Local Conditions on the Universal Liberal Peace: Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka

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Submitted in fulfillment of the requirement for the
Master in Development Studies

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Abstract

This paper examines the Western experience of liberal peacebuilding in Sri Lanka during and after the three decade long civil war. It is recognised that the peacebuilding undertaken in Sri Lanka was 'emancipatory' in nature, in that it did not involve military coercion by the peacebuilders at any point; due to the existence of a robust state, the peacebuilders focused on harnessing individual and local agency through the civil-society as a means of encouraging a bottom-up process that would influence the government to institutionalise minority rights, and thus cement a positive peace that reflected social justice. The Sri Lankan case is indicative of the complex contexts that contemporary peacebuilding operates in, and is ostensibly, ill-equipped to transform on account of internal lacunae in the liberal peacebuilding discourse. Two such assumptions that the failure of liberal emancipatory peacebuilding in Sri Lanka brings into question is - first, the 'linearity' of the discourse in conceptualising greater agency of internationals in shaping post-conflict contexts due to the lack of agency in the 'local.' Second, the romanticised and limited view of the 'local' that is at the centre of ideas about including and harnessing the 'local' in the liberal peace project. Focusing on the peacebuilding work by ethical-principled donors in Sri Lanka highlights how in cases of friction between the local and the global liberal peace project, local actors at different levels may have the greater agency and thus capacity to manipulate and impose conditions on internationals and their discourse; this is not only limited to organised opposition by the domestic elite, but also mass opposition by the very polity that the liberal peace seeks to transform.

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Nomenclature

CLM	Coalition of Like Minded donors
GoSL	Government of Sri Lanka
JPA	Joint Plan of Assistance to(for) the Northern Province
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam; the Tamil separatist militant organisation, based in northern Sri Lanka
PTF	Presidential Task Force for Resettlement, Development and Security in the Northern Province
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SLA	Sri Lanka Army
SLFP	Sri Lanka Freedom Party, led by Rajapaksa
UN	United Nations
UNP	United National Front coalition, led by Ranil Wickremasinghe
UPFA	United People's Freedom Alliance, a parliamentary coalition led by Rajapakse. UPFA formerly included the JVP and JHU

Introduction

For most observers, the 2009 military operation that ended the two decade long Sri Lankan civil War, famously labeled by President Rajapaksa as " the battle to defeat terrorism," marked the failure of the liberal peacebuilding project.[1] Also known as the 'Northern offensive,' the operation marked the Sri Lanka Army's (SLA) offensive against the separatist (LTTE), towards regaining control of the Northern Province, the Tamil heartland which had been the LTTE's stronghold during the 25 year civil war. The separatist group had been defeated and forced to retreat from the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka in July 2007, and the loss of the north meant a decisive victory for the SLA and their Commander-in-Chief, President Rajapaksa. What has been of continued embarrassment for proponents of international peacebuilding is that during the year and a half long military operation, the UN and other international humanitarian actors decided to withdraw from the contested territories, following the government's declaration that it could, 'no longer guarantee the safety of international staff.'[2]After successfully re-capturing the Northern Province, and thus decisively bringing the war to an end, the Sri Lankan government was emphatic that the end of the civil war had been made possible despite the intensive decade long international peacebuilding involvement in the region. As President Rajapaksa in his now famous victory speech to the Sri Lankan parliament on 19th May 2009 stated, "We do not have the time to be experimenting with the solutions suggested by other countries. Therefore, it is necessary that we find a solution that is our very own, of our own nation (...) We expect cooperation for it from the international community and not obstruction. Should the international community doubt our capability to find such a solution, when we have successfully overcome a challenge that that the world was unable to achieve? No. We can achieve this."[3]

This final military operation which established the Rajapaksa government's 'Victor's Peace,' came at the heels of one of the most internationalised peace-negotiations in the post Cold War contexts, and has been a subject of much policy debate in the international community. Most of these have focused on the Sri Lankan case as an example that the larger international project of liberal peacebuilding, which emerged following the end of the Cold War, is in crisis and that there is a need to revisit this viability of this discourse.[4] It was not only

[1]Mahinda Rajapaksa. *'Our Aim Was to Liberate Our Tamil People from the Clutches of the LTTE' President.* May 2009. URL: `http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20090519_04`.

[2]Secretary-General's Internal Review Panel. *Secretary General's Internal Review Panel on United Nations Action in Sri Lanka.* Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG), 2012, (pp. 17).

[3]Rajapaksa, *'Our Aim Was to Liberate Our Tamil People from the Clutches of the LTTE' President.*

[4]Jonathan Goodhand, Bart Klem, et al. *Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka, 2000-2005.* 1. Asia Foundation Colombo, 2005; Jonathan Goodhand and Oliver Walton. "The limits of liberal peacebuilding? International engagement in the Sri Lankan peace process". In: *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 3.3 (2009), pp. 303–323; Sarah Holt. *Aid, peacebuilding and the resurgence of war: buying time in Sri Lanka.* Palgrave Macmillan, 2011; Kristine Höglund and Camilla Orjuela. "Friction and the pursuit of justice in post-war Sri Lanka". In: *Peacebuilding* 1.3 (2013), pp. 300–316; Kristian Stokke and Jayadeva Uyangoda. *Liberal peace in question: politics of state and market reform in Sri Lanka.* Anthem Press,

the inability of the Western governments to bring about a negotiated peace, but specifically, the domestic backlash against the political solutions that would lead to the liberal peace, that fed into this skepticism about the efficacy of liberal peacebuilding.[5] The nature of liberal peacebuilding in Sri Lanka had been distinctly different from the oft cited examples like Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Kosovo that are characterised by an exercise of coercion by peacebuilders, in the form of heavy military involvement. Within Heathershaw's framework, peacebuilding carried out in the Sri Lankan context, with a well-functioning state and political system, was 'emancipatory' and motivated by the specific interpretation of liberal peace as 'justice;' peacebuilders had focused on circumventing the government to socially mobilise a just peace, as opposed to confronting the state and instituting top-down norms.[6] This is different from the notion of peace as 'order,' starting with the enforcement of basic security, which characterises more orthodox peacebuilding as has taken place in Afghanistan and Iraq. Most Western policy assessments that guided the work of peacebuilding practitioners and donors during the conflict characterised the Sri Lankan conflict as a state formation conflict, which has evolved beyond its trigger based on minority grievances.[7] The post-independence Sri Lankan state had retained the centralised state structure of the colonial era, at the center of which was the Sinhalese-Buddhist majoritarian identity. The conflict was thus viewed as a continuous struggle between the Sinhalese majority and the ethnic minorities for the reconstruction of the post colonial Sri Lankan state. Informed by this analysis, the conflict then reflected these demands for restructuring, through a struggle between the three parallel state formation projects of the Sinhalese, Tamils, and the Muslims. The Sinhalese state formation project seeks to protect and maintain the post colonial unitary state while the Tamil state formation project seeks regional statehood or separate statehood. The Muslim state formation claims to respond to the conflict between the Sinhalese and Tamil contest for state power.[8] As a result, the focus of peacebuilding in Sri Lanka was to institute a 'just' peace by transforming attitudes and sources of grievance among these competing factions. It was hoped that this grass-root transformation would pressure the government to address these root causes by undertaking state-reforms that devolved power away from the center and created more inclusive federal power sharing structures.[9] The key focus of peacebuilding

2011; Oliver Walton. "Between war and the liberal peace: The politics of NGO peacebuilding in Sri Lanka". In: *International Peacekeeping* 19.1 (2012), pp. 19–34.

[5]Walton, "Between war and the liberal peace: The politics of NGO peacebuilding in Sri Lanka".

[6]John Heathershaw. "Unpacking the liberal peace: The dividing and merging of peacebuilding discourses". In: *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* 36.3 (2008), pp. 597–621.

[7]Goodhand, Klem, et al., *Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka, 2000-2005*; Jayadeva Uyangoda. "Ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka: changing dynamics". In: (2007).

[8]Jayadeva Uyangoda. "Government–LTTE Peace Negotiations in 2002–2005 and the Clash of State Formation Projects". In: *Conflict and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka: Caught in the Peace Trap* (2011), pp. 16–38.

[9]Oliver Walton. "Conflict, peacebuilding and NGO legitimacy: National NGOs in Sri Lanka 1: Analysis". In: *Conflict, Security & Development* 8.1 (2008), pp. 133–167.

then, was to develop local capacities and agency through a consensual process, effectively categorising it as a fourth-generation approach that was concerned with emancipation and social justice beyond the state.

The employment of this emancipatory gradient had emerged as a consequence of circumstances, rather than conscious design. The peacebuilding project in Sri Lanka had not been a consistently unanimous 'Western' project; only a specific group of Western states had consistently worked during the conflict to 'build' a liberal peace.[10] Away from the realm of rhetoric, there has been a distinct divide in how Western states have worked with or against the Sri Lankan government during and after the conflict on the issue of building a positive peace. The Department for International Development's (DFID) Strategic Conflict Assessment in the year 2000 identifies that among the existing three types of bilateral donors, peacebuilding work had been led by one specific group.[11] The first category contains donor like Japan and Korea, which provided a substantial portion of aid to Sri Lanka and worked "around" conflict by focusing on 'neutral' development issues; this often backfired and even reinforced ethnic differences. The second category was donors that work "in conflict." Among these donors, there was an institutional recognition that the conflict was an issue and need to be taken into account to some degree in aid planning, so as to minimise conflict-related risks. This group typically included larger Western donors like the US, Australia and Canada, who only expressly began engaging with conflict during the peace-negotiations period of 2000-2005. Lunstead, in his discussion on the nature of superpower engagement in Sri Lanka, highlights that the immediate trigger for intensive Western superpower engagement in Sri Lanka from 2001 onwards was the post 9/11 agenda which advocated the simultaneous pursuit of conflict resolution, liberal democracy and market sovereignty.[12] The short-lived Sri Lankan peace-process period from 2000-2005 is thus recognised as being emblematic of the growing number of experiments in 'liberal peacebuilding', which had intensified in the post 9/11 security environment. For larger Western donors, this meant breaking away from the traditional model of development aid, where conflict regions were perceived as the domain for 'neutral' relief work alone, and exploring potential linkages and sites of operation for development aid in conflict, towards building this liberal peace.[13]

The last group, which has long self-identified itself as the 'Coalition of Like-Minded,' (CLM) consists of bilateral donors like Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Germany and the Netherlands, who have had a longer history in their bilateral engagement with the Sri Lankan conflict, including frequent consultations and

[10] Goodhand and Walton, "The limits of liberal peacebuilding? International engagement in the Sri Lankan peace process".

[11] Jonathan Goodhand. "Conflict Assessments". In: *A Synthesis Report: Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Nepal and Sri Lanka, Centre for Defense Studies King's College, University of London* (2001). URL: `http://www.eldis.org/vfile/upload/1/document/0708/DOC21465.pdf`.

[12] Jeffrey Lunstead. "The United States and Sri Lanka1". In: *Conflict and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka: Caught in the Peace Trap?* (2010), p. 54.

[13] Joanna Macrae and Adele Harmer. "Beyond the continuum: an overview of the changing role of aid policy in protracted crises". In: *Harmer and Macrae (eds). ODI, July, London* (2004).

attempts to negotiate with the government towards a power-sharing solutions even during the early years of the conflict, and through the 1990s.[14] Focusing on issues of judicial reform, human rights and conflict resolution this group of donors expressly developed programmes to reduce or manage conflict, and promote long term reconciliation. In other accounts, this group of donors have also been described as 'ethical-principled' donors, on account of the fact that they lack of obvious strategic interests in the country, but focus on issues of peace and development based on the rationale of moral obligation and solidarity in the international system.[15] As a group, they are also recognised as being in favour of more bottom-up approaches to external intervention, both on moral grounds of respecting state sovereignty, and establishing an international democratic liberal order.[16]

In the post-war context, this group continued to propagate the view that aid has the potential for inducing change, including state reform through greater democratisation. Despite the decisive end to the conflict, there were concerns about the direction and the translation of this Victor's Peace to a durable positive peace; from a Galtungian perspective and located in the discourse of liberal peace, the military conflict had only served to create a negative peace, in terms of an absence of violence due to the elimination of the opposition, the LTTE.[17] However, a positive peace, which is constructed as the core of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm, would require an addressing of the core socio-political elements, biases and divides that had caused and perpetuated the ethnic conflict for decades. From 2009 onwards, while some donor agencies from this group like the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) and the Dutch Technical Corporation closed operations in Sri Lanka, these countries continued to be engaged in peacebuilding processes by setting up funding mechanisms for CSOs and INGOs via their embassies.[18] From 2009-2011, along with these embassies other agencies like the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) continued to provide aid that focused on five issue areas: (i) human rights and accountability; (ii) reconciliation and social integration; (iii) governance, democracy and the political settlement; (iv) development and reconstruction; (v) conflict

[14] Jonathan Goodhand. "Sri Lanka: NGOs and peace-building in complex political emergencies". In: *Third World Quarterly* 20.1 (1999), pp. 69–87.

[15] Alberto Alesina and David Dollar. "Who gives foreign aid to whom and why?" In: *Journal of economic growth* 5.1 (2000), pp. 33–63.

[16] Alex J Bellamy and Paul D Williams. "The West and contemporary peace operations". In: *Journal of Peace Research* 46.1 (2009), pp. 39–57.

[17] Jonathan Goodhand, Jonathan Spencer, and Benedikt Korf. *Conflict and peacebuilding in Sri Lanka: caught in the peace trap?* Routledge, 2011.

[18] During interviews, it was also indicated that there are a series of 'anonymous' funding mechanisms that local CSOs and NGOs can apply to. As a practice, one of the example of the institutionalization of this practice can be seen by the EU and its European Instrument for Democracy & Human Rights (EIDHR) that was set up with the intention of supporting local groups, "without the agreement of the governments of third countries." http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/eidhr_en.htm

sensitivity.[19]Their strategy has been perceived as one that is in opposition to the Sri Lankan state, as it focuses on mobilising the masses and civil society to place checks on those in power. It was initially criticised by more pragmatically inclined donors as being to simplistic and confrontational, as it is seen to not adequately leverage the potential of back-door channels, as is preferred by the larger donors.

There was also a question of the strategy's efficacy: from 2006 onwards, the work done by the CLM donors and peacebuilding had come to be 'dirty words,' which faced repeated public backlash, similar to those seen in contexts where more orthodox peacebuilding had been employed.[20] The domestic civil-society had visibly turned hostile to the peacebuilders' agenda, and worked to distance themselves from political solutions advocated by the internationals. In the aftermath of the conflict, despite the persistence of peacebuilders led by this group of donors, involvement in the domestic arena and on the ground seemed as problematic as ever. By 2012, just as larger Western donors broke away from the pragmatic wait-and-watch policy that the group adopted for the first three years after the end of the war, the CLM donors were parallely 'winding down' peacebuilding work on the ground. This was marked by departure of NORAD, DFID, the Dutch Technical Cooperation and the French Development Agencies by late 2011, and a closing of civil society or governance issues based funding from the embassies. At the time that research for this thesis was being conducted, high level sources in the SDC, Norwegian Embassy and GIZ confirmed that they expected to end operations by 2015, effectively reflecting an end to the emancipatory peacebuilding these donors had funded for the past two decades.[21]

Based on this trend of withdrawal by peacebuilders, central research question of this thesis seeks to address is:

> Why after decades of local engagement towards emancipatory civil peacebuilding, did the group of 'like-minded' donors wind-down their peacebuilding operations in the post-conflict period?

There is a distinct paradox in the way this group of donors have pursued their goal of peace as justice against larger international developments: Globally, there has been a renewed political momentum from 2011 towards condemning the lack of progress made by the GoSL in addressing war atrocities and devolving power, as is highlighted by the Secretary-General's Panel of Experts Report of 2011 and United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) Resolution 19/12. This momentum came from larger bilateral Western donors who have tended to link their aid to commercial or strategic security interests and for whom it was strategically relevant that the Sri Lankan government had a growing alliance

[19]Goodhand, Spencer, and Korf, *Conflict and peacebuilding in Sri Lanka: caught in the peace trap?*

[20]Oliver Walton and Pakiasothy Saravanamuttu. "In the Balance? Civil society and the peace process 2002-2008". In: *Conflict and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka: Caught in the Peace Trap?* (2011).

[21]Interviews with Colombo based policy-makers from the SDC, GIZ, NORAD, EU Representation to Sri Lanka and the Maldives, Swiss Embassy, and UNDP

with more 'illiberal' non-traditional donors like China, Iran and Russia, which allowed it to defy Western pressures and even undercut commercial Western interests. In contrast, CLM donors have either withdrawn to the sidelines or have focused on 'normalising' relations with the government, effectively signaling that the peacebuilding baton would be dropped.[22]

In order to unpack this research problem, two sets of research questions were relevant:

1. Why were the peacebuilders in Sri Lanka unsuccessful: what were the fundamental internal inconsistencies in the peacebuilding project that led to its unpreparedness for the Sri Lankan context?

2. Second, what were the specific domestic conditions, processes and actors that directly and adverse impacted the peacebuilding project? Theoretically, what does this response to peacebuilding bring into focus about the liberal peacebuilding project?

The central argument of this thesis is as follows – In post-conflict Sri Lanka, the group of like-minded donors was forced to increasingly scale down civil peacebuilding due to the setting of conditionalities on their work by local actors, which led to a shrinking of humanitarian and policy space in which the peacebuilders could operate. An examination of two-way conditionality in bottom-up peacebuilding is juxtaposed against a critical theory exploration of peacebuilding which questions the 'linearity,' and normative framework of the civil peacebuilding discourse.[23][24] Based on this, the thesis highlights that local actors are adept at manipulating conditionalities in their favour, thus providing evidence to support the findings of an emerging critical literature on liberal peacebuilding interventions, which has placed emphasis on the role of domestic political actors in mediating the peacebuilding outcomes and dynamics of peacebuilding interventions.[25]It employs relatively recent analytical lens developed by Björkdahl and Höglund, that uses the concept of 'friction' to identify points when an external discourse is mediated by and between local actors.[26] The direction this friction will take - for, against, or partially accommodating of the global discourse - is dependent on vertical power relations between peacebuilders and

[22]Stokke and Uyangoda, *Liberal peace in question: politics of state and market reform in Sri Lanka*.

[23]Oliver P Richmond. "Critical agency, resistance and a post-colonial civil society". In: *Cooperation and conflict* 46.4 (2011), pp. 419–440.

