

# Project: Threat Modeling

## Project Title

**Threat Modeling Using STRIDE with OWASP Threat Dragon & Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool**

## 1. Introduction

### What is Threat Modeling?

Threat Modeling is a **structured approach to identifying, analyzing, and mitigating security threats** early in the system design lifecycle.

### Why Threat Modeling Matters

- Finds security issues **before deployment**
- Reduces cost of fixing vulnerabilities
- Improves system architecture security
- Required by **NIST, ISO 27001, SOC 2, PCI DSS**

## 2. Threat Modeling Lifecycle (STEP Methodology)

### STEP Phases Used in This Project

1. DFD (Data Flow Diagram)
2. Identify Threats
3. Mitigate Threats
4. Validation & Review

## 3. STEP 1 – DFD (Data Flow Diagram)

### Definition

A DFD visualizes how data moves through a system and identifies trust boundaries.

### DFD Components

- **External Entities** (Users, APIs)
- **Processes** (Application logic)
- **Data Stores** (Databases)
- **Data Flows** (HTTP, SQL, API calls)
- **Trust Boundaries** (Internet vs Internal Network)

## What to Look Out For

- Unencrypted data flows
- Direct database access
- Missing authentication boundaries
- Excessive privileges between components

DFD created in OWASP Threat Dragon / Microsoft Tool

## 4. STEP 2 – STRIDE Threat Identification

### STRIDE Model Overview

Category	Description
<b>S – Spoofing</b>	Impersonating identities
<b>T – Tampering (Integrity)</b>	Unauthorized data modification
<b>R – Repudiation</b>	Denying actions
<b>I – Information Disclosure</b>	Data leakage
<b>D – Denial of Service (Availability)</b>	Service disruption
<b>E – Elevation of Privilege</b>	Gaining higher access
<b>Evasion</b>	Avoiding detection & controls

# 5. STRIDE Threat Analysis (Detailed)

## 5.1 Spoofing

**Threat:** Fake user identities

**Indicators:**

- Weak authentication
- No MFA
- Hardcoded credentials

**Mitigations:**

- MFA
- OAuth 2.0
- Certificate-based auth

Threat Dragon v2.5.0 English ▾

New Threat #5

Title: SPOOFING THREAT

Type: Spoofing

Status: Open

Score: TBD

Severity: Low

Description: The act of disguising a communication from an unknown source as being from a known, trusted source. Impersonate legitimate users, phone numbers or systems, or devices. Impersonates a trusted source to deceive users, steal data, or gain unauthorized access.

Mitigations:

- Intrusion detection system
- Certificate-based authentication
- Multi-factor authentication
- email authentication
- Implementing strong password policies

Name: BAD ACTOR


Description:

Reason for out of scope:

Out of Scope

Previous Next Cancel Apply

+ New Threat by Type + New Threat by Context



## 5.2 Tampering (Integrity)


**Threat:** Modifying requests, data, configs

**Indicators:**

- No input validation
- Unsigned tokens
- No checksums

**Mitigations:**

- HMAC
- Digital signatures
- Input validation



## 5.3 Repudiation


**Threat:** Users deny actions

**Indicators:**

- Missing logs
- No timestamps
- Logs not protected

**Mitigations:**

- Centralized logging
- Immutable logs
- Time synchronization (NTP)



## 5.4 Information Disclosure

**Threat:** Sensitive data leaks

**Indicators:**

- Plaintext storage
- Open S3 buckets
- Verbose error messages

**Mitigations:**

- Encryption at rest & transit
- Least privilege
- Secure error handling

The screenshot shows the Threat Dragon interface. On the left, there's a process diagram with nodes for 'Process', 'Store', 'Actor', and 'Boundary'. A 'Data Flow' connects 'Store' to 'Actor', and a 'Trust Boundary' connects 'Actor' to a dashed 'Boundary'. The main workspace shows a flowchart with nodes: 'UNAUTHENTICATED' (red border), 'AUTENTICATED' (dashed border), and 'BAD AUTHENTICATION' (red border). The 'Edit Threat #11' dialog is open on the right, containing the following fields:

- Title:** INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
- Type:** Information disclosure
- Status:** N/A, Open, Mitigated
- Score:** [empty input field]
- Severity:** TBD, Low, Medium, High, Critical
- Description:** Confidential server data leaked (user records, business data)
- Mitigations:**
  - Strong encryption protocols
  - Proper access controls
  - Minimize data exposure
  - Use secure headers

At the bottom of the dialog are 'Delete', 'Cancel', and 'Apply' buttons.

