

Operational continuities

FROM THE OKHRANA TO THE KGB

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Like much else in the study of contemporary intelligence, KGB and GRU foreign operations are commonly interpreted with almost total disregard for historical perspective. "Active measures" are widely believed to be an invention of Soviet intelligence. In reality, though the KGB has been responsible for an enormous expansion in the use made of them, their effectiveness was at least as great in tsarist times. There is no convincing evidence that any KGB-inspired press campaign in the West has been as effective as the tsarist attempt to persuade Western investors, all of whom later lost their money, to ignore the risks of investing in Russia. Before World War I, every Paris newspaper of note save for the socialist *L'Humanite* was successfully bribed to support tsarist government loans. By 1914, 25 percent of France's foreign investment was in Russia—three times as much as in the whole French empire, the second biggest empire in world history.¹ The immense French stake in Russia—80 percent of it in government loans—was not due simply to tsarist "active measures," but it would scarcely have been possible without them. It is only necessary to imagine the possible consequences of an equally well-funded press campaign designed to frighten, rather than to reassure, French investors about the state of Russia and the security of their investments. Nor, contrary to popular belief, is there any evidence that KGB forgeries, despite their increased numbers, are more effective than those of the tsarist Okhrana. There is a strong probability that Peter Rachkovsky, head of the Okhrana's Paris-based Foreign Agency from 1884 to 1902, was responsible for the fabrication of the famous anti-Semitic tract, *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, which described a mythical Jewish plot for world domination. The *Protocols* re-emerged between the wars as one of the central texts in Nazi and fascist anti-Semitism, becoming the most influential forgery of the 20th century.² It is still published in a number of countries, mostly in the Middle East. No KGB forgery has had a comparable influence. The KGB, however, has inherited a milder version of the Okhrana's anti-Semitism.

Agent Penetrations

The two most important continuities between tsarist and Soviet foreign intelligence operations are in the fields of Sigint and agent penetration. Russian Sigint suffers from greater neglect than perhaps any other equally important aspect of modern international relations. The history of Soviet agent penetration, by contrast, has been obscured by sensationalism. Such is the worldwide demand for stories of British moles in the Soviet service, preferably from good public schools and Cambridge University with a record of sexual deviance, that when the supply of real moles began to dry up at the beginning of the 1980s, imaginary moles started to proliferate in airport bookstalls. They include Frank Birch, Arthur Pigou, Andrey Gow, Sefton Delmer, Sir Roger Hollis, Graham Mitchell, and Guy Liddell, all of whom are dead; Sir Rudolf Peierls, who, despite the claims of his accuser Richard Deacon that he was dead, turned out to be alive and sued successfully for libel; Lord Rothschild, the victim of innuendo who also sued; and Dr. Wilfrid Mann, who did not sue but who published a convincing explanation of his innocence. By now, the hunt for the "fifth man" has begun to resemble Monty Python's quest for the Holy Grail. Scholarly research on the history of Soviet penetration has a long way to go.

That history begins long before the Bolshevik Revolution. After its foundation in 1881, the Okhrana rapidly developed a network of agents and *agents provocateurs*, initially to penetrate the revolutionary Diaspora abroad. In 1886, Rachkovsky's agents blew up the People's Will printworks in Geneva, successfully giving the impression that the explosion was the work of disaffected revolutionaries. In 1890, Rachkovsky unmasked a sensational bomb-making conspiracy by Russian emigres in Paris; the leading plotter was, in reality, one of his own *agents provocateurs*.³ By the turn of the century, penetration agents were also being used to acquire foreign intelligence.