[24]David Chandler. "Peacebuilding and the politics of non-linearity: rethinking 'hidden'agency and 'resistance'". In: *Peacebuilding* 1.1 (2013), pp. 17–32.

[25]Goodhand and Walton, "The limits of liberal peacebuilding? International engagement in the Sri Lankan peace process"; Jonathan Goodhand. "Stabilising a victor's peace? Humanitarian action and reconstruction in eastern Sri Lanka". In: *Disasters* 34.s3 (2010), S342–S367; Georg Frerks and Bart Klem. "Conditioning Peace among Protagonists. A Study into the Use of Peace Conditionalities in the Sri Lankan Peace Process". In: *The Hague: Clingendael Institute, fc* (2006); Stokke and Uyangoda, *Liberal peace in question: politics of state and market reform in Sri Lanka*.

[26]Annika Björkdahl and Kristine Höglund. "Precarious peacebuilding: friction in global–local encounters". In: *Peacebuilding* 1.3 (2013), pp. 289–299.

local populations, and also horizontal power relations between different local actors. Björkdahl and Höglund also provide a template of how different types of response to the friction can be categorised. Based on this framework, this thesis conducts a long-term analysis of how through a feed-back loop process, local rejection set stage for the option of a military victory, which in turn set stage for the government's co-option of the liberal peacebuilding process in the post-conflict era.

This thesis thus discusses two types of frictions and resultant conditionalities that emerged at different points but operated simultaneously in the post-conflict context : a long existing local rejection, coupled with the government's ability to impose structural limitations. The first conditionality is discussed as first having emerged from the vertical 'friction' between the global liberal peace project and the local populations during the peace negotiations era from 2000-2005. Contrary to accounts which focus on the public's rejection of the Norway mediated peace-negotiations in Sri Lanka as a phenomenon of "ethno-nationalist hysteria," this thesis highlights that the local resistance emerged primarily due to a friction between local and external visions of what a stable peace entailed : For peacebuilders it was located in a federal solution, which was supported by the domestic elite in power. For the local majority, it meant preventing the potential splitting of the state.[27] This local rejection of the Western peacebuilders support for a federal state that operated within the ethno-nationalistic framework in order to appeal to the masses, is analysed as a consequence of the peacebuilders unwillingness to engage with "non-liked minded" factions of the civil society. The local rejection inculcated a culture of self-censorship among potential local collaborators during the conflict period, thus creating effective limits or conditions on who the Coalition of Like-Minded donors can collaborate with. It also played a key role in bringing to power a government that was able to pursue a war for peace agenda, despite Western resistance to the project

Second, the end of the conflict in a military defeat drastically altered the domestic political dynamics in Sri Lanka. The Rajapaksa regime drew legitimacy from this Victor's Peace, and no longer required the support of local marginal political groups which had brought it to power. Demands from these groups were now seen as 'limiting' to the government's progress and pragmatism because of a horizontal friction between the national elite and local groups with regards to the potential Western involvement in the post-conflict processes in the country: While the local groups agitated for a complete rejection, the government was bound by pragmatic concerns and needed to seem more accommodating and respectful of international concerns. The resultant response to this friction is the Rajapaksa regime's focus on consolidating its position as the primary space for domestic agenda settings. Within the governments agenda, it is not against all Western donors, but only against the ethical-principled group, that constantly agitates and demands for the pursuance of peace as justice. Thus the government too has developed a state framework that imposes conditions

[27] David Rampton. "'Would the Real Dutugemunu Please Stand Up?'The Politics of Sinhala Nationalist Authenticity and Populist Discontent". In: (2010).

on donors in order to focus their resources on areas that it prioritises, while effectively 'squeezing out' those that it wants to make irrelevant. This reflects a 'co-option' response wherein the government has selectively appropriated certain aspects of the peacebuilding discourse. However for the ethical-principled donors, faced with both local rejection and government conditionality, which at points have been complimentary, there was effectively no space for operation.

This thesis draws from and builds upon the strand of case-specific practitioner-oriented research that has focused on Sri Lanka in order to highlight the complexity of contexts that peacebuilding is employed in. experience. Past research on Sri Lanka has dominantly focused on the unraveling of the peace process by 2005, peacebuilding during the tsunami response, and factors that led to the termination of the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA), and has drawn similar conclusions: in Sri Lanka, the liberal peace project has always been mediated by domestic actors that are in the dominant position of being able to translate or manipulate the project towards self-serving interests, which in the past has led to ' decidedly illiberal outcomes.'[28] The recognition of the primacy of domestic actors and processes brings into question certain foundational assumptions the discourse makes about itself, as being a process where international actors have greater agency and ability to transform underlying conflict structures. Richmond in his disaggregation of the liberal peace highlights that the notion that an external neutral third party has the ability to 'bring' peace in a conflict environment is common to all versions of the liberal peace thesis.[29] Building on this tradition, this thesis attempts to span a longer period of time, starting from the period after the unraveling of the peace-process in 2003, in order to present a more comprehensive reading of how this exercise of local agency has transformed, changed hands, and in turn impacted the potential role for peacebuilders in post conflict Sri Lanka.

The argument is structured as follows: Chapter 1 which follows this introduction, locates the research question within a larger academic study of peacebuilding. It locates the Sri Lankan experience of peacebuilding and local resistance within the Richmond and Heathershaw's typology of peacebuildings; their critique of the linearity of the peacebuilding discourse is one of the primary conceptual tools used to frame the idea of local agency in setting conditions on international peacebuilding. Drawing from this theoretical exploration, the chapter then details the methodology and design of the research which uses the Björkdahl and Höglund conceptual framework on frictions in local-global encounters for analysing the Sri Lankan case. The modalities of collecting data for this analysis through field research are also presented, including a discussion of the dilemmas encountered in conducting fieldwork in a "dangerous" setting. Chapter 2 discusses the first form of friction that is vertical in nature, emerging between the peacebuilders and the local Sri Lankan population, and the rejection response that emerges as an outcome. The emergence and evolution of

[28] Goodhand and Walton, "The limits of liberal peacebuilding? International engagement in the Sri Lankan peace process".

[29] Oliver P Richmond. "The problem of peace: understanding the 'liberal peace'". In: *Conflict, Security & Development* 6.3 (2006), pp. 291–314.

the local rejection is analysed; this includes a focus on ideologically disparate groups which in common shared their resistance against Western intervention, and the process by which this effectively limited the ability of peacebuilders to build a liberal peace through the civil society. Chapter 3 looks at the post-conflict environment and the second type of horizontal friction between local and national elite which has impacted the pre-existing vertical friction with peacebuilders. The outcome of the horizontal friction has been the emergence of a state framework to moderate any external peacebuilding, which is discussed as a post-conflict local conditionality. This is examined through a case study of the JPA and the role of the Presidential Task force. Between this and the local resistance, peacebuilding done by the CLM donors has thus become ineffective and impractical to the point that, by consensus, peacebuilders have opted to 'abandon the sinking ship.'[30]

[30]Quote from interview with SDC

Chapter 1

Conceptual Framework

This chapter provides a conceptual discussion of the research topic by focusing on the specific form of peacebuilding that has been carried out by ethical-principled donors in Sri Lanka. It addresses the difference of this type of peacebuilding from typically cited cases of peacebuilding in Afghanistan and Iraq, as it has not involved any form of top-down nation-building or state-building in Sri Lanka. Thus, the usage of an umbrella term "peacebuilding," to describe activities towards building different versions of a liberal peace in these different contexts would be confusing, and conceptually unsound. It then discusses the critical theorists' critique of the emancipatory peacebuilding strand , as was operationalised in the Sri Lankan context, in order to examine flaws in the liberal peacebuilding model which overlooks the potential that 'local agency' and resistance has to destabilise a liberal peace.

1.1 Disaggregating peacebuilding

The first institutional articulation of the peacebuilding discourse, which emerged following the end of the Cold War, can be traced to Boutros Boutros Ghali's 1992 'An Agenda for Peace.' In the report, the UN Secretary-General argued that there was a need to 'identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.'[1] The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 had saliently signaled the superiority of the liberal paradigm, and thus, in identifying intrastate conflicts as the most significant threat to the international order, this key document also located the solution within the liberal peace framework - it called for an expansion in the role of the international community from only containing conflicts (peacekeeping) to resolving conflicts (peacebuilding).[2] Recurrently criticised as a 'set of problem-

[1] Boutros Boutros-Ghali. "An Agenda for Peace Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping". In: *International Relations* 11.3 (1992), pp. 201–218, (pp.11).

[2] Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping".

solving strategies' as opposed to a concretely developed framework, the term peacebuilding has come to be associated with a wide-range of interventions in conflict and post-conflict contexts. The proliferation of activities and strategies has meant that the term is less concerned with 'how' to achieve peace, as opposed to what this peace must look like.[3] As a result, peacebuilding has come to be associated with the end ideal that the economic and political reforms it endorses seek to achieve - to build peace within and between states through the promotion of liberal democracy and market economics. The theoretical underpinning of liberal peacebuilding project is the notion of liberal peace. According to this, democracies based on the rule of law are less likely to go to war due to domestic institutional constraints upon leaders, and due to the economic interdependence that arises out of pursuing market economics globally.[4]

Goodhand's distinction between the different types of donors based on the conflict sensitivity of their aid marks a break from earlier literature that focused on variation in institutional behaviour between donors, as these typically discussed the issue within the traditional scope of development aid as aid in a non-conflict environment.[5] Within this scope, conflict situations are viewed as areas of operation for humanitarian aid alone, as was the dominant practice till the end of the Cold War. The peacebuilding discourse, in this sense, marks a new orientation for development aid in conflict and post-conflict contexts. It was developed with the intention of establishing continuities between humanitarian and development aid, while attempting to harness the potential of development aid in conflict resolution and transformation processes.[6]

One part of critical theory on peacebuilding, in the exercise of critiquing the seeming homogeneity of the discouse and to outline the inherent tensions in conceptualisation and implementation of the project, has identified that there are four distinct interrelated strands of liberal peace and hence, multiple 'peacebuildings.' Oliver Richmond and John Heathershaw argue, that these differences and contentions are obscured in mainstream policy discourse in order to create a seemingly cohesive meta-narrative, where peacebuilding is more 'described than defined,' as a set of problem-solving strategies that are universal.[7][8] In their disaggregation of different peacebuilding strategies, there is a differentiation between the underlying vision of peace as conflict management, peace as order and peace as justice.[9] Each of these different versions of peace reflect the four intellectual strands about the possible ontology of the liberal peace- the 'victor's peace', the 'institutional peace', the 'constitutional peace' and the

[3] Holt, *Aid, peacebuilding and the resurgence of war: buying time in Sri Lanka*, (pp.3).

[4] Alex J Bellamy and Paul D Williams. "Introduction: Thinking anew about peace operations". In: *International Peacekeeping* 11.1 (2004), pp. 1–15, (pp.3).

[5] Goodhand, "Conflict Assessments", (pp. 67).

[6] Macrae and Harmer, "Beyond the continuum: an overview of the changing role of aid policy in protracted crises".

[7] Heathershaw, "Unpacking the liberal peace: The dividing and merging of peacebuilding discourses", (pp. 597).

[8] Richmond, "The problem of peace: understanding the 'liberal peace"'.

[9] Heathershaw, "Unpacking the liberal peace: The dividing and merging of peacebuilding discourses", (pp. 604).

'civil peace,'. The victor's peace reflects the age-old realist argument that a peace that rests on a military victory and upon the hegemony of a victor is more likely to survive. The institutional peace rests upon attempts to anchor states within a normative and legal context in which states multilaterally agree how to behave and how to enforce or determine their behaviour, reflecting an idealist, liberal-internationalist vision. The constitutional peace develops from the liberal Kantian argument that peace can only be developed through democracy, free trade and the prevalence of cosmopolitan values. The final identifiable strand is that of the civil peace. It draws from the sphere of direct action and democracy, towards the attainment of democratic governance and basic rights.[10]

The first gradient of peacebuilding, which privileges the development of democratic systems in post-conflict contexts, was mainstreamed into global policy discourse and practice by the UN under Boutros Boutors Ghali, and later Kofi Annan, against the rekindling of liberal internationalist ideals in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse. First operationalised following the Balkan Crisis, democratic peacebuilding subsumed under it the concepts of peacemaking, and peace-enforcement along with the traditional peacekeeping role that the UN system had carried out during the Cold War. The emergence of the peacebuilding discourse intimately linked with reconceptualisation of notions of state sovereignty. During the Cold War, International interventions had been underscored by a Westphalian notion of the state, wherein the desire to endorse the pursuit of liberalism and democracy took place against the recognized precedence of territorial and political sovereignty.[11] The end of the Cold War marked a transition to a post-Westphalian conception of sovereignty that inextricably linked peace within states to peace between states, with a liberal system of economic and political structuring being advocated as the ideal form of sovereign governance. The underlying rationale was that liberal democratic states, through increasing trade relations and economic integration along with an open political culture, are most likely to make decisions that are mutually beneficial. As argued by former US President Clinton, 'democracies don't attack each other, ' drawing from which, 'the best strategy to insure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy everywhere'.[12] Reflective of this, the Agenda of Peace suggested a wide range of post-conflict interventions that included the monitoring of elections, reform of governmental structures, and the promotion of political participation.[13] Heathershaw underlines that the statement of intent was broad enough to allow participation by every UN agency in a project that had an explicit discursive link with the ethics of liberal-democracy.[14]

Against the experience of democratic peacebuilding experiments in Cambo-

[10] Richmond, "The problem of peace: understanding the 'liberal peace"', (pp. 297).

[11] Bellamy and Williams, "Introduction: Thinking anew about peace operations", (pp.3).

[12] President Bill Clinton. *State of the union address.* 26 January 1994.

[13] Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping", (pp.32).

[14] Heathershaw, "Unpacking the liberal peace: The dividing and merging of peacebuilding discourses", (pp. 601).

dia, Latin America and Kosovo, it became clear that the nature of 'peace as order' was not entirely consensual, as its creation often hinged on a conditional relationship between peacebuilding agents and recipients.[15] Identified as a 'conservative' model of peacebuilding, the process of democratic norm diffusion in post-conflict societies took place through an enforced norm transfer. Initially, this 'enforcement' entailed a carrot and stick process of allocating benefits or punitive measures to the reforming country by the multilateral liberal system. However soon, in the highly charged security environment in the aftermath of the 9/11, there was emerged a consensus among a small group of Western states on the use of physical force in order to enforce these norms. While the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq represent the extreme extent of this shift, moderate versions of interventions guided by the 'peace as order' vision have taken the form of conflict-management, and can be seen in Mali, The Democratic Republic of the Congo and Angola; in the latter set of cases, the 'host' state continues to have some say in the kind of order that is to be established.[16] The key difference between peace as conflict management and peace as order has also been the point of intervention - in the latter conceptualisation, described as 'hyper-conservative' peacebuilding, interventions are pre-emptively undertaken in contexts that are considered prone to conflict due to the existence of illiberal governance systems and a consequent lack of basic security. The key target of 'peace as order' is thus, the failed state, which to peacebuilders , is representative of anarchy that has the potential to destabilise the international system , allowing for the repositioning of peacebuilding as state-building.[17] At the very core of this notion is the need for a militarily imposed settlement in order to reconfigure who has the monopoly over force in the identified 'failed' state. This established basic security as an a priori condition to any form of successful domestic and international institutional development of a democratic peaceful order. As Krause and Jutersonke note, a key feature in the formulation of peacebuilding as state-building processes is the institutional linking of security with development and development aid by donors. Through the Cold War Era, within Western states, these had been separately pursued by parallel institutional and political structures.[18] Following 9/11, development aid has become an explicit instrument in the stabilisation and state-building agenda that certain Western actors undertook under the umbrella of 'War on Terror.' The clearest indication of this blurring between the two spheres, leading to the 'securitisation of development' is the emergence of aid practices that purely lend to the military rationale of these operations, and are often disbursed in coordination with military authorities.[19]

Heathershaw argues that while the emergence of the peacebuilding as state-

[15] Richmond, "The problem of peace: understanding the 'liberal peace"', (pp. 304).

[16] Edward Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver P Richmond. *New perspectives on liberal peacebuilding*. United Nations University Press Tokyo, 2009.

[17] Newman, Paris, and Richmond, *New perspectives on liberal peacebuilding*, (pp.12).

[18] Keith Krause and Oliver Jütersonke. "Peace, security and development in post-conflict environments". In: *Security Dialogue* 36.4 (2005), pp. 447–462, (pp. 455).

[19] Oliver P Richmond. "UN peace operations and the dilemmas of the peacebuilding consensus". In: *International peacekeeping* 11.1 (2004), pp. 83–101.

building discourse has emerged to be the dominant focus of policy, academic and popular literature in the last decade, the tendencies toward this can be traced from the early 1990s.[20] Academics like Helman, Rathner and Zartman used ideas of 'failing' or 'collapsing state' when discussing the increase of civil wars in Africa, while the CIA funded a wide scope research programme called the State Failure Task Force. But the possible main-streaming of military interventions during the mid 1990s faced an insurmountable roadblock in the form of high-profile failures of state-centric peacebuilding projects in Somalia and Rwanda. The potential centralisation around the 'state failure' agenda was thus delayed by a shift in focus to 'people centric' peacebuilding, against a call for new approached that moved away from the state, and adopted a more consensual peacebuilding practices that built peace from the grassroots.

During this period, against the mass backlash against top-down peacebuilding, which was criticised as hegemonic and neo-imperial, donors and the peacebuilding community sought to move towards a more measured approach that equally divided risks and dividends between the peacebuilders and recipients. Based on a broad conflict transformation model which recognised the interaction of social, political and economic factors and inequalities in creating and perpetuating conflict, peace was reconceptualised as social justice. Peacebuilding was then presented as a form of custodianship, wherein through a combination of consent, inducement and occasional coercion, peace as justice can be achieved through facilitating the acceptance of difference and otherness, as well as the institutionalisation of social justice.[21]

As Richmond discusses, the pursuance of civil peace is an anomaly in thinking about liberal peace, because the state is not envisioned as the site of transformation. It instead privileges individual agency as a means to achieve human security and justice, beyond the state system, and was seen as the 'emancipatory' version of liberal peace.[22] The incorporation of civil society in peacebuilding interventions can also be discussed as a more invasive peacebuilding. First, the positioning and access of CSOs made possible more intimate forms of norm dissemination, helping construct a 'peacebuilding consensus' among the masses. Second, in states which were perceived to be 'difficult' or 'inadequate' in cooperating with the international community, funding agencies positioned CSOs as an ancillary form of governmental authority.[23] Richmond highlights this emancipatory civil society-led peacebuilding is typically carried out in contexts where the primary 'peacebuilders' are donor agencies, without the prioritisation of negotiations in the state-centric arena; specifically the group of small donors or the 'like-minded' states, who prioritise the effective achievement of aid project goals, privilege the emancipatory version of peacebuilding. The centrality and application of this gradient of peacebuilding led by aid agencies or donors is dis-

[20] Heathershaw, "Unpacking the liberal peace: The dividing and merging of peacebuilding discourses".

