11

Insubordination and its uses

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11.1 Introduction

Prototypical finite clauses are main clauses—indeed, the ability to occur in a main clause is often taken as definitional for finiteness, e.g. by Crystal (1997: 427)[1]—and prototypical nonfinite clauses are subordinate clauses. Problems thus arise when clauses that would by standard criteria be analysed as nonfinite are used as main clauses; examples are the use in main clauses of the English bare infinitive *go* (1a) or Spanish *ir* in (1b) (both from Etxepare and Grohmann 2005: 129), or the Italian and German infinitives used to express commands in (2).

(1) a. John go to the movies?! No way, man.
b. ¿¡Yo ir a esa fiesta?! ¡Jamás!
1.SG go.INF to this party never
'Me go to that party? Never!'

(2) a. Alza-r-si, porc-i, av-ete cap-ito? Rifa-re
get.up-INF-REFL pig-PL have-2PL understand-PSTPTCP make-INF
i lett-i, ma presto! Puli-r-si le scarp-e
the.M.PL bed-PL but quickly clean-INF-REFL the.F.PL shoe-PL

This chapter has had a long gestation, and earlier versions were presented at the Monash University Seminar Series (1989), the inaugural conference of the Association for Linguistic Typology in Vitoria Gasteiz (1995), and at the Cognitive Anthropology Research Group of the Max Planck Institut für Psycholinguistik (1995). I thank Frans Plank for inviting me to revise it for the present volume, thereby rescuing it from further neglect, and Irina Nikolaeva for her subsequent editorial comments. For data, analyses, and references on specific languages I thank Mengistu Amberber (Amharic), Winfred Bauer (Mon), Melissa Bowerman (Dutch), Sue Duncan (Chinese), David Gil (Modern Hebrew), Sotaro Kita and Shigeko Nariyama (Japanese), Alan King (Basque), Bill McGregor (Gooniyandi), Miren Oñederra (Basque), and Anna Wierzbicka (Polish). Bruce Rigsby, Sandy Thompson, Scott Schwenter, and Tony Woodbury drew other crucial papers to my attention, and I am indebted to Eve Danziger, Mark Durie, Masha Koptjevskaja-Tamm, Steve Levinson, Marianne Mithun, Irina Nikolaeva, Eric Pederson, Lesley Stirling, Claudia Wegener, David Wilkins, and two anonymous referees for a range of other critical comments on various versions of this paper.

[1] See Kalinina and Sumbatova (Ch. 7 above) for the quoted definition and fuller discussion.

'(To) get up, pigs, understand? (To) make your beds, and hurry! (To) clean your shoes!' (Source: P. Levi, La tregua: 14, cited in Moretti and Orvieto 1979: 19)[2]

b. Bei-m Eintritt tief verneig-en!
on-DEF.DAT entry low bow-INF
'(To) bow low on entering!' (Weuster 1983: 79)

Such clauses are clearly problematic for typologies of finiteness. The two commonest solutions to the conundrum they pose are either to ignore them altogether or to treat them as underlying subordinate clauses from which some sort of main clause has been ellipsed. A third solution would involve admitting them to the category of finite clauses, concurrently broadening the definition of finiteness in various ways, such as allowing, as finite, verb forms that fail to show tense, mood, or subject person. A fourth solution is to dissociate the assumed necessary link between main clause status and finiteness, allowing certain types of main clause to be nonfinite; see the chapters in this volume by Nikolaeva and by Kalinina and Sumbatova (Chapters 6 and 7 above) for strong arguments in favour of this position.

My contention here will be that such constructions are much more widespread than is commonly believed. In fact I will be casting my net more widely, looking generally at the main clause use of (prima facie) subordinate constructions, whether nonfinite or not. This is because the relevant cross-linguistic patterns are more discernible if you examine the main clause use of subordinate constructions more generally, rather than restricting your purview just to that subset of subordinate clauses which happen to be nonfinite constructions in some languages—especially since the category 'subordinate clause', though not without its problems, is nonetheless cross-linguistically more robust than the category 'nonfinite clause'.

I will apply the term 'insubordination' to *the conventionalized main clause use of what, on prima facie grounds, appear to be formally subordinate clauses.* In surveying the uses of insubordination cross-linguistically, I have three main goals:

- To establish the range of formal manifestations of insubordination (section 11.2), e.g. main clause use of infinitives, but also main clause subjunctives, subordinate word order or characteristic subordinating complementizers or conjunctions in apparent main clauses, logophoric

[2] Translations are mine for the Italian, Spanish, German, and Kayardild material, and for the citations from Buscha, Weuster, and Schwenter. Bracketed material in the translations, such as the '(to)' in (2a) and (2b), is simply a guide to the source grammatical structure, not to the best English translation.

pronouns, or switch-reference in main clauses. As this list indicates, these include both types of nonfinite construction, such as infinitives, and those that are not normally considered to manifest nonfiniteness, such as subordinating conjunction, as well as categories that are intermediate or disputed.

- To establish the range of functions that are served by insubordinated clauses (section 11.3). These include:

  (a) Various expressions of interpersonal coercion, including commands, as in (2), but also permissives, abilitatives, threats and warnings. These are discussed in Section 11.3.1.
  (b) Modal framing of various types, including the unattributed evocation of quotation or belief (as in 1), and other kinds of deontic and evidential use. Here a main clause predicate expressing quotation, perception, thought, emotion, or inference is omitted. In some cases the semantics of this kind of insubordination goes beyond modality proper to tense. These are discussed in section 11.3.2.
  (c) Marking of various discourse contexts, such as negation, contrastive statements, and reiteration, all high in presuppositionality, through the adaptation of devices for expressing interclausal relations to the expression of discourse relations more generally. These are discussed in section 11.3.3.

- To examine the diachrony of how these functions arise through a three-step process of (a) ellipsis, (b) conventionalized restriction of interpretation, (c) development of conventionalized main clause use.

This will lead back to the issue of how realistic it is to maintain a strict distinction between syntactic (inter-clausal) and discourse (inter-sentential) relations in natural language.

11.1.1 *Insubordination: delimiting the phenomenon*

A number of grammarians of individual languages have discussed the problems posed for analysis by what I am calling insubordinated clauses.[3] Yet there has not, to my knowledge, been any detailed typological study of the

[3] The most thorough and succinct discussion of the phenomenon is in the literature on German; see esp. Buscha's (1976) treatment of *isolierte Nebensätze*, 'isolated subordinate clauses', and the lengthier discussion of 'non-embedded clauses with verb-final order' in Weuster (1983). Within the Spanish literature, discussion of independent if-clauses (see section 11.2.2 below) goes back to Bello (1847), who offered an ellipsis-based account (1984 [1847]: §1272), against which a number of investigators in the past two decades have argued that the relevant construction must be considered a main clause (Almela Perez 1985; Montolío Durán 1999; Schwenter 1996; 1999).

phenomenon, so it will be helpful to begin with some overall problems thrown up by this definition.

Many of the examples I will discuss lie at the uncomfortable boundary between parole and langue, where it is not always clear when grammar has emerged from discourse, and this leads to marginalized treatments in descriptions of particular languages. As a result, it is premature to attempt a fully systematic typological survey of the phenomenon, since in many cases the relevant constructions are considered too marginal or elliptical to be described in the standard reference grammars that need to be consulted over a structured sample in mature typological research. The 'if' request in English described below, for example, receives its first mention in an English reference grammar in Huddleston and Pullum (2002),[4] though it is earlier mentioned in two analyses based on conversational corpora, Ford and Thompson (1986) for American English and Stirling (1999) for Australian English, who discusses it in detail. Likewise, crucial data on certain uses of independent *daß*-clauses in German come from specialized discourse studies rather than reference grammars.

My purpose, therefore, is rather to sketch out some emerging patterns in an initial set of languages for which I have been able to obtain relevant information. Although twelve language families are represented, the initial impetus for this survey came from my attempts to make sense of the relevant constructions while writing a reference grammar of the Australian language Kayardild (Evans 1995a). To help with this I consulted the literature on other Australian languages and on Indo-European languages for which detailed work on the pragmatics–syntax interface was available, later adding in material from other languages around the world as I became aware of comparable constructions in them. This leads to a strong bias towards data from Australian and Indo-European languages, which between them account for twenty-four of the thirty-seven languages considered here. (For

Other relevant treatments dealing with particular languages or subgroups are Kettunen's (1924) early discussion of the subordinate clause origin of Estonian indirect (modus obliquus) constructions, Lakoff's (1968) generative semantic treatment of the Latin 'independent subjunctive', Kroskrity's (1984) discussion of formally subordinate negative clauses in several Tanoan languages, Merlan's (1981) discussion of formal links between mood, tense, and subordination in several Australian languages, and McGregor's (1988) discussion of 'non-subordinated' subjunctives in Gooniyandi (Kuniyanti). Some cross-linguistic discussion of indirection in imperatives is in Sadock and Zwicky (1985) and Brown and Levinson (1987). I will discuss this work in more detail below.

[4] Quirk et al. (1985) discuss a few of what I would term insubordinated clauses under the rubric 'subordinate clauses as irregular sentences' (11.41); they discuss *if only* sentences of the type *If only I'd listened to my parents*, but otherwise do not discuss independent *if*-clauses. Earlier grammars such as Leech and Svartvik (1975) do not mention the phenomenon.

substantial further data on comparable phenomena in Daghestanian languages see Kalinina and Sumbatova, Chapter 7 above.) I hope this bias will eventually be corrected by further research built on a more representative sample, at the stage when more attention to the phenomenon in descriptive work makes a wider range of data available.

11.1.2 *Insubordination and depragmaticization*

In my definition above I used the hedge 'on prima facie evidence' to my criterion 'appears to be a formally subordinate clause'. The need for this hedge generally arises because of the following paradox. Insubordinated clauses usually look like subordinate clauses, because of the presence in them of prototypically subordinate characteristics, such as infinitive, participial or subjunctive inflections on their verbs, subordinate word order, complementizers, and so on. But to the extent that, over time, they get reanalysed as standard constructions, those features will no longer be restricted to subordinate clauses, so that the term 'subordinate' means, at best, 'having diachronic origins as a subordinate clause'.

The historical trajectory that leads to the formation of insubordinated clauses follows four steps:

Subordination	Ellipsis	Conventionalized ellipsis	Reanalysis as main clause structure
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Subordinate construction	Ellipsis[5] of main clause	Restriction of interpretation of ellipsed material	Conventionalized main[6] clause use of formally subordinate clause (Constructionalization)

[5] Theories of ellipsis differ widely on the degree to which ellipsed material is recovered. As a matter of definition, for example, Quirk et al. (1972: 536) restrict the use of the term as follows: 'words are ellipted only if they are uniquely recoverable, i.e. there is no doubt about what words are to be supplied … What is uniquely recoverable depends on the context.' This is not a position I accept, for reasons to be discussed later in the chapter. I would rather define ellipsis as involving 'some recoverable elements that are grammatically acceptable', and then allow a range of situations from uniquely recoverable to non-uniquely recoverable (with perhaps an infinite range of possibilities).

[6] In one respect, this panchronic definition involves some circularity once stage (d) is reached. If such clauses are now normal main clauses, why include them in the survey? One reason is that analysts are traditionally reluctant to treat them as full main clauses: typically, grammars will include them in the section on subordinate clauses, and then make an aside that they can also be used independently on occasion. As typologists dependent on secondary sources, we cannot always simply reanalyse the data. A second reason is that by including such cases in our survey we may be able to show that such awkward cases display many regularities cross-linguistically, and in this way lead to a better and more consistent treatment of them across languages.

The most detailed discussions of the phenomenon (though under different names) are in the literature on German, perhaps because the existence of special subordinate word order makes such constructions particularly obvious there (see e.g. Buscha 1974; Weuster 1983; Schwabe 1994; Reis 1995; 2002; 2003; Schlobinski n.d., and references therein). Drawing on examples and analyses from Buscha and Weuster we may illustrate the four phases above.

Full construction with overt main clause. This phase is simply the normal situation where a subordinate clause is used as such; note that the subordinating conjunction *ob* 'whether' in (3) requires that its clause have subordinate word order, with the verb in clause-final position.

(3) Ich erinner-e mich nicht,
I remember-1SG REFL not
ob sie eine Karte gekauft hatte
whether she INDF.F.NOM ticket bought had
'I don't remember whether she bought a ticket.' (Durrell 1997: 387)

Ellipsis of main clause. Any grammatically compatible main clause can be 'reconstructed' by the hearer. I have developed elsewhere (Evans 1993) the concept of 'grammatical placedness' which amounts to a grammatical projection limiting possible main clauses (e.g. to predicates governing the subjunctive, or logophoric contexts). Exactly which main clause is restored is determined by processes of conversational inference.

For German, this is the situation where any grammatically compatible main clause could potentially be restored. I am not aware of any published arguments demonstrating this specifically, but the literature contains some suggestive examples. The discussion of insubordinated *ob* clauses in Buscha and Weuster contains such a wide range of reconstructed elements—with great variation in both the subject and the verb of the ellipsed clause—that there appear to be no grounds for claiming semantic restrictions on the restored materials:

(4) [Was mein-st du dazu,] Ob ich mal wegen meiner
what think-2SG you to.it if I just because my
Galle frag-e?[7]
gall.bladder ask-1SG
'(What would you think), if I just ask about my gall bladder?'
(Buscha 1976)

[7] For these examples, the English translations are my own; occasionally they are slightly non-literal in the interests of idiomaticity.

(5) [Ich zweifl-e,] Ob wir richtig sind?
I doubt-1SG if we right are
'(I doubt), whether we are right?' (Buscha 1976)

(6) Ob diese Wortstellung zulässig ist? [, erschein-t mir fraglich]
if this word.order permissible is appear-3SG I.DAT doubtful
'Whether this word order is permissible (, seems doubtful to me).'
(Weuster 1983: 33)

(7) [Dieser Aufsatz macht deutlich,] ob diese Wortstellung
this article makes clear whether this word.order
zulässig ist[?]
permissible is
'[This article makes it clear, as to] whether this word order is acceptable.'
(Weuster 1983: 38)

Although Buscha (1976) claims that such clauses express 'an uncertainty regarding the opinion of the interlocutor or regarding objective possibilities',[8] she does not demonstrate that this exceeds the general semantic conditions on the use of subordinated *ob* clauses, and examples like (7) from Weuster (1983: 38) demonstrate that all that is needed is a main clause that frames a polar question—which is the general semantic condition on the use of *ob* clauses anyway.

Determining whether regular ellipsis is the best analysis, in a given language, requires rather sensitive language-specific tests. For example, there may be various types of syntactic evidence for the underlying presence of a main clause, such as the presence of negative polarity items like 'ever' or 'any' in an English clause like *that I'll ever give you any money?*, whose presence can only be accounted for by an ellipsed negative matrix clause like *You don't believe*. The application of the negative polarity to test insubordinated Spanish if-clauses is discussed in Schwenter (1999), see below. More difficult to test, because of the very large number of candidate ellipsed clauses, is the question of whether there are any limits on which ellipsed clauses can acceptably be reconstituted. When there are significant restrictions on this, as a result of the conventionalized use of the construction, we move to the next stage.

Conventionalization of ellipsis. Certain syntactically permitted reconstructions become excluded by convention.

There is considerable range in the degree to which restoration of material is conventionalized to a subset of the grammatically tolerated possibilities. This may be extremely general, such as restrictions to a positive rather than a negative consequence in 'if requests' (17, 18), 'if wishes' (8), and 'if offers' (9).

[8] 'Eine Unsicherheit hinsichtlich der Meinung des Partners oder hinsichtlich der objektiven Möglichkeiten.'

(8) a. [Es wäre schön,] / Wenn ich deine Statur hätte
it be.3SG.SBJV lovely if I your build had
'[It would be lovely] / if I had your build.'

b. [Ich wäre froh,] /
I be.1SG.SBJV glad
'[I would be glad]'

c. *[Es wäre schlimm,] /
it be.3SG.SBJV bad
'[It would be bad]'

(9) Wenn Sie sich vielleicht die Hände wasch-en möchten?
if you self perhaps the hands wash-INF might

a. [, können Sie das hier tun]
could you that here do

b. [, wäre das sehr nett von Ihnen]
were that very nice of you

c. *[, können Sie das nicht tun]
could you that not do

d. *[, wäre das nicht sehr nett von Ihnen]
were that not very nice of you

'If you would maybe like to wash your hands.
[, that would be very nice of you]
[, you can do it here]
*[, you cannot do it]
*[, that would not be very nice of you]'

Or it may be very specific, such as the restriction of the main clause to 'what happens' in (10). Here Buscha comments that 'the matrix clause can be eliminated, without any change of meaning. The isolated subordinated clauses of this group [of sentences] need no linguistic or situational context for a monosemous interpretation'.[9]

(10) Und wenn ich nicht von ihr loskomm-e?
and if I not from her get.away-1SG
'And if I don't get away from her?'
[< Was geschieh-t, wenn ich nicht von ihr loskomm-e?]
what happen-3SG if I not from her get.away-1SG

[9] 'Der Matrixsatz kann eliminiert werden, ohne daß sich eine Bedeutungsveränderung ergibt. Die isolierte Nebensätze dieser Gruppe brauchen zur Monosemierung keinen sprachlichen oder situativen Kontext.'

