Model Context Protocol for Digital Forensics

Large Language Models for Digital Forensics

मेरा परिचय

- Researcher at BharatGen, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay
- Author & part of AI Red teaming at OWSAP AI Exchange (AI Security)
- Fusion of Large Language Model with Cybersecurity.
- Speaker at FOSS Mumbai, DEFCON Delhi, BSides Mumbai & BSides Bangalore.
- VERY passionate about National security.

AGENDA ?

14 February 2019

All gave some, some gave all

Masood Azhar is prime accused: NIA counsel on filing chargesheet in Pulwama terror attack case

Updated: 4 Years, 11 months ago

Jammu (JandK), Aug 25 (ANI): National Investigation Agency filed the chargesheet in Pulwama attack case in the Special NIA court on August 25. 40 CRPF personnel were martyred in the 2019 Pulwama terror attack case. NIA counsel Vipin Kalra said, "The charge sheet is of 5,000 pages. If add the digital evidence also, it will run in over 15,000 pages. Masood Azhar is the prime accused. Next date of hearing is September 1."

Pahalgam terror attack: Photos recovered from an encounter site in 2024 helped identify terrorists

Security personnel started their search after the terrorists' photos were matched with the accounts of eyewitnesses present at the Baisaran meadow on April 22

Updated - August 03, 2025 11:45 am IST - New Delhi

DIGITAL FORENSICS



Identifying
&
Collecting Evidence

Preservation

Analysis



Documentation
&
Presentation

TYPES OF DIGITAL FORENSICS

Computer Forensics



Mobile Forensics



Network Forensics

Cloud Forensics



Memory Forensics



E-Mail Forensics

Malware Forensics



IoT Forensics



Drone Forensics

CS-1 : 2008 Mumbai Terror Attack

The analysis of call detail records, emails, and movement details helped to track the attackers and definitively link them to their handlers in Pakistan [Source]

CS-2 : Sony Pictures hack



CS-3 : Silk Road dark-net marketplace



CS-4: Assassination attempt on U.S President(2024)

साक्ष्य के प्रकार

- Personal Identifier
- Network Information
- Communication records
- Financial data
- Locations data
- Internet activity
- File metadata
- Device logs & system Artifacts



साक्ष्य और उसका संबंध

- Contextual Relationships
- Associative relationship
- Communication relationship
- Ownership & Association
- Temporal Relationships

Challenges in Traditional Digital Forensics

- Manual! (Intensive human involvement)
- Time consuming
- Less effective in handling large-scale & sophisticated cyber incidents
- Filtering large datasets, cross-checking communication patterns, and verify source links
- Evidence often exists in unstructured or semi-structured forms such as chat logs, file metadata , system logs, etc

Traditional AI/ML Digital Forensics

- AI/ML brings automation, pattern recognition, & anomaly detection.
- File & Malware Classification
- Network & Log analysis : Anomaly detection algorithm (Isolation forest, SVM, clustering)
- Image Forensics : Computer Vision (CNNs) to detect tampered images, hidden steganography or manipulated video
- Audio Forensics (Speaker identification & verification , Audio tampering)

Limitations of Training-based AI for Digital Forensics

- Comprehensive & varied datasets
- Data Pre-processing challenges (eg Addresses identification using Named-Entity Recognition)
- AI Models Lack Adaptability
- Difficult in extracting Evidence Relationships

Named-Entity Recognition

- NER (Named Entity Recognition) – NLP subtask
- Identifies & classifies entities: names, orgs, locations, dates, quantities
- Converts unstructured text → structured data

I traveled from Mumbai to deliver a talk at BSides Ahmedabad.

- Mumbai → Location
- BSides → Organization / Event (ORG)
- Ahmedabad → Location

Special Air Service (SAS)

Sahibzada Ajit Singh Nagar(SAS)

Large Language Model for Digital Forensics

Large Language Model

Deep neural network for parsing and generating human-like text

Machine learning with neural networks consisting of many layers



GenAI involves the use of deep neural networks to create new content, such as text, images, or various forms of media

Algorithms that learn rules automatically from data

Systems with human-like intelligence

Large Language Model



Large Language Model For Digital Forensic

- Extracting meaningful patterns or relationships from unstructured or semi-structured forms (chat logs, emails, file metadata, browsing histories, system logs)
- Automatically identifying named entities, classifying document types, summarizing lengthy communication threads.
- Detecting suspicious patterns, and establishing semantic links across diverse artifacts .
- Extracting context-sensitive information from large datasets in a conversational manner.

