction with a gun or a knife, and that's what this is about. They're not looking to get anyone in trouble.

They're looking to get home without getting hurt.

Again, I would remind you the burden is on Mr.

Bradley and I ask that you hold him to that burden. I'd suggest to you he did not meet that burden, and I ask that you find Daniel Moynahan as not liable for these allegations. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. Whenever you're ready.

MR. SLEPCHUK: Just have a moment to get set up,

Your Honor?

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THE COURT: Sure.

MR. SLEPCHUK: May I proceed?

THE COURT: Yes.

CLOSING ARGUMENT BY MR. SLEPCHUK

MR. SLEPCHUK: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.

When you head back into that jury room, you're going to have three very important jobs to do. First you're going to have make some decisions about this case.

Second, you're going to have to make sure that each and every one of you listens to and obeys the rules and the instructions that the judge is going to give you.

And third, before you make any decisions about this case, you're going to have to talk to each other and explain to each other how you feel about this case and why. In the next few minutes let me suggest a few ways to help you do just that.

Remember what I told at the very beginning of this trial. Daniel Bradley is suing the defendants because they chose to violate his constitutionally protected right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure on both the Fourth Amendment and Article 14.

As I mentioned during my opening statement and the evidence has borne out they violated that right in seven

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distinct different ways. I'm going to take them one by one.

Let's talk about the motor vehicle stop. The judge is going to instruct you that the police cannot pull over a car unless they have reasonable suspicion based upon specific articulable facts that that car has committed some sort of civil traffic violation or the occupants of that car are engaged in criminal activity or have committed a crime.

Now Officers Dunn and Cicero testified that they stopped the car because it failed to stop at the intersection of Northampton Avenue and King Street.

Daniel told you otherwise. He said, no, that car came to a full and complete stop at that T intersection. Ms.

Robinson had her blinker on and we stopped and then we turned.

He testified that when the officers came up, they asked Officer Cicero why did you pull us over and at first he didn't say anything about the stop sign. He said you ran a red light, a red light. They said we haven't even gone through a traffic light. Then it became, well, you ran a stop sign.

Daniel's testimony on that point was corroborated by the prior sworn testimony of Daeshavana Robinson who was the operator of that car and Savon Tucker who was sitting

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next to Daniel. They both corroborated that the police -that Officer Cicero changed his rationale for the stop
from the traffic light then a stop sign.

Ms. Tucker was clear that that car came to a complete stop. Now Ms. Robinson was a little equivocal on that. Her memory I'll admit was a little bit foggy, but remember exactly what she said. She said I would have had to stop because there's a big bush on the left side on the corner so I would have had to stop to make sure there was no oncoming traffic.

I'd ask that you credit the testimony of Mr. Bradley and the prior testimony of Ms. Tucker and Ms. Robinson and find that the officers in this case did not have reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation had occurred and that the stop was unlawful. Of course, at that time there was certainly no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The officers all admitted nobody had reported a crime. They didn't observe any criminal activity.

That brings us to the next issue. The judge is going to instruct you that under Article 14 once they stop a car, the police cannot question the passengers of the car; cannot ask them for their identification unless they have again reasonable suspicion that that particular passenger has committed a crime or is engaged in criminal activity.

Now, at this point there was no reasonable suspicion

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of criminal activity. So the question is whether or not the officers asked for the identification. Daniel told you that they did. They first came up to the car.

Officer Cicero got the license and rental agreement from Ms. Robinson. The officers went back to their cruiser to check it. They admitted that. They went and ran the information, and when then came back up to the car, Daniel told you that that's when Officers Dunn and Moynahan on the passenger side asked him for his identification.

During her prior testimony Ms. Tucker confirmed that, that they did ask him for his identification.

Now even Officer Dunn admitted that at some point he did ask for the ID, but he claims that he asked for the ID much later on when Daniel was already handcuffed and essentially face down with his head pointing towards the floorboard of that police cruiser locked in the back of that cruiser with a plexiglas partition that you can't pass anything in between. That's what he would have you believe. Hey, can you give me your ID? Ask yourself if that makes any sense whatsoever.

He then tried to say, well, I had taken his wallet from him when I was over at the car before I put him in. He didn't open the wallet to see if his was ID in it so I just asked him.

Now Daniel told you he didn't have a wallet on that

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night. He didn't have a wallet and when I asked Officer Moynahan, hey, when you were standing right next to him at that cruiser at the time when you put him in the car did you see Officer Dunn search him and take a wallet. He didn't see that.

The judge is also going to instruct you that the police may not extend a traffic stop longer than is reasonably necessary to effect whatever the purpose of the stop was.

So in this case the officers had gone back to their cruiser. They had run the information and they knew that there was a problem with the rental agreement and they had to tow this car. They were going to issue Ms. Robinson a citation for use without authority. They knew that. They knew that when Officer Moynahan arrived on scene and they told him, hey, we've got to tow this car. There's a problem.

