APPENDIX II

CHAPTER I

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF HATE PROPAGANDA -- A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION; STATEMENT OF AIMS; WORKING ASSUMPTIONS

Though intergroup conflict, hate, and violence appear to be the inevitable corollary of the human condition throughout history, their scientific investigation is of recent origin. Certain revolutionary religious teachers, such as Asoka and Jesus, proclaimed humanity's essential one-ness, but such exhortations, according to the historic record, served little to counteract the suspicion and fear people were wont – and often with good reason – to display toward the individual or group alien in pigmentation, language, or religious ritual. With so much intuitively convincing evidence that these visible differences implied irreconcilable differences in moral and intellectual qualities, the burden of proof was upon science to demonstrate the fallacy of such beliefs, just as convincing evidence was needed to allow the Copernican system to prevail over the Ptolomeian.

Klineberg (1940) in a series of studies, (Klineberg, 1931, 1935; Peterson & Lanier, 1929; Garth, 1935) adduced overwhelming evidence against meaningful inborn racial or ethnic differences in intelligence or personality attributes. Even the rearguard action of recent opponents of these findings (Weyl & Possony, 1963) manages to adduce very doubtful evidence for rather minor differences in intelligence between American Negroes and whites which, even in the event that they reflected a true and enduring racial difference, would be far outweighed by the enormous variability within each of the two races. As pointed out so effectively by Allport (1954), it would be the case that many individuals of the less endowed race would outclass many members of the "superior" race, so that very little could be said about a given individual's abilities, without measuring them individually. These findings are widely supported by most responsible scientists (see, e.g., Benedict, 1959; Montagu, 1963; Allport, 1954; Mead, 1964; and Boas, 1928).

The very fact that "natural" differences can no longer plausibly explain such conflicts has led to some more recent formulations, briefly discussed below:

1) Aggression and hostility have been viewed as a universal instinct. Here, it suffices to cite the most notable proponent of this theory, Freud (1933), who

postulated two basic instincts, EROS and THANATOS; the latter, a negative, destructive drive, may be turned against others or the self. Physiologists, ethologists, zoologists, and psychologists have supplied considerable evidence indicating that even among lower mammals species, specific, hereditary, or physiological factors play a minor part in the prediction of aggressive behaviour (Clark & Birch, 1945; Scott, 1958; Tinbergen, 1953). This already minor role decreases to the point of practical non-existence where primates and humans are concerned (McNeil, 1959; Seward, 1945; Menninger, 1942). In their view, no explanatory advantage is gained by references to this mysterious, universal quid called "aggressive instinct".

2) Studies have been undertaken of the personality dynamics of individuals obsessed with a high degree of group hatred, and the manner in which such attitudes might be prevented or cured. Put somewhat differently, questions are asked about the basic differences between people tending toward liberal, democratic attitudes, and those favouring authoritarian, intolerant systems. It is relevant to point out that this difference is often viewed as a dichotomy, much on the lines of early Western films, with liberal heroes on one side, and antidemocratic villains on the other. Over the last two decades a number of more or less inspired studies have appeared which attempt to find predictive and correlated variables identifying the personality structure of the fanatic hater (see, e.g., Hoffer, 1958; Sartre, 1948). Other studies have aimed at careful psychological measurement of individual personality traits, and often have found reliable and unsuspected relationships between antidemocratic tendencies and attitudes toward parents, sexual mores, (Adorno et al., 1950) esthetic preferences (Rosenberg & Zimet, 1957) persuasibility (Linton & Graham, 1959) etc. On the other hand, people may be found to espouse even extreme political philosophies if motivated by the expectation of power or financial gain (see e.g., Busch, 1953). It might be argued that a person has to be seriously disturbed to engage in this type of activity, but this argument does not appear to hold. Observation shows that some individuals will cling to their beliefs even in the face of great adversity, while others are easily persuaded to find quite different means of earning a livelihood, if hate propaganda does not pay off.

This distinction is extremely important where a clinical approach toward possible changes in such persons is the main object. For our purposes, it is secondary. Evidence will be presented that communicators can, on occasion, be deterred from emitting hate communications. In some instances, this is surely just a form of compliance with situational requirements, without much of an attitude change; in others, more permanent and deep-reaching effects might obtain. However, within the framework of this survey we shall be concerned with the large majority which neither hates nor loves fanatically. Our focus will be not upon the origins of the extreme group hatred displayed by a few individuals, and its possible cure, but upon the vast majority of individuals whose attitudes and behaviour can be reliably guided by

various persuasive processes, among which formal education and religion are instances. This document will make the working assumption that, in a society of millions of people, there exists a certain number of individuals who, whether we wish to classify them as mentally ill, criminals, or simply deviants, find satisfaction or gain in the nurture and propagation of hate of others. This position does not imply a dichotomous fallacy similar to the one described earlier. It also is not asserted that communication and persuasion always proceed in only one direction. We shall show that, in a face to face situation, the initial responses of the recipient affect further emissions by the communicator, and one of the ways to deal with communicators suggested later in this memorandum originates precisely from these findings. However, observation and experiment both show a decided tendency toward onesidedness in the process of persuasive communication; and we shall assume, both for the sake of simplifying our analysis, and because we are, after all, interested only in the communication from a greater to a lesser "hater", that derogatory information flows in one direction only. A similar assumption is made later on, when corrective and preventive measures are discussed. Some attention will thus be directed toward the communicator of hate propaganda, but this will be done chiefly in terms of the social environment which, in the short or the long run, affects the likelihood of his emitting such propaganda, the manner, time and place in which he may do so, and whom he tries to influence. Our main emphasis, however, in examining the communication process will be directed to personality variables of potential recipients, the environmental factors affecting acceptance of propaganda, the form and content of propaganda materials, and the manner in which the communicator is perceived by the recipient in terms of expertness, status, power, and so on. On a more complex level, interactions among perceived communicator, message, recipient, and situational variables will be examined.

3) The position is stated or implied that there is built into most of the more complex living organisms a mechanism which, if triggered, releases a certain quantity of aggression, much like a fluid filling a vessel and released if the vessel is unstoppered. Both the source of that aggression and the eventual trigger are supposed to be "frustration". From this same formulation are derived also such frequently used terms as "displacement", i.e., the direction of aggression against a target other than the original frustrator, mainly because of some presumed similarity between frustrator and target, and "catharsis", a term representing both the process of purging oneself of the noxious fluid by aggressing, and the subsequent state of lessened tension which is assumed to ensue. The notion that hating the outsider leads to better functioning within a group is due in part to this hypothesis, and dislike of an outgroup is therefore sometimes advocated by otherwise temperate individuals especially in times of crisis. If the pressure of anger can be lessened by venting it upon an outsider, then group efficiency will not be disrupted by the need to aggress further. Psychologists first examined aggression in the context of the Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis (Dollard et al.,

1939). Frustration is defined as the interference with an act directed toward some goal, and aggression as the response which, to paraphrase, reduces the anger caused by such interference, but not the interference itself. The Hypothesis then asserts that there exists a one-to-one relationship between frustration and aggression; that, in other words, frustration always causes aggression, and aggression is always caused by frustration.

Dollard et al. (1939) examine not only inter-individual aggression, but also race and religious prejudice in the light of this Hypothesis. For instance, persecution against Jews in Germany and Negroes in the United States is viewed as aggression engendered by economic frustrations and displaced from the true sources of frustration upon accessible and weaker targets. With some modifications, this view of aggression and aggressive tendencies continues to be held by some psychologists (McNeil, 1959; Berkowitz, 1964), and sociologists (Lasswell, 1962, p. 111) and is widely accepted by psychiatrists (Menninger, 1942) and laymen. It is implied in the often-heard admonitions that, a) individuals should be spared frustrations lest they become aggressive, and b) that, in order to understand and perhaps correct aggressive tendencies, it is both necessary and sufficient to discover the frustrations a person has suffered earlier in life.

Experimental data superficially supporting the notion of catharsis, i.e., cases in which aggression leads to an apparent subsequent lessening of aggressive tendencies are matched by other data indicating that aggression may easily become a habit which grows stronger each time it is indulged (Fesnbach, 1955, 1956; Bandura & Walters, 1963). Also, it is not at all clear that other factors such as self-blame or a feeling that one has made one's point, may not have a part in the temporary decrease in aggression following some aggressive act.

The Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis has frequently resulted in quite circular reasoning and, where rigorously independent definitions for "frustration" and "aggression" were given, has quite often not been confirmed. It makes no scientific sense to observe what appears to be frustration which is not followed by any type of observable aggression, and to argue that therefore the person was "not really frustrated", or to observe some aggressive behaviour, and to conclude directly that it must have been preceded by some type of frustration. Furthermore, where the relationship does seem to hold, it is not clear that we are dealing with some immutable, "built-in" relationship, similar, say, to the migratory movements of swallows released predictably by hormonal changes which, in turn, are caused by the relative length of days and nights. It is far more probable that the individual has learned that in certain situations, commonly referred to as "frustrating", it is appropriate to respond by derogating or attacking the frustrator. These are, of course, quite different processes from the hydraulic model according to which aggression must be drained away so that pressure may be reduced. Klineberg (1950)

> points out that acts of violence against other groups do not necessarily occur in societies where the likelihood of individual frustration is greater. More important, Sherif & Sherif (1965) argue cogently that "we cannot legitimately extrapolate from the individual's motivational urges and frustrations to his experience and behaviour in group situations, as if interaction processes and reciprocities within a group were a play of shadows" (p. 158).

Finally, before proceeding further, it might be of value to examine even in this preliminary statement the question: Are we dealing with a social problem at all?

The first issue in an evaluation of hate literature in particular, and persuasive communication in general, is the question of its presumed effects. Clearly, if it can be established without question that the productions of a few individuals on the fringe of human society are totally ineffective in affecting other individuals in any way, then the question would be reduced to preventing these individuals from committing physical attacks against others, and perhaps themselves.

The position of our society is extremely ambivalent toward this issue. On the one hand, it is expected of the individual (though we no longer insist that he is so equipped at birth) that he acquire at an early age enduring and clearly defined standards of right and wrong, which should safeguard him against all temptation. On the other hand, commercial, religious, and political establishments are engaged in continuous efforts at changing his attitudes and behaviour, with appeals which range from the predominantly rational to the clearly emotional, often the blatantly irrational.

A somewhat modified viewpoint, based in part upon an inversion of the Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis, the shortcomings of which are illustrated above, asserts confidently that we have nothing to fear from influence attempts at group hatred or intolerance as long as our society is relatively free from economic or political stress. It has often been asserted, by dedicated and expert individuals, that the Canadian public, by virtue of social stability and economic well-being, is relatively immune to communications advocating strongly negative attitudes and behaviour against Jews. Such an assertion, from experts so deeply concerned with the problem of human relations, cannot be dismissed lightly. On the other hand, wishful thinking or inadequate research should not be allowed to beg so important a question. Both historical and experimental data show that in times of crisis and upheaval people are more susceptible to hitherto untried ideas, some of which may be those of fanatics and demagogues. It is clearly fallacious, though, to conclude therefrom that no one is susceptible to such ideas during times of stability. Discontent and fear cannot be assumed to be absent even in a prosperous society. Their origins may be of many kinds other than economic. Indeed, this century is often referred to as "The Age of Anxiety", with no reservations about prosperity as an antidote. Thus, even if we wish to remain within the assumption

that only frustration engenders aggression, it is clearly impossible to safeguard all people from all frustrations all the time, even in Canada today.

More important, it is often easy to point to presumed causes of extremist behaviour *after* such behaviour has been observed, but it is still notoriously unfruitful to predict, for a given individual, whether, say, the humiliations he suffered in the 6th grade because of his slight stature will lead him toward a path of deviation and crime, or induce him to become an eminent physiologist.

It has been maintained by individuals with insight who are passionately committed to human rights and dignity that the hate literature commonly encountered bears obvious similarity to the writings one might expect to encounter on the walls of public lavatories, and should be accorded similar attention. In view of the overwhelming evidence that people can be influenced in many ways, the argument that we can safely ignore attempts at spreading wholly irrational emotions can be maintained only if it is argued that such attempts are qualitatively different from all other attempts at persuasion, with which the member of society is faced in his daily interaction with religion, commerce, politics, etc. Such an argument is clearly untenable. However horrifying the content of these materials, the pseudo-reasoning and sham logic, the emotional tone, the facile generalizations, are all present in many of the more innocuous categorizations and stereotypes most of us use in our daily decision processes. Assume the following: I once ate lobster; I became ill. It is not unlikely that I shall refrain from a careful analysis of all the possible antecedent-consequent relationships involved. Are all lobsters bad for me, or just that one? Was it poorly prepared? Was it something else that made me ill? Did I perhaps anticipate that lobster would make me ill? Perhaps I am even reasonable enough to say: "Perhaps not all lobsters are bad, perhaps this one was an exceptional case, but why take chances? There are lots of other foods." Substitute "Jew" for "lobster", "business deal" for "eating", and "lots of other (gentile) business people" for "lots of other food", and we have a good example of the genteel anti-semitism wearing the mask of reasonableness one encounters so often.

The study by Wax (1948), cited also by Allport (1954) illustrates the particular form of prejudice which we might call "playing it safe". Wax answered advertisements for several Ontario resorts. He did so using both a Gentile and a Jewish name, and asked for precisely the same accommodation at the same time. Under the Jewish pseudonym, only 52% replied, and only 36% offered accommodation. The "Gentile" was offered accommodation in 93% of the cases. One need not pursue this instance to the point of drawing an analogy with instances in which similar attitudes later led to the condoning of, even the participation in, genocide. It is quite sufficient to agree that such an argument leads to the easy conclusion that certain individuals are unfit for some social roles purely because of ethnic or other group characteristics. The discriminatory recruiting practices by major companies for executive training in colleges (Globe & Mail, May 25, 1965, p. 88) exemplifies this philosophy.

In psychological literature, the classic conformity studies by Asch (1955) and Crutchfield (1955) are frequently cited as evidence of the degree to which intelligent adults conform to social pressures. In those studies, individuals found themselves in situations in which the evidence of their senses and reasoning powers, as well as their self-evaluation, were faced with divergent group opinions.

More relevant is a recent study by Milgram (1963) in which two-thirds of a group of male adults, asked to administer gradually increasing shock to a defense less victim in another room under an only moderately plausible pretext, did so and reached maximal shock intensity, despite clear "danger" indications on the apparatus and ominous silence from the victim preceded by energetic protests.* No sanctions for non-compliance were mentioned. These commissions of atrocity in the true sense of the word were, in some instances, accompanied by anguished groans, in others by self-blame, and yet in others by seemingly hysterical laughter. Yet, and this is the important point, these acts *were* committed, without direct protest to the experimenter, indeed without even questioning his motives. Though Milgram carefully points to such variables as the sponsorship of this experiment by a renowned university, the rationale given for administering shock (it was supposed to aid the victim in performing a learning task, and thus give us important insights into the learning process), one cannot help recalling Eichmann's defence, and that of lesser murderers, that they acted under orders which originated from a respected source. There is also some reason to believe that had the experimental subjects participated in a similar experiment on repeated occasions, most of them would have learned to bear the concomitant anguish and guilt with considerably greater composure.

