# MADINAS BoF: Mitigating DDoS Attacks Close to the Sources

M. Boucadair October 2020

### Context

- DDoS attacks are increasing
  - Residential and Enterprises are among top targets
  - Attack are more large (volume) and complex
  - Generalized because of the advent of "DDoS as a Service" offerings

"Poor security on many IoT devices makes them soft targets and often victims may not even know they have been infected"

Symantec

"OVH CTO Octave Klaba said the attacks OVH suffered were "close to 1 Tbps" and noted that the flood of traffic was a botnet made up of nearly 150,000 digital video recorders and IP cameras capable of sending 1.5 Tbps in DDoS traffic."


 Have impacts on the reputation of networks hosting these devices

### Filter Close to Sources: ISP

 The ISP can detect DDoS traffic sent from home networks but cannot identify infected devices within the home network

 ISP cannot quarantine the infected device

 Some heuristic to detect attacks may not be deterministic (e.g., flash crowds)



### Filter Close to Sources: ISP


Home Network

@H2

Hi

 Filtering based on the IPv4 address assigned to the CPE is sub-optimal

Impacts other "legitimate" traffic from that home network



### Filter Close to Sources: ISP

@IPv6 1 @IPv6 2

Home Network

@H2


Hi

 Filtering based on the IPv6 address is not efficient and have scalability problems


> Can generate a new IPv6@

Generate a new IPv6@

Same issues with /64



## Filter Close to Sources: CPE



# The Requirement

- MAC filtering is broken if a new MAC@ is generated by the infected device
- The problem is exacerbated with MAC randomization
- Means to unambiguously and persistently identify devices within a home network are thus required