Ex. No:1	Image Steganog	graphy	Date:
Aim:			
Algorithm:			

#### Code:

```
import cv2 import string import os d={}
c=\{\}
for i in range(255): d[chr(i)]=i
c[i]=chr(i)
x=cv2.imread(r"C:\Users\TCS\Desktop\img.jpg") i=x.shape[0]
j=x.shape[1] print(i,j)
key=input("Enter key to edit(Security Key) : ") text=input("Enter text to hide : ")
kl=0 tln=len(text) z=0
n=0 m=0
l=len(text)
for i in range(l): x[n,m,z]=d[text[i]]^d[key[kl]] n=n+1
m=m+1 m=(m+1)\%3
kl=(kl+1)\%len(key)
cv2.imwrite("encrypted_img.jpg",x) os.startfile("encrypted_img.jpg")
print("Data Hiding in Image completed successfully.") #x=cv2.imread("encrypted img.jpg")
kl=0 tln=len(text) z=0
n=0 m=0
ch = int(input("\nEnter 1 to extract data from Image : ")) if ch == 1:
key1=input("\n\nRe enter key to extract text : ") decrypt=""
if key == key1 : for i in range(1):
decrypt+=c[x[n,m,z]^d[key[kl]]] n=n+1
m=m+1 m=(m+1)\%3
kl=(kl+1)\%len(key)
print("Encrypted text was : ",decrypt)
else:
print("Key doesn't matched.")
else:
print("Thank you. EXITING.")
```

```
File Edit Shell Debug Options Window Help

Python 3.8.1 (tags/v3.8.1:1b293b6, Dec 18 2019, 22:39:24) [MSC v.1916 32 bit (Intel)] on win32

Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license()" for more information.

>>>

==== RESTART: C:/Users/TCS/AppData/Local/Programs/Python/Python38-32/steg.py ===

309 464

Enter key to edit(Security Key) : 54637

Enter text to hide : harini
Data Hiding in Image completed successfully.

Enter 1 to extract data from Image : 1

Re enter key to extract text : 54637

Encrypted text was : ha
Encrypted text was : har
Encrypted text was : hari
Encrypted text was : harin
```

Ex. No: 2

# **Configuration of Network – commands**

After undertaking initial stealthy reconnaissance to identify IP address spaces of interest, network scanning is an intrusive and aggressive process used to identify accessible hosts and their network services. The rationale behind IP network scanning is to gain insight into the following elements of a given network:

- ICMP message types that generate responses from target hosts
- Accessible TCP and UDP network services running on the target hosts
- Operating platforms of target hosts and their configurations
- Areas of vulnerability within target host IP stack implementations (including sequence number predictability for TCP spoofing and session hijacking)
- Configuration of filtering and security systems (including firewalls, border routers, switches, and IDS/IPS mechanisms)

Performing both network scanning and reconnaissance tasks paints a clear picture of the network topology and its security features. Before penetrating the target network, specific network service probing is undertaken to enumerate vulnerabilities and weaknesses, covered in later chapters of this book.

## **ICMP Probing**

Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) probes can be used to identify potentially weak and poorly protected networks and hosts. ICMP is a short messaging protocol, used by systems administrators for continuity testing of networks in particular (using tools such as ping and traceroute). From a network scanning perspective, the following types of ICMP messages are useful:

## Type 8 (echo request)

Echo request messages are also known as ping packets. You can use a scanning tool such as Nmap to perform ping sweeping and easily identify hosts that are accessible.

## Type 13 (timestamp request)

A timestamp request message is used to obtain the system time information from the target host. The response is in a decimal format and is the number of milliseconds elapsed since midnight GMT.

# **Type 15 (information request)**

The ICMP information request message was intended to support self-configuring systems such as diskless workstations at boot time to allow them to discover their network addresses. Protocols such as RARP, BOOTP, or DHCP achieve this more robustly, so type 15 messages are rarely used.

## Type 17 (subnet address mask request)

An address mask request message reveals the subnet mask used by the target host. This information is useful when mapping networks and identifying the size of subnets and network spaces used by

organizations.

Firewalls of security-conscious organizations often blanket-filter inbound ICMP messages, and so ICMP probing isn't effective; however, ICMP isn't filtered in most cases, as these messages are useful during network troubleshooting.

### **ICMP Probing Tools**

A number of tools can be used to perform ICMP probing, including SING, Nmap, and ICMP Scan. These utilities and their benefits are discussed here.

#### **SING**

Send ICMP Nasty Garbage (SING) is a command-line utility that sends customizable ICMP probes. The main purpose of the tool is to replace the ping command with certain enhancements, including the ability to transmit and receive spoofed packets, send MAC-spoofed packets, and support the transmission of many other message types, including ICMP address mask, timestamp, and information requests, as well as router solicitation and router advertisement messages.

In these examples, I direct probes at broadcast addresses and individual hosts.

