

REPORT
OF THE
Committee
ON
Proportional Representation

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TO THE HONOURABLE E. C. DRURY,

Premier of Ontario.

Sir,

I have the honour to submit my report on the operation of Proportional Representation as applied in the electoral district of Winnipeg in connection with the Manitoba Provincial Elections.

By section 16 of an Act to amend the Manitoba Elections Act, 1920 (10 Geo. V, chap. 33), it was enacted that the electoral division of Winnipeg should be represented in the new Legislature by ten members, to be elected according to the principles of Proportional Representation. These principles, briefly outlined herein, with rules and regulations, now form sections 178A to 178H of The Manitoba Election Act, a copy of which Act is forwarded herewith.

Formerly Winnipeg was divided into three electoral divisions, each division being represented by two members elected under a system similar to that which is at present in vogue in the electoral divisions of Toronto. All of this was changed by the recent amendment to the Manitoba Act, and Winnipeg was made a single constituency, with a representation of ten members elected under the Single Transferable Vote System.

As you are no doubt aware, the Single Transferable Vote System of Proportional Representation was designed to give every party or organization a representation in an elective body equal to the voting strength of that party or organization. Under this system a party is bound to elect its proportionate number of representatives, provided the voters belonging to that party properly mark their ballots.

The system works out in this manner:

The voter chooses the candidate whom he wishes to have represent him. He signifies his choice by placing the figure 1 in a space provided on the ballot opposite that candidate's name. This is called the voter's "first preference," or "first choice." It may happen that this candidate may not need this vote, and so the voter may make a second choice by placing the figure 2 opposite the name of the candidate he fancies second to his favourite. In like manner the voter may mark as many preferences as there are candidates, and it is always advisable to mark a preference for every candidate representing his party.

The idea in marking more than one preference is this: If all ballots are properly marked and advantage taken of all preferences, it will require a certain number of votes to elect a candidate. This number is called "the quota," and is determined by dividing the total number of first preferences by a number greater by one than the number of candidates to be elected and adding one to the result. To be elected a candidate therefore requires to receive only this quota. All votes over this quota are called surplus votes, and are transferred to those candidates opposite whose name the figure 2 has been placed. In like manner a candidate having the least number of votes after all surplus votes have been transferred is eliminated from the contest and his ballots are distributed amongst the continuing candidates, according to the preferences marked on the ballot. If in either of these cases the voter has failed to make a second choice, his vote is lost and it

becomes an "exhausted preference" or a "non-transferable vote." Therefore a voter should mark as many preferences as there are candidates representing his party, or his vote may ultimately become lost and his party possibly lose its proper number of representatives.

In discussing the Winnipeg election I consider it advisable to divide the election into its various stages.

A. Preparation.

For the ten seats allotted to Winnipeg forty-one candidates allowed their names to go before the electorate, each party—Labour, Conservative and Liberal—placing ten names on its ticket, the remaining eleven persons running independently. This resulted in an unusually large ballot, about eighteen inches long, and one which had a tendency to be more or less confusing to the voter and cumbersome to the officers whose duty it was to sort and count it. However, the exceptionally small number of rejected ballots, less than two per cent. of the total number of votes cast, and the correct balancing of sheets after each count, showed that not only did the voter understand his duty, but the officers had no difficulty in making correct returns.

The first step taken to simplify the ballot was to print the names of candidates in various colours. The standard-bearers of the Conservative party had their names printed in blue, those of the Liberal party in red, of the Labour party in green, and the names of the Independent candidates in black. In my opinion this procedure is very much open to question. It increases the cost of printing; the names of one party were omitted on some ballots; on other ballots the printer had the names of one party partially in the spaces in which the names of another party were printed; and also it is open to question if a party slate should be placed so prominently before a voter in a polling booth.

The most important step was instructing the voters how to mark their ballots. This was done by means of public meetings, addressed by Mr. Ronald Hooper, honorary secretary of the Proportional Representation Society of Canada; by instructive articles in the daily press by the same gentleman; by the distribution of literature by the Government, some of which literature is forwarded herewith; and by the distribution of literature by the various candidates and political parties.

B. The Election.

(Unfortunately about forty of the deputy returning officers failed to put in an appearance, and new appointments had to be made to fill their places at the last minute. It must be understood, however, that this was not due to Proportional Representation.)

At the close of the poll it was the duty of the deputy returning officer to sort out all of the ballots and place in separate parcels, labelled with the candidate's name, all ballots marked in favour of that candidate, and attach thereto a card showing the number of the polling sub-division, the name of the candidate and the number of votes received by him. The deputy returning officers had been well instructed in this, but when some of them failed to put in an appearance it was impossible to fill their places with any but uninstructed men, with the result that many ballots were neither counted nor sorted. All of this extra work fell upon the staff whose duty it was to check over the deputy returning officer's count, and considerably delayed their work.

C. Organization for Counting the Ballots.

The organization for the counting of ballots consisted of the following persons:

- (a) Chief supervisor.
- (b) Two supervisors.
- (c) Four chief sorters.
- (d) Thirty-two sorters.
- (e) Eight transfer clerks.
- (f) Two calculators.

After the transfer of Mr. Ivens' surplus the number of transfer clerks and sorters was reduced by one-half.

Although the persons making up this organization were known as part of the returning officer's staff, nevertheless they acted practically independently of him, and he was consulted with regard to questionable ballots only. He was, however, responsible for their acts and for the ballots while in their possession. He announced the results at the end of each count.

The chief supervisor sat directly behind the returning officer and beside the two assistant supervisors. The two calculators sat behind the supervisors. The four chief sorters had tables in front of their sorters, who occupied two long rows of tables. The transfer clerks had two long rows of tables in the rear of the sorters, each table having forty-one spaces, each space bearing the name of a candidate. One end of the room was partitioned off for the accommodation of the candidates and their agents.

D. Counting the Ballots.

The deputy returning officer handed his ballot box to the returning officer, who checked it off and opened it. The returning officer then gave the rejected and valid ballots to a chief sorter, making a note in his book of the number of ballot box and the number of the chief sorter. The chief sorter then divided the ballots amongst four of his sorters. He had eight sorters, working two to a table. One of these sorters received the ballots from the chief sorter, checked them over, initialled the card the deputy returning officer had attached to them, and handed the parcel to his fellow sorter. This sorter again checked the ballots and handed them to the chief sorter. The chief sorter then handed the parcels to the two supervisors, who tabulated the number of votes received by each candidate. The ballots were then given to the transfer clerks, who placed each bundle in a space on one of the rows of tables labelled with the name of the candidate for whom the ballots are marked.

The chief supervisor was in charge of the organization. All questions arising out of the counting of ballots were submitted to him direct by the assistant supervisors or chief sorters. He had no authority to reverse the decision of a deputy returning officer, but if he considered such a thing necessary he submitted it to the returning officer, whose decision was final.

The calculators totalled the vote after each count, and also calculated the number of votes to be transferred from the candidate whose surplus was being distributed to a candidate receiving a portion of that surplus.

When the first preferences had been totalled by the calculators and the supervisors' returns completed, the chief supervisor was in a position to determine the quota necessary to elect a candidate.

In the Winnipeg election the total number of first preferences counted was 47,427. The number of members to be elected was ten. The quota or necessary number of first preferences for each candidate to receive to make his election certain would, therefore, be $\frac{47427}{11}$ plus 1=4,312.

When all of the votes had been tabulated it was found that Mr. F. J. Dixon had received 11,586 first preferences and Mr. T. H. Johnson had received 4,386. Each of these gentlemen was, therefore, declared elected on the first count by the returning officer.

The next step was to distribute the surplus vote—that is, the number of first preferences in excess of 4,312. Inasmuch as Mr. Dixon received a larger surplus than Mr. Johnson, his surplus was the first to be distributed.

The sorters then sorted Mr. Dixon's ballots, according to second choices, except when that second choice happened to be marked for Mr. Johnson, in which case the candidate for whom the voter had marked a third choice was credited with the ballot. To facilitate this sorting four large racks had been provided, each containing forty-one compartments, labelled with the names of the various candidates. The ballot papers were placed in these spaces according to the preferences marked on them. Since none of these ballots were to be credited to Mr. Dixon or Mr. Johnson, their names were printed on blue paper, and as a candidate was elected or eliminated his card was changed from white to blue.

After the ballots had been sorted they were checked over by the sorters, and each candidate's parcel of ballots was labelled with a card showing the number of votes or second choices in that parcel. These were tabulated by the supervisors and the ballots given to the transfer clerks, who placed them on their second table in the spaces labelled with the candidates' names. Each of these parcels are known as sub-parcels. The calculators were then given the number of second choices marked for each candidate on Mr. Dixon's ballots, and they calculated the number of votes to be transferred to each candidate. That was done in this way. Mr. Dixon received 11,586 votes, of which he must retain 4,312 and may transfer 7,274. He may, therefore, transfer $\frac{7274}{11586}$ of his total number of votes. For instance, Mr. Ivens received 5,758 second choices, and of this number he received $5,758 \times \frac{7274}{11586}$, or 3,616 votes. The remaining 2,142 ballots were retained to preserve Mr. Dixon's quota of 4,312. The calculators would, therefore, announce that Mr. Ivens would receive 3,616 of Mr. Dixon's ballots and Mr. Dixon would retain 2,142. The transfer clerks then took these ballots from Mr. Dixon, and after marking the figure 2 in a corner of the ballot to show in case of a recount that they had been transferred on the second count, placed them with Mr. Ivens' original votes on the first table. This was carried on until the last candidate had received his share. The 4,312 remaining ballots were then placed in a parcel handed to the returning officer, and placed by him in a locked ballot box. The particular ballots to be transferred from each sub-parcel are designated by clause (d) of regulation 8 of section 178F of The Manitoba Election Act as those last filed in the sub-parcel. This opens up an element of chance, since the papers last filed may come from a certain section of the electoral division which is voting its strength for a candidate residing therein, whereas the ballots retained for Mr. Dixon may be marked in a totally different manner. This, however, is reduced to a minimum owing to the amount of sorting that has taken place, and these ballots have been fairly well shuffled.

Upon the completion of this count it was found that Mr. Ivens had secured 5,544 votes, and the returning officer declared him elected on the second count.

