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A. Wiethuechter
S. Card
AX Enterprize, LLC
R. Moskowitz
HTT Consulting
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DRIP Registries
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Abstract

~~TODO~~This document focus on DRIP-related registries and the associated registration procedures that are required for Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking (UAS RID) purposes.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

TODO

2. Terminology

2.1. Required Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2.2. Definitions

~~See~~ This document makes use of the terms defined in [drip-requirements] ~~for common DRIP terms~~. The following additional terms are defined in this document:

HDA: Hierarchial Host Identity Tags (HIT) Domain Authority. The 16 bit field identifying the HIT Domain Authority under a RAA.

HID: Hierarchy Identifier (ID). The 32 bit field providing the HIT Hierarchy ID.

RAA: Registered Assigning Authority. The 16 bit field identifying the Hierarchical HIT Assigning Authority.

Commenté [BMT1]: Please don't forget to position this effort in the context of the overall DRIP architecture.

Commenté [BMT2]: You should refer to draft-ietf-drip-rid

Commenté [BMT3]: As previous comment

Commenté [BMT4]: Idem as the previous comment

3. Provisioning

Under DRIP UAS RID, ~~a specialа~~ provisioning procedure is required to properly generate and distribute the certificates and attestations to all parties in the USS/UTM ecosystem using DRIP RID.

Keypairs are expected to be generated on the device hardware it will be used on. Due to hardware limitations (see Section 4) and connectivity it is acceptable under DRIP RID to generate keypairs for the ~~Aircraft~~ UA on Operator devices and later securely inject them into the ~~Aircraft~~ UA (as defined in Section 3.6.2). The methods to securely inject and store keypair information in a "secure element" of the ~~Aircraft~~ UA is out of scope of this document.

3.1. Overview of Transactions

~~In DRIP, e~~Each Operator MUST generate a Host Identity of the Operator (HIo) and derived Hierarchical HIT of the Operator (HHITo). These are registered with a Private Information Registry along with whatever Operator data (inc. PII) is required by the cognizant CAA and the registry. In response, the Operator will obtain a Certificate from the Registry, an Operator (Cro), signed with the Host Identity of the Registry private key (HIr(priv)) proving such registration.

An Operator may now add a UA. To do that, The Operator MUST:

* ~~An Operator MUST G~~generate a Host Identity of the ~~Aircraft~~ UA (HIa) and derived Hierarchical HIT of the ~~Aircraft~~ UA (HHITa)

* Create a Certificate from the Operator on the ~~Aircraft~~ UA (Coa) signed with the Host Identity of the Operator private key (HIo(priv)) to associate the UA with its Operator.

* Register them with a Private Information Registry along with whatever UAS data is required by the cognizant CAA and the registry.

* Obtain a Certificate from ~~the~~ that Registry on the Operator and Aircraft ("Croa") signed with the HIr(priv) proving such Registration.

* ~~And o~~Obtain a Certificate from the Registry on the Aircraft (Cra) signed with HIr(priv) proving UA registration in that specific registry while preserving Operator's privacy.

The operator then MUST provision the UA with HIa, HIa(priv), HHITa, and Cra.

Commenté [BMT5]: Please add a pointer to the DRIP ARCH I-D

Commenté [BMT6]: Align with the terms in the reqs I-D.

Commenté [BMT7]: To check that the proposal is actually secure.

Commenté [BMT8]: The previous sentence suggests this is discussed, while this one declares it out of scope.

Commenté [BMT9]: I wonder whether we can zoom into this (or provide a pointer) how this can be done.

Commenté [BMT10]: Isn't certificate missing here?

* An UA engaging in Broadcast RID MUST use HIa(priv) to sign Auth Messages and MUST periodically broadcast Cra.

* An UA~~S~~ engaging in Network RID MUST use HIa(priv) to sign Auth Messages.

* Observers MUST use HIa from received Cra to verify received Broadcast RID Auth messages.

* Observers without Internet connectivity MAY use Cra to identify the trust class of the UAS based on known registry vetting.

* Observers with Internet connectivity MAY use HHITa to perform lookups in the Public Information Registry and MAY then query the Private Information Registry which MUST enforce AAA policy on Operator PII and other sensitive information.

3.2. HHIT Delegation

Under the FAA [NPRM], it is ~~expecting~~ expected that IDs for UAS are assigned by the UTM and are generally one-time use. The methods for this, however, are unspecified leaving two options~~.~~:

1 The entity generates its own HHIT, discovering and using ~~thr~~ the RAA and HDA for the target Registry. The method for discovering a Registry's RAA and HDA is out of scope here. This allows for the device to generate an HHIT to send to the Registry to be accepted (thus generating the required Host Identity Claim) or denied.