[21] Richmond, "The problem of peace: understanding the 'liberal peace"', (pp. 294).

[22] Richmond, "The problem of peace: understanding the 'liberal peace"', (pp.294).

[23] Walton, "Conflict, peacebuilding and NGO legitimacy: National NGOs in Sri Lanka 1: Analysis".

tinctly different from more orthodox forms of peacebuilding, where civil society peacebuilding is preceded by military interventions as has increasingly become the norm.[24]

Critical theorists argue that in the last decade, as evidenced by the institutionalisation of concepts like the 'Responsibility to Protect,' proponents of peacebuilding as state-building have attempted to present civil peacebuilding as a part or a stage in the larger state-building process, associating civil society activism with basic security. In an attempt to present a cohesive narrative in the form of a universal 'peacebuilding consensus', these different gradients of peacebuilding may often by combined and thus, in any one peacebuilding intervention, these different strategies may be employed at different points; this chronology and degree to which a gradient is privileged depends on priorities associated with dominant state interests, donor interests and the capacity of peacebuilding actors.[25] In light of this, the biggest criticism against the homogenisation of these different discourses and modes of operation is that this process may well limit the ability of implementer to take into account operational realities; conservative, orthodox, and emancipatory versions of the liberal peace may actually contradict and undermine each other, leading to disruption in the broader peacebuilding process.[26]

1.2 Questioning an 'emancipatory' liberal peacebuilding

In cases like Sri Lanka, which represent a conflict and post-conflict context where there government can competently provide basic security and where there are ostensibly functional democratic practices, the emancipatory gradient presents with the only course of peacebuilding intervention. As a result of this, emancipatory peace-builders in these contexts face radically different challenges than state-builders, who have the sanction of force. Led by donors and aid agencies, the operationalising of emancipatory peacebuilding in such contexts is motivated by larger concerns in the aid community- first, for the sake of the ethics and legitimacy of the peacebuilding project, and second, the search for efficiency and sustainability.[27] Principles of donor engagement based on there two concerns, that are considered mutually reinforcing, were developed in a operational scope that is much broader than peacebuilding. These principles originally developed with a focus on non-conflict contexts, but have also come to guide donor-led

[24] Richmond, "The problem of peace: understanding the 'liberal peace"'.

[25] Oliver P Richmond. "Resistance and the Post-liberal Peace". In: *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* 38.3 (2010), pp. 665–692; Richmond, "UN peace operations and the dilemmas of the peacebuilding consensus"; Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver P Richmond. "The local turn in peace building: A critical agenda for peace". In: *Third World Quarterly* 34.5 (2013), pp. 763–783.

[26] Heathershaw, "Unpacking the liberal peace: The dividing and merging of peacebuilding discourses".

[27] Timothy Donais. "Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes". In: *Peace & Change* 34.1 (2009), pp. 3–26.

peacebuilding interventions . This has been stressed on by the 2008 Accra Declaration which states that, "aid effectiveness principles apply equally to development co-operation in situations of fragility, including countries emerging from conflict, but that these principles need to be adapted to environments of weak ownership and capacity."[28] The general thrust of most principles guiding the aid architecture has been that ethical and legitimate donor interventions are more likely to produce more effective and sustainable results; In this respect, the idea of 'local ownership' or 'community led' interventions has come to become a commonly shared buzz-word between the aid and peacebuilding worlds.[29] [30]

However, despite the seemingly more consensual of intervention reflected in the emancipatory version of peacebuilding, critical theorists are equally skeptical of its 'emancipatory' potential, as they are of the more orthodox gradients, arguing that it takes places within the limited space that the neo-liberal paradigm will allow. The failure of the different peacebuildings is thus, ' not because of the efficiency problems related to the technicalities of its workings, but in the problematique [sic] assumptions and contradictions within the model itself ...'[31] The emancipatory gradient continues to be based on the machine-like workings and faith-based assumptions of liberal peace, attempting to technically addressing contextual problems with universal answers, in the process, denying the local constituencies' right of being an organic part of their own peace.

The linear framing of international intervention in the cause of peace has an implicit liberal telos. For the achievement of this telos, the role of emancipatory peacebuilding can be understood as the removal of blockages by entrenched power elites by freeing the local agency of civil society, which, it is assumed, would undoubtedly express their support for universal liberal democratic norms. It thus constructs a dichotomy between those doing the peacebuilding intervention, and those for whom the intervention is designed.[32] Within this imagery, the 'local' is understood as lacking agency and mobility, and post-conflict spaces are conceptualised as empty spaces in need of new norms, governing institutions and patterns. Further, liberal peacebuilding relies on a form of civil society that is relatively free of ethno-nationalism and generally oriented towards liberal norms and values, in other words, mirrors the Western model. As a result, it overlooks a range of other 'un-like minded' actors that play a key role in mobilising social attitudes and sentiments.[33] Certain scholars have described this as a "romanti-

[28] Paris Declaration. "Accra Agenda for Action". In: *Paris, ocDe (http://www. oecd. org/dataoecd/30/63/43911948. pdf, acessado em 13 de agosto de 2011)* (2005), (pp.5).

[29] Development Assistance Committee et al. *Shaping the 21st Century: The contribution of development co-operation.* 1996.

[30] 'local ownership' as a source of legitimacy and effectiveness in non-conflict contexts has been a key concern for traditional bilateral donors since the early 1990s. It was formally recognized as a key concern for development aid in 1996, with the OECDs Development and Assistance Committee (DAC) which called for a comprehensive approach that —respects local ownership of the development processes (DAC, 1996: 9).

[31] Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh. *Rethinking the liberal peace: external models and local alternatives.* Taylor & Francis, 2011, (pp. 5).

[32] Chandler, "Peacebuilding and the politics of non-linearity: rethinking 'hidden'agency and 'resistance"'.

[33] Walton, "Between war and the liberal peace: The politics of NGO peacebuilding in Sri

cising of the local," wherein liberal peacebuilders are unable to constructively engage with local agencies and processes due to their specific normative understanding of what compromises the ' local ' to be engaged with. It thus overlooks the possibility that the emergence of local agencies could mean a resistance to the 'emancipatory project' of liberal peace builders, which may lead to claims of autonomy from the regional and international sphere and the intended end vision.[34][35] This resistance has the potential to destabilise the monopoly of both national elites and the interveners.

Given that aid or funding the key instrument for mobilising peacebuilding activities in conflict, in peacebuilding contexts like Sri Lanka, internationals are increasingly realising that this local resistance is reflected in the reverse imposition of conditionalities to their aid. As Richmond notes, 'internationals are now learning that where they set conditionalities so local actors also expect conditionalities to be observed. Furthermore, local actors are becoming adept at manipulating conditionalities in their favour. If a sustainable peace is to be constructed, there can be no exit until both locals and internationals have agreed that such a version of peace has actually been achieved."[36]Thus while emancipatory liberal peacebuilding has coalesced around idea of local ownership, civil society or capacity-building approaches, implying an acknowledgement of concerned power relations between the local and the international, it is a selective acknowledgment that fails to recognise the potential for local agency and resistance. What this implies at an operational level is that peacebuilders choose to view any form of resistance as 'non-compliance,' or in the language of peacekeeping, as "spoilers" that are to be mitigated rather than engaged with, as a result of which, the final consensus is as artificial as top-down models.

Drawing from this, critical theorists have called for a 'local turn' in peacebuilding, that eschews the normative liberal ideal and instead adopt a pluralist view of difference, conceptualising peace as hybrid, multiple and often agonitic. The 'local turn' thus implies an engagement with the critical and resistant local agencies that have a role in shaping a subaltern view of peace, and how they act to engage with different conflict related social dynamics and the structures that maintain them. Drawing from the post-structuralist writings on resistance to structural domination, the notion of a "local turn" implies that agency can only really be exerted politically through public mobilization on a large scale. This collective agency emerges through forms of hidden, everyday resistance, in the engagement with structural power. They are discussed as being "hidden" because they operate at a level where they may be invisible to formal theory and methodologies, and those that operate based on these.[37] Critically, local agency is not a "new" phenomenon and has always been present in different forms. It is the present crisis of the liberal peace, along with the growing number of re-

Lanka".

[34]Oliver P Richmond. *The transformation of peace*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

[35]Richmond, "Resistance and the Post-liberal Peace".

[36]Richmond, "The problem of peace: understanding the 'liberal peace"', (pp. 304).

[37]Chandler, "Peacebuilding and the politics of non-linearity: rethinking 'hidden'agency and 'resistance"'.

searchers from the "sub-altern" ranks, that has enabled academia to "see" the local and bring into focus how legitimacy can be collectively constructed by the different elements of the local, and in the case of Sri Lanka, by dominant elements that were fundamentally against any liberal peacebuilding.

1.3 Analytical framework : Friction in Global-Local Encounters

Informed by the critique of different strands of peacebuilding, there has been a growing body of work led by peacebuilding practitioners as well as academics focused on main-streaming academic thinking into policy debates that have adapted this theoretical idea of a 'local turn' towards developing analytical frameworks for assessing post-conflict environments and peacebuilding. Björkdahl and Höglund have attempted to further refine the theory of a 'local turn,' and develop the idea of 'friction' as a conceptual lens through which conflictual engagements between global and local ideas, actors and practices in peacebuilding can be identified and analysed. The notion of 'friction' is based on the recognition that the constructed dichotomy between those doing the peacebuilding, and those for whom the intervention is designed is a false separation; global– local interactions are identified as being encounters that 'can be both a site for empowerment and for domination.'[38] Drawing from the post-modernist thought, its analytical lens of perceiving all interactions in terms of the exercise of power and resistance to this power, 'friction' with respect to the peacebuilding paradigm refers to the evolving confrontations that necessarily emerge when external actors, discourses, and practices interact with the local counterparts at peacebuilding sites.[39]

The friction metaphor was first developed by Tsing to capture the diversity and different types of inequality that influence global-local encounters and give rise to new power dynamics in the process.[40][41] Peacebuilders tend to overestimate the attractiveness of the normative package inherent in the liberal peace while under-estimating the power of local agencies to resist and transform their project. In this context, friction can be understood as the process which is triggered by conflictual encounters and then gives rise to other outcomes, rather than being an outcome to study itself. Björkdahl and Höglund equate the notion of friction to concepts like localisation, vernaculisation and hybridisation, which in common indicate the agency of the recipient to mold and influence the direction of an externally introduced idea. The added value that this brings to the analysis of peacebuilding encounters is the recognition that while any

[38] Johanna Mannergren Selimovic. "Remembering and Forgetting after War. Truth, justice and reconciliation in a Bosnian town". PhD thesis. PhD Dissertation, University of Gothenburg, 2010), 22, 2010, (pp. 35).

[39] Björkdahl and Höglund, "Precarious peacebuilding: friction in global–local encounters".

[40] Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing. *Friction: An ethnography of global connection.* Princeton University Press, 2005.

[41] Tsing introduces this idea suggests that '[r]ubbing two sticks together produces heat and light; one stick alone is just a stick'

encounter will result is some sort of friction, dependent on the ability of actors to negotiate these, the outcome can be oppositional but also accommodating, or selectively accommodating. Thus the idea of friction in peacebuilding encounters refers to, " an uneven, unexpected and uncertain process in which global and local confluence to mediate and negotiate difference and affinity. Friction thus tends to change facts on the ground as it creates new and messy dynamics, agencies, and structures as well as unexpected coalitions built on 'awkwardly linked incompatibles' based on either universal or particular ideas."[42] Thus, while in cases like Sri Lanka, this friction has led to perverse outcomes by valourising local actors against ideas of power-sharing, in other contexts it may well encourage greater democraticastion.

An important component of this framework is the recognising the multilayered nature of power contests. Peacebuilding interactions can see the emergence of vertical frictions, that results in asymmetrical relations between the international and the local. But there is also the issue of horizontal frictions, wherein these interactions impact the relationships between different 'domestic,' or 'local' actors or between the external global actors, in the post-conflict landscape This implies that there is a potential that in the local, there are different perceptions about the peacebuilding process as a result of which a first contest may very well take place between local factions, the result of which then impacts what course the vertical friction will take. As a recognition that there is a multiplicity in terms of power structures that determine the eventual outcomes, the analytical point of departure is to use an actor-oriented perspective to identify the points at which this mediation or negotiation occurs, and thus involves moving beyond the broad categories of 'conflict between the local and the global.'

Björkdahl and Höglund use the concept of friction to identify different categories of responses in terms of compliance, adoption, adaption, resistance, cooptation and rejection . A response of compliance by local actors results in a forced adherence or submission to global external discourses. An adoption response refers to the local adoption of global norms. An adaptation response refers to the hybridisation of global norms and practices with local characteristics. A co-option response is largely led by the local elite and sees the strategic adoption of external norms and practices as a means of averting pressure. The resistance response sees a dominance of global characteristics and a limited adoption of external norms. Finally, the rejection response refers to the complete exclusion of global practices from the local. These responses create new realities as they alter power relations, transform agency and mediate practices related to peacebuilding. The new realities, which emerge from these encounters, will in turn create feedback loops which may create new encounters.1.1 As an example of a feedback loop, the intensification of Sinhala nationalistic fervour among the masses, which is reflective of relective friction between 'local' actors and peacebuilders, was responsible for bring into power the Rajapaksa

[42]Björkdahl and Höglund, "Precarious peacebuilding: friction in global–local encounters", (pp. 295).

led United National Freedom Party (UNFP), whose election rhetoric was a decisive no-negotiate policy with regards to the LTTE. This effectively altered the local realities and signaled new conditions for the next stage of interactions and the potential directions any vertical friction would go.

Figure 1.1: Björkdahl and Höglund's Friction and Feedback Loop Model



Björkdahl and Höglund have used this framework in Sri Lanka order to conduct a short-term analysis, which focuses on the dynamics that exist and emerged due to demands for transnational justice. There however continues to be a need to analyse friction in the context of peacebuilding efforts in Sri Lanka from a the long-term perspective. This requires an analysis of the feedback loops created by long-term engagement and discussing how the resulting outcomes bring into existence new and unexpected arrangements.

1.4 Research Design

As an explanation to why the coalition of like-minded donors rapidly reduced peacebuilding interventions in the Sri Lankan post-conflict context despite the seemingly less-confrontational nature of their project, this thesis examines the factors and dynamics that demonstrate the primacy of local actors and their agency in 'allowing' any form of external peacebuilding . As discussed by Berdal, ' the unfortunate consequence of conceptually abstracting peacebuilding is that these operations do not adequately leverage local knowledge or appreciate how past experiences set limits on what outsiders can achieve.'[43] Thus, this thesis has a two fold focus – first, to disaggregate the discourse on peacebuilding and locate the Sri Lankan case within a specific gradient of peacebuilding, against existing documentation on the trajectory and trends of Western peacebuilding

[43]Mats R Berdal. *Building peace after war.* Routledge New York, 2009, (pp. 214).

engagement. Second, to examine the process by which local challenges to peacebuilders emerged and limited peacebuilding in the post-conflict context. These foci require an engagement with both the theory and practice of peacebuilding in Sri Lanka, and thus three methods have been used in order to develop this research- desk literature reviews of academic studies as well as practitioner papers, primary unstructured interviews and content analysis of government documents and state media reports from 2009 onwards.

The central methodological approach of this thesis is the case study approach, where the objective is to delve into cases in support or against an existing theoretical proposition. In political science, there is a rich history of case study research in public administration and public policy studies, as well as a vibrant contemporary methodological discussion within comparative studies of political system. Yanow et al detail that while "the case study" has been recognised as the most common method of analysis in political science, the term has been used to refer to a range of meanings and usages that vary from specific methods to a research approach.[44] They detail that, "those advancing "case study" as a set of methods – the predominant meaning – engage the concept as a specific form of research involving multi-site studies aimed at establishing causal inferences and hypothesis-testing. Those taking the second perspective typically treat "case study" as part of a broader methodology that emphasizes human meaning and reflexivity. These scholars more often engage in single-site research aimed at detailing the lived experiences of persons in that setting."[45] These two perspectives attach a different importance on case study methodology.

This thesis is reflective of the latter tradition of 'single-site' case studies, where the nature of analysis is is inductive and human-centered. The focus is to learn about the potentially multiple social realities that characterize the setting and its actors. Yanow et al discuss that field research-based case studies engage in an ethnographic version of observation wherein the number of "observations" ie number of interviews, interactions and examinations of documents and data – does not have the same boundaries as number of locations in which the case study is carried out. Thus, field research generates a wide rage of qualitative-interpretive, within-case "observations" that reflect patterns social relations, routines, organisational behaviours, actions, and so on. In contrast, multi-site case study analysis, which is privileged by the comparative politics sub-field, draws upon case studies to explore human diversity with the intent of using these to establish general propositions about human conditions and interactions. However, since the aim of multiple-site case study analysis is to present and test generalisations, nuances, and specific dynamics are often glossed over in order to focus on commonalities across cases. In other words, " the focus on law-like generalizations that this entails runs counter to a more interpretive approach that focuses, instead, on verstehen, thick description, reflexivity, and

[44] Dvora Yanow, Peregrine Schwartz-Shea, and Maria José Freitas. "Case study research in political science". In: *Encylopedia of case study research. Los Angeles: Sage.[Links]* (2008).