## Using SING to send broadcast ICMP echo request messages:

## \$ sing -echo 192.168.0.255

SINGing to 192.168.0.255 (192.168.0.255): 16 data bytes

16 bytes from 192.168.0.1: seq=0 ttl=64 TOS=0 time=0.230 ms 16 bytes from 192.168.0.155: seq=0 ttl=64 TOS=0 time=2.267 ms 16 bytes from 192.168.0.126: seq=0 ttl=64 TOS=0 time=2.491 ms 16 bytes from 192.168.0.50: seq=0 ttl=64 TOS=0 time=2.202 ms 16 bytes from 192.168.0.89: seq=0 ttl=64 TOS=0 time=1.572 ms Using SING to send ICMP timestamp request messages:

#### \$ sing -tstamp 192.168.0.50

SINGing to 192.168.0.50 (192.168.0.50): 20 data bytes

20 bytes from 192.168.0.50: seq=0 ttl=128 TOS=0 diff=327372878 20 bytes from 192.168.0.50: seq=1 ttl=128 TOS=0 diff=1938181226\* 20 bytes from 192.168.0.50: seq=2 ttl=128 TOS=0 diff=1552566402\* 20 bytes from 192.168.0.50: seq=3 ttl=128 TOS=0 diff=1183728794\* Using SING to send ICMP address mask request messages:

#### \$ sing -mask 192.168.0.25

SINGing to 192.168.0.25 (192.168.0.25): 12 data bytes

12 bytes from 192.168.0.25: seq=0 ttl=236 mask=255.255.255.0 12 bytes from 192.168.0.25: seq=1 ttl=236 mask=255.255.255.0 12 bytes from 192.168.0.25: seq=2 ttl=236 mask=255.255.255.0 12 bytes from 192.168.0.25: seq=3 ttl=236 mask=255.255.255.0

There are a handful of other ICMP message types that have other security implications, such as ICMP type 5 redirect messages sent by routers, which allow for traffic redirection. These messages aren't related to network scanning, and so they are not detailed here. For details of traffic redirection using ICMP, including exploit code.

#### **Nmap**

Nmap can perform ICMP ping sweep scans of target IP blocks easily. Many hardened networks will blanket-filter inbound ICMP messages at border routers or firewalls, so sweeping in this fashion isn't effective in some cases. Nmap can be run from a Unix-based or Windows command prompt to perform an ICMP ping sweep against 192.168.0.0/24, as shown in Example 4-1.

Example 4-1. Performing a ping sweep with Nmap

#### \$ nmap -sP -PI 192.168.0.0/24

Starting Nmap 4.10 at 2007-04-01 20:39 UTC Host 192.168.0.0 seems to be a subnet broadcast address (2 extra pings).

Host 192.168.0.1 appears to be up. Host 192.168.0.25 appears to be up. Host 192.168.0.32 appears to be up. Host 192.168.0.50 appears to be up. Host 192.168.0.65 appears to be up. Host 192.168.0.102 appears to be up. Host 192.168.0.110 appears to be up. Host 192.168.0.155 appears to be up.

Host 192.168.0.255 seems to be a subnet broadcast address (2 extra pings). Nmap finished: 256 IP addresses (8 hosts up) scanned in 17.329 seconds

#### **ICMPScan**

ICMPScan is a bulk scanner that sends type 8, 13, 15, and 17 ICMP messages, derived from Nmap. The tool is very useful in that it can process inbound responses by placing the network interface into promiscuous mode, thereby identifying internal IP addresses and machines that respond from probes sent to subnet network and broadcast addresses. Example 4-2 shows ICMPScan being run against an internal network block. Because ICMP is a connectionless protocol, it is best practice to resend each probe (using -r 1) and set the timeout to 500 milliseconds (using -t 500). We also set the tool to listen in promiscuous mode for unsolicited responses (using the -c flag).

Example 4-2. Running ICMPScan

## \$ icmpscan

Usage: icmpscan [ options ] target [...]

- -i <interface> Specify interface.
- -c Enable promiscuous mode.
- -A <address> Specify source address of generated packets.
- -t <timeout> Specify timeout for probe response.
- -r <retries> Retries per probe.
- -f <filename> Read targets from the specified file.
- -E, -P ICMP Echo Probe
- -T, -S Timestamp
- -N, -M Netmask
- -I Info
- -R Router solicitation
- -h Display usage information

- -v Increase verbosity
- -B Enable debugging output.
- -n Numeric output (do not resolve hostnames)

## \$ icmpscan -c -t 500 -r 1 192.168.1.0/24 192.168.1.0: Echo (From 192.168.1.17!)

192.168.1.0: Address Mask [255.255.255.0] (From 192.168.1.17!)

192.168.1.7 : Echo

192.168.1.7: Timestamp [0x03ab2db0, 0x02d4c507, 0x02d4c507] 192.168.1.7: Address Mask [255.255.255.0]

192.168.1.8 : Echo

192.168.1.8: Address Mask [255.255.255.0]

Identifying Subnet Network and Broadcast Addresses

Nmap identifies subnet network and broadcast addresses by counting the number of ICMP echo replies for each IP address during an ICMP ping sweep. Such addresses respond with multiple replies, providing insight into the target network and its segmentation. In Example 4-3 we use Nmap to enumerate subnet network and broadcast addresses in use for a given network (154.14.224.0/26).

