From d10116069553ff93b7d75fa6c48ed3681895590f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robert DeLanghe <1240090+bdelanghe@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2026 19:21:48 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] fix(repo-standard): one reusable workflow = one authority
 ceiling (#55)
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repo-standard.yml @ #54 raised its permission floor above `contents: read`
(sbom needs `contents: write`, scorecard needs `actions: read`). GitHub
validates a called reusable workflow's permission requests as the UNION of
all its jobs, at load time, before any `if:` — so every caller, even a
read-only spell/security PR run, had to grant the superset or hit a
zero-jobs `startup_failure`. That is why #54 could not start and why
conformance#19 is blocked.

Restore one reusable workflow = one authority ceiling:
- repo-standard.yml  — stays `contents: read` (osv, dependency-review,
  spell, test, descriptor); drops the scorecard/sbom jobs + inputs
- repo-scorecard.yml — `contents: read` + `actions: read` (scorecard)
- repo-release.yml   — `contents: write` (sbom); adds an
  `upload-release-assets` input so callers can take the SBOM artifact
  without a release upload

Callers opt into the elevated ceilings with dedicated, event-gated jobs, so
a PR run never instantiates write authority.

Add repo-standard-selftest.yml: calls each reusable workflow at its intended
ceiling. GitHub validates the permission union at load time, so a future
revision that raises a floor fails here, pre-merge, instead of in every
downstream repo — the self-test guard #55/#56 identified as missing. It also
doubles as the reference caller template.

Fixes #55. Closes #56. Unblocks conformance#19.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---
 .github/workflows/repo-release.yml           | 41 ++++++++++
 .github/workflows/repo-scorecard.yml         | 50 ++++++++++++
 .github/workflows/repo-standard-selftest.yml | 57 ++++++++++++++
 .github/workflows/repo-standard.yml          | 83 ++++----------------
 4 files changed, 163 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 .github/workflows/repo-release.yml
 create mode 100644 .github/workflows/repo-scorecard.yml
 create mode 100644 .github/workflows/repo-standard-selftest.yml