The most successful intelligence penetration anywhere in Europe before World War I was the Russian recruitment of the senior Austrian military intelligence officer, Colonel Alfred Redl. The Redl story, like those of the Cambridge moles, has been embroidered with a good many fantasies. But even the unembroidered story is remarkable. In the winter of 1901-1902, Colonel Batyushin, head of Russian military intelligence in Warsaw, discovered that, unknown either to his superiors or to his friends, Redl was a promiscuous homosexual. By a mixture of blackmail and bribery of the kind sometimes employed later by the KGB, he recruited Redl as a penetration agent. With the money given him by the Russians, Redl was able to purchase cars for himself and for one of his favorite lovers, a young Uhlan officer to whom he paid 600 crowns a month. Redl provided voluminous intelligence during the decade before his suicide in 1913, including Austria's mobilization plans against both Russia and Serbia.⁴

A Bolshevik Mole

There was another tsarist precedent that did even more than Redl to persuade Soviet intelligence services of the potential of penetration agents as a weapon against their opponents. The Bolsheviks learned from Okhrana files after the February Revolution that almost from the moment the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party split into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in 1903, they had been more successfully penetrated than perhaps any other revolutionary group. Okhrana knowledge of Bolshevik organisation and activities was so detailed and thorough that, though some of its records were scattered when its offices were sacked in the aftermath of the February Revolution, what survived has become one of the major documentary sources for early Bolshevik history. Of the five members of the Bolshevik Party's St. Petersburg Committee in 1908 and 1909, no less than four were Okhrana agents.⁵ The most remarkable mole, recruited by the Okhrana in 1910, was a Moscow worker named Roman Malinovsky, who in 1912 was elected as one of the six Bolshevik deputies in the Duma, the tsarist parliament. "For the first time," wrote Lenin enthusiastically, "we have an outstanding leader (Malinovsky) from among the workers representing us in the Duma." In a party dedicated to proletarian revolution but as yet without proletarian leaders, Lenin saw Malinovsky, whom he brought on to the Bolshevik Central Committee, as a portent of great importance: "It is really possible to build a workers' party with such people, though the difficulties will be incredibly great." The Bolshevik and Menshevik deputies elected in 1912 sat for a year as members of a single Social Democratic group in the Duma. But when the group split in 1913, Malinovsky became chairman of the Bolshevik fraction.⁶

By 1912, Lenin was so concerned by the problem of Okhrana penetration that, on his initiative, the Bolshevik Central Committee set up a three-man "provocation commission" that included Malinovsky. After the arrest of Stalin and his fellow member of the Central Committee, Yakov Sverdlov, in February 1913, as the result of information supplied by Malinovsky, Lenin discussed with Malinovsky what could be done to forestall further arrests. In July 1913, Lenin again discussed the problem of Okhrana penetration with Malinovsky and two of his chief lieutenants, Lev Kamenev and Grigory Zinoviev. Only Malinovsky saw the

irony of their joint conclusion that there must be an Okhrana agent "near" to the group of six Bolshevik deputies whose leader he was. He was instructed to be "as conspiratorial as possible" in order to reduce the dangers of police penetration. S. P. Beletsky, the director of the Police Department, described Malinovsky as "the pride of the Okhrana." But the strain of his double life eventually proved too much. Even Lenin, his strongest supporter, became concerned about his heavy drinking. In May 1914, the new Deputy Minister of the Interior, V. F. Dzhunkovsky, possibly fearing the scandal that would result if Malinovsky's increasingly erratic behavior led to the revelation that the Okhrana employed him as an agent in the Duma, decided to get rid of him. Malinovsky resigned from the Duma, and he fled from St. Petersburg with a 6,000-rouble payoff that the Okhrana urged him to use to start a new life abroad. But Lenin had been so thoroughly deceived that, when proof of Malinovsky's guilt emerged from Okhrana files opened after the February Revolution in 1917, he at first refused to believe it.⁷

Early KGB Operations

The Bolsheviks were greatly impressed by what they discovered from tsarist files about Okhrana penetration of their prerevolutionary organisation. From the Civil War onwards, they used much the same methods against their own opponents, but on a much larger scale and even more ruthlessly. The infant KGB's two most successful human intelligence operations of the 1920s, *Sindikats* and *Trests*, involved the creation of a bogus anti-Bolshevik underground in Russia in order to penetrate genuine anti-Bolshevik groups in the West. The deception lured to their destruction the two men the KGB regarded as its most dangerous opponents: the former anti-tsarist terrorist Boris Savinkov, who had become Kerensky's deputy minister for war, and the British "master spy," Sidney Reilly.