Example 4-3. Enumerating subnet network and broadcast addresses with Nmap

## \$ nmap -sP 154.14.224.0/26

Starting Nmap 4.10 ( <a href="http://www.insecure.org/nmap/">http://www.insecure.org/nmap/</a>) at 2007-04-01 20:39 UTC Host 154.14.224.16 seems to be a subnet broadcast address (returned 1 extra pings). Host pipex-gw.abc.co.uk (154.14.224.17) appears to be up.

Host mail.abc.co.uk (154.14.224.18) appears to be up. Host 154.14.224.25 appears to be up.

Host intranet.abc.co.uk (154.14.224.26) appears to be up. Host 154.14.224.27 appears to be up.

Host 154.14.224.30 appears to be up.

Host 154.14.224.31 seems to be a subnet broadcast address (returned 1 extra pings). Host 154.14.224.32 seems to be a subnet broadcast address (returned 1 extra pings). Host pipexgw.smallco.net (154.14.224.33) appears to be up.

Host mail.smallco.net (154.14.224.34) appears to be up.

Host 154.14.224.35 seems to be a subnet broadcast address (returned 1 extra pings). Host 154.14.224.40 seems to be a subnet broadcast address (returned 1 extra pings). Host pipex-gw.example.org (154.14.224.41) appears to be up.

Host gatekeeper.example.org (154.14.224.42) appears to be up.

Host 154.14.224.43 appears to be up.

Host 154.14.224.47 seems to be a subnet broadcast address (returned 1 extra pings). This scan has identified six subnets within the 154.14.224.0/26 network, as follows:

An unused or filtered block from 154.14.224.0 to 154.14.224.15 (14 usable addresses) The abc.co.uk block from 154.14.224.16 to 154.14.224.31 (14 usable addresses)

The smallco.net block from 154.14.224.32 to 154.14.224.35 (2 usable addresses)

An unused or filtered block from 154.14.224.36 to 154.14.224.39 (2 usable addresses) The example.org block from 154.14.224.40 to 154.14.224.47 (6 usable addresses)

An unused or filtered block from 154.14.224.48 to 154.14.224.63 (14 usable addresses)

# **Gleaning Internal IP Addresses**

In some cases, it is possible to gather internal IP address information by analyzing ICMP responses from an ICMP ping sweep. Upon sending ICMP echo requests to publicly accessible IP addresses, firewalls often use Network Address Translation (NAT) or similar IP masquerading to forward the packets on to internal addresses, which then respond to the probes. Other scenarios include poor routing configuration on routers that are probed using ICMP, where they respond to the probes from a different interface.

Stateful inspection mechanisms and sniffers can be used to monitor for ICMP responses from internal IP addresses in relation to your original probes. Tools such as Nmap and SING don't identify these responses from private addresses, as low-level stateful analysis of the traffic flowing into and out of a network is required. A quick and simple example of this behavior can be seen in the ISS BlackICE personal firewall event log in Figure 4-1 as a simple ICMP ping sweep is performed.

ISS BlackICE used to statefully glean internal IP addresses

Figure 4-1. ISS BlackICE used to statefully glean internal IP addresses

This figure shows that BlackICE has identified four unsolicited ICMP echo replies from private addresses (within the 172.16.0.0/12 space in this case, but they are often within 192.168.0.0/16 or 10.0.0.0/8).

ICMP Scan supports this type of internal IP address discovery when in promiscuous mode. It is beneficial to run a network sniffer such as Ethereal or tcpdump during testing to pick up on unsolicited ICMP responses, including "ICMP TTL exceeded" (type 11 code 0) messages, indicating a routing loop, and "ICMP administratively prohibited" (type 3 code 13) messages, indicating an ACL in use on a router or firewall.

## OS Fingerprinting Using ICMP

Ofir Arkin's Xprobe2 utility performs OS fingerprinting by primarily analyzing responses to ICMP probes. See the Sys-Security Group web site (http://www.sys-security.com) for further details, including white papers and presentations that describe the Xprobe2 fingerprinting technology and approach. Example 4-4 shows Xprobe2 being used to fingerprint a remote host.

Example 4-4. Operating system fingerprinting using Xprobe 2

#### \$ xprobe2 -v 192.168.0.174

- [+] Target is 192.168.0.174
- [+] Loading modules.
- [+] Following modules are loaded:

- [x] [1] ping:icmp\_ping ICMP echo discovery module
- [x] [2] ping:tcp\_ping TCP-based ping discovery module
- [x] [3] ping:udp\_ping UDP-based ping discovery module
- [x] [4] infogather:ttl\_calc TCP and UDP based TTL distance calculation
- [x] [5] infogather:portscan TCP and UDP PortScanner
- [x] [6] fingerprint:icmp\_echo ICMP Echo request fingerprinting module
- [x] [7] fingerprint:icmp\_tstamp ICMP Timestamp request fingerprinting module
- [x] [8] fingerprint:icmp\_amask ICMP Address mask request fingerprinting module
- [x] [9] fingerprint:icmp\_port\_unreach ICMP port unreachable fingerprinting module
- [x] [10] fingerprint:tcp\_hshake TCP Handshake fingerprinting module
- [x] [11] fingerprint:tcp\_rst TCP RST fingerprinting module
- [x] [12] fingerprint:smb SMB fingerprinting module
- [13] fingerprint:snmp SNMPv2c fingerprinting module [+] 13 modules registered
- [+] Initializing scan engine [+] Running scan engine
- [+] Host: 192.168.0.174 is up (Guess probability: 100%)
- [+] Target: 192.168.0.174 is alive. Round-Trip Time: 0.00015 sec [+] Selected safe Round-Trip Time value is: 0.00030 sec
- [+] Primary guess:
- [+] Host 192.168.0.174 Running OS: "Sun Solaris 5 (SunOS 2.5)" (Guess probability: 100%)
- [+] Other guesses:
- [+] Host 192.168.0.174 Running OS: "Sun Solaris 6 (SunOS 2.6)" (Guess probability: 100%)
- [+] Host 192.168.0.174 Running OS: "Sun Solaris 7 (SunOS 2.7)" (Guess probability: 100%)
- [+] Host 192.168.0.174 Running OS: "Sun Solaris 8 (SunOS 2.8)" (Guess probability: 100%)
- [+] Host 192.168.0.174 Running OS: "Sun Solaris 9 (SunOS 2.9)" (Guess probability: 100%)
- [+] Host 192.168.0.174 Running OS: "Mac OS 9.2.x" (Guess probability: 95%) [+] Host 192.168.0.174 Running OS: "HPUX B.11.0 x" (Guess probability: 95%) [+] Host 192.168.0.174 Running OS: "Mac OS X 10.1.5" (Guess probability: 87%) [+] Host 192.168.0.174 Running OS: "FreeBSD 4.3" (Guess probability: 87%)
- [+] Host 192.168.0.174 Running OS: "FreeBSD 4.2" (Guess probability: 87%) TCP Port Scanning Accessible TCP ports can be identified by port scanning target IP addresses. The following nine different types of TCP port scanning are used in the wild by both attackers and security consultants:

Standard scanning methods Vanilla connect ( ) scanning

## **Half-open SYN flag scanning**

Stealth TCP scanning methods Inverse TCP flag scanning

ACK flag probe scanning TCP fragmentation scanning Third-party and spoofed TCP scanning methods FTP bounce scanning

### **Proxy bounce scanning**

Sniffer-based spoofed scanning IP ID header scanning

What follows is a technical breakdown for each TCP port scanning type, along with details of Windows- and Unix-based tools that can perform scanning.

# **Standard Scanning Methods**

Standard scanning methods, such as vanilla and half-open SYN scanning, are extremely simple direct techniques used to accurately identify accessible TCP ports and services. These scanning methods are reliable but are easily logged and identified.

## Vanilla connect() scanning

TCP connect() port scanning is the simplest type of probe to launch. There is no stealth whatsoever involved in this form of scanning, as a full TCP/IP connection is established with each port of the target host.

TCP/IP robustness means that connect() port scanning is an accurate way to determine which TCP services are accessible on a given host. However, due to the way that a full three-way handshake is performed, an aggressive connect() scan could antagonize or break poorly written network services. Figure 4-2 and Figure 4-3 show the various TCP packets involved and their flags.

In Figure 4-2, the attacker first sends a SYN probe packet to the port he wishes to test. Upon receiving a packet from the port with the SYN and ACK flags set, he knows that the port is open. The attacker completes the three-way handshake by sending an ACK packet back.

A vanilla TCP scan result when a port is open

Figure 4-2. A vanilla TCP scan result when a port is open

If, however, the target port is closed, the attacker receives an RST/ACK packet directly back, as shown in Figure 4-3.

A vanilla TCP scan result when a port is closed

Figure 4-3. A vanilla TCP scan result when a port is closed Tools that perform connect( ) TCP scanning.

Nmap can perform a TCP connect() port scan using the -sT flag. A benefit of this scanning type is that superuser root access is not required, as raw network sockets are not used. Other very simple scanners exist, including pscan.c, which is available as source code from many sites including Packet Storm.

Ex. No:3		Date:
	WIRELESS AUDIT	
Aim:		
Algorithm:		
g		

root@kali:~# iwconfig

eth0 no wireless extensions.

wlan0 IEEE 802.11bgn ESSID:off/any

Mode:Managed Access Point: Not-Associated Tx-Power=20 dBm Retry short limit:7 RTS thr:off

Fragment thr:off Encryption key:off Power Management:of f lo no wireless extensions.

root@kali:~# iwlist wlan0 scanning

wlan0 Scan completed:

Cell 01 - Address: 14:F6:5A:F4:57:22

Channel:6

Frequency: 2.437 GHz (Channel 6) Quality=70/70 Signal level=- 27 dBm Encryption key:on

**ESSID: "BENEDICT"** 

Bit Rates: 1 Mb/s; 2 Mb/s; 5.5 Mb/s; 11 Mb/s

Bit Rates:6 Mb/s; 9 Mb/s; 12 Mb/s; 18 Mb/s; 24 Mb/s

36 Mb/s; 48 Mb/s; 54 Mb/s

Mode:Master Extra:tsf=00000000425 b0a37 Extra: Last beacon: 548ms ago IE: WPA Version

1Group Cipher: TKIP

Pairwise Ciphers (2): CCMP TKIP Authentication Suites (1): PSK

root@kali:~# airmon-ng start wlan0

Found 2 processes that could cause trouble.