Semantics?

- Syntax = structure/format (how it looks)
- Semantics = meaning/intent (what it actually means)
- “MALWARE” vs “MALICIOUS SOFTWARE”

--> Windows Event ID 4625 (syntax) → means Failed Login Attempt (semantics).

--> Log entry explorer.exe spawned powershell.exe (syntax) → means possible malicious activity (semantics).

LLM for Log Analysis

Log Analysis

Logs are records of events and activities generated by systems , applications, network, and security devices.

- MASSIVE VOLUME (MILLIONS 0F LOGS PER DAY)
- REQUIRES DEEP EXPERTISE
- TIME CONSUMING
- LACK OF CONTEXT



osquery

BOSIDES AHMEDABAD

- Converts the OS into a relational database.
- Using basic SQL commands, you can ask question about your OS
- Extensive schema helps with a variety of use cases including

1. vulnerability detection
2. compliance monitoring,
3. incident investigation and more.

280 Tables

Osquery Version: 5.18.1 (current)

Show only Tables compatible with:

Restore Default View

account_policy_data

Additional macOS user account data from the AccountPolicy section of OpenDirectory.

Improve this Description on Github

COLUMN	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
uid	BIGINT	User ID
creation_time	DOUBLE	When the account was first created
failed_login_count	BIGINT	The number of failed login attempts using an incorrect password. Count resets after a correct password is entered.
failed_login_timestamp	DOUBLE	The time of the last failed login attempt. Resets after a correct password is entered
password_last_set_time	DOUBLE	The time the password was last changed

acpi_tables

Firmware ACPI functional table common metadata and content.

Improve this Description on Github

COLUMN	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
name	TEXT	ACPI table name
size	INTEGER	Size of compiled table data
md5	TEXT	MD5 hash of table content

Analysis using osquery

```
.osquery> .mode line
.osquery> select * from process_events;
        pid = 2549
       path = /Users/vishal/Downloads/OSX.Dummy/script
       mode = 0100744
    cmdline = ./script
        cwd =
       auid = 501
        uid = 0          (1)
       euid = 0
        gid = 0
       egid = 0
  owner_uid = 501
  owner_gid = 20
      atime =
      mtime =
      ctime =
      btime =
     parent = 2546       (2)
```

NirikshaQL Pipeline



CYBERCODE ANALYZER | SQL Query Generator

https://82c4435e3da32be835.gradio.live

NirikshaQL

Enter your natural language query and get SQL results from the database Logs.

Your Query

Enter your natural language query here...



Status

Generated SQL Query

33°C Haze

Search

ENG IN

11:0 02-06-202

Limitations of LLMs in Digital Forensics

- Black Box nature : LLM decision making is opaque.
- Limited Domain-Specific Knowledge (Fine tuning is costly!)
- Hallucination & Misinterpretations
- Incomplete or Unverifiable Reasoning
- Data Relevance challenges

MCP (Model Context Protocol)

- MCP is an open standard designed to provide a unified interface for connecting LLM applications with external tools and resources.
- MCP lets LLMs independently locate, select, and interact with services/data sources.
- Supports human-in-the-loop, enabling user validation and data contribution.
- MCP helps LLMs go beyond their static training data, making them more capable, accurate, and versatile by providing access to real-time information and external capabilities.