There were now two elected members with more than the necessary quota. Mr. Johnson had 4,386 votes and Mr. Ivens 5,544. Inasmuch as Mr. Johnson's surplus had been acquired in a count prior to that of Mr. Ivens, it was the next to be distributed. The same procedure was gone through with Mr. Johnson's surplus as that used with Mr. Dixon's surplus.

When this was completed Mr. Ivens' surplus of 1,232 votes was distributed. Since this surplus was derived from Mr. Dixon's surplus votes, only the votes transferred from Mr. Dixon were considered. As Mr. Ivens had received 3,616 second preferences, the ratio of distribution was $\frac{1232}{3616}$.

No candidate received sufficient votes to gain election on this distribution. It therefore became necessary to eliminate the candidate having the lowest number of votes. In this election it happened that the votes of the two lowest candidates were together equal to the third lowest. It was, therefore, possible to eliminate the two lowest, inasmuch as no matter if one received all the votes of the other, which would have been most extraordinary, he would still be low man. This process of elimination is carried on until a candidate has a surplus greater than the difference between the two lowest candidates. If there are but eleven candidates in the field, and the difference between his vote and the vote of the tenth candidate is greater than the total of all surpluses, there is no advantage in transferring these surpluses, and the eleventh man is declared eliminated and the remainder elected.

In this election Mr. Haig received a surplus of 104 on the thirty-first count. The difference between the two lowest candidates was much greater than this, so the lowest candidate was eliminated. This state of affairs continued until the end of the thirty-third count. At this stage there were three elected candidates whose surpluses had been transferred, four elected candidates who had undistributed surpluses amounting to 581 votes, one candidate barely under the quota and three candidates within 300 votes of each other. It was, therefore, necessary to distribute these surplus votes in the order in which they were obtained, to eliminate one of these three lowest candidates. This was done on the thirty-seventh count, when the final surplus had been distributed.

Observations.

The chief claim put forward by the advocates of Proportional Representation is that any public organization or party will receive representation in an elective body in proportion to its voting strength. A perusal of the voting at Winnipeg seems to substantiate this claim. The following summary of the first and final counts is of interest:

Candidates.	First Count.		Final Count.	
	Total Vote.	Percentage.	Total Vote.	Percentage.
Independents	6,362	13.4	nil	nil
Labour	20,167	42.5	20,739	45.5
Liberal	14,423	30.4	16,946	37.2
Conservatives	6,475	13.7	7,895	17.3
	47,427	100.0	45,580	100.0
Exhausted preferences ..	nil	...	1,847	...
Total	47,427	...	47,427	...

(NOTE.—In the final count the percentages are based on the total effective vote. If the exhausted preferences were included the following would then be the percentages, Labour, 43.6; Liberals, 35.7; Conservatives, 16.7; Exhausted Preferences, 4.0.)

In the final results Liberals and Labour each secured four members and the Conservatives secured the remaining two. Therefore, for polling 45.5 per cent. of the total effective votes, the Labour party secured 40 per cent. of the representation; for polling 37.2 per cent. the Liberals secured 40 per cent. of the members and for polling 17.3 per cent. of the vote the Conservatives secured 20 per cent. of the seats.

In this regard it is also interesting to compare the standing of some of the candidates at the end of the first and final counts. The standing is as follows:

	Name.	Party.	First Count.	Final Count.	Order of Election.
1.	Dixon	Labour	11,586	4,312	1
2.	Johnson	Liberal	4,386	4,312	2
3.	Armstrong	Labour	2,767	4,283	3
4.	Cameron	Liberal	2,402	4,312	4
5.	Ivens	Labour	1,928	4,312	5
6.	Haig	Conservative	1,893	4,312	6
7.	Stovel	Liberal	1,743	4,312	7
8.	Rogers	Liberal	1,541	4,010	8
9.	Russell	Labour	1,535	3,520	9
10.	Tupper	Conservative	1,500	3,583	10
11.	Dick	Independent	1,307	11
12.	Christie	Conservative	1,274	12
13.	Queen	Labour	1,253	4,312	13

Here we see that the changes do not affect the percentage of representation from each party. The first change we notice is the difference in the order of election, which is really not very great. The only change of any importance is the replacing of Russell by Queen, each of whom is a member of the Labour party. These results must be viewed with caution, inasmuch as the results in the first count may be misleading, whereas the results in the final count have been obtained by a scientific analysis of the will of the electorate. In other elections the results in the first count may be entirely different from the results in the final count.

The summaries show the uphill battle an independent candidate must make. Although they started with practically the same number of preferences as the Conservative Party, they eventually lost their votes, whereas the Conservatives gained two seats. The Independents must rely upon their own meagre individual following, whereas the members of recognized parties help each other.

The opponents of Proportional Representation state that the expenses of an election under that system are greater than the results warrant. Of course this is a question to be decided by the organization wishing to adopt the system. Their defence is that the results are so accurate and representative that the expenses should be secondary. By subsection 2 of section 169 of The Manitoba Election Act every candidate who is not elected or who does not receive a number of first choices equivalent to one-fourth of the quota forfeits his deposit of \$200. This resulted in twenty-five candidates losing their deposits and adding \$5,000 to the Provincial Treasury. This sum should more than cover the additional expenses.

It has been said that this penalty is much too severe. In some other places it is considerably lower. However, in my opinion this stiff penalty had a very salutary effect in this election, and prospective candidates in Winnipeg at least now know that they must be well and favourably known to receive sufficient vote to even receive their deposit back, let alone having any chance of being elected.

In addition to the expense of such an election the opponents state that the system is cumbersome and unwieldy. The system is more complex than the ordinary style of voting, and success depends upon the amount of instruction given to the voters and the capacity of the organization for counting and sorting the ballots.

In the Winnipeg election Mr. Ronald Hooper was engaged as adviser to the returning officer. He secured the services of Mr. C. C. Ferguson, of The Great West Life Assurance Company; of Major McLean, Professor of Mathematics at Manitoba University; and of Mr. A. E. Parker, Editor of Canadian Finance. To these gentlemen and to their staff, mostly employees of The Great West Life, is due in a very large measure the success of the election in Winnipeg. They were engaged in counting the ballots from 5 p.m., Tuesday, the 29th of June, until 2 a.m., Saturday, July 3rd, during which interval they spent forty-five hours in actual work. Approximately the first ten hours were taken up in sorting the ballots which had not been touched by the deputy returning officers. Considering the heavy turnout of voters and the unusually large number of candidates this was a comparatively short period of time. It is estimated that the staff handled over 110,000 ballots, since many were handled more than once.

It was stated that the voters would be so confused with the ballot that they would congest the polling booths. The number of voters who turned out—namely, 48,246—was the largest on record for Winnipeg, and though some of the polling booths were two hours late in opening it was stated that there was no more congestion than in other elections. At the opening of the late polls, however, there were quite a number of voters lined up waiting to enter. At five o'clock, the closing hour, there were no voters outside of the booths waiting to get in.

After the first count there were 819 rejected ballots, or a percentage of 1.72 per cent. of the total vote.

In the previous election in Winnipeg under the old system of voting the percentage of rejected ballots was 2.5 per cent. of the total vote. Evidently the voter took more care to mark his ballot under the new system.

Another feature in this regard was the comparatively small number of non-transferable votes. At the final count it was ascertained that 1,847 voters had not marked a sufficient number of preferences on their ballot papers. This meant a loss of only 4 per cent. of the total number of votes, which is a surprisingly small percentage. It is always advisable to mark at least as many preferences as there are members to be elected, and it is not at all a waste of time to give each candidate a preference. In this election it was possible to use a fortieth preference, but the record appears to be held by the voter whose twenty-second preference found a final resting place.

The majority of the rejected ballots were found to have been marked with a cross. The next frequent mistake was the placing of the figure 1 after more than one name on the ballot. Some ballots started off with a cross and then continued with figures. Many of the votes became non-transferable, owing to the fact that they either bore too many figures of the same value, or they failed to keep a sequence of figures.

In order to make Proportional Representation a success the following points must be carried out:

(a) Appointment of an efficient returning officer, election clerk, deputy returning officers and staff for counting ballots.

(b) The securing of a proper place to count the ballots.

(c) Instruction of the voters in how to mark their ballots. Best results in this are obtained through the medium of the press. It is impossible to reach sufficient voters by means of public meetings.

It might possibly not be out of place to mention a section of The Manitoba Election Act relating to by-elections in Winnipeg. Section 1784 of that Act reads as follows:

"If one of the members for the electoral division of Winnipeg dies or resigns, or a vacancy arises in any other way, there shall be no by-election to fill such vacancy until there shall be two or more vacancies in the representation, when the vacancies shall be filled by the holding of an election of two (or more) persons in the same way as at a general election in Winnipeg, and the Clerk of the Executive Council shall then issue a proper writ of election accordingly."

Under this section it would be impossible for the Government to grant a portfolio to a member for Winnipeg without losing a seat. This difficulty, however, has been overcome by an amendment to The Manitoba Legislative Assembly Act.

Another section deserving of passing notice is section 256. This section gives the returning officer a casting vote in case of a tie, but excepts from this the city of Winnipeg. Under Proportional Representation if all ballots are properly marked a tie cannot take place; but until that day comes there is still a possibility of a tie, and the simplest means possible should be taken to break it.

A third section is in regard to a recount. Section 261 of The Manitoba Election Act requires a deposit of \$25 to be made by a candidate desiring a recount. Section 265 of the same Act provides for the payment of the expenses out of this sum if the candidate fails to gain election on the recount.

Inasmuch as the counting of ballots under Proportional Representation is very accurate, a recount would not make any material alteration in the results. The expense of such a recount, however, would be considerable, and the deposit of \$25 would be insignificant. A much larger deposit should be demanded, inasmuch as the final count in an election under Proportional Representation is bound to be close and likely to be productive of many recounts unless a substantial check is placed upon it.

Before bringing this report to a close I wish to express my indebtedness to the officials already mentioned above, to the returning officer, Mr. Monkman, and to other members of the staff, too numerous to mention by name, for their kindness, willingness and patience in explaining the inner workings of Proportional Representation to me.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Sgd.) A. S. WINCHESTER.