Assuming, then, that attitudes and behaviour can be learned and changed at practically any age, there are four viewpoints from which this state of affairs can be examined.

1) The ethical aspect. What should people believe or learn?

2) Given certain values, how are they optimally translated into codified norms, or laws?

3) What are the processes whereby individuals accept or reject norms, attitudes, and instigation to engage in certain behaviour?

4) What are the effects of the unrestricted commerce of ideas derogatory to a given group upon the members of that group?

Point #1 is close to the heart of any concerned individual; it represents the basic question of values in human life. Since Plato's call for the philosopher-king, we have not settled the question of who should establish these values. We can

*It might not be amiss to point out that, of course, the victim was a confederate of the experimenter, received no real shock, and that the experimental subjects later were fully informed about the true purpose of the study and the deceptions that were practised.

only hope that, over time, we can learn a valid hierarchy of values, and implement it in our lives. Point #2 is, clearly, both moral and legal, and fraught with conflict where a desired norm, say, freedom of speech, may on occasion have to be codified so as to run contrary to certain forms of such free speech. It may thus also become a subject for inquiry for the logician, but it is, for our purposes, well outside the province of the behavioural scientist.

The rest of the paper will therefore deal only with points #3 and #4.

To summarize, the present memorandum makes the following working assumptions, which will not be subject to further documentation:

1. It is in the interest of our society from every viewpoint to further inter-group respect and tolerance.

2. There exists, in a large population, a relatively small number of individuals preoccupied with intense feelings of hostility, for which in many instances we have no satisfactory explanation. Their proportion is probably affected by social, economic, and political variables, but cannot be assumed to be zero in any society. Their hostility may be indiscriminately directed against all people, or may be focused upon specific groups, however irrationally defined. Whether such individuals are truly pathological, ignorant, criminal, or simply statistical accidents, their undoubted interest to persons concerned with mental health is not denied. In the context of the present document, however, little weight will be placed upon the seeking out of phylo- and ontogenetic determinants of such deviation. Instead, the examination of such individuals will be limited to two aspects:

   a) Responses of the persons with whom they seek to communicate and the social milieu in a wider sense which might affect the content, form, intensity, and frequency of their communication attempts;

   b) Their characteristics as perceived by the recipients of communications that might affect the acceptance of these communications. Individuals who pursue hate strategies purely for gain will not be differentiated in this study.

3. Rather than view the world as populated by two kinds of people, authoritarians and liberals, we shall consider the many members of a society as being composed of individuals whose behaviour and attitudes can assume, under properly conducive conditions, widely different forms of mutual respect or intolerance. Except as stated under assumption #2, we shall not be concerned with the individuals at either end of the spectrum, the violent hater or the near saint.

4. The notion of a one-to-one relationship between frustration and aggression is dismissed, not because it has been conclusively disproved, but because it has been found inaccurate, inadequate, or unparsimonious in

the explanation and prediction of behaviour. Similarly, catharsis as a necessary and sufficient safety valve for accumulated agressive needs, and displacement as attack taking place upon some hypothetical dimension of similarity are not taken into consideration.

5. Finally, our fifth working assumption is that people of all ages, and irrespective of other factors such as intelligence, education, and economic status, are to a greater or lesser degree capable of being influenced by rational or emotional persuasion, to change both their attitudes and their behaviour, aggressive or otherwise.

Our analysis will be concerned with the variables affecting the effectiveness of communication as a technique of spreading inter-group hostility, the resulting attitude and behaviour changes on the part of converts to and targets of these communications, and the value and feasibility of possible counter-measures.

APPENDIX II

CHAPTER II

SOCIAL, EDUCATIONAL, AND CULTURAL FACTORS IN THE EARLY FORMATION OF PREJUDICE

The present chapter will be devoted mainly to disposing at greater length of some generalizations and misconceptions about prejudice and its propagation.

A history of the relationship between discontent, the breakdown of an established order, and the incidence of extremism could fill volumes, and has been the topic of philosophers, historians, sociologists, and novelists. A further documentation in this Report would be an elaboration of the obvious. More important for the present purpose, and far more frequently overlooked, is the question whether economic and cultural stability eliminates political or religious extremism. As pointed out above, this inference is sometimes drawn by highly sophisticated individuals who wholeheartedly oppose such extremism.

In the words of Allport (1962):

> "Societal forces, taken in the round, are distal causal factors in group relations. From them one can predict, at least roughly, the course of conflict... At the same time, the intervening factor of personality is ever the proximal cause of all human conduct. Conformity is the missing link that explains why and how societal forces eventuate into patterns of acceptance or discrimination – – so far as they do so... In so far as societal predictions fail it is because they overlook the non-conformist, deviant, morphogenic aspects of personal behaviour – – of which there are many."

Also, conformity with discrimination practices may be quite unrelated to the intensity of one conformer's prejudice (Dean & Rosen, 1955). However, conformity is in itself not a unitary trait, nor can it be said to be completely present or absent in a person, and even if it were, we should still be at a loss to predict to what such greater or lesser conformity will occur.

The fallacies of looking for imperviousness to hate propaganda because a society is relatively stable and prosperous, and that of drawing inferences from individual motives upon social behaviour have already been mentioned. The membership roll of the John Birch Society and similar organizations contains few names that are found on the public relief list.

Before continuing with a precise examination of the variables of hate communications in the following chapter, two relevant social factors will be

discussed, viz. a) the meaning ot stereotypes, b) the role of secular and religious education.

As MacIver & Page (1949) point out:

> "The individual is not born with prejudices, any more than he is born with sociological understanding. The way he thinks as a member of a group, especially about other groups, is at bottom the result of social indoctrination, in both its direct and its indirect forms, indoctrination that inculcates beliefs and attitudes, which easily take firm hold in his life through the process of habituation." (p. 407)

And Horowitz (1936):

> "Individual attitudes toward the Negro stem not from his personal experiences with them, nor from the intensity of suffering because of the Negro, but rather upon the norms of one's reference group."

To these statements we might add that this indoctrination begins very early, often in quite indirect form. Stereotypes, which Klineberg (1965) calls "pictures in our heads," furthermore assume a considerable degree of consistency within a given culture, and about specific groups (Katz & Braly, 1933; Ehrlich, 1962). It may well be that stereotyping is an indispensable form of generalizing from immensely varied perceptions and cognitions. For instance, Duijker & Frijda (1960) argue that stereotyping has the function of rendering our world more manageable. The crucial distinction drawn by Klineberg is not between stereotypes and no stereotypes, but between flexibility and rigidity in the process of stereotyping. The flexible process will modify a stereotype in the light of new information, and will thus avoid the distorted perceptions that would otherwise persist. That distorted perceptions result from previously formed stereotypes has been conclusively shown in a number of studies. For instance, in an experiment by Razran (1950) people evaluated girls' pictures without names in terms of beauty, likeability, character, etc. Two months later, the same individuals evaluated the same pictures again, but this time some of the pictures bore Jewish or Italian names, others had Irish or Anglo-Saxon names. Jewish or Italian names resulted in a substantial drop of liking, and some decrease in ratings of beauty and character. On the other hand, especially for "Jewish" girls, an increase in attributed ambition occurred.

There is also evidence that the knowledge that one is perceived as a stereotype often results in one's living up to that stereotype. Merton (1949) calls this the self-fulfilling prophecy. A knows that B expects him to be miserly, grasping, and assertive, or, if A is an adolescent, rowdy and ill-mannered, and he may produce just that kind of behaviour. (It should be noted, however, that

such perceived expectations may result in exactly opposite behaviour on the part of A. We shall return to this topic in the final part of this paper).

The notion that stereotypes have some basis in fact, however small, has occasionally been disconfirmed (La Piere, 1936; Shrieke, 1936; Buchanan & Cantril, 1953) or been found to be completely nonsensical where, for instance, students were asked to attribute personality characteristics to unknown persons purely on the basis of their given names. For instance, "Richard", it was widely agreed, must be handsome, "Herman" must be stupid, etc. (Schoenfeld, 1942). The argument that many stereotypes are false does not, of course, imply that all of them are false. Presumably, the stereotype that Watusis are darker-skinned than Danes is almost universally applicable.

Newcomb (1947) points out that the development of inter-group hostility often results in a breaking-off of contacts between the groups, thus allowing the misperceptions and hostilities to crystallize and become legitimized by tradition. These speculations were borne out in an experimental situation by Thibaut & Coules (1952). Simply cutting off communication between two individuals after hostility has arisen caused that hostility to increase further. We shall show later, however, that the obvious counter-measure of increasing contacts between conflicting groups produces the desired effects only under certain conditions.

There is some evidence that groups focusing antagonism upon an outsider can develop bonds of intense intragroup loyalty (Lippitt & White, 1958; Chesler & Schmuck, 1963), but the price for such an outcome is disputable on ethical as well as practical grounds, since a modus vivendi with the target of hostility may have to be found some day. The situation becomes more ambiguous still if the target is not a group or nation in some relatively remote area of the globe, but a part of the very society whose harmony is at stake. Whatever the merits of competition engendered by inter-group rivalry within a society, this study will assume that they are outweighed by the tensions, hostilities, and sufferings they produce.

A considerable variety of studies has shown that people perceive other people and situations selectively (Allport & Postman, 1947; Razran, 1950) i.e., in such a manner as to notice mainly those characteristics which their expectations and stereotypes led them to expect, or with considerable, often incredible distortions (Razran, 1950). More amazingly still, incontrovertible perceptual evidence is often reinterpreted in order to make it match an expectation, so that the same act or event acquires totally different meanings according to the expectations of the perceiver (consider, e.g., an offer of general disarmament by Russia as seen by a conservative American, or the analogous obverse).

For the moment, then, it can be safely concluded that stereotypes result in selective and distorted perception, and, on the part of the stereotyped individual,

may result in his living up to the stereotype, or reacting to it by behaving in an opposite extreme. The relevance of these findings to our present purpose becomes obvious if we consider that, as Allport (1954) has stated, stereotypes and subtle rejection have always preceded more overt acts of discrimination, and that few people, even those who see little threat in Canadian extremist movements, would dispute that in this country too, invalid and unflattering stereotypes are held by a large number of individuals about members of various ethnic groups.

There can be no question that education, religious and secular, may play a salient part in moulding the growing citizen's attitudes, by making him more or less susceptible to certain types of persuasion. However, as Lasswell (1960) indicated:

> "The point has often been made that the chief strategy of democracy has traditionally been "negative," that is, trust in competitive practice rather than an explicit positive goal. The body politic is assumed to be in sound health if political parties, businesses, and mass media are in competition. No one would seriously deny that a very considerable degree of power dispersal is likely to be more favorable to freedom than hyper-concentration of power. But competition is not enough. The plain fact is that the best information and the most competent interpretations may not appear even in a competitive press." (p. 315)

We can readily consider this observation as extending beyond formal scholastic training, for, merely by looking at readership figures for newspapers, it becomes evident that a large number of citizens are precluded access to optional information and are, instead, treated to simplifications, distortions, and platitudes.

Education suffers from other handicaps. Rose (1964) gives a graphic picture of the difficulties faced even by highly skilled educators in dealing with the early and habitual exposure to prejudice which children so often experience. Finally, Stember (1961) quotes convincing evidence that more education does not imply less prejudice, even though the form and expression of prejudice varies across educational strata.

Schein (1958) in his well-known work on "Brainwashing" of American prisoners in Korea, and Milgram (1964) in some after-thoughts on a series of brilliantly conceived studies of morality and obedience,* go one step further in questioning, in particular, the role of American education in instilling moral values in American youth. Perhaps a culture which prizes absolute obedience is likely to magnify further the unquestioning and criminal compliance found by Milgram to

* One of Milgram's studies has already been cited. The relevance of this recent series of studies is, however, so crucial to the issue under discussion that repeated references will be relevant at various points of this paper.

orders clearly injurious to an innocent victim. But if even a society which professes to value liberalism and individuality produces such compliance in 2/3 of a sample of adults, then the questioning of educational effectiveness is clearly in order.*

Turning to religious education, the issue becomes both sensitive and murky. It is often argued that, though the individual must learn from his everyday experience in order to become a member of his society, his ethical and moral standards are derived principally from religious teachings. It is difficult to test these assertions directly, but it is suggestive to note that, though there exist certain relationships between religious denomination on the one hand, and incidence and type of legal offence on the other, no such relationship appears to exist between the intensity of religious beliefs and likelihood of transgression (excepting, perhaps, a very few deeply religious individuals, who could probably be matched by a similar proportion of highly ethical atheists).

Without wishing to offend anyone's religious sensibilities, it must surely be admitted that the Christian ideal of universal love has found only fragmentary implementation, except for a few saintly individuals, and some minor sects. If this statement is made about Christian religions, this is probably because non-Christian religions, including the Jewish faith, have not played policy-making roles in European or American history. It has recently even been argued persuasively by Christian theologians that Christianity has actually fostered anti-semitism by its teachings (Simpson, undated; Olson, 1961). The recent debates regarding Catholic doctrine and its official position toward Judaism tend to bear out these assertions.

Also, Sanford's (1950) well-known findings indicate that individuals professing some religious affiliation expressed more prejudice than those who professed no such affiliation, though no relationships were found with denomination and frequency of church attendance.

Several of the major Christian denominations appear to be conducting a thorough re-examination of their stand on the brotherhood of man. No doubt, this re-evaluation will do much to reduce susceptibility to hate propaganda directed, specifically, against Jews. However, some cautious projections derived from other social issues on which churches have taken a stand in the past indicate that such stands are effective mainly where they coincide with clearly stated secular laws or where there is direct relevance to ecclesiastic matters. For instance, in a study by Charters & Newcomb (1958), Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant college students were made aware of their religious affiliations, and were then asked their "own personal opinions" on various matters concerning

* Some alarming speculations arise also from recent happenings in New York and Toronto, where bystanders watched passively while a victim was being attacked and, in the New York case, murdered. Experimental investigation of how far this non-involvement can go is now being planned by this writer.

the three religions, politics, and feminism. Only the Catholic Group showed greater adherence to the position of their Church than a control group to whom their religious affiliation had not been stressed. More importantly, this "falling into line" with the standards of the Church occurred only in matters directly relevant to Catholic doctrine, leaving other areas unaffected.

In sum, without resorting to banal and facile recriminations, there are grounds for questioning the wisdom of a society in relying solely upon the formal educative process, secular and spiritual, in order to ensure full and responsible citizenship.

Hate Propaganda Seen as Attempts at Persuasion

The following four chapters analyse the spread of hate propaganda as a situation in which one or more individuals attempt to persuade one or more others. As pointed out in the first chapter, a one-way persuasion flow will be assumed; no attention is paid to the possible state of affairs where such persuasion results in spirited and perhaps convincing rebuttal. On the other hand, the communicator will be viewed as being susceptible to feedback from the recipient in terms of acceptance and rejection, and to what he perceives to be an acceptable or unacceptable social milieu.