Conventionalization of the whole construction (Constructionalization). The construction now has a specific meaning of its own, and it may not be possible to restore any ellipsed material. A clear case where the construction has been conventionalized to the point where restoration of ellipsed material is not possible—at least in a way that allows all the overt material to be preserved—is the concessive use of *wo* (where) clauses with subordinate verb order. Buscha (1976), in discussing examples like (11a), is unable to supply a paraphrase from which this can be derived by simple deletion, and replaces *wo* by the subordinating concessive conjunction *obwohl* in her expansion (11b):[10]

(11) a. Wo Zehntausende verreck-en müss-en
where ten.thousands die-INF must-3PL
Lit.: 'Where tens of thousands must die'

b. Obwohl Zehntausende verreck-en müss-en,
although ten.thousands die-INF must-3PL
mach-en sie sich keine Gedanken darüber
make-3PL they self no thoughts about.that
'Even though tens of thousands must die, they don't think twice about it.'

Another nice example of conventionalized meaning going hand in hand with increasingly main-clause-like behaviour is the insubordinated use of *si* clauses in Spanish, historically conditionals, but which can now function as main clauses putting forth a proposition at odds with that articulated or presupposed by the preceding speaker (see 20 below). Arguments for their main clause status are presented by Almela Pérez (1985), Montolío Durán (1999), and Schwenter (1999). In contrast to the subordinate use, which typically suspends factivity, the insubordinated use signals certainty on the part of the speaker (Schwenter 1999: 89), fails to activate negative polarity items such as postnominal placement of *alguna* 'any', is limited to one occurrence per utterance (whereas true conditional *si* can be repeated, one per condition), is impossible to embed under a speech act verb, and cannot appear inside the scope of sentence adverbs like *obviamente* 'obviously'.

Note that the four-stage pathway proposed above zigzags between an opening up, then a closing, of the role of pragmatics. First a previously syntacticized subordinate clause, made independent, becomes available for

[10] Note Weuster's comment (1983: 56) on this construction: '*Wo* verweist [in this example] nicht auf einen Ort; es handelt sich vielmehr um das Konzessive *wo*': *wo* [where] refers not to a place; rather it is a matter of concessive *wo* [i.e. English whereas].

pragmatic interpretation; in this phase grammatical formatives get opened up to the pragmatics and become 'less grammatical'. Only in the second phase does 'depragmaticization' occur, as the newly independent clause acquires a more specific constructional meaning. For example, a switch-reference marker originally interpreted in simply grammatical terms (e.g. tracking identity between subjects in main and subordinate clauses) may take on more general functions of tracking contrasts in discourse, the exact nature of which is to be determined pragmatically. An examination of insubordination is thus instructive for 'interactionist' functional typologies that do not seek to replace structural with functional accounts, but rather examine the ways in which various functions (including pragmatic interpretation) intricately interdepend with language-particular structures.

In addition to its typological importance for the relation between finiteness and subordination, insubordination is also of great interest for theories of historical morphosyntax. The extensive literature on morphosyntactic change—whether as grammaticization or reanalysis—largely concentrates on diachronic developments in the opposite direction, i.e. the development of subordinate constructions from material in main clauses. It has been widely asserted, particularly in the functionalist and grammaticization literatures, that there is a unidirectional pathway from pragmatics to syntax to morphology, one consequence of which is that loose paratactic 'pragmatic' constructions become syntacticized as subordinate clauses.

> [G]rammaticalization is unidirectional [. . .]. [I]t leads from a 'less grammatical' to a 'more grammatical' unit, but not vice versa. A few counterexamples have been cited (e.g. . . . Campbell, in press.)[11] They concern either degrammaticalization or regrammaticalization . . . The former is present when the direction of grammaticalization is reversed, that is, when a more grammatical unit develops into a less grammatical one, while the latter applies when forms without any function acquire a grammatical function. Although both degrammaticalization and regrammaticalization have been observed to occur, they are statistically insignificant and will be ignored in the remainder of this work. Note that many cases of alleged degrammaticalization found in the literature on this subject can be shown to be the result of an inadequate analysis (see Lehmann 1982: 16–20). (Heine et al. 1991a: 4–5)

> From the diachronic point of view, [grammaticalization—*N.E.*] is a process which turns lexemes into grammatical formatives *and renders grammatical formatives still more grammatical.* (Lehmann 1982: v, italics mine)

> [Grammaticalization is a process] whereby linguistic units lose in semantic complexity, pragmatic significance, syntactic freedom, and phonetic substance, respectively. (Heine and Reh 1984: 15)

[11] = Campbell (1991), discussed below.

Discussions of reanalysis have been a bit more willing to admit developments from subordinate to main clause status:

> The discussion so far has focused on unidirectionality, and what kinds of unidirectionality are characteristic of grammaticalization. Virtually nothing is exceptionless, and there are of course instances of change in languages that are counterexamples of tendencies that can be characterized as 'less > more grammatical', 'main clause > subordinate clause', etc. In these volumes the papers by Campbell and Greenberg explicitly raise counterexamples to unidirectionality... It is likely that all these examples are strictly speaking actually not cases of grammaticalization (although once they have occurred they may be subject to the generalization, reduction, loss, and other changes typical of grammaticalization). Rather, the examples Campbell and Greenberg cite can be regarded as instances of reanalysis. (Traugott and Heine 1991c: 6–7)

It is not my concern here to situate insubordination within the grammaticalization/reanalysis dichotomy. Some scholars suggest that grammaticalization is not a logically independent type of morphosyntactic change, but merely a cluster of other processes such as sound change, semantic change, and reanalysis (Campbell 2000). On the reanalysis side, it is not clear that the normal definitions of reanalysis apply clearly to the phenomenon of insubordination,[12] and, as outlined above, the complex trajectory followed in insubordination, with its successive opening and restriction of pragmatic interpretation, may leave room for suitably redefined versions of each process to be identified.[13] However, wherever we situate it within a taxonomy of morphosyntactic change, it is clear that insubordination goes against the usual direction of change by recruiting main clause structures from subordinate clauses.

[12] Langacker's oft-cited definition of reanalysis treats it as 'change in the structure of an expression or class of expressions that does not involve any immediate or intrinsic modification of its surface manifestations' (Langacker 1977: 59). Heine et al. basically follow this definition. Traugott (1980: 49) focuses on the reinterpretation of boundaries: 'another well-known source of grammaticalization is reanalysis ... in which old boundaries are reinterpreted.' It takes a bit of massaging to apply these to any stage of the insubordination trajectory I have outlined above. Conceivably stage (b) could be seen as an example of a sentence boundary being realigned with a clause boundary, but it all seems rather forced and unilluminating.

[13] It would certainly be consistent, for example, with Hopper's salvationist allegory: 'Grammaticalization ... is the tragedy of lexical items young and pure in heart but carrying within them the fatal flaw of original sin; their inexorable weakening as they encounter the corrupt world of Discourse; their fall into the Slough of Grammar; and their eventual redemption in the cleansing waters of Pragmatics' (Hopper 1998: 147–8).

11.2 Formal realizations

Recall that we define insubordination as the conventionalized independent use of a formally subordinate clause. The criterion 'formally subordinate' can refer to any formal feature primarily associated with subordinate clauses in the relevant language: non-finite verb forms; subordinating conjunctions and other complementizers (e.g. case markers with clausal scope); logophoric pronouns and long-distance reflexives; switch-reference markers; or special word order normally confined to subordinate clauses.

The rider 'primarily associated' in the preceding paragraph is important here, since the more an insubordinated clause allows independent use, the less its formal features can be taken as uniquely distinctive of subordinate clauses. This means that arguments of the form 'clause type X is subordinate because it has formal features Y which are characteristic of subordinate clauses' will be circular. Weuster (1983), for example, shows the fallacy of taking V-final clauses in German to be subordinate simply on the basis of their word order, since for some types at least embedding under a putatively ellipsed main clause is either impossible or arbitrary.[14] At the same time, as the independent use of erstwhile subordinate clauses becomes increasingly conventionalized, the relevant constructions may exhibit a mix of subordinate and main clause features. For example, some types of 'suspended' clause discussed for Japanese by Ohori (1995), which fall into my category of insubordinated constructions, behave like subordinate clauses in taking the participial ending *-te*, but like complete sentences in taking the pragmatic particle *-ne* (see further discussion below). Finally, it may be the case that historical developments leading to formal similarity between main and subordinate forms have run in the opposite direction, such as the development of the West Greenlandic intransitive participle from the pan-Eskimo intransitive indicative, as discussed by Woodbury (1985).

The fact remains that virtually all cases discussed here are treated as basically subordinate in their morphosyntax by the sources, and discussed in the section on subordination as a special case. In defence of this position (though this is not always made explicit) there are three types of argument.

[14] 'Dabei ist es das Ziel der Arbeit, zu zeigen, daß eine Klassifizierung finiter Sätze mit Verb-Endstellung als "isolierte" bzw. "nicht-elliptische" oder "hauptsatzwertige Nebensätze" syntaktisch nicht überzeugend gerechtfertigt werden kann. Es soll deutlich gemacht werden, daß es sich um selbständige Sätze handelt ... Es erscheint vielmehr sinnvoll anzunehmen, daß auch hier unabhängige Sätze mit Verb-Endstellung vorliegen' (Weuster 1983: 21)

First, it may be demonstrable by comparative or historical evidence that the construction originated as a subordinate clause; this is the case for the Arizona Tewa examples discussed below, for example, where at the same time the analyst makes it clear that the construction in question is no longer so regarded synchronically.

Secondly, subordinate or main clause status is typically demonstrated on the basis of a cluster of tests, not all of which may yield a positive result in the case of insubordinated clauses; their anomalous position may be demonstrable through their non-prototypical performance here. Related to this are cases where the insubordinated use is semantically restricted compared to standard subordinate uses: an example would be the clear semantic restrictions on insubordinated *if*-clauses, such as the restriction to positive outcomes, compared to their corresponding subordinate clauses.

Finally, in cases where the first two arguments fail, we may argue that such clauses are basically subordinate by resorting to typological analogy, from the two facts that (a) nominalized clauses bearing case affixes on their nominalized verbs are typically a subordinate structure cross-linguistically, and (b) the complementizing use of case markers is, logically, an extension of their two-place predicate use to one in which both arguments are clauses.

The danger of circularity when arguing on such typological grounds is greatest in the case of certain categories that have entered the metalinguistic vocabulary with analyses of languages where they happen to occur in subordinate clauses, but where the cross-linguistic grounds for associating them with subordinate constructions are weak. Logophoric pronouns, for example, were first discussed in connection with African languages, where they are primarily found in subordinate clauses (see below), but subsequent work on Central Pomo (Mithun 1990) suggests that occurrence in subordinate clauses is not a necessary defining feature of logophoric pronouns. Similarly, the 'subjunctive' category has always been defined in a way that vacillates between structural grounds (in terms of particular types of subordinate clause, reflecting the term's origin as a translation of the Greek *hypotaktikē* 'subordinate'—see Palmer 1986: 22) and semantic grounds, such as Lavandera's (1983: 211) characterization of the Spanish subjunctive as referring to states of affairs 'whose occurrence could easily be denied or affirmed, but is instead left unasserted'.

My inclusion of a particular construction as insubordinate typically follows decisions in the primary sources to group them as special independent uses of subordinate clauses, or as descendants of subordinate clauses in previous language states; the component 'independent use' in my definition allows

for the fact that there will be language-specific arguments for treating the construction as a main clause, and indeed the process of insubordination may have been so far-reaching that, synchronically, they have full main clause status.

We now pass to a survey of the various formal characteristics, normally associated with subordinate clauses in the relevant language, for which insubordinated uses have been reported.

11.2.1 *Special subordinate verb forms*

These are forms such as the subjunctive in Italian (12a, b) or Icelandic (25 below), participles in Lithuanian (13a, b) or Japanese (14a, b),[15] and the so-called 'lest' or apprehensive forms in many Australian languages, e.g. Diyari (15a-b) and Kayardild (49 below).

Typically such verb forms are either nonfinite or can be analysed as containing an old complementizer such as a case marker. For each language I give an example of a 'typical', subordinate use, followed by an 'insubordinated', independent use.

(12) a. Non vogl-io che venga domani
not want-1SG that come.3SG.SBJV tomorrow
'I don't want him to come tomorrow.'

b. Che venga domani
that come.3SG.SBJV tomorrow
'(It's possible/likely/I hope/believe etc.) that he'll come tomorrow.'

(13) a. Mókytojas sãko, kàd tù tìngįs mókytis
teacher.NOM say.3 that you be.lazy.PRS.PTCP study.INF
'The teacher says that you are lazy in studying.' (Comrie 1981)

b. Traukinỹs išeĩnąs lýgiai septiñtą vãlandą
train.NOM leave.PRS.PTCP prompt.ADV seventh.ACC hour.ACC
'(It is said that) the train will leave promptly at seven o'clock.' (Comrie 1981)

[15] (14b) is taken from Ohori (1995) and follows his glosses. (14a) is a 'full' version that corresponds maximally to his insubordinated example, though according to Shigeko Nariyama (email of 22 May 2002) 'this sounds a little awkward, though people do say this', and a more natural full version would be *tukaretyatta-kara, zyugyoo yasumu yo*, i.e. where the particle *-te* 'and so' is replaced by *-kara* 'because'. This is typical of the structural slippage that frequently accompanies insubordination, as the now main clauses become detached from their original complex structures and take on main clause features in their own right.

(14) a. Tukare-tyat-te, zyugyoo yasumu yo
exhausted-PRV-PTCP class skip PRT
'Being exhausted, (I)'ll skip class.'

b. A: Zyugyoo yasumu no? B: Tukare-tyat-te ne
class skip PRT exhausted-PRV-PTCP PRT
'Are (you) going to skip the class?' '(I'm) exhausted.'
(Ohori 1995: 202) (lit. 'Being exhausted.')

(15) a. Makita paḍaka-Ø-mayi, wanku yundu wala n̪ayi-yaṯi
gun take-IMP-EMPH snake.ACC 2SG.ERG soon see-APPR
'Carry a gun, in case you see a snake.' (Austin 1981a: 225)

b. N̪ulu-ka kiṉṯala-li yinan̪a maṯa-yaṯi
3SG.F.ERG-TOKEN dog-ERG you.ACC bite-APPR
'This dog might bite you.' (Austin 1981a: 229)

11.2.2 *Subordinating conjunctions and complementizers*

Examples are the use of the word 'if' for polite requests in French (16), English[16] (17, 18), or Dutch (19).

(16) Si on allait se promen-er?
if one went REFL walk-INF
'What if we went for a walk?'

(17) a. (I wonder) If you could give me a couple of 39c stamps please
b. If you could give me a couple of 39c stamps please,
(I'd be most grateful)

(18) (A milkman's sheet about Xmas deliveries, including:[17])
If you would kindly indicate in the boxes below your requirements and then hand the completed form back to your Roundsman by no later than the 16th December 1995

(19) Hans, of je even naar Edith zou lopen
Hans whether you just to Edith will go
'Hans, would you just go to Edith?'[18]

Though the commonest function of insubordinated conditionals is to express polite requests, they may have other conventionalized functions, such as

[16] Alan King (p.c.) raises the question of whether the source is the conditional use ('if X, (then) I'd be grateful') or the embedded-question use; the lack of a paraphrase with 'whether', which would suit the embedded-question use but not the conditional use, suggests the former, but English speakers who I have consulted are divided on their intuitions here. In Basque (see below) the two are formally distinct, and both are available for elliptical requests.

[17] I thank Grev Corbett for this example.

[18] I am indebted to Melissa Bowerman for this example.

expressing disagreement, as in Spanish (20). As an explanation for this development Schwenter (1999: 8), who furnishes this example, suggests that the link from conditionality to disagreement is via an ellipted main clause along the lines of (in this example) 'If it's horrible, how can you say it's great?'.

(20) (Sisters Q and R are looking at clothes in a shop window.)
Q: Ah, ¡mira qué chaqueta más chula!
ah look.IMP what jacket INT great
R: Si es horrible.
if is horrible
Q: 'Hey, look what a great jacket!'
R: 'But it's horrible!'

Conversely, the same function (polite requests) that is expressed by the insubordination of conditionals in some languages may be expressed by insubordination of complementized purpose clauses in others, e.g. by insubordinated *żeby* 'in order that' in Polish (21) or *supaya* (also 'in order that') in Indonesian (36 below).

(21) Żeby ciocia teraz może zadzwoni-ła
COMP auntie now perhaps telephone-PST.F
'If you (auntie) could perhaps make a phone call for me?'

Insubordinated clauses may also involve 'complementizing case' markers on verbs and/or other clausal constituents, which normally signal interclausal temporal or modal relations (Dench and Evans 1988). Compare the use of the complementizing dative in Yukulta, where it marks purpose clauses and is restricted to subordinate clauses (e.g. 22), with the etymologically corresponding clauses in Kayardild, where it may either function as a subordinate clause of purpose (23) or be used in an independent clause as a hortative (24).