MCP Architecture

MCP follows a client-server architecture



MCP for Memory Forensics

Role of memory forensics in incident response workflow

Importance of memory forensics

- Reveals volatile data and processes
- Helps identify malicious activities
- Provides insights into system state at a specific point in time
- Assists in identifying root causes of system issues
- Supports incident response and digital investigations
- Provides context for understanding system events

Memory Image information (imageinfo)

```
root@kali:/opt/volatility# python2 vol.py -f memory.vmem imageinfo
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
INFO    : volatility.debug    : Determining profile based on KDBG search...
          Suggested Profile(s) : WinXPSP2x86, WinXPSP3x86 (Instantiated with WinXPSP2x86)
                     AS Layer1 : IA32PagedMemoryPae (Kernel AS)
                     AS Layer2 : FileAddressSpace (/opt/volatility/memory.vmem)
                      PAE type : PAE
                           DTB : 0x319000L
                          KDBG : 0x80545ae0L
          Number of Processors : 1
     Image Type (Service Pack) : 3
                KPCR for CPU 0 : 0xffdff000L
             KUSER_SHARED_DATA : 0xffdf0000L
           Image date and time : 2011-06-03 04:31:36 UTC+0000
     Image local date and time : 2011-06-03 00:31:36 -0400
```

Volatility Plugins - pslist

```
root@kali:/opt/volatility# python2 vol.py -f memory.vmem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 pslist
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
Offset(V)  Name                    PID   PPID   Thds     Hnds   Sess  Wow64 Start                          Exit
---------- -------------------- ------ ------ ------ -------- ------ ------ ------------------------------ ------------------------------
0x823c8830 System                    4      0     59      403 ------      0
0x820df020 smss.exe                376      4      3       19 ------      0 2010-10-29 17:08:53 UTC+0000
0x821a2da0 csrss.exe               600    376     11      395      0      0 2010-10-29 17:08:54 UTC+0000
0x81da5650 winlogon.exe            624    376     19      570      0      0 2010-10-29 17:08:54 UTC+0000
0x82073020 services.exe            668    624     21      431      0      0 2010-10-29 17:08:54 UTC+0000
0x81e70020 lsass.exe               680    624     19      342      0      0 2010-10-29 17:08:54 UTC+0000
0x823315d8 vmacthlp.exe            844    668      1       25      0      0 2010-10-29 17:08:55 UTC+0000
0x81db8da0 svchost.exe             856    668     17      193      0      0 2010-10-29 17:08:55 UTC+0000
0x81e61da0 svchost.exe             940    668     13      312      0      0 2010-10-29 17:08:55 UTC+0000
0x822843e8 svchost.exe            1032    668     61     1169      0      0 2010-10-29 17:08:55 UTC+0000
0x81e18b28 svchost.exe            1080    668      5       80      0      0 2010-10-29 17:08:55 UTC+0000
0x81ff7020 svchost.exe            1200    668     14      197      0      0 2010-10-29 17:08:55 UTC+0000
0x81fee8b0 spoolsv.exe            1412    668     10      118      0      0 2010-10-29 17:08:56 UTC+0000
0x81e0eda0 jqs.exe                1580    668      5      148      0      0 2010-10-29 17:09:05 UTC+0000
0x81fe52d0 vmtoolsd.exe           1664    668      5      284      0      0 2010-10-29 17:09:05 UTC+0000
0x821a0568 VMUpgradeHelper        1816    668      3       96      0      0 2010-10-29 17:09:08 UTC+0000
0x8205ada0 alg.exe                 188    668      6      107      0      0 2010-10-29 17:09:09 UTC+0000
0x820ec7e8 explorer.exe           1196   1728     16      582      0      0 2010-10-29 17:11:49 UTC+0000
0x820ecc10 wscntfy.exe            2040   1032      1       28      0      0 2010-10-29 17:11:49 UTC+0000
0x81e86978 TSVNCache.exe           324   1196      7       54      0      0 2010-10-29 17:11:49 UTC+0000
0x81fc5da0 VMwareTray.exe         1912   1196      1       50      0      0 2010-10-29 17:11:50 UTC+0000
0x81e6b660 VMwareUser.exe         1356   1196      9      251      0      0 2010-10-29 17:11:50 UTC+0000
0x8210d478 jusched.exe            1712   1196      1       26      0      0 2010-10-29 17:11:50 UTC+0000
0x82279998 imapi.exe               756    668      4      116      0      0 2010-10-29 17:11:54 UTC+0000
0x822b9a10 wuauclt.exe             976   1032      3      133      0      0 2010-10-29 17:12:03 UTC+0000
0x81c543a0 Procmon.exe             660   1196     13      189      0      0 2011-06-03 04:25:56 UTC+0000
0x81fa5390 wmiprvse.exe           1872    856      5      134      0      0 2011-06-03 04:25:58 UTC+0000
0x81c498c8 lsass.exe               868    668      2       23      0      0 2011-06-03 04:26:55 UTC+0000
0x81c47c00 lsass.exe              1928    668      4       65      0      0 2011-06-03 04:26:55 UTC+0000
0x81c0cda0 cmd.exe                 968   1664      0 --------      0      0 2011-06-03 04:31:35 UTC+0000   2011-06-03 04:31:36 UTC+0000
0x81f14938 ipconfig.exe            304    968      0 --------      0      0 2011-06-03 04:31:35 UTC+0000   2011-06-03 04:31:36 UTC+0000
```