diff --git a/.github/workflows/repo-release.yml b/.github/workflows/repo-release.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..218dcc5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/workflows/repo-release.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+# repo-release — release-side artifacts (SPDX SBOM → release assets).
+#
+# Split out of repo-standard.yml (#55): the SBOM upload needs `contents: write`, the
+# highest ceiling of the old monolith. Because a caller must grant the UNION of every
+# job's permissions at load time, leaving this in repo-standard forced even a read-only
+# spell run to grant contents: write — the escalation that made #54 fail to start.
+# One reusable workflow, one authority ceiling: a caller grants contents: write here and
+# nowhere else, on a dedicated job gated to release/publish (non-PR) events.
+name: repo-release
+
+on:
+  workflow_call:
+    inputs:
+      upload-release-assets:
+        description: "Attach the SBOM to the GitHub Release (needs contents: write). False = artifact only (e.g. self-test / no release)."
+        type: boolean
+        default: true
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+jobs:
+  sbom:
+    # Release-side: runs on push/tags/release, not PR.
+    if: ${{ github.event_name != 'pull_request' }}
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      contents: write
+    steps:
+      - uses: step-security/harden-runner@9af89fc71515a100421586dfdb3dc9c984fbf411 # v2.19.4
+        with:
+          egress-policy: audit
+      - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
+      - name: Generate SBOM (SPDX)
+        uses: anchore/sbom-action@e22c389904149dbc22b58101806040fa8d37a610 # v0.24.0
+        with:
+          format: spdx-json
+          artifact-name: sbom.spdx.json
+          output-file: sbom.spdx.json
+          upload-artifact: true
+          upload-release-assets: ${{ inputs.upload-release-assets }}
diff --git a/.github/workflows/repo-scorecard.yml b/.github/workflows/repo-scorecard.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5d21e84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/workflows/repo-scorecard.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+# repo-scorecard — OSSF Scorecard supply-chain posture (report-only).
+#
+# Split out of repo-standard.yml (#55): Scorecard needs `actions: read`, one step above
+# the standard `contents: read` floor. Because a reusable workflow's caller must grant
+# the UNION of every job's permissions at load time, folding this into repo-standard
+# would force ~every repo (scorecard was default-on) to grant actions: read even for a
+# read-only spell/security run. Keeping it here — one reusable workflow, one authority
+# ceiling — lets a caller grant exactly this ceiling, on a dedicated job.
+#
+# A caller opts in by adding a job that `uses:` this workflow and grants
+# `contents: read` + `actions: read`, gated to non-PR events (Scorecard scores the
+# repo, not a diff). See repo-standard-selftest.yml for the reference caller.
+name: repo-scorecard
+
+on:
+  workflow_call: {}
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+jobs:
+  scorecard:
+    # Scorecard runs on push/schedule, not PR — it scores the repo, not a diff.
+    if: ${{ github.event_name != 'pull_request' }}
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+      actions: read
+    steps:
+      - uses: step-security/harden-runner@9af89fc71515a100421586dfdb3dc9c984fbf411 # v2.19.4
+        with:
+          egress-policy: audit
+      - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+      # Report-only: publish_results=false and no SARIF upload (upload needs Advanced
+      # Security on private repos), so results are kept as an artifact. That keeps the
+      # perms minimal (contents+actions read) so callers don't need security-events.
+      - name: OSSF Scorecard
+        uses: ossf/scorecard-action@4eaacf0543bb3f2c246792bd56e8cdeffafb205a # v2.4.3
+        with:
+          results_file: results.sarif
+          results_format: sarif
+          publish_results: false
+      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
+        if: always()
+        with:
+          name: scorecard-results
+          path: results.sarif
+          retention-days: 5
diff --git a/.github/workflows/repo-standard-selftest.yml b/.github/workflows/repo-standard-selftest.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..401b027
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/workflows/repo-standard-selftest.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+# repo-standard-selftest — the reference caller, and the guard #55 lacked.
+#
+# repo-standard.yml (and its siblings) are reusable workflows, but nothing in this repo
+# CALLED them — so #54 raised repo-standard's permission floor above contents: read and
+# passed this repo's CI, only failing once a downstream caller bumped its pin (#55, #56).
+#
+# This workflow calls each reusable workflow with exactly its intended authority ceiling.
+# GitHub validates the permission union at load time, before `if:`, so a future revision
+# that raises a floor fails HERE, pre-merge, instead of in every downstream repo. It is
+# also the copy-paste caller template each repo's .github/workflows/standard.yml follows.
+name: repo-standard-selftest
+
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    paths:
+      - ".github/workflows/repo-standard.yml"
+      - ".github/workflows/repo-scorecard.yml"
+      - ".github/workflows/repo-release.yml"
+      - ".github/workflows/repo-standard-selftest.yml"
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+
+# No ambient authority — every capability is granted per-job, scoped to the workflow it
+# invokes. This is the pattern callers copy.
+permissions: {}
+
+jobs:
+  # Contract: repo-standard.yml starts with ONLY contents: read (the #55 regression).
+  standard:
+    uses: ./.github/workflows/repo-standard.yml
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+    with:
+      security: true
+      spell: false # this repo has no cspell.json
+      test: false
+      descriptor: false
+
+  # Contract: repo-scorecard.yml's ceiling is exactly contents: read + actions: read.
+  # Gated to non-PR so PR runs never instantiate the elevated grant.
+  scorecard:
+    if: ${{ github.event_name != 'pull_request' }}
+    uses: ./.github/workflows/repo-scorecard.yml
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+      actions: read
+
+  # Contract: repo-release.yml's ceiling is exactly contents: write. upload-release-assets
+  # is false so the self-test exercises the permission contract without creating a release
+  # asset on this repo. Gated to non-PR (same as a real release caller).
+  release:
+    if: ${{ github.event_name != 'pull_request' }}
+    uses: ./.github/workflows/repo-release.yml
+    permissions:
+      contents: write
+    with:
+      upload-release-assets: false
diff --git a/.github/workflows/repo-standard.yml b/.github/workflows/repo-standard.yml
index 6a9a120..ee06ceb 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/repo-standard.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/repo-standard.yml
@@ -4,16 +4,22 @@
 # See bounded-systems/conformance for the caller template + rollout.
 #
 # Behaviors (all opt-in):
-#   security  (default true)  — OSV-Scanner (report-only) + dependency-review (PR gate)
-#   scorecard (default true)  — OSSF Scorecard supply-chain posture (report-only)
-#   sbom      (default false) — SPDX SBOM (uploads release assets; needs contents: write)
-#   spell     (default false) — cspell dictionary/allowlist gate (needs a cspell.json)
-#   test      (default false) — set up `runtime` and run `test-command`
+#   security   (default true)  — OSV-Scanner (report-only) + dependency-review (PR gate)
+#   spell      (default false) — cspell dictionary/allowlist gate (needs a cspell.json)
+#   test       (default false) — set up `runtime` and run `test-command`
+#   descriptor (default false) — README managed blocks must match trellis.json
 #
-# All actions SHA-pinned (org policy). Invocations copied from prx's proven
-# osv-scanner.yml / dependency-review.yml / scorecard.yml / sbom.yml, generalized
-# to be language-agnostic. scorecard/sbom raise the security floor org-wide — see
-# workflow-standardization: they previously ran on ~2 of 72 repos.
+# AUTHORITY FLOOR — this workflow is `contents: read` and every job stays within it,
+# so a caller only ever needs to grant `contents: read`. GitHub validates a called
+# reusable workflow's permission requests as the UNION of all its jobs, at load time,
+# before any `if:` — so a single job needing more would force every caller to over-grant
+# (that was #55). Jobs that need more authority therefore live in sibling reusable
+# workflows, one per ceiling, so a read-only caller is never forced above the floor:
+#   scorecard  → repo-scorecard.yml  (adds actions: read)
+#   sbom       → repo-release.yml    (adds contents: write)
+# Callers opt into those with a dedicated, event-gated job (see #55 / #56).
+#
+# All actions SHA-pinned (org policy).
 name: repo-standard
 