2 The entity sends to the Registry its HI for it to be hashed and result in the HHIT. The Registry would then either accept (returning the HHIT to the device) or deny this pairing.

In either case the Registry must decide ~~on if~~whether the HI/HHIT pairing is valid. This is in its simplest form ~~is~~ about checking the current Registry for a collision based upon the HHIT.

Upon accepting a HI/HHIT pair, the Registry MUST populate the required the DNS records serving the HDA with the HIP RR and other relevant RR types (such as TXT and CERT). The Registry MUST also generate the appropriate Host Identity Claim for the given operation.

If the Registry denied the HI/HHIT pair, because there was a HHIT collision or any other reason, the Registry MUST signal back to the device being provisioned that a new HI needs to be generated.

3.3. Manufacturer

Commenté [BMT11]: Add a pointer to the authentication I-D

Commenté [BMT12]: Any indication about the frequency?

Commenté [BMT13]: What is this about

Mis en forme : Surlignage

Commenté [BMT14]: Please consider adding a reminder about how the private registry is identified.

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Commenté [BMT15]: May indicate how

Commenté [BMT16]: How this is signaled?



During the initial configuration and production at the factory the ~~Aircraft~~ UA MUST be configured to have a serial number. ASTM defines this to be an ANSI/CTA-2063A. Under DRIP a HHIT can be encoded as such to be able to convert back and forth between them. This is out of scope for this document.

If DRIP mechanisms are used, ~~Under DRIP~~ the Manufacturer SHOULD be using HHITs and have their own keypair and Cxx (Certificate: Manufacturer on Manufacturer). (Ed. Note: some words on aircraft keypair and certs here?).

Certificate: Aircraft 0 on Aircraft 0 (Ca0a0) is extracted by the manufacturer and send to their Certificate Authority (CA) to be verified and added. A resulting certificate (Attestation: Manufacturer on Aircraft 0) SHOULD be a DRIP Attestation in the Axy Form - however this could be a X.509 certificate binding the serial number to the manufacturer.

3.4. Registry

TODO

DRIP UAS RID defines two levels of hierarchy maintained by the Registration Assigning Authority (RAA) and HHIT Domain Authority (HDA). The authors anticipate that an RAA is owned and operated by a regional CAA (or a delegated party by an CAA in a specific airspace region) with HDAs being contracted out. As such a chain of trust for registries is required to ensure trustworthiness is not compromised. More information on the registries can be found in [hhit-registries].

Both the RAA and HDA generate their own keypairs and self-signed certificates (Certificate: RAA on RAA and Certificate: HDA on HDA respectively). The HDA sends to the RAA its self-signed certificate to be added into the RAA DNS.

Commenté [BMT17]: I don't get this notation

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Commenté [BMT18]: This is indeed a key requirement. Worth to insist on this in the security considerations.

The RAA confirms the certificate received is valid and that no HHIT collisions occur before added a HIP RR to its DNS for the new HDA. An Attestation: RAA on HDA is sent as a confirmation that provisioning was successful.

The HDA is now a valid "Registry" and uses its keypair and Certificate: HDA on HDA with all provisioning requests from downstream.

Commenté [BMT19]: That is?

3.5. Operator



The Operator generates a keypair and HHIT as specified in DRIP UAS RID. A self-signed certificate (Certificate: Operator on Operator) is generated and sent to the desired Registry (HDA). Other relevant information and possibly personally identifiable information needed may also be required to be sent to the Registry (all over a secure channel - the method of which is out of scope for this document).

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The Registry cross checks any personally identifiable information as required. Certificate: Operator on Operator is verified (both using the expiration timestamp and signature). The HHIT is searched in the Registries database to confirm that no collision occurs. A new attestation is generated (Attestation: Registry on Operator) and sent securely back to the Operator. Optionally the HHIT/HI pairing can be added to the Registries DNS in to form of a HIP Resource Record (RR). Other RRs, such as CERT and TXT, may also be used to hold public information.

With the receipt of Attestation: Registry on Operator the provisioning of an Operator is complete.

3.6. Aircraft

3.6.1. ~~Standard~~ Typical Provisioning

Under standard provisioning the Aircraft has its own connectivity to the Registry, the method which is out of scope for this document.



Figure 1: Standard Provision: Step 1

Through mechanisms not specified in this document the Aircraft should have methods to instruct the Aircrafts onboard systems to generate a keypair and certificate. This certificate is chained to the factory provisioned certificate (Certificate: Aircraft 0 on Aircraft 0). This new attestation (Attestation: Aircraft 0 on Aircraft N) is securely extracted by the Operator.

