# What I have been doing

### Recap

- Apps with <del>proof carrying code</del> digital evidence
- Device policies
  - What must an app show to be runnable? "No app should leak my address book"
- App policies
  - How should the app run?
  - "Cannot access address book APIs"

# What I have been doing

"I'll only install an app if it doesn't leak my personal data and Google says it isn't malware."

#### SecPAL

Authorization language

Designed to be readable

Evaluation rules

```
AC, \infty \Vdash A \text{ says } B \text{ can-say}_D \text{ fact} \qquad AC, D \Vdash B \text{ says } fact  (can say) AC, \infty \Vdash A \text{ says } fact
```

```
(A says fact if fact_1,...,fact_k,c) \in AC

AC,D \Vdash A \text{ says } fact_i\theta \ (\forall i \in \{1...k\}) \qquad \Vdash c\theta \qquad \text{vars}(fact\theta) = \varnothing
(cond)
AC,\infty \Vdash A \text{ says } fact\theta
```

"I'll only install an app if it doesn't leak my personal data and Google says it isn't malware."

**User** says *app* <u>is-installable</u> if app <u>meets</u> **NoDataLeaks**, app <u>meets</u> **NotMalware**.

User says Google can-say<sub>∞</sub> app meets NotMalware.

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#### Can Construct Proof

User says app is-installable if app meets NoDataLeaks, app meets NotMalware.

**Google** says **McAffee** can-say<sub>0</sub> app meets **NotMalware**.

User says Google can-say∞ app meets NotMalware.

McAffee says
AngryBirds meets NotMalware.

User says NDLInferer can-say<sub>0</sub> app meets NoDataLeaks.

NDLInferer says
E shows AngryBirds
meets NoDataLeaks if
NDLChecker(E, Game) = True.

anyone says app meets policy if e shows app meets, policy.

### Digital Evidence

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## Delegation

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## Make Comparisons

iPhone says Apple can-say<sub>∞</sub> app is-installable.

**Android** says **User** can-say<sub>∞</sub> app is-installable.

**User** says **Google** can-say<sub>0</sub> app is-installable.

**iPhone** says **User** can-say<sub>0</sub> app can-access resource.

Android says

app can-access resource if

app is-installable,

app requires resource.