(22) kira warra-ja-rna, [dathin-inja makurrarra-ntha burldi-j-inja-yi]$_{DAT}$
close go-IMP-3SG.O that-DAT wallaby-DAT hit-THM-DAT-2SG
'Go close to him, so you can hit that wallaby!' (Keen 1983: 247)[19]

[19] Some of the Australian languages I cite use phonetic symbols (Diyari, Dyirbal). Some use a practical orthography employing digraphs to show retroflex, lamino-dental, and lamino-palatal articulations: Kayardild, Gooniyandi, and Mparntwe Arrernte use leading *r* for retroflex, following *h* to show lamino-dental, and following *y* or *j* to show lamino-palatal, and Mparntwe Arrernte uses following *w* to show consonantal labialization. Western Desert dialects use underlining to show retroflexion. Ngiyambaa employs a mixture of these strategies. In general, voicing is non-phonemic and individual orthographies arbitrarily choose the voicing values. I normally follow the orthography employed in the source, to which readers are referred for phonological details, except that I have retranscribed Yukulta in the same practical orthography as the closely related Kayardild to facilitate comparison of morphemes.

(23) wuu-ja ngijin-ji, wadu-ntha baa-jinj
give-IMP me-LOC smoke-OBL bite-PURP
'Give me (the tobacco), so that I can have a smoke.'

(24) Wirdi-jinja-da dathin-a dukurduku binthu
stay-HORT-yet that-NOM moist.NOM prepuce.NOM
'Let those freshly circumcised foreskins wait a while yet (before burying them).'

Note that the complementizing case spreads to any object NPs present in the complementized clause: the dative to 'that wallaby' in (22), and the oblique to 'smoke' in (23); the Yukulta dative is cognate with the Kayardild Oblique. In addition, the relevant verb inflection, *th.inja* or *j.inja* in both languages according to conjugation, can be broken down into a conjugation marker *th/j* plus the dative/oblique suffix *inja/ntha*. In section 11.3.2.4 we examine a series of changes of this type that have occurred in the Tangkic languages, giving rise to new main clause tense/mood categories.

11.2.3 *Logophoric pronouns and long-distance reflexives*

These are normally restricted to subordinate clauses, but may in some languages be used independently to indicate reported speech or thoughts in a *style indirect libre*. An example from Icelandic is (25), in which all clauses after the first, though not overtly embedded, exhibit such subordinate clause features as the use of the subjunctive and of long-distance reflexives (LDRs). They are used in the 'logophoric domain' in which 'the speech, thought, perception, etc., of an individual, distinct from the speaker or the narrator, is reported on' (Sigurðsson 1986:13)—in this case, the chairman—and would be translated by something like *he expressed* in English. Further examples of insubordination with logophoric pronouns will be given in section 11.3.2.1.[20]

(25) Formaðurinn varð óskaplega reiður. tillagan væri
the.chairman became furiously angry the.proposal was.SBJV
svivirðileg og væri henni beint gegn sér
outrageous and was.SBJV it aimed at self(LDR)
persónulega. ser væri reyndar sama
personally self(LDR) was.SBJV in.fact indifferent
'The chairman became furiously angry. (He felt) the proposal was outrageous and was directly aimed at himself personally. In fact, he (self) did not care . . .' (Sigurðsson 1986: 12)

[20] Note here that while subordinate clauses always presumably originate as such, logophoric pronouns may have a main clause origin—a point I shall return to later.

11.2.4 *Switch-reference markers*

Such markers are normally restricted to subordinate clauses but used, in special cases, with main clauses, as in the Australian language Arrernte. Examples of this will be given in (113–16) below.

11.2.5 *Special subordinate word order*

Special subordinate word order may also occur in insubordinated clauses. An example is the German use of the verb-final subordinate word order when repeating a question, but with the main clause *ich sagte* or *ich fragte* omitted, as in (26), as well as the various other examples given in section 11.1.2 above.

(26) Aber wo komm-st du denn jetzt her?
but where come-2SG you then now hither
'But where are you coming from now?'
Wie bitte?
how please
'What's that?'
Wo du jetzt herkomm-st?
where you now come-2SG
'(I asked) Where you're coming from(?)'

11.2.6 *Combinations of subordinate features; minimal types*

We have already seen examples where more than one feature characteristic of subordinate clauses is found—such as a complementizer and the subjunctive in Italian (12b), or the subjunctive and a logophoric pronoun in Icelandic (25). Example (27) illustrates the combination of a subordinating conjunction plus subordinate clause (verb-final) word order in German.

(27) Ob er krank ist?
whether he sick is
'(You're asking/wondering // I wonder) whether he is sick?'

Or it may happen that a word that is ambiguous between main and subordinate clause functions is shown to be used with its subordinate clause function by its occurrence with some other subordinate clause feature, such as subordinate clause word order, as in (28). The German word *warum* can function as a main clause interrogative meaning 'why', with main clause (V-second) word order, or as an interrogative subordinator meaning '(as to) why', with subordinate (V-final) word order; in (28) the V-final word order shows clearly that it is being used in the second function.

(28) Warum er noch nicht da ist?
why he still not there is
'(You're wondering/asking // I can't understand) why he still isn't there (?)'

Japanese illustrates perhaps the most extremely reduced example of an insubordinated clause: (29) consists of just a subordinating conjunction, the word for 'also', plus an illocutionary particle, thanks to ellipsis of subordinate clause predicates and arguments in addition to ellipsis of the whole main clause:

(29) Ka mo ne
whether also PRT
'Possibly', lit. '[I wonder] whether [it's true].' (Sotaro Kita, p.c.)

11.2.7 *Scope and limits of the present survey*

I shall exclude from this survey, for reasons of scope, formally coordinated clauses used independently, exemplified by the following sentence from Ewe (30). But it may well turn out that they have rather similar functional properties to insubordinated clauses. The overt cohesive contrasting of propositions expressed by different speakers is reminiscent of the 'insubordinated switch reference' to be discussed in section 11.3.3.3, while in terms of interpersonal pragmatics the function of independent or-clauses is reminiscent of many insubordinated requests (section 11.3.1.1).

(30) ma-vá fiẽ sia lóó
1SG.IRR-come evening DEM or
'Should I come this evening or?' (Ameka 1991: 54)

My definition also requires that the resultant construction draw its material from only the old subordinate clause. This is to distinguish it from cases of clause union which end up including elements of an erstwhile subordinate clause (e.g. participial forms, or a causativized verb root) in addition to elements of the erstwhile main clause (e.g. an auxiliary, or a causativizing element). This requirement excludes from consideration such English sentence types as *What if it rains?* (of underlying biclausal nature, from *What happens if it rains*, according to Quirk et al. 1985) and *What if they ARE illiterate?* (from *What does it matter if they ARE illiterate?*), or Russian and other Slavic past forms based on the past participle, with historic loss of the auxiliary verb. It also excludes the plethora of forms in many Cariban languages, discussed at length in Gildea (1998), where the verbs of main clauses are historically nominalizations of various types, once part of copular clauses

from which the copula has disappeared.[21] Cf. the Panare examples (31a), with the nominalization functioning as a habitual present, and no copula, with (31b), exemplifying what Gildea argues is the original construction, where the habitual nominalization is linked to the subject by an overt copula (Gildea 1998: 236).

(31) a. t-ipán-sen iye
IRR-dry-HAB tree
'(This kind of) pole/tree dries.'

b. a-t-ama-sen kəh məh
2-ADP-kill-HAB 3.be this
'This could kill you.' (Nominal interpretation: 'This could be your killer.')

Also excluded are cases where former main verbs are reduced to particles or suffixes to an erstwhile subordinate verb which has become the new main verb; an example would be the change from Latin *cantare (h)a(b)eo* to Italian *cantaró*, or the derivation of evidential affixes in many languages from reduced verbs, such as the Maricopa 'non-visual sensory evidence' marker, *-ʔa*, which is a reduced form of the verb *ʔav-* 'hear', and the 'visual evidential' *-ʔyuu*, which derives from the verb *yuu-* 'see' plus the 1st person prefix *ʔ-* (Willett 1988: 79). Similarly, it excludes cases like Teso (Nilotic), discussed by Heine and Reh (1984: 104–5), where the reconstructed main clause negative verb **e-mam* 'it is not' gets reduced to a negative particle *mam* 'not'. As a result the originally subordinate verb remains the only full verb (32b); in the process this introduces a change from original VSO word order to SVO, as VS[VO] reduces to PartSVO.

(32) a. e-mam petero e-koto eki^{a}ok
3SG-not Peter 3SG-want dog
'Peter doesn't want a dog.' (Heine and Reh's reconstruction for pre-Teso)

b. mam petero e-koto eki^{a}ok
not Peter 3SG-want dog
'Peter doesn't want a dog.'

Finally, I exclude instances where complement-taking predicates embedded in main clauses reduce to formulaic particles, parenthetical phrases etc. This is illustrated in Thompson and Mulac's (1991) discussion of reduction of *I think* from complement-taking predicate (***I think that*** *we're definitely moving*

[21] For a comparable case in the Cupan languages (Uto-Aztecan), where nominalized structures plus copula have been reanalysed as finite verb forms, see Jacobs (1975).

toward being more technological) to a sort of epistemic adverb, as in *It's just your point of view you know what you like to do in your spare time* ***I think.***

Although there is some functional overlap between all the above cases and insubordination, there is a crucial formal difference. Clause union condenses a main and a subordinate clause while retaining semantic elements of both, and examples of reduction of main clause verbs to either affixes (Maricopa) or formulaic phrases (English *I think*) likewise retain material from both clauses. In cases of insubordination, on the other hand, only material from the subordinate clause is overtly expressed.[22] The missing material is merely alluded to—signalled by the presence of subordinate morphosyntax—and must be restored inferentially.

To conclude this section, it is worth repeating that, under 'formally subordinate', I include cases where the evidence for formal subordination is synchronically obvious, as well as those where it is only diachronic. My main reason for doing this is that the rapid turnover of some types of construction in particular directives can bleach the indirection from an 'indirect' insubordinated request and leave it unacceptably direct. In addition, there are many cases where it is not analytically clear how far insubordination has become conventionalized. As we have seen there exists a continuum from subordinate clauses only used as such, to free-standing subordinate clauses for which an ellipsed main clause can be readily supplied, to insubordinated clauses which can be supplied with main clauses though it sounds somewhat unnatural or pedantic, to insubordinated clauses which have become so conventionalized that they are felt to be quite complete in themselves. Once this last point has been reached, there may be disagreement among analysts as to whether 'insubordinated' clauses should be treated as deriving from subordinate clauses at all, since an alternative analysis in which they are just another main clause type becomes more plausible.

11.3 Functions of insubordination: towards a typology

In this section I survey the functions of insubordination, as defined above, in a variety of languages. For each functional type I first discuss the attested range of formal realizations, and then look at some functional reasons why insubordination should occur. It should be noted that although, for expository purposes, functions have been treated as distinct, there are many languages in which a single 'generalized insubordinate' type covers a number of

[22] We shall see one partial exception to this: cases where focused-object constructions derive from a fronted object and an old subordinate clause, reanalysed as a single clause. The crucial difference is that there is no retention of predicate material from the main clause.

functions. Some examples of this multifunctionality will be discussed in section 11.4, where I look at the question of whether a unified semantics, or a unified set of functions, can be given for insubordinated clauses.

11.3.1 *Indirection and interpersonal control*

By far the commonest type of insubordination is found in various types of clause concerned with interpersonal control—primarily imperatives and their milder forms such as hints and requests, but also permissives, warnings, and threats. All such clauses are, to a greater or lesser extent, 'face-threatening acts' (Brown and Levinson 1987), and insubordinating ellipsis has the effect of putting the face-threatening act 'off the record'. In fact Brown and Levinson (1987: 227) explicitly include the strategy 'be incomplete, use ellipsis' in their section on 'off the record' ways of politely handling Face Threatening Acts:

> [Off-record] Strategy 15: Be incomplete, use ellipsis.
> This is as much a violation of the Quantity Maxim as of the Manner Maxim. Elliptical utterances are legitimated by various conversational contexts—in answers to question, for example. But they are also warranted in F(ace) T(hreatening) A(ct)s. By leaving an FTA half undone, S can leave the implication 'hanging in the air', just as with rhetorical questions.

Sadock and Zwicky (1985: 193), in their discussion of how requests are characterized by indirection, include the use of formally subordinate clauses in their typology:

> Indirection usually serves a purpose in that it avoids—or at least gives the appearance of avoiding—a frank performance of some act that the speaker wishes to perform. For this reason certain sorts of effects are more likely to be targets for indirect accomplishment than others. Most cultures find requests somewhat objectionable socially and these are therefore frequently conveyed by indirect means . . . Numerous languages use some typically subordinate clause form, a free-standing infinitive or subjunctive, for example, as a circumlocution for the imperative.

Insubordinated clauses of this type most commonly take the form of complements of request, desire, or possibility predicators, purpose clauses with an implicit 'I say this (in order that X)', and conditional clauses with an implicit 'It would be nice / You would make me happy / I would like it' etc.

11.3.1.1 *Ellipsed predicates of desire* To begin with an example of ellipsed request or desire predicates, consider the well-discussed example of the independent subjunctive in Latin (cf. Lakoff 1968), for which it is claimed that (33b) is a paraphrase of (33a):

(33) a. Imper-o / vol-o ut ven-ias
order-1SG want-1SG that come-SBJV.2SG
'I order/I want you to come.'

b. Ven-ias
come-SBJV.2SG
'Come!/May you come!'

The clear syntactic relationship between (33b) and (33a) is illustrated by the selection of negators: main clauses of command or desire select *ne*, while main clauses of possibility select *non*; these selections carry over into the corresponding insubordinated clauses (34). Note that epistemic interpretations are also available with the Latin independent subjunctive, as with (35b).

(34) a. Imper-o/ vol-o ut ne ven-ias
order-1SG want-1SG that NEG come-SBJV.2SG
'I order/want you not to come.'

b. Ne ven-ias
NEG come-SBJV.2SG
'Don't come! / May you not come!'

(35) a. Potest fieri ut non ven-ias
can.3SG become that NEG come-SBJV.2SG
'It may be that you won't come.'

b. Non venias
NEG come-SBJV.2SG
'Maybe you won't come.'

11.3.1.2 *Ellipsed enabling predicate* Enabling predicates are also commonly ellipsed, leaving behind an insubordinated purpose clause. An Indonesian example is (36), while the Kayardild example (37) is similar: a literal translation would be 'in order to bring that bird back'.

(36) supaya di-baca halaman lima puluh
in.order.that PASS-read page five ten
'If you could read page fifty.'

(37) dathin-a yarbud-a thaari-juru-y
that-NOM bird-NOM bring.back-POT-COMP.LOC
'(Eat it in such a way that) you can bring that bird back (i.e. don't eat it all).'

One specialized type of request realized by an insubordinated purposive clause in the Yankunytjatjara dialect of the Western Desert Language (Australian;

Pama-Nyungan) is the request for permission, as in (38b) below; (38a) illustrates a canonical subordinate clause use of the purposive nominalized verb.

(38) a. ngayulu Yami-nya nyaku-nytja-ku paṭa-n̪i
1SG.NOM Yami-ACC see-NMLZ-PURP wait-PRS
'I'm waiting to see Yami.' (Goddard 1985: 165)

b. ngayulu ngalku-nytja-ku / kuli-nytja-ku?
1SG.ERG eat-NMLZ-PURP listen-NMLZ-PURP
'May I eat / listen?' (Goddard 1985: 166)

Goddard (1985: 166), who notes of this construction that '[a] purposive clause with rising intonation may constitute a complete sentence in itself', goes on to suggest that 'these utterances are probably best interpreted as "indirect speech acts", for they implicitly request the addressee to do something, so that the situation they depict may become possible'.

An equally widespread type of insubordination found in polite requests is the independent if-clause, already exemplified above for French (16), English (17, 18), and Dutch (19); see Stirling (1999) for a detailed discussion of this phenomenon in Australian English.[23] Among the many other languages using independent if-clauses for polite requests are Spoken Mon (39) and Japanese (41). In all of these languages non-elliptical versions are also possible; the ellipsed portion is typically something like '[It would make me happy] if X', as in the non-elliptical (39a) or '[I think it would be a good idea] if X' (40).

(39) a. (yɔ raʔ) ʔa wòiŋ kwan mòn məkɛh, (ʔoa) cɑt mìp
if PRT go visit village Mon if I mind happy
'(I) would be happy if (you) would visit a Mon village.'
(W. Bauer, p.c.)

b. ʔa wòiŋ kwan mòn məkɛh
go visit village Mon if
'(You) should visit a Mon village.' (W. Bauer, p.c.)

(40) oishasan ni it-tara ii to omo-u
doctor LOC go-if good COMP think-PRS
'I think that it would be good to go to a doctor.'