APPENDIX II

CHAPTER III

THE COMMUNICATOR OF HATE PROPAGANDA AS PERCEIVED BY THE RECIPIENT

The way in which the recipient perceives the communicator is an important determinant of the amount of opinion change. Research on the most effective communicator has been carried out under these headings: a) liking or attraction for the communicator, b) his status, c) his trustworthiness, d) his perceived goals, e) his power, and f) his perceived knowledgeability.

a) *Attraction* to the communicator can be a relevant variable both when the communicator is a single person, and when the "communicator" is really a group. Regarding the former, it has been found (Kelman & Eagley, 1965; Berkowitz & Goranson, 1956) that subjects show a marked tendency to misperceive the message of a disliked communicator by displacing it away from their own position, and of a positive communicator by displacing it towards their own position. Back (1951) found personal attraction a potent aid to persuasion. Similar results might apply to the induction of any common prejudice. Regarding the communicator as a group, several studies (Festinger, Schachter & Back, 1950; Kelley & Volkart, 1952; Kiesler, 1963) have shown that the more the members are attracted to the group (or the greater the group cohesiveness), the greater is their conformity to its norms. As for non-members or marginal members, both an experiment (Dittes & Kelley, 1956) and a field study (Menzel, 1957) have shown a greater conformity to group norms among the subjects least accepted by the group. Thus, opinion change increases if the members feel attracted to the group in some way, and wish to find acceptance by it.

   It should be noted that at the present stage of hate propaganda in Canada, this variable still has negligible importance, since person-to-person influence processes are rare. Some studies indicate, however, that, where the legitimacy of hate propaganda becomes more established within a given group, the process whereby members of the hate group influence one another derives considerable vigour from personal attraction.

b) In general, the *status* of the communicator is correlated positively with his ability to influence. Strodtbeck, James & Hawkins (1958) found that, in mock jury trials, "proprietors" (professionals, managers, officials) were more active in the decision-making process than "clericals", "skilled workers" or "labourers" and were forced to shift their predeliberation position less often when reaching a unanimous group decision.

Kelman & Hovland (1953) found that, when the same position of leniency toward juvenile delinquents was advocated by three sources, a judge in juvenile court, a member of the audience, and a juvenile delinquent, the first obtained significantly more positions of leniency than did the third. Appeal to status is a device often used by the writers of hate literature, who cite authors, books and quotations, with the implicit assumptions that these are the people who ought to know, or that this is true because it was written and published. Even assuming fictitious status in order to lend more weight to one's persuasive attempts is neither novel nor rare. More specifically, an individual of presumably little military distinction purveying hate literature in the Toronto area on occasion signs his literary efforts with the pseudonym: "Col. J.P. Fry, National Organizer".

c) Status may, but need not be involved in *credibility*, the third variable to be discussed. Aronson & Golden (1962) found that both relevant and irrelevant (to the communication) aspects of communicator credibility were important determinants of attitude change. In a speech on the virtues of arithmetic, there was a strong tendency for alleged engineers to be more successful persuaders than individuals posing as dishwashers, for prejudiced subjects to be *under*influenced by Negro communicators. The last point is notable for the effect it would have of freezing and reinforcing attitudes and prejudices once acquired, contributing to the effectiveness of hate literature. Hovland & Weiss (1951) found that a highly trustworthy communication source led to significantly more opinion change in the direction advocated, than a source of low trustworthiness, although, even in the highly trustworthy case, less than 25% of the group was induced to change. Four weeks later, the differences between the groups had disappeared, the amount of opinion change decreasing in the highly trustworthy group, and increasing in the low trustworthy group. This last result, the "sleeper" effect, of interest in long-term effects of hate literature, is attributed by Hovland & Weiss to a decrease in the amount of spontaneous association between source and communication content. This hypothesis was tested and confirmed by Kelman & Hovland (1953). The facade of sincerity and openness so often assumed by individuals attempting to sway others is extolled by Machiavelli, and exemplified by "Friends, Romans, Countrymen".

d) The way in which the recipient perceives the *goals* of the communicator affects his response to him. Hovland, Janis & Kelley (1953) suggested that a perceived desire to influence on the part of a communicator would decrease his effectiveness by making him appear less trustworthy. Mills & Aronson (1965) obtained confirmation of the modified hypothesis that when the communicator was attractive, he was more effective if he announced his intention to persuade; when the communicator was unattractive, his stated intention to persuade made no difference to his effectiveness. Other experiments have assumed a desire to influence,

and have varied the communicator's reasons for doing so. Pastore & Horowitz (1955) found that students who judged the motive for a statement as being trustworthy, tended to rate the statement itself as being acceptable to them. Students who judged the motive as selfish or unacceptable judged the statement as unacceptable. Presumably, the reverse effect would also be found, that if the statements are acceptable, the source is rated as trustworthy, making his future statements more likely to be acceptable, a 'spiral' effect, freezing and reinforcing old attitudes and prejudices, and increasing the effectiveness of 'follow-up' hate literature. In any case, in another study (Hovland & Mandell, 1952) conflicting results were obtained. Subjects were read a speech on the advantages of the devaluation of currency by either a prominent exporter or an economics instructor. Despite the fact that the second speaker was later rated as having done a superior job of presenting the facts, there were no significant differences in the opinion change effected by the two speakers. It has been noted before, however, that facts are not necessarily the most important factor in opinion change. One of the recent hate productions uses the inelegant appellation of "Fellow-Kinsmen", in an obvious attempt to establish a perception of common goals. The "goal" gambit is often used when other persuasion-favouring variables are obviously missing. Thus, the shabby, weak, patently unlettered rable-rouser may try to establish a feeling among his audience that, if nothing else, he and they do at least have certain goals in common.

e) It is reasonable to assume that communicators who are perceived as having *power*, as being dispensers of rewards, would be most effective in production of opinion change. Several lines of research support this. Mussen & Distler (1959) presented evidence that male children who identified more strongly with the male parent also showed a stronger tendency to perceive that parent as a powerful source of rewards and punishments. Talland (1954) showed that leaders (power figures) were disproportionately influential in determining the formation of group opinion. Lippitt, Polansky, Redl & Rosen (1958), in studies of two boys' camps, one for disturbed children of lower socio-economic background and the other for adjusted, middle-class children, found that group members, rated as having high power by the other group members, made more social influence attempts and were more successful in them. This variable may be irrelevant to the present purveyors of hate literature, whose power seems to be limited, but its effect has been seen in other countries at other times.

f) Any communication should be more persuasive if the communicator is seen as possessing *information* unavailable or unattainable to the recipient. Although no specific research has been labelled in this way, it is possible to interpret certain results in the light of this suggestion. For instance, in the Kelman & Hovland (1953) study previously mentioned, a

person posing as a judge of a juvenile court is more effective than the audience member or the juvenile delinquent in inducing advocated lenient attitudes toward delinquents. One possible explanation of this result is the fact that the "judge" could have been perceived as having specialized knowledge not available to the others. Similarly, in the Aronson & Golden (1962) study, alleged engineers were superior to "dishwashers" in the production of opinion change on the virtues of arithmetic. "I have here in my hands a document", a few years ago was as well-known a phrase as "I cannot tell a lie". The implication of McCarthy's announcement was, of course, that he had access to information from which others were precluded. Messianic leaders often claim similarly privileged status, although their source of information is usually even less accessible for corroboration than was McCarthy's.

In any communication attempt, several of these variables may work together to produce greater effectiveness. A leader or person of power, e.g., is also likely to have high status and credibility, and to have access to information that the other group members do not possess.

Anticipating somewhat the essence of a later chapter, it should be pointed out that the characteristics of the successful communicator are as important to those who wish to persuade against the hate literature arguments as to its propagators. In sum, it would seem that the successful communicator would be such things as attractive or liked, of high status, high credibility, seemingly altruistic goals, high power, and the sole source of information. Other considerations to be taken into account are:

1. The length of time over which the opinion change holds (since a decrease of spontaneous association between source and content of communication may take place over time – the "sleeper" effect).
2. The type of effect desired, attitude or behavioural change (since communicator characteristics may affect the first, but not the second as shown by Zimbardo, Weisenberg, Firestone & Levy, 1965).

APPENDIX II

CHAPTER IV

THE CONTENT AND FORM OF THE COMMUNICATION

The present chapter continues the analysis of elements in the communication of prejudice with an examination of the content and form of the communication itself. Specifically, we will attempt to answer the following questions:

1) Against whom is the communication aimed?
2) What does it state?
3) What action does it advocate?
4) What are the techniques used to achieve the advocated changes in opinion and action?

The first three of these questions refer to the content of the communication. The last question, which will receive our main emphasis, deals with the form of the communication. By citing the psychological literature dealing with persuasive communication in general, we hope to clarify some of the variables that allow estimation and explanation of the relative success or failure of hate literature.

I The communication content.

1) *The target.* Primarily in the last hundred years communications designed to generate prejudice have been directed against a large number of groups, e.g., Jews and, especially on this continent, Catholics. Racial and national minorities in America, primarily the Negroes, have also faced overt persecution although they seem infrequent targets of hate literature per se (Allport, 1958). The advocates of political change have also been violently attacked through hate literature.

   Allport (1958) concludes that while psychological principles help us to understand the process, they cannot by themselves fully explain why one group and not the other should be selected as objects of hate.

2) *The assertions made regarding the target.* Lowenthal and Guterman (1949) have analysed a large number of tracts and speeches and documented the remarkable consistency in their utterances. The typical tract or speech invariably contains some selection of the following points.

   Communicator and recipient belong to a group which is being cheated out of its birthright. "We, the sincere honest god-fearing, decent people are being taken advantage of by an international conspiracy. Our present government consists of men who are either traitors or deceived fools. It is controlled by 'them'. Our schools, our courts and expecially our economy is falling into 'their' hands."

The conspirators are corrupt. "They roll in wealth, bathe in liquor, debauch our women and children."

There is no middle ground. "It is against them and fuzzy thinking so-called liberals who refuse to recognize and act upon this danger are equally dangerous. They too would tolerate moral decline and defeat by these insidious foreign influences."

Fire must be fought with fire. "We cannot be universalistic in our ethics. We must take drastic action to cleanse ourselves of this menace. It is our sacred duty."

The situation is urgent. "This is a time for action not endless debate. Our enemy grows stronger every day."

There is an answer. "Support us with your money (and sometimes votes) and we will grow strong enough to eradicate this menace."

To this might be added the insistence that the enemy is alien to the in-group in terms of his morals and methods, and hereditary equipment.

Vast use is made of such pseudological devices as the following:

"Professor X said Israel should be admitted to an economic trade commission; therefore, Professor X is pro-Zionist and a pawn of international Jewry." Or, "Professor X criticized American foreign policy in Asia; The Communists criticized this policy also; therefore, Professor X is a Communist."

"All Communists are unpatriotic by definition and villains besides; therefore, all anti-Communists are patriots and worthy of praise."

Although such pseudo-logical reasoning is a common characteristic of hate literature, one should not lose sight of the fact that deliberate falsehood and gross exaggeration rather than semantic subterfuge provide the nucleus of the hate literature communication.

3. *Action advocated by the communications.* Allport (1958) claims that the hate tract or speech is typically vague and unspecific of what action should be taken beyond such legal steps as political and financial support. Nevertheless, recurring expressions such as "exterminate, eradicate, eliminate, liquidate," etc. seem quite specific to this writer. Also, blunt statements of intention to kill all (or almost all) of the Jews *are* found in hate literature.

A documentation of the contents of hate literature, however, is not the purpose of this survey. Our concern is with the psychological principles that can be applied to analyse hate literature as a type of persuasive communication.

II The form of the communication.

Some of the techniques used in the communication of prejudice and some of the factors which determine their success are familiar and need little explication. Others are less obvious and reference to the relevant psychological literature may serve to more sharply focus our attention on issues relevant to the phenomenon of hate literature.

1) *Pseudo-logic.* A pseudo-rational or pseudo-logical approach is a familiar characteristic of hate literature. A few illustrations of the fallacious lines of argument that occur are presented below.

Some Jews are Communists; therefore all Jews are Communists and Communism is a Jewish plot. Similarly, some Jews are wealthy; therefore all Jews are wealthy and the Jews control the economy.

Communists oppose segregration; therefore, integrationists are Communists.

Even though both assumptions and syllogisms are inaccurate, such arguments cannot, as has been pointed out earlier, be assumed to be completely ineffective for all recipients. False assumptions may be accepted because of some qualities the communicator appears to possess (see Chapter 3). The process of logical reasoning is, unhappily, a rare phenomenon, and not even practised consistently by those who know how to use it.

2) *Redefinition and reclassification.* One subtle technique for achieving attitude change is the denial that any fundamental change in attitude is being sought. By redefining the situation using distortion and euphemism, hate literature suggests that the attitudes and actions advocated are logical conclusions of the recipients' existing values and beliefs. (Or they, at least, provide a rationalization for adopting the advocated actions and beliefs.) Murder and robbery which strongly contravene the recipients' existing norms are made palatable when redefined as "extermination of parasites" and "recapture of the property that has been stolen from us". Attacking a neighbour calls for attitude change but "repelling an invader" does not. Conversely, an act that would ordinarily be deemed praiseworthy becomes a loathsome subterfuge if performed by the enemy. A detailed analysis of hate literature would reveal many other instances of this particular persuasion technique.

3) *The achievement of communicator credibility.* The importance of communicator credibility has already been considered in the preceding chapter. Further examination of the hate literature communication may illustrate one way this credibility can be achieved. To maximize attitude change the communicator who is initially unknown to the recipient of hate literature must achieve the latter's positive evaluation. Psychologists concerned with theoretical models of attitude change (e.g., Osgood and Tannenbaum, 1955; Brown, 1962) have

indicated that a communicator can achieve this positive evaluation by strongly endorsing or associating himself with attitudes or objects of judgement that the evaluator regards favourably. Accordingly, in the communication of prejudice the communicator typically starts with a strong endorsement of objects of attitude which are generally highly evaluated such as God, Democracy, Freedom, George Washington, Decency, Purity, Patriotism, etc., (Allport, 1958). He may even explicitly attack such generally disfavoured attitude objects as violence or Fascism depending upon his audience's initial views. In this way the communicator can achieve a higher evaluation from his audience and therefore increase the probability that the views he subsequently expresses will gain their acceptance and compliance.

4) *The threatening emotional appeal.* The appeal made in hate literature is typically directed towards one's emotions and utilizes threats. Its contents concern such emotional topics as sex, exploitation and conspiracy. The effectiveness of emotional appeals, especially those that threaten the noncompliant with unpleasant consequences has been investigated in several studies. Hartman (1936) tested the effectiveness of emotional versus intellectual appeals upon a candidate's success in elections. He concluded that emotional appeals were more effective in gaining votes for a particular candidate. Janis & Feshback (1953) report the apparently contradictory result that a strongly emotional threatening appeal was less effective than a minimally threatening one in eliciting behaviour change. De Wolfe (1964), however, reports that even large amounts of fear facilitated attitude change in a subject. Order can be brought to this seemingly confusing and contradictory set of results with the following interpretation: A threatening emotional appeal will be successful to the extent that it suggests remedial behaviour considered acceptable by the recipient. If the recipient is not presented with a satisfactory means of eliminating the threat he may choose to disregard the threat and reject the communication. The ominous implication for the communication of prejudice is that recipients will be receptive to hate literature to the extent that they believe themselves to be threatened and consider action open to them which can eliminate this threat.