Mr. Hill, from the Special Committee to which was referred Bills (Nos. 68 and 69) of the Session of 1920, to report upon the system of Proportional Representation, presented their reports, which were read as follows:

Your Committee, to which was referred Bills Nos. 68 and 69, met during the recess and heard arguments for and against the adoption of the system of electing members to the Legislative Assembly as set forth in the said Bills. Your Committee regrets that after hearing these arguments and after considerable discussion it was impossible to arrive at a unanimous conclusion of recommendation. Your Committee, therefore, presents for your consideration the report of the majority of the members of the Committee, the report of the minority of the members of the said Committee, the arguments advanced by the advocates and oppo-

nents of the said system, and an outline of Parliamentary action in the United Kingdom, Tasmania and Canada, as furnished to the Committee, and a statement showing the interest in the question in the Province of Ontario.

All of which is most respectfully submitted.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MAJORITY OF THE COMMITTEE.

Your Committee have been impressed with the arguments in favour of the adoption of Proportional Representation in Ontario, and are of opinion, in view of the fact that its adoption is a plank in the platform of three of the political parties and of the expressions of desire on the part of the G.W.V.A. and other bodies and the expressions of opinion in England, and the satisfaction with which the system has worked out in other countries, that steps should be taken towards its gradual adoption in this province. The Committee feel that it would be unwise to adopt it immediately for the whole Province of Ontario because of the difficulties in securing experienced officers to administer the Act and also because of the lack of familiarity of the public generally with the objects to be attained and the method of count. The Committee appreciates that so far as the voter himself is concerned, the duty which he is called on to perform at the polling booth is not more difficult than under the present system, but are apprehensive that its adoption on a wide scale, without previous education, might tend to confusion and misunderstanding to such an extent as to make the system unpopular at the start. There is also this difficulty to be contended with: With the exception of the City of Toronto there is no city having a greater representation than two members. As Proportional Representation requires large constituencies returning three or more members, it would be necessary, should the membership of the House remain as it is at present, that urban and rural sections of the country would have to be placed together as one constituency, which would not be regarded with favour by either those dwelling in the cities or in the country districts, the probability being that both these bodies would feel that the other would obtain an undue advantage under such a system. Northern or New Ontario, by reason of its sparsely-settled nature, also renders it problematical whether elections could be held under such a system in that portion of Ontario, owing to the distances that would necessarily have to be covered. Your Committee are, however, of the opinion that the system should be tried out in certain constituencies at the next election. In order to make such experiments a success it should be tried out in places where no one party would reap an advantage at the expense of another. Your Committee have therefore come to the conclusion that the system should be tried out in both urban and rural constituencies. The urban constituencies which are most adaptable for such an experiment would be the cities of Hamilton and Ottawa, or, in the alternative, it could be tried out in the City of Toronto. Your Committee feel that it would be advisable that a group of constituencies be formed in Eastern Ontario and a group in Western Ontario. After considering the various constituencies as they are at present, your Committee would recommend for this purpose that the present constituencies of Carleton, North and South Lanark, Leeds, Grenville and Brockville be united into one district, returning six members. In Western Ontario your Committee recommends that the present constituencies of North and South Brant, North and South Waterloo, and North and South Oxford should be united and that they elect six members. The number of names on the voters' list in the

Eastern group, according to the return from the records of the General Election to the Legislative Assembly in 1919, is as follows:

Carleton	12,815
Lanark, North	8,941
Lanark, South	10,849
Leeds	10,690
Grenville	10,396
Brockville	10,932
Total	64,623

The number of voters in the Western constituencies were as follows:

Brant, North	10,746
Brant, South	17,145
Oxford, North	14,820
Oxford, South	13,720
Waterloo, North	21,623
Waterloo, South	19,182
Total	97,236

Your Committee have had before them and have considered the question of adopting some method whereby, in the event of more than two candidates running in a single-member constituency, some method could be adopted whereby the candidate to be elected should necessarily obtain more than 50% of the vote cast. There are instances at present in the House of Assembly where members have been elected from constituencies where several candidates have run in which the candidate elected has obtained less than one-third of the total vote cast. In such cases he has been elected a member although two-thirds of the voters voted against him. It would appear to your Committee that if the single transferable vote system was adopted in single-member constituencies that in such an event the member elected would be the choice of over 50% of the voters. This would be a step towards the ultimate adoption of the single transferable vote, with group constituencies all over the province, and your Committee recommends that its adoption for single-member constituencies be enacted by the Legislature.

Your Committee have also considered the question of permitting municipalities, should they so desire, to elect their municipal bodies by means of Proportional Representation, and it recommends that The Municipal Act be amended to permit municipalities to so elect their councils.

The recommendations of your Committee may be summarized thusly:

1. That the cities of Ottawa and Hamilton be each allowed two members, to be elected by these cities as a whole under the single transferable vote system of Proportional Representation, or, in the alternative, that the members from the City of Toronto be elected by this system.
2. That the present constituencies of Carleton, North and South Lanark, Leeds, Grenville and Brockville, together elect six members under the single transferable vote system of Proportional Representation.
3. That the constituencies of North and South Brant, North and South Waterloo, and North and South Oxford, together elect six members under the single transferable vote system of Proportional Representation.
4. That the rest of the province select their members in what is known as single-member constituencies, but that the transferable vote be used in the election of such members.

5. That municipalities be permitted to elect their councils by means of the single transferable vote system of Proportional Representation.

6. That legislation be forthwith enacted carrying into effect the above recommendations.

Your Committee desires to express its appreciation of the invaluable assistance which it has received from Mr. Ronald Hooper, of Ottawa, the Honorary Secretary of the Proportional Representation Society of Canada, who furnished the Committee with much information on Proportional Representation. Your Committee also desires to thank the Honourable the Minister of Labour in the Dominion Government for his kindness in extending Mr. Hooper leave of absence from the Department to attend the sittings of the Committee. Your Committee also expresses its appreciation to Mr. John R. McNicol, of Toronto, the President of the British Representation League, for his presentation of the arguments against the adoption of the system in this province. Your Committee also thanks Mr. A. S. Winchester, of Toronto, for his valuable services as Secretary of the Committee.

HAMNETT P. HILL,
Chairman.

Dated this 14th day of February, 1921.

MINORITY REPORT.

The undersigned members of the Parliamentary Committee on Proportional Representation will not repeat the many arguments put forth by the Proportional Representation League or by the British Representation League, which are fairly well covered in the material attached to the dual report of your Committee, but will content themselves with making certain defined conclusions, viz.:

1. No steps should be taken to consider the question of electoral representation of the people in the Legislature of Ontario until after the census is completed in 1922.

2. A safe principle to be borne in mind is that of representation by population, which is very different from Proportional Representation. We believe that many people are confused by the similarity of the names, and are not informed on the principles involved.

3. In a new country like Canada, where so many people of different races and languages make a new home, efforts should be made to assimilate and merge them into Canadians, rather than segregate them into separate communities with special representation.

4. Proportional Representation would bring many candidates into the field, dividing up the vote on non-essentials and electing representatives of minorities who have not behind them popular approval for their fads and fancies.

5. Proportional Representation means that a minority may often, by using the balance of power, dictate terms to the majority in the Legislature of Ontario.

6. In a sparsely-populated country like most of Ontario the five to eight-member constituency would be too large, all members trying to represent the whole and none representing any particular part. Most members have enough to do now to represent one single constituency and travel about it.

7. Proportional Representation makes for weak groups; weak groups or minority groups means log-rolling and compromise; log-rolling means frequent changes of government, with change of policy, without going to the people for approval.

8. Instability of government in a new country which depends on government policy for development would wreak untold harm in a province like Ontario. The present system generally means majority government for four years, with an opportunity for the Opposition to reverse the Government if the people are not satisfied with its policy. There is always safety in majority rule.

9. The gerrymander in its worst form could be utilized in framing large constituencies; farmers could be hived so that townfolk could reduce the farmer representation in the House, and *vice versa*.

10. Present rural constituencies situated around cities of less than 50,000 population under Proportional Representation would be dominated entirely by the city vote; small towns and villages in a well-populated rural constituency would often fail to get representation. When 13 per cent. in Winnipeg get no representative, that may occur in many places in Ontario.

11. In the proposals of other members of this Committee placed before the House, the Eastern Proportional Representation Riding, comprising the old constituencies of Lanark, Grenville, Carleton, Leeds and Brockville—population, 64,623—would have six members; unit of population, 10,770.

The Western Proportional Representation Riding, comprising two Brants, two Oxfords, and two Waterloos—population, 97,236—would have six members; unit of population, 16,206. There is not much proportion about this to begin with.

11a. One realizes that it is impossible to get exact representation, but when some ridings have a population of sixty thousand and others ninety thousand, it is time to apply a little more fairly the "One man one vote" principle, which should bring representation by population.

12. Cost of elections to the candidate over a large constituency eliminates everyone but the rich man, who can travel the riding and spend plenty of money.

13. An independent candidate running in a single riding can be often elected on a good general policy under the present system. Under Proportional Representation, unless there were several candidates running in the large constituency on the same policy, there would be no chance for this man being elected. He would draw votes from no other source.

14. The British system works well because majorities, consistent with the stability of the country, treat minorities well. Greater progress is made in British communities than in foreign countries practising many forms of Proportional Representation, supposed to safeguard minorities, but actually resulting in keeping the country in a turmoil and never giving it the solid progress that we enjoy in Canada.

15. Your members thus reporting think that the Legislature should consider very carefully before making changes in these trying times; changes that are advocated by a society of individuals rather than by the solid thinking citizens with property rights throughout the provinces. It will be time enough to act when Boards of Trade, Farmers' Associations and Ratepayers' Associations memorialize the Government that a change from the present tried and satisfactory system to Proportional Representation is desired.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

WILLIAM H. PRICE,

For Minority of Committee.

THE ARGUMENT OF THE ADVOCATES OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE BY THE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION SOCIETY OF CANADA.

It is claimed that Proportional Representation makes the elected Assembly more accurately representative of the electorate. The present electoral system in single-member constituencies has evolved from more elementary methods of electing representatives. Great changes have been made since the time when a comparatively small electorate, on a restricted franchise, elected the House of Commons in the United Kingdom.

British political genius has adapted existing Parliamentary institutions to meet the changing conditions. By gradual steps the Cabinet system of government responsible to Parliament, the party system in Parliament, the broadening of the franchise, the machinery of government, has been readjusted to maintain the elected Assembly as the true mirror of the nation.