[23] Ford and Thompson (1986: 365) find that, in their conversational data, 7% of their initial if-clauses express polite directives. Although they state that '[s]ince this use of the conditional form is one of the least compatible with logical interpretation, it is not surprising that in many cases a consequent clause is very difficult to isolate', the examples they cite do in fact have an overt consequent and would hence not count as insubordinated clauses by my definition; an example is 'If you could get your table up with your new sketches just as soon as this is over I would like to see you'.

(41) oishasan ni it-tara?
doctor LOC go-if
'Why don't you go to a doctor?'

The more such subordinated if-clauses become conventionalized, the less speakers are sure of exactly what has been ellipsed. When asked to supply a source main clause for a construction like *If you could give me a 39c stamp*', for example, English speakers I have asked split between two alternatives, corresponding to the conditional and question-embedding uses of English *if*: *I wonder if*... and *If*... *it would be good*. One argument against the first interpretation is that English speakers do not permit parallel examples with *whether*, as in (42):

(42) *Whether you could give me a 39c stamp.

However, one could dismiss this by claiming that selection applies to the process of insubordination, such that not all possible subordinate clauses can be used with ellipsed main clause, and that English only allows insubordination to occur with *if*, not *whether*. It becomes relevant to ask whether there are other languages that allow insubordinated requests with both types; and in fact we find that in Basque, which has distinct constructions for the two types, employing distinct auxiliary forms, both are permitted as insubordinated requests:

(43) a. 39 pezta-ko bi seilu ematen ba-dizkidazu
39 peseta-ADJ two stamp give.IMP SUBOR-AUX
Lit. 'If you give me two 39 peseta stamps.' (condition)

b. Ea 39 pezta-ko bi seilu emango dizkidazu-n.
DUB 39 peseta-ADJ two stamp give.FUT AUX-SUBOR
Lit. 'If you give me two 39 peseta stamps.' (embedded question)
(Alan King, p.c.)

11.3.1.3 *Ellipsed result clauses* Another common source of requests is the omission of main clauses stating a consequence of result, leaving explicit only a reason clause, or more generally a clause giving background. In Kayardild, insubordinated reason clauses—formally, a complementized version of immediate, past, future, or resultative clauses, without any main clause—can be used as hints. The reason is stated, but not the suggested course of action, which is pragmatically obvious.

(44) mala-ntha bala-thurrka kamarr-urrk
sea-COBL hit-IMM.COBL rock-IMM.OBJ.COBL
'(Let's leave here,) because the sea is hitting the rocks now.'

(45) dathin-inja kunawun-inja rabi-jarra-nth rik-urrk,
that-COBL child-COBL get.up-PST-COBL crying-LOC.COBL
rila-thirrin-inj
wake-RES-COBL
'(Someone/you should comfort that child), because it's got up, because it's crying, because it's been woken up.'
(Context: addressing the child's mother in middle of night.)

Kita Sotaro (p.c.) reports that in Japanese insubordinated 'because' clauses can be used in a similar way. An example with at least two quite different interpretations is (46), which includes both request and other interpretations; similar interpretations are available with the structurally parallel but more polite version (47).[24]

(46) Boku wa ik-u kara
I TOP go-PRS because
'Since I am going, [please don't bother / don't worry /etc.].'
'Since I am going, [nobody else has to do it / the problem there will be solved etc.].'

(47) Boku wa iki masu node
I TOP go ADR.HON because
'Since I am going, so . . . [= (46)]'

11.3.1.4 *Free-standing infinitives* The use of free-standing infinitives for requests is extremely widespread. Examples have already been given in Italian (2a) and German (2b); see also the data from Russian discussed by Perlmutter (Chapter 8 above) and from various Daghestanian languages discussed by Kalinina and Sumbatova (Chapter 7 above). In many languages it is confined to written notices and other specialized contexts. But a good example of a language allowing free-standing infinitives in the spoken form is modern Hebrew. David Gil (p.c.) gives the following example of a lifeguard who would continually admonish the bathers (over the megaphone) to move, using an independent infinitive (48a); occasionally, when he felt he wasn't being paid attention, he would elaborate by 'restoring' a matrix sentence (48b); if he still was not obeyed, he would lose his temper and resort to a real imperative, in this particular case employing the colloquial Hebrew option of using the future as an imperative:

[24] Ohori (1995: 210) gives an example of an insubordinated *-kara* clause being used to furnish an excuse for declining an invitation: A: 'Are (you) free today?' B: 'Yes, but because (I')m tired (+ > I can't make it).

(48) a. laʕavor mul hamigdal!
INF.move opposite DEF.tower
'To move in front of the tower!' (i.e. 'Move opposite the watch-tower!')

b. ani mevakeʃ laʕavor mul hamigdal
I request.PRS.M.SG INF.move opposite DEF.tower
'I request (bathers) to move in front of the tower.'

c. taʕavru mul hamigdal!
FUT.2.PL.move opposite DEF.tower
'Move in front of the tower!'

In addition to infinitives, other nonfinite verb forms such as verbal nouns and masdars frequently occur in main clauses in a number of Daghestanian languages (see Kalinina and Sumbatova, Chapter 7 above).

11.3.1.5 *Warnings and admonitions* Another type of interpersonal coercion widely expressed by the use of insubordinated clauses is the warning, admonition, or threat. In many unrelated languages this is expressed by an independent subordinate clause of purpose or negative purpose, spelling out the consequences to be avoided. Many Australian languages, for example, have a special type of subordinate clause, typically labelled 'lest', 'apprehensive', or 'evitative' in grammars, which is used to express undesirable consequences to be avoided by carrying out the main clause action. An example from Diyari has already been given in (15). For Kayardild, (49a) illustrates the subordinate use, while (49b) exemplifies an insubordinated use for giving a warning. See also example (50) from Basque, and (51) from Polish, where negative subjunctive clauses complementized by *żeby* can be used as warnings. Although Polish clauses of this type normally occur insubordinated, it is possible to insert *uważaj* 'look out, pay attention' before them.

(49) a. walmathi karn-da rajurri-n, ba-yii-nyarra
on.top grass-NOM walk-NEG.IMP bite-PASS-APPR
yarbuth-iiwa-nharr!
snake-V.I.ALL-APPR
'Don't walk across the grass, in case you get bitten by a snake.'

b. nyingka ba-yii-nyarra kulkiji-yiwa-nharr
you.NOM bite-PASS-APPR shark-V.I.ALL-APPR
'(Watch out/Do something,) you might get bitten by a shark.'

(50) erori gabe, e!
fall.NON.FIN without INTERJ
Lit. 'Without falling, huh!', i.e. 'Mind your step!' (Alan King, p.c.)
(As spoken, say, by a mother to a small child as they walk along a narrow path or down the garden steps.)

(51) Żeby-ś się tylko nie wywroci-ł-a
in.order.that-you REFL only not fall-PST-F
'Make sure you don't fall! You might fall!'

In most of these languages there is good comparative evidence that the subordinate use is historically prior; in Kayardild, for example, the apprehensive verb form *-NHarra* derives from a verb complementized by the 'having' case, *-marra*. The extension to independent use then probably occurs through omission of the imperative, whose content is usually obvious if one knows the undesirable consequence, and which is in any case a face-threatening act.

Insubordinated if-clauses may also be used as threats and warnings, as in English (52); the use of 'threatening intonation' and frequent presence of such lexical items as 'dare' distinguishes it from the 'if' requests.

(52) If you (dare) touch my car!

11.3.1.6 *Insubordinated requests and politeness* It is appropriate to end this section with some reservations about oversimplifications implicit in the account with which we began it, namely that insubordinated requests are favoured in requests for reasons of politeness by virtue of playing down the explicit interpersonal control made evident in imperatives and other direct commands.

The first problem is that some insubordinated requests actually sound more imperious than commands; an example is the French independent subjunctive.

A second problem is that insubordination may actually remove some markers of politeness; an example of this in Japanese is the ellipsis of *kudasai* 'please', etymologically meaning 'give'. Thus (53a), with a full main clause, is considerably politer than the casual (53b):

(53) a. Are-o mi-te kudasa-i.
that-ACC look-PTCP give-PRS
'Look at that (for me), please.'

b. Are-o mi-te.
that-ACC look-PTCP
'Look at that (for me).'

What seems more likely, then, is that the face-threatening nature of requests and commands places strong pressures on the language system to come up with new variants whose pragmatic force is freed from the history of existing formulas, and that insubordination provides one fertile source for this, but

that the actual pragmatic value of insubordinated clauses need not be more 'polite' than a more direct form.

11.3.2 *Modal insubordination*

Another widespread use of insubordination is to express various kinds of modal meaning, both epistemic—having to do with belief, truth, knowledge about the proposition—and deontic, i.e. 'concerned with action, by others and by the speaker himself' (Palmer 1986: 96) to bring about a state of affairs denoted by the proposition. Although both types of meaning get expressed by insubordinated clauses, there are interesting differences in the source constructions: whereas epistemic insubordination involves 'pure' markers of subordinate status, implicating ellipsed main clauses of reporting, thinking, perceiving, or asserting, deontic insubordination frequently involves complementizers with additional semantic content, such as showing tense/mood relations between clauses.

In this section I also consider the frequent use of insubordinated clauses to express speaker reaction to the proposition, such as astonishment or disapproval, since they frequently display similar formal patterning. As Palmer (1986: 119) puts it: 'if Evaluatives are defined as attitudes towards known facts, they are not strictly modal at all. But they must be briefly considered, because they are sometimes included within, or as semantically closely related to, modal systems.'

Finally, because there are frequently further semantic developments from mood to tense, such as from purposive to future,[25] the use of insubordination to yield new tense markers will also be discussed in this section.

11.3.2.1 *Epistemic and evidential meanings* Probably the commonest type of evidentializing insubordination involves the representation of indirect speech—whether of an identified participant in *style indirect libre*, or simply of unidentified hearsay—by an independent subordinate form. Well-studied European examples are the use in indirect discourse of the accusative subject plus infinitive construction in Latin without overt framing quotative verb (54), or the subjunctive in German or Icelandic (25). As Hall (1964: 220–21) puts it, 'indications of subordination in parataxis can be used, in some languages, throughout long stretches of discourse to indicate their status as quotations or otherwise dependent elements'. He cites, as an example, the following Latin passage with its 'indirect discourse marked by sequences of infinitives in clauses printed as independent sentences'. I give it here as transcribed in the

[25] Or else direct developments to tense marking from the same set of constructions as yield the deontic insubordinated clauses.

Loeb Classical Library edition, and followed by two alternative translations: one from the Loeb edition (by H. J. Edwards), which uses an initial quotative 'he said' followed simply by the use of quotation marks throughout, and one from the Penguin Classics translation (by S. A. Handford) that uses an initial quotative, then no other marks of quotativity at all.

(54) Locutus est pro his Diviciacus Aeduus: Galliae totius
said is by these Diviciacus Aeduan in.Gaul all
factiones esse duas: harum alterius principatum tenere
factions be.INF two of.these one leadership.ACC hold.INF
Aeduos, alterius Arvernos. Hi cum tantopere
Aedui.ACC one Arverni.ACC these when so.much
de potentatu inter se multos annos contenderent,
for political.power among self many years vied
factum esse, uti ab Arvernis Sequanis-que
made.ACC be.INF how by Arverni Sequani-and
Germani mercede arcesserentur
Germans for.pay were.summoned
(Caesar, *de Bello Gallico*, Book I:31, Loeb Classical Library edition)

Edwards translation (p. 47 of Loeb Classical Library edition):
Diviciacus the Aeduan spoke on their behalf. 'In all Gaul,' he said, 'there are two parties; in one of them the Aedui have the primacy, in the other the Arverni. For many years there was a vehement struggle between the two for the dominon; then it came about that the Arverni and the Sequani summoned the Germans to their aid for a price . . .' (Quote continues into following paragraphs, not given here.)

Handford translation (p. 56 of Penguin Classics edition)
Their spokesman was the Aeduan Diviciacus. The Gauls, he said, were divided into two parties, one dominated by the Aedui, the other by the Arverni. After a fierce struggle for supremacy, lasting many years, the Arverni and Sequani hired some German mercenaries to help them.

Similar phenomena, though with different formal markers of subordination, are found in a wide range of languages. In Lithuanian, for example, indirect speech is normally reported with participles (see 13a). However, as an independent sentence, one could say (55), 'without accepting responsibility for the punctual departure of the train, by the use of the participle *išeĩnąs*' (Comrie 1981: 153).

(55) traukinỹs išeĩnąs lýgiai septiñtą vãlandą
train.NOM leave.PRS.PTCP prompt.ADV seventh.ACC hour.ACC
'(It is said that) the train will leave promptly at seven o'clock.'

In Latvian as well (Comrie 1981: 153–4) the active past participle can be used to describe situations whose authenticity is not vouchsafed by the speaker; consequently it is common in fairy tales. See Comrie (1981: 153) for examples. While the participle form is noncommittal with respect to authenticity of the statement, there is a separate form, involving the suffix *-ot*, which is used to express uncertainty about the veracity of a statement, as in (56) as opposed to (57).

(56) Viņš esot bagāts
he.NOM be.PRS.INFER rich.NOM
'he is supposed to be rich'

(57) Viņš ir bagāts
he.NOM be.PRS.3 rich.NOM
'he is rich'

Etymologically, this is a participial ending; like the past participle it can also be used in indirect speech; compared to the quotative use of the past participle it has moved further towards syntactic independence (with its classification as a participle now being etymological rather than synchronic, according to Comrie 1981: 54), and semantically it now expresses uncertainty directly, rather than by implicature from the fact of quotation.

Next door, in Estonian,[26] free-standing clauses with quotative force, in the modus obliquus or 'indirect', as in (58), originated as subordinate clauses embedded under speech act verbs, as in (59), by a process of insubordination similar to those already discussed. See Campbell (1991) for a clear discussion of how this construction evolved, including evidence that the original 'modus obliquus' construction was an Estonian innovation that took place at a stage when the construction was still exclusively subordinate and had not yet been extended to main clauses, and which involved a reinterpretation of participles as finite verbs with a concomitant change in subject case marking from genitive to nominative. Wälchli (2002) contains further discussion in broader Baltic perspective.

(58) Ta tege-vat töö-d
he.NOM do-PRS.INDIR work-PARTV
'They say he is working.' (Campbell 1991: 287)

(59) Sai kuul-da, (et) seal üks mees ela-vat
got hear-INF that there one.NOM man.NOM live-MOD.OBL
'He came to hear/he heard that (they say) a man lives there.'
(Campbell 1991: 287)

[26] Areal influence is obviously a possibility here, though determining the direction of diffusion is problematic—see Campbell (1991), Wälchli (2000), and Dahl and Koptjevskaja-Tamm (2001).

To illustrate a similar development from a totally different part of the world, in Sierra Miwok (Freeland 1951: 87–8), there are two 'narrative tenses', characteristically used in formal narrative when relating whole myths or anecdotes of old days. Although they occur in free-standing clauses, they have a number of formal features in common with subordinate constructions, lacking the pronominal subject suffix characteristic of normal main clauses. Freeland (1951: 87) comments: 'The narrative mode is obviously simply an extension in use of the subordinate mode... and illustrates the Miwok tendency to use as independent verbs, forms originally subordinate in character.' Presumably this originated as embedding under a main clause speech act verb, something like 'the old people said', although Freeland does not go into details on the exact mechanism.

Another manifestation of 'evidentializing' insubordination may involve the extension of logophoric pronouns to independent clause use. The canonical use of logophoric pronouns is in subordinate clauses embedded under matrix verbs of communication, thought, psychological state, or perception,[27] to indicate coreference between a subordinate clause argument and the 'epistemic source' of the main clause (the sayer, knower, etc.). (60a) and (60b) contrast the use of logophoric and non-logophoric pronouns in Ewe subordinate clauses.

(60) a. Kofi be yè-dzo
Kofi say LOG-leave
'Kofi$_i$ said that he$_i$ left.'

b. Kofi be e-dzo
Kofi say 3-leave
'Kofi$_i$ said that (s)he$_j$ left.'

Now in some languages with logophoric pronouns it is possible to use them in main clauses to show 'represented speech' or 'style indirect libre' (Coulmas 1986: 7). In Tuburi, for example (Hagège 1974), logophoric pronouns may continue to be used at a great distance from the original locutionary verb that introduced them. Hagège (p. 298) cites an example in which an account of the origins of a clan, which began with the locutionary clause 'my elders taught me that...', continues to use logophoric pronouns thirty minutes into the text, as exemplified below. Here the logophoric acts as a sort of spoken inverted commas:

[27] This list represents an implicational hierarchy, with types to the left more likely to trigger logophoric contexts (Stirling 1993: 259).

(61) sā:rā dús sō
LOG disperse then
'Then they dispersed.'

In fact, logophoric pronouns in Tuburi need not be introduced by a main clause locutionary verb at all. They may be used to indicate point of view, or to dissociate the speaker from the proposition (p. 300), in other words, they may have quotative evidential force.