[45] Yanow, Schwartz-Shea, and Freitas, "Case study research in political science", (pp. 2).

other such elements for establishing the trustworthiness of the research."[46]

In order to addresses the first question regarding the nature of peacebuilding in Sri Lanka and the motivations and modalities of this process, the thesis draws from the critical theory typology of peacebuilding and the critiques that explore emancipatory peacebuilding specifically, as discussed in the earlier sections. The analysis for this question has thus largely been informed through a literature review on peacebuilding and the specific experience of peacebuilding in Sri Lanka. This was then located within the larger body of research that already exists on Sri Lanka, in order to further build on already existing insights on the challenges that the CLM donors and supporters of peacebuilding have had in engaging with a post-conflict state like Sri Lanka. An exploration of the history of peacebuilding during the conflict has been crucial in helping construct what the present government administration's approach to CLM donors has been

In order to explore local challenges to and conditionality on external peacebuilders, the assertions made by non-mainstream political groups from early 2003 onwards has been marked as the starting point of analysis. The employment of Björkdahl and Höglund framework of identifying frictions and the power relations that influence the eventual response to this frictions, has been the primary conceptual tool for analysing the nature of local resistance against devolution of powers in the during the conflict and post-conflict periods, and later, the emergence of government imposed conditions. The latter set of conditionalities have been motivated by the need to balance appease these local reactions, against macro political considerations of positioning Sri Lanka as a democratic state. The process of identifying the different types of frictions and their point of emergence has, in turn, been informed by a literature review and through fieldwork that was carried out over a period of three months from January to late March 2014. A majority of interviews with national NGOs, think tanks and government officials took place in Colombo. Interviews with donors took place in Colombo, Geneva and in Jaffna, to examine the implementation of peacebuilding on the ground by donor agencies.

Ethical Considerations in Designing Research

While it has been five years since the end of the Sri Lankan conflict, fieldwork or research on issues that are considered 'sensitive,' particularly in light of the increasing Western pressure on the government, has meant that it continues to be a potentially dangerous setting for external researchers. The agents of peacebuilding, donors and INGOs, who continue to face daily challenges in their domestic interactions toward shaping the post-conflict environment are unlikely to provide information that will put their organisation in an unfavourable light. Thus, while interviews with donors, senior government staff, INGOs and the UN provided valuable contextual information, it was through informal channels, wherein the most valuable information and analysis was provided 'off the

[46] Yanow, Schwartz-Shea, and Freitas, "Case study research in political science", (pp. 7).

record." Fieldwork for this project, clearly touched on highly political themes and issues, particularly in light of the then impending UNHRC session in late March 2014, due to which any external researcher was viewed as a 'Western fact-finder.' Thus most of the interviews with government agents and local NGOs had to be done with a degree of caution.

Jacobsen & Landau stress on the need for social scientists undertaking field-work in humanitarian situations to continuously maintain high academic and ethical standards, while avoiding the tendency to engage in advocacy research whereby ' researchers already know what they want to see and say, and come away from the research having "proved it." '[47] They suggest that one way to mitigate against such "ethical traps" is to fully disclose the methodology which was used, including possible biases and the ethical dilemmas encountered in designing and executing it, which is what this section attempts to do.

This is particularly important in the specific case of exploring government conditionalities, which are less overt than the local rejection process. Research on this specific type of local agency exercise was based on an assessment of the factors which led to the launch of the Joint Plan of Assistance for the Northern Province (2011) under the Presidential Task Force for Resettlement, Development and Security (PTF), the CLM donor response to this, and how this was related to the departure of donor agencies from the domestic arena. This involved conducting primary research through unstructured interviews with key international policy-makers from the UN and CLM donor agencies who were present in Sri Lanka during the time that the JPA was launched. This helped to grasp the Western donor perspective or narrative of how the trajectory of participating in the Sri Lanka post-conflict context had evolved after the war, as well as identify changes in donor strategy. Supported by testimonies recorded in International Crisis Group reports across years, the initial interviews also helped to piece together an understanding of what the intent and goal of peacebuilding during and after the conflict has been, and how this appropriately fits within existing theoretical work on peacebuilding.

At the same time, a number of interviews were also conducted with key elected representatives to the Sri Lankan Parliament , the PTF in the Northern Province, members from prominent CSOs, and the Indian Donor Team based in Colombo and New Delhi. The interviews with government officials and local CSOs helped in understanding the 'local' institutional perspective on and resistance to Western peacebuilding, and further, to clarify the modes and the intent of exercising local agency either in favour or against this peacebuilding. The content from these interviews has helped to flesh out the government's dilemma with regards to balancing external demands for accountability with local constrains demands for disassociation from the West. The interviews with the Indian Donor Team, on the other hand, helped clarify how the Sri Lankan government has worked with non-traditional or non-OECD donors, and if the similar conditionalities have been placed on Indian aid. This was felt to be

[47] Karen Jacobsen and Loren B Landau. "The dual imperative in refugee research: some methodological and ethical considerations in social science research on forced migration". In: *Disasters* 27.3 (2003), pp. 185–206, (pp. 187).

relevant as while India is a non-Western donor, it has had a tumultuous and separate history of attempting to build peace in the Sri Lanka during the early years of the war. The value it added to this research was in helping identify what the Sri Lankan government's alternative model of collaboration with external actors in the reconstruction process looks like.

The ethics of this research fall into three categories: that the research should avoid doing harm, that those involved do so with consent, and that confidentiality is maintained unless stated otherwise.

Do no harm

The active presence of the researcher in a 'dangerous' fieldwork site generates several risks. There is a risk that those involved in the research are somehow punished by those in authority for the opinions that they hold. The principle of ' do no harm ' was therefore followed to the maximum extent possible. Donald Warwick discusses the risk that a researcher could be in danger of prosecution, imprisonment, death or torture for research that is seen as a threat to security.[48] There is also potential harm to the research profession in such environments as the actions of a researcher may make it difficult for subsequent studies. This may either take place due to tougher restrictions on research and limitation on the movement of researchers by local authorities, or the inculcation of a culture of fear and/or aversion, where subjects becoming hardened to researchers or prefer to not participate in any further research. In an effort to prevent harm arising from the findings of this research, all quotes in this research are anonymous. To this end, all interviewees were assured that their identity would be kept strictly confidential and that they would never be identified as having participated in the research or as having said particular things

Researcher's positioning

As Holt discusses, in a 'divided society,' there is a danger that all actors are perceived to be partisan based on family name, religion or residence; both 'insiders' and 'outsiders' are subject to different but equally limiting constraints.[49] As Fujii explains: not only are researchers studying their informants, their informants, in turn, are studying them back – to figure out who the researcher is and whether the researcher is a source of potential threat [...] How informants identify researchers can determine the amount or level of access the researcher can gain. If people suspect that researchers are state agents, informants may invoke a party line in interviews and conversations rather than reveal their deeper thoughts. The task of the researcher is to take people's fears and suspicions seriously and try to allay them as much as possible.[50]

[48] Donald P Warwick. *Social research in developing countries: Surveys and censuses in the Third World*. Psychology Press, 1993.

[49] Holt, *Aid, peacebuilding and the resurgence of war: buying time in Sri Lanka*, (pp. 12).

[50] Lee Ann Fujii. "Shades of truth and lies: Interpreting testimonies of war and violence". In: *Journal of Peace Research* 47.2 (2010), pp. 231–241, (pp. 233).

In the case of this thesis, there was a degree of concern over the researcher's identity and intentions, specifically as an academic who is simultaneously perceived as being both 'foreign' (Indian citizen) and 'local' (Tamil surname). My family name was particularly problematic as it indicated that I was from South India, a region that has vociferously denounced the treatment of Sri Lankan Tamils, despite the Indian central government's move to normalise relations and have a restricted dialogue on this contentious issue. Second, as earlier discussed, against the impended Geneva United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) session of March 2014, where the international community was to vote on the setting up of an independent inquiry commission, any research by a 'foreigner' was problematic. That the academic institution I belonged to was in Geneva thus was often an issue.

The next chapter provides some contextual information on the nature of contemporary Western and peacebuilding engagement during Sri Lankan civil war. It presents the problematique wherein despite mainstream accounts that have focused on the failure of the West mediated peace-process as a consequence of the domestic elite's instrumentalisation of ethno-nationalism, a more nuanced historical examination indicates that the resistance first emerged from the grassroots. Till the end of the conflict in 2009, this resistance has played a crucial role in shaping the government's agenda, which has depended on its support base amongst these groups in order to stay in power.

Chapter 2

Local conditions on the universal peace

The following case analysis of Sri Lanka is a long-term analysis based on above discussed body of literature. It seeks to highlight how the principled donors, despite having operationalised the emancipatory gradient which privileges achievement of justice through local actors, failed on account of their unwillingness to engage with, what from their perspective were, "uncivil" sections of the Sri Lankan civil society. In the conflict era, the source of friction is located in the competing visions of what a stable negotiated peace in Sri Lanka would entail : The peacebuilders and local collaborators actively advocated for a federal solution and devolution of power to the Tamil dominated Province. However, for certain local factions, this represented a Balkanisation of the Sri Lankan state and an undermining of, what they constructed as, the fundamental Sinhalese Buddhist nature of Sri Lanka. This 'local' sentiment that strictly advocated for the maintenance of a unitary state found traction among the masses, due to its ethno-nationalist overtones. Following the failure of the peace negotiations, the outcome of this friction was a rejection response by these local groups, due to the peacebuilders continued unwillingness to have a dialogue with what they saw as 'spoilers.' The local rejection took form of a mass attack against local organisations that worked with peacebuilders, which were represented as "traitors," "LTTE-sympathisers" and "unpatriotic." It marks the first set of de-facto conditionalities by local actors that reduced the space for peacebuilding and carried on into the post-conflict era, by effectively limiting the willingness of local actors to collaborate with the international community To illustrate the process by which this rejection response was successful, this section focuses on the unlikely alliance between the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), a marginal communist group that had existed since 1965, and JHU, a faction that represents the interests of the radical Buddhist clergy. The alliance highlights how disparate groups with fundamentally different ideologies united with the common goal of repelling Western peacebuilders. Following the end of the peace-negotiations,

both these marginal parties have became dominant political groups and have since redefined the post-conflict space in Sri Lanka.

This chapter begins with an exploration of Western peacebuilding work and its historical trajectory in order to justify its focus on the ethical-principled donors alone. It then explores the nature of the Sri Lankan political landscape, briefly discussing the ethno-nationalist Sinhalese-Buddhist axis that politics in Sri Lanka has historically coalesced around. Finally, this chapter explores the failure of peacebuilding in the conflict era, on account of its limited and tenuous engagement with an elite civil society, which played a role in the local rejection response to the friction on what peace would mean for the structuring of the Sri Lankan state.

2.1 Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka

Historically following the outbreak of the conflict in 1983, except for India which has a historic ethnic association with the Tamils, no other country made an attempt at a high level intervention in the form of peace-making efforts in the Sri Lankan context. Goodhand argues that lack of this form of Western engagement in the region till 2000 can be attributed to two reasons - first, the conflict was seen as an internal ethnic issue and both warring factions within the country had been against any sort of external engagement in the matter, viewing it as a transgression of national sovereignty. Second, during the Cold War and after, most Western states regarded India as the natural region hegemon, and countries like the US particularly, did not see any geo-strategic value in intervening in the region.[1] Despite this, it would be reductive to categorise the Sri Lankan conflict as an 'introverted' ethnic conflict; most academics have argued that what appears to be 'internal' is actually the result of successive complex political, economic and cultural engagements with the outside world.[2] Several scholars have reasoned that particularly in the last decade of the conflict, the domestic dynamics in terms of government - LTTE relations continued to be more or less at an impasse, and it was the nature and limitations of the international intervention that influenced the course and eventual end of the civil war.[3]

Debates on peacebuilding that focus on the Sri Lankan experience, have implied a level of homogeneity among international actors that has not existed in practice, by focusing on 'Western experience' of peacebuilding during the brief period of alignment that emerged between donors in Sri Lanka from 2000-2005. Contrary to the general tendency of subsuming all Western aid behaviour as a singular collective, there has historically been a distinct difference in the way

[1] Goodhand and Walton, "The limits of liberal peacebuilding? International engagement in the Sri Lankan peace process".

[2] Sunil Bastian. *The Failure of State Formation, Identity Conflict and Civil Society Responses: The Case of Sri Lanka.* University of Manchester. Institute for development policy and management (IDPM), 1999.

[3] Rajesh Venugopal. "The global dimensions of conflict in Sri Lanka". In: *Globalization and Self-Determination Movements, Sempozyum Bildirisi* (2003); Uyangoda, "Government–LTTE Peace Negotiations in 2002–2005 and the Clash of State Formation Projects".

the P-3 – USA, UK and France, with Australia, and smaller European donors like Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Netherlands and Germany, have worked on peacebuilding and engagement with conflict, both globally and in Sri Lanka.[4] Bellamy and Williams describe this as a difference in approach between the 'great powers,' i.e the P3 of US, UK and France, who have traditionally been more strategic in their interventions, and the 'internationalist' middle powers, like the Scandinavian states, Netherlands and Germany, who were motivated by the principles of liberal peace.[5] Till 2001, among the Western superpowers only the UK engaged with Sri Lanka to a limited degree on conflict related issues, on account of the country's status as a former colony; the other superpowers considered this a 'domestic issue' that was the immediate international responsibility of India, which was widely considered the regional hegemon. Major Western bilateral donors like the US and Australia, preferred to focus on issue of trade and technical cooperation, treating the conflict as a 'negative externality' that at best had to be factored in while designing programmes.

This distinction between bilateral donors that view aid as a foreign policy tool and allocate it based on political and strategic considerations, as opposed to donors that have a more 'principled' allocation of aid based on more 'correct' considerations has long been discussed in literature focused on political economy of the global aid system.[6] With regards to the former group of 'political-strategic' donors, considerations like geo-political interests, colonial history and economic interests are among the prime determinants of aid allocation; concerns regarding democratisation and good governance are recognised as being secondary to geo-political concerns. Among Western donors, most account have defined this group as consisting of former imperialist nations, like the UK, France, Portugal and Spain, as well as dominant powers like the US. The second group of donors are motivated by what Lumsdaine describes as a 'moral' vision, which is based on their self-perception as enablers of a liberal system in the global order.[7] While the Scandinavian countries are looked at as the most typical example, Germany, Netherlands and Canada are also often discussed as belonging to this group; however this is based on their aggregated behaviours across contexts. This thesis, in focusing on the bilateral peacebuilding by the ethical-principled donors in post-conflict Sri Lanka, refers to the work done by Switzerland, Norway, Sweden,and Germany, and aid from Denmark, Finland, and Iceland.[8]

[4] Goodhand, Klem, et al., *Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka, 2000-2005*.

[5] Bellamy and Williams, "The West and contemporary peace operations".

[6] Alesina and Dollar, "Who gives foreign aid to whom and why?"

[7] D Lumsdaine. *Moral Vision in International Politics, 1993.*

[8] Some accounts discuss Australia and Canada as being ethical-principled donors. While this may have been true during the Cold War Era, in the last decade, the aid practices and donor agency direction has largerly reflected more political strategic donor like behaviour; in the view of this researcher, the merger of the Canadian International Development Agency into the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and AusAid with the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs in the last three years, effectively signals an end to their potential status as 'ethical-principled' donors.

http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/may/08/australia-canada-aid-merger-poor

It is recognised that following the collapse of the peace-negotiations, the political-strategic Western donors returned to their 'pre-internationalisation risk-averse behaviour,' marking the re-emergence of the three-fold distinction of donors that worked 'around conflict', 'on conflict' and 'in conflict.'[9] As Goodhand highlights, the aid landscape in Sri Lanka during and after the conflict was interesting in that those who has the least financial and global political influence, i.e the like-minded donors, prioritised peacebuilding the longest. However, the lack of resources is in noway indicative of the influence these donors have had on policy and agenda setting. Donors like Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands have had a long historical ties with Sri Lanka, as a result of which, their political influence in Sri Lanka has been disproportionate to their funding. Moreover, these donors have played an important norm setting role in influencing the behaviours and priorities of more financially significant donors by repeatedly bringing up peacebuilding concerns in collective donor forums.

In this respect, the peace window from 2000-2005 is widely regarded as the high point of aligned international interest and intervention in the Sri Lankan conflict. It must be stressed that collective Western intervention occurred as a result of a domestic shift and demand, rather than being imposed by donors, thus highlighting the primacy of domestic agents in the eventual process. The key domestic changes that allowed for this window, was the election of the West leaning United National Front (UNP) coalition, led by Ranil Wickremasinghe in December 2001. The previous government had already initiated the process of talks with the LTTE and requested Norwegian mediation in early 2000, however, it was really under Wickremasinghe that the internationalisation of the conflict developed to its mammoth proportions.[10] The UNP administration sought to link peace-talks with the LTTE to the economic development of the country as a whole, with specific focus on the conflict affected regions of the North and East, in line with international expectations.

As Bastian highlights, the UNF's intended strategy was designed in line with the 'liberal peace' discourse, and thus forwarded the idea that conducting peace-talks against the implementation of free-market economic reforms and liberal 'good' governance would leading to a durable peace.[11] This thus effectively linked security with the development agenda, echoing the sentiments of Western superpowers like the US and UK which had only recently announced their global agenda against terrorism, which placed emphasis on the same nexus. This meant that the success of the Sri Lankan peace negotiations had high stakes not only domestically, but internationally. Lunstead, in his discussion on the nature of superpower engagement in Sri Lanka, highlights that the immediate trigger for intensive Western superpower engagement in Sri Lanka from 2001 onwards was the post 9/11 agenda. Under the then Deputy-Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, it was felt that any Western success in resolving the Sri Lankan conflict

[9] Goodhand, Klem, et al., *Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka, 2000-2005*.

[10] Goodhand, Spencer, and Korf, *Conflict and peacebuilding in Sri Lanka: caught in the peace trap?*, (pp. 9).