If airodump-ng, aireplay-ng or airtun-ng stops working after a short period of time, you may want to kill (some of) them!

PID Name

1148 NetworkManager

1324 wpa\_supplicant

PHY Interface Driver Chipset

phy0 wlan0 ath9k\_htc Atheros Communications, Inc. AR9271 802.11n

Newly created monitor mode interface wlan0mon is \*NOT\* in monitor mode. Removing non-monitor wlan0mon interface...

WARNING: unable to start monitor mode, please run "airmon-ng check kill"

root@kali:~# airmon-ng check kill
Killing these processes: PID Name

1324 wpa\_supplicant

root@kali:~# airmon-ng start wlan0

PHY Interface Driver Chipset

phy0 wlan0 ath9k\_htc Atheros Communications, Inc. AR9271 802.11n

(mac80211 monitor mode vif enabled for [phy0]wlan0 on [phy0]wlan0mon) (mac80211 station mode vif disabled for [phy0]wlan0)

**root**@**kali:**~# airodump-ng -w atheros -c 6 --bssid 14:F6:5A:F4:57:22 wlan0mon CH 6 ][ Elapsed: 5 mins ][ 2016-10-05 01:35 ][ WPA handshake: 14:F6:5A:F4:57:

BSSID PWR RXQ Beacons #Data, #/s CH MB ENC CIPHER AUTH E

14:F6:5A:F4:57:22 -31 100 3104 10036 0 6 54e. WPA CCMP

PSK B

BSSID STATION PWR Rate Lost Frames Probe

14:F6:5A:F4:57:22 70:05:14:A3:7E:3E -32 2e- 0

0 10836

root@kali:~# ls -l

total 10348

-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 10580359 Oct 5 01:35 atheros-01.cap

-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 481 Oct 5 01:35 atheros-01.csv

-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 598 Oct 5 01:35 atheros-01.kismet.csv

-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2796 Oct 5 01:35 atheros-01.kismet.netxml

**root@kali:~**# aircrack-ng -a 2 atheros-01.cap -w /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt [00:00:52] 84564 keys tested (1648.11 k/s)

KEY FOUND! [rec12345]

Master Key : CA 53 9B 5C 23 16 70 E4 84 53 16 9E FB 14 77 49 A9 7A A0 2D 9F BB 2B C3 8D 26 D2 33 54 3D 3A 43

Transient Key: F5 F4 BA AF 57 6F 87 04 58 02 ED 18 62 37 8A 53 38 86 F1 A2 CA 0D 4A 8D D6 EC ED 0D 6C 1D C1 AF 81 58 81 C2 5D 58 7F FA DE 13 34 D6 A2 AE FE 05 F6 53 B8 CA A0 70 EC 02 1B EA 5F 7A DA 7A EC 7D

EAPOL HMAC 0A 12 4C 3D ED BD EE C0 2B C9 5A E3 C1 65 A8 5C

Ex. No:4		Date:
	LINUX AUDITING USING LYNIS	S
Aim:		
<b>Description:</b>		

root@kali:~/Downloads# lynis audit system [ Lynis 2.6.2 ]

See the LICENSE file for details about using this software.

2007-2018, CISOfy – https://cisofy.com/lynis/

Enterprise support available (compliance, plugins, interface and tools)

## [+] Initializing program

\_\_\_\_\_

- Detecting OS... [ DONE ]
- Checking profiles... [ DONE ]

\_\_\_\_\_

Program version: 2.6.2

Operating system: Linux Operating system name: Debian Operating system version: kali-rolling Kernel version: 5.2.0

Hardware platform: x86\_64

Hostname: kali

-----

Profiles: /etc/lynis/default.prf
Log file: /var/log/lynis.log
Report file: /var/log/lynis-report.dat

Report version: 1.0

Plugin directory: /etc/lynis/plugins

\_\_\_\_\_

Auditor: `[Not Specified]

Language: en Test category: all Test group: all

-----

Program update status... [ WARNING ] [+] System Tools

- Scanning available tools...
- Checking system binaries... [+] Software: firewalls
- Checking iptables kernel module [FOUND]
- Checking iptables policies of chains [FOUND]
- Checking for empty ruleset [WARNING]
- Checking for unused rules [OK]
- Checking host based firewall [ACTIVE][+] Security frameworks
- Checking presence AppArmor [FOUND]
- Checking AppArmor status [DISABLED]
- Checking presence SELinux [ NOT FOUND ]
- Checking presence grsecurity [ NOT FOUND ]

- Checking for implemented MAC framework [ NONE ] [+] Software: file integrity
- Checking file integrity tools
- Checking presence integrity tool [NOT FOUND][+] Software: System tooling
- Checking automation tooling
- Automation tooling [ NOT FOUND ]
- Checking for IDS/IPS tooling [NONE] [+] Software: Malware
- Checking chkrootkit [FOUND][+] File Permissions
- Starting file permissions check

	•	• .		1 . • 1	
1	Vn1C	security	scan	detail	c.
$\mathbf{L}$	y III O	sccurity	Scan	uctan	w.