In the case of such independent clause use of logophorics the historical arguments for regarding this as insubordination are weaker than with, say, participles, since we cannot be sure there was ever a stage where they were uniquely associated with subordinate clauses. It is equally possible that the constraint on their use has always been semantic (they can occur in utterances framed as thought or quotation), and that their statistical association with subordinate constructions is an epiphenomenon of the fact that these are the commonest grammatical contexts for such framing. We will not be able to answer this question until we have a better understanding of the historical syntax of logophorics.

Long-distance reflexives present a similar picture to logophorics. Typically found in subordinate clauses, they may also occur in insubordinated clauses, again typically accompanied by an independent subjunctive, and again, the semantic effect is to express represented speech or viewpoint. An Icelandic example using the long-distance reflexive *sig*, construed as coreferential with an ellipsed 'thought' verb, was exemplified in (10) above. Sigurðsson (1986) cites such examples as evidence against a specifically syntactic account of Long Distance Reflexives in Icelandic, since they need have no syntactic antecedent. Such LDRs are, he argues, interpreted semantically as referring to the 'story-experiencing self' in *style indirect libre*, the *erlebte Rede* or 'represented speech and thought'. With their direct and conventionalized semantic interpretation of formally subordinate clauses, these represent a further possible case of insubordination. As far as the Long Distance Reflexives are concerned, there are the same caveats on whether they do in fact originate as subordinate constructions; but in this case they additionally involve independent uses of subjunctives, for which a subordinate clause origin is usually assumed.[28]

A semantically comparable case, but where the evidence for subordinate origins is much stronger due to the proliferation of overtly subordinating morphology in the form of 'complementizing case' suffixes distributed over

[28] For further examples and discussion see Maling (1984: n. 27) on Icelandic and Kameyama (1984: 235) on Japanese.

all words in the clause is Kayardild (Evans 1995a). Here, insubordinated complementized clauses (enclosed in square brackets in the examples below) may, for certain combinations of tense and person, carry various kinds of evidential force:

- direct perception in the case of clauses that are 'immediate' (62), involve non-verbal predicates (63) or present-tense negatives that are formally nominalizations bearing the privative (64);
- inference from observed facts in the case of past clauses (65);
- prediction based on knowledge in the case of future clauses (66).

(62) [dan-kurrka ri-in-kurrka dali-jurrka bududu-nth]
here-LOC.COBL east-from-LOC.COBL come-IMMED.COBL boat-COBL
'(I can hear/see) the boat coming from the east.'
(Context: a group of people waiting on a beach, watching and listening for a boat.)

(63) [dan-kurrka marrkathu-nth]
here-LOC.COBL aunt-COBL
'Here's aunty. (I can see/hear her coming).'

(64) [kajakaja-ntha dali-n-marri-nja-d]
daddy-COBL come-NMLZ-PRIV-COBL-yet
'(I see that/it seems that) daddy hasn't arrived yet.'
(Context: speaker is returning disappointed from the airstrip, where he had hoped to meet the hearer's father.)

(65) [thabuju-ntha warra-jarra-nth]
big.brother-COBL go-PST-COBL
'(There's no one here,) because big brother has gone.'
(Context implies: there's no one here, so big brother must have gone.)

(66) [banga-ntha bijarrba-ntha balung-kuu-ntha thula-thuu-nth]
turtle-COBL dugong-COBL westward-MPROP-COBL descend-POT-COBL
'(I know that) the turtle and dugong will go down to the west.'
(Context: speaker has seen the 'spouts' where they have broken the surface en route.)

The source of knowledge could in each case be made explicit by restoring the ellipsed main predicate, e.g. *ngada kurrij / ngada marrij* 'I see / I hear' in the case of (62) and (63). The restored predicates would in each case govern a clause of the appropriate form. Note the parallel with the skewing in interpretation of English *see/hear* between *I (can) see/hear the boat coming*, with a

true perception-verb interpretation, vs. *I hear/see that the boat has come* and *I heard / saw / could hear / could see that the boat had come*, in which the basis of knowledge may be more indirect, for example resulting from hearsay or inference.

We now turn to the question of why insubordinated clauses should be used for this range of functions, rather than simple clauses on the one hand or explicitly biclausal constructions ('I think that X', 'It seems to be the case that X', etc.) on the other. I shall begin by considering the very insightful account by Schlobinsky (n.d.) of independent *daß* clauses in German client-centred therapeutic discourse. Then I shall extend the discussion to a more general level, and show why there are good pragmatic reasons, not limited to the specialized domain of client-centred therapy, why insubordinated clauses should be used in this way.

In German client-centred therapeutic discourse, therapists regularly follow turns by the client with insubordinated *daß* clauses which restate, suggest interpretations of, or clarify material in the client's turn. Such insubordinated *daß* clauses are associated with a weakly rising intonation, which has the effect of passing back the turn to the client for further restatement. For example:

(67) Client: Ich glaub, also, ich geb erstmal klein bei, um (.) wenn ich jetzt nochmal was dagegen sage, kann ich mir einfach nicht erlauben, dann wird er wieder laut. Also muß ich schon mal klein beigeben.
I think I pull in my horns at first, inorder (.) if I say something against that again, I just can't allow myself to do that, then he'll start yelling. That's why I have to pull in my horns a bit.

Therapist: Daß Sie doch jetzt das Gefühl haben, sich ducken zu müssen.
That you already have the feeling now you have to knuckle under. (Schlobinsky n.d.)

In Rogerian therapeutic discourse, insubordinated *daß* clauses are always connected to a client's utterance, forming the second pair-part of an adjacency pair. The most significant thing about these clauses, from both a semantic and sociolinguistic point of view, is that they are unspecified with regard to facticity: 'the attitude of the speaker remains unspecified because of the absence of the modal operator' (p. 12). The epistemic status of the proposition can only be interpreted through context, which may allow the speaker's attitudes to be recovered inferentially.

Schlobinsky proposes the following functional reason why, in the context of client-centred therapy, insubordinated *daß* clauses are preferable to more explicit constructions with an overt main clause with an epistemic verb:

> One could also imagine an utterance like 'I think you are trying to play that down a bit.' Here however the therapist would raise himself qua SubjectAgent to the discourse agent, and lessen the focus on the client. His utterance would therefore be more directive. By deleting the attitude operator in the superordinate clause the therapist takes his role back and takes the role of the client or reflects her conversational work without attributing a specific attitude to the client such as 'you believe, are convinced, that p . . .' It is exactly here that the two-party monologue is continued. As opposed to an utterance like 'you have the feeling . . .' the *daß* clause is unspecified with regard to facticity and thus allows the client to personally evaluate the proposition. The client is forced to take a position on the part of discourse in focus. (Schlobinsky n.d.: 17)

Schlobinsky thus stresses the specific social features of client-centred therapy as a reason for favouring the independent *daß* clause construction, in particular the non-directiveness of the therapist and the method of arriving at an analysis by joint focusing. But in fact similar characterizations could be made of normal conversation in many small-scale societies, such as Australian Aboriginal societies, in which conversation is normatively non-directive and epistemic statements are arrived at by negotiation of essentially equal conversational participants rather than clear assertion by a more knowledgeable person.

11.3.2.2 *Deontic meanings* A number of languages use insubordinated clauses to express various deontic meanings. In Latin, Italian, French, etc., the independent subjunctive can have a hortative meaning, while in several Baltic languages necessity is expressed by 'debitive' verbal nouns or infinitives (see Wälchli 2000 for a survey of the Baltic data).

An Italian example of the use of an independent subjunctive with hortative meaning is:

(68) Si aggiunga poi che l'uomo è pedante
3REFL add.SBJV.3SG then that DEF.man is pedant
'And then may it be added that the man is a pedant.'
(M. Bontempelli, cited in Moretti and Orvieto 1979)

An explanation of how independent subjunctives acquire hortative meanings is offered in a discussion of Icelandic by Sigurðsson. Here the preterite subjunctive is sometimes insubordinated, particularly with auxiliaries like 'want', 'may', 'have to', 'can', and 'need'. An example is:

(69) Jón θyrfti að fara heim
John had.SBJV.3SG to go home
'John should (/would need to) go home.' (Sigurðsson 1986: 21)

According to Sigurðsson,

> main clause subjunctives reflect the speaker's feelings, opinions, etc.: the speaker feels that John should go home and uses the preterite subjunctive to express this (epistemic modality) . . . The speaker claims [the indicative equivalent] to be true in our (past) world, whereas he claims [69] to be true in the 'world' of his own feelings, opinions, desires, etc. (Sigurðsson 1986: 22).

In Dyirbal 'implicated clauses' are basically subordinate and derive historically (in the *y*-conjugation at least)[29] from the addition of a complementizing purposive case marker *-gu* to the verb (this is cognate with the Yankunytjatjara purposive *-ku* exemplified in 38). Normally they indicate that the subordinate clause is a consequence of the main clause, as in:

(70) balan ɖugumbil baŋgul yaṛa-ŋgu balga-n, baɖi-gu
DEM.II.ACC woman.ACC DEM.I.ERG man-ERG hit-NP fall-IMPL
'Man hits woman, causing her to fall down.' (Dixon 1972: 68)

However, implicated clauses may also be used independently with the meaning 'must' or 'has to', as in the following examples:

(71) balan ɖugumbil miyanda-ygu
DEM.II.NOM woman.NOM laugh-IMP
'The woman wants to laugh (i.e. something has happened to make her want to laugh, and she will have to restrain herself to avoid doing so).' (Dixon 1972: 69)

(72) bayi yaṛa yanuli
DEM.I.NOM man.NOM go.IMP
'The man has to go out (for some reason).'

Dixon offers a plausible explanation for the development of subordinate implicated clauses to insubordinated deontic clauses: the obligation arises from a causal (or 'implicating') connection between an earlier, unreported event and the obligatory event. In other words, insubordination allows the causal relationship expressible by interclausal morphosyntax to be harnessed for the expression of the causal element present in all deontics of obligation.

[29] Dyirbal has two conjugations, *y* and *l*. The origin of the *l*-conjugation form *-li* is obscure, though with apparent cognates in Ngiyambaa (see below).

Another Australian language, Ngiyambaa (Donaldson 1980), uses the same form in subordinate clauses of purpose (73) and as a deontic, usually translated 'must' (74) or 'has got to' (75), in main clauses. Although Donaldson does not analyse the main clauses as derived by ellipsis from the purposive construction, the fact that this is the only main clause inflection also serving in nonfinite subordinate clauses suggests that the main clause construction originates from an insubordinated clause, with a similar semantic development to Dyirbal. Interestingly, verbs in the *-l-* conjugation have the same form, *-li*, as implicated verbs in the Dyirbal *-l-* conjugation, suggesting a form of some antiquity given that the two languages are not closely related.

(73) ŋadhu-na ŋiyiyi / girma-l-i ŋinu:
1SG.NOM-3ABS say.PST wake-CM-PURP you.OBL
'I told her to wake you.' (Donaldson 1980: 280)

(74) ŋadhu bawuŋ-ga yuwa-giri
1SG.NOM middle-LOC lie-PURP
'I must lie in the middle.' (Donaldson 1980:162)

(75) bura:-dhu dhiŋga: dha-l-i
child-ERG meat.ABS eat-CM-PURP
'The child has got to eat meat.' (Donaldson 1980: 162)

11.3.2.3 *Exclamation and evaluation* Insubordinated *that* clauses in English, *daß* clauses in German, and subjunctives in Italian can be used to express evaluation, with reconstructable main clause predicates such as 'I am amazed', 'I am shocked', or 'I would not have expected'. Quirk et al. (1985: 841) comment in this regard on 'the omission of the matrix clause . . . being mimetic of speechless amazement'. For further discussion and data in this volume, see also the discussion of nonfinite exclamative clauses in Bagwalal and Dargwa in the chapter by Kalinina and Sumbatova (Chapter 7 above).

Examples for English (76) are from Quirk et al. (1985)—who do not, however, supply reconstructions of the ellipsed material—and for German (77), from Buscha (1976).

(76) a. [I'm amazed and shocked] That he should have left without asking me!
b. That I should live to see such ingratitude!

(77) a. [Ich wundere mich,] Daß du immer noch Witze
I am.amazed REFL that you still still jokes
mach-en kann-st!
make-INF can-2SG
'[I am amazed] that you can still make jokes (about it).'

b. Daß ich dich hier treff-en würde! [, habe ich nicht
that I you here meet-INF would.SBJV have I not
erwartet]
expected
'[I didn't expect] that I would meet you here!'

Similar constructions using a range of wh-questions with subordinate word order also exist in both languages (78, 79); both examples in (78) were heard from speakers of Australian English in Melbourne, January 1996. Buscha (1976) and Weuster (1983) discuss comparable examples in German in some detail (they are not discussed in Quirk et al.). The reconstructable ellipses are basically comparable in both languages, and express astonishment or surprise, with either 1st person or indefinite 3rd person subjects: 'I'm amazed at [how...]', 'I don't understand [how...]', 'No one understands [why...]'. Frequently exclamative intonation is also used.

(78) a. [I don't understand] How they can bet on a bloody dog like that!
b. [Can anyone tell me] Why they don't schedule the under 11s first!

(79) a. [Ich wundere mich,] Wie du das nur mach-st?
I am.amazed REFL how you that only do-2SG
'[I'm amazed at] how on earth you can do that?' (Buscha 1976)

b. [Niemand begreif-t,] Warum du wohl nie zu Potte
no.one understand-3SG why you well never to potty
komm-st
come-2SG
'[No one understands] why you can never get going.'
(Weuster 1983: 56)

A third type of insubordinated clause, employing a main clause infinitive, can be used to express surprise in English (80):

(80) a. To think that she should be so ruthless! (Quirk et al. 1985)
b. To think that I was once a millionaire! (Quirk et al. 1985)

Quirk et al. (p. 841) argue that '[t]he implied subject in such sentences is the first person pronoun', although they later broaden this to include indefinite subjects in their analysis of the reconstructed material as 'It surprises me to think...' or 'It surprises one to think...'. The tendency of ellipsed subjects to be construed as 1st person will be returned to in section 11.4.2.

A further nonfinite structure used in English, Spanish, and other languages to express hypothetical events (often then repudiated in a further sentence)

was illustrated in example (1), and originally discussed for English by Akmajian (1984). See Etxepare and Grohmann (2005) for discussion of their meaning and syntactic properties.

11.3.2.4 *New tense categories through deictic recentring* Given the cross-linguistic tendency for obligation to develop into future tense, it is not surprising that there should be constructions which develop from (subordinate) purpose clause to (insubordinated) deontics with meanings of obligation or intention and on to (insubordinated) markers of futurity. Blake (1976: 422–3) discusses the development of purposive case markers in Australian languages to complementizers on purpose clauses to markers of desiderative and on to future in some languages; the dative/purpose case suffix *-ku* in Australian languages of the Pama-Nyungan family is a well-known example, and has been exemplified with purpose-complement and permissive uses above for Dyirbal and Yankunytjatjara, but in some other languages it occurs as a future marker, as with the Pitjantjatjara dialect of the Western Dialect language (Blake 1976: 422).

(81) minyma yula-ku
woman cry-FUT(*-DAT)
'The woman will/may cry.'

A comparable but independent series of developments has occurred with the suffix *-kur(l)u* in another Australian family, Tangkic. Basically a proprietive case suffix marking 'having', it is used in all Tangkic languages to mark intentional goals, e.g. 'look for kangaroo-PROP', i.e. 'look for, having a kangaroo (in mind)'. In all modern Tangkic languages and therefore almost certainly in proto-Tangkic it can also be used for purpose clauses, being added both to the verb stem[30] and its non-subject arguments. The following example is from Yukulta, which appears to preserve the proto-Tangkic structure in all essential respects:

(82) wanji-ja-kadi [marliyan-kurlu bala-th-urlu]$_{PROP}$
go·up-IND-PRS.1SG possum-PROP hit-THM-PROP
'I'm climbing up to hit that possum.'

In addition to this original complementizing use of the proprietive, Kayardild and Lardil have evolved an independent, insubordinated use. The carrying of complementizing case marking on NPs into main clause constructions has given rise to the strange phenomenon of 'modal case', by which non-subject

[30] i.e. the root plus the conjugational 'thematic'; it is possible this stem functioned as a participle-type base.

NPs take case-type suffixes encoding mood and tense choices (see Dench and Evans 1988; Evans 1995a; 1995b).

In Kayardild, whose verbal semantics are known in most detail, and where the gloss 'potential' is used for this inflection, the insubordinated use has a wide semantic range that includes future, prescription, desire, and ability, as attested by (83). *-thu* and *-wu* are the Kayardild equivalents of Yukulta *-th-urlu* and (in another declension) *-kurlu* (see Evans 1995a).

(83) dathin-a dangka-a bala-thu bijarrba-wu
that-NOM man-NOM hit-POT dugong-MPROP
'That man will/must/wants to/can hit the dugong.'

The development to future is likely to have been the endpoint of a shift that began, at the time insubordination occurred, with a shift from relative to absolute 'intentional' meanings, i.e. from 'at the time of the main clause, X intended to do Y' to 'now X intends to do Y'; this was followed with a semantic extension from intention to futurity.