[11] Sunil Bastian. "Politics of market reforms and the UNF-led negotiations". In: *Conflict and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka: Caught in the Peace Trap* (2011), (pp. 134).

through mediated negotiations would make the country a poster-child for new US-sponsored global agenda for promoting democracy and interventionism.[12]

The acceptance of Norway as a neutral third mediator by both warring parties in 2001 and the signing of a permanent Ceasefire Agreement in 2002 saw the emergence of the short-lived 'New Aid Agenda' which represented a clear vision and agreement between all donors that aid was to be leveraged towards influencing the Track 1 and Track 2 efforts .[13] The 2003 Tokyo Donor's Conference which saw aid pledges of up to 4.4 billion towards the reconstruction of the North and East, also saw a unanimous agreement towards operationsalising peace conditionalities, wherein it was stated that should the disbursement of the pledged aid would be conditional on the continuation of the peace process. Thus, while the Oslo Declaration which saw the LTTE and GoSL agree to a federal solution, was the high point of the peace negotiations, the Tokyo Conference represented a high-point of donor alignment on the Sri Lankan issue.[14] Given the focus on peace-making during this period, most donor funded civil society activities focused on building a peace-consensus amongst local formal institutions and key political elite. What is significant is that while donors expected the civil society to all establish a popular mandate for the peace process, this mostly failed due to the selection of mostly urban civil society organisations that focused on either ethnic group, without addressing the rural base.[15] The few examples of successful popular mobilization for peace did not involve much donor support and stemmed from alternative interest groups opposed to the war, like the Association of Disabled Ex-Service Personnel, the Association for War-Affected Women and the Parents of Servicemen Missing in Action[16]

Just as the increase in intervention came as a result of domestic demand, the tapering of peace-negotiations and Western mediation was also the result of a change in domestic circumstances. From 2003 onwards, there was a distinct shift in the domestic perception of Western peace-making efforts. By early 2003, the LTTE had already jeopardised the possibility of a negotiated settlement to the conflict by announcing its intent to suspend the peace process on the grounds that donors had come to play favourites and had not treated the separatist organisation at par with the Sri Lankan government.[17] On the other hand, there were differences within the Sri Lankan government regarding what an acceptable negotiated settlement to conflict should look like - while West-leaning Prime Minister Wickremsinghe strongly advocated the Western vision of a federal solution, Sri Lankan President Kumaratunga, under pressure from

[12] Lunstead, "The United States and Sri Lanka1".

[13] Goodhand, Klem, et al., *Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka, 2000-2005*, (pp. 71).

[14] Goodhand, Klem, et al., *Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka, 2000-2005*, (pp. 65- pp.67).

[15] Camilla Orjuela. *Civil society in civil war: peace work and identity politics in Sri Lanka.* Department of Peace and Development Research, Göteborg University, 2004, (pp. 154 - pp.155).

[16] Orjuela, *Civil society in civil war: peace work and identity politics in Sri Lanka.*

[17] Anton Balasingham. *Communication to Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe.* 2003.

nationalist Sinhala allies continued to stress on a unitary state.[18]

Following a break down of government, a fresh set of elections in April 2004 saw the coming to power of the United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA), led by Mahinda Rajapaksa. The Alliance, which was primarily a coalition of nationalist parties that were against a divided state, had fought the elections in opposition to Wickremsinghe and his pro-West policy. Rajapaksa came to power through a political rhetoric that re-framed the ethnic conflict as a ' war against terror', defending the constitutional status quo of the unitary state. Prima facie, it can be argued that these dynamics that led to a shift in domestic strategy away from Western peacebuilding was the consequence of elite instrumentalisation of local sentiments; that the rhetoric of Sinhala nationalism was the key cause for a change in government, has also been represented as a form of "ethnic outbidding" among the mainstream elite.[19]

However, against a historical exploration of Sri Lanka's political landscape since the time of independence, it can be seen that elite belonging to both these two dominant mainstream political parties - Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), which opposed to Western intervention and the United National Party (UNP), whose leadership propagated the western liberal peace- have historically legitimized their rule with reference to themselves as heirs to the tradition of Buddhist kingship.[20] A key feature of the political culture of modern Sri Lanka has been the agreement among national elites of the superiority of Sinhalese Buddhist claims to the island, with the core ideological difference being on how this can be achieved. In turns, political leaders from the SLP and UNP have remained committed to the consolidation of the Sri Lankan post-colonial state, only differing on the issue of the role that liberalisation and Westernisation must play in this process.[21] This is a function of the country's demographic composition - at the time of independence in 1948, the Sinhalese were the largest ethnic group at 74%, the Tamils composed 17%, while the Moors and Malays formed the remaining 9% of the country's population.[22] During the course of the conflict, there has been a demographic change towards an increase in the proportion of the Sinahla's to almost 80% of the island's population. While it would be reductive to imply that the entire Sinhala population has reacted to this ethno-nationalistic rhetoric in the same fashion, the country's primarily agrarian population has tended to vote in preference of its Sinhala identity.[23]

[18] Rampton, "'Would the Real Dutugemunu Please Stand Up?'The Politics of Sinhala Nationalist Authenticity and Populist Discontent".

[19] Neil DeVotta. *Blowback: Linguistic nationalism, institutional decay, and ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka*. Stanford University Press, 2004.

[20] David Rampton. "'Deeper hegemony': the politics of Sinhala nationalist authenticity and the failures of power-sharing in Sri Lanka". In: *Commonwealth I& Comparative Politics* 49.2 (2011), pp. 245–273.

[21] Rampton, "'Would the Real Dutugemunu Please Stand Up?'The Politics of Sinhala Nationalist Authenticity and Populist Discontent".

[22] Lakshmanan Sabaratnam. "The boundaries of the state and the state of ethnic boundaries: Sinhala-Tamil relations in Sri Lankan history". In: *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 10.3 (1987), pp. 291–316.

[23] Rampton, "'Would the Real Dutugemunu Please Stand Up?'The Politics of Sinhala Nationalist Authenticity and Populist Discontent".

As several actors during the peace negotiations period pointed out, Wickremsinghe's strategy of Western involvement was greatly determined by his need to create an "international safety net" against the possible return to conflict with the LTTE.

What this has meant is, "Sri Lanka's mainstream political actors have taken refuge in the affective, emotive but diffuse rhetoric of Sinhala nationalism, to the extent that nationalism has become a sine qua non of political survival articulated by all the mainstream."[24] At different points in history, elite from both these national parties along with other mainstream radical Sinhala dominated-political outfits, have mobilised the nationalistic rhetoric to "externalise" threats; till the 1980s, past targets had included foreign capital, MNCs, Indian intervention and IFIs. Interestingly, the first attempts towards a negotiated settlement were first initiated by the SLFP, led by Kumaratuga in the 1990s, Wickremeginhe and the UNP had only built upon this, rather than be the party that introduced the notion of a peaceful negotiated solution.[25] This tendency had led several political spectators to argue that at least on the surface, it appeared that the mainstream Sri Lankan elites had dropped the rhetoric of an explicit Sinhala nationalist solution, and had come to adopt a more moderate stand. For almost a decade nationalist discourses lost prominence among the mainstream parties and had been kept alive only by smaller, more radical groups, that were not necessarily a part of formal political processes.[26]

In light of this, when exploring the re-emergence of Sinhala nationalism against the liberal peace project, it can be argued that while mainstream parties had begun to shift away from the ethno-national rhetoric, these dynamics continued to operate and emerged at the street level. During the initial phase of talks and the Ceasefire Agreement it is recognised that large parts of wider public opinion were divided between being optimistic or cautious about the process.[27] In critiques of the peace-process, it is recognised that the lack of Track 3 initiatives towards building an effective ground level consensus among "unlikeminded" local actors was one of the biggest fallacies on part of the peacebuilders.[28] In the aftermath of the suspension of talks in April 2003, small nationalist-Marxist and explicitly anti -Tamil groups like Janathi Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) leveraged this failure, to establish mass dissent among the majority Sinhala populace. While basing this mobilisation on the mass critique of the Western exercise and the associated Sri Lankan elite, these small local

[24]Rampton, "'Would the Real Dutugemunu Please Stand Up?'The Politics of Sinhala Nationalist Authenticity and Populist Discontent", (pp.86).

[25]Robert I Rotberg. "Sri Lanka's civil war: from mayhem toward diplomatic resolution". In: *Creating Peace in Sri Lanka* (1999), pp. 1–16.

[26]Rampton, "'Would the Real Dutugemunu Please Stand Up?'The Politics of Sinhala Nationalist Authenticity and Populist Discontent", (pp. 99).

[27]Jonathan Goodhand, Bart Klem, and Gunnar Sørbø. "Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian Peace Efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997–2009, commissioned by Norad Evaluation Department". In: *Report* 5 (2011), p. 2011, (pp. 37).

[28]Goodhand, Klem, and Sørbø, "Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian Peace Efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997–2009, commissioned by Norad Evaluation Department"; Walton and Saravanamuttu, "In the Balance? Civil society and the peace process 2002-2008".

groups who had almost no formal institutional representation prior to this period, managed to widen their support base. Rampton highlights that in Sri Lanka, while elites have beem at the vanguard of nationalist mobilisation in the past, the aftermath of the peace-negotiations indicated that the populist effect of this nationalism had emerged and evolved beyond its elite genesis.[29]

Thus the election victory, which is perceived as a successful nationalist mobilisation by Rajapaksa and the SLFP, in truth only signified Rajapaksa's foresight in aligning himself to this local dissent and thus appropriating a nationalist mantel that had wide local legitimacy. The election alliance was also reliant on concessions to the nationalist grouping, who in turn were committed to reducing the influence of international actors and liberal NGOs in Sri Lanka. Therefore as opposed to being an elite formulated resistance to liberal peacebuilding, the coming into power of the Rajapaksa government can be considered as symbolic of a successful "local resistance" to the project.

2.2 The 'Sinhalisation' of local rejection

Following the collapse of peace-negotiations, major Western donors are recognised as having returned to their pre-negotiations behaviour of being 'political-strategic' donors- while multilateral donors returned to working 'around' conflict, the US, UK and France, took to putting pressure on the new Rajpaksa government through diplomatic channels and international forums like the UN and the IMF, while minimally engaging with the conflict on the ground.[30] In contrast, the 'like-minded' group of donors, shifted their peacebuilding focus back to targeting political change by facilitating domestic demand for governance reform through pressure from non-governmental actors ie local civil society organisations. From 2005 onwards, fifty percent to seventy per cent of aid to Sri Lanka from this group of donors, has bypassed the Sri Lankan government and has been delivered through non-governmental entities.[31] During the peace negotiations period, these donors had worked in line with the New-Aid agenda and had perceptibly adopted a less reformatory stand when compared to the work on judicial reform and human rights that these donors had focused on in the 1990s. As a part of donor alignment strategy, with the focus on Track 1 and Track 2 initiative, CSOs were only mobilised as a technical service delivery mechanism during this period. Particularly following the 2004 tsunami, while the Ceasefire Agreement was still formally in place, CLM donors had come to look to CSOa as a neutral humanitarian aid delivery system, even an alternative service delivery system to the government and the LTTE, and did not have

[29] Rampton, "'Deeper hegemony': the politics of Sinhala nationalist authenticity and the failures of power-sharing in Sri Lanka", (pp. 247).

[30] Goodhand, Klem, et al., *Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka, 2000-2005*, (pp. 70).

[31] Simone Dietrich. "Bypass or Engage? Explaining Donor Delivery Tactics in Foreign Aid Allocation*". In: *International Studies Quarterly* 57.4 (2013), pp. 698–712, (pp. 13).

any explicit peace or conflict related objectives.[32] However, following the failure of the peace-process in 2005, CLM donors began a renewed push for foreign funded CSOs to take up 'peace-initiatives' and influence the domestic political discourse which had increasingly come to adopt the newly elected Rajapaksa government's framing of the ethnic-conflict as a 'terrorism' issue.[33]

According to Walton, in terms of a definition, CLM donors in Sri Lanka identified civil society actors based on a normative view of civil society as being the realm that is capable of building trust and cooperation, promoting and protecting rights and democracy by restraining an unruly state.[34] Walton highlights that this focus on the democratisation potential of the civil society alone, which continued in the post-war context, was inimical to the overall peacebuilding goal for two reasons - first, it caused CLM donors to overlook 'unlike-minded' organisations, which had immense mobilisation potential and hold in society but were not necessarily committed to the Western model of democratisation and peace. Second, this conceptualisation of civil society is based on a rigid binary between the state and civil society, overlooking the fluid relationship between the two spheres; in Sri Lanka, the state has often appropriated initiatives of liberal-minded civil society by mimicking their discourses or by establishing formal mechanisms for collaboration. As an indication of this, two of the largest and most active NGOs during the conflict and post-conflict period - Seva lanka and the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies - have seen active participation by members of the Rajapaksa family on their boards. This fluidity draws from the nature of Sri Lankan politics, which is highly centralized and clientistic. This meant that the most effective CSOs were those that were directly supported by the government or political parties.

As has been discussed earlier, Rajapaksa's coming to power on an ethnonationalistic rhetoric cannot be considered an example of elite instrumentalisation. The existence of local non-mainstream platforms against the peace-process and Western intervention emerged from early 2001 onwards particularly against the People's Alliance-led Devolution Bill of 2000[35]; the most successful resistance was led by the JVP, which at its core, was a Leninist-marxist outfit that was primarily concerned with equitable social redistribution by a centralised state. JVP had emerged in 1965 as an off-shoot of the Maoist section of the Ceylon Communist Party. It principal constituency was based on subaltern, vernacular-educated youth in universities and the rural regions, against the marginalisation of vernacular "sons of the soil" by a post-colonial state that had been dominated by anglicised elite. Given that post-colonial Sri Lankan political culture had been characterised by the articulation of diverse demands from different political factions around an axis of nationalist authenticity, both

[32]Walton, "Conflict, peacebuilding and NGO legitimacy: National NGOs in Sri Lanka 1: Analysis".

[33]Walton and Saravanamuttu, "In the Balance? Civil society and the peace process 2002-2008".

[34]Walton and Saravanamuttu, "In the Balance? Civil society and the peace process 2002-2008".

[35]Georg Frerks and Bart Klem. "Tsunami Response in Sri Lanka". In: *report on a field visit from* (2005), pp. 6–20.

elite and subaltern actors competed for the position as the true guardians of the nation and national interests.[36] Shaped by this, the JVP too has reproduced and operationalised the ideological facets of Sinhalese nationalism in order to legitimize its larger goals. 12

Western liberal peacebuilders, through the Oslo Declaration of 2002 had indicated their vision that the a successful peace would mean a federal solution and a negotiated end to the conflict through a power sharing arrangement with the LTTE. Both mainstream national parties in Sri Lanka had also expressed commitment to this federal solution. This can be seen as the primary source of friction, when compared to the JVP and its collaborators view that this solution posed to Sri Lanka's unitary state framework, territorial integrity and sovereignty.[37] In light of the lack of discourse between the peacebuilders and these groups, the JVP thus took to 'informal' channels of opposition and mobilisation, using proxy CSOs like the Socialist Students Union and the Inter-University Students Federation (IUSF) to recruit youth cadres and forge an alliance among 'alternative' organisations were reflective of Buddhist religious nationalists causes. While most of these religious organisation were in the far-right of the ideological spectrum, they too rejected the notion of a negotiated settlement or a federal state structure. This is best represented by the JVP's unlikely alliance with the JHU, an organisation that was formed by radical Buddhist clergy and had its base in urban and sub-urban aspiring vernacular elite. Unlike the JVP which had a more moderate stand in terms of the role of the ethnic minority and the need for secular ideals under a unitary state, the JHU has traditionally been blatant in its demands that the Sri Lankan state be a Buddhist majoritarian state, with express religious functions. Prior to its alliance with the JVP, the JHU's primary line of attack was against the hegemonic "Christianisation" by Western intervention, as well local collaborators, who sought to undermine the agency and Buddhist identity of the Sri Lankan polity to determine its own national interests. Thus, by 2003, the sites of convergence for these two marginal groups was the understanding that Western intervention was hegemonic and threatened a unitary and territorially sovereign Sri Lankan state, under the ostensible threat by an illegitimate terrorist actor, the LTTE.[38]

During the negotiations period, the general public opinion was either hopeful or ambivalent ; however, over time, as the focus on building consensus for a negotiated peace continued to be limited to higher and formal levels of political power, there was a marked degree of confusion and skepticism about what the project meant for the people.[39] In context of this disassociation between the peace process and the technicalisation of civil society work by donors, the

[36] Rampton, "'Deeper hegemony': the politics of Sinhala nationalist authenticity and the failures of power-sharing in Sri Lanka".

[37] Rampton, "'Would the Real Dutugemunu Please Stand Up?'The Politics of Sinhala Nationalist Authenticity and Populist Discontent".

[38] Rampton, "'Deeper hegemony': the politics of Sinhala nationalist authenticity and the failures of power-sharing in Sri Lanka".

[39] Goodhand, Klem, and Sørbø, "Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian Peace Efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997–2009, commissioned by Norad Evaluation Department".

mass mobilisation by the JVP-JHU combine which undertook a comprehensive critique of global governance, the liberal peace and the mainstream elite, found many takers.[40] Significantly, several scholars have argued that instead of labeling this movement and local dynamic as symptomatic of 'nationalist hysteria,' it should be understood as an extreme position in a larger ongoing debate about the transparency, political aims and expansionism of transnational authorities and the struggle against a homogenous 'global government." It called into question the true agency, allegiance, and representation of the local "civil" society actors that ally with the donors, and in extension, their legitimacy to pursue a certain political solution on behalf of the larger society. The targets of this alliance at different points have included that World bank, UN representative and INGOs.[41]

Significantly, this vertical friction between peacebuilders and the local populations led to a reshaping of national level power dynamics. The Rajapaksa government's coming into power in 2004 has been a function of its establishment of a successful direct electoral alliance with the JVP, and in extension, the JHU.[42] The parliamentary elections of 2004 mark this turning point with the defeat of the ruling United National Party led by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe was defeated, by the United People's Freedom Alliance, which initially consisted of Rajapaksa's SLFP and the JVP. There was further consolidation of power following the presidential elections of 2005, where Rajapaksa came into power as president primarily due to both JVP and JHU throwing weight behind his campaign. As a result, several spectators have argued that the present government's strategy of no negotiation with the LTTE, the subsequent escalation of the conflict into a 'War for Peace,' and the post-conflict state strategy of state-led economic development reflect the aims articulated in the JVP and JHU agreements with the SLFP, as opposed to the SLFP, representative of the old elite, having developed these. This was also stressed upon by the 2007 ICG report which highlighted that, " Nationalist parties, opposed to any significant devolution of power to Tamil areas of the north and east and to negotiations with the Tamil Tigers, help set President Mahinda Rajapaksa's agenda."[43]

2.3 Peacebuilding and local rejection

The peacebuilding work of the like-minded group of donors was greatly affected by this local resistance and the coming to power of the new UPFA government. Between 2005 to 2007 there was, what can only be described as, a systematic

[40] Frerks and Klem, "Tsunami Response in Sri Lanka"; Rampton, "'Would the Real Dutugemunu Please Stand Up?'The Politics of Sinhala Nationalist Authenticity and Populist Discontent".