At that point in time they had a duty to not prolong that stop; to come up to the car and tell everybody, hey, listen, this is the situation. You know we've got to tow this car. You got to go. But they don't do that. They prolong the stop. They ask Daniel for his ID. They then go back and they check it again. Again, they violate his rights under Article 14 by prolonging that stop and by asking him for his identification.

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Let's next talk about the exit order. The judge is going to instruct you that under Article 14 the police cannot issue an exit order unless they have reasonable suspicion that that person poses a safety threat.

Under both Article 14 and the Fourth Amendment to do a patfrisk they need something more. They need reasonable suspicion that the person is armed with a weapon. They had neither reasonable suspicion or safety concern or a weapon in this case.

Officer Dunn testified that he saw Daniel I guess shift from side to side and make some reach towards the doorjamb, towards his right to the doorjamb. That made him very concerned for his safety according him that he could have been retrieving a weapon, although he never saw a weapon. He never saw Daniel stuff anything in his pants. He didn't see that, but maybe he was secreting or hiding a weapon there. That's what made, according to him, made him so concerned for his safety.

Now Daniel denied making those movements. Both Ms. Tucker and Ms. Robinson in their prior testimony said Daniel never made any such reaching movements or shifting movements. They said he was just sitting there.

Officer Cicero who was standing right at the driver window with his flashlight looking in in a fully illuminated car. The other officers had their flashlights

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too and the cruiser behind them had the floodlights on.

He's in just as a good position to see inside that car as anybody else. He didn't see Daniel making any shifting movement. He does not see him reaching.

Even Officer Moynahan who was standing right next to Officer Dunn didn't see any reaching toward the doorjamb or towards the right-hand side. He claimed that he saw Daniel lean towards in the opposite direction or the center of the car and then come back, inconsistent with what Officer Dunn said.

What's even more important is that the police didn't find anything. They searched Daniel. They didn't find any weapons; they didn't find any contraband. They found nothing on him.

They searched that doorjamb area supposedly that area where Daniel was sitting. They didn't find a weapon.

They didn't find anything. So use your common sense and ask yourselves, if there was nothing there, nothing to take, nothing to hide, why would Daniel make a movement like that? Why would he be reaching? He wouldn't. He didn't. He didn't make any such movement. Officer Dunn was untruthful about this reaching movement because he had to justify the exit order somehow.

Now, when you're back there deliberating one of you might say, well, if they didn't stop for the stop sign, if

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Daniel wasn't making these supposed movements, then what was this all about? Why did the officers stop the car? Why would the officers take Daniel out of the car and search him?

Well, it was late at night. It was a bad neighborhood. You heard all from every officer about how bad this neighborhood was; about, oh, the drugs and the guns and the violent crimes that are in this neighborhood, late at night, bad neighborhood.

The officers come upon a car occupied by four young African-Americans and they want to investigate and we'll see what was going on with this car. Maybe they got some contraband in the car; maybe we're going to catch them riding dirty as it's said. So they stopped the car.

They come upon it and they see three females and one male, Daniel. He's the obvious target. Let's pull him out and see if we can find anything on him. Of course, they find nothing. This was profiling, ladies and gentlemen, plan and simple.

Now, let's move on to the arrest and the reasons for this arrest. Now Officer Dunn testified that during the patfrisk that Daniel kicked him in the shin, kicked him hard with a shod foot, a dangerous weapon. Daniel denied kicking Officer Dunn.

Both Ms. Tucker and Ms. Robinson in their prior

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testimony said Daniel didn't kick Officer Dunn. Officer Cicero didn't see Daniel kick Officer Dunn. Even Daniel Moynahan who was standing right next to Officer Dunn didn't see any contact between Daniel, any part of Daniel's body and Officer Dunn and Officer Dunn wasn't injured not in the slightest. No bruising, not even slightest bruising, not even slightest swelling despite that he wasn't wearing a shin pad which would be hard to protect his shin, just had his clothing.

Use your common sense and use your life experience. If you've ever been kicked in the shin, ever even bumped your shin with something hard, it hurts. It's bony. There's not a lot of meat on the shin. It leaves a mark. But there was absolutely no evidence of any injury to Officer Dunn's shin. Why? Because Daniel did not kick him and the arrest was not based upon probable cause.

That brings us to the use of force. The judge is going to instruct you the force has to be reasonable. It has to be proportionate. There are a lot of factors that can play into this and the judge is going to instruct you on that.

But in this case, it's pretty simple. Daniel was handcuffed with his hands behind his back. He didn't pose a threat to any of the officers. The only thing he was doing was verbally protesting the way he was being

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treated. Yeah, he had some attitude. He was mouthing off. He had every right to and officer Dunn struck him in the face, and there's been some talk about whether it was a closed fit or an open fist. It's kind of oxymoron. I don't even know what an open fist means, but it doesn't really matter.

The point is, whether it was a closed fist or it was an open palm, it was unreasonable. It was unnecessary because Daniel did not pose a threat. He was defenseless. And the blow was strong enough to break -- to draw blood to bust his lip and to knock him falling face first with his torso into the lower rear floorboard area of that car. At that point Officers Dunn and Moynahan proceeded to stomp on him in the back.

