

# Why do Larger Firms Pay Executives More for Performance?

Performance-based versus Market-based incentives

---

Bo Hu

June 1, 2018

VU University Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute

# Introduction

---

# Executive Labor Market and Contract incentives

- No. 1 compensation philosophy for named executive officers in Amazon  
*“to attract and retain the highest caliber employees by providing above industry-average compensation ...”*
- Apple Inc.’s 2016 proxy statement  
*“experienced personnel in the technology industry are in **high demand**, and **competition** for executive talent **is intense** ... ”*

Their executives contract incentives are designed

*“ **to attract and retain a talented executive team** and **align executives interests with those of shareholders** ...”*

# Motivating Facts

- A typical executive compensation package:

fixed salary	+	performance-based pay
		(bonus, stocks, options, etc.)
30%		70%

- Performance-based incentives:

$$\text{delta} = \frac{\Delta \text{Wealth (in dollars)}}{\Delta \text{Firm Value (in percentage)}}$$

- Firm size premium in performance-based incentives

delta increases in firm size,

# Motivating Facts

- A typical executive compensation package:

fixed salary	+	performance-based pay
		(bonus, stocks, options, etc.)
30%		70%


- Performance-based incentives:

$$\text{delta} = \frac{\Delta \text{Wealth (in dollars)}}{\Delta \text{Firm Value (in percentage)}}$$

- Firm size premium in performance-based incentives

delta increases in firm size, **controlling for total compensation**

## Motivating Fact: Size Premium



# Motivating Fact: Size Premium

Table 1: Pay-for-performance Incentives Increase with Firm Size

	(1)	$\log(\delta)$ (2)	(3)	(4)
log(Firm Size)	0.578*** (250.03)	0.295*** (112.20)	0.274*** (104.10)	0.273*** (103.68)
log(tdc1)		0.7159*** (176.18)		
tdc1 Dummies (50)			Yes	
tdc1 Dummies (100)				Yes
Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year $\times$ Industry FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	129458	129184	129185	129185

# Motivating Fact: Size Premium and Labor Market

Table 2: Firm Size Premium Increases with Market Competition

	(1)	$\log(\delta)$		(4)
		(2)	(3)	
$\log(\text{Firm Size})$	0.340*** (35.18)	0.372*** (68.97)	0.254*** (23.82)	0.247*** (17.45)
$\log(\text{Firm Size}) \times \text{External CEO}$	0.121*** (4.27)			
Firm_Number		0.000331*** (3.67)		
$\log(\text{Firm Size}) \times \text{Firm\_Number}$		.0000151 ( 2.55)		
Size-Dist-CV			-2.652*** (-14.01)	
$\log(\text{Firm Size}) \times \text{Size-Dist-CV}$			0.220*** (10.23)	
Size-Dist-Gini				-5.743*** (-11.60)
$\log(\text{Firm Size}) \times \text{Size-Dist-Gini}$				0.462*** (8.11)
$\log(\text{tdc1})$	0.589*** (106.98)	0.589*** (106.91)	0.652*** (146.40)	0.651*** (146.23)
Observations	71959	71959	126541	126541

Note: We have controlled for  $age$ ,  $age^2$ , year and industry fixed effects and their interaction terms.



## Motivating Facts:

- Size premium exists *controlling for total compensation*.
- Size premium is larger in industries where the executive labor market is more active.

## Motivating Facts:


- Size premium exists *controlling for total compensation*.
- Size premium is larger in industries where the executive labor market is more active.

## Research Questions:


- How does the labor market interact with contract incentives?
- Why do larger firms pay more for performance?