[41] Rampton, "'Would the Real Dutugemunu Please Stand Up?'The Politics of Sinhala Nationalist Authenticity and Populist Discontent".

[42] Goodhand, Klem, et al., *Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka, 2000-2005*.

[43] Brussels International crisis group. *Sri Lanka: Sinhala nationalism and the elusive southern consensus*. 2007, (pp. i).

scapegoating of civil society initiatives that were linked to liberal peace work, based on these commitments that Rajapaksa's SLFP made with these two organisations. The Parliamentary Select Committee on NGOs that was established in January 2006 was chaired by JVP and dominated by JHU candidates; while focusing on discrepancies during the tsunami response, the body also actively interrogated NGO activities that considered 'inimical to the sovereignty and integrity of Sri Lanka' and 'detrimental to the national and social well being of the country.'[44]

Through public hearings and an anti- NGO campaign in the state media, the JVP effectively linked civil society actions to notions of patriotism and support for a unitary state. There was also a class dimension to this backlash - since engagement with peacebuilders and Western donors required the ability to grasp technical English and the overarching liberal vision, the CSOs being targeted were large Colombo based organisations that represented a small elite network. Through the reliance on JVP and JHU for popular support, the UNFP led Rajapaksa's core constituency was among the lower class and rural Sinhalese, who came to equate the then term NGO with professionalised elite that were out of touch with the concerns of ordinary people.[45] Thus, with peace being equated to an elite federal solution that was anti-patriotic in public discourse, the room for peacebuilders and supported CSOs to emerge as an alternative to Rajapksha's 'war for peace' rhetoric was extremely limited. Most local NGOs and CSOs, in an attempt reinvent their presence in the domestic arena, disengaged from the usage of 'peace' terminology Finally, the establishment of a national ground level consensus towards pursuance of a victor's peace, followed by an intense securitised developed to establish political legitimacy, is also recognised as having been a product of the work done by CSOs that have patronage of the JVP and JHU. Significant among these are the Patriotic National Movement, and the Manel Mal (Blue Lotus movement) which operated as patriotic welfare organisations, which on the surface worked to aid military families, but also provided a forum for the youth to engage in debates on nationalism and the need for military in the maintenance of a unitary state.[46]

The term 'NGO' soon came to signal a set of potentially negative connotations to the broader public; many NGOs to start to stress their 'un- NGOness' and focused on distancing themselves from their NGO status or from the NGO sector as a whole. Local NGOs thus engaged in intensive efforts to repackage their organisations and their work to make it more palatable and relevant to the local population in context of the changing political climate, preferring to eschew peacebuilding labels and activities in order to prolong their own continuity.[47]

Thus, while the issue areas that these donors have focused on in terms of hu-

[44]Walton, "Between war and the liberal peace: The politics of NGO peacebuilding in Sri Lanka".

[45]DJM Hilhorst. "The real world of NGOs: Discourses, diversity and development". In: (2003), (pp. 5).

[46]Rampton, "'Would the Real Dutugemunu Please Stand Up?'The Politics of Sinhala Nationalist Authenticity and Populist Discontent".

[47]Oliver Walton. "Everything is politics". In: *Charities in the Non-Western World: The Development and Regulation of Indigenous and Islamic Charities* (2013), p. 19.

man rights, accountability, governance and reconciliation, have stayed constant throughout their engagement in Sri Lanka, there have been distinct changes in the modalities for implementing peacebuilding strategies due to this local resistance. At an operational level, the idea of a "local rejection" brings into question the efficacy of civil peacebuilding in contexts with perceived "bad governance."[48] As earlier discussed, there has been growing tendency for donors to bypass the government and directly engage with what their perceive as "civil" society as an alternative means of achieving liberal goals in contexts percieved to have 'bad governance'. But as the Sri Lankan case demonstrates, the efficacy and sustainability of this strategy is questionable if "un-like minded" or "uncivil" factions have greater legitimacy among the masses. The vernacular local groups in Sri Lanka were successful in fanning mass anti-West sentiments against the liberal peacebuilding project by representing it as an elite, anglo-saxon, Christian mission that seeks to undermine national unity. During the pre-2000 period, most aid was channelled through the government and in the post-negotiations period donors had sought to channel aid being through the civil society, to 'evade' the perceived increase in illiberal governance by the new regime. However with the backlash and refusal of the local civil society to be associated with any peacebuilding work, this group of donors was forced to either taken on the role of implementers themselves, or have chosen to work only through INGOs and the UN system.[49]This has further reinforced their positions as 'outsiders' in the post-conflict context, giving them limited scope to influence domestic debates or place a 'check' on the government, as is the goal of emancipatory peacebuilding.

[48]Dietrich, "Bypass or Engage? Explaining Donor Delivery Tactics in Foreign Aid Allocation*".

[49]Interviews with CLM donors in Colombo and Geneva

Chapter 3

"Trapped between a rock and a hard place" : Peacebuilding in Post-conflict Sri lanka

This chapter focuses on the second type conditionality that has been imposed on liberal peacebuilders in the post-conflict period. A defining feature of the post-conflict environment has been the emergence of horizontal friction between the government and Sinhalese-nationalist local groups over the role of the West in the post-conflict reconstruction process; reflective of the feed-back loop model discussed by Björkdahl and Höglund , the same absolutist anti-West rhetoric that brought the government to power, became a point of contention and a source of friction. This has resulted in a power struggle between the dominant national political elite (Rajapkse) and dominant local Sinhalese-nationalist groups (JVP, JHU, Buddhist Sangha) to influence the masses and policy making through formal domestic forums like the electoral platform, and informal domestic platforms like the media. In the post-conflict period, the government successfully appropriated the nationalist mantle raised by local actors; the nature of the conflict's end as a 'Victor's Peace' is recognised as being the catalyst that cemented asymmetrical horizontal or domestic power structures in Sri Lanka in favour of Rajapaksa, as it reaffirmed his conflict period election rhetoric of being the 'saviour' of the Sri Lankan state.

While most accounts have focused on the externalisation of threats by the regime in order to consolidate power, these represent static and structure-bound analyses that overlook the continued existence of 'internal' threats ; on conducting an actor-focused analysis as recommended by Björkdahl and Höglund, it can be said that while the 'Tamil question' was effectively put to rest by the military victory, the local rejectionist movements that were responsible for the public momentum and support for the military solution have continued to remain radical and against any power-sharing solution. The government on the other hand, has had to walk a tight-rope between these demands and international pressure,

and has used its consolidation of power towards re-marginalising the political need for the JVP-JHU combine in its electoral victories. Second, it has used this control to construct what some authors have described as a 'smokescreen,' where international actors are involved in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country but within a specific framework. The need for developing this smokescreen in response to international pressure is also explored, as it further helps to understand the nature of controls that the government has developed to mediate Western participation in the post-conflict reconstruction process.

To illustrate better the Rajapaksa administration's establishment of centralised institutional conditions and controls on peacebuilders, which has effectively reduced their access to post-conflict contexts as well as the targeted population, this chapter concludes by focusing on the experience of the nd the role of the Presidential Task Force (PTF) in "managing" peacebuilders. The institution of the PTF can be considered a source of the conditionality, while the JPA and other policies are instruments through which centralised domestic control is exercised. The efficacy of these two in crowding out CLM donors, as is reflected in the group's decision to disengage with the Sri Lankan context and peacbuilding processes, in turn reflects the outcomes of an effective appropriation of the "local turn," and a co-option response by the national elite. The government has repeatedly invoked its legitimacy to impose these conditionalities through its electoral success among the masses.

The structuring of this chapter is modeled based on the actor-oriented perspective within the scope of which Björkdahl and Höglund's friction lens is applied. The first section looks at the horizontal friction between local actors - specifically the Rajapaksa administration and the JVP- the cause for this friction, and the eventual response of elite-co-option. The second section looks at aspects of the long-standing vertical friction between the international community and the Rajapaksa administration regarding the trajectory of post-conflict reconstruction and settlement, and the national elite motivations which shaped a co-option response to this friction. The final part of this chapter focuses on instrumental role played by the Joint Plan of Assistance for the Northern Province (JPA) 2011-2012, and the role of the Presidential Task Force in implementing these conditionalities, and the direct impact this had on the ambit of liberal peacebuilding in post-conflict Sri Lanka.

3.1 Horizontal frictions and the politics of smokescreens

Most accounts analysing the government's control over the trajectory of the conflict and political debate on the issue of minority rights in the immediate post-conflict environment have tended to focus on Rajapaksa and his cabinet alone. It has recurrently been argued that the lack of political impetus towards an effective power sharing that recognises minority rights has been due to the elites having effectively consolidated a 'soft authoritarian' state, by externalis-

ing threats and thus diverting any potential domestic debate.[1] This however, is arguably problematic given that since the end of the war, Sri Lanka has seen one presidential election, parliamentary election and a number of local elections, where these issues have repeatedly been brought up. What the experience of these elections has indicated is the successful statesmanship of Rajapaksa in being able to undermine an already decimated ill-prepared opposition through political strategising and incentives that encourages cross-over politics through a system of political patronage. Most importantly this has deterred the electoral choice of any effective opposition by Wickremasinghe's UNP.[2] This however, is in not a unique feature of the post-conflict context; clientistic and patronage politics have been a central feature of the post-independence Sri Lankan state, drawing from the constant ethnic-outbidding that mainstream parties have engaged in.

What has been a key cause for the lack of domestic momentum towards the devolution of power in post-conflict environment in Sri Lanka is the continued influence that the JVP and JHU have had in holding the government at check. Both these groups perceive any state restructuring towards the devolution of power as a form of Western appeasement that threatens the territorial and moral integrity of the Sri Lankan state's sovereignty.[3] While the Rajapaksa-led UPFA regime was immensely dependent on these local nationalist groups to consolidate its power in the period between 2005 till the end of the war in 2009, in the post-conflict era there was a strategic need to re-frame the government's position on multiple issues. The uneasiness with the extremist local agenda is most keenly noticeable in the experience of the presidentially appointed All Party Representative Committee and the Expert Panel on Constitutional Reform. The original intent of setting up both these ad-hoc bodies during the conflict was to signal a continued commitment to international concerns about a positive peace. However, neither process or body was able to implement intended peace-meal measures due to recurrent boycotts, walkouts, and protests by the participating JVP and JHU representatives.[4] The government's decision to abrogate the CFA on January 16, 2008, despite concerns within the government that this would prompt Western states to discuss a military option is considered to be reflective of how effective and compromising this local groups' pressure was.[5] In discussing this dilemma being faced by the Rajapaksa regime during the period preceding the abrogation , an ICG report notes that, "in part to avoid being challenged by hardline nationalist parties, he has adopted many positions formerly associated with extremist parties... But facing international

[1] Neil DeVotta. "From civil war to soft authoritarianism: Sri Lanka in comparative perspective". In: *Global Change, Peace & Security* 22.3 (2010), pp. 331–343.

[2] Nira Wickramasinghe. "After the War: A New Patriotism in Sri Lanka?" In: *The Journal of Asian Studies* (2009), pp. 1045–1054.

[3] Rampton, "'Deeper hegemony': the politics of Sinhala nationalist authenticity and the failures of power-sharing in Sri Lanka".

[4] Kristine Höglund and Camilla Orjuela. "Hybrid Peace Governance and Illiberal Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka". In: *Global Governance* 18.1 (2012), pp. 89–104.

[5] 'Why the Government of Sri Lanka abrogated the Ceasefire Agreement, ' November 1, 2008 http://www.asiantribune.com/?q=node/9079

pressure not to abandon a political solution, it still says it seeks a southern consensus on constitutional reforms."[6] As a result of this, Rampton notes, despite the past electoral importance of the alliance between Rajapaksa's SLFP and the these groups, the SLFP worked towards not being dependent on these groups, which tend to limit the government space for manoeuvre in the international arena, opposing face-saving gestures such as the restitution of the ineffective India imposed 13th Amendment.[7] In the aftermath of the Victor's Peace, while fielding international scrutiny the newly victorious regime has also sought to, " wrest the mantle of patriotic authenticity away from the smaller nationalist parties such as the JVP and JHU."[8] Particularly post the split of the JVP in 2008, which had resulted in the rise of a more ethno-religiously radical Jathika Nidahas Peramuna (JNU), the Rajapaksa administration was keen to establish its electoral independence from these groups.

Thus following the end of the war, the regime has distanced itself from these factions, while asserting Rajapaksa's role as the true defender of Sri Lanka. The Victor's Peace is realised to have given Rajapaksa the required momentum to appropriate the nationalist mantle, giving legitimacy to his claim of being a reborn 'Dutugemunu," a legendary Sinhala king and devout Buddhist who had regained lost Tamil territory and established total sovereignty over Sri Lanka.[9] This strategy of Rajapaksa and the SLFP can be considered successful, as is indicated by the degree of success the President had in his re-election for a second term in 2010, as well as his consolidation of power in the parliament. In the 2010 presidential election, that is estimated to have had a 70% voter turn out, the President won 58% of the votes. Subsequently, in an early parliamentary election in the same year, the SLFP and its allies secured a two-thirds majority in the parliament,, without support from either the JVP or the JHU. In fact, described as a 'sordid alliance,' the JVP instead chose to back the opposition party, the economic right leaning UNP (which had previously been headed by Wickremsinghe from 2000-2005), indicating the degree to which Rajapaksa had fallen out with these local groups.[10]

[6] International crisis group, *Sri Lanka: Sinhala nationalism and the elusive southern consensus*, (pp. 2).

[7] The Thirteenth Amendment (13A) to the Constitution of Sri Lanka is based on the 1987, Indo-Sri Lanka Accord between Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayewardene . The Amendment created Provincial Councils in Sri Lanka, while making Sinhala and Tamil official languages of the country and English as link language.

[8] Rampton, "'Would the Real Dutugemunu Please Stand Up?'The Politics of Sinhala Nationalist Authenticity and Populist Discontent".

[9] Rampton, "'Would the Real Dutugemunu Please Stand Up?'The Politics of Sinhala Nationalist Authenticity and Populist Discontent".

[10] K. Ratnayake. *Sri Lankan elections: JVP in sordid alliance to back Fonseka*. Jan. 2010. URL: `http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2010/01/jvp-j05.html`.

3.2 Vertical frictions and the politics of smokescreens

The need for this political manoeuvre space in the ongoing vertical friction with the international Western community has been discussed by Goodhand et al, who highlight that in post conflict period, while financial assistance in the form of loans and grants from western countries had fallen, the government was not immune to western opinion and pressure due the economic repercussions.[11] Despite the anti-western rhetoric, the regime is unlikely (and unable) to disengage from 'the West'decisively because there too many long standing economic, political and cultural linkages for Sri Lanka to entirely discount western views and sensibilities. Even towards the end of the war, the Rajapaksa administration had continued to attempt and establish some ground with Western actors. This is reflected in the discourse used by government to legitimize the war in the north and east, by framing its operations within the 'war on terror' framework and labelling it a 'humanitarian war' aimed at liberating the Tamil people from the 'terrorists.'[12] Within Björkdahla and Höglund's framework, the GoSL's success in tipping the balance of the horizontal power struggle in its favour, has thus allowed it to co-opt the former local rejection and re-frame the response to the vertical friction with Western peacebuilders in a more pragmatic fashion. By definition, the co-option response is largely led by the local elite and sees the strategic adoption of external norms and practices as a means of averting pressure.[13]

While there has been an immense focus on Sri Lanka's alliance with non-traditional donors like China, Iran and Russia, there continues to be a question about the degree to which this alliance emerged as a result of political will and strategy as opposed to political need. With the transformation of the shadow war into a full-fledged of military assault from 2008 onwards, political-strategic Western donors like the US, UK, Australia, and Canada exhibited behaviour that has been described as pendulum like, due to the shifts between extremes of political engagement and disengagement.[14] Since the nature of engagement was based on political considerations, strategies changed in response to immediately perceived threats and opportunities. On one hand, this group of donors undertook a set of containment strategies that were based on the growing perception that the Sri Lankan state had increasingly come to take the side of more illiberal states in the global system. The 2008 Western move to block the IMF loan of 2.6 billion USD, during a critical balance of payment crisis is one example of this.[15] Several accounts have seen this as a miscalculated political

[11] Jonathan Goodhand et al. "Sri Lanka: Strategic Policy Assesment". In: *LSE Repository ; Study Commissoned by DFID* (2011). URL: `http://personal.lse.ac.uk/venugopr/Sri%20Lanka%20Strategic%20Policy%20Assessment%202011.pdf`.

[12] Goodhand, "Stabilising a victor's peace? Humanitarian action and reconstruction in eastern Sri Lanka".

[13] Björkdahl and Höglund, "Precarious peacebuilding: friction in global–local encounters".

[14] Goodhand, Klem, et al., *Aid, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka, 2000-2005*.

[15] Goodhand et al., "Sri Lanka: Strategic Policy Assesment", (pp. 44).

'stick' as it pressured the Rajapaksa government moved to form stronger alliances with non-traditional donors like China. For Uyangoda, since Western economic backing to the war against the LTTE came with human rights conditionality,' the regime was forced into a closer embrace with Eastern powers and 'non traditional' donors.[16]

At the same time, reflective of the pragmatism that motivates policy formulation within this donor group, from 2008 onwards, against the Rajapksha government's declaration of 'war for peace,', there was also a systematic proscription of the LTTE in the US, UK, Canada, and Australia. This led to the international de-legitimisation of the non-state actor, directly affecting sources of funding and the potency of diaspora pressure on international governments. In a sense, led by the US, there was a tacit acceptance of the 'terrorism agenda' put forward by the Rajapaksa government. Observers characterised this as a quid pro quo, wherein policy makers in these states felt that their hardline stand on the LTTE would be reciprocated by the Rajapaksa government operationalising the long negotiated power sharing solutions in the post-war environment.[17] Goodhand argues that by virtue of the large programmes and disbursement pressures that donors like the US, Australia and Canada have, there was a prioritization of access over advocacy, with the hope of shaping the government's preferences.[18] Thus while nature and process of attaining the Victor's Peace was problematic to the Western donor community, in its aftermath political-strategic donors viewed it as an opportunity to forge a more inclusive political settlement with more moderate Tamil sections in the North and East. In light of this tenuous window, the Rajapaksa government's strategy of 'externalising' threats through an anti-West rhetoric was thus arguably tempered by the pragmatic need to continue to appease Western concerns, and thus shapes the co-option response.