Now, again, when you're back there deliberating one of you might say, well, would they do that? What's their motivation to assault DAniel and arrest him? Why would they do that?

Again, when Daniel when this was happening, he was being brought out of the car and frisked, being searched, he wasn't a happy camper. He was agitated. He was protesting. Why are you doing this? What have I done? He had attitude. He was questioning them.

He was trying to stand up for his rights because he knew what was happening to him was not right and they

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didn't like that. It's about power. Do what you're told. Don't ask questions or else pay the consequences, and unfortunately Daniel did pay the consequences.

Now the officers claimed they didn't -- we didn't punch him. We didn't kick him. We didn't do any of those things, but you know that's not true. We know that's not true because we have the evidence of the injuries.

We have this photograph that was taken moments after the event, which I don't think anybody disputes that it shows a bloody lip. It's plain as day. And we have the medical records that document bruising to his back; that he was suffering from back pain the entire time he was held at the house of correction. He was prescribed medication. He was assigned to a lower bunk and that was for the reason because he had actual injuries.

Now the defendants have offered zero, zero reasonable explanation as to how those injuries happened. They have no explanation for it. They essentially claim that they don't know how that happened. None of them wrote an injured prisoner report and they claim that they didn't even know about it at the time. And yet, you have Officer Dunn and Officer Cicero, who are shoulder to shoulder escorting Mr. Bradley into that police station, and they couldn't see that. That's plain as day.

The use of force in this case was disproportionate.

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It was unreasonable and it was excessive. It violated Daniel's rights under Article 14 and the Fourth Amendment.

That brings us to the malicious prosecution. Once he's brought to the station, they fill out the paperwork. They charge him with these crimes assault and battery on a police officer and resisting arrest. He's got to go to court and gets arraigned and held on a bail he can't afford. He's in jail for 30 days, and it's not until a year later the case goes to trial and Daniel is unanimously found not guilty by a jury after that trial.

Now, one important thing I want to bring your attention to is the booking video. Now you have this in evidence and I apologize when we played it during the trial, portions of it were a little choppy. I understand, but you're going to have the ability to view that video back in the jury deliberation room. You can pause it and do whatever you need to do to watch that video. I suggest that you do because that video is the real window into the mind, the state of mind of Daniel when he got to that police station.

What's the first thing -- what are the first words out of his mouth when he gets up to that desk in front of the booking sergeant? I need to speak to a captain. I've been assaulted. The booking sergeant brushes him off.

I'm the only one you're going to talk to tonight. He asks

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multiple times throughout that booking procedure to speak to a captain to report the fact that he has been assaulted. Each and every time he's ignored.

He's never offered medical treatment despite the fact that he's bleeding from the mouth. Nobody makes a report, and during that procedure he turns to the defendant Christian Cicero and he looks him dead in the eye and he says "You saw everything that happened that night. I need you to man up. I need you to tell the truth about what happened. If you're not going to man up, then you might as well take your badge off your uniform and throw it on the ground if you're going to let them lie like that."

And what does Christian Cicero do? He does nothing. What does he say? He says nothing. His silence speaks volumes, ladies and gentlemen, because he knew at that moment that Daniel was right. That Daniel had done nothing to deserve the way he had been treated by both Officer Cicero and the other defendants that night.

This brings us to the issue of damages. Now the judge is going to instruct you on the different types of damages. The first is what we call consequential damages and as the name suggests -- or I'm sorry, compensatory damages. As the name suggests, these are designed to compensate an individual for injuries or other wrongs suffered by a defendant.

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Daniel suffered four different types or categories I would say of damages that are worthy of compensation. The first is indignity. Daniel suffered the indignity, the shame, the embarrassment of this whole ordeal; being profiled that night; being snatched out of that car; being searched; his private area being searched by a complete stranger in the presence of those three females. It was embarrassing. It was an indignity.

We already talked about the physical injuries. We know that he suffered an injury to his lip. We know that he had those injuries to his back. They're documented in those medical records during that month period that he was at the jail.

He also had emotional injury which are documented in those same records. Daniel told you that he was depressed. He had anxiety. He was experiencing nightmares.

And unfortunately Daniel while he was held at the jail, a place he did not belong, he should not have been, would not have been at that place had it not been for the unlawful conduct of the defendants in this case, he has the unfortunate experience of witnessing an inmate attempt suicide and that really bothers Daniel. It bothers him to the point that he has to reach out for help to speak to somebody and he does. He gets in contact with a mental

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health professional at the jail, a therapist, and he talks about that experience, and that's documented in those medical records.

So he suffered emotionally as well as physically, but perhaps the most important damage here is his loss of liberty. He sat in that jail for 30 days -- 30 long days and 30 long nights -- for a crime that he did not commit. He told you how it felt being held for 30 days. It made him feel hopeless and worthless.