The developments just described clearly involve modality evolving from the semantics of the case marking complementizer, and are comparable to the evolution of various deontic modal categories from insubordinated purposives, already described in section 11.3.2.2. But in parallel to this development, Kayardild and Lardil applied similar processes of insubordination to other subordinate clauses using complementizing case markers to show relative tense; in the process new categories of absolute tense evolved, as 'immediate present' evolved from 'simultaneous' subordinate clauses marked with a complementizing locative, and 'past' evolved from 'prior' subordinate clauses marked with a complementizing ablative.

For example, 'prior' subordinate clauses are found in Yukulta. They are marked by an ablative case on non-subject NPs in the subordinate clause, and a special 'prior' form of the verb, *-jarrba/-tharrba*, which is etymologically analysable into conjugational thematic *th/j* plus the consequential case suffix *-(ng)arrba*, closely linked semantically to the ablative. Comparative evidence suggests the subordinate clause construction in proto-Tangkic allowed NPs to take either the ablative or the consequential case, but that Yukulta has eliminated the second possibility. Such 'prior' subordinate clauses express events that began before the main clause; they may overlap, as in the case of (84), or precede it entirely (see Keen 1972; 1983 for examples).

(84) kurri-ja-nganta [kabaj-inaba jawi-jarrba]
see-IND-1SG.A.PST sand-ABL run-PRIOR
'I saw you running on the sand.'

Kayardild and Lardil still allow the subordinate clause use, but have additionally extended such clauses to main clause use through insubordination. In both languages, the resultant clause type serves as a marked way of describing past events (the unmarked way is to use the 'actual' verb inflection which does not distinguish past from present); an example is (85). Non-subject NPs bear the 'modal ablative' case (in Kayardild), and the past verb inflection is a reduced form of *-jarrba/-tharrba*: [31]

(85) ngada yakuri-na jungarrba-na raa-jarr
1SG.NOM fish-MABL big-MABL spear-PST
'I speared a big fish.'

Insubordination, in this case, has led to a recentring of the relationship of temporal priority. Instead of holding between the main clause and the subordinate clause, it now holds between the speech act and the insubordinated clause. Comparable deictic recentring has applied to the old simultaneous clause construction, whose insubordinated reflex in Kayardild has an 'immediate present' reading. These changes form part of a suite of insubordinations that have given rise to the majority of tense/mood inflections in Kayardild and Lardil, with their unusual patterning of marking tense/mood both on the verbal inflection and on non-subject NPs through the device of 'modal case'.

The changes described above have run to completion in the sense that the resultant clauses have no synchronic formal reason to be described as subordinate in Kayardild or Tangkic—in fact, as a result of the prevalence of this method for recruiting new tense/mood categories, they are now the canonical main clause type (see Evans 1995a: ch. 10 for details).

In addition to this 'first round', however, there is a second round of insubordination still taking place in Kayardild, and producing a new 'relevant present' construction. This construction is used for a present situation, usually newly arisen, that motivates the speaker's comment (86) or curiosity (87); informants always translate these clauses with 'now'.

(86) [dathin-inja dangka-ntha natha-wurrk]
that-COBL man-COBL camp-LOC.COBL
'That man is married now (i.e. sleeps in his own camp, with his new wife).'

[31] As with the proprietive, processes of final truncation make the correspondence with the Yukulta forms less than perfect, but the forms found in phonologically protected environments, i.e. before further case suffixes, show the cognation more clearly. For example the Kayardild proprietive, normally *ku* or *wu*, becomes *kuru* or *wuru* before an outer locative case (and the descent of proto-Tangkic *rl* as *r* in Kayardild is regular); similarly the ablative, normally *-(k)ina* in Kayardild, becomes *-(k)inaba* before a following locative case suffix. See Evans (1995a) for details.

(87) A: [jina-wurrka ngakin-maan-inj?]
where-LOC.COBL our-begetter-COBL
B: [riya-thi-wurrka ngakin-maan-inj]
east-REM-LOC.COBL our-begetter-COBL
A: 'Where's our dad now?' B: 'Our dad's way over in the east now.'

Such clauses clearly pattern formally as subordinate clauses. In terms of their morphosyntax they are identical to the 'complementized clauses' whose various other functions have been described above in section 11.3.2.1: they bear a complementizing case (oblique or locative according to the person of the clause's subject) outside all other inflections, and their subjects, if pronominal, have special forms for the complementizing oblique. In terms of their semantics, it is most likely that they have developed from the 'perceptual complement' clauses discussed in section 11.3.2.1—from '(I see/hear) X happening now' to 'X [is] happening now' as the matrix perception predicate underwent ellipsis—but the link to present experience and relevance remained.

Unlike most of the functional types of insubordination described above, which have independent attestation in a range of language families, the use of insubordination to recruit new tense categories is largely limited to the Tangkic group; it may have arisen as a response to the paucity of tense/mood categories in the proto-language (McConvell 1981). However, there are occasional parallels from other languages.[32]

In Dyirbal (Dixon 1972: 104), dependent relative clauses in *-ŋu-* (which is probably related to an ablative formative *-ŋu-* widespread in Pama-Nyungan) have a perfective reading. As subordinate relatives, ongoing or completive interpretations are allowed:

(88) baŋgu yugu-ŋgu [gunba-ŋu-ru baŋgul
DEM.ERG.IV tree-ERG cut-REL-ERG DEM.ERG.IV
yaɽa-ŋgu] ŋayguna biriḏu balga-n
man-ERG 1SG.ACC nearly hit-PRS/PST
'The tree which the man cut nearly fell on me.'

(89) ŋaḏa [balan ḏugumbil ɲina-ŋu] buɽa-n
1SG.NOM DEM.ABS.II woman.ABS sit-REL see-PRS/PST
'I am watching the woman who is sitting down.'

[32] For another Australian example, see Dench (forthcoming), who discusses the development, in Nyamal, of an original dative-marked nominalized construction into a narrative present, via independent purposive, to a use to describe culmination points in sequential narratives ('narrative prospective'), to narrative present more generally, to standard present.

But they may be also used as main clauses, in which case only the completive interpretation is allowed:

(90) ŋaɖa babil-ŋa-ŋu ba-gu-m miraɲ-gu
1SG.NOM scrape-ANTIPASS-REL DEM-DAT-III black.bean-DAT
'I've scraped the beans.'

There are many languages around the world where perfect or perfective-type constructions, which originated as copula plus completive or resultative participle, lose the copula through time so that the synchronic past perfective is etymologically a participle of some type. The perfective in most Slavic languages has arisen in this way; in section 11.2.7 we excluded these from being considered 'insubordination' because they have a biclausal (or at least biverbal) origin. Functionally, however, the Dyirbal and Kayardild examples discussed above may be very similar, except that the lack of a copula in their previous language states meant that participles and nominalizations of various types could serve directly as a nonfinite predicate, without needing an auxiliary verb.

A non-Australian example of nominalized / gerundive forms developing an incipient independent use in a way that is reminiscent of Dyirbal and Kayardild is in the South Semitic language Tigrinya. Here what Leslau (1941: 85) calls the 'gerundive' (*gérondif*),[33] which can be used in subordinate clauses to express simultaneity or anteriority with respect to the main clause, may also be used independently to express a resultant state. Although Leslau's description actually cites the independent use first, other authors emphasize that the dependent use is primary. Kogan (1997: 439) states:

> Used independently, the gerund denotes the result of an action in the past (mostly from verbs with stative meaning) . . . In most cases, however, the gerund is found followed by another verb in the perfect or imperfect and denotes an action simultaneous or anterior to this one [the action expressed by the main verb].

It is also possible to use the gerund independently in the closely related Amharic:

[33] In discussing the historical origins of the gerund, in turn, Leslau proposes (1995: 356), for the closely related Amharic, that a form like *säbr-o* 'having broken.3M', derives 'through a process such as 'his breaking' > 'he breaking' > 'he having broken' '. This elaborates the earlier position taken by Cohen, who asserted for Amharic: 'Le gérondif, ancien nom verbal conjugué au moyen des pronoms régimes de nom, ne sert normalement, lorsqu'il est seul, qu'à constituer des sortes de propositions subordonnées incidentes' (Cohen 1936: 181).

At times the gerund stands alone at the end of the sentence without a principal verb. It then behaves like a finite verb. This usage of the gerund occurs when it refers to, or is a continuation of, a thought expressed in the preceding statement, or in answer to a question. The gerund is then uttered with a rising-falling tone on the last syllable. (Leslau 1995: 363)

For example, in replying to the question *käbbädä yät allä* [Kebbede where exist.3M.PFV] 'where is Kebbede?', a possible reply is the 3rd masculine gerundive form *hed-o*, lit. 'his having gone', but translatable in this context as 'Why, he has already left.' Given the availability of ample textual material in the liturgical language Ge'ez, ancestral to both Amharic and Tigrinya, a diachronic study of how this construction developed would be fascinating, but as far as I know has yet to be carried out: Leslau (1999: 81) writes: 'The details on the gerund in the various Ethiopian languages still await a thorough investigation.'

11.3.3 *Signalling presupposed material*

A third function of insubordinated clauses is to signal high levels of presupposed material in the insubordinated proposition, i.e. signalling relatively specific presuppositions about the discourse context in which the sentence can occur (see also Chapter 7 above by Kalinina and Sumbatova for a discussion of the impact of high presuppositionality in the use of nonfinite forms in Daghestanian main clauses). Specific examples of this use of insubordination are (a) negation, (b) focus constructions, (c) discourse contrast, (d) stipulated conditions before assenting to preceding assertions in interaction, (e) reiterations, (f) disagreement with assertions by the previous speaker. I shall discuss each in turn below.

11.3.3.1 *Negation* Givón (1979: 107) has observed that 'negative assertions are used in language in contexts where the corresponding affirmative has been mentioned, deemed likely, or where the speaker assumes that the hearer—erroneously—holds to a belief in the truth of that affirmative.' Leech (1983: 298–9) makes a similar point in terms of implicature from negatives to positives: 'If X is a negative proposition, and if F is the most communicatively significant feature within the "scope of negation" in X and if Y is a proposition identical to X except that it is positive and does not contain F, then X implicates Y.' We shall see below that many languages display formal similarities between negatives and subordinate forms, and will account for this by proposing that such negatives were originally subordinated to main clauses bearing the main assertion.

Kroskrity (1984) proposes this line of analysis for Arizona Tewa (Tanoan, Kiowa-Tanoan).[34] In this language negative verbs combine a prefix *we-* with a suffix *-dí* which is formally a subordinator. Compare (92), which exemplifies a subordinate adverbial clause, with (93), a simple negative clause:

(91) he'i se na-mɛn-dí 'o-yohk'ó
that man 3.STAT-go-SUBOR 1.STAT-be.asleep
'When that man went, I was asleep.' (Kroskrity 1984)

(92) sen kwiyó we-mán-mun-dí
man woman NEG1-3>3.ACTIVE-see-NEG.2
'The man did not see the woman.'

It is important to note that in Arizona Tewa there is no grammatical means for indicating the scope of the negation within the clause itself, unlike in the Isletan Tiwa dialect, where different negation scopes are shown by different placements of the negative affix (Leap 1975; Kroskrity 1984).[35] Instead it simply conjoins, as a main clause, an assertion which implicates the scope of the negative. Examples (93–5) below exemplify the use of this construction to negate subject/agent, object and predicate respectively. Note that the reanalysis of *-dí* as a negative suffix means that, in modern Tiwa, it must be followed by a homophonous doublet acting as a subordinator.

(93) Kada we-mán-mun-dí-dí dó-mun
Kada NEG-3/3ACTIVE-see-NEG-SUBOR 1/3.ACTIVE-see
'Kada did not see her/him/it, I did.'

(94) sɛ'éwe we-dó-ku:p'e-wan-dí-dí t'ummele
pottery NEG-1/3ACTIVE-sell-COMPL-NEG-SUBOR plaque
dó-ku:p'e-wan
1/3ACTIVE-sell-COMPL
'I didn't sell pottery, I sold a (wicker) plaque.'

(95) he'i kwiyó sen we-mán-he:-'an-dí-dí
that woman man NEG-3/3ACTIVE-sick-COMPL-NEG-SUBOR
mán-hey
3/3ACTIVE-kill
'That woman didn't make the man sick, she killed him.'

Kroskrity proposes that, at an earlier phase of the language, negatives were typically biclausal structures with the following structural analysis:

[34] Kroskrity imputes this to Uto-Aztecan, following Whorf and Trager (1937), but recent classifications do not support this lumping and consider it part of Kiowa-Tanoan (Campbell 1997: 138–9). I thank Marianne Mithun for this information.

[35] Kroskrity argues that the availability of positional options is an Isletan innovation.

(96)



The *-dí* subordinator, through association with negation, was probably reanalysed as a negative suffix. A further reanalysis saw 'elliptical negatives' (the negative S plus subordinator but without any following affirmative S) reanalysed as simple negatives through insubordination, and the *-dí* reanalysed as a negative rather than a subordinate marker. Once this reanalysis had taken place, overtly subordinated clauses then needed to be marked by a second *-dí*, as exemplified in (93–5).

Kroskrity cites a number of other languages in which negatives are morphologically associated with subordinate clauses. In the Numic language Kawaiisu (Munro 1976: 308), part of the Numic branch of Uto-Aztecan (Campbell 1997: 134), negatives differ from affirmatives in three ways: by an overt negative marker, by assigning object case to their subject, and by employing 'series II' verb endings, characteristic of embedded or nominalized clauses. An example is:

(97) ta'nipazi-a yuwaatɨ pikee-keene-neena momo'o-na
man-O NEG see-PST.SERIES.II-3ANIM>3ANIM woman-O
'The man didn't see the woman.'

In Western Mono (Bethel et al., n.d.), another Numic language within Uto-Aztecan (Campbell 1997: 134), negative imperatives take a subordinating suffix on the verb.

A number of Australian languages display similar correlations. In the Warburton Ranges dialect of Western Desert (Douglas 1964: 53), negatives usually juxtapose a positive verb bearing tense/mood/aspect with a negated nominalized verb. (98) and (99) illustrate negative imperatives; (100) a negative indicative.

(98) wangka-ntja-maal-pa kanmara-ri-ø!
talk-NMLZ-NEG-NOM quiet-INCH-IMP
'Don't talk, be quiet! ' (Lit. 'Not talking, be quiet.')

(99) tjarpatju-nkutja-maal-tu yila-la!
insert-NMLZ-NEG-ERG pull-IMP
'Don't insert it, pull it!'

(100) ngayulu wangka-ntja-maal-pa kanmara-ri-ngu
I talk-NMLZ-NEG-NOM quiet-INCH-PST.COMPL
'I didn't talk, but became quiet.'

In some related dialects all negative verb forms are historically nominalizations suffixed with the privative ('without') case; it is no longer necessary to conjoin an affirmative. In the Yankunytjatjara dialect, negation simply involves privativized nominalization:

(101) katja-lu wangka ngayi-nya kuli-ntja wiya
son-ERG talk.ACC me-ACC listen-NMLZ not
'(My) son doesn't heed my words.'

Similar historical processes may be assumed to have applied in other languages, such as Kaytetye (not closely related to Western Desert), where negative forms of the verb employ a privative nominalized form:

(102) ape-nge-wanenye
go-NMLZ-PRIV
'not go' (Lit. 'without going')

It seems likely that in all these languages the use of insubordinated verb forms in negative clauses arose in the way outlined by Kroskrity. At first subordinate negative verbs were conjoined with main clause affirmatives; then the affirmatives were ellipsed; then the originally elliptical negative was reanalysed as a free-standing main clause, and the subordinating morphology was reanalysed as negative morphology. The synchronic result is that one type of main clause, high in presuppositionality, shows morphological affinities with subordinate clauses.

11.3.3.2 *Contrastive focus constructions* Negative clauses presuppose the existence of some affirmative clause which is being disconfirmed by the negative. Contrastive focus[36] clauses are high in presuppositionality for another reason: they presuppose a clause which is similar, but predicated of another referent. For example, the relative clause *It's John who I saw* presupposes the relevance of a clause asserting that I saw someone other than John.[37] Many languages develop focus clauses from subordinate clauses

[36] The term 'focus' is plagued with many interpretations in linguistics; here it is being used solely in the sense of 'contrastive focus'.

[37] See Schachter (1973) on formal relations between focus and relativization.

by a route something like the English cleft, without the initial presentative: 'John SUB I saw.'

An example of a language using subordinate forms for marked focus constructions is the Australian language Ngandi (Heath 1985). Like many Australian languages, Ngandi has a single generalized subordinate clause type, marked formally by the prefix *ga-* inside the verbal word. Typically 'a simple subordinated *-ga-* clause functions to provide background for the juxtaposed (usually directly following) matrix clause' (p. 98). This meshes with a leisurely discourse style in which each previous clause is reiterated as background to the next, as in:

(103) gu-wolo-yuŋ bulkuy ɲar-uḏu-ni ɲar-ga-ṛuḏu-ni
GU.class-that-ABS indeed 1PL.EXC-go-PRS 1PL.EXC-SUB-go-PRS
ɲar-waṇʔḏu-ni
1PL.EXC-look-PRS
'... then indeed we go along; going along, we take a look ...'

