

# COMP3260

## Data Security

### Lecture 3



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# Lecture Overview

1. Galois fields  $GF(p)$  and  $GF(2^n)$
2. Entropy
3. Theoretical Secrecy
4. Rate of the Language
5. Redundancy
6. Equivocation
7. Perfect Secrecy
8. One-Time Pad

# Number Theory and Finite Fields

- Text: Chapter 5 Finite Fields
- "Cryptography and Data Security" by D. Denning [2]

Note that in-text references and quotes are omitted for clarity of the slides. When you write an essay or a report it is very important that you use both in-text references and quotes where appropriate.

# Groups, Rings and Fields

## Group

- (A1) Closure under addition: If  $a$  and  $b$  belong to  $S$ , then  $a + b$  is also in  $S$
- (A2) Associativity of addition:  $a + (b + c) = (a + b) + c$  for all  $a, b, c$  in  $S$
- (A3) Additive identity: There is an element  $0$  in  $R$  such that  $a + 0 = 0 + a = a$  for all  $a$  in  $S$
- (A4) Additive inverse: For each  $a$  in  $S$  there is an element  $-a$  in  $S$  such that  $a + (-a) = (-a) + a = 0$

## Abelian Group

- (A5) Commutativity of addition:  $a + b = b + a$  for all  $a, b$  in  $S$

## Ring

- (M1) Closure under multiplication: If  $a$  and  $b$  belong to  $S$ , then  $ab$  is also in  $S$
- (M2) Associativity of multiplication:  $a(bc) = (ab)c$  for all  $a, b, c$  in  $S$
- (M3) Distributive laws:  $a(b + c) = ab + ac$  for all  $a, b, c$  in  $S$   
 $(a + b)c = ac + bc$  for all  $a, b, c$  in  $S$

## Commutative Ring

- (M4) Commutativity of multiplication:  $ab = ba$  for all  $a, b$  in  $S$

## Integral Domain

- (M5) Multiplicative identity: There is an element  $1$  in  $S$  such that  $a1 = 1a = a$  for all  $a$  in  $S$
- (M6) No zero divisors: If  $a, b$  in  $S$  and  $ab = 0$ , then either  $a = 0$  or  $b = 0$

## Field

- (M7) Multiplicative inverse: If  $a$  belongs to  $S$  and  $a \neq 0$ , there is an element  $a^{-1}$  in  $S$  such that  $aa^{-1} = a^{-1}a = 1$

# Galois fields $GF(p)$ and $GF(2^n)$

- Real and integer arithmetic is not suitable for cryptography because information is lost through rounding or truncation.
- Also, for efficiency, we prefer to work with integers that have a given number of bits. For that reason we prefer to use modular arithmetic - integers modulo  $n$ .
- If  $n$  is a prime number, we have a finite field of order  $p$ , which is referred to as Galois field, in honour of Évariste Galois, a French mathematician who first studied them.

# Galois fields $GF(p)$ and $GF(2^n)$

- Many recent ciphers are based on arithmetic in a Galois field  $GF(p)$ , where  $p$  is a prime number.
- Note that because  $p$  is a prime, every integer  $a \in [1, p-1]$  is relatively prime to  $p$  and thus has an inverse modulo  $p$ .
- The set of integers  $\text{mod } p$  together with binary operations 'addition' and 'multiplication' is called a field: it is an integral domain where every element besides 0 has a multiplicative inverse.
- That means that we can do addition, subtraction, multiplication and division without leaving the set.

# Galois fields $GF(p)$ and $GF(2^n)$

- Another type of Galois field used in cryptography is  $GF(q^n)$  where elements are polynomials of degree  $n-1$  of the form

$$a = a_{n-1}x^{n-1} + \dots + a_1x + a_0$$

where the coefficients  $a_i$  are integers  $\text{mod } q$

- Each element  $a$  is a residue  $\text{mod } p(x)$  where  $p(x)$  is an irreducible polynomial of degree  $n$ . (Irreducible means that  $p$  cannot be factored into polynomials of degree less than  $n$ )



# Galois fields $GF(p)$ and $GF(2^n)$

- We are particularly interested in the fields  $GF(2^n)$  where the coefficients are binary digits  $0$  and  $1$ . Computing in  $GF(2^n)$  is very efficient and addition and subtraction correspond to  $\oplus$  (exclusive-or) of the coefficients. Multiplication can also be done efficiently, but requires dividing by  $p(x)$ .
- Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) uses arithmetic in the finite field  $GF(2^8)$  with the irreducible polynomial  $p(x) = x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1$ . Every element  $a$  of this field can be represented as bit vector of length  $8$ , e.g.,  $11011011$ .