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With Attestation: Aircraft 0 on Aircraft N the sub certificate (Certificate: Aircraft N on Aircraft N) is used by the Operator to generate Attestation: Operator on Aircraft N. This along with Attestation: Registry on Operator is sent to the Registry.

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

Figure 2: Standard Provision: Step 2

On the Registry, Attestation: Registry on Operator is verified and used as confirmation that the Operator is already registered. Attestation: Operator on Aircraft N also undergoes a validation check and used to generate a token to return to the Operator to continue provisioning.

Upon receipt of this token, the Operator injects it into the Aircraft and its used to form a secure connection to the Registry. The Aircraft then sends Attestation: Manufacturer on Aircraft 0 and Attestation: Aircraft 0 to Aircraft N.



Figure 3: Standard Provision: Step 3

The Registry uses Attestation: Manufacturer on Aircraft 0 (with an external database if supported) to confirm the validity of the Aircraft. Attestation: Aircraft 0 on Aircraft N is correlated with Attestation: Operator on Aircraft N and Attestation: Manufacturer on Aircraft 0 to see the chain of ownership. The new HHIT tied to Aircraft N is then checked for collisions in the HDA. With the information the Registry generates two certificates: Attestation: Registry on Operator on Aircraft N and Attestation: Registry on Aircraft N (Offline Form). A HIP RR (and other RR types as needed) are generated and inserted into the HDA.

Attestation: Registry on Operator on Aircraft N is sent via a secure channel back to the Operator to be stored. Attestation: Registry on

Aircraft N (Offline Form) is sent to the Aircraft to be used in Broadcast RID.

3.6.2. ~~Operator~~ Operator-Assisted Provisioning

This provisioning scheme is for when the Aircraft is unable to connect to the Registry itself or does not have the hardware required to generate keypairs and certificates.



Figure 4: Operator Assisted Provision: Step 1

To start the Operator generates on behalf of the Aircraft a new keypair and Certificate: Aircraft N on Aircraft N. This keypair and certificate are injected into the Aircraft for it to generate Attestation: Aircraft 0 on Aircraft N. After injecting the keypair and certificate, the Operator MUST destroy all copies of the keypair.



Figure 5: Operator Assisted Provision: Step 2

Attestation: Manufacturer on Aircraft 0 and Attestation: Aircraft 0 on Aircraft N is extracted by the Operator and the following data items are sent to the Registry; Attestation: Registry on Operator,

Attestation: Manufacturer on Aircraft 0, Attestation: Aircraft 0 on Aircraft N, Attestation: Operator on Aircraft N.



Figure 6: Operator Assisted Provision: Step 3

On the Registry validation checks are done on all attestations as per the previous sections. Once complete then the Registry checks for a HHIT collision, adding to the HDA if clear and generates Attestation: Registry on Operator on Aircraft N and Attestation: Registry on Aircraft N (Offline Form). Both are sent back to the Operator.

The Operator securely inject Attestation: Registry on Aircraft N (Offline Form) and securely stores Attestation: Registry on Operator on Aircraft N.

3.6.3. Initial Provisioning

A special form of provisioning is used when the Aircraft is first sold to an Operator. Instead of generating a new keypair, the built in keypair and certificate done by the Manufacturer is used to provision and register the aircraft to the owner.

For this either Standard or ~~Operator~~ Operator-Assisted methods can be used.

4. Security Considerations

TODO

5. References

5.1. Normative References

[F3411-19] "Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking", February 2020.

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

5.2. Informative References

[drip-requirements] Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., Moskowitz, R., and A. Gurtov, "Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Requirements", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-drip-reqs-06, 1 November 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-drip-reqs-06.txt>.

[drip-rid] Moskowitz, R., Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., and A. Gurtov, "UAS Remote ID", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-drip-uas-rid-01, 9 September 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-drip-uas-rid-01.txt>.

[hhit-registries] Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter, "Hierarchical HIT Registries", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-moskowitz-hip-hhit-registries-02, 9 March 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-moskowitz-hip-hhit-registries-02.txt>.

[NPRM] "Notice of Proposed Rule Making on Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft Systems", December 2019.

Authors' Addresses

Adam Wiethuechter
AX Enterprize, LLC
4947 Commercial Drive
Yorkville, NY 13495
United States of America

Email: adam.wiethuechter@axenterprize.com

Stuart Card
AX Enterprize, LLC
4947 Commercial Drive

Yorkville, NY 13495
United States of America

Email: stu.card@axenterprize.com

Robert Moskowitz
HTT Consulting
Oak Park, MI 48237
United States of America

Email: rgm@labs.htt-consult.com