Now, the injuries to his lip that healed. His back got better, but those 30 days Daniel can't get those back. Those days are gone forever for him.

Now as I told you at this beginning of this trial, there is -- these don't come with a price tag and this is hard to try to come up with what these things are worth.

I know I asked you at the beginning if it would be helpful for the attorneys to weigh in and it was kind of a mixed bag so I'm not going to do that. I'm going to leave it to you, to your common sense, to your life experience.

You're going to have to come together to talk about each and every one of these things and I'm confident that when you do that, you're going to be able to come up with a number that fairly and fully compensates Daniel for each and every one of these losses.

The second category of damages that you may award are

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called punitive damages. The point of punitive damages is not to compensate. It's different. The point of punitive damages is deterrence. To deter the defendants from acting like this in the future.

Now the judge will instruct you that you can only award punitive damages if you find that the defendants knew that what they were doing violated Daniel's rights or if they acted in what we could say is a reckless disregard, a callous indifference to Daniel's federally protected rights. And for all the reasons that I already spoke about, I think it's abundantly that the defendants knew exactly what they were doing. They knew what they were doing was wrong and an award of punitive damages is warranted in this case.

Ladies and gentlemen, the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, it's a sacred right. Our Founding Fathers fought a war to obtain that right, and since then much blood has been shed to preserve that right.

Every day people from all over the world come to this country in search of the protections of the Fourth

Amendment and Article 14. In totalitarian countries like

China and North Korea, they don't have the Fourth

Amendment. They don't have Article 14.

In those countries the police can stop you, ask you

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for your documents, detain you, arrest you without justification, without legal recourse, but not here, not in America. We're better than that.

The question for you is, what is it worth? What is this right worth? If it's worth nothing, then we might as well be living in China or North Korea. If it's worth nothing, then the right ceases to exist. Because if there is no consequence, if there's no accountability when police officers violate the Fourth Amendment or Article 14, they won't be deterred. The unlawful practices will continue. Other people will see that, hey, we can get away with this too and there's a snowball effect until the right ceases to protect anyone.

You, as the jury, are the conscience of the community. You have the awesome responsibility here today granted by the Constitution to speak with one voice on behalf of the community.

You have the opportunity to tell the defendants that the Fourth Amendment and Article 14 protections are important to the community and will be enforced by the community, and the only way to do that is to render a verdict here today that fully and fairly compensates

Daniel for all of the injuries that he suffered and also deters the defendants and anybody else paying attention to this case from acting like this in the future.

The choice is yours, folks. The defendants back on August 26, 2015 chose to violate important constitutional principles designed to protect each and every member of the community. I ask that you, as the conscience and the voice of the community, uphold those principles today by assessing compensatory damages and punitive damages against the defendants in this case. Thank you.

MR. SCHMIDT: Sidebar please, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

(Sidebar conference.)

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MR. SCHMIDT: Your Honor, we have a number of objections to plaintiff counsel's closing. First of all, the argument that the validity of the officers' actions would be in any way affected by whether or not something was ultimately found at the search --

MR. SCHMIDT: The validity of their actions is in any way not appropriate because they didn't find anything. It's a total misstatement of the law. It's just flat out wrong. The question is did they follow proper procedure.

That what are the actions?

THE COURT: Hang on.

THE COURT:

MR. SCHMIDT: There were furtive movements or there weren't. It doesn't matter after the furtive movements they don't find anything and so that's just a

false statement of law.

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There was zero evidence in this case of profiling. There was absolutely no basis and evidence for that argument whatsoever. We have a lot of concerns about that.

Further, to suggest that the jurors would be unpatriotic or have some constitutional duty to make an example out of our clients is just wildly inappropriate frankly. And to say they have a burden on behalf of the community, their decision is to decide the facts here.

THE COURT: Anything else?

MR. SCHMIDT: Did I cover it?

MS. SZAFRANSKI: I think so.

MR. COYLE: The reference to a racial motive here is totally --

THE COURT: That's the racial profiling.

MR. COYLE: The bias or the profiling

suggestion.

THE COURT: Okay. That was covered.

MS. SZAFRANSKI: Additionally I may be restating what Attorney Schmidt said, but the fact that the jury is being asked to deter anyone else by setting an award here in addition to the defendants to set an example of them I believe is inappropriate. I may be just restating what Attorney Schmidt said.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. SLEPCHUK: What was the first one again?

THE COURT: The fact that nothing was found in the car is evidence or can be used to determine there was no reasonable suspicion.

MR. SLEPCHUK: No. The point that I was making was the fact that there was nothing found goes to the credibility of Officer Dunn. It makes no sense — this is exactly what I said — that if he was reaching, why would he be reaching for nothing? It makes no sense. That was the point they didn't find anything. If they found something, oh, maybe he put something there. But the fact that nothing was found on either him or where was he supposedly reaching totally cuts against the argument that this movement was made. People don't reach for no reason whatsoever. That's the point.

MR. SCHMIDT: People move around for all different kind of reasons.

THE COURT: How about on the racial profiling?