5) *One-sidedness of the appeal.* Hate literature is a form of persuasive communication that is typically one-sided. That is, it presents only the favourable side of the argument rather than presenting both sides along with attempts to justify one side rather than the other. The psychological literature pertaining to the relative effectiveness of one-sided and two-sided arguments under various circumstances seems relevant to our examination of the communication of prejudice. Hovland, Lumsdaine & Sheffield (1949) report that an initially friendly and receptive audience will be more influenced by a one-sided communication while an initially hostile audience is more influenced by two-sided appeals.

Lumsdaine & Janis (1953) further indicate that a one-sided communication is impaired more by subsequent counter-propaganda than a two-sided communication. Abelson (1959) suggests that a one-sided communication is more effective than a two-sided communication when temporary but immediate attitude change is sought.

6) *Explicitness of conclusions.* Hate literature characteristically states a conclusion, usually several times, rather than allowing its recipients to draw their own conclusions from the arguments presented. (Although the specific action to be taken is often implied rather than stated: Allport, 1958). Hovland and his associates (1952, 1953) examined this question and concluded that it is generally more effective to explicitly draw conclusions than allow the recipient to do so for himself. This principle, however, does not stand up well when the audience is intelligent, especially if it is initially hostile or suspicious.

There are, thus, a variety of attributes pertaining to the communication itself which play a part in determining its effectiveness. Examination of the literature under discussion shows that a majority of the relevant variables appear in hate propaganda.

APPENDIX II

CHAPTER V

THE RECIPIENT OF HATE PROPAGANDA

The present report views hate literature as an attempt at persuasive communication which individuals accept or reject to varying degrees. This chapter examines the differing personality characteristics of the acceptors and rejectors of hate literature.

One intensive and by now familiar line of investigation has dealt with the so-called "authoritarian personality". Early studies (Berelson & Salter, 1946; Murphy & Likert, 1938; Adorno et. al., 1950; Hartley, 1946) established that individuals prejudiced against a single racial, national or ethnic group tend to hold negative stereotypes regarding several such groups and, in fact, characteristically make a sharp distinction between a perceived "in-group"and "out-group" with generally negative attitudes towards members of the latter.

From this concept of generalized ethnocentrism there followed studies which sought to specify the underlying personality structure of the bigot. Intensive research by Adorno et. al. (1950) has suggested a "syndrome" of traits which distinguish the "liberal democrat" from the "anti-democratic authoritarian", thereby generating the concept of the "authoritarian personality". A person of this type characteristically is rigid in his adherence to conventional middle-class attitudes and values and manifests exaggerated concern with such values, condemning and rejecting those who deviate from them. He is submissive towards the moral authorities of his in-group, is preoccupied with power and status considerations, tends to identify with powerful figures, and is generally hostile towards members of the "out-group". These traits are highly inter-correlated. That is, a person high in some traits tends to be high in the remaining ones and similarly, a person average in some is typically average in the remaining ones.

Other investigators have proceeded to suggest specific child-rearing patterns which are associated with, and presumably a cause of, these differing personality types. The adult authoritarian's childhood, for example, typically has been characterized by rigid enforcement of desired standards of behaviour through overt punishment and the withholding of parental affection.

Although the concept of authoritarianism has generated a considerable amount of research and has perhaps enabled us to form a reasonably comprehensive, sophisticated and integrated picture of the bigot, its utility for the approach adopted in this paper is limited. While one's attitudes towards minority groups and notions of their appropriate treatment are obvious determinants of one's response to hate literature, this paper's concern lies in the response to hate literature of individuals who initially are neither strongly favourable nor hostile to these communications.

The *potential* "bigot", the individual who is likely to be influenced by hate literature, to react favourably to its source, and even to engage in behaviour consistent with his attitude change is our central concern. However, the frequently encountered assumption that a person is either all bigot or all liberal, and therefore either totally receptive to hate propaganda or not at all, is a fallacious one. Rather, differences in attitudes, personality, and persuasibility form a continuum, with the great mass of individuals lying between the extremes that we label as liberal or bigot. The issue of greatest social concern is the reaction of the great mass of people who are neither extreme bigots nor devoted liberals, whose attitudes run the gamut from mild ethnocentrism through indifference to moderate liberalism. It is their greater or lesser acceptance or at least acquiescence which poses the potential threat to a democratic system of government, and the freedom of its citizens. Our concern, then, is not what makes one an authoritarian or bigot, but rather, what determines the *degree* of acceptance to persuasion attempts. A large body of experimental research concerned with the general issue of persuasive communication can be examined and applied to the more specific phenomena of hate literature. (The interaction of recipient variables with specific characteristics of communications and communicators will be pursued in the next chapter of this study.)

We can now attack the following questions:

(I) Is there such a thing as general persuasibility? That is, are some individuals consistently more influenced than others by attempts at persuasive communication regardless of the issues involved, the characteristics of the communication, or its source?

(II) If the answer to (I) is affirmative, do there exist other personality characteristics appearing together with general persuasibility and are these characteristics highly intercorrelated?

(III) What are the situational or environmental variables (as distinguished from broader social or cultural factors) which affect receptiveness?

(I) General Persuasibility.

There is evidence that persuasibility exists as a "content-free" factor; that is, it exists independently of the subject matter or the type of appeal presented in any particular persuasive communication. Janis & Field (1959) demonstrate that an individual's susceptibility to persuasive communication on one issue (e.g., "public participation in civil defense") is highly correlated with his susceptibility to persuasive communications dealing with other issues. (e.g., "the merits of a new television comedian" or "the role of General von Hindenburg".)

This finding of general persuasibility also applies when the type of appeal (e.g., "logical" or "fear producing") provided by the communication was varied. King (1959) confirms these general findings and extends the demonstration of

general persuasibility to include differences in communication source. For example, the individual most influenced by a communication he believes to represent the majority opinion of high school teachers is also likely to be most influenced by the majority opinion of high school students or parents.

General persuasibility as a personal characteristic, then, seems to have been demonstrated.

(II) The Personality Correlates of Persuasibility.

1) *Self-Esteem.* There is considerable evidence that low self-esteem or the feeling of social inadequacy is a consistent characteristic of the individual showing high persuasibility. Janis (1954), Linton & Graham (1959), and Cohen (1959) have reported studies based upon both experiments and clinical histories which document this relationship, although investigators seem more successful in demonstrating the relationship with male than with female subjects. Festinger (1964) reports that the individual low on self-esteem is also less likely to investigate information that may be unfavourable to his existing attitudes or beliefs than an individual high in self-esteem. The self-esteem variable, then, is one of particular significance since low self-esteem produces both persuasibility *and* insulation against contradictory views once an opinion has been formed. This combination of factors is especially dangerous since it may decrease the effectiveness of counter propaganda or education attempts once the persuasive communication has been received.

2) *Hostility.* Janis & Field (1959) and Janis & Rife (1959) have tested the hypothesis that highly hostile personalities tend to be relatively less persuasible than persons with little hostility. However, these findings apply only when aggressiveness or hostility is assessed from observation of overt behaviour, rather than self-appraisal. This result may be understood when one considers the relationship between self-appraised hostility and self-esteem. The individual low on self-esteem perceives himself as argumentative, without necessarily appearing so, (Janis & Field, 1959). Thus, a factor is introduced which acts directly against the earlier cited relationship between high hostility (as observed), and low persuasibility.

   Several studies indicate that the individual who is hostile, extrapunitive, or aggressive in his attitudes and everyday interactions, also tends to hold negative attitudes about Jews (Lesser, 1958), expresses hostility towards a perceived out-group (Stagner, 1944), and perceives others to be hostile towards him (Murstein, 1961).

   The implications of these studies seem to be that overtly more hostile individuals are more difficult to influence, but typically hold attitudes particularly amenable to the contents of the hate literature communication. Thus, the

overtly hostile individual may be influenced by hate literature to the extent that he already agrees with its contents. Attempts at counter propaganda may be of limited value since these individuals are *generally* unsusceptible to persuasive communication.

3) *Miscellaneous Factors.* Janis & Field (1959) report that females are generally more persuasible than males, although this finding does not seem to apply to children (Lesser & Abelson, 1959). Apparently, we are dealing here not with an innate sex difference, but with socially learned tendencies for the female to accept persuasion attempts somewhat more readily in an academic, though not necessarily in a marital setting. Tuddenham (1959) in an investigation of the personality factors that are correlated with their tendency to "yield to a distorted group norm" reports that the "yielders" differ from the "non-yielders" in several respects. In general, the yielders appeared to be conventional in behaviour and values, socialized, conscientious, convorming, good-natured and affiliative. The highly independent subjects were higher on intelligence and intellectual achievement measures, had higher status, and seemed more perceptive, psychologically sophisticated, and accepting of others. Marked sex differences were found as women, in general, were more yielding, and the relationship between yielding and personality variables was, again, less pronounced for women than for men.

Generalization from the Tuddenham study, however, must be tempered with caution since it deals with the susceptibility of individuals to only a single kind of persuasive force, group consensus. It is quite possible that a different type of communication would produce yielders with somewhat different characteristics. The investigations of Linton & Graham (1959), for instance, show no relation between intelligence and persuasibility.

Summary

In conclusion, it seems that overt hostility and high self-esteem are inversely related to general persuasibility. Other factors such as intelligence seem to be related to persuasibility for some, but not other persuasion situations, and accordingly are most appropriately examined in the next chapter of this Report.

(III) Situational Determinants of Receptiveness.

1) *Frustration.* The theory that frustration is invariably an antecedent of aggressive behaviour (Miller, 1941) was a popular one among social scientists who investigated prejudice towards minority groups. This "Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis" coupled with such psychoanalytic concepts as displacement seemed powerful weapons in the theoretician's arsenal. Within such a theoretical framework, it would be predicted that hate literature results in attitude

change and appropriate behaviour to the extent that the recipients have experienced prior frustration.

The sweeping generalizations of the Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis unfortunately have failed to stand the test of careful research and the theory itself has been severely attacked. Prior frustration, it has been shown, may lead to a variety of responses other than overt aggression, depending upon a large number of situational and experimental variables. The reward or punishment of previous aggression (Hollenburg, 1951) and experience with previous training (Davitz, 1952), for example, are important determinants of what the consequences of frustration will be.

Nevertheless, common sense, bolstered by the experimental literature, suggests certain obvious relationships between frustration and aggressive behaviour or more specifically between frustration and receptiveness to hate literature. When an individual's usual responses to a threatening environment are unrewarded, the probability that new and often "radical" responses will occur is great. The man who faces poverty, hunger, fear, and rejection and finds his usual responses, such as "waiting for things to get better", or "trying harder to earn a living", or "writing letters to the editor" producing no amelioration of his circumstances, may try new types of behaviour. These may include "getting drunk", "joining a new political party", or even becoming hostile to the real or imagined sources of his difficulties. Hamblin (1958) has further demonstrated that an experimentally produced crisis increases the tendency for a group to reject its old leader if he fails to meet the crisis. The presence of a potential new "leader" with a plan might well accelerate this tendency.

The theoretical orientation of Schachter and his associates (e.g., Schachter & Singer, 1962) allows the derivation of a more subtle relationship between hate literature, environmental frustration and aggressive behaviour. These investigations have convincingly demonstrated the existence of a general need for "cognitive clarity" or labels and explanations for one's feelings and emotions. Their argument, briefly, is that we experience internal arousal states, but must also know whether they mean that we are afraid, elated, angry, etc. Normally, this knowledge presents no problem, because in most situations some comparison with past experiences is quickly made, and the emotional arousal state is immediately "labelled". On occasion, however, vague feelings of anxiety or anger cannot be readily ascribed to specific external events. The content of the hate literature communication either may utilize such preexisting arousal states, or produce emotional arousal, since it deals with such issues as exploitation, sex, violence and God. (Allport, 1954). The emotionally aroused recipient of hate literature then may "label" his emotions in terms of the information it provides. He is told, in essence, by the communication that "what you feel is hatred and anger, and you are

angry at the Jews, who are causing all your problems". When environmental conditions, a depression, for example maintain a high level of diffuse emotionality the attraction of the leader whose message provides cognitive clarity becomes even greater.

2) *Reward or Punishment of Aggressive Models.* A possible determinant of one's receptivity to hate literature may be the consequence of similar receptiveness observed in others. Bandura (1961a, 1961b, 1963a, 1963b, 1963c) and his associates have investigated the effect of punishing or rewarding aggressive models upon subjects' tendency to imitate. Their conclusions relevant to this paper are as follows:

   a. The existence of an aggressive model, real or filmed, increases a subject's tendency to behave aggressively, even in situations different from that in which he has observed the model.

   b. The tendency is increased if the model is also seen as receiving approval; reproof of the aggressive model leads to non-imitation *and rejection of the model.*

   c. The presence of a model who behaves non-aggressively, and obtains approval, produces decreased aggressiveness on the part of subjects.

   d. In general, the observation of models and their subsequent reward or punishment had a greater affect on the amount of aggressiveness subjects demonstrated than actual reward or punishment of the subject's own aggressive behaviour.

3) *Role-Playing.* There is considerable evidence that subjects who are told to adopt a "role" respond to persuasive communication in a manner consistent with their adopted role. Culbertson (1957), for example, reports that adopting a role led subjects to shift their attitude toward Negro integration in housing as well as their general attitude towards Negroes in the direction of the role experience. Janis & King (1954) have similarly shown that overt verbalization to an audience of opinions an individual initially disagrees with, leads to greater attitude change than passive reception of the same material. Satisfaction with one's own performance and the amount of improvisation seem positively related to the degree of attitude change achieved. This point is relevant for instances in which individuals may participate in advocated extremist activities "just for kicks" or "to see what it is like".

4) *Group vs. Solitary Exposure.* Brodbeck (1956) and Mednick & McGinnies (1958) have suggested that group exposure to propaganda may counteract its effectiveness, provided that some or all of the group members oppose the communication and that members are allowed to discuss the issue. If the group is so planned that an overwhelming majority *favours* the advocated position, the small minority of dissenters tends to exhibit considerable attitude change in

the advocated direction. This effect is heightened when the accepting majority are perceived by the minority to be of high status (Kelley & Woodruff, 1956).

5) *Group Membership.* Kelley & Volkart (1952) have demonstrated that membership in a group produces resistance to persuasive communication to the extent that the individual values his group membership and perceives the communication to be contrary to its norms. There is even some evidence that under certain conditions the individual exposed to propaganda contrary to his group's norms may exhibit a "boomerang effect" by undergoing opinion change in the opposite direction to that advocated in the persuasive communication.