# Galois fields $GF(p)$ and $GF(2^n)$

- Computing in  $GF(2^n)$  is more efficient than computing in  $GF(p)$ , where  $2^{n-1} < p < 2^n$ . Why?
- Space efficient: All  $n$ -bit vectors correspond to elements of  $GF(2^n)$ , which is not the case for  $GF(p)$ .
- Time efficient: Arithmetic is more efficient in  $GF(2^n)$  than in  $GF(p)$ .

# Galois fields $GF(p)$ and $GF(2^n)$

- Multiplicative inverses:

Note that in  $GF(2^n)$ ,  $p(x)$  is irreducible, so it is relatively prime to all polynomials of order  $n-1$ , but we are not counting the polynomial whose coefficients are 0 (0-vector).

Thus:

$$\phi(p(x)) = 2^n - 1$$

$$a^{-1} = a^{\phi(p(x))-1} \bmod p(x) = a^{(2^n)-2} \bmod p(x)$$

Alternatively

$$a^{-1} = \text{inv}(a, p(x)) \text{ (Using Euclid's algorithm).}$$

# Galois fields $GF(p)$ and $GF(2^n)$

1. Let  $a = 10101$  and  $b = 01100$ . In  $GF(2^5)$ , find  $c = a+b$ .

**Solution:**

$$\begin{array}{r} a = 1\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 1 \\ \oplus b = 0\ 1\ 1\ 0\ 0 \\ \hline c = 1\ 1\ 0\ 0\ 1 \end{array}$$

2. Let  $a = 10101$  and  $b = 01100$ . In  $GF(31)$ , find  $c = a+b$ .

**Solution:**

$$\begin{array}{ll} a = 1\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 1 & (21) \\ b = 0\ 1\ 1\ 0\ 0 & (12) \\ c = 1\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 0\ 1 & (33) \end{array}$$

$$33 \bmod 31 = 2 \text{ hence } c = 0\ 0\ 0\ 1\ 0\ (2)$$

# Galois fields $GF(p)$ and $GF(2^n)$

3. Let  $a = 10111001$  and  $b = 01101110$ . In  $GF(2^8)$ , find  $c = a - b$ .

***Solution:***  $c = 11010111$

4. Let  $a = 1101$  and  $b = 0101$ . In  $GF(2^4)$ , find  $c = a + b$ .

***Solution:***  $c = 1000$

# Galois fields $GF(p)$ and $GF(2^n)$

5. Let  $a = 101$ . In  $GF(2^3)$  with irreducible polynomial  $p(x) = x^3 + x + 1$  find  $d = a * a$ .

**Solution:** Multiply  $a * a$

$$\begin{array}{r}
 101 \\
 101 \\
 --- \\
 101 \\
 000 \\
 101 \\
 ----- \\
 10001
 \end{array}$$

		1	0	1
		1	0	1
		1	0	1
	0	0	0	
1	0	1		
1	0	0	0	1

Divide by  $p(x) = 1011$ :

$$\begin{array}{r}
 \overline{1011} \overline{)10001} \\
 \underline{1011} \phantom{000} \\
 \phantom{1011} 111 = d
 \end{array}$$

# Galois fields $GF(p)$ and $GF(2)$

6. Let  $a = 111$  and  $b = 100$ . In  $GF(2^3)$  with irreducible polynomial  $p(x) = x^3 + x + 1$  find  $d = a * b$

**Solution:** Multiply  $a * b$ :

$$\begin{array}{r} 111 \\ 100 \\ \hline 000 \\ 000 \\ 111 \\ \hline 11100 \end{array}$$

Divide by  $p(x) = 1011$ :

$$\begin{array}{r} 1011 \overline{) 11100} \\ \underline{1011} \phantom{00} \\ 1010 \phantom{00} \\ \underline{1011} \phantom{00} \\ 0001 = d \end{array} \quad d = 001$$

# Galois fields $GF(p)$ and $GF(2^n)$

7. Let  $a=100$ . If  $GF(2^3)$  with irreducible polynomial  $p(x)=x^3+x+1$  find  $a^{-1}$  and verify that  $a \times a^{-1} \bmod p(x)=1$