Hardening index: 56 [######### ]

Tests performed: 222 Plugins enabled: 1

<b>Result:</b>
----------------

,	Ex. No:5		Date:
1	LA. 110.5	SNORT IDS	Date.
	Aim:		
]	Description:		
	Algorithm:		
•			

[root@localhost security lab]# cd /usr/src

[root@localhost security lab]# wget <a href="https://www.snort.org/downloads/snort/daq-2.0.7.tar.gz">https://www.snort.org/downloads/snort/daq-2.0.7.tar.gz</a>
[root@localhost security lab]# wget <a href="https://www.snort.org/downloads/snort/snort-2.9.16.1.tar.gz">https://www.snort.org/downloads/snort/snort-2.9.16.1.tar.gz</a>
[root@localhost security lab]# tar xvzf daq-2.0.7.tar.gz

[root@localhost security lab]# tar xvzf snort-2.9.16.1.tar.gz [root@localhost security lab]# yum install libpcap\* pcre\* libdnet\* -y [root@localhost security lab]# cd daq-2.0.7

[root@localhost security lab]# . /configure [root@localhost security lab]# make [root@localhost security lab]# make install

[root@localhost security lab]# cd snort-2.9.16.1 [root@localhost security lab]# ./configure [root@localhost security lab]# make [root@localhost security lab]# make install [root@localhost security lab]# snort --version

,,\_ -\*> Snort! <\*-

o" )~ Version 2.9.8.2 GRE (Build 335) "" By Martin Roesch & The Snort Team:

http://www.snort.org/contact#team Copyright (C) 2014-2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Copyright (C) 1998-2013 Sourcefire, Inc., et al.

Using libpcap version 1.7.3 Using PCRE version: 8.38 2015-

11-23 Using ZLIB version: 1.2.8 [root@localhost security lab]# mkdir

/etc/snort [root@localhost security lab]# mkdir /etc/snort/rules [root@localhost security lab]# mkdir /var/log/snort [root@localhost security lab]# vi

/etc/snort/snort.conf

add this line- include /etc/snort/rules/icmp.rules

[root@localhost security lab]# vi /etc/snort/rules/icmp.rules

alert icmp any any -> any any (msg:"ICMP Packet"; sid:477; rev:3;)

[root@localhost security lab]# snort -i enp3s0 -c /etc/snort/snort.conf -l /var/log/snort/ Another terminal

[root@localhost security lab]# ping www.yahoo.com Ctrl + C

[root@localhost security lab]# vi /var/log/snort/alert

[\*\*] [1:477:3] ICMP

Packet [\*\*] [Priority: 0]

10/06-15:03:11.187877 192.168.43.148 -> 106.10.138.240

ICMP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:45855 IpLen:20

DgmLen:84 DF Type:8 Code:0 ID:14680 Seq:64 ECHO

[\*\*] [1:477:3] ICMP

Packet [\*\*] [Priority: 0]

10/06-15:03:11.341739 106.10.138.240 -> 192.168.43.148

ICMP TTL:52 TOS:0x38 ID:2493 IpLen:20

DgmLen:84 Type:0 Code:0 ID:14680 Seq:64 ECHO REPLY

[\*\*] [1:477:3] ICMP

Packet [\*\*] [Priority: 0]

10/06-15:03:12.189727 192.168.43.148 -> 106.10.138.240

ICMP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:46238 IpLen:20

DgmLen:84 DF Type:8 Code:0 ID:14680 Seq:65 ECHO

[\*\*] [1:477:3] ICMP

Packet [\*\*] [Priority: 0]

10/06-15:03:12.340881 106.10.138.240 -> 192.168.43.148

ICMP TTL:52 TOS:0x38 ID:7545 IpLen:20

DgmLen:84 Type:0 Code:0 ID:14680 Seq:65 ECHO REPLY

		_
Ex. No:6		Date:
	LINUX OS HARDENING	
A :		
Aim:		
Algorithm:		

[root@localhost ~]# chkconfig --list |grep '3:on'

Note: This output shows SysV services only and does not include native systemd services. SysV configuration data might be overridden by native systemd configuration.

If you want to list systemd services use 'systemctl list-unit-files'.

To see services enabled on particular target use 'systemctl list-dependencies [target]'.

snortd 0:off 1:off 2:on 3:on 4:on 5:on 6:off [root@localhost ~]# chkconfig snortd off

[root@localhost ~]# chkconfig --list|grep snortd

Note: This output shows SysV services only and does not include native systemd services. SysV configuration data might be overridden by native systemd configuration.

If you want to list systemd services use 'systemctl list-unit-files'.

