

Bo Hu

Affiliation:	Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam Tinbergen Institute	Date of Birth:	Jan 11th, 1988
Address:	DeBoelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, the Netherlands	Place of Birth:	Shandong, China
Email:	huboecon@gmail.com	Citizenship:	Chinese
Phone:	+31 (0) 684724200	Gender:	Male
Homepage:	bohuecon.github.io	Marital Status:	Married

Research fields

Applied Microeconomics, Industrial Organization, Labor Economics, Corporate Finance

Research focus

Endogenous Determination of Market Structure
Market Competition and Dynamic Incentive Contracts

Education

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam & Tinbergen Institute, the Netherlands, 2014 - 2019
Ph.D. in Economics, expected defense in 2019

Erasmus University Rotterdam & Tinbergen Institute, the Netherlands, 2012 - 2014
M. Phil. in Econometrics (cum laude)

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, China, 2009 - 2012
Doctoral Program in Economics

Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, China, 2005 - 2009
B.A. in Economics (cum laude)

References

Dr. **Makoto Watanabe** (Advisor)
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
+31 (0)63 1369203
makoto.wtnb@gmail.com

Prof. **Jose Luis Moraga**
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
University of Groningen
+31(0)20 5986981
j.l.moraggonzalez@vu.nl

Prof. **Pieter Gautier** (Advisor)
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
+31 (0)20 5986038
p.a.gautier@vu.nl

Dr. **Gregory Jolivet**
University of Bristol
+44 (0)117 928 8263
gregory.jolivet@bristol.ac.uk

Working papers

Managerial Labor Market Competition and Incentive Contracts
Job Market Paper

Marketmaking Middlemen, with Pieter Gautier and Makoto Watanabe
Revised and Resubmitted, *RAND Journal of Economics*

Work in progress

Competition and Advance Purchase Behavior: Evidence from Booking.com,
with Marc Möller and Makoto Watanabe

Teaching assistant

Labor Search, PhD course, Tinbergen Institute, 2016
Game Theory, PhD course, Tinbergen Institute, 2012
Industrial Organization, Bachelor course, Vrije Universiteit, 2015 - 2017
Microeconomics, Bachelor course, Vrije Universiteit, 2013 - 2016
Macroeconomics, Bachelor course, Shanghai U. of Fin & Econ, 2010 - 2011
Economic Growth, Bachelor course, Shanghai U. of Fin & Econ, 2011
Econometrics, Bachelor course, Shanghai U. of Fin & Econ, 2011

Presentations

2018: Search and Matching Annual Conference, Cambridge; Belgian Financial Research Forum, Brussels; Rotterdam Executive Conference, Rotterdam; Queen Mary PhD Workshop, London; 26th Finance Forum, Santander

2017: Economics Department Seminar, University of Bristol

2016: Search and Matching Annual Conference, Amsterdam; EEA-ESEM, Geneva

2015: Search and Matching Workshop, Bristol; Search and Matching Annual Conference, Aix-en-Provence; EARIE, Munich

2014: Symposium in Honor of Jean Tirole, Den Haag

Honours and awards

Tinbergen Scholarship, 2012 - 2014
People's Scholarship, Shanghai U. of Fin & Econ, 2011
Outstanding Graduates, Southwestern U. of Fin & Econ, 2009
National Scholarship (1st prize), Southwestern U. of Fin & Econ, 2006-2008
Hang Seng Bank Scholarship, Southwestern U. of Fin & Econ and Hang Seng Bank, 2007

Refereeing

Journal of Health Economics (1)

Organizational experiences

Search and Matching Annual Conference, Amsterdam, 2016

Languages

Chinese (native), English (fluent)

Programming

Julia, Python, R, Stata, MySQL, Matlab, Mathematica, \LaTeX

Addendum: Paper abstracts

Managerial Labor Market Competition and Incentive Contracts

This paper assesses the impact of managerial labor market competition on executive incentive contracts. I develop a dynamic contracting framework that embeds the moral hazard problem into an equilibrium search environment. The competition for executives increases total compensation and generates a new source of incentives, called *labor market incentives*, which substitutes for performance-based incentives (e.g., bonus, stocks, options, etc.). The model is estimated using a newly assembled dataset on job turnovers for executives from U.S. publicly listed firms. The structural estimates show that the model is capable of explaining and predicting the empirical puzzles that executives of larger firms experience higher compensation growth and receive higher performance-based incentives.

Marketmaking Middlemen

This paper develops a model in which market structure is determined endogenously by the choice of intermediation mode. There are two representative modes of intermediation that are widely used in real-life markets: one is a middleman mode where an intermediary holds inventories which he stocks from sellers for the purpose of reselling to buyers; the other is a market-making mode where an intermediary offers a platform for buyers and sellers to trade with each other. We show that a *marketmaking middleman*, who adopts the mixture of these two intermediation modes, can emerge in a directed search equilibrium and discuss the implications of this on the market structure. Our main insight survives with competing intermediaries.