**Solution:**

$$\phi(p(x)) = 2^3 - 1 = 7, a^{-1} = 100^6 \bmod 1011$$

$$100^2 = 100 * 100$$

$$\begin{array}{r} 100 \\ 100 \\ \hline 000 \\ 000 \\ 100 \\ \hline 10000 \end{array}$$

Divide by  $p(x) = 1011$ :

$$\begin{array}{r} 1011 \overline{) 10000} \\ \underline{1011} \phantom{00} \\ 110 \end{array}$$

$$\text{Hence } 100^2 = 110$$



# Galois fields $GF(p)$ and $GF(2^n)$

$$100^4 = 110 * 110$$

$$\begin{array}{r} 110 \\ 110 \\ --- \\ 000 \\ 110 \\ 110 \\ ----- \\ 10100 \end{array}$$

Divide by  $p(x) = 1011$ :

$$\begin{array}{r} 1011 \overline{) 10100} \\ 1011 \\ ----- \\ 010 \end{array}$$

Hence  $100^4 = 010$

# Galois fields $GF(p)$ and $GF(2^n)$

$$100^6 = 100^2 * 100^4 = 110 * 010$$

$$\begin{array}{r} 110 \\ 010 \\ --- \\ 000 \\ 110 \\ 000 \\ ----- \\ 01100 \end{array}$$

Divide by  $p(x) = 1011$ :

$$\begin{array}{r} 1011 \overline{) 1100} \\ \underline{1011} \\ 111 \end{array}$$

$$\text{Hence } 100^6 = 111$$

$$\alpha^{-1} = 100^6 \bmod 1011 = 111$$

# ENTROPY continued

## Example 2

The messages describe penalty shoot-outs; we have  $g$ =goal and  $m$ =miss, with probabilities

$$p(g)=0.9 \text{ and} \\ p(m)=0.1.$$

$$\begin{aligned} H(X) &= -(0.9 \times \log_2(0.9) + 0.1 \times \log_2(0.1)) \\ &= -(-0.13680 - 0.3321) = 0.469 \end{aligned}$$

## Example 3

$X$  is one of the  $k$  characters  $c_1, c_2, \dots, c_k$ , where each character has probability  $1/k$ .

$$H(X) = -\sum_1^k \left(\frac{1}{k}\right) \times \log_2 \left(\frac{1}{k}\right) = \log_2 k$$

If  $k=256$  then  $H(X)=8$ .

That is, if every character in the set of  $256$  characters has the same probability then the average number of bits per character is  $8$ .

In general, for  $n=2^k$ ,  $H(X)=k$ , that is,  $k$  bits are needed to encode each possible message.

## Example 4

Suppose  $n=1$  and  $p(X)=1$ . What is the entropy of the message?

$$H(X) = \log_2 1 = 0$$

There is no information in this message because there is no choice.

# Entropy - Cont.

Given  $n$  messages,  $H(X)$  is maximal for

$$p(X_1) = p(X_2) = \dots = p(X_n) = 1/n,$$

that is, when all messages are equally likely.

$H(X)$  decreases as the distribution of messages becomes more and more skewed, reaching a minimum of  $H(X)=0$  when  $p(X_i)=1$  for some message  $X_i$ .

The entropy of a message measures its **uncertainty**: it gives the number of bits of information that must be learned when the message has been distorted by a noisy channel or hidden in ciphertext.

# Theoretical Secrecy

Information theory provides a theoretical foundation for cryptography.

Information theory measures the theoretical **secrecy** of a cipher by the uncertainty about a plaintext given the corresponding ciphertext.

**Perfect secrecy** is achieved if no matter how much ciphertext is intercepted, nothing can be learned about the plaintext.

The only perfectly secret cipher is **one-time pad**.

# Theoretical Secrecy

All other ciphers leave some information about the plaintext in the ciphertext.

As the length of the ciphertext increases, the uncertainty about the plaintext usually decreases, eventually reaching 0. At that point there is enough information to determine the plaintext uniquely and the cipher is breakable (at least in theory).

Most ciphers are **theoretically** breakable with only a few characters of ciphertext.



# Theoretical Secrecy

This does not necessarily mean that the ciphers are insecure: the computational requirements needed to determine the plaintext may exceed available resources.