MR. SLEPCHUK: I think there's an inference -
the defendants in their closing said, well, there's no -
why would they stop the car? Well, we've got a bad

neighborhood; we got four young African-Americans. I

don't think it's out of bounds to suggest that the motive

was profiling in this case.

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Of course nobody is going to admit, sure, that I profiled them. No one would ever admit that, but I think under the circumstances I'm allowed to suggest a potential motive as to why they stopped this car.

THE COURT: Okay. The patriotic argument?

MR. SLEPCHUK: I don't think it was -- I don't think I misstated anything. I believe that there's a plethora of cases referring to the jury as the conscience of the community.

This is a case in which we're seeking punitive damages. Deterrence is a totally proper argument to make, and so these are important constitutional principles, and again I believe I'm well within my rights to argue that it is appropriate to award punitive damages to deter future violations of these important constitutional rights.

about how you characterized it as far as the assessment of damages. I think the argument that Attorney Schmidt raised was regarding the comparison to China. People getting locked up without reason because the police didn't have any structure within which they operate.

MR. SLEPCHUK: I don't think anyone is going to stand here and dispute that China and North Korea are not exemplars of civil rights. I mean, this country prides itself in our Bill of Rights and our Constitution and so I

don't think there's anything novel about stating that. 1 THE COURT: Do you have any objections to -- did 2 you want to make any objections to defendants' closings? 3 MR. SLEPCHUK: No. 4 5 THE COURT: All right. On the racial profiling issue I must say I was a little surprised that it just 6 popped up all of a sudden, but I agree with Attorney 7 8 Slepchuk that it was raised by the defendants in argument, you know, what's the motive here? 9 I think within the context of making an argument, a 10 closing argument that you're pointing out -- well, I don't 11 know. Was there evidence of the race of the other people 12 13 in the car? 14 MR. SLEPCHUK: There was. 15 THE COURT: Was there? 16 MR. COYLE: The only evidence was that they had no idea who was in the car when they stopped the car. 17 MR. SLEPCHUK: Incorrect. One of the first 18 officers I believe was asked specifically by defense 19 20 counsel -- by the way, I can't remember which one -- what 2.1 was the race of the other occupants and the answer was 22 they were all African-Amercians. MR. COYLE: After they stopped the car, after. 23 MR. SAINT LAURENT: I was about to suggest that 24 there's no evidence they were able to see the occupants 25

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before the car was stopped. Saying it was a pretextual stop would be inaccurate because there's no evidence that they were able to see the occupants before illuminating the vehicle. MR. SCHMIDT: My memory of that evidence was it was me asking Mr. Bradley. THE COURT: Excuse me? MR. SCHMIDT: My memory of that evidence coming in that the race of the three occupants of the car that was through Mr. Bradley. MR. SLEPCHUK: It may have been. THE COURT: I mean, racial profiling as far as the stop of the car, there doesn't seem -- there's no evidence to suggest that they knew the race of the people before the car was already stopped and they walked up to it. MR. SCHMIDT: Right. THE COURT: I mean, the racial profiling argument regarding getting the black male out of the back seat. MR. SCHMIDT: Everyone in the car is African-American. MR. SLEPCHUK: Every person in that car is African-American. He's the easy target. He's a male. MR. COYLE: Basically that was the argument that

1 was made. MR. SLEPCHUK: Right. And I didn't use the term 2 racial profiling by the way. I said it was profiling and 3 you can read whatever you want into that. 4 MR. COYLE: Everybody reads racial into that. 5 THE COURT: I thought that you did say racial 6 profiling. 7 8 MR. SLEPCHUK: I did not. I said profiling. MR. SCHMIDT: I don't know what kind of 9 profiling it could be. 10 THE COURT: Even if you didn't say racial 11 profiling, I think that's a disingenuous argument. 12 13 clearly means racial profiling. I'm going to let the profiling issue stand. 14 I'll let 15 it stand the way it is and the jury can determine what 16 they want to determine about it. I mean, quite frankly, the jury I anticipate is going 17 to go through the same analysis and be talking like we're 18 talking about, like how did anyone see who was in the car 19 20 before the car was stopped and then come down to the issue 2.1 of the black male who was in the back seat was pulled out. 2.2 The question of motive was brought up during defense argument legitimately and so I think responding to it in 2.3 kind -- not exactly in kind but responding to it. As I 24

said, I was a little surprised but I'm going to let that

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1 stand. MR. SCHMIDT: I respect your ruling, Your Honor. 2 I just want to state for the record that this really 3 wasn't something we were in a position to anticipate. 4 It's really an argument that there was no evidence and, 5 quite frankly, an instruction who knows maybe that will 6 just draw more attention to it but it's sort of a big 7 8 assumption that --THE COURT: Well, what kind of instruction would 9 it be? 10 MR. SCHMIDT: Well, I think it's, you know -- I 11 imagine Attorney Slepchuk would be very --12 13 THE COURT: Let me ask you this just in general. 14 Are you asking that I consider addressing the jury right 15 now on this? Because I plan on letting them go home and 16 we can continue to talk about this. I can address them tomorrow. 17 MR. SCHMIDT: That should be fine. 18 MR. COYLE: I would request that you just make a 19 20 simple statement that there was no evidence of racial 21 motive presented in this case. 22 THE COURT: But the question was, can we continue to talk about this now and let the jury go home 2.3 and address it in the morning? 24 MR. SCHMIDT: That's fine. 25

THE COURT: Or are you pushing the issue for me to say something now?