The KGB also penetrated and subverted the Paris headquarters of the remnants of the White Armies that had been defeated in the Civil War. The climax of that penetration was the kidnap and assassination of two successive heads of the White Guards, General Aleksandr Kutepov in 1930 and General Yevgeny Miller in 1937. Emigre Trotskyists were penetrated, undermined, and their leaders assassinated in almost identical fashion. The chief aide of Trotsky's son, Lev Sedov, the main Trotskyist organiser in Western Europe, was the KGB agent, Mark Zborowski. Sedov was liquidated in 1938, followed by several other leading Trotskyists and finally by the great heretic himself in Mexico in 1940.⁸

By the 1930s, however, the most important targets of KGB penetration operations were Western governments and official bureaucracies. The highest-level penetration was probably in France. Ultimately the most important, however, was in Britain. The significance of the British penetration has been frequently misunderstood because of the failure to interpret it in historical perspective. The "ring of five," which Guy Burgess set out to form in Cambridge during the academic year 1933-1934—just as Kim Philby was beginning his KGB career in Vienna, was inspired by the precedents of both Sergei Nechayev's first "ring of five" in 1869 and the more recent examples of the German Communists' *Funfergruppen*.⁹ But the most serious misinterpretation of the significance of early Soviet penetration in Britain derives from a failure to relate it to the development of Soviet Sigint.

Soviet Sigint

One of the commonest recurring errors in studies of the KGB is the belief that it collects intelligence only or overwhelmingly through human agents. In fact, together with the GRU, the KGB runs a vast Sigint system that rivals and perhaps exceeds in size the UKUSA network. It operates through land-based stations in the countries of the Warsaw Pact and as far afield as

Cuba, Ethiopia, and Vietnam; through more than 50 Soviet embassies; and through satellites, aircraft, trucks, submarines, and surface vessels.

Soviet success in Sigint is intimately linked to its success in human intelligence. The myth has developed that codebreaking coups are achieved simply by brilliant mathematicians assisted since World War II by huge banks of computers. In reality, most major breaks of high-grade code and cipher systems on which evidence is available were achieved with the help of at least partial information provided by espionage. Until World War II, no Western intelligence service, with the possible exception of the French, made it a major priority to obtain cipher materials or diplomatic documents to assist its cryptanalysts. The Okhrana, however, had made such material one of its major objectives by the beginning of the 20th century. The British Ambassador in St. Petersburg from 1904 to 1906, Sir Charles Hardinge, discovered that his head chancery servant had been offered the staggering sum of 1,000 pounds to steal a copy of one of his diplomatic ciphers. At 1980's values, that sum compares with the Walker family's earnings from the KGB.

Hardinge also told the Foreign Office he experienced "a disagreeable shock" on learning of the vulnerability of his ciphers. A prominent Russian politician told him he "did not mind how much I reported in writing what he told me in conversation, but he begged me on no account to use the telegraph, as all our telegrams are known."¹⁰ Hardinge claimed to have discovered that Rachkovsky had set up a secret department "with a view to obtaining access to the archives of the foreign missions in St. Petersburg."¹¹

Efforts to improve the British Embassy's rather primitive security were unavailing. Cecil Spring Rice, the Embassy Secretary, reported in February 1906 that, "For some time past, papers have been abstracted from this Embassy. . . . The porter and other persons in connection with the Embassy are in the pay of the police department and are also paid on delivery of papers. . . . Emissaries of the secret police are constantly waiting in the evening outside the Embassy in order to take charge of the paper procured." Despite the installation of a new safe, the fitting of padlocks to the filing cabinets and instructions to diplomatic staff not to let the chancery keys out of their possession, the theft of papers continued. Two months later, Spring Rice obtained proof "that access has been obtained to the archives of the Embassy, which have been taken off to the house of the Agent Komissarov, where they have been photographed." The probable culprit was a bribed servant who had taken wax impressions of the padlocks to the filing cabinets and had then been provided with duplicate keys by the Okhrana. The American, Swedish, and Belgian Embassies all reported similar successful attempts to burgle their files.¹²