# What do I do?

1. Modeling: executive labor market and contract incentives
  - how do career concerns and performance-based incentives interact
  - firm size premium in performance-based incentives
2. Estimation: take the model to US executives data (ExecuComp)
3. Evaluation: work on counter-factuals
  - regulations on executive compensation
  - spillover effect of corporate governance on executive compensation



# Key Elements in the Model



# Key Mechanism in the Model

## Market competition generates incentives

- taking effort today improves managerial skills
- higher managerial skills leads to higher market values

## Market-based incentives are weaker in larger firms

- market competition gives rise to higher expected pay
- especially higher for executives in large firms because they can make use of current firm to negotiate better offers
- by diminishing marginal utility, market-based incentives are lower for them

## Related Literature

- Assignment Models
  - Edmans, Gabaix and Landier (2009), Edmans and Gabaix (2011)
  - executives in larger firms value leisure more  $u(w \times g(e))$ .
- Moral Hazard Models
  - Margiotta and Miller (2000), Gayle and Miller (2009), Gayle, Golan and Miller (2015)
  - moral hazard problem is more severe / the quality of signal (about effort) is poor in larger firms
- Dynamic contract literature
  - moral hazard: Spear and Srivastava (1987), etc.
  - limited commitment: Thomas Worrall (1988, 1990), etc.
- Labor search literature
  - sequential auction: Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002)

## **Illustrative Model**

---



# Two-period Model

## Period 1: Moral Hazard Period

- the firm provides incentive pay

## Period 2: Market Competition Period

- no moral hazard problem
- executives receive offers from outside firms randomly
- incumbent and outside firms bid for the executive

## Moral Hazard Problem

- risk averse executives,  $u(w) - c(e)$ , where  $e \in \{0, 1\}$ ,  $c(1) = c$ ,  $c(0) = 0$
- effort stochastically increases manager's productivity  $z \in \mathcal{Z}$
- $z$  follows  $\Gamma(z)$  when  $e = 1$ , and  $\Gamma^s(z)$  when **S**hirks
- once first period  $z$  is realized, it becomes a constant
- likelihood ratio  $g(z) = \Gamma^s/\Gamma$  decreases in  $z$

$$\sum_{z'} u(z')\Gamma(z') - \sum_{z'} u(z')\Gamma^s(z') \geq c$$

$$\sum_{z'} u(z')(1 - g(z'))\Gamma(z') \geq c$$

- consider the match between one firm and one executive with production

$$f(s, z) = \alpha sz,$$

where  $s$  is firm size

Another firm with size  $s'$  poaches the executive

- for simplicity, with  $\lambda \in (0, 1)$  get an offer from firm  $s' > s$

Bertrand competition

- since  $s' > s$ , the executive transits to  $s'$  and gets a pay of  $\alpha s z$

# Contracting Problem

The firm chooses  $\{w_1(z), w_2(z)\}$  to maximize

$$\int_z \left\{ \left[ \alpha sz - w_1(z) \right] + \beta \left[ (1 - \lambda) (\alpha sz - w_2(z)) + \lambda \times 0 \right] \right\} d\Gamma(z)$$

subject to

$$\lambda : \int_z \left\{ \left[ u(w_1(z)) - c \right] + \beta \left[ (1 - \lambda) u(w_2(z)) + \lambda u(\alpha sz) \right] \right\} d\Gamma(z) = u_0$$

(PC)

$$\mu : \int_z \left\{ u(w_1(z)) + \beta \left[ (1 - \lambda) u(w_2(z)) + \lambda u(\alpha sz) \right] \right\} (1 - g(z)) d\Gamma(z) \geq c$$

(IC)

Note: period 1 in red, period 2 in blue.

# Optimal Contract

The optimal contract follows


$$w_1(z) = w_2(z) = \lambda + \mu(1 - g(z)),$$

where  $\mu$  determines the pay-for-performance incentive

$$\underbrace{\int_z \left[ u(w_1(z))s + \beta(1 - \lambda)u(w_2(z)) \right] (1 - g(z)) d\Gamma(z)}_{\text{Performance-based Incentives}} + \underbrace{\int_z \left[ \beta\lambda u(\alpha sz) \right] (1 - g(z)) d\Gamma(z)}_{\text{Market-based Incentives}} \geq c \quad (\text{IC})$$

How binding IC constraint is depends on how large market-based incentives are.