The second set of economic considerations relates to the costs involved in the reconstruction process. Despite the prolonged conflict and the tsunami, the country was identified as a lower middle income state by 2009 – this was to have multiple impacts on the financing for the government's intended path of state-led development as it meant that the country was no longer eligible for concessional loans from International Financial Institutions. In this context, the continued wielding of economic 'sticks' by more human-rights inclined political-strategic donors further affected the government's ability to finance a speedy reconstruction.[19] In early 2010, following months of negotiations the EU had withdrawn the GSP+ privileges to Sri Lanka on the grounds that the key conditions for renewal ie respect of labour laws, working conditions in the manufacturing sectors and human rights, had not been met. As Goodhand notes, despite the government's rhetoric that the GSP+ trade concessions were not important, there had been a number of informal discussion were the government

[16] Jayadeva Uyangoda. "Sri Lanka in 2009: From civil war to political uncertainties". In: (2010).
[17] Lunstead, "The United States and Sri Lanka1".
[18] Goodhand et al., "Sri Lanka: Strategic Policy Assesment".
[19] Goodhand et al., "Sri Lanka: Strategic Policy Assesment".

had conceded to certain EU conditions about the plight of IDPs and political prisoners, before talks failed.[20] Given that Sri Lanka was emerging from a serious balance of payment crisis, the economic fall out of the political criticism was thus an inherent threat to the stability of the country, and the regime.

Also, despite the increasing focus on the Chinese role in financing Rajapaksa's strategy of state-led development, several economists have pointed out that this financing is hurtful to the Sri Lankan economy. China does not distinguish between ODA from economic cooperation or investment and therefore there is a blurring of concessional finance with other financial flows. While the country has been among Sri Lanka's largest source of foreign funding since 2009, most loans are non-concessional or in the form of export credit with high interest rates and strict commercial conditions being common.[21] Additional typical conditions attached with Chinese loans of including Chinese companies as project contractors and prioritising is equipment, material, technology or services (at least 50%) from China has also been the source of nationalist resentment by local populations and businesses.[22] Thus while the presence of China has been a source of political leverage for the GoSL, allowing the government to triangulate assistance and withstand Western pressure, it has in no way eliminated the country's continued dependence on Western states for trade and commercial ties. Thus while there has been an 'Eastward turn,' the extent to which it represents a step change signaling the irreversible decline of Western interests and influence in Sri Lanka can be contested.

At multiple forums, the President and his advisors as well as ministers have re-affirmed their overt commitment to concerns and ideals of reconciliation, rehabilitation and accountability that have repeatedly been raised by the international community, while including a caveat- that, each of these be domestically led. At his second swearing-in ceremony in early 2010, the President reiterated the government's pragmatism about the perception of the country's growing East-ward tilt, stressing that, "Our policy is one of non-alignment. We do not have enemy states or such groups or blocs. During the last era, we worked with many nations in agreement and friendship for national security. We now step into the development era. We extend our hand of friendship to those who assist us in this endeavor...Therefore, we will strengthen already existing relations between nations and are ready to establish new relations for national security and development."[23]

In the post-conflict period, the GoSL has thus followed a policy agenda geared towards selectively mobilizing domestic and international support, and balancing the two against one another. Goodhand et al. have described this as a strategy that consolidates the governments position through the, 'construction

[20] Goodhand et al., "Sri Lanka: Strategic Policy Assesment".

[21] Ivan Wheeler et al. "China and Conflict–Affected States: Between Principle and Pragmatism". In: *Sri Lanka. Saferworld, London, January* (2012).

[22] B. Sirimanna. *Chinese and Indian Companies Dominate Sri Lanka's Mega Project Business.* May 2011. URL: ttp://www.sundaytimes.lk/100905/BusinessTimes/bt21.html.

[23] Mahinda Rajapaksa. *United in peace, lets build a great nation - President at the second swearing ceremony.* 19 November 2010. URL: http://www.president.gov.lk/index.php.

of elaborate smokescreens seeking to capture or contain a range of potentially oppositional domestic and international forces.'[24]This has shaped the domestic institutional structures that took on the mantel of post-conflict reconstruction. In terms of their domestic orientation, in the vernacular press these institutions have asserted their presence as being regulatory bodies that place a 'check' on any rogue activities by the UN system and the Western powers.In terms of their international orientation, there is a distinct two-fold strategy that has arguably been developed based on the nature and difference between the two groups of bilateral Western donors. Donor support by larger donors who are a part of the political-strategic group continues to be significant in the form of budget support from the IMF, helping bridge the external financial gap and encouraging private sector growth. Therefore, these external resources continue to have significant economic and political effects, and are differently treated. However, in the case of the CLM donors, who have been identified as a much smaller donors with no over commercial or strategic interests, the government views them as an externality that needs to be 'dealt with.'[25] As an interviewer from one of the CLM donors stated, "there is a perverse focus on increasing 'donor alignment' behind the government. This creates an illusion of collective dialogue, but it is only an illusion for the people in Geneva. In Colombo, everyone knows what is what."[26] The nature and scope of the conditionality imposed by the government is analysed by examining the setting up of the 19-member Presidential Task Force for Resettlement, Development and Security in the Northern Province (PTF), a body that continues to be one the primary points of liaison for the CLM donors with the government, and its Joint-Plan of Assistance for the Northern Province, a programme that effectively signals an assertion of government control over spaces targeted by peacebuilders.

3.3 Case Study: The Presidential Task Force (PTF) and the Joint Plan of Assistance for the Northern Province (JPA)

While focusing on locally imposed conditionalities in the post-conflict context, field research for this thesis primarily focused on the development, response and perceptions surrounding the PTF's Joint Plan of Assistance for the Northern Province (JPA), launched in 2011. The field research was carried out for a period of three months in Colombo and Jaffna in early 2014, and focused on both the government and donors perception regarding post-conflict reconstruction, resettlement, and the role of the international community. Since the focus of the discussions was extremely sensitive and needed to be historically located, open ended and flexible interviews were conducted in order to delve into the issue and understand competing narratives, reflections, and perceptions. Finally,

[24]Goodhand et al., "Sri Lanka: Strategic Policy Assesment", (pp. 17).
[25]Goodhand et al., "Sri Lanka: Strategic Policy Assesment".
[26]Interview with Director of Donor Agency, Colombo

the interviews were conducted with highly placed officials in the government, the international donor and NGO community, and certain national NGOs who had participated in high level decision making during the peace-process and had continued to be active in the post-conflict context; since many of these individuals continue to work in the field, anonymity of sources has been of utmost significance.

There are two reasons that the JPA has been chosen in order to examine vertical donor-recipient peacebuilding friction in post-war Sri Lanka: First, the document represents the closest version of a consolidated government policy regarding its envisioned role for Western actors in the Northern Province since establishing absolute control over this contested region in 2009. The precursor to this can be found in the ambiguous Uthuru Wasanthaya (Northern Spring) Programme that was announced in 2009, before the end of the war and eventual consolidation of Rajapaksa's stronghold in domestic politics.; the Uthuru Wasanthaya is however again recognised as a policy direction that reflects demands of the JVP and JHU, as opposed to reflecting the government's stand after having achieved its military victory.[27] The JPA thus has significant symbolic value as a GoSL led framework focused on 'aligning' Western aid with national priorities on the reconstruction and resettlement of the Northern Province, long considered the heartland of the Tamil minority, that directly impacts the ability of the Western nations to continue their post-conflict peacebuilding in the country. Second, asides from its symbolic positioning, the programme has an explicitly stated hierarchy which lists the envisioned role of Non-state actors like the UN and INGOs and the primacy of the government in collecting all end reporting and evaluation data. It was observed that from both, the perspective of the government and the Western donor community, the launch of the JPA was representative of two processes that emerged in the post-war environment- First, increasing centralisation of the Sri Lankan state based on which there was a growing move to 'align' aid to national priorities, by attempting to re-orient donor funding through the government; Second, the government's 'divide and rule' policy on Western donors.

About the JPA 2011 -2012

In the aftermath of the War for Peace operations, characterised by the GoSL as the 'Humanitarian Operation,' which sought to liberate the North from the 'terrorist' LTTE, it was estimated that nearly 300,000 people had been displaced. Even before the official declaration of its victory on May 19th, 2009, on May 14, the official state media released a notice making clear the government's intention that in the aftermath of the conflict, any rehabilitation of the previously disputed regions would be controlled, led and implemented by the Central gov-

[27] Rampton, "'Deeper hegemony': the politics of Sinhala nationalist authenticity and the failures of power-sharing in Sri Lanka".

ernment, with special interest being taken by the President himself.[28] Against the recurring criticisms from the international community and international staff in Sri Lanka of there having been rampant human rights violations and larger civilian casualties than reported by the government, the GoSL wanted to ensure that the rehabilitation of displaced persons was an entirely domestic process, in order to prevent any room for further criticism. The notice announced the appointment of a 19- member Presidential Task Force for Resettlement, Development and Security in the Northern Province (PTF), with the mandate to prepare strategic plans, programs and projects to resettle internally displaced persons and, rehabilitate and develop economic and social infrastructure of the Northern Province. There was no ambiguity with regards to what this meant for the peacebuilders, "When the PTF was established, they were made to know that this was the pivotal point, and they had to accept it... they had to fall in line with us."[29]

The Rajapaska government's decision pursue a military solution from 2005 onwards had meant an intense militarisation of Sri Lanka's political and social arenas, that was accompanied by the valorisation of military personnel. Having placed the military and its defeat of the LTTE on a pedestal, the GoSL had increasingly presented the military establishment as being the repository of true nationalism, and thus, a central element in 're-assimilating' the North into the Sri Lankan nation state. The composition and modalities of the PTF reflects this executive-military nexus; President Rajapaksa nominated to the PTF Basil Rajapaksa, the President's brother who subsequently went on to become the Cabinet Minister for Economic Development, and Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the then Secretary of Defence, indicating that the military would continue to play a key role in the re-emergence of the North.[30] The other members of the 19 member body also included the Chief of Defence Staff, the Air Chief Marshal , the Commander of the Army , the Commander of the Navy, the Commander of the Air Force, and the Inspector General of Police.

Beginning with the 180-day Programme in mid-2009, the GoSL through the PTF established the initial protocol through which the UN, INGOs and NGOs could partner in rapid early recovery interventions to stabilize returning communities. It was mandated that the IDPs be kept in three rehabilitation camps until the PTF, along with the Army, felt that the region had been effectively stabilised. While the Government welcomed UN material assistance, it rejected the UN focus on principles regarding IDP returns and a political solution.[31] The UN was largely unsuccessful in its plans to create a mechanism to coordinate post-conflict assistance among donors and the UN. In the absence of being able to obtain from the Government any sense of an overall public

[28] Interview with member from PTF Secretariat, Colombo ; Interview with Sri Lankan MP, former member of the Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights

[29] Interview with member from PTF Secretariat, Colombo

[30] Significantly, in following the 2010 elections, in early 2011, the Ministry of Defence was renamed to "Ministry of Defence and Urban Development

[31] David Keen. "'The camp 'and 'the lesser evil': humanitarianism in Sri Lanka". In: *Conflict, Security & Development* ahead-of-print (2013), pp. 1–31.

plan to guide post-conflict relief, recovery and reconstruction, the UN found itself implementing actions in an ad-hoc and reactive manner.[32] In contrast to the Sri Lankan government's description of the camps as "welfare centres" or "welfare villages," critics, including the United Nations' High Commissioner for Human Rights Navanethem Pillay, described the camps as "prison" or "internment camps" given that the IDPs were not permitted leave the camps and there was limited access to the camps by independent aid organisations, independent media, relatives and politicians from domestic opposition parties.[33] Thus, despite concerns among international actors that this prolonged detention was a ploy for further 'cleansing' and on the whole, went against international law, several INGOs and UN agencies eventually partnered with the government. As the 2010 Panel of Experts on accountability in Sri Lanka, in an additional memorandum to the Secretary General stated, that the UN and member states "did not adequately invoke principles of human rights that are the foundation of the UN but appeared instead to do what was necessary to avoid confrontation with the government,"

According to GoSL accounts, by 2011, over 456,000 people (138,000 families) displaced at various stages of conflict had been resettled in their area of origin in the North, signifying the success of the centralised government led planning under the PTF.[34] The JPA 2011, according to government, indicated the end of the early recovery phase and the tapering off of the humanitarian crisis created in the aftermath of the Humanitarian Operation. While there would be an addressal of residual humanitarian need, thus real focus of the Joint Plan of Assistance to the Northern Province was to be on broader interventions in the post-conflict regions to strengthen market linkages and value-production to support the transition from aid reliance to self-reliance. Recognising the special needs of particularly vulnerable groups like households led by single women, separated children and unaccompanied minors, the elderly, disabled individuals and others and emergent social issues of land ownership, civil and legal documentation, and equal access to resources, the first JPA in 2011 was thus a humanitarian/early recovery funding appeal to donors for projects identified and approved by the PTF.[35]

In terms of monitoring of progress and indicators, it was made clear that implementing partners would be expected to report twice a month on activities and their impact through the 3W (Who, What Where) tool, that would be controlled and managed by the PTF with the technical support provided by Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The 3W tool had first been introduced by the OCHA following the Tsunami of 2004, and had been used by the agency to map out humanitarian responses and aid-disbursements during the crisis period. However, under the JPA, the OCHA's role would be

[32] Panel, *Secretary General's Internal Review Panel on United Nations Action in Sri Lanka*.

[33] Keen, "'The camp 'and 'the lesser evil': humanitarianism in Sri Lanka".

[34] United Nations I& Partners) Government of Sri Lanka. *Sri Lanka Joint Plan of Assistance to the Northern Province (JPA)*. Presidential Task Force, Government of Sri Lanka, 2011.

[35] Government of Sri Lanka, *Sri Lanka Joint Plan of Assistance to the Northern Province (JPA)*, (pp. 5).

limited to providing, 'technical support to develop the 3W database as per the Sri Lankan context and requirement as well as conducted training to all the staff of government and non-government agencies at central and field levels on reporting into the database.'28

According to OCHA's Financial Tracking System (FTS), in the first year of the JPA 2011, 34.4% of the appeal for $129 million was met.[36] Subsequently, the JPA was renewed for the year 2012. Here, while re-emphasising the JPA as the primary domestic framework for early recovery, the drafters indicated that there JPA would also re-orient to focus on early development interventions, characterised as 'soft assistance.' These were primarily to be capacity-building interventions by agencies which would be 'led by respective GoSL authorities at every level.'[37] However, like the earlier JPA and the nature of assistance allowed in the IDP camps, this would mostly be in the form of material assitance, through construction of facilities and supporting work done by government agencies, under the surveillance of the PTF. A major concession made to international staff working on projects in the North during this period, was allowing access to these regions without mandatory clearance from the PTF. According to the FTS, of the requested $147 million, only 40 million USD or 27.3% of the appeal was funded.[38] While the JPA was not renewed in 2013, analysing the lack of donor interest in the programme, which was repeatedly positioned as the ' definitive planning framework for humanitarian/early recovery operations,' thus presents interesting insights into the existing friction between the GoSL and the donor community, and its attempt to curb any peacebuilding oriented aid following the end of the conflict.

Donor response

OECD data on flows to Sri Lanka from 2011 to 2013, which include humanitarian aid flows to the country indicate that overall, in terms of bilateral donors, Japan, Korea were by far the largest aid providers in Sri Lanka.[39] However in literature, as well as through media statements and reports, it becomes clear that both countries were focused on large-scale infrastructure development and technical cooperation with the government, as opposed to engaging in humanitarian recovery and rehabilitation.[40] In contrast, FTS flows to Sri Lanka detail the 'Other Humanitarian Funding' per donor to the OCHA and funding per donor to the JPA, which is separate from the former OCHA funding window. On examining the disbursement per donor to the JPA 2011, 2012 and on comparing it with the disbursement per donor to the non-government funding appeals in

[36] http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencyCountryDetails&cc=lka&yr=2011

[37] United Nations I& Partners) Government of Sri Lanka. *Sri Lanka Joint Plan of Assistance to the Northern Province; Mid Term Review (JPA).* Presidential Task Force, Government of Sri Lanka, 2011, (pp. 4).

[38] http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencyCountryDetails&cc=lka&yr=2012

[39] Goodhand, Spencer, and Korf, *Conflict and peacebuilding in Sri Lanka: caught in the peace trap?*

[40] Goodhand, Spencer, and Korf, *Conflict and peacebuilding in Sri Lanka: caught in the peace trap?*

Sri Lanka for the same year, the preferred nature of assistance by small CLM donors is reflected. [41]A.3A.2

First, the CLM group of donors, including those whose donor agencies no longer have direct operations in Sri Lanka, had continued to fund conflict recovery related work in the country. Across both years, this group of countries collectively provided about 40% of funding to Humanitarian projects being carried out by the UN, other than the direct programmes being implemented by their respective agencies and embassies. Second, in comparison, the response to the JPA from this group of donors has been, at best, lukewarm. Despite the fact that the JPA appeal was systematically launched two months before the OCHA appeal in order to strategically place it as the decisive humanitarian funding framework, the programme was under-funded, with CLM donors providing less than 20% of the whatever amount was finally given, as compared to political-strategic donors like the US, which was the largest JPA funder.A.2A.4 The series of interviews conducted with donors agencies, embassies, and implementers thus sought to examine this response to the JPA, against the fact that even in the limited policy space that had existed immediately after the war, donors had continued to work towards building a civil peace, as detailed in the earlier section. The following sub-sections are reflective of the broad themes that emerged from these interviews.