 on:
@@ -23,14 +29,6 @@ on:
         description: "Run OSV-Scanner + dependency-review."
         type: boolean
         default: true
-      scorecard:
-        description: "Run OSSF Scorecard (report-only supply-chain posture)."
-        type: boolean
-        default: true
-      sbom:
-        description: "Generate an SPDX SBOM (uploads to release assets; caller must grant contents: write)."
-        type: boolean
-        default: false
       spell:
         description: "Spell-gate: fail on tokens not in the dictionaries or the repo's cspell.json words allowlist (needs a cspell.json in the repo)."
         type: boolean
@@ -108,57 +106,6 @@ jobs:
         with:
           fail-on-severity: high
 
-  scorecard:
-    # OSSF Scorecard runs on push/schedule (not PR — it scores the repo, not a diff).
-    if: ${{ inputs.scorecard && github.event_name != 'pull_request' }}
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    permissions:
-      contents: read
-      actions: read
-    steps:
-      - uses: step-security/harden-runner@9af89fc71515a100421586dfdb3dc9c984fbf411 # v2.19.4
-        with:
-          egress-policy: audit
-      - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
-      # Report-only: publish_results=false and no SARIF upload (upload needs Advanced
-      # Security on private repos), so results are kept as an artifact. That keeps the
-      # perms minimal (contents+actions read) so callers don't need security-events.
-      - name: OSSF Scorecard
-        uses: ossf/scorecard-action@4eaacf0543bb3f2c246792bd56e8cdeffafb205a # v2.4.3
-        with:
-          results_file: results.sarif
-          results_format: sarif
-          publish_results: false
-      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
-        if: always()
-        with:
-          name: scorecard-results
-          path: results.sarif
-          retention-days: 5
-
-  sbom:
-    # Opt-in (default false): uploads to release assets, so the caller must grant
-    # contents: write. Meant for repos that publish releases.
-    if: ${{ inputs.sbom && github.event_name != 'pull_request' }}
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    permissions:
-      contents: write
-    steps:
-      - uses: step-security/harden-runner@9af89fc71515a100421586dfdb3dc9c984fbf411 # v2.19.4
-        with:
-          egress-policy: audit
-      - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
-      - name: Generate SBOM (SPDX)
-        uses: anchore/sbom-action@e22c389904149dbc22b58101806040fa8d37a610 # v0.24.0
-        with:
-          format: spdx-json
-          artifact-name: sbom.spdx.json
-          output-file: sbom.spdx.json
-          upload-artifact: true
-          upload-release-assets: true
-
   spell:
     # Opt-in (default false): fails on any token not in the dictionaries or the
     # repo's cspell.json `words` allowlist. Catches nonsense / promotional