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Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) Hop Limit Option
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Abstract

The presence of Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) proxies may lead to infinite forwarding loops, which is undesirable. To prevent and detect such loops, this document specifies the Hop-Limit CoAP option.

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1. Introduction

More and more applications are using Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] as a communication protocol between involved application agents. For example, [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] specifies how CoAP is used as a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack signaling protocol seeking for help from DDoS mitigation providers. In such contexts, a CoAP client can communicate directly with a server or indirectly via a proxy.

When multiple proxies are involved, infinite forwarding loops may be experienced. To prevent such loops, this document defines a new CoAP option, called Hop-Limit, which is inserted by on-path proxies. Also, the document defines a new CoAP Response Code to report loops together with relevant diagnostic information to ease troubleshooting.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Readers should be familiar with the terms and concepts defined in [RFC7252].

3. Hop-Limit Option

Hop-Limit option (see Section 4.2) is **an elective option** used to detect and prevent infinite loops when proxies are involved. Only one single instance of the option is allowed in a message.

~~The length of the Hop-Limit option is 1 byte. The value of the Hop-Limit Hop-Limit option is encoded as an unsigned integer (see Section 3.2 of [RFC7252]).~~

~~Each intermediate~~ This value **MUST be between 0 and 255 inclusive.**

If a CoAP proxy receives a request which does not include a Hop-Limit option, it SHOULD insert a Hop-Limit option when relaying the request to the next hop (absent explicit policy/configuration otherwise).

The initial Hop-Limit value SHOULD be configurable. If no initial value is explicitly provided, the default initial Hop-Limit value of 16 MUST be used. Because forwarding errors may occur if inadequate Hop-Limit values are used, proxies at the boundaries of an administrative domain MAY be instructed to remove or rewrite the value of Hop-Limit carried in received messages (i.e., ignore the value of Hop-Limit received in a message).

Otherwise, each intermediate proxy, which understands the Hop-Limit option, involved in the handling of a CoAP message MUST decrement the Hop-Limit option value by 1 prior to forwarding upstream if this parameter exists.

The Hop-Limit option is safe to forward. That is, a CoAP proxy which does not understand the Hop-Limit option should forward it on.

CoAP messages **MUST NOT** be forwarded if the Hop-Limit option is set to '0' after decrement. Messages that cannot be forwarded because of exhausted Hop-Limit **SHOULD** be logged with a ~~5-06 TBA1~~ (Hop Limit Reached) error message sent back to the CoAP peer. It is **RECOMMENDED** that CoAP agents support means to alert administrators about loop errors so that appropriate actions are undertaken.

To ease debugging and troubleshooting, the CoAP proxy which detects a loop **SHOULD** include its information (e.g., server name, **server** alias, IP address) in the diagnostic payload under the conditions detailed in Section 5.5.2 of [RFC7252].

Each intermediate proxy involved in relaying a ~~5-06 TBA1~~ (Hop Limit Reached) error message **SHOULD** prepend its own information in the diagnostic payload with a space character used as separator. Only one information per proxy ~~MUST~~ **SHOULD** appear in the diagnostic payload.

~~The initial Hop-Limit value SHOULD be configurable. If no initial value is explicitly provided, the default initial Hop-Limit value of 16 MUST be used. Because forwarding errors may occur if inadequate Hop-Limit values are used, proxies at the boundaries of an administrative domain MAY be instructed~~
~~Doing so allows to rewrite limit the value size of Hop-Limit carried in received messages (that is, ignore the value of Hop-Limit carried in received messages).~~ **TBA1 (Hop Limit received in a message): Reached**
error message, and to ease correlation with hop counts.

4. IANA Considerations

4.1. CoAP Response Code

IANA is requested to add the following entries to the "CoAP Response Codes" sub-registry available at <https://www.iana.org/assignments/core-parameters/core-parameters.xhtml#response-codes>:

Code	Description	Reference
5-06 TBA1	Hop Limit Reached	[RFCXXXX]

Table 1: CoAP Response Codes

4.2. CoAP Option Number

IANA is requested to add the following entry to the "CoAP Option Numbers" sub-registry available at <https://www.iana.org/assignments/core-parameters/core-parameters.xhtml#option-numbers>:

Number	C	U	N	R	Name	Reference
2 TBA2			x	x	Hop-Limit	[RFCXXXX]

C=Critical, U=Unsafe, N=NoCacheKey, R=Repeatable

Table 2: CoAP Option Number

5. Security Considerations

Security considerations related to CoAP proxying are discussed in Section 11.2 of [RFC7252].

The diagnostic payload of a TBA1 (Hop Limit Reached) error message may leak sensitive information revealing the topology of a domain. To prevent that, a CoAP proxy which is located at the boundary of an administrative domain MAY be instructed to strip the diagnostic payload or part of it before forwarding on the TBA1 response.

6. Acknowledgements

This specification was part of [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]. Many thanks to those who reviewed DOTS specifications.

Thanks to Klaus Hartke, Carsten Bormann, Peter van der Stok, and Jim Schaad for the review.

7. References

~~6.1.~~

7.1. Normative References

- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>>.
- [RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252, DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>>.

~~6.2.~~

7.2. Informative References

- [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] Reddy, T., Boucadair, M., Patil, P., Mortensen, A., and N. Teague, "Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification", draft-~~ietf-dots-signal-channel-22~~ **ietf-dots-signal-channel-25** (work in progress), ~~August~~ **September** 2018.

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