Alongside this genuine subordinate use, we find formally subordinate verbs in *-ga-* also used for what Heath calls 'focus constructions', in which 'a constituent other than the verb is highlighted as clause focus'. These may be translated into English by inversion constructions (104), passives (105), or cleft constructions (106). From a discourse perspective, what is important is that the non-focused sections are presupposed, but the connection of the focus with the non-focused part is newly asserted.

(104) gu-ḏawal-gic ŋa-ga-ṛuḏu-ŋi
GU.class-country-ALL 1SG-SUB-go-PST.CONT
'I went to the country', 'To the country I went.'

(105) gu-mulmu ṇigu-ga-ṛa-ŋi ṇi-ḍeremu-ṯu
GU.class-grass 3M.SG.GU-SUBOR-see-PST.CONT M.SG-MAN-ERG
'The man saw the grass', 'The grass was seen by the man.'

(106) Q: ba-ɲja ba-ga-ṛuḏu-ŋi
PL-who 3PL-SUB-go-PST.CONT
A: ṇi-ḍeremu ṇi-ga-ṛuḏu-ŋi
M.SG-man 3M.SG-SUB-go-PST.CONT
Q: 'Who went? A: 'The man went / It was the man who went.'

It seems likely that constructions like these have evolved via a cleft-type construction in which a NP was presented simply by mentioning it (i.e. with no overt presentative), and followed by a relative clause: '(it's) the man (who) went (SUBOR)'. Subsequently a merger of intonation contours yielded a

single clause with a marked informational status. What is important for our analysis here, and parallel to the case with insubordinate negative clauses, is that the insubordinated part (here, the *ga*-verb) is presupposed, not asserted.

Similar focusing uses of a generalized subordinate clause type are found in several other Gunwingguan languages of Arnhem Land, including Rembarrnga (McKay 1975), Ngalakan (Merlan 1983), Mangarayi (Merlan 1981; 1982) and Jawoyn (Merlan 1981).

In Rembarrnga subordination is signalled by a special series of pronominal pronouns to the verb. Subordinate clauses have a wide range of functions, both adnominal and adverbial, with the exact interpretation determined by context and by the TAM categories. Of interest here is the fact that subordinate clauses can be used independently for contrasted objects, as in:

(107) yarap:aʔ-waɲʔ-miɲ muʈulŋu-kaɲa-kaɲaŋʔ ken
1unit.AUG-look-PST.PUN saratoga.fish-DIM-small woops
muʈulŋu-kaɲa-kaɲaŋʔ dirmar-kaɲa-kaɲaŋʔ biri-ḍoɭʔ-miɲ
saratoga-DIM-small barramundi-DIM-small 3AUG.SUBOR-float-PST.PUN
'We saw a lot of little saratogas . . . Woops! Little saratogas? . . . It was little barramundis which were floating.' (McKay 1975: 346)

In Ngalakan such generalized subordination is achieved by suffixing *-gVn* to the verb. Historically this probably derives from a complementizing use of a dative/purposive case marker, which has the form *-gan*, *-gen*, or *-gɨn* in other Gunwinyguan languages of the area. (108) illustrates a true subordinate use—here interpreted as a relative clause—while (109) illustrates an object-contrasting use in an insubordinated clause.

(108) ŋunbu-yiniʔ-ganiɲ ju-goʔje-ʔgen ju-bolo-ʔgon
3/1-tell-AUX.PST.CONT F-that-DAT F-old.person-DAT
meɲeri Ø-maṇiɲ-miɲ-gin mu-juḻuʔ
Hodgson.Downs 3/3-make-PST.PUN-SUBOR VEG-lancewood
'They told me about the old woman who made the lancewood at Hodgson Downs.'

(109) ṇu-gunʔbiri baṛamunu ŋur-ṇe-ŋa-gan
M-that sand.goanna 1INCL.PL-cook-FUT-SUBOR
'It's the sand goanna we will cook.' / 'We'll cook *the sand goanna*.'

Merlan (1981), whose article describing these constructions explicitly addresses the relationship between mood, focus, and subordination, argues that:

subordination simply acts as an instruction to relate the subordinate clause to some other part of the message, the precise relation being subject to interpretation by a

variety of textual and other cues. Subordination in languages like Mangarayi is thus directly and primarily a part of the language system for expressing the relation of parts of the message to other parts. In view of its function in information structuring it is perhaps not surprising to find that in a number of northern languages with generalized subordinate clauses, that which marks subordination also functions at the intra-clause level in structuring focussed configurations. (p. 200)

In Kayardild (Evans 1995a: 534), object-focused clauses (used, for example, when the object is given but not the subject) are insubordinated; the focused NP is either omitted or escapes case marking:

(110) ngijuwa mima-tharra-nth
1SG.COBL beget-PST-COBL
'He's my son.' (Lit. 'I begot (him)'; '(He's the one whom) I begot')

11.3.3.3 *Trans-sentential contrast and switch-reference* Switch-reference is primarily a device for indicating whether relations of coreference or non-coreference, and perhaps also of temporal or modal equivalence, hold between a matrix and subordinate clause. A clause marked with SR morphology thus presupposes a matrix whose subject differs from its own, or whose tense or modality bears a significant relationship of sameness or difference to its own. In many Australian languages, including the Mparntwe Arrernte case discussed below, there is evidence of a subordinate origin for switch-reference markers, which originate as case markers with clausal scope (Austin 1981b; Dench and Evans 1988).

An example of such canonical SR use from the Central Australian language Mparntwe Arrernte (Wilkins 1988), is the contrast between 'same-subject' (SS) marking on the subordinate clause in (111) and 'different-subject' (DS) marking in (112):

(111) artwe-le alye-lhe-me-le kere ite-ke
man-ERG sing-DTR-NPST.PROG-SS meat cook-PST.COMPL
'The man cooked the meat while singing.'

(112) artwe alye-lhe-me-rlenge ayenge petye-me
man sing-DTR-NPST.PROG-DS 1SG.NOM come-NPST.PROG
'I'm coming while the man is singing.'

But switch-reference marking is also sometimes found on independent clauses, where it functions as a cohesive device for indicating tense relations between subsequent independent clauses, or common or disjoint reference across turns by different speakers. Wilkins (1988: 155) cites the following example:

(113) tayele renhe kemparre twe-mele arlkwe-tyeme
tail 3SG.ACC first hit-SS eat-PST.PROG
[long pause]
ikwere-tayeme kwele, arrentye re arrate-tyelhe-rlenge
3SG.DAT-time HEARSAY demon 3SG.NOM appear-go.and.do-DS
'He chopped up the tail and was eating it. [Long pause]. It was then, they say, when the cannibal arrived on the scene.' (Wilkins 1988: 155)

He comments: 'the split into two sentences in this way presumes the "simultaneity" of the two events, most commonly expressed through switch-reference clauses, and also serves to highlight the entrance of a character who is to play an important role as the text unfolds.'

Such uses of SR markers in independent clauses may also be a powerful device for integrating successive conversational turns: 'a participant in a conversation may interject, add to, or question the statement of another participant, by using a sentence that is a clause morphologically subordinated (marked for same- or different-subject) to a sentence uttered by another participant.' An example is:

(114) A: yeah, ikwere-kerte, re pente-ke kwete,
INTERJ 3SG.DAT-PROP 3ERG follow-PST.CONT still
bullock re
bullock 3SG.DEF
'Yeah, (they walked along) with it. That bullock, he kept on following (them).'
B: nhenge kaltyirre-mele, eh?
remember learn-SS INTERJ
'Was (that one we're talking about) learning (as he followed along)?'

Different-subject markers may also indicate contrasting activities or directions, and as such may become conventionalized at event boundaries such as leave-takings. John Henderson (p.c.) reports that two common leave-taking expressions in Mparntwe Arrernte involve different subject markers attached to independent verbs:

(115) kele yenge lhe-me-nge
OK I go-PRS-DS
'As for me, well I'm off.' (I don't know what you're up to, but . . .)

(116) urreke are- tyenhe-nge
later see-FUT-DS
'See you later.'

The function of SR morphology may thus be extended from the grammaticalized linking found in complex sentences to the pragmatically presupposed linking found in conversational turns, and adjacency pairs like leave-taking sequences. In some cases, such as (115), it may be possible to plausibly supply ellipsed material, in which cases we may simply wish to analyse these as cases of ellipsis. In others like (116), however, a stage of conventionalization appears to have been reached where it is no longer normal or even possible to supply the missing material, so we may wish to consider this a case of insubordination.

11.3.3.4 *Conditions on preceding assertions in interaction* Very similar to the insubordinated SR clause is the adaptation, for cohesive purposes, of other constructions normally associated with subordinated clauses, such as the use of 'if' clauses to limit agreement with a previous speaker by laying down a particular condition (117). As Ford and Thompson (1986: 368) put it in their discussion of this example, 'the speaker who states the condition does not repeat the main clause, but merely gives the condition which relates to a preceding proposition (albeit not the speaker's own claim).' In this case, however, it seems likely that we are only dealing with ellipsis, harnessed to interactional cohesion, since there is obviously recoverable ellipsed material, along the lines of 'I admit that it's possible, if . . .' in this example.

(117) S: Is it practically impossible to have that [a certain demand curve]?
I: If you have this base.

11.3.3.5 *Reiteration* A further example of insubordination in cases high in presuppositionality involves their use in reiteration: clauses of a subordinate form appropriate to embedding under a main clause such as 'I said [ ]' or 'I asked [ ]' may be used independently, with ellipsis of the main clause reporting the speech act. Here the context of mutually manifest repetition makes the restoration of the ellipsed speech act verb quite clear.

We have already seen an example of this from German in section 11.2.6, with verb-final word order being used independently when repeating a question, and the speech act main clauses *ich fragte* 'I asked' or *ich sagte* 'I said' ellipsed. A more intricate example comes from Basque, which uses different subordinate forms for statements, questions, and commands.[38] The basic form of a verb such as *dator* 'is coming' (118) will be changed, when embedded under an epistemic or reportative predicate, to the subjunctive

[38] I am indebted to Alan King (1993 and p.c.), from whose work the Basque examples and analysis are adapted.

form *datorrela* (119); when a question (120) is so embedded, the form will be *datorren* (121).

(118) Jon d-a-tor
John 3SG.ABS-PRS-come
'John's coming.'

(119) Uste d-u-t Jon d-a-torr-ela.
think 3ABS-AUX-1SG.ERG John 3ABS-PRS-come-DEC.SBJV
'I think John's coming.'

(120) Jon d-a-tor?
John 3SG.ABS-PRS-come
'Is John coming?'

(121) Ez d-a-ki-t (ea) Jon d-a-torr-en
not 3ABS-PR-know-1ERG DUB John 3SG.ABS-PRS-come-INT.SBJV
'I don't know whether John is coming.'

In cases of reiteration, the appropriate subordinate form may be used independently: the declarative subjunctive for a reiterated statement (122) and the interrogative subjunctive for a reiterated question (123). Note that this means that the reiterated, insubordinated clauses make explicit formal distinctions with regard to speech-act type that are not made in the case of the primary main clause.

(122) A: Jon d-a-tor
John 3SG.ABS-PRS-come
B: Zer?
what
A: Jon d-a-tor-**ela**
John 3SG.ABS-PRS-come-SBJV
A: 'John's coming.' B: 'What?' A: '(I said) That John's coming.'

(123) A: Jon d-a-tor?
John 3SG.ABS-PRS-come
B: Zer?
what
A: Ea Jon d-a-torr-en
DUB John 3SG.ABS-PRS-come-INT.SBJV
A: 'Is John coming?' B: 'What?' C: 'Whether John is coming.'

With commands, the main clause imperative construction exemplified in the first line of (124) is replaced by an 'imperative subjunctive' form, as in the third

line;[39] the already-insubordinated use of the infinitive for a command, exemplified by the first line of (125), gets replaced under reiteration with the gerundive form in *-tzeko*, in the third line.

(124) A: Etor zaitez hona
come AUX here
B: Zer?
what
A: Etor zaitez-**ela** hona
come 2SG.FORMAL.IMP.AUX-IMP.SBJV here
A: 'Come here!' B: 'What?' A: '(I said) to come here!'

(125) A: Etorr-i hona
come-PTCP here
B: Zer?
what
A: Eto-**tzeko** hona
come-GER here
A: 'Come here!' B: 'What?' A: '(I said) to come here!'

In the case of reiterated statements and questions, the subject of the ellipsed main clause is taken to be the 1st person. With reiterated commands, however, the subject may be either the 1st person or a 3rd person, since this pattern of reiteration is not restricted to cases where the speaker who reiterates is the originator of the original speech act. If a mother tells her daughter Mila, for example, to go and tell Mila's sister Pili to come to the house to eat lunch, the command could be reiterated by Mila using the gerundive as follows:

(126) MOTHER: Mila, esan Pili-ri etortzeko bazkaltzera
Mila tell.PTCP Pili-DAT come.GER have.lunch.GER
MILA: Pili, etortzeko bazkaltzera!
Pili come.GER have.lunch.GER
MOTHER: 'Mila, tell Pili to come to eat lunch.'
MILA: 'Pili, to come to eat lunch.'

Mila thereby conveys quite explicitly that she herself is not the originator of the command, as she would be if she had said:

[39] Though Alan King, who supplied these examples, points out that (124) is rather less likely than (125) to occur colloquially because 'colloquially ... the forms *etor zaitez* and *etor zaitezela* just aren't used that much (in speech)', creating a stylistic clash between the informality of the structure and the literary sound of this form of the verb (Alan King, email of 4 Apr. 2002).

(127) MILA: Pili, etorri bazkaltzera!
Pili come.PTCP have.lunch.GER
'Pili, come to eat lunch!'

The reiterations discussed here superficially resemble the insubordinated clauses found with free indirect speech discussed in section 11.3.2.1 above, a use that develops into quotative or hearsay evidentials in many languages. However, there are significant differences: reiterations are much more context-specific, presupposing both a preceding question like 'what?' and, before that, the statement, question, or command being reiterated. In addition, reiterations are semantically more specific, in the sense that the subject of the ellipsed clause in reiterations is 1st person (except in the special Basque case of reiterated commands, where it may be either 1st person or a 3rd person close at hand), whereas the subject of the ellipsed clause in evidentializing insubordination is usually a nonspecific 3rd person; 'they', or 'people' or 'the elders'.

The very specific alignments between the various forms of subordinate marker on the Basque verb and corresponding complex-clause structures point to clear sources in elliptical structures in each case. However, the limitations on the person of the subject of the ellipsed clause, and of the ellipsed verb itself, illustrate the transition between stages 2 and 3 of our scenario, in the sense that conventionalized restrictions on interpretation have begun to accrue.

11.3.3.6 *Disagreement with assertions by the previous speaker* The use in Spanish of insubordinated conditional clauses with *si* (originally 'if') has already been discussed and exemplified (20). Recall that syntactic tests for the main clause status of this construction, such as its behaviour with negative polarity items, were summarized in section 11.1.2, and that the likely development has been from 'if X, (then how can you say Y)' to 'but in fact it's the case that X'. It is worth reiterating here, though, the characterizations that have been given by authors examining this construction. According to Schwenter (1996: 328), uses of insubordinated *si* 'all deal with correcting or modifying underlying pragmatic presuppositions that have been evoked (or inferred) in conversation'. Almela Perez (1985: 8) puts it slightly differently: 'the *si* we are concerned with is adversative: in every case it signifies a frustration of the previous turn; it therefore always allows, before it, the form *pero* [but].'[40] Although there is, in one way, a similarity to the

[40] 'El *si* del que nos ocupamos es adversativo: en todos los casos significa una frustración del miembro anterior; por eso siempre admite, precediéndole, la forma *pero*.'

'contrast' use of switch-reference markers discussed in section 11.3.3.3, in those cases there is no perceived incompatibility between the propositions put forth by successive speakers: it is simply a matter of them pointing out some contrast that holds between them, e.g. between what two different participants under discussion are doing. With insubordinated *si* in Spanish, by contrast, the proposition being put forward by the speaker using *si* is logically incompatible with the one it is aimed against. In the first case, then, the first speaker's proposition is presupposed and serves as a point of departure for a contrasting proposition about something else, while in the second case the fact that the first speaker's proposition has been asserted is presupposed, but its truth is then disputed, bringing this usage closer to the use of insubordination with negatives.

11.3.3.7 *Presuppositionalizing insubordination: summary* In the first three cases discussed above—negatives (11.3.3.1), focus constructions (11.3.3.2), and trans-sentential contrast (11.3.3.3)—the tight grammatical conditions attached to particular subordinate clause constructions become loosened so that they can be satisfied by the broader discourse context rather than by a governing main clause. Negative clauses in Tewa and Western Desert move from needing an overt main clause explicitly expressing the contrasted positive to implicating some general positive state of affairs calculable from context. Focusing subordinate clauses in a number of Australian languages move from requiring a contrasted clause, or the overt equational element of a cleft construction, to implicating such a component: roughly, from 'It was X which were floating' to 'X which were floating'. Generalizations from switch-reference proper to trans-sentential contrast more generally in languages like Mparntwe Arrernte involve the ellipsis of the contrasted element: '[X is/may be Ving], while C-SR.'