## Compare market-based incentives between $s_1 < s_2 < s'$



# Market-based incentives decrease in firm size

## Proposition

In the two-period model, the market-based incentives decrease with firm size iff the utility function has a **relative risk aversion larger than 1**

$$-\frac{wu''(w)}{u'(w)} > 1.$$

## Intuition

Market competition raises the overall compensation level making the executive less sensitive to market incentives due to diminishing marginal utility

# Towards a Dynamic Model

Why do we need a dynamic model?

- Match the data.

Two-period model is too simple to generate the moments.

- Job ladder equilibrium effect.

The maximum value a firm is willing to bid depends on the market competition that it faces, in particular the bids of firms higher on the job ladder.

- Study the contagion effects.

In the equilibrium, we study the spillover effects of corporate governance in large firms.



# Towards a Dynamic Model

## Two-period Model

- no moral hazard in period 2
- $z_2 = z_1$
- only one outside firm  $s' > s$
- no or static eq.

## Dynamic Model

- dynamic moral hazard
- persistent productivity  $\Gamma(z, z')$
- outside firm follows  $F(s')$
- spillover effect in the eq.

## Dynamic Model

---

# Set Up

## Executives:

- risk averse,  $u(w) - c(e)$ ,  $e \in \{0, 1\}$ ,  $c(1) = c$ ,  $c(0) = 0$
- effort increases individual productivity  $z \in \mathcal{Z}$
- $z'$  follows a Discrete Markov Chain process  
 $\Gamma(z, z')$  if  $e = 1$ ,  $\Gamma^s(z, z')$  if  $e = 0$   
likelihood ratio  $g(z, z') = \Gamma^s/\Gamma$  decreases in  $z'$
- die with  $\delta \in (0, 1)$ , the match breaks up, job disappears

## Firms:

- firm size  $s \in \mathcal{S}$ , exogenous and permanent
- production  $y(s, z) = \alpha sz$


Search Market:

- on the job search
- with  $\lambda_1 \in (0, 1)$  sample an outside firm from  $F(s)$

Sequential Auction:

- Bertrand competition between current and outside firms
- Each firm has a bidding frontier,  $\bar{W}(z, s)$ , defined by  $\Pi(z, s, \bar{W}(z, s)) = 0$
- $\bar{W}(z, s)$  increases in  $z$  and  $s$

# Timing



# Dynamic Contract

- State at  $t$   $h_t = (z'_t, s_t, s'_t)$ , history  $h^t = (h_1, h_2, \dots, h_t)$
- A feasible contract is a plan that stipulates

$$\{e_t(h^{t-1}), w_t(h^{t-1}), l_t(h^t)\}_{t=0}^{\infty},$$

- Simplifications  $\rightarrow \{w_t(h^{t-1})\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ 
  - $e = 1$  is always optimal.
  - exclude firing, to be extended.
- Use the executive's beginning-of-period expected utility,  $V$ , as a co-state variable

$$\sigma \equiv \{w(V), W(z', s', V) | z' \in \mathbb{Z} \text{ and } V \in \Phi\},$$

# Contracting Problem

Firms maximize profits

$$\Pi(z, s, V) = \max_{w, W(z', s')} \sum_{z' \in \mathbb{Z}} \left[ \alpha s z' - w + \tilde{\beta} \sum_{s' \in \mathbb{S}} \Pi(z', s, W(z', s')) \tilde{F}(s') \right] \Gamma(z, z')$$

subject to

$$\lambda : V = u(w) - c + \tilde{\beta} \sum_{z' \in \mathbb{Z}} \sum_{s' \in \mathbb{S}} W(z', s') \tilde{F}(s') \Gamma(z, z'), \quad (\text{Promise-K})$$

$$\mu : \tilde{\beta} \sum_{z' \in \mathbb{Z}} \sum_{s' \in \mathbb{S}} W(z', s') \tilde{F}(s') (1 - g(z, z')) \Gamma(z, z') \geq c. \quad (\text{IC})$$

$$\mu_0 : W(z', s') \geq \min\{\overline{W}(z', s'), \overline{W}(z', s)\} \quad (\text{PC-Executive})$$