MR. SCHMIDT: We can instruct them in the morning.

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 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ SAINT LAURENT: We can instruct in the morning.

(End of sidebar conference.)

THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to let them go home and we'll continue to talk.

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, that concludes the closing arguments. I was discussing the legal matters at sidebar with counsel and I see no reason to leave you sitting there while we start talking over these things because there is quite a lengthy process from here to get the case ready to give you instructions to make the case yours for deliberations.

So you're done for today. Come back tomorrow morning at 9:30 instead of nine. Come back at 9:30 so we have a little buffer time in case we need to deal with something in the morning. Come back at 9:30 and I will instruct you tomorrow and the case will be yours for deliberations.

Between now and tomorrow, don't talk to anyone about the case. Even though it's over and you've heard closing arguments, all of the same instructions apply about not talking to each other about the case or anyone else or trying to find out about the case, internet wise, post anything about the case, social media wise. Stay away from any media reports. I don't think there are going to be any but if you happen to see any. All right. Thank you.

A JUROR: Are we in the court at 9:30 or downstairs?

THE COURT: Downstairs at 9:30. Good question.

THE CLERK: All rise.

(The jury left at 3:00.)

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THE COURT: All right. Everyone can be seated.

So, Attorney Schmidt, we were in the middle of talking about -- I think I was going to ask you about what kind of instruction would you be requesting on the racial issue? And at that point I have said -- and I appreciate your comments that you're accepting that the court has found that you did talk about motive. It was responded to, not exactly in kind, by the plaintiff but it was responded to.

So you've made, you've made a good point about the stop of the car. There's no evidence to support racial profiling before the officers approached the car to see who the actual occupants are. That's an issue that the jury has before them and so what would you suggest?

MR. SCHMIDT: I mean, I'm not sure I agree that

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the issue is before them. I think it was raised in panel voir dire and then we didn't hear another word about it after that. Frankly, it's litigation by surprise in my opinion.

That being said, if Your Honor is not inclined to address race directly --

THE COURT: But address it how and in what context? I'm not sure it needs to be -- I'm not sure I need to instruct the jury that there's no way the police saw the race of the people in the car before they pulled it over.

MR. SCHMIDT: I agree you can't get that fact specific but some sort of instruction saying, you know, facts that may not be in evidence may have been included in this closing. It's up to you to determine whether that actually -- there is any evidence supporting those claims. You know, it's not up to Attorney Slepchuk whether or not that evidence is there. It's up to the jury and maybe reminding them if there were things in the closings that you don't think you heard, it's up to you.

Frankly, I think it would be appropriate to refer back to the last closing because I don't think anyone on the defense side did that. But, again, I feel strongly that this was litigation by surprise.

THE COURT: In other words, holding back the

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profiling reference whether or not racial the complete term or not? Even if it was just profiling, I agree with defense clearly and unequivocally it means racial profiling.

MR. SCHMIDT: Frankly, at sidebar the claim was made to be some other kind of profiling and I think that's evidence of the surprising intent here. I don't think the defense is getting a fair shake here.

THE COURT: Attorney Slepchuk.

MR. SLEPCHUK: Your Honor, they raised it in their closings. What could possibly be the motive? I responded to it.

You know, it's incredible to me that a party could be precluded from making this type of argument unless the defendants in any case, not just this case but any type of a case where you have young, African-American people being pulled over by all white police officers that unless the officers were so kind as to admit, well, yes, we did profile them, that you couldn't make the argument. No one is ever going to admit that. Let's be real.

So we have an inference. They raised the question what could possibly be the motive and I think that I reasonably and fairly responded to it. And to say they were not on notice of it I think is, quite frankly, disingenuous considering we all know who the parties

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involved are. We know the circumstances of the case. These issues were teased out in voir dire and they opened the door to that when they suggested there could be no possible motive for them to make all this up or to fabricate.

THE COURT: Well, I think Mr. Bradley testified at the very beginning of his testimony regarding why he was bringing a lawsuit and I believe he said something to the effect of, you know, wanting to do something about this type of police treatment of a group of people. I don't know exactly what his testimony was. I don't remember so I don't want to misquote it.

MR. SLEPCHUK: Sounds about right.

THE COURT: But clearly the gist of what I got was his saying that he wanted to do something himself about this type of racial type of treatment. He said something to that effect in his testimony. Do you recall that?

MR. SLEPCHUK: I do recall him saying something to that effect. His exact words I don't know off the top of my head. Yes, he did say something.