Gains and Losses

By the turn of the century, if not before, the diplomatic intelligence derived from Sigint and stolen embassy documents was having an important influence on tsarist foreign policy. From 1898 to 1901, Russia made repeated attempts to persuade Germany to sign a secret agreement on spheres of influence in the Turkish Empire that would recognise her age-old ambitions in the Bosphorus. The attempts were abandoned at the end of 1901 because, as the Russian Foreign Minister Count Lamsdorf informed his ambassador in Berlin, decrypted German telegrams showed that the German government had no real intention of signing an agreement.¹³ Throughout the reign of Nicholas II, Russia remained the world leader in diplomatic Sigint. Britain, Germany, the United States and most minor powers had no Sigint agencies until World War I. Austrian Sigint seems to have been limited to military communications. Tsarist Russia's only serious competitor in diplomatic Sigint was her ally, France. Remarkably, studies of tsarist foreign policy continue to ignore Sigint altogether.¹⁴

The Bolshevik Revolution did serious short-term damage to Russian Sigint. It led to the dispersion of the tsarist codebreakers who had given prerevolutionary Russia the world lead in cryptanalysis. Even worse, from the Soviet point of view, was the defection of some of the ablest codebreakers to the West. One was E. C. Fetterlein, who broke prewar British ciphers. He eventually became head of the Russian section of GO & CS, the interwar British Sigint agency and the forerunner of GCHQ.

The feeble early Soviet ciphers used to replace the compromised tsarist systems further simplified the task of Western codebreakers. As a result, for a decade after the Revolution, British and probably several other powers were able to decrypt a substantial amount of Soviet diplomatic traffic.

Regaining the Advantage

The repeated revelation of British success in breaking Soviet codes led to Russia's adoption in 1927 of the virtually unbreakable one-time pad for its high-grade diplomatic traffic. Thereafter, the balance of advantage shifted to Soviet Sigint.¹⁵

The KGB and GRU revived and expanded tsarist techniques for obtaining Western cipher materials and diplomatic documents to assist their codebreakers. Initially, their most successful Sigint-support operations were probably those targeted on Western embassies in Third World capitals, notably Beijing and Tehran. A police raid on the Soviet Embassy in Beijing in April 1927 uncovered entire filing cabinets full of diplomatic dispatches and cipher materials stolen by Chinese servants and others from Western diplomatic missions. In the filing cabinets, according to a Foreign Office minute, were "probably the two most important dispatches" written recently by the British envoy, Sir Miles Lampson, as well as other British documents. Lampson himself reported that thefts of Italian and Japanese documents were even more extensive. The documents obtained from the Italian legation included "decyphers of all important telegrams between Peking and Rome and vice-versa." Stolen Japanese files, according to Lampson, were "comprehensive and even include such details and seating arrangements at official dinners and records of conversations held between officials of Legation and visitors thereto."¹⁶

By the early 1930s, one of the most important and the least-studied sections of Soviet intelligence was the KGB/GRU Sigint unit headed by Gleb Boki of the KGB, with Colonel Kharkevich of the GRU as his deputy. "This section," reported one of its members, "always gives directions to departments which conduct intelligence work abroad to secure by some means or other through their workers abroad the codes of foreign governments. . . ." Soviet cryptanalysts had, almost certainly, far more captured cipher materials as well as plaintext versions of diplomatic traffic to compare with the ciphered originals than any of their less numerous Western counterparts.¹⁷

If the history of Soviet penetration during the 1930s is set in the context of the development of Soviet Sigint, it quickly begins to take on a new significance. In Britain, in particular, the major achievement of Soviet penetration agents before World War II was the assistance they provided in breaking British diplomatic ciphers and in gaining access to Foreign Office documents. Guy Burgess, the first Soviet mole in British intelligence, joined Section D of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) only late in 1938, and he had limited access to SIS as a whole. Philby, Blunt, Long, Cairncross, Klugmann and other Soviet agents did not succeed in penetrating the intelligence services until after the outbreak of war. By the time Burgess joined Section D of SIS, however, the KGB had already recruited at least four agents inside the

Foreign Office. The first recruit was Ernest Oldham, a cipher clerk in the Communications Department that dealt with all of the Foreign Office's incoming and outgoing diplomatic telegrams.