Proper representation of minorities is regarded as one of the essentials of government by the people. Minorities are finding their way into the Legislatures in separate groups under the present system. Minority representatives are frequently elected in single-member constituencies owing to the majority of voters dividing into groups in support of rival candidates. It is urged on behalf of Proportional Representation that the election method should be adapted to reproduce the opinions of the electors in their true proportions.

Proportional Representation is British in origin. It is advocated by many representative British statesmen most profoundly attached to the British constitution as being in accordance with the principle of building upon the experience of existing institutions rather than pulling down or launching into a sea of experiment. Some of the most prominent advocates of its adoption in Great Britain are: Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, Rt. Hon. H. H. Asquith, Lord Robert Cecil, Lord Hugh Cecil, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Birkenhead, Sir John Simon, K.C., Viscount Bryce, Lord Morley, Earl Selborne, Earl Grey, Lord Curzon, Lord Milner, Lord Lansdowne, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and Cecil Harmsworth, M.P. According to the Hansard Report of Debates in the House of Commons at Westminster, January 30th, 1918, Lord Robert Cecil said:

I believe that proportional representation would make the House of Commons more accurately representative of the electorate of this country. This is the true function of representative institutions; that is the true principle of democracy. I advocate it because I feel it would restore and increase the character and the authority of the House, and I advocate still more because I am convinced that in the course of the next few years we in this country and, I believe, the people of every country in Europe, are going to have great tests applied to the solidity and the reasonableness of our institutions and to many of our most cherished beliefs. I wish to see our constitution made as strong, as vigorous, and as well founded as possible, in order to resist the shock of the times that are coming upon us.

The present Lord Chancellor, Lord Birkenhead, has said as follows:

Experience, where the system has been put into operation, has consistently and convincingly refuted the criticisms which have been directed against it, and I, for one, feel unshaken confidence that within no distant period its acceptance as a theory will be universal, and that it will be put into practical application wherever in the civilized world representative institutions prevail.

The authority of an elected Legislature is based on the representative principle. Without Proportional Representation the tendency is towards the lack of

cohesion in political action. Some notable evidence of the growing instability of the party system has been furnished by general election in several provinces of Canada in recent years. In countries where Proportional Representation is the method of election the results would seem to be favourable to party stability. M. Georges Lorand, one of the party leaders in the Belgian Chamber of Representatives, is reported as saying, in a speech in London, December 3rd, 1913:

We have used it (Proportional Representation) for thirteen years, and we have had six general elections with the new system, and the result is that not a single party, nor fraction of a party, is opposed to the reform; its extension is inscribed in the programme of all the parties.

It has been said by opponents of Proportional Representation that it would lead to the splitting of parties, but it has had the opposite effect; parties, far from splitting into fragments, have brought their ranks closer together, but within these ranks they have found room for such diversity of opinion as may exist, nay, as is essential within any living and active political force.

In the Manitoba provincial elections held on June 29th, 1920, Winnipeg elected representatives by the method of Proportional Representation, while the remainder of the constituencies in the province were polled as single-member constituencies. In Winnipeg the electorate divided itself into three groups of opinion—Labour, Liberal and Conservative. Outside of Winnipeg, in the single-member constituencies, five groups were elected—Liberal, Conservative, Farmer, Labour and Independent.

The constituency of Winnipeg had to elect ten members on one ballot by what is called the single transferable vote, under Proportional Representation. Forty-one candidates were nominated for the ten seats. The number of valid ballots cast totalled 47,427. The single transferable vote allowed the voters to elect the candidates they preferred in proportion to the voting strength of the parties in the election. Four Labour representatives were elected, four Liberals (including one woman candidate), and two Conservatives. This result reflected the percentage of votes cast by each party; all parties were satisfied that they secured fair representation in proportion to votes cast.

In the constituencies outside of Winnipeg the electors voted for candidates by the usual method of marking X against a name. Minorities in the single-member constituencies are thus unable to secure representation. But in some of the single-member constituencies, where several candidates were nominated to contest one seat, the majority of voters failed to secure representation owing to the votes being split between two or more candidates.

For example, in Brandon City the Labour candidate secured election with 2,007 votes, while 2,648 votes for other candidates failed to secure any representation. The votes were cast in Brandon as follows:

Albert E. Smith (Labour)	2,007
S. S. Clements (Liberal)	1,403
Brig-General Kirkcaldy (Conservative)	1,245

This result in a single-member constituency is typical of several. In the electoral division of Emerson 1,681 votes failed to secure representation, while 989 votes elected the representative. The votes were cast in Emerson with the following result:

Dmytro Yakimischak (Farmer)	989
Roy Whitman (Conservative)	925
John D. Baskerville (Liberal)	756

In Manitou constituency 1,827 votes were ineffectual, while 1,185 secured the seat as follows:

John S. Ridley (Conservative)	1,185
G. T. Armstrong (Liberal)	901
George Compton (Farmer)	926

In Rockwood the elected candidate obtained 978 votes; 977 votes were cast for another candidate, and 638 votes for a third candidate.

Results such as the above in single-member constituencies tend to introduce an element of instability into the Legislature. Members are sent to represent constituencies by a minority of votes, while majorities in the constituencies are unrepresented.

Such elements of chance are entirely eliminated by the more effective voting method of Proportional Representation. By grouping the constituencies to elect three or more members on one ballot with the single transferable vote, all parties are assured of representation in true proportion to votes cast, as demonstrated in Winnipeg.

There are instances in Canadian elections where the total votes for one of the parties have failed to elect one representative throughout an entire province. The single-member constituencies make it possible for one party only to secure representation in each electoral division.

Thousands of voters are deprived of representation at every election. British Columbia Provincial elections in 1912 resulted as follows:

Party.	Votes polled.	Seats.
Conservative (McBride Government)	51,181	31
Liberal	21,261	0
Socialist	12,087	2

The Conservative Party also secured nine other seats uncontested.

In the Federal elections, 1911, British Columbia constituencies failed to elect one Liberal representative in seven seats, although more than two-sevenths of the total votes were cast for Liberal candidates. British Columbia's representation in the House of Commons resulted as follows:

Party	Votes polled.	Seats.
Conservative	25,622	7
Liberal	16,350	0

The general election in 1904 produced an equally notable result. The minority in Nova Scotia failed to secure representation in the House of Commons, while the majority took 18 seats, though the minorities scattered in single-member constituencies polled more than forty per cent. of the total votes, thus:

Party.	Votes polled.	Seats.
Liberal	56,526	18
Conservative	46,131	0

The element of chance in single-member constituencies is thus liable to deprive minorities of any representation, but there are instances in Canada where it has tended to set up minority rule. The Federal elections in 1896 resulted in a minority of votes obtaining the majority of seats:

Party.	Votes polled.	Seats.
Conservative	416,640	88
Liberal	405,506	118
Independent Parties	76,900	7

Such results seem liable to occur again in Provincial and Federal elections as long as members are elected in single-member constituencies. Obviously the failure of the electorate to secure accurate representation in accordance with the political opinion of the country may tend to shake the confidence of some groups of opinion in political action. The following table gives results of the general elections in the United Kingdom, December, 1918. A column is attached giving the estimate of seats in proportion to votes:

Contested Seats (excluding Universities).

Parties.	Votes polled.	Seats obtained.	Seats in propor- tion to votes.
Coalition and Allied:			
Coalition Unionist	3,488,543	285	184
Coalition Liberal	1,419,992	103	73
Coalition Labour	48,957	3	3
National Democratic Party ..	230,912	12	12
Independent Unionist	375,914	25	20
Total Coalition	5,564,318	428	292

Contested Seats (excluding Universities).

Parties.	Votes polled.	Seats obtained.	Seats in propor- tion to votes.
Non-Coalition:			
Liberal	1,282,122	25	67
Labour	2,292,102	47	120
Socialist and Farmers	39,657	1	2
Co-operatives	51,133	1	3
National Party & Nationalists	92,547	2	5
Independents	375,351	5	20
Total Non-Coalition	4,132,912	81	217
Majority for Coalition...	1,431,406	347	75

This distorted representation, due to the method of election in single-member constituencies has been much commented upon by British statesmen. It is said to be responsible for some of the lack of confidence in parliamentary methods, since manifested in the ranks of organized labour. Lord Selbourne said of it, in a letter to *The Times*:

At the general election the Labour party polled in contested seats in Great Britain 2,292,102 votes. This poll entitles them to 120 seats in Great Britain in respect of the contested constituencies alone; but the total number of seats they obtained in contested and uncontested constituencies was 59. The result is that the Labour party know they are not fairly represented in the House of Commons, and many of their leaders, whose presence they consider essential to the proper consideration of their business, have failed to obtain seats in the House of Commons. The consequence is that they look less and less to the House of Commons as the place where the questions which interest them can be properly considered and dealt with, and that there is an ever-increasing tendency to deal with these questions outside Parliament. This fact is fraught with danger At the next general election nothing is more probable than that the Unionist party will poll a sufficient number of votes to entitle them to a representation of 200 or more, but that the number of Unionist members returned will be 100; per contra, the Labour party may receive gross over-representation; but that will be no remedy for past injustice—it will only be aggravation of the evil.

This lack of confidence in constituted government is evident in Canada also. The Royal Commission on Industrial Relations, in their Report to the Dominion Government, stated as follows:

The complaint was made at several places that legislation enacted at the request and for the benefit of labour was not adequately enforced. . . . The belief appears

to be entertained that the governments, both local and federal, are largely controlled by the financial interests, and that their influence was manifest not only in legislation, but in the executive action of the several governments. . . . These considerations, it was alleged, had shaken the faith of the working classes in governments as at present constituted.

The exaggerated swing of the pendulum mentioned by Lord Selbourne may be produced in single-member constituencies by a comparatively small change over of votes. The following are examples of this exaggerated change in the representation of the House of Commons in Canada, due to the swinging over of minorities in single-member constituencies:

Federal Elections, 1908.

Party.	Votes polled.	Seats actually obtained.	Seats in proportion to vote.
Liberal	594,270	135	114
Conservative	552,134	86	107
Majority		49	7

Federal Elections, 1911.

Party.	Votes polled.	Seats actually obtained.	Seats in proportion to vote.
Conservative	669,594	134	115
Liberal	625,103	87	106
Majority		47	9

The Liberal Party polled 42,136 more votes than its opponents, and won 135 seats in the House, a majority of 49 seats over its opponents. But, as a matter of fact, the Liberal Party won 49 of its seats by majorities amounting in the aggregate to only 6,543 votes. So that if slightly more than half that number of voters in those constituencies had voted differently the Liberal majority in seats would have been wiped out.