Volatility Plugins - pstree

```
root@kali:/opt/volatility# python2 vol.py -f memory.vmem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 pstree
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
Name                                                  Pid   PPid   Thds   Hnds Time
-------------------------------------------------- ------ ------ ------ ------ ----
 0x823c8830:System                                      4      0     59    403 1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC+0000
. 0x820df020:smss.exe                                 376      4      3     19 2010-10-29 17:08:53 UTC+0000
.. 0x821a2da0:csrss.exe                               600    376     11    395 2010-10-29 17:08:54 UTC+0000
.. 0x81da5650:winlogon.exe                            624    376     19    570 2010-10-29 17:08:54 UTC+0000
... 0x82073020:services.exe                           668    624     21    431 2010-10-29 17:08:54 UTC+0000
.... 0x81fe52d0:vmtoolsd.exe                         1664    668      5    284 2010-10-29 17:09:05 UTC+0000
..... 0x81c0cda0:cmd.exe                              968   1664      0 ------ 2011-06-03 04:31:35 UTC+0000
...... 0x81f14938:ipconfig.exe                        304    968      0 ------ 2011-06-03 04:31:35 UTC+0000
.... 0x822843e8:svchost.exe                          1032    668     61   1169 2010-10-29 17:08:55 UTC+0000
..... 0x822b9a10:wuauclt.exe                          976   1032      3    133 2010-10-29 17:12:03 UTC+0000
..... 0x820ecc10:wscntfy.exe                         2040   1032      1     28 2010-10-29 17:11:49 UTC+0000
.... 0x81e61da0:svchost.exe                           940    668     13    312 2010-10-29 17:08:55 UTC+0000
.... 0x81db8da0:svchost.exe                           856    668     17    193 2010-10-29 17:08:55 UTC+0000
..... 0x81fa5390:wmiprvse.exe                        1872    856      5    134 2011-06-03 04:25:58 UTC+0000
.... 0x821a0568:VMUpgradeHelper                      1816    668      3     96 2010-10-29 17:09:08 UTC+0000
.... 0x81fee8b0:spoolsv.exe                          1412    668     10    118 2010-10-29 17:08:56 UTC+0000
.... 0x81ff7020:svchost.exe                          1200    668     14    197 2010-10-29 17:08:55 UTC+0000
.... 0x81c47c00:lsass.exe                            1928    668      4     65 2011-06-03 04:26:55 UTC+0000
.... 0x81e18b28:svchost.exe                          1080    668      5     80 2010-10-29 17:08:55 UTC+0000
.... 0x8205ada0:alg.exe                               188    668      6    107 2010-10-29 17:09:09 UTC+0000
.... 0x823315d8:vmacthlp.exe                          844    668      1     25 2010-10-29 17:08:55 UTC+0000
.... 0x81e0eda0:jqs.exe                              1580    668      5    148 2010-10-29 17:09:05 UTC+0000
.... 0x81c498c8:lsass.exe                             868    668      2     23 2011-06-03 04:26:55 UTC+0000
.... 0x82279998:imapi.exe                             756    668      4    116 2010-10-29 17:11:54 UTC+0000
... 0x81e70020:lsass.exe                              680    624     19    342 2010-10-29 17:08:54 UTC+0000
 0x820ec7e8:explorer.exe                             1196   1728     16    582 2010-10-29 17:11:49 UTC+0000
. 0x81c543a0:Procmon.exe                              660   1196     13    189 2011-06-03 04:25:56 UTC+0000
. 0x81e86978:TSVNCache.exe                            324   1196      7     54 2010-10-29 17:11:49 UTC+0000
. 0x81e6b660:VMwareUser.exe                          1356   1196      9    251 2010-10-29 17:11:50 UTC+0000
. 0x8210d478:jusched.exe                             1712   1196      1     26 2010-10-29 17:11:50 UTC+0000
. 0x81fc5da0:VMwareTray.exe                          1912   1196      1     50 2010-10-29 17:11:50 UTC+0000
```