Oldham worked for the KGB from 1930 until 1933, when the strain became too much and he committed suicide. He was succeeded by one of his colleagues in the Communications Department, Captain J. H. King, who worked for the KGB from 1934 (with a break in 1937-1938, when the KGB London residence was liquidated in the Great Terror) until shortly after the outbreak of war, when he was detected after a tipoff by the Soviet defector, Walter Krivitsky.

In addition to the two cipher clerks, the KGB recruited two high-flying young diplomats. Donald Maclean of Trinity Hall, Cambridge, entered the Foreign Office in 1935, thus becoming the first of the Cambridge moles to penetrate Whitehall. Three years later, the personnel department reported that he had done "extremely well." "He is a very nice individual indeed and has plenty of brains and keenness." The KGB probably agreed. Maclean was followed by John Cairncross of Trinity College, who joined the Foreign Office in 1936. He remained there until 1939, when he joined the Treasury. That move would scarcely have been sanctioned by the KGB, unless it was satisfied with the flow of intelligence from other British diplomatic sources in embassies, as well as in the Foreign Office.¹⁸

Sigint and Foreign Policy

Even in the era of *glasnost*, Sigint is still off limits for Russian historians. Thus, Western historians will have to take the lead in exploring an important aspect of Soviet policy that cannot be researched in the USSR itself. Of those areas of Stalinist foreign policy which stand in the most pressing need of reassessment, one of the most obvious concerns Soviet relations with prewar Japan.

Perhaps the best-publicised story in Soviet intelligence history concerns the spy ring in Tokyo run from 1933 to 1941 by Richard Sorge, who had access both to the German Embassy and, through Hozumi Ozaki, on occasion to the Japanese Cabinet and high command. The official hagiographies, however, all contain at least one deliberate distortion. The Sorge story is used to conceal the existence of what probably was an even more important intelligence source—the Sigint derived from breaking Japanese codes and ciphers.

Sigint was largely responsible for the acute Soviet fear of Japanese surprise attack in the winter of 1931-1932. Perhaps the most alarming intelligence was the intercepted telegrams of the bellicose Japanese military attache in Moscow, Lieutenant-Colonel Kasahara, who wired Tokyo in March 1931:

It will be (Japan's) unavoidable destiny to clash with the USSR sooner or later. . . . The sooner the Soviet-Japanese war comes, the better for us. We must realise that with every day the situation develops more favorably for the USSR. In short, I hope the authorities will make up their minds for a speedy war with the Soviet Union and initiate policies accordingly.

Kasahara later admitted that his call for an attack on the Soviet Union as soon as possible was ridiculed in Tokyo as "the opinions of an immature observer." At the time, however, Moscow had no means of knowing that Kasahara's telegram was not taken seriously. It thus feared that the "Manchurian incident" in September 1931 was the prelude to an attack on the Soviet Union. Moscow became so alarmed during the following winter that it took the extraordinary step in March 1932 of publishing in *Izvestia* extracts from Japanese telegrams

quoting Kasahara's call for "a speedy war" and slightly less bellicose utterances by the Japanese ambassador, Hirota. Sigint remained a major, though still unresearched, influence on Soviet policy toward Japan until at least the end of the Pacific War.¹⁹

It is equally clear that existing accounts of the origins of the Nazi-Soviet pact require some revision in order to take account of the role of Soviet Sigint and stolen diplomatic documents. Donald Cameron Watt has recently argued persuasively that, during Anglo-French negotiations with the Soviet Union in 1939, the Russians provided the German Embassy in London with misleading excerpts from British diplomatic documents. The intercepts were designed to encourage the Germans to conclude a Nazi-Soviet pact by suggesting at various times that the British were more eager for a deal with Russia than in fact they were and that they were willing to offer better terms than were actually offered.²⁰