In the 1911 election the Conservative party won over the support of a few thousand voters, and, as a result, secured a majority of 47 seats in the House of Commons. But the Conservative party won 47 of its seats by combined majorities, amounting to only 5,094 votes. So that if slightly more than half that number of voters in those constituencies had voted differently the Conservative majority in seats would have been wiped out.

These figures mean practically this: that in 1908 some 6,543 voters swung the balance in favour of the Liberal party being returned to power; while in 1911 some 5,094 voters effected the overthrow of the Liberal Government and the creation of a Conservative regime.

In countries where Proportional Representation is the method of election there is no such exaggerated change. Small floating minorities cannot dominate any constituency under Proportional Representation. Experience in Belgium, Sweden, Tasmania, Switzerland, New South Wales and elsewhere, according to election results, would seem to point to greater stability in the Legislature and more continuity of policy when members are elected by Proportional Representation.

The following are election results for the Tasmanian House of Assembly:

	1909.		1912.		1913.	
Party.	Seats in proportion to votes.	Seats actually obtained.	Seats in proportion to votes.	Seats actually obtained.	Seats in proportion to votes.	Seats actually obtained.
Labour	11.69	12	13.66	14	13.99	14
Anti-Labour . . .	18.31	18	16.34	16	16.01	16

Similar examples of accurate representation in accordance with the voting strength of the parties are available from other countries.

The case for Proportional Representation is summed up by its advocates thus:

1. It will reproduce the opinions of the electors in Parliament and other public bodies in their true proportions.
2. It will ensure that the majority of electors shall rule and all considerable minorities shall be heard.
3. It will give electors a wider freedom in the choice of representatives.
4. It will give representatives greater independence from the financial and other pressure of small sections of constituents.
5. It will ensure to parties representation by their ablest and most trusted members.

THE ARGUMENT AGAINST PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE BY THE BRITISH REPRESENTATION LEAGUE.

ENCOURAGES INVESTIGATION.

We encourage any legitimate effort to ensure, if possible, a more correct expression of public opinion by the ballot. We vigorously protest against the adoption of Proportional Representation, and its immediate sequence "group government," without a full, wide and thorough investigation into the defects of this system as well as its merits.

LONG PROPAGANDA.

The Proportional Representation League has long advocated in favour of its system and equally long attacked the British system. Through the ready quotation of figures pertaining to foreign Governments using some one of the known 300 systems of Proportional Representation, and the lack of their investigation by some of our legislators, and the further fact that the general public knows little about Proportional Representation or its supposed success in foreign countries, and that there has been no organization to focus opposition against it, the Proportional Representation League has been able to have its system adopted in a small way in some parts of Canada.

PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION CLAIMS.

1. The Proportional Representation League claims that the British system of voting and electing members of Parliament does not give minorities representation. Example: It is claimed that while many Liberals voted in Toronto in the 1917 general election that no Liberals were elected, and, further, that other minorities, such as temperance, single-tax, Socialist, Labour, liquor, race or creed "groups" are also without representation. Under Proportional Representation it is claimed that any or all minorities may have special representation.

2. The Proportional Representation League further claims that under the British system in which the single-member constituency is almost (there are a few exceptions) universal, that if three or more candidates are in the "field" that

frequently the victor is returned by a "relative," not an absolute majority. Example: The recent East Elgin by-election.

3. The Proportional Representation League also claims that the "parties" returned under the Proportional Representation system of voting will represent their relative strength in the country, and that large majorities will be a thing of the past.

HOW PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION OPERATES.

A five (or more) member constituency is the size recommended.

The intention is that a voter shall vote for five candidates of the list nominated. Experience is that in a five-member constituency from 20 to 30 candidates will "stand" for election. The voter must place a numeral after the names of his five favourites in the order of his preference—1-2-3-4-5. The returning officer first ascertains the "quota" which is the minimum number of votes required to elect a candidate. The "quota" is found by sorting the ballots and counting the number of "first" preferences and by dividing this number by the number of the candidates, plus one. In a five-member constituency the divisor is six. Example: Suppose there are 12,000 "first" preferences; six, divided into 12,000, gives 2,000. He then adds one to this number, making 2,001, which number becomes the "quota." He declares elected all candidates having 2,001 votes or more. Suppose candidate No. 1 received 4,002 "first" preferences. He has, therefore, the surplus of 2,001 votes. The returning officer counts these ballots again so as to divide the surplus votes according to the preference of the voters. Suppose he finds that on these 4,002 ballots candidate No. 2 has 500 second preferences, No. 3 has 1,500 second preferences, No. 4 1,250 second preferences, No. 5 751 second preferences. He then determines the percentage of the vote that No. 1 can give away; in this case 50%. He then divides the "second" preferences according to this percentage, and gives No. 2 fifty per cent. of his 500, or 250. No 3 thus gets 750, No. 4 gets 625, and No. 5 gets 376. This process continues until five candidates receive the "quota."

PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION INVENTORS AND WHERE IT IS IN FORCE.

The best known systems of Proportional Representation are those of Hare, d'Hondt, Hare-Clark, Gregory, Droop and Bailey, and either one of these systems or a modification is in operation, wholly or partially, in Sweden, Finland, France, Belgium, Portugal, Switzerland, Queensland, West Australia, Denmark, Servia, Wurtemberg and Tasmania. And in Canada, in Winnipeg for provincial parliamentary elections.

REASONS WHY PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION IS NOT SUITABLE FOR CANADA OR ONTARIO.

Our British system Election Acts set out:

1. A citizen shall have one vote.
 2. A vote shall be recorded by marking "X" after one candidate's name.
 3. A constituency shall elect one member.
 4. The candidate receiving the highest number of votes shall be elected.
 5. The "party" electing the greatest number of members shall govern.
- No other system ever devised is as intelligible or speedy.

Under Proportional Representation the constituencies are large; return five or more members; the voter must at least use three of his five preferences; the candidates to be elected to be determined as outlined in a previous paragraph; the largest number of "groups" than can form a working majority will govern. No other system is as unintelligible, complicated, or takes such a wearisome time to determine the victors. Under Proportional Representation in Winnipeg the ballots were counted 30 times or more, and almost a week elapsed before the result was definitely known. In one election in Tasmania it was found necessary to count the ballots more than 100 times. In the late Winnipeg Municipal Election, under Proportional Representation, a large percentage of the ballots were spoiled, and the people were distracted waiting for the results to be announced.

MINORITY REPRESENTATION.

Notwithstanding the fact that in Canada the Parliament is usually divided into two great parties over some national question under the British system, members feel that they are elected to represent the country's interests as a whole. Our Parliaments have always heeded public opinion. Example: Sir Wm. Hearst and the O. T. A., or Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the S. A. contingents. In the past, "races," "creeds," or "classes" have always found ready defenders in our Parliaments without specially electing men to do so. Under Proportional Representation large constituencies and transferable votes conduce to the electing of "groups" of one brand or another. Example: In the late Belfast Municipal Election, under Proportional Representation, the following "groups" were elected to council—Unionists, Sinn Fein, National, Socialist, Liberal and Labour. A formerly industrious harmonious council has been filled with strife, and it is doubtful if the minorities will receive equal treatment to that which they formerly received when the said council was overwhelmingly Unionist.

AS TO "RELATIVE" AND "ABSOLUTE" MAJORITIES.

The British system of small constituencies and the British system of "two-party" government eliminates race, creed or class candidates. Our constituency fights are generally between well-known men. The better known, the more interest is taken; indeed, it takes a good fight to get the voters out, and, therefore, under our system only in rare instances does the victor not receive an absolute majority. Even in three-cornered fights the victor has an absolute majority as frequently as a "relative" majority.

Large government majorities create stability and harmony, and have not been proven tyrannical or unfruitful, but, on the contrary, invariably enact much useful legislation.

Proportional Representation, on the other hand, destroys the "two-party" system and results in the "many-party" or "group" system of government. There are six main "groups" in the Belgian, and a throng of "groups" in the French Parliaments, and similarly in other foreign countries. Parliaments in the foreign countries are not dissolved when the "bloc" or combination of "groups" forming the government is defeated. The "groups" merely realign under another leader. At best this is only government by "compromise." Under the British system, when a government is defeated in the House on any policy an appeal to the people is made, and the people decide the issue.

THE BRITISH SYSTEM ASSIMILATES IMMIGRANTS.

The principal countries in which Proportional Representation is at present in force are old, compact and populous countries, having no immigration into them. They speak one, or at most two languages. Ours is a new country, with two main languages, and all other languages according to the origin of our large influx of immigrants. Our present system of single-member constituency and two-party government induces them to take sides and interest themselves in our national questions, and Canadianizes them. Proportional Representation would divide them along the lines of their races and creeds and de-Canadianize them.

EXCESSIVE COST OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS.

If it is costly for a candidate to run an election under present conditions, say in Brockville, it will cost six times as much for the same candidate to run an election in the combined counties forming the new eastern riding. Substantial, sound business men will refuse to offer themselves. An indifferent electorate will refuse to vote, and our Legislature will be reduced to impotence.

BY-ELECTIONS.

By-elections under the British system serve good purposes. They illustrate the trend of public opinion and fill parliamentary vacancies. The cost of running a by-election is moderate, but under Proportional Representation a by-election will be like a "young" general election. To fill a vacancy in a six-"seat" constituency will necessitate the whole constituency voting again, and the cost will be excessive. One of these two things will happen: successful men will refuse to be "bled," and will not be candidates, or only rich men can be candidates.

TICKET PLUMPING.

The Winnipeg Parliamentary Election, which was carried on under Proportional Representation regulations, appears to the public to have been a pronounced failure, at least as far as the claims for Proportional Representation are concerned. Thirteen per cent. of the electors voted for the Independents, but none were elected; 13.7 per cent. voted Conservative, and two were elected; 30.4 per cent. voted Liberal and four were elected; 42.5 per cent. voted Labour-Socialist, and four were elected. Three of the latter "group" had previously been tried for sedition and were, or are now, serving terms in the penitentiary. They were elected as a result of "ticket" plumping. The "groups" were not returned in accordance with their apparent strength. The electoral machinery was costly, and the citizens were exasperated through a week of counting ballots to learn the victors. It is still a puzzle to figure how the Labour-Socialists only returned four members, considering that they secured such a large percentage of the first preferences as well as their share of transfers.