SANS DFIR

DIGITAL FORENSICS & INCIDENT RESPONSE

Hunt Evil

POSTER

$25.00
DFPS_FOR508_v4.11_0624

Poster was created by Rob Lee and Mike Pilkington
with support of the SANS DFIR Faculty

dfir.sans.org

SANS DFIR CURRICULUM

SANSForensics @SANSForensics dfir.to/DFIRCast dfir.to/LinkedIn

DIGITAL FORENSICS

FOR498
Digital Acquisition and Rapid Triage
GBFA

FOR500
Windows Forensic Analysis
GCFE

FOR518
Mac and iOS Forensic Analysis & Incident Response
GIME

FOR585
Smartphone Forensic Analysis In-Depth
GASF

INCIDENT RESPONSE & THREAT HUNTING

FOR508
Advanced Incident Response, Threat Hunting & Digital Forensics
GCFA

FOR509
Enterprise Cloud Forensics & Incident Response
GCFR

FOR528
Ransomware and Cyber Extortion

FOR572
Advanced Network Forensics: Threat Hunting, Analysis & Incident Response
GNFA

FOR577
LINUX Incident Response and Threat Hunting

FOR578
Cyber Threat Intelligence
GCTI

FOR589
Cybercrime Intelligence

FOR608
Enterprise-Class Incident Response & Threat Hunting
GEIR

FOR610
REM: Malware Analysis Tools & Techniques
GREM

FOR710
Reverse-Engineering Malware: Advanced Code Analysis

SEC504
Hacker Tools, Techniques & Incident Handling
GCIH

Find Evil – Know Normal

Knowing what's normal on a Windows host helps cut through the noise to quickly locate potential malware.
Use the information below as a reference to know what's normal in Windows and to focus your attention on the outliers.

System

Image Path: N/A for `system.exe` – Not generated from an executable image



csrss.exe

Image Path: `%SystemRoot%\System32\csrss.exe`

...below as a reference to know what's normal in Windows and to focus your attention on the outliers.



csrss.exe

Image Path: `%SystemRoot%\System32\csrss.exe`

Parent Process: Created by an instance of `smss.exe` that exits, typically appearing as an orphan process.

Number of Instances: Two or more

User Account: Local System

Start Time: Within seconds of boot time for the first two instances (for Session 0 and 1). Start times for additional instances occur as new sessions are created, although often only Sessions 0 and 1 are created.

Description: The Client/Server Run-Time Subsystem is the user-mode process for the Windows subsystem. Its duties include managing processes and threads, importing many of the DLLs that provide the Windows API, and facilitating shutdown of the GUI during system shutdown. An instance of `csrss.exe` will run for each session. Session 0 is for services and Session 1 for the local console session. Additional sessions are created through the use of Remote Desktop and/or Fast User Switching. Each new session results in a new instance of `csrss.exe`.

services.exe

Image Path: `%SystemRoot%\System32\services.exe`

Parent Process: `wininit.exe`

Number of Instances: One

User Account: Local System

Start Time: Within seconds of boot time

Description: Implements the Unified Background Process Manager (UBPM), which is responsible for background activities such as services and scheduled tasks. `Services.exe` also implements the Service Control Manager (SCM), which specifically handles the loading of services and device drivers marked for auto-start. In addition, once a user has successfully logged on interactively, the SCM (`services.exe`) considers the boot successful and sets the Last Known Good control set (`HKLM\SYSTEM\Select\LastKnownGood`) to the value of the CurrentControlSet.

svchost.exe

- Investigating DLLs
- Investigating Process Handles
- Investigating Registry
- Time analysis
- Dumping process

Problem ?