THE COURT: Attorney Schmidt, do you recall that?

MR. SCHMIDT: I remember him saying something about trying to stop this type of treatment.

THE COURT: Right.

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MR. SCHMIDT: I'm not sure it was any sort of racial -- it certainly didn't ring the bell for me that this is going to turn into a race case.

THE COURT: It rang the bell for me that he was talking about race. I don't want to say I disagree with you that this case would turn into it. It's hard to say the case actually turned into it by one comment in the closing argument.

MR. SCHMIDT: Your Honor, the combination of that and then talking about the bloodshed for these rights and that they have a duty, basically a patriotic duty --

THE COURT: Well, so on the racial profiling or the reference to race, I'm not going to -- I'm going to overrule your objection.

On the other issues I tend to agree with you. I think that the suggestion that not finding anything in the car is a factor regarding no reasonable suspicion existed is a misstatement of the law.

And I think the length to which plaintiff went to talk about other countries and China and patriotism and things like that was an unnecessary and inappropriate appeal to sympathy and inflame passions that can be addressed through an instruction, and there generally is an instruction.

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There generally is that instruction about the verdict can't be the result of feeling sympathies, et cetera. You all know the instruction I'm talking about. I'm going to work on that instruction to kind of deal with the specifics of this case.

On the reasonable suspicion, I will endeavor to come up with some language before I take that on in the jury instructions that kind of defines those things. I'll be able to tell you exactly about these specific instructions in the morning when I get a chance to do that.

So remind me in the morning because sometimes I just roll into things. But as to other parts of the instructions, I don't know how much time you've had to look at them but they're an amalgamation of both yours of what was submitted to me. So I felt that we could use this time to talk about those to the extent that you're prepared to.

MR. SLEPCHUK: Your Honor, I understand Your Honor's rulings and I appreciate it. I just want to say with respect to the perceived misstatement of law, it was not my intention -- and I don't believe that I came off this way but apparently I did -- that not finding anything was relevant to reasonable suspicion. My point in that was the credibility that somebody wouldn't be making movements for no reason. That was the point, so.

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Coyle, with Officer Cicero.

THE COURT: What I find a little troubling about your comment is that you had made a comment similar in your motion for judgment as a matter of law and I said to you point blank the fact that you're arguing that nothing was found in the car goes to reasonable suspicion being supported or not supported was absurd. That's my quote. I said absurd and you still used it in your closing argument. MR. SLEPCHUK: I quess, Your Honor, I misunderstood. I think--THE COURT: It's hard to take you saying that you misunderstood. All right. Why don't we just move on? MR. SLEPCHUK: Sure. THE COURT: What do you want to do with the jury instruction? MR. COYLE: Do you want to address these now or in the morning? THE COURT: We're not going to have much time in the morning, so. MR. COYLE: Then I would object to a punitive damage instruction directed at Officer Cicero. THE COURT: What I want to do is kind of go from the beginning forward if we can. Starting with whatever element comes first and that's I think you, Attorney

MR. COYLE: I'll start on 26 I think. 1 THE COURT: I know that Leeann gave you multiple 2 copies of the instructions. Can I have one back? 3 MR. SCHMIDT: Your Honor, do you want all four 4 back? 5 THE COURT: No, just one copy so I can follow 6 along with what you're following along with. 7 8 So we are going to start on? MR. COYLE: Page 29 I think the elements start. 9 The general instructions start on 26 I guess. 10 THE COURT: All right. Attorney Coyle, go ahead 11 relative to depravation of rights to be free from 12 13 unreasonable seizure, traffic stop. MR. COYLE: In part B you list two factors or 14 15 elements as to unreasonableness. One, the defendants 16 lacked reasonable suspicion that the driver of the vehicle committed a traffic offense and that the occupants in the 17 vehicle committed a crime or were presently engaged in 18 criminal activity. But number two, the defendants' 19 20 actions found that the vehicle stop were not reasonably 2.1 related in scope to any circumstances that may have 22 justified the stop, I'm a little concerned that this allows kind of culpability for --2.3 THE COURT: The verdict form, however, is going 24 to be very specific about the only theory that's available 25

for Officer Cicero on that count. 1 MR. COYLE: This kind of bleeds into the 2 subsequent actions after the actual stop. 3 THE COURT: Yes, but the verdict form is going 4 to be specific as to what the only thing the jury could 5 find as to Officer Cicero was. 6 MR. COYLE: Okay. 7 8 THE COURT: Definitely keep that in mind to make sure that tomorrow morning when you have the verdict form 9 to look at it and you can check that to see if that 10 satisfies you. 11 MR. COYLE: Okay. On page 30 in the paragraph 12 13 that starts "if you find," you say -- essentially you go through the elements if you find and then I would like to 14 15 see also in there conversely if you do not find, then you must find for the defendants. 16 THE COURT: All right. I'm not going to include 17 that. 18 MR. COYLE: I believe that was all I had in the 19 time that I had to read it. 20 21 THE COURT: Okay. 22 MR. SAINT LAURENT: I don't believe we have any other objections to the instructions. 2.3 THE COURT: All right. 24 MR. COYLE: Actually I didn't have time to read 25

all this, judge, but I'm looking at this, this is titled "reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop."