The important question is not whether a cipher is **unconditionally secure** but whether it is **computationally (practically) secure**.

# Rate of the Language

Consider a language  $L$  consisting of messages of  $N$  characters.

The **rate of the language** is the average entropy per character, that is,

$$r = H(X) / N$$

Real languages consist of messages of varying lengths.

In that case we can define the rate of the language for messages of length  $N$ , say  $r_N$ .

# Rate of the Language

As  $N$  increases,  $r_N$  tends to a constant  $r$  which is then **the rate of the language**.

For large  $N$ , estimates of  $r$  for English range from 1.0 bit/letter to 1.5 bit/letter.

We shall use **1.5 bit/letter** as the estimate for English in our calculations.

# Absolute Rate of the Language

If the alphabet of  $L$  consists of  $L$  characters then the absolute rate  $R$  of the language is  $R = \log_2 L$ .

The absolute rate is the maximum entropy of the characters under any probability distribution.

That is, the absolute rate is the maximum number of bits of information that could be encoded in each character assuming all possible sequences of characters are equally likely.

# Absolute Rate of the Language

If all sequences of characters in a language have the same probability then  $r = R$ .

What is the absolute rate of English?

The absolute rate of English is  $R = \log_2 26 = 4.7$  bits per letter.

# Redundancy

The absolute rate of English is significantly greater than the actual rate because English is highly redundant.

*Mst ids cn b xpresd n fwr ltrs, bt th xprnc s mst nplsnt!*

In any natural language, as well as in programming languages, redundancy arises from the structure of the language.

# Redundancy

The redundancy is reflected in the statistical properties of actual meaningful messages:

- single letter frequency distribution
- digram frequency distribution
- trigram frequency distribution
- N-gram frequency distribution

As longer sequences are considered, the proportion of meaningful messages to the total number of possible letter sequences decreases.

# Redundancy

In practice, the rate of language (entropy per character) is determined by estimating the entropy of N-grams for increasing values of N.

As N increases, the entropy per character decreases because there are fewer choices and some choices are much more likely than others.

The rate of language is estimated by extrapolating for large N.



# Redundancy

The **redundancy**  $D$  of a language with rate  $r$  and absolute rate  $R$  is defined as

$$D = R - r.$$

For English,

$$D = 4.7 - 1.5 = 3.2$$

Thus, English is 68% redundant, since  $D/R = 0.68$ .

When using the rate of 1 it is around 79% redundant.

# Equivocation

The uncertainty of a message can be further reduced given additional information.

**Example:** Suppose  $X$  is a 32-bit integer, all values equally likely so  $H(X) = 32$ . Suppose we learn that  $X$  is even. How much does this additional information reduce the entropy of  $X$ ?

By 1 bit because all even integers have 0 as their last bit.

# Equivocation

The entropy of a message  $X$ , given some additional information  $Y$ , is measured by the **equivocation**  $H_Y(X)$ , the uncertainty about  $X$  given knowledge of  $Y$ .

The **equivocation**  $H_Y(X)$  is the **conditional entropy** of  $X$  given  $Y$ :

$$\begin{aligned} H_Y(X) &= -\sum_{X,Y} p(X,Y) \log_2 p_Y(X) = \\ &= \sum_{X,Y} p(X,Y) \log_2 \frac{1}{p_Y(X)} = \\ &= \sum_Y p(Y) \sum_X p_Y(X) \log_2 \frac{1}{p_Y(X)} \end{aligned}$$

# Equivocation

$p_Y(X)$  is the conditional probability of message  $X$  given message  $Y$  and  $p(X,Y)$  is the joint probability of message  $X$  and message  $Y$ :

$$p(X,Y) = p_Y(X) p(Y)$$

If events  $X$  and  $Y$  are independent, then  $p_Y(X)=p(X)$

And we have

$$p(X,Y) = p(X) p(Y)$$

and

$$H_Y(X) = H(X) \sum_Y p(Y) = H(X)$$

# Equivocation

**Example:** Let  $n=4$  and  $p(X)=1/4$  for each message  $X$  so  $H(X)=\log_2 4=2$ . Let  $m=4$  and  $p(Y)=1/4$  for each message  $Y$ . Suppose each message  $Y$  narrows down the choice of  $X$  to two of the four messages, both equally likely:

$Y_1: X_1 \text{ or } X_2$	$Y_2: X_2 \text{ or } X_3$
$Y_3: X_3 \text{ or } X_4$	$Y_4: X_4 \text{ or } X_1$

What is the equivocation of  $X$  given  $Y$ ?