6) *Public or Private Commitment.* There is evidence that a public declaration of one's opinions or some other type of behavioural commitment, tends to "fix" the attitudes of the individual so that they are relatively resistant to change (Hovland, Campbell & Brock, 1957).

7) *Group Decision.* Lewin and his associates (1952) were the first to study the effect of group decision upon the actions and attitudes of individuals. Group discussion with the goal of reaching group consensus proved more effective than a lecture by an expert in producing and maintaining attitude change and behaviour consistent with this attitude change. Subsequent investigators (e.g., Bennett, 1955) in assessing the importance of the various components of the group decision process, concluded that perceived group consensus and public commitment account for its effectiveness.

8) *Expected Gain in Self-Esteem.* As Simpson & Yinger (1958, p. 260) so aptly point out, "it seems unlikely that man would show the enormous capacity for prejudice and discrimination which he frequently exhibits were it not for the gains he seems to acquire". In the case of the dominant group member, these can include the prestige gains of belonging to a "superior" group, and the economic gains from exorbitant prices and rents. These few advantages, however, are neither available nor attractive to all.

9) Finally, when a recipient is unwilling or unable to hear other arguments on the same topic, the influence of the communicator may thereby be heightened. Hovland (1958) suggested that if subjects anticipated counter-argument, they would avoid immediate acceptance of the first position. He also suggested that one possible effect of acceptance of the first communication would be to discourage self-exposure to any later communications. This suggestion is supported by the polls reported by Hyman & Sheatsley (1958), in which it was found that people tend to avoid information not congenial with prior attitudes. This would be another significant factor in the possible influence of hate literature, either where a predisposition to prejudice exists, or where a person has been exposed to an initial communication almost accidentally, formed some attitudes, and then avoids conflicting information.

In sum, a great deal is known about personality and behavioural correlates of susceptibility to persuasion. This knowledge is essential in the planning of "immunization" or counter-propaganda. However, to indulge in the luxury of an analogy, knowing *who* is more likely to contract an infection does not obviate the desirability of minimizing the overall probability of its spread.

APPENDIX II

CHAPTER VI

INTERACTIONS AMONG COMMUNICATOR, COMMUNICATION AND RECIPIENT VARIABLES AFFECTING PERSUASIVE COMMUNICATION

In the preceding chapters the effects of communicator, communication and recipient variables affecting persuasive communication were considered separately. The problem considered in the present chapter is the interaction effects between communicator, communication and recipient variables. Examination of interacting variables affecting persuasive communication will proceed by considering two types of interaction:

(I) Interaction between communicator and recipient variables,

(II) Interaction between communication and recipient variables.

(1) Interaction between communicator and recipient variables.

1) *Perceived status of communicator and personality of recipient.*
Berkowitz & Lundy (1956) sought to determine whether there are any personality characteristics whereby individuals successfully influenced by their peers can be distinguished from those more likely to be persuaded by authority figures while individuals who scored low on a measure of self-confidence were more readily influenced by their equals. Another type of person susceptible to influence, both by peers and authority figures, was found to possess a highly complex personality and to be low on self-confidence. In another study (Rohrer & Sherif, 1951), subjects classified as authoritarians and non-authoritarians were exposed to the following types of appeals:

(a) Anti-Negro remarks attributed to authority figures,

(b) Pro-Negro remarks attributed to authority figures, and

(c) An information booklet presenting facts about the changes in educational health, and occupational position of Negroes during the last century.

The investigators found that authoritarian subjects were swayed more by remarks attributed to authority figures regardless of whether these remarks were pro- or anti-Negro than by the information booklet. Non-authoritarian subjects were influenced more by the information booklet than they were by the remarks of authority figures.

2) *Discrepancy between the positions of communicator and recipient.*
Several experimental investigations dealt with the effect on persuasive communication of the discrepancy in the positions of the communicator and the

recipient. Brehm & Lipsher (1959) e.g., found that, as the discrepancy between positions of subjects and communicator increased, the perceived trustworthiness of the communicator decreased. Where discrepancy was extreme, however, the communicator was perceived as trustworthy. This last finding is critical, and documents the shrewdness of communicators like Dr. Goebbels. He is reported to have argued repeatedly that, in order to be believed, it is sufficient that the lie be very big indeed. Presumably, the recipient then reasons that no-one in his right mind would invent such a story, unless it were true, or he was convinced of its truth.

The prediction that one is more likely to accept the views presented by a "liked" as compared to a "disliked" communicator is both reasonable and supported by several experimental studies (Tannenbaum, 1953; Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955; and others). This type of reasoning carries implications relevant to the present issue. The propagators of hate literature typically identify themselves as a Nazi organization of some kind. The stereotypic image of "The Nazi" has been, generally, extremely negative. It would seem to follow that the message of the hate communication, being linked with a very disliked type of communicator, has little likelihood of producing opinion or attitude change in the advocated direction Would that mean that a vast majority of Canadians and Americans are immune to hate communications simply by virtue of their initially negative image of the Nazi source? There are two objections to this oversimplification. The first to be considered follows from Festinger's (1957) model of cognitive dissonance. In order to present the argument, a brief exposition of the dissonance principle seems necessary.

Cognitive dissonance exists when two beliefs or attitudes are in some way contradictory, do not match For example, a smoker reading an article linking smoking with cancer might experience a state of dissonance, the dissonant cognitions in this instance being: "I smoke" and "Smoking is harmful". The state of dissonance in this case may be reduced by rationalizing that the evidence linking smoking and cancer is inadequate, by remembering the familiar persons who smoke and yet are not suffering from the disease etc One notion implied by the dissonance model, and relevant to the topic of the present paper, is that a person will try to justify his engaging in a certain action. For example, a person who finds himself listening to a disliked communicator experiences the following dissonance: "Here is a person whose ideas I detest. Yet, here I have spent time listening (or reading)" One way of reducing dissonance is to increase acceptance of the communication. Or the process might develop as follows: "I dislike this person's notions intensely, and I am about to reject them outright. Yet, I also pride myself on being a fair and reasonable person." A way of reducing possible dissonance in this situation is to bend over backwards in giving a despised communicator the benefit of the doubt.

The second argument against the position that the negative valence of the communicator renders his message totally ineffective in producing attitude change is based on experimental evidence. The reference is made here to the "sleeper

effect" obtained by various investigators (Hovland, Lumsdaine & Sheffield, 1949; Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Kelman & Hovland, 1953); and mentioned in Chapter 3. Thus, even assuming negative evaluations of the hate communicator for Canadian and American audiences, it does not follow that the communications propagated by such sources are necessarily without effect in changing recipient opinions.

(II) Interaction between aspects of the communication and personality of the recipient.

Weiss & Fine (1955) found that people aggressive and toughminded in their everyday attitudes and outlook, are more likely than others to be influenced by an argument with a harsh point of view. The same experimenters (Weiss & Fine, 1956) also showed that subjects temporarily aroused to anger and aggressiveness were more influenced by a communication attempt taking a harsh point of view than subjects not so aroused. Katz, McClintock & Sarnoff (1957) demonstrated that anti-Negro attitudes based on ego defenses (of the kind referred to in the discussion of authoritarian personality) can be better changed by communications designed to explain the psychological basis of the attitudes, whereas anti-Negro attitudes which are not rooted in personality traits can be influenced better by factual material about Negroes.

Wygrocki (1934) exposed a group of high school students to crudely propagandistic statements about various national groups, religious sects, political parties etc. The intelligence of the group members as measured by a standard intelligence test was found directly related to resistance to this type of propaganda. Examination of data from studies of the effects of the "Why We Fight" films produced for the purpose of troop indoctrination during World War II led Hovland (1953) to suggest two hypotheses linking recipient intelligence and persuasibility by certain kinds of materials as follows:

> "...(a) Persons with high intelligence will tend, mainly because of their ability to draw valid inferences, -- to be more influenced than those with low intelligence when exposed to persuasive communications which rely primarily on impressive logical arguments.
> (b) Persons with high intelligence will tend, mainly because of their superior critical ability, to be less influenced than those with low intelligence when exposed to persuasive communications which rely primarily on unsupported generalities or false, illogical, irrelevant argumentation..."
>
> (p. 183)

In conclusion, review of the relevant literature has revealed interaction effects obtaining both between communicator and recipient variables and between communication and recipient variables. In other words some apparent characteristics of the communicator are more relevant to some recipients than others, and individuals differ in the type of communication to which they are most susceptible.

APPENDIX II

CHAPTER VII

EFFECTS OF HATE PROPAGANDA UPON MEMBERS OF THE TARGET GROUP

There are three persons significant to the hate literature problem: the communicator, the recipient, and finally the attacked minority group member himself, or the target. In this context, the focus on the latter is not so much on the harsh punishment and cruel abuse suffered in the concentration camps (Bettelheim, 1952, Schein, 1958), as on the more impersonal, less institutionalized type of insult expressed by hate literature. It is important to know if the effect of this is a substantial and a significant one, and, more importantly, if it is harmful. The possible effects of hate literature can be analysed in terms of its effects upon the target person's:

1) personality

2) attitudes and opinions

3) actions.

All three aspects may be objects of derogation and stereotyping. Granted that some prejudiced information is developed with deliberate malice by communicators, it has also been shown earlier that a large majority of individuals to whom hate communications are directed accept and nourish stereotypes -- often in a "genteel" fashion, through selective perception, perceptual distortion, and the reinterpretation of otherwise incontrovertible facts.

Quite similar phenomena may occur on the part of the target. As G. H. Mead has emphasized, the child comes to know himself by "taking the role of the other", by seeing himself as he imagines others to see him. Eventually, he learns to take the role of the "generalized other", in other words, that represented by the norms and expectations (including the stereotypes) of his society and membership groups. This process may create a self-picture for the minority group member which matches that held of him by the majority group. In several studies, (Bayton, 1941; Gilbert, 1951), Negro students have been found to give much the same description of "typical" Negroes, as did white students, with the addition of several more favourable traits to the list. Thus, the tendency for personality traits to fit the stereotype is an expression of acculturation to the beliefs and expectations of the majority. From another point of view, it is also due to the uniformities in the environment provided for or available to minority group members. For instance, minority group members may be lower class members of society at large, or they may occupy a narrower, though not necessarily a lower range of occupational opportunities. The large difference between the promise of the American Dream

(Simpson & Yinger, 1958, p. 200) and the fulfillment, whether the discrepancy is economic, as for the Negro, or social, as for the Jew, may lead to fear, hostility, insecurity and general dissatisfaction. The ambivalence and strain in turn leads to a general self-consciousness, and increased attention to the membership group.

Certain of the attitudes and opinions of the minority group member may be expected to differ from those of the majority group member. It has previously been mentioned that dominant and subordinate groups can hardly be expected to have identical self pictures. For minority group members, this unique self picture tends to include a certain devaluation of self, an acceptance of the majority group's judgement of inferiority. In Lewin's (1948) chapter on "self-hatred among Jews", he speaks of conflicts between the German or Austrian Jew and the East European Jew, or between the French Jew and the German Jew. This antagonism resulted from the situation of the semi-assimilated German and Austrian Jews, who saw their status threatened by the influx of other Jews, alien in culture and speech. This hatred may also be directed against Jewish Institutions, Jewish mannerisms, or Jewish ideals. The same holds true for Negroes. In a study (Clark & Clark, 1947) of Negro boys and girls between 3 and 7 years of age, the majority of the medium and dark children chose a Negro doll when asked an identification question (the doll that looks like you). But, when asked a preference question (the doll you like to play with), 67% of the children chose the white doll. These feelings of inferiority or self-hatred, however, are seldom expressed in an unambiguous way. In what seems at first glance to be a contradiction, these attitudes take the form both of in-group hatred and in-group solidarity, of out-group hatred, and out-group identification. Johnson (1941) reported that, in a study of over two thousand rural Negro boys and girls, there was a decided tendency for the same subjects to rate both black and white persons negatively. Lewin (1948) speaks of both the cohesive and disruptive forces in underprivileged groups. The members of such groups are hampered by their group affiliations. Thus, there are a number of reluctant members for whom the forces urging them away from the group are greater than the forces pulling them toward the group. On the other hand, since the minority group members' safety and security lies in his membership group, there is also a tendency to become prejudiced in favour of it (Allport, 1954). "A feeling of common fate and shared problems exists alongside intragroup conflict and jealousy" (Simpson & Yinger, 1958, p. 222). A specific example illustrating some of these features is that of Negro anti-Semitism. Here we have in-group solidarity and out-group hatred in the banding together of Negroes against whites, and identification with the out-group and its attitude by acceptance of anti-Semitism.

There is no doubt that minority group members react in specific ways to prejudicial situations. It is another matter to ascertain whether or not the fact of group membership produces characteristic responses to universal situations. One early study (Crane, 1923) was a biased attempt to find "the psychological explanation of the impulsiveness, improvidence and immorality which the Negro everywhere exhibits." A measure of "inhibition" was used, viz. the number of hand withdrawals

from a dropped weight and slight electric shock. There were no significant differences between white and Negro subjects. On the other hand, two later studies (Chapman, 1944; Zborowski, 1952) showed a greater sensitivity to pain in Jewish than in non-Jewish subjects of various backgrounds. The obvious interpretation in terms of a stereotype was voided by Lambert, Libman & Poser (1960) who showed that the momentary importance of group membership can be a crucial factor in such results. Jewish, but not "Christian" (Protestant) subjects increased their pain tolerance when told that their groups were typically inferior in this regard. In a situation of explicit competition between the two religious groups, both increased under the spur of alleged inferiority, and when informed that their group was superior in pain tolerance, "Christian" subjects increased in tolerance, while Jewish subjects remained at the pre-instruction level. The authors explain this result as an indication that Protestant people prefer to extend the differences between Jewish and Christian people, while Jewish people prefer to eliminate such discrepancies. Whatever the value of the interpretation, it is clear that behaviour is affected by stereotypes.

Looking at the ways in which a target can respond to the open or covert manifestation of prejudice, Simpson and Yinger (1958) discuss three fundamental varieties,

1) aggression

2) avoidance

3) acceptance.

1) *Aggression,* once considered the inevitable result of frustration (Dollard et al., 1939), is now recognized as a suitable, expected response to certain situations only. Numerous studies have shown that the greater the perceived power of the frustrating agent, the more aggressive responses are restrained, (Graham et al., 1951; Thibaut & Riecken, 1955, etc.). When the subjective probability of successful assault upon the restraining barriers becomes near-zero, one common adjustment to deprivation may be self-aggression, (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). This last point has already been illustrated in the section on attitudes. As behaviour, it can be exemplified by the high suicide rate of the non-political middle-class prisoners in the German prison camps of World War II (Bettelheim, 1952). These were the prisoners whose beliefs and level of self-esteem were most shaken by the confinement, since, presumably, they experienced humiliations to which they were less accustomed than lower class prisoners, did not have the invulnerable self-esteem of the élite, and, of course, had no opportunity for retaliation.