Centralisation

By both government and international accounts, the JPA was developed as a replacement to the Consolidated Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP), which is an annual humanitarian appeals process that is traditionally hosted by the OCHA. Within this framework, the OCHA and UN system source aid from the international donor community and implement programmes through the UN system, also making the UN a focal point in the identification of roles and responsibilities, stating longer-term objectives and goals, and developing the framework for monitoring the strategy.[42] In terms of the degree of consultation with the host government, the CHAP is to be approved by the Foreign Affairs Ministry and respective line ministries, and does not necessarily have to be formulated with government participation; particularly during the conflict era, when humanitarian action spanned both government and LTTE controlled areas, humanitarian aid workers were more focused on being perceived as 'neutral,' which meant limited degree of government involvement. From the government's perspective, the CHAP reflected an era when external ' LTTE sympathisers ' had aided the opposition, while in the present, it represented a parallel system of service delivery and thus needed to be better 'aligned' with national priorities. This undercurrent was evident during interviews with members of the government stat-

[41]Source: OECD Databank

[42]http://www.unocha.org/cap/appeals/sri-lanka-joint-plan-assistance-northern-province-jpa-2011

ing that the "CHAP was not discussed with the central government at all."[43] More grievously received was the UN Cluster system's practice of bottom-up consultations to inform the humanitarian response; for the government, "consultations only took place at the district level, with Government Agents who do not have the authority or foresight." [44]Juxtaposed against this dominant line of institutional thinking, the replacement of the CHAP with the JPA led by the PTF represented the consolidation of control over alternative systems of foreign funding targeting post-conflict regions in Sri Lanka. The military defeat of the LTTE meant the end of a bifurcated aid system wherein 'humanitarian' aid was provided by non-government actors in the North, while development aid was provided by the government to the south.[45] While the government goal has been to increasingly channel all aid through the government apparatus, the JPA represents a middle path wherein donor spending would take place within a government road-map.

Second, the JPA signals that processes and priorities for early recovery, and eventually, development planning for in the post-conflict North would not be independent of the administration's political stand. A repeated criticism made by the international community regarding the nature of post-conflict reconstruction by the GoSL was the lack of focus on 'soft' issues of reconciliation, inter-community dialogue and intra-community coping in the post-conflict environment. Within the existing human-rights based approach that is privileged by the West and the UN, these issues are closely linked with the idea of transitional justice and accountability for war-time rights violations, without the resolution of which, effective transformation of underlying conflict structures and a durable peace are not possible. The JPA, as the key post-conflict planning framework makes no mention of these concerns, instead presenting a focus on 'hardware' issues as the programmatic template which draws from the 'homegrown' Sri Lankan model of reconciliation through development. In a separate key communication to donors from the Ministry of Economic Development, headed by Basil Rajapaksa emphasised, the Sri Lankan government equated effective reconciliation and settlement with the addressal of four key developmental challenges[46]- Restoring public goods such as health and educational facilities, restoring trade and livelihoods by ameliorating physical capital and communication, restoring key infrastructure and preventing exploitation and inequality of vulnerable groups. The JPA was thus designed as a first steps to the long term adressal of these challenges. To quote an interviewee who has previously been a presidential advisor, ' Basil is interested in winning hearts and minds through cement and steel."[47]

Third, the JPA re-asserts the Rajapaksa government's depiction of cen-

[43]Interview with member from PTF Secretariat, Colombo

[44]Interview with member from PTF Secretariat, Colombo

[45]David Keen. "Compromise or capitulation?: report on WFP and the humanitarian crisis in Sri Lanka". In: (2009).

[46]Interview with Development Partners Forum Secretariat, Colombo

[47]Interview with Sri Lankan MP and former member of the Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights

tralised control over the rehabilitation of conflict affected regions as being key to the continued existence of an undivided unitary Sri Lanka state i.e the JPA as being central to national security. This is most significantly a salient response to repeated demands from international actors that the GoSL devolve power to the Northern and Eastern Province as a first step towards correcting the unequal power-sharing structures in the Sri Lankan state. During interviews with government representatives, it was indicated that the external demand for decreased centralisation was perceived as being seditious and contrary to the interests of a united Sri Lankan nation.[48] Under the CHAP, it was felt that implementing agencies would allow the local government agents a greater degree of agency and decision-making authority that undermined the role of the central government and planning authorities, and reinforced regional identities. JPA activities on the other hand, would be carried out under the direct guidance of central government's line ministries, with approval from the PTF and the responsible ministry heads. During interviews, an interesting insight that emerged was the idea that even in the case that Provincial Council for the North was elected in during the time of implementing the JPA, the control of reconstruction process would continue to be centralised.[49] It was felt that devolution to any administrative unit other than the central government's provincial agents would allow for fragmentation among the ranks, allowing regional politicians to 'politically manipulate and may be overrun any development for personal gain." Donors in turn discussed this as a personal strategy of the Rajapaksa clan to closely associate with all merits arising from the reconstruction process; as the shine from the Victor's Peace wore away, it was hoped that the 'big roads, infrastructure and the newly 'Sri Lankanised' North would bring in the votes.'[50]

In terms of Björkdahl and Höglund's framework, this centralisation of aid and external participation around the national government is an outcome of the 'co-option' response that the government successfully employed, which has allowed a small group of national elite to emerge as 'translators' in any domestic dialogue with external actors. Here, the focus is not on the entire government or the legislative assembly, but the executive which is governed by Rajapaksa, his brothers, and a close circle of advisers. When tracing back the feed-back loop model to the circumstances that have been instrumental in centralising the power of mediating vertical frictions with external actors in this small group, it is possible to locate culpability in the narrow engagement of peacebuilders with the Sri Lankan civil society. While the overt scapegoating may have ended, the risk-aversion to stimulating domestic debate about the trajectory that this elite is taking, by social factions that are critical of the government, persists. Simply put, there has been a domestic lull and lack of momentum towards holding the government accountable from factions other than the JVP due to the systemic de-legitimisation of groups that endorsed power-sharing solutions in

[48] Interview with member from the PTF; Interview with Sri Lankan MP; Interview with the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies, Colombo

[49] Interview with PTF Member

[50] Interview with Development Partners Forum Secretariat, Colombo; Interview with Minister Councillor, EU Delegations to Sri Lanka, Colombo; Interview with SDC (Colombo)

the conflict period.[51] While there are a few dissaggregated voices in the form of the Colombo based intelligentsia, the persisting asymmetry in power relations tilts the majority public opinion in favour of the Rajapaksa government and clan.

Divide and Rule

As has been highlighted earlier, the GoSL's co-option response to the vertical friction that emerged between it and external Western actors over the nature and direction of post-conflict reconstruction, was shaped by the economic concerns of the government. However, in this respect, the Rajapaksa administration has largely focused on courting larger political-strategic donors like the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and the EU, that posses definite potential in terms of expanding economic cooperation. In this respect as funding from the CLM group of donors has declined, both in absolute terms and in comparison to non-traditional donors, and given the lack of significant historical economic ties with these countries has meant that the GoSL has less incentive to encourage their presence in Sri Lanka. This, coupled with the fact that funding for more 'political' and sensitive sectors like civil society peacebuilding and human rights has come from this group, has led the GoSL to perceive them as a hindrance.[52] Thus a key strategy adopted by the Rajapaksa administration as a part of its co-option response is to disincentivise any collective Western donor interaction with the government, a divide and rule strategy that is focused on preventing the re-emergence of powerful parallel donor forums that have collective bargaining power, as had existed during the peace-process and briefly during the tsunami response. Secretary to the Treasury, Dr. P.B Jayasundera, who has been a long standing member of Mahinda Rajapaksa's inner circle, raised this issue as early as 2005, claiming that the "donors are likening themselves as a cartel," and that, " if the country is strong enough in its thinking, we should ask not just for a program loan or a balance of payment assistance but ' where are we heading?' "[53] Against this line of institutional thinking, in the post-conflict environment, the institution of the PTF can be visualised as the converging platform for the Ministry of Finance and Planning, Ministry of Economic and Urban Development and the Ministry of Defence, each of which is headed by either Mahinda Rajapaksa or his brothers. It represents a common liaison office for interacting with donors and in turn, determining the priority level of a donor in having a direct dialogue with either Ministry or the executive.[54]

Goodhand et al. have noted that compared to the conflict period, where there were a number of donor forums and working groups that placed collective

[51] Walton, "Everything is politics".

[52] Goodhand et al., "Sri Lanka: Strategic Policy Assesment".

[53] *Sri Lanka's donor cartel out of step: Treasury Sectretary.* 31 July 2005. URL: http://www.lankabusinessonline.com/news/sri-lankas-donor-cartel-out-of-step:-treasury-sectretary/350066126.

[54] Interview with Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies, Colombo; Interview with SDC (Colombo); Interview with Norwegian Embassy (Colombo); Interview with PTF member (Colombo)

demands on the government (hence the likening to a cartel), the PTF has worked to disincentivise collective bargaining.[55][56]At the time of research, it was found that in the post-conflict period there were largely three functional donor collective platforms - the Donor Coordination Forum and the Bilateral Donor Forum were largely informal structures that have been likened to 'Coffee club' meetings. The Development Partner's Forum, which is organised by a Secretariat housed in the World Bank, represents the only formal functional collective platform. Through interviews with the Development Partner's Forum Secretariat, it became clear that the forum was more intended for de-facto organisation between external partners in the Sri Lankan context, rather than being a bargaining platform with the government. It was tacitly understood that the government preferred bilateral communication, and according the the DPF Secretariat, it was increasingly difficult to establish contact or dialogue with Sri Lankan policy makers, despite the fact that at its conception, the Forum had visualised the regular participation of government officials.A.6 The Forum now presents as being an internal problem-solving forum for Western bilaterals and multi-laterals. Significantly, none of the non-traditional donors operational in Sri Lanka had a constant presence on the forum and not due to lack of invitation.

A second institutional practice that mirrors this intent of 'divide and rule' is the formal process of collaboration between the government and external actors. Donors that were interviewed confirmed that they either had signed direct bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MoUs) with the respective line ministries in the period immediately before the PTF was operational, or had signed direct MoUs with the PTF. However, in both cases, the all reconstruction and rehabilitation work related permissions were cleared by the PTF, which worked closely with the Ministry of Defence.[57] Given that the PTF is ultimately responsible to the President, who is also the head of the Ministry of Defence, it is felt that the entire process of donor fragmentation is closely based on the personal agenda of the Rajapaksa family first, and then to a much lesser degree with that of the UPFA coalition. Within this institutional structuring, and against the continued distrust and risk-aversion in the domestic civil-society, the CLM donors have taken to implementing all post-conflict related programmes either through their local staff agencies (eg. SDC, GIZ, NORAD) or through the UN system and INGOs. It was felt that in the case a local implementer was chosen, it would lead to additional scrutiny and bureaucratic procedures. However, in response, the government's concern in controlling these control of

[55]Goodhand et al., "Sri Lanka: Strategic Policy Assesment".

[56]Donor partners meeting – monthly review of the situation chaired by the World Bank, ADB, UN + 1 bilateral; Bilateral Donor Group (BDG) chaired by EU delegation and Switzerland, which has several working groups – Human Rights (EU and UN office of HR); Mine action (UNDP/USAID); DDR (USAID); civil society; diaspora; police; Donor Peace Support Group; INGO heads 'coffee club'. Examples of coordination bodies and groupings for humanitarian action include: Coordination Committee for Humanitarian Assistance (CCHA) Chaired by GoSL; Inter-Agency Standing Committee (Humanitarian/UN and NGOs); UN cluster meetings; Post-tsunami donor groups; ICRC/IFRC networks;

[57]From 2009 onwards, NGOs working in post-conflict regions are required to register with the Ministry of Defence and while humanitarian agencies are looked after by the PTF

INGOs and UN agencies, has become a key focus in the postwar. [58]

Third, among CLM donors, there was also a distinct awareness that the treatment of political-strategic donors was markedly different, as the latter group was allowed many more opportunities to have a direct dialogue with the government.[59] Through interviews, it was also felt that through the composition of the PTF, the president intended to send a less conspicuous message: Both Gotabaya and Basil Rajapaksa, respectively the Secretary of Defence and the Minister of Economic Development and Urban Planning, are US greencard holders, and their presence of on the PTF is intended to be both reassuring as well as assertive in 'aligning' these donors with larger disbursement pressures with the domestic agenda on reconstruction in the North, and the larger government economic agenda. This success of this is reflected again in the funding patterns of the JPA, where states from the Western political-strategic group has been the largest funders. A.4A.2

Thus, despite the failure of the JPA as programme, it can be argued that the government has been sufficiently successful in its larger goal of 'squeezing out' donors involved in peacebuilding through a process of establishing institutions and processes that encourage aid and donor fragmentation. It is however important to reiterate that the government did not cause this fragmentation, but merely effectively leveraged it towards creating greater operational differences between the political-strategic and ethical-principles (CLM) donors. Its co-option response where it presented its post-conflict agenda as being responsive to and derived from the international concern for human rights but through a domestic process thus effectively helped delay greater pressure from larger, more important donors. This left the smaller CLM donors to salvage a civil peacebuilding mission, without required backing, in a context that had become fundamentally opposed to the 'Western' tenants that the liberal peace, due to past over-sight of the peacebuilders.

[58] Interview with former UN resident Co-ordinator (Geneva), Interview with UNDP (Colombo)

[59] Interview with with SDC (Colombo); Interview with Norwegian Embassy (Colombo); Interview with Minister Councillor, EU Delegation to Sri Lanka (Colombo)

Conclusion

Five years after the end of the conflict in 2009, the most recent UN Human Rights Council Resolution 25/1 of March 28th 2014 which mandated the UNHRC to conduct an external international inquiry on the war crimes committed during the last legs of civil war in 2009, are indicative that the Western aims for a liberal peace in Sri Lanka are far from over. Significantly, one day after the Resolution being passed, the Sri Lankan polity in the Southern and Western Province were to vote for their provincial councils; in this highly charged environment, the opposition had keenly worked to leverage the upcoming Resolution vote against the ruling party. In light of this, the Rajapaksa led UPFA's winning both provincial councils with 55% of the vote share (the closest next competitors, the UNP, having secured only 26% of the votes in comparison) can be considered a confirmation that the local rejection of the larger liberal peace vision continues to exist at the very grass-roots. Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa did not mince words in his post-Provincial elections victory speech, declaring that, " the victory is a fitting-reply to the anti-Sri Lankan elements.. (it) is a clear mandate by the Sri Lankan people against the UN rights resolution threatening the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country..."[60] Parallel to this, he also reaffirmed that, "We are a nation that is enriched by a very rich humanist thinking. Therefore, false concepts of national unity or processes for peace that become active because of funds coming from abroad will not bear fruit (...)Developing concepts without knowing the history of the nation will not serve national unity. One must understand the indigenous ways and aspirations."[61]

This thesis, in discussing the failure of the more emancipatory and participatory gradient of liberal peacebuilding, has sought to highlight how like every other external process, the process of building peace through a people is also mediated by the people. That in the case of post-conflict Sri Lanka, the majority has chosen to see Rajapaksa as their voice and primary mediator in this process, brings up the question of what respecting the local mandate implies in terms of externally influencing a move towards a more inclusive peace, that would take into account the concerns of the Tamil and other minorities. A concrete

[60] *Sri Lanka ruling party's victory is a mandate against UN resolution - President.* 30 March 2014. URL: http://www.colombopage.com/archive_14A/Mar30_1396194543CH.php.

[61] *President Mahinda Rajapaksa Addressing the National Unity Convention, at the BMICH.* July 2014. URL: http://www.president.gov.lk/speech_New.php?Id=141.

operational answer to this can unfortunately not be found in critical theory, which while engaging in a much needed discursive exercise of questioning the perverse assumptions and mis-perceptions that guide seemingly universalistic discourses, is still nascent in lending itself to pragmatic policy or practitioner oriented thinking. Significant frameworks that have been developed as alternatives to the existing ' problem-solving ' orientation of peacebuilding include advocating the framework of ' hybridity,' which recognises the heterogeneity of the local which lends to the legitimacy of formal and informal ' illiberal ' structures, and thus advocates an engagement with them to produce more locally relevant structures; the notion of the ' everyday peace ' which focuses on understanding what peace entails in informal spaces of social interaction, in order to enhance the social contract between externals and the local; and the lens of 'friction' that this thesis employed, which focuses on the points that mediation of the global discourse occurs, recognizing the inherently confrontational nature of any norm transfer. In common, these frameworks question the notion of the 'local,' advocating a larger role for the recipients in shaping and implementing a contextualised peace, in recognition that internationalism has real limits. But as more moderate critics like Roland Paris highlight, much of these seemingly anti-liberal but pro-peacebuilding positions draw from thinking in the liberal paradigm to support their alternatives, leading the moderates to assert that pragmatically, there may be ' no realistic alternative to some form of liberal peacebuilding strategy. '

In terms of a stand in this large debate, this paper offers a focus on the issue of ' who ' from the international community builds peace and ' how,' to identify what an alternative if there is one - could entail. In Sri Lanka it must be stressed that while the initial local rejection stemmed from the faulty modalities of civil-peacebuilding, the spiral that ensued was compounded by the existence of a greatly divided international community, which the government further leveraged; thus, in discussing local rejection and a direction towards a realistic alternative, this paper would further like to raise the question of if the present failures occur not only on account of a disconnect in the theory of peacebuildings with existing realities, but also a disconnect among the actors who purportedly are unanimous in their interpretation and support for these different gradients. It would thus support the critical theory perspective for the need to begin by disaggregating peacebuildings, against a broader practitioner-based introspection of the context at hand, that more importantly, factors in the degree of agreement and priority given to the peacebuilding process by the different international actors involved in its implementation.

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Appendix A

Figures

Figure A.1: Aid Trend in Sri Lanka (OECD Database)



Figure A.2: OCHA Financial Tracking System; Joint Plan of Assistance to the Northern Province, Funding by Donor (2011)



* Funding = Contributions + Commitments

Contribution: the actual payment of funds or transfer of in-kind goods from the donor to the recipient entity.
Commitment: creation of a legal, contractual obligation between the donor and recipient entity, specifying the amount to be contributed.
Pledge: a non-binding announcement of an intended contribution or allocation by the donor, which does not necessarily specify which organisation it is intended for or if it is for an appeal or response plan project. In some cases, pledges are recorded early in a crisis and there is a time lag in the commitments and contributions resulting from the announcement. As soon as commitments are made from that pledge, only the remaining balance of the pledge appears in the pledge column in FTS.

Figure A.3: ' Other Humanitarian Funding, ' CLM donors and Political Strategic donors (Source: FTS data on funding to non-JPA appeals)



Figure A.4: OCHA Financial Tracking System; Joint Plan of Assistance to the Nothern Province, Funding by Donor (2012)



* Funding = Contributions + Commitments

Contribution: the actual payment of funds or transfer of in-kind goods from the donor to the recipient entity.
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Figure A.5: Other Humanitarian Funding, ' CLM donors and Political Strategic donors (Source: FTS data on funding to non-JPA appeals 2012)



Figure A.6: Development Partners Forum Structure (Source: DPF Secretariat)