

Merkle-tree-based integrity verification protocol for geo-distributed storage systems

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Problem



How can we efficiently verify the **integrity** of files in a file system?

```
root@node:/root# ls -lh
total 200G
-rw-r--r-- 1 root  root   21M Jan  1 00:00 photo1.png
-rw-r--r-- 1 root  root   4.4K Jan 10 08:30 photo2.png
-rw-r--r-- 1 root  root   2G Jan  7 09:50 photo3.png
-rw-r--r-- 1 root  root   7.1M Mar  9 11:00 photo4.png
-rw-r--r-- 1 root  root   24K Mar  9 11:01 photo5.png
-rw-r--r-- 1 root  root  130M Jun 25 18:25 photo6.png
...
```

We can use checksums.

Problem

But, what if a file is split into pieces and distributed across different **regions**? We would need to perform a checksum on each node.





Cubbit, a geo-distributed storage system.

Cubbit – How it works


Each file is split into $n + k$ pieces (i.e., **shards**) using Reed-Solomon. Each shard is sent to a different node (i.e., **agent**).

At least n shards are required to reconstruct the file, while k shards provide redundancy.

Italy – 3 nodes



Switzerland – 2 nodes




Cubbit – Problems using checksum

- 1 If nodes are offline, it becomes impossible to check all shards for a file.

Italy – 3 nodes




Switzerland – 2 nodes




Cubbit – Problems using checksum

- 1 If nodes are offline, it becomes impossible to check all shards for a file.
- 2 During upload, some **nodes may be offline**, but they might be online during verification.

Italy – 3 nodes



Switzerland – 2 nodes




Cubbit – Problems using checksum

- 1 If nodes are offline, it becomes impossible to check all shards for a file.
- 2 During upload, some **nodes may be offline**, but they might be online during verification.
- 3 Should we check each reconstructed file or each shard individually?

Italy – 3 nodes




Switzerland – 2 nodes




Solution

Each node uses a Merkle tree structure to organize shards during integrity verification. All nodes agree on **corrupted files** through the Raft consensus protocol. Data are organized using **Reed-Solomon codes**.



Merkle trees

It is a binary tree T of height H with 2^H leaves and $2^H - 1$ internal nodes. Each leaf stores the **cryptographic hash** of the underlying data, rather than the raw data itself. The same cryptographic hash function is applied recursively at internal nodes, which store the hash of the concatenation of their two children.



$$n_{parent} = f(n_{left} || n_{right})$$

Merkle trees – Lib

A dedicated Rust library was developed to efficiently compute Merkle tree root hashes.

| Hash function | 5 MB | 10 MB | 15 MB |
|---------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| SHA-256 | 89.901 ms | 178.42 ms | 268.53 ms |
| Keccak-256 | 521.49 ms | 1.1334 s | 1.3438 s |
| BLAKE3 | 73.091 ms | 154.68 ms | 219.79 ms |



Raft


A consensus protocol, where each server on a cluster is a follower, a candidate or a leader. There is a single **leader**, responsible for sending messages to other servers via the Raft **log**.




Upload flow

Let's save our Christmas holidays family picture on Cubbit.

- Select a file. (e.g., xmas2024.png)
- Gateway applies Reed-Solomon codes and sends each shard to a different agent. (e.g., xmas2024.1 to Agent 1)
- Each agent chooses the same pseudo-random string for the filename. (e.g., ff4c4b3)
- Finally, every agent saves the file using a **two-level folder structure**. (e.g. ff/4c/4b3.1 for Agent 1)



Aggregated roots




The leader builds Merkle trees for each folder, with the agents' Merkle root hashes as leaves.

Map of hashes

```
roots = {
    "fe":    "root hash of fe",
    "ff":    "root hash of ff",
    "ff/4c": "root hash of ff/4c",
    # ...
}


agent_roots = {
    "fe": [
        "Agent 1 root hash of fe",
        "Agent 2 root hash of fe",
        "Agent 3 root hash of fe"
    ],
    # ...
    "ff/4c": [
        "Agent 1 root hash of ff/4c",
        "Agent 2 root hash of ff/4c",
        "Agent 3 root hash of ff/4c"
    ],
}
```

Check corruptions




Tests – Set up

8 Agents with 4 CPU(s), 8-16 GB of RAM, and 45 GB of Disk.




For each test, we vary the number of online/offline agents, file sizes, and file counts.


Same dataset but different file size and count



Test with offline agents



Test with very large number of tiny files



- Scenarios with many small files amplify the **cost of synchronization and consensus**.
- Verification time increases with the number of agents and files.
- Confirmed the correctness and resilience of the approach under different scenarios and network conditions.

Conclusion

By combining Merkle trees, Raft consensus, and Reed-Solomon codes, we built a scalable and fault-tolerant protocol for distributed data integrity verification **without relying on full file scans or constant node availability**.

Thank you!