To see services enabled on particular target use 'systemctl list-dependencies [target]'.

snortd 0:off 1:off 2:off 3:off 4:off 5:off 6:off [root@localhost  $\sim$ ]# yum update all

[root@localhost ~]# vi /etc/modprobe.d/no-usb [root@localhost ~]# sestatus SELinux status: enabled

SELinuxfs mount: /sys/fs/selinux SELinux root directory:

/etc/selinux Loaded policy name: targeted Current mode:

permissive Mode from config file: permissive Policy MLS status:

enabled

Policy deny\_unknown status: allowed Memory protection checking: actual (secure)


Max kernel policy version: 31


[root@localhost ~]# passwd -l p201711 Locking password for user p201711. passwd: Success

[root@localhost  $\sim$ ]# cat /etc/shadow | awk -F: '(\$2==""){print \$1}' [root@localhost  $\sim$ ]# systemctl enable iptables

[root@localhost ~]# echo ALL >>/etc/cron.deny [root@localhost ~]# vi /etc/sysconfig/network

Ex. No:7	LIVE DATA ACQUISITION OF A FOLDER	Date:
Aim:	LIVE DATA ACQUISITION OF A FOLDER	
Algorithm:		





Created By AccessData® FTK® Imager 4.5.0.3 Case Information: Acquired using: ADI4.5.0.3 Case Number: case001 Evidence Number: 1

Unique Description: CSBS IS Examiner: Benedict

Notes:

Information for C:\Users\bened\Desktop\To Print\CSBSFOLDIMG.ad1: [Computed Hashes]

MD5 checksum: 61ccca5209aa38b26609597275da9b24

SHA1 checksum: 7d3c0de861466782e07d20b64c899959bdbd8ce6 Image information:

Acquisition started: Fri May 27 10:34:25 2022

Acquisition finished: Fri May 27 10:34:36 2022 Segment list:

C:\Users\bened\Desktop\To Print\CSBSFOLDIMG.ad1 Image Verification Results:

Verification started: Fri May 27 10:34:36 2022 Verification finished: Fri May 27 10:34:37 2022

MD5 checksum: 61ccca5209aa38b26609597275da9b24 : verified SHA1 checksum: 7d3c0de861466782e07d20b64c899959bdbd8ce6 : verified

Ex. No.: 8	WEB VULNERABILITES USING O-SAFT	Date:
	WED VULNERABILITES USING U-SAFT	
Aim:		
<b>Description:</b>		
Algorithm:		

[root@localhost]# tar xvjf o-saft.tgz [root@localhost]#cd O-Saft

[root@localhost O-Saft]# ./o-saft +info rajalakshmi.org

./o-saft.pl +info rajalakshmi.org | cat

\*\*WARNING: 149: no executable for '/usr/local/openssl/bin/openssl' found; all openssl functionality disabled

!!Hint: consider using '--openssl=/path/to/openssl'

\*\*WARNING: 058: given path '/etc/ssl/certs/' does not contain a CA file

\*\*WARNING: 060: no PEM file for CA found; using '--ca-file=/etc/ssl/certs/ca- certificates.crt' Use of uninitialized value \$\_no in regexp compilation at ./o-saft.pl line 230. Use of uninitialized value \$\_no in regexp compilation at ./o-saft.pl line 230. Use of uninitialized value \$\_no in regexp compilation at ./o-saft.pl line 230.

\*\*WARNING: if default file does not exist, some certificate checks may fail !!Hint: use '--ca-file=/full/path/ca-certificates.crt' Given hostname: rajalakshmi.org

IP for given hostname: 14.99.10.232

Reverse resolved hostname: static-232.10.99.14-tataidc.co.in

DNS entries for given hostname: 14.99.10.232 static-232.10.99.14-tataidc.co.in;

\*\*WARNING: 204: Can't make a connection to 'rajalakshmi.org:443' without SNI; no initial data (compare with and without SNI not possible)

\*\*WARNING: 203: connection without SNI succeded with errors; errors ignored

!!Hint: use '--v' to show more information about Net::SSLinfo::do\_ssl\_open() errors

\*\*WARNING: 205: Can't make a connection to 'rajalakshmi.org:443'; target ignored

!!Hint: use '--v' to show more information

!!Hint: use '--socket-reuse' it may help in some cases

!!Hint: use '--ignore-no-conn' to disable this check [root@localhost O-Saft]# ./o-saft +cipher rajalakshmi.org

./o-saft.pl +cipher rajalakshmi.org | cat

!!Hint: +cipher: functionality changed, please see 'o-saft.pl --help=TECHNIC'

\*\*WARNING: 149: no executable for '/usr/local/openssl/bin/openssl' found; all openssl functionality disabled

!!Hint: consider using '--openssl=/path/to/openssl'

\*\*WARNING: 058: given path '/etc/ssl/certs/' does not contain a CA file

\*\*WARNING: 060: no PEM file for CA found; using '--ca-file=/etc/ssl/certs/ca- certificates.crt' Use of uninitialized value \$\_no in regexp compilation at ./o-saft.pl line 230. Use of uninitialized value \$\_no in regexp compilation at ./o-saft.pl line 230. Use of uninitialized value \$\_no in regexp compilation at ./o-saft.pl line 230.