2) *Avoidance* as a reaction again is suitable only in certain types of situations. Estimates of the extent of Negro "passing", necessarily inaccurate, range from a few thousands to tens of thousands per year in the United States (Simpson & Yinger, 1958). In the case of the Jewish People, this takes the

form of reform religion, Anglicized names, and loss of the Jewish tongue and culture. In some cases, avoidance of the dominant group by economic segregation (buying from and selling to the in-group only) can be maintained by middle and upper class business and professional people. "Other things being equal, the higher the income and occupational status of a minority group member, the more successfully can he avoid direct contact with prejudice (Simpson & Yinger, 1958, p. 238).

3) There are 3 degrees of *acceptance* of status as a reaction to prejudice and discrimination, 1) wholehearted, 2) specific, 3) unconscious. The first is accompanied by resignation, even apathy, or an exclusive involvement in one's own group. It pervades one's total way of life and living. The second is a more rational, adaptive mode of response. The individual is aware of and accepts certain social or occupational barriers. He knows that business associate X might have lunch with him, but would not invite him home. Finally, the third produces the ambivalence and tension that may be either disheartening and disorganizing, or driving and challenging (Simpson & Yinger, 1958), but is in either case denied by the target person as constituting an important motive.

The effect of prejudice and discrimination on the minority group member has been traced through personality, attitudes and opinions, and actions. Two questions were asked at the beginning of this paper. The first question has been discussed, and it must be concluded that the effect of prejudice and its communication appears to be a substantial one. The second question has been answered tentatively, but the evidence is convincing: The occasional beneficial effects of increased striving and intra-group pride appear to be far outweighed by the economic, social, and psychological damage. Through no fault of his own, a member of society is being degraded and humiliated. He is on guard against the insults, the sarcasm, the cruel humour accorded to his group. Even irrelevant comments and actions are interpreted in the light of this vigilance. Although the overall amount of mental illness does not differ from group to group, or race to race, the incidence of specific mental illnesses does. McLean (1946) shows that there is some evidence that the psychoneurotic syndrome is relatively high among Jews, and hypertension common among Negroes (McLean, 1946), although it must be kept in mind that reports in this field have been subject to criticisms claiming that classification might itself be affected by patient's race or ethnic origin, and that the group under study has not been properly controlled for socio-economic status. (see, e.g., Scott, 1958).

From the point of view of society as a whole, any harm done to some of its members affects the community as a whole. Furthermore, there are consequences for the group as well. There is the economic loss from unwilling workers, waste of potential skilled and able manpower, and the cost of segregation. On the national level, there are the consequences of a moral ambivalence and tension. How does

hate literature fit in with democracy, and liberty and justice for all? On the international level, there is the diminishing respect of the smaller nations who do not look for advice to a country that cannot solve her internal problems. The only possible gain to society is that of the "challenge-response" situation (Toynbee's phrase, cited in Simpson & Yinger, 1958, p. 187), indicating that the frustrations of the minority group member may spur him on to greater achievements. However, should this be the case, it is probably true only for a few exceptional members of each group, and, if there is a sociological moral to be drawn from it, then surely ethics must prevent us from doing so.

APPENDIX II

CHAPTER VIII

THE PREVENTION OF THE SPREAD OF PREJUDICE

We have now examined at some length not only the variables entering directly into the propagation of prejudice, but also some of the theories aimed at explaining the phenomena of group hatred and its spread. A brief look has been taken at the general factors of a social, economic, and political nature that might be of importance to this issue, and a longer one at directly relevant variables at the time and place at which a communication is attempted. In some instances, some of the findings discussed earlier can be readily interpreted in their obverse form, as being applicable to the prevention of the spread of prejudice. For instance, since we have evidence that communicators are encouraged by subtle cues of acceptance on the part of the recipient, the prescription is easily derived that such cues should be avoided, or discouraging cues substituted. Experimental evidence corroborates this deduction. It is not always the case, however, that a clear opposite of a facilitating situation exists; also, logical negation is not always supported by empirical evidence. McGuire (1964, p. 192) points out that the study of resistance to persuasion is not the inverse of studying persuasion itself.

For these reasons, as well as that of an ordered presentation, this chapter will systematically discuss methods for preventing the communication of prejudice.

The following methods of preventing persuasion in general are equally applicable to the specific problem under consideration. They will be illustrated by representative, rather than comprehensive examples and references.

A first categorization can be made by differentiating those methods which attack the problem at the source, and those which are directed toward the recipient of propaganda. All methods discussed in this chapter are, furthermore, non-legal, i. e., they involve no legislative problem, except perhaps very indirectly.

Methods of Counteracting The Spread of Hate Propaganda

1) Methods operating directly upon the communicator

a) *Social pressures opposed to hate propaganda.* - -According to basic learning principles and experimental data by Verplanck (1955) and Greenspoon (1951), verbal behaviour is predictably affected by a show of approval or disapproval. The communicator who encounters frequent rebuffs may, in all likelihood, restrain or alter his communications. This modification of his verbal behaviour

may, but does not necessarily, imply a change in attitude. Also, it is important to specify the source of disapproval. A source which the communicator respects is more effective than one he despises or is indifferent to. The latter instances may, indeed, lead to a so-called boomerang effect, strengthening the communicator's attitudes and enhancing his verbal productions. A boomerang effect is also predicted to be more powerful, if the values attacked are more salient in the communicator's life space, than where they have only peripheral importance (Kelley & Volkart, 1952).

Note that the behaviour even of prejudiced individuals is highly responsive to social requirements (perhaps more so than that of non-authoritarian individuals, in view of susceptibility to others, especially persons of authority). This makes the danger of implied disapproval from a respected source more intense. Nevertheless, this brief analysis of possible restraints or discouragement of a communicator shows that the circumstances which might produce such behaviour changes are extremely unlikely to occur: rebuffs from non-respected or hated sources are ineffective; potentially effective sources are unlikely to administer the rebuff.

2) **Methods operating upon the recipient**

a) Influencing the recipient to express *disapproval* to the *communicator*. - - This is simply a corollary of the earlier suggestion applied to the communicator himself. If the recipient is respected by the communicator, this method might be effective. More probably, however, the communicator, by the process of circular reasoning particularly germaine to such individuals will relegate a previously respected person to the circle of the despised for the very reason that a communication was rebuffed.

b) *Discrediting* the *source*. - - There exists ample evidence that communications from sources perceived as having low status or little knowledge, or having an axe to grind, are accepted to a lesser degree than information originating from fair, well-informed, high status sources. (Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Strodtbeck, James & Hawkins, 1958; Aronson & Golden, 1962; Mills & Aronson, 1965).

However, studies by Hovland, Lumsdaine, & Sheffield (1949) and by Hovland, Janis, & Kelley (1953) show the striking phenomenon known as the "sleeper effect," and discussed earlier. After a period of time, the advantage of the respect source disappears; in other words, the content of the message is remembered, while the source is forgotten. This finding is especially damaging to the notion that a source deserving little respect in the eyes of the recipient will be reliably disbelieved.

c) *Disapproval of groups to which the recipient sees himself as belonging (reference groups)*. - - Studies by Newcomb (1943), Kelley & Woodruff (1956), and Rhine (1958) indicate that, not surprisingly, the attitudes of other members of a reference group toward the communication will affect the recipient's attitude toward it.

d) *Discrediting the information.* - - Providing accurate information or pinpointing obvious inaccuracies or fallacies in the communication may alter the recipient's attitude toward it (Katz, Sarnoff, & McClintock, 1956), but fails in a surprising number of instances simply because the recipient does not accept the new information, being already committed emotionally to the attitude advocated by the communication.

e) *Associating values important to the recipient with those attacked by the communication.* - - For example, if love of *all* of one's fellow men can be successfully made part of a person's value system, his resistance to contrary propaganda will be stronger (see, e.g., Kelley & Volkart, 1952).

f) *Emphasizing elements which the recipient and the target have in common.* - - Experiments show that perceived similarity (Kaufman & Marcus, 1965) and perceived common danger (Feshbach & Singer, 1957; Werner & Wagner, 1955) tend to unite people and lessen hostility.

g) *Providing insight.* - - There is evidence that providing the recipient with an understanding of the motives which make him susceptible to hate propaganda may increase his resistance (Katz, Sarnoff & McClintock, 1956).

h) *Inoculation.* - - This very interesting and highly effective method, explored extensively by McGuire (1964) consists in providing a prospective recipient with small advance doses of the information to which he is to be made resistant and preferably having him formulate an active rebuttal. In this manner apparently the person is forced to think the topic through, and especially examine those beliefs which previously were accepted by him without question. Never having had reason to question or defend such a belief, he is both unmotivated and unpractised in defending it. McGuire also showed the obverse of this intriguing finding, viz. that those very beliefs that always have been taken for granted are quite susceptible to change, a finding that should give pause to those arguing that certain "self-evident" truths are impervious to influence attempts.

i) *Role-playing.* - - The experimental literature cites several instances in which individuals arguing (under some irrelevant pretext) an issue on the side opposed to their own beliefs, subsequently altered their attitudes in such a manner as to bring them closer to the position they advocated in their role-playing. (Brock, 1962; Culbertson, 1957; Janis & King, 1954). These generally found results may be due to at least two causes: 1) Again, the role-player may have been forced to think about the issue, and especially to view it from a new angle, putting himself into the other person's place, as it were; 2) The findings are explainable in terms of the so-called dissonance theory, briefly explained earlier. In the present instance, assume that a person has agreed, presumably under little or no coercion, to present as convincing an argument as he could on the side of an issue opposite to his own attitude. Now, if he has made a good case, he either runs the risk of being foolish for

not accepting some of his own excellent points, or he runs the risk of perceiving himself as dishonest for having practised sophistry. Both of these threats are readily reduced if the role-player lessens his opposition to the ideas he so ably advocated. A corollary to this formulation predicts that better role-players change their attitudes more than poor role-players.

j) *Increasing contacts* between recipients and targets. - - There is considerable evidence that increasing contacts can reduce prejudice - - (e. g., Deutsch & Collins, 1951) and there is ample evidence to the contrary (Harlan, 1942; Lee & Humphrey, 1943; Williams, 1947). The relevant variables are both the attitude with which such contacts are approached - - a readiness to confirm one's prejudices as opposed to a relatively open mind - - and the circumstances under which such contacts take place. It is, for instance, unlikely that the white businessman's daily encounters with his black elevator man will affect the former's prejudices; encounters under equal status conditions, on the other hand, appear to be somewhat more effective, although, again, by no means highly reliable (Harding & Hogrefe, 1952; MacKenzie, 1948).

k) It may sometimes be practicable to induce in the recipient attitudes and/or behaviour *logically incompatible* with the ones advocated by the communication. (Brehm, 1960).

l) According tangible *rewards* for behaviour and expressions of attitudes opposed to the communication (Milgram, 1965).

m) *Emphasizing* or, if possible, *implementing the non-permanence of the group* in which the recipient takes pride and with regard to which the target might be considered an outsider. If the fluidity, the temporal and situational nature of in-group is emphasized, their mythical attributes should recede in importance.

n) *Counter propaganda* – This is perhaps the most obvious manner of combatting influence attempts. Putting this technique into practice is, however, more complicated than appears at first sight. In some instances a rational appeal is appropriate, in others an emotional appeal, say, to recipient's decency, works best.

It can be seen that, while a variety of methods counteracting persuasion are available, they are neither foolproof nor, more importantly, readily practicable on a large scale. These reservations are in no sense aimed at depreciating the excellent and highly promising work done in this area, but simply to place it in the proper perspective with regard to immediate and fairly general application.

The relative immunity of prejudice to even one's own reasoning processes, furthermore, has been movingly described by Griffin (1961) and Podhoretz (1963). Quite often it seems that neither others nor we ourselves can alter our emotions through reason alone.

APPENDIX II

CHAPTER IX

THE LAW AS A SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR

As lawyers have examined the applicability of new psychological insights to legal matters, it is equally proper to examine the law as it affects social behaviour. There can be no question that not only informal group norms, but also the highly formalized form of such norms represented by the law can and should be studied in terms of their social, psychological, and social-psychological effects. The present study would fall short of its aim if it neglected that aspect of the issue.

It is not within the province of this paper to examine such issues as the feasibility or enforcement of laws. The intriguing question as to whether potential and avowed destroyers of liberty ought to be accorded untrammelled freedoms will also not be touched upon. Instead, possible infringements upon the freedom of target groups will be examined.

McNeil (1959) points out that a group can give informal sanction to the most extreme forms of aggressive expression (p. 266). The crucial term here is not "extreme aggression," but "informal sanction". Where no explicit interdict exists, informal approval or support of even highly unusual behaviour, aggressive or otherwise, may occur. This is not to say that informal sanctions may not run directly contrary to the law. One need only cite Prohibition to recognize the error of that argument. But the role of the law in codifying and clarifying the rules of social interaction cannot be overemphasized. Allport stresses the need for enforceability, but this term should be understood not only in the sense of whether there is someone to apprehend a violator. It is just as important that the Law clearly states what may or may not be done.

Allport (1958, p. 437 ff) points out the fallacy of the argument that prejudice cannot be legislated against. First, he notes that discriminatory laws surely increase prejudice, and asks why the reverse might not be the case. More important, and more directly applicable to the problem at hand, is Allport's observation that legislation is not directly aimed at prejudice. "The establishment of a legal norm creates a public conscience and a standard for expected behaviour that check overt signs of prejudice." (p. 437). Though Allport does not dwell upon the process of such a phenomenon, he maintains that attitudes tend to match previous behaviour. This notion that behaviour originally engaged in for various reasons tends to produce attitudes in closer agreement with such behaviour than before the behaviour took place forms a large and well documented body of social psychological research and theory, as pointed out in the previous chapter; though it is not

maintained, of course, that any type of act, committed under duress or quite accidentally, will immediately produce totally consonant attitudes. There can be little doubt, however, and recent acts of compliance in the Southern United States corroborate this, that situational demands arising from quite recent norms often engender compliance, and that this compliance subsequently may modify deep-seated attitudes.

Granted that observance is greatly hampered where a law is unrelated or even contrary to the early socialization process each person undergoes, laws nevertheless have a decisive effect upon molding and, if necessary, altering cultural norms. It does not matter that a large percentage of ostensibly law-abiding individuals may on occasion violate some of these laws; the great majority of them, even though never apprehended, are painfully aware that they have acted in opposition to some accepted standard by committing an act they often would not condone if committed by someone else.

It might be argued, then, that the effectiveness of a norm or a precept originates not only from its ethical value – after all, most people agree that we should love our neighbours as ourselves, although few people do – but, to a considerable degree, from the perceived momentary or enduring requirements of the social environment, and the degree to which others are perceived as adhering to that norm. The ultimate and clearest instance of such norms is the written law.