• India’s digital forensic investigators are overwhelmed with thousands of pending cases

•Limited resources, rising cybercrime, and complex technical requirements.

•The backlog continues to grow (We need AI solutions)

Volatility MCP Server

- It’s open source!!
- Appreciation from Monnappa K A
- Beta testing
- Natural Language Memory Forensics: Ask Claude to analyze memory dumps using natural language
- Currently runs over the internet. (BUT CAN RUN LOCALLY ALSO)
- 80% accuracy

Claude

Coffee and Claude time?



file

Security Aspects of the Model Context Protocol (MCP)

UpGuard
https://www.upguard.com › blog › asana-discloses-data...

Asana Discloses Data Exposure Bug in MCP Server

Asana identified a bug in its Model Context Protocol (**MCP**) server that may have exposed data to **MCP** users in other **Asana** accounts.

“A Security Nightmare”: Docker Warns of Risks in MCP Toolchains

AUG 04, 2025 • 2 MIN READ

by

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Tool poisoning attack (TPA)



Sandbox Escape

A tool or agent breaks isolation and reaches outside resources.





Sandbox Escape

A tool or agent breaks isolation and reaches outside resources.



Others attacks

- Rug Pull Attack : A tool or server is replaced with malicious code after being trusted.
- Configuration Drift : Security settings are changed over time without being noticed.
- Package Name Squatting (servers) :A fake MCP server is set up with a misleading name.
- Indirect Prompt Injection : Harmful instructions are hidden in tool outputs or resources.
- Data Exfiltration : Sensitive information is taken out through MCP calls.
- MCP Rebinding : Connections are redirected to an attacker's server.

Real-World MCP Security Vulnerabilities

1. mcp-remote RCE (CVE-2025-6514): Hackers trick the client into running system commands via malicious endpoints. Impact: Full system compromise
2. MCP Inspector Localhost RCE (CVE-2025-49596) : Debug tool exposed to the internet allowed code execution from any website. Impact: Remote code execution via browser
3. Filesystem MCP Server – Sandbox Escape (CVE-2025-53109, CVE-2025-53110): Tools bypassed folder restrictions and accessed sensitive files. Impact: Credential leaks, privilege escalation

Real-World MCP Security Vulnerabilities

4. Tool Poisoning in Cursor IDE : Fake functions instructed the AI to exfiltrate secrets like SSH keys and AWS creds. Impact: Zero-click secret exfiltration

5. MCP Preference Manipulation Attack (MPMA): Malicious tools manipulated metadata to outrank trusted ones. Impact: Covert agent hijacking


भारत



भारतीय प्रौद्योगिकी संस्थान हैदराबाद
Indian Institute of Technology Hyderabad

सत्यमेव जयते

विज्ञान एवं
प्रौद्योगिकी मंत्रालय
MINISTRY OF
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

PARAM-1 BharatGen 2.9B Model

Why another LLM model? Why BharatGen? Whats special?

- Those model are universal in capability; they are not universal in exclusivity.
- India’s reality: 20+ official languages + 100+ dialects
- 25% of the training corpus to Indic languages across diverse scripts and domains.
- Tokenization fairness: To avoid the vocabulary fragmentation of Indian words under Western-trained tokenizers, we design a multilingual SentencePiece-based tokenizer that captures both prefix-root and agglutinative patterns common in Indian morphologies.

Why another LLM model? Why BharatGen? Whats special?

Western-trained tokenizer:

Example word: “विकासशीलता” (vikāsśīlatā = development-ness)

Broken into random subword pieces: वि | का | स | शी | ल | ता

Problem: fragmentation → inefficiency & loss of meaning

BharatGen tokenizer :

Same word: “विकासशीलता”

Recognized as structured units: विकास | शील | ता

Benefit: captures prefix-root-agglutination → preserves semantics

THANK YOU!!