OPINIONS AGAINST PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.

In the British House of Commons in 1908 a bill promoted by the Proportional Representation Society was rejected.

2. Again, in 1910, a Royal Commission of the British Parliament, after a most thorough investigation, rejected Proportional Representation.

A few excerpts from the said 1910 report:

- A. "The question has been raised whether it would be necessary to take any precaution against frivolous candidatures."
- B. "Failures to exercise a second preference will be numerous; failures to exercise a third will be far more so."
- C. "A glance at the list of private members' bills and motions or at the deputations received by the Ministers, will show that the number of 'parties' represented directly or indirectly in the House of Commons is incalculable. . . . Even generally hostile witnesses were apparently unable to name any considerable 'minority' in the sense, which at present is absolutely deprived of representation."
- D. "The dangers of drawing inferences from the experience of any one country is illustrated by the fact that every one of the six states which have adopted Proportional Representation has selected a substantially different form of it."
- E. "If it is decided that Proportional Representation in some form ought to be introduced, each of the systems would have a good claim to serious consideration, for each has conspicuous merits not shared by the others."
- F. The advocates of the transferable vote remind us that the object of a representative body is to represent; but the objects of a representative government is not only to represent, but to govern. "*We are unable to recommend its adoption in existing circumstances for elections to the House of Commons.*"

3. Again, in 1917, after a conference on electoral reform, in a letter to the Prime Minister from the Speaker of the British House of Commons, we read:

"Every candidate at the election of a Member of Parliament for any county or borough shall be required to deposit with the returning officer at the time of his nomination £150 (\$750)." (Note—That will stop a lot of "frivolous" candidates.) "If a candidate is not elected, and the number of votes polled by him does not exceed . . . one-eighth of the total number of voters polling . . . the deposit . . . shall be forfeited to the treasury."

4. While the said letter of the Speaker does recommend that if any five-member constituencies are formed the election of same shall be according to some brand of Proportional Representation, it does not recommend a system. The fact is, there are no five-member constituencies in England, and if there were the \$750 deposit would eliminate all fad and crank candidates. Further, as far as can be learned, the Speaker's recommendations were not adopted.

5. Hon. Mr. Meighen, M.P., in a Canadian Press despatch from Winnipeg, November 16th, is reported to have said: "'Group' Government would result in log-rolling, dickering and bargaining; the worst possible form of administration."

6. Hon. Senator Davenport, in the *Outlook*, writes (August issue): "For the moment we are through with experiments—political, social, economic. The probable futility of any considerable third-party movement is obvious, entirely aside from the academic argument in favour of great unity and national single-mindedness, which results from two parties facing each other, as over against a system of log-rolling, coalition groups."

7. The *Outlook*: "We regard the idea of Proportional Representation and 'group' government as interesting in themselves, but not of much practical consequence."

8. Department of Government, Harvard University: "We believe that the desirability of Proportional Representation depends in part, not upon general principles, but upon local conditions."

9. The *Providence Journal*, in a long article, against the European system, says: "In Europe these 'groups' are sometimes able to control the Government by combinations—the 'bloc.' Ministries are thrown down and new ones set up overnight by reckless manœuvring of allied minorities, to the destruction of stability of government and the embarrassment of sound national purposes."

10. The *Halifax Chronicle*, July 7th, 1920, describing "group" government, states: "It is earnestly hoped that the people will profoundly and patriotically consider these facts (foregoing facts against the European system) in view of the efforts now being made to stampede the public in the direction that has got Manitoba in such a deplorable muddle. . . . The 'group' system on the European continent has been anything but satisfactory. They (the groups) are generally classified as they sit—'right,' 'left,' 'centre,' tapering off, respectively, from extreme conservatism to extreme radicalism. . . . The door would be thrown open to all sorts of 'dickering,' compromise and corruption. A government so formed could, in the nature of things, be neither stable nor trustworthy, and it would be practically without responsibility."

11. Hon W. E. Gladstone, M.P., late Premier of Great Britain, speaking on the Redistribution Bill of 1884, is reported to have replied to those advocating Minority Representation and Proportional Representation, as follows: "Well, Sir, we have considered the question much . . . objection in the first place that it was artificial; that it was not known to our usages and our history; where that particular scheme only commanded the assent of a handful; where everybody else was inclined to fall foul of it and attack it. Sir, *we do not see our way to the introduction of what I do not like to call a new-fangled, but a novel and artificial system of that kind.*"

OUTLINE OF PARLIAMENTARY ACTION FOR PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM.

GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND ACT (1914).

On January 17th, 1913, the House of Commons, by a vote of 311 to 81, provided, by the application of the principle of Proportional Representation, for the election of the proposed Irish Parliament. The Government of Ireland Act (1914) provided for the election of the Irish Senate by the single transferable vote system of Proportional Representation, each province being polled as a separate constituency; and in the case of the election of members of the House of Commons, all constituencies returning three or more members to be elected by the same system. This latter provision was later amended by the House of Lords to provide that all constituencies, with the exception of Dublin University, should return not less than three members.

Shortly after passage of the Act the war intervened and the Act was not put into effect.

REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE BILL.

In the fall of 1916 the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, from his place in Parliament, authorized the appointment of a Speakers' Conference to consider the question of electoral reform in Great Britain. In this connection he said:

"With regard to the parliament which is going to undertake the work of reconstruction after the war, it is eminently desirable that you should provide an electoral basis which will make that parliament reflective and representative of the general opinion of the country and give to its decision a moral authority which you cannot obtain from what I may call a scratch, improvised, and makeshift electorate. Let us see . . . if we cannot work out by general agreement some scheme under which, both as regards the electorate and the distribution of electoral power, a parliament can be created at the end of the war capable and adequate for discharging these tasks and commanding the confidence of the country."

The conference sat for several months, and among its unanimous recommendations was one that Proportional Representation should be applied to the election of all members of the House of Commons (except for those representing thirty populated areas), including the representatives of universities.

For thinly-populated areas the alternative vote was recommended (i.e., each voter to have the opportunity of making a second and further preference) in order to ensure that where more than two candidates were running in single-member constituency the elected candidate would represent a majority of the electors, and not, as might otherwise happen, a minority only. Attached hereto is the report of the conference on electoral reform, giving the personnel of the conference, which includes representatives of all parties in the United Kingdom.

The first vote on the question of Proportional Representation (on the instructions to boundary commissioners) was taken in the House on June 12th, 1917, and it was defeated by 148 votes to 141. The bill without the Proportional Representation clauses then passed through the House of Lords, and on January 22nd an amendment restoring Proportional Representation was carried by 131 votes to 42. During the passage of the bill through the House of Commons there had been an increasing demand from agricultural organizations that Proportional Representation should be applied to the counties, and a deputation from these organizations pressed their views upon the House of Lords' Committee, with the result that this Committee prepared a schedule applying Proportional Representation to all parts of the country. On January 29th, 1918, this schedule was carried in the Lords without a division, but was rejected by the Commons the next day by 223 to 113. A new amendment was proposed by Lord Selborne in the House of Lords on February 4th to apply Proportional Representation to boroughs returning three or more members. This was carried by 86 votes to 35. A test division to exclude Birmingham from Lord Selborne's amendment, was taken, and the exclusion was carried (February 5th) by 206 votes to 156. On February 6th a further attempt to embody Proportional Representation in the bill was made in the House of Lords. Lord Lansdowne moved an amendment to appoint a commission to frame a scheme of 100 constituencies chosen from boroughs and counties, to which Proportional Representation should be applied. *This amendment was accepted by the Government and carried in both Houses.* A commission was appointed, local enquiries were held, but the scheme, although its adoption was moved by the *Minister of Education*, Mr. H. A. L. Fisher, was not supported by the Government as such (it having been previously understood that the question should be considered a non-party matter), and was defeated by 166 votes to 110. The speakers in its support included among them two ex-Prime Ministers, Mr. Asquith and Mr. Balfour; Lord

Robert Cecil, Mr. H. A. L. Fisher, Sir Alfred Mond, and Sir F. E. Smith, members of the Government; Lieut.-Col. L. S. Amery, Lord Hugh Cecil, Mr. H. J. Mackinder, Mr. J. A. Marriott, Major J. R. P. Newman, Col. R. A. Sanders, Mr. Leslie Scott, Sir Mark Sykes, and Lord Wolmer (Unionists); Sir Ryland Adkins, Mr. H. G. Chancellor, Mr. C. T. Needham, Mr. Chas. H. Roberts, Mr. J. M. Robertson, Sir John Simon, and Mr. Anuerin Williams (Liberals); Mr. W. C. Anderson and Mr. Philip Snowden (Labour); Mr. J. Devlin, Capt. Gwynn, Mr. Hugh Law, Mr. T. Scanal (Nationalists), and Mr. T. M. Healy (Independent Nationalist).

The non-acceptance of Proportional Representation did not apply, however, to university constituencies, and in December, 1918, the members for the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge, Trinity College, Dublin, the Scottish Universities, and a group of newer English Universities were elected by the single transferable vote. The Scottish group elected three members, and the other constituencies two each.

SLIGO CORPORATION ACT.

In the session of 1918 the British Parliament passed the Sligo Corporation Act, making it compulsory that members of the Sligo Corporation should be elected under the single transferable vote system. In January, 1919, the municipal elections were held, with results gratifying to all parties concerned. Almost immediately there arose a strong demand for the extension of the system to all local government elections in Ireland. "If the new Government," said the *Irish Times*, "really intends to live up to its programme, it will insist that all these elections shall be decided by Proportional Representation. No more beneficial measure of reconstruction could be given to Ireland."

LOCAL GOVERNMENT (IRELAND) ACT, 1919.

