


COMP3260/COMP6360 Data Security

**Week 8 Workshop – 26th and 28th April 2021
Solutions**

1. Consider the known plaintext attack on triple DES with two keys as presented in the lectures. Show that the expected effort for this attack is of order $2^{120-\lg n}$, where n is the number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs available to the intruder.

Solution: The following known-plaintext attack on triple DES, due to Oorschot and Wiener, 1990, was considered in the lecture.



- 1) Obtain n known plaintext-ciphertext pairs (P, C) . Place them in a table sorted on the values of P .

P_i	C_i

- 2) Pick an arbitrary value a . For each of the possible 2^{56} keys $K_1 = i$, calculate the plaintext value P_i that produces a : $P_i = D_i[a]$.
- 3) For each P_i that matches an entry in the first table create an entry in the second table consisting of the K_1 and $B = D_i[C]$

B_j	key i

- 4) For each of the possible 2^{56} possible keys $K_2 = j$, calculate $B_j = D_j[a]$ and check if there is a match in table 2, in which case (i,j) is a candidate pair of keys.
- 5) Test each candidate pair of keys on a few plaintext-ciphertext pairs; if no pair succeeds, repeat from step 1 with a new value of a .

If we only have one plaintext-ciphertext pair, the probability that we selected the correct a is $p=1/2^{64}$. For n plaintext-ciphertext pairs, the probability that we selected the correct a is $n/2^{64}$.

We now need to use a result from probability theory, which states that if we have a bag with N balls, and if n of them are red, then the expected number of times we need to draw a ball without a replacement to draw one red ball is $(N+1)/(n+1)$. In our case this means that the expected number of a 's we need to try is $(2^{64}+1)/(n+1)$ and for large n we have $(2^{64}+1)/(n+1) \approx 2^{64}/n$. Since for each a we need to try 2^{56} keys (first for $K_1=i$ and then for $K_2=j$), the expected effort for the attack is $2^{56}2^{64}/n = 2^{120}/\lg n$.

Note that in the above derivation we ignored the effort of searching through n plaintexts.

- Find the unicity distance of Triple-DES, and the Advanced Encryption Standard that uses the key which uses key with 128, 192 or 256 bits

Solution:

Triple-Des has key length 168 bits, so it has 2^{168} possible keys:

$$H(K) = \log_2 2^{168} = 168 \text{ Bits}$$

$$N = H(K)/D = 168/3.2 = 52.5 \text{ bits}$$

AES 128 bit key: $H(K) = \log_2 2^{128} = 128$ Bits; $N = H(K)/D = 128/3.2 = 40$ bits

AES 192 bit key: $H(K) = \log_2 2^{192} = 192$ Bits; $N = H(K)/D = 192/3.2 = 60$ bits

AES 256 bit key: $H(K) = \log_2 2^{256} = 256$ Bits; $N = H(K)/D = 256/3.2 = 80$ bits

3. The first stage in each round of the AES is Substitute Bytes Transformation which uses 16×16 S-box. Bytes of the State are replaced one at the time, in the following way: the leftmost 4 bits of a byte determine the row and the rightmost 4 bits determine the column in the S box. The first row and the first column of the S-box are shown below:

[illegible]

Show that the byte in row labeled 9 and column labeled 5 has value 2A. (Hint: Multiplicative inverse of 95 in $GF(2^8)$ with irreducible polynomial $p(x) = x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1$ is 8A; try to find this yourself!)

Solution : See text.

4. The Inverse Substitute Byte Transformation uses the inverse S-box, which is constructed by first applying the inverse of the transformation $B' = XB \oplus C$ (we denote this transformation as $B' = YB \oplus D$), and then taking the multiplicative inverse in $GF(2^8)$ with irreducible polynomial $p(x) = x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1$. The inverse transformation is

$$b_i' = b_{(i+2) \bmod 8} \oplus b_{(i+5) \bmod 8} \oplus b_{(i+7) \bmod 8} \oplus d_i$$

In matrix form we have

$$\begin{bmatrix} b_0' \\ b_1' \\ b_2' \\ b_3' \\ b_4' \\ b_5' \\ b_6' \\ b_7' \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} b_0 \\ b_1 \\ b_2 \\ b_3 \\ b_4 \\ b_5 \\ b_6 \\ b_7 \end{bmatrix} \oplus \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

Prove that inverse S-box is indeed the inverse of S-box.

Solution :

We need to show that $B = YB' \oplus D = Y(XB \oplus C) \oplus D$

$$\begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} b_0 \\ b_1 \\ b_2 \\ b_3 \\ b_4 \\ b_5 \\ b_6 \\ b_7 \end{bmatrix} \oplus \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} b_0 \\ b_1 \\ b_2 \\ b_3 \\ b_4 \\ b_5 \\ b_6 \\ b_7 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} b_0 \\ b_1 \\ b_2 \\ b_3 \\ b_4 \\ b_5 \\ b_6 \\ b_7 \end{bmatrix} \oplus \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} b_0 \\ b_1 \\ b_2 \\ b_3 \\ b_4 \\ b_5 \\ b_6 \\ b_7 \end{bmatrix}$$

5. a. What is $\{53\}^{-1}$ in $GF(2^8)$?
 b. Verify the entry for $\{53\}$ in the S-box.

Solution:

- a. $\{01\}$
 b. We have

$$\begin{array}{cccccccc}
 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\
 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\
 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1
 \end{array}
 \oplus
 \begin{array}{c}
 1 \\
 0 \\
 0 \\
 0 \\
 0 \\
 0 \\
 0 \\
 0
 \end{array}
 =
 \begin{array}{c}
 1 \\
 1 \\
 1 \\
 1 \\
 1 \\
 0 \\
 0 \\
 0
 \end{array}
 \oplus
 \begin{array}{c}
 1 \\
 1 \\
 0 \\
 0 \\
 0 \\
 1 \\
 1 \\
 0
 \end{array}
 =
 \begin{array}{c}
 0 \\
 0 \\
 1 \\
 1 \\
 1 \\
 1 \\
 1 \\
 0
 \end{array}$$

In hexadecimal notation, this is $\{7C\}$, which is indeed the value in row 0, column 1 in the S-box.

6. Compare AES to DES. For each of the following elements of DES, indicate the comparable element in AES or explain why it is not needed in AES.
- XOR of subkey with the input to the f function.
 - XOR of the f function output with the left half of the block
 - f function
 - permutation P
 - swapping of halves of the block

Solution:

- AddRoundKey
- This best corresponds to the MixColumns, as there different bit bits affect each other.
- F function contains S boxes, which are the non-linear elements; therefore, it corresponds to SubstituteBytes
- ShiftRows, which permutes the bytes
- There is no exact match for swapping of halves of the block; as it permutes the bits, it is most related to ShiftRows.