\*\*WARNING: if default file does not exist, some certificate checks may fail

!!Hint: use '--ca-file=/full/path/ca-certificates.crt'

\*\*WARNING: 409: SSLv2 does not support SNI; cipher checks are done without SNI

\*\*WARNING: 409: SSLv3 does not support SNI; cipher checks are done without SNI ECDHE-

RSA-AES256-SHA yes HIGH

DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA yes HIGH

DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA yes HIGH ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA yes HIGH

DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA yes HIGH

DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA yes HIGH AES256-SHA yes HIGH

CAMELLIA256-SHA yes HIGH AES128-SHA yes HIGH CAMELLIA128-SHA

yes HIGH

DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA yes MEDIUM SEED-SHA yes MEDIUM IDEA-CBC-SHA yes weak ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA yes HIGH DHE-RSA-

```
AES256-SHA yes
               HIGH
DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA
                                yes
                                     HIGH ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA yes
     HIGH
DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA
                     yes
                          HIGH
DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA
                                yes
                                     HIGH AES256-SHA yes
                                                HIGH CAMELLIA128-SHA
CAMELLIA256-SHA
                     yes
                          HIGH AES128-SHA yes
          HIGH
     ves
DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA
                                MEDIUM SEED-SHA
                                                      yes
                                                           MEDIUM
                          yes
                yes
                     weak ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
IDEA-CBC-SHA
                                                                HIGH
                                                           yes
DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 yes
                                HIGH
ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256yes HIGH DHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305-
SHA256 yes HIGH DHE-RSA-AES256-CCM8
                                     yes HIGH
DHE-RSA-AES256-CCM
                    yes
                          HIGH ECDHE-ARIA256-GCM-SHA384 yes
DHE-RSA-ARIA256-GCM-SHA384
                                yes
                                     HIGH ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
          HIGH DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 ves HIGH DHE-RSA-AES128-
     yes
CCM8 yes
DHE-RSA-AES128-CCM yes
                          HIGH ECDHE-ARIA128-GCM-SHA256 yes
DHE-RSA-ARIA128-GCM-SHA256
                                     HIGH ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384
                                yes
          HIGH DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256 yes
                                           HIGH ECDHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-
SHA384 yes HIGH DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA256 yes
                                                HIGH ECDHE-RSA-AES128-
SHA256
                yes
                     HIGH DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 yes
                                                      HIGH ECDHE-RSA-
                          HIGH DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256yes
CAMELLIA128-SHA256 yes
                                                                HIGH
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA yes
                          HIGH
DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
                    yes
                           HIGH
DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA
                                     HIGH ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA yes
                                yes
     HIGH
DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA
                     yes
                          HIGH
DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA
                                     HIGH AES256-GCM-SHA384
                                yes
                                                                      yes
     HIGH AES256-CCM8
                                HIGH
                          yes
AES256-CCMyes
                HIGH ARIA256-GCM-SHA384
                                                yes
                                                      HIGH AES128-GCM-
SHA256
                     HIGH AES128-CCM8
                                                HIGH
                yes
                                           yes
AES128-CCMyes
                HIGH ARIA128-GCM-SHA256
                                                      HIGH AES256-SHA256
                                                ves
          HIGH CAMELLIA256-SHA256
                                                HIGH AES128-SHA256
                                           yes
                                                                      yes
                                           HIGH AES256-SHA yes
     HIGH CAMELLIA128-SHA256
                                     yes
                                                                HIGH
                          HIGH AES128-SHA yes
                                                HIGH CAMELLIA128-SHA
CAMELLIA256-SHA
                     yes
     yes
          HIGH
DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA
                                MEDIUM SEED-SHA
                                                           MEDIUM
                           yes
                                                      yes
                                     HIGH TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
                                yes
     HIGH TLS AES 128 GCM SHA256
                                           yes
                                                HIGH
                       0 0 0 0 0
         SSLv3:
                  0
         TLSv1:
                       2 0 1 7 13 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
                  10
         TLSv11:
                  10
                       2 0 1 7 13 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
         TLSv12:
                  44
                       2 0 0 29 46 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
                       0 0 0 0 3 TLS AES 256 GCM SHA384
         TLSv13:
                  3
Selected Cipher: [root@localhost O-Saft]#
```

Ex. No: 9		Date:
LA. 140. )	MALWARE ANALYSIS	Date.
Aim:		
Descriptions		
<b>Description:</b>		
Algorithm:		

```
Yara Script:
rule spyeye : banker
{
  meta:
  author = "Ben"
  description = "SpyEye X.Y memory" date = "2022-05-25"
  version = "1.0" filetype = "memory"

strings:
$g = "bot_version"
$h = "bot_guid"

condition:
  any of ($g,$h) and filesize >50000


Output:
[root@localhost Downloads]# ll malware.exe
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root 148480 May 26 11:17 malware.exe
```

[root@localhost Downloads]# yara spyeye.yara malware.exe spyeye malware.exe


Ex. No: 10		Date:
Aim:	N-STALKER	
Description		
Description:		
Algorithm:		
S		











D 37 44		<b></b>
Ex. No: 11		Date:
	OWASP VULNERABILITY TEST	
A :		
Aim:		
<b>Description:</b>		
•		
A.B		
Algorithm:		



























Ex. No: 11		Date:
	WEBSITE AUDIT	
Aim:		
<b>Description:</b>		
Algorithm:		