As a result of the insistent demand the British Government passed, on June 3rd, 1919, the Local Government (Ireland) Act. The vote in the House of Commons on the third reading was 244 to 42. This Act applies the single transferable-vote system of Proportional Representation to the election of all local representative bodies in Ireland, amounting to about four hundred in number. The system was accordingly used in about 120 towns and urban districts in Ireland in January, 1920, and for the election of some 200 county councils, rural district councils, etc., in June, 1920. The evidence shows that the results gave complete satisfaction to practically all parties. Earl Grey has written of the January elections as follows:

"The number of electors participating in the election was nearly 68 per cent. of those on the register, a record for Ireland, and a figure rarely, if ever, reached in municipal elections in Great Britain. A further notable feature was the good spirits exhibited by the parties toward each other. 'This Proportional Representation election,' wrote one of the Dublin papers, 'was one of the most business-like proceedings that the general public ever assisted at.' This opinion was heard on all sides, and from those who had been active in Irish politics for a generation."

It is now proposed to convene in Ireland a constituent assembly elected by Proportional Representation, in the hope that such an assembly may find a solution to the Irish problem.

THE SCOTTISH EDUCATION ACT, 1918.

The new Scottish Education Act has set authorities for every county and for larger cities, thus largely increasing the size of the districts by which the authorities

are elected, and it is provided that the system of election shall be the single transferable vote. The county education authorities established by the Act were elected under the Proportional system in April, 1919. The single transferable vote was used for the first time from one end of Scotland to the other, and the results, according to press reports, appear to have given complete satisfaction to everyone.

THE LOCAL ELECTIONS (PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION) BILL, 1920.

The Local Elections (Proportional Representation) Bill, 1920, enables local authorities in England, Scotland and Wales to adopt, by a three-fifths majority of Proportional Representation system of the election of aldermen, bailies, and councillors. The bill has passed the House of Lords after modifications suggested by the Government, and has been "starred" as a Government measure on reaching the House of Commons. It is, therefore, likely to become law at the next session.

TASMANIA.

In view of the fact that the single transferable vote system of Proportional Representation has been in force in Tasmania for many years, the Committee made a careful, detailed study of this system.

Tasmania is an island off the south coast of Australia. From north to south it is two hundred miles long, and from east to west two hundred and forty-five miles. The area of the main island is 24,331 square miles, but a number of adjoining islands included within the legislative jurisdiction brings the total area to 26,215 square miles. (The area of New Brunswick is 27,985 square miles.) Executive authority is vested in the Governor-General, who is appointed by the Crown, and he is assisted by a Cabinet of five Ministers responsible to the legislative body. This body is the Parliament, consisting of the Legislative Council (18 members, elected for six years) and the House of Assembly (30 members, elected for three years). There is universal adult suffrage.

Proportional Representation was introduced into Tasmania by the Electoral Act of 1896, in which a form of the single transferable vote was used for two of the electorates of the House of Assembly. The causes which led to the adoption of this system were thus stated by the late Mr. Justice Andrew Inglis Clark in a statement contributed by him to the report by a commission composed of Mr. J. G. Davies and R. M. Johnston on the elections for the Senate and the House of Representatives in Tasmania for 1901, this statement being as follows:

"The Clark-Hare system of voting was introduced into the Electoral Law of Tasmania in consequence of the frequent failure of the ordinary system of voting to secure a proportionate representation of the preponderating opinion of the electors on political questions either in single or plural electorates."

Under the first Electoral Act, which provided for the election of the members of a bicameral Legislature, the City of Hobart, by the "Block vote" elected five representatives to the House of Assembly as one electorate, and the City of Launceston elected three representatives to the same Branch of the Legislature in the same manner.

Under that system it was discovered that a majority of the electors, in each of the two electorates, could elect all the representatives, and leave a very large minority totally unrepresented in the Legislature. To remedy this evil those two electorates were divided into eight single electorates. But under this system it was

discovered that when three or more candidates presented themselves for election, it very frequently happened that the successful candidate was elected by a minority of the total number of votes recorded. The same thing sometimes occurred in the rural electorates, which were all single electorates, but the number of candidates in the rural electorates did not often exceed two. It was also discovered that the division of the Cities of Hobart and Launceston into eight single electorates reduced the area of each electorate, and the number of votes to such small dimensions that the agents and canvassers of the several candidates could easily interview every resident elector and ascertain very closely the number of purchasable or otherwise controllable votes.

After the representation of the cities of Hobart and Launceston was increased into six and four members, those electorates were divided into five electorates, each of which returned two members. At the same time two rural electorates, each returning two members, were created. Under this plan it was discovered that the majority of electors in the total number of the electorates which returned two members, frequently secured much larger representation in Parliament than that to which it was proportionately entitled, and thereby gave a preponderance of voting power in the Legislature to a political party which had secured only a minority of the total number of votes recorded at a general election. In several instances neither of the successful candidates in a double electorate was elected by a majority vote. The last-mentioned result was frequently produced by a large number of the electors voting for only one candidate out of the five or six who were in the field.

With a view to avoiding these serious defects the cities of Hobart and Launceston were converted into two electorates under the Clark-Hare system, which enables every section of political opinion which can command the requisite quota of votes to secure a number of representatives proportionate to its numerical strength. It also utilizes every vote recorded if the elector chooses to exercise the whole of its power to indicate his preferences. If any vote is not used to help in the election of a representative it is because the voter has chosen to indicate his preference for a less number of candidates than the number of representatives to be elected in the electorate in which he votes.

The Electoral Bill of 1896 was brought in by Mr. Clark, then Attorney-General. The Bill applied the Single Transferable vote method to two electorates—Hobart (6 members) and Launceston (4 members), leaving the rest of the country in single member electorates. The Electoral Act of 1896 contained a provision that it should remain in force until 31st December, 1897, but it was afterwards extended and it remained the electoral law of Tasmania until repealed by the Electoral Act of 1901. The system came under discussion again in 1899, when the Electoral Bill of that year was before the House of Assembly. Mr. Clark meanwhile had become a Justice of the Supreme Court of Tasmania and the Bill was brought in by Mr. D. C. Urquhart. It was proposed to apply the system to the whole of Tasmania, which was to be divided into seven districts returning from four to seven members each. The debate dealt mainly with the political effects and difficulties of the system. The supporters of the system urged it provided representation for minorities. The opponents of the system urged that it was not understood; that electors did not want it; and in particular that the country districts were against it, and that large districts were difficult to canvass. The Bill was withdrawn by the Government and the old Electoral Act of 1896 (in which, as previously mentioned, the system was used in Hobart and Launceston) was continued until 1901.

In 1901 Sir Elliott Lewis introduced a Bill in which the system was to be used for the whole of Tasmania. This was opposed on much the same grounds as in 1899 and the Government gave away and reverted to the Single Member System again.

The Electoral Law was again under consideration in 1906, when Mr. J. W. Evans brought in an Electoral Bill in which Tasmania was divided into five districts, each returning six members. This Bill was withdrawn and another similar Bill was introduced, which became law the following year and has remained the law to the present. Elections under it have been held in 1901, 1912, 1913, 1916 and 1919. The committee was furnished with the reports made on the last three elections to the Parliament of Tasmania by the Commission, and they are attached to this report as Schedules "A," "B" and "C." The five constituencies in Tasmania vary in size. The committee has been furnished with a map of Tasmania showing the five constituencies, which map is attached hereto as Exhibit "D." The number of electors in each district is as follows:—

Bass	22,377
Darwin	18,588
Denison	25,619
Franklin	22,525
Wilmot	18,432

In a letter to the chairman of the committee the Deputy Chief Electoral Officer for Tasmania writes as follows, with reference to the system in force:—

"Regarding the method generally, it may be said that it satisfactorily answers all requirements. Theoretically this system and that of Switzerland is perfect, and minor anomalies which occur in actual practice can hardly be said to outweigh even to a small extent, many of its advantages."

The results of the five elections held under this system show that in each election the number of seats actually obtained by the respective parties was almost mathematically exactly in proportion to the number of votes cast for the candidates of each party. It will be noticed from the figures of the number of voters in each of the districts that there is not in Tasmania a uniform quota, that is to say, that the number of votes requisite to elect a candidate are not the same in each district. Tasmania has adopted what is known as the district quota. There has been much discussion in Tasmania as to the advisability of adopting a uniform quota, but as yet this letter has not been adopted.

The committee has attached hereto the Tasmania Electoral Act of 1907 as Schedule "E," the Hare-Clark system of Election, Explanations and Illustrations as Schedule "F," copy of the regulations relating to Legislative Council and House of Assembly elections as Schedule "G," and instructions to returning officers for House of Assembly elections as Schedule "H."

OFFICIAL ACTION IN CANADA.

In Canada there has been some years a movement for the introduction of Proportional Representation to federal, provincial and municipal elections. In 1916 the Proportional Representation Society of Canada was formed to meet the growing demand for information on the subject. The membership of this society includes the names of many prominent parliamentarians of the various political parties, together with many representative public men. This society reports a

greatly increased demand from all over Canada during the past year for lectures, pamphlets, and blank forms for the conduct of private elections.

The first definite action for Proportional Representation was taken in Ottawa in 1916, when the electors carried on a plebiscite in favour of Proportional Representation for municipal elections by 5,083 votes against 3,853. No immediate action resulted, but in July last the Ottawa City Council unanimously approved a resolution that the legislation necessary for its immediate application be sought.

In 1916 the Alberta Legislature made Proportional Representation optional for Alberta cities, and Calgary adopted the system in that year, and has since held their municipal elections under it.

In 1918 British Columbia passed similar legislation, and in several British Columbia cities, including Vancouver and Victoria, Proportional Representation has been adopted, and in some cases elections under it have already been held.

During the past year permissive legislation was passed in Saskatchewan and by-laws on the matter are to be submitted to the electors in Regina, Moose Jaw, Saskatoon, and North Battleford at the next municipal elections. At the same time the Saskatchewan Government appointed a commissioner to study Proportional Representation with a view to its adoption to the election of the Legislature. The report will be presented at the next session.

In Manitoba very considerable progress has been made during the present year. During the recent provincial elections the City of Winnipeg was grouped together as a ten-member constituency and the single transferable vote was used. The result was that four supporters of the Government, four Labour members and two Conservatives, were elected. Evidence with respect to the election, in the form of letters to the Proportional Representation Society of Canada, was submitted to your Committee. The Honourable Thomas N. Johnson, Attorney-General of Manitoba, wrote in part as follows:—

I feel that I can truthfully say that I have not now and never have had a single regret for the efforts made by me personally in connection with the introduction of this reform into our election laws. The Proportional Representation system gives a more truly representative legislation than the system of single-member constituencies. Everything claimed for it in the literature which we used, and with which you are familiar, was clearly accomplished. The electors of Winnipeg had no more difficulties than usual, and the counting, notwithstanding the great number of candidates (41 in all), came off without a hitch of any kind.