A reassessment of the "Great Patriotic War" in the light of the achievements of Soviet Sigint is also overdue. In the early 1970s, the history of the Western Front was suddenly transformed by the disclosure of two stunning intelligence successes. First came the revelation of the Double Cross, which turned all surviving German agents in Britain into British-controlled double agents feeding the enemy with false intelligence. Then came the even more sensational disclosure of the "Ultra" secret: the breaking at Bletchley Park of the main enemy codes and ciphers, especially the various versions of the German "Enigma." For the next 15 years, historians were astonishingly slow to ask whether anything similar happened on the Eastern Front. The pioneering research of David Glantz concludes that, so far as deception was concerned, it did. *Maskirovka*, he argues, achieved successes on the Eastern Front comparable with those of the Double Cross system in the West. It remains difficult to assess in detail the achievement of Soviet wartime Sigint. Geoff Jukes, however, has argued convincingly that there was a dramatic improvement in Soviet Sigint during the few months after the Red Army's victory at Stalingrad early in 1943.²¹ The major reason for that improvement was probably so straightforward that it has been generally overlooked. Among the more than 80,000 German prisoners of war, there were signals personnel running into three figures. When their Soviet captors requested their cooperation, most must surely have concluded that it would be unwise to refuse. Soviet Sigint was, once again, powerfully assisted by human intelligence. The Red Army also captured at Stalingrad an unknown quantity of Enigma machines. But Juke's argument that Soviet cryptanalysts broke the military Enigma remains unproven. It may be that the Russians, lacking the technology to replicate the cipher-breaking apparatus devised at Bletchley Park, were unable to do more than break the simpler Baltic version of naval Enigma that may have lacked the plugboard used in other varieties.

Agent Assistance

During and after World War II, KGB and GRU penetration agents in the West achieved very much more than providing assistance to Soviet Sigint. But that assistance remained of greater importance than is usually realised. The greatest successes achieved by Soviet intelligence in the United States since World War II have probably been the penetration of American Sigint. In 1948, William Weisband, a cipher clerk in the Armed Services Security Agency, revealed to the Russians—as did Philby a year later—that their reuse of the same one-time pads had allowed limited but highly important Anglo-American decryption of their diplomatic and intelligence traffic. The Russians changed their cipher systems, and Britain and the United States lost at a stroke their single most important source of Soviet intelligence during the Cold War.²²

Worse was to come. In the space of a few years at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, Soviet intelligence had no less than three agents operating in the National Security

Agency and successfully recruited another NSA defector. In December 1959, two NSA cryptanalysts, 30-year-old Bernon F. Mitchell and 28-year-old William H. Martin, flew undetected to Cuba at the beginning of their three-week annual leave, boarded a Soviet freighter, and delivered their shopping lists in Moscow. Their absence was not detected by NSA until over a week after the end of their leave.

In September, Mitchell and Martin gave a highly embarrassing press conference in Moscow's House of Journalists, where they revealed, *inter alia*, details of NSA's breaking of the codes of American allies and of US overflights of Soviet territory. Somewhat surprisingly, Mitchell had been recruited by NSA, despite admitting to six years of "sexual experimentations" up to the age of 19 with dogs and chickens. The security review that followed his and Martin's defection seems to have concentrated on a search for other sexual deviants. It failed to detect Jack E. Dunlap, an Army sergeant assigned to NSA as a courier for highly classified documents who, despite a salary of only \$100 a week, had purchased a Jaguar, two Cadillacs and a 30-foot cabin cruiser. Dunlap's three years of well-paid work for the KGB from 1960 to 1963 lasted slightly longer than John F. Kennedy's term in the White House. When Dunlap committed suicide in 1963 under the strain of his double life, he was buried with full military honors, like Kennedy, in Arlington National Cemetery. His treachery might never have been revealed but for his wife's discovery a month after his death of a cache of documents he had failed to deliver to his Soviet control.