$$\mu_1 : W(z', s') \leq \overline{W}(z', s). \quad (\text{PC-Firm})$$

# Optimal Contract

---



# The Optimal Contract

Given the beginning of the period state  $(z, s, V)$ , the current period compensation is given by  $w$ ,

$$w : \frac{\partial \Pi(z, s, V)}{\partial V} = -\frac{1}{u'(w)},$$

and the continuation utility follows

$$W(z', s') = \begin{cases} \overline{W}(z', s) & \text{if } \overline{W}(z', s') \geq \overline{W}(z', s) \\ \overline{W}(z', s') & \text{if } \overline{W}(z', s) > \overline{W}(z', s') > W(z') \\ W(z') & \text{if } \overline{W}(z', s) > W(z') \geq \overline{W}(z', s') \end{cases}$$

where  $W(z')$  satisfies

$$\frac{\partial \Pi(z', s, W(z'))}{\partial W(z')} = \frac{\partial \Pi(z, s, V)}{\partial V} - \mu(1 - g(z, z')).$$

# Contracting Problem

Insert in the optimal contract, the participation constraint becomes

$$V = u(w) - c + \tilde{\beta} \sum_{z'} \left[ \lambda_1 \sum_{s' \in \mathcal{M}_1} F(s') \overline{W}(z', s) + \lambda_1 \sum_{s' \in \mathcal{M}_2} F(s') \overline{W}(z', s') \right. \\ \left. + \left( 1 - \lambda_1 \sum_{s' \in \mathcal{M}_1 \cup \mathcal{M}_2} F(s') \right) W(z') \right] \Gamma(z, z'), \quad (PKC')$$

and the incentive compatibility constraint becomes


$$\tilde{\beta} \sum_{z'} \left[ \lambda_1 \sum_{s' \in \mathcal{M}_1} F(s') \overline{W}(z', s) + \lambda_1 \sum_{s' \in \mathcal{M}_2} \overline{W}(z', s') F(s') \right. \\ \left. + \left( 1 - \lambda_1 \sum_{s' \in \mathcal{M}_1 \cup \mathcal{M}_2} F(s') \right) W(z') \right] (1 - g(z, z')) \Gamma(z, z') \geq c. \quad (IC')$$

# The Optimal Contract in terms of wage $w$

For exhibition, impose  $u(w) = \log(w)$ , then

$$w(z', s') = \begin{cases} \bar{w}(z', s) & \text{if } \bar{w}(z', s') \geq \bar{w}(z', s) \text{ or } w(z') > w(z', s) \\ \bar{w}(z', s') & \text{if } \bar{w}(z', s) > \bar{w}(z', s') > w(z') \\ w(z') & \text{if } \bar{w}(z', s) > w(z') \geq \bar{w}(z', s') \end{cases}$$

where  $w(z') = w(z) + \mu(1 - g(z, z'))$ .




$$w(z', s') = \max\{\min\{w(z), w(z', s)\}, w(z', s')\}$$




$$w(z', s') = w(z', s)$$


# Optimal Contract




# Optimal Contract




# Optimal Contract



# Optimal Contract




# Optimal Contract







# Optimal Contract




# Optimal Contract




# Optimal Contract




# Optimal Contract




# Optimal Contract




# Optimal Contract



# Optimal Contract




# Optimal Contract






# Optimal Contract




# Optimal Contract




# Optimal Contract


$wage$




# Optimal Contract




# Optimal Contract




# Optimal Contract



# Optimal Contract




# No Moral Hazard, Full Commitment







# Only Moral Hazard



# Only Limited Commitment



# Optimal Contract




## Proposition


Market-based incentives decrease in firm size iff the utility function has a **relative risk aversion larger than 1**