Free-standing conditions (11.3.3.4) and reiterations (11.3.3.5) remain closer to the original construction: their context-specificity means that the candidate ellipsed clause is heavily restricted. The 'disagreeing *si*' construction in Spanish (11.3.3.6), like free-standing conditions and reiterations, remains tightly bound in terms of being restricted to second turns, though its semantics has moved further away from what can be readily stated by restoring a conversationally restricted main clause.

In each of these six subtypes, grammatical machinery that originally developed around overt relations between a main and subordinate clause, often using the inherently two-place predicate expressed by complementizing case, is subsequently generalized to encode similar relations between the insubordinated clause and some other part of the discourse. This latter may

be unexpressed, or no longer involved in a subordinating grammatical relation to the insubordinated clause.

11.4 Multi-purpose insubordination, constructional indeterminacy, and pragmatic interpretation

In a number of languages, insubordinated clauses have what at first sight seem to be a bewilderingly wide range of functions. In this section I examine two Australian languages—Gooniyandi and Kayardild—with such 'multi-purpose' insubordination. I show that the functional range of insubordinated clauses is essentially the union of the three higher-level functions above: indirectionalizing, modalizing, and presuppositionalizing. I also examine the extent to which the precise interpretation can in large measure be recovered pragmatically because of predictable interactions with verbal tense/aspect/mood categories.

11.4.1 *Gooniyandi*[41]

In this non-Pama-Nyungan language (McGregor 1988; 1990) so-called 'subjunctive' clauses, marked by an enclitic *-ja*, can occur either as subordinate clauses or independently. I shall assume that the subordinate function is primary and that the independent use results from insubordination.[42] McGregor identifies the following 'common core of meaning' for subjunctive clauses in Gooniyandi, whether main or subordinate:

> [T]he speaker is not asserting or proposing the propositional content of the clause; he is neither asserting/proposing that the situation will occur (realized by future tense), nor that it might have occurred (realized by potential mode). Rather, what he is asserting/proposing is that the propositional content of the clause is hypothesized, supposed, reckoned, guessed, hoped and so on . . . The enclitic *-ja* functions like the logical operator |-. In other words, the speaker is not asserting/proposing a proposition about the world, but rather, a proposition about a proposition about the world, in effect that he will entertain its validity. (p. 41)

[41] In spelling the language name I am employing the practical spelling now preferred for this language, and used in McGregor's (1990) reference grammar, but which differs from the spelling Kuniyanti used in McGregor (1988). Examples retain the orthography of the source.

[42] Because there is no other formal marker of subordination, McGregor avoids taking the subordinate use of subjunctives as primary, and implies that they share the same multifunctional characteristics whether they are subordinate or independent. The analysis I propose here suggests they would have originated as subordinate clauses, a question that can only be answered by historical work on related languages.

The specific nature of this 'second order proposition', however, results from interaction of the subjunctive clitic with the tense markers—past, present, and irrealis—and with the person of the subject.

Combined with the past tense, the subjunctive suggests a statement about the past made on the basis of inference, as in (128).

(128) (A police posse discovers the recently vacated dinner camp of a group of Aborigines they are following. The head tracker asserts (to the policemen):)
ngapjawirra ngamunyali
eat.SBJV.3PL before.REPET
'They were eating here not long ago.' (McGregor 1988: 42)

Combined with the future, the subjunctive can produce a request for permission with a 1st person subject (129; cf. the Yankunytjatjara example (38b)), and a prediction with a non-1st person subject (130).

(129) nganyi wartngiri mikarliminhi majayu
I go.PRS.1SG I.told.him boss
wartjawulunayi ngarraki yawarta
go.SBJV.FUT.1SG>3DU my horse
kay wartpinayi mikamingarra
OK go.FUT.3DU he.told.me
"'I'm going", I told the boss.
"I might (would like to) take the two horses."
"OK, take them", he told me.' (McGregor 1988: 40)

(130) paplikajnhingi ngilangku palma yuwarni thutjawingkani
pub.ABL east creek one descend.SBJV.FUT.2SG
'From the pub you'll go east, and cross one creek.' (McGregor 1988: 39)

Combined with the present, the subjunctive is used 'to avoid stating the obvious by intruding his own attitude'; this may have the effect of strengthening the epistemic status of the proposition rather than weakening it, along the lines of English *I reckon I walk*.

(131) wartjangiri
go.SBJV.PRS.1SG
'I walk hard.'

Combined with the irrealis, the subjunctive suggests that the speaker 'may suppose or entertain the notion that the situation occurred even though he knows it didn't':

(132) yuwulungka marniwa kartjayuni
man his.sister hit.SBJV.IRR
'The man might have hit his sister (though I know he didn't).'

The subjunctive in Gooniyandi, then, signals that the speaker is not asserting/proposing a proposition about the world, but rather, a proposition about a proposition about the world. The exact nature of the second order proposition, however, is not directly asserted but left to inference: it may involve circumstantial evidence (128), an indirect seeking of permission (129), or even strengthened assertion (131).

11.4.2 *Kayardild*

The functional range of the Gooniyandi independent subjunctive covers certain indirectionalizing uses (requests for permission) and a number of evidentializing or modalizing ones (hearsay, inference, assertion of conviction, prediction), but not the presuppositionalizing or deictic-recentring sets. In Kayardild the problem is more complicated still, since all main functional types of insubordination are present: interpersonal coercion, modal (both deontic and epistemic), and presuppositionalizing.[43]

Presuppositionalizing insubordination in Kayardild, in the form of object-topicalized clauses, is always formally distinctive: the object is either omitted, as in (113) above, or appears in the nominative (133) instead of the usual object-marking (which would here take the form of the modal proprietive plus complementizing oblique case, giving the form *ngaarrkuuntha* were it not for the rule assigning object topics the nominative—see Evans 1995a).

(133) kambuda barji-j, ngaarrka barji-ja
pandanus.fruit.NOM fall-ACT pandanus.nut.NOM fall-ACT
rar-umban-da warmarr. [mutha-wuu-ntha
south-ORIG-NOM wind.NOM much-MPROP-COBL
darr-u-ntha diya-juu-ntha ngaarrk]COBL
time-MPROP-COBL eat-MPROP-COBL pandanus.nut.NOM
'The pandanus fruit falls, the pandanus nut falls at the time of the south wind. (One) can go on eating pandanus nut for a long time.'

Even though the odd-topic formal pattern—absent or nominative object—always overtly signals the presence of a presuppositionalizing function in the

[43] The historical operation of insubordination, in the form of 'modal case', which results from deictic recentring of tense/mood categories, was discussed in section 11.3.2.4; since the latter clauses have no particular synchronic evidence for primarily subordinate status, being insubordinated purely in a diachronic sense, they will not be discussed further here.

sense of object-focusing, it does not follow that this is the only function of such clauses. In (37), for example, there is simultaneous signalling of the utterance's function as an indirect request (through the choice of potential verb plus complementizing case), and as an object-focused construction (through the appearance of the object in the nominative).

So although an algorithm for interpreting insubordinated clauses in Kayardild can begin by searching for the manifestations of 'odd-topic marking' and assigning any insubordinated clauses with this feature to the object-topicalized category discussed in section 11.3.3.2 above, it cannot then conclude that this is the only aspect of insubordinated interpretation to be given to such a clause, since there may be other aspects (e.g. indirect request) motivating the choice in addition to the fact of object topic.

Nor does this exhaust the possibilities of using insubordinated clauses for a presupposed discourse context. For example, insubordinated clauses in the potential may be used to give consequences of a prior assertion, comparable to the independent use of a *so* or *so that* clause in English. An example from a Kayardild argument between two women—D, who is voicing her grievance at having lost her husband to M—is the following, which involves insubordinated clauses in the second and third turns (see Evans 1995a: 626–30 for the full text). In the second turn, by M, the insubordinated clause, in conjunction with the stress on the subject pronoun, expresses contrastive focus on the subject: '*I've* taken him.' But in the third turn the insubordinated clause, which here has no arguments in the nominative or ellipsed, is expressing the consequence of the action described in the preceding two turns: 'so that I'll be left with nothing':

(134) D: ngijin-jina dun-kina nyingka buru-tharr !
my-MABL husband-MABL 2SG.NOM take-PST
'You've taken my husband!'

M: [ngijuwa buru-tharra-nth, natha-maru-tharra-ntha
1SG.SBJV.COBL take-PST-COBL camp-V.DAT-PST-COBL
ngijin-maru-tharra-nth!]$_{COBL}$
my-V.DAT-PST-COBL
'I've taken (him), to my camp!'

D: [ngijuwa wirdi-juu-ntha warirra-ntha wirdi-juu-nth!]$_{COBL}$
1SG.SBJV.COBL remain-POT-COBL nothing-COBL remain-POT-COBL
'So I'll be left with nothing!'

This leaves the problem of determining the meaning of insubordinated clauses lacking object topic marking. Table 11.1 summarizes the interpretive

options available for three selected TAM categories in Kayardild insubordinated clauses. Note that for the past tense two interpretations are possible, and for the potential and immediate, three each. How far can these various functions of insubordinated clauses be derived from functions of regular subordinate clauses? Can we derive the insubordinated meanings from the subordinate ones, via main clause ellipsis? Or is there a sufficient difference that we should attempt to associate constructional meanings directly with the various types of insubordinate clause?

In support of an ellipsis analysis one can cite the many constructions, exemplified in the preceding sections, where appropriate main clauses can readily be supplied. To the insubordinated *yaluluntha karnajurrka niwanjurrk* [flame burns him]$_{\text{COBL}}$, for example, we can supply a main clause *ngada kurrija* 'I see'. This would account for the presence of complementizing case, the immediate verb inflection, and the meaning supplied on the occasion of the utterance: 'I see him being burned by the flames.'

Further support for the ellipsis analysis comes from the many interpretations available for a given insubordinated clause, as represented partially in Table 11.1. Although I have given very specific translations to the

TABLE 11.1. Interpretive options for insubordinated Kayardild clauses in the immediate, potential, or past

Interpretation of reconstructed clause	Tense/mood of insubordinated clause		
	Immediate	Potential	Past
Epistemic	Perception (62, 63) I see/hear etc. that X	Knowledge (65) I know/assume that X	Inference (64) What I behold must result from X
Directive	Hint: (do something) because X is happening now (44)	Hint: (do something) so that X will happen (37)	Hint: (do something) because X has happened (45)
Discourse context		Consequence of previously stated fact: (V has happened) so X will happen (134)	
Tense	X is the case now (86, 87)		

insubordinated clauses in my examples, it must be borne in mind that these are utterance rather than sentence translations, and involve interpretations of the particular contexts in which they were recorded. Many would, in other contexts, be given quite a different interpretation. This makes it impossible to pair insubordinated clauses directly with constructional meanings (e.g. those summarizable as 'perception evidential' or 'polite command').

Such a wide range of interpretations is available for two main reasons. First, there is a range of possible matrix predicators, e.g. 'see', 'hear', 'smell' in the case of perception predicates. Secondly, some tense/moods in the insubordinated clause are potentially compatible with several types of matrix predicator. For example, potential clauses are compatible with main clause imperatives (giving rise to the 'hint' use exemplified in 37), and with actual main clauses of different types (giving rise to the 'inference' and 'consequence' meanings exemplified in 65 and 134 respectively). Only hortative and desiderative insubordinated clauses (not shown in Table 11.1) have a single reconstructed clause type, although even there the actual predicate ('say' vs. 'ask' vs. 'warn') is not specified.

Against the pure form of the ellipsis analysis one can make two arguments. First, it is rather difficult to relate some insubordinated meanings (such as the 'relevant present') directly to those found in complex clauses, and even in some other cases (such as the 'inferential' use of the past and potential) some semantic bridging is necessary. In such cases it seems more reasonable to see ellipsis as a first step in the development of the construction, as outlined in section 11.1.2, but to attribute the detailed semantic characteristics to 'depragmaticization', the conversion of pragmatic enrichment (such as perceptual comments being most commonly made of present events) to constructional meaning.

Secondly, there appear to be restrictions on what may be the subject of the 'restored' main clause predicate if this is a perception verb: the subject of the higher clause is always interpreted as 1st person in a declarative and second person in a question. There are good pragmatic reasons for this—a perceptually based assertion about an ongoing situation naturally implicates that the perceiver is the speaker, and a perceptually based question naturally implicates that the perceiver is the addressee[44]—and these extra constraints appear to have accrued to the relevant constructions by depragmaticization.

[44] See Hargreaves (1991) for a discussion of how evidentials in Kathmandu Newari take the speaker as epistemic source in statements, and the hearer in questions.

The balance of evidence, then, supports a hybrid position. On the one hand, in many cases the presence of complementizing case seems to signal simply that the hearer should interpret an insubordinated clause by inferentially restoring an ellipsed, contextually appropriate main clause that is grammatically compatible with the insubordinated clause (in the sense that it would assign complementizing case, and use an appropriate sequence of tenses). On the other hand, there are further, conventionalized constraints on the interpretation of some insubordinated clauses that suggest they have been grammaticized: the meaning of these constructions is more specific than one would expect if it were simply a matter of restoring ellipsed material.

11.5 Conclusion

This chapter has been a heuristic one, concerned with exploring constructions which tend to get marginalized in linguistic analysis and description. As a result, it is hard to get a systematic picture across the world's languages. If the phenomena have eluded description in English, it is certainly likely that less well-described languages will have examples of the phenomenon that have yet to be made available for typological comparison, although working in their favour is that corpus- and fieldwork-based descriptions are less likely to dismiss relevant data in the way that Matthews (1981: 40–42) dismisses incomplete utterances as 'of no concern to syntax, except as a source of confusion in our data'. I hope that the preliminary systematization of data presented here will encourage linguists to take these constructions more seriously, and have no doubt that we will see further formal and functional types being identified.

Insubordination is an important phenomenon because of the unusual way the direction of diachronic change runs: from subordinate clause to main clause, from morphosyntax to discourse, and (in its initial stage) from grammar to pragmatics. In each of these, it is a sort of backwash against the prevailing direction in which historical developments are supposed to occur. For functionalists who have shown us in how many ways grammar can emerge from discourse, it is a reminder that elaborate grammatical structures can also be partly disassembled and co-opted as discourse devices. For theories of pragmatic implicature, it illustrates how projected grammatical structures can act as a scaffold for the inferencing process.

The material we have surveyed here is relevant to debates about finiteness in several ways. First is the issue of how far main clause status entails finiteness. Just as insubordination can make it harder to maintain a crisp categorical distinction between subordinate and main clauses, so it can blur

the boundary between finite and nonfinite clauses. In particular cases, however, we want to know what motivates the discrepancy: should we appeal to characteristics of nonfiniteness in particular (such as lack of assertativity)? Or should we see it as following from broader characteristics of insubordination, as sketched here, which happen to bear nonfinite constructions up into main clause structures along with others which it would be artificial to term nonfinite, such as clauses introduced with complementizers or general markers of subordination?

Secondly, we want to know whether the changes from subordinate to main clause status necessarily entail changes in finiteness as part of the reanalysis process. Again, considering a broader range of insubordination types, only some involving nonfinite constructions, makes it seem less of an automatic consequence that change to main clause status would automatically increase the finiteness of a construction. The redeployment of linkages from intra-clausal to general discourse links, for example, has nothing to do with finiteness as it is normally defined. Accepting insubordination as a common process makes it clearer what is special about finiteness, by dissociating it from the main vs. subordinate clause parameter.

Thirdly, finiteness, like any other semantic value, is subject to diachronic change. Speakers draw on nonfinite constructions to detach themselves from speech-act or epistemic commitments, whether by presenting infinitives as impersonal alternatives that avoid making the command stance overt or by using participles in cases of hearsay to avoid taking responsibility for direct assessment of epistemic value. This process of sign-building means that the contexts and communicative intentions behind these initially disembodied nonfinite statements gradually attach to the constructions themselves, turning infinitives into normal imperatives, and erstwhile participles into hearsay evidentials. Once this process occurs, we do indeed see a semantic shift towards finiteness as insubordination occurs.

Returning to the general problem posed by insubordination for grammatical description, as reanalysis of erstwhile subordinate clauses (nonfinite or otherwise) into main clauses proceeds, at least some of their morphosyntactic characteristics are no longer sufficient conditions for identifying a clause as subordinate. In the first stage of the process, the distinction can be saved by treating insubordinated clauses as underlying subordinate clauses whose main clauses have been ellipsed but can plausibly be restored for analytic purposes. At the second stage, while the structure itself may still be adequately described by treating it as an underlying subordinate clause, this can only be achieved by turning a blind eye to the greater semantic specificity associated with the insubordinated clause, and ignoring the fact that certain logically

possible 'restored' meanings or functions are never found with the insubordinated construction. By the final stage these clauses have been so nativized as main clauses that the generalizations gained by drawing parallels with subordinate structures are outweighed by the artificiality of not including them in the muster of main clause types.