Allport presents a strong argument against a complete reliance upon the educative process for remedying social ills. He states:

> "It is often said that the way must be paved for remedial legislation through education. Up to a point this statement is undoubtedly true. Debate, hearings, and an aroused electorate are all essential. But when the initial work has been done, then the legislation in turn becomes educative. The masses of people do not become converts in advance; rather they are converted by the *fait accompli*. It is a well-known psychological fact that most people accept the results of an election or legislation gladly enough after the furore has subsided." (1958, p. 438)

As Hegel points out: "The state cannot recognize conscience in its peculiar form, i. e., as subjective knowledge, just as in science, too, subjective opinion, assurance, and the appeal to subjective opinion have no validity." (quoted in Kaufmann, 1959, p. 102).

A simple, but appealing example is provided by a series of studies by Lefkowitz, Blake & Mouton (1955) in which 99% of all pedestrians observed a "Wait" sign at an intersection, even though there were neither cars nor policemen in sight (a sizeable percentage broke that ordinance when an example was set by a "stooge" who did cross against the sign). Also, Freed, Chandler, Mouton & Blake

(1955) found that strongly worded prohibitions are more effective as deterrents than weakly worded ones, especially if an alternative behaviour is suggested. In both of these studies, it should be noted, no mention of penalty was made, nor is it plausible to infer that participants expected to be punished for transgression.

To summarize: The law, as seen in this context, derives its importance not from its functions as a punishing, rehabilitating, or deterrent agent, not even from that of providing just compensation, but rather from its unique opportunity to codify, clarify, and impose rules of social interaction.

The study by Milgram (1963) cited earlier found that behaviour quite akin to "atrocity behaviour" can be induced in about two thirds of a sample of quite ordinary individuals. The justification adduced for delivering purportedly dangerous and patently painful amounts of electric shock to a peer was certainly no more plausible than the reasons given for ethnic discrimination, persecution and destruction. What appeared to be of importance was the aura of legitimacy conferred by the elegant premises of a major university. Some participants clearly suffered when asked to inflict considerable pain, others had laughing fits, which they were later at pains to discount as evidence of sadism. One need not draw the conclusion that, under normal circumstances, two thirds of the adult American male population are potential torturers, but even allowing for some special characteristics of the study just discussed, its more general implications for the plasticity of ethical values when in conflict with apparent situational demands cannot be ignored. It is almost impossible not to draw parallels between the experimental subjects at Yale and Adolf Eichmann's acquiescence to mass murder.

It must be pointed out, however, that this role of informing the public about norms, called the "declaratory" effect by Walker (1964) is by no means unequivocal in its effects. Walter & Argyle (1964) conducted a survey and an experiment in which the hypothesis was tested that people are more likely to regard an act as immoral when they also believe it to be illegal, than when they believe it to be legal. No noticeable effect due to "illegality" as opposed to "legality" was found for the following behaviours:

littering
drunkenness
obscene language

A question on suicide supported the hypothesis to a limited degree in the initial survey, on the other hand, an experimental question on prostitution showed an opposite effect: In some instances the information that prostitution was illegal produced a less censorious attitude than the belief that it was legal. (It should be noted that the subjects were young males of above average intelligence.)

Three observations are in order regarding this failure to corroborate the "declarative" function of the law:

1) Walker & Argyle found, and for reasons in harmony with their purpose eliminated, a sizeable proportion of subjects who declared that they would view a behaviour as normally wrong *merely because* it has been outlawed. It may well be that the proportion in a sample susceptible to prejudiced communications would be even greater, given their generally found submissiveness to authority.

2) Walker & Argyle examined attitudes, not behaviour. Their study does not answer the crucial question whether individuals would be more likely to engage in certain behaviour, depending on their legality, regardless of whether they are viewed as moral or not.

3) The questions posed by Walker & Argyle in no instance deal with acts through which another person could be caused serious physical or psychological injury. It is especially in this latter case where the "declarative" function of the law might prove effective in that it authenticates findings of injuries of which most people might be unaware or skeptical.

These reservations clearly suggest additional research, to be further explored in the final chapter.

There remains an additional aspect relevant to the present chapter. We have dwelt so far upon the possible effects of legislation upon potential recipients and converts of extremist propaganda. The question of the effects of such propaganda upon members of the target group is equally important.

The possible effects of threat and vilification have been examined in an earlier chapter. The question now to be answered is whether a legislative act would have any effect in lessening the subjectively perceived threat inherent in such propaganda, and thereby reduce its nefarious consequences, regardless of whether the actual flow of communication is lessened. Unfortunately, this writer knows of no directly relevant experimental literature. Once more, rigorous research is urgently needed. However, if we again consider the Law as representing clearly formulated group norms, some plausible inferences can be drawn. The individual who directly or indirectly realizes that he is the target of hate propaganda may then either perceive himself as unprotected by his society, or he may derive comfort from the firm stand the society takes in protecting him from threats or libel.

Inter-group hostility and the propaganda resulting therefrom constitutes both a social problem afflicting the entire society, and, as has been argued, a threat to the target, though not necessarily an immediate physical one. Both of these dangers can be countered substantially by a firm and well-publicized stand by society against the extremists advocating group hatred. The target group stands to suffer less injury if society is clearly dissociated from hate-mongers, so that the latter do not appear to operate with at least the implicit approval of a large majority.

It is probably true that some of the processes advocated in the previous chapter aimed at preventing the acceptance of prejudiced propaganda may well be effective when applied to members of the target group. The Jew, too, may on occasion require the factual reassurance offered by the contradiction of outrageous assertions, and by discovering common attributes' between himself and members of the majority group.

The experimental literature cites a number of studies, all of which show that group support enhances an individual's resilience against outside attack, confers greater self-confidence, and leads to more effective performance on task or job. Observation of real-life situation supplies equally vast and unequivocal evidence. Indeed, "uprootedness," "anomie," or non-belongingness have been shown to lead even to suicide.

It could, of course, be argued that the material in question need not signify loss of group support at all, but in fact may strengthen the solidarity of the attacked sub-group. In many instances this is undoubtedly so, but two objections can be offered immediately: One is that our fluid society, to a considerable extent, weakens the in-group. The minority group member quite often stands almost alone in an impersonal society; secondly, the pride of intense in-group loyalty on the part of a minority group is usually spurious. As pointed out, there is evidence from studies on American Negroes and Jews indicating that they have adopted many of the same prejudices against one another as are shown against them as a group (Engel, et al. 1958; Adelson, 1953; Clark & Clark, 1947). This self-contempt makes its tragic appearance quite early in life, and constituted one of the decisive points in the U.S. Supreme Court Decision against the feasibility of "separate but equal" educational facilities.

Whatever an individual's loyalty to sub-groups in his society, in all but a few instances where all his values are adequately represented by those sub-groups and he lives his life wholly within them, his major investments, in terms of education, occupation, and cultural values, still rest in the society as a whole. The effects of rejection by society of one or another of its sub-groups forms a long history of human iniquity. There are good grounds for believing that the absence of action and unequivocal protection can be seen as a lesser degree of such rejection.

A recent incident at a public park in Toronto may serve as a useful illustration. A large number of survivors of Nazi persecutions rioted against a widely publicized Nazi gathering. Informal questioning showed clearly that their anger sprang chiefly from the impression that no official position had been taken against a public gathering at which the main topic, presumably, was to be the statement that extermination had been carried out imperfectly, and that a more thorough reprise was imminent. The above is in no way to be interpreted as endorsing the counter-measures taken, nor is it suggested that legislation should be the outcome of pressures exerted by illegitimate public gatherings. Conversely, though, it might be argued that much civil rights legislation in the United States is the result of

planned, orderly public pressure, and that the apparent orderliness of a given target population in the face of provocation and threat ought not to preclude its legitimate protection.

That the recent survivors of the most systematic and efficient attempt at genocide, as well as any other citizens, are entitled to the protection of this society not only against physical violence, but against calumny, fear, and threat, is not in doubt. The question is whether this support should come from the law, especially in view of the almost total absence of informal support these individuals have received from religious and communication media. In fact, the latter have perhaps aggravated the issue by viewing it in terms of a rational conflict of interests, in which one opinion is as good as the next. Individuals openly advocating mass deportations, sterilizations, and genocide are solemnly interviewed and acquire a status not far removed from that of an authority.

Free speech is certainly a powerful argument. It is also a shibboleth. Presumably, some restraint would be imposed upon a communication calling upon citizens to slay their next-door neighbour, not because most people would do so, but because a few might. Impartiality is another catchword which often takes the place of rejection: should the right to advocate murder be accorded the same status as the right to freedom from threat?

One further point that has to be made is that which concerns the launching of a legislative campaign as determined by the likelihood of its success. As Chein (1955) points out, there are good, though unsuccessful campaigns, and bad successful ones, in addition to the other two obvious variants. Both of these campaigns have praiseworthy objects. The former, although it fails to become statute, informs and arouses the people toward a favourable attitude, and, to look at the important obverse in our instance, may imply essential solidarity and support for the target group. The other campaign succeeds in obtaining desirable legislation, but in so doing antagonizes public opinion.

APPENDIX II

CHAPTER X

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Studies on prejudice and its eradication have constituted a considerable portion of psychological research over the last 20 years. The present suggestions will restrict themselves specifically to the relationship between legislation, and prejudice and its communication. A more detailed outline of the research sketched below will form part of imminent research proposals by the writer.

1) *The susceptibility to pseudo-logic, unwarranted generalizations, and circular argument.* – These studies would explore systematically the success of communications analogous in form to hate material, but dealing with unrelated topics. The "respectability" of the source would also be varied.

2) *The "declarative" effect of legislation with regard to attitudes toward crimes of violence or slander.* – This series of studies would ascertain whether people's attitudes toward such acts are affected by the legality of those acts. These studies could be refined by, a) keeping *informal* norms constant, and b) studying the effects of legal norms upon what a person perceives to be informal norms.

3) *The effects of legislated norms upon violent or slanderous behaviour.* – These studies would examine the effectiveness with which aggressive or otherwise anti-social behaviour can be induced, given that they are (or are not) illegal. Again, informal norms would be kept constant.

4) *The effects of social support, either legal or informal, in minimizing the harmful consequences of hate propaganda for the intended victims.* This is perhaps the subtlest and most difficult project, requiring considerable sophistication. An experimental situation would be devised in which a person is subjected to direct or indirect attack by virtue of a group affiliation, which might be permanent or temporary. This attack would take place under conditions in which non-members of the group give either no support, formal or informal support, or both, and effects upon self-esteem, resilience, aggression and other response variables would be measured.

APPENDIX II

CHAPTER XI

SUMMARY, AND SOME PERSONAL VIEWS

This paper has examined the psychological aspects of hate propaganda. It began with some working assumptions, essentially that in a vast society there will, for some reason or other, exist some extremists, but that our interest lies not so much in explaining or curing their pathology, but in protecting the rest of society from contamination and injury. It was further assumed that there is no explanatory value in postulating unchangeable, instinctive, and universal needs to hate or aggress. Finally, it was assumed that people are susceptible to persuasion of many kinds, hence, that the problem of hate propaganda is relevant to the general issue of social behaviour, and should not be dismissed a priori as being ineffective.

The second chapter dealt with social and cultural variables that might affect emission of propaganda on the part of the communicator, and receptivity on the part of potential converts.

The communication situation itself was discussed in detail in Chapters III, IV, V and VI dealing, respectively, with communicator characteristics as perceived by the recipient, variables of the communication, personality correlates of persuasibility, and interactions among those three elements.

Chapter VII examined the possible effects of hate propaganda upon the targets of such propaganda. Chapter VIII dealt with a variety of non-legal measures designed to counteract the effects of persuasive communications.

Chapter IX attempted an analysis of the psychological aspects of law. Chapter X proposed briefly some possibly fruitful areas for future research.

The writer, aware that neutrality on a sensitive topic is difficult, if not unattainable, has made every effort to present evidence impartially. He has taken pains to remain within the limits of his competence. At this point however, it might not be amiss to expand somewhat on his own views, which are the following:

1) Freedom of expression must be protected carefully and judiciously.

2) Such freedom clearly has some limitations in a complex society.

3) Conceivably, freedom of speech should in some measure be contingent upon responsibility.

4) Well-meaning concern about democratic freedoms has often obscured threats to equally fundamental rights of minority groups.

5) The writer is not competent to judge the possible legal side effects of legislation applicable to the problem at hand, but has considerable evidence of the undesirable effects of hostility-generating propaganda, both upon potential converts and targets.

6) On the basis of this vast amount of evidence on one side, and the possible dangers inherent in any curtailment of free expression, this writer leans toward some formalization of norms precluding the kinds of activities against groups that are now considered inadmissible when aimed at individuals. The effects of such formalization might be beneficial from three viewpoints:

a) Restraint upon possible communicators, not necessarily through fear of apprehension or punishment, but rather through the establishment of a social climate perceived by them as being unconducive to their message.

b) "Social reality", or a clearer understanding of what is or is not acceptable in the society for the recipient of such propaganda. The communicator would be seen as operating outside the limits of acceptability. Also, informal norms would probably move toward legislated formal norms.

c) A reassuring knowledge to targets and potential victims that they enjoy the clear protection of society not only against physical attack or individual calumny, but also against the threats and vilification directed against them as members of a religious, ethnic, racial, or other group. It is quite likely that such a reassurance through legislation would go a long way toward removing motives for unregulated self-protection.

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APPENDIX II

A Postscript:

Dealing with Intergroup Conflicts Through Education

The present postscript consists of two parts, the first is a partial survey of educational procedures used in dealing with prejudice. This first part examines some of the most thorough and successful approaches, in Great Britain, the United States, and Canada, and should provide a useful guide for possible future plans in Canada. Some suggestions for such plans will be made in the second part of this study. The suggestions will attempt to incorporate the most successful features of the programs discussed in Part 1, but do so, a) in such a manner as to adapt such programs to present requirements in Canada, and, b) by incorporating more recent psychological theories and findings.

Part 1 – Natural Programs

Great Britain

In Great Britain, Domnitz (1953) presents a series of lectures on the improvement in human relations in settings ranging from the infant to the adult stage.

He quotes Miss V.M. Daniel's work "Activity in the Primary School" to underline the need for materials aimed at developing *Standards* of social behaviour, but is aware of possible conflicts between school versus home standards.

At the secondary school level, logical thinking and the spotting of flaws can be profitably taught.

Various organizations dealing with adult education, e. g., The Workers' Educational Association and The Council of Citizens of East London are cited as playing a significant role in the reduction, through lectures, discussions, and contacts of intergroup hostility.

United States

The Missouri Commission on Human Rights publishes a Guide giving an outline of topics to be developed into lectures and, where possible, incorporated into such *high school* courses as:

World History
American and Missouri History
Contemporary Issues
Civics
American Government
Sociology

Public Speaking
Psychology
Family Relations

The techniques aim at:

1) Producing an understanding of the relationship of human rights legislation and individual behaviour to basic American and human goals.

2) Giving information about basic rights and the cost of prejudice and discrimination.

3) Developing attitudes of mutual respect and individual, rather than group evaluation.

4) Developing skills and abilities in rational evaluation of information and the detection, in oneself and others, of prejudice or discrimination.

The Guide also contains a suggested vocabulary of relevant terms, a list of films and recordings, and suggestions for classroom work.