On the very day Dunlap's suicide was discovered, another NSA defector, Victor N. Hamilton, gave another embarrassing news conference in Moscow. Once again, Soviet intelligence had exploited a weak link in US Sigint security. NSA had retained Hamilton as a cryptanalyst working on Arabic material even after its psychiatrists pronounced him "mentally ill" in February 1959, discharging him only four months later when he was diagnosed as "approaching a paranoid-schizophrenic break."²³

Other Penetrations

Though it lives on in airport bookstalls, the great age of the ideological Soviet mole—the era of the Cambridge ring of five, Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White and their counterparts throughout the West—has passed away. Its passing does not, of course, exclude the possibility, as happens in all periods of history, of the occasional throwback to an earlier age. But for some time the greatest opportunities for Soviet penetration have come from the bribery and seduction of low-level personnel with access to Sigint and technical collection. The classic examples over the last 25 years have been the Walker family network in the United States from 1968 to 1984 and Geoffrey Prime at GCHQ from 1968 to 1978. Both, disturbingly, were discovered largely by chance: Walker as the result of evidence from his wife and anonymous letters from Jerry Whitworth; Prime after he had been caught molesting schoolgirls. More recently, the seduction of Marines guarding the cipher room in the US Embassy in Moscow is part of a KGB penetration plan which is as old as American-Soviet diplomatic relations. In 1939, the assistant American military attache in Moscow, Ivan D. Yeaton, noted how "generously" the NKVD provided female company for embassy clerks:

These "party girls" were well-trained linguists and informers known as intelligence circles as "pigeons." Having attended a few of these parties, I was amazed at the freedom with which (embassy) lads discussed embassy affairs before the "pigeons." It also became obvious, at least to me, that there were homosexuals in the group. From a security standpoint, this was a dangerous situation. But as long as . . . my superior . . . also had a [Russian] girlfriend, there was nothing I could do about it.²⁴

Although Yeaton did not realise it, the KGB had simply resumed a campaign to penetrate the US Embassy begun well before World War I and discontinued only because of the breach in diplomatic relations that followed the Bolshevik Revolution. While the KGB has continued that campaign with far greater resources and fewer scruples than in tsarist times, there is no evidence that it has been any more successful than the Okhrana either in penetrating the US Embassy or in breaking American ciphers.

NOTES

Since its foundation as the Cheka on 20 December 1917, the KGB has suffered frequent changes of name. For convenience, it is referred to in this paper simply as the KGB.

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4. Ian Armour, 'Colonel Redl: Fact and Fantasy,' *Intelligence and National Security*, vol II (1987), no. 1.
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7. Ibid.
8. Andrew, *KGB Foreign Operations*, chs. 2, 3, 5.
9. Christopher Andrew, 'F. H. Hinsley and the Cambridge Moles: Two Patterns of Intelligence Recruitment,' in Richard Langhorne (ed.), *Diplomacy and Intelligence in the Second World War* (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 24-6.
10. Hardinge to Sanderson, 3 June 1904, Lansdowne papers, Public Records Office (PRO), FO 800/115.
11. Spring Rice to Grey, 12 April 1906, PRO FO 371/123/12817.
12. Spring Rice to Grey, 28 Feb. 1907, PRO FO 371/123/7670. Spring Rice to Grey, 12 April 1906, PRO FO 371/123/12817.
13. Lamsdorf to Osten Sacken, no. 27, 10 Jan. 1902; quoting extracts from German intercepts, Nelidov papers, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris.
14. See the numerous intercepts in the four series of Russian diplomatic documents, edited in German translation by Otto Hoetsch, *Die Internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus* (Berlin, 1933-42).
15. Christopher Andrew, *Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community* (London, 1985); published in the USA as *Her Majesty's Secret Service*, chs. 9, 10.
16. See the files on the Beijing episode in PRO FO 371/12500.
17. Andrew, *KGB Foreign Operations*, ch. 5.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid. *Izvestia*, 4 March 1932.
20. D. Cameron Watt, '(John) Herbert King: A Soviet Source in the Foreign Office,' *Intelligence and National Security*, vol. III (1988), no. 4.
21. Geoff Jukes, 'The Soviets and Ultra,' *Intelligence and National Security*, vol. III (1988), no. 2.
22. Peter Wright, *Spycatcher* (New York, 1987), p. 184; confirmed by unattributable source.
23. James Bamford, *The Puzzle Palace* (Boston, 1982), ch. 4.
24. *Memoirs of Ivan D. Yeaton USA (ret'd.) 1919-1954*, US Army Military History Institute, pp. 21-22.