$$-\frac{wu''(w)}{u'(w)} > 1.$$


## Bidding frontier is more flat as firm becomes larger




## Market-based incentives for executive in firm $s_2$



## Market-based incentives for executive in firm $s_2$




## Market-based incentives for executive in firm $s_3$





## Market-based incentives for executive in firm $s_3$




# Estimation

---


# Moments and Estimation

Moments	Target	Model	Estimates	Standard Error
Exit Rate	0.0691	0.0691	$\delta = 0.0691$	0.0012
EE Rate	0.0523	0.055	$\lambda_1 = 0.2759$	0.0017
$\hat{\rho}_z$	0.8111	0.5499	$\rho_z = 0.7$	0.0036
Mean(z)	0.1284	0.1763	$\mu_z^w = 0.06$	0.0006
Var(z)	0.0141	0.0141	$\sigma_z = 0.12$	0.0014
Mean(log(wage))	7.17714	6.5241	$\mu_s = 1.7847$	0.228385
Mean(log(size))	7.44379	8.7934	$\sigma_s = 1.3982$	0.0314657
$\beta_{wage-size}$	0.370295	0.3196		
Mean(log(delta))	4.01842	3.8080		
$\beta_{delta-size}$	0.297673	0.2941	$c = 1.91385$	0.0259
$\beta_{delta-wage}$	0.717209	2.1228	$\sigma = 2.50748$	0.0046
Mean(delta > 0)	0.994725	0.9844		

# Model Predictions



# Model Predictions v.s. Data



# Quantitative Analysis

---

## Decompose the contributions

- market-based v.s. performance-based incentives

## Work on contagion effect of corporate governance

- less entrenchment (lower  $\alpha$ ) v.s. better monitoring (lower  $c$ )

And more? ...

## Conclusion

---



## Summary

- Executives are motivated by performance-based incentives and market-based incentives.
- Market-based incentives are smaller in larger firms. So larger firms need more performance-based pay.
- The model can fit the size premium very well and generate the reasonable delta over firm size and total compensation.

**Questions?**

CEO's of "Small Firms" in S&P 500

tdc1: total compensation

delta: dollar-percentage incentive

	Company	Market Cap millions	tdc1 000's	delta 000's/%
	INCYTE CORP	446.408	2432.9734	60.939838
	WESTROCK CO	547.828	2800.668	130.96215
	ENVISION HEALTHCARE CORP	678.6906	1777.991	217.729
	PRICELINE GROUP INC	886.0817	1775.531	165.73476
	LKQ CORP	889.9763	2602.093	473.70974
	REGENERON PHARMACEUTICALS	897.3801	3094.134	566.14187
	SKYWORKS SOLUTIONS INC	1113.547	2638.243	128.10688
	CENTENE CORP	1130.155	4584.605	344.02299
	ALASKA AIR GROUP INC	1194.977	950.098	99.525198
	HOLOGIC INC	1276.448	2709.708	428.10996
	ACUITY BRANDS INC	1328.171	1102.528	133.42285
	ANSYS INC	1368.129	3738.803	431.01562
	GARTNER INC	1474.909	8945.338	158.65569

CEO's of "Large Firms" in S&P 500

tdc1: total compensation

delta: dollar-percentage incentives

	Company	Market Cap millions	tdc1 000's	delta 000's/%
	TIME WARNER INC	79965.89	18545.215	1212.9513
	CONOCOPHILLIPS	80163.26	35442.729	4520.5571
	UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC	82439.55	3120.042	340.01132
	VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC	83233.88	19425	861.09722
	HOME DEPOT INC	86128.2	35750.103	2014.3633
	AT&T INC	94944.89	17283.529	1666.3201
	COCA-COLA CO	95494.39	12781.61	425.62199
	PEPSICO INC	97836.48	15268.415	2919.7995
	CISCO SYSTEMS INC	121238.6	16269.85	5981.3853
	CHEVRON CORP	126749.6	13125.882	1106.8351
	INTL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP	129381.2	21693.615	1298.8777
	INTEL CORP	147738.2	6101.835	1874.5755
	WAL-MART STORES INC	192048.2	16652.894	1465.7708
	EXXON MOBIL CORP	344490.6	48922.808	3843.027