## 5.5 Denial of Service (Availability)


**Threat:** Resource exhaustion

**Indicators:**

- No rate limiting
- No WAF
- Single points of failure

**Mitigations:**

- Rate limiting
- Auto-scaling
- Load balancers



## 5.6 Elevation of Privilege


**Threat:** User gains admin access

**Indicators:**

- Over-permissioned roles
- Missing RBAC
- Shared admin accounts

**Mitigations:**

- RBAC
- Privileged Access Management
- Just-in-Time access



## 5.7 Evasion

**Threat:** Bypassing detection

**Indicators:**

- Disabled alerts
- Weak SIEM rules
- No behavioral detection

**Mitigations:**

- SIEM tuning
- UEBA
- Defense in depth

## 6. Tools Used


### 6.1 OWASP Threat Dragon

#### Tool Overview

Open-source threat modeling tool for creating DFDs and STRIDE threats.


#### Installation

```
git clone https://github.com/OWASP/threat-dragon
cd threat-dragon
npm install
npm start
```



## Step-by-Step Usage

1. Create new model
2. Add processes, data stores, flows
3. Assign STRIDE threats
4. Export report
  - Creating model
  - Adding threats
  - Generated report



Threat Dragon v2.5.0 English


Show model diagrams  Show mitigated threats  Show out of scope elements  Show empty elements  Threat Dragon logo  Show element properties


Not provided

### Summary



Metric	Total
Total Threats	66
Total Mitigated	0
Total Open	66
Open / Critical Severity	0
Open / High Severity	0
Open / Medium Severity	0
Open / Low Severity	0
Open / TBD Severity	66

### Instagram Stride





### Instagram Stride




## 6.2 Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool


### Tool Overview

Microsoft desktop tool for STRIDE-based threat modeling.

### Steps

1. Create new model
2. Define architecture
3. Auto-generate STRIDE threats
4. Review mitigation suggestions





# Threat Modeling Report

Created on 11/20/2025 8:39:14 PM

Threat Model Name:

Owner:

Reviewer:

Contributors:

Description:


Assumptions:

External Dependencies:

## Threat Model Summary:

Not Started	25
Not Applicable	0
Needs Investigation	0
Mitigation Implemented	0
Total	25
Total Migrated	0


## Diagram: Diagram 1



## Diagram 1 Diagram Summary:

Not Started	25
Not Applicable	0
Needs Investigation	0
Mitigation Implemented	0
Total	25
Total Migrated	0

## Interaction: Database Flow



- Architecture view
- Threat list
- Mitigation panel

## 7. Validation & Security Testing (SAFE)

### How to Validate Findings

- Review logs
- Configuration review
- Access control testing
- Architecture walkthroughs
- Secure code review

### What to Analyze After Modeling

- Attack paths
- Trust boundary violations
- High-risk STRIDE categories
- Unmitigated threats

## 8. How to Identify Vulnerabilities (Without Exploitation)

### Indicators of Vulnerabilities

- Outdated versions
- Weak authentication
- Missing encryption
- Misconfigured IAM

### Sources of Evidence

- Application logs
- Cloud audit logs
- Configuration files
- Threat model reports

## 9. Mapping to NIST CSF

NIST Function	Threat Modeling Mapping
Identify	Asset & threat identification
Protect	Mitigation controls
Detect	Logging & monitoring
Respond	Incident response planning
Recover	Resilience & availability

## **10. ISO 27001 Annex A Mapping**

<b>Control</b>	<b>Description</b>
A.5	Information security policies
A.8	Asset management
A.9	Access control
A.12	Logging & monitoring
A.14	Secure system development
A.16	Incident management

## **11. Security Best Practices**

- Least privilege everywhere
- Zero Trust architecture
- Encrypt everything
- Centralized logging
- Regular threat model reviews
- Update threat models after changes

## 12. Analysis & Recommendations

### Key Findings

- Most risks originate at trust boundaries
- IAM misconfigurations are critical
- Logging gaps increase repudiation risks

### Recommendations

- Perform threat modeling during design
- Integrate into CI/CD
- Combine with secure code reviews
- Reassess quarterly

## 13. Conclusion

Threat modeling using STRIDE, OWASP Threat Dragon, and Microsoft TMT provides a proactive security mindset. This project demonstrates real-world AppSec, Blue Team, and GRC skills aligned with NIST CSF and ISO 27001.