

## Can Public Agencies Capture “Price-Signal” Feedback?

*Designing Market-Like Mechanisms Without Becoming a Market*

### 1 Why Price Signals Matter

- **Instant feedback loop** In private markets, rising or falling prices tell firms whether resources are scarce, demand is shifting, or quality is mis-aligned.
- **Distributed intelligence** No central planner has to collate every datapoint—millions of transactions aggregate local knowledge into a single, comparable metric.
- **Evolutionary pressure** Firms that misread signals lose margin or market share; those that respond quickly scale up, creating continual performance pressure.

Public water and infrastructure agencies rarely “see” those signals because:

1. **User fees are politically capped**; they do not float with real-time demand or risk.
2. **Budget cycles are annual or bi-annual**, muting short-run feedback.
3. **Success metrics are compliance-oriented** (e.g., pass/fail permits), not value-oriented (e.g., marginal cost per risk-unit reduced).

### 2 Surrogates for Market Feedback

Below are proven or emerging tools that replicate *parts* of the price-signal function without fully privatizing the service.

Surrogate Mechanism	How It Works	Water-Sector Examples	Feedback Strength
<b>Performance-Based Budgeting</b>	A share of the operating budget (or executive bonuses) is tied to outcome metrics, not inputs.	UK regulator <b>Ofwat’s “Outcomes Delivery Incentives”</b> reward/penalize utilities £ per customer-indexed KPI variance.	Medium
<b>Shadow Pricing (“Internal Tariffs”)</b>	Finance teams assign notional costs to activities (energy, chemicals, downtime). Crews see the “bill” even if no cash moves.	Singapore PUB’s plants track <i>avoided kWh</i> savings as a pseudo-revenue line; teams can reinvest the credit.	Medium–High
<b>Pay-for-Performance Contracts (ESCO / EPC)</b>	Third-party firm funds upgrades; agency pays only from verified savings or risk reductions.	160+ U.S. water facilities have energy-service contracts; cumulative guaranteed savings >\$500 M.	High on targeted KPIs
<b>Tradable Permits / Cap-and-Trade Analogues</b>	Regulator sets a cap (e.g., nutrient discharge) and issues permits that agencies can trade; the permit price becomes a <i>scarcity index</i> .	Chesapeake Bay Watershed nutrient credit trading saves some utilities 50% vs. plant-only upgrades.	High but scope-limited

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<b>Competitive Benchmarking &amp; League Tables</b>	Publish standardized cost-and-service data; reward top quartile or penalize laggards.	Netherlands' water boards publish annual efficiency scores; laggards lose a slice of future capital grants.	Medium
<b>Outcome-Based Grants</b>	Federal or state funds flow <b>after</b> targets (leak reduction, PFAS removal) are verified.	U.S. EPA's WIFIA now pilots "milestone-based draws" that release funds only after sensor-verified progress.	Medium
<b>Digital "information markets"</b>	Open dashboards where citizens up-vote priorities or pledge micro-payments for improvements, creating a demand-reveal signal.	Taipei's <i>vTaiwan</i> platform influenced storm-drain spending, ranking projects by public willingness-to-pay.	Low today, rising

### 3 Design Principles for Effective Surrogates

1. **Tie stakes to controllable outcomes** – link rewards/penalties to metrics field staff can influence (energy per m<sup>3</sup>, leak-hours closed).
2. **Make the "price" visible fast** – dashboards, weekly scorecards, or even shift-end texts keep latency low.
3. **Embed guardrails against gaming** – pair each primary KPI with a *counter-metric* (e.g., energy savings **and** water-quality complaints).
4. **Adjust the coefficient, not the metric** – if incentives misfire, change the reward rate rather than adding more KPIs.
5. **Start with a pilot and escrow** – hold bonuses/penalties in escrow during Year 1 to debug data quality before cash changes hands.

### 4 Potential Pitfalls

- **Perverse incentives** if KPIs are too narrow (e.g., minimizing chemical cost while biofilm risk rises).
- **Equity concerns** when outcome-based grants steer money away from disadvantaged areas that start further behind.
- **Measurement error** that erodes trust; invest early in sensor QA/QC and third-party verification.
- **Political blow-back**; frame incentives around *public value* ("dollars saved = more budget headroom for lead-line replacements").

### 5 Quick-Start Checklist for Agency Leaders

1. **Map today's informal price signals** (energy bill spikes, emergency overtime, customer complaints).
2. **Select one high-spend pain point** (e.g., non-revenue water) and design a *shadow price* every team can see daily.

3. **Layer a small bonus pool** ( $\leq 2\%$  of O&M) tied to verified improvements; publish standings monthly.
4. **Invite external challengers**—run a reverse auction for leak detection or biosolid hauling to generate a reference price.
5. **Review in 12 months**; expand only metrics that drove behavior without unintended harm.

## 6 Key Takeaway

Public agencies will never replicate the full spontaneity of open markets—but they **can** borrow the market's sharpest feature: *continuous, consequence-aligned feedback*. By embedding surrogate price signals—performance-based budgets, shadow tariffs, tradable credits—utilities gain the evolutionary pressure private firms live with every day, without surrendering public-interest mandates.

Ofwat, "PR19 Outcomes Framework," 2020

U.S. Department of Energy, "Energy Savings Performance Contracts in Water and Wastewater Facilities," 2023

Chesapeake Bay Commission, "Nutrient Credit Trading Study," 2022