The State Committee on Human Relations in Pennsylvania (1962) has a carefully designed program for elementary and secondary grades. It begins by stressing that intergroup education comprises more than race relations, and is concerned with people in the community. It is, thus, not to be confused with courses acquainting the student with cultures in other countries.

The program suggests that intergroup relations training is not limited to a given course or curriculum and emphasizes the importance of such education for members of majority and minority groups.

In Philadelphia, some public schools have adopted a Quaker film symbolizing the absurd nature of discrimination. "Churkendoose" is now considered by various State Boards of Education. The program strongly emphasizes involvement in *action* and the experiencing of pleasurable events in an intergroup setting.

Several publications by the U.S. Government attempt to coordinate, within the limits of their jurisdiction, the efforts of the individual states (See, e.g., Public Education Staff Report, 1963, United States Commission on Civil Rights; Staff Report to the United States Commission on Civil Rights: Southern States, North Carolina, 1963).

A publication by the American Council on Education entitled, Literature for Human Understanding (1948) views the resolution of intergroup conflicts in terms of the study of literature, especially in the classroom, and suggests a number of suitable and well-known works. A particularly interesting and sound point is the suggestion that prejudice be first attacked at the level of spontaneous verbalizations unsupported by social pressure.

Cogent objections are also raised against the well-meaning, but misguided attempt to induce respect and admiration for members of minority groups by discussing outstanding figures like G.W. Carver, B.T. Washington, Justice Brandeis, Haym Solomon, et cetera. Such a program may deprive the student of the opportunity to gain realistic insights into the everyday frustrations suffered by members of minority groups, and may also engender the unrealistic expectation that such minority group members should generally be extreme instances of virtue and excellence. This expectation may, further, be shared by children from minority groups, and since it fails to be fulfilled, result in frustration and anxiety.

A substantial and continued effort is being made by the American Council on Education. A thorough documentation of a four-year study is given in the volume "Intergroup Education in Public Schools" (Taba, Brady, & Robinson, 1952).

The approach of this remarkable project can be summarized only at a considerable sacrifice of accuracy and persuasiveness. In essence, however, the project takes for its point of departure the customary approaches aimed at dispelling intergroup hostility. These traditional approaches dealt with:

a) An emphasis upon the negative, deleterious aspects of such conflicts in terms of social disorganization, individual maladjustment, and the inefficiency and waste of prejudice and stereotypes;

b) The formal teaching in schools of citizenship and character education.

The work utilized (then) new findings in sociology, psychology, and education, and stressed the "positive" approach of wholesome intergroup relations as a product of day-to-day living in school and community.

Apparently, the study was also the first to enlist the cooperation of students, teachers, administrators, parents, and others in the community.

The book further describes minor reports and workshops in various parts of the country, designed to propagate the insights gained in the project.

The schools in which the studies were conducted were mainly located in urban areas of the north. No schools in the so-called Deep South were included.

Of direct interest to the present Report is the analysis of conflicting views on prejudice in terms of deliberate – and hence controllable – malice, pathological, and sociological determinants. Without casting its vote for one or another of these formulations, the work notes the unique role of the formal educational process in alleviating or eliminating prejudice, especially by the multiple approach advocated by the authors and utilized in the studies.

A further important point is made when the initial reluctance of schools having no immediate problem are discussed. It was soon found that even where

there were no conflicts along the traditional divisions of race or national groups, prejudice and discrimination could be found based upon recent immigration from the south or rural areas, economic status, and quite frequently, intra-family conflicts caused by the different cultural values of parents and children. The traditional educational methods often attack that prejudice which is at the time the most pressing national problem. Thus, children in areas where such a problem is absent may actually *learn* prejudice against the unenlightened fellow who is prejudiced against Jews or Negroes, without understanding the social and psychological origins of prejudice.

Four aspects of growth are thus subjected to this training process:

a) factual knowledge and ideas

b) social sensitivity

c) rational and objective habits of thought

d) social skills.

It becomes apparent from this very sketchy outline why the projects described extended over several years. Schools had to be recruited, the cooperation of communities and other agencies had to be secured, and finally the training program itself was undertaken in three yearly steps. Throughout, the authors stress continuity and cumulativeness of this positive educational process, and it is probably relevant to stress once more at this point that the program showed valuable results not only in dealing with the traditional areas of intergroup conflict defined by race and ethnic group, but also with economic, urban-rural, and, very importantly, parent-child conflicts.

An interesting point based upon sound psychology is made by a Quaker publication: it advocates direct instruction and intense small group approaches, and dismisses mass appeals. The emphasis upon *action* is justified by arguing that Americans *live* their way into thinking, rather than think their way into living. (This is, of course, the well-documented psychological principle of dissonance reduction, whereby that which has been done becomes more acceptable). Lest this tendency be construed as crassly modern pragmatism, the pamphlet quotes John 14:9: "Jesus called people to follow, expecting following to result in belief".

UNESCO

The Conference Bulletin of the UNESCO Institute for Education, Hamburg (1964) points out that:

a) attitudes can be taught which view differences with positive interest rather than hostility;

b) combating prejudice and discrimination is not an educational activity isolated from all other educational efforts.

Reduction of prejudice was studied, a) at the cognitive intellectual level, b) through group processes, procedures, and compositions aimed at reducing prejudice at the non-cognitive (attitudinal or affective) level, and, c) implications for teacher training.

Examples drawn from various scholastic disciplines, e.g., history and statistics, were recommended.

The meeting devoted special consideration to the multiple causes of prejudice, and the required multiple remedies by the teacher; it took pains to distinguish between lightly and strongly held prejudices and stereotypes. The former were ascribed mainly to conformity, the latter to anxieties and frustrations.

Logical thinking and the formation of new norms are introduced as powerful and enduring antidotes against facile generalizations and unquestioning conformity to prejudiced norms.

Research aimed at assessing the effectiveness of the three approaches was discussed.

Canada

In Canada, a "Program Manual for Brotherhood" was issued by the Canadian Council of Christians and Jews (1962). It suggests, i.a.: Conferences on Human Relations for High Schools, Young Adult Conferences, Seminars on Human Relations for University Students, Seminars on Human Relations for Nurses and Hospital Staff, Brotherhood Week, High School exchange visits between English and French speaking students.

The teachers' role in properly implementing the program is maintained to be dependent upon active support by the administration.

In order to facilitate such implementation, the formation of committees composed of teachers is recommended. Such committees should be moderate in size as well as in the frequency of their meetings, and their main purpose would be exchange of ideas and discussion of optimal classroom methods.

The Report allows for differential aptitude on the part of teachers, but insists that, given proper motivations, this aptitude can be developed to a considerable degree. (One might note here that we can safely assume that *motivation,* too, can be taught to teachers, since we assume that it can be taught to students.)

Various techniques are outlined for elementary and secondary grades, applicable in several subjects.

The school is also seen as providing a unique opportunity for group activities, though the Report notes that this opportunity is seldom and incompletely realized.

The report concludes with a history of legislation and a bibliography of teaching aids.

An article entitled, "My Neighbour and Me" (1959), (the grammatical atrocity presumably is intended to convey down-to-earth sincerity) suggests an ambitious program of education, not limited to a single age group. Its appeal is rational, emotional, and patriotic, but the steps it suggests are quite vague and no relevant literature or theories are cited.

The Hon. W.G. Davis, Minister of Education for the Province of Ontario, has forthrightly addressed himself to the very real problem of biased passages in school text books. An excerpt of a recent statement by him to the 27th Ontario Legislature reads as follows:

> "Mr. Chairman, during the past year several members of the Legislature, among them the Member for Scarborough West, have drawn my attention to certain passages in school textbooks which were clearly out of line with the spirit of the Ontario Human Rights Code.
>
> "I won't take the time now to go into the matter in any detail. I do want, however, to inform the Member for Scarborough West and others who have raised this question with me, that in co-operation with the Ontario Human Rights Commission and its Director, Dr. Daniel Hill, we are about to make a thorough examination of all school textbooks, not just for the purpose of removing material which may be offensive to any of the groups which make up our multi-national family, but more important, to make sure that our text-books do contain the type of material which does full justice to the contribution of many peoples to the development of our Province and Nation.
>
> "I know from recent correspondence with our textbook publishers institute that they too are willing and indeed anxious to co-operate with us in this matter."

The 1963 National Seminar of The Canadian Association for Adult Education discussed at length human relations training in Canada. Different training programs across Canada, it regretfully notes, suffer from a scarcity in exchange of ideas. The need for training of trainers was pointed out.

Dr. T.J. Mallison notes that, contrary to the situation in the U.S.,

1) No major Canadian University or Research Centre had been linked with this field of training.

2) An important difference between Canadian and American cultures in emphasis: In America, stress is placed upon a shared value system and common goals, while in Canada an acceptance of differences is sought. Thus, Canada aims at modification of attitudes, while the U.S. seeks to induce changes in values.

This analysis and contrast may well be an oversimplification. Clearly, both cultures require changes and adaptations in values as well as in attitudes, even though with regard to specifics, say, bi-or multi-lingualism, their goals may differ.

Factual information for instance of a biological nature dispelling myths about racial superiority, should be presented not out of context, as an item of knowledge to be reproduced at an exam, and then forgotten, but as a follow-up and a corroboration of an awareness developing gradually during guided interaction between conflict-torn groups.

Part 2 – Suggestions for Implementation and Research

The following recommendations can lay only partial claim to originality. Many of the suggestions are either taken from the literature cited in Part 1, or readily derivable from it. On the other hand, standard procedures are often irrelevant to specific situations, and require redefinition and adaptation.

In considering the role of education in the prevention and resolution of intergroup conflicts, then, the following main points should be emphasized:

1) Preventive education is as necessary and, as ample evidence demonstrates, far more promising than collective education. Hence, the issue is relevant in some way or another even in those areas where no topical and newsworthy conflicts exist.

2) The understanding, attitudes, and skills imparted in a successful program of intergroup relations are relevant along many dimensions of conflict other than the well-publicized ones of race and ethnic origin.

3) The importance of commitment and behaviour as opposed to mere discussion or lecture, cannot be overrated. Bull-sessions, reasoning, attainment of insight, and an examination of one's values are worthy and edifying endeavours. However, active participation in pleasurable intergroup activities, realistic exposure to different ways of life, not as quaint, puzzling phenomena, but as constituting an integral part of the fabric of our society form an indispensable complement to these processes. It may be surprising to the layman and implausible to the educator that make-believe, role-playing or pertinent dramatizations have been shown to have strong effects upon the performers, though they are far less effective with regard to the spectators.

4) A thorough, long-range program of teacher training, again through *doing*, rather than mere talking should be instituted. As anyone else, the teacher is

likely to carry with him a fair amount of prejudice, usually without malice or awareness. He, before most others, must be freed from such preconceptions, since, as we have seen, they are readily transmitted without direct exhortation, indeed without the intention of the teacher. Attitudes and beliefs are communicated subtly, and, given the position of the teacher vis-à-vis the children, carry enormous weight.

5) While we must expect some highly deviant people in a large society, serious precautions ought to be taken to protect our schools from highly prejudiced teachers.

6) It may be a delicate but necessary task to make teachers, administrators, and the community aware that personal religious beliefs stated by the teacher as a knowledgeable and awesome figure, may cause anguish to some of the children, and encourage division along sectarian lines. The present analysis is not concerned with the issue whether, for reasons of separation of Church and State, religion belongs in the public school at all. It is concerned with the effects of overt or implied religious partiality by teachers or administration.

7) An effective educational program at any level is impossible without considerable parental and communal support. The extension of the educative process in intergroup relations serves therefore a twofold purpose:

   a) To eliminate, reduce or prevent such conflicts at the adult level, and,

   b) to establish an accepting milieu for education in intergroup harmony at the harmony at the primary and secondary level.

8) The process of education in general, and intergroup relations in particular, ought not to be debilitated by compartmentalization. Intergroup relations are not a subject, but should form a strong underlying viewpoint for instruction in many areas.

9) As in the formal disciplines, the effects of educational efforts upon attitudes, behaviour, and skills relating to intergroup issues should form the object of continuous and careful study. It is not enough to devise a program, activate it, and complacently expect it to result in perpetual perfection.

10) The gathering of knowledge about processes affecting intergroup relations should not be limited to "natural", classroom studies; the value of carefully controlled, though "artificial" experimental situations is established beyond a reasonable doubt.

11) Too often, highly specialized tasks, requiring advanced skills in a discipline, are entrusted to the professional educator. It is unrealistic to expect even the ablest educator to be also a psychologist, sociologist, and social worker, beyond perhaps a very elementary level. The problem at hand requires more than elementary skills.

12) The desirability of separating classes into subgroups according to specific skills should be evaluated very carefully. Persuasive and plausible

arguments can be made on both sides of this question, e.g., "The brighter students can progress at their own pace, instead of being held back by the slower ones," as opposed to "The brighter students find themselves faced with very exacting standards. Living up to these standards can engender considerable anxiety." The less brilliant student also has arguments going for him in favour of either separation or non-separation. For instance: "If the brighter are removed from competition, the less brilliant ones are less threatened and can aim for more realistic goals" – as opposed to: "Removing the brighter students leaves the others without some very good examples to emulate."

The academic bases for separation thus seem to arrange themselves on both sides of the argument. From a human relations point of view, though, the issue is more one-sided. If segregated, the lesser students are quite likely to learn to consider themselves as second-raters, while the bright students may find it very difficult not to look upon their less gifted peers with pity and contempt. Such contempt for individuals less gifted intellectually is in no way more justifiable than the traditional forms of prejudice we seek to eradicate. Yet, it seems that this form of prejudice is widely taught, at least by implication.

These reflections are not be taken as a categorical opposition to all forms of student grouping, but it is suggested that, where such groupings are deemed advisable, they should be undertaken with full awareness of possible consequences, and traces of possible harmful side effects should be carefully noted. It is, also, often possible to arrange for transient groupings, specific to a given topic, in such a manner that habits of intellectual aristocracy and arrogance, as well as those of resignation and low self-esteem, have little opportunity to take root. These task-specific groupings should, moreover, not be permanently closed, so that other students may aspire to join such an "élite" at some not too distant date. More positively, the less gifted in certain academic disciplines may well be the ones who need most individual attention, even ego-building. Yet, they are usually the ones who are most ignored. Ways can and should be found to convey to all students a feeling of accomplishment and self-esteem.

The approach which promises to lead to a more harmonious society is not limited to the curriculum. The influence of the school and its values and attitudes extends beyond the classroom both chronologically and topographically. Group activities, begun in school, can be successfully carried outside.

The brevity of the second part of this Report should not be construed as glibness or superficiality. Clearly, much pure and specific applied research is needed if this ancient disease is to be combatted successfully in our society.

However, we do now have some of the knowledge to undertake this task, and this young and varied society may offer a unique opportunity at this time in its history to avoid this grievous infection which has caused so many dark pages to be written in history books. The fact that we possess incomplete knowledge should be no deterrent to action, nor should we delude ourselves that such action is not needed here, and now.

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