THE COURT: You're on page 29?

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MR. COYLE: It starts on 30 and as you keep reading, this is all reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop but then it kind of bleeds into -- I'm looking on page 31 now -- "an exit order does not automatically," et cetera. It seems again to mix the two fairly significantly distinct issues in this case, being the actual stop for the traffic violation and the exit order to Mr. Bradley which Officer Cicero had no role in it.

THE COURT: Right. Well, under 1983 the unreasonableness would have those two factors. But, as I said, I'd like to wait and see your thoughts after looking at the verdict slip. The effort by the court will be to make sure the verdict slip clarifies and very much narrows what the jury is to consider for Officer Cicero as opposed to the others.

MR. COYLE: Okay. Well, I'll deal with that tomorrow.

MR. SCHMIDT: Your Honor, I would just make a request that for Officer Moynahan that with the verdict slip just to leave off the issues regarding to the traffic stop.

THE COURT: Yes. I hadn't thought about that

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before although we did realize after we were talking about Officer Cicero that Moynahan wasn't involved. Agreed.

I'm going to try to do something on the verdict slip.

MR. SCHMIDT: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And we're going to hopefully email you at least the first draft of the verdict slip sometime tonight. You'll be getting an email from Leeann and if, if after you have more time to look at this you come up with some substantive important objections, you can send an email.

Don't email her regarding grammatical corrections or things like that. But if there's something that you find that really you think is of significance, let her know in the email so I can try to think about it before tomorrow morning so that if we're going to make changes, we'll be ready to do that in the short time that we have. All right?

MR. SLEPCHUK: Your Honor, the only thing that I saw was on page 40 just when talking about the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act and Article 14, the language that you use I think it pretty much mirrors what I had submitted. However, since I had submitted this, there was somewhat of a change or a clarification that came from the SJC just very recently on January 29th in a case called <u>Commonwealth v. Torres-Pagan</u>.

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I actually quoted the relevant language in my motion for judgment as a matter of law. It's on page 9 of that. It kind of just clarified the difference under Massachusetts law between what's needed for an exit order versus a patfrisk.

So essentially there's a quotation in the case that the police may order the occupants out of the vehicle "If the police are warranted in the belief that the safety of the officers or others is threatened; two, police have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; or three, police are conducting a search of the vehicle on other grounds."

Then they go on to find or clarify that. "Thus, in the absence of reasonable suspicion of a crime or justification to search the vehicle on other grounds, an exit order is justified during a traffic stop if officers have a reasonable suspicion of a threat to safety. A lawful patfrisk, however, requires more; that is, police must have a reasonable suspicion, based on specific articulable facts, that the suspect is armed and dangerous."

So that just came out and so I think it's a little bit -- I mean, it kind of clarifies. I think before the standard was in order to justify an exit order for the purpose of a patfrisk, you just need officer safety. This

kind of clarifies it a little more. It's kind of a two-step.

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THE COURT: So <u>Torres-Pagan</u>, I'll take a look at that language to see if it supplements or -- are you saying it's a supplement or a full replacement of the language?

MR. SLEPCHUK: I think it would be a replacement. I mean just the line "In addition, a police officer may order the occupants out of the vehicle for the limited purpose of conducting a patfrisk only if there is specific articulable facts that warrant a police officer reasonably to be apprehensive about his safety." I think Torres-Pagan changed that a little bit to say that, yes, for the exit order you need just the safety concern which may be unrelated to a weapon.

I mean, I think they use the example in that case like maybe the people could drive off or hit somebody or something like that. But in order to do a patfrisk, you need more than just safety. It needs to be specific to armed and dangerous and so it's a little bit of a clarification of Massachusetts law on the issue.

THE COURT: Are you familiar with that case?

MR. SCHMIDT: Your Honor, our concern is this happened in 2015. This is a brand new case so I don't know if there's -- I have not seen the case outside of

just reading Attorney Slepchuk's motion, but I think that's an issue to be aware of. THE COURT: All right. I'm going to look at it. 3 I didn't read it. When I saw the case referenced in your 4 memo, I didn't read it with a critical eye towards applying it as you're suggesting I apply it now so I'll 6 take a look at it. 7 All right. So again, Attorney Slepchuk, the same issue. If, when you have time going through these things, 9 you see something glaring that's jumping out at you, send 10 it in an email. It's my intention to try to get you a verdict form 13 early enough, before midnight. Actually as soon as I can, at least a draft. So consider what you first get a draft 14 15 and then you can develop it more. Very good. Thank 16 you. MR. SCHMIDT: Thank you. 17 THE COURT: Be here at nine, five of nine so that if there's anything -- I'm sure there will be so just 19 meet here in court at nine o'clock. All right? (Court recessed at 3:21.) 22

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