In this case the knowledge of  $Y$  reduces the uncertainty of  $X$  to 1 bit.

# Perfect Secrecy

**Shannon** studied the information theoretic properties of cryptographic systems in terms of three classes of information:

- plaintext messages  $M$  occurring with known probabilities  $p(M)$ , where  $\sum_M p(M)=1$ ;
- ciphertext messages  $C$  occurring with known probabilities  $p(C)$ , where  $\sum_C p(C)=1$ ;
- keys  $K$  chosen with probabilities  $p(K)$ , where  $\sum_K p(K)=1$ .

**Perfect secrecy** is defined by the condition

$$p_C(M) = p(M)$$

where  $p_C(M)$  is the probability that  $M$  was sent given that  $C$  was received.

# Perfect Secrecy

The probability of receiving  $C$  given that  $M$  was sent is the sum of the probabilities  $p(K)$  of the keys  $K$  that encipher  $M$  as  $C$ :

$$p_M(C) = \sum_{K, E_K(M)=C} p(K)$$

A necessary and sufficient condition for perfect secrecy is that for every  $C$  and for all  $M$   $p_M(C)=p(C)$ .

# Perfect Secrecy

So the probability of receiving a particular ciphertext  $C$  given that  $M$  was sent is the same as the probability of receiving  $C$  given that some other (any other) message  $M$  was sent.


Perfect secrecy is possible using a completely random key at least as long as the message it enciphers.

Perfect secrecy requires that the number of keys must be at least as great as the number of possible messages.

Otherwise there would be some message  $M$  such that for a given  $C$ , no  $K$  deciphers  $C$  into  $M$ , implying that  $p_C(M)=0$ . However,  $M$  is not impossible, so  $p_C(M) \neq p(M)$ .



# Perfect Secrecy



# Perfect Secrecy

**Example:** Suppose we intercept a ciphertext which was produced by a Caesar cipher, with key  $K$ .

**C=DOXDRYECKXNWOXGYEVNXYDLOOXYEQR**

Is this cipher perfectly secure?

No. We cannot achieve perfect secrecy because the number of possible keys is smaller than the number of possible English sentences of length 31. This cipher is easily broken because only one of the possible 26 keys ( $K=10$ ) produces a meaningful message:

**TENTHOUSANDMENWOULDNOTBEENOUGH**

# Perfect Secrecy

We have  $p_C(M)=1$  and  $p_C(M')=0$  for every other message  $M'$ .

$p_M(C)=p(10)=1/26$  and  $p_{M'}(C)=0$  for every other message  $M'$ .

$p_C(M)$  is certainly greater than  $p(M)$  and  $p_M(C)$  is greater than  $p(C)$ .

# One-Time Pad

Modification of the preceding example to achieve perfect secrecy: shift each letter not by a constant number of places but by a random number.

Then  $K = k_1 k_2 \dots$ , where each  $k_i$  is a random integer in the range  $[0, 25]$ .

Perfect secrecy is achieved since any 31 character long message could be enciphered to  $C$ .

# One-Time Pad

The ciphertext in the last example could have resulted from using the key  $K$   
 $= 3, 3, 4, 22, 3, 4, 24, 21, 22, 10, 9, 10, 14, 10, 20, 16, 24, 14, 10, 14, 11, 18, 20, 18, 19, 22, 14, 13$   
to encrypt the message

$M' = \text{ALTHOUGHONEMANMIGHTJUSTSUFFICE}$

A cipher that uses a non-repeating random key stream is called a **one-time pad**.

One time pads are the only ciphers that achieve perfect secrecy.

# Next Week

1. Unicity Distance
  2. Symmetric Cipher Model
  3. Kerckhoffs' Laws
  4. Codes and Ciphers
  5. Classical ciphers
    1. Transposition Ciphers and How to Break Them
    2. Substitution Ciphers and How to Break Them
- Text Chapter 2
  - "Cryptography and Data Security" by D. Denning - Information theory

# References

1. W. Stallings. "Cryptography and Network Security", Pearson, global edition, 2016.
2. D. Denning. "Cryptography and Data Security", Addison Wesley, 1982.