Mr. F. J. Dixon, M.L.A., the leader of the Labour Party in Manitoba, wrote:

The use of Proportional Representation at Winnipeg in the recent provincial election demonstrated the merit of the system in securing representation for the different parties in proportion to their numerical strength in the constituency.

While it is probable that under the old system, with three-cornered contests, Labour would have secured more seats, the Labour party does not desire to increase its representation in legislative bodies by taking advantage of an antiquated system of election. It prefers to win by putting before the electors a programme to meet the needs of the time and candidates worthy of support.

The Labour party, when numerically weak, advocated Proportional Representation. Now that it is gaining in strength it has no desire to recede from its former position.

Winnipeg's experience certainly demonstrated the superiority of Proportional Representation with grouped constituencies over the single-member constituency plan.

Mr. W. J. Tupper, M.L.A., Conservative, wrote:—

In my opinion the test that Proportional Representation underwent in this city during the late provincial election was successful.

As I understand the system, it is intended to give representation to all parties in proportion to their numerical strength. The result of the late election showed that the minority parties in the city of Winnipeg received representation in accordance with

their voting strength. It, however, did not favour independent candidates as you will have observed.

I might say that the success of the system seems to me to depend upon the efficiency of those in control of the counting. We were fortunate in this province to have exceptionally able men in charge and the result is no doubt in a great measure due to them.

Mr. John T. Haig, M.L.A., Conservative, wrote in part as follows:—

I feel in talking to my supporters generally that they are entirely satisfied with the working of the system Taken as a whole, I believe the members elected truly represent the proportional vote of the community as it was at that time. As you know we have had a difficult situation in Winnipeg since the strike last year, and anything that will give all the elements in the community a chance to voice their opinions in Parliament appears to me to be a good thing for the whole community. If we had had the old system in Winnipeg I doubt if a single Conservative would have been elected, and I have no doubt the Government would have had a larger representation in the House at the expense of the Conservative and Labour parties because they would have had the machinery of distributing the seats, and as Governments usually do, would have distributed them with an eye to the result being to their advantage. Under this system no such thing can happen.

The *Manitoba Free Press* wrote editorially on the election as follows:—

Winnipeg, it may be ventured, has put Proportional Representation upon the Canadian political map. The test the new system has successfully passed through in the recent Manitoba election is the last thing needed to demonstrate the practicability and merits of Proportional Representation. Its extension to the rural constituencies in Manitoba is assured, and its ultimate adoption for all elections—civic, provincial and federal, may now be looked on as inevitable. In Winnipeg the test was classic, and Proportional Representation came through with flying colours.

Some of the advantages of the new system are very apparent. In the first place Proportional Representation eliminated the excitement and bitterness from the election campaign; the knowledge that each party could only get its fair proportion, and no more, of the available seats made the old-time strategy and electioneering useless; it also saved thousands of dollars which would have been spent in pushing the individual candidates and it enabled the electors to approach the ballots with a calmness of mind which gave them an opportunity to cast their votes with the greatest possible understanding and intelligence; the trifling number of spoiled ballots is an eloquent testimonial to the fact that the electors were cool and clear-headed when they went to the polls.

The leading fact, however, is that the result of the ballot was worked out with mathematical exactitude to the desired end; the elected candidates represent in accurate proportion the voting strength of the parties in the city; no votes were lost and the voter who saw that his first choice had been defeated knew that his vote was not extinguished, but passed on to his alternative preference, and that in the final results he had secured his correct proportion of representation.

* * *

This successful workout of Proportional Representation in Winnipeg will have an influence in favour of the system throughout Canada. Winnipeg was also being closely watched in Great Britain and in other centres where the merits of this system of election are under consideration. A more difficult test apparently has never been applied, and the result has fully vindicated all the claims that Proportional Representation gives a true and just reflection of the total electorate in the personnel of the bodies elected under its rule.

Additional evidence as to the working of Proportional Representation in the Winnipeg elections was forthcoming in the report of Mr. A. S. Winchester, of the Department of the Attorney-General of Ontario, who was sent to Winnipeg to observe the process of counting the ballots, etc. Mr. Winchester's report is attached hereto as Schedule "I."

In March, 1920, the City Council of Winnipeg, in order to prevent an almost complete monopoly of either labour or non-labour representation on the City

Council at the next municipal elections, secured an amendment of the city charter, which enabled the city to use Proportional Representation. As a result the municipal elections in January next will be held under Proportional Representation.

The Montreal City Charter Commission has devoted several sessions to the study of Proportional Representation in connection with the proposed new city charter, and while no report has yet been presented it is extremely likely that it will contain a recommendation that Proportional Representation be adopted for future municipal elections in that city.

We understand that Proportional Representation has been endorsed by a number of Dominion and Provincial organizations, including the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada, the various Provincial Labour organizations, the G.W.V.A., both Dominion and Provincial, the Independent Labour parties of Manitoba, Ontario and British Columbia; the Canadian Council of Agriculture; the various Provincial Grain Growers' Associations; the Social Service Council of Manitoba. A number of these organizations have also, we understand, applied Proportional Representation to the election of their own officers.

A typical example of the resolutions endorsing Proportional Representation is the one adopted at the Dominion Convention of the G.W.V.A., held in Montreal in March, 1920, which was as follows:—

Whereas, it has been shown that the system of Proportional Representation is the only fair way that the true feeling of an election can be established;

And whereas, this has been fully demonstrated in other parts of the world;

Therefore, be it resolved, that we, the Great War Veterans' Association in Dominion Convention assembled, thank the various Local and Provincial Commands for the great interest shown on this important question, and reaffirm the stand of the Vancouver Convention, 1919, i.e., that the G.W.V.A. recommends the principles of election under the system of Proportional Representation in all elections in the Dominion of Canada, and that this recommendation and affirmation be forwarded to the proper authorities through our Dominion Commands.

INTEREST IN ONTARIO.

At the Provincial Liberal convention, held at Toronto in June, 1919, the following resolution was carried:—

That in the opinion of this convention the present system of election of representatives to our elective bodies is unrepresentative and undemocratic:

Its defects are three-fold: (1) often a gross exaggeration of the strength of the victorious parties; (2) sometimes a complete disfranchisement of the minority; (3) at other times a failure of a majority of citizens to obtain their due share of representation.

Therefore, be it resolved, that the Liberal party in the Province of Ontario, in convention assembled, favours the placing of a law upon the statute books providing that the election of members to the Legislature and municipal councils shall be by a form of preferential voting, which will result in Proportional Representation.

The United Farmers of Ontario on August 1, 1919, annunciated their policy, clause No. 10, of which reads:—

"To apply the method of Proportional Representation to our electoral methods."

The platform of the Independent Labour Party of Ontario, which was published in the *Industrial Banner*, January 31, 1919, contained a Proportional Representation plank, as follows:—

"Proportional Representation with grouped constituencies."

At the last convention of the Provincial command of the Great War Veterans Association, the following resolution was carried:—

Whereas, it has been shown that the system of Proportional Representation is the only fair way that the true feeling of an election can be established, and whereas this has been fully demonstrated in other parts of the world,

Be it resolved, that we, the members of the G.W.V.A. in provincial convention assembled, endorse in full the principles of election under the system of Proportional Representation, and further that we recommend Proportional Representation for all elections in Canada, whether Federal, Provincial or Municipal.

The Ottawa Board of Trade on October 19, 1920, unanimously endorsed Proportional Representation and forwarded the following resolution to the chairman of this committee:—

The Council of the Ottawa Board of Trade are in hearty accord with the system of Proportional Representation and wish you all success in your investigation of the subject.

In July last the Ottawa City Council, as previously mentioned, unanimously adopted a motion that permissive legislation be requested from the Provincial Government to apply Proportional Representation to the municipal elections of the city.

The Ontario Provincial Council of Carpenters at their recent annual convention used Proportional Representation for the election of its officers, and, according to the Peterboro' *Examiner*, June 28, 1920, "the delegates approved the Proportional Representation system of voting and recommended that it be adopted for all elections in Canada."

The Ottawa Trades and Labour Council has adopted resolutions approving Proportional Representation for all elections.

The Ottawa Teachers' Institute at its annual meeting on February 20 last according to the *Montreal Gazette*, "unanimously endorsed the principle of Proportional Representation," and certain speakers "were warmly applauded when they addressed the teachers in its support." The teachers also decided to adopt Proportional Representation for future elections for their own officers.

Proportional Representation has been used for some years in Toronto for the election of the Allied Trades and Labour Council, and in Ottawa by the Civil Service organizations, numbering several thousands of members; by the Rotary Club; by St. Paul's Methodist Church for the election of managers; and by Local No. 80, American Federation of Musicians.

At a recent meeting of the Hamilton Chamber of Commerce to consider the subject of Proportional Representation it was "unanimously decided," according to the *Hamilton Spectator*, "to recommend the directors of the Chamber of Commerce to consider the advisability of choosing next year's officers by the system."

The syllabus of the extra-mural courses of Queen's University includes an essay on Proportional Representation.

The following are among those newspapers and periodicals in Ontario which judging by their editorials, are definitely supporting Proportional Representation:

Brantford Expositor
Brockville Recorder and Times
Canadian Labour Press
Chatham Planet
Fort William Journal
Hamilton Herald

Hamilton Spectator
Hamilton Times
Industrial Banner, Toronto
Kingston Standard
Kingston Telegraph
Le Droit

Lindsay Post
 London Advertiser
 London Free Press
 Ottawa Citizen
 Queen's Quarterly
 Social Welfare, Toronto
 Toronto Globe

Toronto Star
 Toronto World
 Veteran
 Woman's Century
 Woodstock Sentinel-Review
 Canadian Railroader

Among those newspapers who, while not definitely committing themselves editorially, have shown keen interest in the subject, are:—

Cobalt Nugget
 Ingersoll Review
 Kingston Whig
 Kitchener Record
 Pembroke Standard
 Presbyterian and Westminster, Toronto,
 July 22 and October 28, 1920.

Port Arthur News-Chronicle.
 Sault Ste. Marie Star
 Stratford Herald
 St. Thomas Times-Journal
 Windsor Star